

**FOREIGN  
RELATIONS  
OF THE  
UNITED  
STATES**

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**1977–1980**

**VOLUME XXI**

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**CYPRUS; TURKEY;  
GREECE**



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**DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE**

**Washington**



# Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980

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Volume XXI

## Cyprus; Turkey; Greece

*Editor*

David Zierler

*General Editor*

Adam M. Howard

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN  
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

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# About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series, which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

## *Sources for the Foreign Relations Series*

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government

agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), in College Park, Maryland.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department's central files for 1977–1981 are available in electronic or microfilm formats at Archives II, and may be accessed using the Access to Archival Databases (AAD) tool. Almost all of the Department's decentralized office files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to or are in the process of being transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Carter Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Carter Library include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

#### *Editorial Methodology*

The documents in this volume are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance

from the General Editor and the Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in this volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words repeated in telegrams to avoid garbling or provide emphasis are silently corrected. Words and phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

#### *Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation*

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, reviews records,

advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

### *Declassification Review*

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2011 and was completed in 2012, resulted in the decision to withhold 3 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 6 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 20 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable—given the limitations of space—record of the Carter administration's policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean region, Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece.

**Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.**  
*General Editor*

**Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D.**  
*The Historian*

Bureau of Public Affairs  
April 2014

# Preface

## *Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series*

This volume is part of a *Foreign Relations* subseries that documents the most important foreign policy issues of the administration of Jimmy Carter. The focus of this volume is on U.S. policy towards Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece. U.S. diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean region under President Carter, however, was heavily influenced by dramatic events during the Nixon and Ford administrations; in particular, the attempt by the Greek military Junta to depose Cypriot leader Makarios III in July 1974 and the subsequent Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The 1974 Cyprus crisis still posed a daunting set of interrelated policy challenges two and a half years later. First, the Turkish invasion created a violent de facto division of Cyprus between its ethnic Greek and ethnic Turkish communities. Second, Greece, citing the inability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to prevent the invasion, removed itself from the Alliance's military structure. And third, the U.S. Congress, in protest of the Ford administration's perceived "tilt" toward Turkey in this dispute, imposed an arms embargo on Turkey, which went into effect in February 1975. Readers who wish to understand the broader context of the Carter administration's Eastern Mediterranean region policy, therefore, should consult *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976. The administration's efforts to address the impact of the Cyprus conflict on the NATO Alliance are documented in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume V, European Security, 1977–1983.

## *Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXI*

This volume documents the major foreign policy decisions taken by the Carter administration toward Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece. Documentation in this volume includes memoranda; records of discussions within the U.S. policymaking community as well as with foreign officials; cables to and from U.S. diplomatic posts; and papers that set forth policy issues and options and that show decisions or actions taken. The documentation emphasizes both the process by which U.S. policy developed and the major consequences of its implementation.

The organization of the volume reflects the chronology as well as the geography behind the Carter administration's approach to the Eastern Mediterranean region. Unlike previous *Foreign Relations* volumes on the subject, this volume features a regional compilation on the



Cyprus conflict. This editorial decision reflects the strategic and political decision by the administration, at the outset, to approach the division of Cyprus holistically as a complicated matrix of issues involving not only Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece, but also the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and their respective relations with their counterparts in Athens and Ankara. The regional compilation features documentation on Carter's prior commitment to resolving the Cyprus conflict. As a candidate for President, Governor Carter and his principal foreign policy advisers, Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski, saw in the region an opportunity to draw a sharp distinction between what they perceived as the Ford administration's failed approach of "tilting" toward Turkey and downplaying the human rights violations that occurred as a result of the Turkish invasion. Carter's critique of Ford's policy aligned him with those in Congress who supported the arms embargo on Turkey. Carter pledged that, if elected President, he would put renewed focus on the region through high-level diplomacy.

The memoranda and reports contained in the regional compilation show the Carter administration grappling with the Cyprus issue in strictly multilateral terms. This regional coverage, however, has its limitations. The vast majority of Embassy cable traffic, as well as records of bilateral meetings between U.S. officials and their counterparts, are in the country compilations. Furthermore, toward the end of the administration, when it became clear that Carter's initial goal of reunifying Cyprus would not succeed, U.S. officials resorted to a more bilateral approach in Greece and Turkey, while at the same time decreasing Washington's profile in the ongoing negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. As a result, the regional compilation is "top heavy." As the administration's multilateral approach became less intense, there was less corresponding documentation.

As with the regional compilation, most of the documents in the bilateral Cyprus compilation date from the administration's first two years. Carter and his advisers initially viewed a Cyprus settlement and reunification of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities as pivotal to defusing tensions between Greece and Turkey; consequently, the administration focused much of its initial efforts on Cyprus. The documents in this compilation demonstrate that the interests of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots did not always align with their respective counterparts in Athens and Ankara. This divergence, along with the largely irreconcilable negotiating postures among the leaders of both Cypriot communities, effectively brought the prospects of a full settlement to a halt by the end of 1977. Although Carter and his advisers continued to advocate a settlement and push for the United Nations to take an increasingly active role in negotiations, the momentum required to achieve a breakthrough was largely lost by early 1978.

The compilation on Turkey includes documentation on the administration's decision in 1978—despite lack of progress on Cyprus—to press Congress to overturn the arms embargo on Turkey. Many U.S. officials concluded that the embargo had taken a serious toll on Turkey's defense posture—the ramifications of which affected not only Turkey itself but NATO as a whole—and that, in turn, U.S.-Turkish relations were rapidly deteriorating. Members of Congress who had advocated linking a Cyprus settlement to the arms embargo argued that Carter had broken his campaign promise. Citing high-level efforts to forge a settlement, the administration—notably, Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff—countered that, without abandoning its goals for Cyprus, U.S. interests in the Eastern Mediterranean region were broader than the island stalemate. The White House lobbying campaign paid off: in the summer of 1978, both houses of Congress voted to overturn the arms embargo on Turkey, thus improving U.S.-Turkish relations and addressing concerns for the viability of NATO.

The principal focus in the compilation on Greece is the Carter administration's efforts to reintegrate the Greek military into the NATO command structure. In light of the administration's *de facto de-linking* of Cyprus from the arms embargo on Turkey, this proved to be no easy task. While Greek leaders gradually de-emphasized the role of Cyprus in U.S.-Greek relations, Athens was unwavering in its insistence that Washington maintain the arms embargo on Turkey. Greece insisted that not only would lifting the embargo make Turkey more intransigent on Cyprus, but also that the ethnic Turkish community in Cyprus was much less independent of Turkey than Ankara claimed. As the documents in this compilation demonstrate, Greek concerns were rooted more deeply in strategic concerns relating to the military competition and territorial disputes in the Aegean Sea with Turkey. Athens argued that lifting the arms embargo would make Turkey more likely to engage in regional adventurism. In October 1980, after a protracted series of negotiations on the command and control structure of Greek and Turkish forces in the Aegean, Greece—with the support of the new military government in Turkey, which took power in a coup the previous month—agreed to rejoin the military structure of NATO, on the condition that a NATO commander would direct Greek and Turkish forces on a case-by-case basis.

### *Acknowledgments*

The editors wish to thank officials at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) at College Park, Maryland, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense. David Zierler collected and selected documentation and edited the volume under the supervision of David Geyer, Chief of the Europe and General Division, and Edward C. Keefer,

former General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. Melissa Jane Taylor and David Geyer reviewed the volume. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review, under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. Stephanie Eckroth and Rita Baker did the copy and technical editing. Do Mi Stauber, Inc. prepared the index.

**David Zierler, Ph.D.**  
*Historian*

# Contents

About the Series .....	III
Preface .....	VII
Sources .....	XIII
Abbreviations and Terms .....	XIX
Persons .....	XXV
Cyprus; Turkey; Greece	
Eastern Mediterranean Region .....	1
Cyprus .....	115
Turkey .....	276
Greece .....	490
Index .....	637



# Sources

*Sources for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXI, Cyprus; Turkey; Greece*

In preparation for this volume, the editors made extensive use primarily of Presidential materials held in the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Department of State materials held in the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) in College Park, Maryland. Of the Presidential materials, several collections proved to be particularly valuable for this volume. The 1977 Transition File contains a number of documents that detail how Governor Carter developed his policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean as a Presidential candidate. These documents provide a blueprint for Carter's subsequent policies during his first year in office, and they also serve as a baseline to illustrate the extent to which the Carter administration reversed course once it had determined that a full negotiated settlement in Cyprus was out of reach. The National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File for Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece is an excellent resource for many of the most important policy meetings on the Eastern Mediterranean region as well as miscellaneous but important documents pertaining to each country. The National Security Council, Institutional Files contain many of the NSC's key meetings regarding policy toward the region. The National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File is generally the best source for memoranda of conversation between U.S. officials and their foreign counterparts. Finally, the National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special File, containing memoranda from National Security Council Staff member Paul Henze to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski, is an indispensable resource for understanding how the Carter administration eventually pursued policies that were more closely aligned with those of the Ford administration than with Carter's own pledges first as a candidate for President and then during his first year in office.

Several collections originating in the Department of State and now housed at Archives II also proved extremely valuable for this volume. The Central Foreign Policy File is a repository for telegrams between the Department of State and U.S. diplomatic posts. Because of the multilateral nature of the issues in the Eastern Mediterranean, the cable traffic to, from, and among the Embassies in Nicosia, Ankara, and Athens is vital to understand Cypriot, Turkish, and Greek responses to U.S. policy. The lot file containing the records of Secretary of State

Cyrus Vance is a rich repository of key memoranda of conversation between Vance and the leading political figures of the region. The records of Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher (much of which was already declassified at the time of research) proved important particularly when he was serving as Acting Secretary of State. Finally, it would not have been possible to document the diplomatic challenges of the Cyprus impasse without the records of Department of State Counselor Matthew Nimetz. Nimetz, who served as the Department's point person on Cyprus, was involved in nearly every aspect of U.S. efforts to achieve a settlement between the ethnic Greek and ethnic Turkish communities of Cyprus, both as a direct mediator and as a partner to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. The files of Matthew Nimetz and Paul Henze demonstrate the real and sometimes mutually exclusive choices confronted by the Carter administration and provide valuable insight in assessing the overall policy of the administration toward Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece. They also document the enormous influence that can be exerted by relatively unknown U.S. officials in the foreign policy establishment.

Because intelligence-gathering and analysis did not play a large role in the formulation of U.S. policy toward Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, documentation originating in the Central Intelligence Agency is not prominently featured in this volume. Still, a number of documents from the CIA's National Intelligence Council Files provide key insights into the political and tactical calculations of the leaders of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. Finally, the Department of Defense took a leading negotiation position with regard to efforts to reintegrate Greece into the military structure of NATO. Documents housed at the Washington National Records Center provided key memoranda between Department of Defense officials and their counterparts in Greece in the successful effort to reintegrate Greece and thus bring NATO back to its state before the war in Cyprus in 1974.

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# Abbreviations and Terms

**addressees**, addressees

**ADIZ**, Air Defense Identification Zone

**AFSOUTH**, Allied Forces Southern Europe

**AKEL**, Anorthotikon Komma Ergazo Laou (Report Party of the Working People) (Cyprus)

**Amb**, Ambassador

**AmEmbassy**, American Embassy

**ASD**, Assistant Secretary of Defense

**BOP**, balance of payments

**C**, Confidential; Office of the Counselor, Department of State

**CA/VO**, Visa Office, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State

**CEMA**, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

**CENTO**, Central Treaty Organization

**Cherokee**, a special telegraphic channel established for highly sensitive Department of State messages

**CIA**, Central Intelligence Agency

**CINCSOUTH**, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe

**CINCUSAFE**, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Air Forces, Europe

**CINCUSNAVEUR**, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe

**CMC**, Clark M. Clifford

**CNO**, Chief of Naval Operations

**COMAIRSOUTH**, Commander, Allied Forces Southern Europe

**COMEDEAST**, Commander, Eastern Mediterranean Area

**COMSIXATAF**, Commander, Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force

**Col**, Colonel

**CSCE**, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

**D**, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State

**DAC**, Development Assistance Committee (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)

**DAS**, Deputy Assistant Secretary

**DCA**, Defense Cooperation Agreement

**DCI**, Director of Central Intelligence

**DCM**, Deputy Chief of Mission

**DDI**, Deputy Director of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

**DECA**, Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement

**DepASD**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

**DepSec**, Deputy Secretary

**DepSecDef**, Deputy Secretary of Defense

**DeptOff**, Department of State Officer

**DIA**, Defense Intelligence Agency

**DirGen**, Director General

**DIRNSA**, Director, National Security Agency

**dissem**, dissemination

**DOD**, Department of Defense

**DPC**, Defense Planning Committee (NATO)

## XX Abbreviations and Terms

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**E**, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs  
**EC**, European Community  
**EDEK**, Cypriot Social Democratic Party  
**EDT**, Eastern Daylight Time  
**EEC**, European Economic Community  
**EmbOff**, Embassy Officer  
**enosis**, Cypriot union with Greece  
**EOKA-B**, Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) (Greek Cypriots)  
**ESF**, economic support funds  
**EUR**, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
**EUR/RPM**, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
**EUR/SE**, Office of Southern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
**Exdis**, exclusive distribution  
**Ex-Im**, Export-Import Bank

**FAA**, Foreign Assistance Act  
**FAM**, *Foreign Affairs Manual*  
**FBIS**, Foreign Broadcast Information Service  
**FCO**, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom)  
**FIR**, Flight Information Region  
**FM**, Foreign Minister  
**FMS**, foreign military sales  
**FonMin**, Foreign Minister  
**FRC**, Federal Records Center  
**FRG**, Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)  
**FY**, fiscal year  
**FYI**, for your information

**GA**, General Assembly (United Nations)  
**GNP**, gross national product  
**GOC**, Government of Cyprus  
**GOG**, Government of Greece  
**GOT**, Government of Turkey

**H**, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State  
**H/C**, hand-carried  
**HIRC**, House International Relations Committee  
**HSB**, Harold S. Brown

**IBRD**, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
**ICAO**, International Civil Aviation Organization  
**ICBM**, intercontinental ballistic missile  
**ICJ**, International Court of Justice  
**ICRC**, International Committee of the Red Cross  
**IEA**, International Energy Agency  
**IMET**, International Military Education and Training  
**IMF**, International Monetary Fund  
**INR**, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**INR/DRR/RSE/FP**, Soviet Foreign Political Division, Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**INR/IL**, Office of Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**IO**, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

**IOC**, International Olympic Committee

**IO/UNP**, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

**ISA**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

**J**, Jimmy (Carter's initial)

**JAMMAT**, Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey

**JC**, Jimmy Carter

**JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff

**JLO**, Joint Liaison Office

**JP**, Justice Party (Turkey)

**JUSMMAT**, Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey

**L**, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

**L/PM**, Office of the Legal Adviser for Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

**Limdis**, limited distribution

**LOS**, Law of the Sea

**LRTNF**, long-range theater nuclear forces

**M**, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Management

**MAP**, Military Assistance Program

**MBB**, Muskie-Brown-Brzezinski (Meeting Group)

**MBFR**, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

**MC**, Military Committee (NATO)

**memcon**, memorandum of conversation

**MFA**, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**miladdes**, military addressees

**MisOff**, Mission officer

**MOD**, Minister of Defense

**MOFA**, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**MOU**, Memorandum of Understanding

**MP**, Member of Parliament

**MSA**, Mutual Security Agreement

**NAC**, North Atlantic Council

**NAMSA**, NATO Military Supply Agency

**NAP**, Turkish National Action Party

**NARA**, National Archives and Records Administration

**NATO**, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**Niact**, night action

**NIC**, National Intelligence Council

**NIE**, National Intelligence Estimate

**NIO**, National Intelligence Officer

**NMR**, National Military Representative

**Nodis**, no distribution

**Notal**, not to all

**NOTAM**, Notice to Airmen

**NSA**, National Security Agency

**NSC**, National Security Council

**NSP**, Turkish National Salvation Party

**NTM**, national technical means

**NYT**, *The New York Times*

**O&M**, operation and maintenance

**OECD**, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

**OEG**, Open-Ended Group (NATO)

**OMB**, Office of Management and Budget

**OPR/LS**, Language Services Division, Office of Operations, Bureau of Administration,  
Department of State

**OSD**, Office of the Secretary of Defense

**OSD/ISA**, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

**OSR**, Office of Strategic Research, Central Intelligence Agency

**P**, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

**para**, paragraph

**PASOK**, Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Greece)

**PermRep**, Permanent Representative

**P.L.**, Public Law

**PLO**, Palestine Liberation Organization

**PM**, Prime Minister; Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

**PM/ISO**, Office of International Security Operations, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs,  
Department of State

**POL**, political

**POL/MIL**, political/military

**PRC**, Policy Review Committee

**PriMin**, Prime Minister

**PRM**, Presidential Review Memorandum

**reftel**, reference telegram

**Rep**, Representative

**RG**, record group

**RPP**, Republican People's Party (Turkey)

**rpt**, repeat

**S**, Secret; Office of the Secretary of State

**SACEUR**, Supreme Allied Commander Europe

**SALT**, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

**SBA**, Sovereign Base Area

**SC**, Security Council (United Nations)

**SecDef**, Secretary of Defense

**SecGen**, Secretary General

**Secto**, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State while traveling

**Secy**, Secretary

**septel**, separate telegram

**SFRC**, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

**SHAPE**, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

**S/P**, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

**Specat**, special category

**SRSG**, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General

**S/S**, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Department of State

**SSA**, security supporting assistance

**S/S-I**, Information Management Section, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

**S/S-O**, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Department of State  
**SSOD**, United Nations Special Session on Disarmament  
**Stadis**, distribution within the Department of State only  
**SYG**, Secretary General of the United Nations

**T**, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance; after August 22, 1977,  
 Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology  
**telcon**, telephone conversation  
**TFSC**, Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (recognized only by Turkey)  
**TGS**, Turkish General Staff  
**TMA**, terminal maneuvering area  
**Tosec**, series indicator for telegram to the Secretary of State while traveling

**U**, Unclassified  
**UDI**, Unilateral Declaration of Independence  
**U.K.**, United Kingdom  
**UKG**, United Kingdom Government  
**UN**, United Nations  
**UNFICYP**, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus  
**UNGA**, United Nations General Assembly  
**UNSC**, United Nations Security Council  
**UNSSOD**, United Nations Special Session on Disarmament  
**UNSYG**, United Nations Secretary-General  
**U.S.**, United States  
**USAFE**, United States Air Forces Europe  
**USCINCEUR**, United States Commander-in-Chief, European Command  
**USDel**, United States Delegation  
**USDELMC**, United States Delegation to the NATO Military Committee  
**USDOCOLANDS****South****east**, United States Document Officer, Allied Land Forces South-  
 eastern Europe  
**USDOCOSouth**, United States Document Officer, Allied Forces South Europe  
**USEUCOM**, United States European Command  
**USG**, United States Government  
**USICA**, United States International Communication Agency  
**USMission**, United States Mission  
**USNATO**, United States Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
**USNMR SHAPE**, United States National Military Representative, Supreme Headquar-  
 ters Allied Powers Europe  
**USSR**, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
**USUN**, United States Mission to the United Nations  
**USYG**, Under Secretary General (United Nations)

**VOA**, Voice of America  
**VP**, Vice President

**WMC**, Warren M. Christopher  
**WSJ**, *The Wall Street Journal*

**XMB**, Export-Import Bank

**Z**, Zulu time (Greenwich Mean Time)





# Persons

- Aaron, David L.**, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Albright, Madeleine K.**, Congressional Relations Officer, Press and Congressional Liaison Office, National Security Council Staff, from March 1978 until January 1981
- Alexander, William V., Jr.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Arkansas)
- Alexandrakis, Menelas D.**, Greek Ambassador to the United States until October 1979
- Allen, Lucius, Jr.**, General, USAF; Director, National Security Agency, from August 1973 until July 1977; Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, from July 1, 1978, until June 30, 1982
- Anderson, David**, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State
- Angelides, Angelos**, Cypriot Deputy Chief of Mission in the United States
- Arafat, Yassir**, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization
- al-Assad, Hafiz**, President of Syria
- Atakol, Kenan**, Turkish Cypriot diplomat and foreign affairs spokesman
- Atalay, Nail**, Turkish Cypriot Office Representative
- Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal**, President of Turkey from 1923 until 1938
- Athanssiou, Nicolas**, Greek Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Atherton, Alfred L., Jr. (Roy)**, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from April 27, 1974, until April 13, 1978; Ambassador at Large from April 11, 1978, until May 22, 1979; Ambassador to Egypt from May 1979
- Atwood, J. Brian**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from 1977 until August 1979; Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from August 3, 1979, until January 14, 1981
- Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos**, Greek Minister of National Defense
- Barbis, George M.**, Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Greece
- Barbour, Robert**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
- Batibay, Daryal**, Special Counselor to the Turkish Foreign Minister
- Bazargan, Mehdi**, Prime Minister of Iran from February 1979 until November 1979
- Beckel, Robert G.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from 1977 until January 1978; Special Assistant to the President for Congressional Liaison from January 30, 1978, until January 1981
- Begin, Menachem**, Prime Minister of Israel from June 21, 1977
- Bennet, J. Douglas, Jr.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from March 18, 1977, until August 2, 1979; Administrator, Agency for International Development, from August 3, 1979, until January 20, 1981
- Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr.**, United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from April 26, 1977, until March 31, 1983
- Bilge, A. Suat**, Turkish Ambassador to Switzerland until 1979; leading negotiator in the Aegean Sea/continental shelf dispute negotiations between Turkey and Greece
- Bilhan, Murat**, Counselor, Turkish Embassy in the United States
- Billings, Leon G.**, Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State from May 1980
- Bitsios, Dimitrios**, Greek Foreign Minister until November 20, 1977
- Blackwill, Robert D.**, member, National Security Council Staff for West Europe Affairs from September 1979 until January 1981
- Blumenthal, W. Michael**, Secretary of the Treasury from January 23, 1977, until August 4, 1979
- Bowdler, William G.**, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

- Brademas, John**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Indiana)
- Bremont, Marshall**, member, National Security Council Staff for USSR and East Europe Affairs from May 1979 until January 1981
- Brown, George S.**, General, USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from July 1974 until June 1978
- Brown, Harold**, Secretary of Defense
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew K.**, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Buffum, William B.**, United Nations Under Secretary General for Political and General Assembly Affairs
- Byrd, Robert C.**, Senator (D-West Virginia)
- Çağlayangil, Ihsan Sabri**, Turkish Foreign Minister from March 31, 1975, until June 21, 1977
- Cahill, Jacklyn**, Special Assistant to Secretary of State Vance
- Callaghan, James**, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from April 5, 1976, until May 4, 1979
- Caramanlis, Constantine**, see Karamanlis, Konstantine
- Carrington, Lord (Peter Alexander Carrington)**, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
- Carter, James Earl, "Jimmy,"** President of the United States
- Carter, William Hodding, III**, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from March 25, 1977, until June 30, 1980
- Case, Clifford P.**, Senator (R-New Jersey)
- Ceaurescu, Nicolae**, President of Romania
- Celik, Vedat**, Foreign Minister of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus from 1976 until 1978
- Chapman, Geoffrey**, staff member, Office of Southern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Chelik, Vedat**, see Celik, Vedat
- Christopher, Warren M.**, Deputy Secretary of State from February 25, 1977, until January 16, 1981
- Chorafas, Angelos**, Director for NATO Affairs, Greek Foreign Ministry
- Christophides, Ionnis**, Cypriot Foreign Minister until August 3, 1978
- Chrysospathis, Spyros**, Greek Delegation Chief for U.S.-Greek base negotiations
- Chrysostomos I**, Archbishop of Cyprus
- Clerides, Glafcos**, Greek Cypriot President of the Democratic Rally Party
- Clifford, Clark M.**, President's Personal Emissary to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus
- Clift, A. Denis**, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
- Cooper, Richard N.**, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from April 8, 1977, until January 19, 1981
- Crawford, William R., Jr.**, Ambassador to Cyprus from August 31, 1974, until March 27, 1978
- Davies, Rodger P.**, Ambassador to Greece from May 2, 1974; assassinated in Nicosia on August 19, 1974
- Davos, Ioannis**, General, Hellenic National Defense General Staff from 1976 until 1980
- DeConcini, Dennis W.**, Senator (D-Arizona)
- De Cuéllar, Javier Pérez**, see Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier
- Demirel, Süleyman**, Turkish Prime Minister until June 1977, from July 1977 until January 1978, and from November 1979 until September 1980
- Denktash, Rauf**, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (recognized only by Turkey)
- Derwinski, Edward J.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Illinois)

- Dillery, C. Edward**, Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy in Cyprus; Director, Office of Southern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Dillon, Robert S.**, Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy in Turkey
- Dimitriou, Nicos**, Cypriot Ambassador to the United States until 1979
- Dobrynin, Anatoly F.**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
- Dodson, Christine**, Deputy Staff Secretary of the National Security Council from January 1977 until May 1977; thereafter Staff Secretary until January 1981
- Dountas, Michalis**, Greek Ambassador to Cyprus
- Dulles, John Foster**, Secretary of State from 1953 until 1959
- Duncan, Charles W., Jr.**, Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 31, 1977, until July 29, 1979; Secretary of Energy from August 24, 1979, until January 20, 1981
- Dworken, Morton**, Political/Military Officer in the Embassy in Greece
- Eagleton, Thomas F.**, Senator (D-Missouri)
- Eaves, John**, Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Nicosia
- Ecevit, Bülent**, Turkish Prime Minister from June 1977 until July 1977, and from January 1978 until November 1979
- Eizenstat, Stuart L.**, Chief Executive Director, White House Domestic Policy Staff; Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy
- Elekdag, Şükrü**, Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry; Turkish Ambassador to the United States from 1979 until 1980
- Eralp Orhan**, Turkish Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Erbakan, Necmettin**, Chairman of the National Salvation Party (Turkey)
- Erim, Nihat**, Turkish Prime Minister from March 1971 until May 1972
- Erkmen, Hayrettin**, Turkish Foreign Minister from November 1979 until September 1980
- Ermarth, Fritz**, Defense Coordinator, National Security Council Staff, from September 1978 until November 1980
- Ertekün, Necati**, Adviser to Rauf Denktash
- Esenbel, Melih**, Turkish Ambassador to the United States from April 1975 until July 1979
- Evren, Kenan**, General, leader of the Turkish military coup in September 1980
- Ewing, Raymond C.**, Director, Office of Southern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Fascell, Dante B.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Florida)
- Findley, Paul**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Illinois)
- Ford, Gerald R.**, President of the United States from August 1974 until January 1977
- Funk, Gerald**, member, National Security Council Staff for Sub-Saharan Africa Affairs from December 1978 until January 1981
- Galindo Pohl, Reynaldo**, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Cyprus from March 1978 until May 1980
- Gates, Robert M.**, National Security Council Staff Aide to Zbigniew Brzezinski
- Gelb, Leslie H.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs from February 23, 1977, until June 30, 1979
- Ghalanos, Alexis**, Chairman of the Cypriot House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee
- Gilman, Benjamin A.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-New York)
- Giscard d'Estaing, Valéry**, President of France
- Gobbi, Hugo**, United Nations Special Representative on Cyprus from May 1980
- Gratsios, Agamemnon**, General, Hellenic National Defense General Staff from 1980
- Griffith, William E.**, Special Adviser to Zbigniew Brzezinski on Soviet affairs
- Gromyko, Andrei A.**, Soviet Foreign Minister
- Güvëndiren, Ekrem**, Director of Cyprus-Greece Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Guyer, Roberto**, United Nations Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs

- Habib, Philip C.**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from July 1, 1976, until April 1, 1978
- Haig, Alexander M., Jr.**, General, USA, Commander in Chief, European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe from June 1974 until June 1979
- Hamilton, Lee H.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Indiana)
- Hammarskjöld, Dag**, Secretary General of the United Nations from 1953 until 1961
- Hanson, Thor**, Rear Admiral, USN, Director of the Joint Staff from June 22, 1979, until July 1, 1981
- Hartman, Arthur A.**, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from January 8, 1974, until June 8, 1977
- Hassan II**, King of Morocco
- Henze, Paul B.**, Intelligence Coordinator, National Security Council Staff, from January 1977 until December 1980
- Hirsch, John L.**, United States Mission to the United Nations officer
- Holmes, H. Allen**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
- Hopper, Robert F.**, Office of the Counselor, Department of State
- Hoskinson, Samuel M.**, Intelligence Coordinator, National Security Council Staff, from January 1977 until May 1979
- Humphrey, Hubert H.**, Senator (D-Minnesota) from January 3, 1971, until January 13, 1975
- Hunter, Robert E.**, member, National Security Council Staff for West Europe Affairs from January 1977 until August 1979; for Middle East and North Africa Affairs from September 1979 until January 1981
- Hussein bin Talal**, King of Jordan
- Hutcheson, Richard G.**, White House Staff Secretary, Staff Secretary's Office
- Hyland, William G.**, member, National Security Council Staff for USSR and East Europe Affairs from January 1977 until October 1977
- Iakovos**, Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Diocese of North and South America
- Ioannides, George**, Greek Cypriot Representative to the intercommunal negotiations
- İşik, Hasan Esat**, Turkish Defense Minister
- Jacovides, Andreas**, Cypriot Ambassador to the United States from February 1980
- Javits, Jacob K.**, Senator (R-New York)
- Johnson, Lyndon B.**, President of the United States from November 22, 1963, until January 20, 1969
- Jones, David C.**, General, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from June 1978 until June 1982
- Jones, David T.**, staff member, Office of Southern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Jordan, Hamilton**, White House Chief of Staff from August 1979 until June 1980
- Judd, Frank**, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
- Kandemir, Nüzhet**, Turkish Director General for International Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Kapanli, Turhan**, Turkish Minister of Defense
- Karamanlis, Konstantine**, Prime Minister of Greece from July 23, 1974, until May 10, 1980; President of Greece from May 15, 1980
- Khomeini, Ruhollah**, Supreme Leader of Iran from December 1979
- Kirca, A. Coşkun**, Turkish Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Kissinger, Henry A.**, Secretary of State from September 21, 1973, until January 20, 1977
- Knoche, Enno Henry**, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, from July 7, 1976, until August 1, 1977

- Komer, Robert W.**, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from October 24, 1979, until January 20, 1981
- Konofaos, Spyros**, Admiral, Greek Chief of Naval Operations
- Korhan, Oğuz Ramadan**, President of the Assembly of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (recognized only by Turkey)
- Kornienko, Georgi M.**, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
- Korutürk, Fahri**, President of Turkey from April 6, 1973, until April 6, 1980
- Kreisky, Bruno**, Chancellor of Austria
- Kubisch, Jack B.**, Ambassador to Greece from September 26, 1974, until July 17, 1977
- Kyprianou, Spyros**, President of Cyprus from September 1977
- Lagacos, Eustache**, Greek Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Lance, Thomas Bert**, Director, Office of Management and Budget, from January 23, 1977, until September 21, 1977
- Larrabee, F. Stephen**, member, National Security Council Staff for USSR and East Europe Affairs from September 1978 until January 1981
- Ledsky, Nelson C.**, Director, Office of Southern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
- Leonard, James F.**, Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Long, Clarence**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Maryland)
- Lowenstein, James G.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
- Luns, Joseph M.A.H.**, Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Lyssarides, Vassos**, leader of the Greek EDEK Party
- Macomber, William B.**, Ambassador to Turkey until June 1977
- Makarios III**, President of Cyprus until August 1977
- Manatos, Andrew E.**, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Congressional Affairs
- Matthoefer, Hans**, West German Finance Minister
- Mavrommatis, Andreas**, Cypriot Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Maynes, C. William**, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from April 14, 1977, until April 9, 1980
- McCloskey, Robert J.**, Ambassador to Greece from March 1978
- McGiffert, David E.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
- McGovern, George S.**, Senator (D-South Dakota)
- McHugh, Matthew**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New York)
- McIntyre, James T.**, Director, Office of Management and Budget, from March 24, 1978, until January 20, 1981
- McNamara, Robert S.**, former Secretary of Defense; President of the World Bank from April 1968 until June 1981
- Mezvinsky, Edward**, Ambassador to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
- Michaelides, Alekos**, Greek Cypriot House President
- Miller, G. William**, Chairman of the Federal Reserve from March 1978 until August 1979; thereafter Secretary of the Treasury until January 20, 1981
- Mills, Hawthorne Q.**, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in Greece from July 1977 until March 1978
- Mitsotakis, Konstantinos**, Greek Foreign Minister from 1980 until 1981
- Molvayiatis, Petros**, Director General, Greek Prime Minister's Political Office
- Mondale, Walter F.**, Vice President of the United States from January 20, 1977, until January 20, 1981
- Moore, Francis B.**, "Frank," Special Assistant to the President for Congressional Liaison
- Müezzinoğlu, Ziya**, Turkish Minister of Finance
- Mumford, William F.**, Chairman, NATO Military Committee
- Muskie, Edmund S.**, Secretary of State from May 1980

- Newlin, Michael H.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from 1980 until 1981
- Newsom, David D.**, Ambassador to Indonesia from February 27, 1974, until October 6, 1977; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from April 19, 1978, until February 27, 1981
- Nicolaides, Andros A.**, Cypriot Counselor in the United States
- Nimetz, Matthew**, Counselor of the Department of State from April 8, 1977, until March 19, 1980; Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology from February 21, 1980, until December 5, 1980
- Nixon, Richard M.**, President of the United States from January 20, 1969, until August 9, 1974
- Nunn, Samuel**, Senator (D-Georgia)
- Ökçün, Gündüz**, Turkish Foreign Minister from January 1978
- Olçay, Osman**, Turkish Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Olsen, Arthur J.**, Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy in Belgium
- Onan, Ümit Süleyman**, First Representative of the Turkish Cypriots for intercommunal negotiations
- O'Neill, Thomas P.**, "Tip," member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Massachusetts); Speaker of the House
- Önhon, Candemir**, Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus
- Örek, Osman**, Defense Minister of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
- Owen, David**, British Foreign Minister from February 11, 1977, until May 4, 1979
- Owen, Henry D.**, Special Representative for Economic Summits; National Security Council Staff for International Economics from October 1977 until January 1981
- Özal, Turgut**, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister from September 1980
- Papadopoulos, Tassos**, First Representative of the Greek Cypriots to the intercommunal negotiations
- Papaioannou, Ezekias**, leader of the Greek ADEK Party
- Papaligouras, Panayotis A.**, Greek Foreign Minister until May 1978
- Papandreou, Andreas**, founder and Chairman of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)
- Papoulias, Georgios**, Greek Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Pelagias, Georges**, Assistant to Cypriot President Kyprianou; thereafter Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier**, United Nations Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs; Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General in Cyprus until April 1978
- Petree, Richard W.**, Deputy U.S. Representative to the Security Council from October 1979
- Petrignani, Rinaldo**, Deputy Secretary, NATO Military Committee
- Plaza Lasso, Galo**, United Nations Mediator for Cyprus
- Poats, Rutherford M.**, member, National Security Council Staff for International Economics from September 1978 until January 1981
- Powell, Joseph L., Jr.**, "Jody," White House Press Secretary from 1977 until January 1981
- Qadhafi, Muammar**, Chairman of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council and Commander in Chief of the Libyan Armed Forces
- Quandt, William B.**, member, National Security Council Staff for Middle East and North Africa Affairs from January 1977 until August 1979

- Rallis, Georgios**, Greek Foreign Minister until May 1980; Prime Minister from May 1980 until October 1981
- Rogers, Bernard W.**, General, USA, Supreme Allied Commander Europe from June 1979
- Rolandis, Nicos A.**, Cypriot Foreign Minister from September 3, 1978
- Rosenthal, Benjamin S.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New York)
- Rossides, Zenon**, Cypriot Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Rousakis, John P.**, Democratic Mayor of Savannah, Georgia
- Roussos, Stavros**, Deputy Secretary General, Greek Foreign Ministry
- Rumsfeld, Donald**, Secretary of Defense from November 20, 1975, until January 20, 1977
- al-Sadat, Anwar**, President of Egypt
- Şahinbaş, Faruk**, Turkish Assistant Secretary General; lead negotiator on U.S. military bases in Turkey
- Saltik, Haydar**, Deputy Chief, Turkish General Staff
- Sancar, Semih**, General, Chief of Staff of the Turkish General Staff until March 1978
- Sarbanes, Paul S.**, Senator (D-Maryland)
- Saunders, Harold H.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from April 1978 until January 1981
- Sawyer, Harold**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Michigan)
- Schaufele, William E.**, appointed Ambassador to Greece in July 1977, but did not serve
- Schlesinger, James R.**, Secretary of Defense from July 2, 1973, until November 19, 1975; Special Assistant to the President, Energy Office, from January 21, 1977, until August 4, 1977; Secretary of Energy from August 5, 1977, until July 20, 1979
- Schmidt, Helmut**, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from May 16, 1974, until October 1, 1982
- Shear, Harold E.**, Admiral, USN, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe
- Sherry, George L.**, Assistant United Nations Secretary General for Special Political Affairs
- Shitikov, Aleksei Pavlovich**, Chairman, Soviet of the Union of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR
- Sick, Gary G.**, member, National Security Council Staff for the Middle East and North Africa
- Siena, James V.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, European and NATO Affairs
- Slocombe, Walter B.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning
- Smirnov, Leonid Vasilevich**, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers
- Solarz, Stephen J.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New York)
- Soulioti, Stella**, Adviser to the Cypriot President
- Soysal, Mümtaz**, Turkish Adviser to Turkish Cypriot intercommunal negotiators
- Spain, James W.**, Ambassador to Turkey from February 1980
- Sparkman, John J.**, Senator (D-Alabama)
- Spiegel, John**, Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State
- Spiers, Ronald I.**, Ambassador to Turkey from July 12, 1977, until January 11, 1980; Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research from January 28, 1980, until October 4, 1981
- Stoforopoulos, Euthimios**, Greek Foreign Ministry
- Stone, Galen L.**, Ambassador to Cyprus from April 6, 1978, until September 30, 1981
- Tarnoff, Peter R.**, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, from April 4, 1977, until February 8, 1981
- Tatar, Rustem**, Economic Adviser to Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktash
- Thatcher, Margaret**, British Prime Minister from May 1979
- Theodoropoulos, Vyron**, Greek Secretary General



**Thompson, James**, Major General, USA, Chief, Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey

**Thornton, Thomas P.**, member, National Security Council Staff for South Asia and United Nations Matters from 1977 until January 1981

**Tito, Josip Broz**, President of Yugoslavia until his death in May 1980

**Toon, Malcolm S.**, Ambassador to the Soviet Union from January 1977 until October 1979

**Treverton, Gregory F.**, member, National Security Council Staff for West Europe Affairs from January 1977 until August 1978

**Triantafyllides, Michalakis**, Greek Cypriot Constitutional Adviser to the Government of Cyprus

**Truman, Harry S.**, President of the United States from 1945 until 1953

**Tsamados, Constantine**, Head of NATO Affairs, Greek Foreign Ministry

**Tsatsos, Konstantinos**, President of Greece until May 1980

**Tuchman Matthews, Jessica**, member, National Security Council Staff for Global Issues from January 1977 until June 1977

**Tülümen, Turgut**, Director General of Cyprus-Greek Affairs, Turkish Foreign Ministry

**Türkeş, Alparslan**, Turkish political leader

**Türkmen, İlter**, Turkish Delegate to the United Nations; Turkish Foreign Minister after the military coup in September 1980

**Turner, Stansfield M.**, Admiral, USN, Director of Central Intelligence from March 9, 1977, until January 20, 1981

**Twaddell, William H.**, Special Assistant to Secretary of State Vance

**Tzounis, John A.**, Director General, Greek Foreign Ministry; Greek Ambassador to the United States from October 1979

**Urquhart, Brian**, United Nations Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs

**Vance, Cyrus R.**, Secretary of State from January 23, 1977, until April 20, 1980

**Vest, George S.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs from April 29, 1974, until March 27, 1977; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from June 16, 1977, until April 14, 1981

**Waldheim, Kurt J.**, Secretary General of the United Nations from January 1, 1972, until December 31, 1981

**Warnke, Paul C.**, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from March 14, 1977, until October 31, 1978

**Wexler, Anne**, Assistant to the President for Public Liaison

**Wright, Jim**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Texas); House Majority Leader

**Yerocostopoulos, Constantin**, Chief of Staff, Greek Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**Yiğit, Özdemir**, Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry from 1980

**Young, Andrew J.**, Ambassador to the United Nations

**Zablocki, Clement J.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Wisconsin); Chairman of the House International Relations Committee

**Zahedi, Ardeshir**, Iranian Ambassador to the United States from 1973 until 1979

# Cyprus; Turkey; Greece

## Eastern Mediterranean Region

### 1. Letter From Senator Thomas Eagleton to Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 1, 1976

Dear Zbig:

While we touched on the national security issue at our lunch the other day, we failed to discuss a challenge Ford can present in debate which best exposes the mutually exclusive goals we recommend for Governor Carter, i.e., win over the Greek-Americans while guarding against alienating the Turks. This challenge would come in the form of a question designed to elicit the Governor's specific position on the Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey. The question might be phrased as follows:

Governor Carter has acknowledged the great importance of Turkey to the security of the United States. My Administration, after months of negotiation, has concluded an agreement with that NATO ally that will enable the United States to reopen our vital intelligence bases, and to assure the integrity of NATO's southern flank. The Democratic Congress has refused even to consider this agreement thereby further damaging our relations with Turkey and setting back our efforts to gain a Cyprus settlement. I think it is vitally important to know whether Governor Carter will support the implementation of this agreement if he becomes President, or whether he is willing to precipitate a crisis with Turkey that could leave our country badly weakened in the eastern Mediterranean.

The Demirel government, which has steadfastly maintained its pro-West outlook, has banked its prestige on its agreement with the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, 1976-77 Transition File (Anthony Lake), Box 103, Cyprus/Turkey: 5-10/76. No classification marking. The letter was sent from Brzezinski to Governor Carter's advisers Stuart Eizenstat and Robert Hunter under a September 7 covering memorandum alerting them to the likelihood that the Cyprus issue would come up during Carter's Presidential campaign. Brzezinski, a professor at Columbia University, advised Carter on foreign affairs during the campaign. Also attached but not printed is an August 30 status report on congressional hearings on the Defense Cooperation Agreement between the United States and Turkey.

United States. The four-year agreement was designed to satisfy the Turkish demand for a “Congress-proof” pact. It has significantly alleviated political pressure on Demirel, though the State Department argues that he is becoming increasingly nervous over congressional inaction as his government approaches an election year.

Therefore, although the signing of a new arms agreement with Turkey at this time ignores the will of Congress and seems a poor prescription for a tense situation, the failure to implement the agreement will undoubtedly elicit a strong Turkish reaction. Turkey could close our bases permanently and/or drop out of the military arm of NATO (though, like Greece, maintaining its membership in the political council).

Governor Carter’s outright rejection of the agreement will significantly compromise his ability to deal with Turkey later. And, if he embraces it in any way, Greek-Americans will be offended.

My recommendation is that Governor Carter use the opening to recount the failure of the Ford/Kissinger policy on Cyprus and the Administration’s inability to work with Congress in designing a foreign policy that deserves public support. The Governor should stress that his Administration will provide an opportunity for a fresh look at the Cyprus problem—a complex problem involving both humanitarian and security considerations.<sup>2</sup>

He should state that his Administration will be guided by a concern for the *rule of law* and by a strong desire to bring relief to the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities through a just settlement along lines prescribed by U.N. Resolution 365.<sup>3</sup> The pragmatics of our defense relationship with Greece and Turkey will not be ignored, but the new policy will be grounded on high principle, reflecting the American people’s basic sense of fairness.

With respect to the agreement with Turkey negotiated by Secretary Kissinger,<sup>4</sup> it should be noted that Congress was understandably

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<sup>2</sup> An unknown hand, most likely Brzezinski’s, drew a vertical line in the left margin adjacent to this and the next two paragraphs.

<sup>3</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 365, adopted on December 13, 1974, endorsed General Assembly Resolution 3212 of November 1, 1974. Following the Greek-supported coup of Greek Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios in July 1974 and subsequent Turkish invasion of the northern portion of Cyprus, Resolution 3212 called for the ongoing “sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus” and for the “speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from Cyprus, and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs.” (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1974, p. 285) A discussion of UN Resolution 365 is *ibid.*, pp. 288–290.

<sup>4</sup> For background on the Ford administration’s attempts to restore military aid to Turkey, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Documents 228–230. On October 2, 1974, the House voted to lift partially the arms embargo against Turkey. (*Congress and the Nation*, vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 866–867)

reluctant to act on an agreement which, if implemented in the absence of a similar agreement for Greece, would have badly distorted the balance of military power in the eastern Mediterranean. (If the agreement with Greece is submitted before the end of this session of Congress, the same argument can be used but with the added point that there was no time to carefully consider the implications of both agreements.)

The Governor should then assert that it would be improper for a prospective President to comment on whether any particular international agreement—particularly one not yet approved by Congress—would comport with whatever policy a future Administration might adopt.

Finally, Zbig, let me say this: I recognize that the foregoing may be a bit too detailed insofar as setting forth the essence of a sound position for Governor Carter to have in his mind in a national debate. Frankly, this position was devised as a response to a specific question which may not be forthcoming. As a general proposition, I think Carter might be better off sticking to the following fundamentals on Cyprus:

1.) The Kissinger/Ford Cyprus policy has been an unmitigated disaster, alienating Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey simultaneously!

2.) As President he will instruct his new Secretary of State to give priority attention to the matter and to use the influence and good offices of the United States to work with all the interested parties.

3.) That a solution on Cyprus, like it or not, is intertwined (avoiding the code word “linked”) with other disputes between Greece and Turkey (e.g. Aegean oil).

4.) A fresh approach by a fresh Administration might work. The old approach by the old Administration will be simply more of the same and is doomed to failure.<sup>5</sup>

I am saying in essence that, politically, the best defense on Cyprus is a good offense. To the extent that you dwell on past failures of U.S. policy, Carter’s ability to deal with the problem later will be preserved.

I hope this is of some help.

Best regards,

**Thomas F. Eagleton<sup>6</sup>**

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<sup>5</sup> In the margin, an unknown hand, most likely Brzezinski’s, drew a vertical line highlighting points 1 through 4 and an arrow pointing to the line for emphasis.

<sup>6</sup> Eagleton signed “Tom” above this typed signature.

## 2. Paper Prepared by Cyrus Vance for Governor Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated

### THE UNITED STATES AND GREECE, TURKEY AND CYPRUS

#### A. *What are our goals?*

Our goal in Cyprus is to help bring about serious negotiations which will lead to a political accommodation between the two Cypriot communities, based on a territorial (zonal) arrangement more approximate to the first cease-fire lines, within the framework of an independent and sovereign Cypriot state. The political accommodation should be accompanied by a withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Cyprus and a return of all refugees to their homes in safety<sup>2,3</sup>.

From a broader standpoint, our goals are to assist in the prevention of conflict and the improvement of relations between Greece and Turkey and the resolution of the Cyprus problem. These objectives are of major importance to the United States, to NATO and to peace and stability in the region. To these ends, we should be prepared to assist the parties, in any reasonable and even-handed way, in the resolution of their differences.<sup>4</sup>

#### B. *1967 and 1974 experience.*

1. In 1967, the United States determined that it was in its interest and that of world peace to play an active part in attempting to prevent a war between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, and in assisting the parties to resolve their differences. To this end, President Johnson dispatched Vance as his special representative to Ankara, Athens and Ni-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, 1976–77 Transition File (Anthony Lake), Box 103, Cyprus/Turkey: 5–10/76. No classification marking. At the top of the page, Vance wrote, “Governor—Per your request I have prepared this brief paper on Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. Hope it’s helpful in the debate. I believe this is one of the most vulnerable points in the Republican record. Cy.” Vance, an attorney in private practice and a former Deputy Secretary of Defense, advised Governor Carter on foreign affairs during the campaign. It is likely that Vance was referring to the second of three debates between Carter and President Ford. The debate, which took place on October 6, 1976, in San Francisco, focused primarily on national security and foreign policy issues. The Cyprus issue did not come up. Below Vance’s note, Carter initialed “C.”

<sup>2</sup> Carter underlined the last sentence of this paragraph.

<sup>3</sup> These two points have been endorsed by 117 nations, including Greece and Turkey, in General Assembly Resolution 3212 of 1 Nov. 1974, which was passed by a vote of 117–0–0. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>4</sup> Vance’s emphasis on even-handedness with regard to the Greece-Cyprus-Turkey dispute was expressed more fully in two position papers released by the Carter campaign. For text of these papers, see *The Presidential Campaign, 1976*, vol. I, part 1: Jimmy Carter, pp. 689–690.

cosia to assist in mediating the potential conflict. In carrying out this responsibility, Vance immediately flew to Ankara and then shuttled back and forth between Athens and Ankara in an attempt to ascertain the essential demands of the parties. This was done in an even-handed fashion without any tilt toward either of the parties. After receiving a full bill of particulars from both sides, Vance prepared four points of proposed agreement which, in his judgment, met the essential demands of the parties and gave them a face-saving formula under which each could draw back from the brink. With minor modifications, both countries agreed to these points. Thereupon, Vance went immediately to Nicosia and in a series of negotiations obtained the Archbishop's acquiescence. In this process, Vance worked closely with the special representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, and with the ambassadors of several countries. The cooperation and team work was excellent.<sup>5</sup>

2. In 1974, the Administration was unwilling to take a positive role and, as a result of its vacillation, indecision and misjudgment, failed to take the steps which might have deterred the invasion. The Administration tilted toward Turkey and did not play an even-handed role. As a result, the United States has succeeded in alienating Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus. The situation now stands in a tragic and seemingly hopeless impasse.

### C. Background.

Like France and Germany, Turkey and Greece joined NATO amid expectations in the Atlantic community that common purpose could overcome ancient antipathies.<sup>6</sup> It has not. Despite their cooperation within the Alliance, Greece and Turkey are at loggerheads over Cyprus, in whose inter-communal conflicts each is intensely involved, and over Aegean Sea rights. Presumably neither country (especially Greece, the weaker) wants war between them. Nonetheless, their postures risk such a war—which could disintegrate NATO's southern front and further unsettle the Middle East.

Turkish-Greek confrontations have not been of American making, nor can they be dissolved except by Greece and Turkey themselves. Even so, both countries (and again especially Greece, needing a counterbalance to Turkish strength), have looked to the United States for support and protection against the other. Resolute American policy has twice (in 1964 and 1967) been a crucial factor in averting Turkish military action against Cyprus in circumstances that could have led to di-

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<sup>5</sup> Documentation on the Vance Mission, which began in late November 1967, is in *Foreign Relations*, 1964–1968, vol. XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey.

<sup>6</sup> Turkey and Greece both joined NATO on February 18, 1952.

rect Greek-Turkish war. Conversely, wobbly American policy in 1974 undoubtedly gave Turkey some encouragement when it decided to seize and occupy a major part of Cyprus, with consequences that will continue to be an issue in 1977.

Both Greece and Turkey, especially the latter, are relatively poor countries by European standards and seek fuller economic integration with Europe. Better relations between them could hasten this process by enabling them to focus more resources on development.

The essence of the matter is that the United States, NATO, and the countries in the eastern Mediterranean have a very strong interest in getting stability in the area.

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### 3. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 31, 1976

#### PARTICIPANTS

Secretary of State-designate Cyrus R. Vance  
Senator-elect Paul Sarbanes  
Representative John Brademas  
Representative Benjamin Rosenthal  
Clifford Hackett, Congressional Staff  
Edward Davey, Congressional Staff  
Richard Moose, Carter Transition Team, Department of State  
Peter Tarnoff, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-designate

Brademas began by telling Mr. Vance that the Congressmen were concerned about rumors that he was under pressure from the outgoing administration to allow the Turkish DCA to go forward to the Congress in early January. Mr. Vance said that no pressures had been applied, but that he had been asked whether he would object to such a move. Brademas responded that it would be an “extremely dangerous mistake” to resubmit the DCA to Congress immediately despite the view held by the “career people at State” that a Democratic President will be better able to influence the Democratic Congress on this issue. He added that it would be “disastrous” to have an immediate confronta-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Memcons Vance Pre-Inaug. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Tarnoff on January 7, 1977.

tion on the DCA and that Mr. Vance should do what he can to avoid being "squeezed" between the outgoing administration and Congress.

Sarbanes said that Mr. Vance had considerable "running room" on this issue as long as he allowed it to lie dormant for awhile. Sending the DCA up to Congress now would place the issue "front and center" and force hostile Democratic Congressmen to respond negatively. Delaying its submission to Congress could be explained by the need to review all multi-year arms supply agreements, including the Greek DCA which has not yet been concluded.

Brademas said that it would be a mistake to assume that the conclusion of a DCA agreement with Greece would satisfy Congress and allow passage of the Turkish DCA as long as there was no progress on Cyprus. He added that the two DCA's raised important budgetary questions: should the U.S. pay \$1.7 billion to two NATO allies? Sarbanes mentioned that delaying submission of the DCA would signal to the Congress that the new administration is rethinking its policies in the area, without interrupting the flow of arms to Turkey that is now proceeding. Brademas said that he strongly supported allowing \$170 million in FMS to go to Ankara despite Turkish "colonization" of much of Cyprus, a move that will shortly be condemned by the Council of Europe. Mr. Vance then pointed out that Greece had also been guilty of violations of neutrality in the area.

Rosenthal stated that the new administration's position on Cyprus should be based on consultation with those who have opposed the current State Department position, and Mr. Vance replied that he very much wanted Congressional input on this and other issues. Rosenthal continued that submission of the DCA would be an "offensive act," and that Governor Carter and Mr. Vance should "stop everything" and "put the machine in neutral." They should rethink the Cyprus problem from scratch, change American ambassadors to the three concerned countries, and send a fact-finder to visit the area. No DCA's should be submitted until the Cyprus question is resolved and the new administration comes up with sweeping new policies on how to regulate U.S. arms sales worldwide which are now totalling \$11-12 billion a year.

Mr. Vance then indicated that if he advised Secretary Kissinger against submitting the DCA now, the current administration would hold it back. Mr. Vance added that he might well proceed to change some of the American ambassadors in the area.

Brademas commented that Makarios is likely to be much more flexible on the terms of a settlement with the new American administration, and that he had clear and persuasive evidence to this effect. Sarbanes said that a Cyprus settlement is possible now, and that Mr. Vance had much more "running room" on the issue than did Secretary Kissinger. Rosenthal added that if Mr. Vance tells the Congress that certain



parties are acting unreasonably in the Cyprus dispute, he will be believed in a way that Secretary Kissinger was not.

Brademas asserted that the Turkish General Staff will compromise on Cyprus but that Secretary Kissinger had never really pushed the Turks. When Secretary Kissinger showed the Department's reporting cables from Ankara to Brademas, it was obvious to him that no real pressure had been applied on Ankara. Brademas stated that he fully recognized the need to keep Turkey in NATO. Sarbanes suggested that the West Europeans—especially the Germans and Italians—could be helpful in mediating the Cyprus dispute. Rosenthal pledged that the Congressmen would “keep quiet” until the new administration had put together a “package” on Cyprus.

Mr. Vance then offered to share his thinking on the issue with the Congressmen. He read the text of the five Cyprus principles that Secretary Kissinger had wanted to offer to the interested parties as a basis for negotiation, and that had been approved by the members of the European Community.<sup>2</sup> Representatives of the Greek Government have told Mr. Vance of Caramanlis' desire to have a Cyprus settlement on equitable terms. Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil sent Mr. Vance a letter in which he expressed concern about the state of relations between the U.S. and Turkey and asked that Mr. Vance see Ambassador Turkmen.<sup>3</sup>

Turkmen then told Mr. Vance that the political situation in Turkey was still very tense with public opinion highly inflamed on the Cyprus issue. The DCA was very important to Turkey, and failure to pass it would drastically reduce American leverage in Ankara although the Turks would not leave NATO if rebuffed. Turkmen said that the Turkish military was not dictating the government's Cyprus policies, although the generals did determine the size of the Turkish forces that were needed for the portion of Cyprus being occupied. If the DCA were passed, Turkey would move ahead on Cyprus. Turkmen added that he was fairly optimistic that the talks between Greece and Turkey on the Aegean would make some progress. The representatives of the Cypriot Government who had sought out Mr. Vance were much more specific. They had come with a map of the island with proposed divisions between the two communities and had stated that their views must be taken into account, warning that no settlement should be negotiated over their heads.

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<sup>2</sup> Kissinger laid out the five Cyprus principles in his speech “Building International Order,” delivered before the 30th United Nations General Assembly on September 22, 1975. (Department of State *Bulletin*, October 13, 1975, pp. 545–553)

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

The Congressmen replied that they saw the present Cyprus situation much in the same way as Mr. Vance. Sarbanes expressed regret that Secretary Kissinger had turned down a proposal that Senator Eagleton and then Secretary of Defense Schlesinger had discussed which would have involved a "step-by-step" plan beginning with President Ford exercising his waiver rights to allow up to \$100 million to go to Turkey despite the imposition by Congress of an arms embargo.<sup>4</sup> Following this move Ankara would have allowed some Greek refugees to return to Turkish-occupied territory. Secretary Kissinger argued that the Turks rejected this formula, but Sarbanes expressed the view that Ankara was never really urged by the U.S. to accept it. He said that it may no longer be possible to work out a "step-by-step" scenario in the Cyprus dispute.

Mr. Vance conveyed his view that Turkey was prepared to compromise, but that a way must be found to permit Ankara to change its position without appearing to be forced into backing down publicly. The Congressmen agreed and said that they "have the same problem." Mr. Vance pointed out Makarios' resistance to sign anything that recognized a bi-zonal Cyprus. The Congressmen then disagreed among themselves about whether it was clear that Makarios is prepared to be more flexible.

Sarbanes said that if Mr. Vance sent an emissary to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus who came back and convinced Congress of the worth of a new set of proposals to end the dispute, the Congress would then bring "pressure" on Makarios and Caramanlis, help enlist the support of the West Europeans, and vote sufficient aid funds to sweeten the package. Sarbanes added that "time is not on Makarios' side." Rosenthal commented that Mr. Vance brought with him "fresh air, objectivity, credibility" and that Congress would cooperate in effecting a settlement that leave each of the three interested parties "somewhat unhappy." He added the view that the Turks are also looking for a way out, since they do not want to be ostracized by Western Europe and the U.S. The Turkish economy is faring poorly and outside help is needed. Turkey does not want to have to occupy Cyprus forever.

The Congressmen then summarized their views:

1. Nothing should be done on the Cyprus issue in the coming weeks that would force confrontation between the Congress and the administration; and
2. The new administration should announce that it is taking a new look at the problem, name new American ambassadors in the region,

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<sup>4</sup> The waiver rights formulation was discussed in a conversation among Ford, Kissinger, and several members of Congress in June 1975. See *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Document 228.

and send an emissary to the three contending countries while working quietly behind the scenes to prepare a solution.

Mr. Vance replied that he had already been considering the advisability of sending an emissary to visit the area in order to study the Cyprus problem. The most difficult problem would be determining how much territory will remain under Turkish control. The interested parties, not the U.S., should supply proposals for a division of the island between the two communities, and then proceed to negotiate together. Makarios nevertheless remains a problem. The West Europeans could be helpful, but it is still uncertain how rapidly a solution can be worked out.

[Omitted here is a portion of the conversation unrelated to the Eastern Mediterranean.]

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#### 4. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 5<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 21, 1977

TO

The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO

The United States Representative to the United Nations  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Cyprus/Aegean (U)

The President has directed that the Policy Review Committee undertake, under the chairmanship of the Department of State, a review of Cyprus and the situation in the Aegean. This review should assess our interests and objectives, and the possibilities for moving toward a peaceful solution of both disputes, in light of the new Administration's accession to office.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 2, PRM/NSC 1–24 [1]. Confidential.

The review should:

1. Provide a State/CIA assessment of the current positions of the principal parties—the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, the Greek, Turkish and Cypriot Governments. The assessment should include what each expects of the United States in the near term. It should evaluate the domestic pressures each faces, and discuss the possibility that those pressures will lead to defined developments affecting particular American strategic interests in Greece and Turkey. It should also describe the relationship between the Cyprus question and the disputes over the Aegean continental shelf and air space.

2. Examine the components of a Cyprus settlement: territorial adjustments, form of government, economic requirements, and guarantees, including the role of the United Nations or other outside powers. (State)

3. Analyze alternatives available to the United States in order to promote a settlement, likely reactions of the parties, kinds of American commitments required, and implications for the mid-term. (State, Defense)

4. Assess, as a special feature of alternative strategies, the two Defense Cooperation Agreements with Greece and Turkey, and the bearing of those agreements on the Cyprus and Aegean disputes. (State, Defense, JCS)

5. Review the possibilities for involving our European allies in the process of settling the disputes, including assessments of various forms of U.S.-European cooperation and/or types of negotiating forums. (State)

6. Review the state of Congressional and public opinion toward the Cyprus question and the two base agreements, and suggest, as an integral part of our diplomatic approach, strategies for dealing with Congress and the general public.

The review should be no more than 20 pages in length. It should be completed by January 27, in time to be submitted to the Policy Review Committee in the week of January 31.<sup>2</sup>

**Zbigniew Brzezinski**

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<sup>2</sup> The February 3 review paper is in the Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 25, PRM-05. It is attached to a covering memorandum, which noted that the paper would be the basis of discussion at the Policy Review Committee meeting of February 10. The minutes of this meeting are printed as Document 5.

## 5. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 10, 1977, 3–4:30 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Cyprus

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *State*

Secretary Cyrus Vance

Arthur Hartman

Clark Clifford

#### *Defense*

Secretary Harold Brown

Charles W. Duncan

Maynard W. Glitman

#### *JCS*

L. Gen. William Y. Smith

#### *CIA*

Enno Knoche

[*name not declassified*]

#### *NSC*

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

David Aaron

Greg Treverton

Paul Henze

Christine Dodson (notetaker)

Robert Hunter

Adm. Stansfield Turner

*Secretary Vance:* Let us begin the meeting with a review (by CIA) of how things stand currently.

*Mr. Knoche:* (On Turkey) Our main concern is Turkey; elections are scheduled for next October; if the internal situation deteriorates, it is likely the military may intervene; there is internal disorder, particularly student disorder; at this moment, the chances are less than 50–50 that the military will intervene before the Clifford mission.<sup>2</sup> Also we should keep in mind that the pattern of military intervention in Turkish do-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 9, Cyprus: 1977. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Attached but not printed are a February 11 covering memorandum from Dodson to Brzezinski and, at Tab A, an undated report titled "General Objectives of the Clifford Mission."

<sup>2</sup> President Carter announced on February 3 that he was asking Clark Clifford to be his personal emissary to undertake a mission to Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey to conduct an assessment of the situation on Cyprus. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 77–78)

mestic politics is one of imposing martial law for a time until order is reestablished and then withdrawing rather than taking over, becoming the government. There is a kind of "democratic tradition" in Turkish military intervention in domestic affairs. So, such intervention, should it occur, would not embarrass the Clifford Mission.

*Secretary Brown:* They do, however, occasionally hang ministers!

(Laughter and Vance reminisces about inopportune arrival in Turkey once, in the middle of a military intervention)

*Mr. Knoche:* (On Cyprus): Denktash and Makarios have, as you know, already held one meeting.<sup>3</sup> The meeting was held on Turkish initiative after the Clifford mission was announced; it was probably a move designed to make the Turkish-Cypriot leadership look good before Clifford arrived. Denktash probably exceeded his instructions.

The Turkish Cypriot position defines the territory to be held by Turkey between 30–33%; the Greek-Cypriot position, no more than 20%. Somewhere between this 20% and this 30–33% is the room for maneuver and compromise.

(On Aegean) Tension remains. The Greeks insist on their exclusive right to the seabed. However, Turkey feels the stronger party; they have the upper hand in Cyprus and it will be difficult . . . there will be trouble if they are asked to move away from this position of strength.

*Secretary Vance:* What about the Geneva talks on Greek-Turkish differences?<sup>4</sup>

*Mr. Knoche:* [less than 1 line not declassified]

*Secretary Vance:* I have some indications: the talks are proceeding in a satisfactory way on the outset. I have talked to Bitsios; the Greek and Turkish Ambassadors are looking into how to proceed more rapidly.

[name not declassified: less than 1 line not declassified] the Greeks and Turks are taking the Geneva negotiations more seriously. The issue is to break the linkage between Turkish and Greek differences in the Aegean and the Cyprus question.

*Secretary Vance:* Turkman (?) [Turkmen] indicated to me that there was no specific linkage; that talks on both issues could go on side-by-side.

*Mr. Knoche:* (On Greece): Karamanlis looks forward to the Clifford Mission; the Greeks consider it in their interest. The Greeks consider

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<sup>3</sup> The meeting took place January 27 in Nicosia.

<sup>4</sup> The UN Sub-Commission on the Protection of Minorities and Prevention of Discriminatory Treatment, under the auspices of the Human Rights Commission in Geneva, served as a stage for debate over Cyprus in the summer of 1976. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1976, p. 610)

themselves the weaker party and therefore favor U.S. involvement. To them, non-involvement by U.S. is considered an indication of American leaning toward Turkey. There is a fear of pro-leftist drifting if there is American non-involvement.

*Secretary Vance:* What do you have on Makarios?

*Mr. Clifford:* Nothing new. He is watchful; waiting. Athens is leaning on him to influence his actions. But nothing specially new. . . .

*Secretary Vance:* Should we do anything, should we take any initiative before Clark gets there?

*Secretary Brown:* It is imperative that as soon as feasible we get work on a Turkish and a Greek DCA going along together.

*Secretary Vance:* Absolutely. We cannot hope to get anything through Congress unless agreements are proposed together.

Clark, if you have any indication during your mission, that *both* parties are ready to begin to talk on the DCA, let us know so we can begin domestic arrangements.

*Secretary Brown:* The Turkish military has a strong influence. We need to know if we have a possibility of putting through DCA accord to get the Turks moving.

*Mr. Knoche:* [1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

[name not declassified: 1½ lines not declassified]

*Secretary Vance:* There is a lot of skepticism, especially among the Congress, on the real value of these bases.

*Lt. General Smith:* From the military operational point of view, also, these bases are very important.

*Secretary Brown:* [1½ lines not declassified]

*Lt. General Smith:* That is right, of course.

*Secretary Vance:* Let us now move to a consideration of the objectives of the Clifford mission.

[Secretary Vance then read the objectives of the Clifford Mission as mandated by State (Tab A)—copies were made and distributed to participants.]<sup>5</sup>

Clark, please report to us on your discussions with Congress.

*Mr. Clifford:* I confined my discussions to the House. I had a good, frank talk with Zablocki; I also met with the Brademas Sarbanes group; the Greek, Turkish and Cypriot ambassadors, and with Admiral Turner. These are my conclusions:

Congress is saying that unless there is action on Cyprus there will be no action on Turkish DCA; there is a distinct reluctance to go along

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<sup>5</sup> Brackets in the original.

even with part-time or halfway measures. Even the military aid currently given to Turkey is under close questioning. On the other hand, the view of the Turkish Ambassador is that "if the U.S. links Cyprus to the DCA you'll get nowhere." A complete separation is requested.

Turkey, up to now, had the feeling that the executive branch was sympathetic to its outlook; it (Turkey) felt it could pretty much ignore Congress, not be bound by its action. I have attempted to indicate clearly to the Turkish Ambassador that this is a new deal; that times have changed; that there is a Democratic President and a Democratic majority, and that the Congress and the Administration will move together . . .

*Secretary Vance:* I think they go even further: they believe they have a commitment from the Executive to see their interests through. It is necessary that we make it clear to them that there is a change:

- (1) The Executive branch has now a different view;
- (2) The votes in Congress are simply not there.

*Secretary Brown:* They may not be bound by Congress, but we are!

*Mr. Clifford:* Our mission's responsibility is to make this clear to Turkey. In confidential conversation we can get into the linkage of the Cyprus and DCA question without appearing really to hook the two together inseparably.

The Denktash/Makarios meeting may have some significance but may only be the result of the announcement of our mission. There is a second meeting scheduled between the two to be attended by Waldheim also. These are the first meetings in 13 years. At least they are talking although nothing substantive was discussed and both restated their known position.

We expect a good reception from the Greeks; we will let you know if any substantive discussion on bases (?) takes place. Makarios has even invited me to lunch.

*Dr. Brzezinski:* Have a food-taster along!

*Mr. Clifford:* Our problem is we don't have much time. Carter has to go over Ford's budget by March. Under new regulation, Congress has to reach a decision on budget by May 15. I will bring this to the attention of both the Greeks and the Turks. I expect good cooperation from the Greeks. Denktash and Makarios will try; the big problem is going to be Turkey. We feel sympathetic and understanding: Demirel has to be cautious not to indicate he is making concessions; his rival will jump on it. If I were Demirel I would like to go into the Turkish election with a multimillion dollar DCA concluded.

If Cyprus settlement can come not from direct pressure from the U.S., and [not?] as a condition for a U.S./Turkish DCA, but maybe as a



result of a UN initiative it will be more acceptable to the Turkish people.

The problems of a Cyprus settlement are many:

- (a) apportioning of population;
- (b) apportioning of land;
- (c) titles to property; etc.

If we can get an understanding on basic principle, an agreement to come back with, we can perhaps go to Congress with this and ask them to go along with the executive on faith. I would personally like to see a Turkish DCA; I would like to see a restoration of the bases in Turkey . . .

*Lt. Gen. Smith:* Yes, sir.

*Mr. Clifford:* The best that can be expected from the mission is to develop a climate within which the parties feel that there can be understanding as a basis for progress. If, on the other hand, we come back and say that the Turks are unwilling to do anything at all at this time we will have to report this to the NSC and have the policy makers decide what this Administration's position is going to be.

*Secretary Vance:* It will be important to work with the Nine. The Nine have leverage with Greece, so that will be an important piece of the puzzle.<sup>6</sup>

*Mr. Clifford:* Yes, but we cannot use their leverage with Turkey, and that is where we need it.

*Dr. Brzezinski:* It appears that the definition of objectives for the Clifford mission is consistent with Option I of the PRM; this seems to indicate that Option II is considered implicitly impractical.<sup>7</sup> I would like, however, to raise an issue: is it wise to focus so heavily and directly on the Cyprus issue itself? Ought we not to consider, not a new line, but a somewhat different focus for this mission? As stated now, there is the danger that the Clifford mission could be perceived as a U.S. mediation effort on Cyprus. Should we not consider the alternative of focusing on the general Greek-Turkish relationship as such . . .

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<sup>6</sup> Reference is to the European Community.

<sup>7</sup> Reference is presumably to the February 3 review paper mandated by PRM 5. Prepared by the Department of State, the paper offered two options regarding U.S. involvement in promoting a settlement of the Cyprus dispute. The first option reads: "If the parties in the area are receptive to a U.S. initiative on Cyprus and the European Community continues to want to work closely with us, we should make a major effort in close consultation with the EC to achieve a significant breakthrough within the next two to three months or at a minimum to institute a more intensive and continuous process of negotiations between the Cyprus communities." The second option reads: "If one or more of the parties do not want the U.S. involved or are unwilling to engage in a serious negotiation process, we should stand back until a more active U.S. role appears propitious while continuing to support any efforts the Secretary General and European Community can mount."

Work with those two . . . Make the purpose of the mission not be a triangle Athens/Ankara/Nicosia, but an Athens/Ankara shuttle aiming at facilitating the dialogue between Athens and Ankara, all aspects of the relations between these two and hope that resolution of the Cyprus question will come as an outcome of that more general dialogue . . .

*Secretary Vance:* Let me speak to this: I doubt that the ultimate solution in Cyprus really depends on the Greeks and the Turks. Makarios still has the ability to block anything they might agree to.

*Dr. Brzezinski:* That is precisely my point—it will be much easier for us to deal with Makarios if movement has been started in the whole Greco-Turkish relationship. If you concentrate on Cyprus alone, then Makarios's ability to spoil things will be enhanced. But I am really posing this whole consideration as a question. It seems to me that the Clifford mission should aim at getting a dialogue going between Demirel and Caramanlis . . .

*Secretary Vance:* A dialogue on what?

*Dr. Brzezinski:* On all aspects of their relationship . . .

*Secretary Brown:* Stay out of the Aegean question—Cyprus is the only item of interest to Congress . . .

*Dr. Brzezinski:* Unless you get the Turks and the Greeks to focus on the larger dimensions of their relationship, you plunge too heavily into the most emotion-laden issue—Cyprus itself, and the whole mission runs the danger of being unsuccessful.

*Secretary Vance:* Leave it up to Clark to handle; the important thing to Congress is movement with respect to Cyprus.

*Dr. Brzezinski:* There is no dispute about this—the question remains: how do you get movement? You won't get movement if you plunge right into the middle of the Cyprus issue. Mr. Clifford should consider concentrating on Athens and Ankara, going back and forth between the two perhaps twice before even going on to Cyprus.

*Secretary Vance:* We would leave it up to Clark; he should be flexible about going back to any place if he considers it advisable.

*Dr. Brzezinski:* This is fine; this flexibility should include the option to skip Nicosia if he so decides.

*Secretary Vance:* No argument.

*Mr. Clifford:* I recognize the merit of Zbig's point: the question becomes what do you say as you get off the plane in Athens, then in Ankara . . . In Athens the emphasis should be placed on US-Greek relations; if the question of Cyprus comes up, fine, discuss it in private meetings. In Ankara, I will emphasize my defense background and the long-standing US-Turkish defense relationship with reference to NATO, our bases, etc. I intend to make no mention of Cyprus at all. However, when I talk privately with Demirel I can say "Mr. Prime Min-

ister, it is up to you: do you want to help us with the problem we have with Congress?"

We can lay off Cyprus; but in the last analysis in addition to furthering relations with two important allies, it is progress in Cyprus that interests Congress; in fact, Congress is shockingly uninterested in long-term Greek-US and Turkish-US relationship.

*Dr. Brzezinski:* I find what Mr. Clifford has said much more congenial than Option I of the State Department paper. Our objective should be: improve Greco-Turkish relations so that within that climate the Cyprus question can be resolved.

*Secretary Vance:* Do not delude yourself, however, that the heart of the problem is Cyprus.

*Secretary Brown:* The administration cannot officially link Cyprus to the DCA but we should tell Turkey privately about it.

*Mr. Clifford:* The mission's success should not be directly linked to the solution of the Cyprus question. So that the mission will not be a failure we must emphasize the value of our relationships with the Greeks and the Turks. Cyprus can be kept within the framework of the discussions but not become their focus.

*Mr. Knoche:* Try to include the Turkish General Staff in the discussions.

*Secretary Vance:* They will probably be in the next room along with other advisers of Demirel's. Demirel will shuttle between the conference room and his advisers for consultations.

*Mr. Clifford:* General Sancar is not averse to some movement on Cyprus. Cyprus has no real economic significance for Turkey; it has no military significance and to the contrary it is an expensive operation for the Turkish army to maintain. It is essentially an emotional factor. If we can diminish this emotional factor and set Cyprus within the framework of the factors that are of much greater importance to Turkey—military aid and its entire relationship with the U.S. and the West—we will have some degree of success. If the groundwork is laid so that a next mission can pursue it, we will have succeeded in this mission.

*Secretary Brown:* Don't tie the success of your mission to a solution of the Cyprus problem. The *process* only should be set.

*Mr. Aaron:* Yes, do not tie us too close to that; we do not want to have them come to us every time something goes wrong!

(General agreement)

*Mr. Clifford:* A congressman in fact told me "Mr. Clifford, we expect you to come back and right there would be The Clifford Line." I cannot imagine this working and I will not aim for it.

*Mr. Duncan:* Yet someone else from the outside will have to take the political flak for drawing that line at the end.

*Secretary Vance:* No doubt. The Greeks will say 20%; the Turks 30–33%; then someone within that range will have to say “this is the line.” They will not do it themselves. Neither wants to give way to the other.

If we can get enough progress as a result of this mission to get the two DCA’s through Congress together, the chance of further success is good. If we cannot, everything may unravel. We may even have trouble maintaining our fallback position which is to maintain aid at its current levels.

*Secretary Brown:* How would no DCA affect the Turkish elections?

*Secretary Vance:* It will help Ecevit; it will hurt Demirel.

*Mr. Aaron:* This is where the Greeks become important. If you can get the Greeks to agree to consider going forward with a DCA and asking their supporters here to support it then you might start unravelling this knot.

*Mr. Clifford:* The Greek position is: no DCA for Greece, because then there will be a DCA for Turkey and the Greeks want no Turkish DCA. They have no interest in a Greek DCA; current levels of aid favor them and they see no reason to change that.

*Mr. Henze:* Karamanlis is not such a hard-liner on this; actually the Greeks in America have taken a harder line.

*Secretary Vance:* Clark, you should feel your way around: the Nine can help, the English and French have indicated a desire to help, the Germans have some leverage with Turkey.

*Mr. Clifford:* I will leave them with the suggestion that if they want us we will come back.

*Admiral Turner:* I would like to stress the depth of the Turkish feeling that for the past two years we have been putting it to them. It is very unlikely that they will be in a mood for any concessions. There is a strong feeling of injustice felt particularly by the military people.

*Mr. Clifford:* I have no illusions on this subject: Turkey is the problem. They are deeply aggrieved by what they consider our improper, infamous actions in the past. But we have to convince them that this is a new deal, that they and we should find a way to be of benefit to them. I hope that by the third day I would be successful in changing their attitude.

*Mr. Hartman:* You also have to keep in mind that the Turks have accomplished their objectives in Cyprus: they are protecting their population.

[name not declassified: 1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

*Secretary Vance:* Troop withdrawal means a lot to middle-of-the-road congressmen.

*Mr. Hartman:* I do not think that it will satisfy the Hill.

*Secretary Vance:* I read it differently.

*Mr. Clifford:* Perhaps troop withdrawal coupled with other signs of progress will be of some impact.

*Secretary Vance:* There is no decision needed out of this meeting. Our purpose was to get everyone's views on the Clifford mission before Clark leaves.

*Secretary Brown:* There are differences of shading, nuance.

*Secretary Vance:* Get them to us and we will revise the memorandum to reflect them and redistribute it.

*Mr. Clifford:* I want to thank everyone for holding this meeting for me. I will report back to you on my return to assist you in determining the administration's position and policy on this issue. I have also been asked to report to the Congress as soon as I return.

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## 6. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 10, 1977, 3–4:05 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Cyprus and the Aegean

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *State*

Secretary Vance  
Arthur Hartman

#### *Defense*

Harold Brown  
Charles W. Duncan  
Gen. William Smith (JCS)  
Maynard Glitman

#### *CIA*

Enno Knoche  
[name not declassified]  
Stansfield Turner

#### *NSC*

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron  
Robert Hunter  
Paul Henze  
Gregory Treverton  
Christine Dodson

#### *Special Emissary*

Clark Clifford

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 9, Cyprus: 1977. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter wrote "ok" and initialed "C" at the top of the first page. For the minutes of this meeting, see Document 5.

### 1. *Nature of the Problem*

All agreed that Turkey is the key to the current problem. It deeply resents the arms embargo and Congress' failure to approve the Defense Cooperation Agreement. Turkey bristles at any attempt to link Congressional passage of the DCA or military aid to Turkish concessions on Cyprus. At the same time, the attitude in Congress remains stiff: if there is no Turkish movement on Cyprus, Congress may not approve the DCA. Clifford reported that many in Congress are surprisingly insensitive to the serious damage done to American [*less than 1 line not declassified*] capabilities by the loss of the Turkish bases.

### 2. *Guidelines for the Clifford Mission*

Clifford's mission will be exploratory in nature, an effort to improve the climate for negotiations in the region, not to seek final solutions. However, the mission will be an important shaper of the tone of future American policy and how it is perceived. Cyprus is the Congressional problem, all agreed, but there were differences about what that meant for immediate strategy. Several suggested that there is no way to avoid confronting the Cyprus problem early and directly, with the considerable American involvement in negotiating a solution. Others, however, worried that too much focus on Cyprus, rather than on more general Greek-Turkish relations, would make the entire process hostage to the Cypriot leaders, especially Makarios, and expose the United States to blame for any failure.

### 3. *Objectives of the Clifford Mission*

Clifford emphasized that the purpose of his mission is to begin building a climate in which the Greeks and Turks can improve their bilateral relations, and in which progress on Cyprus is possible. The maximum objective would be to return with enough evidence of Turkish flexibility on Cyprus to induce Congress to move forward with the Turkish DCA. All agreed, however, that the chance of that is practically nil. It might be possible to demonstrate enough movement so that Congress will continue the present limited supplies of arms to Turkey.

### 4. *Scenario for the Mission*

It was agreed that Clifford will use his judgment about stops in addition to the three capitals and Vienna (to see UN Secretary General Waldheim). He might conduct a second round of visits to Athens and Ankara before going to Cyprus. And he might visit Chancellor Schmidt, since the Germans have good relations with Turkey.

—*In Athens*, he will stress in public the importance of U.S.-Greek relations. In private, he will press the Greeks to move ahead with negotiation of a Greek DCA, so that it can go to Congress in tandem with the

Turkish DCA. If Caramanlis agrees to that, pro-Greek members of Congress can hardly object.

—*In Ankara*, he will try to avoid any public mention of Cyprus, and stress the importance of U.S.-Turkish defense relations. But in private he will indicate to Prime Minister Demirel, frankly, that we need his help if the DCA is to get through Congress.

—*In Cyprus*, he will support the efforts of the parties to work toward a settlement, perhaps under UN auspices. All agreed that some outsider would, in the end, have to suggest the final compromise on territory. It is important to work with the European Community as well. It has considerable leverage with Greece, which is seeking admission.

—*On returning* to the United States, Clifford will report to the President.

—*Later*, a further trip to the area might be warranted.

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## 7. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 15, 1977, 1:45–2:15 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

The President

Clark Clifford

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Mathew Nimetz, Counselor-designate, Department of State

Gregory F. Treverton, NSC Staff

1. The President outlined his understanding of the current situation: we need the bases in Greece and Turkey. There is a strong Greek-American political force that must be recognized. There may be some feeling in Turkey that the President is biased towards Greece. The President noted the progress made in the inter-communal talks under

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: President: 2/77. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

Waldheim's auspices.<sup>2</sup> He also noted the leverage provided by West Germany's relationship with Turkey, and he indicated that Clifford should see Schmidt if he thought it useful.

2. The President said we want to let Greece and Turkey know we are prepared to help but will not intrude. We need a Greek DCA to go forward with the Turkish DCA. At the same time, we need help from Turkey. There will be no public link between Cyprus and the DCA, but no matter how we feel, Congress and the public see a tie.

3. Clifford called the mission wise and timely, though it is unlikely to result in a major breakthrough. He described his discussions with Congress and emphasized the apparent impasse between Congress and the Turks over passage of the DCA. He suggested that the Makarios-Denktaş meetings, a hopeful development, are unlikely to result in a settlement without pressure from Greece and Turkey.

4. Clifford indicated that the United States is not too popular in Greece. He felt the Greeks might be prepared to give up their DCA if that would prevent the Turks from obtaining theirs.

5. In Turkey, Clifford said he would emphasize that the situation has changed from the previous Administration. Congress and the Executive will work together. He will say explicitly that we want the DCA to pass, but that we will need help from the Turks.

6. Clifford indicated we have no plan to take to the area. After the trip, however, we should have a better sense of the situation, the constraints, and the possibilities for movement. If that enables us to develop a plan about how to proceed, perhaps that plan should be passed to the UN. Brzezinski concurred in the outline of Clifford's strategy. It seems sensible to him to try to solve the Cyprus issue by improving relations between ourselves and Greece and Turkey, and between the two of them, rather than through a head-on approach.

7. In closing, Clifford indicated the deadline imposed by Congressional action on the budget. The Ford budget contains \$250 million in Turkish aid. This Administration will have to make its intentions known about that aid, perhaps as early as late March.

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<sup>2</sup> On the origins of intercommunal talks mediated by the UN, which commenced in January 1975, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1975, pp. 273–277. Talks continued intermittently over the next two years with Greek and Turkish participation. According to a report issued by Waldheim on December 9, 1976, tensions between the two communities had quieted over the previous several months, although the fundamental problems arising from the conflict in 1974 remained unresolved. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1976, pp. 296–297)



**8. Report by the President's Personal Emissary to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (Clifford) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 1, 1977

The mission you assigned to me and my associates has proved to be a fascinating one and we are gratified that progress was made in the various areas of concern that the United States has felt over developments in the Eastern Mediterranean.

There was assigned to me an unusually able and experienced staff. Messrs. Nimetz, Ledsky, Treverton and Hopper made an invaluable contribution to the mission. We had team strategy sessions before going to each country and reached agreement as to the proper approach to be employed. The United States Ambassadors and their staffs in the countries we visited also made important contributions to our efforts and fully participated in our discussions.

In analyzing the conversation that you and I had, plus the briefings that I received at the State Department and from the National Security Council, I felt that you had given me four assignments:

1. Gather the facts regarding the problems of the Eastern Mediterranean and get the attitudes of the various leaders of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.

2. Begin making a preliminary effort to lessen tensions that exist between Greece and Turkey over the Aegean.

3. Search for ways to improve the bilateral relationships that exist between the United States and Greece and the United States and Turkey.

4. Ascertain what contribution, if any, the United States could make toward obtaining progress in the solution of the bitter dispute in Cyprus.

In an assignment of this kind, my experience leads me to believe that one of the first orders of business is to ascertain where the pressure points are. What leverage do we have on the various parties that we can properly utilize to persuade them to make a contribution toward peace in the area? To illustrate: it was already clear before we left Washington that if the question of the settlement of the Cyprus question were left solely to the two Cypriot communities, there was virtually no chance

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 9, Cyprus: 1977. Secret. Clifford's mission to the Eastern Mediterranean was from February 15 to March 1, which included a visit to London February 27–March 1. Clifford discussed the report with President Carter on March 4; see Document 10.

that progress would be made. For two and a half years the parties have scarcely been talking. United Nations machinery has been ineffective in getting the parties to negotiate seriously. Some new effort was clearly needed.

I shall now address myself to the four assignments that you gave us.

1. *Gather the facts and obtain the attitudes of the leaders.* We have learned a great deal about the area. Our meetings in the various countries were with the heads of government and their senior advisers, as well as with Secretary General Waldheim. In each country we visited, I held several private conversations with the national leader, and as a team we held lengthy substantive discussions on major issues of concern with the foreign ministers, defense ministers and senior officials. As personal relationships were developed, the talks became franker and more forthright. By the time we left each country we had a clear picture of the attitude of each government and the personalities of the men who were involved. We not only directed our inquiries to the governments now in office, but in each instance had excellent meetings with opposition leaders. This resulted in the acquisition of much valuable information that will be useful to us in the future. Appended to this report is a chronology of our meetings and general summary reports of our discussions in each country we visited. We have also attached memoranda of conversations prepared with respect to certain particularly important meetings.

2. *Make an effort to lessen the tension in the Aegean.* I believe we all received the clear impression that the dispute between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean could result in an incident leading to confrontation or even war. Prime Minister Caramanlis lectured us with intense feeling on his perception of Turkish expansionism in the Aegean. The controversies between Greece and Turkey center upon the following: (a) questions regarding the continental shelf in the Aegean; (b) the air control zone over the Aegean; (c) the boundaries of territorial waters; (d) militarization of certain Greek islands contrary to treaty obligations; and (e) the creation of a Turkish amphibious military force along the Aegean coast.

We noted with care Prime Minister Caramanlis' points and presented them to the Turkish Government. Turkish officials went to great length to explain the Turkish position in each instance and argued vehemently that Turkey was not expansionist.

I believe that this discussion had a number of benefits. It acquainted Turkey with the intensity of Caramanlis' feeling about these Aegean problems. It may persuade both sides to negotiate more seriously during the forthcoming round of continental shelf talks in Paris. The expression of our deep concern about possible incidents may re-

duce the risk of unilateral research operations by Turkey in sensitive disputed areas of the Aegean, but it should be noted that we received no assurance in this regard. Turkey has been made aware of our deep concern about difficulties in the Aegean and of our opinion that hostilities between the two countries would mean an immediate cessation of US arms flow to the area. We should build upon this understanding in Turkey to discuss the Aegean issues more forthrightly with the Greek Government with a view to encouraging substantive negotiations and avoiding unfortunate incidents.

3. *Improve bilateral relationships between United States and Greece and United States and Turkey.* The delivery of personal letters from you to the leaders of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus was well received and provided an opening toward better relations.<sup>2</sup> The appointment of Secretary Vance was particularly well received in the area, as was the knowledge that the new United States Administration was reviewing its policies in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Lengthy and valuable conversations were held on a range of bilateral issues. Both Greece and Turkey are dissatisfied with their relationships with the United States and we gave them full opportunity to air all their grievances. There is now a better understanding on the part of these nations regarding the attitude of the United States.

For a considerable period of time the Greeks have taken a relaxed attitude toward resuming negotiations regarding the US-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement. During our discussions we pressed them to set a date for resumption of the talks. On the last day of our stay in Athens, the Foreign Minister informed us that he had been instructed by Caramanlis to say that by the middle of March the Greeks would have a team ready to negotiate. In our discussions with the Greeks about their NATO relationship, we obtained their fundamental support for a gradual reintegration in NATO's military wing, but we believe this will proceed slowly until the Cyprus and Aegean issues are closer to solution.

We discussed United States-Turkish bilateral relations at some length in Ankara, and we believe the Turkish leaders now understand as never before that improved relations depend on movement in Cyprus. However, we emphasized, publicly and privately, our desire

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<sup>2</sup> Carter sent letters on February 15 to Fahri Korutürk, President of the Republic of Turkey; Constantine Tsatsos, President of the Hellenic Republic; and Archbishop Makarios III, President of the Republic of Cyprus. In each letter, Carter expressed his appreciation for the good wishes he received from the leaders' respective countries, and cast the Clifford mission as a way to reduce tensions. The text of the three letters is in telegram 35392 to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia, February 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770055–1157) He also sent letters to Karamanlis and Demirel. See Document 87.

to restore close relations and the importance we attach to Turkey's contribution to NATO. We were heartened that these feelings were reciprocated, and that we did not hear any threats that Turkey was considering leaving NATO or taking an anti-Western attitude.

4. *Ascertain what contribution, if any, the United States could make to getting progress in the solution of the bitter dispute in Cyprus.* This is the toughest nut of them all to crack. The parties operate within a framework of a long history of bitterness, recrimination and intercommunal violence. We all recognized that this was the problem that would take the greatest efforts if any concrete commitments were to be obtained.

Our strategy began in Turkey. We informed the Turks flatly that there was no chance that the United States Congress would pass a Defense Cooperation Agreement with the Turkish Government until substantial continuing progress was made in Cyprus. The Turks repeated their long-standing objection to linking the defense agreement with Cyprus and said that they felt they had been treated very unfairly by the United States Congress and in fact had been humiliated by the imposition of the embargo. They believe they have a strong legal case and a strong moral case for their intervention in Cyprus. As the talks progressed, however, they became more realistic. The Turks were finally convinced that it did them no good to rail at the Congress, but that if they wished to improve their position with the United States in the defense field, they would have to make a substantial contribution to the solution of the Cyprus question.

Late on the last day of our visit in Ankara, the Foreign Minister informed us that, after intense deliberations, his government would give us its commitment that the Turkish Cypriot negotiator would place upon the table, at the March 31 Vienna intercommunal talks, a concrete and reasonable proposal for the constitutional structure of a new government in Cyprus. They also agreed to serious and sustained negotiations in the future.

We consider this Turkish commitment to be an important step forward. The parties have talked intermittently at each other for some time but each has refused to make written proposals or to talk seriously about substance. We made no reciprocal United States commitment in response to this decision other than to say that the Turkish action would have a favorable impact upon our policy review, and that we would seek to obtain a reciprocal territorial proposal from Archbishop Makarios.

After this forward step in Ankara, we proceeded to Cyprus for conferences with Archbishop Makarios and the Turkish leader, Mr. Denktash. I had two lengthy visits with Archbishop Makarios. Our team decided on the strategy that Makarios must be told that United States interest in Cyprus, while at the present time at a high level, is

fairly certain to decline. Makarios was told that if a settlement in Cyprus was not reached during this year, he could expect the United States interest to decline to the point where his bargaining posture would deteriorate substantially. In addition, we told Makarios that our concern over our bilateral relationship with Turkey and the condition of the NATO alliance was such that we could not endanger those relationships much longer by using whatever leverage we had to obtain the cooperation of other nations in working toward a settlement in Cyprus. Noting the great importance of the territorial issue to the Greek Cypriots, we suggested that the most valuable contribution that Makarios could make would be for him to agree to place upon the table a specific proposal covering the division of territory.

The impact of this argument on Makarios was profound. At our second meeting, he was more forthcoming and stated that he had reached the decision to place upon the table in Vienna on March 31 a map which would recognize the principle of bizonality (a concession he has never before made directly to the Turks), and would provide for a 20% Turkish zone. Such a proposal would form the basis of the negotiations over the territorial division in a federal state between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, Makarios and his Foreign Minister promised to engage in sustained negotiations and indicated they would welcome continued help from the United States.

The conference with the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Denktash, was the most difficult of all because he resented the pressure toward a settlement he was receiving from the Turks and further resented the fact that there was nothing he could do about it. However, Denktash and his Turkish Cypriot associates did confirm that they would present a written constitutional proposal in Vienna. In addition, Denktash did agree that serious and sustained negotiations would be undertaken.

The negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots will continue to take place under United Nations auspices, and we assured Secretary General Waldheim that our involvement was in no way in competition with his prominent role. Waldheim, however, is eager for our assistance and support. Now that the parties are committed to submit concrete, responsible proposals (the Turks on constitutional arrangements and the Greeks on territorial division) and to negotiate responsibly, a supportive role in encouraging further progress seems appropriate for the United States.

A supportive role for the British and perhaps other European powers may also be helpful at an appropriate time. We discussed the Cyprus part of our mission in detail with Foreign Minister Owen in London at the conclusion of our travels. The British are guarantors, along with Greece and Turkey, of the 1960 Cyprus constitution and also retain two sovereign base areas on the island which we believe to be of

great value to the United States and Western Europe and to the present delicate stability of Cyprus.<sup>3</sup> The British may discuss these base areas with you during Prime Minister Callaghan's visit next week, for they have been seeking to reduce their commitments on Cyprus. This concerns us. Both the Turkish leaders and Makarios explicitly requested that the other Europeans not be brought into the detailed Cyprus negotiations at this time, and we have honored their request in our discussions with the British.

No one can guarantee that once the negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots actually begin in Vienna, the parties will act in good faith. Each has, however, been given the clear impression that if the proposal each presents is merely formal, or is plainly unreasonable, and if substantive negotiations do not ensue, that fact will not be lost upon us.

The only way that Makarios and Denktash can reach agreement will be under the continued leverage that has now been introduced and that must be continued, certainly during the balance of this year. We believe that this leverage can be successful because both the Turkish and the Cypriot leaders now understand that they have more to gain from making a serious effort to seek a solution through the creation of a unitary, bizonal, federal state on Cyprus than to remain intransigent and inflexible and risk United States displeasure.

The interest displayed by the President of the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean, in itself, has had a profound impact upon the area. Everyone took note of the fact that you chose in the first month of your new term to give such important attention to the problems of that area and that you were seriously reviewing United States policies in the region. The nations involved would like to establish a good working relationship with the new Administration, and we emphasized the fact that the next eight-year period of the Carter Administration would be extremely critical for their political, military and economic interests.

We have a delicate task in the future to relax certain restrictions regarding Turkey, to strengthen relationships with Greece without incurring Turkish displeasure, and at the same time to maintain sufficient leverage to obtain their continued interest in assisting in the settlement of the Cyprus question. We believe that this task is well worth undertaking to further the important interests of the United States in strengthening the southern flank of NATO, in restoring solid relation-

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<sup>3</sup> The Governments of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom signed an agreement on February 19, 1959, in London which, among other provisions, gave each country guarantor status to ensure the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. (Department of State *Bulletin*, March 16, 1959, pp. 367-368) The Cypriot constitution was agreed on in Zurich on February 11, 1960, leading to Cypriot independence on August 16, 1960. The United Kingdom retained sovereignty over two military bases on the island.

ships with two old friends and in resolving a problem of great humanitarian concern on Cyprus.

### *Recommendations*

On the basis of the facts we have gathered, the efforts we have made, and the progress already achieved in improving United States relations with the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, we believe that our policies in the months ahead should be directed toward the following ends:

1. Given the importance we attach to NATO, the rebuilding of its Southeastern flank, and our own bilateral security relationship with Turkey, as well as the positive attitude we encountered in Ankara, we recommend that at an early date the Administration endorse in principle the United States-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement which has already been submitted to Congress. This endorsement should be coupled, however, with an indication that the Administration will not press for Congressional approval of this agreement at this time. It would be understood that the Administration would take an active role in seeking enactment of the DCA only after substantial progress has been made toward achieving a Cyprus settlement, which we believe can occur in 1977.

2. We recommend, as an interim measure, that you request Congress to enact legislation for FY 1978 that will permit foreign military sales to Turkey, as well as FMS financing of \$175 million, through credits or guaranties. This recommendation to Congress could be coupled with a request to selected NATO allies that they provide additional military equipment which Turkey needs to fulfill NATO commitments. We believe this positive approach to Turkish military needs would be appreciated in Ankara, but would not be seen in Greece or Cyprus as inimical to their interests.

3. We strongly believe that the United States must continue to play an active role in the Cyprus negotiating process. This role should be supportive of United Nations Secretary General Waldheim, and closely coordinated with our principal European allies.

4. Especially with respect to Cyprus, we consider it important that between now and the resumption of intercommunal negotiations in Vienna on March 31, our efforts be directed to ensuring that Greek Cypriot proposals on territory, and Turkish Cypriot proposals on a future Cyprus constitution, be sufficiently realistic and constructive as to form the basis for sustained negotiations. Assistance to the parties might also be necessary in connection with the meetings, so as to avoid the procedural breakdowns that have occurred in the past. We should maintain a supportive role with the parties to the intercommunal talks, to encourage a sustained negotiating tempo. This will probably entail

maintaining effective leverage on Turkey, Cyprus and Greece to make the reasonable concessions and accommodations that will be essential.

5. Further with respect to Cyprus, we recommend that you ask the Congress to appropriate assistance funds to be made available once the two Cypriot communities reach a settlement. The funds would be designed for reconstruction and development of the island and would be apportioned on a fair basis so that both the Greek and Turkish zones would benefit.

6. A strong effort should be made to persuade the British to retain their two important sovereign base areas on Cyprus. As a last resort, some United States financial support for these bases may be necessary, but we need not decide upon any such arrangement before consultations with the British on this subject are held. Prime Minister Callaghan will very likely have a request in this regard when he talks with you in Washington next week.

7. With respect to Greece, we believe it is important to resume talks as soon as possible to conclude a United States-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement. We must anticipate, however, that the Greek Government may move slowly since it has little incentive to conclude the agreement until it is convinced that your Administration will recommend Congressional approval of the United States-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement.

8. To preserve and rebuild the Southeastern flank of NATO, we recommend continuing to work for the reintroduction of Greece into the military wing of NATO as early as possible. We should pursue this goal through the alliance structure and with our individual NATO partners.

9. The Aegean controversy between Greece and Turkey is potentially the most explosive dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean. We do not believe that our Government's own views on the complex underlying issues are as yet clearly formed. Accordingly, we propose that a comprehensive study of Aegean issues be undertaken under the leadership of the Secretary of State and that once firm conclusions are rendered, both Greece and Turkey be counseled as to our conclusions and asked whether we might be of further assistance in resolving Aegean difficulties. Until this study is completed, we recommend that the United States steer an even-handed course and refrain from giving the Greek Government the type of written security guarantee that it is seeking from us. Instead, we should continue to tell both the Greeks and the Turks of our strong desire that these complex issues be resolved by substantive negotiation between them or by mutually agreed upon third-party procedures.

I wish to express my gratitude to the President for this opportunity to serve in this important area of international concern.



We remain available to be of assistance in any manner in which the President should desire.

Respectfully submitted,

Clark M. Clifford<sup>4</sup>

### **Attachment**

### **Record of Meeting With Secretary-General Waldheim<sup>5</sup>**

February 18, 1977

#### *Meeting with Waldheim*

Clifford met for two hours over breakfast February 17 with UN Secretary General Waldheim in Vienna to review the results of Waldheim's meeting in Nicosia the weekend of February 12–13 with Cypriot President Makarios and Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash.

Clifford thanked the Secretary General for making time available on his busy schedule, and noted how valuable Waldheim's personal views would be to the US team which was just beginning a trip to the Eastern Mediterranean. Nuances which Waldheim could provide of the meeting last weekend in Nicosia would be of great value.

Waldheim described the meeting in Nicosia in a positive fashion. While noting that no solution could be expected soon, he said he was pleased that things were moving again. A new spirit was visible in Cyprus. Both Makarios and Denktash seemed interested in making progress and were now prepared to discuss substantive issues in a way that had been impossible before. Waldheim said Makarios in particular appeared anxious to negotiate, and while the verbal exchange between Denktash and Makarios had been extremely tough, the atmosphere between the two was friendly throughout most of their long four-hour meeting together.

Waldheim then reviewed in some detail the background of each of the four principles which had been agreed upon, principles which he described as "sufficiently clear" to offer a basis for subsequent negotiations. The key word in the first principle, according to Waldheim, was "bicomunal". Use of this word allowed Makarios to keep his options open, although Waldheim conceded that Denktash had made it adamantly clear that no solution other than a bi-zonal one was possible.

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<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

<sup>5</sup> Secret.

Waldheim said that there had been an endless discussion of the second principle which dealt with territory. The Turks had repeated their earlier figure of 32.8 or 20 percent. Waldheim said it was his personal feeling on the basis of this and earlier discussions that an eventual settlement somewhere between 25 and 27 percent was obtainable. As for the third point, Waldheim said that Denktash had made it clear that "freedom of settlement" could be no more than a statement of principle. The phrase "certain practical difficulties" in this principle was shorthand for Turkish security considerations. Waldheim said there had been general agreement in discussion of the fourth principle that foreign affairs, defense and finance would be among those powers reserved to the central government.

Waldheim said that with respect to subsequent negotiations, he had in mind convening inter-communal talks in Vienna on March 30, or March 31. Waldheim would stay in Vienna only for the first four or five days, and then turn the negotiations over to Ambassador De Cuellar. Waldheim said he hoped this next round would last four to five weeks, and that a final solution to the Cyprus problem could be achieved before the end of 1977. Waldheim cited two reasons for the "breakthrough" which resulted in agreement to resume the inter-communal talks. The first was Greek understanding that support by the international community, as expressed through a succession of US [UN] resolutions, had provided no real basis for movement toward a Cyprus settlement. The second reason was Turkish recognition that despite their power on the ground, no international recognition for the new Turkish status on Cyprus was possible without a negotiated settlement. Waldheim said he had no doubt also that Turkish desire to have the United States approve the US-Turkish base agreement also had played an important role in getting Ankara to be more flexible.

Clifford expressed his appreciation to Waldheim for his description and analysis. He explained briefly the nature of his own mission to the area, putting emphasis on the US desire to begin a resolution of the bilateral difficulties we faced in both Greece and Turkey. He noted that our real interest centered on these bilateral security questions though we recognize that continuing difficulties in Cyprus prevented early progress in solving them.

With respect to Cyprus, Clifford emphasized US interest in having the UN play a leading role. We wanted to contribute in any way we could to this UN effort. Our preference was to adopt and maintain a low profile. We felt this was not only in our interest, but also better for the UN as well. In this regard, Clifford said we would be interested in Waldheim's judgment as to what we could do to be of help in assisting the Cyprus negotiating process.

Waldheim expressed appreciation for this offer of US assistance. He agreed that the US had a vital role to play, particularly through the contacts we have and the influence we can exert in Ankara and Athens. Waldheim noted that US and UN efforts could and should be complementary. The key to movement on Cyprus lay in Ankara, and it was here that Waldheim thought we could be of most assistance. The territorial issue was central for the Greek Cypriots, and US influence would be most welcome in getting the Turks to show flexibility in this area. Waldheim noted at the same time that this could not come from direct US pressure, since the Turks resisted any form of direct linkage of their DCA to Cyprus.

Clifford thanked Waldheim for his comments and noted again that we did not wish to take a leading role in Cyprus ourselves, but to contribute to maintaining the momentum which had been established through the initiative of UN Secretary General Waldheim. We wanted to help in any way we could. In this regard, Clifford suggested that Waldheim pass to the US any request he had for our assistance in moving the parties closer to an agreement.

Waldheim thanked Secretary Clifford for this frank exchange of views, and the offer of future US assistance. A solution to the Cyprus problem could only come about through the kind of complementary action by the US and the UN which had been discussed. It was agreed that we would work together in the months ahead, in an effort to move the Cyprus negotiations as quickly and constructively as possible toward a successful solution.

### **Attachment**

#### **Report by the President's Personal Emissary to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (Clifford) to President Carter<sup>6</sup>**

February 20, 1977

#### *Vienna/Athens Report*

Clifford had a good meeting in Vienna on February 17 with United Nations Secretary General Waldheim. Waldheim gave a full report on the Makarios-Denktaş meeting, expressing cautious optimism based on the apparent willingness of the parties to discuss issues. Waldheim welcomed U.S. help, noting U.S. influence in Ankara. Clifford stressed

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<sup>6</sup> Secret; Nodis.

the U.N. lead in this matter and the willingness of the U.S. to support his efforts.

Clifford met with Chancellor Kreisky and conveyed the President's personal regards and thanks for Austria's bicentennial gift to the U.S. (Professorships in Austrian History at Stanford University and the University of Minnesota). Kreisky spoke mostly about the Middle East, where he believes the time is right for a settlement; otherwise, less moderate Arab leaders will emerge in the PLO and in Arab nations.

In Athens, Clifford first paid courtesy calls on President Tsatsos and Prime Minister Karamanlis, delivering President Carter's letters, which were very much appreciated. Press coverage has been particularly positive, given the great unpopularity of the U.S. in Greece during the last few years. Long substantive meetings with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and other top officials went extremely well.<sup>7</sup>

The Greeks presented their positions clearly and with great force. These positions were not unlike those expressed in the past, but there was a new sense of urgency and pessimism, especially in the way Prime Minister Karamanlis outlined his current problems. Greek leaders clearly appreciated the chance to present their views to the President's personal emissary.

The major impression the Greeks wanted us to have was that Turkey had become over the past two years a fundamentally expansionist power, and that Turkish expansionism was aimed directly at Greece. The Greeks cited as evidence of this:

A. Turkey's second offensive in Cyprus in August 1974, and Turkish failure to negotiate in Cyprus in good faith on the territorial issue.

B. Disputes relating to the air zone over the Aegean.

C. Disputes over the Aegean continental shelf.

D. Other so-called Turkish provocative acts and statements.

In all their presentations, the Greeks stressed that the fault for all their current problems lay with Turkey. The Greeks insisted they were moderate and conciliatory, ready for negotiations and compromise. All progress, however, was blocked because of Turkey's basically expansionist orientation. Thus, there was an air of pessimism in every position. The Prime Minister stated with the utmost seriousness that he would no longer be able to follow a policy of moderation regarding Turkish provocations. He stated that Greece could be humiliated no longer because the Greek people would not stand for it. As an illustration, he stated flatly that if the Turks sent out an exploratory ship again,

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 5, Document 164.

Greece could no longer rely on diplomacy. With considerable emotion he informed us that the continuance of the present Turkish attitude, in his opinion, would lead to war between the two countries.

With reference to individual issues, the Greek positions can be summarized as follows:

A. We requested the Greeks to set a date for resumption of base negotiations. At formal meetings they were evasive. However, at our final lunch, the Foreign Minister stated that the Prime Minister had agreed to our request. He indicated an announcement to this effect will not be made until after the Clifford party leaves, ostensibly because of Greek domestic sensitivities, but also possibly because the Greeks are waiting to see what position the Clifford party will take with respect to the Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement. We agreed to a delay in the Greek announcement, and we expect the negotiations to resume either in Washington or Athens on or about March 15.

B. While Greek officials acknowledged that the position on the Turkish DCA was fully a matter solely for the U.S. to decide, both Karamanlis and Bitsios expressed a “private” view that U.S. military aid to Turkey should not be resumed until after a settlement of both the Cyprus issue and Greek-Turkish difficulties in the Aegean. This latter condition, which would link the resumption of Turkish military aid to resolution of the Aegean problem, constitutes a new and more rigid Greek position. The Greeks did suggest that both base agreements might be completed and ratified, but that the respective aid packages should be separated from the general documents.

C. With respect to NATO, the Greeks indicated they were in favor of the Alliance and wanted to move back towards full membership. But until there was progress on Cyprus and the Aegean, this re-entry would have to take a slow and measured pace, and therefore had to be organized on the basis of a special relationship.

D. The Greeks refrained from giving an indication of how the U.S. might be of assistance in facilitating a Cyprus settlement, although we put the question directly several times. The Greeks made clear that they themselves could not adopt an active role at present, but would continue to be helpful behind the scenes. The Greeks maintained that Makarios was now reasonable and wanted to negotiate and that therefore our most important service would be to press the Turks to make a reasonable territorial proposal. The Greeks, however, were not optimistic about the prospects for forthcoming inter-communal talks in Vienna in March.

The Greek Foreign Minister asked that the Kissinger letter of April 10, 1976, which the Greeks see as a mild form of security guarantee against Turkish actions in the Aegean, be reissued by Secretary Vance

and, if possible, strengthened to provide assurances against provocations by either side.<sup>8</sup>

Clifford and party listened to the Greek presentation, asked questions but made no commitments, except to take back their views to Washington, and to consider them carefully in the Government's review of policies in this area. Clifford expressed the view that the U.S. wishes to promote a strong NATO, to restore good U.S. relations with both Greece and Turkey, and to help Greece and Turkey resolve their differences.

Greek leaders expressed throughout their presentations their strong fears of Turkish intentions, including possible ultimate threats against the Greek islands in the Aegean. At the same time the Greeks, while insisting they were moderate, seemed to have no idea as to how they might resolve their problems with Turkey themselves. While talking of further negotiations they appeared to have no plan as to how to proceed, and they seem to have prepared no substantive proposals of their own, particularly with respect to the Aegean question which they claim is the most dangerous.

Greek moderation indeed appears based on a realization of Greece's fundamental weaknesses vis-a-vis Turkey. Nonetheless, the Prime Minister emphasized that hostilities between the two countries might occur and that he might not be able to restrain the Greek military and populace if what Greeks fear is Turkish provocation continues (such as seismic research operations by the Turks in the Aegean this spring and summer).

### **Attachment**

#### **Report by the President's Personal Emissary to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (Clifford) to President Carter<sup>9</sup>**

February 24, 1977

#### *Ankara Report*

Clifford met on February 21 and 22 with the top officials of the Turkish Government, including the President of the Republic, the

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<sup>8</sup> The letter was signed by President Ford and sent through Kissinger to Athens on April 9. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Document 63.

<sup>9</sup> Secret. The report is marked both Nodis and Exdis. See also Document 88.

Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Chief of the General Staff and other military leaders, the Defense Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Ecevit, and other officials.

These meetings were long, intensive and frank. Throughout Clifford received the most courteous reception and evidence of a strong desire of Turkish leaders to improve the present relationship. More important, although his message was tough, Clifford believes he received, somewhat unexpectedly, a positive, constructive response that may lead to movement in the Cyprus negotiations.

*Basic Message.* Clifford told the Turkish leaders the following: Our Government believed in a strong US-Turkish relationship; we believed it to be in our interest and in Turkey's interest to maintain and strengthen the NATO relationship; it was the basic desire of the United States Government to promote the defense cooperation agreement that had been signed; the attitude of our Congress was largely unchanged; and discernible improvement in the Cyprus situation was necessary if the DCA was to be pushed to enactment by the Administration. The United States and Turkey should be partners in a process of strengthening our relationship and getting the DCA enacted. Turkey's role in the partnership must be to encourage substantial progress in the Cyprus negotiations. We recognized Turkish sensitivities about linking Cyprus to the DCA and also the potential impact of this issue in their forthcoming election. Clifford made no public mention of any Cyprus/DCA link, and seldom referred publicly to Cyprus at all.

*Turkish Response.* The Turkish leaders expressed great concern about the arms embargo and the need for Congressional approval of the DCA. They described their long association as a trusted NATO ally; the long history of Cyprus which has no clear rights or wrongs; and emphasized that an arms embargo was not a proper way to treat an ally. This presentation of the Turkish position was generally mild and was not coupled with any threat to pull out of NATO or to permit the US-Turkish relationship to deteriorate. On the contrary, the Turks seemed—in private, of course—to accept the fact that Cyprus and the DCA are in reality linked at least in the eyes of the Congress. With respect to Cyprus, the Turks go back to 1959 and present a long list of grievances, including use by the Greeks of US arms in Cyprus, which they point out did not result in a US embargo of Greece. They are convinced, furthermore, that they made a major contribution by getting the recent round of Makarios/Denktash meetings started.

*The Aegean.* Clifford stated that he had found a fear in Greece of possible expansionist intentions on the part of Turkey, particularly with reference to the Aegean. This was evidenced, in Greek eyes, by the occupation of Cyprus, the dispute over air space, the continental shelf

and territorial waters, and the *Sismik* voyages.<sup>10</sup> Clifford indicated that the United States took no position on the Aegean issues and had no desire to interfere between the two nations, but that the United States was always concerned when two of its allies had disputes between them.

*Turkish Response on the Aegean.* In response, the Turks argued that they had good historical, equitable and legal arguments with respect to the complex Aegean issues and noted that Greece was turned down by both the Security Council and the World Court. To them, Greece appears now to be raising procedural issues to impede and delay substantive talks. The Turks further noted that Greece has militarized islands off their coast in clear contravention of provisions of the treaties by which Greece acquired the islands, including the Treaty of Paris to which the United States is a signatory. They asked why the United States does not embargo arms to Greece in response to this treaty violation. The Turks categorically reject the idea that they are an expansionist power. They disclaim any hostile intentions against Greece and any desire to take any of the Greek Aegean islands. This view was especially eloquently presented by Opposition Leader Ecevit who insisted that he and the present Turkish Government stood together in this matter. They view the Aegean problems as similar to those of other countries over difficult maritime resource issues, and believe they can be resolved by the two countries themselves through substantive negotiations. They believe that Greece takes an unreasonable position in viewing the Aegean as an exclusive Greek sea.

*The Positive Response.* During the course of his presentation to the Turkish officials, Clifford stated the need for movement on Cyprus in the strongest possible way. He told the Turks that he hoped they would actively consider their discussions and that he did not expect an immediate response. The message clearly registered upon the Turkish leaders. At the final meeting with the Foreign Minister and his top aides, Clifford did receive a response. The Foreign Minister, in a carefully worded statement, first repeated the basic Turkish position, but then went on to say that Turkey wished to be cooperative in this matter, and that the Turkish Cypriots would present a concrete proposal at the March 31 intercommunal meeting in Vienna, which we agreed to hold in the closest confidence. The Foreign Minister proposed further that it would be helpful if the Greek side would present a concrete territorial proposal, and implied that the United States might be helpful in Athens and Nicosia in obtaining such a step by the Greek Cypriot negotiator.

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<sup>10</sup> The *Sismik* was a Turkish oil exploration vessel operating in the Aegean in 1976. Greece considered the presence of the *Sismik* a provocation and threatened to deploy its navy to intercept the ship. News reports quoted Turkish Prime Minister Demirel as responding, "Interception of the *Sismik* will be an act of piracy. Short work is made of pirates." ("The Aegean: Acts of Piracy?," *Time*, August 23, 1976)



Clifford responded to the Turks, after a caucus with Ambassador Macomber and the members of his mission, as follows:

(a) We were gratified by the serious thought they had given these matters and the promptness and constructive nature of their response;

(b) Their commitment to make such a concrete proposal in the Vienna meeting could help lead to progress;

(c) We assumed this proposal would be reasonable, for obviously a polemical proposal would be counter-productive;

(d) We agreed that it would be useful if serious territorial proposals could also be on the table;

(e) We should obviously not disclose their proposed initiative, but would discuss the possibilities of a territorial proposal in Nicosia, London and Washington, and would keep the Government of Turkey informed, and they should do the same with us.

Clifford did not, however, give them much reason for optimism in expecting Archbishop Makarios to table such a proposal. He reiterated that this would be one of the matters we would discuss in London and in Washington and would remain in touch with both Ankara and Athens. Clifford suggested the possibility of one or more third parties presenting a territorial proposal through Waldheim if for political reasons Makarios would not.

Clifford also made the point that the negotiators in Vienna should work on a sustained and serious basis rather than have a mere pro forma meeting. The Turks said they agreed with this and would do their best to assure Turkish Cypriot cooperation.

Clifford promised the Turkish leaders that their proposed initiative would not be disclosed by him. Because the initiative might be imperiled if it were publicly associated with his visit to Ankara, Clifford has requested that the greatest confidentiality be accorded this information until such time as it is made public by the parties themselves.

Clifford is not certain this commitment by the Turkish Government will lead to real progress, but it does constitute a concrete commitment. He was pleased with the attitude of the Turkish leaders.

## Attachment

### Report by the President's Personal Emissary to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (Clifford) to President Carter<sup>11</sup>

February 26, 1977

#### *Nicosia Report*

The Clifford Mission met on February 23, 24 and 25 with the leading officials of the Cypriot Government, including President Makarios, the Foreign Minister, the leader of the opposition party, Mr. Clerides, the Greek Cypriot negotiators in the Cyprus talks and other officials. The Mission also visited the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot negotiator and most of the members of the Turkish Cypriot leadership. Mr. Clifford's two private meetings with Archbishop Makarios were extremely productive, leading to a concrete response. The Archbishop agreed, after a long and frank discussion, to accept the principle of bizonality and to present a bizonal map with a 20 per cent Turkish zone at Vienna to serve as the basis for negotiation of the territorial issue.

*Basic Message:* Clifford's approach to President Makarios and to all of the Greek Cypriots was that he brought a message of friendship and concern from our new President. He alluded to the Administration's deep humanitarian concern and its desire to assist in a just resolution of the Cyprus problem. Clifford indicated to President Makarios and the Foreign Minister that this was the best possible time to reach a settlement because United States and world opinion was presently sympathetic to the problem of Cyprus. However, he stated quite frankly that this sympathetic attitude would change if the Cypriots did not make progress in their discussions. He noted that the U.S.-Turkish rift over Cyprus had impaired our defense relationships and that a time would come when we would have to remedy that situation. Clifford implied that if the negotiations were prolonged, especially by unrealistic Greek Cypriot demands, our sympathy might dissipate.

*Cypriot Response:* Archbishop Makarios understood Clifford's message. We believe he has decided to make a real attempt to reach a solution this year. His agreement to table a bizonal map, referred to above, is an important step. The Turks in Ankara had suggested that he try to get Archbishop Makarios to table such a proposal. Clifford had expressed pessimism about getting him to do so. The Greek Cypriots also agreed with Clifford's suggestion that the forthcoming Vienna negotia-

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<sup>11</sup> Secret; Nodis. See also Document 32.

tions be sustained and serious. They indicated their interest in finding a procedural approach that would be mutually satisfactory and would permit substantive discussion.

*Discussions with the Turkish Cypriots:* The Turkish Cypriots were unhappy about U.S. involvement. Mr. Denktash explained at great length the history of Turkish grievances at the hands of the Greek majority between 1960 and 1974. He expressed his belief that a solution could be reached if the United States and the European nations left the Turkish Cypriots (and the mainland Turks) alone to deal with the Greek Cypriots. Western intervention, he argued, is always manipulated by Makarios. However, Denktash did clearly state that his negotiators would present a written memorandum about the allocation of authority between the central government and the two bizonal states at the March 31 Vienna meetings, and that they would negotiate in good faith. Clifford believes that Mr. Denktash's negative attitude is primarily a result of his aggravation over being pressed from Ankara. His associates were considerably more forthcoming and positively inclined than Mr. Denktash himself.

*Visits to Refugee Camps:* On both the Greek side and the Turkish side, the mission visited refugee areas as well as new housing projects built with U.S. assistance. The mission heard testimonials from both Greeks and Turks to the tragic circumstances of men still missing and unaccounted for. Clifford received delegations of homeless people. He also received many words of praise for the considerable refugee assistance that the U.S. has provided.

*London Consultations:* Both Turkish and Cypriot officials have requested that Clifford not draw the European Community (or the British) into the negotiations because both sides feel such a step would overly complicate these sensitive negotiations. Clifford did not intend at this stage to disclose the specific proposals that each side will make.

In summary, except for Mr. Denktash's unhappiness at being pushed into a constructive step by Ankara, Clifford believes his mission to Cyprus to have been successful beyond expectations. The leaders of both sides, for domestic political reasons, have requested the highest level of confidentiality to these commitments, and Clifford gave assurances that these requests would be honored.

## 9. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 2, 1977, 9 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Report by Clark Clifford on his Mission to the Eastern Mediterranean

### PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary  
 Mr. Clark M. Clifford  
 Mr. Philip Habib, Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
 Mr. Matthew Nimetz, Counselor-designate of the Department  
 Mr. James G. Lowenstein, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR  
 Mr. Nelson C. Ledsy, Director, Office of Southern European Affairs, EUR  
 Mr. Robert F. Hopper, Special Assistant to the Counselor-designate (Notetaker)

The Secretary thanked Clark Clifford for the outstanding job he had done on a difficult task. Secretary Clifford then summarized the fourteen-day mission. He noted that it had been an extraordinarily interesting experience. Lessons were learned on this mission that his instincts lead him to conclude will be useful in the future. He thanked the Secretary for the innovative, experienced and smooth team which he had been provided. He then handed Secretary Vance a copy of the report which he was submitting to the President.<sup>2</sup> He thought the Secretary would be pleased to learn that there was general jubilation in the area over the election of President Carter and particularly concerning Mr. Vance's appointment as Secretary of State.

Clifford's principal conclusion is that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots will never reach agreement if left to themselves. There is too great a past history of recriminations and mutual savagery. To negotiate within a framework of hundreds of years of bitterness and suspicion is, of course, exceedingly difficult.

Clifford reported his team's conclusion that progress on Cyprus necessitated effective leverage on Denktash, and the Turkish Cypriots. This leverage had to come from Turkey. Therefore, the Ankara stop was perhaps the most critical one of the entire mission. The first full day in Ankara was spent building personal relationships. Once these were built the firm and clear message was delivered that a US-Turkish DCA could not be enacted without constructive and active help by the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance NODIS Memcons, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hopper on March 4; approved by Twaddell on March 16. The meeting took place in Vance's office.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 8. The report includes records of Vance's discussions during his mission.

Turkish Government in regard to Cyprus. The Turks were informed that this was not due to the “Greek lobby” but rather reflected a general Congressional attitude shared by its senior leadership. The Turks were told that they were of course sovereign and independent and could do as they liked, but if they wanted a DCA they would have to act as the Administration’s active partner in the Eastern Mediterranean while trusting the Government to be Turkey’s partner in Washington. This idea appeared to have some appeal.

It should not be overlooked, Clifford added, that the Turks are still embittered by what they perceive as an unfair and humiliating embargo. They also suffer from a national inferiority complex and feel isolated and unappreciated. At the end of the Clifford visit, however, they were reasonably assured that the Clifford team was Turkey’s sincere friend, but also understood that Turkish efforts on Cyprus would be required if the US-Turkish relationship was to be restored and improved.

Clifford reported that at the last hour of the last meeting on the last day in Ankara the Turkish Foreign Minister said his Government had given intensive thought to Clifford’s presentation and would instruct the Turkish Cypriots to make a concrete constitutional proposal in the next round of intercommunal talks. The Foreign Minister stressed that he desired a reciprocal commitment from Makarios to put forward an equally concrete territorial proposal. The Turks made clear their potential embarrassment if they were the only side to make a concrete offer. They were given no commitment by Clifford though he undertook to persuade Makarios of the merit of presenting a territorial proposal. The Turks agreed that ultimately their offer was not conditioned upon a proposal from the Greek Cypriots. Clifford then called to the Secretary’s attention some interesting intelligence reports concerning this matter.<sup>3</sup>

In Nicosia, Clifford had two long visits with Archbishop Makarios. The first opened with a long discussion of each other’s personal background and formal matters. The discussion then turned to the Cyprus problem and Clifford described the Turkish proposal indicating that the time had come for an equal contribution from the Greek Cypriots. Clifford asked Makarios to think about the fact that the deep interest displayed by the Government and Congress of the United States for a Cyprus solution could well be a diminishing asset. Clifford suggested that Makarios move quickly. The United States over the last thirty years had invested a great deal in NATO and in NATO’s southern flank—Greece and Turkey. This investment was important and when ultimately weighed against American interests in Cyprus would eventu-

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<sup>3</sup> Not further identified. See Document 89 for an intelligence report on the impact of Clifford’s mission.

ally be overriding. 1977 represented the best year for a favorable solution since it is possible that by 1978 the United States could not risk further endangering NATO.

Clifford then described the Archbishop's three options: (1) negotiate now while friends were interested; (2) negotiate later alone; and (3) the worst alternative, failure to negotiate and being left with a divided island secured by Turkish troops. Clifford described his farewell with Makarios after this meeting as having been formally warm and in fact cool to the point where he doubted the Archbishop would desire to hold a second meeting.

The same evening Clifford delivered a similar message to the Greek Ambassador to Cyprus who displayed a good deal of concern.<sup>4</sup>

Makarios renewed the tentatively set farewell meeting planned for the next day. The meeting lasted for over an hour and Clifford said the message from the previous meeting had the desired impact. Makarios committed himself to putting a map on the table in Vienna. This map is to accept the principle of bi-zonality and form the basis for serious territorial negotiations.

The Archbishop evidenced a concern that the Turkish constitutional proposal would be a charade. Clifford assured him that the Turkish Foreign Minister clearly understood the need for a serious Turkish Cypriot constitutional proposal which would provide a reasonable basis for negotiations. Clifford described the Archbishop's complaint about dividing Cyprus into two local governments. Makarios expressed his concern about such federal arrangements. Clifford responded that the United States had no problem whatsoever with such a solution since we had made a federal government work for over two hundred years.

Clifford believes that the trouble with the intercommunal negotiations to date is that there had been interminable talk but nothing concrete on the table. He noted that the mission had been very discreet in expressions of optimism until it had received the two firm commitments. Then the mission consciously decided to speak out in a more optimistic tone and to indicate that a solution in 1977 was now possible.<sup>5</sup> This was judged the best way to continue pressure upon Denktash and Makarios to actually put forward serious proposals on March 31.

Clifford recommended that this stress be maintained and that the Secretary and the President express some public gratification that

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<sup>4</sup> No record of this meeting was found.

<sup>5</sup> In a news conference held in Nicosia on February 25, Clifford stated that "real progress" had been made during his mission. (Steven V. Roberts, "Clifford Says Solution Is Possible To the Cyprus Problem This Year," *The New York Times*, February 26, 1977, p. 4)

the parties now apparently realize the time has come for serious negotiations.

Clifford then reported on the good talks he had in London with Foreign Secretary Owen and his team. The British were given a full report.<sup>6</sup> At lunch Owen took Clifford aside and for twenty minutes discussed the two British Sovereign Base Areas. Owen indicated he would raise this issue with the President and the Secretary during his March visit to Washington. Clifford offered his opinion that these bases, which are actually British sovereign soil, are important and should be maintained. He noted that their 99 square miles and 2,000 British military cost the British £36 million a year. Owen was fishing for some encouragement that the United States could help them meet this expense. Clifford said he gave him none beyond acknowledging that the bases are important. Clifford then said the British would seek a clear indication of the new Administration's attitude toward the bases. Clifford understands that there was an agreement the UK would give the United States five years' advance notice before abandoning either of the SBA's. (Notetaker comment: this came from General Allen of NSA in a meeting with Clifford on February 26, 1977.) Clifford thought Owen might ask for money but that he would not at this point raise British abandonment of the bases.

Clifford then explained the approach he and his team had taken toward our bases in Turkey. There had been a conscious decision to not mention them at all. Clifford said he repeatedly listed a number of issues of concern between the United States and Turkey, never including the bases. This so worried the Turks that Demirel finally asked Clifford about "our very valuable bases." Clifford replied that in our relationship there are many other important issues and that for the time being we were making other arrangements. Clifford assured Secretary Vance and the others of his realization that the bases are valuable and that we ultimately want them open, but that for now the relationship between Turkey and the United States is best served if the Turks concentrated on other things, i.e., Cyprus.

Clifford then turned to the Aegean. He had been startled at the vehemence of Caramanlis' assertions that Turkish policy had now entered a new expansionist phase and that grave danger lies ahead. This emotion coming from the impressive and moderate Caramanlis had been noteworthy. Caramanlis took over an hour to describe the several Aegean disputes. In summary there are five: (1) delimitation of the continental shelf (Clifford explained how absurd the Turks find the Greek theory which, based upon their many Aegean islands, effectively

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<sup>6</sup> Clifford was in London February 27–March 1.

denies to Turkey any continental shelf); (2) air space; (3) territorial waters; (4) Greek fortification of the Dodecanese and other islands (which Greece claims is purely defensive and the Turks find a clear treaty violation); and (5) the Turkish amphibian force on the Aegean (which was the most worrisome for Caramanlis).

After giving the Greek explanation for each of these issues, Caramanlis explained to Clifford that he and the Greek people had already suffered two humiliations at the hands of the Turks. These were the second invasion of Cyprus and last summer's sailings of the SISMIK into disputed Aegean waters.<sup>7</sup> Caramanlis claimed he had been exceedingly moderate in both cases but could not guarantee continued moderation if provoked again. He also claimed that he had tried to negotiate these issues but had not been met with serious Turkish responses.

Clifford said he took great pains to explain this Greek attitude to the Turks. During the second day in Ankara, the Turks spent two and a half hours stoutly defending themselves against the Greek charges. On some of the issues their case has merit and on others it does not. In any event, Turkey has now learned, from us, of the severity of present Greek views and of American concern that any conflict between the two would be a grave event indeed. Turkey now knows the United States would react negatively toward any provocations and that the arms flow to both sides would be cut off in the event of hostilities. Clifford concluded that individually the Aegean issues seem amenable to technical solution. He recommended the United States Government conduct a serious study of these issues and how they might be resolved. Finally, he judged this three-sided exchange of views valuable in that Greece and Turkey are aware that the United States expects them to act in a cautious and responsible manner.

Secretary Vance asked Clifford if Ecevit was on board regarding the substantive constitutional proposal. Clifford answered that in each country he had met with opposition leaders, with the knowledge of the government. He had held a long visit with Ecevit who seemed very intelligent and argued strongly for a Cyprus solution. On the other hand, Prime Minister Demirel expressed to Clifford his fear that Ecevit is really waiting in the wings to accuse Demirel of caving in to United States pressures on Cyprus. Demirel offered up his weak governing coalition and the imminence of elections as excuses for an inability to act. Clifford told him that the time had come for action and that his internal problems could not be accepted as impediments to a Cyprus solution.

Habib then asked if Demirel wasn't really more afraid of his coalition partner Erbakan. Clifford responded that coalition problems must

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 10, Document 8.



have been seriously considered before the Turkish Government decided to instruct Denktash on the constitutional proposal. Mr. Nimetz then added that he did not think Erbakan would torpedo the constitutional proposal, but that a final solution would probably have to come after the Turkish election.

Secretary Vance asked if Clifford thought Ecevit would sabotage it. Clifford said Ecevit eloquently asserted the time had come for a solution. He was probably not aware of the specific proposal but he probably will not oppose it. Nimetz reminded the group that Ecevit on the other hand is a hardliner on the Aegean. Secretary Vance told of Ecevit's comment to him four months ago that he would settle for a percentage of the oil in the Aegean, but felt the sovereignty problems would be much more difficult to resolve.

Nimetz also reminded the group that since Athens had been the mission's first stop, it had not been possible to report back to them on Turkish thinking. Moreover, the Greeks were not flexible at all on the Aegean issues. Therefore, it was clear that some time soon we would need to get back to them.

Secretary Vance asked if Denktash was prepared to follow Ankara's direction regarding Cyprus or would he find a way to drag his feet. Clifford thought Denktash had no alternatives. His talk with Denktash had been very difficult and Denktash was almost personally offensive, but this was understandable. He was upset at recent instructions he had received from Ankara to push the concrete proposal. At the end of the meeting Denktash grudgingly indicated he would do as he was instructed and that the time had come for all Cypriots to agree on a solution. He reiterated, however, his resentment of United States involvement and his belief that whenever an American visits Cyprus, it always strengthens Makarios. Clifford said this long, rather negative talk helped Denktash work off some steam so that in a major press conference afterward he seemed mollified, and made helpful statements.

Secretary Vance said he felt Denktash would not be totally intransigent. Clifford agreed Denktash had to be responsive since economic and military realities made him a servant of Ankara. Moreover, the Turkish area of Cyprus had appeared to Clifford strikingly poorer than the Greek section. The Turkish area was feeling economic pressure and the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey may have decided it was time to settle.

Secretary Vance then asked if the Archbishop had really committed himself to a bi-zonal solution. Clifford said he thought so and described the map Makarios had shown him which had included a Turkish zone which was very small but was clearly bi-zonal. Clifford concluded that he had asked the Archbishop if he now accepted bi-zonality and the answer was yes. Nimetz stated that he and Mr.

Ledsky had also pressed the Cypriot Foreign Minister at a separate meeting who clearly understood and accepted the necessity for proposing a bi-zonal system with a dividing line providing the Turks with at least twenty percent of the Republic.<sup>8</sup>

Habib then asked if the Greek Cypriots would also submit a paper on the new constitution. Clifford said no. Both sides will be content if each puts forward one proposal and then responds to the proposal of the other. Ledsky advised that this was necessary since Erbakan would not permit a Turkish territorial proposal. Nimetz reported that in both Ankara and Nicosia the need for sustained and non-interrupted negotiations had been stressed.

The Secretary and Habib then asked what the role for the UN would be. Clifford described his meeting with Waldheim in which he had reassured the latter that the United States and the Clifford mission would support and complement UN efforts. Waldheim was receptive to the offer of assistance and found especially attractive the idea that at appropriate times suggestions for breaking any stalemates would be passed to him. Clifford concluded that in spite of past failures Waldheim and the UN do have a role to play and that at some time someone, perhaps Waldheim, will have to describe a reasonable settlement to the parties and then make them accept it. Habib wondered whether that party would not, in fact, have to be the United States. The Secretary replied that while the United States might have to provide the final impetus for a solution, such a push would best come under the umbrella of the United Nations.

Clifford then raised the problem of the European Communities' role. At one point he had felt the EC could usefully put forth a map but he now strongly doubted they could take a visible, active role. The Turkish Foreign Minister, in the strongest terms, had urged we not seek EC involvement. The reason he gave was Soviet nervousness. Interestingly, in Nicosia the Archbishop had also welcomed a US role but again cautioned against EC initiatives. Clifford joined the Secretary in concluding that the UN is best positioned to play a decisive role with US support and encouragement. A US role will be required, however, since Waldheim has little leverage.

Secretary Vance then picked up his copy of Clifford's report and promised to send it immediately to the President. He then turned to the Congressional question pointing out that they are very interested and that dealing with them will require great care. An approach must be designed to treat the informational and policy elements of the problem.

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<sup>8</sup> No record of this meeting was found.

Secretary Vance then asked where we stood on the Greek DCA. Clifford outlined the status of the stalled talks and reported on his specific request to Caramanlis to reopen them. At the last official event in Athens, Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios told Clifford he had been instructed by the Prime Minister to select a team and resume negotiations in mid-March. Habib then asked Clifford if he felt a US team should be created or if the Ambassador and DCM should continue to direct the effort. It was agreed that this should be dealt with later.

Secretary Vance then reported on his conversation with Senator Sarbanes earlier in the week. The Senator told him he had heard the State Department would recommend movement on both DCA's.<sup>9</sup> He added he would have trouble with the total amount of assistance to Turkey over the four-year span which he felt was out of proportion to their contribution toward Cyprus progress. He asked the Secretary to scale down the size of Turkish aid. Clifford stated that the Senator had not been accurately informed and did not clearly understand the mission's goals. Clifford said the recommendation in his report is that the President generally endorse the Turkish DCA in principle but not move to finalize it. To encourage continued Turkish cooperation, however, he would recommend \$175 million in military assistance for Turkey in FY 1978. The \$50 million increase over 1977 would be a reward for their cooperation. The difference between the FY 1978 proposal and a full four-year \$1 billion DCA would remain as a carrot to induce further cooperation. The Secretary asked if the Turks understood this. Clifford explained that it had not been bluntly communicated to them since it required a decision by the Secretary and the President.

Habib feared the Turks would claim that they could do no more until they got the whole DCA. Clifford said this had been the unhappy stalemate in the past, but that the Turks now seemed to accept the idea of an active partnership between Turkey and the United States to resolve the Cyprus dispute and its relationship to defense cooperation. The Secretary stated he had just read a message which indicated that the Turks understood and accepted this.<sup>10</sup>

Mr. Ledsy gave his opinion that in spite of the Greek acceptance of a resumption of negotiations they will drag their feet until they are sure whether the new Administration will support the Turkish DCA or not. Nimetz also pointed out that the Greeks had attempted to add progress on the Aegean to progress on Cyprus as conditions which should be linked to the DCA.

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<sup>9</sup> No record of this meeting was found.

<sup>10</sup> Not further identified.

Clifford then informed the Secretary that the House International Relations Committee wanted him to testify at 9:00 a.m. on March 9.<sup>11</sup> The Secretary said he definitely thought Clifford should appear, but that he should provide them with details only in closed session. He thought it should be possible to work out something with Chairman Zablocki and that Clifford should also talk with Senator Sparkman. Clifford agreed it would be wise to reserve much of his report to private sessions.

He then explained that during the mission he had stressed the President's early and personal interest in the Eastern Mediterranean to great effect. To build up the momentum developed it would be very helpful to have an early meeting with the President. After the meeting a carefully thought out statement should be issued. Everyone agreed such a meeting was imperative, not only for the signal it would send to the area, but also to provide guidance for future contacts on the Hill. The Secretary undertook to arrange such a meeting and once again thanked Secretary Clifford for his effort.

Clifford said there was one additional point he would like to raise and that was Makarios' sense of outrage at the Washington Post's CIA allegations.<sup>12</sup> Makarios had raised President Carter's comment in a press conference regarding a letter he had received from another individual named in the stories. Makarios indicated he would send a letter to the President and that he too would appreciate having that fact mentioned in some public mode.

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<sup>11</sup> No record of Clifford's testimony was found. His prepared statement on his mission to the Eastern Mediterranean was relayed in telegram 53954 to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia, March 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770083-0663)

<sup>12</sup> See Joseph Fitchett, "Cypriots Believe CIA Tried to Kill Makarios, Not Pay Him," *The Washington Post*, February 24, 1977, p. A15. The article noted that Makarios denied receiving money from the CIA and was considering legal action against *The Washington Post*.

**10. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 4, 1977, 2:30–3:20 p.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

President Carter  
Vice President Mondale  
Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State  
Clark Clifford, President's Special Emissary to the Eastern Mediterranean  
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Matthew Nimetz, State Department Counselor-designate  
Gregory Treverton, NSC Staff

Mr. Clifford reported on his recent mission to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.<sup>2</sup> He described it as exhilarating and thought it had accomplished more than he had expected. The mission brought a message of hope from a new President.

*Cyprus*

Mr. Clifford described his strategy with regard to the Cyprus issue. The mission tried to see where leverage existed. In Turkey the message was one of partnership: Turkey wants an end to the arms embargo, and we want progress on Cyprus. Mr. Clifford disabused the Turks of any thought that the position of Congress is only the result of the "Greek lobby." On the last day of the visit, the Foreign Minister indicated that Ankara would press Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash to submit a concrete proposal on the form of government for Cyprus at the intercommunal negotiations in Vienna at the end of March.

In Cyprus the message was very different. Mr. Clifford told Makarios of the Turkish initiative and indicated that Makarios should present a territorial proposal. Mr. Clifford noted the help we have rendered to Cyprus in the past but suggested that we cannot continue indefinitely at serious cost to our NATO relationships. In the end, Makarios agreed that his negotiator would present a reasonable bizonal map in Vienna.

Mr. Clifford's conversation with Denktash was the least pleasant of any of his discussions. Denktash resented being pressured by Ankara, but he confirmed that he would present a proposal in Vienna.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: President: 3/77. Confidential. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 8.

*British Bases on Cyprus*

Mr. Clifford described his conversations in London with Foreign Secretary Owen.<sup>3</sup> The question of the British sovereign bases on Cyprus came up, and Mr. Clifford thought it would surface again in the President's conversations with Prime Minister Callaghan.

*Aegean*

Mr. Clifford said he was startled at the vehemence of Greek Prime Minister Caramanlis' description of "Turkish expansionism" in the Aegean. Caramanlis said he had been pushed as far as he could go, and any further Turkish action could lead to war. Mr. Clifford believed, however, that the Aegean differences between Greece and Turkey could be solved. The United States may be able to serve as a moderating, intermediate influence. Mr. Clifford, for instance, had been able to convey the Greek fears to Ankara and receive detailed explanations from the Turks.

*Letters to Heads of State*

Mr. Clifford suggested that the President write letters to Demirel, Makarios and Denktash thanking them for receiving Clifford, at the same time indicating gratification at each's commitment to present a proposal in Vienna. A similar letter might be sent to Caramanlis, indicating that the United States is prepared to extend its good offices in a resolution of the Aegean disputes.<sup>4</sup>

*Follow-Up*

The President indicated his desire to follow up the mission in ways that do not aggravate Turkey. Mr. Clifford agreed and recommended that the United States extend \$175 million of military credits to Turkey but not give it any military aid until the Cyprus problem is resolved. Secretary Vance believed that Senator Sarbanes and his colleagues would accept that, and the Vice President suggested that Clifford meet privately with pro-Greek members of Congress. The President indicated that Mr. Clifford could tell Messrs. Sarbanes and Brademas that he agreed with Clifford's recommended approach. To the extent they can go along, that would help us with the Greek Government. The President indicated that he is determined to move in the direction suggested by Mr. Clifford in any case.

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<sup>3</sup> Clifford arrived in London on February 27. His written report to the President only briefly mentions these talks. He reported more fully to Secretary Vance; see Document 9.

<sup>4</sup> Letters to Makarios, Demirel, and Karamanlis are printed as Documents 35, 90, and 165.

11. **Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Lowenstein) to Secretary of State Vance<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 7, 1977

*Unveiling of U.S. Policy for the Eastern Mediterranean: Next Steps*

*Issue for Decision*

We need to decide what strategy to follow with respect to our policies in the Eastern Mediterranean now that the Vienna round of Cyprus intercommunal talks has taken place.

*Background*

Based on reports to date, it seems clear that both the Turkish and Greek Cypriots have met their basic commitments to Clark Clifford, i.e., the Turks tabled a constitutional proposal, the Greeks put forward a territorial proposal in the form of a map, and some substantive discussion of these proposals took place in Vienna.<sup>2</sup> While both proposals were clearly inadequate and were held to be unacceptable by the other side, they appear to have been seriously worked out and put forward in good faith, and represented some minimal advance from past substantive positions. The Vienna meetings were used to exchange views on the proposals, although neither side retreated from its respective opening positions which are far apart. The parties are expected to meet again for another round in Nicosia next month. However, Archbishop Makarios' illness and the pending June election in Turkey will probably make important concessions impossible in the next few weeks.

Continued United States support and involvement will be needed at every step if any early positive results are to be achieved. The presence of a U.S. observer in Vienna was welcomed and appreciated by the U.N. as well as both parties. A continued U.S. role is regarded as essential by all concerned. The Turkish Foreign Minister observer in Vienna even went so far as to suggest a future Cyprus negotiating procedure to replace the inter-communal talks which would have Greece, Turkey, the UK, and U.S. all at the table together with the Greek Cypriots and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Subject Files and Chrons 1977/78/79/80, Files of Assistant Secretary J. Brian Atwood, Lot 81D115, Box 4, Greece/Turkey/Cyprus. Confidential. Drafted by Ledsky and Ewing on April 5; sent through Nimetz on April 6; cleared by Gerald Helman (IO/UNP), Atwood, and Richard Ericson (PM).

<sup>2</sup> The meetings concluded on April 7. See footnote 3, Document 38.

Turkish Cypriots. The Cypriot Ambassador here asked Clark Clifford to consider more active U.S. involvement.

A comment should be made about the parties' proposals. The Turkish Cypriot constitutional proposal, if implemented, would create a government that resembles a confederation more than a federation. This is not acceptable to the Greek Cypriots. Clearly the central government must be given more authority. The Greek Cypriot territorial proposal is not really bizonal (it has two zones and two enclaves, which meet at a "federal" road-junction) and gives inadequate territory to the Turkish zone. Clearly, the Turkish zone must be expanded. However, our summary view is that the results of Vienna, while hardly a breakthrough, were probably about all that could realistically have been expected at this stage. Due largely to Clark Clifford's discussions and energetic U.S. follow-up, a process has at least been started.

In considering our future strategy, these additional factors should also be borne in mind:

A. Regardless of what flows from their proposal in Vienna, the Turks will expect something positive from the Administration since they lived up to their commitment to put a constitutional proposal on the table, and to negotiate in good faith. Continued silence by the Administration after Vienna will be seen in Ankara as proof that Washington is unreliable or has chosen pro-Greek policies. Such an approach may lead to a negative Turkish reaction to future Cyprus talks. Insisting upon a total solution to Cyprus before aid levels are established runs grave risks in the highly charged US-Turkish relationship, affecting important NATO interests.

B. Given the approaching June Turkish elections, a breakthrough toward a Cyprus settlement cannot be expected in May or June, although a process of constructive discussion should be sustainable.

C. To comply with a tight legislative schedule, the Congress must receive Administration recommendations on the FY 1978 military assistance package by the time it returns from Easter recess on April 18.

D. The Greek and Cypriot Governments can be expected to be disappointed with any Administration recommendations for increased levels of military sales credits to Turkey for FY 1978.

E. US-Greek negotiations on the Greek DCA are due to resume April 13. Karamanlis clearly wants to move Greece back to closer integration into NATO and wants to stabilize the US-Greek bilateral security relationship. By early May it should be possible to determine whether the Greeks will move quickly to complete these negotiations with the U.S. or whether they will drag their feet until they come to realize that the Administration will support Congressional approval at some point of the Turkish-US Defense Cooperation Agreement.



F. Difficulties in the Aegean traditionally increase seasonally in the spring and summer; this is likely to happen shortly, thus taking the spotlight off Cyprus as far as the Greeks and Turks are concerned. We do not want to link these two problem areas. Studies are underway regarding how the USG might help defuse or resolve the complex of Aegean disputes. We will be back to you on this later.

Bearing these factors in mind, we would suggest the following scenario:

*Suggested Scenario*

A. Announce, through backgrounder or answer to press question, that in our view while the Vienna talks did not lead to a breakthrough, they had positive aspects, and that the Turkish Government and Makarios had responded positively to Clifford requests.<sup>3</sup>

B. Have the Administration endorse Clifford's recommendations in whole or in part by indicating to key members of Congress and then publicly that the Administration (i) endorses, in principle, the Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement (although making it clear that we will not press Congress for a vote at this time); (ii) recommends \$175 million in Foreign Military Sales financing in FY 1978 compared with \$125 million in FY 1977 and \$200 million in the Ford Administration's budget presentation;<sup>4</sup> and (iii) urges removal of some or all restraints on FMS cash purchases by Turkey.<sup>5</sup>

The last of these will be the most controversial. Our assessment is that with strong Administration backing, Congress would approve the package, but after a fight. It might be possible to work out a compromise permitting cash purchases of certain named items, such as the F-4's, or a raising of the ceiling on FMS cash purchases to accommodate certain Turkish purchases.

C. Couple announcement on US-Turkish military assistance policy with support for military assistance to Greece in FY 1978 at the DCA level. (A total of \$175 million of which \$35 million is grant assistance and the remainder FMS credits and guaranties).<sup>6</sup>

D. Make renewed effort to get the Greek base negotiations concluded, pointing out that we favor such defense cooperation agree-

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<sup>3</sup> Vance approved recommendation A on April 8. Jacklyn Cahill, one of the Secretary's special assistants, confirmed his approval on April 8 by initialing and date-stamping on his behalf. Vance underlined "did not lead to a breakthrough," and wrote, referring to the Vienna talks, "I would play it down still more."

<sup>4</sup> Vance approved recommendations B(i) and B(ii).

<sup>5</sup> In the margin next to recommendation B(iii), Vance wrote a question mark and neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.

<sup>6</sup> Vance approved recommendation C.

ments with our allies and wish to stabilize our security relationship with Greece as a means of helping resolve problems in the Eastern Mediterranean. Negotiations resume in Athens on April 13.<sup>7</sup>

E. Ask Clark Clifford to testify on the Hill on behalf of the Administration's policy for Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. He has indicated a willingness to do so. Prior to public announcement of our proposal, a meeting should be held with the Greek interest group, and with other Congressional leaders, to explain the Administration's position.<sup>8</sup>

F. Consider messages (letters from you or Clifford, or messages through the Ambassadors) to Makarios and Demirel expressing appreciation for the constructive beginning made in Vienna and urging that concrete negotiations be continued in Nicosia in May.<sup>9</sup>

G. Have Clifford and Nimetz consult with UN Secretary General Waldheim to indicate our continued support for his role, our desire to keep in close touch with him, and our interest in receiving his ideas on what we could usefully do to help advance prospects for an eventual settlement.<sup>10</sup>

H. Begin substantive diplomatic efforts promptly after the Vienna talks conclude to ascertain how the parties view continued U.S. involvement and where the positions of the parties on territory and constitutional structure are open to compromise. This can probably be done in Nicosia by our Embassy, but may also require a working-level trip to the Island. We should privately make clear to the parties that their substantive proposals left a lot to be desired. We will also have to keep in mind that the June 5 Turkish elections and Makarios' illness will place limits over the next two-three months on what can be accomplished.<sup>11</sup>

I. Engage Prime Minister Karamanlis and Prime Minister Demirel in substantive discussions in London at the NATO Summit. This can be done at the President's bilateral meetings with both leaders and at follow-up sessions with the Prime Ministers and the Foreign Ministers. Clark Clifford has indicated that he is available, and believes it would be useful, to be present in London to assist in these discussions—he developed excellent personal relationships with Karamanlis and Demirel.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Vance approved recommendation D.

<sup>8</sup> Vance approved recommendation E.

<sup>9</sup> Vance approved recommendation F and wrote "Clark" in a space for "By Whom."

<sup>10</sup> Vance approved recommendation G.

<sup>11</sup> Vance underlined "left a lot to be desired" and wrote "yes" in the right-hand margin. He approved recommendation H.

<sup>12</sup> Vance disapproved the recommendation "Ask Clifford to come to London" and wrote in the margin, "There won't be enuf time in the meeting to warrant a trip by Clark."

J. Be alert to renewed tensions on Aegean issues and indicate to both parties our willingness to be helpful while continuing to urge them to exercise caution and to attempt to work out their differences directly. Our studies should be concluded by then and we will have some substantive ideas.

*Recommendation*

That you approve the above scenario to be implemented beginning the week of April 11.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Vance approved the scenario.

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## 12. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 18, 1977

SUBJECT

Security Assistance for Turkey and Greece

Secretary Vance proposes three steps deriving from the Clifford Mission which he wishes to present to Congress next week. These include

- endorsement in principle of the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) signed in March 1976, but without pressing for Congressional approval at this time;<sup>2</sup>
- recommendation that Congress approve FY 1978 FMS credit financing for Turkey up to \$160 million (\$35 million more than FY 1977 but \$15 million less than the Turks have been expecting). (The full \$175 million originally recommended will be requested for Greece.)
- authorization for lifting the FMS cash ceiling to permit Turkey to go ahead with F-4 procurement, which is already under way in response to NATO recommendations, until such time as FMS credits can be used.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 26, Greece: 1/77-4/78. Confidential. Sent for action. Henze forwarded a draft with a memorandum to Brzezinski on April 15. Brzezinski initialed the memorandum and wrote, "I agree." (Ibid.) Attached and printed as Document 92 is an April 15 memorandum from Vance to Carter calling for equal aid packages to Turkey and Greece. Attached but not printed is an April 18 covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance notifying Vance of Carter's approval to restore foreign military sales for Turkey at \$175 million.

<sup>2</sup> Carter wrote "ok" in the margin next to this point.

*The most important of these steps by far is endorsement of the DCA. Announcing this Administration's support of it now should have a good effect in the pre-election atmosphere in Turkey.*

I have reservations about cutting the FMS credit from \$175 million to \$160 million. State justifies it, and has Clark Clifford's concurrence, because of a feeling that the Turkish Cypriots were less forthcoming at the recent Vienna talks than they might have been. But I am not sure that holding back \$15 million may not simply annoy the Turkish military leaders and be felt by Demirel as a petty wrist-slap as he goes into elections while it may have no effect at all on the Turkish Cypriots in the next phase of the Cyprus negotiations. If we are going to ask Congress to give Greece \$175 million, we are best off being formally even-handed and asking for the same amount for Turkey. (In actuality, considering Turkey's far greater population and much larger armed forces, the same amounts are not really even-handed at all.)

Lifting the FMS cash ceiling for F-4 procurement will get the Turks out of a bind which will otherwise confront them and the American aircraft manufacturer at the end of June when aircraft now on the assembly line will have to be held up if further financing cannot be arranged.

While State expects that the Greek lobby in Congress will be opposed to any aid to Turkey, they feel they have good chances of persuading the leadership to endorse this program.

I have been told that Secretary Vance is going to propose to you that Clark Clifford go to London next month to talk further to Demirel and Karamanlis after you meet with them. He will discuss concrete moves both can make to keep up movement toward settlement of the Cyprus issue and other Greek-Turkish strains. This seems like a good move to me and the kind of initiative more likely to achieve a positive effect than the proposed \$15 million cut in FMS credits requested for Turkey.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you approve Secretary Vance's proposals but with restoration of requested FMS credits for Turkey to \$175 million, the same amount as for Greece.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Carter checked his approval of the recommendation and initialed "J" below it. Vance's proposals, outlined in an April 15 memorandum to Carter, were not attached but are printed as Document 92. An April 19 night reading item for the White House noted that Carter's plan on assistance to Turkey "profoundly disappoints" pro-Greek members of Congress who characterized the package as "no real shift from the Ford-Kissinger policy." (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Subject Files and Chrons 1977/78/79/80, Files of Assistant Secretary J. Brian Atwood, Lot 81D115, Box 4, Greece/Turkey/Cyprus)

**13. Memorandum From Gregory F. Treverton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 22, 1977

SUBJECT

The President's Meeting with Brademas, Sarbanes, and Eagleton, April 22:  
Summary and Comments

Administration participants, in addition to the President, were the Vice President, Secretary Vance, you and me.

The members of Congress repeated many of the arguments they had made two days ago in their meeting with you and the Vice President.<sup>2</sup> They said that the Administration's proposals on the Turkish DCA and military assistance to Turkey were not in the spirit of the President's campaign promises; that they were justified by neither human rights concerns nor by the outcome of the recent Vienna discussions; that the increase in military transfers to Turkey, including the exception for F-4s, was not just from \$125 million to \$175 million but potentially to as much as a half billion dollars; and that our policy amounted to a return to that of Ford and Kissinger.

In response, the President and Secretary Vance both regretted the breakdown in communications. The President indicated that the Administration had done all it could to promote a Cyprus settlement—including sending Clark Clifford to the region—and the \$175 would demonstrate our evenhandedness. He said he wanted to hear what the Congressional discussants found objectionable.

Secretary Vance made similar comments. He offered that if the Committee deleted the exemption for F-4s, the Administration would not fight it. The President stressed Turkish paranoia about any linkage between the DCA and Cyprus. That is overriding, and he thought we had gone as far as we could, public, in making a link. Privately, the Turks are under no illusions: they know there is a link.

There was implicit agreement on two points:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 75, Turkey: 1–12/77. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> In an April 19 memorandum, Treverton briefed Brzezinski for this meeting, which included Vice President Mondale and Congressmen Sarbanes, Brademas, Rosenthal, Eagleton, and Fascell. Treverton recounted the meeting, which took place in Mondale's office on April 20, in an April 21 memorandum to Brzezinski. Treverton noted the negative reaction of the Congressmen to Carter's Eastern Mediterranean policy. Both memoranda are *ibid.* See also footnote 3, Document 12.

(1) *If the Committee deletes the exemption for F-4s, the Administration will not fight.* Privately, Congressman Hamilton and others will be informed of that, but the President stressed that no public mention be made of the arrangement.

(2) *Members of Congress can cite Nimetz' testimony before the Senate committee (April 21) as evidence of a DCA/Cyprus link, but they cannot identify the President or Vance publicly with linkage.*<sup>3</sup> The formal Administration position will remain that there is no linkage. Nimetz' comments, while ambiguous, go quite far in suggesting a linkage (farther, in fact, than the President expected). The members of Congress can run with those statements. They will endeavor not to bring Nimetz back to testify again.

*Comment*

The concession on the F-4 exemption will be taken hard by the Turks, but the fall-out should be manageable provided we can make it appear that we fought the good fight and lost. That, however, will not be easy. It will take a careful orchestration. And we may be in the difficult position of dissuading those who are prepared to support our formal position. (Hamilton, for instance, told us that he thought the package as proposed could pass both the Committee and the full House.) Similarly with the DCA, the magnificent ambiguity will be hard to sustain. If Turkish officials or newsmen get a whiff of the arrangement, they will pester with questions that will make it hard to avoid either: (a) directly contradicting what Brademas *et al* are saying; or (b) suggesting publicly that there is a link. Nimetz and I have agreed that our best hope is letting the proposal proceed as quietly as possible through the committees.

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 92.

**14. Memorandum of Conference<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 13, 1977

**MEMORANDUM OF CONFERENCE WITH  
SENATORS SARBANES & EAGLETON AND  
CONGRESSMEN BRADEMÁS AND ROSENTHAL**

I met in Room H-107 in the Capitol for an hour and twenty minutes with the above Members of Congress and their staff assistants.

Brademas opened the meeting by stating that the four men there had had breakfast on Tuesday, October 11th, with Foreign Minister Çağlayangil of Turkey. He felt the breakfast went well and that there was a frank exchange of views and there seemed to be a desire on Çağlayangil's part to get his positions clearly before the four men. At the conclusion of this report, Brademas asked that I bring the men up to date on the status of the present negotiations involving Cyprus.

I stated I felt the general climate in the Eastern Mediterranean had improved considerably since our trip some eight or nine months ago. The Greeks seem to be acting moderately and we had definite word from the Turks that they would refrain from provocative acts in the Aegean. I dealt at some length on recent talks with Çağlayangil in New York and the results of the Nimetz-Ledsky mission to Turkey.<sup>2</sup>

I informed the group that it was clearly my opinion that the Turkish government had reached a policy decision to settle the Cyprus problem. I thought this was due to a substantial degree because of the precarious Turkish financial position. I stated that in the course of the recent meetings which had been held with Çağlayangil, subjects such as withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus, structure of the new government, territorial settlement in Cyprus and similar problems, had been discussed in depth. I expressed the opinion that progress was being made.

Each of the four men spoke and took the position that oral representations from the Turks would mean nothing to them. It would be necessary that definite action be taken. At one time or another, the following suggestions for concrete action were made by them: (1) The

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977–1980, Lot 81D85, Box 2, Eastern Mediterranean—1977. No classification marking. Drafted by Clifford. Tarnoff forwarded the memorandum to Vance on October 14, noting that Clifford wanted to be sure the Secretary saw it. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> Vance met with Çağlayangil on September 27 and he and Clifford met with Çağlayangil on October 5. See Documents 99 and 100. Clifford and Çağlayangil met again on September 29. See footnote 2, Document 101. Nimetz and Ledsky met with Çağlayangil in Turkey on September 14. See Document 98.

Greeks should be permitted to return to Famagusta and the operations there should be reactivated; (2) The airport, which has been closed since 1974, should be reopened. Not only would it be a great convenience to travelers but it would indicate a willingness on the part of the Turks to cooperate; and (3) The main highway, which has been closed since 1974, should be reopened.

These acts would constitute symbolic gestures demonstrating the good faith of the Turks and their desire to solve the complexities of Cyprus.

One rather interesting facet of the conversation was that the four men indicated they were not impressed by the Turkish suggestion that the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus would begin. Caglayangil had indicated that the presence of the Turkish troops there constituted a financial drain, so Sarbanes' attitude was that the Turks would be doing this mainly for their own benefit and not as a step toward peace. I disagreed with this and we had a friendly discussion over the subject. I took the position that it would be unrealistic to expect a settlement of all the issues in Cyprus before the Congress would move on the matter. I said I thought there should be simultaneous movement on the part of the Turks and Congress and that, as progress was made, each side would be in a better position to make concessions. Sarbanes wanted to know immediately what kind of concessions I had in mind. I replied that I was not in a position to go into detail in this regard but that a number of concessions had already been made by Congress and these could be carried forward.

Sarbanes, instead of attacking the Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement in its entirety, said he felt that the principal fault of this program was that it extended for four years. He believes this is a mistake. We do not have other similar agreements for such a long period of time with other allies. When I reminded him that the Greek DCA was for four years, he said he was sure the Greeks would be willing to reduce the term if the Turkish DCA were similarly reduced.<sup>3</sup>

The suggestion was made that it might be advisable for the Administration to abandon the idea of a Turkish DCA. I felt called upon at this point to reiterate my personal support for the Turkish DCA and to give my reasons why I thought it should be passed ultimately. I argued that it was important that we strengthen both Greece and Turkey's military competence within the NATO framework. I concluded my remarks on the note that I was very comfortable in the conviction that strengthening these two NATO allies would not in any way change the balance of military power between them.

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<sup>3</sup> The U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement was initialed in Athens on July 28. See Document 168.



The climate of the meeting was friendly and more conciliatory than I had anticipated. From time to time in the discussion, each man emphasized the fact that the position they were taking was not only a moderate one, but it was their intention to cooperate.

C.M.C.<sup>4</sup>

*Postscript:*

After reading the memorandum over, I was conscious of the fact that I had not ascertained the manner in which the breakfast was set up between the four Members of Congress and Foreign Minister Caglayangil.

I telephoned the assistant to Congressman Brademas and learned that the Iranian Ambassador, Ardeshir Zahedi, invited Mr. Brademas to dinner the evening of Monday, October 10th. Ambassador Zahedi said he was having the dinner for Mr. Caglayangil and he thought it would provide the two men with an opportunity of getting to know each other and possibly having a talk.

Mr. Brademas replied that he had a dinner engagement Monday evening but he was interested in meeting Mr. Caglayangil so he suggested that he would get the other three men together for breakfast and they could meet with Mr. Caglayangil for breakfast on Tuesday morning in the office of Mr. Brademas. Ambassador Zahedi performed this function. Mr. Caglayangil was agreeable and the breakfast came off on Tuesday morning as previously referred to.

C.M.C.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

15. **Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 15, 1977

SUBJECT

Review with Clark Clifford of Recent Developments in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus Situation

Clark Clifford asked that you and the President be informed of what he told me during an hour's review on 14 October 1977 of his recent involvement in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus situation.

He feels the climate for recent talks was greatly improved because there had been no flare-up of Greek-Turkish tension in the Aegean during the summer. Last spring the Greeks were all talking of *war* with the Turks. Bitsios never used this word during his talks last week with Vance and Clifford. Clifford's net impression from talks with Bitsios is that the Greeks are no longer gripped by fear of Turkey and therefore more amenable to real bargaining after their elections, but that they have little enthusiasm for a settlement and would just as well stall indefinitely. Kyprianou made a poor impression on Clifford; he regards him as a pawn. With Makarios gone, he feels, *initiative* for a Cyprus settlement *must all come from Athens and Ankara* and both countries must keep their respective communities in Cyprus moving constructively.

*The real change in the situation is on the Turkish side.* After a lot of unproductive talk in larger sessions, Vance, Clifford and Caglayangil met alone for nearly two hours and Caglayangil let his hair down.<sup>2</sup> He said his government had made a firm decision to move to settle the Cyprus problem and get the DCA approved. (This is confirmed by CIA reporting.)<sup>3</sup> He said they were compelled to do this because of their worsening economic situation and the drain on their resources Cyprus caused. He said Demirel felt politically stronger now and felt he could keep his coalition partners under control. As soon as the Greek elections are over (20 November), Caglayangil said the Turks would start moving. (They have a National Security Council meeting scheduled for 17 November.) Concessions involving territory, constitutional arrangements and reduction of troops in Cyprus were talked about and *though*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 1, Chron File: 10-11/77. Secret. Outside the System. Sent for information.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 100.

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

*details and timing were left for the future, Clifford feels the Turks are serious and that there is, at last, some hopefulness in the situation.*

During his Washington visit early this week, Caglayanil used Ardeshir Zahedi as intermediary for getting together with the hard core of the Greek lobby. He had breakfast with Brademas, Sarbanes, Eagleton and Rosenthal on 11 October. Clifford met with this group the next day and thinks he detected some slight “give” in their position, especially Sarbanes, who has been the most anti-Turkish of all. Clifford is going to sound out a wide range of other Senators and Congressmen in the next couple of weeks. Until he does that he does not want to recommend tactics for handling the DCA. He is thinking of another mission to the area in early December. The Turks made clear to him that he would be welcome.

Clifford is going at this job with zest, wisdom and patience and obviously intends to stick with it until he succeeds. I came away feeling we are very fortunate to have got him involved.

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## 16. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 4, 1977, 11:30 a.m.–noon

### SUBJECT

Summary of the President’s Meeting with Clark Clifford on  
Greece-Turkey-Cyprus Problem

### PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter  
Clark Clifford  
Secretary Cyrus Vance  
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski  
Matthew Nimetz  
Paul B. Henze (Notetaker)

After greetings and preliminary remarks, Secretary Vance asked to make an opening statement:

*Vance:* I believe there is a real chance that the Turks are prepared to try to deal with the Cyprus problem—otherwise I would not be recom-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President: 11–12/77. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Henze, who initialed the memorandum. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

mending that we take up this problem now. If we do not deal with the problem, it will fester and get much worse. It is dangerous for NATO to have a weak Turkey. I do not think we should look at the situation in terms of whether Greek opposition is going to change over the next year or so. If we do not deal with the problem now, it is going to erupt. Even though there is a great deal of political risk involved—we may have a real fight—the importance of what can be achieved is worth that risk.

*The President:* How adamant are Congressional opponents?

*Vance:* The Greek lobby is strongly against doing anything. But they do not speak for all of the Congress. Zablocki's view is that if he put this to a vote in his committee the Turkish DCA would carry. We probably have the votes to carry it in the House.

*The President:* But by the time we get to the Congress we will have some demonstrable evidence of Turkish concessions . . .

*Clifford:* We have learned a lot in nine months. The Turks have continued to be difficult as is their nature. They are deeply aggrieved by the actions our government—as if it were a unit—has taken, as they put it. One factor that has been demonstrated to me is the need we have to continue to back NATO all the way. Greece and Turkey constitute the southern anchor of NATO. Turkey has found no other course of action that would suit her purposes better than remaining in NATO. Because Turkey is very important to NATO, it is very important to us. Turkey has not cooperated well with us up to now.

We still have an interest in Cyprus—but as a matter of fact, Cyprus is just one smaller piece on the chessboard—it is Turkey and Greece and our efforts to prevent trouble between them that matter. We do not want to give the Soviets a chance to be real troublemakers in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Turks want the DCA—they say, "You sign it and we will get on." It is of enormous significance to them. The military level of Turkey has been slipping downward rather fast. It will not take a lot of money to get them back in good shape. The DCA will do it.

Cy and I had an enormously successful meeting in New York during the UN session with Caglayangil alone.<sup>2</sup> For the first time we had a breakthrough: Caglayangil said: "It is my government's intention to settle the Cyprus matter." Then he gave the reasons, including the fact that they have very serious problems in their economy. As we talked on, he gave us the impression that the Turkish Government is putting Cyprus high on its agenda; they are facing reality almost for the first time. Caglayangil said, "We intend to settle the question of Cyprus." I believe him and know that Cy believed him at the time. But

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 100.

the Turks cannot go ahead and do all that our Greek friends would like them to do on Cyprus. The answer is that we and they must move contemporaneously. We want to face up to the decisions—it is the unanimous opinion of all of us that the President should decide that he is ready to proceed to persuade the Congress to pass the Turkish DCA. There are things the Turks can do—make some statements about settlement on Cyprus, e.g. They can start withdrawing troops. They can start talking about how the new government in Cyprus is to be constructed—Caglayangil said we should not worry about that, “We will work out a reasonable arrangement on the government.” Then there is the question of the dividing lines. The Turks can start talking about that. Caglayangil went back and talked to Demirel—the State Department now has word that Demirel’s government approves this approach and is prepared to move. So we must work together—they start to move toward a settlement and we plan the mounting of a campaign to get the Turkish DCA passed. We can do it. We can get the help of our military. George Brown said that they would go all-out to help us organize support in Congress. Al Haig will come back if we want him to. If people on the fence in Congress hear a strong military presentation, it will be difficult for the Greek Lobby to convince fence-sitters that there are other considerations that are more important.

We have initialled a Greek DCA. We would like the Greeks to be prepared to move with us on their DCA—we should move on both DCA’s in Congress together. I agree with Cy that there is a certain risk to the President and the government if we go ahead. But it is my conviction that there is a greater risk if we do not go ahead. I don’t know how long we could continue to hold the Turks in line otherwise. They have come in with a reasonable attitude. A rebuff from us would be quite serious. It is actually in the basic selfish interest of both the Greeks and the Turks for us to move ahead. So—if we are to be directed by the President to get ready there is a lot we could do to begin to mount a well planned presentation.

*Brzezinski:* I have a question. The memo outlines steps the Turks would take. The \$93.7 million FMS determination for F-4’s is ready to be signed by the President.<sup>3</sup> What steps are the Turks going to take in response?

*Clifford:* They are prepared to take concrete steps.

*Vance:* They have already made small troop withdrawals.

*The President:* Will Turkey publicly announce troop withdrawals?

*Clifford:* Yes.

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<sup>3</sup> See Documents 101 and 102.

*Nimetz* explained the background on the Presidential Determination for the F-4's and noted that it had been cleared with Brademas and with Sarbanes' staff.<sup>4</sup>

*Clifford*: We can say that we know that they are making a good-faith effort to prepare for negotiations.

*Vance*: We should go forward with the \$93.7 million and they can go forward with troop withdrawals. But there is a question whether we can go forward with anything more than this before the 20th of November—date of the Greek elections. More initiative on our part could cause problems in connection with the Greek elections.

*The President*: Why hasn't there been direct Turkish and Greek involvement in the Cypriot discussions in the past?

*Vance*: Neither country wanted to get directly involved. The discussions have been a charade on both sides. The Turks are now willing to take a direct part, but we don't yet know whether we can persuade the Greeks to do so. Caglayangil said that unless he had somebody at the table Denktash would not be flexible enough.

*Clifford*: I doubt that there is anything that can be done that will please the Greek Lobby—they do not want us to do anything for the Turks at all. They are adamantly opposed to the DCA with Turkey. They only grudgingly agreed to military aid. Their whole attitude is, "To hell with the Turks." So of course we have to expect opposition from them and it is likely to continue but at the last meeting I had with them I had some indication that the degree of opposition had lessened somewhat.<sup>5</sup>

*The President*: I presume Karamanlis would not object.

*Clifford*: Karamanlis will probably complain but he will understand our position if we explain it firmly to him.

*The President*: He really aggravated me in London.<sup>6</sup>

*Clifford*: They both do this.

*Vance*: The Brademas people would rather see no Greek DCA than see the Turkish one passed.

*The President*: We just have to meet that attitude head-on—I am perfectly prepared to do it.

*Vance*: We might find Congress trying to cut back on the term of both DCA's to two years. There is general sentiment for this.

*Clifford*: We must prepare for the argument that the Greek Lobby here will push: that Turkey is still in violation of the agreements about

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<sup>4</sup> Presidential Determination No. 78-1; see Document 102.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 14.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 166.

use of U.S. arms in 1974—we will just have to expect that.<sup>7</sup> I believe that there will be enough sensible men in Congress who will see it clearly.

*The President:* And I will have to present it clearly, which I have not done.

*Vance:* Brademas will allege that this is a repudiation of promises made in the campaign—this worries the Vice President.

*The President:* I don't believe that argument can be made. And the argument will not be valid if the Turks have begun to take constructive steps.

*Clifford:* The Greeks will deprecate the importance of the steps the Turks take.

*Nimetz:* We have to keep the pressure on the Turks. We must press them to the limit to be helpful.

*Vance:* If we make the decision to go forward we face the real question of when and to what degree we consult with the Greek Lobby in Congress.

*The President:* We will go ahead on these first steps. Cy and Clark will put together a strong briefing paper. I will have the Greek Lobby in and have it out with them. I will approach this in terms of my campaign commitment to settle this issue.

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<sup>7</sup> Congress held that the Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus constituted an offensive act, thereby violating Turkey's agreement that the arms it received from the United States would be used for defensive purposes only. In accordance with the 1975 Foreign Assistance Act, the United States imposed its embargo on arms to Turkey, effective February 5, 1975. (*Congress and the Nation*, vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 858–860) See also *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Document 217.

**17. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 2, 1977, 11:30 a.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

The Secretary  
Senator Paul Sarbanes  
Congressman John Brademas  
Counselor Matthew Nimetz  
Assistant Secretary George Vest  
Deputy Assistant Secretary Brian Atwood  
Legislative Assistant to Senator Sarbanes, Cliff Hackett

**SUBJECT**

Discussion of Eastern Mediterranean with Senator Sarbanes and Congressman Brademas

Brademas and Sarbanes initiated this meeting with the Secretary to discuss the Administration's FY 1979 budget request for Greece, Turkey and Cyprus and other related subjects. Paul Sarbanes opened, saying that the purpose of the visit was to get "your thinking" on the current situation in the Aegean. He said the fiscal '79 budget request would be the first made by this Administration and would therefore be scrutinized carefully by the Greek-American community and by the countries involved. He realized that the vagaries of the budget cycle had forced difficult decisions on the Administration, perhaps prematurely. Our actions, whether we like it or not, would be read as signals of our intentions.

The Secretary replied that both the Greek and Turkish DCAs had been negotiated and are "in place." The budgetary "numbers" we are considering would represent the amounts necessary for implementation of these agreements. He indicated that were the DCAs not acted upon, "different numbers would be operative." The major "footnote" to the Administration's budgetary request was the question of progress on Cyprus. In that regard, we are "cautiously optimistic" that the Turkish government is "getting around to taking serious steps on Cyprus." We hope to get the intercommunal talks reconvened where discussions can take place on the difficult territorial and constitutional questions. We feel it important that both the Turkish and Greek governments participate in the talks. This is important because of their

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Subject Files and Chrons 1977/78/79/80, Files of Assistant Secretary J. Brian Atwood, Lot 81D115, Box 4, Greece/Turkey/Cyprus. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Atwood on December 14; cleared in draft by Nimetz and Vest. Copies were sent to Nimetz, Vest, Bennet, Ledsky, and Ewing. The meeting took place in Vance's office.



ability to exert influence over Denktash and the Greek-Cypriot government. So far we have had some expressions of interest on the part of the Greeks but are not sure whether they will agree to participate.

The Secretary said that he was meeting with both the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers in Brussels and that he would have a better feel for the prospects for progress on Cyprus after those meetings.<sup>2</sup> He added that there should be a “line item” on Cyprus, but he was not sure of the amount. If we were to achieve a Cyprus settlement, it may be necessary to request additional appropriations for Cyprus perhaps in a supplemental request.

Referring to the Administration’s policy on the Turkish DCA, Sarbanes said that he was concerned that “the modalities have been frozen” because of Kissinger’s four-year, \$1 billion agreement with Turkey.<sup>3</sup> This agreement, he said, precludes step-by-step movement toward a settlement in that it restricts our ability to respond. We need to “break out of this pattern” and to “find something short of the DCA” as a response to less than complete movement by the Turks. Brademas added that we must consider “a variety of graduated responses,” and adopt an “action-for-action” strategy.

Sarbanes said that he thought a broader question was involved in that the concept of four-year DCAs is one which should undergo careful scrutiny within the Administration. He said that we are currently burdened by this approach and that countries such as the Philippines and Grenada were able to exert great leverage over us (he added parenthetically that the Prime Minister of Grenada had come to see him recently with a pitch for a multi-year aid contract with the United States for continued use of communications facilities on the island.) He suggested telling the Turks that they were “caught up in a broader policy (re DCAs)” and that the DCA is no longer valid.

The Secretary said that he had thought a great deal about the broader problem and believed it would be best to “move away from that pattern.” However, that is a long range issue, and he is not sure that it can be done in this case. He said that he could not give an answer “at this time.” Sarbanes reiterated his view that we must find a way to respond if the Turks move some part of the way toward a Cyprus settlement. Failure to approve the DCA, he said, would not be as traumatic for the Turks were we to place a change of position on the Turkish DCA in the broader framework of a general policy toward DCAs around the world.

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<sup>2</sup> See Documents 104 and 172.

<sup>3</sup> The U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed on March 26, 1976, but Congress did not approve it because of the arms embargo. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Documents 240, 241, and 247.

Sarbanes then asked the Secretary to assess the recent Greek elections. The Secretary said that he was somewhat disappointed with the result, that Caramanlis suffered some but that he still had a broad margin and should have sufficient power to deal with the problems of his country. He said that it was still too early to see what the election would mean in terms of the US-Greek relationship. We would soon send a new Ambassador to Greece. "As you know, I feel that Bill Schaufele got a raw deal."<sup>4</sup> He said that our new ambassador is a good choice and that we expect him to be well received. He then asked the two to offer their views on the Greek election.

Sarbanes said that he was concerned over the results, that (Andreas) Papandreou had "vaulted" into a powerful position using an anti-American theme. This raises questions as to "what happens the next time," and underscores the urgency of resolving the Cyprus matter. Brademas said that Papandreou is a "dangerous man." He expressed concern that we may be taking Greece for granted. In a meeting at the White House some months ago the President appeared "cavalier" in that he seemed to assume that Greece would always be a close ally.<sup>5</sup> "If Caramanlis died we would have serious problems," Brademas said.

The Secretary said that it was his belief that Caramanlis would like to resolve the major issues which confront Greece. He would like to leave as his legacy a strong Greece, united with Europe in the Common Market and NATO.

Brademas then asked what the Administration proposes to do with the Greek DCA. The Secretary said that he certainly hopes the Greek government will sign the DCA, but that he would learn more about their position at Brussels. Sarbanes opined that the Greek DCA "plays into Papandreou's hands." He feels that we should simply renegotiate a "status-of-force" relationship with Greece and drop the DCA. The Secretary said that he felt this would be interpreted in Greece as a sign of weakness on Caramanlis' part since his government had negotiated the DCA and had advocated it publicly. Sarbanes disagreed and said that Caramanlis' public position was that if the Turks had a four-year agreement with the United States, Greece should too.

The Secretary then asked whether a reduction in the period of the Turkish DCA from four to two years would make a difference on the Hill. Sarbanes said that he could not comment on such a proposal without knowing what the Turks were prepared to do on Cyprus. "Let

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<sup>4</sup> Carter nominated Schaufele, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Ambassador to Greece on June 23, but the Greek Government protested the nomination. See footnote 2, Document 169.

<sup>5</sup> Presumably Brademas is referring to the April 22 meeting. See Document 13.

us assume that the Turks are prepared to undertake real drawdowns and other positive actions on Cyprus,” the Secretary said.

Sarbanes responded that that did not “get me very far” because a military drawdown on Cyprus would offer the appearance of change with no real change. He said there would be no actual movement on the island in that the Turks would still be able to maintain military control over the Northern sector. Congress went to \$175 million (in FMS credits), an increase of 40 percent over the previous amount, and there was still no movement on the part of the Turks. The Greek-American community is now asking why Turkey should get any money in Fiscal 1979. Brademas said that the two had met with Foreign Minister Caglayangil of Turkey who told them that Turkey was ready to be helpful on Cyprus. Despite this, he said, there had been no actual movement. “If the Turks really want to do something, fine, but we must match action for action,” Brademas said.

The Secretary then asked the two for their views on what would be an appropriate action by the Turks, “a withdrawal of forces?” Sarbanes said that this would not be significant if Turkey continued to maintain its military dominance. Brademas said that movement must be tangible and irreversible and mentioned reopening the road from Nicosia to Famagusta and opening the Nicosia airport.

Sarbanes wondered whether the President and the Vice President were aware of the increasing restlessness in the Greek-American community. He attributed the restlessness to: (1) the role we played at the United Nations on the Cyprus Resolution this year and our decision to abstain;<sup>6</sup> (2) the recent story in the New York Times which quoted American sources as saying that the Turks had threatened to expel US forces by Spring;<sup>7</sup> (3) the discovery of a loophole wherein Turkey purchased military items from the NATO supply center in apparent contravention of the embargo; and (4) Hodding Carter’s “even-handed” letter on the Cyprus problem. Brademas said that Greek-Americans are “hot under the collar.” Sarbanes said that the Mayor of Hartford, Connecticut recently wrote an open letter to the President highly critical of the Administration’s Cyprus policy.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> The United States abstained from UN General Assembly Resolution 32/15 on November 9, on the grounds that the Resolution, which expressed “concern over the lack of progress at the intercommunal talks,” focused excessively on past tensions instead of looking ahead to future solutions. The United States also objected that the Resolution artificially inflated the threat of the Cyprus dispute to world peace. See *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1977, p. 359. The text of the Resolution is on pp. 366–367.

<sup>7</sup> “U.S. Denies Troop Ouster is Threatened by Turkey,” *The New York Times*, December 1, 1977, p. A9.

<sup>8</sup> Neither Hodding Carter’s letter nor the letter from the Mayor of Hartford, Connecticut, was found.

Brademas asked what the Administration is doing to get across to Turkey that the time for action is now. The Secretary said that we have made it clear to the Turks that they must move now. In spite of Demirel's weak government, we hoped that Turkey would still be able to move on Cyprus.

Sarbanes then asked about the Cyprus elections. The Secretary said that Kyprianou has indicated that he would be somewhat limited in what he could do during this transition period. "That is why we need Greek participation in the Cyprus talks," he added.

Sarbanes then reiterated that the budget document was extremely important and said that last year's budget proposal was unacceptable. He said that the Turks had made no movement on Cyprus and that their inaction had made it difficult for him and other Members of Congress to justify the increase to \$175 million. Matt Nimetz said that there had been some movement and that recent Turkish statements were significant in that they held the promise of additional movement. He said that they recently agreed to allow Greek hotel owners to move back into Varosha to reopen that Greek resort area.<sup>9</sup>

Brian Atwood said that in light of the Administration's endorsement in principle of the Turkish DCA, it would be inconsistent to request less money than that necessary to implement the DCA. It could be made clear that the requested amounts were subject to approval of the DCA and that there would therefore be no indication of a change in the Administration's policy. He asked whether Brademas and Sarbanes might explain to the Greek-American community that it was important to retain these amounts in the budget "as a carrot" so that Turkey would have an incentive to negotiate on Cyprus. Brademas said that he thought that approach might be workable but that the descriptive language used in the budget document was extremely important. The Secretary said that it was our inclination to use "the carrot" and he agreed that the descriptive language was important.

Brademas then raised the NAMSA (the Nato Military Supply Agency) question and cited a recent speech by Lee Hamilton criticizing the Defense Department for allowing the Turks to purchase American equipment from this source.<sup>10</sup> Sarbanes said that the NAMSA matter has raised broader questions as to whether the US military and NATO were in line with the Administration's policy. Brademas said that US

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<sup>9</sup> The Greek Cypriot population of Varosha, an area of the city of Famagusta on the eastern shore of the island, was evacuated in the wake of the Turkish invasion in 1974. During the intercommunal negotiations between Makarios and Denktash in January and February 1977, Makarios called for the return of 35,000 Greek Cypriots to Varosha. See footnote 5, Document 31.

<sup>10</sup> Hamilton's speech is printed in the *Congressional Record*, November 25, 1977, pp. 37915-37916.

military commanders undercut the Administration when they make public statements criticizing the embargo. He asked whether our NATO allies understood the need to urge Turkey to resolve the Cyprus problem. The Secretary said that the British clearly understand our policy and that the West Germans have also been quite helpful. Matt Nimetz observed that NATO countries are obviously interested in strengthening NATO but that they realize that a resolution of the Cyprus problem may be the key to a restoration of the Southern flank.

The meeting ended amicably with the Secretary and the two legislators agreeing to keep in close touch.

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## 18. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 8, 1977

### SUBJECT

Turkish and Greek DCAs

The DCA with Turkey was negotiated in the winter of 1975–76 and signed in March 1976. The DCA with Greece was negotiated in part in 1976, then held up for nearly a year by the Greeks and completed only in the summer of 1977. It was initialled on 28 July 1977 but Karamanlis has delayed signing it.

Both DCAs replaced earlier agreements which were declared invalid in the wake of the Cyprus crisis of 1974. Both involved months of difficult, detailed negotiation over the exact status of our military installations in Greece and Turkey, import and export of equipment and supplies, status of our personnel, communications arrangements, rights of access [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and some supporting facilities by the Greeks and Turks. In both countries four major installa-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 75, Turkey: 1–12/77. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation reads: "The President has seen." The memorandum is attached as Tab A to a memorandum to Brzezinski from Henze. In a draft of the covering memorandum to Brzezinski of December 7, Henze noted that he had heard "casual suggestions" about dropping the Greek and Turkish DCAs, which he thought would be a "recipe for disaster." (Ibid.) Brzezinski wrote above the first paragraph of his memorandum to Carter, "Response to your query." Carter wrote at the top of the page: "Zbig, Assess [with] Fritz [Mondale] & Frank [Moore] best strategy for Congressional action—JC." Hutcheson forwarded the memorandum to Mondale, Brzezinski, and Frank Moore on December 9. (Ibid.)

tions and two dozen minor and auxiliary installations are covered. In both countries the negotiations involved a serious process of give-and-take but the agreements which emerged are sound and clear, and we feel they protect our basic interests effectively, while at the same time providing the basis for real, constructive cooperation with our two allies. They are better than what we had before.

Both agreements include commitments to supply military assistance: \$700 million over four years for Greece and \$1 billion over four years for Turkey. Per capita and in terms of the size of their armed forces, the provision of aid is more generous for Greece than for Turkey.

The importance of the DCA to the Turks goes well beyond its specific provisions. They see it as evidence of our basic politico-military commitment to them as allies and as reaffirmation of their status as full members of the western alliance. The Greeks are less emotionally attached to their DCA—and have shown themselves willing to delay every step connected with it as a means of forestalling restoration of the Turkish-American relationship.

If we were to abandon the DCAs the Greeks would see this as a triumph over the Turks and the Turks would feel outwitted by the Greeks. Relations between the two countries would be seriously damaged. If the Turkish DCA were presented separately to the Congress and rejected, the Turks would consider the American alliance as it has existed for 30 years at an end and might leave NATO. The Greeks do not see their DCA as essential to the preservation of their relationship with the United States, but Karamanlis must recognize that the DCA provides the most practical avenue for reassociating Greece with the United States and with NATO. If the Turkish DCA is separately ratified, Greek interest in having theirs signed and ratified will doubtlessly increase sharply.

Ratification of both DCAs is the most clear-cut and evenhanded way of laying the basis for settlement of Greek-Turkish differences and restoration of both these countries to full participation in the western alliance and the European and North Atlantic communities.

**19. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 25, 1978, 8 a.m.

**SUBJECT**

Secretary's Meeting on Greece and Turkey

**PARTICIPANTS**

Senator Paul S. Sarbanes

Congressman John Brademas

Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal

Mr. Clifford P. Hackett, Senator Sarbanes' staff

Mr. Richard Horowitz, Congressman Brademas' staff

The Secretary

Assistant Secretary Bennet, H

Assistant Secretary Vest, EUR

*Visits with Ecevit and Karamanlis*

The Secretary described his more than two hours' conversation with Ecevit where they had talked of global, regional, and bilateral issues. On the matters of immediate interest, Ecevit said he was determined to get the Cyprus issue settled so that it would not interfere with the economic, social, and other priority issues which now faced Turkey. He said he intended to be an activist and would have new proposals for both the territorial and constitutional issues in Cyprus. He had discussed his ideas with Denktash who is in agreement on their substance. His territorial proposal might not offer as much as the Greek Cypriots would like at the outset of their discussions, but it would be a genuine offer and a basis for negotiation. On the constitutional side he thought it should be a federal and not a confederal system and his proposal would be a real practical basis for resolving the situation. Cyprus, as he said several times, was a thorn that had to be removed so that Turkey could deal with issues that were more vital to Turkish needs.

As for the DCA, Ecevit hoped the question would be resolved soon. The Secretary told Ecevit that he was proceeding on the assumption that he, Ecevit, knew that this issue was linked to the situation in Cyprus and it was simply a matter of fact that this relationship was much in the minds of Congressmen. Ecevit said that the DCA was outmoded and not really fair to the Turks because the dollar had depreci-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780045–2474. Confidential. Drafted by Vest; cleared by Bennet; approved by Anderson on February 1. The meeting took place on the eighth floor of the Department of State. Vance had met with Ecevit in Ankara January 20–21 and with Karamanlis in Athens January 21. See Documents 107 and 173.

ated and arms cost more and maybe it should be looked at again. The Secretary had responded that if the DCA were opened up, it was unrealistic to think that the result would be any increased amounts; that was a simple fact of life. We had endorsed the Turkish DCA in principle and the decision as to when it would move in Congress was related to the events in the Eastern Mediterranean, as we had made clear to the previous Turkish administration and to the Turkish Ambassador.

The Secretary said that in Greece he had a lengthy and useful discussion with Caramanlis. Caramanlis explained that from his point of view Cyprus was at the core of his difficulties with Turkey and with the Greek-NATO relationship. He would like to have the Cyprus issue resolved, but he was inclined to doubt the Turks would put a serious proposal on the table. The Secretary explained to Caramanlis what Ecevit had said to him and Caramanlis responded that if it should turn out that way, he would try to get Cyprus resolved, which in turn could clear the way to reintegrate the Greek forces into NATO.<sup>2</sup> From his point of view the Aegean was more important than Cyprus. The Secretary told Caramanlis that he was pleased that the two sides planned to resume their Paris discussions on this issue on February 12 and asked what he proposed to do about Ecevit's offer for a summit. Caramanlis had responded that if something useful were to come, he would favor it, but he did have questions. Did Ecevit have the power to deliver? Was he sincere about trying to resolve the difficulties? The Secretary pointed out that it would be possible to have lower level talks to test the way, and if these proved encouraging, he could go ahead at the top. (He commented to the Congressmen that he was encouraged that now publicly Caramanlis has followed this line.)

In general he said Caramanlis' mood was very good, optimistic, positive, and friendly. In fact, much the same could be said of Ecevit. Both urged that the U.S. should not try to play a direct role, but should be available to help if asked. The Secretary said he made it clear that we are available to assist the U.N. Secretary General and the parties if they wish, but we looked to them to work it out.

The Secretary observed that his own feeling was that Ecevit had more to him than Caramanlis seemed to think at this point. He believed that Ecevit, who was a very bright man, really wanted to resolve the issues.

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<sup>2</sup> Greece dropped out of NATO's military structure in response to NATO's failure to halt the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Documents 20–23, 25, 26, and 56.



*Linkage*

Brademas asked if the Secretary had made it clear to the Turks that linkage really remains a fact of life here. The Secretary replied that insofar as Congress is concerned, it was clear that there is linkage. Brademas noted that this Administration had inherited Kissinger's DCA-or-nothing framework and now that Ecevit had raised renegotiating the DCA, he suggested we could pick that up and find some way to get out of the four-year DCA framework. The Secretary replied that what Ecevit wanted was another agreement with more money so renegotiating the DCA would not be helpful. We didn't like the four-year packages, but the arrangements with Spain, Turkey, Greece, and possibly the Philippines were there and we were stuck with them. Brademas persisted that if we wanted to find a handle to move to another arrangement, Ecevit has provided an opening.

He then turned to the IMF and suggested that the IMF people could tell the Turks that they have a lot of extra expenses with their forces in Cyprus. Brademas had the impression that we had not done much with the economic weapon.

The Secretary interjected that he had raised with Ecevit the question of reducing the number of years in the DCA, and Ecevit had replied it simply would be disastrous and give the impression of a lack of U.S. commitment and continuity in U.S. policy.

Returning to linkage, Brademas asked if he could say that he had been assured by the Administration that there was no change in our policy and that the DCA was linked to progress in Cyprus. The Secretary replied that we had never said that, so the answer was no. He went on: There would be hearings in the spring and the issue would come up at that time. He would have to see what was put on the table by the Turks and the others and after being in touch with the Congressmen, he would then make his final decision. Brademas said that he recalled a meeting with the President who had told him, "I can't say it publicly, but I am telling you there is a linkage." He said he would like to say that the President had made a campaign pledge to that effect and that he believed him. He displayed a Greek-American newspaper with the headline, "Now it's tricky Jimmy." The Secretary said it should be clear that when we see what is on the table we, after consulting with the Congressmen, will decide what the Administration will do.

Sarbanes interjected that he was worried about Papandreou's strength at the last election, which he understood had been heavily financed by Qadhafi. He was concerned about the long-run situation in Greece. We don't know what Ecevit will put on the table. We don't like four-year agreements, but if the Cyprus situation is resolved, we will be back to square one. He could see that eventually he and the Administration could differ in judgment as to whether what Ecevit put on the

table was or was not reasonable. Sarbanes went on that it did not help to have Haig, reinforced by the Pentagon, make statements favoring early action for Turkey. This gave a picture of the Administration playing a double game. He emphasized at once, however, that he did not attribute this to the Secretary. However, he continued, the Administration's approach was a carrot and stick approach, and the military seem disposed to give the carrot right away and try to end-run Congress. How optimistic, he said, was the Secretary?

The Secretary replied he could not say yet but, on the basis of what Waldheim and Ecevit had told him, he felt that Ecevit really wanted to get the Cyprus issue out of the way. He thought Ecevit was sincere. Caramanlis was doubtful, but was ready to explore the possibilities. On constitutional issues he thought the proposal would be forthcoming. On the territorial one the initial proposal would be at least a fair beginning. That was his guess. On the DCA he anticipated doing nothing on the Hill before March. That would give time for the Ecevit proposals to be looked at in February. Sarbanes returned to his point that he was concerned that the Turks would look forthcoming and Congress would be on the spot to give away its billion dollar decision prematurely before we knew where the Turkish negotiations would lead. The Secretary responded that until he saw what was on the table he could not answer. Rosenthal reinforced Sarbanes' point and said that once Congress had acted it would have no more carrot and the Turks would only be midstream in the negotiations. The Secretary responded that it really depended on momentum of events in the Eastern Mediterranean. That was as close as he could go to linkage, and we had explained before why we did not wish to go beyond that.

The Secretary circulated the figures that would be going up in the budget for Greece and Turkey. He thought that the arrangement had been worked out properly with lower numbers in the proposal and higher numbers in the footnote, following the Congressmen's suggestion from their last meeting.

The Secretary noted that he had asked Caramanlis what was his approach to the Greek DCA. Caramanlis had said that although he might change his mind, at that point he did not think he could go forward with it until he had resolved the Greece-NATO relationship, and he could not resolve that until he had settled Cyprus. Brademas observed that if the Administration decided to push for the Turkish DCA and not the Greek DCA, there would be all hell to pay on the Hill. He hoped we would not get into this jam. The Secretary shared the hope.

The Secretary noted that the Turks would like follow-on discussions on bilateral issues and in the course of that discussion he, the Secretary, had urged the Foreign Minister to face up to their economic situation in relation to the IMF review. Brademas appreciated the fact that

the Secretary had brought up economics and the IMF with both Ecevit and the Foreign Minister.

Senator Sarbanes asked if the Turks appreciated that if Cyprus were settled, the U.S.-Turkish relationship would be okay, and the Secretary said yes. Particularly this was true of Ecevit, who was a sophisticated man. Brademas, trying again, asked if NATO is so important, why couldn't we urge Ecevit to be much more forthcoming, implying that otherwise there might be a question of IMF help and arms. The Secretary responded that he thought blackmail would be dangerous to fool around with, and in fact he was not certain that we had that much leverage with the IMF. Sarbanes again said he was disturbed about Haig, the Pentagon, and the kind of story that had recently appeared in the *Washington Post*, giving the impression that the Administration had one viewpoint, but that Congress was impeding action.<sup>3</sup> This public image would create a whole new ball game.

Rosenthal suggested that it would be appropriate for the Secretary to send Ecevit a message to wrap up his recent visit and to stimulate him to be as forthcoming as possible in the prospective negotiations. The Secretary agreed at once this was a logical thing to do, and he would write to him in that sense. Sarbanes on linkage summarized that linkage was privately established, but could not be publicly stated. Sarbanes, returning to the figures for FMS and grant aid, noted a drop in grant aid for Greece, which Assistant Secretary Bennet said he would look into.

The Secretary concluded that all concerned recognized this was a critical time. Ecevit, he felt, had to take initiatives and Caramanlis and he had to be the men to settle things. He liked Caramanlis very much and found him an interesting, thoughtful, and encouraging national leader. Caramanlis was worried about the seabed and Greek sovereignty in the Aegean and the possibility of Papandreou exploiting the situation, but in general thought there was at least a possibility now for constructive evolution in the Mediterranean. Brademas noted that on several occasions recently Matt Nimetz talked about the U.S. getting more involved in the substance of a possible Cyprus settlement. The Secretary responded that both the Greeks and Turks had said that we should stay out and leave it to them to work under the aegis of the United Nations. We agreed to do so, but stand ready to assist if the United Nations and the concerned parties wish.

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<sup>3</sup> Michael Getler, "Vance Gets Blunt Turkish Welcome," *The Washington Post*, January 21, 1978, p. A14.

**20. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 21, 1978

## SUBJECT

Greek-Turkish Military Assistance

Congressional hearings have been scheduled during the first week of April at which the Administration will be expected to present its program on Greek and Turkish military assistance, and in particular its approach to the Turkish embargo and the four-year, \$1 billion Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). The embargo (Section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act) was imposed by the Congress as a result of the 1974 Turkish military operations in Cyprus. We have endorsed the DCA in principle, but have not requested Congressional action; there has been an implicit linkage—never publicly articulated—that our decision on the DCA was related to positive Turkish movement on a Cyprus settlement. However, we have also stressed the importance of our bilateral relationship with Turkey and its major role in NATO.

There is a general consensus in State, shared I believe by other departments and agencies, that if we fail to restore the Turkish relationship this year, these relations will deteriorate rapidly and may lead to unfortunate actions by the Ecevit government with respect to our bases and military presence in Turkey, Turkey's commitment to NATO, and Turkey's general Western orientation. On the other side, the Greeks and Cypriots would have a strong negative reaction, as would important U.S. constituencies, if we moved to a full restoration of the Turkish relationship at a time when substantial progress on Cyprus has not yet occurred. (Prime Minister Ecevit has given public and private assurances that the Turkish Cypriots will present meaningful proposals to Waldheim shortly, but we have no assurance as to the timing or the contents of these proposals.)

Three possible courses of action which we have considered are the following:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 75, Turkey: 1-7/78. Secret. Carter wrote "Fritz [Mondale]—See me. J" at the top of the first page. No record of a follow-up meeting between Mondale and Carter was found. In a handwritten note to Carter, Brzezinski informed him that Brzezinski, Vance, and Brown had agreed upon the "sensitive memo" before him and that all of the options were politically "costly." Brzezinski also recommended that Carter talk with Mondale prior to making a decision. (Ibid.)

*I. Full DCA Package for Turkey.*

Request the Congress to repeal the embargo (Section 620(x)) and approve the DCA. At the same time, we would express our continued commitment to work for a just Cyprus solution.

*Pro*

—This approach would clearly please the Turks and, if successful, would ensure their continued Western orientation.

—It will face up fully to the issue of our Turkish relationship and allow us to fight the battle on the Hill in terms of basic United States interests in the region and not on the substance of the Cyprus problem.

—It would lead to the re-opening of our intelligence bases in Turkey and the strengthening of Turkish military forces dedicated to NATO purposes.

—It may in the long run promote a Cyprus settlement because, assuming the Turkish authorities present reasonable opening proposals, the lifting of the embargo and passage of the DCA would make the Cypriots more willing to negotiate realistically.

*Con*

—This package would provoke a major fight on the Hill, led by Brademas and Sarbanes, the outcome of which is not wholly clear especially if the Turks are not helpful with timely and positive Cyprus proposals.

—It introduces the troublesome factor of a four-year base agreement which many Members of Congress will oppose regardless of the country involved.

—It imposes on the Administration a major battle in Congress at a time when we are trying to reduce the number of open and difficult issues on the Hill.

—It will strain our relations with Greece and Cyprus and perhaps make some U.S.-Greek and Greek-NATO issues more difficult politically for Caramanlis.

*II. Modified Package for Turkey.*

This approach involves a new package we have developed which can be defended as balanced, fair and responsive to the current situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has not been discussed with the Turks or with Brademas and Sarbanes. It may reduce opposition on the Hill, and it may have some appeal to Ecevit although clearly far less than a decision to push the DCA.

1. Maintain the Turkish military assistance level in FY '79 at \$175 million in FMS credits, but ask for no grant military aid.

2. Recommend the immediate lifting of the embargo (Section 620(x)). This removes the ceiling on FMS cash purchases, permits third country transfers, and facilitates military planning with the Turks.

3. Announce (jointly, if possible, with the Turkish Government) that the 1976 DCA will be promptly re-negotiated. The Turks will want to increase the dollar amount in the DCA; we will seek to reduce the four-year commitment; we will both be able to make other changes, and deal with the major base issues. Members of Congress will be informed that it is unlikely that a re-negotiated DCA would be submitted to them this year.

4. Increase Greek military assistance to \$140 million FMS credits, the same as last year, and put off any signing of the Greek DCA. We would tell the Greeks that we also wish to re-negotiate their DCA.

5. In light of Turkey's serious economic difficulties, amend present FY '79 FAA proposal to include a security supporting assistance loan for Turkey of \$50 million, subject to an agreement between Turkey and the IMF on a stabilization program.

6. If Congress wishes, acquiesce to a requirement for a Presidential determination that Turkish credit purchases are NATO related and continuation of regular Presidential reports to the Congress on progress towards a Cyprus solution.

#### *Pro*

—Lifting of the embargo deals with the major irritant in US-Turkish relations. Both sides could benefit by the decision to re-negotiate the DCA.

—The package addresses Turkey's economic needs—something which the DCA itself does not do.

—It is the kind of package which can be defended on its own merits in the Congress, since it is something we have put together ourselves based on our evaluation of the current circumstances.

—The package avoids a four-year, \$1 billion commitment to Turkey, a commitment many on the Hill oppose because of its precedent-setting character.

—Since Ecevit did not negotiate the DCA and has occasionally criticized it, our willingness to re-negotiate the document could be useful to Ecevit domestically.

#### *Con*

—Since it proposes "lifting the embargo," Brademas, Sarbanes, et al., and the US-Greek community are virtually certain to fight this package hard.

—In the continuing absence of a DCA, the Turks may decide not to open our intelligence bases.

—The Turkish military and the NATO alliance will not be fully satisfied because the flow of funds to upgrade the Turkish military establishment would be delayed.

—This approach may require another Congressional fight next year if a new DCA is presented, although progress in Cyprus in the meantime may reduce this possibility.

—Greek and Cypriot reaction to this package would be adverse, although not as strongly negative as would be the case if we pushed the DCA.

### *III. No Movement on a Turkish Program.*

Under this alternative, we would support our request for \$175 million in FMS credits as an exception to the embargo. We would state that movement on the DCA is not appropriate at this time.

#### *Pro*

—This would avoid a major fight in Congress with the Greek supporters. (However, it should be noted that supporters of the Turkish relationship have indicated that they may try to push the DCA independently of whether the Administration gives its support.)

—Such an approach would be greeted with relief in Greece and Cyprus.

#### *Con*

—The reaction in Turkey is sure to be decisive and prompt. Ecevit has hinted that he will boycott the Washington NATO summit meeting in late May at which he is to serve as President of the North Atlantic Council. The Turks may take some action with respect to US personnel at the remaining bases in Turkey and call into question the continuing presence of our nuclear weapons there. They have indicated that they would re-assess their over-all security arrangements which risks a loosening of Turkey's ties with NATO and with the West generally and a subsequent movement toward a more neutralist approach.

—Media and Congressional reaction in the event Turkey reduced its links with NATO and the West could provoke unpleasant hearings critical of our Eastern Mediterranean policy approach.

—Under these circumstances, overall US security interest in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East would be adversely affected.

—Maintaining the embargo is unlikely to help solve Cyprus: On the contrary, it might provoke the Turks to withdraw their proposals and refuse to negotiate with the Cypriots; the Turks could even take out their frustration by adopting a less compromising attitude toward Greece.

—The situation in the Eastern Mediterranean is more likely to get worse rather than better, and we will have to face the same issue again next year in a substantially more difficult atmosphere.

*Recommendation:*

Harold, Zbig, and I concur in recommending that we adopt Option II.

Once a decision is taken, I recommend that we invite Sarbanes and his colleagues to the White House and explain what we intend to do. You will recall that we told them we would keep them informed. After talking to them, I recommend that we send a message to Ecevit in Ankara setting forth our package, which we will explain as designed to lift the embargo, meet Turkey's pressing economic needs, and allow re-negotiation of the DCA. We would also inform the leaders of both Houses, the Greeks and the Cypriots of our proposal prior to presentation.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Carter checked his approval of Option II and initialed "J.C." Brzezinski returned a copy of this memorandum to Vance on March 22 and reported that the President approved Option II and planned to meet with Congressional leaders shortly. (Ibid.) The President met with the Congressmen on March 24. No record of the meeting was found. On July 25 the Senate voted 57–42 to lift the arms embargo against Turkey. On August 1, the House voted 208–205 to lift the arms embargo. See Document 121.



**21. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

RP M 78–10231

Washington, May 25, 1978

**SUBJECT**

NATO's Troubled Southeastern Flank: Greek and Turkish Foreign Policies

*Summary*

*The quarrels between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and the Aegean have triggered significant changes in the two countries' broader foreign policies. Their efforts to outmaneuver each other have weakened NATO's southeastern flank and disrupted the harmony of the Western defense and economic systems in general. At the same time, the critical importance to both countries of their Western ties puts limits on how far they can go. Neither—but especially the Greeks—can afford to leave the field to its rival by bolting the West altogether. And Turkey will be cautious in pursuing its self-proclaimed intention to adopt a more independent foreign policy.*

When Greece and Turkey have quarreled in the past they have moved in fairly predictable ways. The pattern followed by the Greeks has been to secure external involvement, believing that this can only help them against their more powerful adversary. This strategy has served them well. Their independence from the Ottomans and all subsequent recoveries of territories from the Turks have been won with the help of outside intervention.

Precisely because of the Greeks' success, the Turks for their part, have constantly opposed the involvement of other powers in their disputes with the Greeks. Indeed, it is their experience of constantly being "ganged up" on by the West that accounts for the Turks' [*less than 1 line not declassified*] ambivalent feelings toward their allies in NATO.

*Differing Strategies*

The two countries have exhibited similar behavior in their present rivalry over Cyprus and the Aegean. The Greeks have sought to mobilize and involve all their friends and allies in their behalf. Their withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command in 1974 and their decision to revise defense relations with the US were aimed in part at nudging both into playing a greater role in settling the disputes. These

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 80T00634A, Box 3, unlabeled folder. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A note on the first page reads: "This memorandum was prepared by the Western Europe Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis in coordination with the Office of Strategic Research and the Office of Economic Research. 'Questions and comments may be addressed to [*name not declassified*].' A distribution list is attached but not printed."

moves have been measured, and have been partly compensated for by a concerted drive to "join Western Europe" by way of membership in the European Community. While that move is aimed mainly at bolstering Greece's economy and its Western democratic tradition, it is also seen by Greeks as another "security blanket" of sorts against the Turks. In that context, the rush to join is part of the broader Greek-Turkish rivalry.

The Turks, on the other hand, have consistently maintained that Greek-Turkish problems must not be linked to Turkey's relations with its US and West European allies. Believing that Turkey has other options by virtue of its size and strategic location, the Demirel government underscored this point in 1975 by suspending US base operations in Turkey in response to the Congressionally imposed arms embargo. Beyond that, the Turks have sought to counter Greek maneuvering within the Western orbit with some of their own. They have tried to obstruct Greece's effort to negotiate a new relationship with NATO, in part because of a genuine concern that the Greeks are trying to get a free ride but also in retaliation for Greek lobbying in behalf of the US arms embargo.

And while the Turks have not officially opposed Greece's prospective membership in the EC, they are clearly upset at the prospect of being isolated from that institution and they have insisted that the Community must include Turkey in its political consultative process once the Greeks get in.<sup>2</sup> More important, the Turks have sought to increase their leverage with their allies—and also to carve a new niche for Turkey in international politics—by dangling the threat of a further loosening of ties to the West and a closer relationship with the Soviet Union and the Third World.

#### *Greece—A "Hooked Fish"*

Greece, on the other hand, has been reluctant to wander outside the Western orbit because of the close cultural, ideological, economic, and security ties with the West that prompted John Foster Dulles to refer to Greece as a "hooked fish." Dulles was speaking in the context of the East-West conflict; but the fact is even more relevant in the Greek-Turkish rivalry since the Greeks cannot afford to concede Western support to the Turks. Indeed, "We belong to the West" has been a consistent slogan of the Caramanlis government even as it seeks to bring pressure to bear on the West to do its bidding toward the Turks.

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<sup>2</sup> The Greek Parliament ratified Greece's accession to the European Community on June 28, 1979, and Greece officially became a member on January 1, 1981.

Because of this sentiment, the Greeks have allowed US bases to operate relatively unimpeded despite their unhappiness with the US response to their case against the Turks. And most recently, Greek reaction to the Administration's decision to press for a lifting of the embargo against Turkey has been rather muted and will probably remain so even if Congress lifts the embargo.

Nor has the Caramanlis government felt very comfortable outside of NATO's integrated military command. A trend toward slowly bringing Greece back into the alliance began in 1976 when most of the Greeks' nuclear-capable forces were earmarked for NATO use. This was followed by a decision last fall to participate selectively in alliance military exercises. It culminated in a decision last winter to seek full reentry in all but name as soon as possible. To be sure, the latter was also prompted by indications from some West European leaders that Greece's EC application might be processed more speedily were it to return to NATO as well as Greek concern that Turkey was dominating the alliance's southeastern flank by default. Indeed, the question of naval command and air control in the Aegean are emerging as the major stumbling blocks in the Greek-NATO negotiations, with the Greeks insisting that their former authority in these areas be restored once they return, and the Turks in particular opposing such a move.

Greece's troubles with its allies have not led to any noticeable improvement in Greece's relations with the Soviet Union. The staunch anticommunism of the Greek political, military, and economic elite, the Communist civil war experience, and Moscow's courting of the Turks are the reasons. And while there may be a slight thaw in the relationship when Greek Foreign Minister Rallis goes to Moscow this summer to sign some minor cultural, consular, and trade agreements, Greek-Soviet relations are not likely to improve substantially. On the other hand, Caramanlis by his "Balkan initiative" has tried to bring about a greater measure of cooperation between Greece and its Balkan Communist neighbors. Designed to secure Greece's flank in the event of a clash with Turkey and often resorted to by Greek leaders in the past in times of Greek-Turkish friction, the effort has been most successful with Yugoslavia, with which the Greeks have developed closer political, economic, and even a limited amount of military cooperation. Lately, Greek-Albanian relations have also improved.

[less than 1 line not declassified] But it will remain so only so long as it is ruled by conservatives or centrists—such as Caramanlis and his colleagues—who are committed to the West. Someone like leftist opposition leader Andreas Papandreou might seek permanently looser ties with the US and NATO and might also break with the EC were he to come to power—and his prospects will depend in part on the Greek electorate's perception of Western behavior in the Greek-Turkish con-

troversy. To be sure, the staunchly pro-West military presumably would be a constraint on Papandreou, but the officer corps might itself acquiesce in a reduction of ties to the West in the event of another humiliation by Turkey to which it felt the West was unresponsive.

*Turkey More Assertive*

The Demirel government only flirted with the idea of loosening Turkey's ties to the West; the independent-minded Ecevit is considering it more seriously. But there is a good deal of posturing in Ecevit's statements. He is fully cognizant that the alternatives to Turkey's economic and military ties with the West are limited. Moreover, both he and the majority of the Turkish elite prize their self image as "Western" and "European".

Ecevit has talked about adopting a "new defense concept" for Turkey. The concept's meaning seems to have been left purposefully vague; essentially, however, it envisages a role for Turkey similar to that of the French in NATO or the Romanians in the Warsaw Pact. Ecevit has noted, for example, that although Turkey will both of necessity and choice, remain within the Western defense and economic systems, it must not act as a military bastion or agent of the West in its region. Moreover, Turkey should make its "own contribution to détente" by reducing tensions in its area and improving relations with the Soviet Union. A corollary is the effort to develop closer political and economic relations with Arab and other Third World states—an effort that has produced few political or economic results so far. Always implicit and sometimes explicit are possible reductions in Turkey's commitment to NATO, in the size of the US or NATO presence in Turkey, and in the size of Turkey's armed forces.

The extent to which Ecevit implements his new approach will depend in the first place on whether the US arms embargo is lifted. If it is not, Ecevit would find it difficult politically and psychologically not to take further retaliatory measures, focusing on the US bases in Turkey or on Turkey's commitment to NATO. Whatever he chose to do, his moves would probably be tempered by the recent willingness of Western governments and financial institutions to help bail out the faltering Turkish economy, which is a far more serious issue in the short term for Turkey than that of arms. They have offered to provide substantial credits and to refinance part of Turkey's sizeable short and mid-term debt. An even more important reason for Turkish caution is that Turkey will need additional credits and refinancing to solve its economic problems.

Turkey in fact remains heavily dependent on the West in many important ways, and Ecevit will have to take this fact into account as he tries to assert a greater degree of autonomy. Turkey needs Western

credits and hard currency to meet its development needs in amounts which the Soviet Union has been unable or unwilling to supply despite its economic largesse to Turkey in other ways. Turkey, moreover, does not have a viable alternative to Western, and particularly US, arms. [2 lines not declassified]—and the military balance would doubtless tilt toward Greece while the process was underway. Even if they could set aside their historic suspicion of the Soviets, the Turks would be reluctant to pay the political price that Moscow would almost certainly demand for such vast amounts of economic and military assistance. Ecevit, therefore, is unlikely during his widely publicized visit next month to Moscow to enter into any agreements with the Soviet Union that would be incompatible with Turkey's continued membership in NATO.

Nor does it appear likely that Ecevit's courting of the Third World will produce any more dividends than it did for his predecessor. For example, the Arabs' reaction to Turkey's economic plight to date and their attitudes on Cyprus do not suggest a dramatic improvement in relations.

[1½ lines not declassified] to be sure, and one that clearly intends to test the length and strength of the line. The Turks in fact will probably succeed in stretching the line; but a break is not much likelier for Turkey than it is for Greece. Meanwhile, until they are settled, the squabbles between the two will continue to weaken and disrupt Western institutions.

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**22. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Nimetz) to Secretary of State Vance and the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 31, 1978

**SUBJECT**

The Eastern Mediterranean—Post-Embargo Initiatives

In our efforts to secure repeal of the Turkish arms embargo, we have consistently stressed that lifting the embargo is only the essential

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977–1980, Lot 81D85, Box 2, Eastern Mediterranean—1978. Confidential. Drafted by Ewing; cleared by Vest and Anton DePorte (S/P).

first step toward breaking the impasse in the Eastern Mediterranean. In light of the expectations in the Congress and the region of new American initiatives, alone or in conjunction with others, it is important that we begin moving promptly once we are sure of the ultimate result in the Congress. There is a strong assumption that the United States will mount an active offensive to obtain early progress on Cyprus. There is also a clear expectation that embargo repeal will lead to the expeditious opening of U.S. facilities in Turkey. Action geared toward reducing the negative impact of the lifting of the embargo in Greece and Cyprus is also anticipated.

In charting a comprehensive strategy toward the area in the immediate aftermath of embargo repeal as well as over the next several months, we need a clear understanding of our priorities and ways to deal with them effectively.

Karamanlis and the Greek Government appear reconciled to repeal of the embargo, although to deflect opposition, media, and public concern they will continue to criticize our action, probably in muted, cautious tones. Most importantly, the Greeks will seek in the period following the lifting of the embargo to achieve several priority political goals: namely, they will expect the United States to pressure the Turks to accommodate Greek conditions for its return to NATO; they will anticipate a more active U.S. role in extracting meaningful Turkish concessions on Cyprus; they will attempt to get U.S. support in their Aegean differences with Turkey; and they will want to maintain the current military balance with Turkey.

In the period following embargo repeal, Ecevit will expect and welcome an active U.S. effort to bring Turkey back toward a full contribution to the Alliance. He will probably accept U.S. activities to promote progress on Cyprus. The Turks, however, will be very wary of any such effort which seems to represent new heavy pressure. They have also listened carefully to some of the arguments made to and in the Congress regarding the woeful shape of the Turkish defense structure and the extremely important geographic and military contribution which Turkey makes to the West. These arguments will lead them to expect a significant level of military assistance in 1980. Ecevit will also seek to find ways to show that his interest in revitalizing the Turkish-American relationship has borne fruit beyond the simple removal of the negative symbolism which the embargo had come to represent. In this regard, the Turks will particularly seek commitments of U.S. and Allied economic and financial assistance to help overcome their continuing severe economic difficulties. The Turks will expect us to insist on immediate reopening of our facilities in Turkey, but may try to bargain this against U.S. military supply and/or economic aid. While negotia-

tions will undoubtedly prove to be difficult, we hope to achieve rapid resumption of activities at these facilities.

The Greek Cypriots will be bitter and resentful in the wake of repeal of the embargo. Given their apparently genuine belief in its efficacy as a pressure tactic, they cannot but regard removal of the embargo as a severe setback to their hopes, rather than as an opportunity for progress. There is likely to be a temporary surge in anti-Americanism in the press and in the political realm. However, many responsible political and Foreign Ministry people believe that, having eliminated the embargo, the United States will have assumed a much greater burden of responsibility vis-a-vis Cyprus. This may well be translated into an expectation that we will now exert much heavier pressure on Turkey. We anticipate that Kyprianou, Rolandis, Pelagias and others will be willing to work actively with us to lay the foundation for a resumption of talks and will want to share their views and ideas with us.<sup>2</sup>

While the Turkish Cypriots will be pleased with removal of the embargo, it is unlikely that this step alone will induce them to be more flexible and conciliatory towards the Greek Cypriots. Ankara will have to continue to exert determined and consistent pressure but both the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots may resist U.S. and/or Western European efforts to become more actively involved in the substance of the Cyprus issue.

Against this backdrop of promises made or implied as well as expectations in the area, George Vest and I think our short and medium term area objectives should be the following:<sup>3</sup>

#### *Problems/Objectives*

##### *Greece:*

—Restore a sense of trust and vitality to US-Greek relations, in part by directing the focus of our bilateral relationship away from dominant military security aspects to bilateral cooperation in the economic, scientific and cultural areas, possibly through the establishment of joint working groups.

—Facilitate an early return to NATO on terms satisfactory to Greece and to the Alliance.

—Encourage continuation of Greek/Turkish efforts peacefully to resolve Aegean issues while avoiding U.S. involvement in the substance of the controversy or the provision of a binding security guarantee.

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<sup>2</sup> Vance drew a vertical line in the margin adjacent to this sentence and wrote a question mark. He also underlined "Kyprianou."

<sup>3</sup> Vance approved each of the following objectives—subject to several handwritten instructions noted below—by writing "ok" in the margin next to each.

—Indicate a willingness to proceed with the negotiated but unsigned US-Greek defense cooperation agreement with deletion of the multi-year financial provision.

*Turkey:*

—Secure early Turkish agreement on activation of closed facilities and normalization of our defense presence in Turkey.<sup>4</sup>

—Begin a process of dialogue with the Turks on long-range military questions, including the role and equipment requirements of the Turkish military and how the U.S. and other Alliance members can and cannot assist in filling these requirements.

—Listen to Turkish ideas on revitalizing our bilateral non-defense relationship while making clear to them that our ability to provide economic/financial aid is limited by our budgetary constraints and that the Turkish Government itself must get its economy under control.

*Cyprus:*

—Assist in breaking the current negotiating impasse, working in close conjunction with the U.N. Secretary General; the British, French, Germans, and Canadians; and directly with the parties in order to achieve a basis for early talks.

—Achieve rapid and visible progress toward resettlement of Varosha.<sup>5</sup>

—Encourage the Cypriot parties to resolve humanitarian and technical issues such as missing persons and the reopening of Nicosia Airport.

*Conclusions*

It is obvious that these objectives must be approached over different time periods. For example, negotiations with Turkey on reopening the facilities and an effort to facilitate NATO re-entry should resume very quickly; a Cyprus settlement will certainly not be achieved this year, but progress on Varosha could be significant. As we move forward to improve our relations with all countries, we must be careful that in seeking to achieve one goal we do not jeopardize opportunities with respect to others. In addition, we must be aware of the limitations of our influence and the risk of interjecting ourselves too directly in the substance of Greek/Turkish bilateral disputes.

*Recommended Actions:*

1. Soon after it is clear that the embargo will be lifted, the President should send messages to Karamanlis and Kyprianou reaffirming our intentions to work actively on Cyprus and to strengthen our relations with both countries.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Vance wrote "should be soon" in the margin adjacent to this recommendation.

<sup>5</sup> Vance wrote "important to do now" in the margin adjacent to this recommendation.

<sup>6</sup> Vance wrote "yes" in the margin adjacent to this paragraph.



2. A message should also be sent to Ecevit. I recommend a telephone call from the President after the House vote. We are preparing talking points. A written message may also be appropriate after the conference meets to resolve Senate/House differences. We should convey to Ecevit our particular interest in seeing Greek/NATO entry move forward, our strong desire for early Cyprus progress (particularly Varosha), and the importance to us of early base reopening. On the latter point, negotiating instructions are being prepared in State/Defense, and we plan to send a team to start negotiations very soon.<sup>7</sup>

3. With regard to Cyprus, we should move simultaneously on at least three tracks:

a) We have agreed with the UK, FRG, France and Canada to work together on the Cyprus problem and preliminary work should begin soon. We have discussed with the British the first steps in this process, including the circulation of documents and a possible meeting of experts in Washington or London in September. Further consultations on this process should be undertaken without publicity.<sup>8</sup>

b) We should also work in close conjunction with the United Nations to support their efforts on specific matters such as Varosha, Nicosia Airport reopening, establishment of the missing persons committee. We should lose no time in working with the U.N. to reconcile the Greek and Turkish Cypriot proposals on Varosha in order to demonstrate visible progress.

c) We know that elements of the Cypriot Government, including even Kyprianou, believe that only the U.S. can really achieve movement toward a Cyprus solution. We have been told that an early visit to Cyprus would be welcome by the Cypriot Government and also demonstrate U.S. concern. Such a visit should be considered for an early date, perhaps early September, or even during the week following the embargo vote. Clark Clifford has been perceived during the Congressional debate as rather pro-Turkish and I doubt that we should risk sending him to the island when the Greek Cypriots will publicly be feeling antagonistic towards us. I would suggest instead that we discuss with the Cypriots the idea of my making the trip with a very small team. We would sound out the parties on Cyprus and try to lay the groundwork for our future activities.

4. Consideration should also be given to visits to Greece and Turkey in the near future, perhaps in conjunction with a Cyprus trip. Discussions with the Turks on the base agreement, NATO military cooperation and similar subjects would be useful. We will want particularly both in Ankara and in Brussels to make clear that it is important to

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<sup>7</sup> In the margin adjacent to the recommendation that Carter should call Ecevit, Vance wrote "*done*." In the margin adjacent to the recommendation that Carter should consider a written message to Ecevit as well, Vance wrote in the margin, "*ok*."

<sup>8</sup> Vance wrote "*good*" in the margin adjacent to this recommendation.

<sup>9</sup> Vance wrote "*yes*" in the margin adjacent to this recommendation and underlined "We should lose no time in working."

see early positive movement of Greece into NATO. A high-level visit to Greece would help further to reassure the Greeks of our general approach to the area. A political visit in the region by the Vice President should also be considered for 1979, depending on progress in various areas.<sup>10</sup>

5. With regard to the Aegean and Greece-Turkey bilateral relations, we should continue to welcome and encourage the current promising dialogue which is taking place at several levels. We should, however, not involve ourselves in the substance of the various issues since to do so would involve taking sides and getting into very intricate and controversial issues.

We would welcome your reaction to these ideas.

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<sup>10</sup> In the margin adjacent to the recommendation for future trips to Greece and Turkey, Vance wrote "*who?*"

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## 23. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, August 14, 1978, 1617Z

19342. Subject: Turkey, Greece, Cyprus: The View From Moscow. Ref: (A) Ankara 5761, (B) Istanbul 2443.<sup>2</sup>

Summary: Recent conversations with Greeks, Turks, and Soviets in Moscow reveal an awareness that subtle shifts in Eastern Mediterranean-Soviet relationships are taking place, but also indicate a lack of agreement on what those shifts might be. Attention in this vacation month is now focused on the historic visit of the Greek Foreign Minister in early September—a visit which, because it is an historical

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780332-0151. Confidential. Sent for information to Adana, Ankara, Athens, Istanbul, Izmir, and Nicosia.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 5761 from Ankara, August 10, the Embassy relayed the Turkish reaction to the recent criticism in the official Soviet news organ TASS of the U.S. decision to lift the arms embargo. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780327-0779) The telegram noted that the criticism was a source of embarrassment for Ecevit. Telegram 2443 from Istanbul, August 9, described reaction among Istanbul's press circles to the Soviet criticism as "consternation." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780327-1030)

first and because it comes at a time of regional change, may assume a public significance larger than it would otherwise merit. End summary.

1. Within the past few days Embassy officers have had private discussions with Turkish Embassy Counselor Bilhan, Greek Embassy DCM Botzaris, and MFA Fifth European Dept. Counselor Pushkin (Greece-Cyprus). All were preoccupied with the impending visit of the Greek Foreign Minister as seen against the background of the lifting of the U.S. arms embargo against Turkey and Ecevit's visit to the Soviet Union. All professed to see Rallis' visit as a "normal" step in the four year long process of improved Greek-Soviet relations, but all admitted that the visit and the visit communique would be particularly significant at this time.<sup>3</sup> They saw this as so not only because of the precedent-setting nature of any "first" visit, but also, and more important, because of the uncertain nature of the subtly changing pattern of inter-relationships in the Eastern Mediterranean set in motion by the Ecevit visit and the lifting of the U.S. arms embargo.

2. The Greek DCM felt that Ecevit had sold his political birthright for a mess of Soviet economic pottage. Botzaris questioned the scale and the significance of the Soviet-Turkish economic relationship, and he felt that the Soviet-Turkish political document gave Moscow a handle with which to press the Turks on the issue of the reopening of certain U.S. intelligence gathering bases in Turkey. He thought Ecevit might, in turn, use this Soviet pressure as an excuse to resist the U.S. desire that the bases be activated.

3. It is true that Moscow is greatly concerned over the possibility of the reopening of the bases. In an unusual manner, the Soviet central press (*Pravda*, Aug. 3; *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Aug. 5) has spoken openly of this likelihood, and Turkish Counselor Bilhan has told us that the Soviets have shown "anxiety" about this in numerous working level conversations here. Oddly enough, however, the TASS article which has caused such a stir in Turkey (Ref A, B) has not, to the best of our knowledge, been released here and certainly has not been reported in the Soviet central press. Since Embassy did not receive Ankara's 5643 which reported this article, we are not able to comment on the article itself.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Rallis left Athens on September 4 for a six-day visit to the Soviet Union. The trip marked the first time a Greek Foreign Minister visited the Soviet Union since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1924. The Greek and Soviet Governments issued a joint communiqué on September 11 which underscored improved relations recently forged between the two countries.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 5643 from Ankara, August 6, the Embassy noted the TASS article with two headlines pertaining to the lifting of the arms embargo, which read: "TASS: Lifting of Embargo Will Destroy Balance of Forces in the Aegean" and "Soviet Union: Raising of Embargo Will Increase Instability in Aegean." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780322-0419)

4. Our Turkish source told us that, as a result of the improvement of U.S.-Turkish relations, a certain chill has set in with regard to Soviet-Turkish relations. For example, repeated Turkish requests to begin negotiations on the flight information region have gone unanswered. On the other hand, according to Bilhan, the economic understandings reached during Ecevit's visit are moving forward on schedule and plans are being made for a meeting of the Joint Economic Commission in Moscow in late September-early October.

5. While there is some disagreement among our interlocutors about Moscow's present evaluation of the Cyprus situation, all agree that reports in the Western press about a change in Moscow's policy (as reflected in the Ecevit visit communique) were greatly exaggerated. All explain away the language of the Soviet-Turkish communique as representing the lowest common denominator of agreement on this complicated issue.

6. In any case, as has been previously reported, the Greeks asked for and received private Soviet reassurance that Soviet policy had not changed, and the Soviet press began to apply a corrective rudder to Western press speculation by openly criticizing the situation in the Turkish community of Cyprus and by plumping for Moscow's perennial idea of an international conference on Cyprus (for example, V. Drobkov's article in July 7 weekly *Novoye Vremya*).

7. In our conversation with him, MFA Greek-Cypriot desk officer Pushkin refused to speculate about Moscow's prospects for getting Rallis' endorsement of such an international conference, but he freely admitted that the Cyprus question would be one of the primary topics for discussion during the visit. Of course, our Turkish colleague Bilhan saw the worst in this regard, ominously noting Cyprus President Kyprianou's support for the conference and his current "private" visit to Greece as indicators of softness in the Greek position. Our Greek colleague, Botzaris, did emphasize what he felt to be the new, and implicitly anti-Turkish, development represented by Moscow calling for implementation of existing UN resolutions on Cyprus.

8. Comment: Moscow is obviously concerned at the implications of a substantial improvement in U.S.-Turkish relations and may be irritated at any indication that Ecevit used his recent visit here primarily as an attempt to pressure the Americans. The stage is set for an improvement in Soviet-Greek relations which, no matter how innocent, can be expected to worry the Turks. And there are continued rumors here of a Kyprianou visit (Pushkin would only deny that a July visit had been scheduled, note that Kyprianou had visited the U.S., and affirm that such a visit to Moscow—"later"—would be normal and desirable). A Kyprianou visit would present many possibilities for Soviet mischief-making, should Moscow decide to waive its usual caution with regard

to a balance between the Greek and Turkish positions toward Cyprus. We do not yet see any indication that Moscow has decided to do this, and we suspect that what we will see is a continuation of Moscow's present pattern of slight zig zags—first toward Greece, then toward Turkey—which in the end will produce the same even-handed policy line that we have seen in the past.

Toon

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## 24. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

RP M 78–10331

Washington, August 30, 1978

### GREECE, TURKEY, AND THE WEST IN THE POST-EMBARGO PERIOD

#### Key Judgments

*The US decision to lift the arms embargo against Turkey has disappointed the Greeks and pleased the Turks, but the embargo's removal will neither irreparably damage the West's relations with Greece nor produce a complete rapprochement with Turkey. And while it might in the long run help produce progress on the Aegean and Cyprus disputes, it is not by itself likely to lead to any dramatic breakthrough. The pace of negotiations in those disputes will be determined more by the protagonists' weighing of political, strategic, and emotional factors against the advantages of compromise.*

*Despite the embargo's removal, in fact, the West will continue to experience more strains in its relations with Turkey than with Greece. The Turks have greater economic needs than the Greeks, and the West may be unable or unwilling to fulfill them. Western interests on the issues of Greek reintegration in NATO and Greek entry in the EC are parallel to those of Athens and run at cross purposes with those of Ankara. Moreover, for reasons deriving from ideology, domestic politics, financial stringency, and its perception of Turkey's strategic importance, the Ecevit government is more willing to drive a hard bargain on the question of defense cooperation with the West and to ex-*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 80T00634A, Box 13, unlabeled folder. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A note on the first page reads: "This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Regional and Political Analysis. 'Questions and comments may be addressed to [name not declassified].'" It was distributed widely to officials in the National Security Council, the Department of State, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The distribution page is attached but not printed.

*plore the possibility of closer relations with the Soviets. Western relations with Greece would worsen markedly only if Athens concluded that the West was hesitant in supporting Greece's NATO and EC bids or indifferent in the face of Turkish military pressure on Greece.*

The US decision to lift the arms embargo against Turkey removed an issue of great symbolic importance to both Greeks and Turks. For the Greeks, the embargo had been a measure of crucial US support against their stronger Turkish adversary. For the Turks, it had been yet another manifestation of the West's view of them as second class members of the Western community. But removal of the embargo does not get to the core of the problem. As long as Greek-Turkish differences persist, their conflicting demands and expectations will cause problems in their relations with both NATO and the EC. Indeed, the West's relations with Turkey may become more strained than those with Greece.

#### *Rapprochement With Turkey Incomplete*

Prior to the decision to lift the embargo, the Turks hinted that if Turkey's defense and economic needs were not met by its allies, or if the allies tilted toward the Greeks, Turkish foreign policy might shift away from the West and closer toward the Communist and Third World states. Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit went part way in implementing this "new look" in Turkish foreign policy by courting the Soviet Union and making his "own contribution to detente."

The West's positive response last spring to Turkey's grave economic crisis, together with the imminent lifting of the arms embargo, has loosened but not eliminated the Turks' need and desire to reduce their ties to the West. Some elements of strain are likely to persist as Ecevit gropes to solve Turkey's many domestic and foreign policy problems in a way that fits his own ideological framework, domestic political constraints, and a challenging international environment.

All indications are, for example, that Turkey will continue to have formidable defense and economic needs that the West may be unable or unwilling to underwrite, particularly if the Turks remain unwilling to live within their means. Ecevit, moreover, seems inclined to pursue his opening to Moscow, which has already resulted in the possibility of substantial economic benefits he may not wish to jeopardize. The government might also be tempted to look for foreign scapegoats in the West for the country's economic plight and its domestic political violence. Tackling those problems may leave it little domestic political capital to deal with the quarrels with the Greeks that caused the rift with Turkey's allies in the first place.

#### *Greeks Cut Losses and Look to Future*

For their part, the Greeks lobbied for the embargo and withdrew in 1974 from the military side of NATO, but they made it clear that they

did not intend to leave the Western orbit. Prime Minister Karamanlis' line was not that he would loosen Greece's ties to the West if he did not get adequate support, but that the absence of such support would produce a leftist government that would loosen those ties. As proof of his intentions, Karamanlis could point to the continued unimpeded operation of US bases, Greece's bid for EC membership, and his effort to return Greece to full participation in NATO—all in the face of the growing power of the leftist opposition headed by Andreas Papandreou.

The decision to lift the embargo has fostered disappointment with the Carter administration among Greeks, together with a sense of resignation arising out of the belief that geopolitical considerations made the "choice" of Turkey over Greece inevitable. The Greeks have taken some comfort from the qualifiers imposed by the US Congress, as well as from administration assurances that the military balance in the region would be maintained and that the US remains opposed to the use of force to settle differences.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, doubts about the US administration's commitment linger.

Overall, the inclination of the Karamanlis government seems to be to hope for the best with respect to Turkish behavior and US assurances, and to proceed with its effort to secure EC membership and reintegration into NATO. Within the Alliance, Greece expects its allies to facilitate its return in the face of Turkish obstructionism. On Cyprus and the Aegean, the Greeks say that it is now incumbent upon the US and the West Europeans to fulfill their assurances that the Turks would be more flexible once the embargo was lifted. The Karamanlis government, however, has associated itself so closely with the West that it has more of a vested political interest in playing down differences. In this respect, it differs from its Turkish counterpart, which has made a domestic political virtue of standing up to the West and courting the Soviets.

### *Relations With the US*

That Turkey's relations with the West—and particularly the US—may now be more difficult than those of Greece was underscored recently when Ecevit felt compelled in both private and public statements to link the reactivation of US bases in Turkey to the provision of additional US assistance. A message to that effect was conveyed to the US by visiting senior Turkish officials and in a pointed speech by Ecevit that reiterated two themes: that Turkey's relations with the West must be broadened to include greater economic as well as defense cooperation, and that such defense cooperation must not impair the atmosphere of trust and detente developing between Turkey and the Soviet

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 121.

Union. The trigger for these comments was the reluctance of the US, the International Monetary Fund, and private lending institutions to give further help to the Turks until Ankara takes additional austerity measures and fully implements those already agreed upon.

The Greeks by contrast, have made no effort to retaliate for the lifting of the embargo, for example, by restricting operations at US bases. No such move seems likely, for they can less easily afford to irritate the US. Moreover, because the Greek economy has generally been prosperous and because Greece has an excellent international credit rating, Greek relations with the US and Western Europe will be devoid of the ill feelings and tensions stemming from Turkey's debtor status. So long as the present ratio of US military assistance to Greece and Turkey is maintained and the military friction with Turkey that would make the Greeks more demanding is absent, Greek relations with the US are apt to remain on an even keel. Indeed, the Karamanlis government has shown some receptivity to improving and expanding those relations and has welcomed prospective visits by senior US officials toward that end.

#### *Relations With NATO*

Ecevit's linkage between defense and economic cooperation also applies to NATO. He has pointed to Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which calls upon the Alliance to work for the welfare and stability of member states. In the absence of more assistance from their allies, the Turks have already refused to commit themselves to the Alliance's long term defense program agreed to at the NATO summit in Washington last May. Ecevit also seems intent on pursuing his idea of Turkish coproduction of NATO arms. He sees this as providing substantial economic and military benefits for Turkey, but the allies see it as difficult and possibly impractical given Turkey's present low level of industrial and technological development.

Friction between the Greeks and NATO is not at an end, of course. But ever since the Greek decision earlier this year to seek full reintegration, it is the Turks who seem more troublesome in the NATO context because of their resistance to proposals worked out between the Greeks and the NATO military structure. The Turks objected to proposed interim arrangements whereby, with minor modifications, the Greeks would resume their status quo ante command responsibility in the Aegean as well as control of Aegean airspace which they had before 1974. The Turks refuse to accept the argument that such arrangements would not prejudice the solution of the bilateral dispute over the Aegean.

#### *Relations With the EC*

In the area of relations with the European Community too, much of the strain in Greek-EC relations is diminishing while that between



Turkey and the EC seems likely to increase. Most of the friction between the Community and Greece was related to the degree of Community commitment to Greek membership and to the timing of the accession process. Those issues have been resolved to the satisfaction of both sides, with all members committed to Greek entry by 1981. To be sure, some friction still exists on the terms of Greek entry; this is likely to increase when crucial issues such as agriculture, free movement of workers, and the length of the transition period are dealt with. But the unstated Greek desire for membership at almost any price and the Community's sympathy for Karamanlis make it unlikely these negotiations would go off the rails.

The Turks, on the other hand, have become increasingly disappointed with the poor returns from their associate member status. They initially were hoping for preferential access to a major export market, large credits, and a permanent source of employment for Turkish workers. In fact, a negative trade balance has developed, worker migration has been curbed, and in Turkish eyes, EC financial assistance has been inadequate. The Turks, moreover, resent the Community's Mediterranean policy and its agreements with third countries that have watered down the meaning of Turkey's associate status. They have also been upset by the warm response to Greece's application, which in their view has raised the spectre of Turkish isolation from Western Europe and a pro-Greek tilt by the Community in the Aegean and Cyprus disputes.

The Ecevit government reacted to these concerns by declaring early in its term that it would seek a revision of Turkey's associate status—already revised once before in Turkey's favor in 1970—and that a touchstone of EC impartiality vis-a-vis Greece and Turkey would be its willingness to include Turkey in its political consultative process once the Greeks gained admission. Indeed, the Turks subsequently emphasized the consultative aspect, and the Community responded by offering to include Turkey in political discussions through a three man committee of present, past, and future Council presidents. The Turks have rejected this procedure as inadequate, however. They now want to focus on economic negotiations. The Community's likely parsimony on economic assistance, suggests that Community relations with the Turks will become more troublesome.

#### *Cyprus and the Aegean*

The potential for friction is somewhat greater with the Turks than with the Greeks with respect to the Cyprus and Aegean disputes. There is little doubt that the decision to lift the embargo has removed one important cause of Turkish immobilism, since no Turkish government has wanted to be seen buckling to such overt pressure. But the embargo has also served as an excuse as well as a cause for Turkey's reluctance to

show greater flexibility. The Turks will still be inclined to drive a hard bargain with the Greeks for strategic and emotional reasons, and also because the government is pushed in this direction by domestic political considerations. And they will remain suspicious and resistant in the face of any external involvement in their quarrels with the Greeks.

The decision to rescind the embargo is apt to make the Greeks more flexible in the longer term, but in the shorter term their policy is likely to be passive and reactive. Both the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots assert that their respective opening proposals on the Aegean and Cyprus have gone a long way toward meeting Turkish demands and that it is now up to the US and the West Europeans to press Turkey to reciprocate. In the meantime, the Greeks will be content to focus their attention on the EC and NATO negotiations while making sure that the Greek Cypriots do not backtrack on the proposals they have already tabled.

### *The Soviet Option*

Although the relations of both countries with Moscow have been improving, the Greeks have less reason and desire to enhance their Soviet ties. The Ecevit government, on the other hand, seems inclined to continue using the Soviet card both as an end in itself and as a means of securing badly needed military and economic assistance from its allies.

In Greece, disenchantment with the West has not fostered any sentiment among Greek leaders or in most of the electorate to court Moscow; this remains true even after the decision to rescind the embargo. The staunch anti-communism of the Greek political, military, and economic elite and Moscow's wooing of the Turks accounts for this, as does the absence of any great need for Soviet economic assistance. Although there will be a thaw when Greek Foreign Minister Rallis goes to Moscow next week to sign some minor cultural and consular agreements, and although Karamanlis himself may visit Moscow before too long, the relationship is not likely to change substantially.

In Turkey, by contrast, Ecevit seems to be continuing his effort to secure public and military acceptance of detente with the Soviet Union, which he considers desirable both to increase Turkey's maneuverability and security, and to guarantee delivery of the substantial economic assistance promised him during his Moscow visit last June. This apparently included a three-fold increase in trade between the two countries and substantial quantities of oil. Whether Ecevit intends to pursue detente with Moscow to the point of reducing the US or NATO presence in Turkey, as [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and his own statements have implied, will become clearer when negotiations on the reactivation of US bases begin this fall.

*Conclusion*

Overall, then, US and West European relations with Greece and Turkey are likely to remain troubled so long as the bilateral differences between the two countries are unresolved and each tries to mobilize Western support against the other and in behalf of broader national goals. The embargo in this respect was merely one element of a complicated equation. Its lifting is likely to produce neither Turkish intransigence and adventurousness, as opponents of its rescinding had feared, nor significant Turkish flexibility, as some on the other side had hoped. Instead, both Greeks and Turks are likely to continue jockeying for advantage, and progress in resolving their disputes is apt to be slow as they weigh strategic, emotional, and domestic political considerations against the desirability of compromise and improving the cohesiveness of the Western defense and economic systems.

Lifting of the embargo is not likely by itself to cause irreparable damage to relations with the Greeks or a complete rapprochement with Turkey. Greece has too many historical, cultural, economic and security bonds with the West for that to happen, and the Karamanlis government has no other viable option in any event. Greece's relations with the US and Western Europe would worsen markedly only if the latter began to show some hesitancy about supporting Greek membership in the European Community and reintegration into NATO, or in the event of a Turkish resort to military pressure to which the West responded with indifference.

The Turks also have a strong commitment to the West. But the combination of the greater economic needs, their strategic importance, and Ecevit's desire to leave his imprint on Turkish foreign policy is likely to continue to produce substantially more friction between Turkey and the West, the more so at this juncture when Turkey feels the West is not being adequately sensitive to Turkey's economic woes and is pursuing policies toward the Greeks in the EC and NATO that are incompatible with Turkish interests. The result is that Turkey will continue to follow a foreign policy that will be somewhat similar to the French and Romanian models in NATO and the Warsaw Pact respectively, grounding itself within the Western camp but pursuing independent policies both within that camp and toward other states, including the Soviet Union.

**25. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Congressional Affairs (Manatos) to the Counselor of the Department of State (Nimetz)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 30, 1978

The Administration's Cyprus policy has severely damaged the President's support among the Greek-American community. Greek-Americans are the only major group in the country who contributed large numbers of certain Republican votes, dollars and influence to the election of President Carter. As the attached memorandum documents, without that switch of support in the marginal states it is very likely that Gerald Ford would still be President.<sup>2</sup> For the first time in history, the Greek-American vote is something other than one of the small ethnic groups whose support it would be nice to have.

A survey of top Greek-American political observers estimates that if the election were held today President Carter would receive approximately thirty percent of the Greek-American vote. That compares with approximately eighty percent he received in 1976. This defection may not be immediately perceptible but is quite real.

The group's perception of betrayal accelerates the Greek-American's natural drift to Republicanism. This drift does not include the well educated who are involved in politics—Sarbanes, Brademas, Alexander, etc. The drift includes the middle class, upper middle class and upper class—the majority in the United States—who tend to be conservative.

Unlike the Ford-Nixon Administrations, we have some advantages in our effort to gain support with the Greek-American community. The Greek-American Capitol Hill and Mayoral leadership is in our party and is willing to encourage Presidential support if they can do so without losing their credibility with the Greek-American community. We also have greater policy flexibility than did Kissinger/Ford/Nixon because we are not constrained to act in a way which justifies the decisions which led to the Turkish invasion.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of Southern Europe, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977–1980, Lot 83D256, Box 1, POL 2 Cyprus 1977 and 1978. Eyes Only. A notation at the top of the page, presumably written by Manatos, reads: "Some of the political information I touched on the other day. I thought you might be interested."

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is a November 23, 1976, memorandum from Manatos to Senator Eagleton. Citing electoral data from Ohio and Pennsylvania, Manatos argued that Greek-American support for Governor Carter was crucial to his successful run for the White House.

**26. Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 4, 1979

SUBJECT

Greece-Turkey-Cyprus (U)

This memorandum responds to your request of 4 April relayed by Bob Gates.<sup>2</sup> (U)

There has been *no significant movement* so far this year on the Cyprus issue, but it is *no more the fault of the Turks than it is of the Greeks and Cypriots*. In fact, one could make a fair case that Greeks and Greek Cypriots have been even more stubborn and uncooperative than the Turks or the Turkish Cypriots. Our consciously adopted tactic has been to leave Cyprus up to the UN so as not to becloud our own efforts to improve bilateral relations with both Greece and Turkey and this has proven wise. We have, quietly, continued to appeal both to Karamanlis and Ecevit to try to get some movement and to press their respective Cypriots. Karamanlis wants to continue to stay as far away from Cyprus as possible and Ecevit does not feel he can afford politically to be seen as accommodating on this issue in light of his own precarious domestic political situation. (C)

The Greek lobby in this country puts all the blame on the Turks and argues that Turkey's need for more economic aid should be exploited to pressure her into a Cyprus settlement. (A crude attempt on our part to do this would probably only result in pushing Ecevit into an anti-American corner or causing him to fall.) Privately, we should continue to appeal to Ecevit to help us with Congress by at least demonstrating some political cleverness in making offers that put the Greeks on the defensive or force them to make some counter-offers. (C)

Greek Cyprus continues to enjoy an unprecedented economic boom—so there is not much incentive there to risk anything for a settlement. Turkish Cyprus, on the other hand, is still economically depressed and represents a net burden on the Turkish economy. (U)

We should not get ourselves into the middle of the Cyprus situation at this late stage, having avoided it for so long, much as both

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 3, Chron File: 4/79. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Hunter, Larrabee, and Albright.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

Greeks and Turks would welcome the drama of a Camp David type of involvement by the President (I had two informal requests last week from Turks that we do this—and, of course, rejected them). But we might, as a tactic and as a way of trying something different from the lackadaisical UN effort, consider appointment of a European mediator. (C)

There has been *slight progress on other issues between Greece and Turkey* and in the private sector (between businessmen, journalists) there have been intelligent efforts to further reconciliation. Aegean talks have resulted in slight progress on air and seabed issues. Delineation of military boundaries and the NATO reintegration have not progressed recently. *On these issues we have a right to expect greater forthcomingness from the Turks.* It is also on these issues that *discreet pressure* in connection with increases in aid would be most likely to produce results. (C)

We will be making the same mistake the Administration made last year and the year before if we let our approach in Congress to Turkish problems be taken primarily in the framework of the complaints and political machinations of the Greek lobby. We need to take the initiative with responsible, national-security-minded senators and congressmen to brief them straightforwardly on the key facts of the Greek-Turkish-Cyprus situation and to seek their support and initiative. We should not let Brademas and Sarbanes call the shots. (C)

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**27. Memorandum From the Vice President's Assistant for  
National Security Affairs (Clift) to Vice President Mondale<sup>1</sup>**

No. 1541-79

Washington, December 11, 1979

SUBJECT

Greece/Turkey/Cyprus

As reflected in the President's November 28 report to the Congress, the Cyprus negotiations have been losing ground.<sup>2</sup> President Kyprianou and the Greek Cypriots have succeeded in putting through

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Foreign Countries, Box 50, Foreign Countries—Greece/Turkey/Cyprus, 1979. Secret. Sent for information.

<sup>2</sup> For the text of the report, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book II, pp. 2162-2163.

a Cyprus resolution creating a seven-nation (including Cuba) international committee to assist the UN Secretary General in his efforts to find an acceptable settlement. This “internationalization” of the problem makes any settlement a more remote possibility.<sup>3</sup>

#### POSITIONS OF THE KEY PLAYERS

*Greek Cypriots*—President Kyprianou does not want to move the kind of agreement that might be possible—i.e., the agreement that appeared to be shaping up last summer involving return of Verosha by the Turkish Cypriots, with the Greek Cypriots agreeing to the Turkish definition of “bizonality.” Kyprianou would rather keep the issue alive. He is willing to allow the talks to continue for a long time in the hope that the force of international opinion will help him to achieve an agreement more to his liking.

*Turkish Cypriots*—Denktash, in turn, has lost interest in an early agreement. He has become increasingly concerned that an early agreement, while favorable on paper for the Turkish Cypriots, might in reality dissolve with restoration of contacts and commerce between the two communities because of the cleverness of the Greek Cypriots and their ability to turn developments their way.

*Turkey*—Prime Minister Demirel, having just returned to office, is faced with a colossal number of problems at home, Cyprus is no more than a back burner issue, and Demirel’s minority government depends on the support of right wing Turkish parties who favor a strong Turkish Cyprus.

*Greece*—Again, Cyprus is a back burner issue in Athens. Internationally, Caramanlis is very annoyed that the U.S. has not been more supportive of Greece’s position on resolution of problems relating to Greece’s return to NATO. Domestically, Caramanlis is grappling with the decision on whether he will run for the newly created office of Greek President this April and, if so, who he will guide into position as his replacement in the office of Prime Minister.

*UN Secretary General*—Waldheim continues to consult and, with none of the parties interested in compromise over Cyprus, a renewed initiative by him offers the most likely avenue for fresh attention to the Cyprus settlement.

*US-Greek Relations*—the Greeks continue to have a love-hate relationship with the U.S. To this point, they have not favored SACEUR General Bernie Rogers’ proposed solutions to the difficult Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) problem blocking Greek reentry into NATO. Rogers has suggested that NATO’s Southern Command have

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 74. UN General Assembly Resolution 34/30 was adopted on November 20; see footnote 5, Document 74.

air defense responsibilities over the Aegean's international waters. The Greeks say that this does not solve the problem of Greek air space over the islands immediately adjacent to Turkey. When the new Greek Ambassador presented his credentials to President Carter this fall, I am told he conveyed a letter some 7 pages long from Caramanlis to the President complaining of our misguided approach to US-Greek relations.<sup>4</sup>

Looking to 1980 and anticipated pressure on the Administration by the Greek American community, I offer the following thoughts:

—A US initiative on Cyprus does not hold out much promise given the fact that of the six players (including Waldheim and ourselves) we would be the only player pressing for an early just-compromise settlement—which all others would probably interpret as expected election year activity.

—We stand the best chance, while difficult, of furthering our US foreign policy objectives (of interest to Greek Americans) if we concentrate on US-Greek relations and on working to achieve Greek reintegration in NATO—an objective of very real importance to Caramanlis in terms of his accomplishments as Prime Minister (assuming he decides to step up to the office of President this spring).

Bernie Rodgers, wearing his international hat, is taking great care to work independently of the U.S. However, I understand he will be briefing Secretary Vance during Vance's visit to Brussels this week.<sup>5</sup>

—To keep the Cyprus front under control, I believe it might be useful if the President were to invite Waldheim to Washington early in 1980 to review the situation<sup>6</sup>—and I believe the President might wish to include important members of the Congress, such as Senators Eagleton and Sarbanes, and Representative Brademas—to demonstrate, with the Secretary General doing the talking, that the US continues to do everything it can to assist the parties toward a settlement.

—On the Greek-American front, I recommend that you get together with Vance and Christopher—you might wish initially to raise the subject at a Friday breakfast—to receive Vance's report on his talks with Bernie Rodgers and to see if we can apply greater creativity to resolving the ADIZ problem and to achieve Greek reintegration.

—*Visit by Caramanlis.* If Greek reintegration can be achieved and I think Caramanlis would want this to happen and will help if we help him, it may be possible for the President to extend an invitation to President Caramanlis to visit the US following the April elections in Greece.

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<sup>4</sup> John Tzounis replaced Menelaos Alexandrakis as Greek Ambassador to the United States in June 1979. He presented his credentials to Carter on October 12, 1979. The letter from Karamanlis to Carter, dated September 25, 1979, emphasized that Turkey continued to poison what would otherwise be healthy and mutually beneficial relations between the United States and Greece. The letter is printed as Document 193.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 196.

<sup>6</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, Waldheim met with Carter at the White House on January 6 to discuss Iran and Afghanistan. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No substantive record of the discussion has been found.



**28. Report Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,  
Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

No. 1336

Washington, March 7, 1980

**(U) SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON TURKEY AND GREECE:  
STATUS AND OUTLOOK****(C) *Summary***

One of the Soviet Union's major foreign policy interests in the recent Brezhnev era has been to develop its relations with Turkey and Greece in response to strategic concerns in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The campaign reached a zenith of sorts in 1978–79 with a series of high-level visits, the signing of political documents establishing a framework for expansion of ties, and agreements to develop trade and economic cooperation. The Kremlin's desire to neutralize NATO and to reduce US military options in the region dictates a continuing Soviet stake in viable relations with Athens and Ankara.

Greece's relative economic and political stability and its government's desire to normalize relations with the East, even while retaining a strong anti-Communist bias at home, augur development of relations more or less along the lines of those between the Soviet Union and most West European countries.

Turkey promises to be an unpredictable, even volatile, equation for Moscow. Growing economic and political difficulties in Turkey may lead to a more conservative order or other conditions that could erase some of the gains the Soviets have achieved.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan already has begun to renovate Turkey's ties with the West at the expense of those with the Soviet Union, as members of the Western alliance respond to events by increasing the flow of economic and military aid to Ankara. The strong opposition of Saudi Arabia, a major potential aid donor, and other influential non-aligned powers to the Afghanistan invasion may also deter the Turks from expanding their Soviet ties.

Kurdish separatism in Iran, if successful, will raise the possibility of similar actions among Turkey's Kurdish minority. The Turks will be sensitive to any Soviet attempt to sponsor the Kurds in Turkey or Iran.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office Subject Files 1965–1980, Lot 92D412, Box 3, Balkan Affairs 1979–80. Secret; NoFORN; NoCONTRACT; ORCON. Prepared by H. Jonathan Bemis (INR/SEE); approved by Martha Mautner (INR/RSE/FP).

Significant Turkish rapprochement with the USSR and its allies in the 1980's is unlikely, even under a left-of-center government in Ankara. Militating against it are a multitude of influences—historic Turkish opposition to Russia, the anti-Communist bias of a basically conservative Muslim population, the inability of CEMA member-countries to match the economic advantages offered by the West, the example of Afghanistan. On the other hand, economic, security, and pragmatic political considerations will compel even a conservative government to try to maintain good relations with the Soviets.

[Omitted here is the body of the intelligence report.]

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**29. Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 12, 1980

SUBJECT

Significance of the Turkish Military Takeover for Greek & Cypriot issues

The military takeover in Turkey does *not* make Greek and Cyprus issues less amenable to settlement.<sup>2</sup> I will be surprised if the military leadership does anything to interfere with the intercommunal talks which resume again in Cyprus next week. The Turkish military favors Greek reintegration into NATO and settlement of Aegean issues with Greece. It was their initiative which led to the lifting of the NOTAM last summer.<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, the Turkish military is no pushover on these issues and will resent our preaching to them or embarrassing them by bringing them up as if they were the only priority that concerned us. Their first priority is restoring domestic tranquility to Turkey, keeping the economy functioning well and setting a constitutional reform

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 5, Chron File: 8-9/80. Confidential. Copies were sent to Bremont, Blackwill, Albright, and Griffith.

<sup>2</sup> On September 12, General Kenan Evren, Chief of the Turkish General Staff, took control of the Turkish Government. See Document 154.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 7, Document 163.

process in motion.<sup>4</sup> These should be our priorities too—for it is only by accomplishment of these objectives that Turkey can be secured as a valuable ally and effective member of NATO and rebuilt as a bastion of strength in the Middle East.

The Turkish military leadership is nevertheless likely to recognize the advantages of making as much progress as possible on Greek relations and Cyprus. We need to deal with them quietly on these issues and we need to restrain the Greeks and Cypriots (if they are so inclined) from making embarrassing noise about them. We also need to restrain (if we can) Greek-American congressmen and other Greek Lobby spokesmen from making critical, intemperate comments about these problems or from seeming to make taunting challenges about settling them. The old Greek Lobby has been remarkably quiet during this campaign season and is being encouraged in no way by the present Greek Ambassador here, who probably sees Turkish developments very much along the lines I have outlined in this memorandum. There is no way in which anyone can benefit by making Turkey a campaign issue in any way. All tendencies to do so should be avoided.

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<sup>4</sup> Henze expanded this line of reasoning in a memorandum to Brzezinski, written the same day, with the subject line, "Our Response to Military Takeover in Turkey." Henze argued that the coup was a positive development, it had nothing to do with anti-American/NATO sentiment, and the United States should not publicly criticize the takeover. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 75, Turkey: 9/80–1/81)

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### 30. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

PA 81–10004

Washington, January 1981

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 82T00150R, Box 3, The Cyprus Conflict: Cultural and Psychological Factors. Secret; *[handling restriction not declassified]*. Two pages not declassified.]

# Cyprus

## 31. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 19, 1977, 10 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Cyprus Situation

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *US*

Secretary of State-designate Cyrus R. Vance  
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary, EUR  
Nelson C. Ledsky, Director, EUR/SE

#### *Cyprus*

Glafcos Clerides, Cyprus Political Leader

### SUMMARY

Clerides said he was still optimistic that a negotiated Cyprus settlement could eventually be reached. He agreed that the next four months presented opportunities to get the negotiating process restarted and urged that this chance not be lost. He endorsed the idea of sending a US envoy to the area, as the first step in developing US proposals which, following coordination and support by the EC-9, could be inserted into the negotiating process. Clerides felt that only with this kind of external stimulus could negotiations be kept from bogging down in the kind of procedural disagreements that have prevented meaningful talks from taking place since February 1976. Secretary-designate Vance explained that we had reached no specific conclusion as to how to proceed, but we were looking for ways to be helpful in facilitating movement toward a Cyprus settlement.

#### *A. Current Situation and Future US Actions*

After recalling that they had last met in Rome in 1975 to discuss Cyprus,<sup>2</sup> Mr. Vance asked Mr. Clerides to describe the current situation on the island.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance NODIS Memcons, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Ledsky; approved by Twaddell on January 31. The meeting took place in Vance's office. Clerides traveled to Washington specifically to meet with Vance.

<sup>2</sup> No record of this meeting was found. Vance was then a private citizen, serving as President of the New York City Bar Association.

Clerides said he was anxious about the atmosphere. A climate of optimism had been created by the American elections, and everyone on the island now expected some movement in the next few weeks or months. It was important that this optimism not be totally disappointed by a further indefinite stalemate.

Clerides recalled the strong anti-US feeling that had gripped the island in 1974. This feeling had now begun to disappear, but it could return at any time. The United States must be careful not to create the impression that it can bring about a solution by waving a magic wand, yet there should be no inertia either. There is a growing feeling, which Archbishop Makarios shares, that either progress will be registered in the next few months or Cyprus will enter a long period of stagnation. Clerides explained that he did not completely share the Archbishop's view on this point, but he, too, believed that the next few months were important and that the opportunities they presented should not be lost.

Mr. Vance agreed that the over-optimism on the island was potentially dangerous and could lead to disillusionment. Miracles were not possible. Nonetheless, the US had a strong interest in seeing that progress toward a solution begins to be made. Mr. Vance then asked Mr. Clerides' opinion as to whether it might be useful to send an envoy to the area to assess the situation on the ground, and make an evaluation of what might be done by the new Administration.

Clerides thought this an excellent idea. His only reservation was that the envoy not go out to learn the views of the parties in an unstructured way. If this were done, the parties would tell him only what they had told others, and nothing would have been gained. There have been countless study missions and general reports on Cyprus already. What had to be made clear to the parties before the envoy traveled was that the envoy wanted to know in concrete terms the precise limits of each side's position. In this way, the envoy could come back with some rough idea of the margins, within which solutions on individual points were possible.

Mr. Vance explained that he had reached no specific conclusions as yet as to how to proceed, but that we were looking for ways in which we might be helpful in laying a foundation for facilitating movement toward a Cyprus solution. In this connection, he asked for Clerides' views as to whether the US should proceed alone, ask the Europeans to do something separately, or consider some form of US-European initiative.

Clerides said he favored a joint venture involving the US and the EC-9 powers. He was not sure how this would work in practice, but suggested that after the US envoy visited the area, and developed a plan of action, consultation should begin with the Europeans to insure that the US plans had the full support and approval of the EC-9.

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*B. The Nature of a Settlement*

Mr. Vance noted at this point that US-EC-9 cooperation had occurred in 1976 in connection with the five-point principles paper.<sup>3</sup> He wondered whether this had been a productive exercise and whether that document had contained anything useful from a Cypriot standpoint. Would something along the lines of this paper still be helpful?

Clerides said that the five principles had some usefulness but had been looked upon with great mistrust in Cyprus because they were viewed as a product of an unfriendly Administration. This kind of a document might be of some help if the points in it were expanded and reformulated.

This exchange led to a more general discussion of what might constitute a just settlement from a Cypriot standpoint. Clerides said the only feasible—even if not entirely just—settlement will almost certainly involve a bizonal federation. At the same time the current Turkish zone in the north had to be reduced. Percentage figures themselves were not as important as the question of how many refugees could return to the areas the Turks vacated. Clerides noted, for example, that while New Famagusta and its environs represented less than 1% of Cyprus, the area could absorb as many as 40,000 Greek Cypriots. There were also other areas in the north with high absorptive capacity.

As for a future central Government, Clerides said there would have to be meaningful participation by both communities without absolute numerical equality. In the 1960 constitution the Turks were given veto powers on foreign policy, defense and internal security questions. These vetoes made the system unworkable. What was required now was Turkish equality in the formulation and not the execution of policy. Mr. Vance agreed that it should be possible to devise a constitutional system that would make this possible. Clerides recalled in this connection that when the subject of immigration had been discussed orally at one point last year, Denktash had said there could be a joint immigration board composed of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots who would pass on applications. Clerides felt a similar system might be devised for the management of ports and airports as well. Mr. Hartman noted that as far back as 1974, former Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit had spoken along parallel lines.

Clerides observed, however, that two basic difficulties remained in the constitutional area. The Greeks wanted to preserve a federation, whereas the Turks wanted to create a confederation. While the difference was in part semantic, it was evident that the Turks wanted the Central Government to have as little power as possible, whereas the

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 3.

Greek Cypriots wanted the opposite. The second area concerned whether the religious leaders could hold positions in government. If the Turks insisted on writing into a new constitution that Cyprus can only be a lay state, there will be no settlement. Makarios may some day of his own accord resign, but he will never sign any agreement which prevents the church and those occupying places in it, from playing a direct role in state affairs.

### *C. The Situation in Northern Cyprus*

Mr. Vance asked Clerides for his evaluation of Denktash. Was he free to take positions on his own, or was he under the firm control of Ankara?

Clerides answered that at the start of the negotiations two years ago, he had the impression that Denktash's hands were firmly tied by Ankara. As the talks went on, however, it became evident that Denktash had considerable freedom on some issues. On occasion he proved even more difficult than the Turkish Government. This much was clear: Denktash was unable to undertake any initiative without the permission of Ankara, but Denktash clearly could not be forced to do something by Ankara against his wishes.

Clerides said the economic situation in the north was most unfavorable. The Turkish Cypriots had been unable to organize anything properly. There was substantial unemployment, and the standard of living had declined markedly since 1974. Still, there was uncertainty in Clerides' mind as to what political effect this would have. The economic situation might serve as pressure on Denktash to reach an accommodation with the Greek Cypriots, but it was also possible it might move him in the direction of issuing a unilateral declaration of independence.

As for Turkish colonization of the north, Clerides said Greek Cypriot estimates were that some 30,000 Turks had been brought to the island thus far. Mr. Hartman noted that we were not sure whether these Turks were permanent settlers or were being rotated into and out of Cyprus as temporary workers.

Mr. Clerides explained that an even more serious problem was the expulsion of Greeks from the north. These expulsions were proceeding daily, despite promises made by Denktash to the UN Secretary General as long ago as last April.<sup>4</sup> Clerides conceded that Turkish pressure was only one of many reasons the Greek Cypriots in the north lived under extremely difficult conditions. Schools were inadequate and once families send children south to school, they cannot return, even for holidays. There are no doctors left in the villages, and hospital care throughout the north is very poor. Moreover, when one or more

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<sup>4</sup> The correspondence is detailed in *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1976, pp. 284–286.

Greek-Cypriot families move to the south, Turks are immediately placed in their houses, thus creating a kind of psychological pressure for the remaining Greek Cypriots to begin thinking of leaving also. There was also, Clerides noted with satisfaction, a vibrant economic situation in the south which clearly attracted Greek Cypriots. The southern economy had bounced back in an amazing way, so that the per capita income of Greek Cypriots in the south today equals the per capita income of all Cypriots in 1974.

#### *D. Future Negotiations: The UN Role*

Clerides said he remained optimistic that a negotiated settlement could be achieved. He still felt that most Turkish Cypriots were not content with the current situation and wanted a solution which would reunite the island in some way.

Mr. Hartman then enquired as to Clerides' evaluation of the UN's role to date. Had UN Representative Perez de Cuellar proved helpful in moving the parties toward negotiation?

Clerides responded that for most Cypriots, including Makarios, it was imperative that whatever proposals were made and solutions reached, they had to be fed through the UN machinery. This was essential to make them acceptable in Nicosia. As for de Cuellar, he was an excellent diplomat but was somewhat over-cautious and conservative, and, given the necessity he felt to get instructions on all points from New York, it was difficult for him to be creative as he had to be if anything is to be accomplished.

Clerides was also pessimistic about the result of an early meeting between Denktash and Makarios. Clerides said he had discussed this subject with Makarios last Friday in Nicosia. Makarios believed the Denktash letter mildly formulated, and had accordingly decided to accept the invitation for a meeting.<sup>5</sup> Word of that acceptance had been

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<sup>5</sup> Denktash's letter was not found; see footnote 5, Document 84. Denktash and Makarios met in Nicosia on January 27 and February 12 under UN auspices. The first meeting was described in news reports as a "surprise" which broke 13 years of silence between the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. (John K. Cooley, "Makarios, Denktash, in Surprise Talks," *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 28, 1977, p. 4) The leaders agreed that the key to a solution for Cyprus was to keep the island an independent, bi-communal, and non-aligned federal republic. The second meeting, which was mediated by Pérez de Cuéllar and Waldheim, delved into more specific issues. The meeting produced what became known as the "Makarios-Denktash Guidelines," consisting of four principles: "1. The two sides are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal federal republic. 2. A territorial division between the federated areas would take into account their economic viability and land ownership. 3. Questions of freedom of movement and settlement are left to further discussion. 4. A central government would be established with the task of safeguarding the unity of Cyprus on the basis of its bi-communal nature." (Borowiec, *Cyprus: A Troubled Island*, p. 126) In telegram 20561 to US-NATO Brussels, January 29, the Department reported the details of the first meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770032-0248) The second meeting, which was mediated by Waldheim, is described in telegram 438 from Nicosia, February 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770052-0593)



passed orally through UN Representative de Cuellar. The Archbishop had intended to propose that rather than meet at the Ledra Palace, as Denktash had suggested, a luncheon be arranged at de Cuellar's residence in the Greek-Cypriot side of Nicosia. Clerides said he had suggested to the Archbishop that a second possibility would be to have the meeting at UN headquarters adjacent to Nicosia airport. In this way, Denktash could helicopter to the meeting from the Turkish sector of Nicosia. Clerides said it was his impression that both of these ideas had been passed on to de Cuellar.

Clerides thought the Denktash letter, which he said he had not read, had not suggested a substantive discussion of the Cyprus problem, but only the establishment of "links" between the two sides. When it was pointed out to Clerides that the letter again referred to the possibility of setting up a transitional regime to carry the two communities through the period of negotiation, Clerides responded that if that was the case, there would be only one meeting, for Archbishop Makarios would have nothing to do with this idea. Hartman observed that the Denktash letter provided a basis for a meeting, and that the opportunity should not be lost.

Clerides agreed, noting that the last substantive discussion of the Cyprus problem had occurred almost one year ago, in February 1976.

Mr. Vance recalled that when he had spoken to the current Greek-Cypriot intercommunal negotiator in New York some six weeks ago, the negotiator had explained that the two sides were bogged down continuously with procedural disagreements.<sup>6</sup> Clerides said the problem was the Greek Cypriots wanted to discuss territorial issues first to see what they might get back, but the Turks would only talk about territory at the end of the negotiations, when the Greeks had confirmed their acceptance of a bizonal federation with a weak central government.

Mr. Vance suggested that a way could be found around these kinds of procedural hurdles. The US did not underestimate the difficulty of doing so, but felt that some new effort to facilitate the negotiating process should be attempted.

Mr. Clerides observed that so long as matters are left to the two sides, it was almost certain that procedural difficulties would develop. It was essential that concrete proposals be formulated by outsiders, and given to the parties as a basis for discussion. In order to make proposals which are realistic, however, it is imperative that the outsiders have a clear idea of what the actual positions, and not the public stance, of the parties are. It is for this reason that a US envoy should go to the field,

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<sup>6</sup> No record of this meeting was found.

and obtain specific information, from which a proposal or series of proposals could be developed.

*E. Publicity*

Mr. Vance concluded the conversation by thanking Clerides for expressing his views so concisely and clearly. The two agreed to say as little to the press as possible about the conversation. Clerides said he would see Makarios after he returned to Nicosia but would give the Archbishop no details of what was actually discussed. It was agreed that in response to enquiries, both sides would say merely that there had been an informal exchange of views between friends of long standing which took place before Mr. Vance assumed the position of Secretary of State.

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### 32. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Nicosia, February 24, 1977, 10:15 a.m.

#### PARTICIPANTS

*Cyprus*

President Makarios  
Foreign Minister Christophides

*US*

Secretary Clark Clifford  
Ambassador Crawford  
Mr. Matthew Nimetz  
Mr. Nelson Ledsky

President Makarios began the conversation by welcoming Clifford to Cyprus as the special envoy of President Carter. He said the people of Cyprus were pleased with the keen interest the new Administration had shown in the problems of the island, and its expression of willingness to work for a settlement. The US could play a decisive role, and the President said he was pleased the Carter Administration was prepared to help the parties move toward a solution. The President said he deeply appreciated this US interest and willingness to be involved.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770044-0769. Confidential. Drafted by Ledsky on February 24; approved by Hopper on March 14. The meeting took place in the Presidential Palace. President Carter named Clark Clifford his personal emissary to Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey on February 3. See Documents 5-8.

He then recounted the history of the intercommunal discussions.<sup>2</sup> These, he said, had produced no results. The current Cyprus situation is deadlocked. The President described his recent meeting with Denktash, which he called a mild breakthrough.<sup>3</sup> He said his two meetings represented an effort to find common ground through which negotiations could proceed. Some common ground had indeed been found, though not enough to justify great optimism.

Turkish motives for resuming the dialogue had been the subject of great speculation in Cyprus. Some said it represented a desire by Turkey to improve its image in the international community. Some said it represented a Turkish desire to have the US Congress move to ratify the Defense Cooperation Agreement. Makarios himself declined to speculate on the Turkish motive, but said that irrespective of what had moved the Turks, the meetings themselves were a positive step. Movement had occurred in the right direction.

The President was doubtful, however, about the prospects for the March 31 meeting in Vienna. He wondered whether the Turks would be willing to make meaningful concessions before the Turkish elections. Despite such reservations, he said he and his government were prepared to go forward with good will.

He then described at some length the issues involved in movement toward a Cyprus settlement. The territorial question was the key to the solution. The principles of freedom of settlement, freedom of movement and freedom of property were also vital. With respect to the powers and functions of a future central government, Makarios insisted that these must safeguard the unity of the state as well as have regard for the bicomunal character of Cyprus.

The criteria for the territorial solution were land ownership, productivity and economic viability. The territorial settlement also had to take account of the population ratio. Official records of land ownership maintained by the British before independence and those of the Cyprus Government developed after independence showed that the Turks owned somewhere between 18 and 20 percent of the land. This was close to the percentage of Turks on the island.

President Makarios recalled that he had proposed a Turkish zone of 20%, and Denktash had countered with a proposal for 32.8%. The Turkish figure could not be justified and Makarios noted that a great gap existed between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot figures.

President Makarios noted that his Government had accepted the concept of a bicomunal federation. This was the first time in history a

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 7.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, Document 31.

unitary state would be reconstructed to become a federal state. But federation could not be disguised as confederation. Nor could it be a prelude to partition. Cyprus was a small country which had been economically integrated and homogenized. It had to have a governmental structure that would ensure cohesion and economic unity. It would also have to prevent the further separation of people. No solution could deviate from basic human rights principles. These same principles had been stressed by President Carter who had proven that he was a man of action and not mere words. His recent acts in the human rights field had led to great feelings of confidence in Cyprus and it was in this spirit that the Cypriot people welcomed US initiatives to find a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem.

Secretary Clifford thanked President Makarios for his gracious welcome and said that he would like to discuss his own feelings about President Carter in some detail. He had found the President a man of unusual intelligence, with a real capability for leadership, and this suggested that he would have a successful and productive presidency.

Clifford recalled the long relationship between the United States and Cyprus and especially between the leaders of the United States and His Beatitude, President Makarios. He praised President Makarios for his leadership and past courage, noting that despite many difficulties, he continued to provide firm and meaningful leadership for his country. This provided a basis of confidence to the Cypriot people, and hope for a Cyprus solution.

Clifford asserted that President Carter believes that 1977 is the year of decision for Cyprus. At the very start of his term as President, he had selected Clifford to head a mission to the Eastern Mediterranean. This mission aimed at ascertaining the facts, gaining the impressions of the leaders in the various countries, the difficulties and problems that existed, together with recommendations for positive solutions. The President looked forward to receiving a report from the Clifford mission with suggestions as to how the United States might utilize its good offices in efforts to solve the problems that existed in the area. Once the Clifford mission returns to Washington, it will prepare a report which the President and his senior advisers will consider, and following their discussions they will reach an agreement on future policy. This in turn will be discussed with Congress, so that if at all possible, jointly agreed policies will be adopted.

Clifford recalled that during the past eight years, the United States had a divided government in Washington. The Administration had been in the hands of one party and the Legislature had been controlled by another. This is not the way the US system was designed to operate and strains naturally developed. This situation had now been

remedied. President Carter working with the Democratic Congress should be able to smoothly formulate and execute policy together.

Clifford then reviewed his travels during the preceding week. He recalled his breakfast meeting with Waldheim in Vienna, where he had assured the UN Secretary General that the US recognized and supported the UN's central role in the intercommunal negotiations.<sup>4</sup> The United States intended to cooperate and not compete with Waldheim's efforts. The United States wanted to be helpful in every way it could. It also intended to stay in the background. Any activity which put us out in front might look like we were forcing the parties to do something that they preferred not to do.

Clifford said he had invited Waldheim to inform us when and how the United States might be of real assistance. Waldheim had expressed appreciation for this position, and had suggested that we contact him at any time we had proposals we considered of value. In sum, we conveyed to him our wish to be helpful without being overly activist.

The United States believes a Cyprus solution is vitally needed. The present situation is unsatisfactory and potentially volatile. No situation remains static, and the situation could well change in ways which would be disadvantageous to the Cypriot people. Therefore, we felt there was pressure on all the parties and the friends of Cyprus to find a solution as quickly as possible.

Clifford said that his mission had spent three days in Greece, had established a warm, personal relationship with Prime Minister Caramanlis and had conveyed the notion that we wished to be helpful in solving problems in the Eastern Mediterranean. Clifford said that he had told Caramanlis that his mission would not end with this visit, and that he expected President Carter would use the mission again once US policies in the Eastern Mediterranean had been established and some need arose to be directly helpful to the parties.

After Greece the Clifford mission had gone to Turkey. Clifford said he had never visited Ankara before. He had sought, in his three days in the Turkish capital, to develop a personal relationship with the Turkish leadership, and he believed he had succeeded. He had spent several hours alone with Prime Minister Demirel. An equally long talk had been arranged with opposition leader, Bulent Ecevit. Clifford said he had obtained a better appreciation of the problems in the area, and now realized that Greece, Turkey and Cyprus all dealt with a set of problems exacerbated by years of mistakes and misunderstandings. This did not make the problems insurmountable. Indeed, countries

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<sup>4</sup> Clifford's meetings are described in the attachments to Document 8.

which had experienced deep distrust, such as France and Germany, had been able with good will on both sides to resolve their differences.

Clifford asserted that Cyprus represented the climax of his visit. He noted that he had already met with some of the President's associates and that on Friday he intended to call on Rauf Denktash and get the views of the Turkish Cypriots.<sup>5</sup> All of these conversations increased his understanding of the problems of the area, and are exceedingly helpful. Clifford said he had now reached certain conclusions of his own about the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. He intended to pass on these personal conclusions to President Carter on his return to Washington, and therefore wished to discuss them directly with President Makarios later in their conversation today.

The Archbishop again insisted that the United States could play a decisive role in settling the Cyprus problem. Any proposal from the United States would be most welcome. Indeed, without such US help, Makarios did not think the representatives of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities could reach agreement on their own.

President Makarios noted that the next round of Vienna talks were scheduled to begin at the end of March, but he questioned how long they would last and what substantive developments would result. From his viewpoint it now looked like the Vienna talks would be purely ceremonial in character. Rather than talking about territory, the Turks will probably say they have no records and are not willing to discuss detailed adjustments. They may insist on returning to Nicosia quickly. Makarios said it was his personal view that progress was simply not possible until after the Turkish elections.<sup>6</sup> The Turks, he said smilingly, probably want a solution, but he was not sure what kind of solution. His guess was that it would be a solution not substantially different from the present situation. They will probably offer to return only three to five percent of the territory they now hold. There could be no solution on this basis.

The first issue to be discussed in Vienna, Makarios insisted, must be territory. This subject is of primary importance to the Greek Cypriots. The territorial issue touched on the refugee question and other problems and principles. Makarios said his government was ready to make concessions, but the fact remained that the Turks were in a position of overwhelming strength. Moreover, Greek-Cypriot compromises could not be at the expense of the unity of Cyprus.

Makarios admitted that mistakes had been made by both sides over the past 15 years, yet this history must serve as a guide to a future

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<sup>5</sup> Clifford met with Denktash on February 25. The details of that meeting are reported in the fourth attachment to Document 8.

<sup>6</sup> Turkey held the election on June 5.

settlement. Any agreement to be reached must be lasting in character. The Turks need not fear Enosis or any abuse from the Greek-Cypriot side.<sup>7</sup>

Makarios agreed that 1977 was a crucial year for Cyprus. If the current impetus is lost, no solution would be found for a long time and the present dangers would continue. A solution for Cyprus would ease other problems in the area, between Greece and Turkey and between both of these NATO allies and the United States. A solution would also be in the interest of the entire NATO Alliance. Some people on the island think any involvement by NATO or NATO members is intrinsically bad. Makarios insisted that this was not his position. He said he welcomed the assistance of the United States, and that such help was badly needed. At the same time, he hoped that the Congress would not approve a Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey until significant progress was made on Cyprus of a type that would ensure that a real solution is certain. Any other course would tend to convince people in Cyprus that the recent Makarios–Denktash meetings were staged by the Turks in an effort solely to convince Congress to move forward with the Turkish DCA.

The United States has the ability to put pressure on Turkey and thus to facilitate concessions in connection with Cyprus. The US embargo is a practical means of doing this. The President said he realized that one could not challenge Turkey directly, but that there were other ways of exerting pressure. Indeed, such pressure was essential if there was to be meaningful progress. Once agreement on the details of a Cyprus settlement were achieved, there would be a number of other questions that would arise, such as guarantees. Each of the two communities is suspicious of the other and a system different from the present guaranty arrangement would have to be found.

President Makarios concluded his presentation by saying that he did not know whether the United States would be specific and make a direct proposal to help solve the Cyprus problem. In his view, the U.S. Government was free to proceed in this direction. He said he was also aware that the European Community was interested in being helpful.<sup>8</sup> He stated his preference and desire for a US initiative, which had Euro-

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<sup>7</sup> Rejecting a policy of enosis was one issue upon which Makarios and the leaders in Turkey and the Turkish portion of Cyprus could all agree. Makarios' opposition to enosis precipitated the failed coup against him launched by the Greek right-wing military Junta in July 1974, which in turn led Turkey to invade the northern portion of Cyprus. Makarios sustained his anti-enosis policy after the collapse of the Junta in Athens and the restoration of a democratic Greek government.

<sup>8</sup> On the role of the European initiatives to solve the Cyprus impasse, see Dodd, *The Cyprus Imbroglia*, pp. 61–74.

pean backing rather than a European initiative which had America's support.

At this point, President Makarios and Secretary Clifford withdrew for a private conversation.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> No substantive record of this portion of the meeting has been found.

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### 33. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 25, 1977, 11:30 a.m.

#### SUBJECT

President Carter's Conversation with UN Secretary General Waldheim

#### PARTICIPANTS

*The United Nations*

Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General

Roberto Guyer and

William Buffum, Under Secretaries General for Special Political Affairs

*The United States*

The President

The Vice President

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Council

Secretary of State Vance

UN Ambassador Andrew Young

C. William Maynes, Assistant Secretary-designate, Bureau of International Organization Affairs (Notetaker)

The President welcomed the Secretary General to Washington and stated that he had a number of issues he hoped they could discuss together.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

#### *Cyprus*

The President commented that the Secretary General appeared to have achieved an outstanding success in Cyprus by bringing together

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, National Security Issues, Box 85, National Security Issues—United Nations, [2/9/1977–12/31/1978]. Secret. Drafted by Maynes. Distributed to Tuchman and Mondale. The meeting took place in the White House. Guyer had been involved in the intercommunal dispute since 1971.



Makarios and Denktash.<sup>2</sup> He expressed US appreciation for the help which the Secretary General had given Clark Clifford and concluded that we wanted to continue to consult on events in Cyprus.

The Secretary General replied that there has been a real change in attitude in Cyprus. He felt that the two sides now wanted to come to terms although one could not be too optimistic given the many difficulties involved in final settlement. But the Greek Cypriots now realize that they cannot solve their problems by resorting to the General Assembly. And the Turkish Cypriots realize that military power alone will not gain them the international legitimacy they require. Denktash, for example, has tried and failed to get the right to address the General Assembly.

The President asked to what degree Denktash took orders from the Turkish Government or acted on his own. The Secretary General responded that it depended on the circumstances. At times, the Turks complained that Denktash was exploiting their own international political difficulties. At other times, Denktash complained that the Turks had ordered him to abandon proposals which he had sold to his own people with great difficulty. In any event, the Secretary General believes that after the Turkish elections in June, there is a good chance to make real diplomatic progress.

The Secretary asked whether Makarios was really prepared to accept a bi-zonal solution. The Secretary General volunteered that Makarios was prepared, but reluctantly. During the negotiations, Denktash asked Makarios why he was using the word “bi-communal”, which he had never used before, and what it meant. After considerable discussion, Denktash announced that he would accept “bi-communal” as long as Makarios understood that he, Denktash, considered that it meant “bizonal.”<sup>3</sup> According to the Secretary General, “Makarios accepted this silently.”

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 5, Document 31.

<sup>3</sup> The distinction between “bi-communal” and “bi-zonal” centered on how to reconcile Makarios’ attempts to maintain Cyprus as a unitary state while satisfying Denktash’s condition that any settlement ensured a degree of autonomy for the minority Turkish-Cypriot population.

34. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 15, 1977, 1752Z

57270. Subject: Cyprus Negotiations: Cyprus Ambassador's Call on Under Secretary Habib.

1. Cypriot Ambassador Dimitriou called on Under Secretary Habib March 11 for discussion current U.S. views on Cyprus prior Ambassador's departure March 13 for brief visit to Cyprus. Counselor-designate Nimetz also present.

2. Habib and Nimetz explained why Clifford had returned from Eastern Mediterranean in cautiously optimistic mood, convinced that March 31 intercommunal negotiations represented important opportunity for progress and that Cyprus settlement could be achieved in 1977. What was necessary first step was for both sides to honor commitments they had made to Clifford. We were beginning to receive indications that this might not occur and Habib asked Dimitriou to personally stress to Makarios importance we attach to having realistic proposals placed on table in Vienna. Greek Cypriots had agreed to produce map to serve as basis for concrete territorial discussions and Turks had said they would provide outline for structure of future government. It was vital that both sides lived up to these promises.

3. Nimetz went on to explain that a way had to be found, preferably before both parties got to Vienna of arriving at procedures whereby territorial and constitutional issues can be discussed simultaneously. Greek Cypriots could not expect territorial issues to be considered first and constitutional issues tackled only when Greek and Turkish zones had been finally determined. Any number of ways could be found to produce simultaneous discussions of territorial and constitutional questions and we trust Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would work with UN Special Representative de Cuellar in Cyprus to develop acceptable procedures in next week or two.

4. On timing, Nimetz said that we looked forward to six or seven days of substantive discussion in Vienna and hoped subsequent Easter recess would be relatively short. There seemed no reason why talks could not resume and continue for several additional weeks in April. Nimetz agreed with Dimitriou that Vienna was a better site than Nic-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770089-0022. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Nuel L. Pazdral (EUR/SE) and Ledsky; cleared by Ledsky, Barbour, Nimetz, and Sebastian (S/S); approved by Habib. Sent for information Immediate to Ankara, Athens, London, and USUN.

osia for sustained, serious talks but indicated our understanding of Denktash's preference for a Cyprus venue.

5. U.S. role: Nimetz indicated we would remain active, consulting closely with the parties and with UN officials over the next two weeks and as the talks progress. He said we understand the Archbishop's delicate position and the importance of avoiding any appearance of putting pressure on him; newspaper stories alleging that we, or the EC-9, planned such pressure were untrue.<sup>2</sup>

6. Toward end of conversation Dimitriou asked about the Administration's plans with respect to the Turkish-U.S. security relationship. Nimetz responded that the U.S. intended to work to restore close U.S.-Turkish ties and would thus endorse U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement in principle. Administration would not, however, press for its immediate approval by Congress but would instead, as interim measure, work for legislation for FY 1978 that would permit Turks to make cash and credit military equipment purchases in U.S. in somewhat larger amounts than were possible in the last two fiscal years.

7. Dimitriou said reports from Cyprus about the Clifford mission had been most encouraging and that when he returned to Nicosia, he would carefully present to President Makarios the positions Habib and Nimetz had outlined.

**Vance**

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is likely to Bernard D. Nossiter, "Clifford Said to Expect Cyprus Breakthrough in March," *The Washington Post*, March 1, 1977, p. A7. The article quoted Clifford as having warned Makarios to be flexible at the Vienna talks or "his friends would lose interest in Cyprus," and that the intercommunal dispute in Cyprus was of "minimal concern" when compared to the Carter administration's goal of restoring full military cooperation with Turkey.

35. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 18, 1977, 0050Z

60063. Subject: Letter to President Makarios From President Carter.

Please deliver following letter, dated March 16, from President to President Makarios. Signed original has been pouched.

Begin text. Your Beatitude: While I know that Secretary Clifford has already expressed his thanks for your cordial reception during his visit to Nicosia, I wanted to write to you to add my personal appreciation for the courtesy and openness with which you received my special representative and his party. I would like particularly to thank you for your very kind personal regards which Secretary Clifford conveyed to me.

The time you devoted to Secretary Clifford, the warm personal relationship which you and he developed, and the excellent hospitality which you extended greatly assisted in his mission. Secretary Clifford has reported to me at length on his extensive discussions with you<sup>2</sup> and this, in turn, has led to our greater understanding of the Cyprus problem.

Your willingness to begin sustained and concrete negotiations is vitally important. I was particularly grateful to learn from Secretary Clifford that specific, substantive proposals will be put on the table in Vienna later this month. It is the sincere hope of the United States that through discussion of such concrete ideas the way will be opened to real progress toward the Cyprus settlement we all desire. While we continue to support fully the role of United Nations Secretary General Waldheim, my administration will spare no effort to make any contribution we can to assist with the Cyprus intercommunal talks. It is my earnest hope that through the efforts of all interested parties, 1977 will prove to be the year a just Cyprus settlement becomes a reality. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter.

End text.

**Christopher**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770092-0611. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Ewing from text received from the White House; cleared by Hopper, Ledsky, and Leo Reddy (S/S); approved by Barbour. Sent for information Priority to Ankara and Athens.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 10.

**36. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, March 30, 1977, 11:15 a.m.–2:15 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Berlin, Cyprus, Arms Control, CSCE, Bilateral Matters

**PARTICIPANTS***United States*

Secretary Cyrus R. Vance  
Ambassador Malcolm Toon  
Mr. Paul Warnke  
Assistant Secretary Arthur  
Hartman  
Mr. William Hyland  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
Slocombe  
Mr. William D. Krimer,  
Interpreter

*USSR*

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko  
Deputy Chairman of the Council  
of Ministers L.V. Smirnov  
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy  
Korniyenko  
Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin  
Mr. O. Sokolov  
Mr. V.F. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

**CYPRUS**

*Gromyko* suggested to take up the question of Cyprus. He asked if the Secretary would like to be first to speak. How did he assess the present situation? The Soviet Union did not want to see any hostilities in that area, and therefore hoped the US position was similar.

*The Secretary* said he would be happy to take up the Cyprus question. He personally had been involved in Cyprus problems over the years, particularly during the period of time in 1967 when he, together with others from the United Nations, was involved in resolving the dispute that existed at the time, in order to avoid a conflict between Greeks and Turks.<sup>2</sup> It was with concern and sadness that he had seen the conflict break out in the early 70's. Since then a number of efforts by various countries and by the United Nations were made to try and find a way to resolve such conflicts. Recently, in an effort to offer our good offices and help the United Nations in their efforts to resolve the dispute, we had sent a mission to Cyprus headed by Mr. Clifford. Mr. Clif-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Personal files of Cyrus R. Vance, 1977–1980, Lot 80D135, Box 1, Moscow Trip, March 28, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by William D. Krimer (OPR/LS) on April 2; reviewed in draft by Hyland; approved by Twaddell on April 12. The meeting took place at the Kremlin. Vance was in Moscow primarily to reopen strategic arms discussions. The full text is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 21.

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey, Documents 307, 319, 320, 325, 335, 339, 359. Vance noted his work on the Cyprus issue during this time in his memoirs. (*Hard Choices*, pp. 144 and 168)

ford had discussed the issues that divide the Greeks and Turks, in particular with the Archbishop and Mr. Denktash, to see whether or not common ground that would settle the dispute could be found. In so doing, he had indicated that he had no wish to do anything that would not be helpful to UN Secretary General Waldheim's efforts to settle the intra-communal dispute. Clifford had reported the results of his discussions with Cyprus leaders to Waldheim and had offered our assistance. As Gromyko undoubtedly knew, the intra-communal talks were about to begin in Vienna today, and it was the Secretary's understanding that the parties had new proposals on the table that would be helpful. As he understood it, one side would put forward a new proposal to resolve the territorial question, and the other a proposal to resolve the question of governmental structure. If these proposals were actually discussed, then perhaps we would see progress. This was in the hands of the Secretary General, as an overseeing party to the discussion. We believed we should leave matters in his hands, while supporting his efforts.

*Gromyko* remarked that while Waldheim was overseeing matters he was, of course, in no position to decide anything.

*The Secretary* agreed that that was correct. The ultimate solutions should be worked out by the parties. Therefore, he thought we should see what comes out of the Vienna talks and then decide.

*Gromyko* asked if he could take it that it would be correct to state that the new Administration in the US favored preservation of Cyprus as an independent, sovereign, and integrated state.

*The Secretary* answered: "You can."

*Gromyko* took that to be a very good response; it indicated that our positions had much in common. He would ask another question—would the US Government agree that no foreign troops should be based in Cyprus, that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots live in peace, that they maintain order with their own small forces, or was its position that foreign troops should be retained there indefinitely.

*The Secretary* said that the first was our view. However, the question of British bases on Cyprus would have to be worked out between Britain and Cyprus.<sup>3</sup>

*Gromyko* said that that was another question. He had asked whether the US believed that ultimately there should be no foreign troops in Cyprus.

*The Secretary* said he clearly agreed that there should be no Greek or Turkish forces in Cyprus. That had been our position from the beginning.

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 8.

*Gromyko* said that this response drew our positions closer together. By way of information, he told the Secretary that recently Foreign Minister Çağlayangil of Turkey had visited Moscow.<sup>4</sup> He had touched on the Cyprus question. *Gromyko* did not know where he had obtained that information, but on the territorial question he had said that in general Greek Cypriots—Archbishop Makarios—were closer to accepting the idea of 30%–31% of territory for the Turks. If that was really so, the Turkish Foreign Minister had said, then the Greek and Turkish positions on the territorial question were not all that far apart. *Gromyko* was saying this to the Secretary for the sake of information, but could not go into further detail, since this was not a subject for discussion between Turkey and the Soviet Union. He felt it would not be out of place if our two countries could assist and advise the two communities, although it would be they who would have to arrive at a final settlement.

*The Secretary* said it was his understanding that the Turkish Cypriots' position was that they wanted to get 30%–31% of the territory, while the Greeks were prepared to give something closer to 20%. He would predict that they would finally compromise on 26%–27%.

*Gromyko* said that had also been his impression after his talk with the Turkish Foreign Minister. He had suspected that 30%–31% was more wishful thinking than reality.

To finish up with the Cyprus question, *Gromyko* said the Soviet Union would hope that the question would be settled and would no longer be a problem. He felt that, in general, the Turks were inclined to take the road toward solution. He believed that if both sides were flexible, we could be optimistic about the future. However, no one should interfere with them, although the US and the Soviet Union should assist and prevent any outside interference. As for military bases, and foreign troops, ultimately these should leave.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

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<sup>4</sup> Çağlayangil was in the Soviet Union from March 13 to 17. The Embassy reported in telegram 3789 from Moscow, March 22, that Çağlayangil secured Soviet endorsement of the Cypriot intercommunal talks. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770099–0026)

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37. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, May 19, 1977, 8–9:30 a.m.

## PARTICIPANTS

*United Nations*

Mr. Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of the United Nations

Mr. Roberto Guyer, Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs, United Nations

*United States*

Mr. Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State

Mr. Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

## SUBJECT

Secretary Vance's Working Breakfast with Secretary General Waldheim: PART IV—CYPRUS

Waldheim opened this portion of the conversation by asking how things were going with respect to Cyprus. The Secretary said there had been meetings in London with both Demirel and Caramanlis.<sup>2</sup> Both had talked a lot about how bad the other one was. We had urged them to cooperate and to work with the Secretary General, emphasizing that it was essential to make progress for the sake of peace in the area. We told them that both are old friends and it is unthinkable that they should go to war. We had urged them to get back to resolving the Cyprus problem after the Turkish elections.

The Secretary said that Demirel had given us a stern lecture about the need to complete the defense cooperation agreement. We had told Demirel we agreed but simply did not have the votes in Congress. At the same time, we pointed out that we had increased our military assistance by \$50 million. We needed action on their part, however, to overcome suspicions in Congress arising from their actions in 1974. We told Demirel that if there is progress on the Cyprus question, we believe we can get the votes in Congress.

The Secretary said we had also urged both Greece and Turkey to solve the Aegean problem, and had warned the Turks against sending their ship back into the Aegean. The Secretary said we gather there has

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Personal files of Cyrus R. Vance, 1977–1980, Lot 80D135, Box 1, Geneva Stop—May 18–21, 1977. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Atherton on May 19; approved by Twaddell on June 13. The meeting took place in Vance's hotel suite. Vance was in Geneva May 18–21.

<sup>2</sup>Carter met with Demirel and Karamanlis separately on May 10 in London during a NATO summit meeting. See Documents 94 and 166.



been some improvement with respect to the problem as a result of talks in London between Bitsios and Çağlayangil.<sup>3</sup>

Waldheim said this accords with his view. On Cyprus, communal talks would reconvene on the 20th, largely for face-saving purposes. Before any progress is possible, however, it will be necessary to await the results of the Turkish elections on June 5.

Waldheim said he wanted to report a possibly significant development. The Turks had had a military mission in Famagusta last week studying the situation. The UN people on Cyprus thought this was the result of U.S. efforts to press the Turks to make territorial concessions. The mission may have been looking to see what could be given back to the Greeks. Waldheim said he was convinced that the Varosha section of Famagusta was the principal bargaining point. While the Turks had looted it, they had not moved people in, and it could absorb 40 to 50,000 persons. Waldheim said he was convinced the Turks would not return much more—perhaps a bit south of the Famagusta-Nicosia Road. He doubted that they would give up anything at Morphou.

The latest rumor, Waldheim said, was that while the Turks were proposing two zones, they would want certain areas directly under a central federal government, presumably so that they would have some influence over the Greek zone. Waldheim said he doubted the Greeks would accept this; they would probably insist on full control over Varosha.

Another idea was that the Turks might give up the no-man's land, which in fact was under UN-Turkish control. Counting Varosha and the no-man's land, they would reduce the Turkish-held territory to 32% which could perhaps be further decreased to 29%. This would, however, take many months. The U.S. role, Waldheim said, was important in continuing to press the Turks.

In response to Waldheim's question about Makarios' health, the Secretary said we had understood he had lost the use of one fourth of his heart. He wants to come to the U.S. this summer for a check-up. Waldheim said Makarios also suffers psychologically. He is not an easy man, but he is the only one with the power to keep things together.

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<sup>3</sup> Bitsios and Çağlayangil met in Strasbourg on April 28. No record of a meeting in London was found.

**38. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between  
President Carter's Special Emissary (Clifford) and Cypriot  
President Makarios<sup>1</sup>**

London, June 15, 1977, 12:25 p.m.

I reached Archbishop Makarios by telephone in his suite at the Grosvenor House in London.

The early part of the conversation was taken up with a discussion of His Beatitude's health. He said he felt he had completely recovered from the heart attack and had been examined by more than one doctor and the present indication is that his heart is sound and working effectively. Fortunately, the attack had been a mild one and doctors indicated he would not need to feel further concern.<sup>2</sup>

I referred again to the sense of appreciation I had continued to feel for the exceedingly hospitable reception he had extended to me and my colleagues on the occasion of our visit to Nicosia. I mentioned my gratification at the excellent talks we had had and I felt it was important that we had become friends and could speak in the future, as we had in the past, with complete candor. He agreed that our visits had been good ones and he expressed his appreciation for our continuing interest in his island.

I thanked him for all that he had done to assure that Mr. Papadopoulos would present a territorial proposal in Vienna. I suggested to His Beatitude that the proposal presented, while apparently not acceptable to the other side, certainly constituted the confirmation of the personal agreement that I had had with His Beatitude to present such a document. I further suggested that the proposal on the structure of the new government presented by the Turkish Cypriots was affected by the pending Turkish election.<sup>3</sup> I suggested that we felt that the Turkish negotiators were under severe restrictions at the time due to any possible public reaction to the proposition presented by them. His Beatitude evidenced some understanding of this and that then led to a discussion regarding the Turkish election.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977–1980, Lot 81D85, Box 2, Eastern Mediterranean—1977. No classification marking. Attached but not printed is a June 16 covering memorandum from Clifford to Nimetz, indicating that Clifford also sent a copy to Ledsky.

<sup>2</sup> Makarios suffered a heart attack on April 3.

<sup>3</sup> The constitutional proposal put forward by the Turkish Cypriots at the Vienna talks in March–April called for a central government on Cyprus with highly limited powers; that is, one that had little jurisdiction in areas dominated by Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriot proposal called for initial establishment of a federal state. For an overview of the proposals, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1977, pp. 344–345.

We agreed that if Mr. Ecevit had obtained a clear majority in the election it would make it easier for him to make decisions and take decisive action. However, the hope was expressed that he still might be able to construct a government that would be a workable one. His Beatitude suggested this might take some period of time and that we would, of course, watch developments with continuing interest.

I said that, after permitting some period of time to pass, President Carter thought it would be important for us to return to the Eastern Mediterranean. I referred to the fact that I had a telephone conversation with President Carter during the morning in which we had a discussion of the Cyprus matter and that he indicated the same continuing degree of interest as he had had from the beginning.<sup>4</sup> The Archbishop replied that we were welcome at any time we saw fit to come back to Cyprus. He indicated that he felt that the talks we had had before were very useful, and that he intended to cooperate in a further effort to find the correct solutions to this complex problem.

I said that developments would determine the time of our next visit and that we would be in touch with him to make sure that the trip would be set at a time completely convenient to His Beatitude. He indicated he did not intend to do much traveling and that we would be welcome when it seemed appropriate for us to return. He expressed his appreciation for the telephone call and then advanced the thought that the continued interest of the United States in Cyprus was a vital factor in the months that lie ahead.

My personal reaction to the conversation is that the Archbishop made a definite effort to be friendly, cooperative and appreciative. I believe that the conversation accomplished all that we hoped it might.

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<sup>4</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter and Clifford spoke from 9:31 to 9:40 a.m. on June 15. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No substantive record of that conversation has been found.

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**39. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 1, 1977, 2 p.m.

SUBJECT

Current Situation in Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Spyros Kyprianou, President, Cyprus House of Representatives  
Ambassador Nicos G. Dimitriou, Cypriot Ambassador to the U.S.  
Mr. Andros A. Nicolaides, Counselor, Embassy of Cyprus  
Mr. Clark Clifford, President's Special Representative  
Ambassador William Crawford, U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus  
Mr. Nelson C. Ledsky, Director, EUR/SE (Note taker)

Clark Clifford began the conversation by inviting Kyprianou to describe the current situation on Cyprus, particularly since February.

Kyprianou responded that the Cypriot government had lived up to all its commitments, and at Vienna in April had done everything possible to move the Cyprus negotiations forward. The Greek Cypriot map was complete and comprehensive in contrast to the Turkish Cypriot constitutional presentation, which was totally inadequate.

Since Vienna, an aura of disappointment had settled over Nicosia. Nothing of substance had occurred. There were still ceremonial talks taking place in Nicosia, but no progress of any kind had been recorded. A further meeting or two had been set for July to determine whether another full round of talks should be scheduled in Vienna. The Cypriots are skeptical about the utility of such a round, and Archbishop Makarios has made it clear that there will be no talk for the sake of talking.

The Cypriot government does not want to give the world the impression that something has been achieved when, in fact, nothing has been achieved. The main effort had to be focused in Ankara, and the key to a solution rested with the new Turkish government and not with Denktash. Kyprianou suggested that Ecevit should be in a position to make more concessions on Cyprus than any other Turkish leader, but that his initial statements had been disappointing and discouraging.

Kyprianou concluded that Cyprus was on the eve of several crucial months and in this connection asked Clifford if he intended to follow up on his earlier mission. Kyprianou said Clifford's personal ef-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of Southern Europe, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977-1980, Lot 83D256, Box 1, POL 2 Cyprus 1977 and 1978. Confidential. Drafted by Ledsky on July 11. The meeting took place in Clifford's office.

forts had been most important, and would continue to be vital to any chance for progress.

Clifford said the U.S. Government hoped that progress could soon be made toward a Cyprus settlement. We, too, had been disappointed with developments in the past several months, but attributed the slower pace to the Turkish electoral situation. Even the Turkish memorandum on the constitution perhaps should be seen in the light of the fact that no Turkish government, on the eve of an election, could have authorized a more forthcoming document, knowing that it might be made public at any moment.<sup>2</sup>

Clifford went on to say that the U.S. did not want just any agreement on Cyprus, but one that was fair and had a chance to endure. Partition of the island was clearly not the answer. Nor did either of the documents presented by the parties in Vienna provide a real future blueprint. This was too bad, but understandable. No negotiator ever puts forward his total position in his first presentation.

Clifford said that the momentum achieved during his previous visit in February had to be restored. The U.S. intended to talk to the new Turkish government in this sense, pointing out to Ankara the unique opportunity that now existed to settle the problem for the good of Turkey, NATO and overall stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. Clifford said that for the moment we were marking time until we could get an accurate reading of the Turkish situation. We were also beginning to prepare for our next move, and in so doing had come to a number of conclusions. First, it was evident that no solution could be reached quickly if the matter were left exclusively to the two communities on Cyprus. Both Greece and Turkey had an important role to play in the process. Secondly, though all the various issues in the Eastern Mediterranean were inter-related, it was important to keep Cyprus separate. Mixing the issues together could only complicate the chances for solving any of them. Finally, a Cyprus solution was only possible if both communities compromised with respect to the structure of a future government. It was not enough to fall back on words like sovereignty, viability, independence. These concepts were susceptible to varying interpretations. In Clifford's view what was possible was a federation on the U.S. model. This could provide a large measure of local autonomy together with an effective, functioning central government. Local authorities could be responsible for protecting life and property, collecting some taxes, running schools and social services, but the pre-eminent authority would belong to the central government.

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 38.

Clifford said that at the right moment, he and his group were prepared to go out to the area again. He was prepared to be active, but only if the parties asked him to be active and raised no obstacles to further U.S. involvement. Clifford said he would only return to the area at a time convenient to the parties—all the parties—and that in the meantime, the two communities on the island should continue whatever contacts they could. There was a psychological value in meetings, even if progress was limited. Conversely, a break-off could effectively set back the negotiating process.

Clifford noted that, so far, the U.S. had only been involved procedurally. Our participation in Vienna was clearly of this sort, and we were reluctant about moving into the substance of individual issues. Nonetheless, we were flexible, and if the parties wanted greater U.S. involvement or participation, we would certainly be willing to move in that direction. For example, if the parties wanted, he or members of his team could come to Cyprus and remain on the island for some time.

Our willingness to help, said Clifford, was based on the American peoples' continuing interest in Cyprus. This interest is most clearly reflected in the Congress. Anything hopeful that occurs on the island assists our involvement. Conversely, anything unpleasant complicates our involvement and makes it more difficult for the U.S. to be of assistance. In this connection, Clifford mentioned the trial of the murderers of Ambassador Davies.<sup>3</sup> He said the U.S. response to the convictions meted out to those found guilty had thus far been positive. The penalties were admittedly relatively mild, but most Americans feel that at least action has been taken and that the killers had been identified, tried and punished to some degree. In this connection, Clifford said that the American people and the Congress would note with concern any commutation or lessening of the sentences of those convicted.

Kyprianou thanked Clifford for his candid assessment of the situation. He said Clifford's views on Ambassador Davies' killers would be conveyed directly to Archbishop Makarios. With respect to future negotiations, Kyprianou said Clifford's active involvement, so long as consistent with the UN umbrella, would be most welcome. Kyprianou also thanked Clifford for his statements about the need for a strong central government and Clifford's clear renunciation of partition.

Kyprianou noted that while there might be further Greek Cypriot compromising, their proposals had been drafted with great care and difficulty, and already embodied serious concessions. There were limits to how far the Greek Cypriots could go, particularly since the

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<sup>3</sup> Ambassador to Cyprus Rodger Davies was killed during an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia on August 19, 1974.

Turkish Cypriots have not yet made the slightest concessions. Kyprianou emphasized again that the next few months would be crucial.

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**40. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Vest) to Secretary of State Vance<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 13, 1977

*Future Cyprus Strategy*

*ISSUE FOR DECISION*

How active should we be later this summer or fall in searching for a Cyprus settlement or resolving other problems in the eastern Mediterranean? We need your guidance to enable us to begin planning now for any further U.S. initiatives.

*CURRENT SITUATION*

We have essentially been marking time on Cyprus since the Vienna round of intercommunal talks and the start of the Turkish electoral campaign some three months ago. This inactivity will have to continue at least until a new Turkish government is firmly in place, a process that seems to be nearing completion. The odds now are that former Prime Minister Demirel will succeed in reconstructing the three-party coalition which governed Turkey for the last two years. We should know by the July 16–17 weekend if Demirel will be successful. Should Demirel fail, Ecevit may be given a second chance or the process of working toward some kind of grand coalition could begin and take a further month to resolve.

A Demirel-Erbakan-Turkes coalition would not easily make concessions on Cyprus. But Demirel badly wants an improved security relationship with the U.S. and recognizes that Cyprus is increasingly a drag on Turkey's international position. In addition, Ecevit has

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977–1980, Lot 81D85, Box 2, Eastern Mediterranean—1977. Confidential. Sent through Nimetz. Drafted by Ewing and Ledsky on July 12, and cleared by Barbour, who initialed the memorandum for Vest. The memorandum bears Vance's stamped initials on the lower right corner. In a covering memorandum forwarding this memorandum to Vance, Nimetz reported: "Once a Turkish government is firmly in place, we may be faced with choices requiring prompt decisions and action." Nimetz also noted that Clifford remained "very active" regarding the Cyprus negotiations. (Ibid.)

adopted a moderate, constructive tone on Cyprus and might allow Demirel to make the necessary concessions toward resolving that issue, while vigorously expressing opposition on other matters. Thus, we tend to think that regardless of the outcome of the government formation process in Ankara, there is a chance for movement on Cyprus, something we ought to be ready to exploit if it is found to exist.

As we see the situation, the period from late August to late September might be the time for a further move on Cyprus, assuming formation of a Turkish government before August 1. Such a U.S. initiative would revive the negotiating momentum achieved immediately after the Clifford Mission last February and could set the stage for further substantive efforts by the UN, U.S. and others on Cyprus later this fall and winter. It might also help prevent a major debate on Cyprus at the UN General Assembly which convenes on September 20, as well as dampening the fuss about Cyprus at the Belgrade CSCE Conference.<sup>2</sup>

We recognize, of course, that an early U.S. effort to move on Cyprus may be impossible. This could happen if the Turkish political situation remains unclarified or if one or more of the parties refuse to deal with us. But in an attempt to explore possibilities for early action, we have quietly but actively sought the counsel of the parties to the dispute, our Western allies, UN officialdom, and the Congress as to what we might do next. We have also in this interim period attempted to resolve the most immediate problems connected with our troubled defense relationships with both Greece and Turkey. These recent activities may be summarized as follows:

(a) *Consultation with the UN.* We have talked to high-level UN officials in New York, and the Secretary General's Special Representative for Cyprus, who have agreed to probe to see whether one or more technical discussions should be scheduled in July in an effort simply to keep the current negotiating process alive. UN officials are convinced that no meaningful progress is possible without a further U.S. initiative. They would like to see a second Clifford mission to the area in August or September.

(b) *Contacts with the Greek-Cypriots.* Clark Clifford had a long and friendly telephone conversation with Archbishop Makarios in June, and Kyprianou had a good round of meetings in Washington two weeks ago.<sup>3</sup> In these contacts we sought to convince the Cypriot leadership not to lose faith in the current negotiating process but to bide time until a government emerges in Ankara. The Cypriots clearly want and

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<sup>2</sup> The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe began in Helsinki in 1975. The follow-up meeting, held in Belgrade from October 1977 to March 1978, focused particularly on human rights issues.

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 38 and 39.



expect a further U.S. initiative this fall, and have begun to raise the possibility, if one does not emerge, of asking the UN General Assembly in October to organize an international conference where the Cyprus issue can be considered by, among others, the Soviets.

(c) *Contact with the Turkish-Cypriots.* Department officers have talked in New York to Turkish-Cypriot “Foreign Minister” Chelik and have suggested some procedural steps that the Turkish-Cypriots might take prior to a resumption of intercommunal talks to improve their constitutional proposals.<sup>4</sup> We also suggested to Chelik that U.S. constitutional experts might work directly with Turkish-Cypriot lawyers on this project. Chelik said he would discuss this idea with Denktash, but we have had no response as yet.

(d) *Turkish military situation.* An interim commercial arrangement has been worked out on the F-4s that will take us to late October, and we have sent an authorization to the White House covering the final \$55 million in FMS credits the Turks can receive in FY-1977. However, the Turkish military establishment continues to face supply problems caused primarily by the embargo.

(e) *Turkish economic situation.* Turkey faces an urgent, short-term foreign exchange shortage brought on by a high growth rate, sluggish exports, high oil prices, the effects of recession in Western Europe, and inflationary domestic policies. Until a new government is confirmed, policies to meet these difficulties cannot be formulated nor can the Turks approach the IMF or other potential donors until they are prepared to take economic measures themselves. We have done nothing to encourage the Turks to think that they can get assistance from us to meet their economic problems. An effort to settle the Cyprus problem would make it easier to strengthen all aspects of U.S.-Turkish relations and we think the Turks realize this.

(f) *Greek-U.S. Defense Cooperation Agreement.* We have quietly resumed base negotiations in Athens. Progress has been made, and we have an informal pledge from Caramanlis that a final, open negotiating round can be held in late July or August.

(g) *Congressional situation.* Our continuing close contact with the Greek interest group and other members of Congress suggests that we have restored some good will and understanding, along with an expectation of early and vigorous Administration action to help move the Cyprus issue toward a solution.

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<sup>4</sup> Vedat Celik met with Deputy Chief of Mission C. Edward Dillery in Nicosia on May 3 and on July 6. Although Celik also met with Nimetz in the United States on June 13, no record has been found to confirm if this was the meeting in New York.

### *Our Next Steps*

(a) *Talking to the Turks.* How much we can do with respect to Cyprus and when we can do it depends on the degree of Turkish cooperation we are able to elicit. Ankara holds the key to progress on Cyprus and we know that the Turks are suspicious of outside involvement, and are tough bargainers who do not make concessions easily. We also know that Turkish patience in dealing with the U.S. is wearing thin.

Our next approach to Turkey must, therefore, be carefully conceived and executed. In our judgment this can best be done by channeling our initial contact with the new Turkish government through our Ambassador in Ankara. We think Ambassador Spiers should be authorized to probe Turkish positions on Cyprus and the U.S.-Turkish security relationship, and to ascertain through a series of conversations whether, how and when further Western initiatives might be undertaken. Our further decisions would thus be taken on the basis of our Ambassador's assessment, presumably sometime in mid-August.<sup>5</sup>

(b) *Preparing for an initiative.* If the Turks are at all responsive to the idea of new outside activity on Cyprus, the question remains as to the content of such an initiative. Until now, as you are aware, we have sought to limit ourselves to procedural aspects of the Cyprus problem. But given the inability of the UN to do more than preside over the negotiating process and the unwillingness of all the parties immediately involved to make innovative proposals, some form of outside substantive involvement would appear to be essential if any early progress is to be made.

There are two major areas where such an effort might be centered: (1) helping the two sides devise elements of a government structure which would contain both a central authority and local autonomy for the Turkish zone and (2) development for presentation to the parties of compromise territorial ideas. (The Greek-Cypriot map tabled in April allotted 20 percent to the Turkish zone; Denktash now controls 36 percent of Cyprus, but has spoken of accepting 32.8 percent. An outside proposal in the 25–30 percent range might greatly speed the negotiating process.)

The Greek Cypriots have already responded positively to the concept of this kind of U.S. substantive involvement; the Turks will be somewhat more reluctant, but even they would regard U.S. involvement as preferable to that of any other party. Unless you have objection, we would favor beginning to develop proposals in these two areas

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<sup>5</sup> Vance approved this step and wrote in the margin: "After new govt is in place." Cahill confirmed Vance's approval on June 14 by initialing on his behalf.

which, depending on the circumstances, could be considered for presentation to the parties at the appropriate moment.<sup>6</sup>

(c) *Involving Others*. Over the past two years we have worked closely with the British and less so with the other EC-9 members on Cyprus and other eastern Mediterranean issues. To be frank, nothing much of value has resulted from these consultations. We know, too, that the Greeks, Cypriots and most of all the Turks, are suspicious of too much outside involvement, which they view as a form of pressure on them for concessions. Two weeks ago, the British sent a ten-man delegation to Washington to discuss the future of their Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus and to discuss informally what we might consider doing together with respect to Cyprus. We agreed only to study some ideas, and to stay in touch with one another.

For the immediate future, we are inclined to think that the U.S. should work alone as much as possible, keeping the UN and British, and to a lesser degree our other European friends, advised of what we are planning and doing. At a later time, when the contours of a Cyprus settlement become clearer, it might be useful to bring appropriate western influence to bear on the parties. German involvement might be particularly helpful at later stages in the process.<sup>7</sup>

(d) *Organizing a future initiative*. The desires of the parties, the results of the initial talks with the new Turkish government, and the wishes of the UN and our European allies all must be taken into account in deciding whether, and if so how and when, a further U.S. initiative might best be organized this year. These considerations also bear on how Clark Clifford could best be enlisted to help further with the Cyprus problem.

Clifford, as you know, has continued his active interest in Cyprus and other eastern Mediterranean problems. Since May, in talking to Greek, Turkish and Cypriot leaders, he has conveyed his determination to stay engaged and travel again to the area if the parties—all the parties—believe further direct U.S. involvement would be helpful. Clifford, who on occasion has said he would be prepared to stay in the area for a prolonged period, understands that a second mission can be undertaken only when conditions are right (i.e. the Turkish political situation is clarified), and only after further substantive preparatory work has been accomplished.

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<sup>6</sup> Vance approved this step and wrote in the margin: "But we should not do anything without first clearing w. Kurt Waldheim." Cahill confirmed Vance's approval on June 14 by initialing on his behalf.

<sup>7</sup> Vance approved this step. Cahill confirmed Vance's approval on June 14 by initialing on his behalf.

We believe that under proper circumstances a second trip by Clark Clifford to the area could be a decisive factor in achieving further progress. Clifford can also be a critical asset in explaining our policies on the Hill. For both reasons, we would like to continue to work closely with him, and begin to develop substantive positions and strategies in close consultation with him. Depending on developments, for example, it might be useful for Clifford to meet the new Turkish Foreign Minister and/or other key figures in New York or Europe, or possibly Nimetz could make a preparatory swing through the area to set the stage for a second Clifford trip. We recommend that we begin to consider plans along these lines.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Vance approved this step and wrote in the margin: "Show them to me first." Cahill confirmed Vance's approval on June 14 by initialing on his behalf. Although Clifford remained active in working toward a settlement in the Eastern Mediterranean, he did not return to the region in that capacity.

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#### 41. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Nicosia, August 8, 1977

##### PARTICIPANTS

Clark Clifford

Cypriot Minister of Foreign Affairs Ioannis Christofidis

A reception was given on the evening of the burial of Archbishop Makarios.<sup>2</sup> After greeting the Foreign Minister at the reception, he suggested that we slip into another room and have a brief conversation. We were able to arrange this without any interruption.

He first expressed his personal appreciation for the caliber of the Delegation sent to the Archbishop's funeral by President Carter. He indicated that it was impressive and was gratifying to the Cypriot government and its people. He asked that I express his appreciation and that of his government to President Carter.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of Southern Europe, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977–1980, Lot 83D256, Box 1, POL 2 Cyprus 1977 and 1978. Confidential. Drafted by Clifford on August 10.

<sup>2</sup> Makarios died of a heart attack on July 3.

He had heard that I was having a press conference at the American Embassy on Tuesday, August 9, and he asked if he might make a suggestion or two with reference to the press conference.<sup>3</sup> I told him I welcomed any thoughts that he had.

He emphasized that there was widespread disappointment among the Greek Cypriots over the lack of progress since the U.S. Delegation visited Cyprus, Greece and Turkey in February of this year. He believed that there was considerable euphoria at the time over the progress made with the problem and the suggestion that it might be settled in the year 1977 was accepted enthusiastically. Since then, however, it was felt there had been no appreciable attainments. He felt strongly that the Turkish Cypriots had not complied with the Turkish agreement made with me regarding the tabling in Vienna of a plan for the structure of the new government. He suggested that it was the opinion of the top officials in Nicosia that the submission by the Turkish Cypriots in Vienna had been so unreasonable that it could not, under any stretch of the imagination, be considered as compliance with the understandings. In fact it caused considerable alarm because the effect of such a memorandum was to create two separate countries instead of unifying Cyprus as an independent, sovereign state. For these reasons he thought it best to down-play any feeling that we had regarding progress even though he conceded that the bringing of the parties together and the tabling of memoranda had not been accomplished before.

He was quite voluble in suggesting that the present difficulty over Famagusta was the most dangerous development that had occurred for some time. It clearly demonstrated to him that instead of the Turkish Cypriots attempting to find areas of agreement, they were creating new and alarming issues of confrontation.

The previous hope that the Turkish Cypriots under pressure from Ankara might be reasonable in negotiating has been completely destroyed by their intransigence regarding Famagusta.

This action has led a number of Greek Cypriots to feel that it is probably impossible to deal with Denktash and his Turkish Cypriots because they constantly react to any bargaining effort with a counter-proposal that destroys any possibility of compromise. Famagusta is considered to be a symbol and if the Turkish Cypriots proceed to acti-

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<sup>3</sup> Clifford held the press conference at the American Center in Nicosia on August 9. Before taking questions Clifford praised Makarios' efforts to work toward peace and affirmed the continuing determination of the United States to find a settlement acceptable to all sides in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Embassy transmitted the text of the press conference in telegram 2086 from Nicosia, August 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770287–1262)

vate it and proceed on the assumption that it is theirs, then emotions will run very strong in Nicosia.

He expressed the hope that the U.S. would recognize the impact of this incident upon future negotiations and would take steps to convince Ankara not to go on with the Famagusta exploitation. I in no way suggested that there was any specific action that could be taken in this regard but that it would be a matter to discuss and consider by the members of our team. He expressed some concern over the impact that the Archbishop's death would have upon the course of the negotiations. I replied that the Archbishop's wisdom, judgment and moderation would be greatly missed, but that after a short interval there was no reason why the work could not go forward. I told him I thought it was important that the intercommunal talks should proceed even if no accomplishments result; that it was valuable to have the parties in contact so that at least the illusion of negotiating was created. I said that we had received some setbacks these last few months but that it was entirely possible that the next series of developments would be beneficial. I told him we were not discouraged and that these temporary difficulties merely emphasized our determination to stay with the problem until it was solved. He found this encouraging and took it as an occasion of expressing his appreciation to our government and to this effort that was being made.

He brought up the subject of the difficult weeks that lay ahead for the Greek Cypriots. No one else had the standing and appeal to the populace that the Archbishop had. Careful consideration was being given to the means by which the strongest and most effective new government of Cyprus could be created. I assured him that our relationship with the Republic of Cyprus was such, and our confidence in its leaders was firm, that we would continue to support it in its place in the family of nations. I assumed that there would be a proper succession in accordance with constitutional processes and that this would in no way diminish our receptivity for a relationship with the Republic of Cyprus.

**42. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State and the Embassy in Greece<sup>1</sup>**

Ankara, August 10, 1977, 1140Z

5966. Subject: Policy Analysis and Recommendations: Adjusting to Post-Makarios Uncertainty.

1. The death of Makarios has removed one of the few relatively stable factors from the complex political equation in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is possible that the Greek Cypriot leadership succession will be quickly sorted out, that an authoritative leader will emerge, and thus that intercommunal negotiations can be relaunched without undue delay. On the other hand, and perhaps more likely, we may be faced with a prolonged period of uncertainty and the prospect of resumed negotiations indefinitely put off. This would raise an immediate challenge to the current course of our policy: How can we reasonably insist that the Turks make progress in Cyprus when the Greek Cypriots have no leader with a mandate to negotiate and when it is unclear how much time must pass before realistic negotiations can again be carried on?

2. We believe that the prospects for a period of prolonged uncertainty are sufficiently great that we should consider possible alternatives to our present policy. We also believe that such a situation might provide a basis for persuading a majority of Congress that a continuation of current policy is not beneficial to US interests. We here present, in action memorandum format, our analysis and recommendations regarding the new situation.

3. Issue for decision:

—Should the administration, in light of a changed situation in Cyprus, be prepared to make an effort with Congress to secure endorsement of the US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), and if so, on what terms? Such an effort, if decided upon, should be undertaken after a reasonable pause to allow the situation in Cyprus to become clearer but with an eye to the congressional calendar which we understand calls for adjournment in the early fall.

4. Essential factors.

—Until now, favorable congressional action on the DCA has not been considered possible without visible progress on Cyprus (i.e., Turkish concession). It has also been believed that Turkey would, in its

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<sup>1</sup>Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770287–1110. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent to Nicosia.

own interest, make concessions on Cyprus to permit congressional action on the DCA within acceptable time limits.

—The corollary belief was that Makarios was not only willing to settle for a Cyprus solution on terms less satisfactory than those that had existed prior to the Turkish intervention in 1974, but also that he was capable of imposing such a solution on the Greek Cypriot community.

—Any elected successor to Makarios will probably need substantial time to build up the political power and prestige necessary for him to be able to impose such a solution. (If the September by-election of a successor is followed by another election in February 1978, the period before an effective and decisive government emerges in Nicosia will be longer.)

—Under these circumstances, the Turks will not move unilaterally and the possibility of progress toward a Cyprus solution will be put off until at least mid-1978 and perhaps longer.

—If the approval of the DCA remains tied to progress in Cyprus when progress is impossible, the US-Turkish and Turkish-NATO relationship will continue to deteriorate and our larger security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean will be impaired. The continued decline in Turkish defense capability will set up a variety of pressures and problems which could lead to a weakening of Turkey's Western commitment and further embitter Turkish-Greek relations.

5. Options—The broad choices presented below are between continuing our present policy under the probable new circumstances created by Makarios' death or making a variety of adjustments in our policy to meet the new circumstances.

Option A. Continue our present policy, i.e., not actively seek congressional endorsement until there is enough progress on Cyprus to eliminate the risk of congressional rejection of the DCA. (Variant: ask for unilateral Turkish concessions as a goodwill gesture to Makarios' successor.)

Pro:

—The objective situation in the Eastern Mediterranean has not changed. The Turkish side holds more territory than is justified and should make concessions. Without Turkish concessions the Cyprus problem will remain unresolved. (While we present this as a pro argument—one that will be made by proponents of continuing pressure on Turkey—it is based on what we believe to be the mistaken assumption that putting pressure on the GOT will resolve the Cyprus problem.)

—From the point of view of the administration's relationship with Congress, this appears to be the least costly course of action in the short run.



Con:

—This policy has not in itself produced Turkish concessions for the last two and a half years, and its chances now are further cut by the uncertainty in Cyprus.

—There is no assurance yet that any Greek Cypriot leader will soon have enough real authority to negotiate a settlement and commit his community to it. Even if the winner of the by-election genuinely wished to negotiate an agreement, the prospect of another election in February 1978 could deter him from undertaking the potential political risks of settlement. Conversely, a settlement negotiated by an interim leader might possibly be disavowed by his successor.

—The GOT will not throw away bargaining chips by making concessions outside of a negotiating framework and without a clear trade-off.

—The Turks will not understand our continuing to apply pressure on them for progress in Cyprus when the Greek Cypriots are unable to conduct negotiations on a settlement for perhaps an indefinitely prolonged period. They no doubt will regard our continuation of such a policy as both unrealistic and unfair, and they probably will draw inferences about our aims that will be further damaging to our relations.

—With the passage of time, Turkish resentment of US congressional pressures is hardening, Turkish military capability to contribute to NATO defense is drastically deteriorating, and Turkish willingness to consider strategic alternatives to association with the US and NATO is increasing.

—Congress is not monolithic on this issue. In the long run, important elements could blame the administration if Turkey turned away from NATO towards neutralism, or became pro-Soviet or pro-Arab.

Option B. Continue to insist that prior progress is necessary for DCA approval but advise the GOT of the precise minimum offer it must make to meet our need with Congress, and commit ourselves to seek congressional endorsement once that offer is made regardless of Greek or Greek Cypriot reaction.

Pro:

—If successful, this course would eliminate the main source of damage to our bilateral relationship with Turkey and would rationalize our approach to our security position in the Eastern Mediterranean.

—This course would make it clear to the Turks administration is willing to invest efforts in seeking congressional approval of the DCA simply being manipulated by insatiable Greek Cypriots or the Greek Lobby.

—Such an arrangement would tend to dampen Turkish fears that whatever prior concessions are offered will merely whet the appetite of the Greek Cypriots and their partisans.

Con:

—The US would become a self-appointed arbiter, involved directly in the substance of the maneuvering and bargaining over Cyprus.

—Either side or both might be alienated by the US position.

—The Turks, not having much confidence in US constancy, might be reluctant to offer up concessions simply in return for US aid without any guarantee of a settlement.

Option C. Actively seek early congressional endorsement of the DCA arguing that this important to our and NATO's political and security interests and that the uncertain situation in Cyprus makes continuing linkage unrealistic and counter-productive.

Pro:

—If successful, this course would eliminate the main source of damage to our bilateral relationship with Turkey and would create a basis for continued positive Turkish military participation in NATO.

—The Turks might feel obliged to make concessions after endorsement.

—Even if the Turks did not make concessions, Cyprus would be no farther from a settlement than it is now, our influence with the GOT would be higher, and our relationship with Turkey would be sounder.

Con:

—We would appear to be countenancing Turkey's hard-line approach to Cyprus, encouraging future Turkish intractability, and tempting disregard of our conditions on other matters.

—We would be vulnerable to charges of political expediency, of relegating moral principles to a secondary position, and of taking advantage of Makarios' death to settle short.

—The Greeks and the Greek Cypriots would be incensed. Their responses would be emotional and perhaps damaging to our interests.

—The international anti-Turkish propaganda campaign (now focussed on human rights issues) conducted successfully by the Greek Cypriots for the last several years would be intensified and the US might also become a target. Opponents of the DCA in Congress might be given additional ammunition as a result of Greek Cypriot efforts this fall at the Council of Europe and the Belgrade CSCE follow-up conference.

—The effort to win congressional approval might not work and its failure would further damage our bilateral relationship and our security position.

Option D. Seek congressional approval of the DCA on a "condition subsequent" basis (i.e., the GOT would be committed to take specific moves after congressional endorsement).

Pro:

—The “pro” factors listed for Options B, C, and D would apply.

—The elimination of public linkage would make it politically easier for the Turks to move.

—A linkage would continue to exist, however, and Turkish concessions could be relatively assured.

—Improvement of the Turkish-US relationship would not, as the Turks view it, be left dependent on the Greek Cypriots and their partisans.

Con:

—Some members of Congress would still be reluctant to agree to an arrangement which would appear to be abandoning linkage.

—Negotiation of the subsequent conditions would be difficult—and would involve us directly in the substance of the issue.

—The Turks would be reluctant to make any concessions not publicly defensible. Given its own internal weakness, as well as the weakened and uncertain state of the Greek Cypriot administration, the GOT might find it difficult to make significant concessions even on this basis.

Option E. Abandon the DCA and seek with Congress and the GOT a new way of restoring our relationship.

Pro:

—The Turkish DCA is not a perfect instrument. It has become a symbol of executive-legislative conflict. The delay in endorsement has aggravated the Turks.

—A less formal basis for our relationship might give us more flexibility.

Con:

—Under foreseeable circumstances the DCA offers the best deal we can get from the Turks.

—A formal basis for our relationship is necessary not only because of uncertainties introduced into the US-Turkish defense relationship by congressionally-mandated arms transfer restrictions but also because of internal Turkish political and economic dynamics which have begun to move the GOT away from the West.

—Abandonment of the DCA would suggest to the GOT a lessening US relationship and interest.

—The problems that plague the DCA would almost certainly plague any alternative arrangement.

—Finding a new way would involve further delay and deterioration of both US-Turkish and Turkish-NATO relationships and might in the long run prove more costly to the US.

6. Recommendation. We recommend the administration begin private consultations with key members of Congress making the point that the death of Makarios will probably introduce so much uncertainty and delay into the Cyprus settlement process that our present policy is no longer sustainable without spiraling costs to US-Turkish relations and the Turkish commitment to NATO and seeking to identify which course of action would be most acceptable in Congress. Our preferred course of action would be Option D.<sup>2</sup>

Spiers

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 190652 to Ankara, August 12, the Department replied: "Clearly, Makarios' death has created a situation in which we must carefully plan what we do next to advance prospects for a Cyprus solution as well as to restore the closest possible US-Turkey relationship. There is also no question that these two matters must be examined in tandem. This policy review process has already begun in Washington and your cable will be a valuable tool as this effort continues. You should also know that while we intend to proceed expeditiously, the issues involved are sufficiently complex that early decisions are unlikely. There will thus inevitably be some delay in responding to the underlying questions in your telegram." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770290-0561)

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#### 43. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

New York, October 1, 1977, 12:30 p.m.

##### SUBJECT

The Secretary's Meeting with Cypriot President Kyprianou

##### PARTICIPANTS

###### *Cyprus*

President Spyros Kyprianou

Foreign Minister John Christophides

Ambassador Zenon Rossides—Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Ambassador Dimitriou—Ambassador to the United States

Mr. Georges Pelighias—Assistant to the President

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of Southern Europe, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977-1980, Lot 83D256, Box 1, POL 2 Cyprus 1977 and 1978. Confidential. Drafted by Ledsky; cleared by Vest and Daniel Spiegel (S); approved by Anderson on October 15. The meeting took place in Vance's suite in the UN Plaza Hotel. Vance was in New York to attend the session of the UN General Assembly.

*United States*

Secretary Vance

Matthew Nimetz—Counselor of the Department

George S. Vest—Assistant Secretary, European Bureau

Ambassador Leonard—Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Nelson C. Ledsky—Director, EUR/SE

*SUMMARY:* President Kyprianou reviewed the Cyprus situation in standard terms, placing special emphasis on the necessity for US action to bring about Turkish concessions. He affirmed his country's readiness to proceed with intercommunal talks, but said that care must be taken to avoid a future inconclusive round. The Secretary said we were prepared to do what we could to assist the current intercommunal negotiating process. He expressed mild optimism that Turkey might be prepared to take some positive steps in the months ahead, and said that he would have a clearer picture of this prospect following his next meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil.<sup>2</sup> The Secretary stressed the importance of maintaining the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus and asked the Cypriots to speak to those who had not made a sufficient financial contribution to this UN effort. The Cypriots agreed to do so, and said in response to US urging that they would also be prepared to scale down their rhetoric and recourse to international fora at such time as a serious Cyprus negotiating process began. *END SUMMARY*

*The Cyprus Situation*

Kyprianou began with a gloomy assessment of the Cyprus situation. He said he could detect no change at all in Turkish attitudes in recent months and that in the absence of such change, he doubted that progress could reasonably be expected anytime soon. It was for this reason that the Cypriots had come to rely so heavily on the United States. American initiatives were most welcome. The United States was in a position to play an important and constructive role, if only because Turkey cannot for long ignore the United States. The Cypriot Government sincerely believes that if Turkey is made to feel that the situation in Cyprus has become intolerable—not because Cypriots think so—but because the United States and Western Europeans are fed up with the continuing stalemate, only then will there be a possibility of movement. Until then, said Kyprianou, there is little reason for optimism.

Secretary Vance said he did not wish to disagree, but that on the basis of his initial conversation with Foreign Minister Caglayangil and the trip which Matt Nimetz had undertaken to Ankara on his behalf several weeks ago, he was somewhat more optimistic about the possi-

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<sup>2</sup> The meeting took place on October 5 in Vance's suite in the UN Plaza Hotel. See Document 100. Vance and Çağlayangil also met on September 27; see Document 99.

bility of positive action by Turkey.<sup>3</sup> The Secretary said he would be seeing Caglayangil again, probably on October 5, and would be in a better position to assess the situation after that meeting. The meeting between Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios and the Turkish Foreign Minister on October 1 might also provide some new insight on Turkish thinking.<sup>4</sup> In any event, it seemed premature to suggest now that there was absolutely no chance of movement.

Responding to a question from Foreign Minister Christophides, the Secretary said that one source of optimism was the very fact that the Turks were anxious to meet with him a second time and to continue the dialogue which Matt Nimetz has begun in Ankara. The Secretary suggested that it was our current view that the new Turkish government was in a position to act on Cyprus if it wished. Although superficially the same coalition that ruled Turkey before July, the current government seemed to have come to some clearer internal agreement about policy and this too provided some basis for optimism.

Mr. Nimetz expanded on the Secretary's comments by suggesting a new flexibility in the Turkish Government's attitude toward Cyprus was discernible. We are not certain how much flexibility exists or in which direction the Turkish Government is prepared to act. It was these questions we have been seeking to answer through our dialogue with the Turks over the past several weeks. We have asked them how far they are willing to go to help reinvigorate the negotiating process. We have tried to assure them that we will not push them in directions they cannot go, but we want them to act in areas where action is possible. We know that Turkey has problems. It has internal economic difficulties. It has domestic security problems. There is also Cyprus and the Aegean. Nonetheless, our sense is that the current government knows it has to face up to these problems if it wishes to stay in office for the next four years.

Foreign Minister Christophides said that information had come to the Cypriot Government suggesting that Erbakan had been given greater influence over economic matters but that in return, he had surrendered some flexibility on Cyprus. This could prove to be a very hopeful development. President Kyprianou said that he had seen these same reports, but wondered whether the new Turkish coalition could really move beyond positions taken earlier this year. The Turkish Government clearly wanted the US arms embargo lifted. The Cypriot Government, in contrast, wanted it kept in place. President Kyprianou dis-

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<sup>3</sup> Nimetz was in Ankara for consultations on September 14. See Document 98.

<sup>4</sup> According to reports in the Turkish press, this meeting lasted for 2½ hours, during which the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey discussed Cyprus and the territorial dispute over the Aegean Sea.

claimed any intention of interfering in US internal affairs, but insisted that removal of the embargo would destroy any chance of constructive movement on Cyprus.

Secretary Vance said it was the US view that the negotiating process should be kept going. He said we appreciated the UN Secretary-General's view that the process not be allowed to turn into a charade. Care must be taken before a further round is convened. Our interest, said the Secretary, was not to act as or become a mediator, but only to assist the process of intercommunal talks under the Secretary-General's aegis.

Ambassador Rossides interrupted to say that what Cyprus really wanted from the United States was some form of protection. The Cypriots wanted US assurances that they would not be exposed to further aggression from Turkey. When the Secretary noted that this had been a matter which he had discussed repeatedly with Ambassador Rossides over the years, President Kyprianou said that it was premature to talk about a system of guarantees before we know what is to be guaranteed. The outlines of a Cyprus solution were needed before one proceeded to discuss the guaranty question. President Kyprianou also agreed with the Secretary that it was important that there not be further intercommunal talks just for the sake of having talks. Before a further round is scheduled, it was important to know what kind of proposals would be forthcoming from the Turkish side. The Greek Cypriots have put forward their ideas. The Turks in contrast have said little of substance on either the territorial or constitutional questions. It is time for the Turkish side, said Kyprianou, to say what they have in mind.

President Kyprianou noted again the importance of the United States in extracting concessions from Turkey. He insisted that the United States had an important role to play because Turkey will only be forthcoming if US pressure is exerted on it. President Kyprianou repeated this theme several times as did Foreign Minister Christophides. Both also noted the serious negative consequences that would flow from a further unsuccessful negotiating round.

The Secretary and Mr. Nimetz emphasized that we would continue to make an effort to obtain movement from Turkey. They cautioned, however, that too much should not be expected from our next meeting with Foreign Minister Caglayangil. A real breakthrough was most unlikely. What we have embarked on is a process of discussion with the Turks that will probably continue over several months and not lead to any dramatic results.

The Secretary promised to keep the Cypriots informed of developments in these discussions, and expressed the hope that the Cypriot Government would be willing to enter into serious negotiations if the Turkish side agreed to do so. President Kyprianou assured the Secre-

tary that the Cypriots were ready, and were waiting only for a meaningful, positive signal from the Turks before agreeing to resume the intercommunal talks.

#### *UN Peacekeeping Force*

The Secretary said he was concerned about the state of the UN peacekeeping force on Cyprus.<sup>5</sup> The Finnish Government intended to take its troops out. The Canadians are also thinking of withdrawing. Other nations with contingents on the Island seemed also to be restless. The major question was funding. Ambassador Leonard noted in this connection that some of the countries with forces on Cyprus were three years in arrears in receiving payments from the UN. Mr. Ledskey suggested that the key question was getting adequate contributions from UN members who were not now contributing a fair share. It would accordingly be most helpful if the Cypriot Government would speak to some of these countries. The Secretary underscored the importance of this suggestion by noting the possibility of future peacekeeping forces in Rhodesia and Namibia.

Foreign Minister Christophides said he knew about the Finnish situation, but had heard nothing about the possibility of a Canadian withdrawal. He realized as well the importance of the funding question and said his Government would be prepared to speak to France and certain other countries who were not making a fair contribution. He wondered if the US could supply a list of those countries we deemed most stingy, and which we felt the Cypriot Government could best approach. Ambassador Leonard agreed to do so.

#### *The Cyprus Economy*

The Secretary enquired as to the current status of the Cypriot economy. President Kyprianou responded that things were not going badly. There was internal confidence, and a measure of prosperity had been re-established. At the same time, the President insisted that Cyprus still had problems. The economy was not anywhere near pre-1974 levels. There were still major refugee needs to be met. Almost one-third of the entire Cypriot population were turned into refugees in 1974, and this situation could not be quickly corrected. Foreign Minister Christophides interjected at this point a statement of appreciation for the US contribution to refugee relief and reconstruction projects. He said American aid was greatly appreciated, but was still very much needed.

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<sup>5</sup> The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established in March 1964 pursuant to Security Resolution 186. After the cease-fire on August 16, 1974, in Cyprus, the UNFICYP maintained the cease-fire and the buffer zone between the northern portion of Cyprus occupied by Turkish troops and the rest of the island.



*Consideration of Cyprus Issue in International Fora*

Mr. Nimetz noted that the Turkish side was extremely sensitive to campaigns directed against it by the Cypriots in international conferences and in the UN. The United States recognized that so long as the negotiating process was stalled, it was natural that the Cypriots would take their case to world public opinion. The time may come, however, if we are successful in getting a serious negotiating process restarted that this campaign should be halted, and we wondered whether the Cypriot Government would be prepared to cooperate.

President Kyprianou said that one of the obligations of his Government was to keep the Cyprus issue alive. It was the least he could do in the absence of progress. The Cypriots have the right—indeed the duty—to bring the matter to the attention of the UN. The Cyprus problem was a serious international issue, in which there had been no real movement in recent years. President Kyprianou said his government would have to bring the question up in the General Assembly next month, but that if something of substance developed in the negotiating process the Cypriot Government would be willing to scale down public discussion in international fora. Foreign Minister Christophides agreed, saying that such a curtailment would be in the interest of the Cypriot Government once a serious negotiation with the Turkish side began.

The meeting closed with a brief discussion of what President Kyprianou would say to the press. The Secretary and President Kyprianou agreed that the Cypriots would indicate that the meeting, in which a review of the situation in Cyprus had occurred, had been exceedingly useful and constructive.

#### 44. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

New York, October 5, 1977, 12:10 p.m.

##### SUBJECT

President Carter's Meeting with UN Secretary General Waldheim

##### PARTICIPANTS

The President

Kurt Waldheim, UN Secretary General

Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State

Andrew Young, US Representative to the UN

William Buffum, Under Secretary General for Political and General Assembly  
Affairs

Roberto Guyer, Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs

Brian Urquhart, Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs

William Maynes, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization  
Affairs

Thomas Thornton, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

Turning to *Cyprus*, the President emphasized our reliance on the UN in this matter, and our willingness to coordinate closely while the UN played the leading role. Clark Clifford may go back to the island. Waldheim said that the problem was with the Turks who would not discuss territorial matters seriously. The US should pressure the Turks on this. The Greeks are afraid that the Turks will use another round of talks only to create the illusion of negotiations.

Secretary Vance said he was told yesterday by the Turks that they would be "flexible and generous".<sup>2</sup> It remains to be seen what this means. The President pointed out that the Turks want a general security agreement with the US. Congress would not agree to this without a Cyprus settlement, and even though the Turks reject this linkage, it is there. Waldheim said that the Greeks and Turks both have confidence in him and he is prepared to resume meetings this year if he is sure the Turks will talk substance.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Cyprus.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 51, UN: 1977. Confidential. Drafted by Thornton. The meeting took place in the Secretary General's office. The full text is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXV, United Nations; Law of the Sea.

<sup>2</sup> No record of the meeting was found.

**45. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

New York, October 5, 1977, 4:15–4:35 p.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

Spyros Kyprianou, President of Cyprus  
Ioannis Khristofidis, Foreign Minister  
Zenon Rossides, Ambassador to the UN  
Nicos Dimitriou, Ambassador to the US  
George Pelagias, Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
President Carter  
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
George Vest, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European Affairs  
Thomas Thornton, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

The meeting opened with the President's expression of his and the American people's deep concern with the Cyprus issue.

President Kyprianou stressed the fact that Cyprus relies on the US and supports the charter principles.<sup>2</sup> The issue is not an internal Cypriot matter, but a question of Turkish involvement. The Greek Cypriots must contend on an unequal basis since the Turkish Cypriots are backed up by the Turks. (Kyprianou then provided a short description of the situation in Cyprus.) There must be, he concluded, a viable, lasting solution.

In response to the President's question, Kyprianou said that the Greek Cypriots would accept a federation (not a confederation), assuming that the territorial issues were settled. He stressed that any non-unitary state would be an unnatural solution, since Cyprus is a unit. The Greek Cypriots will concede 20% of the territory to the Turkish Cypriots, however, if refugees can return to that area and if there is a unitary state.

The President asked if Kyprianou preferred the UN as an intermediary. Kyprianou said that was the case, but the Secretary General lacks the power to push for a solution. That must be the US role.

The President warned against overestimating our power, but promised to do what we could. When he saw Karamanlis and Demirel last May in London, there seemed little prospect for progress; now may

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 35, Memcons: President: 10/1–5/77. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Thornton. The meeting took place in Carter's suite at the UN Plaza Hotel.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is presumably to the Charter of the United Nations. Since the Turkish invasion of the northern portion of Cyprus in 1974, debate in international bodies such as the UN considered the question of whether or not this act constituted a violation of the principles of the UN Charter.

be a better time to try.<sup>3</sup> The Turks have a problem with the American Congress. They want a Defense Cooperation Agreement and we have explained to the Turks that they must make some progress on Cyprus, even though they reject the idea of linkage. The whole matter is very complicated and the Turks demand more than 20% of a federal state. There are also differences on the exact form of government. Both Cypriot sides should sit down together under UN auspices and stay there until they reach an agreement. Clark Clifford is ready to return whenever there is hope for at least partial success. We are eager to participate in the settlement process. We will cooperate with the Secretary-General and do not seek a preeminent role.

Kyprianou emphasized that, contrary perhaps to previous times, the Cypriots unequivocally support a US initiative. They seek a just solution in terms of UN Resolutions and human rights. A just settlement is in everybody's interest; partition will be a source of continuing friction.

The President asked if the Cypriots envision federation something along the US model. What would be the proportion of Greek/Turkish representation?

Kyprianou said the US model was relevant and that the representation could be either in terms of ratios of population or have added features assuring Turks of additional representation on matters of special interest. Representation is not a stumbling block as long as it is not an issue of confederation. The status quo, partition, must not be legalized.

The President replied that he and the American people agreed completely. The next step was to see what the Turks tell Secretary Vance in their bilateral meeting today; then see if a new Clifford trip is needed.<sup>4</sup> Then we could consult with the Secretary General and get things moving. Flexibility is needed on both sides. We will, within the bounds of rationality, encourage the Turks to be forthcoming on Cyprus. Karamanlis and Demirel say that Cyprus is relatively less important; they are more afraid of a war breaking out over the Aegean problem. We will keep focusing their attention on Cyprus.

Kyprianou pointed out that the Greeks had made proposals at the last round of talks but the Turks failed to respond. The mere idea of federation is a big concession. The Turks must now follow suit.

The President asked what the Cypriot preference concerning the Sovereign Base Areas was; could that area be added to the Greek terri-

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<sup>3</sup> See Documents 94 and 166.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 100.

tory?<sup>5</sup> The Cypriots responded that the area involved was very small and the matter never came up.

Kyprianou stressed that Cyprus is a test case for the UN. Solution would be easy if President Carter's principles were applied.

President Carter pointed out that interpretations of principles can vary. Ultimately the parties must reach an agreement. We must keep the Turks, members of NATO, convinced of our fairness and good intentions. We seek only justice and will not be timid in acting. Vance and Clifford are an ideal pair to be involved.

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to two military bases in Cyprus retained by the British after Cyprus gained its independence.

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#### **46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 3, 1978, 1825Z

29343. Subject: Cyprus Ambassador's Meeting With Secretary.

1. Cyprus Ambassador Dimitriou called on Secretary February 1 on instructions. He was accompanied by Cypriot Embassy DCM Angelides; Counselor Nimetz, EUR Deputy Secretary Barbour and EUR/SE Director Ewing were also present for 25-minute meeting. Dimitriou also talked privately with Secretary for few minutes at end of conversation.

2. Dimitriou said he had been asked to see Secretary in the light of the statements made by Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit after Secretary's visit to Ankara and impression which had been conveyed that assurances may have been given that administration would seek to have Congress lift Turkish "embargo" and approve US-Turkish DCA.<sup>2</sup> There seemed to also be impression that Secretary may have given Ecevit to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780052–0660. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Ewing; cleared by Barbour, Mitchell and Anderson; approved by Nimetz. Also sent to London and USUN; for information to Ankara and Athens.

<sup>2</sup> Vance visited Ankara January 20–21; see Document 107. During the press conference Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit held for U.S. journalists on January 21, he was asked about the status of the DCA. He made no mention of "assurances" regarding a resolution on military cooperation with the United States, but did emphasize a changed climate and new opportunities for both the United States and Turkey.

understand that these U.S. steps would not be linked to progress toward solution of Cyprus problem. Dimitriou recalled that President Kyprianou had called in Charge in Nicosia<sup>3</sup> to make similar representation. Dimitriou said GOC did not want to meddle in U.S. internal affair. However, embargo in Cypriot eyes had always been associated with Cyprus problem. President Carter had assured President Kyprianou in New York in October that there was in fact linkage between restored US-Turkish defense relationship and progress on Cyprus.<sup>4</sup>

3. Secretary said U.S. position had been made very clear on a number of occasions. The administration favors in principle DCA's with both Turkey and Greece. One of the factors to be taken into account in asking Congress to act on Turkish DCA will be situation in Eastern Mediterranean. Clearly Cyprus was one important element of Eastern Mediterranean situation. But direct linkage has never been made and will not be made between Cyprus and decision to press Congress to approve Turkish DCA. Secretary said U.S. continued to attach great importance to solution of Cyprus problem and this had also been stated to GOT. We hoped and expected that Turkish side would come forward with realistic proposals on territory and constitutional questions, but we would have to wait and see what developed before deciding what action to take. Secretary said Ecevit had not described to him or apparently to Secretary General Waldheim what would be proposed on either territorial or constitutional question but had stressed commitment to federal solution. He hoped that proposals would be positive and forthcoming and constitute basis for resumed intercommunal dialogue. Secretary agreed with Dimitriou's comment that proposals should not only be concrete but open way to meaningful negotiating process. Secretary hoped that proposals would be constructive and that response by Greek Cypriots would be also. He urged Dimitriou that GOC not prejudge proposals on basis speculation in Turkish press.

4. Dimitriou said that U.S. embargo restrictions on Turkey were based on premise that substantial progress should be made on Cyprus problem. Proposals alone did not constitute such progress. The Secretary said he took note of this position, but said that we should wait and see what the proposals look like when they are put forward. At that time, we would be able to evaluate them and come to some judgment. He emphasized that no promises or assurances had been made while he was in Ankara.

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<sup>3</sup> The Charge was C. Edward Dillery.

<sup>4</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter met with Kyprianou and other Cypriot officials on October 5 from 4:15 to 4:38 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) Carter wrote in his diary that the "solution to the Cyprus situation obviously is not on Cyprus itself but in Greece and Turkey." (*White House Diary*, p. 114)

5. Dimitriou said that in GOC view Cyprus solution should be straightforward and as devoid of restrictions and constraints as possible. He stressed that territorial question was particularly important. Secretary agreed with Dimitriou's comment that problem represented "tragic situation" and expressed hope that progress could soon be made.

6. Dimitriou said he had been asked to call to Secretary's attention GOC concern re certain passages in Department's human rights report on Cyprus.<sup>5</sup> He expressed particular concern that report seemed to equate victims with those who perpetrated situation. Secretary stressed that human rights was fundamental concern of U.S. foreign policy and was of utmost importance. Law required Department to file reports with Congress on all countries which received assistance. We had tried in the 109 reports sent to Congress January 31 to record as accurately as possible factual situation. Nimetz said he had personally reviewed Cyprus report and felt it was a fair statement of the situation. The Secretary added that it was necessary that even information based on hearsay be covered in such reports. Nimetz said he thought Turkish Cypriots would probably not like parts of report and could understand why GOC might well prefer stress on different points. The Secretary agreed with Dimitriou's comment that the administration continues to consider there is moral aspect to Cyprus problem.

7. Dimitriou said the GOC continues to have faith and trust that Carter administration will continue to do all it can to advance Cyprus settlement.

8. The Secretary reiterated that while we recognize principal responsibility lies with parties under auspices UN Secretary General, U.S. is willing to do what we can to help if parties so request within UN framework. We are sensitive to all aspects of the Cyprus problem. It remains a matter of great concern to us that movement be made toward a solution. The Secretary said he had spoken personally with Secretary

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<sup>5</sup> On February 9, the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released the Department of State's annual Human Rights Reports for 1977, which the Department of State had submitted to Congress on January 31. Part of the Cyprus report was reprinted in "Excerpts From State Department Reports on the Status of Human Rights Abroad," *The New York Times*, February 10, 1978, p. A14. The excerpt reads: "There are no indications that torture is currently permitted or practiced by the Government of Cyprus, the Turkish-Cypriot administration or Turkish forces in northern Cyprus. There have been no recent instances of large-scale or politically inspired cruel or inhuman treatment of persons on Cyprus. It is generally accepted, however, that violations of human rights in the form of cruel and inhuman treatment of civilians and prisoners were committed in the courts of the Greek-led coup against President Makarios in July 1974 and during the subsequent Turkish military intervention. Arbitrary arrest or detention is not currently being practiced in Cyprus." The full report is in 2 *Annual Human Rights Rep. Submitted to Congress by U.S. Department of State*, 1978, pp 443–447.

General Waldheim recently who also knows of our willingness to be supportive when the parties thought it would be useful. We hoped positive proposals will be put on table in February which will pave way to resumed negotiations. Dimitriou said U.S. support and offer of good offices within UN context would be of great value as would ongoing U.S. effort to persuade GOT to be forthcoming.

9. Dimitriou subsequently twice telephoned Nimetz, after reading human rights report on Cyprus and Turkey, to reiterate his strong concern at manner in which human rights aspects of Cyprus problem had been treated in Department report. Nimetz gave further background on reports but stressed again importance of all sides making every effort to get meaningful negotiating process underway at early date.

Vance

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#### 47. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 2, 1978, 0136Z

53254. Eyes only—for the Ambassador. Subject: The Secretary's Conversations With President Kyprianou, February 26. Ref: Nicosia 532.<sup>2</sup>

1. There follows, for your information only, an account of circumstances and substance of the Secretary's two telephone conversations with Cyprus President Kyprianou on February 26.

2. Cyprus Ambassador Dimitriou telephoned EUR Assistant Secretary Vest afternoon February 25 to say that he had been instructed by Kyprianou to pass following oral message to the Secretary: a) President Kyprianou felt "insulted and let down" in wake of President Carter's

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1978. Confidential; Stadis; Exdis; Eyes Only. Drafted by Chapman; cleared by Ewing and Anderson; approved by Vest.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 532 from Nicosia, February 27, is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780089–0479. The telegram expressed gratitude for the Department's assistance in defusing tensions arising from the Larnaca Airport incident, described in footnote 3 below.



message to Sadat on the Larnaca incident.<sup>3</sup> Fact that Cyprus was small country did not mean that it had no rights and no need to preserve its sovereignty. b) Kyprianou was deeply disturbed by information received from Ankara that Counselor Nimetz and U.S. delegation in Turkey had agreed with GOT that it was imperative to lift embargo. c) In light of U.S. report on human rights in Cyprus, rumors that administration was trying to divorce Turkish embargo from Cyprus issue, and apparent efforts of U.S. to assist Turkey at Greek and Cypriot expense, there was no doubt that climate of U.S.-Cyprus relations was deteriorating.

3. Dimitriou also told Vest that Kyprianou ardently desired to improve relations with the U.S. and was struggling hard to prevent any deterioration. But he needed evidence to achieve this objective. Regrettably, on account of the administration's stance in the Larnaca incident and on the Cyprus problem in general. Kyprianou found himself in a very difficult position and with few possibilities for improving ties as he wanted. Kyprianou was prepared to meet with President Carter to discuss matters before they worsened.

4. The Secretary telephoned Kyprianou morning of Feb 26 to assure him that he had received his message and to make following points: a) We wanted good relations with Cyprus, but the statements that were currently being made on the island did not move us in that direction; b) Kyprianou should not accept as fact incorrect rumors which had been reported about recent meetings Nimetz had had in Ankara; c) Secretary said that he was deeply troubled and offended by charges which had been made by Lyssarides against the U.S. and Clark Clifford.<sup>4</sup> The Secretary said that these charges were totally false and that they were extremely harmful to relations between our two countries. He suggested that Kyprianou take action to deny them. Kyprianou agreed, and said he had already done so.

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<sup>3</sup> On February 18, Yusuf al-Siba'i, editor of the Egyptian newspaper *al-Ahram* and a friend of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, was assassinated in Nicosia by Palestinian gunmen. The gunmen took hostages and planned to fly out of Larnaca International Airport on a Cyprus Airways jet. President Sadat subsequently sent commandos to the Larnaca Airport to intercept the gunmen, at which point gunfire was exchanged between the Egyptian commandos and soldiers from the Cypriot National Guard. Carter's subsequent message to Sadat lauded the Egyptian leader for the "courageous decision" he had made. An account of this episode is in Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Egypt's Road to Jerusalem*, pp. 67–79. See also "2 Gunmen in Cyprus Kill Top Cairo Editor and Take off with 17," *The New York Times*, February 19, 1978, p. 1. Carter's letter to Sadat is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XVIII, Middle East Regional; Arabian Peninsula.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 524 from Nicosia, February 25, the Embassy reported that Vassos Lyssarides, speaking in the Cypriot House of Representatives two days earlier, had accused Clark Clifford of hastening the death of Makarios by putting undue diplomatic pressure on him. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780088–0423)

5. Kyprianou said he wished to raise two concerns with the Secretary: a) The President's letter to Sadat concerning the Larnaca incident; and b) Rumors to the effect that agreement had been reached between Nimetz and Prime Minister Ecevit that the embargo would be lifted immediately, and that there was no linkage between Cyprus and the embargo. After some discussion, Kyprianou suggested that he be authorized to state that the Secretary had assured him that President Carter's message did not intend to fix blame on the GOC, and to make appropriate statement with respect to rumors concerning lifting of arms embargo. The Secretary said that he would consider this suggestion and would be back shortly.

6. After consulting with the President, the Secretary telephoned Kyprianou again and told him that he could say that he had discussed the Larnaca incident with the Secretary and that the latter had stated: "The message from President Carter to President Sadat was not intended to fix blame on either Egypt or Cyprus in connection with this tragic incident." Secondly, the Secretary said that Kyprianou was authorized to state in connection with rumors relating to recent Nimetz discussions in Ankara that "those discussions were technical discussions and no agreement was entered into and no commitments were made."

7. Kyprianou reiterated to the Secretary his desire for strengthening U.S.-Cyprus relations and suggested that a discussion of our bilateral relations would be useful in this connection. The Secretary said that we would discuss the matter of bilateral talks with the Cypriot Ambassador.

Vance

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**48. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Nicosia, March 2, 1978, 1100Z

565. Subject: President Kyprianou Message to President Carter.

1. Following is text of March 2 message from President Kyprianou to President Carter as given to Ambassador same date.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 9, Cyprus: 1/78-5/79. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

2. Quote Top Secret (GOC classification). Dear Mr. President:

I very vividly recall the meeting which we have have had in New York on the 5th of October, 1977, which I believe has contributed substantially to the better understanding and cooperation between the United States and Cyprus. That meeting together with the statements which we both made after the meeting created, at least in Cyprus, the right climate and impressions in so far as the relations between the United States and Cyprus are concerned.<sup>2</sup>

Since then, certain things have happened which spoiled to some extent the excellent atmosphere which we then created.

I am sending this message to you to express certain views in all frankness, because I earnestly believe that in the relations between true friends frankness and sincerity is the best approach. Needless, Mr. President, to emphasize how much I value your personal friendship and the friendship of the United States towards Cyprus. I am anxious to do whatever I can to improve to the maximum possible degree our relations and our cooperation and I am equally anxious to see the image of the United States in Cyprus at its proper level.

At our meeting in New York you told me that the United States will do its utmost to assist for a just solution to the Cyprus problem and also that the embargo is definitely linked with the Cyprus problem and that that was the position not only of the Congress but also of the administration.

I am fully convinced of your keen interest for both an early and a fair and equitable solution to the Cyprus problem in conformity with the resolutions of the United Nations, as I am fully convinced of the important role that the United States can play in this respect.

I am today addressing myself to you, Mr. President, in the first place with regard to the question of the arms embargo against Turkey and I wish to express certain views on the matter in the light of rumours that the administration is thinking of reconsidering its policy on this issue.

It is my firm belief that if the embargo were to be lifted, the prospects for a just solution to the Cyprus problem would be entirely destroyed. Turkey will show no moderation, despite possible promises to the contrary, and the present unacceptable situation entailing so many evils on the people of Cyprus will be prolonged. As a consequence, the wider are involved will not be enabled to acquire the desirable stability and security.

The arms embargo against Turkey was imposed by the Congress of the United States in relation to the question of Cyprus and most spe-

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 45. The statements made after the meeting were not found.

cifically because of the American law. I have no doubt that its untimely lifting will also result in the deep disappointment of all Greeks who sincerely wish to hold high the image of the United States.

The lifting of the embargo without the removal of the reasons which necessitated its imposition would give rise to accusations against the United State of non compliance with the American law and of its declared policy, as well as for lack of consistency.

Recalling again our meeting in New York, Mr. President, I was then indeed very happy to hear from you that the question of Cyprus was definitely linked with the question of sending arms to Turkey and the granting of help to that country and that there ought to be substantial progress towards a solution of the Cyprus problem before the whole matter could be reconsidered by the administration and the Congress. I was also very much impressed by your sincere and precise words that the Turks had used American military equipment in their operation against Cyprus and that the American people have reacted against this through their Congress.

I earnestly hope that you will be able, Mr. President, to continue the same course of line on this important question.

The second matter upon which I would like briefly to touch upon is the question of the violation of human rights in Cyprus. I was very much disturbed by the report which you have submitted to the Congress in relation to this matter.<sup>3</sup> The question of human rights should never be connected with any political considerations and in so far as the actual violation of human rights in Cyprus by Turkey is concerned, the report of the Human Rights Commission of the Council of Europe is quite clear about it, namely that human rights in Cyprus have flagrantly and persistently been violated by Turkey.<sup>4</sup> I trust that you have in your possession this report but, if you don't, we will be glad to provide you with a copy. As far as the Council of Europe is concerned, it is not correct that the Committee of Ministers did not endorse the report. The matter is still pending before the Committee, again, unfortunately, for purely political reasons.

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, Document 46. The full report begins: "Perhaps more so than elsewhere, human rights questions in Cyprus cannot be treated in isolation from political considerations."

<sup>4</sup> Kyprianou was referring to the Council of Europe, European Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Commission, July 10, 1976. The report was issued by the Council in response to Application Nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75, brought by the Government of Cyprus against the Government of Turkey, alleging that the Turkish invasion of the northern portion of Cyprus and ongoing military occupation constituted violations of international law and human rights norms. Although Kyprianou simplified the multifaceted conclusions of the Council, the report clearly cited a number of Turkish violations relating to the invasion and subsequent occupation of northern Cyprus.

I know how much you are concerned with human rights and I am absolutely certain that you would wish to find out all the truth about the violation of human rights in Cyprus. My government and myself are at your disposal and at the disposal of your assistants in this respect, at any time.

A third point, Mr. President, is the relations of Cyprus with Egypt as a result of the recent tragic incidents at the Larnaca Airport.<sup>5</sup> I have no doubt in my mind that the whole blame lies with the Egyptian side. But I am quite ready to forget everything and do whatever I can towards the restoration of our relations with Egypt, with which our friendship and cooperation has always been very close. I would be grateful if you would be kind enough, to give the necessary advice to President Sadat with a view to responding to my repeated requests for trying to restore our relations in the interests of both countries, as well as in the interests of the entire area.

I have decided to send this message to you, Mr. President, in my fervent desire to contribute to the maximum possible degree towards the improvement of the relations between the United States and Cyprus which I very much value. The people of Cyprus and myself think highly of the United States and of yourself, and on our part we shall not fail to do anything with a view to fostering our relations and the image of the United States in Cyprus, something which we consider very important for more than one reason.

Finally, I am wondering, Mr. President, whether the time has not come to consider the possibility of a new meeting between the two of us in a new effort to promote further our relations and understanding, but this is for you to decide. Such a meeting, I believe, might prove most constructive and useful.

I do not intend to make this message public. I consider it as a private and personal message.

With my best regards and wishes and the expression of my highest consideration. Spyros Kyprianou, President of the Republic of Cyprus.  
End quote.

**Crawford**

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 3, Document 47.

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49. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 20, 1978, 2357Z

71814. Subject: Meeting Between Secretary and Cyprus House of Representatives President Michaelides.

1. Cyprus House of Representatives President Michaelides, accompanied by Cypriot Ambassador Dimitriou, met with Secretary March 17. Counselor Nimetz, EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Barbour and EUR/SE Director Ewing were also present for 25 minute meeting. Michaelides talked privately with Secretary for five minutes at end of conversation. Most of discussion centered on Cyprus problem, but Michaelides also gave Secretary brief description of his recent visit to Cairo (septel-Notal).<sup>2</sup>

2. Michaelides said that GOC was rather concerned that no progress was being achieved on Cyprus problem. Greek Cypriots were now expecting proposals from Turkish side but did not know when or even if proposals would be made, whether, if made, they would make resumption of the negotiating process possible. Secretary said he shared Michaelides hope that Turkish proposals will be made, will be constructive and will lead to substantive dialogue and real progress.

3. Michaelides said the Greek Cypriots were keen to solve the problem. He said he understood that after the Turkish Cypriot proposals were given to Secretary General Waldheim, the latter would consult with the parties. Michaelides said he hoped this procedure would be followed since it was essential for fruitful negotiations. He asked whether the U.S. could play a role at this stage to assist, in consultation with the Secretary General, in narrowing the gap in positions to make effective negotiations possible. The Secretary responded that he had told Waldheim and the parties that we would leave the matter in the Secretary General's hands. If he or the parties requested U.S. assistance, we would be glad to help. However, we did not want to intrude ourselves into the situation.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1978. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Ewing; cleared by Barbour and Anderson; and approved by Nimetz. Sent for information to Ankara, Athens, London, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is presumably to telegram 8444 from Cairo, March 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780116–0132) Michaelides made the trip in an attempt to defuse Egyptian-Cypriot tensions resulting from the Larnaca Airport incident of February 18. According to the Embassy's report, the visit was unsuccessful.

4. Michaelides said he was not suggesting replacing the Secretary General's role. Quiet U.S. efforts could perhaps help bridge what he was sure would be an initial gap in positions. Too large a gap in positions would keep the Greek Cypriots from negotiating and time would be lost. Michaelides said the GOC wanted to think positively; U.S. assistance to the Secretary General would be of great help.

5. The Secretary said he had discussed matter with Waldheim on several recent occasions.<sup>3</sup> When Waldheim received the proposals, he would see if a basis exists for an intercommunal meeting. Waldheim might share his views with the U.S., but that was entirely up to him. Michaelides said the Greek Cypriots did not want a failure; they were "eager but not desperate" to see negotiating movement. He felt the U.S. can always play a significant role in the Cyprus problem.

6. The Secretary recalled that in his recent visits to Ankara and Athens he had promised that the U.S. would be glad to help if asked by the parties, but would not intrude itself into the situation.<sup>4</sup> He agreed fully with Michaelides comment that quiet efforts would be more effective.

7. Michaelides asked about the GOT attitude which as he understood it was that the U.S. should not interfere in the Cyprus problem. He did not understand that position since Turkey had asked U.S. views on Cyprus. The Secretary replied that he understood that the Greek position was that the U.S. should not involve itself either. Michaelides said he thought there was room for quiet, high level diplomatic efforts to help bridge the gaps and that certainly his government appreciated U.S. help.

8. Michaelides said that the GOC had great and serious concern that at this critical juncture the U.S. might consider lifting the embargo restrictions on Turkey. The GOC felt that U.S. arms restrictions represented the only really practical means of pressure on Turkey. The arms embargo was not total—arms supplies from the U.S. continued. He saw the restrictions as a means of telling Turkey that the U.S. did not agree

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<sup>3</sup> The Cyprus issue arose in two recent exchanges between Vance and Waldheim. During a UN bilateral meeting, reported in telegram Secto 10014 from the Secretary's Delegation in New York, September 30, Waldheim told Vance that he was willing to restart intercommunal talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, but warned against "familiar Turkish delaying tactics." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770357-0177) Later in this conversation Vance assured Waldheim that he did not wish to "hamper" UN efforts to resume the intercommunal talks. In telegram 7101 to Tehran, January 11, Vance replied to a letter from Waldheim and expressed his delight at Waldheim's notification that the latest round of Cyprus negotiations had proven promising. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148-2295)

<sup>4</sup> See Documents 107 and 173.

with its aggression on Cyprus. Michaelides doubted very much that the Turks would negotiate and make concessions if the embargo was lifted and they no longer had an incentive nor would Ecevit be able to overcome opposition objections to concessions on Cyprus should the embargo no longer provide a need to move. Michaelides said he hoped the U.S. would keep in mind that there might be a catastrophic reaction among public opinion in Cyprus if attempts to solve the Cyprus problem failed because the embargo was lifted. He asked the Secretary whether the administration had reached a conclusion in its decision process.

9. The Secretary said he had nothing to add to what had already been said on the subject. Michaelides said he hoped the GOC concerns would be taken into account.

10. In response to a question, the Secretary said the Turkish Government previously indicated that Cyprus proposals would be forthcoming. The Secretary expected that they will make proposals but did not know about the timing, nor did we have any information on the substance of the proposals. Ecevit was, however, clearly committed to a federal solution.

11. Michaelides agreed that a true federal solution would be best for both communities, but stressed the importance of including provision for the principles of freedom of movement, settlement, and right of property. He also expressed a feeling that Denktash would be a serious obstacle to any real progress.

12. Nimetz said Department only had press reports to go on but it appeared the Turkish side might delay putting proposals forward. During his February visit to Ankara, Nimetz said the Turks were actively working on the proposals.<sup>5</sup> We understood that a major effort at the highest level had been made, although we had no information on details of the proposals.

13. Michaelides said that the territorial question was especially important. The Secretary said the U.S. had long recognized and stated to all parties that territorial and constitutional questions were equally important. Both would have to be dealt with constructively to achieve a solution.

14. The Secretary suggested, and Michaelides agreed, that in this delicate period it would be best to say to the press simply that the Secretary had looked forward to meeting Michaelides for the first time for a general review of the situation in the area and to be brought up to date on GOC views.

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<sup>5</sup> Nimetz was in Ankara February 21-24.



15. Dimitriou said that President Kyprianou would be grateful if he could have the Secretary's home telephone number. The Secretary agreed that it could be provided.

16. Dimitriou also asked when Kyprianou might expect a reply to his recent letter to the President. The Secretary said he hoped such a reply could be sent next week. He noted that the President had been extremely busy recently with southern Lebanon, the Panama Canal Treaty, the coal strike, etc.

17. The remainder of the conversation was directed to Cyprus/Egypt relations (septel) before Michaelides met briefly with the Secretary alone.<sup>6</sup>

Vance

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<sup>6</sup> No substantive record of this portion of the conversation was found.

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## 50. Letter From President Carter to Cypriot President Kyprianou<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 22, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your message of March 2 about relations between our two countries and the prospects for a settlement on Cyprus.<sup>2</sup> I fully share your desire to maintain the close and cooperative ties that we long have enjoyed. As you know, I deeply believe that a just and lasting Cyprus settlement is in the interest not only of the peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean, but of the world at large.

From the start of my Administration, I have tried to promote such a solution through the intercommunal negotiations conducted under

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 9, Cyprus: 1/78–5/79. No classification marking. Although no drafting information appears on the letter, Trevorton forwarded a draft based on language received from the Embassy and the Department to Brzezinski on March 16. In a memorandum sending the final draft to Carter on March 20, Brzezinski commented that the draft response "cannot satisfy Kyprianou, but it will flatter him and allay some of his worries. It emphasizes the strength and the enduring quality of the U.S. commitment to fostering a Cyprus settlement; takes note of the importance to the U.S. of bolstering the southern flank of NATO; points to concrete evidence of U.S. concern for the human rights situation in Cyprus; is non-committal with respect to the request for intercession with Sadat; and politely declines the suggestion for a meeting." (Both *ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 48.

Secretary General Waldheim's auspices. That commitment was also demonstrated by the mission that former Secretary Clark Clifford undertook at my request in February 1977; in our own discussions in New York last October; in the numerous meetings that Secretary Vance has held over the past year with his Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot counterparts and with the Secretary General and other U.N. officials; and in the constant diplomatic efforts that we have made, in public and in private, to encourage meaningful and productive negotiations. I can assure you that these efforts will continue. At the same time, I would hope that your government will take advantage of any opportunity that might arise to engage in negotiations on the substance of the Cyprus problem.

You ask whether current U.S. restrictions on arms sales and assistance to Turkey might soon be lifted. As I am sure you recognize, the United States has a number of important interests in the Eastern Mediterranean; among these are the maintenance of a strong southern flank of NATO and the strengthening of relations with all nations in the area. I assure you that the United States will fully consider all relevant factors before we make a decision about our military assistance commitments in the area. One of these factors will be the course of events in the Eastern Mediterranean.

As you have noted, the advancement of human rights worldwide is a fundamental foreign policy objective of my Administration. It applies to Cyprus as much as to any other country. The depth of U.S. commitment is clear from the substantial contributions that we have made since 1974 to the relief and rehabilitation of displaced persons on Cyprus, from our support for UNFICYP, from the intense diplomatic efforts that we have devoted in recent months to encouraging formation of a committee to [missing text]<sup>3</sup> and above all from the continuing effort to promote an overall Cyprus settlement. In all these endeavors we have been motivated by deep humanitarian concern.

I share with you the hope that normal relations between your government and Egypt will soon be reestablished, and I can assure you that, as appropriate occasions arise, we will continue to do what we can to help you both heal the breach.

I enjoyed meeting with you in New York to discuss how relations between our two countries could be further improved, and I am sure you will agree that our two governments should engage in the fullest possible exchange of views in the important period that lies ahead. Secretary Vance has told me that he spoke with you by telephone on February 26 and was able to clear up certain misunderstandings that had

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<sup>3</sup> The missing text "investigate cases of missing persons on the island," is in a copy of the letter in Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 9, Cyprus: 1/78-5/79.

arisen. I know that officials of my government will be in frequent contact with Ambassador Dimitriou; and I hope that your government will continue to turn to Ambassador Crawford—and his successor Ambassador Stone—to convey to us your concerns and suggestions and to seek information and advice.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

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## 51. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Turkey and Cyprus<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 26, 1978, 1422Z

106179. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Subject: Cyprus Negotiations. Ref: (A) Nicosia 1090, (B) Ankara 3187.<sup>2</sup>

1. I am deeply concerned that an opportunity to resume the Cyprus intercommunal negotiations may be lost on account of the intransigence and posturing of both sides.<sup>3</sup> This is, I believe, a critical moment for Cyprus, and a further opportunity to bridge the gap and move towards a settlement may not arise for several years to come. I have spoken with Waldheim and have urged him to persist in the efforts to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0347. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Chapman; cleared by Nimetz, Vest, Maynes, Ewing, and Thomas G. Martin (S/S–O); and approved by Newsom. Sent for information to Athens, USUN, and the White House. In an April 25 memorandum forwarding the draft telegram to Vance, Vest reported: “As you requested, we have prepared a cable instructing Ambassadors Spiers and Stone to impress on the Turks and the Greek Cypriots the need for a more flexible approach to negotiations at what could be a critical juncture for the Cyprus problem.” In the margin, an unknown hand wrote, “Cable released by P 4/26.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office of Southern Europe, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977–1980, Lot 83D256, Box 1, POL 2 Cyprus 1977 and 1978)

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 1090 from Nicosia, April 24, the Embassy characterized the latest proposals from the Turkish side as a “non-starter.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–2677) See footnote 6, Document 113. Citing this assessment, the Embassy in Ankara, in telegram 3187, April 25, asserted: “Kyprianou should not be allowed to have his cake and eat it too, i.e., to tell Waldheim privately that he will not send a representative to reconvened intercommunal talks, if Waldheim decides to call for them, while avoiding the onus of taking such a negative stance in public.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850101–2077) See also footnote 2, Document 178.

<sup>3</sup> For an overview of the recent intercommunal negotiations under UN auspices, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1978, pp. 377–378.

bring the two sides together. I have pledged him our full support in this endeavor, and have undertaken to do what we can to persuade the parties to adopt a more flexible and forthcoming approach. The Secretary General said that he would welcome any such assistance.

2. For Ankara: You should see Ecevit or Okcun as soon as feasible and speak along the following lines:

(a) As you know, the administration does not link repeal of the arms embargo with progress on the Cyprus issue. You also know that the administration making a very strong effort with the Congress to secure approval of the President's program. Nevertheless, you should recognize that the administration is waging an uphill battle. Anything further which will help demonstrate a forthcoming Turkish attitude on Cyprus will be of great assistance in this regard.

(b) In our view, the new Turkish Cypriot proposals (to the extent we know them) represent only a minimal advance. Frankly, we had hoped for a more flexible and forthcoming approach. The constitutional proposal, while more detailed than the one tabled in Vienna last year, appears to be unduly rigid.<sup>4</sup> We recognize that you are prepared to negotiate on territory, but the areas you have said you are willing even to discuss seem much too imprecise. Finally, your Varosha proposal, while welcome, strikes us, in its present form, as probably unworkable.

(c) We recognize that you have assured Waldheim and us that the Turkish side would be prepared to be flexible when negotiations resume. However, it is difficult for the Secretary General to commit himself to reconvening the talks on the basis of verbal assurances alone; he needs something more in the way of concrete evidence of your side's intentions.

(d) Accordingly, we would strongly urge you to re-examine the proposal to see whether improvements can be made in all three areas, but particularly with respect to Varosha and territorial matters. For example, we do not believe a solution can be reached unless Varosha is Greek-administered. If you find you cannot make any actual changes in what has already been drafted, you could perhaps define more fully to Waldheim the range of your negotiating options, indicating flexibility in these specific areas. If this is done, we have reason to believe the Secretary General will call for meetings.

(e) We very much appreciate Turkish readiness to reach a fair and lasting settlement on Cyprus. However, we are concerned that with the passage of time a settlement will be all the more difficult to negotiate, and we would urge that you take the extra step to ensure that the present opportunity to resume negotiations is not lost.

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 38.

(f) We are making an approach also to Kyprianou since we recognize fully that moving this negotiating process forward will require a willingness on the part of the Greek Cypriots to give a positive response when the Secretary General calls for a resumption of talks.

3. For Nicosia: You should plan to see Kyprianou at the earliest opportunity and speak to him along the following lines:

(a) We can understand your government's disappointment at the new Turkish Cypriot proposals. From what we know of them, they seem to represent only a minimal advance over earlier Turkish positions.

(b) I want to emphasize, however, that these proposals clearly represent only initial positions. They do not set limits as to how far the Turkish Cypriots are prepared to go. Ecevit, we understand, has given clear assurances that the Turkish side will be flexible and forthcoming when negotiations resume.

(c) I would urge, therefore, that the GOC reconsider its initial negative position and regard the Turkish Cypriot proposals for what they are—a starting point only. If the Cyprus settlement that we all desire is to be achieved, it seems to us that you must be ready to enter into negotiations to put to the test the Turkish side's expressed readiness to move towards a mutually-acceptable solution.

(d) In our view, this is a critical moment for Cyprus. If this opportunity to bridge the gap and move towards a settlement is lost, the prospects are that the situation will be deadlocked for several years to come and that the present unsatisfactory status quo will become increasingly consolidated.

(e) I would also urge you not to look at the prospects for resuming negotiations solely through the prism of the arms embargo. President Carter, Secretary Vance, and other U.S. Government officials have reiterated on many occasions the strong U.S. commitment to assist the UN and the parties to reach a Cyprus settlement that will be fair and will stand the test of time. I have been authorized once again to renew that commitment and give assurances of our intention to play a role with regard to the Cyprus problem that will finally bring the progress which we so earnestly desire.

4. FYI: The Secretary spoke by telephone with UNSYG Waldheim shortly after his return to Washington April 24.<sup>5</sup> (Secretary based his comments in part on Ref A; Ankara 3159 had not yet been received in Department.)<sup>6</sup> Secretary said he understood Waldheim's feeling of

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<sup>5</sup> No record of this conversation was found.

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 3159 from Ankara, April 24, the Embassy recommended that the United States should do everything in its power to restart the intercommunal talks. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850101–2070)

frustration and discouragement and the difficulty in which he would be placed if he called for intercommunal talks on the basis of the present Turkish proposals. Secretary said he hoped Waldheim could do whatever he could to see if basis existed to get talks started perhaps inter alia through use of new Cyprus Special Representative Galindo Pohl. Waldheim said he hoped US would also do what it could with the parties. Secretary agreed to do so and also to keep in close touch with Waldheim.

Vance

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**52. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 24, 1978, 2044Z

132423. Subject: Nimetz Meeting With Denktash in New York, May 19.

1. Department Counselor Nimetz met with Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash for forty-five minutes in New York May 19. Nimetz reviewed with Denktash both the current possibilities for a resumption of Cyprus negotiations and the status of such issues as the reopening of Nicosia Airport and formation of a missing persons committee. Denktash indicated that his purpose in coming to New York had been to take advantage of the presence of so many world leaders for the SSOD to press the Turkish Cypriot cause and specifically to improve international perceptions of the April 13 proposals.<sup>2</sup> He said that he planned to travel to Washington to meet with members of Congress and that he might well remain in the U.S. through the UNFICYP mandate renewal debate in mid-June. (FYI: Denktash will meet with Secretary in New York May

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of Southern Europe, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977–1980, Lot 83D256, Box 1, POL 2 Cyprus 1977 and 1978. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Chapman; cleared by Ewing and Stanislaus R.P. Valerga (S/S-O); approved by Nimetz. Sent for information to Ankara, Athens, London, and USUN. Nimetz was in New York to attend the UN Special Session on Disarmament.

<sup>2</sup> The proposals, presented by Turkish Cypriot representatives to Waldheim, are detailed in a press release titled "Concrete, Substantial and Voluminous" and are reprinted as Appendix 51 in Ertekün, *The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus*, pp. 345–354. The key point of the proposals called for a system of government consisting of two federated states for the purpose of strengthening the political autonomy and geographic separation of the Turkish Cypriot community.

24;<sup>3</sup> he is expected to come to Washington for closed session with HIRC May 25. Kyprianou also expected come to Washington for Congressional contacts either June 7 or 8.)<sup>4</sup>

2. Addressing the current negotiating prospects, Nimetz said that we were seriously concerned that the forthcoming congressional vote on the Turkish arms embargo—irrespective of which way it went—could well bring about deterioration in the Cyprus situation and perhaps lead to a deadlock of several years' duration. In the one case the Turkish side would probably become intransigent, to judge from Ecevit's recent remarks; in the other, the Greek Cypriots. Hence if there was to be any progress in the near future towards a settlement, it was essential that a decisive move towards reconvening negotiations be made very shortly in advance of the congressional vote. Nimetz said that for our part we were actively seeking ways to make it possible for Waldheim to call for a fresh round of talks. We had made it clear to the Greek Cypriots that now was the time to come to the table and that by maintaining a negative front they would be passing up a possible opportunity to achieve real progress. At the same time, however, both we and the Secretary General needed solid help from the Turkish side; we had to have some new ideas or some concrete indications of flexibility that Waldheim could use to justify reconvening negotiations and to persuade the Greek Cypriots to come to the table. Nimetz said we were convinced that there was in fact more to the Turkish Cypriot proposals than had been articulated. These had not been presented as clearly as they could have been, and the Greek Cypriots had skillfully exploited the situation.

3. Denktash responded by stressing that the Turkish Cypriot side was fully prepared to negotiate in earnest and to show maximum flexibility once the talks were reconvened. He was ready and willing to meet Kyprianou at any time and at any place, and was convinced that movement would be possible if only Kyprianou would agree to sit down and talk. Only dialogue, he stressed, could generate trust and an understanding for the differences that separated the two sides. At the same time, Denktash voiced his belief that the Greek Cypriots would continue to refuse to negotiate and instead to focus on the "long struggle" for as long as the congressional debate on the arms embargo continued. He cited the Cypriot High Commissioner in London as telling him that the GOC wanted the Turks to take as hard a line as possible, since this would increase international and congressional sympathy for the Greek Cypriot cause. Denktash also expressed doubts as to whether Kyprianou had the domestic political strength to conclude a

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 53.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 55.

settlement. He was in fact a servant of the National Council, on which sat powerful political figures who wanted a settlement only if it would bring them all of Cyprus. Even Makarios could not always carry the National Council with him, so how could Kyprianou be expected to? Denktash also maintained that Kyprianou, Clerides and Lyssarides had from the start been opposed to the four principles that he and Makarios had worked out in February 1977,<sup>5</sup> and that since Makarios' death there had been a steady erosion of these principles, as witness Kyprianou's increasing stress on majority rule. Denktash concluded that only through strong pressure from the U.S. could the Greek Cypriots be induced to work for a realistic settlement.

4. Nimetz asked Denktash how he saw the U.S. exerting this pressure. By lifting the embargo we would be sending a strong signal to the Greek Cypriots, but what else could we do? Denktash said that it was vital that the Turkish side have better publicity. The Greek Cypriots were now able virtually to monopolize international coverage and could, for example, successfully sustain the charge that the Turkish Cypriots were the intransigent party on the missing persons question when in fact quite the reverse was true. Nimetz remarked that this situation now appeared to be changing, pointing out that there was a lot of editorial support in the U.S. for lifting the embargo and for a resumption of negotiations on the basis of the April 13 proposals.

5. Denktash sought to make it clear that failure to lift the embargo would represent the point of no return for Turkey. Should this be the case, we would be forced to take "certain steps" in the Security Council in mid-June. On the other hand, if the embargo were lifted the Turkish side would be "jelly-like" in its flexibility.

6. Regarding the substance of the issues, Nimetz said that it was our view that the constitutional question was inherently the more difficult since the broad philosophical differences that existed on the structure and functions of the future central government did not lend themselves to compromise. Territory was at once more practical and negotiable an issue; one could easily envisage the two sides arguing over a map section by section and gradually coming together. In this connection, Nimetz remarked that territorial percentages were generally unhelpful and that the April 13 proposals, in avoiding mention of them, had embodied an inherently flexible approach. Unfortunately, however, percentages had become something of a shibboleth both for the Greek Cypriots and for the international community. Denktash was largely unreceptive to Nimetz' suggestion that the Turkish Cypriots seek to tempt the GOC on the constitutional issue by offering them

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 5, Document 31.



more territory, but he echoed the Counselor's fear that an intercommunal negotiating session involving Onan and Papadopoulos might break up quickly without any results. For this very reason, he noted, the initial, basic discussions would have to be carried on between himself and Kyprianou. If Kyprianou were able to satisfy him that the Greek Cypriots did not desire to Hellenize all of Cyprus, then the Turkish side would be prepared to leave the door open for future integration by evolution.

7. When Nimetz broached the subject of Varosha, Denktash asked rhetorically whether it was not consistent with a federal system of government for a certain number of Greek Cypriots to live under Turkish Cypriot administration and vice-versa. Nimetz said that we believe differently, namely that Varosha should ultimately revert to Greek Cypriot control. This course would in fact be in the Turkish Cypriots' own interests, since administering some 30,000 Greek Cypriots would be no easy task. Nimetz noted that the Turkish Cypriot position on Varosha, as it was now emerging, was a forthcoming one, and he stressed that the return of large numbers of Greek Cypriots to Varosha under acceptable conditions would have a greater impact than anything else on opinion in the U.S. and in Greek Cyprus. We did not believe that Kyprianou would be able to resist a serious offer on Varosha, but would find himself obliged to return to the table if only on account of the domestic pressure that would develop.

8. Nimetz said that he could not understand why the two Cypriot communities did not encourage greater non-political communication across the green line as a means of breaking down barriers. Bar associations and doctors groups could meet, and there could be joint sports contests. If the limited federalism that the Turkish Cypriots propounded was to work, it would need to be abetted and developed through functional non-political contacts such as these. Denktash replied that the Turkish side believed firmly in dialogue and was prepared to react favorably to any suggestions for common working groups and the like as long as they were not politically motivated. It was the Greek Cypriots who had intervened and prevented trade union leaders from the two sides from meeting—not the Turkish Cypriots. Unfortunately instances such as the recent GOC attack on Council of Europe rep Karasek confirmed that the Greek Cypriots were not interested in compromise but only in imposing their will across the board.

9. Nimetz asked Denktash where the Turkish Cypriot side now stood on the projected missing persons committee and on the reopening of Nicosia Airport. Denktash said that he was fully in favor of establishing a missing persons committee on the understanding that it

would operate under ICRC rules of procedure.<sup>6</sup> When an ICRC representative had visited Cyprus recently, Denktash had asked her whether the ICRC normally held votes when conducting inquiries such as this; she had replied no. With regard to Nicosia Airport, Denktash said that he would agree to reopening it to all civilian traffic (not simply U.N.) under the control of a U.N. administrator who would be assisted by an adviser from each community. He would not insist on an equal number of Turkish and Greek Cypriot personnel in the airport's technical staff; these and other functional questions could be decided upon by the administrator in conjunction with the two advisers. His only pre-condition would be that both zones have equal access to the airport. (This part of the conversation was later relayed to U.N. Under Secretary-General Urquhart, who said that it seemed to represent an advance over Denktash's earlier position and that Waldheim would probably want to follow up when he met with Denktash on May 22.)

10. Nimetz took note of Denktash's readiness to move ahead with a missing persons committee, adding that it was our feeling that the two sides had essentially reached agreement on the substance of this issue late last year. He said that Kyprianou had asked to see Ambassador Mezvinsky in New York to discuss this very subject, and that we would be happy to relay to him Denktash's interest in moving ahead and to sound out Greek Cypriot intentions on this score. Denktash agreed, and said that he would also like to meet with Mezvinsky.

11. Nimetz encouraged Denktash to press ahead on concrete issues such as the airport reopening and the missing persons committee, and to give adequate publicity to these efforts. Results in these areas would be important not only politically, in that Turkey's friends in the Congress would have ammunition to use with their colleagues, but also substantively in that the negotiating process would acquire a certain momentum. It was our impression that the Greek Cypriots would begin losing sympathy if they continued to maintain a negative attitude on all issues; it would then be very helpful to the Turkish side if they could portray themselves as positive and forthcoming.

**Christopher**

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<sup>6</sup> General Assembly Resolution 32/128, adopted on December 16, 1977, requested the Secretary General to establish a committee jointly with the International Committee of the Red Cross to investigate missing persons in Cyprus.

**53. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, May 25, 1978, 1400Z

Secto 6005. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Turkish Cypriot Leader Denktash, May 24.

1. Summary: The Secretary met for twenty minutes May 24 with Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash. Denktash was accompanied by Turkish Cypriot New York representative Atalay. Counselor Nimetz, IO Assistant Secretary Maynes, and EUR/SE Director Ewing were also present. Denktash was affable and seemed anxious demonstrate his flexibility and openness to ideas. End summary.

2. The Secretary said he had found Denktash's May 22 statement very constructive.<sup>2</sup> The administration intends to push hard for lifting of the Turkish arms embargo. We regretted the vote in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee but this did not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate as a whole which might well be more receptive than the House. We would bend every effort to persuade the full Senate. In this regard, statements such as Denktash had made May 22 were helpful. The Secretary said he had conveyed a message to Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit indicating that while the task will be difficult and hard, it was possible to get the embargo lifted.

3. In response to the Secretary's question concerning conditions in Cyprus, Denktash said the Turkish area was functioning normally and had reached the point where it could even afford such luxuries as government crises, resignations by the Prime Minister, inflation, etc. The Turkish community had full security in its area; its members were relaxed and could smile. Those who were refugees from the south had no desire to return. The Turkish Cypriots recognized that certain numbers of Greeks would return to their homes in the context of a settlement but there was no similar sentiment on the Turkish side.

4. Denktash stressed that he was in the U.S. not only to help make progress toward a Cyprus settlement but to help Turkey which had suffered much internationally as a result of Cyprus.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1978. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia; Priority to Bonn, Brussels (for the Embassy and USEEC), Copenhagen, London, Paris, and USNATO; and to USUN. Vance was in New York for the Special Session on Disarmament at the UN.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 54.

5. Denktash recalled that Ecevit had asked him earlier this year what margin of territory could be given up. His reply had been it all depended on whether real peace could be achieved. Denktash said he was concerned that the other side did not seriously want a settlement but only wanted to bargain for bargaining's sake. They were pocketing all Turkish offers but still would not come to the negotiating table. He saw no indication that the Greek-Cypriots wanted to negotiate. Denktash said he would like very much to meet with Kyprianou while both are in New York but he had received no response to his suggestions of such a meeting.

6. The Secretary noted that in Denktash's May 22 statement reference had been made to 30,000–35,000 Greek Cypriots who could return to New Famagusta during the negotiating period. Denktash recalled that about 40,000 Greeks had lived in Varosha prior to 1974. Of that total approximately 5,000 had lived in an area which the Turkish Cypriots felt threatened the harbor area and the Turkish town. Thus, the Turks felt that this area should be retained and those affected compensated. However, even this could be discussed in the course of negotiations.

7. The Secretary asked whether some form of UN administration of Varosha would be possible while negotiations were proceeding. Denktash said he was open to all ideas. A Turkish proposal had been made but he was willing to consider various formulae. The Turkish community was prepared to take political risks provided that a permanent settlement was achieved. The Secretary said he understood the importance of a final and lasting settlement.

8. Nimetz asked whether it would be possible for Secretary General Waldheim to appoint a representative to work on Varosha, or perhaps a sub-group could be set up to work on the matter. Denktash said he had not thought in a concrete way about modalities. In any event, the UN would be involved. The first Turkish offer had suggested Turkish-Greek administration but even under that concept the UN would handle the police function. Denktash said that specific areas should be delineated to which people could return on a graduated basis as negotiations continue. Denktash felt that a technical survey of water, sewage, and other municipal services could also be undertaken once negotiations began, perhaps under auspices of a joint UN-Greek-Turkish team. In this regard, it might be necessary to come to the U.S. for financial assistance.

9. The Secretary said that Varosha is one of the most important issues, both in factual and symbolic terms.

10. Denktash was concerned that the Greeks would prefer now to talk only about the constitutional issue. The Turkish position was that there should be two communities in one Cyprus with each community

secure and autonomous in its area. In contrast, Denktash said the Greek concept was to restore one Greek Cyprus in which Turks would be accommodated.

11. In response to the Secretary's question on the status of the missing persons issue, Denktash said he had fully agreed May 23 to a U.S. draft paper in a meeting with Ambassador Mezvinsky.<sup>3</sup> Denktash said the ball was now with the Greek Cypriots. His only pre-condition was that establishment of a missing persons committee should result from a meeting between him and Kyprianou although if Kyprianou continued to refuse to see Denktash he might even withdraw that condition. The Secretary said the missing persons question was important to help create a favorable atmosphere.

12. The Secretary said that when he met with Kyprianou on May 25 he would raise the idea of a Denktash-Kyprianou meeting. Denktash said that he thought the only way progress could be made was through a meeting of the two community leaders who had the responsibility to make decisions. Lower-level negotiations would bog down in press speculation, the constant need for instructions, etc. In his two meetings with Makarios, Denktash said there had been real breakthroughs and more could have been done if there had been less criticism of Makarios from other Greek Cypriots.

13. The Secretary said he felt there was a real opportunity to move forward with the Cyprus problem now. It would be a tragedy to miss this chance. Denktash said he wanted to get the process going and his May 22 statement had stressed that point.

14. The Secretary suggested to Denktash that when he meets with the House International Relations Committee May 25 it would be useful if he could convey a sense of flexibility and a willingness to achieve progress. In closing the meeting, the Secretary indicated that we would pursue the Varosha idea both with the UN and with the Greek Cypriots.

15. Prior to the Secretary's meeting, Nimetz and Maynes discussed briefly with Denktash the June renewal of the UNFICYP mandate. Denktash said he was not informed of the status of current negotiations in Cyprus re: the status of UN forces in the north, but if such an agreement could be reached soon, he thought the Security Council in June should only extend the UNFICYP mandate for two or three months pending various developments including congressional action on the repeal of the Turkish embargo.

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<sup>3</sup> The meeting was reported in telegram 2091 from USUN, May 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780218-1119)

16. Nimetz said such an effort by the Turkish Cypriots to use the UNFICYP mandate renewal as a weapon would not be helpful to the Turkish side in the eyes of U.S. opinion. He urged that Denktash consider whether such an approach would not be counter-productive. Maynes pointed out that such an effort could also have an unfortunate effect on the UN force itself. Denktash said that the Greek Cypriots would probably try to make substantive changes in the mandate. Such a move would open up the entire issue. Nimetz urged that all parties concentrate on the underlying problems of Cyprus at this key period.

Vance

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**54. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 26, 1978, 0314Z

134352. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Cyprus President Kyprianou, May 25, 1978, New York.

1. Cyprus President Kyprianou met privately with Secretary for twenty-five minutes in latter's suite at U.N. Plaza Hotel in New York May 25. Subsequently, Foreign Minister Rolandis, Ambassador to U.S. Dimitriou, Ambassador to U.N. Rossides, MFA Sec Gen Pelagias, two other Cyprus U.N. Mission officers, and GOC press spokesman joined Kyprianou. Also present for expanded twenty minute session were Assistant Secretaries Vest and Maynes, Deputy UN Rep Leonard and EUR/SE Director Ewing.

2. With Secretary's concurrence, Kyprianou summarized his private talk with Secretary along following lines. Talk had been useful and very friendly. He and Secretary understood each other well. There were one or two points which they had discussed which Kyprianou said he and Secretary did not want to divulge to others at this point. They had agreed to disagree whether repeal of Turkish arms embargo would have positive or negative consequences. Kyprianou said he had expressed his concern about U.S. efforts, including May 23 Dept of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1978. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Ewing; cleared by Frank Wisner (S/S); and approved by Vest. Sent for information to Athens, Ankara, London, Paris, Bonn, USNATO, Brussels, Copenhagen, and USUN.

State press spokesman statement, which in his view were designed to mislead and create false impression that present Turkish attitude was more promising than was the case.<sup>2</sup>

3. Varosha had been touched on but clearly this was only one ingredient and basic essence of Cyprus problem had to be dealt with.

4. Kyprianou said he and Secretary had agreed that most practical way to proceed would be thru his meeting Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit while both are in U.S. Kyprianou also said they had discussed how best to proceed in setting up such a meeting which ideally should be private. Secretary confirmed that we would do what we could to bring about such a meeting. However, he cautioned that nothing should be said publicly about such a possible meeting and Kyprianou acknowledged this was prudent.

5. Kyprianou said he had reassured Secretary that despite differences of views with USG he was in no way anti-American although "others" made efforts to create such an impression. He wanted to enhance relations between the two countries to maximum extent.

6. Kyprianou said he had formally asked Secretary to study the specific proposal (set forth para 10 below) which he had made to SSOD May 24 and Secretary had agreed to do so. Kyprianou said he had also taken proposal up with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko as well as with Sec Gen Waldheim.

7. Secretary said he would be in touch with Kyprianou again after he talked with Ecevit next week.<sup>3</sup> Kyprianou said he planned to come to Washington evening June 7 for separate sessions with HIRC and SFRC June 8. He would give a press conference but had no other set plans in Washington. Otherwise, Kyprianou said he would be in New York except for a weekend trip to Chicago May 27–28 and to Boston June 3–4.

8. In response to question, Secretary said he would not see Denktash again. In response to another question, Secretary said he believed Ecevit does want to solve the Cyprus problem. There followed a general discussion in which Kyprianou did most of the talking but his colleagues chimed in on a) Ecevit's motives, b) the state of the Cypriot economy (good in the Greek area although there were still problems

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is presumably to the prepared statement read by a Department spokesman at the daily briefing on May 23 responding to a statement released by Denktash the previous day. The statement concluded that Denktash's pledge to enter into "sustained, intensive good-faith negotiations" with Greek Cypriots "with an open mind and in a spirit of conciliation and flexibility" was "positive and encouraging." (Telegram 131372 to Nicosia, Ankara, and USUN, May 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780217–1133)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 116.

with refugees and labor shortages were causing difficulties), and c) conditions in the Turkish zone (miserable).

9. At conclusion meeting, Secretary and Kyprianou discussed how to handle press questions re meeting (USUN septel).<sup>4</sup> Kyprianou then gave informal press conference in hotel lobby (septel).<sup>5</sup>

10. Following are portions relating to Cyprus in May 24 Kyprianou UNSSOD speech as provided by Kyprianou to Secretary:

Begin text-unclassified

a. I come from a very small country which is situated in a very sensitive area of the world, and we are very much and deeply concerned about what goes on in the field of disarmament and, therefore, in the field of security. We have a problem of our own, which is an international problem. It is a problem which concerns our people; it concerns the area; it concerns the United Nations; it concerns the entire world. And we feel quite sincerely that through strict implementation of the United Nations, and especially General Assembly Resolution 3212 (XXIX), as endorsed by the Security Council, the Cyprus problem will be solved and at the same time Cyprus will cease to be a source of friction and conflict in the world.

b. And, taking advantage of this Special Session on Disarmament, I would go a step further and publicly call upon the United Nations to act, and call upon the General Assembly, the Security Council and the permanent members to act, and call upon the United States and the Soviet Union to act. I propose total demilitarization and disarmament of the Republic of Cyprus and implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations; a mixed Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot police force, composed in accordance with the proportions of the population, a police force under the permanent guidance and control of an international United Nations police force. I make this proposition publicly, before all. If the world wants peace, Cyprus is ready to make its contribution, which would be a contribution to our own people, by solving our problem and therefore removing the causes of our drama, but which would at the same time remove the cause of wider friction and wider conflict in the interests of world peace and security. End text.

Vance

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<sup>4</sup> The Department reported this discussion in telegram 133346 to Ankara, May 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780221-0544)

<sup>5</sup> Not found.



**55. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 7, 1978, 2034Z

144337. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Cyprus President Kyprianou, New York, June 3, 1978.

1. Summary: Secretary met with Cyprus President Kyprianou at latter's request at Hotel Pierre in New York Saturday, June 3. One-hour meeting covered various aspects of Cyprus negotiating situation, particularly Kyprianou's continuing interest in arranging meeting for himself with Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit. Also present were Foreign Minister Rolandis, MFA Secretary General Pelagias, and Cyprus U.N. Representative Rossides. Secretary was accompanied by Counselor Nimetz and EUR/SE Director Ewing. Secretary met briefly alone with Kyprianou at end of general meeting. End summary.

2. Kyprianou said he had thought it would be useful to exchange views with Secretary on contacts he had had in New York since they had last met on May 25 (State 134352).<sup>2</sup> Kyprianou said he would be in Washington June 8 and expected to leave the U.S. on June 11.<sup>3</sup> He said he had done his best to arrange a meeting with Ecevit but he now felt that no such meeting could be set up at this time.

3. At the request of Kyprianou, Foreign Minister Rolandis described the brief conversation he had with Ecevit prior to a lunch June 2 given by UN SYG Waldheim. Rolandis said he had asked Ecevit (with Defense Minister Isik and MFA Sec Gen Elekdag also present) why he would not meet with President Kyprianou as the latter had proposed. According to Rolandis, Ecevit said that Kyprianou was creating many difficulties for the Turkish side, citing a Kyprianou statement in Chicago indicating that Denktash did not represent the Turkish Cypriots. Ecevit explained that a meeting without Denktash present would imply Turkish acceptance of that view. Rolandis said he told Ecevit that he and Kyprianou could make progress if they met alone but that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1978. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Ewing; cleared by Vest, Anderson, and Arthur Houghton (S); approved by Nimetz. Sent for information Priority to Athens and Ankara; and to USUN, London, Brussels, USNATO, and USNMR SHAPE.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 54.

<sup>3</sup> Kyprianou spent his time in Washington giving interviews to the press and appearing before congressional panels to make the case that intransigence on the Turkish Cypriot side and the likely lifting of the U.S. arms embargo against Turkey would doom the possibility of a Cyprus settlement. These activities are described in telegram 146669 to Nicosia, June 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780241–1134)

would not be possible with others present. Ecevit made the counter-suggestion of a four-party meeting with Karamanlis also present. Rolandis said a four-party meeting was impossible for both Kyprianou and the GOG but that a Kyprianou-Ecevit meeting might find common ground and establish a base for further negotiations. The Greek side was not against negotiations but was waiting for adequate Turkish proposals. Rolandis recalled that Elekdag had continued the conversation after Ecevit left and had stressed that only Ecevit of Turkey's leaders in the recent past did want to solve the Cyprus problem and was in a position to do so. (Elekdag told DeptOffs separately that GOT was not seeking to denigrate Kyprianou by Ecevit's refusal to meet alone but it simply could not be placed in a position of undermining or discrediting Denktash.)

4. Secretary Vance said he too believed that Ecevit did want to solve the Cyprus problem. He had internal problems in Turkey and the festering sore of Cyprus took time and attention away from other problems. We were convinced that the Turkish Government did want to find a lasting Cyprus settlement.

5. Kyprianou said that British Foreign Secretary Owen had asked urgently to see him June 2 following a Callaghan-Ecevit meeting earlier in the day. (Kyprianou said he had agreed to visit London June 23 to talk further with the British about what they could do concerning the Cyprus problem.) Owen had pressed the four-party meeting idea, but Kyprianou said he had responded that such a meeting would make Cyprus in part a Greek-Turkish bilateral matter, a result which was unacceptable. Kyprianou said he had told Owen that he could not meet Denktash on an equal footing. Denktash and Ecevit were not on close terms and there was growing opposition to Denktash in the Turkish Cypriot community. Kyprianou said he was receiving many messages from Turkish Cypriots urging that he not see Denktash. Just before his death Makarios had told Kyprianou that his having met with Denktash had created many problems, and thus, Kyprianou claimed, he was following the Makarios line. Kyprianou said that while Ecevit had internal problems, so did he. He thought that no one in Cyprus would tolerate his having met with Denktash. Kyprianou said that his initiative to suggest a meeting with Ecevit showed that he did indeed want progress on the Cyprus problem even before the Turkish arms embargo question was decided.

6. Kyprianou said he was willing to meet with Ecevit in his personal capacity without his being addressed as President of the Republic of Cyprus. An advance announcement was not necessary and he was willing to make an advance commitment to permit a satisfactory meeting to be arranged. He thought that such a bilateral meeting was the only way to see if common ground could be found for eventual re-

sumption of intercommunal talks. Kyprianou said Owen had then suggested a Kyprianou meeting with Ecevit and Denktash together. Kyprianou said it would be unacceptable for the Turkish Prime Minister to meet with the two Cypriot communal leaders, but it might be possible if Kyprianou, as President of Cyprus, and Denktash, as an advisor to Ecevit, were to get together with Ecevit. But there were also practical problems since, according to Kyprianou, with Denktash present it would not be possible to go into the depth of the Cyprus problem and get something concrete. Kyprianou said he sincerely wanted to make a breakthrough.

7. The Secretary said he had given the matter of arranging a meeting considerable thought since their last conversation. He agreed that it was essential that the present deadlock be broken and that the present opportunity be seized. He recognized the difficulties for both Ecevit and Kyprianou of arranging an appropriate meeting. The Secretary said he thought there were really only two possibilities: (a) a four-party meeting, and (b) some three-person variation. He hoped the latter could be pursued to see if something could be arranged, perhaps under the auspices of the Secretary General. Kyprianou said in that case he would have to be recognized as the President of the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary said he thought that Waldheim could try to put something together involving Kyprianou, Ecevit and Denktash during which Kyprianou could talk with Ecevit. The Secretary said he had not discussed this matter with Ecevit in any detail but said he thought a quiet meeting in New York under the auspices of the Secretary General might be practical and possible for all concerned. Kyprianou said he would think about it further.

8. Nimetz recalled that he had suggested to Pelaghias June 2 an idea which we knew the Turks would have accepted of a Kyprianou-Denktash meeting under the auspices of Waldheim at which a date and place for resumption of intercommunal negotiations would have been announced followed by a tripartite meeting involving Ecevit.<sup>4</sup> Nimetz said it was our understanding that the Turks were unwilling to have a three-party meeting without a prior Kyprianou-Denktash meeting. Our view was that the intercommunal talks offered the way to move forward with the problem.

9. Kyprianou suggested that if that were the case, Papadopoulos should be the one to deal with Denktash or with some other Turkish Cypriot. The Secretary stressed that intercommunal talks must be the way to resolve the Cyprus problem, and that if some form of other meeting could take place, it should help find a way for resumption of

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<sup>4</sup> No record of this meeting has been found.

talks. The Turkish Cypriots must decide who is their appropriate representative; this was a decision that could not be taken by the Greek Cypriots or other outsiders.

10. Kyprianou said that if a meeting with Ecevit could not be done properly that he was prepared to withdraw the whole idea which he had initiated. The Secretary said again that an opportunity existed to make a real breakthrough on the Cyprus problem and we would regret if that opportunity was missed. Kyprianou said he did not see how we could really expect substantive progress since from a Cypriot point of view that would probably facilitate the administration's effort to get the Turkish embargo lifted. Kyprianou said he could have refused to do anything until the embargo question was out of the way but instead put forward the Ecevit meeting idea as a means to achieve a breakthrough. He felt a responsibility to all of the people of Cyprus not to miss any opportunities.

11. The Secretary said he commended this positive attitude. We wanted to see the embargo lifted since we felt that was important for NATO, our relations with Turkey and offered the best chance to move forward on Cyprus. Kyprianou said he disagreed with that assessment and feared that if the embargo were lifted we would later regret it.

12. In response to a question from Nimetz on what specifically would come out of a bilateral meeting with Ecevit, Kyprianou said he would go with open mind and with no fixed ideas in order to find out what Ecevit really had in mind. The Secretary said he would expect that agreement would be reached that there was sufficient opportunity for progress to resume the intercommunal talks. Kyprianou said the Turks might abandon their April proposals or do something else to allow resumption of talks. He wanted to find something to justify new talks. Rolandis interjected that if Ecevit was not prepared to accept a true federation there was no sense in proceeding. Secretary said he thought Ecevit did believe in a federal solution. The Turkish side was prepared to talk on the basis of the Makarios-Denktash principles. He urged again that Kyprianou consider a three-way meeting with Denktash present which did not necessarily preclude his participating as President of Cyprus.

13. Rolandis said he understood the problem of excluding Denktash and said he liked the idea of the Secretary General organizing an affair at which there could be a private conversation with Ecevit. Perhaps the Secretary General could invite the President of Cyprus and the Prime Minister of Turkey and their advisers to such an occasion. The Secretary said he thought the key point was to find a way which would lead to resumed intercommunal talks.

14. Rolandis asked if Ecevit would accept such an invitation from Waldheim. Nimetz said he was somewhat more pessimistic than the

Secretary since, on the basis of his conversations with the Turks, he thought the most they would accept would be an initial Kyprianou-Denktaş meeting, agreement that intercommunal talks should resume, and then a tripartite meeting to include Ecevit. The Secretary said that Kyprianou's statement in Chicago had complicated and made more difficult arranging a meeting with Ecevit, since it seemed to support the Turkish claim that Kyprianou was anxious to discredit Denktaş.

15. Rolandis asked whether the Secretary thought it might be preferable if he tried to arrange to meet with Foreign Minister Okçun. The Secretary replied that he would not rule out such an idea although there would be a problem if a Turkish Cypriot rep were excluded.

16. Kyprianou said he appreciated the Secretary's deep interest in the Cyprus problem. He and the Secretary then met briefly in private while Foreign Minister Rolandis, Counselor Nimetz, and others talked further in a separate room.<sup>5</sup> Nimetz emphasized again that it would be very difficult to arrange any high level meeting after the weekend of June 3–4 when Ecevit and others left the United States. He hoped that the parties could begin discussing substantive questions rather than just various meeting possibilities. He asked whether any thought had been given to just what specifically would come out of a meeting with Ecevit. Rolandis thought that improved rapport between Kyprianou and Ecevit might allow discovery of a new basis for resuming negotiations.

17. At the Secretary's request, Nimetz and Ewing subsequently met with Elekdag and Tulumen. Nimetz said in our view a quadripartite meeting was not possible and suggested that the Turks consider further whether a tripartite meeting with a specific purpose could be arranged, perhaps at the invitation of the Secretary General. We thought such a meeting was important and could be productive. Elekdag said that GOT still regarded a Kyprianou-Denktaş meeting as the proper first step, but they would consider further the tripartite meeting possibility.

18. Elekdag said that at a June 2 reception at the Turkish Embassy Waldheim had told Ecevit he was thinking of arranging an informal social gathering June 4 to which Ecevit, Kyprianou, Karamanlis, and Denktaş would be invited, along with their wives. Ecevit said he would attend. At such a gathering he assumed there could be appropriate bilateral conversations. Elekdag said he understood Waldheim had made a similar proposal to Kyprianou, who had not responded until earlier that morning when Ecevit was in a meeting with Wald-

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<sup>5</sup> No record of this meeting has been found.

heim. Kyprianou had telephoned Waldheim to say he could not accept such an invitation and had asked to speak on the telephone with Ecevit. Elekdag had taken the phone and had talked with Kyprianou. He had stressed that Ecevit did not want to denigrate Kyprianou nor could he discredit Denktash. Kyprianou had then talked again with Waldheim and had undertaken to consider the idea further and to call Waldheim from Boston later in the day.

Vance

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## 56. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 9, 1978, 11:15–11:20 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Telephone Conversation between President Carter and President Kyprianou of Cyprus

President Kyprianou had called from New York. After exchange of greetings and regrets at not being able to meet personally, President Kyprianou said he wished to assure President Carter that “despite whatever differences we may have, I would like to consider you as a friend.” President Carter replied that he had enjoyed being with him at their last meeting.<sup>2</sup> He said that he felt it was very important to get the intercommunal talks going again and that he hoped President Kyprianou would do everything possible to achieve this result.

President Kyprianou replied that he had been doing a great deal during the past few weeks but that he still believed that a meeting between Ecevit and himself would have been the best way to find common ground. “I offered to meet him in my personal capacity—I think he wanted to do it—but other people advised him against it.” The President replied that we had urged Ecevit to meet “with you and Denktash, with Denktash and Karamanlis or whatever combination could be worked out.” President Kyprianou countered, “The other formulas would not have worked—but a private meeting between me and Ecevit

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 3, Cyprus, President Kyprianou, 10/6/78. Confidential. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter was in the Oval Office for this conversation. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 45.

would have been much more useful.” President Carter observed that such a meeting would have been an insinuation that Denktaş was not qualified to speak on his own and this was a political problem for Ecevit. President Kyprianou said he would have been ready to meet Ecevit in his capacity as President of the Republic of Cyprus, as recognized by the entire world, and Denktaş could have participated in the meeting as representative of the Turkish-Cypriot community—“but they rejected that also.”

President Carter said that he had found Ecevit much more forthcoming than his predecessor. “I believe he genuinely wants to reach a settlement. I know the Turkish proposals are not acceptable to you and we agree that they do not go far enough but they are a basis for discussion. We will use our good offices as best we can and I hope your statements will be adequate to keep things going.” President Kyprianou replied, “As the leader of a small country under occupation, I need to be strengthened with my own public opinion.” “All of us face that problem,” President Carter observed, reminding President Kyprianou that we recognized this need and saying that he believed Secretary Vance had made that clear to him in the last few days. President Kyprianou said he greatly appreciated the time Secretary Vance and other American officials had given him during recent weeks. “I hate to bother you,” he said to President Carter; “you have so many problems.” He suggested a meeting in September when he will return to the UN.<sup>3</sup>

President Carter said he looked forward to a possible meeting then but he hoped that meanwhile we could work together closely and exploit every opportunity for progress. President Kyprianou said he hoped in September it might be possible for him to meet with Ecevit. President Carter replied, “I hope we do not have to wait that long—you and I and Ecevit can be working together before that time to get talks going.” President Kyprianou commented on his views of the arms embargo, enquiring whether Secretary Vance had explained to the President what his (i.e. Kyprianou’s) position was. President Carter said Secretary Vance had indeed explained this to him. “We have tried in good faith to derive some benefit from the embargo,” President Carter continued, “but for three years it has not worked—my belief is that the relationship between Greece and Turkey has not been helped and our own relations with both countries are not as good as they were before. It has maintained a wedge between Greece and Turkey and ourselves. It has not encouraged a settlement in Cyprus. I am sure that maintaining the embargo will continue the stalemate we have now.”

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<sup>3</sup> Carter and Kyprianou met on October 6 in Washington. See Document 59.

President Kyprianou said he was frightened of the consequences of lifting the embargo.

President Carter assured President Kyprianou that regardless of the outcome of the vote in the Congress he was committed to working together toward a settlement in Cyprus.

President Kyprianou asked whether President Carter had received his photograph and thanked the President for his. President Carter said he had and thanked him. Both wished each other well and the conversation was concluded.

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**57. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Nicosia, September 5, 1978, 1030Z

2262. Subject: Nimetz Call on President Kyprianou.

Summary. In lengthy initial meeting with President Kyprianou, Counselor Nimetz listened to standard Cypriot views from the President. Foreign Minister Rolandis introduced positive subjects on several occasions. The tone of meeting was constructive and friendly throughout. End summary.

1. Counselor Nimetz and Ambassador called on President Kyprianou for discussion which lasted almost one and one-half hours Sept. 4. FonMin Rolandis was also present.

2. President Kyprianou presented known GOC positions highlighting the need for USG to pressure Turkey to improve their proposals. In spite of differences over the embargo, Cyprus wanted close and good relations with the U.S. The President stated that, contrary to some reports, GOC was intensely interested in a solution to the Cyprus problem. He felt that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were eager for a settlement (although Denktash personally was not).

3. Nimetz stressed he had not brought any plan, but wanted a better understanding of the GOC's positions. We appreciated the efforts the President had made to dampen the adverse reaction caused by the embargo issue. Nimetz reported on his discussions with Turkish

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of Southern Europe, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977–1980, Lot 83D256, Box 1, Nimetz Trip to Cyprus—Sept. 1978. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Athens, London, and USUN.



SecGen Elekdag in Washington.<sup>2</sup> He pointed out that the Turks believe they have made proposals and if the GOC does not feel these proposals are good enough, they should be prepared to sit down and discuss them. Nimetz said that the U.S. is committed to work for a solution in support of the U.N. SecGen's mandate and was interested in defining as precisely as possible what the GOC considers to be necessary in order for them to commence intercommunal talks.

4. In response President Kyprianou again expressed his interest in meeting with Turkish PriMin Ecevit. Several attempts to have President define precisely what he felt he needed from Ecevit resulted in generalized statement that such meeting would permit him to satisfy himself whether Ecevit was interested in a real solution or not. If Turkey's goal is domination of Cyprus or partition, then no settlement is possible. If Turkey's interest is only the security of the Turkish Cypriots, then Kyprianou indicated that a solution could be found through the intercommunal talks.

5. FonMin Rolandis reaffirmed the positive aspect of GOC interest in negotiations, stressed the need for movement at this time and emphasized his conviction that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots sincerely wanted a solution, the main obstacle to which was the presence of Turkish troops. He felt, and the President agreed, that through demilitarization of the island the security of the Turkish Cypriots could be secured. Also, because of the economic potential of the island, attractive financial inducements could be offered to the Turkish Cypriots.

6. President Kyprianou said he really wanted to know how the Turks viewed the future of Cyprus. If indeed they viewed Cyprus as an independent entity then it should be possible to come to an agreement on the basis of the Makarios-Denktaş Guidelines (as interpreted by the Greek Cypriots).<sup>3</sup> One idea, the President said, would be to start with the 1960 Constitution, and see what additional guarantees the Turks would require. The discussions reviewed constitutional issues, geographic and demographic issues and a possible Varosha settlement in some depth. Nimetz also alluded to the missing persons issue and the reopening of Nicosia Airport.

7. Comment: President Kyprianou was cordial, calm and genuinely constructive. He seemed to listen with interest to his FonMin's interjections which tended to be more positive and imaginative. One was left with the feeling that the President does want to move toward a

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<sup>2</sup> Nimetz and Elekdag discussed technical matters relating to U.S.-Turkish military cooperation following the repeal of the arms embargo. The Cyprus dispute did not arise during this conversation. (Telegram 210172 to Ankara, August 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780339-0246)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, Document 31.

settlement but has not yet recognized what concessions it will require and how to initiate a process to get from here to there.

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**58. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Nicosia, September 8, 1978, 1700Z

2331. Subject: Nimetz Visit to Cyprus: Discussions With Turkish Cypriot Leader Denktash, September 6.

Summary: Counselor Nimetz and party met with Denktash for one hour September 6 and then continued discussions more informally with enlarged Turkish Cypriot delegation at luncheon in Famagusta. Denktash was moderate and emphasized willingness to sit down with Greek Cypriots at any time to discuss all the issues. He offered no new mechanism for resuming talks, claiming that he had made adequate offers, but was at least receptive to suggestions that UN might seek to draw up agenda for fresh round of negotiations and that 1960 Constitution could be modified to incorporate bizonality and federalism. While most skeptical of Kyprianou's proposal for demilitarization, Denktash displayed interest in concept of economic development fund to assist Turkish Cypriots. He endorsed general idea of non-governmental dialogue, but was suspicious of Greek Cypriot purposes in wanting this. Small, non-violent demonstration took place outside Denktash's residence during meeting. End summary.

1. Upon arrival at Denktash's residence, Nimetz party was greeted by some 108 rightist demonstrators bearing signs protesting Nimetz visit and opposing any concessions to Greek Cypriots, especially over Famagusta. Demonstration was peaceful if noisy; chanting was clearly audible during private meeting with Denktash.

2. Nimetz opened discussion by clarifying procedures for lifting of Turkish embargo. Once President had made required initial certification to Congress, embargo would be removed unconditionally.<sup>2</sup> There

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 6, Cyprus File. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Ankara, Athens, London, Bonn, Paris, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 121.

was requirement for report to Congress every sixty days, but no provision for re-imposition of embargo should we be unable to demonstrate progress at each interval. Subsequent requests to Congress for security assistance to Turkey and Greece would be accompanied by statements justifying such aid in the light of U.S. policy in the region; but this would not have any effect on removal of embargo. Denktash appeared reassured by this clarification, commenting that his concern over the embargo had been in its effect in alienating Turkey from the West.

3. Nimetz stressed to Denktash continued U.S. interest in seeing solution to Cyprus problem. Our concern was both humanitarian and based on realization that Greek-Turkish relations could not be restored fully until problem was resolved. Nimetz explained that purpose of current visit was to determine whether there were any prospects for forward movement and to see how the U.S. could best be of assistance to the parties. We would want to be in a position to be helpful should Waldheim ask for our advice. Nimetz noted that his talks on the Greek Cypriot side had gone better than expected. The GOC did not harp on the withdrawal of Turkish forces or the enforcement of UN resolutions. Rather, we encountered a promising mind-set in private conversations, and indications that serious thought was being given to the problem.

4. When Denktash recounted what he considered to be unrealistic demands on the other side, Nimetz stressed belief that there was in fact basis for bargaining. The Greek Cypriots had now returned to the Makarios-Denktash Guidelines, they accepted the concept of federation, and basically, they were ready to agree to bizonality. They appreciated, moreover, Turkish Cypriot concern over security and were prepared to make arrangements to satisfy this. Nimetz expressed belief that there should be enough ground in common to work something out, but that only way to accomplish anything was through negotiations. Denktash strongly concurred in the latter point; the table was the place to make suggestions and counter-suggestions.

5. Nimetz noted that there was a substantial political problem for each side in initiating negotiations. They could not accept the other's proposals as a basis for talks, and yet they could not simply sit down with no advance substantive preparation. Denktash interjected that the Makarios-Denktash Guidelines afforded a sufficient base for starting negotiations—why not discuss each other's interpretations of these? Nimetz accepted the notion of the Guidelines as a point of departure, but emphasized that the groundwork would have to be laid before any intercommunal sessions were held. Perhaps Waldheim or someone else could convoke preliminary discussions on the subjects to be discussed, with the aim of transforming the Guidelines into actual agenda items. Nimetz noted again that the GOC was not ready to negotiate in the abstract, and that it was politically very difficult for them to sit down with

the Turkish Cypriot April 13 proposals on the table.<sup>3</sup> Denktash maintained that the Turkish Cypriots had put forward their "biggest bait" and it had been rejected. He then recounted in some detail how Greek Cypriots had consistently rejected in past any and all proposals put forward by Turkish Cypriots. He underscored his readiness to discuss all issues, but what could he do if the other side would not sit down?

6. Revision of 1960 Constitution. Nimetz suggested that one negotiating path worth exploring would be modification of the 1960 Constitution, in accordance with the Makarios-Denktash Principles, to provide for a bizonal federation in Cyprus. This would give resumed negotiations form and substance, and would permit both sides to withdraw their own proposals without facing the unpromising prospect of an open agenda. Since the Greek Cypriots accepted both the 1960 Constitution and the Makarios-Denktash guidelines, this might well represent an acceptable face-saving device for them. Denktash explained that the 1960 Constitution had attempted to bridge what were quite opposite political aims on the part of the two Cypriot communities. Perhaps a more effective system could have evolved in time, but the Greek Cypriots had not allowed it to work. Denktash noted, however, that the concept of the 1960 Constitution was embodied in the April 13 proposals; he sought only to introduce the concepts of federalism and bizonality.

7. Return of refugees. Denktash argued that Greek Cypriot insistence that all refugees return to their homes amounted to undermining the concept of bizonality. He asserted that the Turkish Cypriots could not be dislocated once again, and that the only way to remove causes of friction was to allow the peoples of each community to live by themselves. Nimetz expressed his belief that the Greek Cypriots were realistic on this issue; they would insist that a certain number of refugees be allowed to return to their homes, but for practical purposes they envisaged the Turkish zone as overwhelmingly Turkish in population. This was a matter that would have to be resolved through quiet negotiations between the two sides. Nimetz underscored the political difficulties for the Greek Cypriots if they did not espouse the refugee cause; on the other hand, if the interest of the refugees could be stimulated, they could act as a useful pressure on the GOC as they had over Varosha. Nimetz pointed out to Denktash that legislation lifting embargo referred to return of refugees and not return of all refugees.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 52.

<sup>4</sup> Presidential Determination No. 78-18, September 26, formally lifting the U.S. arms embargo against Turkey included the following provision on the refugee issue in Cyprus: "That the Government of Turkey is acting in good faith to achieve a just and peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem, the early peaceable return of refugees to their homes and properties, and continued removal of Turkish military troops from Cyprus in the context of a solution to the Cyprus problem, and the early serious resumption of intercommunal talks aimed at a just, negotiated settlement." See Document 121.

8. Demilitarization and security. Nimetz said that he had found on the Greek Cypriot side an appreciation for Turkish Cypriot security concerns. They wanted to satisfy these concerns, and believed that Kyprianou's demilitarization proposal could accomplish this.<sup>5</sup> Denktash was most skeptical. He described how, after the failure to form a Cypriot army in the early 1960's, the Greek Cypriots had formed their own armed groups and had attacked the Turkish minority. On the basis of past experience, demilitarization meant that the Turks would be without arms while Greeks armed secretly. Denktash said that some form of disarmament could perhaps be arranged in the form of a renunciation of large weapons? But there would need to be sufficient forces on the island for the foreseeable future to back up settlement guarantees.

9. Economic assistance. Nimetz said that the Greek Cypriots had also expressed an understanding of the economic difficulties of the Turkish Cypriots and had indicated their readiness to extend some form of economic assistance in the event of a settlement. He reminded Denktash that in his statement before the HIRC on April 6 Secretary Vance had stated we might request additional funds from the Congress in the event of a settlement to ease the process of readjustment.<sup>6</sup> It was our hope, Nimetz said, that a larger proportion of this aid could be channeled to the Turkish Cypriot side. The Greeks seemed to feel, however, that outside assistance would not be required, that the island had sufficient potential as a center for tourism and Middle Eastern economic activity to provide for the needs of both sides. Nimetz expressed his belief that some economic package beneficial to the Turkish side could be developed, and that negotiations on the subject could usefully be held in parallel with constitutional and territorial talks. Perhaps a joint fund could be established to finance projects in the north.

10. Denktash freely admitted that the Turkish Cypriots had severe economic problems. While he emphasized that outside assistance was needed right now, he nevertheless maintained that a development fund established simultaneously with a political settlement would be a good idea if it came without political strings. In this context, Denktash brought up the economic "boycott" against the north, charging that the Greek Cypriots were the ones creating barriers and calling on them to lift the "boycott" as a gesture of goodwill. The GOC was opposed to reopening Nicosia Airport because this would weaken the "boycott". When Nimetz asked whether reopening the airport solely for UN use

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 54.

<sup>6</sup> For Vance's prepared statement before the Committee, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, May 1978, pp. 33–35.

would be any easier, Denktash declared that this would only reinforce the "boycott" in that the UN would continue to refuse to utilize Ercan.

11. UN aspects. In response to Denktash query, Nimetz said that it was our impression that the GOC had not yet decided on a plan of action at the UN this fall. We had told them that any resort to the UN in a manner offensive to the other side would cause difficulties as far as resuming negotiations were concerned, and we felt that they appreciated this. Nimetz encouraged Denktash to work with Galindo-Pohl as a means of resolving concrete problems such as Varosha and missing persons and of moving to a resumption of full talks. Denktash said that he believes Waldheim had a significant role to play in a settlement, that he could make it a success. Nimetz added that we believed Waldheim and his associates could be usefully involved in preparing at least an agenda for the next round of talks.

12. Contacts between the communities. While endorsing general concept of instituting dialogue with Greek Cypriots in non-governmental channels, Denktash was chary of Greek Cypriot intentions in wanting to enter into such contacts. He felt that the purpose might be to demonstrate to the world that Cypriots of both communities could get along together, and that the Cyprus dispute was essentially one between Cyprus and Turkey. He interpreted the proposed Chrysostomos-Mufti meeting in this light, and felt that it would not be a good idea.<sup>7</sup>

13. As Nimetz party departed, demonstrators rushed into compound of Denktash residence and briefly jostled Denktash/Nimetz car. There was no violence, however. Denktash, who had been surprised and embarrassed at demonstration, expressed apologies to Nimetz at meeting and at subsequent luncheon. He later publicly criticized demonstrators in radio interview.

14. In company of Denktash, Nimetz party visited two mass graves of Turkish Cypriots killed in 1974 and briefly toured closed portion of Varosha. Denktash then hosted luncheon at Palm Beach (formerly Constantiya) Hotel in Varosha, at which Assembly President Korhan, negotiator Onan and a number of "TFSC" ministers were also present.

**Stone**

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<sup>7</sup> No record of this meeting was found.

**59. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 6, 1978, 10:20–10:40 a.m.

**SUBJECT**

Summary of the President's Meeting with President Kyprianou of Cyprus

**PARTICIPANTS**

President Jimmy Carter  
Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State  
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Matthew Nimetz, Counselor, Department of State  
Jerrold Schecter, NSC Staff Member for Relations with the Press  
Paul B. Henze (Notetaker), National Security Council Staff Member  
  
Spyros Kyprianou, President of Cyprus  
Nikos Rolandis, Foreign Minister  
George Pelagias, Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Nikolaos G. Dimitriou, Cypriot Ambassador to the United States

*President Carter* met President Kyprianou on the South Lawn and took him and his party to the Cabinet Room. The President began the discussion by saying that Secretary Vance had given him a report of his conversations with President Kyprianou.<sup>2</sup> "We share your interest in bringing peace and basic human rights to Cypriots. As you know, we have a longstanding interest in trying to solve issues on Cyprus and I hope that we can make progress in the near future," the President continued. "Secretary Vance has told me that you are prepared to begin negotiations with Mr. Denktaş. We hope that this could be on a continuing basis. One of the things we have learned the hard way in dealing with the Israelis and the Egyptians is that spasmodic meetings are completely fruitless and can even cause a deterioration of the relationship because so much energy is spent in trying to get people to meet and in the intervening periods both sides concentrate on analyzing their reasons for disagreement and do not want to meet again. I hope that it will now be possible for negotiations to begin on the basis that you described to Secretary Vance. We are glad to offer our good offices but the UN should be the primary group to whom you turn for arrangements. We want to be helpful without interfering," the President concluded.

In replying, *President Kyprianou*, after thanking the President for receiving him and recalling their last meeting with pleasure, said he

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President: 10/78. Confidential. Drafted by Henze. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room. Kyprianou was in the United States to attend the UN General Assembly.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 54 and 55. The report referred to by Carter was not found.

had always felt it would be more constructive for him to meet with Prime Minister Ecevit than with Mr. Denktaş but he recognized that Ecevit did not want to meet with him. Thus he came to the conclusion that he should meet with Denktaş, provided that "certain things are agreed beforehand." "Just meeting and saying that we have failed will create more difficulties for everybody," he declared. He went on to say that many people in Cyprus opposed his meeting with Denktaş because Denktaş was regarded as committed to partition since 1954, i.e. an extremist. Other Turkish Cypriot leaders, Kyprianou said, were more moderate but because of the presence of Turkish troops could not express themselves. Thus he was willing to meet Denktaş on condition that nothing become known until there was agreement on the basis of which they could continue negotiations. The concrete step could be the return of the Greek part of Famagusta, he said. Once this was done talks could continue on three conditions: (1) that UN resolutions, especially #3212, be recognized as valid;<sup>3</sup> (2) that the existing Cyprus constitution of 1960, which was accepted by Britain, Greece and Turkey as well as both Cypriot communities and has not been replaced by anything else, would be recognized; and (3) that the four guiding principles which were agreed upon between Archbishop Makarios and Mr. Denktaş be considered valid.<sup>4</sup> Within the framework of these three conditions, President Kyprianou said, "A more specific framework for a solution to the Cyprus problem could be developed." He added that he agreed that negotiations that took place every six months could not lead to anything: "We should sit down for days and try to break the deadlock. I have to admit that with Denktaş it will be more difficult than it would be with Ecevit." He said that their information indicated that the vast majority of Turkish Cypriots were eager for a settlement: "They live under conditions of misery; they have no work; they do not know what to do; they want to emigrate; they are not happy with the Turkish troops; they are not happy with the settlers brought from Turkey to change the demographic character of Cyprus."

*President Kyprianou* reiterated his willingness to try negotiations with Denktaş but maintained there must be pressure on Denktaş from Ankara. "With all due respect, I believe your influence should be exercised in the direction of Ankara—they should change radically their attitude if we are going to achieve a solution—if we are going to approach the Cyprus problem in its complexity we will never solve it; it

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<sup>3</sup> Resolution 3212 was adopted by the General Assembly on November 1, 1974. In calling for the validity of the resolution, Kyprianou was likely referring to its first provision calling on "all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and interventions directed against it." (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1974, p. 295)

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 5, Document 31.



must be approached in its simplicity.” He complained that Cyprus could not negotiate on an equal basis with Turkey, but said that if the Turks were to agree to withdraw their troops from Cyprus and let them be replaced with an international police force, in which the U.S. could participate, then the Turkish Cypriots would be free to express their views. “I am sure that reconciliation would then be very easy. I am sure that past experience has taught both Greek and Turkish Cypriots that happiness lies in unity. If this does not happen, Cyprus will be a permanent source of friction between Greeks and Turks.” He concluded by saying that they had decided again to raise the Cyprus problem in the UN, both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council and ask for the implementation of UN resolutions. “Naturally we would like to have your support for this,” he declared.<sup>5</sup>

*President Carter* said Prime Minister Ecevit had assured him that Denktaş was willing to withdraw from Varosha. “I believe they will comply with this commitment,” the President added. The exact delimitation of the withdrawal lines would have to be worked out, he noted. Until a settlement was achieved, however, the President said he thought it unrealistic to expect the Turks to withdraw all their troops from Cyprus. Mr. Christopher said the Turkish position was that they would withdraw their troops when a settlement had been reached except for troops that would be provided in the settlement agreement itself. The Turks were committed to drawing new boundaries between the Turkish and Greek communities in Cyprus, he added. The President asked about the boundaries of Varosha. Mr. Christopher said he assumed they could be agreed on and President Kyprianou replied that they would have to be worked out. He said there were differences between Greeks and Turks on the number of inhabitants thought to want to return to Varosha. They calculated 32,000 according to 1973 statistics, who could return now, but the Turks had been talking of 36,000. Some people might not want to return, he said, unless everyone returned. *President Carter* asked whether in referring to unanimous support for UN Resolution #3212, President Kyprianou meant that Turkey had also supported it. He did, President Kyprianou replied. Mr. Christopher said Turkey had supported it. President Carter then asked about the 1960 constitution. Mr. Christopher said it could be a basis for starting talks but it did not reflect the federal principles that were agreed upon between Makarios and Denktaş and these changes would have to be accepted.

*President Kyprianou* said the 1960 constitution would have to be applied practically. He maintained that Cyprus did not really have the prerequisites for a federal system because it was too small, but he said

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<sup>5</sup> President Carter did not comment on this request. [Footnote in the original.]

they were resigned to accepting it if the Turks insisted. *President Carter* asked whether Denktaş had reaffirmed his adherence to the agreements that he and Makarios had made. Mr. Christopher said he had and that he felt these principles could be regarded, and accepted by Denktaş as the basis for renewed negotiations.

"You would prefer that this be kept secret?" *President Carter* asked *President Kyprianou*, who answered "Yes." *President Carter* stressed that the U.S. is not trying to inject itself into this situation but only wishes to assure both parties that its good offices are there to be drawn on.

*President Kyprianou* replied, "We need your assistance—I have one of the most difficult tasks to try to realize—a country which has been split by invasion. I need your assistance, for all human rights have been violated. Turkey must understand that a divided Cyprus or a Cyprus with a bad solution may simply be the beginning of a new Cyprus problem. We want to find a lasting solution. Federalism there may be—but there must also be unity."

*President Carter* replied that he had found Ecevit to be quite forthcoming, especially in comparison to his predecessor. "He is willing to take steps that may not be popular in his own country. I have no way of knowing the relationship between Ecevit and Denktaş but I think that it is obvious that Ecevit would have some influence on Denktaş," the President continued; "we look forward to exploring these next steps with you and then we can see whether what you propose is acceptable to Denktaş," he added. He then asked *President Kyprianou*, "Do you have a preference where the future meetings might take place?"

*President Kyprianou* replied that they might take place in Cyprus—"I have no preference—as long as there is agreement in advance." "Would Nicosia be a satisfactory place?" *President Carter* asked. *President Kyprianou* said that it would be. Mr. Christopher indicated that the State Department would start working on this question immediately with both parties. *President Kyprianou* said that he had told Secretary Vance that there must be a firm commitment on the part of the Turks for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus.

*President Carter* said we felt we had that and the Turks were adhering to their promise to us: They had told us they would continue withdrawing troops and they had; they had notified us each time they planned to do so—"and our intelligence has indicated that they have done what they have told us they were going to do," the President declared. Mr. Christopher said he expected the Turks to go on withdrawing troops in the course of negotiations. *President Kyprianou* came back to his earlier assertion: if it would be possible to withdraw all Turkish troops and have an independent force replace them, then settlement would be easier.

"I agree that would be easier," *President Carter* said, "but I do not think that it is accurate to anticipate that the Turks are going to withdraw their troops unilaterally. There is distrust on both sides and we would like to remove it." "It is obvious to me after long talks with Ecevit that they would like to see this situation solved and they are willing to be much more flexible than I had observed a year ago," the President declared, noting that other commitments made it necessary for him to bring the meeting to an end. He accompanied President Kyprianou and his party back to his car.

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## 60. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 31, 1978, 10:45–11:20 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Cypriot-Turkish Negotiations

### PARTICIPANTS

David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates, NSC Staff

Ambassador Nicos G. Dimitriou of Cyprus

*Ambassador Dimitriou*, responding to Mr. Aaron's greeting, said that he was trying to be optimistic but was not hopeful that the Turks would be responsive to Greek-Cypriot concerns. He noted that President Kyprianou had had a good meeting with President Carter and that they were now waiting to see what would happen. The Ambassador said that his government had turned to the UN.

*Mr. Aaron* observed that going to the UN was a waste of time.

*The Ambassador* said that Cyprus must apprise the UN that the problem on the island remains. He said his government hoped that after discussions at the UN there might be some movement.

*Mr. Aaron* replied that the only progress toward a negotiated solution would be through sustained talks.

*Ambassador Dimitriou* countered that the Turkish proposal does not offer the possibility of a meaningful dialogue. For President Kyprianou

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 33, Memcons: Aaron, David: 2/77–12/78. Confidential. Drafted by Gates. The meeting took place in Aaron's office in the White House.

to meet with Denktash, the latter needs to agree to certain pre-conditions, including the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus and agreement on certain principles. The Ambassador said that the US must understand that his government had been burned several times in talks with the Turks which had failed. He said that his government did not want the same type of negotiating merry-go-round.

*Mr. Aaron* stated in response that talks were the only way to get a settlement.

*The Ambassador* asked for *Mr. Aaron's* views, particularly whether he thought the Turks would make concessions along the lines agreed by Makarios and Denktash (for example, withdrawal of Turkish troops).

*Mr. Aaron* said he could understand the political problems involved and particularly the difficulties imposed by the presence of Turkish troops in Cyprus. But he cautioned that pre-conditions for negotiations never lead to anything productive. The US believes the only answer is for the intercommunal talks to start and for the negotiations to be kept going. In these circumstances, there might be an important role for the UN Secretary General. But broader UN consideration of the problem would not help.

*The Ambassador* noted the UN General Assembly recognition of the Cyprus problem and related Security Council resolutions. He added that the General Assembly has taken specific note of the fact that the resolutions are not being observed.

*Mr. Aaron* replied that this would not get the troops out.

*The Ambassador* said that his government is committed to placing the issue in the hands of the UN. He contended that it is not a choice between the UN or intercommunal talks—noting that both forums might be used.

*Mr. Aaron* responded that the UN approach is only a prescription for delay and it will not advance the cause of a settlement.

*Ambassador Dimitriou* responded that his government had no choice but recourse to the UN—although he realistically had to note, as one commentator has put it, that UN resolutions are like checks for which there is no bank to honor.

*Mr. Aaron* asked when the dialogue could get started.

*The Ambassador* responded that the UN debate likely will be finished by mid-November with another resolution likely the result. He then asked to what extent the US would pressure Turkey to make concessions.

*Mr. Aaron* responded jokingly that the US has about as much leverage with Turkey as with the Ambassador's government. He said that the US certainly will help where it can and will offer its good offices,

but warned that pressure will not work. He said that the sides must get their talks going, define problems and issues and in so doing bring matters to a point where other countries such as the US can use their influence on specific points—rather than to make broad overtures generally condemning one side or the other. He continued that only in this way can the US help to break the barrier between the Turks and the Government of Cyprus. He emphasized again the need to get a sustained discussion going first, and reiterated that commitments in advance or pre-conditions simply will not work. The application of US pressure in such circumstances is similar to using a lever without a fulcrum.

*The Ambassador* observed that a change in the Turkish attitude had been predicted by the US if the embargo were lifted, but in fact there had been no sign of change. He asked if the US is prepared to abide by the conditions of the law. He noted that the President has avowed in his reports to the Congress that the Turks are making a good faith effort toward a settlement.

*Mr. Aaron* responded that the Turks like the Cypriots are not willing to make concessions before talks. He added that the Greek-Cypriots are not negotiating from weakness. He observed that there is a great deal of pressure on the Turkish to do the right thing, but they do not have to do it if the Greek-Cypriots will not even start talking. The Turks are prepared to start talking and if the Greek-Cypriots want an agreement, then they must start talking.

*The Ambassador* agreed that dialogue is essential but said that preceding rounds of discussions had presented chances for progress that had not been fulfilled. He said this prior experience accounted for Greek-Cypriot reservations about further talks. He said that they need some indication of what the Turks are prepared to do on Cyprus, even if such indications are behind the scenes. He concluded that another round of talks ending in stalemate would only aggravate the situation on the island.

*Mr. Aaron* said that in essence the Ambassador was saying the Greek-Cypriots need talks.

*The Ambassador* replied that his government has affirmed the desirability of talks, but that all the signals they see about the prospects for such talks are negative. He suggested that there is too wide a gap between the parties now for progress and that exploratory talks are needed. The Ambassador continued that the Allies have been unwilling to press Turkey in this regard.

*Mr. Aaron* responded that there is nothing specific to pressure the Turks about. He repeated that pre-conditions never work and there will not be progress under such circumstances. He allowed that perhaps the State Department could try to help behind the scenes but

then again emphasized that the only solution is to sit down and negotiate.

*The Ambassador* said that his government is not against negotiating, but that there were differences of approach. There once had been three obstacles to progress: (1) the question of union with Greece—which is no longer an issue; (2) sovereignty on the basis of federation—which his government has accepted as long as it is not a sham; and (3) opposition to a bizonal federation—which his government has accepted in principle (although there are differences with respect to territory and constitution). He said that as a result of these changes in his government's position the situation was now better than before. Nevertheless, the Turks continue to persist on 32.8 percent of the island while his government calls for 18 percent. He noted that the official government records prove that Turkish ownership before the 1975 conflict and occupation was about 12 percent. He concluded that all these things give the impression that the Turks do not want to negotiate, that their attitude is negative and that they do not want a solution. Six rounds of talks have been frustrating. He continued that if the UN Secretary General felt that further talks would be useful he would have called for them.

*Mr. Aaron* asked if the Ambassador knew the UN Secretary General. He is certainly not Dag Hammarskjöld. He continued that the Secretary General is in the least favorable position to say that you should sit down with the Turks.

*The Ambassador* repeated that the Secretary General is not persuaded that the situation has changed enough to permit new talks. He added that he hopes the US position in the UN debate will not be against the Cypriot government. He noted that the Eastern countries will support Cyprus, but that the US is cautious.

*Mr. Aaron* replied that if the sides continue their endless pursuit of questions of pride the stalemate will go on forever. The US wants no part of that. We are prepared to put our weight behind concrete progress. But if the US jumps into the UN debate to satisfy the pride of the Cypriot government, how does that advance the negotiations? Thus, the US probably will be cautious and save our influence for the main event—real discussions.

*The Ambassador* said that if the Turks realize that the US is dedicated to a settlement, their attitude would change. He complained that the Turks were exploiting their position in the Alliance, whose members were not being helpful.

*Mr. Aaron* said again that there is nothing on which we could now bring our influence to bear.

*The Ambassador* asked if that meant that the US needed an opening to play its role, to which *Mr. Aaron* replied "Yes, exactly."

# 61. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Cyprus, Turkey, and Greece<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 13, 1978, 2343Z

288157. Subject: Cyprus Initiative: Nimetz Meetings on November 10 With Michaelides/Rolandis, Denktash, and Secretary-General Waldheim.

1. Department Counselor Nimetz met in New York with GOC House of Representatives President Michaelides and Foreign Minister Rolandis at 10:15 A.M. on November 10 and submitted to them our non-paper on a framework for a Cyprus settlement. Nimetz was accompanied by EUR/SE Cyprus Desk Officer Chapman. Meeting took place at Harvard Club since Rolandis/Michaelides did not wish to inform or involve other members of inter-party delegation attending UNGA. By way of introduction Nimetz made the same general points as in para 2, State 284954, emphasizing that the non-paper represented a very delicate balance and that we did not want to engage in any pre-negotiations on it.<sup>2</sup> Michaelides and Rolandis read through the paper quickly, with Nimetz offering specific comments on each paragraph. Neither of the Cypriots raised any immediate objections to particular features of the paper, and seemed quite pleased at the territorial formula and at the provisions for resettlement of Varosha. They undertook to study it very carefully, to discuss it with President Kyprianou, and to be in touch with us again very shortly. Rolandis suggested a fur-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 6, Cyprus File. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Chapman; cleared by Ewing, Sharon Ahmad (EUR), Thomas G. Martin (S/S–O) and in IO/UNP; approved by Nimetz. Sent for information Immediate to Bonn, London, Ottawa, Paris, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 284954 to Nicosia, November 9, the Department instructed Stone to give Kyprianou a “non-paper,” drafted in coordination with the United Kingdom and Canada, as a possible basis for resumed intercommunal talks. The paper would also be submitted to Denktash in New York on the same confidential basis in which Kyprianou was to receive it. Stone was also instructed to tell Kyprianou that, while some elements might be unacceptable the paper, taken as a whole, would serve as a “valid point of departure.” Once the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots accepted this framework, Waldheim would then formally present the paper to the negotiators from their respective communities. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780462–0291) The “non-paper” outlined a conceptual framework to address the disputed issues on Cyprus, including the following provisions: a “bicommunal federal state with two constituent regions,” each of which would be inhabited primarily by Greek Cypriots in one region and Turkish Cypriots in the other; a new constitutional structure and a government system consisting of a central authority as well as regional institutions; and the withdrawal of non-Cypriot armed forces from the island. (Memorandum from Nimetz to Christopher, October 23; National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 6, Cyprus File)

ther meeting early next week. All present were in full agreement that the paper should be held very closely.

2. Michaelides said that the GOC had been giving considerable thought as to the level and working procedures of future intercommunal negotiations. If indeed the two sides were able to return to the table, the GOC would want to negotiate on a serious and sustained basis and he—Michaelides—would probably be the chief negotiator, assisted by a moderately-sized team. However, this would be possible only if the Turkish Cypriots were also prepared to appoint a higher level negotiator. Michaelides agreed with Nimetz that for the sake of efficiency and speed negotiating sub-groups could be formed to discuss territory, specific constitutional aspects, return of displaced persons, etc.

3. The GOC request for a Security Council meeting on the Cyprus issue was discussed at some length. Both Michaelides and Rolandis characterized resort to the Council as an unfortunate necessity, and explained it principally in terms of domestic political needs. They averred that they were interested in having only a brief session which would adopt a resolution reaffirming previous UNGA and UNSC resolutions on Cyprus and would request the Secretary-General to report to the Council within a specified time on the progress achieved in implementing these resolutions. Rolandis explained further that the GOC intent was to extract the political content from the semi-annual debate and resolution on renewal of the UNFICYP mandate, so that this essentially procedural step could be taken in the future without the kind of difficulties that were experienced last June. There would then be semi-annual SYG reports (and presumably SC meetings) on the implementation of U.N. resolutions; and separate semi-annual reports on UNFICYP operations.

4. Nimetz noted that we had all along considered recourse to the Security Council to be unnecessary and possibly detrimental to the prospects for negotiation. However, since the GOC seemed determined to go ahead—and Rolandis confirmed that this was so—our aim would be to get the debate over as quickly as possible and to ensure that whatever resolution was passed would contribute to a resumption of negotiations. Nimetz said that we would be prepared to work with the GOC and others to develop a resolution that achieved these ends. In light of the Varosha SC experience in the fall of 1977,<sup>3</sup> we were genuinely concerned that Security Council consideration of the issue could drag on

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<sup>3</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 414 was adopted on September 15, 1977, after a complaint by the Cypriot Government concerning the Turkish plan to re-colonize Varosha in the Turkish-occupied part of Cyprus. The resolution called on both parties to refrain from unilateral actions and to resume negotiations.



for several weeks—with possibly serious consequences. Rolandis hypothesized that if both sides were prepared to accept the non-paper immediately, then Waldheim could perhaps be asked early next week to request the parties to postpone Security Council consideration of the Cyprus item on the grounds that his contacts with the parties were bearing fruit and that he was now prepared to put some specific ideas before them. This would give the GOC a way to back out gracefully. Michaelides was somewhat dubious about such a scheme, noting that it would give rise to much speculation in Cyprus and might not satisfy public opinion. While on this theme, Michaelides noted that the negative U.S. vote on operative paragraph 8 of the GA Resolution had been the principal news item in the Greek Cypriot press that day, and had given rise to across-the-board anti-American commentaries.<sup>4</sup>

5. At noon Nimetz met with Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash (at USUN) and submitted to him the Cyprus non-paper. Denktash was accompanied by New York Rep Atalay; Nimetz by Chapman and USUN officer Hirsch. At subsequent luncheon hosted by Denktash former Turkish UN Rep Turkmen was also present. By way of introductory remarks Nimetz drew on the general points in para 2, State 284952, emphasizing that the non-paper did not constitute an “American plan,” that we were asking the two Cypriot parties to accept it only as a basis for further intercommunal negotiations, and that its existence and the present U.S. role should remain strictly confidential. Nimetz also stressed our belief that a just and durable solution to the Cyprus problem could be achieved only through free, direct negotiations between representatives of the two communities, and that the role of outsiders should be confined solely to stimulating a resumption of this process.

6. After a cursory reading of the non-paper, Denktash said that he could only comment as Sir Winston Churchill reportedly did upon hearing of a military catastrophe—“Is that so? Fetch me a scotch-and-water.” This was no more than the Greek Cypriot position artfully camouflaged; he could not envisage Kyprianou having any difficulty with a single sentence. He was particularly worried at mention of the 1960 Constitution, which he had repeatedly said was unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriot side as a basis for negotiation. Denktash said that his existing authority from the “TFSC” Assembly was to work for a bizonal, bicommunal federal system within the Makarios-Denktash

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<sup>4</sup> Paragraph 8 of General Assembly Resolution 33/15, adopted on November 9, called for the Security Council to examine the timely implementation of all UN Cyprus resolutions and recommend appropriate action to ensure their implementation. The United States abstained in the vote on the resolution because of that provision, on the grounds that it would not promote an atmosphere conducive to negotiations. See *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1978, pp. 383–384.

Guidelines. Since he was now being asked to accept a non-paper that represented an amalgamation of the Guidelines and the 1960 Constitution, he would accordingly be obliged to consult with Orek, the Cabinet and the Assembly before he could provide us with a response. Such wide-ranging consultations would make it near-impossible to maintain the necessary secrecy. He predicted that, in any case, the Greek Cypriots would leak the paper very quickly.

7. Nimetz said that the non-paper represented no more than an extension and elaboration of the basic Makarios-Denktash instructions, and was in no way incompatible with them. He recalled that Denktash himself had previously acknowledged that elements of the old constitution could be effectively utilized in drawing up the new. Since the whole power structure would be very different in the future, the Turkish Cypriots should have no fear that they would be denied basic rights and privileges embodied in the 1960 document. Nimetz then went through the non-paper with Denktash in detail, drawing on the points in para 3, State 284952, and demonstrating that essential Turkish Cypriot interests were safeguarded at each and every juncture.<sup>5</sup> He asked Denktash to look beyond the wording and the rhetoric, and to analyze carefully the meaning of each specific provision of the paper. Aside from complaining that the constitutional court system established in 1960 had never worked, Denktash offered no further specific comments on the paper. However, he undertook to give it "real thought" and to be back in touch with us. Nimetz said that we had received the impression that the Greek Cypriots were genuinely interested in negotiating seriously and on a continuous basis towards a settlement. They were giving serious consideration to appointing Michaelides as chief interlocutor, if this elevation of the negotiating level were matched on the Turkish Cypriot side.

8. In ensuing discussion of the GOC request for UNSC consideration of the Cyprus issue, Nimetz said that the Greek Cypriots had told us they were interested in having only a brief Council session and that they had their sights on what they saw as a mild resolution. For our part, we would like to see UNSC consideration of the issue finished as quickly as possible, and our strategy would be geared towards encouraging a resumption of the intercommunal talks—or at least preventing the erection of any further obstacles to this. Denktash, clearly dispirited at the twin "blows" of the UNGA outcome and the upcoming SC debate, said that his chief preoccupation was to get the whole business

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<sup>5</sup> In telegram 284952 to Ankara, November 9, the Department emphasized that the United States expected both the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to commit to sustained and earnest negotiations, and that the framework allowed the Turkish Cypriots "a significant voice in national affairs and fully protects their essential interests." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780462-0287)

finished quickly so that he could return to Cyprus. He was afraid, however, that the Greek Cypriots would try to drag things out indefinitely. Denktash added that the harsh GA Resolution and immediate recourse to the Security Council were hardly indicative of a readiness on the Greek Cypriot part to enter into serious face-to-face negotiations.<sup>6</sup>

9. Nimetz subsequently met with Secretary-General Waldheim and Under Secretary-General Urquhart, with Secretariat officer Sherry also present. Nimetz took note of the several approaches that had been made in New York and elsewhere that day, and commented briefly on the initial reactions of Rolandis and Michaelides and of Denktash. He said that our purpose had not been to put forward a paper that both sides would endorse with enthusiasm, but simply one that they would agree to accept as a basis for resumed intercommunal negotiations under U.N. auspices. Once both parties had indicated their acceptance we would communicate this to the Secretary General, in the hope that he would then convoke a meeting between Kyprianou and Denktash and formally present the paper to them as a framework for talks. Nimetz noted that we had had to overcome resistance from both sides in undertaking this effort. The Turks had repeatedly told us they wanted no outside initiative and had expressed the belief that Kyprianou would come around if given time and less attention; the Greek Cypriots, for their part, had wanted us to delay until after the UNSC meeting on Cyprus was over. We had told the Turks that their approach was simply inadequate and that some positive effort was needed if there were to be negotiations; and with the Greek Cypriots we had insisted that we could wait no longer.

10. Waldheim said that he would not hesitate to convoke a Kyprianou-Denktash meeting, under this scenario, so as to reach agreement on the basic framework for negotiation. While noting that much work remained to be done, he endorsed our basic approach to the problem. Waldheim sketched the difficulties he faced in convening negotiations unless he was assured that something positive would result from them. Last spring he had taken the Turkish Cypriot proposals to Nicosia and had met with a wall of resistance from Kyprianou, who had privately told him that he would not send a delegation even if the Secretary General called for a new round of talks. Waldheim said that he could not have risked so outright a Greek Cypriot rebuff. However, now that the Turkish arms embargo debate was over there would seem to be no valid reason for Kyprianou to resist a further effort to restart the intercommunal negotiations, and he surely could not object to a face-to-face meeting with Denktash if only because Makarios had done

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<sup>6</sup> Reference is to General Assembly Resolution 33/15 of November 9. See footnote 4 above.

this. Nimetz said that Greek Cypriot plans to raise the level of their negotiator—if this was matched on the Turkish Cypriot side—seemed to indicate that they were serious about entering into a sustained and productive dialogue. Waldheim noted that he had also been told by the Greek Cypriots that Michaelides might be the new negotiator, and recalled that he had on several occasions in the past encouraged both sides to raise the level of their interlocutors. He added that he could not personally be present while intercommunal negotiations were in progress, but would leave someone else in charge.

11. Waldheim read through the paper quickly, with Nimetz commenting on certain of the more important provisions. The Secretary General said that some of the ideas incorporated into it, such as the Agency for Regional Cooperation and Coordination, sounded familiar. The area of Varosha to be opened for resettlement was in fact quite similar to that he had himself suggested at one time. Nimetz commented generally that the non-paper was an expansion of the Makarios-Denktaş Guidelines, a restatement at the next level of specificity. It was a balanced document that did not prejudice the position of either side, and it was our intention to press for its integral acceptance without engaging in pre-negotiations.

12. Waldheim expressed the hope that the upcoming Security Council consideration of the Cyprus issue would not disrupt this initiative. He noted that he had twice sought to discourage Rolandis from having recourse to the Council. On the first occasion, Rolandis had seemed to agree that this would be unwise, but then he had come back to say that a formal decision had been taken in Cyprus and that public opinion there expected some Security Council action. Further approaches would no doubt meet with the same response, and did not therefore seem worthwhile. Waldheim noted that much would depend on the nature of the resolution the Greek Cypriots were able to obtain, although given the Security Council configuration this could not but be a relatively mild one. In response to the Secretary General's query as to the timing of further moves, Nimetz estimated that it might take the parties perhaps a week or two to reach a decision on the non-paper. We had urged them to move quickly, but at the same time to analyze the non-paper with due care. While agreeing that we should not wait too long, Waldheim expressed doubt as to whether a resumption of negotiations would be practically possible before next January or February, with the UNFICYP renewal debate in the Security Council and the Christmas holidays coming up very soon.

13. Waldheim assured us that he would hold the non-paper in the strictest confidence: only he, Urquhart and Sherry would know about it. In concluding the meeting, he urged that we continue to stress to both parties that this effort is aimed at no more than bringing about a

resumption of talks in the established intercommunal forum. The Turkish side, as we were no doubt well aware, was very concerned that our plan was to abandon this framework in favor of a more direct U.S. role.

14. In a separate conversation, Sherry confirmed that the GOC intent in the Security Council was to request a resolution recalling previous GA and SC resolutions and asking that the Secretary General report to the Council twice a year on progress made in their implementation. Urquhart and Sherry both emphasized that such a requirement for periodic reports would make sustained and serious negotiations very difficult.

15. Comment: Waldheim is already required to report to the Security Council twice a year in connection with semi-annual renewals of UNFICYP. We do not rpt not believe requiring second series of reports by Waldheim would have effect of de-politicizing UNFICYP debate, as Rolandis claimed. To the contrary, probable result would be four Waldheim reports a year and four Security Council meetings, in which inevitable polemics could adversely affect chances for successful negotiations—Greek Cypriots probably want to use these meetings to keep the pressure upon the Turks.

Vance

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## **62. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

TDFIR DB-315/15822-78

Washington, November 21, 1978

15947690. Exclusive dissemination to addressee named in final paragraph. Country: Cyprus. Subject: Comments of Cypriot President on U.S. Cyprus Initiative. (DOI: Mid-November 1978). Source: [3½ lines not declassified]

Summary: Cypriot President Spyros Kyprianou believes that the U.S. Government is making a sincere effort to assist in resolving the Cyprus problem. Nonetheless, his initial view, following receipt of the U.S. Government suggestions for a settlement, is that he cannot accept

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Bremont Subject File, Box 64, Cyprus: 2/77-12/78. Secret; Wnintel; No-for; Nocontract; Orcon.

the proposal in its present form as a basis for resumption of intercommunal talks.<sup>2</sup> Pending the outcome of discussions with Cypriot ministers and party leaders, he intends to prepare a series of counterproposals to the American paper in order to attempt to identify and correct those elements in the paper which are unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots. End summary.

1. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in mid-November 1978, Cypriot President Spyros Kyprianou gave his views on the paper presented to the GOC by the American Government containing a suggested framework for a settlement to the Cyprus problem. Kyprianou said that based on his initial reading and study of the paper, he believed that the American Government was serious in attempting to bring about a settlement to the Cyprus problem. He said, however, that he could not accept the paper in its present form as a basis on which to resume intercommunal negotiations. Kyprianou added that, pending discussion of the paper with the government ministers and with party leaders in the National Council, his present intention is to prepare a set of "counterproposals" which would address those issues in the present paper which are unacceptable to the GOC.

2. Kyprianou identified as follows those areas of the paper which troubled him:

A. While the GOC accepts the principle that "the northern region of Cyprus" will be predominantly Turkish, Kyprianou said that this conflicts with later provisions in the paper dealing with the return of refugees to their homes. Kyprianou said that the GOC must be in a position to state unequivocally that "all" refugees will be "allowed" to return. The implication in the paper that some refugees may be "unable" to return (i.e., not permitted to return) is unacceptable as a basic element in any proposal which could lead to the resumption of intercommunal talks. Kyprianou accepts that many refugees indeed may choose not to return to their former homes and properties, but stated that the present paper must be clarified to eliminate the implication that some would not be permitted to return. Kyprianou said that he accepted fully the concept that those Cypriots who chose to return to the Turkish area would fall under local Turkish administration. This concept would remain valid even should a sizable number of Greek Cypriots choose to return to a given area. Should this happen in the north, the effective result would be, in such areas, a Greek Cypriot majority living under the administration of a Turkish minority. This particular area then would not technically be "predominantly Turkish." Kyprianou acknowledged that this would undoubtedly inhibit many Greek Cypriots from exer-

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 61.

cising their right to return. Kyprianou also said that Turkish Cypriots currently living in Greek Cypriot properties in the north to which Greek Cypriots wanted to return should be resettled at government expense on government lands closely adjacent to the locations they presently inhabit.

B. Kyprianou said that he accepted the American paper's formulation that the Makarios/Denktaş Guidelines, the 1960 Cyprus Constitution and relevant United Nations' resolutions should provide the framework for a negotiated settlement. He said, however, that he could not accept the order and emphasis given these elements in the present paper. Consequently, he tentatively plans to suggest that this portion of the paper be restructured to give primary emphasis to the United Nations' resolutions.

C. Kyprianou said that while he would not object to the bicameral proposals in the U.S. paper, he felt that as currently formulated they would not provide sufficient importance and weight to the role of the Greek Cypriot community. For instance, the provision that three eighths of the Turkish Cypriot members of the lower House must participate in a vote to make it binding left open a very real possibility of deadlock in the deliberations of legislature. Kyprianou said he plans to ask that these points be clarified and that the Greek Cypriot role be strengthened.

D. Regarding the provisions for President and Vice President of the Republic, Kyprianou said he felt that, under present formulation, the Turkish side would insist that the Presidency alternate between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot incumbents. Kyprianou described this as a most important point because the Greek Cypriots could never accept a Turkish Cypriot president. Kyprianou said that he would seek to have this point explicitly clarified.

E. Kyprianou said that he had some problems with the concept of a thirty percent proportional representation for Turkish Cypriots in the assignment of Ministerial portfolios in the Federal Government, but felt these problems could be resolved through negotiations. Ratification of Ministerial appointments by the upper House was satisfactory to Kyprianou as long as the correct proportional balance is maintained.

F. With regard to the proposed Agency for Reconstruction, Kyprianou said that it would be difficult for him to accept equal representation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in this body.

G. Kyprianou said that he felt strongly about the issue of Famağusta and intended to hold out for the return to Greek Cypriot control of the entire area populated by the Greek Cypriots prior to 1974. Kyprianou said that this specifically included the rural areas west of Varosha and its suburbs.

3. Kyprianou said that he intends to begin work on formulating clarification and counterproposals to the American paper as soon as the senior Cypriot officials and party leaders now in New York had returned to Nicosia. Kyprianou said that the public U.S. role in these proposals must be minimized and the U.N., specifically Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, should be directly and actively involved.

4. Kyprianou said that he is considering three separate approaches to the situation. One is a public call for the Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides to submit new, concrete proposals for the resumption of the talks. The second alternative would be a meeting between himself and the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash to submit their own clarifications and counterproposals to the American framework. The third alternative being considered by Kyprianou would be to initiate a series of contacts with the Turkish Cypriot side on a level lower than that of President. Specifically, he has considered delegating this task to Minister to the President Georgios Ioannidis. Kyprianou said that, at present, he tends to favor the latter approach, but might revise his views in light of upcoming consultations with government and party leaders.

5. In conclusion, Kyprianou said that he has no intention of rejecting the American paper. On the other hand, the GOC will not accept the paper without reservations because, in his view, acceptance of the plan in its present form would lead to partition of the island.

6. ACQ: [1 line not declassified]

7. Field dissem: [1½ lines not declassified]

8. Washington dissem

State: Exclusive for the Director, INR

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**63. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus and the Mission to the United Nations<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 13, 1979, 0152Z

9646. Subject: Nimetz Meeting With Waldheim on Cyprus, January 12.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790017-0441. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Chapman; cleared by Melvyn Levitsky (IO/UNP), Dillery, Hopper, and Thomas Reynders (S/S-O); approved by Vest. Sent for information to Ankara; and Priority to Athens, Bonn, London, Ottawa, and Paris.



## 1. (C-Entire text)

2. Department Counselor Nimetz met with UN Secretary General Waldheim January 12 for review of latest developments on Cyprus issue. Under Secretary Urquhart and Secretariat officer Sherry attended meeting on UN side; USUN officer Hirsch and Cyprus Desk Officer Chapman on US side.

3. Waldheim began by quickly summarizing state of play from UN perspective. The Greek Cypriots had given a positive response to his proposed formula for the resumption of negotiations, accepting it without reservations. The Turkish side had informed Galindo Pohl that they accepted the proposal in principle but had a number of reservations.<sup>2</sup> Denktash had put forward a revised draft and had promised a second explanatory paper which had not yet been delivered. (This explanatory paper arrived by cable from Nicosia during follow on meeting with Urquhart.)<sup>3</sup> Waldheim said he feared that if the Turkish side set preconditions for returning to the table there would be the usual wrangling between the two sides which could lead to unfortunate delay. Secretary General noted that he had proposed to the two sides that they meet some time during the second half of February.

4. Waldheim said he saw the Turkish Cypriot redraft creating a problem in that the Greek Cypriots had already said that they could accept no changes in the UN document. Rolandis apparently feared that to do so would cause further domestic problems for Kyprianou. Another difficulty that had now arisen was that Kyprianou and Rolandis wanted to publish the UN proposal. Waldheim said that he had just sent a letter to Rolandis through Galindo Pohl urging that he not publish the proposal but he (Waldheim) was not sanguine that Kyprianou could resist domestic pressure to publish. Waldheim said that Galindo Pohl had also been instructed to tell the Greek Cypriots that some concessions would be expected from them on economic matters once the negotiations are underway.

5. Waldheim said that he had recently been in touch with Turkish UN PermRep Eralp to express his concern over the Turkish Cypriot suggested revisions and had asked that the GOT use its influence with Denktash to persuade him to accept the UN formulation without amendment. Denktash would of course be free to express reservations over the formulation which could then be discussed once negotiations

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<sup>2</sup> Waldheim's December 19, 1978, procedural paper on the resumption of intercommunal talks called for meetings to be held either in Nicosia or at UN Headquarters in New York, and were to focus on the constitutional, territorial, and economic disputes between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 9, Memos From WC to P, E, T, M, C—1978)

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

were underway. Instructions had also gone to Galindo Pohl to make a direct request to Denktash along these lines. Waldheim also noted that the French UN PermRep had come to see him November 11, on behalf of the EC-9, to seek information on Cyprus developments and to ask whether the Nine could be of any help. Waldheim had said that it would be useful if the Nine could express to the Turkish side their concern over any attempt to rewrite his formulation.

6. Nimetz said that it seemed as if we had made definite progress now towards a resumption of intercommunal talks, although admittedly new problems had arisen with the Denktash counterproposal. Nimetz then briefed the Secretary General on the Cyprus aspects of the Deputy Secretary's January 11 meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit on the basis of Ankara 334, particularly stressing the points noted in para 8.<sup>4</sup> Nimetz went on to say that we had had further commentary from the Turkish Foreign Ministry on the Denktash counterproposal, and had been told that the Turkish side would not insist on certain of their changes—in particular insertion of the word “bizonal”. It was our feeling, Nimetz said, that the Turkish Cypriots would accept the UN paper if some minor changes were made. Basically this was a psychological matter for the Turkish side: the paper, which they assumed had been coordinated with the Greek Cypriots, had been sent to them for their comments and suggestions, and they probably felt a need to provide some input.

7. Waldheim said that he was encouraged to hear what Ecevit had told Christopher regarding the intentions of the Turkish side. This seemed to paint quite a different picture from what the Denktash counterproposal as such had implied. He said that the best course now would be for the UN to prepare a fresh version of the formulation taking into account some of the Turkish Cypriot suggestions. He felt that it would be best to do this as quickly as possible. Urquhart pointed out that Rolandis had already said that he could accept no changes in the UN paper. Waldheim acknowledged this but emphasized that he had previously made clear to Rolandis that the paper as submitted on December 19–20 was not to be considered a final text but would have to await the comments from the other side. As far as the substance of the Turkish Cypriot suggestions was concerned, Waldheim said he believed it would be much easier to arrange a “political truce” between the parties than to bring an end to the “economic blockade”.

8. Nimetz told Waldheim that we would be fully prepared to make approaches in Ankara and Nicosia in support of Waldheim's revised

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 344 from Ankara, January 11, the Embassy reported that Christopher sought neutral language in the proposal that would be acceptable to both sides. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790015-0991) Regarding Christopher's visit to Ankara, see footnote 2, Document 129.

paper, if he thought this would be helpful. Waldheim said he would appreciate this. The two agreed that the basic concept would be to make a few changes so that Denktash could say that his ideas had been taken into account in the paper, while the other side could maintain that the changes were minor. Nimetz said that we had prepared some suggested revisions which we would be happy to pass on on an informal basis. He stressed that these were purely a US product and had not been coordinated with our British and Canadian partners.

9. In concluding the meeting Waldheim said that he was encouraged at recent developments and felt that a resumption of negotiations could shortly take place.<sup>5</sup> Nimetz said that we shared this view, adding that Ecevit had assured Christopher in Ankara of the Turkish desire to move into serious negotiations.

10. Nimetz and Chapman then met with Urquhart and Sherry to go over our informal suggestions for revision of the UN formulation. Urquhart and Sherry said that they would take these into account in drafting the revised text together with their own ideas and some that Galindo Pohl had forwarded. In the course of the meeting telegrams were delivered from Galindo Pohl summarizing his meetings with Denktash and Rolandis on January 11. Urquhart shared these with us. Rolandis appeared to be backing away from his position that there could be no changes in the UN paper. He expressed a strong preference for the original text but at the same time asked that if amendments were to be proposed that this be done strictly in private. Denktash had delivered to Galindo Pohl the explanatory paper which he had earlier promised, and had indicated that he was not setting conditions for the resumption of talks. He said that all he had done was to express his views on the draft paper as had been requested of him, in the expectation that his views would be given careful consideration. Denktash complimented the Secretary General for making a constructive approach for the resumption of talks, and expressed understanding and goodwill in respect to his efforts. Nimetz and Urquhart agreed that these reports were encouraging and that the way seemed clear for the UN to present a second “working draft” to both sides. Urquhart said that he would provide us with the new text as soon as possible.

11. Nimetz suggested that it might be tactically useful for the Secretary General to suggest to the parties a tentative date for a

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<sup>5</sup> According to a report from the Embassy in Bonn, Waldheim expressed pessimism on the prospects for Cyprus intercommunal negotiations during a meeting on February 7 with the West German Permanent Representative to the UN. Citing Denktash's conditions for future talks as counterproductive, Waldheim noted that Turkey was less inclined toward flexibility on Cyprus since its leaders believed that the revolution in Iran had strengthened Ankara's standing in the region. (Memorandum from Vest to Christopher, February 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780037–1424)

Kyprianou-Denktash meeting. This would bring more pressure on the parties to accept the revised formulation and would clearly indicate that the Secretary General is prepared to move decisively. Urquhart agreed that this would be a good idea but noted that he would have to consult with the Secretary General on this matter. It might be possible for some specific date to be mentioned in a covering letter which Galindo Pohl would give to Denktash and Rolandis when submitting the revised paper.

12. Urquhart gave us a copy of Denktash's explanatory paper (referred to in para 10 above).<sup>6</sup> This will be transmitted septel.

13. Department will brief UK and Canadian representatives on Cyprus aspects of Ecevit-Christopher conversation and on further steps to be taken by UN early in the week of January 14.

Vance

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<sup>6</sup> Not found.

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**64. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Embassy in the United Kingdom and the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Nicosia, March 22, 1979, 1643Z

826. London for Counselor Nimetz. Subj: Next Steps on Cyprus Dispute.

1. (Confidential-Entire text)

2. This message recommends next steps in handling Cyprus problem.

3. Summary. Current U.N. efforts appear to have run their course without effective results. Any mediation effort, however, to be acceptable to GOC must be under aegis UNSYG. Recommend that SYG Waldheim be urged to appoint proven negotiator such as Urquhart or de Cuellar as Personal Representative SYG for conduct sustained negotiations. Also suggest study of economic moves that could contribute to ultimate settlement. End summary.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of Southern Europe, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977-1980, Lot 83D256, Box 1, POL 2 Cyprus Group. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Athens, Bonn, Ottawa, and Paris; and Immediate to USUN.

4. Based on my conversations with Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike, there seems to be clear consensus that recent effort of SYG Waldheim, through SRSG Galindo Pohl, to reach agreement on agenda for resumption intercommunal talks is getting nowhere and has, in fact, come to the end of the road. Pleasant and capable as Galindo Pohl is, he has not been able to show much initiative and effectively press both sides to arrive at an agreed agenda. In fact, his function has been largely that of messenger between SYG and two sides. There are those who feel he has also been inhibited by his limited command of the English language.

5. All Cypriots recognize essentiality and need for an effective mediator who would be politically acceptable. Latter qualification boils down to requirement that any mediator must be under U.N. auspices. This in turn, means either personal involvement of SecGen or appointment of recognized mediator—though this term is unacceptable to Turkish side—of international standing. Such an individual could be supported by Galindo Pohl in his efforts. I understand precedent for such a role exist in the case of Tuomioja and Galo Plaza in 1964.<sup>2</sup>

6. Individuals who come to mind are Under-Secy Brian Urquhart or his newly-appointed colleague, de Cuellar. Latter, who served with distinction as SRSG here in Cyprus prior to appointment Galindo Pohl, almost succeeded in resolving thorny question of committee for missing persons before he left island in late 1977.<sup>3</sup> Department may know of others. I do not believe that such a high-level appointment would create serious difficulties for Galindo Pohl. It might be desirable if person named were also empowered to consult with GOG and GOT.

7. I believe foregoing recommendation represents best hope of re-directing U.N. efforts onto a constructive political track which might ultimately lead to Cyprus solution. As Dept. aware, many Cypriots regret rejection Anglo-American-Canadian plan as basis for resumption negotiations and certainly feel that way should be found to resurrect that plan in the context of resumption intercommunal talks.<sup>4</sup> This however could not be the basis for the resumption of negotiations, but would have to be preceded by confidential agreement to make use of the plan.

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<sup>2</sup> Following the death of Sakari Tuomioja, a Finnish diplomat and UN Mediator for the Cyprus conflict, Secretary General U Thant appointed Ecuadorian diplomat Galo Plaza Lasso as his successor.

<sup>3</sup> Pérez de Cuéllar held the post of Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus from September 1975 until December 1977, at which point he rejoined the Peruvian Foreign Service. His successor, Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, arrived in Cyprus in early May 1978. In telegram 1184 from Nicosia, May 9, the Embassy relayed Galindo Pohl's optimism about the future course of the intercommunal negotiations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780196–0441)

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the U.S. "non-paper"; see footnote 2, Document 61.

8. I am personally convinced that FonMin Rolandis and President of the House of Reps Michaelides are genuinely anxious to find a way out of present impasse, and I am further convinced that their views carry great weight with President Kyprianou. On Turkish/Turkish Cypriot side I have been assured again today, March 22, by Ambassador Onhon that Denktash will stand behind July 20, 1978, offer on Varosha<sup>5</sup> and that Ecevit was helpful in urging Denktash to be flexible in negotiations during latter's recent Ankara visit. When I told Onhon I sensed that the position of the Turkish side had hardened in the last six months, he denied that this was in fact the case.

9. I had hoped to meet with FonMin Rolandis following joint meeting of National and Ministerial Councils March 21, but in view his early departure for Italy that has not been possible. I hope see DirGen Pelagias March 23 after conclusion of resumed session National and Ministerial Council meeting at 1800 hours March 22. In brief conversation with Presidential Adviser Soulioti, I was assured that discussions in Council were focussing on positive as well as negative moves. Possibility exists that this is, however, only tactical. FonMin Rolandis told me evening March 20 that he had just spent a half hour with President Kyprianou and was encouraged by latter's receptivity to his positive suggestions regarding next steps.

10. Parallel to foregoing recommendation for next move on political front, I suggest we study economic moves that could be made to improve climate and prospects for lasting Cyprus solution. Such moves may be easier for GOC to take in present atmosphere than political steps. Over time they could contribute more to Cyprus settlement than if we and others continue to hammer away on political track.

11. I have drafted foregoing in hopes that it will be of assistance to Counselor Nimetz in helping to focus his discussions in London. USUN will undoubtedly have its own perspective re above recommendations including its assessment of likely reaction of SYG.

**Stone**

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<sup>5</sup> In an "open message" to the Greek Cypriot leadership, Denktash offered that Greek Cypriots who formerly inhabited the city of Varosha would be permitted to begin resettlement as soon as the intercommunal talks were reconvened. (Telegram 185911 to Ottawa, July 22; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780302-0808) See also *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1978, p. 381.

**65. Telegram From the U.S. Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, April 12, 1979, 2330Z

1594. Subject: Christopher/Nimetz Discussion With Waldheim on the Cyprus Initiative.

1. (C-Entire text.)

2. Summary: SYG Waldheim told the Deputy Secretary and the Counselor April 11 that as a result of consultations last week with Rolandis and Atakol, he will propose the convening of a Kyprianou/Denktaş summit in Nicosia probably May 16–18. He hopes to utilize the summit to obtain their agreement to a scaled-down agenda as the basis for early resumption of intercommunal negotiations. In preparation for the summit he will send USYG Perez de Cuellar to Nicosia later this month to work with the parties. Christopher urged Waldheim to seek agreement at the summit on a specific date for resumption of intercommunal negotiations. The U.S., he said, was prepared to give its full support to his efforts, and would make supporting demarches in Ankara and Nicosia. End summary.

3. Deputy Secretary Christopher and Counselor Nimetz, accompanied by Ambassador Petree, USUN MisOff Hirsch and Deputy Sec. Special Asst. Spiegel met with Waldheim, Urquhart, and Sherry in the Secretary-General's office at the UN on April 11 at 1700 to discuss the UN's Cyprus initiative. In reply to Christopher's query as to the outcome of his meetings with Rolandis and Atakol, Waldheim said that both of them had indicated that they wanted him to convene a summit even without an agenda agreed upon in advance. Rolandis had telephoned him April 10 from Salonika to confirm GOC agreement to convening the summit. Rather than seeking to hold the summit later this month as Rolandis had suggested, Waldheim instead will propose to the parties that he convene it in Nicosia on or about May 16–18 upon returning from his Asian trip. In order to assure adequate preparations, he intends to dispatch USYG Perez de Cuellar to Nicosia next week to conduct further preliminary consultations with the parties.

4. At their meeting in Geneva, Waldheim said, Rolandis had indicated that the GOC hoped the summit could produce agreement on an agenda for resumption of intercommunal negotiations. Rolandis outlined three possible scenarios for the results of the summit: (a) full

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of Southern Europe, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977–1980, Lot 83D256, Box 1, POL 2 Cyprus Group. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Athens, Brussels, London, Nicosia, Ottawa, Paris, and USNATO.

agreement on an agenda; (b) failure with no agreement at all; and (c) an interim situation in which the SYG could announce that agreement had been reached on certain elements of an agenda while other points remained to be worked out. In this last case, the parties would ask Waldheim to continue his efforts to resolve the remaining differences. Christopher told Waldheim that we hope he will be able to obtain the agreement of the parties to a specific early date for resumption of intercommunal negotiations, rather than end up with the inconclusive result outlined by Rolandis in option c, or worse yet, with a complete breakdown.

5. Waldheim said that he agreed with the Deputy Secy. on the desirability of reaching agreement on an agenda, even if it is significantly scaled-down from the ones which the UN had already proposed as well as from the U.S. non-paper. The key problems, he said, remain the need to obtain some assurances from the Turkish side regarding Varosha and from the Cypriot side regarding easing of the economic blockade and political warfare in a manner which each side can explain credibly to its own political institutions and public opinion.

6. Reviewing his Zurich discussion, Waldheim said Atakol insisted that the Turkish Cypriots are prepared to have Varosha considered only as part of a package settlement. This departs from the UN's understanding of Denktash's July 20, 1978 open message. The present Turkish Cypriot position as Atakol had explained it to him is that they will not agree to any preliminary resolution of the Varosha issue, nor will they allow any refugees to return before progress has been made on other issues. The UN and the Turkish Cypriots continue to disagree on the extent of the area of resettlement envisaged in the open message. Nonetheless, Waldheim said he was encouraged by Atakol's indication of willingness to have him convene a summit even without a pre-agreed agenda in order to try to cut the Gordian Knot. He recalled the positive results of the Makarios/Denktash summit which had produced the four Guidelines.<sup>2</sup>

7. As regards the Cypriot position, Waldheim said he had urged Rolandis to seek GOC agreement to have the economic blockade included as a subject for discussion on the agenda of intercommunal negotiations. Rolandis had adamantly refused stating that it was impossible for the GOC, after the Turks had stolen their orchards, to make it possible for them to sell this produce abroad. Urquhart suggested that one way to overcome this problem could be for the SYG at the summit to suggest ways of improving the economic and social situation on the island without referring specifically to the blockade. Waldheim added

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 5, Document 31.



that he hoped there would be some movement on this issue at the summit, despite the GOC's very tough position.

8. Christopher expressed appreciation to Waldheim for his efforts and decision to convene a summit. The U.S., he said, would give him its full support and we were prepared to make supporting demarches in Ankara and Nicosia. Our impression, he continued, was that a confluence of events at this particular time made it more likely than earlier that the two sides would be prepared to show flexibility. Supporters of Greece in the U.S. Congress had conveyed to Nicosia their impression that the GOC's negative approach to the US/UK/Canadian proposal and in negotiations with the SYG was not in its best interest. The Ecevit government for its part may be more eager to lighten its responsibilities for Cyprus in view of its pressing economic and social problems. We believe, he continued, that the Turkish side could be persuaded to go back to Denktash's original position of July 20 on Varosha if the Cypriots agree to make some tangible concessions on the economic and political warfare issues. As regards the Cypriots, it is our impression that Rolandis wants to be helpful. Moreover, it may be possible for Karamanlis to encourage Kyprianou to show greater flexibility. Nimetz observed that Waldheim had considerable leverage with both sides at this particular time. They are very much aware that he must prepare his report to the Security Council by May 31 and neither will want to be blamed by him for intransigence or lack of political will.

9. Urquhart asked for further clarification of our assessment of the current GOT attitude toward the Cyprus question. The chairman of the Cypriot House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, Alexis Ghalanos, had suggested to him this week that the Turkish domestic situation was so bad that Cyprus was no longer a priority issue in internal politics. Ghalanos thought this could make it easier for Ecevit to demonstrate flexibility. Christopher replied that there was perhaps some validity to Ghalanos' assessment, but on the other hand it was hard for Ecevit personally to devote much attention to the Cyprus issue given the press of other business.

10. At the end of this portion of the discussion, (Middle East section is being reported septel) Christopher again expressed our deep appreciation to Waldheim for his efforts in this very difficult task and pledged our full support and readiness to do whatever we could to help bring about an early resumption of intercommunal negotiations after the summit. They agreed that USUN and the UN Secretariat would remain in close touch with each other in the weeks ahead.

**Young**

66. **Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Nicosia, April 30, 1979, 1538Z

1168. Subject: Call on President Kyprianou April 30. Ref: State 107265.<sup>2</sup>

1. Confidential-Entire text.

2. This telegram concerns ongoing efforts directed at a Cyprus solution.

3. Summary. I called on President Kyprianou morning April 30 and carried out instructions reftel. The President asked me to inform my government that he is sincerely interested in finding common ground for a resumption of the intercommunal talks. End summary.

4. I met with President Kyprianou for approximately twenty minutes morning April 30 and carried out instructions para 14 reftel. As regards advance preparations for the meeting, the President said he did not wish to agree beforehand on what would be said in a communique following the meeting before the meeting had even been held. He implied that he considered this practice somewhat dishonest and said that he wanted to deal with matters very clearly and fairly.

5. Regarding the proposal that he meet alone with Denktash, the President said he had mentioned this to President Carter when he met with him last fall.<sup>3</sup> His objective in seeking such a private meeting was not to deal the SecGen out of participation but rather to provide an opportunity for him and Denktash to have a private conversation so that they could say things to one another which would not be on the record. He did not envisage that such a meeting would necessarily be a very lengthy one.

6. When I made the point that we understood the SecGen might come to Cyprus only if he received some assurances of a successful meeting, the President said he disagreed with such an approach on the part of the SecGen. One couldn't be certain that the meeting would be

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of Southern Europe, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977-1980, Lot 83D256, Box 1, POL 2 Cyprus Group. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Athens, London, Bonn, Ottawa, Paris, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 107265 to Nicosia, April 28, the Department instructed Stone to keep the upcoming summit between Kyprianou and Denktash on track and to underscore to both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders the importance both the United States and the United Nations attached to a successful outcome. The Department also reported on the meeting between Christopher and Pérez de Cuéllar in Washington on April 26. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 59.

successful even before it took place. The only way this could happen would be if the SecGen wanted Perez de Cuellar to do the job for him and, if that were the case, it wouldn't be necessary for the SecGen himself to participate. As regards a mediator or a Security Council mediation panel, the President said that, while he would have no objection to this approach, he assured me he would not press it.

7. He said he wanted a thorough exploration of the issues with Denktash and he was not interested in a purely ceremonial meeting. Only after going into the substance of the problem in depth did he feel it would be possible to make progress. He asked me to assure my government that he intended to have a full discussion with Denktash, that he was very sincere in this effort, and that he was genuinely interested in securing common ground for the resumption of the intercommunal talks.

8. The President obviously regards the effort to agree to a communique even before the meeting is held as a questionable practice, and told me he felt he should not be expected to mislead either his own people or the international community. One had to have the meeting first before coming to agreement on the wording of a communique.

9. Just before leaving, I told him I had heard very good things about Ambassador de Cuellar, and he indicated that he thinks very highly of him.

Stone

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## 67. Editorial Note

On May 19, 1979, Cypriot President Spyros Kyprianou and Rauf Denktash, *de facto* President and leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, held a summit in Nicosia under the auspices of the United Nations and with the participation of United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. In telegram 2221 from USUN, May 23, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations reported that Waldheim warned both leaders that the international community was losing patience with the stalemate and that the capacity of the United Nations to mediate the conflict had a limit. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790235–0078) The summit produced a ten-point agreement, which expanded upon the four-point agreement forged between Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios and Denktash on February 12, 1977. (See footnote 5, Document 31) The most salient feature of the ten-point agree-

ment was that both leaders agreed to continue holding talks on the territorial and constitutional disputes that had heretofore prevented a settlement between the two Cypriot communities.

## 68. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 22, 1979, 12:05–12:17 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Meeting with Archbishop Chrysostomos

### PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter  
Mike Chanin, Deputy Assistant to the President  
Phil Spector, Associate Assistant to the President  
Robert Hunter, NSC Staff Member

Archbishop Chrysostomos  
Ambassador Nicos Dimitriou, Cypriot Ambassador to the United States  
Andros Nicolaides, Minister, Cypriot Embassy  
Archbishop Iakovos, Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church of North and South America

Photo session.

*The President* said he was happy to see Archbishop Iakovos.

*Archbishop Iakovos* replied that they are good friends, and the President has his prayers.

*The President* said that he needs his prayers and help.

*Archbishop Iakovos* thanked the President for his role in Cyprus. His Beatitude is here to express the gratitude of the Cypriot people.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 9, Cyprus: 1/78–5/79. Confidential. Hunter forwarded a copy to Brzezinski on May 23. (Ibid.) The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

<sup>2</sup> Although he succeeded Makarios as Archbishop of Cyprus in November 1977, Chrysostomos did not assume Makarios' political authority. The meeting with Carter occurred over the objections of NSC Staff member Paul Henze, who asserted in a May 21 memorandum to Brzezinski that Chrysostomos' "hardline" position against Turkish Cypriot and Turkish interests would complicate matters just at the time when Kyprianou and Denktash had agreed to more talks. Henze also questioned the political value of a meeting: "The number of Greek-American votes likely to be gained from a Presidential 'photo session' with Chrysostomos is infinitesimal. If Greek Americans find, however, that they can hold the President hostage (and get him to reverse a stand) in maneuvers such as this, they can be relied upon to aid and abet more of them." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 3, 5/79) In mid-April, the CIA first reported that Chrysostomos sought a meeting with Carter, and that he would press for U.S. support of a unified Cypriot state under Greek Cypriot rule. (Central Intelligence Agency, CADRE System No. C03338732)

*Archbishop Chrysostomos* said that they know well American history, and that the American people have fought for the freedom and independence of other nations. The Cypriot people know the American tradition of liberalism. They know the President's own declarations on human rights, especially concerning Cyprus.

*The President* said yes.

*Archbishop Chrysostomos* said that this was the reason, after the President's election, he offered to bring the best wishes of the people of Cyprus. They rejoiced over the President's election. This is a tragic situation for the people of Cyprus, who are submerged under Turkish occupation. He asks: what will the U.S. do to help the situation. The President has a religious mind, and believes in Christ. In the whole Middle East, Christianity is in danger from the Moslems. Cyprus is the only Middle East country where Christians are in the great majority. He appeals to the President's Christian conscience to act to help his Christian brothers in Cyprus to regain their human rights. They ask only freedom and justice. The approach of the United States to Cyprus' problems is not what they expect. They know that Turkey depends on the U.S. The U.S. needs to pressure Turkey to withdraw its troops from Cyprus. The people of Cyprus believe that the U.S. had the power to prevent their going there; and believe the U.S. has the power to stop the invasion, and to urge Turkey to withdraw its troops.

*The President* said that their goals are the same: withdrawal of Turkish troops; to see Cyprus united; to see peace restored; and to see all Cypriot peoples have their human rights. Yet the Archbishop overestimates the ability of the United States to move Turkey. However, he promises to try to bring about these goals.

*Archbishop Chrysostomos* said (jokingly) that the President might ask if he had done his best, and, if not, "Why Not the Best?"—for freedom.

*The President* (laughing) agreed. They must struggle together.

*Archbishop Chrysostomos* said that their duties are imposed by Christian belief.

*The President* thanked the Archbishop. (There was then the presentation of gifts. The President said, on receiving a book on Cyprus, that he would like to see it for himself; Archbishop *Chrysostomos* said that he would be welcome. He also presented a letter from some Greek prisoners in Turkey, and asked the President's help).<sup>3</sup>

*The President* said they should work together to achieve their common goals.

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.

*Archbishop Chrysostomos* asked what message the President had for the people of Cyprus.

*The President* answered that we share their goals of a unified Cyprus, the withdrawal of Turkish troops, the ability of people to return to their homes, and the restoration of human rights.

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**69. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Nicosia, June 18, 1979, 1323Z

1705. For Counselor Nimetz and Assistant Secretary Vest, EUR.  
Subj: Meeting With Perez de Cuellar June 18

1. During my meeting with UN Under-Secy Perez de Cuellar (please protect) morning June 18, reported septel, he mentioned two matters in great confidence.<sup>2</sup> First, he said that the UN had obtained information that during Denktash's recent visit to Ankara, he had complained to PriMin Ecevit that SecGen Waldheim was no longer impartial in dealing with the Cyprus problem and had taken the Greek-Cypriot position regarding missing persons. For this reason Denktash reportedly informed Ecevit that SecGen Waldheim had lost his credibility with the Turkish-Cypriot community. Comment: From this disclosure, I gathered that de Cuellar intends to lean over backwards in an effort to be as impartial as possible in handling the negotiations.

2. Secondly, de Cuellar told me that his personal reaction to the individuals at the table was positive as far as all were concerned with the exception of Soysal. He said that Ioannides and Onan had served together as members of the Assembly and were personally very cordial to one another. In the case of Triantafyllides and Ertekun, he said they had been close personal friends, a friendship which had equally been shared by their wives. The one jarring personality, he said, was Soysal, whom he described as cold and hard. He called him a Marxist who, he had been told by a Turkish source, was practically a Communist. He

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of Southern Europe, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977-1980, Lot 83D256, Box 1, POL 2 Cyprus Group. Secret; Immediate; Exdis—Handle as Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> At this juncture Pérez de Cuéllar had assumed the role as primary UN actor to mediate the intercommunal negotiations. In telegram 1708 from Nicosia, June 18, the Embassy reported on the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790276-0323)

asked if it would be possible for me to provide him with some background information on Soysal. I told him I would see what I could do.

3. Action requested: I would much appreciate a frank appraisal of Soysal and what makes him tick, which I could share with de Cuellar orally if the Department prefers I not give him anything in writing.<sup>3</sup>

Stone

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<sup>3</sup> An unknown hand drew a bracket around this paragraph and wrote underneath: "we will send careful essentially 'make the best of his expertise and humanitarianism' type oral talking points." The Embassy responded to the request for information on Soysal in telegram 4781 from Ankara, June 22: "His concept of a Cyprus settlement aims first and foremost to protect Turkish interests in the region, and he is convinced that the West cannot be sympathetic to those interests, no matter how impartial it may try to be." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790282–0899)

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## 70. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher) to Vice President Mondale<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 26, 1979

### SUBJECT

Cyprus Negotiations

The Cyprus intercommunal talks resumed as scheduled on June 15, but major difficulties soon arose over the agenda and the U.N. decided to call a recess on June 22 rather than risk a complete breakdown of the negotiations. Over the past month U.N. representatives in Cyprus have held informal consultations with both sides in an effort to break this deadlock, but their efforts have thus far proved unavailing.

The current dispute between the Cypriot parties is on the surface a procedural one—whether the negotiations will commence with point two (definitions) or point five (Varosha) of the Nicosia communique of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Office of the Vice President, Box 205, Memos from the VP to the President, [7/1/1979–9/2/80]. Confidential. Mondale forwarded the memorandum to Carter on July 27 and commented: "Mr. President, attached is a memorandum that Warren Christopher prepared for me on the status of the current Cyprus negotiations. You will notice the last paragraph indicates some sign that the U.N. is weakening in its assertiveness in trying to bring about a solution. I hope that when you meet Waldheim, you will press him for progress in this area." (Ibid.)

May 19.<sup>2</sup> But this disagreement reflects clear substantive differences as well as a persistent mutual distrust between the parties. The Greek Cypriots want to see Varosha opened to resettlement as quickly as possible both as a test of Turkish good faith and as a means of assuring domestic support for the negotiating track, while the Turkish Cypriots are concerned about yielding Varosha without first having obtained a Greek Cypriot commitment to the fundamentals (as defined by the Turkish Cypriots) of an overall settlement. In recent meetings with U.N. representatives the Greek Cypriots seem to have shown some flexibility, but thus far the Turkish Cypriots have said that they cannot even discuss Varosha unless they have some assurances as to the general shape of an overall settlement.

The reasons for the Turkish Cypriot attitude are unclear. They may simply be stalling, or it may be that they are genuinely concerned that the Greek Cypriots' intention is simply to take back Varosha and not continue with serious negotiations on the principal constitutional and territorial issues. The U.N. ascribes the Turkish Cypriots' negativism to the current political situation in Turkey. With a very precarious hold on power and with elections due in October, Prime Minister Ecevit, they maintain, is in no position to pressure the Turkish Cypriots into making concessions.

With these questions in mind we approached the Turkish Government to probe their intentions with respect to Cyprus. High-ranking Foreign Ministry officials with whom we spoke stoutly defended the Turkish Cypriot position, but at the same time assured us that the Turkish side remains interested in a Cyprus settlement and gave indications that they might be prepared to reach a compromise arrangement that would allow talks to proceed on Varosha in exchange for certain Greek Cypriot assurances. Our assessment is that, while the domestic political situation indeed acts as a serious constraint, the Turks' delaying tactics are primarily prompted by substantive concerns over Greek Cypriot intentions. This gives us some cause to hope that a formula can be devised to resolve the present deadlock. But this will require an intensified effort by the U.N., which plays the key mediatory role.

Indeed, one of the problems we have detected over the past week or so is a waning in the U.N.'s interest in actively pursuing a resolution of the deadlock. In an effort to reactivate the U.N. role, I raised the Cyprus question with Kurt Waldheim yesterday and urged him to do

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 67.



what he could to end the negotiating recess as soon as possible.<sup>3</sup> He said that the internal Turkish situation probably precluded any progress for the moment, but undertook to instruct his representatives in Nicosia to make a further effort with the Cypriot parties. We are asking our Mission in New York to follow up with the U.N. Secretariat on this and to pass to them certain suggestions for a scenario to overcome the deadlock.

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<sup>3</sup> No substantive record of a meeting between Christopher and Waldheim on July 25 was found. Waldheim met with Carter on July 30 in the Cabinet Room; the portion of the conversation on Cyprus is as follows: "Waldheim acknowledges some slippage since the successful 19 May negotiations. The Turks, according to him, now want to change the terms, have 'Bizonality' clarified, and secure better provision for 'security arrangements.' The Secretary-General stated his intention to pursue the matter actively through his Special Representative. He commented that Prime Minister Ecevit doesn't seem to want to get in too deeply prior to October elections in Turkey." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 51, UN: 1979)

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**71. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Nimetz) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 14, 1979

SUBJECT

The Cyprus Situation

REF

USUN 3713, dated 9/11/79<sup>2</sup>

The day before yesterday you asked me for my views concerning the assessment of a UN official that Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit felt the May 19 Kyprianou-Denktaş agreement was an unacceptable basis for negotiations. EUR has prepared a review of the present state of the Cyprus negotiations, which I am attaching. My personal views are the following:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 9, Memos from WMC to Offices/Bureaus—1979. Confidential. John King, Nimetz' Special Assistant, initialed for Nimetz.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is telegram 3713 from USUN, September 11, which reported that UN efforts had failed to make progress on the Cyprus negotiations.

—There is little reason to expect a resumption of productive Cyprus intercommunal talks in the near term.

—The Cypriot Greeks will concentrate on the UN forum through December. The Turks will be preoccupied with elections, political and domestic issues in the coming months.

—As long as there is hope that SYG Waldheim will bring the two sides back to the conference table, we must back him fully.

—Based on our information, we cannot confirm the reports that Ecevit found the May 19 document unacceptable and that he instructed the Turkish Cypriots to stall the negotiations indefinitely.<sup>3</sup>

—However, as noted above, Ecevit is increasingly preoccupied with his own shaky political situation and has less time for and interest in the Cyprus problem.

—As the November 30 deadline for the UN SYG Cyprus report approaches, the two Cypriot parties may, however, show some more flexibility vis-a-vis the Waldheim good-offices effort to avoid being blamed in the report for lack of progress.

### **Attachment**

#### **Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State<sup>4</sup>**

Washington, undated

#### *The Present State of the Cyprus Negotiations*

REF: USUN 3713 (attached)<sup>5</sup>

We agree with Sherry that there is little reason to expect a resumption of the Cyprus intercommunal talks in the near term. The parties remain fundamentally divided on the nature of a final settlement. They have argued indirectly since June 22 over how to resume their direct dialogue, but the makings of an agreement to negotiate are lacking. Neither side is willing to give up its major trump—for the Greek Cypriots, the lifting of the economic blockade; for the Turkish Cypriots, the re-

<sup>3</sup> See Document 70.

<sup>4</sup> Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by James A. Williams (EUR/SE) on September 13; cleared by Dillery, Sharon E. Ahmad (EUR), Melvyn Levitsky (IO/UNP), and John Nix (IO/UNP).

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2 above. The telegram characterized Sherry as "gloomy" regarding the status of the negotiations because "both parties will continue to hold adamantly to fundamentally irreconcilable positions."

opening of Varosha to resettlement—until the other makes prior concessions. This approach effectively precludes a pragmatic approach to the many aspects of the Cyprus problem. After more than a decade of fitful starts and stops, the intercommunal talks have gone nowhere.

The Cypriot communities have no historical experience of successful negotiation with each other. Outside powers imposed the London-Zurich Accords on them in 1959.<sup>6</sup> Between independence and late 1963, the two communities frustrated each other, thus making the Accords unworkable. Between 1964 and 1967, the Greek Cypriots dominated the Turkish Cypriots. Between 1968 and mid-1974, the intercommunal talks made no progress because the Turkish side was too weak and the Greek side too demanding. Since 1974, the Turkish side has pressed its advantage and the Greek side has been under no effective inducement to yield.

It sometimes appears that the USG is the only government which truly wants a successful negotiation of the Cyprus problem. Since 1963, we have submitted more plans and devoted more time to this problem than have all other outside powers. Unable to bring about a negotiated settlement, we have sought as a policy goal to establish and to maintain a process of intercommunal negotiation, in order to meet our minimal requirements. Unfortunately, our leverage has been insufficient to alter the posture of either party to the Cyprus dispute.

At present, we see no alternative to continued support of Waldheim's good-offices effort. That effort brought about the May 19 Kyprianou-Denktaş agreement—the only significant point on which the two sides have agreed in the past 30 months. So long as there is hope that Waldheim will bring the two sides back to the conference table, we must back him fully. Specifically, we must continue to argue for resumption of the talks on the basis of the May 19 agreement, a document which incorporates by reference the 1977 Makarios-Denktaş guidelines and the pertinent UN resolutions. We shall be considering what steps we might take if this effort fails, but we see no reason for us to get out in front of Waldheim until the fate of his initiative is known.

We disagree with Sherry's evaluation that Ecevit decided to scotch the talks after May 19, or that he found the May 19 document unacceptable. Ecevit is preoccupied with his own shaky political position and elections in October. However, acceding to the May 19 agreement cost him little, if anything, in Turkey. We do not see how resumption of the talks would hurt him prior to the elections next month. The reality on the Turkish side is probably more subtle—i.e., to the extent that Ecevit dwells increasingly on his domestic predicament, he has less time for

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 3, Document 8.

the Cyprus problem which thus falls prey to the inflexibility of the Turkish bureaucracy. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that, after hearing Solarz's frank review of the situation in Congress, Ecevit recently directed the GOT to show more "flexibility" on the Waldheim statement.

The calendar offers further reason not to expect a near-term resumption of the talks. We are now in the annual season of "internationalization". The GOC recently won victories at the Commonwealth meeting in Lusaka and the Nonaligned Summit in Havana.<sup>7</sup> It will certainly seek a strong Cyprus resolution in the UNGA, and possibly also in the UNSC. This pursuit gives the other side, in Ankara and in Nicosia, an excuse for its own posturing and temporizing.

There are two rays of hope on this rather gloomy horizon. First, the UN may soon conduct an effective "informal consultation" between the two sides, either in New York or in Nicosia. Second, the UNSYG must send his Cyprus report to the Security Council by November 30. Neither side wants to be cited in that document as the reason for the lack of progress in the intercommunal talks. There is thus a chance that, as the November 30 date approaches, the two parties will agree to certain minimal steps that could enable the Waldheim good-offices effort to continue.

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<sup>7</sup> The Cyprus dispute was a topic of discussion at international meetings beyond the UN. In telegram 2701 from Lusaka, August 8, the Embassy reported on the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting held in Lusaka, Zambia, during August 1979. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790359-0452) The conference communiqué, dated August 7, called for a resolution of the Cyprus conflict along lines that could be interpreted as favoring the Greek Cypriot side. The communiqué called for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 355 (1974), which called for the territorial integrity and non-alignment of Cyprus and the removal of foreign troops from the island. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1974, p. 292) The last point was an implicit but clear reference to the ongoing occupation of northern Cyprus by the Turkish military. Speaking as host of the Nonaligned Movement summit of 1979, held in Havana, Cuban President Fidel Castro addressed the UN General Assembly on October 12, during which he also criticized the occupation of Cyprus by foreign troops.

**72. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Nicosia, October 23, 1979, 1528Z

2993. Subj: Independence and Turkish Cyprus. Ref: Nicosia 2853.<sup>2</sup>

1. C-Entire text.

2. This is a reporting message.

3. Summary: Discreet soundings indicate that the Turkish Cypriot "government" is likely to avoid a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), despite political weakness in Ankara. As GOC internationalization of the Cyprus problem continues, Turkish Cypriots are becoming increasingly resigned to regularizing and expanding what they generally regard as their already independent status as the only credible alternative to their present ambiguous position. However, most envisage gradual progress toward a recognized independence grounded on expanding economic self-sufficiency, and would oppose any abrupt move that would jeopardize existing, painfully won economic relations with Europe and the Middle East. Denktash may well use Greek Cypriot excesses during the UN debates as a pretext for a carefully measured political move toward a greater degree of independence. We now judge, however, that he will stop far short of UDI, except in the unlikely event that sanctions are approved by the UN. End summary.

4. With Senate elections likely to produce a government crisis in Ankara, it appeared possible that a resulting relaxation in Ankara's control over Turkish Cypriot affairs would give "President" Denktash greater scope to move toward seeking recognition of the independence of Turkish Cyprus (reftel). Over the past few days we have explored this possibility with Turkish Cypriot contacts. Although we avoided direct approaches to the question, which might be misinterpreted, we gained a much improved understanding of their attitudes toward independence.

5. While many if not most Turkish Cypriots continue to view a bi-zonal federal concept as an ideal solution of the Cyprus problem, increasing numbers, including interlocutor Onan and Denktash's economic advisor Tatar, are beginning privately to express a loss of faith in this ideal and to discuss the need for fuller independence. Their confi-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, 1979—Human Rights and Country Files, Lot 82D103, Box 2, Cyprus 1979. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Ankara, Athens, Bonn, London, Paris, Ottawa, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 2853 from Nicosia, October 9, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790462–0753.

dence in the potential for a negotiated settlement has been seriously eroded by continued Greek Cypriot internationalization of the Cyprus problem on the heels of what they regard as Greek Cypriot intransigence in intercommunal talks. They feel that internationalization demonstrates the absence of any genuine Greek Cypriot desire for a settlement that will take into account the interests of both sides.

6. This does not mean, however, that Turkish Cypriots—other than a few extreme rightists—favor immediate UDI. Instead, most favor building a sound economy as a foundation for eventual political independence. Even working level contacts in the “MFA” gave priority to increasing export and tourism revenues, which they fear would drop if a dramatic move toward independence brought world disapproval, let alone formal UN sanctions. “Finance Minister” Hakki Atun fully appreciates, for example, that a separate currency, essential to full independence, cannot be established until the economy is on a firmer footing. (Institution of a separate currency would of course be a significant signal to the Greek Cypriots of the reality of Turkish Cypriot independence, while at the same time freeing the Turkish Cypriots from dependence on the troubled Turkish lira.) These and other contacts believe that recognition by other states and representation in international forums will follow eventually, at least in part as a result of expanding trade relations. Also, much faith has been placed in the Islamic community and efforts continue to be made to find Islamic sources of finance and loan guarantees. They see no reason to jeopardize the possibility of developing such relations or what most perceive to be growing prosperity, only to achieve equal footing with Greek Cypriots in the war of words that they are already resigned to losing.

7. The threat of seeking international recognition for what “President” Denktash describes as their already independent state is one of the few elements of bargaining leverage that Turkish Cypriots possess. In public statements “President” Denktash implies that UDI, or at least a more recognizable degree of independence, will be a necessary reaction to continued GOC internationalization of the Cyprus problem. Privately, he advocates UDI explicitly as a means of promoting a federal solution by putting the two sides on an equal footing. His “government” occasionally takes measures to expand Turkish Cypriot independence in reaction to GOC moves seen as unfavorable to the Turkish Cypriot position. The decision to require the use of “TFSC” postage stamps by Greek Cypriots living in the “TFSC”, in reaction to a GOC move at the UPU Congress to ban “TFSC” stamps, is the most recent example.<sup>3</sup> The question of whether the goal is a genuine federal solution

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Universal Postal Union, an agency that advises the UN on international matters as they relate to postal cooperation among nations.

on acceptable terms or complete and viable independence can best be answered by pointing out that the two possibilities are complementary. Both are acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots and neither need be sacrificed until the other is in sight.

8. Possible moves which Denktash may take, should he decide that the GOC has badly overplayed its hand at the UN, include announcement of recognition by another country, probably Muslim if there are any takers, or dropping the word “federated” from “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus”. The latter subtlety would present the GOC with a *de jure* confirmation of the present *de facto* situation. Either move, to have practical effect, would have to receive at least tacit acceptance from Western countries which perceive that the GOC has obtained an unnecessarily harsh Cyprus resolution in the UNGA. On the basis of our recent explorations, we believe that Denktash will not repeat not opt for UDI. The situation would be drastically altered should the UN adopt sanctions, since the Turkish Cypriots would no longer have anything to lose in declaring UDI. We are not sure the GOC realizes this, but it appears to have given up on sanctions this year as unattainable.

9. Whatever emerges from this year’s UN consideration of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots will continue to develop more complete independence for their state unless or until the GOC offers serious, credible proposals for a federal solution that adequately protect, in Turkish Cypriot eyes, the interests of the Turkish Cypriots. For reasons rooted in its own internal politics, the GOC is likely to remain incapable of moving in this direction for the foreseeable future.

Stone

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**73. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 9, 1979, 1548Z

292292. Subject: (C) Secretary’s Message re U.N. Committee on Cyprus.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790516–1051. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by James A. Williams (EUR/SE); cleared by L. Paul Bremer (S/S), J.E. Becker (S/S–O), Holmes, Gerald Helman (IO), and Melvyn Levitsky (IO/UNP) and John H. King (C) in draft; approved by Christopher. Sent for information Priority to USUN, London, Paris, Athens, Ankara, Bonn, and Ottawa.

1. (C-entire text).

2. Ambassador should deliver at the earliest opportunity the following message from Secretary Vance to President Kyprianou.

3. Begin text: You will recall that, at our September 26 and October 4 meetings in New York, I agreed to reflect on proposals for a U.N. Committee on Cyprus and to keep in touch with your government in preparation for the General Assembly discussion of the Cyprus question.<sup>2</sup> Ambassador Stone has already given Foreign Minister Rolandis our views. I want to assure you that we gave full and earnest consideration to the proposals for a committee, and I ask you to reconsider your position in light of the conclusions we reached.

4. Cyprus and the United States have a common interest in seeking a just and lasting settlement to the Cyprus question. We share the view that only serious negotiations in the intercommunal talks can achieve that goal; we also believe that the current mediation effort of U.N. Secretary-General Waldheim offers the best prospect for moving in that direction. At the same time, the United States wants to avoid any measure which could undermine the Secretary-General's efforts to bring about a resumption of the intercommunal talks.

5. With these considerations in mind, we have analyzed the proposals for creating a U.N. committee on Cyprus. In all candor, we have regretfully concluded that a committee, whatever its makeup and mandate, would not bring the Cyprus question closer to resolution. On the contrary, we believe it could raise new issues of controversy and discord. In the interest of our broader, mutual goal of finding a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem, I hope you will review your support of a committee.

6. Let me raise a second, related consideration. We have followed with great interest the efforts by the Secretary-General and his staff to resume the intercommunal talks. We continue fully to support those efforts. I ask you, Mr. President, to respond favorably to the Secretary-General's ideas, in the hope that this step will lead to a meaningful dialogue with the Turkish Cypriots on the major elements of the Cyprus problem. I strongly believe that the prospect of success, however modest, makes it worthwhile for your government to take a step which

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<sup>2</sup> Kyprianou first broached the idea of a committee at the September 26 meeting in New York, to which Vance responded that he would take the concept under consideration. (Telegram 256288 to Nicosia, September 29; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790445-0533) At the October 4 meeting, also held in New York, Kyprianou revised his original proposal so that the committee would consist specifically of Mediterranean states whose representatives would negotiate the Cyprus dispute under the auspices of the UN and with Kurt Waldheim's direct participation. (Telegram 262395 to Nicosia, October 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790459-0089)



has virtually no risk, and possibly great benefit, for the people of Cyprus.

7. Whatever the outcome of the General Assembly debate on Cyprus, the United States will continue to seek a prompt resumption of the talks. We regard the basis of those talks as the May 19 communique between Mr. Denktash and yourself, the Makarios-Denktash Guidelines of 1977, and the relevant U.N. resolutions. We shall continue to make our views known to all parties, whenever such action seems useful or promises a good result.

8. Throughout the long course of the Cyprus problem, there have been those who see only difficulties and adduce reasons why something cannot be done. I have always regarded you, Mr. President, as a man of more creative vision based on hard experience. Great problems call forth acts of great statesmanship, and I am confident that your government will continue to strive to meet that high standard.

9. I enjoyed very much our recent talks in New York. I look forward to staying in close touch with you in the weeks ahead, and I hope that you will communicate with me at any time through Ambassador Stone. End text.

Vance

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**74. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Nicosia, November 13, 1979, 1509Z

3187. Subject: Kyprianou's Reply to Secretary's Message re UN Committee. On Cyprus. Ref: (A) State 292292, (B) Nicosia 3172.<sup>2</sup>

1. (C-entire text.)

2. MOFA Director General Pelaghias called me to Foreign Ministry late morning November 13 and handed me following message for

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<sup>1</sup>Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790523-0002. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Athens, Bonn, London, Ottawa, Paris, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup>Telegram 292292 is Document 73. Telegram 3172 from Nicosia, November 10, relayed Kyprianou's oral response to Vance's message. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790518-0477) Kyprianou protested that a UN committee would not replace the intercommunal talks, and that such a committee offered the best way forward on negotiations.

Secretary Vance, incorporated in transmittal letter from Pelagias to Ambassador.

3. Begin text. "I have read very carefully the message that you sent me through your Ambassador in Nicosia, Mr. Galen L. Stone.

4. I honestly cannot agree with the arguments put forward against our proposal for the setting up of a committee. I am of the opinion that the committee we are seeking from the General Assembly will greatly assist in creating better prospects for promoting a solution on the Cyprus problem. It will create a new momentum. It will fascilitate (sic) the task for the Secretary-General rather than frustrating his efforts. We do not envisage that the committee should substitute the Secretary-General. On the contrary, it will strengthen his hand, if he so wishes. I believe that with the setting up of this committee better prospects will be created even in the direction of the resumption of the talks, irrespective of the negative attitude that the Turks are taking today towards the proposal for such a committee.

5. Five years have elapsed since the invasion of Cyprus by the Turkish Army. Talks have been going on for the last five years to no avail. We have repeatedly put forward concrete proposals which were rejected by the Turkish side without even being discussed. During these long years when we had to face the displacement of over two hundred thousand people, the loss of home and property, the tragedy of the orphan (sic) families and the drama of the missing persons, nothing concrete has been done for the promotion of a solution to the Cyprus problem. We were faced instead by a completely negative attitude of Turkey. I would like to remind you that when the embargo was about to be lifted we were told that once it was lifted there was going to be a very substantial change in the attitude of Turkey favoring a just and lasting settlement to the Cyprus problem.<sup>3</sup> Nothing to that effect has happened, however. The embargo was lifted, but, unfortunately the Turkish policy towards Cyprus has hardened even more.

6. As I told you on many occasions and during our recent meetings in New York, we have concluded an agreement between Mr. Denktash and myself on the 19th of May, 1979, and we were ready and willing to commence negotiations on the basis of that agreement. In fact, talks commenced on the 15th June, but, owing to the attempt of the Turkish side to introduce new elements outside the agreement, those talks were very short lived. The Turkish side left us no alternative than to go to the General Assembly this year with new more practical proposals which will, in our opinion, prove to be helpful and constructive. This is the reason we have asked you to support the creation of such a committee.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 50.

I feel that it will really be a very positive step forward. Concerning your reference to the talks, I would like to welcome your statement that you will continue to seek prompt resumption of the talks on the basis of the 19th of May Agreement, which includes also the Makarios-Denktaş Guidelines of 1977 and the UN Resolutions relevant to the Cyprus problem and that you will continue to make your views known to this effect.

7. I would like to point out that we are not the party who have rejected the talks; but the Turkish side by putting forward conditions for their resumption and by seeking to exploit some ideas unofficially put forward last August by the Secretary-General,<sup>4</sup> which never amounted to formal proposals and which were used by the Turkish side to bring to the foreground once more unacceptable conditions. As I said before, we have the 19th of May Agreement, which is very clear and very comprehensive and which in our opinion contains all the substantive elements which could form the basis for an agreement. We cannot accept any preconditions or considerations for the resumption of the talks.

8. Cyprus and its people, Mr. Secretary of State, has suffered very much during the past five years from the Turkish occupation, from the continuous denial by the Turkish side to our people of the basic human rights, from the perpetual violation of universally accepted principles, from the continuous putting into effect of new measures by the so called Turkish Cypriot Administration to bring closer partition and eventual annexation of the occupied part of Cyprus to Turkey. We feel very strongly that Cyprus is entitled to a better treatment by the United Nations and by its friends, particularly by the United States which is particularly sensitive for the safeguard of human rights and the principles of freedom, justice and democracy.

9. We reasonably expect the approval of a committee as we are proposing together with a stronger resolution from the General Assembly on the Cyprus problem, so that, at last, there can be some step towards the implementation of the UN resolutions which have been adopted since 1974. It is only in this way and with the withdrawal of foreign troops and with the return of the refugees to their homes in safety that we can hope to create a new Cyprus fully independent, sovereign, united, territorially integral, enjoying no more rights than any other free country member of the United Nations.<sup>5</sup>

10. To this effect, we would like to see, as I said above, a mobility and a new momentum to be created. And we are convinced that the United States can positively contribute in this respect.

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<sup>4</sup> For these proposals, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1979, p. 425.

<sup>5</sup> General Assembly Resolution 34/30, adopted on November 30, authorized the establishment of an ad hoc committee on Cyprus. The United States abstained in the vote. (*Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1979, pp. 431–432)

11. I am looking forward to continue the close cooperation with you and I wish to express the hope that in the near future we can see the beginning of a new and happier era for Cyprus and all its inhabitants." End text.

Eaves

## 75. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 7, 1980, 0143Z

33234. Subject: (C) Rolandis Call on Secretary and Nimetz.

1. (S-entire text).

2. Cyprus Foreign Minister Rolandis called on Secretary Vance on February 5. Rolandis was accompanied by Cyprus Ambassador Jacobides and GOC Foreign Ministry officer Strambos. Under Secretary-designate Nimetz and EUR/SE Director Dillery (notetaker) also sat in. Rolandis met separately with Nimetz following Secretary's meeting.

3. Rolandis opened the conversation. He reported that he had met UNSG Waldheim February 4 and felt it was also expedient to meet the Secretary. He appreciated that Turkey is more important than Cyprus for the United States. However, he felt that if the Cyprus problem could be solved Greek-Turkish relations could be improved and U.S. and Western interests in the Eastern Mediterranean would be promoted. Rolandis said his job is made difficult by the fact that while Cyprus has basically a pro-Western society, support for the Cyprus position in world forums comes from other directions. It was this situation that caused Cyprus to abstain in the UNGA on the vote condemning the USSR for its action in Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup>

4. Rolandis said Waldheim hopes to have the talks start in March. He is considering a formula under which there would be three

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 17, Cyprus: 1/77-1/81. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Ankara, Athens, USUN, and the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Dillery and James E. Tobin (EUR/SE); cleared by Holmes, Tarnoff, John Nix (IO/UNP), and Seton Stapleton (S/S-O); approved by Nimetz. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800003-0057)

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to UN General Assembly Resolution ES-6/2, "The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security," adopted January 14 during a special emergency session of the General Assembly. The text of the resolution is in *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1980, p. 307.

packages of four sessions of the negotiations. Each of the main subjects would be considered in each package: Varosha, goodwill measures, constitution, and territory. Each 4-day package would be followed by a period of 10 days for study and behind-the-scenes negotiation. Rolandis said he had accepted this concept. However, he believed that problems are never solved in plenary and that neither side will yield at the beginning of any discussions. Thus, it is important to do some preparatory work.

5. The FonMin continued that it is a requirement for the GOC that the Varosha issue be solved at the beginning of negotiations. He recognized that the Turkish Cypriots could not give Varosha up without some compensatory action at the beginning of the talks. General thinking had been that political concessions would be required to achieve this. The GOC cannot make such concessions.

6. In an effort to solve this problem, Rolandis said he had identified three possibilities: (1) the two sides might try to negotiate the re-opening of Nicosia Airport;<sup>3</sup> (2) the GOC could offer aid to the Turkish Cypriots to help the difficult economic situation in the north; (3) there could be joint ventures under United Nations organizations such as improvement of the electricity system, road development, telephone, etc. Rolandis thought the most practical of these ideas was the prospect of GOC aid for the Turkish Cypriots. Some of this could be in foreign exchange. This would be along the line of the part of the May 19 Agreement that calls for measures to display goodwill. It would also have a long term positive effect of reducing the differences in per capita GNP that now exist between the two communities.

7. The Secretary asked how difficult it would be to reopen Nicosia Airport. Rolandis replied it would be very difficult; questions of equality of staffing and passports would arise immediately. His general idea was that the United Nations could take the airport over and run it. Nimetz felt it would be almost as easy to solve the whole Cyprus problem as to open the airport because basic questions would arise immediately in airport negotiations. He noted that the Turkish Cypriots would not want to give up operating their own airport at Ercan. Rolandis concurred that opening Nicosia would take time.

8. Rolandis explained that these difficulties caused him to think of the aid proposal. He asked whether the United States could see if his aid proposal would be attractive in Ankara. He had mentioned it to Secretary-General Waldheim. The Secretary responded that the U.S. would be glad to try; he couldn't promise what could be done.

9. The Secretary asked Nimetz for his view on whether we should raise this with Ambassador Elekdag or with Foreign Minister Erkmén.

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<sup>3</sup> The airport had been closed since August 16, 1974.

Nimetz responded that we would have to give some thought to this. The Secretary noted that Foreign Minister Erkmén is a decent, reasonable, experienced man and should be personally involved in the effort. Rolandis believed it would be better to make the approach to Erkmén.

10. Nimetz asked Rolandis how he thought Denktash would react to this proposal. Nimetz said Denktash has a strong hold on Turkish Cyprus policy at the moment. Rolandis concurred that Denktash has a good deal of power at the present time. He noted that Denktash recently has been making unfavorable statements. The only hope was that the economic problems which face the Turkish Cypriots might mean that Denktash would be attracted to the aid for Varosha proposal. He felt that Ankara could handle Denktash on this if the GOT really wished to do so.

11. Nimetz noted that with regard to Rolandis' third proposal, the GOC previously had not made it easy for international organizations to work in the north of Cyprus. Would this attitude now change? Rolandis replied that it would have to. He said this is one of the important elements of the GOC's current discussions with the EC on possible assistance for Cyprus.

12. The Secretary closed the meeting by saying he would think about how we might help promote Rolandis' idea. It was agreed that we would give some reaction to Rolandis when Deputy Secretary Christopher meets him on February 7.<sup>4</sup>

13. Nimetz asked how we should handle the press on the visit. The Secretary noted that in his February 5 testimony before the HFAC he had said that the Cyprus problem remains; it is the only world problem that is as difficult as the Arab-Israeli situation.<sup>5</sup> Rolandis said he would make a short statement that he had come to see the Secretary to report to him about his conversation with Waldheim. All agreed that any discussion of the Rolandis aid idea should be held as closely as possible.

14. In a later meeting with Under Secretary-designate Nimetz, Rolandis suggested that the aid money might be channeled through the Evkaf, a religious group in the north. That way Denktash could use it as he sees fit. Nimetz remarked that the plan has merit because it gives the Turkish Cypriots needed financial aid without political concessions on the part of the GOC.

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<sup>4</sup> The Department reported the meeting between Christopher and Rolandis in telegram 36271 to Nicosia, February 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N800003-0204) Rolandis relayed that Denktash had rejected the UN's latest proposal to resume intercommunal talks and that Rolandis was seeking Waldheim's support to resume the negotiations.

<sup>5</sup> Vance's testimony is in United States, Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings, *Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Years 1980-81*, Part 1, pp. 1-35. His statement is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1980, pp. 40-43.

15. When asked what amount of money he had in mind, Rolandis mentioned dols 50 million as a realistic sum. He cautioned that he hadn't thoroughly considered what the total amount should be and had yet to clear the figure with Kyprianou and the Cabinet. He said that, in any event, the money must not be a token amount and must be enough to begin to bring the island's two economies closer to equality.

16. On the issue of resettlement of Varosha by Greek Cypriots, Rolandis said that a reopened Varosha would create jobs for hundreds of Turkish Cypriots. This, too, would improve the economic condition of the north. The reopened area of Varosha would have to be large enough to house 30–35 thousand Greek Cypriots.

17. Rolandis would also ask the "TFSC" to reopen the main road from Nicosia to Larnaca. While this is not a major concession, he said it would improve the political climate in the spirit of paragraph 5 of the May 19 Agreement.

18. Rolandis told Nimetz that the creation of a UNGA committee on Cyprus can be avoided if productive talks are started. He wanted the USG to know that the committee idea was not conceived to cause us discomfort. Once Kyprianou got started with promoting the idea, it became impossible to stop. Rolandis assured Nimetz that, should the committee idea come to fruition, the GOC will do everything it can to see that the membership is not objectionable to the U.S. In reply, Nimetz told the Foreign Minister that the U.S. understands the GOC's need to take advantage of the U.N. cycle in making its case to the world. However, we still believe that the committee will be an impediment to real progress.

19. Before Rolandis left, Nimetz asked him if he wanted the financial assistance concept to be portrayed as a GOC or a Waldheim idea. Rolandis said that it should be portrayed as a Waldheim plan or the Turkish side will reject it immediately. Rolandis will telephone Waldheim February 6 to get his agreement to call this "the Waldheim Plan". Nimetz agreed to discuss the idea further on February 7 when Rolandis meets with the Deputy Secretary.

20. Comment: We find the Rolandis proposal for aid to north Cyprus interesting because it does offer a new way to try to break the logjam preventing movement on the intercommunal negotiations. We are concerned about a number of points: It is not clear whether Rolandis has the full agreement with his government for the scheme. There would be numerable negotiating difficulties as regards the size of the area to be open, access, jurisdiction, etc. Nevertheless, we have committed ourselves to be as helpful as possible, and would appreciate Posts' comments on the Rolandis idea and how we might promote it. End comment.

Vance

76. **Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 8, 1980

SUBJECT

Cyprus Talks

Cyprus talks remain stuck on dead center, with Waldheim trying to get them started again. Basically everybody is merely talking about talking—and there is not even much of that going on. Neither Greek nor Turkish Cypriots has made the slightest move that would get talks between them going again and there is no solid reason to believe that either side really wants talks—public positions notwithstanding. Neither Ankara nor Athens has attempted to play a significant role in this process in recent months nor is there much likelihood that they will in the coming months, since both are preoccupied with issues of much greater importance. Cyprus is no longer a burning domestic issue in either Greece or Turkey.

Waldheim has made a meticulous report to the General Assembly of the efforts he has made to get talks going.<sup>2</sup> The President of the General Assembly has not yet officially reacted.

We are well on the sidelines in this process—and should stay there—keeping the monkey on Waldheim's back.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 17, Cyprus: 1/77–1/81. Confidential.

<sup>2</sup> Waldheim submitted the report to the General Assembly on April 2. The report noted that irreconcilable differences between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot representatives had prevented progress along the lines of the ten-point agreement of May 19, 1979 (see Document 67). In the report, Waldheim called for leaders from each community to reaffirm the validity of the ten-point agreement as a starting point to restart talks. (*Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980*, pp. 449–451)



**77. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Newlin) and the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Vest) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 25, 1980

SUBJECT

Cyprus

This is in response to your request of April 8 for an analysis of the Cyprus situation; specifically, whether the time is ripe for a new U.S. initiative.<sup>2</sup>

Secretary-General Waldheim's April 2 report to the General Assembly on Cyprus notes that his efforts have "not, so far, borne fruit".<sup>3</sup> Indeed, there has been no real progress in resuming the stalled inter-communal talks since they broke down in June 1979. Embassy Ankara has raised several important questions relating to the Cyprus issue. We believe it is time to reassess US Cyprus policy and explore possible methods of breaking the current deadlock.

*US Interests*

For both humanitarian and policy reasons, the US is clearly interested in a resolution of the Cyprus problem. While Cyprus is not the salient issue of controversy it was four years ago, it has the potential of re-surfacing as a major problem in our relationships in the eastern Mediterranean.

At the present time, the situation on the island is stable and international interest has declined. Traditional proponents of the Greek-Cypriot cause in the United States have markedly decreased the intensity and frequency of their efforts to prod the Administration to solve the Cyprus problem by taking an anti-Turkish line. Newspaper items on US-Turkey relations seldom mention Cyprus. At least for the present, both communities on Cyprus prefer the status quo to making the concessions that a compromise solution would entail. In light of the relative stability on the island and the back seat the issue has assumed

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Portions of 1980 Security Assistance Subject and Country Files, Lot 82D197, Box 3, Cyprus (S.A. 1980). Secret. Drafted by James E. Tobin (EUR/SE) on April 24; cleared by Dillery, Peter Bridges (IO/UNP), and Ewing. Sent through Nimetz.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 76.

in both US domestic and international politics, we must consider what options and risks we have before us as we pursue a Cyprus settlement.

*Options for Resuming the Intercommunal Talks*

There are several avenues open to attempt to move the negotiations off dead-center. (Pros and Cons of each option are listed in the Attachment).<sup>4</sup>

1. Continue to support Waldheim's efforts. This would involve behind-the-scenes lobbying with the parties and public statements in support of Waldheim. This option would mean that the US should avoid activities which might give the impression we are taking an independent initiative.

2. A new US Initiative. This could be a low-key effort in normal diplomatic channels or could be a highly visible act such as a visit to the island by a senior US official, or a "Camp David" approach such as recently suggested in a House Subcommittee report. The latter would focus US and world opinion on Cyprus.

3. A British Initiative. Recent news reports have speculated that the Thatcher government, having succeeded in Rhodesia, might like to try to solve the Cyprus problem.

4. A Multi-Lateral Initiative. This would involve a joint effort by the US, UK, FRG, Canada and possibly France.

5. A Conference of the Guarantor Powers. This is the approach which produced the 1960 Constitution.

*US Policy*

None of the above options identified in our analysis (Attachment) has more than a slim chance of success. The political dynamics in the region are such that no party is so committed to achieving a solution that it is willing to make the required compromises. It is, however, essential that the UN effort continue so that when both sides' firm positions gradually soften and eventually begin to converge, a mechanism is in place to facilitate negotiations. We believe that at least for the next several months, the United States should continue to support the Secretary-General's efforts and try to ensure that no action endangers Waldheim's efforts. This policy would require that we allow Waldheim alone to play the leading visible role as mediator. At the same time, we must actively discourage developments like the unilateral Turkish-Cypriot resettlement of Varosha, because they would sidetrack or even derail Waldheim's good-offices mission.

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<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed is a paper titled "Cyprus: Options for Resuming the Intercommunal Talks," which presents a number of "pros" and "cons" for how the United States could help move the stalled negotiations forward.

*Long-Term Prospects for Cyprus*

In effect, Cyprus negotiations are already underway. Each side is publicly and privately developing and defining its position. It will take a long time before uncompromising attitudes on central issues evolve into attitudes which would promote the understanding and acceptance of concepts which will be vital to a permanent solution.

There have been some basic changes since 1974. “Enosis” is no longer a live cause among Greek-Cypriots. The Greek-Cypriots are no longer able to pursue what appeared to be their unwritten policy of systematically discouraging Turkish-Cypriot presence on the island. The Turkish-Cypriots enjoy security and autonomy but no longer benefit from the Greek-Cypriot economy and do not receive international recognition. For many reasons, the Athens government is less interested in active participation in Cypriot affairs.

Both communities are beginning to realize that they must compromise to achieve a solution. The Greek-Cypriots are becoming aware that the world community will not or cannot force the Turkish Army to leave the island without an overall settlement and that the political conditions prior to August 1974 will not return. By the same token, the Turkish-Cypriots may eventually realize that the world will not accept them as an independent state and that they cannot survive in an economically isolated condition.

Neither the US nor any other power can create the pre-conditions for a solution. Those changes must come from the Cypriots themselves. In fact, a bold initiative runs the risk of actually worsening the prospects for a solution. For the moment, it may be best to allow time to run its course and, in the process, erode the hardened positions until both communities reach the point where they have the will to resolve their dispute. At that time it might be useful for an outside interested party to offer once again to be helpful. We should continue to consult with the UK, FRG, Canada and France and to monitor the situation to determine when the time is right for a new initiative.

*Current State of Play*

The President of the General Assembly has not yet decided to appoint the committee authorized by the last UNGA Cyprus resolution. It is safe to assume that he would accede to GOC pressure to form the committee should Kyprianou decide that a committee is necessary.<sup>5</sup> For the present time, the GOC appears to be willing to allow some time to pass before it decides how to proceed on the committee issue.

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 73, and footnote 5, Document 74.

The UNFICYP mandate renewal will be before the Security Council in June. At that time, Waldheim will issue a report on the peacekeeping operation and good-offices efforts in Cyprus for the past six months. It is possible that the Security Council discussion on UNFICYP could flare up into a contentious debate between the two sides, but we believe that the Council will renew the mandate as it did last December without reopening old wounds. We plan to contact all concerned parties before the debate and make clear our concern that no one do or say anything during the UNFICYP renewal debate which might endanger the Secretary-General's good-offices effort.

We are approaching the season when the GOC resorts to international conferences like the Non-Aligned Meeting and the UNGA to score propaganda victories for its cause. Experience has shown that any attempt to undertake a Cyprus initiative during this "internationalization season" is fruitless.

#### *Recommendation*

That the US continue to consult with all parties in support of the Secretary-General's good-offices effort. We would also remain in close and continuing contact with the UN and renew our offer to assist the Secretary-General in any appropriate manner. Under current circumstances, we would not undertake a new initiative during the remainder of this year but would begin now to consult with the British and our other allies to get their views on how an initiative might usefully be promoted in the first quarter of 1981 when there should be a "window" in the internationalization season.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> In the last sentence Christopher placed brackets before "during" and at the end of the sentence and wrote in the left-hand margin, "at this time, but will keep the matter under review." He approved the recommendation on May 2.

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#### **78. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency**

PA 80-10239

Washington, May 1980

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 81T00208R: Box 4, Office of Political Analysis. Secret; *[handling restriction not declassified]*. One page not declassified.]

**79. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Vest) to Acting Secretary of State Christopher<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 13, 1980

*Intercommunal Talks on Cyprus: Where Are They Going?*

The resumption on August 9 by the Greek and Turkish Cypriots of long-recessed (since June 1979) intercommunal talks is a result of the parties' desire to see the negotiating process begin again; hopefully in a serious, sustained manner. It also stemmed from painstaking efforts by UN Secretariat officials and the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Cyprus. A number of factors were relevant.

*A. U.S. Role*

As discussed below, we cannot, nor should we, claim any direct credit for the decision to resume the Cyprus negotiations. However, the Secretary's conversations in Ankara in June with Turkish Prime Minister Demirel and Greek Foreign Minister Mitsotakis<sup>2</sup> and the subsequent dialogue on Cyprus conducted by our Ambassadors in Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia may have helped move the process along. We have seen no evidence on this occasion of Ankara pressing Denktash to be more reasonable but there is reason to believe that the Rallis government did encourage Kyprianou to find a way to accept the U.N. opening statement so that negotiations could begin again.

*B. Cypriot Domestic Politics*

There has been growing impatience in Cyprus with President Kyprianou. He has been criticized strongly from left and right for his perceived failure to seize/take initiatives on the Cyprus issue. Recently, the Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL) broke with Kyprianou, ostensibly over his failure to explore initiatives to resolve this problem.

Moreover, Parliamentary elections are expected in September 1981. They will occur on a new proportional basis which will considerably erode Kyprianou's political support. (The next Presidential election is scheduled for 1983.) Progress toward reaching a settlement would obviously strengthen Kyprianou's electoral position.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Chron Files, Speeches and Papers of Lucy W. Benson (1979) and Matthew Nimetz (1980), Lot 81D321, Box 7, Matthew Nimetz Chron (August 1980–Dec 1980). Confidential. The memorandum was sent through Nimetz. Drafted by Dillery and Jones on August 12; cleared by Philip Wilcox (IO/UNP), Ewing, and Arthur M. Giese (T).

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 152 and 203.

### C. *The Forthcoming UN Debate*

The 1979 UNGA Resolution on Cyprus authorized the President of the General Assembly to form a Committee to "assist" the Secretary General unless he reported by March 31, 1980 progress in intercommunal negotiations.<sup>3</sup> Since last fall, the Greek Cypriots have become less enamored with the committee idea (the Turks always opposed it) probably because they could not be assured control of the UN Committee no matter how docile, and because while the Committee might serve to cast world public attention on the Cyprus issue, it would retard, if not preclude, any concomitant negotiating effort.

Additionally, the Greek Cypriots were concerned as to what new "victory" they could hope to achieve at this year's General Assembly. Thus, while the Greek Cypriots certainly have not given up on using the international arena to advance their cause in the future, they have apparently decided to play this year's UNGA in low-key assuming talks are continuing through the fall. The Turkish Cypriots are always at a disadvantage at the UN and thus prefer an effort on the island.

### D. *The Libyan Connection*

Recently, the Libyan Foreign and Information Ministers made separate visits to Cyprus attempting to arrange a Denktash-Kyprianou meeting in Tripoli under Qadhafi's auspices. Both Denktash and Kyprianou were reluctant to reject flatly the Libyan proposal and the Libyans blandly (or cleverly) announced that it would take place. Resumed talks under UN aegis, however, take the Cypriots off the Libyan hook—a point both Denktash and Kyprianou recognized.

#### *Decision to Resume Talks:*

We had been aware over the last year of the protracted UN efforts to reopen the Cypriot intercommunal talks although not always informed about the specific details of each procedural formula of the opening statement to be used by the UN. Following the failure of a major effort by Perez de Cuellar in June involving visits to Cyprus, Ankara, and Athens, the UN did not disclose to us the specifics of subsequent discussions with the Cypriots and we did not press them for details. Recent reporting from Nicosia and Athens, however, indicated that both sides were examining renewed UN proposals and on August 4 Embassy Nicosia noted that Denktash had virtually accepted the latest formulation.<sup>4</sup> A British Embassy official here showed us a cable

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, Document 74.

<sup>4</sup> The Embassy reported Denktash's reaction to the UN proposal in telegram 1900 from Nicosia, August 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800372-0928) The UN procedural proposals presented by Under Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar are summarized in *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1980, pp. 451-452.

from the British High Commission in Nicosia reporting that on August 4 the GOC was deeply engaged in reviewing the proposals but that no decisions had been made. For the most part, information came from UN officials in the field, not from UN headquarters in New York where the information was more closely held. Thus, we had a good deal of information about the UN process but were not aware that agreement was so close and that this would not be another case of one side agreeing to language while the other side raised problems. In any event, it is clear that a deal was struck only a few hours before the UN announcement on August 6.

*Current Status:*

The first formal ceremonial meeting of the resumed intercommunal talks took place on August 9. Hugo Gobbi, the UN Special Representative on Cyprus, who was largely responsible for working out the details over the last six weeks, read the opening statement (copy attached).<sup>5</sup> This statement was the result of months of negotiations and actually outlines some of the major issues that will be discussed: a constitutional system that will be federal, a territorial solution that will be bizonal, priority to the Greek resettlement of Varosha, and attention to practical methods of achieving economic and humanitarian progress on the island. At some undefined early stage, negotiations on these four topics are to be delegated to committees. The security concerns of the Turkish Cypriots are also acknowledged to be something that must be addressed. All these ideas are descendants of the U.S. plan we submitted in 1978, and thus we can take justifiable pride in the role we have played.<sup>6</sup> However, it is important the U.S. role be quiet and behind-the-scenes and that the UN remain out front.

Each of the areas for discussion has special difficulties. The Turkish Cypriots will juxtapose their requirements for “security” and a “bizonal” political structure with Greek Cypriot desires to recover occupied territory and preserve the unity of the Cypriot state. Clearly, there are tradeoffs between territory and constitutional aspects. Currently, the Turkish Cypriots (about 18 percent of the population) backed by the Turkish army hold approximately 37 percent of the island. This includes some of the best farming land and a major port and tourist area (Famagusta). Turkish seizure of these sectors in 1974 resulted in displacement of approximately 150,000 Greek Cypriots, many of whom still seek to return. This is particularly true of Varosha, which is a relatively new and potentially very profitable tourist city in

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<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed is the August 9 opening statement of Hugo Gobbi, UN Special Representative in Cyprus, at the resumed intercommunal talks between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The statement is *ibid.*, pp. 453–454.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2, Document 61.

the Turkish Cypriot zone now unpopulated. Clearly, territorial adjustments are possible; the Turks have indicated that the Turkish Cypriots will be flexible and the Greek Cypriots do not expect to limit Turkish Cypriots to only 18 percent of the island (Greek Cypriot interlocutors have privately suggested 25 percent). Denktash will be a tough negotiator on this subject as he will not want to displace resettled Turks.

Turkish Cypriot requirements on the constitutional/bizonality issues remain somewhat nebulous. Arguments have raged for years over what "bizonality" *actually* means. The Greek Cypriots claim the Turkish Cypriot goal is a confederal state so weak that the Turkish Cypriot sector will effectively be independent. (There are continuing reports that the Turkish Cypriot leader ultimately intends to seek independence for his area; however, there is no reason to think that the Turkish Government or any other government would tolerate such a unilateral action.) It is likely that the Turkish Cypriots would accept a federal structure with considerable local autonomy including a local police force and some access controls, ceding defense, foreign affairs and central bank powers to a Federal government.

Thus, while tradeoffs appear possible, the Turkish Cypriots recognize that territory is their strongest card and will seek maximum Greek Cypriot concessions on constitutional issues before agreeing on an overall package settlement.

#### *Next Steps:*

The atmosphere at the opening session August 9 was cordial and the meeting went very well. However, as was to be expected, shortly after the meeting President Kyprianou gave a press conference in which he "clarified" some of the terms under use, and reaffirmed his position that "bizonality" means partition and that all refugees must return to their homes. Denktash felt it necessary to respond, and the latest information is that some time after the Turkish "bayram" holiday ends on August 14, his government will meet to decide whether or not the Kyprianou statements are an impediment to continuing with the talks. We think that the talks will proceed as scheduled.

#### *A Role for the U.S.:*

We believe this round of talks will continue for some while and not be ruptured after a few days as was the case in 1979 since:

- The sequence of meetings (one meeting each week on four basic subject areas starting September 16) makes probable at least two months of negotiations;

- Both sides for reasons elaborated above should be willing at least to continue the talks through most of the UNGA session;

- Both sides recognize that an early breakdown of the talks would mean a protracted delay in further intercommunal talks. Thus, if not a



“last chance,” these talks are surely the best chance for the immediate future of making progress to resolve outstanding issues. More importantly, this point seems to be realized by key figures in both communities.

In order to decide what the United States can and should do to facilitate the negotiations and to make them productive, it is important that we have a clear picture of United Nations thinking and plans. You will be meeting with Deputy Secretary General Perez de Cuellar on August 14, and Matt Nimetz will visit New York to speak with de Cuellar and Secretariat members who work on Cyprus on August 20.<sup>7</sup> These two meetings will give us an opportunity to inform the UN on our recent conversations with the Cypriots and in Ankara and Athens, and to ask the Secretariat for more information about the talks and their plans for dealing with substance. We should also discuss ways we might be of assistance to the UN, bearing in mind that any US suggestion should be carefully designed so as not to complicate the UN effort.

Other actions we could consider are:

- Offer to contribute papers on the substance of a settlement for possible use by the Special Representative of the Secretary General in the continuing meetings.

- Investigate “practical measures” such as facilitating Turkish Cypriot economic activity, passport problems, missing persons, cooperation in communications, etc.

- Offer to make demarches to the interested parties to emphasize the importance of getting on seriously with the talks. One approach would be a Presidential letter to Kyprianou—and a letter from Secretary Muskie to Denktash—encouraging both to cooperate with Waldheim.

- Begin now to consider a visit to the island by you or another senior U.S. official at a time when it would help the Secretary General’s effort.

- Take another look at our November 1978 proposals to determine whether they could be reworked and presented again in a way that would make them more acceptable to all shades of Cypriot opinion.

- Consult again with other countries interested in achieving progress on Cyprus, particularly the British.

- Should they come to the General Assembly this fall, arrange for President Kyprianou and Denktash to be received by a suitably senior American official to press both to cooperate with the Secretary General.

*If the UN Fails:*

The United Nations Secretary General is really not in a position effectively to mediate the Cyprus problem since his mandate is to pro-

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<sup>7</sup> According to telegram 220731 to USUN, August 19, Christopher and Pérez de Cuéllar actually met on August 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800396–0081)

vide good offices and to facilitate intercommunal negotiations. There is, however, no interest on the part of most Greek Cypriots and all Turkish Cypriots in having the U.S. and/or some other interested country or a group of countries step in to try to replace the Secretary General and press the parties harder to meaningful negotiations. In any event, it would appear to be inopportune to consider this option when the Secretary General has just successfully restored the intercommunal dialogue.

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**80. Telegram From Secretary of State Muskie to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, September 25, 1980, 1824Z

Secto 8013. (U) Subject: Secretary's Bilateral With Cyprus Foreign Minister Rolandis.

Summary. Secretary met with Cyprus Foreign Minister for 30 minutes September 23 at Secretary's suite, UN Plaza Hotel, New York. Meeting entirely focused on Cyprus intercommunal negotiations and international consideration of Cyprus. Rolandis was accompanied by Cyprus UN Perm Rep Mavrommatis, Ambassador to the U.S. Jacobides, and his Special Assistant Shiampos. Secretary was accompanied by Under Secretary Nimetz, USUN Ambassador Petree, EUR DAS Ewing, and DeptOff Dillery (notetaker). End summary.

1. Meeting began with a short private session between Secretary and Rolandis. When rest of group joined, Secretary said he had been emphasizing to Rolandis the need to give and take on both sides to achieve progress in Cyprus talks. Any U.S. intervention would have to be done judiciously and with a careful eye to timing. He said we would stay in touch with GOC through Under Secretary Nimetz.

2. Nimetz noted that in our first communication with the new Turkish military authorities in Ankara on the day of the takeover our Ambassador had discussed Cyprus with then-Secretary General of the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Subject Files of Edmund S. Muskie, 1963-1981, Lot 83D66, Box 2, unlabeled folder. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Dillery; cleared by Vest and Mary Kennedy (S); approved by Raymond Seitz (S/S). Sent for information Immediate to USUN, Nicosia, Ankara, Athens, London, Bonn, Paris, and Ottawa. Attached but not printed is an October 7 covering memorandum from John H. Kelly (S/S-S) to L. Paul Bremer, III (S/S). Muskie was in New York for the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly.

Turkish MFA Turkmen.<sup>2</sup> We had emphasized need for Cyprus inter-communal talks to be forward going and sustained.

3. Secretary asked Rolandis if the first phase of the resumed inter-communal talks would be pro-forma. Rolandis explained the organization of the talks with four subjects to be discussed weekly in rotation. Two were subordinate and would be covered in the first two sessions: Varosha and confidence-building measures. The other two to be considered in the third and fourth sessions were more basic: constitution and territory. Rolandis noted it would take four weeks to complete a cycle, with the first cycle given to explanations. He thought the second cycle would be crucial as this would be when counter-proposals would be presented with possible sharp reactions. The Special Representative of the Secretary General would have to be very careful in this phase. If he got through it, however, and the dialogue was kept going, future cycles should be easier.

4. Rolandis said meeting of interlocutors on September 16 had been very good.<sup>3</sup> The atmosphere was cordial. The Turkish Cypriots had said that they had come with the “will to find a way,” and they seemed to be serious about this.

5. Rolandis went on to express hope that “some countries including the U.S.” would help by influencing Turkey in the right way. He felt that the new military authorities in Ankara are in a position to take decisions on Cyprus because they do not have to cater to the small, extremist political parties. Further, he thought it would be easier for the army to “undo what was done in 1974” than it would be for any political party who could be accused of betrayal.

6. Rolandis said it was his government’s strong hope and belief that this time there is a chance. The GOC does not want to miss this opportunity. The GOC also believes that Secretary General Waldheim is determined to go for sustained talks. Rolandis had discussed inter-communal talks with Waldheim September 22. Rolandis said he hoped that the bad experience of the short-lived June 1979 talks will not be repeated. The GOC will be patient and will concentrate on the smallest positive points to keep the process going. It wanted to see the talks be sustained.

7. The GOC, Rolandis said, is deferring most if not all of its international activities in order to promote progress in the talks. It would

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<sup>2</sup> The Embassy reported this communication in telegram 6587 from Ankara, September 12. Turkmen assured Ambassador Spain that Turkey, under its new military government, remained committed to achieving a solution for the Cyprus dispute. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800435–0566)

<sup>3</sup> Another round of intercommunal talks had opened on August 9. See *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1980, pp. 453–454.

adopt a low-profile approach. His address before the General Assembly would be carefully expressed but positive noting the talks and calling on all concerned to help the Secretary General. He would avoid mentioning that Cyprus is occupied by foreign troops. The GOC also will not pursue recourses in the Human Rights Commission, in Strasbourg and Geneva, and in ICAO as long as the talks continue. In short, the GOC intended to display good will and helpful to moderation. Rolandis repeated that the changed Turkish situation may improve resolution of the Cyprus problem and wondered whether the time was right for the USG to help to the degree it could.

8. The Secretary said he was very pleased with the constructive and flexible approach being taken by the GOC and hoped both sides would take this same approach. Patience is needed, he said, and we should measure progress in months, not days. He reiterated that we would be wise in our selection of the right time and method to use our influence.

9. Rolandis said that the GOL would always be receptive to any message from the Secretary or his associates. His government really wants a solution and is willing to consider any ideas. Cyprus is small; there is no reason why the whole population should not share in its prosperity.

10. Nimetz observed that the situation is better now than it has been in the three-and-one half years he has been following the issue. On tactics, Nimetz thought that the third cycle of considering the four subjects would be the most critical because the first would be largely the presentation of formal proposals and the second of formal counterproposals. The important thing, he said, was to get past the first real negotiating sessions with the mechanism of the talks intact. Nimetz noted that he had had lunch with Turkish Cypriots same day (Atakol and Alzlay being reported septel) and they expect the debate to be joined in the third round.<sup>4</sup> Nimetz thought that at that point the UN and perhaps other outside help might be useful particularly if done quietly.

11. Rolandis said he had always considered that there were two fora: the plenary sessions themselves and SRSG Gobbi's behind the scenes activities. He had always felt that the real problems could not be solved in plenary and thus the role of Gobbi was important. His private work will be important when one of the two sides is tempted to break off the talks because of unacceptable positions taken by the other.

12. Nimetz recalled that one idea had been to have working groups or sub-committees to get over the hard points. Rolandis noted that it

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<sup>4</sup> No record of this meeting was found.

had been agreed that these could be established. Rolandis said the GOC would keep the US fully informed through Ambassador Stone.

13. The Secretary closed the meeting by saying that he was delighted to get Rolandis' briefing and as a result has a sense of cautious optimism about the Cyprus situation.

14. Correct any references to "GOL" to read "GOC" (Government of Cyprus).

**Muskie**

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**81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and the United Kingdom, and the Missions to the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 30, 1980, 1320Z

289947. Subject: (U) Cypriot Ambassador Jacovides Discussion With Under Secretary Nimetz. Refs: A) Nicosia 2644 B) Nicosia 2665 C) Nicosia 2660 D) State 282387.<sup>2</sup>

1. (C-entire text)

2. Summary: Under Secretary Matthew Nimetz met with Cypriot Ambassador Andrew Jacovides on October 24 for a tour d'horizon encompassing the intercommunal talks and the role that may be played by Greece and Turkey, Cypriot domestic politics, and US aid to Cyprus. End summary.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800519–0184. Confidential. Drafted by Jones; cleared by Dillery and Giese; approved by Nimetz.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2644 from Nicosia, October 23, the Embassy reported on Denktash's critical reaction to Carter's recent statement that Cyprus was a problem to solve following the reintegration of Greece into NATO. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800506–0861) According to telegram 2633 from Nicosia, October 22, Carter made the statement before a group of Greek Americans. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800504–1044) Carter's remarks were made on October 20 in New York; see *Public Papers: Carter 1980*, Book III, p. 2369. In telegram 2660 from Nicosia, October 24, the Embassy reported on the Cypriot Government's negative reaction to the reintegration of the Greek military command in NATO. The reintegration triggered large-scale protests staged by Greek Cypriots in Larnaca and Nicosia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800508–0395) Telegram 2665 from Nicosia, October 24, and telegram 282387 to Nicosia, October 22, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800509–0529 and D800505–0902, respectively.

3. Jacovides opened the discussion with a brief review of the inter-communal talks. He was mildly critical of the “orchestrated” Turkish Cypriot press stories on the Greek Cypriot territorial proposal suggesting that this kind of story suggested “bad faith” in revealing to the press the details of a confidential negotiation. If the Turkish Cypriots didn’t like the GOC proposal, they should present their own. In conclusion, however, both negotiators had been making fairly positive statements and the course of the negotiations could best be described as “so far, so good”.

4. Following this line, Jacovides remarked upon Denktash’s visit to Ankara and his “unnecessary” departure statement (Ref A and B). He observed that most recognize it would be in Turkish interest to do something positive on Cyprus and that FM Turkmen is a known and positive quality. Nevertheless, Jacovides noted nothing is known about what the Turks might do and consequently he asked if the US had any information that would make the GOC feel “more comfortable”.

5. Nimetz responded that in both the content and tone of discussions about Cyprus, the Turks have given us reason to believe they are interested in solving the problem. We do not expect great leaps in policy but Ankara has been able to face up to tough decisions. Progress has been made on the economy and political terrorism and Nimetz hoped the same philosophy would be applied to the Cyprus problem. Nimetz noted—and stressed its applicability to the GOC as well—that the US had been emphasizing that problem solving brings political benefits. He commented that too many countries see only the disadvantages of problem solving. Nimetz concluded that Ankara wants the negotiations to continue and was prepared to give Denktash a push as necessary.

6. DAS Ewing suggested that the timing of Denktash’s visit to Ankara was interesting as the parties were reaching a stage where future positions would have to be developed. Jacovides suggested the third sequence of meetings would be particularly important. Nimetz suggested making a more cautious judgement as both communities were now locked into positions. He recalled that negotiations often are lengthy and that discussions outside the main meetings often provide the keys to progress. He suggested consequently that he would not be pessimistic if the third round of meetings was not particularly eventful. It was, Nimetz concluded, too much to expect fresh concessions in the third round.

7. Responding to a question by Nimetz on the effect of Greek reintegration on the talks, Jacovides was mildly positive. He noted that Rallis as well as Mitsotakis had explicitly stated that reintegration would lead to progress on the Cyprus problem. In the GOC statement (Ref C), Nicosia had carefully not said that the effects would be positive

but (resisting the negative proposals of AKEL and EDEK) taken the line that reintegration was Athens' decision and that the GOC hoped for continued Greek support.

8. Nimetz suggested that reintegration was a major step. The improved atmosphere between Greece and Turkey would make it easier to solve problems. Recalling that a wide variety of US-Turkey problems had been resolved, Nimetz noted that Cyprus was one of the few remaining and consequently focus on the issue would heighten.

9. Jacovides cautioned that protracted intercommunal discussions would foster the belief that the talks were being used to evade action in international fora. He observed that it was clear which side (the GOC) was more damaged by inconclusive dialogue and that the GOC would have problems regaining international attention and momentum if the talks did not develop. Still Jacovides observed that factors in several areas e.g., Greek elections, Middle East turmoil could have a positive effect on the talks. Progress on Cyprus could help Rallis' electoral position against the left and difficulty in the Middle East suggests the efficacy of a strong NATO and hence settling intra Alliance problems such as Cyprus. Jacovides hoped, however, there would be no slackening of US efforts on the Cyprus issue.

10. Recalling earlier US efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem and regretting its difficult nature, Nimetz assured Jacovides that Cyprus is on the US agenda and that we have every intention of working for a solution of the problem. In the course of comments on President Carter's Cyprus statement (Ref D), Nimetz recalled that both the rule of law and geopolitical realities suggested the need to resolve the Cyprus problem. Not even a cynic would suggest that Greece and Turkey could cooperate peacefully without solving the Cyprus problem.

11. In response to Nimetz's question on the effects of recent domestic developments on the talks, Jacovides stated that the key government figures and all political parties with the possible exception of EDEK are committed to the talks. Consequently, Kyprianou would not be hindered in decision making if the Turkish Cypriots made a "just and reasonable" proposal. He recalled that in 1977 Makarios had made proposals even though the Turkish Government appeared weak and that Ankara should not be misled by the appearance of domestic disarray in Nicosia to avoid forthcoming proposals. Nimetz stated that this point could be useful in conversation with Ankara.

12. Turning to the question of refugee aid for Cyprus, Jacovides made a strong case for continued US assistance. He said he understood the US Embassy opposed further assistance but he stressed the political utility of completing the half-finished refugee rehousing program. If refugees were suitably rehoused there would be less pressure to return to property in the north. Thus while the GOC would not give up the

“principle” that all refugees must be permitted to return, the reality of situation would ease negotiations. Jacovides also urged that the administration support the refugee program and not be viewed as opposing congressional funding. The money would be well used, benefitted Turkish Cypriots as well, and actually should be adjusted upward to account for inflation. Administration support for refugee aid would strengthen the image of the USG in Nicosia as concerned about the Cyprus problem and consequently have a positive effect on the intercommunal talks.

13. In response Nimetz noted Jacovides’ effective, comprehensive presentation but recalled the wide variety of pressing refugee problems worldwide e.g., Southeast Asia, Afghanistan, Somalia. While recognizing that aid for Cyprus was a reaffirmation that the political problem posed by the island had not ended, Nimetz stated that the case for Cyprus refugee relief was less persuasive each year and harder to argue vis-a-vis competing refugee needs.

**Muskie**

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**82. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Vest) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 20, 1980

**SUBJECT**

Cyprus Intercommunal Talks: End of Round Assessment

**SUMMARY:** The second sequence of four intercommunal meetings has brought slight substantive progress but also some deterioration of the negotiating atmosphere as traditional animosities flared at the final meeting dealing with the most controversial issue—territory.<sup>2</sup> Despite this, we believe a basic goal—institutionalization of the talks—is virtually achieved. The prospect of movement toward rapid solution of the Cyprus problem, however, remains highly remote and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800163–1595. Confidential. The memorandum was sent through Nimetz. Drafted by Jones; cleared by Dillery.

<sup>2</sup> An unknown hand underlined the middle portion of this sentence.



progress on the issues that divide the communities is likely to be painstakingly slow.

**DISCUSSION:** The second sequence of substantive discussion on the four basic topics of the Cyprus intercommunal ended on November 12. Meetings were held on October 15 and 31 (skipping a week for Muslim religious holidays and Turkish National Day) and November 5 and 12. They have and will continue to address the agreed topics in rotation (Varosha, “practical measures”, constitutional issues and territory) at meetings approximately once weekly.

### *Substance*

Both sides continued to develop their positions moving slightly beyond opening proposals on Varosha and “practical measures”. In discussing Varosha, the Turkish Cypriots proposed that an undefined portion of the city be demilitarized and jointly administered by Greek and Turkish Cypriots and UN officials. No limit was placed on the numbers of Greek Cypriots permitted to return to the area. A key element of this proposal, for which the Greek Cypriot negotiator pressed in vain, is to define the extent of the proposed area.

Regarding “practical measures”, the Greek Cypriots responded positively on minor Turkish Cypriot requests for outstanding social security payments and cooperation in the health field, but objected to other Turkish Cypriot proposals on passports and elimination of the economic embargo as implying Greek Cypriot recognition of the “TFSC”. The Turkish Cypriot negotiator promised to cooperate with Greek Cypriot requests for documents (land records, bank books, birth certificates) left in the north since 1974.

The meetings on constitutional and territorial issues were still more difficult. The Greek Cypriots for example pressed for Turkish Cypriot positions on territory, claiming that without precise boundaries a new federal constitution could not be formulated. Following a protracted, indecisive session on the constitution, SRSG Gobbi concluded that the only point of agreement by the parties was that Cyprus should be a federal republic and that fundamental rights and liberties should be guaranteed. The session on territory was likewise unproductive with the Greek Cypriots urging the Turkish Cypriots to present a specific map of their territorial requirements and view Cyprus as an integrated economic unit. The Turkish Cypriot negotiator, however, flatly rejected the concept of an integrated economic community.

### *Tone*

The negotiating atmosphere remained reasonably good with both sides seriously presenting their positions and exploring each other’s proposals. Apparently, the Greek Cypriot negotiator (Ioannides) is demonstrating considerable forbearance at the negotiating table, a

characteristic particularly evident during the final meeting on "territory" when the Turkish Cypriot bluntly and emotionally rejected an extensive presentation directed at considering Cyprus as an integrated economic unit. Ioannides, however, made a conciliatory response.

Politicization of the talks was accentuated by the publicity surrounding SYG Waldheim's invitation to Rolandis and Atakol to meet in NYC in mid-November. Although the proposal was subsequently rejected, the style of the GOC rejection exposed it to both internal criticism from Famagusta refugees and the Turkish Cypriots. Each side also resorted to public posturing on the territorial issue with Denktash stating that a specific village (located in a salient extending into the GOC-controlled area) would not be returned, a position totally unacceptable to the Greek Cypriots. For his part, Kyprianou asserted that all refugees would be able to return to their homes. Still the level of rhetoric has remained within bounds and tempers are still under control.

### *Prospects*

The conclusion of the first two rounds suggests that the initial goal—institutionalization of the talks—has been reached. The third round scheduled to end in mid-December should reinforce this conclusion but without substantive progress. Thus while there has been no breakthrough, neither has there been any breakdown. We can expect the talks to continue at least for the immediate future and consequently there is breathing room for further discussion, presentation of proposals, and ultimately of compromise.

Several events are on the horizon:

—the ultimate GOC position on a UNGA debate of the Cyprus issue is still undetermined. Although Cyprus is on the UNGA agenda, no time for debate has been formally scheduled and the GOC is attempting to use the prospect of avoiding debate and putting the item off until 1981 as a lever to induce Turkish Cypriot flexibility in the inter-communal talks.

—meetings between high ranking Greek and Turkish Cypriots and SYG Waldheim remain possible. The Security Council will meet in mid-December for a routine six-month renewal of UNFICYP's mandate. It is likely that Waldheim would meet separately with the ranking GOG and Turkish Cypriot representatives and such meetings, if held, could be mildly productive. If the third round is unproductive, however, UN Secretariat officials may be tempted to roll out personal proposals even if the negotiating scene is not yet ready for them.

The fundamental fact that the parties are far apart in substance continues to pertain. A Turkish official recently commented that the negotiations could take two years to end, and this appears optimistic to many observers.

**83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 10, 1980, 1238Z

327038. (U) Subject: Cypriot Ambassador Jacovides Meeting With Under Secretary Nimetz. Ref: (A) Nicosia 3000, (B) Nicosia 3004, (C) Ankara 8695.<sup>2</sup>

1. (C-entire text).

2. Summary: In farewell call on Under Secretary Nimetz on December 5, GOC Ambassador Jacovides discussed *inter alia* the effect of the transition on U.S. policy toward Cyprus and the status of the intercommunal talks. End summary.

3. After brief exchange on the effects of the transition in terms of U.S. policy toward Africa and South America, Jacovides commented on future U.S. attitudes toward Cyprus. He suggested that the current level of U.S. support for the U.N. framework and the intercommunal talks was the right approach. He noted that the U.S. was watching the process on the sidelines and observed that the intercommunal talks have developed somewhat although thus far not yet in substantive terms. The climate was good. He assumed the Turkish military take-over would help as in his opinion the Turks could no longer plead that they had a weak government. He recalled the Onan-Ioannides TV presentation (Ref A) as indicating that while there were substantive differences, the spirit of the talks was good.

4. Jacovides expressed some concern, however, over potentially disruptive statements such as Denktash's comments on territory (Ref B) and Turkish FM Turkmen's interview with "Yanki" (Ref C). Turkmen's reported statement that a Varosha accord could not be implemented before general agreement surprised him and he labeled it "factually incorrect" *inter alia* in the light of the May 1979 Agreement. Jacovides then noted Turkmen's comment that the U.S. expressed to Turkey no deeper concern about Cyprus than would Norway. Although he knew

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800589–0110. Confidential. Drafted by Jones; cleared by Dillery and Ewing; approved by Nimetz. Sent for information to Athens, Ankara, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 3004 from Nicosia, December 3, the Embassy reported on coverage in the Greek Cypriot press that Denktash had "hardened" his position with respect to the intercommunal negotiations and was unprepared to return any Turkish occupied land to the Greek Cypriots in the foreseeable future. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800576–1101) Telegram 8695 from Ankara, December 2, relaying items from a press interview with Turkish Foreign Minister Türkmen, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800574–1037. Telegram 3000 was not found.

differently, Jacovides stated that an interview of this nature influenced some opinions in Cyprus.

5. Nimetz observed that in the interview Turkmen was trying to demonstrate international support for Turkey and attempting to portray Ankara's good relations with the U.S. While Nimetz noted he was pleased Turkmen had not suggested the U.S. was pressuring Ankara on Cyprus, nevertheless it was clear we were more concerned and had done more about the issue than Norway.

6. Turning to the intercommunal talks, Nimetz stated the U.S. would be concerned if the currently scheduled recess beginning December 8 dragged on. He had the impression there had not been hard thinking on either side concerning next steps. He observed that a time comes in any negotiation for testing each other with solid proposals and suggested the January–February period could be a critical time.

7. Jacovides responded that the Greek Cypriots intended no slackening of the talks. He commented, however, that it was a real sacrifice on the GOC's part to eliminate discussion of the Cyprus issue in international fora and remarked that the current situation with no international discussion was obviously advantageous to the Turkish Cypriots. Some evidence of a willingness to move on the Turkish part would help to justify the current GOC attitude. He hoped that a strong government in Ankara would be helpful and suggested that Varosha was the place to start. Another 2–3 months without progress would damage the talks' momentum. Nimetz agreed and suggested the sides should consider the potential problem of how to sustain momentum in the negotiations during the recess in the talks.

8. In retrospective comments, Nimetz expressed disappointment that despite successes in other areas of the region, there had not been as much movement on the Cyprus issue. Still, he believed, the problem is solvable and with work can be resolved. Jacovides agreed, adding that the catalyst could be Varosha as an agreement here could resettle significant numbers of refugees and improve the atmosphere. Jacovides praised Turkish FM officials he knew as reasonable, moderate people and concluded that Greece, Turkey and Cyprus need not be weighed against each other as NATO needed a strong Turkey and a reasonable, satisfactory solution to the Cyprus problem should be achievable without damaging any of the participants.

**Christopher**

# Turkey

## 84. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 21, 1977, 3 p.m.

### SUBJECT

The Turkish-US Security Relationship and Cyprus

### PARTICIPANTS

#### US

The Secretary-designate

Mr. Christopher

Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary, EUR

Nelson C. Ledsky, Director, EUR/SE

#### Turkey

Ambassador Esenbel

### Summary

Ambassador Esenbel complained about the January 19 Departmental statement, which asked Congress to withhold immediate consideration of the US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Vance defended the statement, saying it was the only means to stave off Congressional statements opposing the US-Turkish security relationship. Mr. Vance added that the US intended to complete its policy review of the Eastern Mediterranean in the near future, and then would strive to rebuild Turkish-US friendship. Ambassador Esenbel explained the latest Turkish initiative on Cyprus by asserting that Ankara had virtually forced Denktash to write Makarios, and propose a meeting which Turkey hoped would lead to detailed discussions of substantive issues required for a negotiated Cyprus settlement. Mr.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770033-1449. Confidential; Limdis. Drafted by Ledsky; approved by Twaddell on February 22. The meeting took place in Vance's office.

<sup>2</sup> The statement, relayed in telegram 13345 to Ankara, January 20, reads as follows: "President Ford sent the Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey to the Congress without consulting the new administration. We had previously been informed that the agreement would not be sent forward, since we had initiated a full review of the related foreign policy issues which would not be completed until after the change in administrations. We hope that no action will be taken by the Congress until this review is completed." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770020-0868) Ford sent the Defense Cooperation Agreement to Congress on January 18; for the text of his transmittal letter, see *Public Papers: Ford, 1976-77*, Book III, p. 2961. An explication of U.S. policy regarding the DCA during the Ford administration is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 4, 1976, pp. 424-428. See also *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Documents 231, 234, and 247.

Vance said the US welcomed meetings between Makarios and Denktash, and hoped they would lead to early progress.

*A. US-Turkish Defense Relationship*

Ambassador Esenbel opened the meeting by recalling his conversation with Mr. Vance this summer, and handing the Secretary-designate a congratulatory letter from the Turkish Foreign Minister.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Vance read the message and said he would write a personal reply.

Ambassador Esenbel then made a lengthy presentation about the importance of the US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). The document, in his view, aimed at correcting the imbalance in Turkish-American relations created by Congressional action in late 1974. It was the tool by which the two countries could renew and revitalize close political and security relations. Esenbel recalled the damage done to these relations over the past two years and said now was the time to begin moving in a new direction.

Turkey, asserted Esenbel, had been very patient. It had appreciated that little could be done preceding the US elections and had accordingly waited quietly for more than ten months. Now it appeared a further delay would be required, but Esenbel warned that Turkish patience could not last indefinitely. There would soon be national elections, and there was already heavy internal criticism of the Turkish Government from both left and right. Failure of the US Congress to approve the DCA would feed this opposition and strengthen those in Turkey who believed the US was no longer a credible or reliable ally.

On the other hand, approval of the US-Turkish Agreement would bring benefits to both sides. It would eliminate the remaining restrictions on Turkish arms purchases in the US. It would enable US bases in Turkey to begin functioning again. It would strengthen the Turkish Government in defending close US-Turkish ties and help put those ties on a stronger, stabler basis. In Alliance terms, it would mean that Turkey's contribution to NATO force levels could be maintained and strengthened.

Esenbel said he could not disguise his Government's concern at the statement issued by the State Department on Wednesday.<sup>4</sup> This concern had already been registered by the Turkish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister directly to Ambassador Macomber. The US statement, moreover, had already begun to be exploited by the Greek press.

Esenbel said he did not understand why the Ford Administration decided to send the US-Turkish Agreement to Congress at the last mo-

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> January 19.

ment. At the same time, it was unclear to him why the new Administration felt so apprehensive about having this step taken. Turkey never expected immediate Congressional approval of the DCA, and it fully understood that the new Administration would want initially to review its policies in the area. For this reason, the statement issued on Wednesday seemed so unnecessary. What was most worrisome was the extent to which the statement reflected the new Administration's felt need to placate the Greek lobby in Congress.

Esenbel concluded his presentation by noting that Turks are a frank people who state their views directly. It was the Turkish position that the US-Turkish DCA must stand on its own merits and cannot be linked to other subjects. Indeed, the very genesis of the Agreement was a desire by both countries to separate the defense relationship from other problems in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Mr. Vance said he would like to respond frankly to Ambassador Esenbel's comments. The new Administration felt deeply about the need to maintain and strengthen the friendship between Turkey and the US. It, too, wished to repair the damage which had been caused in past years.

What occurred on Wednesday could be explained very simply. The US was in a transition process, and the incoming Administration needed to review the complex of issues involving Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. It had informed Congress some weeks ago that this study would be undertaken, and it was not yet complete.

The new Administration also believes that if the Turkish-US Agreement is to get through Congress, considerable spadework on the Hill will be required. There are many in Congress who feel strongly about Cyprus and who have translated that concern into a deep interest in all issues involving Greece and Turkey. The new Administration has not yet had a chance to do the Congressional missionary work which it feels must be done, and for this reason asked Dr. Kissinger to withhold transmitting the DCA to the Congress. The request was made to give the incoming Administration time to do its own spadework and then present the issue in a way which gives no one an excuse to dig themselves in in opposition. Unfortunately, the Agreement went forward. Mr. Vance said he thought this was simply a mistake, but within hours, the damage that he feared would occur started to take shape. Congressmen began calling to say they would have to come out publicly in opposition to the DCA if the State Department remained silent. It was in an effort to forestall such statements—and Mr. Vance noted that none were made—that the new Administration felt it had to issue the statement it did.

Mr. Vance said he understood the Turkish position, and pledged that the new Administration would work as rapidly as possible to com-

plete the required internal study and then would constructively try to move forward to restore the US relationship with Turkey.

Ambassador Esenbel said he had no doubt in his own mind that the new Administration was sincere in wanting to restore US-Turkish relations. He could even understand why some statement had to be issued on Wednesday. What he could not comprehend was why the statement had to link the DCA with a review of "other related issues." Such linkage was bound to create internal problems in Turkey, make matters more difficult for the Demirel Government and prevent flexibility on the issue of Cyprus. Mr. Vance replied that only the statement issued on Wednesday, with the language it contained, could have made it possible to stave off Congressional statements in opposition to the DCA.

### *B. Cyprus*

There followed a brief review of the economic and political situation in Turkey, with Esenbel indicating that national elections were still most likely to occur in October. The conversation then passed to Cyprus. Mr. Vance said he hoped all the parties to the Cyprus dispute could find a way to move the situation toward an equitable solution. He said he was happy to see that Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash had taken the initiative in proposing a meeting with Makarios and hoped that the meeting would take place and serve as a basis for additional talks between the two Cypriot leaders.

Ambassador Esenbel said that the Denktash letter, a copy of which he handed to Mr. Vance, represented an initiative which had the strong backing of Ankara.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, the Turkish Government had virtually forced Denktash to send the letter, and insisted he attend the meeting on January 27 (even though Denktash claimed it was his birthday). Ankara had also forced Denktash not to make an issue of venue, but to meet wherever Makarios proposed. (The meeting would take place at UN headquarters near Nicosia airport.)<sup>6</sup>

The Turkish Government hoped Denktash and Makarios could use their meeting to agree on guidelines for future negotiations, one of which would have to be that substantive issues could only be discussed in committees or subcommittees. The first such committee could deal

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<sup>5</sup> Not found. In telegram 139 from Nicosia, January 15, the Embassy noted that Denktash's letters to UN Secretary General Waldheim and Archbishop Makarios were designed to "seize diplomatic initiative" toward securing a negotiated settlement to the Cyprus dispute. The Embassy projected that Makarios would be hesitant to become drawn into negotiations, given the brief and unsuccessful history of past proposals. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770016-0321)

<sup>6</sup> Denktash and Makarios met on January 27 and February 6. See footnote 5, Document 31.



with the question of the future constitution of Cyprus, and could consider which powers would be delegated to the two state regimes under a bizonal federation and which would be retained by the federation itself. Once agreement on these points was reached, it would then be possible to consider some of Makarios' special ideas, such as how to assure freedom of movement. In all these discussions, Esenbel said, it would have to be recognized that the clock could not be turned back to July 1974. No one should expect complete freedom of travel or residence.

Esenbel said that if things went this far, the territorial issue could then be discussed in a separate committee or subcommittee on the basis of the Brussels Agreement of 1975.<sup>7</sup> All that required negotiation was the line of demarcation between the two zones. There could be no discussion based on percentages or attempts to move back a preconceived number of refugees. Each side could produce a map, from which a general discussion could proceed. Esenbel thought it to be essential that the Greeks present a map first, and be prepared to defend why they had placed the lines where they had. The Turks could then produce a map containing a counter proposal, and the give-and-take might eventually produce an agreed line.

Esenbel said that it was essential that these talks, once started, be kept absolutely confidential. He also thought it likely that at the first meeting, Denktash would again bring forward a proposal for some form of provisional government which would operate until a final settlement could be reached. If this were not acceptable to Makarios, and Esenbel observed that nothing along these lines had been thus far, Denktash would then ask Makarios for a gentleman's agreement that while negotiations proceeded, the Greeks would cease their propaganda efforts against Turkey in international fora. Esenbel expressed doubt as to whether Makarios would find this acceptable, but said Turkey wanted Denktash to probe the Greek Cypriots on all these points.

The meeting ended with a brief discussion of US planning with respect to the Cyprus issue. In response to Esenbel's questions, Mr. Vance said he planned no trip to Greece or Cyprus in connection with his forthcoming swing through the Middle East. As for the possibility of sending an envoy to the area, Mr. Vance acknowledged that this was something he was thinking about but had not yet reached a final decision on. Mr. Vance said that if such a decision were taken, he intended to inform Ambassador Esenbel in advance of any public statement.

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<sup>7</sup> Reference is to the agreement reached between Greece and Turkey in Brussels on May 31, 1975, that problems between the two countries would be resolved by negotiations and that the issue of the delimitation of the continental shelf of the Aegean would be resolved by the International Court of Justice.

**85. Intelligence Information Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency**

Washington, January 31, 1977

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files, NIIM 0035-77. Top Secret; Codeword. Four pages not declassified.]

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**86. Letter From Turkish Prime Minister Demirel to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Ankara, undated

Dear Mr. President,

I would like to avail myself of the auspicious occasion of your assuming the high office of President, to extend once more my sincere wishes for your success, personal health and happiness. I am aware that in these early days of your administration many urgent domestic and international policy issues are awaiting your personal attention and devotion. I would wish to hope that the future of Turkish-American Bilateral Security Relations would also be considered among the priorities. My main concern in inviting your considerate attention to this aspect of our relationship, is in fact motivated by my firm belief in the value of these ties which have served the interests of our nations for a period of nearly three decades as well as the interests of the North Atlantic Alliance to which we are both committed.

Mr. President, as you are aware, it is one of the main foreign policy choices of Turkey to maintain its membership to the alliance and to continue the bilateral security and defence relations with the United States. This has been our policy in the past and we believe that it is in our interest to continue such a policy in the future. However, I must confess that the Congress decision to impose an arms embargo on Turkey has created serious domestic difficulties for the Turkish Government in upholding the credibility of the alliance and the usefulness of bilateral security relationship with the United States.<sup>2</sup> Yet my Gov-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 16, Greece: 1977. No classification marking. Although the letter is undated, Esenbel forwarded a copy to Vance on February 11.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 1, and footnote 7, Document 16.

ernment acted with restraint and goodwill and spared no effort to avoid any further deterioration of our relations. Our joint efforts with the outgoing administration produced a new Defence Cooperation Agreement which aims at, above all, restoring the mutual confidence between the two nations which characterize our relationship for the last three decades.<sup>3</sup>

Mr. President, it is certainly up to your Administration and the United States Congress to determine where its country's vital interests lie. What I would like to add to your considerations is that the already seriously damaged traditional and friendly Turkish-American relations can hardly survive another set-back. I believe that we should all try to avoid such an undesirable situation which will not only further adversely affect the Turkish-American bilateral relations but also shake the credibility of the alliance as a whole.

With these in mind, I am sincerely convinced that both of our countries have a common and vital interest in having the Agreement to be put into effect without further and unnecessary delay.

I am sure the restoration of our security ties will not only strengthen Turkey's contribution to the Alliance but will also contribute to a considerable extent to the peace and stability in the area.

I thought I should bring these views to your attention in all frankness at this stage of our relationship and in doing so I am exclusively guided by my firm belief that, if we are equally concerned of the present situation, we should both spare no effort to remedy it.

With kind regards.

Yours sincerely,

**Suleyman Demirel<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Documents 233, 236, and 241.

<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

# 87. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Greece and Turkey<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 16, 1977, 2108Z

35397. Subject: Clifford Mission: Letters From President. Vienna for Clifford Mission party.

[Omitted here is a letter from Carter to Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis.]

2. For Ankara: Please deliver as soon as possible following letter from President to Prime Minister Demirel in reply to latter's message of February 11 (State 33247).<sup>2</sup> Begin text:

"February 15, 1977

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

"Thank you for your message of February 11 setting forth your views on the critical importance of restoring the security relationship between Turkey and the United States.

"I fully share your desire that early attention be given to finding ways to improve and restore the close security ties between our two countries that have served both our nations so well for more than a generation. The friendship between our two peoples and our partnership in the North Atlantic Alliance has clearly been to the benefit of both nations. It is for all these reason that I have asked one of my most trusted advisers, former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, to undertake a special mission on my behalf to the area. Mr. Clifford is a man of broad experience and sound judgment. I hope you will speak frankly with Mr. Clifford about your concerns and that you will also discuss with him how together we might work to restore the closest possible Turkish-American relationship. I will look forward to receiving recommendations from Mr. Clifford on his return.<sup>3</sup>

"You may be assured that Secretary Vance, Mr. Clifford and I are determined to do all that we can to restore warm and friendly ties of mutual cooperation between Turkey and the United States.

"With very best regards. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter (signature)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 19, Turkey: Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, 2/77-4/80. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Ewing from text received from the White House; cleared by Peter Sebastian (S/S); approved by Hartman. Sent for information Immediate to Vienna and Nicosia.

<sup>2</sup> Not found. Demirel's letter is printed as Document 86.

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 8 and 10. For the origins of the Clifford Mission, see Documents 5-7.

“His Excellency

Suleyman Demirel

Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey” End text.

3. Signed originals of both letters being hand carried by Clifford Mission party. Please confirm by immediate cable when letters have been delivered.

4. The White House does not intend to release this exchange of messages but has no objection if the recipient wishes to do so.

**Hartman**

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**88. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Ankara, February 22, 1977, 3 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Meeting with Former Prime Minister Ecevit

**PARTICIPANTS**

*Turks*

Bulent Ecevit

Hasan Esat Isik

Turan Gunes

*Americans*

Secretary Clifford

Matthew Nimetz

Nelson C. Ledsky

Gregory Treverton

Ecevit welcomed Clifford warmly and, following a brief conversation about the domestic Turkish electoral situation, in which Ecevit affirmed that national elections would likely be held in June, the discussion quickly turned to the purpose of the Clifford mission. Clifford explained that he had come to the Eastern Mediterranean to ascertain the facts about the problems in the area and the attitudes of the parties. The mission would then prepare a report for the President and, based on this report and meetings in Washington, new policies would be formulated to cover the Eastern Mediterranean. Clifford reviewed his visit

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977–1980, Lot 81D85, Box 2, MemCons. Confidential. Drafted by Ledsky.

to Vienna and Greece, and said that we intended after Ankara to proceed to Cyprus and London.<sup>2</sup> He then asked Ecevit to give us the benefit of his views on the problems in the area as he saw them.

Ecevit focused first on statements in the press attributed to Clifford that the problems existing between Greece and Turkey were greater than Clifford had thought when he left Washington.<sup>3</sup> Ecevit expressed the view that matters between Greece and Turkey were proceeding more smoothly in recent months and he was therefore startled by Clifford's special reference to these issues.

Ecevit went on to insist that there had been no recent change in Turkish attitudes toward Greece. Turkey was not an expansionist power; nor was it pursuing aggressive policies. Indeed, the present coalition in Ankara was so divided that it could barely formulate or implement a foreign policy at all. Ecevit noted that the coalition was unable to discuss Cyprus or solve Turkey's problems with the European Community. There were no visible segments of public opinion that demanded an aggressive policy toward Greece. Ecevit insisted the Turkish people were not adventuresome, and that the very impossibility of the Turkish Government acting decisively in any area made a mockery of Caramanlis' assertions to Clifford.<sup>4</sup>

Ecevit said that with respect to questions about an Aegean army, this was not a new development. The stationing of amphibious vessels along the Aegean began in the late 1960s as a response to the gradual Greek military buildup on the Aegean islands.

With respect to air rights issues, Ecevit said Turkey had been remiss in decades past in not insisting on its rights in the Aegean. It had left air traffic control to the Greeks, and Athens had taken advantage of this Turkish laxness to extend naval and air control, first through the NATO apparatus and then bilaterally over the entire Aegean. Turkey does demand a re-evaluation of this situation based on new circumstances and technology.

With respect to the Continental Shelf, Ecevit noted that Greece had been conducting seismographic studies in the Aegean since 1965. Much of this exploration was in areas which might logically be considered under dispute. The Turks said nothing while this was going on. When Ecevit assumed control of the Turkish Government in 1974 he said he

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<sup>2</sup> Clifford was in Vienna February 16–17, in Athens February 17–20, and in Nicosia February 23–25.

<sup>3</sup> Although no statement by Clifford has been found, several news reports noted the difficulties the Clifford Mission faced. See, for example, Steven V. Roberts, "Clifford in Athens on Mission for Carter to Resolve Cyprus Problem and Heal Greek-Turkish Breach," *The New York Times*, February 18, 1977, p. A6, and Thomas Butson and Barbara Slavin, "Clifford's Cyprus Mission," *The New York Times*, February 20, 1977, p. 4.

<sup>4</sup> See the second attachment to Document 8.

asked for negotiations with the Greek junta concerning both the air space and Continental Shelf questions. The Greeks rejected this request and Ecevit said he had no choice but to send the first Turkish seismic vessel into the Aegean. In 1975 Ecevit said he had made arrangements for a further exploration by a Norwegian vessel, but he left office and the caretaker Turkish Government did not feel strong enough to pursue this matter. Then last year, under pressure from Ecevit, Prime Minister Demirel sent the *Sismik* out into the Aegean.<sup>5</sup> Ecevit claimed Turkey had every right to take this action and that when he had been in Washington in 1976 he had told President Ford, Secretary Kissinger and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld that Turkey wanted a full settlement of all questions connected with the Aegean, but that the Greeks would not meet Turkey half way.<sup>6</sup> Ecevit then went on to describe how the Greeks took their case in the fall of 1976 to the Security Council and the World Court and both bodies came down generally more on the Turkish than Greek side. It was only then, Ecevit claimed, that Greece accepted the need for serious negotiations.

Ecevit said that he personally viewed this as a hopeful development, and that a modest beginning had been made in recent months. He insisted that if the two countries were left alone they would eventually reach a negotiated settlement to their various Aegean disputes. Ecevit went on to say he was concerned by the slow pace of these negotiations, which he claimed benefitted the Greek position. Ecevit said that the position of his party on the Aegean was clear, and that if he won the forthcoming elections he would move to speed up the negotiations with Greece. He insisted, however, that Turkey had to get a fair share of Aegean assets.

Ecevit went on to insist there was no relationship between the Continental Shelf issue and the question of Turkish aggressive intent in the Aegean. Turkey has made no claims against the Greek islands. Ecevit said he had made such an announcement publicly and would be prepared to do so again at any time. The real difficulty, Ecevit said, was that Greece was exploiting her sovereignty over the islands to make claims over the entire Continental Shelf, but he concluded his presentation by saying that the issue was under control, and that there was no reason to be worried by the present state of Greek-Turkish differences over the Aegean.

Mr. Clifford said he would like to mention two other points raised by Caramanlis. The first was that Caramanlis was a moderate leader who wanted to negotiate. Turkey therefore was missing an opportunity

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 10, Document 8.

<sup>6</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Documents 243 and 244.

by not settling Greco-Turkish problems with him. Caramanlis said he could find no interlocutor in Turkey with whom he could talk. Clifford said he felt that there was indeed a lack of understanding between the two sides, which could produce, without the fault of either, a very serious situation.

Ecevit said perhaps Caramanlis was right on this point and that no conversation partner could emerge in Turkey until after the June elections. At that point, Ecevit said, he hoped to speak directly to Caramanlis as he had tried to do when Caramanlis returned to Athens in the summer of 1974. Ecevit repeated, however, that there was no reason for Greece or any other power to fear Turkish expansionism. No responsible Turkish official had advocated or believed in such a course. Nor does the evidence of recent years suggest that the Turks really want to expand their territory. Ecevit noted that Turkish forces could have seized all of Cyprus in 1974 had they wanted to do so. Instead, Ecevit said, he had sought immediate negotiations and a settlement. While this had not succeeded in 1974, he said he hoped that after the elections he would be in a position to reestablish contact with the Greeks, reach decisions at a policy level and then move quickly to conclude a Cyprus settlement. In this connection he suggested that the present negotiating approach, whereby meetings at the technical level sought agreements which could then be referred upward, was unlikely to produce real results.

In response to further questions about Cyprus from Secretary Clifford, Ecevit said his party had long advocated a reconciliation and final settlement. Ecevit claimed he had urged the coalition government to find a solution to this problem for the past year and a half, and he had never interfered, nor would he in the future, should the coalition wish to move positively on this matter. The real problem lay in the makeup of the coalition itself. It was his understanding that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in recent weeks had simply bypassed their other coalition partners to push for a meeting between Denktash and Makarios. These meetings may not lead to any definite results. Even if they did the matter would have to be referred back to the Parliament and Turkish Government coalition, which is so divided it cannot approve anything until after the Turkish elections. It would be a good thing, however, if a dialogue between the two Cypriot communities could be kept going between now and late summer so that the new Turkish Government could merely pick up and move to reach an early final settlement.

For now, it was Ecevit's view that the friends and allies of Turkey should do nothing but wait and see what develops in the intercom-



munal talks in Vienna in March.<sup>7</sup> There was no point in the United States becoming active now, for there could be no expectation of immediate results. Ecevit insisted, however, that Turkey wanted a negotiated solution and wanted to establish good relations with Greece as well. The desire for improving relations with Greece related to NATO, but even without NATO, Greece and Turkey were neighbors and thus had to learn to live together. Ecevit observed that Turkey now has good relations with all its neighbors except the one which was nominally its ally. Ecevit said he would like to make one further observation, namely, that whenever Turkey's friends in the West stay out of Greek-Turkish difficulties, the two countries manage to resolve their problems peacefully. Whenever Turkey's friends become overly involved, as they did after World War I, difficulties and even worse have resulted. Both nations are experienced and intelligent, and they have the means to establish good relations between themselves if they are left alone.

Clifford suggested there were both comforting and disturbing elements in Ecevit's comments. He then went on to describe the situation with respect to Greece, and the US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement. He noted with respect to Cyprus, that there had been no progress in more than two and a half years. This had disturbed many in the United States, who no longer were prepared to view meetings and optimistic statements as evidence of movement toward a negotiated settlement.

Ecevit replied that while he understood the situation in Congress, it was a disturbing thought for a country like Turkey, in a critical geographic situation, to observe that her security might be decided by the internal politics of foreign allies. It was impossible for Turkey to keep her defense relations suspended for any lengthy period of time. It was disturbing also that in the minds of many in the United States, Turkey exists only because Greece exists. Turkey is concerned with more than Greece. It has interests and concerns in the Middle East and throughout the Mediterranean. It wanted to maintain strong ties with NATO, and a strong defense against the Soviet Union. Ecevit felt that it was essential that the United States try to dissociate its security concerns from the quarrels between neighbors which occasionally occur around the world.

Secretary Clifford said that if he and his mission had their way, we would have settled the Turkish-US Defense Cooperation Agreement long ago. He insisted that U.S. policies and actions were not focused on Greece. The United States was conscious of the importance of Turkey

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<sup>7</sup> The talks took place March 31–April 7. See Document 11.

and respected and admired Turkey's loyalty and devotion to the Western Alliance system. Clifford said he also respected Ecevit's forthrightness and wanted to be equally candid in describing the situation in the United States. He said that regrettable as it might seem, Cyprus did hold up the US-Turkish relationship. This was reality, whether we liked it or not, and he therefore expressed hope that pressure [*progress*] could soon be made in moving toward a Cyprus settlement. Clifford said he knew that such progress could not be dramatic. He knew, too, that it might not occur immediately, given the Turkish electoral situation. Nonetheless, he noted that such progress was in the joint interests of Turkey and the United States.

Ecevit said he agreed with Clifford and that he and his party both wanted and would work toward a Cyprus solution and better Turkish relations with Greece. He said he would do so, not in the interest of US-Turkish relations, but because such progress was important for Greece, important for Turkey and important for the two communities on Cyprus. He pledged that his party would be of help to the present coalition government in any way it could with respect to Cyprus and the Aegean, but he noted with regret that he did not believe the present government in Turkey was in a position to request or receive such assistance. He concluded his presentation by observing that perhaps we would all have to await the electoral results in Turkey. In that sense, early elections would help us all.

Clifford thanked Ecevit for his frankness and courtesy and said that he had much enjoyed the conversation and the chance to meet with such an experienced and dynamic Turkish leader.

## 89. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

TDFIR DB-315/02408-77

Washington, March 3, 1977

204690. Country: Turkey/Cyprus/Greece. DOI: 22 February 1977. Subject: 1. Negative reaction of senior Turkish General Staff (TGS) officers to Clifford Mission. 2. Preparation of TGS option paper on reaction to possible abandonment by the U.S. of the Turkish-American Defense Cooperation Agreement. Source: [5 lines not declassified].

(Summary: Following the Turkish General Staff (TGS) briefing of U.S. Special Envoy Clark Clifford and his delegation at the TGS on 22 February, TGS Chief General, Semth Sancar and other senior TGS officers met [text not declassified] to discuss the results and impressions of the meeting. Joining in this informal discussion were the TGS participants at the briefing, including Lt. General Haydar Altik, TGS Chief of Operations; Rear Admiral Zahit Atakan, TGS Chief of Intelligence (J-2); Lt. General Ilsam Soydan, TGS Chief of Logistics and Plans (J-4); and Lt. General Necdet Ozturun, TGS Chief of Strategic Plans (J-5). The thrust of their remarks was that although Clifford claimed he came to hear the Turkish point of view and learn the facts of the situation in the area, instead he presented an “ultimatum” that Turkey must choose between Cyprus and the Turkish American Defense Coordination Agreement (DCA).<sup>2</sup> A few days after this meeting, TGS Chief General Sancar ordered the TGS to prepare a draft plan of what steps the TGS should take if, as a result of the Clifford Mission, the U.S. announces that the DCA is to be abandoned or if no agreement on Cyprus is possible. The TGS report has to be completed by 4 March, and serve as the basis for

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 1, Chron: 3/77. Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals; Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants; Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator. In a March 4 covering memorandum to Brzezinski and Trevorton, Henze commented: “It appears that [Clifford’s] impact on the Turkish General Staff may have been more negative than he realized. While I do not doubt that these initial reactions are correctly reported, *I am not sure they will persist* . . . The conclusion I would draw from this report is that it will be important over the next few weeks to do nothing to bruise Turkish military sensitivities further while at the same time keeping up the dialogue and pressure with the Turkish political leaders. The Turkish military will accept the views and initiative of their political leaders on these questions during the foreseeable future.” (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> Reactions to the Clifford Mission elsewhere in the Turkish Government did not necessarily reflect those reported in this cable. For example, CIA Intelligence Information Cable [text not declassified], March 2, reported that Prime Minister Demirel felt that Clifford’s mission to Turkey was “basically positive in outcome” and that one outcome was that the Carter administration “came away with a better understanding of Turkey’s position vis-à-vis Greece and Cyprus.” (Ibid.)

discussion of options by the National Security Council (NSC). End summary.)

[Omitted here is the body of the cable.]

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**90. Letter From President Carter to Turkish Prime Minister Demirel<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 16, 1977

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Although Secretary Clifford has already expressed his thanks for your cordial reception during his recent visit to Ankara, I wanted to write you personally to add my appreciation for the courtesy and openness with which you and your colleagues received my Special Representative. The time you devoted to Secretary Clifford, and the warm personal relationship which he tells me developed between you, gives me great hope for early and full restoration of the close ties which have so long bound our two countries together.

I can assure you that when Secretary Clifford spoke out of the wealth of his own personal experience of the abiding importance of NATO, he was expressing my views as well as his own. The American people place great value on Turkey's friendship and the alliance relationship we have developed and maintained together for almost thirty years. In conveying to me the impressions he gained from his visit to Ankara,<sup>2</sup> Secretary Clifford has deepened my understanding of the situation in the eastern Mediterranean and of the importance that must be attached to safeguarding and strengthening U.S.-Turkish relations.

I was also heartened to learn, based on Secretary Clifford's mission, that specific, substantive proposals will be put on the table in the next round of intercommunal negotiations between the two Cypriot communities which begins in Vienna later this month.<sup>3</sup> I am hopeful that through these procedures a process of sustained discussions of concrete issues can begin and that progress can be made toward the lasting and just solution that will benefit all Cypriots. My Administra-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 19, Turkey: Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, 2/77-4/80. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 8 and 10.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 11 and footnote 3, Document 38.

tion places a high priority in assisting in any way we can the efforts of United Nations Secretary General Waldheim and the two Cypriot communities in reaching a mutually acceptable settlement. It is my earnest hope that through these efforts, 1977 will prove to be the year a just Cyprus settlement becomes a reality.

I hope that it will be possible to meet with you at an early date so that we have an opportunity to discuss matters of mutual concern to our two countries.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

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## 91. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 8, 1977, 2 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Turkey-US Security Relations; Cyprus; The Aegean

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *US*

Secretary Cyrus Vance

Matthew Nimetz, Counselor-designate

Raymond C. Ewing, Acting Director, EUR/SE (notetaker)

#### *Turkey*

Ambassador Esenbel

### *US-Turkey Defense Cooperation*

Ambassador Esenbel said he would be returning to Ankara for a week or 10 days of consultations on April 9. Before he left Washington, he wanted on behalf of the Turkish Government to stress the importance of the US-Turkey Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) signed in March 1976.<sup>2</sup> In the campaign prior to the June 5 elections, there would most probably be criticism by Ecevit and others of the Demirel Government for signing an agreement which had still not been imple-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Subject Files and Chrons 1977/78/79/80, Files of Assistant Secretary J. Brian Atwood, Lot 81D115, Box 4, Greece/Turkey/Cyprus. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Ewing on April 11; approved by Twaddell on April 18. The meeting took place in Vance's office.

<sup>2</sup> Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Çağlayangil signed the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement on March 26, 1976.

mented. In addition, the Turkish military faced increasing problems since its access to supplies had been interrupted. Esenbel said a partial solution through June had been worked out for the F-4 problem.<sup>3</sup> He was aware of the recommendations of Clark Clifford but wondered when decisions would be announced. Esenbel noted that NATO Secretary General Luns took the position that the DCA should be approved by the Congress without conditions because of its importance to Turkey's position in NATO.

The Secretary said that Clifford had submitted a written report to the President, and that decisions would shortly be taken so that they would be ready when Congress returns from its current recess on April 18. These pending decisions would include both suggested 1978 military aid levels for Turkey and possibly also endorsement of the DCA in principle.

Esenbel said his government hoped for the strongest possible statement to make clear the support of the Administration for the DCA. He recalled he had recently discussed timing with Clark Clifford (State 71604) who had said that soundings with Congress would help determine when conditions were ripe for movement on the DCA.<sup>4</sup> This vague formulation did not satisfy his government.

The Secretary said we could not be more precise about timing at this stage. Priority attention was being given to the 1978 security assistance legislation. Esenbel asked if the Administration could say that Congress should take up the DCA as soon as it completed work on the 1978 aid bill. The Secretary replied that the most we could do in the near future, if we reach that decision, was to indicate the Administration's endorsement in principle of the DCA. Mr. Nimetz hoped that this would help with the period through the Turkish elections.

Esenbel said he had recently talked with a number of Senators and Congressmen. He thought the Senate would support the DCA now. He agreed with the Secretary's observation that the situation in the Senate was better than in the House. Sparkman had told him that if the Administration gives the signal he could get the DCA quickly to the floor.

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the U.S. plan to sell Turkey F-4 aircraft as part of a commercial contract in order to get around the legal prohibitions of the arms embargo. The Department reported this information in telegram 77318 to Ankara, April 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770120-1066)

<sup>4</sup> The meeting with Clifford took place on March 30 in Washington, at Esenbel's request. Esenbel wanted to sound out Clifford's thinking on how to proceed with the Defense Cooperation Agreement in light of his mission to Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. Clifford stated that his trip reinforced his longstanding belief in the importance of the U.S.-Turkish relationship and of Turkey's place in the NATO Alliance, but that he did not feel that the administration would be able to get the DCA through Congress at that time. (Telegram 71604 to Ankara, March 31; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770111-0183)

McGovern had told the Ambassador he was now open-minded and realized he had made a mistake in supporting the Turkish embargo; Humphrey would favor the DCA. Eagleton said he did not want a fight. The Secretary agreed that progress had been made and recalled he had told Esenbel in January that the Administration wanted to build support so that when it brought the DCA before Congress it would not be defeated.<sup>5</sup>

Esenbel said that on the House side Zablocki was prepared to push the DCA if the Administration asked. Solarz and Derwinski were ready for hearings in June while Rosenthal and his associates would never be satisfied. Hamilton had told Esenbel that priority should be given to the 1978 aid bill and that the Administration should “hang tough” regarding lifting of the FMS cash ceiling. Hamilton wanted to wait until he saw what happened to the aid bill to make a judgment on the timing of the DCA.

### *Cyprus*

The Secretary said Congress would also be watching what happens at the Cyprus inter-communal talks in Nicosia next month. Esenbel said the Turkish side in Vienna had done its best.<sup>6</sup> The talks would continue but Esenbel felt that the Greek Cypriot map with four zones was quite unacceptable. The Secretary said he thought getting a map on the table was at least a start. He felt that the Turkish Cypriot proposal was not as forthcoming as one could have expected either. Esenbel said it could be perfected; in any event a federal system for Cyprus would have to take account of the realities of the island. It could not be patterned on the Swiss or American models. The Secretary said he understood the problem but clearly both sides had a ways to go.

Esenbel thought that a settlement would take time since with all Turkish good will Archbishop Makarios would probably again change his position. But in any event Cyprus should not get in the way of US-Turkish military cooperation.

### *Greek DCA*

Esenbel hoped the Administration would not ask Congress to consider the Greek and Turkish DCA together because the Turks were convinced that if that was the case the Greeks would continue to drag their feet. The Secretary said he had taken note of this Turkish concern.

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 84.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 11.

*Aegean*

The Secretary asked about the status of the talks between Greece and Turkey on Aegean issues. Esenbel recalled the November 1976 Bern agreement on the continental shelf, but said the Greeks by insisting on technical-level expert discussions were adopting a procedural approach rather than trying to find a solution.<sup>7</sup> The Turks felt a "political" effort to find a compromise was essential. The two foreign ministers would meet at the Council of Europe meeting in Strasbourg later this month. In response to the Secretary's question as to whether there was any chance of movement before the Turkish elections, Esenbel said there might be more meetings at the technical level and Bilge and Tzounis might meet again in Bern on the continental shelf question. An agreement on airspace issues had been close but the Greeks had shifted their position.

The Secretary asked if it would do any good if we encouraged them to move. Esenbel said that would be helpful although the US should not try to come up with a solution. It would be very useful if we encouraged a political settlement. Mr. Nimetz recalled that Greece and Turkey interpreted differently the Bern agreement, particularly the function of the legal experts. Esenbel agreed that the legal experts could serve useful purpose, but they could not solve what was an important political problem. The Secretary agreed that it seemed to him that the complex Aegean issues could best be settled on political grounds.

*USSR and Cyprus*

In response to Esenbel's question, the Secretary said the Soviets had raised Cyprus during his recent visit to Moscow.<sup>8</sup> He had replied that talks were going on in Vienna; we supported the UN Secretary General and believed that the two communities should be given a chance to reach a solution. We did not want to interfere and did not think an international conference would be helpful.

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<sup>7</sup> Reference is to an agreement reached between Greek and Turkish officials in talks during November 1976 regarding the territorial dispute over the Aegean Sea. The text of the agreement included a list of pledges undertaken by both sides to ensure that future negotiations would be kept confidential and that neither country would undertake an action that would threaten the prestige of the other. (Telegram 12453 from Athens, November 22, 1976; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760436-0040)

<sup>8</sup> See Document 36.



**92. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 15, 1977

**SUBJECT**

Security Assistance for Turkey

We have held up submitting proposals to the Congress concerning our security assistance relationship with Turkey pending a full evaluation of Clark Clifford's recommendations and an assessment of the Cyprus talks in Vienna. The results of those talks are now in hand. The Turks did fulfill their promise to Clifford to put a constitutional proposal for Cyprus on the table, but the contents of that document were disappointing as was the Turkish Cypriot response to the Greek Cypriot territorial proposal. As a consequence the negotiating round in Vienna, though far from a failure, went less well than we had hoped.

Given Congressional appreciation of this fact, the continuing inclination in Congress to link the level of security assistance to Turkey with progress on Cyprus, and the need to let the Turks know that we expect them to be more forthcoming in the Cyprus negotiations, I believe, and Clark Clifford agrees, that we should cut back somewhat on Clifford's previous recommendations.

It is important, however, that our proposals (a) demonstrate the importance of our alliance relationship, and give the Turks increased capacity to meet their NATO commitments, (b) signal our dissatisfaction with the minimal performance of the Turkish Cypriots in Vienna, yet (c) give the Turks a sufficient level of assistance to provide an incentive for further cooperation in the search for a negotiated Cyprus solution.

I would accordingly propose that we move as follows with respect to Turkey:

1. Endorse in principle the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement of March 1976, but not press for Congressional approval at this time. This is exactly in line with Clifford's previous recommendation.

2. Recommend to Congress Foreign Military Sales financing for Turkey for FY 1978 of up to \$160 million. This is \$15 million less than

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 26, Greece: 1/77-4/78. Confidential. In an April 18 covering note to Vance, Brzezinski wrote: "The President has approved the proposals in your memorandum of April 15 but with the restoration of FMS for Turkey, \$175 million. This same amount is for Greece."

the original Clifford recommendation but \$35 million more than in 1977. The Turks will be dissatisfied with the reduction from Clifford's recommendation but will not seriously object. The reduction may help to convince some in Congress to accept the entire package.

3. Seek a modification of the current ceiling on Foreign Military Sales transactions with Turkey so that, in addition to sales up to the \$160 million financing level discussed in the previous paragraph, Turkey could also finish procurement of forty F-4 aircraft for which two contracts have already been signed. This relaxation is much less than Clark Clifford originally recommended. All other restrictions on Turkey contained in existing legislation would continue in effect.

I plan to outline this program in the next few days to the leadership of Congress and to those particularly concerned with Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. Formal testimony on the Turkish assistance package will begin before subcommittees of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committees on April 21 at which we will support the Greek security assistance package of \$175 million for FY 1978 (\$35 million in grant aid and \$140 million in financing authority).<sup>2</sup>

We will seek to work with Congressional leaders so as to avoid any fight on the Turkish assistance program. The compromise package outlined above should satisfy most members of Congress. At the same time, it is important to be aware that those most closely associated with Greece in the Congress may find a program which gives any assistance to Turkey unacceptable. We thus may face a fight, but if we do, I believe we can win as our position is justifiably moderate and in the country's and NATO's long-term interest. Clark Clifford is prepared to be helpful in supporting our recommendations in the Congress.

This program is the minimum necessary to assist Turkey with its security needs and to preserve Turkish cooperation in the future, as well as to encourage further movement toward a Cyprus settlement once the Turkish elections of June 5 are out of the way.

Attached at Tab 1 is the statement we will use on security assistance to Turkey and Greece next week.<sup>3</sup> At Tab 2 is the draft legislation we intend to submit to Congress on behalf of the Administration reflecting the above program.

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<sup>2</sup> Nimetz testified before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. For Nimetz's testimony, see *Congressional Record*, April 21, 1977, pp. 275-319.

<sup>3</sup> Tabs 1 and 2 are attached but not printed.

**93. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Vice President Mondale<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 3, 1977

**SUBJECT**

Turkey's Financial Problems

Turkey's foreign exchange reserves have been declining gradually for a long time. Recently, however, the rate of decline has accelerated. We are now beginning to get reports of foreign banks denying letters of credit to the Turkish Central Bank, but it is difficult to know how drastic the problem is until more information comes in. Meanwhile, it is clear that some of Turkey's financial authorities are urgently exploring ways to build up their reserves: loans from abroad, quick sales of agricultural commodities from stockpiles, transfer of workers' deposits from Germany. The situation has worsened at a very awkward time for Demirel, who has had good luck in managing Turkey's finances over the past two years and hoped to benefit from this record in the elections which take place on 5 June.

The problem is not basic unsoundness. Over the past six years, Turkey has had one of the best sustained economic growth rates in the world. The precarious political balance in the country, where proportional representation keeps producing weak coalitions, has prevented governments from taking firm measures to put the country's finances on a sound long-term basis. Instead, short-term high-interest loans from foreign banks have been used to keep reserves up. This short-term indebtedness needs to be converted into medium or long-term loans. This is difficult to do in the midst of a heated election campaign. Demirel was hoping he could get by without having to face the problem yet. He may still be able to.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 75, Turkey: 1–12/77. Secret. Sent for information. In a May 3 covering memorandum to Mondale, Brzezinski reported: "You noted a [*text not declassified*] yesterday which stated that the Turkish Government fears that it may be unable to meet its financial obligations if foreign bankers liquidate their Turkish lira accounts. The item added that the government hopes to stave off a politically damaging payments crisis by borrowing abroad. It has approached the First National City Bank of New York for a \$300 million loan and intends to sound out the IMF during meetings this week in Washington. You asked whether the above could be used to get Turkish cooperation. The attached memo responds to your question." (Ibid.) Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Henze forwarded a draft to Brzezinski on May 2 and commented that the United States "should not appear to be crassly exploiting" Turkey's economic situation. (Ibid.)

Turkey has no place to turn except Western bankers and governments for help with its financial problems. When she needed similar help in the 1960's, several of her NATO allies joined to refinance her indebtedness and the arrangement paid off handsomely. A similar arrangement is quite conceivable now, but it would have to be accompanied by domestic austerity measures which would slow economic growth and force cutbacks in social services and long-term development projects. (In other words, Turkey would have to accept commitments like those the British have agreed to in return for loans and concessions.) These measures can only be taken by a strong government. If either Ecevit or Demirel wins a working majority on 5 June, prospects for working out these problems will be good. If the elections are indecisive, Turkey is likely to degenerate into political and financial crisis.

There is no way the present financial problems of Turkey could be exploited to make the Turks more forthcoming on Cyprus. Any hint that we were trying to do so would, in this tense election period, unleash a wave of nationalist protesting that would rile up the political situation and make the outcome of the elections even more uncertain than it is. After the elections, Turkey's need for friends who can help her sort out her indebtedness and get her financial affairs in order for the long haul will in all likelihood encourage her leaders to move to settle current political problems such as Cyprus and relations with Greece.

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#### 94. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

London, May 10, 1977, 8:48–9:25 a.m.

##### PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance  
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Clark Clifford  
Robert Hunter, Staff Member, National Security Council (Notetaker)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 35, Memcons: President: 5/77. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Hunter. The meeting took place at Winfield House. Carter and Demirel were in London for the NATO Ministerial meeting, which took place May 10–11.

Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel  
Foreign Minister Sabri Caglayangil  
A Notetaker  
Plus Another Official

SUBJECT

President's Meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Demirel

*The President* began by saying that he and the Prime Minister agreed that more engineers were needed in government as leaders—instead of all the lawyers!

*Clark Clifford* said he would take this up with the Foreign Minister!<sup>2</sup>

*The President* said that he was proud that Demirel was visiting us. There had been no chance to get acquainted before. There is a problem in the Aegean. We want to strengthen our ties with Turkey. He appreciates the hospitality given to Clark Clifford in Turkey, during the visit early in the Administration. Could Demirel help him understand what we can do to bring about peace in the Eastern Mediterranean? The U.S. is committed to Europe and to peace and friendship with Turkey. This is very important. How can we improve US-Turkish and Turkish-Greek relations? We would not interfere, but are available to help.

*The Prime Minister* thanked the President very much. He will express his deep concern, and should report the facts. Turkey and the United States are good, loyal friends. There had been three decades of common cause. Turkey is a free and independent democracy, which keeps the flag of democracy flying. Turkey is surrounded by communist countries and others, and is more democratic than they are. They share the values of the West, and will definitely defend democracy for the Turkish people.

Turkey is in a place that, if Turkey has troubles, it is difficult to repair them, no matter how much effort is made. The Soviet Union has not changed its goals of more than 300 years. It wants access to the sea, and now to the oil areas. Turkey is a handicap for the Soviet Union, which is not able to go out to the outside world. There is no problem in the Mediterranean with the Soviet Union, and he hoped there would not be. Turkey is trying to develop, and has “done good.” Despite troubles, it has kept the idea and the institutions of democracy. Soon it would have elections.

They are trying to build their country, and defeat poverty. If they can solve this problem, it will prove that democracy is not a handicap for development. No other developing country had been as successful as Turkey in the past 30 years.

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<sup>2</sup> Both Clifford and Çağlayangil were lawyers.

*The President* said that Turkey has a very favorable development rate, and deserves credit for it.

*The Prime Minister* said that relations with the U.S. are to their mutual advantage; they are based on good will and confidence. There is no evidence that Turkey has not lived up to the demands of its relationship with the U.S. It has the Soviet Union as its neighbor, with a common border. Turkey has done its all for the allies. It has let U.S. and NATO installations on Turkish soil to watch the Soviet Union, or to trap it in the Black Sea. Therefore, if there is trouble, Turkey is the first target.

*The President* said he understands.

*The Prime Minister* said that they had even allowed U.S. missiles, which were then taken out after the Cuban Missile Crisis. So much risk had been taken for the common cause. Then two years ago—with no direct conflict with the U.S. and no Turkish harm to the U.S.—there was a U.S. embargo on arms. The U.S. sells arms to 92 countries, but not to Turkey and not to (Cuba?).

*The President* said we are ready to sell arms to Turkey.

*The Prime Minister* said that the Turkish people found the embargo hard to understand. Turkey is a good and strong member of NATO and is needed.

*The President* said there is no question about that.

*The Prime Minister* said that NATO is still valid, and needs a strong partner (in Turkey), not a weak one.

*The President* agreed.

*The Prime Minister* said that Turkey's army has one source of new weapons and spare parts. Its defense would collapse if it does not have them.

*The President* agreed.

*The Prime Minister* said that the embargo was imposed although there was no direct conflict with the United States. Then they had closed common installations. In March 1976, the Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed—this was more than 13 months ago. He had expected that Congress should lift the embargo, and repair U.S. relations with Turkey. This had not happened yet. There is deep concern about the rest of it (?). Turkey is a strong fortress of democracy, and is anti-Communist. It shouldn't be paralyzed; and relations shouldn't be endangered for nothing.

*The President* said he knows.

*The Prime Minister* asked how he could talk to his people when they say that an embargo means hostility and bad relations. But why? He had to answer his people.

*The President* said he had only been in office a little more than three months. We are making good progress so far. Demirel should get great credit for it. We had increased from \$125 to \$175 million the authority to sell arms to Turkey. This is a move in the right direction. It should be seen in Turkey as progress and a victory, not as a defeat. This would help the President and our friendship with Turkey. It is a tribute to Demirel that the figure has been increased. His guess is that Congress will approve it.

There is a problem for the United States and Turkey. There are difficult relations with the Congress after Vietnam. We have strict laws on the use of U.S. weapons that we supply. There are deep feelings about Cyprus. Congress feels that, against U.S. law, weapons were used by Turkey in Cyprus. We must dissipate this feeling.

He is determined that the military agreement with Turkey will be approved, and thinks it will be. But Congress will not act before alleviation of the situation on Cyprus. He knows how deeply Demirel feels about not linking the issues. We can't mislead Demirel: without progress on Cyprus, the Congressional view is that there needs to be a rectification of the use of U.S. weapons, against U.S. law. Otherwise, the DCA will not be approved. He has good hopes for it. He has spent hours trying to understand how to push Congress. It would be serious for relations with Turkey if the DCA came to a vote and were rejected by Congress. He wants to make sure that when the vote is taken, it will be "yes."

He hopes for some expression from Turkey: not critical because there is no DCA, but appreciating the progress made on the increase in military sales. This would show that the two countries can work together, and value one another's friendship.

He is pleased that Turkey had tabled a proposal on Cyprus. Demirel has influence with the Turkish Cypriots. If progress is demonstrated, then this would remove problems with the Congress.

Turkish friendship is crucial to the United States, as it was at the time of the Korean War, when Turkey stood shoulder to shoulder with us, when we almost stood alone. We will never forget this. The close friendship goes back to the time when President Truman provided aid to Turkey—not as a gift, but as an investment. It was a good investment for the United States, and paid rich dividends. He is proud of Turkey's strength, its courage vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and its commitment to democracy. If public statements stress disappointment and criticism and condemnation, then this will make progress difficult with Congress.

He knows how deeply Demirel feels about the DCA. He hopes that Demirel will let him deal with Congress in a way to bring results, not a negative reaction. If the vote were held now, it would be negative. If

there is progress on Cyprus, he can assure Demirel that the vote will be positive. He needs Demirel's help. He wants to restore complete friendship between the United States and Turkey.

*The Prime Minister* said that Cyprus is not a Greek and Turkish problem.

*The President* said he knows but it is seen as such in the U.S.

*The Prime Minister* said they feel the hurt in Turkey.

*The President* said he knows.

*The Prime Minister* said if the weight is put on Turkey instead of the Greek-Cypriots, there is hurt in Turkey, and this does not help.

*The President* said we did not put weight on Turkey more than on the Greeks.

*The Prime Minister* said that relations with the United States were being damaged for nothing. It is said, we can get the DCA, but first Turkey must act over Cyprus. To be frank: even if we get a solution on Cyprus, if the U.S. puts pressure on Turkey, this will not help.

*The President* said he knows.

*The Prime Minister* said that Turkey did not start the Cyprus problem.

*The President* said we know.

*The Prime Minister* said that Cyprus is more quiet now than ever. Turkey didn't just go and invade one morning. They were forced to do so because nothing else could be done: there was going to be genocide. In this case, it is a 27 year old story. The Turkish people are sensitive about it.

*The President* said he knows.

*The Prime Minister* said that Greece is its neighbor, and that there are some problems. Turkey wants to settle them peacefully, and doesn't want confrontation. They have been patient. But as long as Cyprus is interrelated with US-Turkish relations, then we will go nowhere.

*The President* said he did not equate Cyprus and other issues in his public statements. He didn't create this link in the minds of Congress or the U.S. people, making it interrelated. He had not done that in his public statements, and never will do so.

Turkish willingness to work with Greece in the Aegean would be constructive. If the Foreign Minister could enter discussions on the Aegean with Greece, this would be important to the world: to have discussions and prevent war. It could preserve the Turkish position and pride, and prevent actions leading to combat.

We want to be fair, and act when asked. Clark Clifford could be an intermediary. We want to know Turkey's position. We can act only



when Greece and Turkey ask. There is no U.S. favoritism. He is proud of U.S. friendship with Turkey. The American people needed to be shown progress. The DCA agreement has not been signed (sic). The Cyprus problem had not been solved. And Greece and Turkey had not solved the Aegean problem. We need to show progress and friendship—this the world needs.

*The Prime Minister* said he had to repeat that it was a difficult position to explain the situation to the Turkish people. Cyprus was not a direct US-Turkey conflict. If it were, then he and the President could settle it!

They had a dialogue (with Greece?), but it was not successful. There were complicated cases. Turkey would not go to confrontation; it is willing to settle all problems. But if US-Turkish relations are related to the settlement of problems, where there had been one problem, there would be two: one to repair relations between Greece and Turkey, and two to repair relations between Turkey and the United States. Why do we have two problems instead of one? How can he explain to his people that the U.S. Congress and people want Turkey to settle problems with Greece and only then be friendly to Turkey?

*The President* said that this was not necessary for friendship. He is asking Demirel to let him work quietly on the DCA, and to work quietly and independently on Cyprus. Meanwhile, to emphasize progress made on arms sales, NATO, and friendship. There should not be emphasis placed on remaining problems: this makes solving them more difficult.

*The Prime Minister* asked how he could make this understood in Turkey? There is deep concern in Turkey that relations with the United States had been suspended for several months.

*The President* asked the Secretary when we would get the \$175 million.

*The Secretary* replied “very shortly.”

*The President* said it will show strong commitment to Turkey, and our friendship.

*The Prime Minister* said that the \$175 million is important, but more important is the U.S. attitude towards Turkey. This would be created with the ratification of the DCA. It will repair relations; it will make other things possible.

*The President* said that Demirel knows that he has endorsed the DCA. He has insisted that Congress pass it. It won't before it sees demonstrable progress on Cyprus. If he could sign it now without Congress, he would do so. He has done all he can. We must separate three things in our minds: the DCA, Cyprus and the sales agreement—where there has been good progress that should be recognized.

Later we should work for progress and Cyprus—that would be good; and also for progress on the DCA, which would be good. It would help the U.S. if not everything Turkey says is criticism. He would be pleased if we could ratify the DCA now, but we can't.

*The Prime Minister* said that so far, all the DCA had done was nothing except damage relations with the U.S.

*The President* agreed.

*The Prime Minister* said he had made clear, as a great friend of the U.S. that it was time to defend US-Turkish relations. He had worked very carefully to keep down problems. He had tried not to damage relations with the United States.

*The President* said that this is very important.

*The Prime Minister* said that, to be frank, he is very much concerned.

*The President* said he had one point to add: is it possible to have continuing negotiations with Greece on the Aegean, instead of confrontations? We are eager for peace. We will not interfere. Is this possible?

*The Prime Minister* asked if peace were there. The problem would keep on as long as Greek-Turkish relations are injected into Turkish-American relations—then the problem cannot be solved.

*The President* asked what he could do to help.

*The Prime Minister* said: one thing, ratify the DCA!

*The President* said he would do his best. He said that Demirel was a very good and strong man.

The meeting adjourned at 9:25 and was followed by a brief discussion of what the two leaders would say to the press; followed by a meeting with the press outside Winfield House.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> For the press statements, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 847–848. Later that day, Carter sent a handwritten note to Demirel, which reads: "I enjoyed being with you. We value your friendship. Thank you for being so helpful to me. Your friend, Jimmy Carter." (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Countries, Box CO-56, CO 163 1/20/77-7/31/78)

**95. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

SR M 77–10078

Washington, June 3, 1977

*Turkey's Search for Alternate Sources of Arms**Summary*

[*handling restriction not declassified*] During the 2 years which have elapsed since the US arms embargo was imposed in February 1975, Turkey has been attempting to reduce the traditional dependence of its armed forces on US military equipment. Turkish efforts to develop alternate sources of arms have taken four basic forms:

- attempting to acquire arms, through either purchase or foreign aid, from other NATO members;
- increasing domestic arms production;
- investigating the possibilities of cooperation with other Muslim states and of direct purchase from non-NATO countries; and
- exploring the possibility of obtaining arms from the Soviet Union.

Although the Turks have had some success in locating non-US sources, the overall result of the effort has probably convinced them that there is no source or combination of sources which can satisfactorily replace the US for some time to come.

[*handling restriction not declassified*] Meanwhile, the embargo has caused serious difficulties for the Turkish forces, particularly the air force, at a time when Greece is significantly improving the quality of its forces through the introduction of new US and French equipment. Turkey's acquisition of F-4s since the partial lifting of the embargo has only partly alleviated the situation. [*3 lines not declassified*]

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 80T00633A, Box 1. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A note at the bottom of the first page reads: "This OSR contribution was requested by the NIO for Western Europe. It is to be incorporated into a DDI intelligence memorandum entitled *Turkey: Economic Situation Facing the New Government* which will be drafted by CIA's Office of Economic Research." That memorandum was not found.

96. **Briefing Paper Prepared by Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

BULENT ECEVIT

Bulent Ecevit prides himself on being a tough Turk with a gentle soul. He has more natural appeal than any Turkish leader since Atatürk. Having served only 7½ months as Prime Minister, however, he is essentially unproven as a leader. He came into office in 1974 advocating far-out economic and social reform schemes, but his main political acts before the Cyprus crisis were a sweeping general amnesty and resumption of poppy cultivation.<sup>2</sup> His optimism on the Turkish Government's ability to control poppies was justified. The amnesty, however, caused the release of many terrorists and agitators who have contributed to the high level of civil commotion in Turkey during the past two years.

Ecevit is weakest on economics. He will have to deal with urgent economic problems now and this, along with the interlocking problems of Cyprus, Greece, U.S. and NATO relations, will be the two main challenges he will face as Prime Minister.

Ecevit was a reluctant dragon in respect to Cyprus in 1974. He ordered invasion only as a last resort, after determined efforts to persuade the British to join Turkey in intervening. Once done, Ecevit exploited the Cyprus operation to make himself a national hero. His popularity was enormously high when he resigned in September 1974 to rid himself of his reactionary coalition partner, Erbakan.

Out of power and frustrated during the past two years, Ecevit has flirted with the left and sometimes dabbled with narrow nationalism. He has avoided getting stuck on extreme positions, however, and there is no reason to doubt his basic commitment to NATO, EEC and close relations with Europe and the United States. He is sincerely interested in social justice and believes a high rate of economic growth can be combined with expanded social services and rural development.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 75, Turkey: 1-12/77. Confidential. In a June 9 covering memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski noted that Henze, who served for the past three years in Turkey, "observed Ecevit closely both in and out of office and knows him personally." Carter wrote "good" in the upper right corner and initialed "J" on the covering memorandum. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> For the U.S. reaction to Ecevit's lifting of the 1971 opium poppy ban in 1974, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Documents 199, 202, 204-206, 208, and 209.

Ecevit wants to have a good international image and close ties with European and American leadership. This Administration should have no difficulty developing rapport with Ecevit. He is in a better position than anyone else in Turkey could be to move toward a Cyprus settlement and reconciliation with Greece. His talk of a meeting with Karamanlis at an early date is not mere posturing. Ecevit would like to do what Ataturk did with Venizelos in the 1920's: settle Greek-Turkish strife so both countries can concentrate on more fundamental objectives: complete social and political modernization and integration into Europe.

Ecevit speaks good English, has great personal charm and is easy to talk to. His quick mind grasps key issues readily but he sometimes goes off on flights of fancy, like the poet he is. He likes to make dramatic personnel appointments. A Turkish Government under his leadership would be much more exciting and colorful than it has been in the past 2½ years.

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## 97. Editorial Note

On July 3, 1977, the Turkish National Assembly voted 229–217 against Bülent Ecevit's Republican People's Party, a move which immediately prompted Ecevit's resignation. Two days later, Süleyman Demirel (who voted against Ecevit) met with Turkish President Fahri Korutürk to begin the process of forming a new coalition government with Demirel as Prime Minister-designate. Demirel rejected forming a coalition with Ecevit at the latter's suggestion. On July 21, Demirel became Prime Minister once again, sitting atop a coalition government with a similar makeup to the government he led for over two years prior to the election. President Carter sent Demirel a congratulatory note eight days later, assuring Demirel that "Turkey can count on the ties of friendship and alliance which have served our countries and our shared ideals so well these past thirty years." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 1, Chron File: 8–9/77)

At year's end, after months of political violence, worsening economic conditions, and widespread frustration over the Aegean and Cyprus disputes, the political fortunes of Demirel and Ecevit were flipped; on December 31, Demirel's government received a 228–218 no confidence vote in the National Assembly, at which point Demirel quickly resigned and Korutürk named Ecevit Prime Minister. Telegram

412 from Ankara, January 17, 1978, reported that Ecevit won a vote of confidence in the National Assembly by 229–218. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780024–1164)

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**98. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Nimetz) to Secretary of State Vance<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 19, 1977

Our exploratory discussions in Ankara were designed to test whether a scenario could be developed that would lead to progress on Cyprus and to a political climate in which the Turkish DCA could be pressed and passed.<sup>2</sup>

The atmosphere of our talks was better than it was during our February visit.<sup>3</sup> The new Demirel government, we were repeatedly told, has both a desire and the strength to deal substantively with difficult issues. It claimed to be doing so in economic matters, and said it could do so with respect to Cyprus. These claims still need to be tested.

We presented a basic message: the U.S. was a friend of Turkey, not an antagonist. We had common goals: restoration of good bilateral relations; strengthening of NATO; passage of the DCA; and a solution to the Cyprus problem by establishing a bizonal, federal state. Since we both wanted the same results, we should work together on a scenario of actions to be taken during the next few months so that our goals could be accomplished. We would try to take account of their political situation; they in turn must understand our political needs.

When it became clear that this approach was striking a responsive chord, we gave them some concrete ideas. We emphasized that these were preliminary ideas being floated on the working level to see whether they believed something along these lines would be feasible. Attached is a summary of a possible scenario, along the lines we pre-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977–1980, Lot 81D85, Box 2, Eastern Mediterranean—1977. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> The discussions were part of a trip to Athens and Ankara taken by Nimetz September 11–16, in preparation for Vance's upcoming meetings with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios and Turkish Foreign Minister Çağlayangil in New York.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Clifford Mission.

sented in Ankara.<sup>4</sup> I should say that, on the sub-ministerial level, we were told that a number of these ideas would probably be acceptable—but there were no commitments (and some expressions of difficulty) with respect to the more important items. These should be further explored when Foreign Minister Caglayangil arrives in New York. (He is bringing his senior staff who will meet with us in Washington before our meeting.)

I believe that we are now at a critical point in our relations with Turkey. We can no longer claim to be a new Administration “studying” the problem; on their side, elections have been held and a government is in place. The opportunity presented now could be seized upon to save the relationship and also to initiate a new phase in the Cyprus negotiations. On the other hand, if this opportunity is lost, I see only a deteriorating security relationship, with adverse implications for NATO, and also no real chance for movement on Cyprus any time in the near future.

Our goal was always to use the DCA as leverage for concessions on Cyprus. I believe that if the Turks accept a scenario such as the one we explored in Ankara, we will have succeeded in our goal.

I am sure that some will argue that we should hold out for still more. After nine months working steadily on this issue, it is my judgment that the type of Turkish undertakings represented by the attached scenario represents about the best that can be gotten. There is no chance of getting a signed and sealed Cyprus agreement any time soon—if only because of the political vacuum created by Archbishop Makarios’ death.<sup>5</sup> In other words, to hold out for more would probably mean getting nothing on Cyprus—and losing perhaps our best chance to salvage our security relationship with Turkey.

We must wait to see whether the major elements of this package will be accepted by the Turks. Our conversations were with the most positive, pro-Western men in the Foreign Ministry; they will have their problems with their political leadership. Before we hear from them, however, I believe we must get a better sense of how this Administration wants to handle the Turkish relationship; namely, whether this Administration would agree to push the DCA on the Hill during the next six months under a scenario of this kind.

Let me add to this memorandum a few fundamentals about the Eastern Mediterranean problem:

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<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed is a list, titled “Possible Scenario Based on U.S. Ideas Presented to Turkey,” prepared by Nimetz as a guide for analyzing the matrix of issues confronting U.S. policy in the Eastern Mediterranean.

<sup>5</sup> Makarios died on August 3.

1. The deterioration of Turkey's military establishment caused by the embargo has reached critical levels. Most experts believe it will take up to a decade to bring the Turkish armed forces up to NATO standards. Our Military Attaches in both Athens and Ankara believe that Greece has now overtaken Turkey militarily, at least in the air and sea. This has the Turks worried. It also means that the Turkish DCA is no threat to Greece.

2. The situation in Cyprus has changed radically with Makarios' death. Kyprianou may or may not stay on as President in the February elections, but the important fact is that no leader will have the personal charisma or the political base to negotiate, much less sell, a settlement in the next months to the Greek Cypriots.

3. This power vacuum on Cyprus places a new burden on Greece. Given the politics of Cyprus, no agreement can be sold on the island without Greece's seal of approval. Therefore, it is important that the Greeks be brought into the negotiating process—either formally or informally. The Turks independently have also reached this conclusion. Greece, however, will be reluctant to participate, for Cyprus is a political liability. Greek leaders have expressed this attitude repeatedly. We believe that U.S. involvement might help to overcome Greek reluctance to participating.

4. The intercommunal talks under Waldheim are the central mechanism for the negotiations, since they are a UN-established means of bringing Greek and Turkish Cypriots together on the basis of equality. However, the intercommunal talks cannot by themselves negotiate a settlement. First, neither Greece nor Turkey are represented at the table, and their presence is vital. Second, everything said at those meetings is leaked to the press. Third, the UN mechanism lacks the authority or political force to move the talks forward.

5. For these reasons it seems obvious that third-party involvement is required—behind the scenes, confidential interchanges in support of, and as a supplement to, the UN process. The United States is the obvious—perhaps only—choice. (Joint US-British or US-EC-9 are possible alternatives.) The Greek Cypriots have already put their trust in us—they want us to mediate and know that only the U.S. has the influence to move the Turks. Greece, too, might be willing to become engaged if it knows that we will be playing an important role. Now, if Turkey will also invite us to serve in a mediating capacity, we will have the moral and political authority to work effectively for a real solution to the Cyprus problem. However, their wounded pride and Turkish political realities make it impossible for them to permit the U.S. to play a defined and visible role while our embargo is in effect. I think the Turks can be persuaded to accept our involvement, but only after the embargo is lifted. The attached scenario is built upon this premise.



**99. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

New York, September 27, 1977, 11:30 a.m.

**SUBJECT**

The Secretary's Meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil

**PARTICIPANTS***Turkey*

Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Ambassador Ilter Turkmen, Permanent Representative to the United Nations  
Ambassador Melih Esenbel, Ambassador to the U.S.  
Sukru Elekdag, Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Turgot Tulumen, Director, Cyprus Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Ekrem Guvendiren, Interpreter

*U.S.*

The Secretary  
Under Secretary Habib  
Matthew Nimetz, Counselor of Department  
Ambassador Ronald I. Spiers, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey  
George S. Vest, Assistant Secretary, European Affairs  
Nelson C. Ledsky, Director, EUR/SE

**SUMMARY:** Secretary Vance reviewed with Foreign Minister Caglayangil the results of previous working level discussions aimed at developing a series of joint steps to restore close US/Turkish relations. The two Ministers agreed that this effort had been worthwhile, and should be continued. The Secretary said he wished to discuss the question of US-Turkish relations directly with the President, and then have a further meeting with Foreign Minister Caglayangil with a view to reaching some firm conclusions that can provide a basis for real progress in the months ahead. END SUMMARY

The Secretary said he had reviewed the reports Counselor Nimetz had submitted following his return from Ankara and his meetings with Secretary General Elekdag this past week in Washington. Progress had clearly been made in developing a possible joint work program, and before Foreign Minister Caglayangil returned to Turkey it was the U.S. hope that a solid basis for progress could be established.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil responded with a lengthy monolog which began with some probing questions about Turkish and U.S. ob-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, unlabeled folder. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Ledsky on September 28; approved by Anderson on October 11. The meeting took place in Vance's office at the UN Plaza Hotel. Vance and Çağlayangil were in New York for the annual session of the UNGA.

jectives. It had been the Turkish hope, said Caglayangil, to reach full agreement on a joint series of steps to strengthen Turkish-U.S. relations. Instead, all that had been produced thus far was a paper reflecting the differing perspective of the two sides.<sup>2</sup> The question therefore arose as to whether we were proceeding in the right direction.

The Turkish intention was to rebuild U.S.-Turkish relationships. A 30-year period of close and wonderful U.S.-Turkish ties had suffered as a result of an arms embargo imposed by the U.S. To overcome that embargo, Turkey had negotiated a new Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with the United States. No one had forced the U.S. to sign that agreement, but having done so, all that Turkey now asked was that this agreement be ratified by the U.S. Congress.

The Turkish Foreign Minister said it had been his assumption that the United States had begun a dialogue with Turkey recently in an effort to find a way to implement the DCA and thus restore the overall U.S.-Turkish relationship. The point of the exercise was not, said Caglayangil, to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. Even if Turkey gave the U.S. a full power of attorney with respect to this issue, the problem could not be solved in October or November of 1977. Numerous difficulties stood in the way of progress on Cyprus. There was now no government on the Greek Cypriot side of the island capable of assuming the responsibilities for negotiating and implementing a settlement. The Greek government also had no incentive to find a solution and was now entering an electoral period of its own. Under these circumstances, Caglayangil asked rhetorically, why was the U.S. focusing on Cyprus? Did we want to carve out a role for ourselves? What indeed was the purpose of asking for specific steps now from Turkey with respect to Cyprus? Caglayangil said he hoped our requests were aimed at providing ammunition—not to convince the Administration of Turkish goodwill, but rather to help the Administration convince the Congress that the embargo had been in error and that the DCA should now be passed. If this was, in fact, the Administration's motive, then Turkey was certain the Administration would be successful and was willing therefore to be of assistance in the process by taking certain joint steps with the U.S.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil, reading from the draft list of possible joint actions, then outlined what Turkey would be prepared to do. He said his government could issue a series of statements at the highest level, indicating Turkish support for the intercommunal negotiating process and its willingness to play a more active role in efforts aimed at achieving a Cyprus settlement. He said Turkey might also be prepared

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<sup>2</sup> Not found.

to withdraw some further troops from the island. Turkey was also willing to discuss all aspects of a Cyprus settlement at any forum which might be convened. Ankara could also provide assurances against unilateral actions in northern Cyprus which might interfere with the negotiating process. Finally, Caglayangil said Turkey would be prepared to participate directly with Greece to help bring about a Cyprus settlement, and could make a public statement to that effect.

With respect to a future Cypriot constitution, Caglayangil said this was a matter that had to be resolved by the two communities on the island through the negotiating process. It would not be useful for Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots, or even the two working together with western experts to formulate a concrete constitutional plan and then give it in advance to the Greeks or the Greek Cypriots. The general outlines of a future constitution had already been presented by the Turkish Cypriots last April in Vienna. It provided for a loose federation, with certain key powers such as foreign affairs reserved for the central government.<sup>3</sup>

Caglayangil said that as long as the U.S. embargo was in place, it was difficult to consider a direct U.S. role in such specific issues as a future constitution for Cyprus. It was even more difficult to envisage the U.S. assuming a role as mediator. Even if Turkey were to agree to such a role, this would not help the negotiating process. Indeed, such a U.S. role would create a whole series of new problems in an area where there were already more than enough difficulties. The fact was, said Caglayangil, that the current negotiating procedures had not, in fact, broken down. What was needed was not a new forum, but a way to bridge the existing gap on substantive issues between the two Cypriot communities.

Caglayangil said that he assumed that when our two staffs had talked about a more active U.S. role, this was conceived as a means to assist the Administration convince Congress that progress on Cyprus was being made. Why was a more active U.S. involvement necessary? The U.S. already had a role through the mission given to Secretary Clifford. This could continue. Moreover, the Turkish government was always willing to provide full information to the American side on negotiating developments. Turkey could not do more than that.

Caglayangil concluded by insisting that the draft action paper had made abundantly clear what the U.S. expected from Turkey; and that what was far less clear was what Turkey could expect from the U.S. Turkey needed to know when the DCA would be ratified. It needed to know how the U.S. planned to reorder U.S.-Turkish relations. What

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 38.

help would we provide in the economic sphere? Finally, Caglayangil said he wished to bring to the Secretary's attention the fact that a Turkish journalist had received information from the State Department that the U.S. and Turkey were discussing certain practical steps, including a possible Turkish troop reduction from Cyprus. This kind of disclosure endangered the entire negotiating process now under discussion. This, said Caglayangil, underscored the importance of finding a solution to the entire publicity problem, which had long plagued the Cyprus negotiations.

Secretary Vance thanked the Turkish Foreign Minister for his presentation and said he would like to answer some of the basic questions which the Turkish side had raised. U.S. objectives, said the Secretary, were clear: to find a means to improve U.S.-Turkish relations, and get them back to where they were in the past. The U.S. recognized that an important factor in achieving this goal is Congressional approval of the DCA. The U.S. Administration would like to see this accomplished at an early date. The Secretary said he wished to be frank on this point. If the U.S. Government were to put the DCA forward before there was clear-cut support for the document, and the DCA were defeated by the Congress, this could set back U.S.-Turkish relations for a long time. Thus, the Administration had to be careful before embarking on the important step of urging Congress to vote on the DCA. The Secretary said he knew that it was a matter of principle to the Turkish government that there could be no linkage between Cyprus and the U.S.-Turkish security relationship. Unfortunately, such a linkage existed in the minds of many members of Congress. Therefore, it was our judgment that progress on Cyprus was needed to get the DCA passed. It is this progress that we have been trying to achieve. Because U.S. efforts thus far had not been successful, we hoped the joint exercise underway these past weeks might create the right atmosphere to move forward on both the Cyprus issue and the U.S. security relationship.

When Caglayangil confirmed that this also corresponded to Turkish objectives, the Secretary said he found many positive elements in the joint U.S.-Turkish paper. It should be clear, however, that the U.S. had no desire to play the role of mediator, or to get too far out front of the Cyprus negotiations. Our only interest was in seeing to it that progress was made.

The Secretary said he wished to talk to the President about this entire set of issues and then see Foreign Minister Caglayangil a second time to go over in even greater detail the action program now under discussion.

The discussion then turned briefly to the question of Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash's role in any future negotiations. When the Secretary inquired as to whether Denktash was flexible and willing to

enter into serious negotiations, Caglayangil responded that Denktash had both internal problems and his own ambition. The Turkish Cypriot leader was also unhappy about the present situation in which his government lacked any form of international respectability. Caglayangil noted that the PLO had an observer in New York and that in all fairness, Denktash deserved similar treatment.

Caglayangil suggested that the U.S. change its approach to Denktash as a means of moderating Denktash's attitudes. This in turn would help the Turkish government control and contain Denktash, Caglayangil noting that while Turkey could hold Denktash's hand, it could not close his mouth.

Counselor Nimetz said the U.S. had already assisted the Turkish Cypriot community, but was looking into ways in which further help might be provided. There were problems in this area, and it was our basic view that Denktash was a Turkish and not a U.S. problem.

The Secretary said he knew Denktash personally and had great respect for him. But he also knew the Turkish Cypriot leader could be rigid and at times difficult to deal with. The Turkish Foreign Minister agreed, and said if the Secretary knew Denktash, he certainly understood the problems the Turkish government faced in seeking to control him.

In summing up the conversation, the Secretary said the U.S. was interested in real progress in resolving the Cyprus problem, and not in cosmetic steps aimed at satisfying Congress. We also agreed that the intercommunal talks will get nowhere without the direct and active participation of Greece and Turkey.

The Secretary said he very much regretted the press leak which apparently occurred, and said he had no objection to a draft press statement which Foreign Minister Caglayangil circulated and said he wished to use at the conclusion of the meeting to dim press speculation about the contents of the discussion.

The meeting concluded with the Turkish Foreign Minister agreeing that if Greece can be persuaded to participate directly in future talks, this would immeasurably assist Turkey in controlling Denktash. He also said he very much welcomed the idea of a second meeting with the Secretary, after the Secretary had spoken with President Carter.

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100. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

New York, October 5, 1977, 4 p.m.

## SUBJECT

Restricted Session—The Secretary's Second Meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil

## PARTICIPANTS

*Turkey*  
Foreign Minister Caglayangil  
Mr. Guvenderin—Translator

*United States*  
The Secretary  
Clark Clifford

The restricted meeting extended for more than one hour and contained a great deal of repetition of past positions taken by the Turks. Secretary Vance made it dramatically clear to Caglayangil that we had to have all the help we could get to move the DCA through the Congress. He informed Caglayangil that the President was going to have to have the Secretary's and Clifford's assurance that the DCA would pass before he would send it to the Congress with his recommendation that it be approved.

Caglayangil insisted that his government has recently decided on a clear and unequivocal policy to settle the Cyprus issue. Cyprus had caused Turkey great difficulty, both from an economic standpoint and in terms of Turkey's image in the world. The Cyprus operation had been very expensive and one of the practical reasons a solution was indicated was that it could save Turkey a substantial amount of money.

Caglayangil was questioned in detail about Turkey's position and in all his replies Caglayangil sought to convey the impression that Turkey was prepared to take whatever action was necessary to obtain a Cyprus settlement. Turkey well understood the importance of Cyprus as compared to the importance of its bilateral relationship with the United States and the healthy continuance of the NATO Alliance. He indicated that he thought that in the Turkish Government's policy review, Cyprus had been placed in its proper perspective.

With reference to the details of a Cyprus settlement, Caglayangil estimated that a fair and equitable division would result in 32 percent going to the Turkish-Cypriots. He said that were he asked whether or

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977–1980, Lot 81D85, Box 2, MemCons. Secret; Exdis. The meeting took place in the Secretary's suite at the UN Plaza Hotel.

not he had ever made a comment to this effect to the Secretary, he wanted to be on notice in advance that he would have to be at liberty to deny it. Makarios had put forward a map that would have allotted the Turkish-Cypriots about 20 percent of the island, and Makarios had let it be known that there might be flexibility in the Greek-Cypriot position up to 25 percent. Secretary Vance asked Caglayangil as to whether the Turks were prepared to be flexible in their 32 percent figure. Caglayangil replied affirmatively but suggested it was a mistake to deal in percentages. A number of special situations existed on the island that had to be taken into account; this could be done if both sides approached the problem in an atmosphere of goodwill.

Secretary Vance asked what Caglayangil thought should be done with Varosha. Caglayangil replied equivocally. He said further negotiations were required, that there were both Greek and Turkish interests there that had to be taken into account, but that in the final analysis an equitable settlement could be arranged.

Proceeding to the next area of discussion, Secretary Vance asked what Turkey's ideas were with reference to the structure of the new government of Cyprus. Caglayangil dismissed this airily with a wave of his hand. He said that this was absolutely no problem, and wasn't worth taking the time to discuss. All sides appreciated in general terms the kind of government that would have to be created, and Caglayangil foresaw little difficulty in the parties reaching an agreement on this subject. He indicated that Turkey did not intend to take a stiff position in this area and maintain it adamantly so as to impact adversely on the prospects for an early settlement.

Caglayangil said in this connection that at some point Secretary Vance should invite Denktash to the United States. This might occur after the DCA had been passed by the Congress, if that proved to be the policy of the US Government. Such a visit would mean a great deal to Denktash and the Turkish-Cypriots, and would add immeasurably to the ease of working with Denktash.

Secretary Vance and Caglayangil got into a long discussion regarding specific words connected with the draft paper under consideration. Instead of attempting to have a definitive written instrument that would set forth specifically what each side would do, Secretary Vance stated that he would have a memo prepared which he would submit to President Carter.<sup>2</sup> Caglayangil replied that he would prepare a memo and submit it to Prime Minister Demirel and the Turkish Cabinet. Each agreed to present the problem to their respective leaders along with

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 101. The draft paper was not found.

their personal opinion that the course of action agreed upon would lead to the settlement of Cyprus and the passage of the DCA.

The understanding between the parties was based upon the joint realization that the settlement of the Cyprus question would lead to the passage of the DCA and the passage of the DCA would lead to the settlement of the Cyprus question. Each side indicated that the efforts by both parties would take place concurrently but that there was no way to set condition precedents for later action. Both understood this to mean that our two governments had reached an understanding that, assuming higher approval, the United States would move in good faith for the passage of the DCA and that those in the Administration who had the responsibility would seek to persuade people by conveying our considered opinion that the settlement of Cyprus was well on its way.

This kind of approach appealed very much to both the Secretary and Foreign Minister Caglayangil. Caglayangil promised to inform his government in this sense, and said he already knew the US would be pleased by the actions that would be forthcoming from Ankara. When Secretary Vance reiterated that we needed more than just words, Caglayangil tapped the draft paper and said this constituted part of our oral understanding of what Turkey is to do and what the US is to do. It was better to have an understanding in our hearts than on paper, said Caglayangil. Secretary Vance agreed.

With reference to the question of the timing, Secretary Vance asked if it would not be better to delay certain actions until after the Greek election in November. Caglayangil at once quickly and firmly agreed. He said that in the meantime both sides could be going about their business—the United States could proceed with the FMS program. Turkey could initiate some of its planning and making certain statements, so that the time between now and November 20 would not be wasted. Thereafter both parties would proceed with appropriate haste to get the job done.

Caglayangil stated his strong belief that Turkey and Greece should participate in the intercommunal talks on Cyprus. When it was suggested that it might be difficult to persuade Greece to work along in this way, Caglayangil replied that if the United States took a firm enough position, Greece would come along. Secretary Vance suggested that might be so. Caglayangil feels that the United States must maintain a very active role with reference to the negotiations on Cyprus and Secretary Vance suggested that it probably would be most effective if it were done in the background rather than out in front.

*COMMENT:* The tone of the meeting was excellent. Caglayangil spoke with commendable candor. Secretary Vance was equally frank. There was considerable discussion of the fact that the Cyprus problem was one small and minor element in an entire mosaic. The men agreed



that the future of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Turkey was of great importance and the continued maintenance and strengthening of the NATO Alliance was a matter of prime concern, particularly in the light of recent Soviet arms build ups. Finally, the importance of the discussion centered on the fact that the Secretary and Foreign Minister reached a new approach on how to handle our common problems in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Çaglayangil was obviously pleased at the result of the talks. At one time he indicated that he was placing his faith, his reputation and his honor on the line, and that we would find that he would carry through on the understandings that were in the process of being reached. Secretary Vance stated that he knew that President Carter favored the DCA and that he would wish to go ahead with it if his advisers believed that the Congress would pass it. In this regard it was suggested to Çaglayangil that the timing of the DCA might have to change. The President now had pending the Middle East, the Panama Canal and a number of other exceedingly important and controversial issues. These factors might affect the timing of proceeding with the DCA, if the President so decided. Çaglayangil said he understood this.

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**101. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 23, 1977

SUBJECT

U.S. Relations with Turkey and the Cyprus Issue

The two lengthy meetings which Clark Clifford and I had with Turkish Foreign Minister Çaglayangil in New York, which built upon earlier meetings our Counselor, Matt Nimetz, had in Ankara and Washington, have left us with a sense of encouragement about the possibilities for an improved situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.<sup>2</sup> I

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 50, Turkey: 1977. Secret; Exdis. In the upper right corner, Carter wrote, "Cy—Sounds like excellent progress—if it materializes. J.C."

<sup>2</sup> Clifford met with Çaglayangil in New York on September 29, and Çaglayangil repeated many of the points he raised with Vance on September 27. The memorandum of conversation is in the National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977–1980, Lot 81D85, Box 2, MemCons.

would like briefly to review the specific issues we discussed with the Turks, and to set out for you the policy which we recommend for the months ahead with respect to both Turkey and Cyprus.

The Turkish Foreign Minister convinced me in New York that his government wants to re-establish the closest possible bilateral defense relationship with the U.S. He said Turkey was prepared to do whatever was necessary to resolve the Cyprus question and accepted that this was a necessary step to putting Turkish-U.S. relations back on the right track. Turkey could not act, however, so long as it was seen to be responding to direct U.S. pressure. A series of positive steps could be initiated, some time after the Greek elections of November 20, to bring about real progress—not just the appearance of progress—with respect to Cyprus.

The Foreign Minister said he would discuss this matter further with Prime Minister Demirel upon his return to Ankara; I, in turn, undertook to discuss with you the steps we might consider taking to show our support for these Turkish steps and our readiness to begin moving the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement through Congress in 1978. We agreed to communicate with each other again once our internal consultations were completed.

On the basis of our conversations in New York, the Turkish side is now considering:

(1) *A series of public statements*, announcing Turkish support for early resumption of meaningful Cyprus negotiations and Turkey's readiness to play an active, positive role in achieving a solution.

(2) *Further troop reductions* totaling several thousand men stretched out over three or four months, coupled with public statements suggesting that Turkey will consider further withdrawals as negotiating progress continues and will remove all unauthorized troops and equipment from Cyprus when a negotiated settlement is finally achieved.

(3) *Broadening the current UN intercommunal negotiating forum* by seeking to have created a supplementary negotiating mechanism which would make possible the direct participation by Turkey and Greece as well as the two Cypriot communities. The Turks suggested that we initiate this procedure in a request to Waldheim, after preliminary soundings have been made.

(4) *The presentation of a new set of constitutional proposals* at the next round of Cyprus talks, the outlines of which would be communicated to us in advance in bilateral discussions.

(5) *A commitment to negotiate on territorial questions* at the next Cyprus negotiating round with the understanding that modifications in the Greek Cypriots' favor would be part of any final package settlement.

(6) *An assurance that the U.S. can play a behind-the-scenes role* following the establishment of this new negotiating mechanism, pursuant to which Clark Clifford could intensify his bilateral discussions with the parties to assist in their negotiating efforts.

(7) *A private assurance to the U.S. against provocations and unilateral actions* by the Turks in northern Cyprus that could jeopardize matters to be discussed in the Cyprus negotiations.

(8) *A few practical, interim measures in northern Cyprus* that will demonstrate Turkish flexibility and give evidence that the Turkish side is prepared to alter the existing status quo.

These steps will not in themselves solve the Cyprus issue or necessarily even result in sustained negotiations. Indeed, unless Turkish proposals are met by responsiveness on the part of the Greeks and Greek Cypriots, they may lead nowhere. Yet I believe it would be unrealistic to expect the Turks to pledge to do more initially than we were able to exact from the Turkish Foreign Minister as outlined above. I also think that if the Turkish government really takes these steps, and they in turn are supported by the Western Europeans and ourselves, a positive atmosphere will be created and a solid basis laid for the kind of serious negotiating progress which has been absent for the past three years.

I believe we should tell the Turks we will endorse the steps outlined above, and will work with them, to the extent our behind-the-scenes involvement will be helpful and accepted, in ensuring the most productive results possible.

As this process moves forward, the Turks will expect the U.S. to do the following:

(1) Arrange for early Presidential Determinations to cover the \$175 million already authorized by Congress for FMS credits for Turkey in FY 1978.

(2) Use our influence with UN Secretary General Waldheim and the Greek and Greek Cypriot governments to broaden the Cyprus negotiating mechanism so that Greece and Turkey as well as the two Cypriot communities can participate in meaningful negotiations.

(3) Undertake to schedule Congressional hearings on the Turkish DCA in late January 1978, and seek full Congressional approval by March/April 1978. (We should also seek to persuade the Greeks to sign their DCA, which has been initialled, in December so that it can be considered at the same time.)<sup>3</sup>

I know it will be difficult, given our other foreign and domestic policy concerns at present, to commit ourselves to still another legisla-

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 168.

tive program in the foreign policy field. Nonetheless, I believe it is a matter which cannot be put to one side much longer. The Turks have felt themselves disadvantaged and humiliated by the Congressionally-imposed "embargo" which has been in effect for more than two years. They view enactment of the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, which was signed in March 1976, as the vehicle to restore our bilateral and NATO relationship. Our choice, therefore, is to test them now or to accept a continuing stalemate, or worse, in the eastern Mediterranean. Clark Clifford and I believe working with the Turks in the manner discussed in New York gives us the best chance to make progress on Cyprus—and the opportunity to restore the U.S.-Turkish security relationship, resume our operations at Turkish intelligence facilities and strengthen Turkey's NATO capability. If we do not move ahead in this manner, I can foresee only continued stalemate in the Cyprus negotiations and a deteriorating security relationship with Turkey, with serious consequences for NATO and the entire region.

I believe that the time has come to test the Turks and take the risk involved. The scenario outlined above provides sufficient safeguards so that we need not proceed too far or too fast without testing the consequences. We will in effect be doing nothing visible until the Turks begin to act. Public actions would begin in earnest only after the November 20 Greek elections while our moves in the Congress in respect to the DCA need not begin until late January, by which time we will be in a position to gauge the sincerity of Turkish actions. Thus, we are proposing that (a) we take certain minimal interim steps at an early date and (b) inform the Turks that we will pursue common goals, including pushing the DCA next year.

There is also no question that John Brademas, Paul Sarbanes, Tom Eagleton, Ben Rosenthal and their supporters will oppose this approach since they believe that all existing military arms restrictions on Turkey should be maintained until a settlement of the Cyprus problem is in place. Clark Clifford had a general discussion with this group on October 13 and we plan at an early date to undertake further consultations with them and others from the leadership of the foreign relations committees of both houses.<sup>4</sup>

I would very much welcome an opportunity to discuss this matter with you and hope that you would also invite Clark Clifford, who sat in with me during my last meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister in New York, and held separate bilaterals with Kyprianou, Bitsios and Caglayangil.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 14.

<sup>5</sup> At the end of the memorandum, Carter wrote "ok" and initialed "JC." See Document 16.

**102. Editorial Note**

In mid-October 1977, the Carter administration set in motion the legislative and political work required to reestablish U.S. arms sales to Turkey. At immediate issue was the financing of \$93.7 million for 40 F-4E aircraft, ordered by Turkey in August 1976, which would come out of the overall figure of \$175 million already slated for defense assistance to Turkey. In an October 24 memorandum to Secretary of State Vance, Deputy Secretary of State Christopher recommended that President Carter exercise his authority under Section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) which was “necessary to enable Turkey to fulfill its NATO defense responsibilities so that the articles may be sold to Turkey during FY 1978 and their purchase may be financed under FMS.” The memorandum was cleared by officials from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Office of Management and Budget. The memorandum is in the National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 7, Memoranda to Secretary—1977.

In accordance with the recommendation, Vance noted in an October 26 memorandum to Carter that President Ford approved determinations to assist Turkey under the FAA in August and November of 1976, and that consultations with congressional committee staffs indicated that Carter’s determination to approve Turkish assistance would not “raise serious objections” on the Hill. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 50, Turkey: 1977) In separate memoranda to Carter, dated November 1 and November 4, respectively, James T. McIntyre, Jr., Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski concurred with Vance’s recommendation. Brzezinski noted that this move would help to “demonstrate to the Turks that we are doing everything our legislation permits to maintain their military strength—in return we expect them to develop and maintain momentum toward settlement of their problems with Greece and Cyprus.” McIntyre assured Carter that this legislation was consistent both with Presidential Directive 13 (Conventional Arms Transfer Policy) and with Carter’s human rights policy. (*Ibid.*) Carter signed Presidential Determination No. 78–1 on November 5, authorizing the financing of \$93.7 million for the aircraft. (*Ibid.*)

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103. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Brussels, December 7, 1977, 9:30 a.m.

BILATERAL MEETING BETWEEN SECRETARY BROWN AND  
TURKISH MINISTER OF DEFENSE TURAN KAPANLI

## ATTENDEES

*U.S. Side*

Secretary Brown, Mr. McGiffert, Mr. Siena, Admiral Hanson

*Turkish Side*

Minister of Defense Kapanli

Permanent Representative A. Coskun Kirca

Chief of the NATO Department of Foreign Affairs M. Galip Balkar

An Under Secretary from the Ministry of Defense

A Lt. General from the Ministry of Defense

Defense Advisor to NATO Permanent Representative M. Tugay Ozceri

1. Dr. Brown opened the meeting by congratulating Minister Kapanli upon his recent appointment as Minister of Defense, saying that he was looking forward to working closely with him. He said that we in the United States place great importance on our relationship with Turkey and that the personal relationship between himself and Minister Kapanli was most important because of strains that had developed between our countries over the past few years. We in the U.S. Government and particularly in the Defense Department value very highly our close bilateral arrangement and hope that in the coming year we can come even closer together, and that he would do all that he could to bring this about. He continued that he had spoken personally with President Carter who shares these strong feelings about NATO as a whole and about the importance of Turkey to the Alliance—that President Carter and Dr. Brown want to see the relationship between our countries strengthened.

Dr. Brown continued that the United States knows that it must take certain steps and that Turkey must also do so to bring this strengthening of relationships about—that rebuilding it is a two-way street. The problem on Cyprus has disturbed this relationship in recent years. Discussions between Secretary Vance and the Turkish Foreign Minister will be taking place and Dr. Brown believes that this is a basis

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-80-0035, Box 30, Turkey, 1977 ISO.-680.1. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, ASD (ISA), DepASD (ISA) EurAffairs, and Komer. Brown and Kapanli were in Brussels for the meeting of the NATO Defense Planning Committee December 6-7.

for moving ahead and rebuilding our relationships in the months to come.<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Brown assured Minister Kapanli that within the restraints imposed by our Congress on the Executive Branch of the United States, he wants to do all that he can to improve our relationships with Turkey and to improve the Turkish defense capability. As soon as the Foreign Ministers' discussions have moved ahead in the next few months, he will be doing all he can to push the Defense Cooperation Agreement through Congress. Dr. Brown stated that he had visited Turkey several times, that he had enormous respect for the fighting qualities of the Turkish military, and for the dedication of Turkey to the Alliance, and thus had very strong feelings and reasons for restoring our traditional relationship.

2. Minister Kapanli thanked Dr. Brown and said that he had listened with great attention to his interesting and valuable ideas, that he especially liked and supported and aligned himself with Dr. Brown's statements about the Alliance with Turkey and about the NATO Alliance to which we each belonged. He said that although he felt that there was no substantive reason for strains in our relationship, we can't deny that they exist, but that Dr. Brown's words about Turkey's position in the Alliance meant much to him and that he especially felt that the statement of what Dr. Brown was prepared to do in 1978 was most important.

He continued that for all these reasons he would only be too sorry to see any lessening or loss of confidence by the Turkish people in NATO—that we have a long history of Turkish partnership and sharing of Alliance principles. Kapanli said he was especially heartened by Dr. Brown's mention of having been to Turkey and his impression of the Turkish fighting men of which the Turks are so very proud. Speaking of initiatives to serve to ease strains in our relationships, Kapanli said he was not prepared to submit that the faults can be directed toward the Turkish government for the state of affairs, but said that the talks between our Foreign Ministers certainly had a potential for improving the relationships. He agreed to the need for defense cooperation and welcomed Dr. Brown's emphasis on this and was pleased that the U.S. government recognized the importance of the Defense Cooperation Agreement to our relationship.

Kapanli continued that he was grateful for Dr. Brown's words about his efforts to do everything he could within the constraints imposed by the U.S. Congress and said that he wanted to support and align himself with the statements made about the Belgian government

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 104.

(sic) in the Plenary Session the day before and the need for a strong commitment to the Alliance.<sup>3</sup> He emphasized that each and every member of NATO is duty bound to commit itself. He said he was speaking to Dr. Brown in a similar spirit and attitude. He remarked that Turkey, in spite of dedicating 17% of its budget to defense last year, is increasing this percentage to 20% this year, a fact which proves Turkey's dedication to the Alliance.

Finally, Kapanli stated that the ideas he had presented to Dr. Brown had the support of Turkey's public opinion and are not just his views.

3. Dr. Brown, in closing the meeting, stated that he was certainly not attributing any blame to the Turkish government or to the United States government for the strains that had developed between the two countries over the past few years. He said that the question is what to do now and that this was a problem for our Foreign Ministers, that he is confident that they will take steps to resolve this. He concluded by saying that it was a task for himself and Minister Kapanli to do all they could to advance the relationships in the terms that they could handle at their level.

4. Both Dr. Brown and Minister Kapanli thanked each other warmly for the opportunity to meet, and the meeting adjourned.

**Thor Hanson**

*Rear Admiral, USN*

*Military Assistant*

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is presumably to statements made during the DPC meeting generally about the ongoing importance of maintaining strong relations and cooperation among NATO members for defense against the Warsaw Pact, and specifically an acknowledgment that Turkey (and Portugal) urgently needed external assistance for the modernization and support of its forces. These statements were reiterated as Paragraphs 2 and 9, respectively, in the final communiqué issued at the conclusion of the meeting.



**104. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Brussels, December 8, 1977, 6:30 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Secretary's Meeting with Caglayangil

**PARTICIPANTS***Turkey*

Foreign Minister Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil

Sukru Elekdag, Secretary General, MFA

Melih Esenbel, Turkish Ambassador to the United States

Coskun Kirca, Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO

Turgot Tulumen, Director General, Cyprus-Greece Affairs, MFA

Ekrem Guvendiren, Director, Cyprus-Greece Affairs, MFA (also interpreter)

*United States*

Secretary Vance

Under Secretary Habib

Assistant Secretary Vest, EUR

Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO

Mr. Raymond C. Ewing, EUR/SE, Deputy Director (notetaker)

**SUMMARY:** The Secretary met with Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil for 30 minutes to discuss Cyprus and the US-Turkey defense relationship. The meeting was shorter than had been anticipated because the Secretary's preceding bilateral meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Papaligouras started late and ran longer than had been expected. **END SUMMARY.**

While the Turkish press and photographers were leaving the room, the Secretary told Caglayangil that he hoped to be able to come to Ankara as soon as it was possible to set a date. He and Caglayangil also briefly discussed the December 11 Turkish local elections.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil said that since he last met with the Secretary in New York in early October Turkey had made certain efforts with respect to the Cyprus problem.<sup>2</sup> He had on suitable occasions responded to press queries suggesting that it was difficult to leave the Cyprus problem to the two communities and that it might be useful to consider some way to engage Turkey and Greece in the negotiating

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, unlabeled folder. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Ewing on December 16; approved by Anderson on December 23. Vance and Çağlayangil were in Brussels for the biannual NATO Ministerial meeting. The meeting took place at the Turkish Mission to NATO.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 100 and 101.

process. Caglayangil said that he thought his remarks might help pave the way for quadripartite talks by starting discussion of that idea.

He had also made other constructive statements, including the promise to withdraw Turkish military forces from Cyprus in the context of an agreed settlement. Prime Minister Demirel had made similar statements.<sup>3</sup>

In order to assist the efforts of Clark Clifford, State Department officers had been informed of Turkish thinking on a future constitutional arrangement for Cyprus.

It had been decided to withdraw 2,634 more Turkish troops from Cyprus in five steps beginning in the second half of December and continuing every two to three weeks thereafter. Caglayangil said that the withdrawal schedule could be extended or shortened as seemed useful.

Caglayangil noted that Denktash had stated that hotels in Varosha could be reopened so that foreign tourists could return. The Secretary said he had been pleased to note that statement. Caglayangil said that an expert committee would shortly do research in Varosha to look into which hotels could be opened and how Denktash's statement could be implemented.

In summary, Caglayangil said that he felt the Turkish performance warranted "promotion with two stars to the next class." However, he suspected that if grades were being awarded, the United States might not get as good a grade. Caglayangil said that there had been certain expectations from the United States which had not yet been met. In particular, the Turkish side needed to know when Congressional hearings would start on the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). Caglayangil also recalled that the Secretary had promised US support in helping Turkey with its economic difficulties in the international financial institutions. Caglayangil said that thus far such US efforts had not been effective with the IMF or other financial institutions. He said that he wanted to bring these matters to the Secretary's attention quietly and calmly and not in the negative way that the Greek side usually approaches such questions. He also mentioned that the Greeks had asked to participate in NATO's Long Term Defense Program but tried to

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<sup>3</sup> For example, during a press conference on October 19, Demirel was asked by a Swedish journalist how long Turkey planned on keeping its military in Cyprus. Demirel responded, "Until a new order is established. That is, until a political solution is reached and the people there are no longer threatened." Demirel went on to say that he had already withdrawn a portion of the soldiers stationed in Cyprus. (Telegram 7750 from Ankara, October 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770385-1110)

block approval of the Turkish DCA or even a meaningful reference to it in the NAC communique.<sup>4</sup>

Çaglayangil said he had appreciated learning of the US decision to help the Turkish Cypriots with “feasibility studies” as well as the idea of inviting Denktash to the United States. He hoped the latter could take place before Congressional hearings on the DCA.

Çaglayangil said that as a result of December articles in the *Christian Science Monitor* and in the Turkish press, there was speculation in Turkey that the government had sold out its Cyprus case.<sup>5</sup> He therefore thought it would be helpful to issue a joint statement after the meeting with the Secretary.

The Secretary said that he had talked to the President before leaving for Brussels and that the President had expressed particular interest in learning of the Turkish plans and schedule for further troop withdrawals. The Secretary said he would report to the President on his return to Washington on December 15 on the information which Çaglayangil had outlined. With regard to international financial institutions, the Secretary said he had asked that we do all we could to be helpful to Turkey with the IMF and other financial institutions. He said he could not give a date for hearings until after he had discussed the matter with the President. The Secretary said he appreciated the statements which Çaglayangil had made and noted that he had referred with interest and appreciation to these statements as constructive steps by Turkey when he spoke to the press on December 7.<sup>6</sup> With regard to the idea of a joint statement, the Secretary said he would take the draft which Çaglayangil provided and respond later.<sup>7</sup> He thought it would be better to postpone any such statement until December 9.<sup>8</sup> Çaglayangil said he had no problem putting the statement off until the following day.

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<sup>4</sup> The Greek Foreign Minister and Vance discussed this during their meeting immediately preceding this one. See Document 172. Vance refers to this meeting later in this conversation.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is presumably to two articles in *The Christian Science Monitor*, both written by Sam Cohen, “Turkey Talks of Cyprus Plan as Part of a Package” November 25, 1977, p. 11, and “U.S.-Turkish Deal Reported on Cyprus and Arms Ban,” December 7, 1977, p. 3. Cohen quoted Çaglayangil based on statements the Foreign Minister made to the Turkish press. The latter article in particular presented agreements between the United States and Turkey as close to final and based on an explicit and mutual understanding that Turkey would “unfreeze” the Cyprus dispute and subsequently the United States would complete legislation to resume its Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey.

<sup>6</sup> Vance made a statement to the press on his departure from Washington on December 7; not found.

<sup>7</sup> The draft was not found.

<sup>8</sup> For Vance’s December 9 news conference, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 1978, pp. 28–30.

The Secretary said he met with Greek Foreign Minister Papaligouras just prior to his meeting with Caglayangil. Papaligouras had been very concerned about the DPC communique and the way the DCAs were mentioned in the draft NAC communique.<sup>9</sup> The Secretary said that he and Papaligouras had also discussed general US-Greek relations. He had raised the matter of possible four-power Cyprus talks and said he thought this might be a constructive idea. Papaligouras had made clear that the current Greek position is negative. In general, Papaligouras had been very emotional on this and other issues.

Secretary General Elekdag emphasized again the importance to the Turks of learning when hearings would take place. The Secretary reiterated that he would have to talk to the President. He said there had already been some consultations on the Hill and that we were not sitting on our hands. We must decide how to handle this in our own way and move when we were sure that the proper foundation had been laid. Elekdag responded that the Foreign Minister had understood in New York that hearings would be arranged in late December or early January. The Secretary said he did not recall any such specific timetable having been discussed and noted that there had been no record kept of their meeting. He did recall that Caglayangil felt that nothing should be done until after the November 20 Greek elections. He also noted that nothing could realistically be done with Congress in December. Ambassador Esenbel thought that it was not very likely that anything could be arranged until after Congress returns January 19.

The Secretary said it was important not to be concerned with specific dates but rather to move on a pace that was appropriate in order to succeed. We had started the necessary steps toward that goal.

Caglayangil suggested that under these circumstances, it was important that Turkish troop withdrawals from Cyprus should not be wasted and wondered if it was better to delay until a more propitious time. The Secretary responded that it would indeed be constructive to go forward with the withdrawals and thought this would be seen by Congress as a useful step.

Caglayangil said that since Turkey did not have unlimited numbers of soldiers to pull out from Cyprus, he did not want the reduction to be already forgotten at such time as the hearings were held. The Secretary asked if he was free to tell Congress about the Turkish withdrawal action. Caglayangil thought that it would be helpful to do that. The Secretary hoped that when the Turks announced the first reductions they would also make clear that more would follow at a later date. Elekdag said they would be spread over time to get the maximum

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<sup>9</sup> For the DPC communiqué, see footnote 3, see Document 103. For the draft NAC communiqué, see footnote 3, Document 172.

impact in conjunction with the hearings. Caglayangil said in announcing the first withdrawal a general statement would also refer to the broader context and imply further reductions will be forthcoming.

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**105. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Nimetz) to Secretary of State Vance<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 11, 1978

We received a long cable from Ron Spiers reporting on his first meeting with Ecevit.<sup>2</sup> You will receive a summary of the cable, but in general it is very positive, with Ecevit reaffirming Turkey's pro-Western orientation, its desire to resume close relations with the United States and willingness to get the Cyprus talks moving through new Turkish proposals.

The issue I would like to flag for you now is the following paragraph which I am duplicating from the cable:

"In this connection he said Turkey's defense cannot be separated from the global problem of East-West relations. He needed to know what had happened in this area since the DCA was signed. He did not feel well-informed about the basic approach of the Carter Administration and felt that Turkey, as a participant in the alliance, must have broader information on the US perspective. Accordingly, he would welcome a short visit from an authoritative member of the Administration. It should not, however, be anyone below the level of the Secretary of State, Defense or Brzezinski. He felt that a Brzezinski visit would be easier to handle since he had invited him to Ankara after the Bilderberg Conference two years ago.<sup>3</sup> Since Brzezinski is a Sovietologist with a broad view of US objectives, a visit by him would be particularly appropriate, whereas a visit by the Secretary, although it would be welcome, would have more of an official cast."

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977–1980, Lot 81D85, Box 2, Evening Reading. Secret; Nodis. Copies were sent to Ewing and Vest. In the upper right corner, Vance wrote, "Matt—It should be Brown or the group of you 3. CRV," in response to Nimetz's question about who should meet Ecevit in Ankara. The group of three refers to Nimetz, Clifford, and McGiffert.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 212 from Ankara, January 11. (Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Foreign Countries, Box 50, Foreign Countries—Greece/Turkey/Cyprus, [1978])

<sup>3</sup> The Bilderberg Group conference took place in Izmir, Turkey, in 1975. This annual event gathers dozens of global leaders from the political, economic, and business spheres.

George Vest and I would like to get your thinking on this issue of arranging a high-level visit to Turkey. A Brzezinski trip is one possibility, although it raises wider issues of the role of the NSC. Secretary Brown might be interested in going to Ankara; you might be able to do it as an adjunct to a Middle East trip. Another alternative is for the President to phone Ecevit and ask him to receive a team of Clifford, Dave McGiffert and me.

George Vest and I feel strongly that we should seize this opportunity to deal with Ecevit, and how to do it needs your guidance.

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**106. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 18, 1978

SUBJECT

US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I are persuaded that Congressional approval of the proposed Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey is becoming more and more important. The military situation on the Southern Flank of NATO is one which offers little comfort. In the case of Turkey, however, the matter is one which we have some power to affect positively or negatively through our handling of the DCA. We are running a substantial risk that the longer the DCA is delayed the more likely become Turkish actions which as a practical matter will nullify their participation in the Alliance.

You may recall that last August I showed to you the attached letter from the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee which rather poignantly describes the situation in the Turkish Armed Forces.<sup>2</sup> At the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 75, Turkey: 1-7/78. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Not attached, but a copy is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 50, Turkey: 1978. The letter, dated July 25, 1977, is from General H.F. Zeiner Gundersen to General George S. Brown, Chairman, JCS. Gundersen wrote that on a recent review of the Turkish military situation, he marveled at the discipline and fitness of the troops, given the "antiquity" of their equipment, much of which dated to the 1940s. Gundersen reported on the frustration felt by Turkish military leaders due to the disparity between their defense burden as a Cold War front-line army and the poor status of their equipment. The swift passage of the DCA, he believed, "will end what is seen by [the Turks] as the discrimination of one member against another who is doing the best it can against the Warsaw Pact."

NATO Defense Planning Committee meeting in Brussels in early December, several speakers, most prominently the German Minister of Defense, cited this situation as one of serious concern to the Alliance. They are pained by the way we are treating an ally. They are irked because we appear to be acting at the bidding of Greece.

As to the Greeks, it is plain to me that they are holding off signing their DCA for the purpose of preventing us, they hope, from moving forward on the Turkish DCA. We cannot force them to sign. But we should not let them control our relations with Turkey in so crude a manner.

If you decide to ask the Congress to approve the DCA, I will strongly support favorable action. The Joint Chiefs assure me that they too will actively back the DCA in the Congress. I know that General Haig will also lend his support.<sup>3</sup>

**Harold Brown**

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<sup>3</sup> Vance submitted a memorandum to Carter in support of Brown's memorandum. In his February 1 memorandum, Vance assured Carter of Ecevit's determination to resolve the disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 75, Turkey: 1-7/78)

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## **107. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Ankara, January 23, 1978, 0800Z

574. For Spiegel. Subject: Uncleared Report of Secretary's Visit to Ankara.

1. Introduction: During the nineteen-hour visit to Ankara January 20–21, the Secretary had two working meetings with Prime Minister Ecevit which lasted a total of four hours. As foreshadowed in Ecevit's original invitation, these meetings dealt with a wide range of bilateral and global issues. The central issue discussed however, and the one to which Ecevit returned time after time, was the status of the U.S.-Turkish bilateral relationship. Ecevit repeatedly affirmed a desire and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance Nodis MemCons, 1978. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

an intention to revitalize what he called the stagnant bilateral relationship, but his comments revealed that he has not fully made up his mind about how he wants to accomplish that task. The following summarizes conversations between the Secretary and Prime Minister Ecevit January 20–21.

2. The first working session took place after dinner January 20 and lasted two hours. Ecevit began this session by explaining that his government places great value on the U.S.-Turkish relationship, and for that reason his party while in opposition had avoided making the question of the stagnant U.S.-Turkish relationship an emotional issue. He said it appeared that on the U.S. side the basic reason for the deteriorated state of the relationship had to do with internal political factors. He said that Turkey was forced to accept this as a fact of life but it was sometimes difficult to deal with and Turks sometimes wondered if there were not some other deeper reason for the U.S. attitude.

3. Ecevit said that the stagnation in relations between the two countries had done great damage to Turkish security and that Turkey could not continue to allow its security to deteriorate. He volunteered that he was not talking about a threat from the Soviet Union. He said he was not aware of any particular increase in pressures from the Soviet Union, and although Turkey is always aware of the Soviet reality, it was not the current cause for concern. The present problem has to do with the rapid increase in armaments in the countries neighboring Turkey on the west, east and south. Ecevit said that since the United States is the source of many of these arms, Turkey wonders if there might be some hidden reason.

4. Ecevit said he had concluded that the time had come for a re-evaluation of the U.S.-Turkish relationship. To help him in this he would appreciate being brought up to date on developments in U.S.-Soviet relations which might affect Turkey. He specifically asked whether it was true as had been widely rumored that the United States and the Soviet Union had come to a gentlemen's agreement three or four years ago to divide the world into spheres of influence with the Middle East being left to the United States.

5. Ecevit then said he believed the "phenomenal development" of Turkish democracy had been given undue weight by Turkey's friends in their dealings with Ankara. He said that Turkey is the only developing country that has been successful in maintaining democracy uninterrupted since World War II. Ecevit said he thought this achievement should be considered by Turkey's Western allies to be more important than the bravery of Turkish soldiers. If this factor doesn't carry any weight with the Carter administration, he said, he feared that it would never carry any weight.



6. In response to Ecevit's opening remarks, the Secretary said the United States had taken note of the lack of emotionalism in Turkey about the state of the U.S.-Turkish relationship and appreciated it. The Secretary said he agreed with the Prime Minister's view that domestic political factors in the United States played a significant role in the strain in U.S.-Turkish relations. He said that when the Carter administration had taken office, it had very carefully evaluated the possibility of getting a Turkish-U.S. Defense Cooperation Agreement through Congress. As a result of this evaluation, the Carter administration had determined that the votes simply were not there. The Secretary said he thought this situation was changing however. He expected that the DCA would come up for discussion in the Congress in March of this year and he was hopeful that it would be passed.

7. The Secretary then responded to Ecevit's question about the status of U.S.-Soviet relations with a brief summary of the areas of cooperation and competition between the two countries. He also specifically denied the existence of a gentlemen's agreement between the U.S. and USSR as described by Ecevit. He reviewed recent developments in the SALT talks and expressed his personal judgment that a new agreement would be possible by April of this year. The Secretary said he also believed that substantial progress had been made toward a comprehensive test ban and that work was proceeding satisfactorily on the question of armaments limitation in the Indian Ocean and on a chemical warfare agreement.

8. The Secretary said that during the past year the most important area of contention between the United States and the Soviet Union has been in the field of human rights. Two other areas of dispute in US-Soviet relations were the Soviet role in the Horn of Africa and the unsatisfactory bilateral trade relationship which had resulted from U.S. legislative restrictions.

9. The Secretary then responded to Ecevit's complaint that Turkey's success in democracy had been given inadequate recognition by its allies, particularly the United States. He acknowledged that democracy is particularly important to the Carter administration and said that Turkey's successes had perhaps not been taken into account sufficiently. He promised to review that question.

10. The Secretary then asked the Prime Minister what he considered to be the most important problems in the U.S.-Turkish bilateral relationship and what major problems Turkey faced in its relations with neighboring countries.

11. Referring to the Secretary's comments about progress toward a new SALT agreement, Ecevit asked if the development of the neutron bomb would affect that progress. The Secretary said it would not. What it might affect, he said, would be the deployment of forces in Central

Europe since the neutron bomb would be a particularly effective weapon against armor formations. The Secretary went on to say that if our allies do not believe that deployment of such a weapon on their territory is a good idea, then the United States is clearly not interested in deploying it. The United States had still not received a clear answer, however, about the attitudes of its allies.

12. In response to the Secretary's question about trouble spots in the U.S.-Turkish bilateral relationship, Ecevit said the first problem is the role the United States plays—perhaps in spite of itself—in the deterioration of Turkish-Greek relations. He explained that as long as Greece believes it has the unqualified support of the United States, it will not be willing to negotiate seriously with Turkey. He said that when the two countries had been left alone to solve their problems, they had been quite successful in doing so.

13. A second problem in the bilateral relationship Ecevit identified as military cooperation. He said his government wanted to dissociate the embargo from the DCA. He said the embargo was a clearly negative factor which should be removed first. Then, he said, the United States could proceed to the "positive possibility" of the DCA. Ecevit said the DCA should be reviewed in the light of developments since it was signed in March 1976—increased arms sales to Turkey's neighbors, depreciation of the dollar and increases in cost of arms. He also said that the DCA as it stands calls for an immeasurably larger contribution from Turkey than from the United States.

14. Ecevit said that in contrast with the previous government, his government intended to accord priority to the development of Turkey's economy. That economy, he said, was in particularly bad shape as a result of the United States arms embargo, the need for oil imports, and the mistakes of the previous government. The DCA, as it is now written, increases those burdens without providing any "compensating vitalism", he said. Ecevit acknowledged that it would be a difficult task to rewrite the DCA but he thought perhaps it could be supplemented by elements of economic cooperation. He suggested that such cooperation could be in the fields of arms industries or in other fields. Regardless the purpose would be to compensate for the burdens imposed on the Turkish economy by the DCA.

15. Referring to the Secretary's comments on US-Soviet relations, Ecevit said he was pleased that the Secretary had indicated relations between the two countries were improving. Particularly under these circumstances, Ecevit said, Turkey did not want to take actions which might be considered provocative by its neighbors. He said that in conversations with Soviet leaders he had found them to be particularly concerned about the American "observation installations" in Turkey. Ecevit said he had gained the impression that the reactivation of those

installations would be considered provocative. He said he himself did not consider them provocative and he recognized that Turkey had a responsibility to the Alliance and to the world with respect to the installations. However, he wanted to lighten Turkey's burden in this regard. He wondered, he said, if the United States would consider trying to incorporate these installations into a SALT agreement with the Soviet Union.

16. The Secretary said that national technical verification capability had been an important element in the SALT talks. Since the intelligence installations in Turkey were of a similar nature, he said he would be glad to explore the Prime Minister's proposal as a technical question. He said he didn't know whether it would work or not but he would look into it. He said he did not think anything could be done in this regard until SALT III.

17. Ecevit again said that Turkey did not want to shirk its responsibility to the Alliance. On the other hand, he felt that Turkish security had been unduly endangered by its participation in the Alliance. He said that in his view, Turkey had been used as a tool by the allies, forcing the Soviet Union to concentrate forces in the Caucasus and thereby reducing the burden on Western Europe. He again said that he thought it was time for Allied attitudes toward Turkey to undergo a transformation. He said that Turkey should be evaluated not for her military contribution but for her political development, i.e. her success in democracy. He said he wanted Turkey to be considered something more than a collection of brave soldiers.

18. Responding to Ecevit's expressed wish that the United States dissociate Greek-Turkish relations from US-Turkish relations, the Secretary said that in so far as the Cyprus problem is concerned, the United States has no desire to be involved. He said that if Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus can solve the problem by themselves, the United States would be delighted.

19. The Secretary said that the Prime Minister's suggestion that the DCA might be expanded to include economic cooperation raised a number of complex and difficult issues which he needed to reflect on before giving him an answer. At the same time, the Secretary said there was one potential problem with the DCA that he wanted to point out. He said there are some people in Congress who have a fundamental difficulty with the concept of four-year agreements. He said he didn't think this opposition was insurmountable, but he simply wanted to advise the Prime Minister that it does exist.

20. Ecevit then reviewed Turkey's bilateral relationships with its neighbors. Turning first to Iran, he said Turkey had no problems in its relationship with Iran, but there were no cooperative developments either, despite what Turkey sees as extensive opportunity. The Secretary

said he had discussed this problem with the Iranians and he suggested that the Prime Minister again raise with Iran the possibility of increased cooperation.

21. Ecevit said Turkey had increasingly good relations with the Arab states, particularly Iraq and Libya. He said he recognized that the United States did not have good relations with those two countries, and he suggested that those relationships be re-evaluated because he believed these two countries—more than any other oil-producing countries—try to use their money for the good of their people. The Secretary noted that recent US efforts to improve relations with Iraq had been rebuffed.

22. Ecevit then turned to Greek-Turkish relations. He said the Aegean issue is an increasingly important problem in the relationship between the two countries. Turkey could not forego its rights in the Aegean, he asserted. With respect to Greek claims that Turkey harbors expansionist aims, Ecevit said he would be willing to give any kind of guarantee that Turkey has no designs on the Greek islands of the Aegean.

23. Ecevit said he is willing to enter a high-level political dialogue with Greece soon as possible, but he noted that the Greeks seemed reluctant. He said he realized summit talks required extensive groundwork, but he thought that it might even be possible to have a top-level talk even to prepare the groundwork for future meetings.

24. Ecevit said he realized that Greek Prime Minister Caramanlis would have greater political problems than he would with a summit meeting. Nevertheless, he said he believed that Caramanlis attaches some value to improving Greek-Turkish relations. He noted that Caramanlis is perhaps at the peak of his career and may not be around much longer. After Caramanlis goes, Ecevit said, it might be too late. This opportunity should not be missed.

25. Ecevit then said that the military balance between Greece and Turkey had been upset in recent years. He said that he sincerely believed that Greeks and Turks have no basic conflicts, but he was convinced that the Greeks would not be prepared to enter into a sincere dialogue until the present military imbalance is corrected.

26. On the Cyprus question Ecevit said that his government wanted the Turkish Cypriots to take the initiative on both the territorial and constitutional questions. He cautioned, however, that the Greeks should not expect too much from the Turkish proposals. He said he had been prepared to be generous on territory in 1974, but because of permanent settlements that have taken place in the intervening period, adjustments in the demarcation line would be more difficult. He also said that his government is committed to a Cyprus settlement based on a federal framework. Such a solution, he said, would be the healthiest so-

lution and would avert the possibility of partition. Ecevit said that both sides must accept the reality that the two communities must live separately. On the other hand, however, freedom of movement should be possible in time.

27. The Secretary thanked the Prime Minister and said he shared his view that a federal framework provides the only chance for a viable solution. He then asked if Ecevit had been in touch with Kyprianou. Ecevit pointed out that Kyprianou is not his counterpart. He said that from what he had read, however, he thought that Mr. Kyprianou would not be an easy person for Mr. Denktash to deal with.

28. This session concluded with Ecevit saying that the Greek Cypriots and Greeks profess to believe that Turkey and Greece should not be involved in the Cyprus negotiations. Ecevit said, in his view, total uninvolvedness is unrealistic. He believed that Turkey and Greece need not be directly involved but they would need to give encouragement to their ethnic counterparts in order for a settlement to be reached.

29. When the talks resumed the morning of January 21, the Secretary briefed the Prime Minister on the Middle East situation. The Secretary summarized in some detail the background, framework, and objectives of the Egyptian-Israeli talks. He explained that earlier in the week good progress had been made on some aspects of the talks, but at that point Sadat had recalled his delegation. The Secretary said that Sadat had explained to him that the recall of his Foreign Minister did not signify an end to his commitment to the talks.<sup>2</sup> However, as a result of what he considered inflammatory statements made by Begin earlier in the week, he believed that it was necessary to have a cooling-off period. Otherwise he feared an uncontrolled escalation of counterstatements would have resulted. The Secretary said that Sadat had explained that he viewed what had happened as only a temporary setback. The Secretary told Ecevit that in his judgment the process will slow down for a time but will continue.

30. In response to the Secretary's request for his views, Ecevit said he believed it would be very risky to tell the Palestinians they could not have a national homeland. He then returned to his view expressed during talks the previous evening concerning the importance of Libya and Iraq. He said he believed a Middle East solution would have to be satisfactory to them in order to be viable.

31. The Secretary then returned to the subject of the DCA and told Ecevit that during the night he had given some preliminary thought to the possibility, as suggested by Ecevit, of amending the DCA. He said

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<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Document 204.

that he believed an effort to amend the DCA would create a great many problems. Ecevit said he had not officially asked for amendment of the DCA.

32. The Secretary then brought up the subject of missing persons in Cyprus, being reported septel.<sup>3</sup>

33. Ecevit then reverted to the subject of the DCA. He said that the Secretary had mentioned the previous evening the possibility that Congress might wish to reduce the term of the agreement to less than four years. The result of such an effort, he said, would be public indignation in Turkey and damage to his government. To avoid this possibility he suggested that both governments should look into ways to cooperate, perhaps in amending the agreement. One possibility, he suggested, might be to take the initiative to shorten the agreed term of the DCA while keeping the financial commitments at the same level. After all, he pointed out, nearly half of its four year term has already passed, during which time prices have gone up and the dollar has lost value. He acknowledged, however, that he recognized the riskiness of an amendment effort. The Secretary strongly agreed that amending the DCA would be a very risky business.

34. The Secretary then clarified that he had mentioned the subject of congressional opposition to a four year term agreement only because there are one or two Senators who might bring it up as a matter of principle. He did not think they would carry the day, however.

35. The Prime Minister warned that an "unsavory" discussion in Congress would have its counterpart in the Turkish Parliament. It might make the DCA more palatable, he said, to reduce it to two years while maintaining the same financial commitment.

36. Ecevit then shifted the subject to Greek-Turkish relations. He said that the Secretary had stated that the United States did not want to be involved in the disputes concerning Cyprus or the Aegean. Ecevit said the fact is that the United States is involved but it only focuses on Cyprus and ignores the Aegean which is extremely important to Turkey. He repeated his statement of previous evening that Turkey could not forego its rights in the Aegean.

37. Ecevit also complained that, although Greece has heavily armed its Aegean islands, the United States has not objected. He also said that Greece is deploying arms it has acquired from the United

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<sup>3</sup> The Embassy reported the discussion on missing persons in telegram 575 from Ankara, January 23. Ecevit characterized the issue of Greek Cypriots missing since the 1974 conflict (which he numbered at thirty) as a tactic used by the Greek Cypriots to "bog down" the intercommunal talks. (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance Nodis MemCons, 1978)

States not for collective defense but against Turkey. The Secretary said that he had, in fact, raised the problem of militarization of the Aegean islands with the Greeks at the request of the GOT. MFA Secretary General Elekdag intervened to say that he did not recall that GOT had ever requested that we do so. The Secretary said that the United States had raised the issue with Caramanlis in London.<sup>4</sup> In response the Greeks had explained that they were taking action only in self-defense. Nevertheless, the Secretary said that he had made it clear that he was concerned that he considered the matter serious.

38. During this exchange Elekdag brought up the subject of an exchange of letters between Secretary Kissinger and Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios concerning the Turkish-U.S. DCA.<sup>5</sup> Ecevit said that Ambassador Macomber had given him a copy of those letters, and Foreign Minister Caglayangil had passed on his reaction to the letters to Kissinger but had never received a response. Later in the conversation, Defense Minister Isik suggested that the United States provide Turkey with a letter about the arming of the Aegean islands similar to the one Kissinger had given Bitsios on the U.S.-Turkish DCA.

39. Ecevit again expressed his concern about the serious military imbalance developing between Greece and Turkey. He said this imbalance must be remedied if there is to be a dialogue. The Greeks, he suggested, do not want to make a serious effort to resolve the Aegean dispute, preferring to let the talks drag on indefinitely.

40. Ecevit then asked the Secretary when it might be possible to discuss further the details of bilateral problems. The Secretary said the two sides should aim for beginning of discussion after the middle of February.

41. Ecevit said he would like to know whether the United States would be able to help Turkey deal with its immediate economic problems, both by bilateral assistance and advice and by using its good offices with the International Monetary Fund. The Secretary said that the United States would be willing to express its views to the IMF.<sup>6</sup> He

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the May 10, 1977, meeting between Carter and the Greek Prime Minister. See Document 166. The issue of militarization of the Aegean islands was brought up by Carter, who relayed Turkish concerns over this trend.

<sup>5</sup> The exchange of letters, which occurred after the signing of the U.S.-Turkish DCA on March 26, 1976, is described in telegram 86157 to Athens, April 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840098–2517) See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Documents 62 and 64.

<sup>6</sup> Turkish Finance Minister Ziya Müezzinoğlu further pressed this case with Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal during a meeting in Washington on March 23. Müezzinoğlu was in Washington to sign a letter of intent with the IMF to secure its assistance to stabilize the Turkish economy. Blumenthal assured Müezzinoğlu that there was no U.S. “economic embargo” against Turkey and that the United States remained supportive of the Turkish economic program. (Telegram 85814 to Ankara, April 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780144–1146)

said he would talk to Secretary Blumenthal after returning to Washington and would be back in touch with Ecevit. Ecevit asked if the United States would be willing to consider some kind of supplemental economic support without the DCA. The Secretary asked that the Prime Minister make specific proposals. With respect to the immediate future, however, the aid bill had already been completed.

42. Returning to his idea that the embargo and the DCA should be dissociated, the Prime Minister asked the Secretary whether he believed the embargo should be lifted first. The Secretary said it was a difficult political question and he would prefer to go through the congressional hearings on the DCA in March. Prime Minister said that lifting the embargo would ease his political problems; however, he was not pressing it.

43. Ecevit then brought up the question of Kurdish separatism. He said Turks have the impression that the United States backs the Kurdish national movement. The Secretary assured him that the United States was not supporting the Kurdish national movement.

44. As the discussion ended, Elekdag asked about the possibility of defense support assistance. The Secretary said that inasmuch as the aid bill had been completed, defense support assistance for Turkey would require supplemental legislation, and he would need to discuss that possibility with the President.

45. Elekdag and the Prime Minister then returned to the question of timing for congressional action on the DCA. Prime Minister said he had been told the US had given the GOT to understand last fall that hearings on the DCA would begin in December. Elekdag confirmed that statement, and complained that now it appeared that the earliest possible time would be March. The Secretary said he would talk to the appropriate committee chairman on the subject of a calendar.

46. Department please pass info addressees as desired.

**Spiers**



**108. Memorandum From Gregory F. Treverton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 24, 1978

**SUBJECT**

Where we Stand on the Turkish DCA

Your memorandum of February 6 to Vance and Brown (attached) has not been fully answered.<sup>2</sup> I understand the Secretary regarded the evening reading item on Saturday to be as full an answer as possible (or desirable to put on paper) at this time.<sup>3</sup> But State is frankly slow to move on this issue. As you know, a small State/Defense/Treasury team has been in Ankara this week examining all aspects of the U.S.-Turkish relationship, at the behest of Ecevit—part of our general strategy of encouraging the Turks to take initiatives on Cyprus which would in turn permit us to move forward with the DCA.<sup>4</sup> (C)

First reports from that group are mixed. As usual, the Turks hoped our people would come checkbook in hand. They did indicate that the Ecevit-Caramanlis Summit is now set for March 9–10, but fleshed-out Turkish proposals on Cyprus are not yet ready. Ecevit's subordinates hinted that the Prime Minister might not come to the May NATO Summit—it is Turkey's turn to be honorary Council president—if the DCA question is not resolved by then. (C)

The timing may be difficult for us. Congressional hearings on security assistance—at which our position on the DCAs will be expected—come up in March. Yesterday, in fact, the Hamilton subcommittee proposed hearings as early as the 13th and 14th, to wrap up before the Easter holiday.<sup>5</sup> That timing leaves us little time to orchestrate matters with Congress; perhaps more serious, it may not allow enough time for the Turkish initiatives we require to ripen. On the other hand, the Turks are all too aware of our Congressional timing: if positive action on the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 50, Turkey: 1978. Confidential. Sent for action.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed. The memorandum reads: "The President has directed that we start planning our Congressional tactics now on the Turkish and Greek DCA's. In light of this, please submit to me by the end of the week a strategy for Congressional action."

<sup>3</sup> The evening reading item, presumably dated February 18, was not found.

<sup>4</sup> The team, led by Nimetz, was in Ankara February 21–24.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the International Relations Committee, of which Lee Hamilton (D-Indiana) was the Chair.

DCA is not begun soon, they understand that the next window would be late fall. (C)

*RECOMMENDATION:*

—That we urgently review the situation when Nimetz and the group return, with particular attention to the first issue: do we intend to proceed ahead in March and ask for passage of the DCA? That turns in large measure on our reading of what the Turks are prepared to do. The timing may be influenced by Panama and other items on the legislative agenda, but I don't think Panama should be a major consideration.<sup>6</sup> And it, of course, is a matter for Presidential decision.

—If the decision is to move forward, develop and begin immediately to implement a plan of contacts on the Hill. In particular, we need to assure that those who support us are as well briefed as are those who will oppose us; otherwise, the proGreek Congressional groups will continue to be able to play the role of spoiler.

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<sup>6</sup> Reference is to ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties of 1977, which included provisions to cede control of the Canal to Panama after 1999. The Treaties were signed on September 7, 1977, ratified on March 16 and April 18, 1978, and went into force on October 1, 1979.

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## 109. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Ankara, February 24, 1978, 1220Z

1443. For the Secretary from the Ambassador. Subj: US-GOT Relations.

1. Although I have had a good opportunity to discuss the subject with Matt Nimetz over the past two days, I believe it is my responsibility to convey to you directly my strong recommendation that you and the President decide to move firmly in support of early congressional endorsement of the Turkish DCA in the hearings during the next month.

2. The reasons for and against this have been rehearsed at length, but I want to summarize my own views in the light of the meetings we have had over the past two days.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P8501901-1668. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis.

3. Fundamentally, I believe that our relations with Turkey will be irreversibly damaged if we do not make this move. This country is more important to us than either Greece or Cyprus, although I do not think that we should let it become an either/or choice.

4. In his polite, matter-of-fact, way Ecevit has given us a time limit. I have no doubt that he means it. If we do not move on the DCA by the time of the NATO summit, Turkey will make a major assessment of its interests and alignments in this world.<sup>2</sup> The conventional wisdom is that Turkey has no options. I do not believe that this is the case over the long run. Certainly Turkey does not.

5. As a first step, I believe that Turkey will close down the five US facilities which have been in provisional status. Ironically, the significance of these installations may be even greater for their capability to monitor and extend our arms control agreements than for purely military reasons. While all of them, at least theoretically, could be relocated, it would be at substantial cost to the US, probably including some degradation of our intelligence and verification capability.

6. I also take seriously the statement that Ecevit will not go to the NATO summit meeting in Washington in May if the DCA is still languishing. Even aside from the impact of the non-attendance of the scheduled presiding officer at the summit, his absence would be a major blow to the Alliance at a session presumably designed to show solidarity and strengthen the Alliance. It is clear to me that most of our allies are uneasy about the embargo and its consequences, and there is a good deal of sympathy for the Turkish position despite the view that the GOT should have been more forthcoming on Cyprus.

7. I do not know what, if anything, the Turkish Government would do with respect to its position in NATO. However, I believe that Turkey will set itself on a path that gradually but inexorably will diverge from that of its NATO partners. One practical factor is that as long as our NATO-related forces remain here under the restrictions and burdens imposed by “provisional status,” which can only be relieved by passage of the DCA, tensions and difficulties will increase in our [garble—military-to]-military relations to a point where we will probably both want our forces and our weapons removed. The consequence will be a progressive severing of Alliance ties when preservation of an acceptable East-West balance is a *sine qua non* for our efforts to build a stable detente and extend the arms control process.

8. Turkey is in deep economic trouble, primarily because of the impact of oil prices and the attempts of previous governments to continue an unsustainably high growth rate. Ecevit is like an archaeologist pre-

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<sup>2</sup> The summit took place in Washington May 30–31.

siding over a dig, the dimensions of which are only gradually becoming clear and the precise extent of which is not yet known. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that the political and social stability and the democratic institutions of this country could, perhaps quite rapidly, be put in jeopardy. To judge from our contacts with Turkish officials in the past few days, the Turkish Government itself is deeply worried about the social consequences of the present economic crisis and of the austerity measures necessary to correct it. Although it is an irrational view, the fact of the embargo leaves us holding some of the bag for this situation in Turkish opinion. More importantly, I am convinced that as long as the embargo exists, we will be hampered in our ability to be helpful in this country's struggle to maintain the political institutions basic to the freedom of 42 million people. Its removal seems to be a first step to anything else.

9. Finally, I realize that there are differences of view on whether the embargo gives leverage on Cyprus. I am firmly convinced that it does not, that it has operated for three years as an impediment rather than a stimulus to progress. However, I now believe this issue is academic. Ecevit, in my judgment, is firmly committed to do everything reasonable toward a Cyprus settlement, embargo or no. Under these circumstances, continuation of the embargo will only do more damage to our relationship and to the Alliance as a whole. It will not push Ecevit into doing more to settle Cyprus than he would do without it.

10. I also accept the point of view that the embargo now operates as a disincentive to the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to negotiate. There is burgeoning evidence that their policies are more influenced by the objective of keeping the embargo in place, with the mistaken idea this is the way for us to force Turkish concessions on their behalf, than to achieving progress on substance. It would be unfortunate if the disincentive of the embargo led them—and us—to miss a settlement opportunity which may not recur for some time.

11. I realize that from my perspective I can only see part of the problem, but I feel that I owe it to you and to the President to be as clear as I can in stating this perspective. Those who oppose lifting the embargo now tie their willingness to do so to "a solution" in Cyprus. "A solution", I fear, is a ways away, even with the maximum good will on all sides. If they will not agree to lifting the embargo until a settlement is signed, sealed and delivered, there is not much likelihood of their being brought around in time to avoid many of the consequences I have alluded to above.

12. For all these reasons I urge that we bite this bullet now.

**Spiers**

**110. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Nimetz) to Secretary of State Vance<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 1, 1978

**SUBJECT**

Congressional Views on US-Turkish Relations

George Vest and I met with Brademas and Sarbanes February 28 to describe last week's talks in Ankara. I also met with Lee Hamilton on March 1, who agreed to move the hearings back to April 4 so that we could comment more convincingly on the Cyprus situation.

In my meeting with Brademas and Sarbanes, I stressed my negative approach to any immediate economic assistance to Turkey and to making a commitment on the Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). I also indicated that I had pressed for real progress on Cyprus in order to create the conditions which would make DCA approval possible. I told Brademas and Sarbanes that the Turkish proposals on Cyprus are not yet finished but from a general description we were led to expect a true federation and a territorial approach involving relocation of a substantial number of Turkish Cypriots; there were signs as well that Varosha would be negotiable. I emphasized that I had stressed in Ankara the importance we attach to forthcoming Turkish proposals. Ecevit had stressed to me that he wants Cyprus solved and that the proposals will be reasonable.

I indicated that the Turks anticipate the Administration will move ahead in Congress with the DCA in the coming weeks and that, while they made no threats, they expect to know exactly where they stand before the NATO summit in Washington at the end of May. I said we attach great importance to a Cyprus settlement, but we wanted to maintain and strengthen our relationship with Turkey. I told Brademas and Sarbanes that the risk of a complete break with Turkey was a serious one and that the present government could be expected to re-evaluate its defense relationship if the DCA were not approved this spring.

Brademas responded that in his view the Administration had undermined the credibility of a clear and direct linkage between movement to resolve the US-Turkish defense relationship and a Cyprus settlement. He and Sarbanes reiterated at length their complaints about the Administration's FY 79 assistance proposals for Turkey, Greece and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977–1980, Lot 81D85, Box 2, Eastern Mediterranean—1978. Confidential; Nodis. Cleared by Vest. A copy was sent to Bennet.

Cyprus; their unhappiness with press comments made recently by Ambassador Spiers;<sup>2</sup> and their displeasure with the Department's human rights report on Cyprus.<sup>3</sup> (Brademas said he would no longer oppose human rights amendments to international financial institution legislation after his experience with the human rights reporting by the Department.) Both said they appreciated the continuing dialogue with the Department, but they felt they had been blindsided several times in the last year. They said they sensed the Administration might well be moving toward asking for congressional approval of the DCA. If that happened, there would be a "bloody battle." Already there was a sense of outrage in the Greek-American community; the President's popularity and credibility had been clearly damaged. Brademas and Sarbanes felt the President needed them on a number of difficult questions before the Congress and they were being put in an impossible situation.

I responded to their specific points and to their political analysis, but noted that my job is to give advice on the merits of the case. I suggested they consider the likely political repercussions of a Turkish change of policy, and the consequences of a congressional investigation into "who lost Turkey" in the event Turkey cuts or limits its links with NATO or the U.S.

At the end of the conversation, both said they would like to be treated as allies and wanted to try to work this out with the Administration. They urged that another meeting be held in a week or two. We agreed we would certainly keep in touch before any final decisions were taken.

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is presumably to Ambassador Spiers' interview with the Turkish news agency ANKA, conducted in English on January 24 and widely disseminated to other news outlets. Spiers made many of the same arguments he presented in Document 109. On an earlier date he stated, "I am prepared to argue with anyone who says that the embargo is a 'trump card' which will produce a solution in Cyprus. The embargo has not made a solution easier, on the contrary it has made it more difficult." (Telegram 747 from Ankara, January 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780048-0673)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, Document 46.

**111. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for Congressional Liaison (Moore), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Beckel), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Bennet) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 4, 1978

SUBJECT

Turkish DCA—Legislative Strategy

*Summary*

If we decide to move ahead with the Turkish DCA, the votes will be hard to come by but probably obtainable. The critical question is how to minimize the damage to our credibility with Brademas, Sarbanes, and the Greek community, who will feel that we have backed down on campaign and personal commitments to them. If the issues are handled properly, we can probably avoid serious damage to this and other legislative priorities.

The requirements are (i) a clear, compelling rationale for our position and (ii) at least a week's prior notice to Brademas and Sarbanes before any leaks or public announcements from us.

*Background*

The Turks are pressing for action on the DCA. Ecevit, the new Turkish Prime Minister, told State Counselor Matt Nimetz that he might not attend the NATO summit if the Administration does not act on the DCA by May and that he would be forced to take other steps to readjust Turkish foreign policy.

Ecevit and Caramanlis will hold a summit meeting on March 9 and 10 which may offer some hope for future improvement in Greek-Turkish relations.<sup>2</sup> In addition, Ecevit has promised to produce proposals on Cyprus within the next few weeks for U.N. Secretary-General

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 75, Turkey: 1–7/78. No classification marking. At the upper right corner of the first page, Carter wrote, "Frank—After #1 and perhaps #2 [see footnotes below], then I'll make a decision. JC." In a March 8 covering memorandum to Brzezinski, Henze wrote, "I am appalled by the weakness of this paper. It seems concerned primarily with the problem of how to break bad news to the Greek lobby, not with approaching the task with the strongest possible case which will ensure that the Administration's position prevails and it does not end up looking inept in Congress." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> Carter underlined the first portion of this sentence and wrote "#1" in the margin. Both Ecevit and Karamanlis publicly declared their meeting in Montreux, Switzerland, March 10–11 a success. See footnote 7, Document 175.

Waldheim, and there is a chance that these proposals—the first serious proposals the Greeks have put forward—can provide a basis for negotiations between the Cypriot communities.<sup>3</sup>

Even if the summit goes well and Ecevit's proposals are reasonable, the pro-Greeks on Capitol Hill will still want to use stick rather than carrot to encourage further concessions by Turkey. They will recall campaign promises in which we pledged to work toward a fair and equitable *settlement* on Cyprus and in favor of the arms embargo on Turkey. The mere possibility of *progress toward a settlement* will not in any way satisfy the Greek-American constituency.

### *Tactical Considerations*

On April 4, Congressman Lee Hamilton will hold hearings on Greece and Turkey in connection with FY 79 assistance. This hearing had originally been scheduled for March 13, but Hamilton agreed to postpone it to give the Administration time to make its decision on the DCA. Meanwhile, Hamilton and a majority of members of the House International Relations Committee have written Secretary Vance recommending that the DCA be submitted in adequate time to be considered along with this year's Security Assistance bill and promising support.

The House floor will probably be the most serious hurdle, although Rules may be a problem because O'Neill has always supported Brademas on this issue. With strong Presidential endorsement, we believe the Turkish DCA can pass the House. In the Senate, the most serious problem is the impacted calendar.

In view of the April 4 deadline, we must have a final decision and full rationale by roughly March 20. With this in hand, the following steps should then be taken:

1. At least a week before announcement or leaks, the Secretary of State and possibly the President should talk individually with Sarbanes, Brademas, Rosenthal, and Eagleton to explain the reasons for the Administration decision. We should state frankly that we want to give them time to adjust to what we know to be a difficult development for them. We should appeal for as much understanding as possible and for help in explaining to their Greek-American constituents the factors which compelled the Administration decision. We should invite them to make whatever use of the information they wish during the succeeding week, but make it clear that any leaks will come from them, not us.

2. Simultaneously, the decision should be communicated directly to Prime Minister Caramanlis and President Kyprianou, so that they do not hear it first from the Greek-Americans.

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<sup>3</sup> Carter underlined the first portion of this sentence and wrote "#2" in the margin. He circled "the Greeks" and connected the circle to a question mark in the margin.



3. Shortly before public announcement, we should communicate the decision to Zablocki, Findley, Solarz, and Hamilton (who support the DCA) and to Sparkman, Case, and Javits.

4. There should be a Presidential letter to the Speaker of the House and the Vice President for further distribution to all Members in which we set forth the reasons for the decision and describe the progress that has taken place on Cyprus and our commitment to continue U.S. involvement in supporting the U.N.-sponsored intercontinental [*intercommunal?*] talks about NATO.

5. Responsibility for a detailed legislative strategy and execution should be assigned to State.

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## 112. Letter From President Carter to Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 27, 1978

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

As you know, we have recently conducted a thorough review of our Eastern Mediterranean policy in preparation for this spring's Congressional hearings relating to the 1979 security assistance program for Turkey and Greece. I thought it important that you receive directly a full description of my decisions as well as an explanation of the factors which are behind these decisions. For this reason, I have dispatched Warren Christopher to meet with you personally. He will speak frankly and with my full confidence.

I want to assure you of the vital importance I attach to an early resumption of the closest possible relations between the United States and Turkey. I have the greatest respect for what you are doing to break the impasse in the area which has existed for too long. We have been particularly impressed by your initiative to deal with the difficulties which have existed between your country and Greece, and thus I have been pleased to learn that your meeting with Prime Minister Caramanlis in Montreux seems to have been a success in opening the way for further dialogue.<sup>2</sup> I am also impressed by the strength of democratic institutions in Turkey despite what we recognize are severe strains. I

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 19, Turkey: Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, 3/78–5/79. No classification marking. In the upper right corner, an unknown hand wrote, "H/C [hand-carried] to Turkey by Secy. Christopher."

<sup>2</sup> The meeting took place March 10–11. See footnote 7, Document 175.

am also pleased that your government has successfully reached agreement with the International Monetary Fund, and I share your hope that this step will be followed by renewed international financial confidence in the long-run economic vitality of Turkey.

Against this background, I believe the package which we are prepared to present to Congress early next month is a balanced and fair response to the current situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. I especially endeavored to make concrete my Administration's commitment to strengthening our relations with your nation. I hope you will see it as a major move forward.

This approach is not without risk. Secretary Christopher will outline the difficulties that we know our approach must overcome to be successful. He will be seeking your understanding and support so that our shared goal of rebuilding our relationship can be realized.

I want you to know how much I look forward to meeting with you in Washington in May. I have been greatly impressed by what I have been told about you and by the forthright way you are dealing with the challenges facing Turkey.

With warmest regards,  
Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

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**113. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Ankara, March 29, 1978, 1945Z

2351. TAGS: US-Turkey Relations: Deputy Secretary's Meeting With Prime Minister Ecevit.

1. Following a short private meeting with the Prime Minister, DepSec Christopher met at 10:00 am March 29 for 45 minutes with Ecevit, Foreign Minister Orcun, MFA SecGen Elekdag, and MFA officials Batu, Tulumen and Ozgul. DepSec accompanied by Ambassador,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Foreign Countries, Box 50, Foreign Countries—Greece, 1977–1978. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Athens; Priority to USNATO. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

Counselor Nimetz, Assistant Secretary (EUR) Vest, EUR/SE Director Ewing, and DCM Dillon.

2. PriMin opened meeting by telling group that DepSec had told him about key decisions taken on Turkish-American relations and had conveyed letter from President. Ecevit said DepSec had stressed importance of revitalizing Turkish-American relations. He then asked DepSec to make his presentation.

3. DepSec said that President and his senior advisors, including Vice President Mondale, Secretary Vance, Secretary Brown, Mr. Brzezinski and two or three other key advisors had met on Monday, March 27, for complete discussion of Turkish-American relations.<sup>2</sup> This had culminated a two week review. Following the meeting, the President had asked DepSec to come immediately to Ankara and had given him letter for the PriMin. The goal of the decisions taken was to resume the closest possible relationship between the two countries. In making his decisions, the President had reviewed various options and had taken into account diplomatic, military, and political factors. Particularly in dealing with political factors, it was important to understand that this was no exact science. Reasonable men could differ. There was, however, now a concrete Presidential decision to go ahead with the program which he would describe. This program would go forward promptly and would be presented in congressional hearings on April 6. DepSec stressed that one important background element in review process was need to make sure that any program proposed could succeed in Congress; this point had been reinforced by recent experience with Panama Canal Treaty.

4. DepSec said there were four basic elements in the program which the President intended to recommend to Congress:

A) The President would recommend to Congress that the embargo be lifted immediately. As PriMin had said in January, it was the negative factor in our relationship which needed to be removed.<sup>3</sup> Lifting the embargo would free up the MAP pipeline of some 85 to 90 million U.S. dollars; would open up transfer of U.S. equipment from third countries; and would open up a whole range of other possibilities that had been precluded by the embargo.

B) President would recommend to Congress 50 million dollars in security supporting assistance (SSA) as an economic loan for BOP purposes. This was a substantial departure for the President because the aid budget for 1978 was already in the Congress and thus the President

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<sup>2</sup> No record of this meeting was found. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place in the Cabinet Room from 11:15 to 12:15 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 107.

would be reopening his earlier request. DepSec noted parenthetically that the President was pleased with the Turkish accord with the IMF and noted that the U.S. had tried to be "somewhat helpful." He said that an SSA loan had a symbolic as well as a practical effect. It would demonstrate U.S. confidence in the Turkish economy and, in Ecevit's words, would represent "compensating vitalism". It was an important beginning.

C) The President will go ahead with 175 million dollars FMS in FY-1979, the same level as in 1978.

D) The President believed the DCA should be renegotiated to recognize 1978 realities. As PriMin himself had said, it should be reviewed in light of current developments. This should be done promptly.

5. Through this approach President Carter could put his own stamp on U.S. military relations with Turkey. The most important reason for renegotiation, however, was our belief that the current DCA would not succeed in the Congress. This was primarily because of the four-year term and the billion dollar commitment. The agreement could be improved and modernized. There was a new mood in Congress and a desire to evaluate matters on a shorter term basis. Events elsewhere in the world, e.g. negotiations with the Philippines, had shown the great difficulty with a long term U.S. commitment.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, changes in bases had already made the DCA outmoded. DepSec observed that the PriMin might possibly assess renegotiation as a negative factor, but he saw it as positive because of the opportunity it would afford the PriMin and the President to put their own stamp on U.S.-Turkey relations. DepSec said he wished to emphasize that the President was prepared to fight for the program that he had outlined and to accept the political risks in doing so.

6. PriMin Ecevit asked DepSec what he meant in his reference to bases. DepSec replied that some installations were no longer significant. Others might be better under joint operation. He could be more specific if necessary but his real point was that three years had passed and conditions had changed. He then asked Ambassador to comment on the installations.

7. Ambassador said that there were five significant bases covered under the DCA. One was about to be shut down. Two could perhaps be reopened and operated by Turks with American training and equipment. The other two could possibly be jointly operated. All of this could be reflected in new negotiations. DepSec said he was not prepared to conduct renegotiations on current trip. He would welcome Turkish thinking.

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<sup>4</sup> The administration was also in the process of negotiating payment for U.S. use of military bases in the Philippines.

8. DepSec said that he hoped for PriMin's favorable reaction to President's decision which administration would present to the Congress. There were risks involved and it should be understood that passage of the program would not be easy. The President though was anxious to overcome problems which existed in U.S.-Turkey relations.

9. PriMin said he understood that the President will ask the Congress for the lifting of the embargo and for 50 million dollars in credit but will not ask for approval of the DCA. PriMin then referred to his recent conversation with Senator Javits (Ankara 2249) and noted that Javits had advocated the opposite course, i.e., concentration on the DCA.<sup>5</sup>

10. DepSec replied that he had great respect for Senator Javits but President had reached a different conclusion. He believed that a billion dollar, four-year DCA could not succeed in the Congress. DepSec hoped he would have an opportunity to compare views with Senator Javits for whom he had great respect but he wished to stress that others, including the Vice President, differed with Senator Javits in their assessment of what program would succeed.

11. The PriMin replied that he just wanted to be clear. He added that it was not only Javits but a majority of the HIRC who had said that with unequivocal attitude on the part of the administration it would be possible to push the DCA through the Congress.

12. DepSec said that the President had looked at all possibilities but believes that the first thing to do was to remove the embargo and then turn to a new DCA. HIRC and President were agreed in that they both wanted to put Turkish-American relationships back on the track. The DCA might get through the committee but it could run into heavy weather on the floor. Of course reasonable men could differ on these views. The PriMin could be assured that the President was determined to make this program succeed.

13. PriMin replied that when he took over office, his impression was that the USG was concerned over his attitude on the DCA. We had come to understand that Carter administration wanted to see DCA implemented. Had there been, he inquired, a reassessment?

14. DepSec replied yes. The USG had in effect become persuaded of PriMin's January view as expressed when Secretary visited Ankara.

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<sup>5</sup> The meeting between Javits and Ecevit took place on March 24. Javits told the Prime Minister that certain Congressmen, himself included, drew a distinction between overturning the arms embargo and passing the DCA. Javits, who emphasized his support for a strong Turkey, stated, "I can vote for the DCA—no trouble, but it would be hard even for me to reverse myself on the embargo." (Telegram 2249 from Ankara, March 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780131–0503)

As administration officials now looked at DCA, they could see ways it could be improved, especially regarding the four-year term.

15. PriMin recalled that Secretary had mentioned four-year aspect but said he had told Secretary that two year agreement would be all right, if Turkey were compensated economically. He noted also that the GOG had not signed its DCA and he saw no evidence that they wished to sign. He asked if GOG continued a position of blocking the Turkish DCA, would the President persist (in pushing new Turkish DCA) even if Greeks did not sign. In short, would there still be a connection?

16. DepSec said USG would go ahead no matter what the Greeks did, but we could not go ahead with the present DCA. Nimetz interjected that SecVance had come to Turkey at the end of a trip to the Middle East primarily to listen to Turkish views. His remarks at that time had not been definitive USG views. On his return, Secretary had directed Department to engage in an intense review of Turkish-American relations which had now been completed.

17. PriMin asked if President would say openly that he would go ahead with a new Turkish DCA on its own legs regardless of what Greek attitude is. DepSec replied in the affirmative that the President would go ahead. Nimetz added that in preparation for the upcoming hearings, PriMin's point would be taken into consideration. We would say during those hearings that a new DCA would be presented promptly.

18. Ambassador Spiers told PriMin that with the embargo gone, Greeks would be faced with a fundamentally different situation.

19. PriMin suggested break so that both principals could talk to these colleagues and suggested further meeting at 5:30 pm.<sup>6</sup> DepSec asked about handling press and PriMin suggested that he tell reporters as he left that the group from Washington had come to tell the Turks about new policy decisions taken by the President. Technical details were continuing to be discussed and the talking had not ended.

**Spiers**

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<sup>6</sup> The later conversation, described in telegram 2352 from Ankara, March 29, centered on how the U.S. and Turkish Governments would publicize their joint plans to move forward. (Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Foreign Countries, Box 50, Foreign Countries—Greece, 1977–1978) Christopher reported Ecevit's Cyprus plan in telegram 5681 from Bonn, March 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850104–2699) Ecevit's policy was that he envisioned Cyprus as a bi-zonal, bi-communal, independent, and non-aligned nation. During an April 6 press conference, Ecevit publicized this policy, further expounding that he envisioned a future Turkish Cypriot entity as a federal state. (Telegram 2609 from Ankara, April 6; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780148–0948)

# 114. Letter From Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit to President Carter<sup>1</sup>

Ankara, May 15, 1978

Dear Mr. President,

Your message of May 11 reached me during my visit to Bonn.<sup>2</sup>

I studied the draft declaration proposed for the forthcoming NATO summit meeting carefully, and found the tone rather strong and challenging and I thought that it might provoke many states to harden their positions, thus resulting in a speeding up of the armaments race. Many of us will be speaking in the special sessions for disarmament of the United Nations right before or right after the NATO meeting in Washington and I feel that the proposed declaration would sound rather out of tune with the way I personally would be inclined to speak in that important United Nations meeting.

In view of the limitations imposed on her possibilities of maintaining her military strength, Turkey cannot afford to be provocative towards her neighbors.

We attach great value to detente in principle. Besides, under the circumstances that Turkey presently finds herself in, she has a stake in detente to which she must make her own contribution in her own way and by keeping in view her own possibilities and limitations.

My Government cannot therefore, subscribe to a declaration which, in our view, impairs detente although I am sure, this is not your intention either.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 50, Turkey: 1978. Secret. The letter is attached as Tab A to an undated covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter. Brzezinski wrote, "This is clearly [Ecevit's] response to the vote in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the embargo; that he is prepared to play the "Soviet Card" in a limited way at UNSSOD and the NATO Summit." The SFRC voted 8–4 against lifting the embargo on May 11, following a vote on May 3 in the HIRC 18–17 to lift the embargo. The Department reported the SFRC vote in telegram 121040 to Ankara, May 12. (Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, Country Files (1940–1986), Lot 89D336, Box 4, Turkey 620 (x) Repeal) The Embassy reported the HIRC vote in telegram 3457 from Ankara, May 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780221–0457)

<sup>2</sup> Ecevit's May 11 message called attention to the Soviet threat in two points: 1) "The military threat to the Alliance posed by the Warsaw Pact states continues to grow, out of proportion to any legitimate needs for security;" and 2) "the growth of Soviet power and its projection in places outside the Alliance area, both directly and through allies, complicate the search for peace and our ability to sustain support among our peoples for detente." (Telegram 119887 to all NATO capitals, May 11; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 19, Turkey: Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, 3/78–5/79)

<sup>3</sup> Carter replied to Ecevit on May 19, assuring the Prime Minister that he remained committed to doing everything he could to revitalize the U.S.-Turkey relationship. (Telegram 127594 to Ankara, May 19; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 112, 5/1–12/78)

Looking forward to seeing you in Washington soon Mr. President,  
I remain, with highest regards,

Sincerely yours,

**Bulent Ecevit<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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### **115. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Ankara, May 16, 1978, 1280Z

3734. Subj: Effect on Turkish Cyprus Policy of Failure To Lift Embargo.

1. Summary: As Turks have indicated, congressional defeat of the administration's effort to lift the arms embargo would cause the Ecevit government to review all aspects of Turkish foreign policy, including its Cyprus policy. Although that review might not result in a dramatic, immediate change, it would, we believe, result in a hardening of the GOT attitude which in turn would greatly diminish the chances of early resumption of intercommunal talks and could eventually lead to a complete breakdown in the negotiation process followed by partition or UDI. End summary.

2. One of the many questions brought into focus by the close vote in the HIRC May 4 and the SFRC defeat May 11 is what will happen to Turkey's Cyprus policy if the administration's effort to lift the embargo fails. Successive Turkish governments have consistently objected to the concept of linkage between the embargo and the developments on Cyprus, but under Demirel the GOT maintained "reverse" linkage by saying that it could not be expected to make concessions on Cyprus as long as the embargo remained in force. When Ecevit came to power in January, he took the initiative to remove this reverse linkage, declaring that Turkey's national interests dictated a Cyprus solution regardless of the embargo.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780206-0594. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to Athens, Bonn, Copenhagen, London, Nicosia, USNATO, USUN, USNMR SHAPE, USDOCOSouth, USDOCOLANDSoutheast, USCINCEUR, Adana, Istanbul, and Izmir.



3. Although Ecevit has reconfirmed the policy of non-linkage several times in past weeks, it has become increasingly apparent that linkage will in fact continue as long as the Greek side sees only two feasible alternatives: (a) Turkish capitulation on all major issues; or (b) continuation of the embargo which, if not totally satisfactory, at least keeps Turkey in check while Greece increases its air and naval buildup. Since Turkish capitulation is unlikely, the Greek and Greek Cypriot policy of choice is continuation of the embargo. This choice seems premised on the belief that the Turks will ultimately respond positively to the pressure of the embargo—a belief we consider unrealistic and dangerous.

4. Ecevit has already been frustrated by the fact that his unilateral “peace offensive” did not induce more flexibility on the other side. If the embargo is reconfirmed by Congress—an act Turks will see simply as a response to Greek and Greek Cypriot pressures—we expect Ecevit will respond by “reviewing” the whole range of Turkey’s foreign policies including its Cyprus policy.<sup>2</sup> Such a review will take place in a domestic political atmosphere charged with emotional nationalism, and its results are likely to reflect that atmosphere. Reasoned consideration of policy options will probably take a back seat to efforts to find a scapegoat and assert national dignity. There is likely to be an open rejection of the views and concerns of outsiders, particularly the US.

5. Nevertheless, of Turkey’s several apparent policy options, only one—capitulation—is likely to be discarded out of hand. The others—from standing fast to UDI—seem to us to be a continuum of sub-options for what will probably emerge as the new Turkish approach.<sup>3</sup> We cannot totally rule out immediate and angry gestures (such as settlement of Varosha) but we expect Ecevit’s initial approach will take something like the following form:

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<sup>2</sup> In his official statement on the SFRC vote, Ecevit said the vote did not surprise him; that his government was resigned to the possibility that the embargo might not be lifted; and that an ongoing embargo would not threaten Turkish independence. But the impact on Turkey’s Cyprus policy would be clear: “It is obvious,” Ecevit said, “that as long as the US arms embargo is maintained, and as long as it is thought that Turkey will eventually yield under pressure, there will be no settlement of the Cyprus problem.” (Telegram 8842 from Bonn, May 12; Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, Country Files (1940–1986), Lot 89D336, Box 4, Turkey 620(x) Repeal)

<sup>3</sup> Turkey was considering a number of military options alongside its Cyprus policy, in light of the SFRC vote. During a May 16 meeting with U.S. military officials at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, General Kenan Evren, Chief of the Turkish General Staff, warned that if the embargo was not lifted before the congressional summer recess, Turkey would: 1) Drastically reduce U.S. installations in Turkey; 2) Reduce the size and number of NATO Headquarters and installations in Turkey; 3) [text not declassified]; 4) Reduce the size of Turkey’s overall military structure and the number of units committed to NATO. (Telegram 1668 from SHAPE, May 16; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 75, Turkey: 1–7/78)

A. A statement that his efforts for a settlement had been predicated on the assumption that the Greek Cypriot side wished to negotiate a fair settlement, an assumption which they had destroyed;

B. A reaffirmation of a willingness of the Turkish side to enter into negotiations on the basis of proposals now on the table; and

C. A warning that the Turkish Cypriots cannot be expected to remain indefinitely hostage to an illusory Greek Cypriot goodwill.

6. All of the implications of such an approach are not yet clear. One that is, however, is that the intercommunal talks will be postponed indefinitely. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots will ostensibly remain willing to negotiate. But, in fact, disillusioned by the negative response of the Greek side—and of the world in general—to their earlier efforts, they are likely to become increasingly rigid. In such a situation, resumption of the intercommunal talks will become dependent on a major conciliatory effort by the Greek side, which we gather would be an extremely unlikely development.

7. With no prospect of resumed intercommunal talks, it is likely to be only a matter of time until Turkey responds to the pressures of the Turkish Cypriots and super-nationalists in Turkey to seek a “new international status” for the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. This is a step the Ecevit government would take only with great reluctance because it violates both long-standing RPP policy and popular concepts of national security interests. We therefore think it is unlikely that the GOT will soon agree to a Unilateral Declaration of Independence. But “creeping partition”—that is, stabilization of the current division—would eventually lead to either independence or incorporation into Turkey.

8. This analysis is speculative and we cannot be sure how closely its projections will coincide with developments. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the Turkish reaction to a defeat of the effort to repeal 620(x) will, at the very least, mean a serious setback to efforts to reach a negotiated solution to the Cyprus issue. At worst, it could mean UDI and/or partition of the Republic of Cyprus.

**Spiers**

**116. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 31, 1978, 8–9 a.m.

**SUBJECT**

Summary of the President's Meeting with Prime Minister Ecevit of Turkey

**PARTICIPANTS**

President Jimmy Carter  
Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State  
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
George Vest, Assistant Secretary of State  
Matthew Nimetz, Counselor, Department of State  
Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the President  
Jody Powell, Press Secretary to the President  
Paul B. Henze (Notetaker), National Security Council  
  
Bülent Ecevit, Prime Minister of Turkey  
Gündüz Ökçün, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Hasan Işık, Minister of National Defense  
Şükrü Elekdağ, Secretary General, Foreign Ministry  
Turgut Tülümen, Director General for Cyprus and Greek Affairs, Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs  
Melih Esenbel, Ambassador of Turkey

The President opened the meeting by welcoming the Prime Minister and his party and stating that Turkey is crucial to the U.S. defense posture, that Turkey's economic and military strength are very important to the United States and that anything we can do to ensure development of this strength we wish to do. The President observed that the arms embargo is the most important immediate issue, stating, "I am determined to do our utmost to remove the arms embargo and reopen completely normal relations." The President stressed that the U.S. Government had continued to do its best to satisfy Turkey's military needs within the leeway allowed by the law. He also noted that we understood the delicacy of linkage between the embargo and Cyprus. He said he considered Aegean questions were fundamental, but since the focus of attention has been on Cyprus, progress on Cyprus takes on an exaggerated importance. He said that recent statements by the Turkish side on Cyprus had perhaps not received the notice they deserved and urged the Prime Minister, especially in forthcoming meetings with the Congress, to be as specific as possible about Turkish willingness to negotiate on Cyprus and flexible on relations with Greece.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 2, 5/78. Confidential. Drafted by Henze. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Ecevit was in Washington to attend the NATO summit meeting May 30–31.

PM Ecevit replied that in recent public statements he had tried to tone down his anxieties and avoid emotionalizing. He had learned from President İnönü, he said, that if you permit emotions to build up over international issues they may get out of your control. He did not wish, therefore, to indulge in tactical maneuvering. He felt, nevertheless, that he must be frank in explaining to the President the problems Turkey faced. He went on to expound at length how Greece had blocked Turkish efforts to negotiate and his conviction that Greece wished to crush Turkey under U.S. pressure. He said it seemed to Turkey that Israel had violated U.S. arms-use laws more than Turkey had, but Turkey was treated differently. He said he had been frustrated in his efforts at Montreux to get PM Karamanlis to join him in a serious effort to settle Cyprus and other issues between Greece and Turkey and Kyprianou had refused to meet with Denktaş or join a four-way meeting with Karamanlis. He reiterated issues on which the Turkish side is ready to negotiate in Cyprus, emphasizing that six areas are subject to territorial adjustment as well as the security zone comprising 3% of Cyprus; he repeated the position on resettlement of Varosha. On constitutional arrangements he described the bizonal federal formula as one which he hoped would permit evolution into a "more closely knit unit." Kyprianou was trying to go back from the realistic position that had been worked out between Makarios and Denktaş, he said. While Karamanlis could credibly claim that he could not influence Makarios, he could not make this claim in respect to Kyprianou. PM Ecevit spoke with strong feeling about Greek intentions to carry the quarrel with Turkey into the EEC, of the Aegean 12-mile territorial limit and FIR issues. The Greeks, he said, consistently refused to negotiate these issues, branding Turkey intransigent.

The Prime Minister went on to comment on the difficulties of getting the American press to reflect Turkey's concerns, citing problems with his own recent interviews with the *NYT* and *WSJ*.<sup>2</sup> "Even when I have rapport with the journalists, my message does not reach the American people," he declared. The President interjected that he sometimes felt he had the same problem. The Prime Minister then said to the President, "But you have not yet come out openly on this matter with the exception of an answer to a question in a veterans' meeting—we get the impression that Turkey does not rate high enough in the list of priorities of the Administration; it comes after Panama and Saudi Arabia."

"There is a limit to what we can do at once in Congress," the President replied; "it is now coming to the top of our list." The Prime Min-

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<sup>2</sup> The interviews referred to by Ecevit are likely Bill Paul, "Turkey May Pursue Stronger Soviet Ties, Threatening U.S. Role in Mideast, NATO," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 30, 1978, p. 11, and Bernard Gwertzman, "Turkish Chief Sees no Russian Threat," *The New York Times*, May 30, 1978, p. 1.

ister complained that NATO had also been too passive on the embargo issue. The equipment of the Turkish army is now close to 50% ineffective, he said, and General Haig's estimates were that by 1980 it would be 80% obsolete. This was an intolerable situation for NATO itself when other countries were being heavily armed in the Middle East, which is full of explosive problems. The Prime Minister underscored the Turkish commitment to democracy and development. If his present government failed to secure the conditions for keeping Turkey on this path, as it had been ever since WWII, the likelihood that democracy could continue in Turkey was not good. He concluded his remarks on this problem by saying, "If something does not happen soon, we will do our best not to drift away too much . . . but the measures we would have to take for our security could not be dissociated from our political posture. Mr. Karamanlis has been trying to create a deceptively optimistic impression of NATO's situation in this respect . . . Turkey is at the limits of its patience and I am at the limits of my possibilities."

The Prime Minister summed up his situation by referring to his cultural attachment to the West and the legacy of Atatürk and said, "Unless you do something more effective and concrete—unless the NATO Council ends up with a clear attitude on this problem—there will be deep disappointment in Turkey. A Congressional decision with humiliating strings attached would be worse than no decision at all. The position you adopted in April would be perfectly acceptable. There are rumors that strings may be attached . . . this would have extremely negative effects on Turkish public opinion."

The President stressed that we do not underestimate the seriousness of Turkish concern and emphasized that the Administration is marshalling all its influence in the Congress to ensure the removal of the arms embargo. He said that he had recently had the leaders of the House and the Senate around the same table to discuss these matters<sup>3</sup> and recalled that he had already dealt with two major foreign policy challenges this year—the Panama treaties and the Middle East arms sales issue. Both proposals had originally been regarded as doomed to defeat and the Panama issue was the most difficult with which he had ever dealt. No domestic lobbies were available to help the Panamanians or Saudis and there were strong domestic forces ranged against them, like the Greek groups who want to continue the arms embargo. But a major element of strength was the constructive attitude taken by the governments of Panama and Saudi Arabia; their public statements were designed to harmonize with our own. "Your knowledge of our country is a great advantage to you," the President told the Prime Minister; "My belief is that with your help we can succeed." The President

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<sup>3</sup> No record of this meeting was found.

went on to say that he largely agreed with the Prime Minister's estimate of Greek motives but that this did not deter him.

The President encouraged Prime Minister Ecevit to make maximum use of opportunities such as the National Press Club speech on June 1 and interviews with major publications to underscore the facts and the constructive character of Turkey's position.<sup>4</sup> He suggested, if the Prime Minister wished, that he seek the advice of Secretary Vance or others on the American side to ensure that his National Press Club speech was formulated in the most constructive way possible and underscored all the points of strength in Turkey's stance. We can, in turn, do our part by focusing American public opinion on the positive side of these issues, the President pointed out. The President then observed that our position would be easier if Turkey could see fit to make further reductions in its troop strength in Cyprus, for it was important, the President said, for Congressional leaders to get the accurate impression that Turkey genuinely wants to settle the Cyprus issue.

The President asked the Prime Minister about possibilities of meeting with Kyprianou and Denktas, or with Karamanlis. In subsequent discussion, the President emphasized that further proposals for such meetings, even if the Greek side does not accept them, could impact favorably on Congress. The President complimented the Prime Minister on the favorable impression he had made the evening before on Senator Nunn. The President said we would be presenting the arms embargo problem to the Armed Services Committee next week and regarded this as a very important step, for the issue, tactically, had to be handled as a military matter. The President urged the Prime Minister to be positive in his public comments on PM Karamanlis, to stress Turkey's commitment to NATO and to avoid threats to move toward the Soviets which would have a negative impact in Congress.

Secretary Vance underscored what the President had said by appealing to the Prime Minister to be open-minded and flexible about meetings with Denktas and Kyprianou, and Karamanlis as well, if possible. PM Ecevit explained that politics among Turkish Cypriots placed certain constraints upon him. He could not let Turkish Cypriots get the impression that he was taking decisions without consulting them. There was further discussion of interviews in the American press, especially in *Newsweek* and *U.S. News & World Report*. The President and Secretary Vance offered advice and help in respect to these.

As the hour drew to a close, the Prime Minister declared, "I will do my best. I have so much confidence in you, Mr. President, that I believe you will do a superb job. This has been a very constructive meeting. I

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<sup>4</sup> Ecevit pledged in this address that Turkey's membership in NATO would not be affected should the United States maintain the arms embargo.

can see much more clearly your concerns which you describe very well.” The President commented that the Prime Minister of course knew best how far he could go on constitutional and territorial questions and repeated his advice that PM Ecevit do everything in his power, while in America, to get the reasonableness and seriousness of his position across to the American public and members of the Congress. The President emphasized again that he would do everything he could to help and said we wanted to work very closely with the Prime Minister’s representatives here during the coming weeks.

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### 117. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

New York, June 4, 1978

#### PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister of Turkey Bulent ECEVIT  
Foreign Minister Gunduz OKCUN  
SYG of the Foreign Ministry ELEKDAG  
Permanent Representative of Turkey to the U.N. Ilter TURKMEN  
  
Senator Paul S. Sarbanes (Maryland)  
Congressman John Brademas (Indiana)  
Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal (NY)  
Ambassador James F. Leonard, USUN

SUMMARY: Senator Sarbanes and Congressmen Brademas and Rosenthal expressed disappointment that the recent Turkish proposals on Cyprus had not been more forthcoming.<sup>2</sup> They thought an opening unilateral concession, such as returning Varosha outright to the Greek-Cypriots, would have facilitated negotiations and swept aside opposition to lifting the arms embargo. Prime Minister Ecevit responded by reviewing the Cyprus problem since 1974, stressing that the August 1974 Turkish military move had been the direct result of Greek intransigence in Geneva, coupled with an immediate threat to Turkish-Cypriots on the island. The Prime Minister stressed that he would pursue a solution regardless of what action Congress took on

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of Southern Europe, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977–1980, Lot 83D256, Box 1, POL 2 Cyprus 1977 and 1978. Confidential. Drafted by James F. Leonard (USUN) on June 5. The meeting took place in Ecevit’s suite at the UN Plaza Hotel. No time for the meeting, which lasted for approximately 2½ hours, is noted. Ecevit was in New York to attend the UN Special Session on Disarmament.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 6, Document 113.

the embargo. He underlined that Varosha's political future was open to negotiation. He felt strongly that direct negotiations between the two communities were the best way to solve the Cyprus problem. The Prime Minister argued vigorously that the arms embargo is an impediment to negotiations. Following the meeting Ambassador Leonard outlined to Senator Sarbanes and Congressmen Brademas and Rosenthal the dilemma of the embargo: maintain it and negotiations will probably remain deadlocked; lift it and at least Varosha will probably be recovered, though no one can be sure what else might be achieved. END SUMMARY.

Congressman Brademas opened the discussion by reviewing his own positions on Greek-Turkish relations and Cyprus. He pointed out that he, like Representatives Sarbanes and Rosenthal, had been a vigorous critic of the Greek Junta and that he was on record publicly to express understanding of the first Turkish military action in Cyprus in July 1974. He had been strongly critical of the second Turkish action in August and his subsequent support of the embargo on U.S. military assistance to Turkey had been for him quite natural, given the importance he attached to scrupulous fulfillment of our laws governing the use of U.S. weapons.

Brademas said that he had been a strong admirer of the Prime Minister and was very sympathetic to his program for internal reform and progress in Turkey. In fact, he said, he and his colleagues considered themselves to be "social democrats" and they had, therefore, been very pleased when the Prime Minister had succeeded in forming a government and they had been very hopeful that a new Turkish policy on Cyprus would make it possible for them to follow their own desires to vote for arms for Turkey. They recognized the importance of Turkey in NATO and of a strong NATO.

The Congressman drew attention to the initiative from the U.S. Administration to add an extra \$50-million to the FMS allocation for Turkey last year, an initiative they had hoped would make it easier for the Turkish Government to come forward with helpful proposals. In spite of this, there had been no movement whatsoever from the previous government and he was quite disappointed at what had been put forward so far by the Ecevit Administration.

Senator Sarbanes followed up the Brademas presentation with endorsement of its general thrust and added his own particular praise for the Prime Minister's record and general orientation. He had to say in all frankness, however, that he found the Turkish proposals put forward by Mr. Denktash to be not meaningful. He recognized that the Turks were describing them as simply "opening positions", but the very serious doubts and suspicions harbored by the Greek side could only be overcome if there was something more concrete than had been offered



so far. In particular, he thought it had been a great mistake that the Turkish side had not offered what he called a “loss leader”—that is, a unilateral concession—as a means of making it clear that they were serious and flexible and that the negotiations would be pursued in a sincere fashion. He said that as an example, but only an example, he thought it would have been highly desirable if the Turks had offered simply to give back Varosha to the Greek Cypriots, even before sitting down to negotiate the remaining problems. Such an offer from the Turkish side would have, he said, swept away opposition to the lifting of the embargo.

Congressman Rosenthal reiterated many of the same points, adding that it was not merely his colleagues in Congress who saw the Turkish proposals as not being meaningful, but it was also public opinion in Western Europe and the United States and the most senior officials of the U.S. Administration.

After these three opening statements had been made, taking about one-half hour, Prime Minister Ecevit gave an extended review of his attitude toward the Cyprus problem, beginning with his effort in early 1974 to open a dialogue with the Greek Junta. The Junta had simply refused to engage in any dialogue and instead he found himself faced with the “Samson Coup.” He had immediately gone to London and had urged the United Kingdom Government to join him in the action which was appropriate, given their status as guarantors of the Cyprus agreements.<sup>3</sup> The UKG had refused and he had therefore taken action alone, as was Turkey’s right under those agreements. Turkey then had gone to the Geneva negotiations with its military forces on Cyprus in a very precarious position. They were occupying only a narrow corridor between Kyrenia and Nicosia. Moreover, there were pockets of Turkish Cypriots surrounded by Greek forces at several places including the castle of Famagusta. These Turks were in serious danger of being massacred. In the light of these dangers, Turkey had offered at Geneva to accept a repositioning of military forces, which would have placed broad zones occupied by the UN between Turks and Greeks and would have obviated the dangers to the surrounded Turkish civilians. The Greeks had, however, been flatly negative to these proposals and he had, therefore, been compelled to make the August military move. He explained he was going into this in such detail because he had encountered on many occasions the attitude reflected by Brademas; the understanding of the first Turkish action combined with the condemnation of the second.

Congressman Rosenthal intervened at this point to say that as a practical politician he could understand the inability of Greek Prime

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 8.

Minister Caramanlis to make any move in the extremely fragile situation following the overthrow of the Junta.

Ecevit responded that that might well be the case, but that the political situation in Athens was hardly the fault of the Turks, in fact the Greeks owed the Turks quite a debt for bringing about a situation which enabled them to regain their democratic freedoms. In any case, he said, he found that following the August events, he—on his side—did not have the political freedom, because of the attitude of one of his coalition partners, to take those actions which he felt Turkey should take to solve the Cyprus problem. He had therefore given up the government and had, with regret, noted the paralysis that had come over the whole Cyprus question since that time.

Despite the fact that it would have been easier to solve the problem in 1974 than it was now, he had come back into office determined to find a solution. Ecevit stated very strongly that he was seeking a solution for Cyprus, not in order to get the embargo lifted, but because Greece and Turkey were neighbors and it was imperative to live in peace together and to solve their problems themselves. He would, therefore, pursue a solution for Cyprus no matter what Congress did about the embargo question. In seeking a solution, he had encouraged Mr. Denktash to put forward proposals and when these proposals were not properly understood, he had himself made it clear that the Turkish side was prepared to be flexible and had encouraged Mr. Denktash to do the same. Both he and Denktash were very clearly on public record on this matter. He also pointed out that Varosha had not been treated in any detailed way in the Turkish-Cypriot proposals and that as further evidence of Turkish good faith he had encouraged subsequent clarification which added the element that Greek-Cypriots in numbers of up to 30- to 35-thousand would be free to return to Varosha once negotiations were underway.

Senator Sarbanes interjected that the Turkish proposal on Varosha was not seen as a meaningful one, since it envisaged Greek-Cypriots coming back to live under Turkish rule. Ecevit responded to this that both he and Denktash had made clear that the political framework under which Varosha would eventually be placed was a completely open question.

For almost two hours the above themes were reiterated and elaborated upon by the Prime Minister and the three gentlemen from Washington. Sarbanes, in particular, backed up by Brademas, presented the need for a "front-end concession" to demonstrate the sincerity of the Turkish side in the negotiations.

The Prime Minister reiterated in a number of ways his point that these negotiations were best handled directly between Greeks and Turks, and that it was not the best way to solve the problem to "have us

negotiating here” on the Cyprus matter. In fact, he pointed out, the effect of the existence of the embargo is to prevent true negotiations. The Greek side bends all of its tactics to preventing the embargo from being lifted and for this reason they refuse to come to the table and test the sincerity of the Turkish side in a normal way. President Kyprianou and his associates, Ecevit asserted, are not interested in any near-term or reasonable solution to the Cyprus problem, but rather wish to keep the embargo up for a number of years in the hope of restoring the status quo ante-1974.

Brademas and Company did not take issue with this analysis but underlined that the Turkish side had it within its power to expose the Greek tactic if it was as described by the Prime Minister. Congressman Rosenthal, in particular, seemed to take the Prime Minister’s point that the embargo was preventing negotiations rather than facilitating them and reiterated many times “we want out” of this uncomfortable position between the two sides.

Among the elements discussed, but not really focused on, were the various possibilities for arranging an encounter between Ecevit and Kyprianou. Ecevit indicated a willingness to meet with Kyprianou but not in a format that would “destroy Denktash.”

The discussion, in spite of its circularity and constant replowing of old ground, was almost never hostile. The Congressional group and the Prime Minister took sharp issue with each other on many points, but on neither side was there anything resembling anger. The discussion ended in an inconclusive fashion.

Ambassador Leonard accompanied the Washington group to a restaurant and discussed briefly with them what might be done next. He underlined that it seemed to him that the supporters of the embargo faced what he recognized was a difficult dilemma—if they maintained the embargo it was not likely these negotiations would go forward and the Greek-Cypriot refugees would gain nothing for years or perhaps forever. On the other hand, if they lifted the embargo, it was likely that they could regain Varosha for the Greek-Cypriots, but they would simply have to take their chances on Turkish flexibility toward remaining territorial questions and the constitution. It would of course be difficult to reimpose an embargo after it had been lifted.

Brademas and Rosenthal seemed much more receptive to this analysis than Sarbanes, whose attention seemed concentrated on the “errors of the past” rather than where we go from here.

The following morning in a conversation with Ambassador Turkmen, Leonard was told that the Prime Minister had been quite pleased by the whole conversation and had not at all been angered by the strong and frank tone taken by the three Americans.

118. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 5, 1978

## SUBJECT

Bilateral Between Secretary Brown and Prime Minister Ecevit at Turkish  
Embassy, 5 June 1978

## THOSE ATTENDING WERE

## US

Secretary Brown  
Deputy Secretary Duncan  
Assistant Secretary (ISA)  
McGiffert  
Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA)  
Siena  
Ambassador to Turkey Spiers  
Mil Asst to SecDef, RADM  
Hanson  
Asst for Southern Europe (ISA),  
Col Walker (notetaker)

## Turkey

Prime Minister Ecevit  
Minister of Foreign Affairs Okcun  
Minister of National Defense Isik  
Ambassador to the US Esenbel

After opening pleasantries, *Prime Minister Ecevit* thanked Secretary Brown for his personal efforts in attempting to lift the embargo. *Secretary Brown* responded that everyone in the Administration will do all he can to persuade Congress of the importance of removing the embargo. It is essential that the Administration move forward in this effort. He noted that on 4 June during his interview on FACE THE NATION, he had been able to work in a reference to the effort even though the question had not been asked. At a cabinet meeting on June 5 the President had stated that the embargo question has the highest priority.<sup>2</sup> The President will more than likely make a substantive statement at his next press conference.<sup>3</sup> We are urging Congress to hold other hearings so that we may point out once again the urgent need for lifting the embargo; this is important for strengthening the Alliance. Secretary Brown observed that the Prime Minister's recent statement on the subject during the Summit was very helpful, and that he should continue such statements since we are "in this together."

<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-81-0202, Box 69, Turkey 1978. Confidential. Drafted by Colonel Norman Walker. The meeting took place at the Turkish Embassy. In an attached note to Walker, dated June 7, Rear Admiral Thor Hanson reported that he approved the memorandum but had added "a couple small things." The handwritten revisions have been silently incorporated into the text.

<sup>2</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place from 9 to 11:10 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

<sup>3</sup> Carter opened his June 14 press conference with a statement about the embargo. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, p. 291*)

*Prime Minister Ecevit* said that since the embargo is the cause of the present difficulty in our relationship, he appreciates the stand that Secretary Brown and Secretary Vance have taken. He noted that he is hopeful of a promising result, and that he will continue his own efforts. Neither country can allow the suspension to continue, since the suspension has lasted too long already. The balance of detente (sic) [*defense?*] must be maintained on the Southeastern flank in order to counter the Soviet threat. Serious consequences will result from the formation of a vacuum in the Turkish area. But stability must be based on deterrence, not on lofty words. Even if the embargo is lifted, however, we must consider a new concept and structure. It must be based upon new political conditions, the new feeling in NATO, and changes in the international situation and in military considerations. The military must be streamlined and made more efficient and not constitute a burden on the economy, but act as a spur to the economy.

There are joint measures that the US and Turkey can take to improve the situation. Turkey has been handicapped by restricted outside supply sources and too much dependence on a single source. The Prime Minister stated that he would like to see that dependence eased by Turkey's being included in co-production schemes as with European nations. Such arrangements would involve technology transfers, foreign payment supports and formation of new industries. However, such a scheme of interdependence would allay concerns of the people of other allied countries as to which direction Turkey would go. There is obviously a close relationship between industry and defense; that is, a heavy defense structure cannot be built on a weak economy. Turkey would like the US to be more aware of that relationship in the future. Ecevit pointed out that in certain areas Turkey can export military equipment to the Allies, as well as supply some of her own needs. He mentioned that he had suggested to President Carter that this offshore purchasing system could give new economic impetus. It would be possible to enlarge several industries in Turkey in order both to meet Turkish needs and to supply other Allies. Examples are the manufacture of rockets, anti-tank munitions, and communications and electronic equipment, including co-production. Additionally, Turkish shipyards could build submarines for Allies and other friendlies. Repair and modernization facilities in Turkey could be enlarged, but financial assistance would be required, under appropriate provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Ecevit stated that apart from these industrial matters, the Turkish Armed Forces need to be discussed. As General Haig noted, the Turkish Armed Forces have lost about 50% of their effectiveness, primarily because of lack of needed material such as T-38 training aircraft. It would be helpful if the US could find a way to assist in this area, even

before the embargo is lifted. He further noted that he appreciated Secretary Brown's contribution to the reorganization issue discussed at the recent Ministerial in Brussels. A continuing need exists for NATO air training facilities in Turkey. He noted that Turkish pilots formerly won almost all NATO contests, but are now suffering from a lack of proficiency and a decrease in morale.

The Prime Minister emphasized what he considers the worst bottleneck currently affecting defense and NATO cooperation—a shortage of infrastructure construction in Turkey. He believes this results from a lack of interest in NATO, as well as neglect by the Turkish economy. Such infrastructure projects include pipelines, port facilities, airfields, and storage facilities. Unless priority is given this important area, Turkey's reinforcement reception capability will be seriously affected. Assistance is required either bilaterally or through NATO.

In addition to the economic problems, a serious problem exists in the definition of areas of responsibility in the Aegean. No-one in NATO, Turkey, or Greece knows his area of responsibility, and confusion would exist if something happened in the Aegean area.

In regard to the DCA, the Prime Minister stated that Turkey would be willing to negotiate immediately after the embargo is lifted. There is no legal basis for resumption of base operations, but the situation could be handled. The joint US-Turkish facilities, particularly the identification, control and communications facilities, are important for security purposes, as well as SALT, MBFR, etc. The Soviets think such facilities are a provocation, but Ecevit said that he sees them as serving peaceful purposes. In any case, the Turks would have no objection in principle to resumption of talks immediately after the embargo is lifted.

*Secretary Brown* told the Prime Minister that he would respond to the points that he had raised, but necessarily in varying degrees of specificity. He stated that we understand and agree with the need for the Turkish economy to support defense needs. This in turn would mean that the Turkish Armed Forces would be better able to carry out their NATO role. Secretary Brown said that once the embargo is lifted a joint planning study should be the first step. The State Counselor raised this point last February, as well as the question of Turkey's defense industry capability for meeting its own and Allied requirements.<sup>4</sup> He told Ecevit that he had asked members of the Defense Department to look at these points. He pointed out to Ecevit the importance of private invest-

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<sup>4</sup> During a February 23 meeting in Ankara with Şükrü Elekdağ, Nimetz suggested such a planning study to determine how the Turkish military could meet NATO commitments. Nimetz added that no such study should commence until after the Defense Cooperation Agreement between the two countries was signed. (Telegram 1408 from Ankara, February 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780084-0665)

ment, although that is not the only way out. The tank repair and modernization facilities, etc., would be part of it. DoD experts will visit and look at those facilities at the appropriate time. This will not solve the balance of payments problem; it will be a long time before Turkey will be able to manufacture modern aircraft, for example.

The matter of joint training facilities also came up at the DPC. It is imperative to have joint training facilities in Europe, not to replace existing facilities but as a supplement. In regard to military infrastructure, Secretary Brown suggested that Turkish planners participate with the planners of other Allies in the Long Term Defense Program. Whatever is accomplished in this area will be accomplished through this structure. Concerning the Aegean, General Haig is working hard with both Turkish and Greek leaders. The problem is obviously not solved yet, but these discussions have so far prevented the political problems from worsening. Secretary Brown agreed that we should move forward on the DCA as soon as possible, but such movement obviously could occur only after the embargo is lifted. However, in the interim, he believes we will be able to establish a working arrangement. He summarized his remarks by noting that the Administration is working hard with Congress in order to address the important elements that the Prime Minister had introduced.

*Prime Minister Ecevit* thanked Secretary Brown for the opportunity to discuss these items with him. He observed that he is glad to see that we basically agree on the nature of the problems confronting us. He further stated that our joint planning efforts, even in rudimentary form, will aid considerably later this year when Turkey is developing its new strategy plan. It will give the Turks confidence.

The meeting terminated, and a short statement was made by each principal to press representatives.

119. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Nimetz) to Secretary of State Vance and the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 20, 1978

SUBJECT

Substantive Issues Related to the Turkish Embargo Decision

There have been some indications from our Congressional supporters, for example Zablocki, and from those leaning against us, for example Ben Gilman, that the House vote will be close and the embargo is likely to be sustained unless Turkey quickly makes further constructive moves. There are a number of areas where the Turks could theoretically offer concessions either unilaterally or diplomatically. The Turks would greatly prefer that any additional movement by them be related to matching moves from the other side *and* the UN. Such responses are very unlikely until after the vote.

*The Tactical Situation*

Getting additional movement from the Turkish side will not be easy. First, Ecevit and the foreign policy leadership group will be in Moscow and pretty much out of touch until June 25. Second, Ecevit would clearly ask whether any suggested concession(s) would be sufficient, in the manner of the DeConcini reservation, to swing the vote to Turkey's favor.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, there is no group in the Congress in a position to assure us or the Turks that any single concession or package of concessions would suffice to win the day. Third, Ecevit has been tremendously impressed by the President's determination to press Congress hard on the embargo and would regard our asking for more Turkish concessions so soon after his Washington visit as a sign that the Administration's commitment is not genuine. Fourth, the Greek Cypriots have given no indication that they would respond positively to any realistically possible Turkish gesture *until after* the embargo is voted up or down in Congress. Moreover, no matter what the Turks might do, it is very doubtful that Waldheim would call upon the Greek

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of Southern Europe, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977-1980, Lot 83D256, Box 1, POL 2 Cyprus 1977 and 1978. Confidential. Cleared by Ewing.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to legislation introduced by Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-Arizona) to modify the Panama Canal Treaty in April 1978. DeConcini insisted that the Treaty include the right of the United States to intervene militarily should the Canal's security become threatened. Carter agreed to the modification and the Senate passed the Treaty with the so-called DeConcini reservation intact. (Jorden, *Panama Odyssey*, pp. 585-599)



Cypriots to attend intercommunal negotiations until he is sure they would accept and he is convinced this will not happen while the embargo question is open.

*Areas Where Movement is Possible*

We have already discussed the following items with the parties and have a good idea of their views:

*Turkish Troop Withdrawals.* In the President's meeting with Ecevit, the Prime Minister was told that a dramatic reduction might be significant. Ecevit recounted the 16,000 troop withdrawals that have taken place since the 1974 invasion. The Turks assert that in the context of a final settlement essentially all of their troops will be withdrawn and that in the interim they envisage continuing phased incremental withdrawals. (COMMENT: These withdrawals tend to be so small and so ineptly announced as to have no public impact.) Caramanlis in his meeting with the President criticized the presence of Turkish forces, but signalled that a reduction of even 10,000–15,000 would not change the balance on the island or Turkey's position as an occupying power<sup>3</sup> and similar comments have been made by the Greek Cypriots. Even though the Greek side would denigrate any Turkish withdrawal, it would have some effect in the Congress.

*Varosha.* Secretary General Waldheim in his latest Cyprus report indicated that the UN could appropriately help facilitate the return of Greek Cypriots to Varosha. We have been floating such an idea with the Turkish side, with our Western allies and with the UN for the past month. The Greek side has, however, shown no interest in a package deal for Varosha which would include their agreeing to resumption of intercommunal negotiations. The ideas in our non-paper were also floated with the Brademas group and they have not responded.<sup>4</sup> Alternatively, the Turkish side could publicly call upon the UN to rehabilitate and administer Varosha once talks resume. This would have some impact. Or, the Turkish side could make explicit that Varosha will be returned to Greek Cypriot control. A clear statement to this effect would truly be significant, but it would be seen in Turkey as a new concession and would be resisted by Denktash.

*The Demilitarization of Cyprus.* At the UN Special Session on Disarmament, Cypriot President Kyprianou suggested that Cyprus be demilitarized and a police force be established under UN supervision manned by Greek and Turkish Cypriots in proportion to existing popu-

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 175.

<sup>4</sup> Presumably a draft of the "non-paper" described in footnote 2, Document 61.

lation ratios.<sup>5</sup> We undertook to study this proposal. Our preliminary view is that this is only a superficially attractive idea. If there were a "unitary" police force serving throughout Cyprus, it would severely undermine the Turkish goal of equality between the two communities with substantial autonomy for each zone. On the other hand, if this new police force was structured so that the Turkish component (some 20% of total) would serve only in the north and the 80% Greek component only in the south, such a force would be offensive to the Greeks. This does not appear to be a proposal that could be developed in the next week or so.

*Summit Meetings.* Secretary General Waldheim invited the four leaders, Caramanlis, Ecevit, Denktash and Kyprianou, to get together for an informal social meeting in New York. Kyprianou refused. In the very unlikely event that Ecevit were to agree to a bilateral meeting with Kyprianou without Denktash, we might be able to get Kyprianou to agree to resume negotiations and this would be helpful in the Congress. However, the Greek Cypriots seem determined to avoid a resumption of intercommunal talks, even should a Ecevit-Kyprianou meeting take place.

*The Constitution.* The Turkish side might make clear that their conception of a federal Cyprus with two equal zones has room for a national president elected on a one-man, one-vote basis, albeit with clearly prescribed and limited powers. Specific examples of "flexibility" might also be outlined.

*The Nicosia Airport and Missing Persons.* The Turks have been reasonably forthcoming on both of these issues and we could probably convince them to make public statements unconditionally accepting solutions most Americans would view as reasonable. This would only help us in Congress if we could also in some way either get the Greek side to respond positively or assign responsibility on the Greek side for not picking up on these good-faith offers. But once the embargo issue is out of the way, we have indications that the Greek Cypriots may accept the latest missing persons committee formulation. Both of these issues are sufficiently technical to make it difficult to assign responsibility to the two sides.

*US-Turkish Bilateral Prisoner Exchange.* In response to renewed Congressional interest in the release of three Americans serving long drug smuggling sentences in Turkey, and in response to several demarches by Embassy Ankara, the Turkish Government has just indicated its willingness to negotiate a bilateral agreement along the lines of an existing European convention. Ambassador Esenbel has notified

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 54.

the most interested Congressman (Harold Sawyer of Michigan) who reportedly was delighted. We studied this convention several years ago and determined that we could not adhere to it. I have asked the Legal Bureau to look at it again to see if we can use it to build an acceptable bilateral agreement which will accomplish our purposes. If so, we will work towards an early joint announcement of negotiations. Success in this venture would be seen as a positive Turkish move by at least three Congressmen.

### *Conclusion*

If we decide to push the Turks for additional very specific concessions and gestures, we must realize that—assuming we succeed—the Turks may comply in a manner that does not convince the “leaners” and undecideds and that the Greek side will probably not respond positively. The greatest impact in the Congress would result from a public signal by the Administration that the Turks are now being forthcoming and moderate on Cyprus but that the Greek side is not responding because they prefer maintenance of the embargo to negotiations. This would be a difficult domestic political choice for the Administration and would also impact on our future ability to follow a balanced, diplomatic approach in the area.

### *An Alternative*

While we might still seek some of the above concessions on their merits, we might earn more credit—at less risk—were we to focus our efforts on convincing the Congress, the Greek Americans and the Greeks and Cypriots that we have not abandoned the Cyprus problem. This could be done by announcing that as soon as the embargo is lifted, we will undertake new diplomatic initiatives in conjunction with the UN and with those in Europe who share our concern to seek a prompt resolution of the Cyprus problem. We would make clear that after the embargo is lifted, we will join our friends in making substantive suggestions which will help the two parties negotiate in a sustained and flexible manner. I believe the Europeans, in any event the British and the Germans, think a more substantive third party role will be required and would be pleased to join us in such an effort.

**120. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 18, 1978

**SUBJECT**

Military Advantages to Turkey of Lifting the Embargo

One question we are encountering in urging Senators and Congressmen to vote to lift the Turkish embargo is whether it would result in practical advantages to the Turkish military. Since we are stressing the deterioration of the Turkish defense forces, it is important to show how the lifting of the embargo will arrest the deterioration. Thus, while calling attention to the political and symbolic significance of lifting the embargo, we should also emphasize the following specific military benefits:

—Approximately \$70 million in equipment financed under the military assistance grant program before the embargo was imposed will be released from the pipeline. Most of these items are in storage and can be delivered quickly.<sup>2</sup>

—We will be able to give permission to our European allies to sell or transfer US-origin or licensed equipment to Turkey. The Germans, the Dutch and others have aircraft and other equipment which we know they would be willing to transfer to Turkey once the embargo is lifted.

—We will be able to resume military training for Turkish personnel in the U.S.—an item of great importance to the Turks.

—There will no longer be an annual ceiling on Foreign Military Sales transactions with Turkey. While we have sought only \$175 million in credit authority in 1979 (same as in 1978), with the lifting of the embargo Turkey can make additional cash purchases through Defense Department channels.

—Finally, we will be able to intensify joint planning with Turkish military authorities to find ways to work together in the future to deal with Turkey's force obsolescence problems.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 50, Turkey, 1978. Confidential. Carter initialed "J" in the upper right-hand corner. In a July 21 covering memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski commented: "A matter of primary concern to members of Congress in deciding how to vote on lifting the Turkish embargo is whether lifting the embargo would result in practical advantages to the Turkish military." In the upper right corner, Carter wrote, "Be careful on this—J." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> In the right-hand margin next to this point, Carter wrote, "Don't overemphasize these."

While repeal of the embargo will have the above practical advantages in bringing Turkey back to a position where it can play a full Alliance role, repeal will not upset the Greek-Turkish military balance.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Carter underlined the last portion of the sentence and in the right-hand margin wrote, “most important political (Congressional vote) consideration.”

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## 121. Editorial Note

Following several months of lobbying by White House, Department of State, and Department of Defense officials, Congress agreed to overturn the arms embargo against Turkey. The Senate voted 57–42 to lift the embargo on July 25, 1978. The vote also approved \$2.8 billion in foreign arms sales to Turkey, and it included a requirement that the President issue a report every two months to Congress on the status of the Cyprus negotiations. This requirement, introduced by Senators Robert Byrd (D-West Virginia) and George McGovern (D-South Dakota), also stipulated that U.S. arms would be used “solely for defensive purposes” to enable both Turkey and Greece to fulfill their NATO obligations. (Graham Hovey, “Senate Acts to Lift Arms Ban on Turks, But Adds Warning,” *The New York Times*, July 26, 1978, page 19) Later that day, the Department of State issued a statement commending the Senate vote: “The lifting of the embargo will allow the United States to proceed in an atmosphere of renewed trust to work toward the strengthening of our relations with the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean. The Administration will continue to exert every effort to help bring about a just and lasting Cyprus solution, and to help achieve peaceful solutions to problems in that region. The lifting of the embargo will help promote the achievement of these important policy goals.” The White House also issued a statement. (Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1978, page 34)

On August 1, the House voted to overturn the embargo with a narrower vote of 208–205 after Jim Wright, the Majority Leader (D-Texas), introduced an amendment that the President could end the embargo after certification that cooperation with Turkey was in the national interest and that Turkey was acting in good faith to settle the Cyprus dispute. President Carter issued a statement the same day welcoming the vote. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, pages 1357–1358)

On August 2, President Carter and Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit exchanged letters that affirmed each leader’s commitment to re-

invigorated relations between their countries. The letters are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 19, Turkey: Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, 3/78-5/79.

The House-Senate conference committee reached agreement on August 14 finalizing the legislation, paving the way for the repeal of the embargo on September 26. President Carter's statement on signing the legislation into law and Presidential Determination No. 78-18, "United States-Turkey Military Cooperation," both September 26, certifying that the resumption of full military cooperation with Turkey was in U.S. and NATO interests and that Turkey was acting in good faith to resolve the Cyprus dispute are in *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, page 1636.

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**122. Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 15, 1978

SUBJECT

Next Steps on Turkey

This is a short follow-up to your comments on my memo of 20 July 1978 (attached).<sup>2</sup> Basically things have gone well and no hitches have developed in the embargo-lifting effort. It may still take until September until the legislation is finally acted upon by the House and Senate and signed by the President. He will then have to prepare a certification to complete the embargo-lifting action. State is working on a draft. On the basis of the cooperation we have had from the Turks in re-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 75, Turkey: 8/78-3/79. Confidential. Sent for information.

<sup>2</sup> Attached at Tab A but not printed. In the memorandum, Henze assumed that Congress would vote to overturn the embargo and advocated that once this was done, the United States should press Turkey to move ahead with Cyprus negotiations and to maintain the momentum for negotiations between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. Henze went on to note positive developments regarding the Aegean territorial dispute between Greece and Turkey; a cooperative atmosphere among Greek and Turkish officials regarding Greek re-entry into NATO; and the beneficial impact lifting the embargo would have on the ailing Turkish economy. Brzezinski wrote, "good analysis" in the upper right-hand corner. (Ibid.)

cent months, he should be able to offer this certification without difficulty—though we also have to expect that a Greek Lobby rearguard will continue to offer some criticism of any step taken. Unless the President provides the certification the legislation requires and officially lifts the embargo, Ecevit cannot afford to permit the bases to reopen. All talks with the Turks and Ecevit's public statements indicate that they will move with goodwill to get at least the more important bases reopened.<sup>3</sup> Then the task of renegotiating the DCA (and also the DCA with Greece) must be tackled expeditiously. State has done good preparatory work.

Kyprianou may block any progress on Cyprus. We will see what effect Karamanlis has had on him after he returns from his current vacation in Greece. Given the fact of the August vacation season, which everyone in Turkey, Greece and Cyprus adheres to, we should not expect to try any new pressures of our own until after Labor Day. State's initiatives to persuade our NATO allies to help push for a Cyprus settlement have shown modest promise; we need to keep pressing this.

Meanwhile, the Turks have a major problem with the IMF which we, correctly, are not intervening in.<sup>4</sup> Finance Minister Muezzinoglu is coming to talk to the IMF and FM Permanent Secretary Elekdag, with whom we have had very useful conversations this past week, is staying through the present week to participate in these talks. An IMF-Turkish agreement is essential if Turkey is to get the kind of help she needs from the U.S. and international banking communities.

I have had a couple of indications recently that Ecevit would still very much appreciate a visit from you. A visit, centering on broad talks about world issues with a good deal of intellectual content, could serve a very useful purpose in consolidating U.S.-Turkish relations. I suggest you think tentatively of visiting Turkey in October, preferably in the framework of a trip that includes two or three other places as well, so as not to overdramatize the Turkish stop. If you visit Turkey, you should also stop for a day in Greece.

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<sup>3</sup> An unknown hand underlined "will move with" and "the more important bases reopened" and wrote a question mark in the margin.

<sup>4</sup> At issue was the IMF's devaluation of the Turkish lira. Turkish officials contended that such a move was premature because the effect of the last devaluation on March 1 had not had the opportunity to work its way through the Turkish economy. In a meeting between Elekdag and Christopher on August 11, Elekdag argued that the IMF actions were undermining Ecevit's stabilization program and could have negative and widely felt effects throughout Turkey. (Telegram 206099 to Ankara, August 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780333-0914)

## 123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 29, 1978, 1527Z

248372. Exdis; USOECD; military addressees handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Meeting Between Secretary Vance and Turkish Foreign Minister Okcun, New York, September 27.

1. Summary: Turkish Foreign Minister Okcun met with Secretary Vance at latter's suite at U.N. Plaza Hotel, New York, September 27 for approximately forty-five minutes. Subjects covered included Turkish economic situation, Turkish-Greek relations, Cyprus, and US-Turkey defense cooperation. Other subjects briefly discussed (reported septels) were US-Turkey prisoner transfer treaty negotiations and exchange of information relating to terrorist activity.<sup>2</sup> Okcun was accompanied by Turkish Ambassador Esenbel, Secretary General Elekdag, MFA Director General for Multilateral Political Affairs Arim, and Ministry Special Assistant Oymen. Also present on U.S. side were Counselor Nimetz, Assistant Secretary Vest, and EUR/SE Director Ewing. Nimetz, Vest, and Ewing had lunch Sept. 27 with Elekdag and Esenbel. Luncheon conversation for most part covered same ground [garble] to extent additional points were covered, they are reported in this message. End summary.

2. The Secretary told Okcun he had been pleased to hear that Prime Minister Ecevit had made statement earlier Sept. 27 relating to reopening of U.S. defense installations in Turkey.<sup>3</sup> That step would be important indication of mutual confidence which [garble—he] felt existed between Prime Minister and President Carter. Foreign Minister agreed that reopening of facilities was an important aspect of the new chapter

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780398-0284. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Ewing; cleared by Hopper, Arthur Houghton (S), and Thomas Reynnders (S/S-O); approved by Vest. Sent for information Priority to Athens, Nicosia, USUN, USNATO, London, Paris, USNMR SHAPE, USDOCOSouth Naples, and USDELMC. Ökçün and Vance were in New York to attend the UN General Assembly meeting.

<sup>2</sup> The Department described the discussion on attempts to reach a prisoner transfer treaty between the United States and Turkey in telegram 247759 to Ankara, September 29. In telegram 249586 to Ankara, September 30, the Department reported that Ökçün expressed his hope that the U.S. and Turkish security services would be able to exchange information relating to threats against Turkish diplomatic personnel. Vance pledged U.S. cooperation. Both telegrams are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780397-0095 and D780400-1144.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 6909 from Ankara, September 27, the Embassy reported that Ecevit made this statement a day after the U.S. arms embargo was lifted. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780394-1202)



in US-Turkey relations which followed lifting of the U.S. embargo on Turkey.

3. Secretary Vance said we were pleased that Turkey and the IMF had reached an agreement on the second drawing under the Standby Agreement. We were fully supportive of Turkish efforts to overcome its economic problems. The Secretary said that the U.S. could not provide economic assistance of the magnitude needed by Turkey and he believed that the most effective way was to obtain such funds from private international financial markets. He then asked how Turkish efforts to acquire new credits from the private banks were progressing. Okcun said that the GOT wanted to put US-Turkish relations into a broader framework which would not emphasize only the defense relationship. There were other ways and means to expand US-Turkish cooperation. He hoped USG would continue to encourage private banks and would also reactivate Export-Import Bank lending to Turkey. The Secretary said the USG has no control over private bank decisions, although Under Secretary Cooper and others would continue in their contacts with these banks to describe the general state of US-Turkey relationship in the post-embargo period.

4. In response to Okcun's question whether a "program of action" could be prepared relating to ExIm Bank activity in Turkey, the Secretary said this would have to be discussed with the Bank, which through its board and senior staff would have to decide whether new lending to Turkey was appropriate at this juncture. Nimetz noted that with apparent resolution of Turkey's problems with IMF, rescheduling of official debt, and progress on working out arrangements with private banks, XMB was already reviewing what if anything could now be done. We would continue to discuss these matters with XMB for the next few weeks to see what could be done with regard to Turkey. In response to question, Secretary said that if GOT wished to forward a proposal, we and the XMB would be glad to examine it.

5. Following a discussion of the prisoner transfer treaty negotiations (septel), and in response to a question from Okcun, the Secretary said we were in the process of putting together the administration's FY 1980 budget request. Final assistance figures are not yet available, but Prime Minister Ecevit should not be concerned that the aggregate assistance level for Turkey would cause him any embarrassment. The Secretary stressed that he could not give a figure and that the budget process was not yet completed. At this point—approaching final determination—the program for Turkey looked satisfactory and would probably include FMS credits, MAP, IMET, and economic supporting assistance.

6. Elekdag referred to the 1976 DCA supplementary list and urged that the USG make this equipment available for sale at the lowest avail-

able price, preferably a nominal price, to take account of Turkey's difficult short-term balance of payments problem as well as its defense needs. Nimetz said that DOD was ready to receive a Turkish military team to review Turkish requirements. Some of the 1976 equipment was no longer available, but we were prepared to give the lowest possible prices consistent with our overall policies. We also indicated that MAP materiel pipeline items would be shipped expeditiously, some by air. The Turks could send a military team to Washington as soon as they were ready, even during the week of October 2.

7. Okcun referred to the conversation in June between Prime Minister Ecevit and Secretary Brown in Washington,<sup>4</sup> and hoped that work could go forward to see what could be done in the defense co-production area. Nimetz said that in the last few days we had made a proposal to send a team to Ankara to see what might be possible, and that their visit could take place in the coming weeks.

8. Reverting to Turkey's financial situation, and re-responding to the Secretary's question, Okcun said that Finance Minister Muezzinoglu was meeting in Washington Sept. 27 with representatives of the seven large banks concerning both debt rescheduling and, hopefully, fresh credits in the range of \$500 million. Turkey faced acute problems over the next ninety days which presented political risks to the Prime Minister. Fresh credits from abroad were therefore essential. He hoped that USG support in this regard would be forthcoming. The Secretary reiterated that Under Secretary Cooper would keep in touch with the banks as he had indicated he would do.

9. Okcun asked for U.S. support to make the OECD consortium for Turkey more active, particularly in exploring external financing possibilities for Turkey's fourth five-year plan, which was still under preparation for presentation later to the National Assembly.<sup>5</sup> The Secretary said he was not familiar with the status of our thinking on the consortium, but we would take note of Turkish interest in a more active consortium role. Subsequently at lunch, Elekdag and Esenbel said they recognized that the USG could pledge at a consortium meeting only what we would do in any event, but thought that the consortium might be an effective way to encourage greater interest in Turkey's economic problems on the part of the other OECD member countries.

10. In response to the Secretary's repeated assurance of U.S. support for GOT efforts to strengthen Turkey's economy and his offer to study carefully specific ways we might be able to demonstrate that support, Okcun asked whether the USG could consider using its good of-

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 118.

<sup>5</sup> The OECD Consortium to Aid Turkey was established in 1962.

fices with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to encourage them to consider greater interest in Turkey's economic development.

11. Elekdag referred to the many US-Turkish conversations in 1978, and noted that he would be returning to Ankara for the October 2 National Security Council meeting. Ecevit would be taking serious political risks to reactivate immediately U.S. installations unless he had a clear idea of what could be expected from the U.S. in 1980. He noted that the Secretary had indicated that the level of proposed assistance would not cause Ecevit embarrassment. Could he also tell the Prime Minister on his return that it was expected that the assistance level would be adequate to Turkey's needs? The Secretary replied that he could so indicate, but we could not be in a position of talking about precise figures at this stage, except to indicate that we anticipated a level which would represent a material advance over the level provided for in the 1976 DCA.

12. In response to a question from Okcun, Nimetz and Vest confirmed that the U.S. was prepared in principle to work out the modalities to have Kargaburun and Belbasi transferred to Turkish operation. We were waiting to hear further from the GOT. Elekdag stressed that all of the facilities would be reopened, but that discussion concerning the future of these two installations should occur shortly.

13. With regard to Turkish-Greek relations, Okcun said that there was concern in Ankara that the repeated reiteration over the last several months of the "Kissinger formulation" relating to the Aegean had encouraged the Greek Government to slow down discussion of Aegean issues with the GOT.<sup>6</sup> He hoped U.S. would not encourage negative Greek attitude, which could lead to a dragging out of the talks. The Secretary said that in our view goodwill and a serious effort was required from both Turkey and Greece and we certainly supported the objective of their resolving their differences.

14. With respect to Cyprus, Okcun hoped the U.S. would encourage others to have the UNGA adopt a "mild resolution" on the Cyprus question, which would call for a resumption of intercommunal talks. The Secretary said he would be talking with Greek Foreign Minister Rallis and the Greek Cypriots, and would encourage them as well as the Turkish side to try to find a way to push forward with the negoti-

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<sup>6</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Documents 67, 245, and 246. Kissinger and Bitsios and then Kissinger and Çağlayangil discussed at length the Greek-Turkish dispute over Aegean territorial rights. Çağlayangil called for the Aegean to be split down the middle and divided evenly between Greece and Turkey, with special negotiations to take place over Aegean islands and areas suitable for joint exploration of natural resources.

ating process.<sup>7</sup> With regard to the Cyprus UNGA resolution question, we would examine the matter with the greatest of care. Okcun said he hoped we could encourage UNSYG Waldheim to call for talks. The Secretary said he would be talking further with Waldheim and would encourage him to continue efforts to find a way to resume the negotiating process. We would also continue to make clear to both the GOC and GOG our hope that a way would be found to resume talks.

15. After a brief discussion of terrorism (septel), Elekdag described his recent talks in Athens with Greek Secretary General Theodoropoulos.<sup>8</sup> He stressed that a key issue at present was the Greek refusal to discuss the claimed 10 nautical mile territorial air space around the Greek islands. He expressed fear that the Greeks had espoused a policy of evading fundamental issues. The GOT would continue the dialogue, however, and hoped that progress could be made. At lunch, Elekdag gave a detailed description of the Turkish position on the air space question along the same general lines provided earlier to Embassy Ankara.

16. At the close of the meeting, Okcun said that improved Turkish-US relations were even more important than Turkish-Greek relations. He thought that with continued confidence on both sides, a new chapter in cooperation was possible. The Secretary agreed that we share that objective and want to do all we can to achieve it.

**Christopher**

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<sup>7</sup> See Document 181.

<sup>8</sup> See footnote 2 above.

**124. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Vest) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 3, 1978

Circular 175 Procedure—Request for Authorization to Negotiate with the Government of Turkey a New Agreement to Govern the Operations of United States Defense Installations in Turkey

*Issues for Decision*

This memorandum requests authorization pursuant to the Circular 175 Procedure (11 FAM 700) to negotiate an agreement on the above subject. The issues for decision are whether negotiations should proceed and, if so, what position should be taken by the U.S. Negotiators.

*Essential Factors*

In July 1975, the Government of Turkey unilaterally announced the termination of the 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement which had governed the operation of U.S. military facilities in Turkey. It also suspended primary mission operations at those facilities which were not in direct support of NATO defense activities. The GOT claimed that these actions were justified by the arms embargo imposed pursuant to U.S. law in February 1975.

A new defense cooperation agreement was signed on March 26, 1976. This agreement was intended to permit resumption of suspended U.S. operations and end the embargo. However, its entry into force was expressly subject to the enactment of implementing legislation because the agreement obliged the USG to provide specified amounts of military assistance as well as foreign military sales and FMS financing over a four year period, all of which were then prohibited by the statutory embargo.

Implementing legislation was submitted to Congress in June 1976, but Congress did not act on it and maintained the embargo in force until September 1978. The present Administration did not press for enactment of the multiyear military assistance and FMS credit package.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, Country Files (1940–1986), Lot 89D336, Box 2, Turkey: DCA (ML). Confidential. The memorandum was sent through Nimetz. Drafted by George T. Churchill (PM/ISO) on November 2; cleared by Colonel Majors (OSD/ISA), Thomas G. Weston (H), Peter B. Swiers (EUR/RPM), Ted A. Borek (L/PM), James M. Flanagan (EUR/SE), Henze, Hopper, and Richard E. Curl (INR). Attached but not printed is the October 27 Memorandum of Law to commence base negotiations with Turkey.

Early in 1978, after consultation with the Turkish Government, the Administration decided that the 1976 agreement should not be used as a basis for seeking a lifting of the embargo. Instead, it was decided that a new defense agreement should be negotiated after the embargo had been lifted.

Section 13(a) of the International Security Assistance Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-384, approved September 26, 1978) authorized the President to make a determination which would cause the embargo legislation to cease to have any force and effect. The determination was signed on September 26, and transmitted to the Congress. In response, on October 4, the Government of Turkey issued a decree authorizing the resumption of suspended U.S. operations for a transitional period of one year starting on October 9. The decree specified interim conditions for operations at all installations, pending the negotiation and entry into force of a new agreement. (An exception is the major installation at Karamursel, which we had already decided to close for our own reasons.)

We have agreed with the Government of Turkey that negotiations should begin in November. Early negotiations seem advantageous from our standpoint because a very cooperative atmosphere in Turkey prevails now that the embargo has ended. Moreover, a new agreement is needed to remove restrictions still imposed on our operations. The U.S. team would be led by Ambassador Spiers, and the Embassy staff would be supported by policy and legal experts from State and Defense. U.S. Negotiators would take the following positions:

—The agreement should be confined, to the extent possible, to matters related to U.S. military activities in Turkey. While we will, of course need to support Turkey's NATO role through economic and security assistance, it is our intention to make no commitments in this area and to keep the agreement on military facilities separate and distinct from discussions on these broad areas of defense cooperation. (We expect the Turkish Government to press for a closer connection than we consider desirable between U.S. military activities and questions of assistance.)

—The agreement, while providing the fundamental guarantees desired by both sides, should be as broad as possible in its language, relying on mutual good will and a process of pragmatic resolution of specific problems rather than setting forth a complex set of detailed operating rules.

—U.S. positions on specific issues will be consistent with essential requirements and will take into account agreements reached or to be negotiated on facilities elsewhere.

Negotiations on the new agreement will proceed in close consultation with Department of Defense and other concerned agencies. When

a text is agreed *ad referendum* by the negotiators separate authorization will be sought for its signature.

We do not anticipate the inclusion in the Agreement of any provisions which will require the enactment of implementing legislation. Since the Agreement will be in furtherance of the North Atlantic Treaty, an executive agreement would seem appropriate. A Memorandum of Law is attached. However, we will consult with the relevant committees of the House and Senate and interested members of the Congress concerning both the form and content of the Agreement prior to the commencement of negotiations and as they proceed.

The circumstances of these negotiations, which will involve classified drafts and documentation on both sides, will preclude the opportunity for public comment in advance of conclusion of an agreed text and a decision on its classification. Every effort will be made to produce an unclassified agreement, with any necessarily classified subjects dealt with in separate annexes.

*Recommendation:*

That you authorize Ambassador Spiers or his designee, with support personnel from Washington as needed and under the general supervision of Counselor Nimetz, to negotiate a new agreement *ad referendum* on the conduct of U.S. military activities in Turkey, subject to concurrence of L, EUR, PM, INR, DCI, and DOD.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Newsom approved the recommendation; November 7 is date-stamped below.

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## 125. Message From the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Haig) to Secretary of State Vance<sup>1</sup>

Mons, Belgium, November 20, 1978, 1938Z

SHP 3796. From Gen Haig, SACEUR, SHAPE, Belgium.

1. During the Secretary General's regular luncheon with the Chairman of the Military Committee, Mumford and the major NATO

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–81–0202, Box 69, Turkey 1978. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for information to JCS for Secretary Brown and General Jones; to [text not declassified] Ankara, [text not declassified] Athens, and [text not declassified] Belgium for the Ambassadors; and to USEUCOM for General Huyser (UNCINCEUR) and JLO Naples for Admiral Shear (USDOSouth).

commanders, Luns summarized his impressions of his recent visit to Ankara and discussions with the Turkish Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Defense Minister, and the Chief of the Turkish General Staff. Luns emphasized that he was extremely well received in Ankara and that there were absolutely no reproaches to NATO officials or the Alliance at any time during the visit. In general, he categorized Prime Minister Ecevit as the most flexible Turkish official with whom he met and Defense Minister Isik the most negative with the Foreign Minister only somewhat less constructive than the Prime Minister. He noted that he had framed his visit to Ankara around a liaison visit to CENTO in order to assuage Greek concerns but subsequently was informed that the Greeks were delighted that he had visited Ankara. Luns described the multiple sessions with the Turkish officials as arduous but of great value in that it was clear that the Turks are now reassured of NATO interest in their plight. In outlining the circumstances which led to his visit, the Secretary General noted that as Secretary General of NATO it was incumbent upon him to attempt to work the problem of Greek reintegration just as he had earlier worked the problem surrounding the Icelandic fisheries dispute.<sup>2</sup> He noted that in this regard he may have bruised American feelings since clearly they had an initiative of their own underway. He drew this conclusion both from the fact that U.S. NATO Ambassador Bennett had delicately but effectively urged him not to enter into details on Greek reentry while in Ankara. After his arrival in Ankara, his discussions with Ambassador Spiers confirmed American sensitivity and, as he had assured Ambassador Bennett, he provided Spiers an outline of the proposals he would make to the Turkish side, emphasizing that they were not firm proposals but merely "venting" points for subsequent consideration by the Turkish side.

2. In describing his proposals Luns made it clear that he had emphasized to the Turks that there were absolutely no links between the Turkish economic plight and the existing political issues between Greece and Turkey, including Cyprus and Aegean command issues. He stated that the Turks were delighted with this clarification and complained that in recent discussions with the Canadians, Canada had emphasized the linkage between help for Turkey economically and progress on Cyprus. Luns also stated that during the economic discussions the Turks complained bitterly about the IMF's rigidity while praising World Bank President McNamara's forthcoming response to Turkey's economic needs. The Turks apparently are also concerned

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the third "Cod War" in 1975 between Iceland and the United Kingdom over the size of territorial rights to fishing areas. Luns mediated a dispute between the two countries, which culminated in an agreement on fishing rights reached in June 1976.



about the recent FRG ruling which reduced support for the children of Turkish guest workers by 50 percent, a step which has resulted in 450,000 Turkish dependents entering the Federal Republic to join their sponsors. The Secretary General noted that these young people were neither “fish nor fowl” and could easily become tomorrow’s revolutionaries.

3. Luns then described his military reintegration proposals in considerably less detail than he had given them to Ambassador Spiers, noting that they consisted of four basic steps. Before listing these, Luns stated that he had formulated the proposals as a result of studying papers associated with the Haig-Davos discussions and deliberations of the Military Committee.<sup>3</sup> Luns noted that he had prepared the proposal in conjunction with Deputy Secretary General Petrignani and mentioned having the approval of several Ministers. He also referred to his authority provided under the provisions of the watching brief agreed upon several years ago. In discussing his four steps, Luns advised the Turks that the proposal should be reviewed in the context of a clearly delineated disclaimer clause which would emphasize that no juridical consequences would result from the interim command arrangements. He also emphasized that his proposals were designed to permit an early reentry for Greece and their acceptance might also involve an obligation to convene a special group, perhaps under the DPC or a group of nations, which would seek to work with both sides in arriving at more permanent arrangements. The four proposals as described by Luns were:

One: procedures for the return to normal air traffic over the Aegean.

Two: Provision for cross tell from existing radar sites.

Three: An “ambiguous” sentence establishing the principle of the task force naval command system to be effected when ships were assigned to NATO (Luns commented that this proposal really constituted no change in day-to-day command arrangements).

Four: A proposal that SACEUR work out command arrangements and boundaries to be applied in time of war.

4. Apparently the Turkish side remained essentially negative on the reintegration steps throughout the visit, and Prime Minister Ecevit clearly rejected them on Saturday afternoon during his final meeting with the Secretary General. Luns stated that the Prime Minister termed them unacceptable from the Turkish point of view but, as a consequence of the Secretary General’s urgings, agreed to attempt to undertake talks with Prime Minister Karamanlis before making an official

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 184.

and categorical rejection. Ecevit apparently agreed to this additional step and Luns plans to talk with the Greek side about such a meeting between the Prime Ministers, sometime this week.

5. The remainder of the Secretary General's briefing touched upon his assessment of Turkey's grave economic outlook which is clearly foremost in his mind. He noted that it is evident that Turkey has become increasingly reliant on economic and trade relations with the Soviet Union which appears to be more willing than NATO nations to meet Turkey's needs. He noted that Ecevit described the current situation as the gravest ever faced by a democratic Turkey. Although there were absolutely no hints of a Turkish realignment or withdrawal from NATO, in private discussions this was hinted at to the Secretary General by responsible Turkish officials. Luns stated that in his view it was ludicrous that Western nations provide such vast resources to third world nations of far less importance to Western security and dramatized his own fears that recent internal difficulties in Turkey, with a growing terrorist threat and near economic collapse, could result in a military takeover with the ultimate loss of Turkey to the West. The Secretary General stated that he would prepare a paper for the North Atlantic Council on this situation and remarked that the key to Turkey's future clearly rested in American hands.

6. Warm regards, Al.

SSO note: Deliver during duty hours.

**126. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

RP M 78–10506

Washington, December 27, 1978

**TURKEY UNDER MARTIAL LAW** [*handling restriction not declassified*]*Overview*

*The government's resort to martial law on Monday to quell Turkey's spiralling political violence was a painful political and ideological step for socialist-minded Prime Minister Ecevit. The move holds dangers for his government and opportunities for his political rivals if the tough action proves unsuccessful. Whether martial law will restore domestic tranquility will depend as much on the determination of extremists to persist as in the capabilities of Turkey's no-nonsense military. [handling restriction not declassified]*

The imposition of martial law for the third time since World War II, and the second in this decade, became official December 26 when the Grand National Assembly concurred. Ecevit had tried a series of more moderate measures during his first year in office aimed at curbing violence while preserving constitutional liberties, but they failed on both counts. They included a streamlining of the judicial system, improvements in law enforcement methods and personnel including the purging of those associated with extremist groups, and the selective use of military troops to augment the police in outlying provinces. Most recently, Ecevit banned the youth wing of Alpaslan Turkes' neo-facist National Action Party, which has spearheaded the violence from the right. That over 600 people were killed during Ecevit's first year in office—more than double the rate of deaths in the last year of his predecessor's reign—attests to this failure. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

*Ecevit Wary of Martial Law*

Ecevit's resistance to declaring martial law until the weekend disturbances in Maras left nearly 100 dead is rooted in politics and ideology. The Prime Minister had strongly criticized earlier martial law periods for their excesses, particularly against members of the left wing of his party who suffered most. In addition, Ecevit has exhibited a

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 80T00634A, Box 5. Secret. A note at the bottom of the page reads in part: "This memorandum was prepared by the Western Europe Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and coordinated within CIA and DIA." The memorandum was distributed widely throughout the U.S. Government, including to Denis Clift, George Vest, and Brigadier General James A. Williams, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

strong personal commitment to democracy and against military or other forms of authoritarian rule. Indications are that Ecevit consented to martial law only after a majority of his cabinet, and possibly the military as well, came out strongly in its favor. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

### *Causes of Violence*

Political violence in Turkey has numerous causes. These include the sharp cleavage between leftist "modernizers" and Islamic traditionalists and nationalists leading to the emergence of rival extremist groups. Their ranks have been augmented with youths radicalized by an outmoded educational system and poor job prospects. In addition to left-right differences and student discontent, the violence has been fueled by sectarian disputes between Sunni and Shiite Muslims and by Kurdish separatist aspirations in the impoverished eastern provinces where economic discontent obviously also plays a role. Whereas the violence in the large urban areas has been directed by one extremist faction against another and has taken the form of "gang warfare," that in the east has involved large numbers of people, in part because law enforcement is less efficient and the people are more malleable. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

### *Extreme Right Defiant?*

The more conservative opposition parties have charged Ecevit with coddling leftist extremists and there is little doubt that his government has been more vigorous in quelling rightist-inspired violence, particularly in the cities. The most recent pattern in the eastern provinces, however, has been one in which extreme rightists—possibly associated with Turkes—have incited the politically more conservative Sunni Muslims to attack members of the poorer Shiite minority who tend to support Ecevit's party or other leftist groups. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Ecevit has implied that the rioting in Maras was organized by Turkes' followers and there are indications he may be right. Ecevit's charges have fueled talk about a Turkes conspiracy to create disorder leading to the fall of the government and military intervention and has raised the possibility of additional government measures against Turkes' party. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

### *Outlook*

The immediate outlook for the Ecevit government, and in the longer term, for Turkish democracy, will depend on how effective martial law is in curbing domestic strife. Should the Turkish military secure peace, if only a temporary one, Ecevit will have bought time—time to attend to the underlying causes of violence and to related problems

such as Turkey's failing economy, which is experiencing inflation and unemployment rates of over 50 percent and 20 percent respectively as well as severe foreign exchange shortages. The military authorities will be aided by the fact that extremist leaders, including Turkes, have been reluctant openly to incite their followers to storm the barricades. Indeed, Turkes has even denied any link with extreme rightist gangs. Nonetheless, the need to share power with military authorities in the 13 affected provinces could create strains in the government's razor thin parliamentary majority of two seats. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Should extremist factions persistently challenge the martial law regime, Ecevit's prospects may quickly deteriorate. He will be subjected to conflicting pressures from within his government, his party, and the military, and may ultimately face the dilemma either of backtracking or adopting even more repressive measures. In such circumstances, his government would be in jeopardy, and it is difficult to know what might follow it. There are serious obstacles to most of the alternatives that have been suggested, such as a grand coalition, a government of "technicians", or a more active role for the President. And should none of these materialize, the military might rapidly lose its reluctance to try again the unhappy experiment in direct rule that it tried in 1971.<sup>2</sup> [*handling restriction not declassified*]

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<sup>2</sup> The Turkish military ousted Prime Minister Demirel on March 12, 1971, following months of political violence.

## 127. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 28, 1978, 10–11 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Turkey

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *State*

Secretary Vance (Chairman)  
Richard Cooper, Under Sec. for  
Economic Affairs  
Matthew Nimetz, Counselor  
George Vest, Asst. Sec. for  
European Affairs

#### *Defense*

David McGiffert, Asst. Sec. for  
International Security  
Dr. Ellen Frost, Dep. Asst. Sec. for  
Int'l Economic Affairs

#### *Treasury*

Anthony Solomon, Under Sec. for  
Monetary Affairs  
Frank Maresca, Acting Dir/Office  
of Dev. Nations/Finance

#### *JCS*

Lt. General William Smith,  
Assistant to the Chairman

#### *CIA*

Admiral Stansfield Turner  
Joseph Zaring, NIO/WE

#### *OMB*

Dr. John White, Deputy Director  
Edward Sanders, Deputy Assoc.  
Director for Int'l. Affairs

#### *White House*

Zbigniew Brzezinski  
David Aaron

#### *NSC*

Paul B. Henze (Notetaker)  
Ambassador Henry Owen  
Rutherford Poats

*The short-term economic problem:* The first part of the meeting was devoted to a review of the short-term Turkish economic problem. There was agreement on several basic principles: that the IMF should be kept in the picture because its participation is essential to attract full participation by the private banking community; that in working out arrangements for immediate help the Germans should be persuaded to take the lead and the EEC as a whole should also play a major role, with the United States, in effect, coming third in line; that the first major tactical step is for the President to secure a commitment to an urgent pro-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 51, Turkey: 1–4/79. Confidential. Drafted by Henze. In the upper right-hand corner, Carter wrote, "ok. J.C." The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. In a December 15 memorandum to Brzezinski, Henze wrote: "Turkey is the only corner of the 'Crumbling Triangle' which has not yet crumbled." Referring to an attached paper he wrote, titled: "Is Turkey Susceptible to the Iranian Sickness?," Henze suggested that it form the basis for an SCC review in early January. In an attached handwritten note, Brzezinski replied, "I like it. A good job." He proposed instead a PRC meeting rather than an SCC meeting. (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Countries, Box CO–56, CO 163 1/20/77–1/20/81)

gram from Schmidt, Callaghan and Giscard at Guadeloupe.<sup>2</sup> After discussion of the scope of short-term Turkish needs, in which Under Secretary Solomon took the lead, it was agreed that we should run the risk of overestimating, rather than underestimating, the gap between requirements and available resources: \$1.8 billion was estimated as the total gap with up to \$500 million required in new money to be provided by some form of consortium. In addition to European and American participation, possibilities for Saudi, Kuwaiti and Gulf involvement will be explored both for financial reasons and to underscore the relationship of Turkey to the Middle Eastern situation as a whole. The Chairman directed that a Presidential letter to Chancellor Schmidt, a position paper for the Guadeloupe Summit and necessary background data be completed by 29 December.

*The longer-term economic problem:* Assistant Secretary Cooper noted that the longer-term prospects for Turkish economic growth are good but what happens depends on solutions to the current crisis and basic structural reforms. The Chairman directed Mr. Cooper to chair a Working Group to assess the longer-term and propose tactics for approaching it. The question of Congressional attitudes, should it become necessary to seek a supplemental appropriation for aid for Turkey, was discussed. The Chairman directed the State Department Counselor to assess this question.

*Christopher visit:* There was unanimous agreement that Deputy Secretary Christopher's visit to Turkey should go ahead as scheduled.<sup>3</sup> The Chairman directed the Department of State to prepare a scope paper on the Christopher visit taking into account the discussion of this meeting.

*Other assistance and confidence-building steps:* Dr. Brzezinski said that he thought it was important to recognize that the economic situation in Turkey was showing signs of developing into a political crisis. In spite of its inadequacies, he said, the Ecevit Government was the best we could hope for in Turkey in the foreseeable future and its collapse could bring a period of political confusion which might culminate in military intervention. This would have an unsettling effect on the whole region. It was important, he said, to avoid segmentizing economic and political issues too much. He suggested the Christopher visit be taken as an opportunity to lay the groundwork for other measures to bring the Turks into a closer relationship which would undo

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<sup>2</sup> Guadeloupe, a French Caribbean island, was the site for a meeting of the leaders of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and West Germany January 5–6, 1979. They agreed that each country would contribute to an economic stabilization program for Turkey.

<sup>3</sup> Christopher visited Turkey January 10–11.

some of the damage of the Cyprus/Arms Embargo period. The Chairman agreed and directed the Department of State to develop a scope paper for the visit which would reflect these concerns. The Chairman went on to say that he felt more concrete plans for expansion of public diplomacy and exchange programs, military cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation and mechanisms for regular consultation on issues of common concern should be developed. Dr. Brzezinski proposed that increased intelligence cooperation be added to this list. The Chairman agreed.

*Intelligence Assessment:* Before the meeting concluded, the Chairman asked the Director of Central Intelligence to summarize the current conclusions of the intelligence community with special reference to recent civil disturbances and the likely effectiveness of martial law. The DCI commented that having to impose martial law was a setback for Ecevit but what political consequences it would have depended upon how rapidly the military were able to reimpose order. If the military have to resort to large-scale use of force, trouble could be expected from the left wing of Ecevit's party and this could lead to a situation where some people thought Erbakan's party could become necessary to Ecevit to maintain a coalition. The DCI said that the intelligence community saw no inclination on the part of the military to assume power themselves.

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## 128. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

RP M 79-10006

Washington, January 3, 1979

### PROSPECTS FOR THE ECEVIT GOVERNMENT AND FOR TURKISH DEMOCRACY [*handling restriction not declassified*]

#### *Key Judgments*

*Turkey has entered a difficult period that will test the cohesiveness of Ecevit's left-of-center government as well as the resiliency of its democratic institutions. Recognizing that inaction could be as dangerous as action for his*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-82-0205, Box 22, Turkey 1979. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. In a January 29 covering memorandum to Brown, Turner recalled that Brown had asked Turner to report on what the CIA was doing with regard to the insurgency in Turkey. (Ibid.) A note at the bottom of the page reads in part: "This memorandum was prepared by the Western Europe Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and coordinated within CIA."



*precariously poised government, Ecevit took some significant but incomplete steps during his first year in office to turn Turkey's failing economy around and to curb its spiralling political violence. But these proved too little in the case of the economy, and too late in the case of political violence. [handling restriction not declassified]*

*In consequence, Ecevit was compelled to declare martial law in 13 of Turkey's 67 provinces to curb the social unrest which originates in political, sectarian, and ethnic rivalries that are aggravated by the faltering economy. This has cost him much in political capital in his own party, given new opportunities to the opposition, and limited further his ability and probably his willingness to risk the hard decisions the economy requires. It has also reopened the possibility of a larger political role for the military. [handling restriction not declassified]*

*Ecevit could secure some short term maneuvering room if martial law works, but overall, its imposition may add to the many other problems facing his government and contribute in the end to its fall. Should this occur, prospects for the emergence of a government more able and willing to confront Turkey's domestic and foreign policy problems are not encouraging. The result may be active involvement by the military in the political process, and in the last resort, perhaps another temporary experiment in direct military rule.<sup>2</sup> [handling restriction not declassified]*

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

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<sup>2</sup> Turner informed Brown in his January 29 memorandum to expect a follow-up review within the next month on the implications of the Turkish military's growing presence in the political system. On February 16, Turner sent Brown CIA Memorandum RP M 79-10074, February 5, titled "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics." The memorandum surmised that the political and economic crisis in Turkey could hasten greater militarization of the Turkish polity, which was a move that both political and military leaders would reluctantly take if they considered it necessary. (Ibid.)

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**129. Letter From Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Ankara, January 19, 1979

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for the letter you have kindly sent to me with Deputy Secretary of State Mr. Warren Christopher.<sup>2</sup>

I deeply appreciate the importance you attach to revitalizing and widening the relationship and co-operation between our two friendly countries and the personal interest that you have taken in the efforts for providing economic and financial help to Turkey in view of difficult problems that we have been facing for some time.

It is re-assuring to hear from you, Mr. President, that the prospect of Broad Multilateral Co-operation to help alleviate our urgent economic problems were taken up during your recent meeting, with Chancellor Schmidt, President Giscard D'Estaing and Prime Minister Callaghan.

I had an extensive and useful conversation with Mr. Christopher, covering the major issues that concern both our countries, including the necessity of increasing Military Assistance and I discussed with him the nature and dimensions of our economic problems as well as the policies we are following to deal with them. I also explained to him our relationship with the I.M.F., particularly stressing the necessity of taking into consideration the economic, social and political implications of certain measures that are recommended to us.

As I am sure you well know, Mr. President, Turkey has been passing through a critical period of her history and we attach utmost importance to surmounting the crisis of this period without any damage to our Democracy. This is important, not only because of the Turkish people's strong and proven attachment to the democratic way

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 19, Turkey: Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, 3/78-5/79. No classification marking. Attached but not printed is a January 19 covering letter transmitting the message from Esenbel to Vance.

<sup>2</sup> Christopher delivered a letter from Carter to Ecevit, in which the President informed Ecevit of the aid decision reached at the Guadeloupe Summit. During his trip to Turkey, January 10-11, Christopher presented Ecevit with a \$300 million aid package. Christopher reported on his conversation with Ecevit in telegram 320 from Ankara, January 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840137-2582) Christopher described the meeting as friendly and positive; he reported that Ecevit was firmly in control of the government and was committed to economic modernization, to strengthening the U.S. bilateral relationship, and to easing tensions with Greece. The text of Carter's letter is in telegram 381 from Ankara, January 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790018-1114)

of life and to human rights and freedom, but also because Democracy is the basic bond between Turkey and our allies and friends in the West.

I am relieved to observe that recently there has been an increasing awareness among our friends and allies of the urgency of Turkey's economic problems and your personal interest, Mr. President, encourages me to be hopeful that this awareness may soon be translated into action in dimensions commensurate with our urgent requirements.

Allow me to take this opportunity to wish you continued success in your efforts for a stable world peace.

With high regards, I remain, Mr. President

Sincerely yours,

**Bulent Ecevit**<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**130. Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 22, 1979

SUBJECT

Turkey

The initial good effect of martial law in Turkey which I described after I returned from my visit there last month *was negated by the assassination of Abdi Ipekçi*.<sup>2</sup> *The country is back in the condition of tension and un-*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 75, Turkey: 8/78–3/79. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Sick, Larrabee, Owen, Poats, Hunter, and Ermarth. A stamped notation at the top of the first page reads: "ZB has seen."

<sup>2</sup> Henze spent 11 days in Turkey in mid-January and reported his impressions in a January 15 memorandum to Brzezinski. In the memorandum, titled "Turkey—How do Things Stand?," Henze asserted that Ecevit's political strength was intact, that he remained committed to the West, and that the economic situation was bleak but not beyond rescue. Henze connected increased U.S. military aid to maintaining political stability in Turkey. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 3, 1/79) On February 1, Abdi Ipekçi, the editor and publisher of *Milliyet*, a major Turkish newspaper, was killed in a drive-by shooting in Istanbul. In a February 2 memorandum to Brzezinski, Henze surmised that the politically mainstream tone of *Milliyet* could only mean that Ipekçi's killer's were "bent on silencing voices of moderation and good sense and undermining Turks' confidence in themselves." (Ibid.)

*certainty of December.* Extension of martial law will help keep things from getting worse—but there is a great potential for further deterioration. Martial law covers less than 20% of the area of the country and less than 30% of the population. Disruptive forces have moved to the non-martial law regions and are intensifying strains there. *The economic situation has not improved* and the country remains solvent only by astute financial juggling. The combined western effort to provide short-term economic aid is stretching out and the good psychological effect of Guadeloupe and the Christopher mission could rapidly turn into a mood of frustration and negativeness if increased economic and military aid continue always to be over the horizon, promised but not delivered.<sup>3</sup> (U)

*We should not underestimate the effect of the Iranian collapse on Turkey.*<sup>4</sup> The two most basic effects are: it reinforces *Turks' worries about U.S. ability to assert itself*; it raises the specter of *fragmentation of Iran* and especially of *Kurdish troubles*, which Turkey deeply fears. These worries are much more serious for Turks than concern that religious influences from Iran will spill over into Turkey; Turks are confident that they will not. (U)

*If we want to keep Turkey on our side and keep the country from deteriorating further, we will have to exert ourselves more than we have to date and be ready to pay a higher price.* So far we have tried to get by on the cheap and it isn't working. We have also tried to push responsibility for economic and military aid for Turkey off on our NATO and other allies—and this is working poorly. We have to take the lead ourselves. In our *base negotiations* now under way, we have tried to slip by with a fragmentary agreement that is convenient for us but which in no way meets Turkish material and political requirements. *The price we have to pay for the idiocy of the arms embargo is commitment to a comprehensive arrangement with Turkey—political, economic and military—in order to keep Turkey a member of the NATO alliance and enjoy the use of facilities there.* The sooner we face up to this fact, the better our chances of success will be; our approach to date has been founded on illusion and wishful thinking. (C)

*Talk about a multi-billion arms commitment to Egypt galls Turks.* They have stayed in the western alliance consistently for 30 years and we tell them we can provide only \$200 million in FMS for 1980 and no MAP! Egypt, which has worked against American purposes for the better part of the past 30 years, gets sympathy because its Soviet-supplied arsenal needs modernization. Loyalty seems to Turks not to produce div-

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 129.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the political turmoil in Iran that forced Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi to flee the country in January 1979.

idents. Turks see the tactical value of keeping Egypt on our side now, but they think they are at least as important to basic U.S. strategic purposes. Turks are determined not to be taken for granted. They want credit for their commitment to democracy and feel they don't get it. No Turkish political leader who ignores these deeply felt attitudes can gain or stay in office, nor will the Turkish military go on tolerating political leadership that does not ensure the bare minimum the military leadership feels it must have to maintain respectable armed forces. (C)

*What is to be done?* We need to find occasion to *underscore our commitment to Turkey publicly and back it with a commitment to provide increased military and economic aid*. Unless we put our money where our mouth is, neither the Turks nor our NATO allies will take us seriously. *Specifically*, the Administration should seek a *supplemental appropriation from Congress* to cover a stand-by credit for Turkey of an impressively large amount—say \$300 million for economic purposes and \$200 for military modernization. The funds need not all be made available at once and there can be conditions attached to them (but not Cyprus conditions; the Greeks are at least as responsible for current lack of movement on Cyprus as the Turks are). *The psychological effect of such a commitment on our part will be enormous*; it will not only bolster Turkish confidence in themselves, it will encourage other Western governments to provide more generous aid and it will demonstrate to the *international banking community* that we are committed to Turkey. Bankers will thus be prepared to provide commercial credit in quantity—the only way Turkey can overcome her present short-term debt repayment and balance-of-payments crisis. (C)

*Turkey is a good bet economically*. Its total indebtedness is modest in proportion to its GNP and its prospects for future economic growth. It can, with better management, repeat the economic performance of Brazil or Korea. Turkey is also a better bet *politically* than any country in the area. It has had its revolution and it manages, under difficult circumstances, to continue to practice democracy. Its society has safety valves. It has no hopeless ethnic or religious cleavages. It is to our benefit to capitalize on its strength. It is still, last but not least, *a military partner well worth having*. If we provide reasonably generous aid, we can have more direct influence on its military modernization. *We should restore MAP for Turkey immediately*. The symbolism of this act would be of enormous importance to the Turkish military and the cost would be small. (C)

When we have taken these steps to demonstrate our support for Turkey, *we should send a really senior Administration official there to underscore our commitment*. Vance is the only cabinet-level official to have visited Turkey in this Administration. That is not enough for a major ally.

You would be the best one to go, but Harold Brown should also find occasion for a visit. (C)

The whole area is watching how we respond to Turkey's current predicament. If we let Turkey stumble and falter, the loss will be much greater than Turkey, for our friends and allies in both the Middle East and Europe will inevitably revise their judgments about the value of association with us and commitment to the kind of world order we are working for. *If we can't muster the capacity to help Turkey out of its current predicament, we aren't likely to meet some of the larger challenges we are going to have to face in the years ahead.* By responding to Turkey's current need for help, we can demonstrate that we do know where we are going in the world and reinforce in other countries the desire to be with us. (U)

I attach a very strong cable Ron Spiers sent in a few days ago. Everything he says is valid.<sup>5</sup> (U)

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<sup>5</sup> Not attached. Reference is likely to telegram 1397 from Ankara, February 16. Spiers cautioned that the United States was in danger of positioning itself for a "major political setback" should it fail to provide immediate economic assistance to Turkey as promised at the Guadeloupe Summit. Spiers contended that without such aid, Ecevit's government was in danger of collapse, which was particularly worrisome because there appeared to be no viable government to replace it. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840137-2596)

**131. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 7, 1979, 9:30–10:40 a.m.

**SUBJECT**

Turkey

**PARTICIPANTS***State*

Warren Christopher, Chairman  
Richard Cooper, Under Sec./  
Economic Affairs  
Matthew Nimetz, Counselor

*Defense*

Charles Duncan  
James V. Siena, Dep. Asst. Sec./  
Eur and NATO Affairs

*Treasury*

Arnold Nachmanoff, Deputy Asst.  
Sec for Dev. Nations  
Robert Pelikan, Dev. Nations/  
Finance

*JCS*

Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith,  
Assistant to Chairman

*CIA*

Dr. Robert Bowie, Dir/NFAC  
Joseph Zaring, NIO/WE

*OMB*

James McIntyre  
Edward R. Jayne, Assoc. Dir. Nat'l  
Security & Int'l Affairs

*White House*

David Aaron

*NSC*

Paul B. Henze, Notetaker  
Henry Owen

The meeting was devoted to discussion of:

- the need to put more momentum behind the “Guadeloupe Initiative” to provide economic assistance for Turkey
- the need for additional military assistance
- methods of coordinating the process of assessing these needs within the Executive Branch, and
- strategy for gaining approval from the Congress of reprogrammed or supplemental funds that may be needed. (C)

There was unanimous agreement in the group on the urgency of the situation. The DOD representative stressed the overriding strategic value of Turkey [*1½ lines not declassified*]. The JCS representative underscored the psychological significance to the Turkish military leadership of stronger support commitments from us. (C)

It was agreed that German leadership in organizing multilateral economic assistance has been weak and that the German commitment

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box 20, PRC/I Minutes—1977–80. Confidential. Drafted by Henze. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

to additional aid has been disappointingly small.<sup>2</sup> The group recognized that to secure faster action and greater commitments of assistance from our allies we must move into a stronger lead position ourselves. Secretary Blumenthal will raise the urgency of Turkish economic assistance in a forceful manner at a dinner he is having on the evening of 7 March with his counterparts from Germany, the UK, France and Japan. (C)

Assistant Secretary Cooper declared that U.S. leadership on this issue is likely to produce the results we desired only if we commit more aid ourselves. He stressed the need for action as soon as possible but also underscored the fact that economic support for Turkey will have to continue in FY 1980 and FY 1981. (C)

Discussion of possible additional amounts and kinds of assistance led the Chairman to designate Mr. Cooper as Chairman of a Working Group which will meet immediately to develop a fully coordinated Executive Branch proposal for additional economic and military aid, as well as other possible measures such as FMS debt rescheduling, which the DOD representative suggested. The Working Group will aim to have a report for the President ready no later than 12 March 1979.<sup>3</sup> (C)

The Director of OMB expressed a series of cautions about shortness of funds and Congressional attitudes as well as possible implications of other Middle East requirements. The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs stressed the urgency of the problem and the need of the Executive Branch to assess needs in terms of realistic appraisal of where the U.S. interests lie. He said it was necessary to work with Congressional leadership to develop the kind of approach that would best serve our national interests. The Chairman directed that the Working Group reflect OMB concerns but declared that the Turkey problem was too pressing to be put off until an assessment of larger needs in the Middle East could be made. (C)

The group recognized the desirability of providing MAP aid for FY 1979 and continuing it in FY 1980. The DOD representative mentioned major co-production possibilities that he considered worth exploring. It was agreed that these should be examined as a second-stage effort once

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<sup>2</sup> The institutional forum for Western aid to Turkey was the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, through which West Germany took the lead based on discussions at the Guadeloupe Summit in January.

<sup>3</sup> Poats forwarded Cooper's report in a March 15 memorandum to Brzezinski. The report, which was distributed to the PRC members, concluded that Turkey required greater economic aid than either the United States or West Germany had previously calculated, and that a supplemental MAP program should be secured in Congress for funds in addition to the \$200 million in FMS credits. Brzezinski wrote on Poats' memorandum, "Is this enough? ZB." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 75, Turkey: 8/78-3/79)



the framework of an immediate short-term economic assistance effort had been established. (C)

[1 paragraph (1½ lines) not declassified]

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**132. Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 27, 1979

SUBJECT

Kurds (U)

This memorandum responds to your two notes (attached at TAB A) on reports of Ambassador Spiers' discussion with Prime Minister Ecevit on 24 March 1979 during which Ecevit expressed his worries about the Kurdish problem.<sup>2</sup> I have no doubt that Ecevit's worries are genuine. They have been growing ever since Iran fell into crisis. They will have been given impetus by the recent outbreak of Kurdish separatism in Iran. (S)

The Soviets have always found the temptation to dabble in Kurdish separatism irresistible in the past; we have succumbed to it ourselves on a couple of occasions. I have called Zbig's attention to this issue in two recent memoranda (attached at TAB B if you want to re-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 75, Turkey: 8/78–3/79. Secret. Sent for information. Next to Henze's initials at the top of the page, Aaron wrote, "Good Memo." Copies were sent to Quandt, Sick, Hoskinson, Funk, and Ermarth.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed are two documents reporting a conversation between Spiers and Ecevit. The first, a March 26 reading item, noted that Ecevit asked Spiers to relay to Carter and Vance his concerns that "the Israelis and the Palestinians are exploiting the Kurdish problem." Ecevit also predicted that the Kurdish nationalists "would become a radical leftist movement." Aaron marked the item and wrote in the right-hand margin, "What is the true story here?" The second, telegram 2415 from Ankara, March 26, underscored the "depth" of Ecevit's concern about the Kurdish problem. Spiers reported Ecevit's suspicions of the West's involvement in Kurdish affairs and noted that historically only the Kurds had posed a threat to the integrity of the Turkish Republic. Spiers surmised that Ecevit's concerns were triggered by events in Iran where the possibility of Kurdish autonomy was growing. The Ambassador also sought guidance on how to respond to Ecevit's request that Washington influence other Western capitals not to exploit the issue of Kurdish nationalism. At the top of the telegram, Aaron wrote to Henze, "Paul—please follow up. Very important."

view them).<sup>3</sup> Ecevit has reason to be alarmed if the Soviets decide to make a major investment in Kurds now, using them as they have exploited Palestinians to destabilize the whole area. The Turks have the most to lose because they have both the largest Kurdish population and one which is best integrated into their own state and society. In face of other strains Turkey is experiencing, alienation of her Kurds could have a devastating effect on her stability and on her military strength over the next few years. (S)

What do we do?

- Build up basic Turkish strength (as we are moving to do) to give the Turks the confidence to maintain their strong governmental system which has been more effective in constraining Kurdish nationalism than either the Iraqis or the Iranians have been.

- Use whatever influence we can develop (we seem to have almost none at present) to see that Iranian Kurds are contained.

- Learn more about what is happening among Kurds so that we are operating on the basis of knowledge, not hearsay or fears. We mounted effective intelligence operations 1–2 years ago to find out what was going on among Eritreans. The Kurdish problem is far more important from the viewpoint of our strategic interests than the Eritrean one. We should be able to learn as much about it.<sup>4</sup> (S)

Suspensions that we are dabbling with Kurds and that Israelis may be doing so too will probably persist. If we deny them too often we merely reinforce them. We should, however, be in steady dialogue with our Turkish allies on this problem; this should assuage some of the worries we know they have. If we can ever work up the basis for meaningful dialogue with the Iraqis, we should probably also talk to them about Kurds. They have had more experience with Kurdish rebellions than anyone else and should know the dangers of letting the Soviets play around too freely. (C)

It could be, however, that the Soviets are doing less than we think. The plain fact is that we don't know. The Soviet radio broadcasts 10½ hours per week in Kurdish *officially*; there are also clandestine broadcasts, I believe. As far as I know, FBIS isn't listening to any of them.<sup>5</sup> Someone ought to be in order to judge what the Soviets seem to be trying to do with the Kurds. The Kurdish-language press in the Soviet Union should also be read. This is only one of many things FBIS is not

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<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed. In a March 21 memorandum to Brzezinski, Henze relayed reports from the Embassy in Tehran on the widening activities of Kurdish autonomists in Azerbaijan. Henze recommended that the issue of Kurdish autonomy "should be taken up in a broader context" and registered his concern that the CIA and others in the intelligence community were insufficiently attentive to this issue.

<sup>4</sup> In the left-hand margin, Aaron wrote, "do this!" and drew an arrow pointing to this paragraph.

<sup>5</sup> Aaron underlined this sentence and wrote, "Get them on the job!"

doing and we are are not having much luck pushing Stan Turner to push them to do more. Zbig has my memorandum to Turner (copy of this package of correspondence at TAB C)<sup>6</sup> urging more effort at having FBIS work harder on the whole “soft underbelly” of Asia. I hope he sends it on to him soon. (C)

We need to press CIA to step up more sensitive forms of intelligence collection, too. I am preparing a memorandum on this in response to Zbig’s instruction on reading my memorandum of 21 March.<sup>7</sup> (U)

Anything else you suggest we do?

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<sup>6</sup> Not attached and not found. In an April 3 memorandum to Henze, CIA asserted that all discussions with Ecevit regarding the Kurds should be kept to a minimum. CIA attached portions of the Pike Committee report, as excerpted in the February 16, 1976, issue of the *Village Voice*, which examined U.S. funding of the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq in 1972. CIA wrote that both Spiers and Ecevit “may be reassured specifically that we had no relationships with the Kurds prior to the Nixon agreement with the Shah,” and that the program was separate from the issue of Kurds in eastern Turkey. (National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Box 27, Turkey, 3 Apr 1979–19 Sep 1979) The agreement in question is likely a reference to a deal reached between the Shah of Iran and the Nixon administration for the United States to supply Iran with sophisticated arms until 1980. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, Document 164.

<sup>7</sup> Aaron wrote “good” at the end of the sentence.

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### 133. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Ankara, April 13, 1979, 1115Z

2911. Dept pls pass White House and Dept of Defense. Subject: US–GOT Relations; Defense Negotiations.

1. Secret-entire text.
2. Action message bearing on U.S. position in continued US–GOT defense negotiations.
3. Summary: Embassy believes changed circumstances both within Turkey and strategically within region indicate need for review at highest levels in Washington of the value of U.S. military installations in Turkey and the nature of our defense relationship. Maintenance of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790170–0657. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

present instructions in our bilateral negotiations could well result in failure. This subject should be a prime candidate for possible high level discussions here. End summary.

4. Our present negotiation instructions (State 45098)<sup>2</sup> were formulated before the impact of Iran, SALT and the Middle East peace settlement. We believe our present approach should be the focus of renewed careful attention at the very highest levels in Washington.<sup>3</sup>

5. Pursuant to instructions, we have told the Turks that their approach, with its integral 5-year force modernization plan, is outside the realm of the possible. The practical consequences of this position could be failure to reach agreement in our negotiations. The Turkish reaction to our "best efforts" formula for future defense assistance has been frigid. We were told after Ambassador's talk with Sahinbas (Ankara 2811) that the present Turkish approach could not be turned around by anyone but the Prime Minister and doubts were expressed that even he could do it.<sup>4</sup> It appears that the Turkish military are not willing to accept what we can offer now: a year-by-year consideration of Turkish military requirements in a context in which they believe our judgment is largely influenced by extraneous political issues.

6. The Turkish 5-year "modernization" plan, which we initially priced at between \$10 and \$15 billion, has been subject to detailed review and JUSMMAT estimates it to be in the \$3 to \$4 billion range (apparently including O&M costs). From Turkish standpoint, this plan is fairly moderate (omitting such high-cost items as F16's, for example) and justifiable if Turkey is to continue to make a creditable contribution to NATO defense. The Turks argue that they are not asking for money, as in the past, but are seeking specific items of military equipment made necessary by their NATO role. The Turks will certainly hold out for some portion of equipment transfers at reduced cost.

7. A further difficulty bearing on our negotiations is the Turkish perception of recent events in this region. Turkey sees the magnitude of

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<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> The Embassy's suggestion was supported by high-level officials in the Department of Defense. In an April 30 memorandum to Vance and Brzezinski, Brown noted that the review should ascertain how "forthcoming" the United States could be with regard to security assistance to Turkey over the next five years. Brown did not think that a more conceptual review of the overall defense relationship with Turkey was necessary because there was no question in the administration that "a healthy defense relationship with Turkey is genuinely critical to our security needs." The memorandum is in the Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-82-0205, Box 22, Turkey 1979.

<sup>4</sup> The Embassy reported Spiers' meeting with Şahinbaş, leader of the Turkish negotiating delegation, in telegram 2811 from Ankara, April 10. Spiers informed Şahinbaş that the amount of aid Turkey sought from the United States was "beyond our means." Şahinbaş responded that news of U.S. reluctance to enter into a five-year defense support agreement was "badly received" by the Turkish military. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790164-1127)

U.S. efforts elsewhere. They point to our delivery on an urgent basis from U.S. stocks—which we seem to be able to spare—\$400 million of equipment to Yemen. They read about the Secretary of Defense traveling to the Middle East talking about large infusions of military assistance. Earlier this week, the papers carried reports of McGiffert's visit to Cairo and the \$1.5 billion additional assistance package for Egypt. They see military funds being poured into Israel.

8. The Turks see themselves, in contrast, as a NATO member, located directly on the Soviet border, their armed forces disastrously malequipped and facing block [*bleak?*] obsolescence, under levy of additional U.S. military and intelligence requirements which will increase their attractiveness as a target for Soviet political and military pressure and destabilization efforts, as well as their isolation in this region as the only country harbouring U.S. military installations. While the decision to seek a \$50 million grant program has had a positive impact on the spirits of pro-NATO elements, the general reaction in military circles is that our overall response is minimal and ad hoc as measured by their needs.

9. It is possible that the net sum of these perceptions will be that the game is not worth the candle. Perhaps those who say that Turkey has no alternative to its defense ties with the West may be right. On the other hand, they may also be wrong. There are significant groups here who feel Turkey's best interests would be served if the country opted out of NATO. Also, there are other Turkish policy options, far less drastic, which would simply remove U.S. forces but maintain NATO membership (the Norwegian model is much in Ecevit's mind—as is the French). Many view the acceptance of U.S. military and economic aid as giving us license to push them in directions contrary to their national interests on Cyprus, Greek reintegration, etc. We may find that we are placing more weight on an essentially ambivalent Turkish political situation than it can bear, and that we will tip it in an unfavorable direction.

10. If Warren Christopher comes here, I think he should make the defense agreement—its framework, not its details—a major topic for candid exploration. This should be preceded by a review at the highest level before we conclusively reject the Turkish approach in the defense negotiations.

11. It may also be time to give some serious consideration to even higher level visits. In defense terms, a full and frank discussion with the Turkish military establishment of its problems and plans, in our view, warrants a personal visit by Harold Brown and a top-level officer. (Perhaps it would be feasible to develop a 5-year modernization program which we could promise our best efforts to support, both bilaterally and within NATO—always subject to congressional action—and

use this bridge to secure a definitive resolution to the Greek reintegration program.)

12. The Turks currently see their relationship with us as without clear direction. They are confused and uneasy. Its proponents had hoped that a 5-year defense agreement would give a new stability to the relationship. The best we have been able to say is that we want a one-year renewable option. Perhaps we could make a small move in the Turkish direction as a next step, by including a revision of Article 3 of the foundation agreement (Ankara 0966), (which the Department has approved in State 45098)<sup>5</sup> to read as follows: Qte Pursuant to Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty and in recognition that cooperative efforts of both governments as well as the assistance of other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is needed to assist Turkey to fulfill its responsibilities as a member of the Alliance, and with a view toward strengthening the mutual security cooperation between the two governments, representatives of the United States and Turkish armed forces will develop and keep current an equipment requirements list, arranged in order of priority, representing a 5-year Turkish armed forces modernization program. The Government of the United States shall exercise its best efforts consistent with United States laws, to provide the Government of the Republic of Turkey defense equipment, services and training, or the financing thereof, in accordance with the priorities established in this list. Unqte

13. Action requested: Review of our current instructions for defense negotiations and approval of revised Article 3.

**Spiers**

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<sup>5</sup> Neither found.

**134. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 14, 1979, 2113Z

94317. For Ambassador from Acting Secretary. Subject: Presidential Letter to Prime Minister Ecevit and Talking Points. Ref: (A) Ankara 2879, (B) State 085689.<sup>2</sup>

1. The following letter from President Carter should be presented to Prime Minister Ecevit at the earliest possible time.

2. Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I am writing to you on a matter of major importance not only for the United States, but for the peace and security of the world. I hope shortly to conclude the SALT Two treaty with the Soviet Union. Knowing your deep commitment to nuclear arms control and your understanding of the central role which SALT plays in our common effort to improve East-West relations, I want to raise with you personally an essential contribution Turkey can make to the Treaty's success.

I know you recognize the crucial importance of verification with respect to the whole SALT process and the new Treaty in particular. To help ensure that we do not miss an historic opportunity to move the world in the direction we both desire, I am requesting your cooperation in efforts to establish a verification system consonant with the Treaty and central to its realization.

We are taking several steps to improve our verification systems over the longer term—particularly with satellites. To cover the interim period we must take other measures. In this connection, we propose to install monitoring equipment on high-altitude aircraft which could collect enough signals from Soviet ICBMs during flight-testing so as to provide for the verification of SALT constraints on these missiles.

To do so, the aircraft would have to fly at high altitudes over Turkish airspace. These aircraft would not overfly the Soviet Union, and would not be based in Turkey. At certain times of the year when there is a significant chance of a Soviet test on any given day, daily flights might be required to ensure that most of the ICBM flight-tests

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 116, 4/14–30/79. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 2879 from Ankara, April 12, and telegram 85689 to Ankara, April 6, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840167–1715 and P840131–2102. The former telegram relayed Elekdağ's message that Turkey needed more information before considering the U.S. overflight request. The latter telegram relayed the Embassy's suggestion that a letter to Ecevit detailing the U.S. overflight proposal was the best step forward.

are monitored. The aircraft could be ready within perhaps 6–9 months. We would of course work closely with you in planning and implementing all phases of this program.

I can assure you that what I am proposing is fully consistent with the provisions of the SALT Treaty. The use of national technical means of verification is explicitly provided for in the Treaty, as is a ban on interference with these means. Further, there is recognition of the propriety of collecting telemetered ICBM signals whenever this telemetry is used for verification. The flights I am proposing are also consistent with the Soviet practice of collecting information about flight-testing of US ICBMs. While I fully appreciate Turkey's historical sensitivities about overflights of adjacent nations by intelligence collection aircraft based in Turkey, I believe you will agree with me that what I am now proposing is fundamentally different from the activities of the past.

In view of your own strong support for the Treaty and the clear legitimacy of the program itself, I hope that after studying my proposal you will agree that we can proceed to institute this limited overflight system at the earliest possible time.

Should you have any questions about my proposal, please ask Ambassador Spiers and we shall provide a full and prompt response. I look forward to hearing from you at an early time so that together we can proceed to ensure the verifiability of a new SALT Two treaty. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter. End.<sup>3</sup> No original text to follow.

[Omitted here are talking points for Spiers.]

Vance

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 85689 to Ankara, April 6 (see footnote 2 above), the Department instructed Spiers to emphasize again the great importance Carter attached to Turkey's cooperation in the U.S. verification and compliance efforts to maintain the SALT II treaty.



**135. Letter From Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Ankara, April 21, 1979

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of April 14 which I have studied with the great care that it merits.<sup>2</sup>

I am indeed aware of the vital role that SALT plays and can further play in ensuring better East-West relations and in paving the way for a more secure world. Allow me to congratulate you, Mr. President, for your perseverance in making SALT II possible and I wish you success in its conclusion.<sup>3</sup>

My government would be willing to try and secure Turkey's contribution to the effective implementation of SALT II. It was due to our awareness of the importance of verification that we did not hesitate to expedite the resumption of activity in the installations in Turkey, soon after the lifting of the embargo, without waiting for the signing of new defence and economic co-operation agreement with the United States of America.

We were faced with considerable reaction from the Soviet Union, however, as they tended to interpret our decision as incompatible with good neighbourly relations.

In anticipation of such a reaction, I had suggested to Secretary of State Mr. Cyrus Vance, during our discussions in Ankara in January 1978, just after assuming office, that it would greatly increase our possibilities of contributing to detente and to nuclear arms control if the functions of the installations in Turkey were to be taken up between the United States of America and the Soviet Union in SALT discussions.<sup>4</sup>

I am sure you would appreciate, Mr. President, that Turkey, being situated in a most sensitive part of the world and faced with immense

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 51, Turkey: 1–4/79. Secret; Nodis. In an April 23 covering memorandum to Brzezinski, Henze summarized the letter as follows: "What [Ecevit] says, in essence, is that Turkey is agreeable to them [overflights] if we and the Soviets together agree that they are okay and, presumably, if we guarantee Turkey against any retribution from the Soviets for cooperating." Henze also noted that the situation could effectively subordinate Turkish sovereignty, and he wondered if there was a precedent for this with regard to NATO, and, moreover, if acceding to Carter's request for overflights was politically tenable in Turkey. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 134.

<sup>3</sup> The SALT II Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union was not signed until June 18 in Vienna.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 107.

problems, would not wish to risk her own security and endanger her own relations with the Soviet Union and other neighbouring countries, while trying to contribute to improved East-West relations and to world peace.

It would, therefore, greatly ease our position if Turkey's role in the efforts for the successful implementation of SALT II were to be acceptable to both parties in the agreement, or the contributions that could be expected from certain third countries were to be clearly defined.

Yet, even after the information we have received from Ambassador Spiers, we are left somewhat in the dark as regards the arrangements on which you might have agreed with the Soviet Union on verification, particularly in respect to the possible role of third countries.

It is very important for us to be clear on this point before being committed to new forms of contribution, especially to allowing overflights for intelligence purposes, in view of the sensitivity not only of the neighbouring countries, but also of our own public opinion.

Although we have been assured through your Ambassador that the United States does not need "Soviet approval of or acquiescence in" its verification activities, I am sure you would agree that it would not be equally justifiable or safe for a country in Turkey's position to forego seeking such acquiescence.

The modernization of the already existing installations in Turkey for improved verification can be considered separately. Since this may be interpreted and explained within the framework of our existing co-operation. But any new arrangement should be initiated in a way that would not create new problems either for Turkey or for our region and for the East-West relations in general.

In view of these considerations, I agree, as has been suggested by the U.S. Ambassador in Ankara, that the matter be studied in greater detail and alternative possibilities of Turkey's extended co-operation be reviewed between our officials, and during the expected visit to Turkey of Deputy Secretary of State Mr. Warren Christopher.

I assure you, Mr. President, that we would do all we can to try and find the means of further extending our co-operation for world peace provided that Turkey's position or regional detente is not thereby endangered.

With highest regards, I remain, Mr. President.

Sincerely yours,<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Printed from an unsigned copy.

**136. Memorandum From Henry Owen of the National Security Council Staff to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 23, 1979

## SUBJECT

Emergency Aid to Turkey (U)

Your initiative in asking the Congress for \$100 million in supplemental economic aid to Turkey, raising the potential US total contribution to \$248 million,<sup>2</sup> is putting pressure on Germany to fulfill its leadership role by offering a matching amount. It also has helped to convince the Turks that the international aid effort is serious. The impact on other donors has been less impressive. (C)

Schmidt responded (Tab A)<sup>3</sup> on March 30 that it would be difficult to raise the German contribution above the \$100 million (plus \$70 million in previously planned project aid) already announced, but he would try. Subsequently our embassy reported that Schmidt's special envoy for this exercise, Herr Kiep, and the Foreign Office are pressing for an additional \$100 million German appropriation (exclusive of export credits comparable to our \$50 [million] ExIm credit offer). We have repeatedly told the Germans that you want full matching by Germany. Senator Muskie plans to tell Schmidt on May 7 that Congress will not appropriate more economic aid for Turkey than the FRG provides. (C)

Giscard responded to you on April 11 (Tab B) with what we already knew: France will provide mixed export credits totalling \$70 million and will try to cause them to be used quickly. Our experts doubt that more than half will be usable by Turkey in 1979. Giscard also claimed one-fourth credit for the prospective EC contribution of \$100 million in development aid to Turkey—much of which is not applicable to the immediate Turkish balance of payments deficit. No reply to Giscard seems indicated. The State Department will express disappointment to the French Embassy. (C)

The UK will wait until it has a new government before reconsidering its \$15 million offer. (C)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 75, Turkey: 4–8/79. Confidential. Sent for information. Carter and Brzezinski each initialed in the top right-hand corner.

<sup>2</sup> On April 10, Carter transmitted to Congress a bill to authorize \$100 million in supplementary economic support for Turkey. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, pp. 647–648)

<sup>3</sup> Tabs A and B are attached but not printed.

Ohira's reply indicated that Japan would increase its \$50 million offer if France and the UK increased theirs. (C)

German hat-passing efforts are unlikely to be fruitful until Germany itself raises its contribution and the Congress reacts to your supplemental request. (Senate hearings on the supplemental for Turkey are to begin April 27.) These two actions are interrelated; the OMB memo that you approved provides that we will testify to the Congress that we will provide only such part of the proposed \$248 million to this year's emergency aid pool as the FRG will match. (C)

Meanwhile, Turkey has taken some significant economic rationalization measures and agreed to resume negotiations next week with the IMF on a comprehensive reform program. These negotiations are likely to take two to three months. The Turks now realize that they will not get emergency economic aid until they adopt a program acceptable to the IMF. (C)

We will keep you informed of further developments.<sup>4</sup> (U)

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<sup>4</sup> In a May 5 memorandum to Carter regarding emergency aid to Turkey, Owen reported that the German Minister of State for Foreign Affairs told him that "the FRG still refuses to match us on aid to Turkey, as a matter of principle, but that there is no ceiling on the amount of German aid." Owen suggested that the United States could accommodate the German position by asking the Germans to match the U.S. appropriated aid of \$198 million but not match the ExIm Bank loan of \$50 million. Owen reasoned: "Since they will probably make export loans anyway, in order to sell their exports, we would not lose out on the cash and they would not lose out on the principle. We could still tell the Congress that our appropriated aid was being matched." Owen further reported that Schmidt was waiting to hear Carter's response and Owen recommended that Carter approve telling the German Ambassador that the United States would adapt "its position to the Chancellor's view by asking only for matching of our appropriated aid." Carter approved the recommendation and initialed "J" at the bottom of the memorandum. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 51, Turkey: 5-12/79)

**137. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Ankara, May 8, 1979, 1036Z

3486. Subj: (S) Deputy Secretary's Visit to Ankara—Oral Message From President Carter to Prime Minister Ecevit.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Prior to plenary meeting evening May 7 Deputy Secretary Christopher met privately with Prime Minister Ecevit and conveyed following oral message to him from President Carter:

"I am very much aware of the difficulties Turkey is now experiencing. We want to be helpful to you in dealing with these problems. We attach enormous importance to the Turkish-American relationship and see it as having both long-term and fundamental importance in the entire political, economic and security system we support.

"Turkey is a country dedicated to democracy, to broadly based economic development, and to social justice. It has already made great strides toward creating a full and modern life for its people. We want to see Turkey continue to serve as an example for the developing world to emulate. This was Atatürk's vision and one which you have brought closer to realization.

"Turkish participation in NATO and its involvement in other European-American common undertakings is a vital element in our own political and security calculations. We are eager, too, to see Turkey develop its role as a link between Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. We welcome and value your help and advice in dealing with problems in these areas.

"I admire the political courage you have displayed in making difficult economic and internal security decisions during the past few months. And I sympathize with you in dealing with the political strains these courageous decisions have caused.

"I am heartened that progress is being made in working out an economic stabilization program that will enable you to reach agreement with the International Monetary Fund. I look forward to working closely with you to help Turkey return to a condition of economic good health so that your country can build on the economic base that has been developed in the past two decades. I foresee increasing opportu-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Mr. Leslie H. Gelb, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Lot 81D101, Box 4, Turkey. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

nities for cooperation between our two countries, and I assure you we will pursue them vigorously.

"Warren Christopher will talk to you frankly about my concerns relating to SALT and the verification problem, which is very important to us and, I believe, to you too. I hope he can work out with you a basis for understanding and cooperation which will serve both our interests."

3. Ecevit said that it was a sympathetic and understanding message and asked that this be conveyed to the President.

Spiers

### 138. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Ankara, May 8, 1979, 1532Z

3507. Department pass Munich for Nimetz/Ewing. Subject: (S) Meeting With Prime Minister Ecevit—SALT Verification—May 8 Session.

1. Summary—Deputy Secretary Christopher and Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit agreed on a draft oral note from US to Soviets (text below) regarding overflights of Turkey for SALT verification purposes. Christopher noted that text had not been seen by President and other senior U.S. officials. Ecevit after consulting with his colleagues modified the draft originally tabled by Christopher (text also below) to exclude implication that Turkey had already agreed to cooperate in overflight program. Ecevit said he would have to consult with other members of his government and party leaders and could not complete process until after May 20 when FonMin returns from trip abroad. End summary.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 75, Turkey: 4-8/79. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Henze forwarded the telegram to Brzezinski with a May 9 memorandum commenting on the Christopher mission: "It is primarily on the basis of this cable that I conclude that the talks did not really go very well. Our problems with Ecevit and the Turkish government are at least as great as I have been emphasizing all along. And the rather flaccid optimism we have been getting from State on these issues is hard to maintain." (Ibid.)

1. Deputy Secretary opened May 8 afternoon meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit by indicating there were two reasons why he had decided to remain in Ankara for an additional meeting with the Prime Minister—

A) He was not sure he had adequately conveyed the time pressures we were under. We were close to an announcement of an agreement in principle on SALT II. If we were to follow the approach suggested by Ecevit May 7, viz to seek Soviet acquiescence,<sup>2</sup> the best time to do so would be within the relatively small window between the announcement of agreement in principle and the summit meeting at which the Treaty would be signed:

B) The Deputy Secretary said there also was a more substantive factor. If the US and Turkey were unable to reach agreement on a point of great importance related to the SALT process which in turn was important to President Carter and the Congress, this could have an adverse effect on the tone of our relationship for some time to come in the future. Speaking as a friend of Turkey, Christopher said he would like to avoid such shock waves and see if the U.S. and Turkey could not come closer on the overflight issue.

2. The Deputy Secretary said he had tried to develop an approach that took into account the PriMin's letter to the President,<sup>3</sup> the exchange of views on May 7 and our concern not to give the USSR veto power over what allies of the U.S. did on their own territory. In regard to latter concern, we took into account fact that the UK and FRG already played a verification role. Christopher said he had tried to meet Prime Minister Ecevit's thought of not putting Turkey in jeopardy because of its geography, other relationships, and current problems. He had a draft for the Prime Minister's consideration which had not been seen by the President or other senior USG officers.

3. Before looking at the draft, Prime Minister Ecevit responded strongly indicating that it was "unfortunate and disheartening" to have a new stumbling block introduced into our relations. "Turkey does not deserve such treatment." It has been a trusting and trustworthy ally. Turkey showed this in reactivating the facilities without a new agreement or knowing what level of aid would be forthcoming. When the President and Christopher broached the subject of overflights, Ecevit said the GOT did not even think of using this as a bargaining point to secure additional aid. If Turkish cooperation with the Western world is beset at every point with stumbling blocks, Turkey's sense of insecurity within the Alliance will only increase.

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<sup>2</sup> Telegram 3487 from Ankara, May 8, reported on Christopher's meeting with Ecevit on May 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790169–1247)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 135.

4. Christopher said it was not his style to engage in bargaining or trades or to make US attitude dependent on what Turkey does. Repeal of the embargo was initiated in this spirit. We were now talking of a bolder, nobler cause and the proposal he was making was not unreasonable. The reference to the effect of a turndown in US-Turkey relations was not a threat, only a comment reflecting realities. He was not attempting to coerce. He was confident the GOT would do what was right.

5. Christopher then tabled the following draft noting that operationally it was intended to serve as oral note to the Soviets.

Begin text of draft given to Ecevit:

1). The United States intends, subject to the approval of the Government of Turkey, to use overflights of the territory of Turkey as one of the means of verification recognized by the SALT II agreement.

2). Having in mind the provisions of SALT II as well as the existing verification practices of both sides, the United States expects that the Soviet Union will not interfere with or object to these overflights. Should there be any such interference or objection, it would have adverse repercussions with respect to ratification of SALT II and its subsequent implementation.

3). The United States has been informed by the Government of Turkey that it shares the belief of the United States and the Soviet Union that the SALT II agreement will contribute to improved East-West relations and to world peace. It is therefore prepared to cooperate in the effective implementation of SALT II by giving permission for such overflights on the basis set forth above.

End text of draft given to Ecevit.

6. Ecevit quickly read the draft and said he wanted to consult his colleagues (participants in the May 8 meeting were the same as May 7—Ankara 3487—with addition of POL Counselor on US side).<sup>4</sup>

7. After a twenty-minute consulting period, the Turkish side returned. Ecevit said his initial reaction was favorable. There was a problem with the last sentence which implied an agreement on the part of Turkey, and he proposed modification to delete this (revised text below). He could, however, undertake no commitment until he consulted the Council of Ministers, the National Security Council, party leaders, and possibly Parliament. FonMin Okcun would return to Turkey about May 20 and soon thereafter Ecevit said he could meet with the NSC, the Cabinet, and possibly party leaders.

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 3487 from Ankara, identified the Turkish participants: Deputy Prime Minister Cetin, Defense Minister Akmandor, MFA Secretary General Elekdag, MFA officials Şahinbaş, Ali Hikmet Alp, and Yarim Eralp, and Lieutenant General H. Celenkler, TGS. See footnote 2 above.



8. Following is text as revised by Ecevit and accepted by Christopher—

Begin text of draft as modified by Ecevit—

1. Subject to the approval of the Government of Turkey which shares the relief of the United States and the Soviet Union that the SALT II agreement will contribute to improved East-West relations and to world peace, the United States intends to use overflights of the territory of Turkey as one of the means of verification recognized by the SALT II agreement.

2. Having in mind the provisions of SALT II, as well as the existing verification practices of both sides, the United States expects that the Soviet Union will not interfere with or object to these overflights. Should there be any such interference or objection, it would have adverse repercussions with respect to ratification of SALT II and its subsequent implementation.

End text of draft as modified by Ecevit.

9. Ecevit said that even before Christopher's remarks implying linkage he had had the impression that we were dragging our feet on economic credits, bilateral aid, and on the new defense agreement. If this impression is confirmed, he will have to conclude that it is linked to a new element. That would tend to open an "incurable wound" with the U.S. and the West. Turkey's already existing sense of insecurity in the Alliance would be further increased. Ecevit repeated that he had not thought to exploit the U.S. requests for overflights either bilaterally on defense aid issues or with OECD countries. This proposal goes beyond Alliance/defense relations to questions of world peace and the prevention of nuclear war and thus he did not think of using it as a bargaining chip for asking for additional aid. If, however, the Turks perceived linkage in the mind of an ally, they would have to rethink their whole position if the government, the NSC, or public opinion gets the impression that bilateral and/or OECD aid is being delayed because of this element then there would be a reaction relating to all Turkey's co-operation, including this aspect and it could cause deep disappointment on the part of all.

10. Christopher said this discussion demonstrates that in our effort to improve our relationship and cooperate together we must be sensitive to each other and the way things are understood in the other country. We are concerned not to jar the relationship and will continue to be sensitive. The U.S. course will be constructive in character. We are determined to press our effort to help Turkey as fast as possible. Christopher said he was returning to Washington with several high agenda items.

a) We want to get congressional approval of the full economic assistance program—we will press FRG to match—we will seek commensurate amounts from others.

b) Christopher said he intended to see if MAP could be restored in the Senate. This was both of real and symbolic value.

c) Christopher said he had met that morning with JUSMMAT Chief General Thompson and his Deputy.<sup>5</sup> He promised to look into military issues further on his return to Washington.

d) Christopher said he would recommend to the President and Secretary Vance that assistance to Turkey be a priority agenda item with the new UK Government at the first US-UK meeting.

11. The rest of the discussion covered various military issues and the line Ecevit would take with the press (septels).<sup>6</sup>

12. Foregoing was not cleared by Deputy Secretary prior to his departure from Ankara.

**Spiers**

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<sup>5</sup> No record of the meeting was found.

<sup>6</sup> The telegram referring to "various military issues" was not found. The telegram reporting on how Ecevit would deal with the press is telegram 3505 from Ankara, May 8. In the telegram, the Embassy noted that Christopher and Ecevit agreed: 1) on the importance of preventing leaks to the press regarding the overflight issue; 2) that the talks produced positive developments on defense cooperation between the United States and Turkey; 3) that the United States would use its influence to support Turkey in the OECD; 4) that both the United States and Turkey expressed hope on progress over the Cyprus dispute; and 5) that Ecevit would make no mention of the issue of Greek reintegration into NATO. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156-1495)

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### **139. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 12, 1979, 1643Z

121617. For Amb. Spiers from Christopher. Subject: US Overflights.

1. The President and the Secretary of State have approved the approach to the Soviets and the oral note on overflights which was agreed to ad referendum between Prime Minister Ecevit and me last Tuesday.<sup>2</sup> You should contact Ecevit and tell him that we would like to take the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 116, 5/10-31/79. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 138.

matter up with the Soviets as soon as he is able to confirm his tentative approval of the approach.

2. It is highly desirable that the Secretary be able to present the oral note and discuss this matter with Dobrynin before the Secretary leaves on May 20 for an extended trip to Europe and the Middle East. The Secretary will not return to Washington until approximately June 3 and it could be very difficult for him to take the matter up with Dobrynin during the last days before the summit when Dobrynin may well have returned to Moscow. For that reason please tell Ecevit that we would like to have his concurrence to enable us to discuss the matter with Dobrynin as early as feasible during the week of May 13–19. I realize that Ecevit indicated that he wanted to await Okcun's return on May 20, but I hope that he can consult Okcun by cable if necessary. Please report on Monday, May 14 what the prospects are on this matter.<sup>3</sup>

3. You should tell Ecevit in confidence that I met with Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd yesterday to discuss the feasibility of restoring the grant MAP on the Senate floor. Senator Byrd asked about "my friend Ecevit," and I gave him a full briefing on my trip, including my perception of the disappointment of the Turkish military leaders at the SFRC's substitution of FMS for MAP. Byrd said he was willing to help in restoring grant MAP by offering an amendment on the Senate floor if he believes the move can be successful. He has a reputation of prevailing on any matter that he has sponsored on the Senate floor. At his request, we will make soundings in the next day or two and report back to him early next week.

4. If you have not done so, you may also wish to report to Ecevit on the action of the House Appropriations Subcommittee in approving the \$100 million in supplemental economic aid for Turkey and permitting the use of \$22 million of previously appropriated but still unobligated grant MAP. If the latter action survives, it would permit approximately \$11.7 million in such prior year MAP funds for Turkey. I contacted Chairman Clarence Long and Congressman Matthew McHugh in connection with this vote. They both predicted a difficult although not im-

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<sup>3</sup> On May 15, *The New York Times* reported Turkey would agree to the U-2 verification flights only if Moscow did not object. The article reprinted a statement released the previous day by the Turkish Foreign Ministry: "In response to the United States request, it has been pointed out that Turkey attaches great importance to SALT II and to its effective implementation. However, since Turkey is not a party to this treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union and as the text is not fully known to its Government, the subject could be taken up in the authoritative Turkish governmental bodies only if it is determined by Turkey that the requested contribution advances the objectives and concurs with the understanding of the parties to the treaty." (Bernard Gwertzman, "Turkey Would Let U-2 Use its Airspace if Soviet Approved," *The New York Times*, May 15, 1979, p. A1)

possible battle on the \$50 million in new grant MAP for Turkey if and when it reaches the House.

Vance

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#### 140. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

PA 79-10225

Washington, May 24, 1979

Turkey: Ecevit Government in Crisis  
[*handling restriction not declassified*]

##### Overview

The chances of Bulent Ecevit's left-of-center government surviving the country's worsening internal security and economic crises have further diminished. Ecevit's efforts to balance political imperatives against the need for quick, decisive action have produced measures that are frequently too little or too late.<sup>2</sup> [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Political violence—back to pre-martial law levels—has become significantly more destabilizing, with the terrorists resorting to the killing of prominent Turks and Americans. Kurdish separatist organizations have been encouraged by events in neighboring Iran to step up their demands for autonomy. The economy is in such bad shape that even the promised international assistance—which is contingent on Turkey's still problematical compliance with International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommendations—would be no more than palliative if not accompanied by structural changes. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Important sectors of the government's constituency have gradually been alienated—Ecevit is now one vote shy of a parliamentary majority. After first angering the conservatives in his government and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 80T00942A, Box 10, Turkey: Ecevit Government in Crisis, Secret/Copies 263, 24. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A note on the title page reads: "This report was prepared by the Western Europe Division of the Office of Political Analysis. It has been coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Directorate of Operations and the National Intelligence Offices for Western Europe."

<sup>2</sup> In a May 1 memorandum to Brzezinski, Henze also predicted that Ecevit's acute political weaknesses had virtually ensured that the United States would not be able to secure a "fully favorable response from Ecevit on U-2 flights in the near future." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 3, 5/79)

then the leftists, Ecevit is now losing the support of other key groups. Businessmen, who take credit for Ecevit's accession to power, have called on him to step down. The ever watchful military has grown impatient with the civilian leaders' politicking and has begun to assert itself more in the making of internal security policy. An influential general has advocated tougher laws, and the leader of the 1971 "coup by memorandum," who is now a senator and presidential hopeful, has gone so far as to call for a more authoritarian constitution. Even labor has soured on Ecevit because of his economic policies and his acquiescence in the military's May Day clampdown on labor and leftists. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Ecevit still hopes to emerge from his Republican People's Party (RPP) convention that opened 24 May with his waning strength relatively intact.<sup>3</sup> He might then limp along until the October senatorial election, hoping that foreign aid will rescue the failing economy and give him another boost. Even if he survives until then, however, a defeat at the polls seems likely to follow. Moreover, whatever Ecevit's individual fate, growing numbers of Turks are fed up with weak governments and politics-as-usual. Support for an "above-parties" government is on the increase and some Turks even talk about a more basic "reform" of the political system itself, which might lead to military involvement. A weak government in Ankara will continue to make for strains in Turkey's relations with its allies, and in the longer term so too would an authoritarian one. If Turkey does move toward authoritarianism, it will almost certainly be of the right—[*less than 1 line not declassified*]*—and not of the left.* [*handling restriction not declassified*]

[Omitted here is the body of the intelligence assessment.]

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<sup>3</sup> Ecevit remained in power following a vote at the RPP convention on May 28, securing his position as party chairman until 1981.

# 141. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Madrid, June 1, 1979, 1508Z

Secto 4118. (U) Subject: NAC Ministerial: Secretary Vance's Bilateral With Turkish Foreign Minister Okcun.

1. (S-entire text).

2. Summary: Turkish Foreign Minister Okcun in May 31 conversation with Secretary Vance focused on U.S./Turkish bilateral relations. Relationship should be improved through concrete developments in areas such as co-production and quickening of the military pipeline deliveries. Okcun urged rapid movement on U.S./Turkish base negotiations along the lines of the Turkish scenario for these negotiations. He also stressed the need for U.S. support in the OECD context. Okcun conveyed to Secretary Prime Minister Ecevit's gratitude for U.S. efforts on military assistance to Turkey and in OECD. Okcun expressed hope for movement in Cyprus intercommunal discussions and said that Kyprianou must give up his idea of a unitary state. On other matters, Okcun stressed Turkish concern with events in the Iran/Afghanistan "crescent." Secretary responded that he would follow-up on bilateral issues Okcun had raised. He described our policy vis-a-vis Iran and the PLO. End summary.

3. Present for bilateral on U.S. side were Counselor Nimetz, Ambassador Bennett, Assistant Secretary Vest, and note taker. Turkish participants were Ambassador Sahinbas, who is responsible for U.S./Turkish base negotiations and Ali Hikmet Alp of MFA.

4. Secretary Vance told Okcun that he had enjoyed latter's interventions during NATO Ministerial even though he didn't agree with all of them. He asked what subjects Okcun wanted to take up.

5. Okcun said that U.S./Turkish bilateral relations were of great importance. When Ecevit government came to office in early 1978 it had stressed this point and had hoped for more progress than had actually been achieved. Turkey now looks forward to concrete results and projects in order to sell U.S./Turkish cooperation to the Turkish public.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance NODIS MemCons, 1979. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Athens, Nicosia, USNATO, and USNMR SHAPE. In a May 31 covering memorandum to Jack Perry (S/S), Art Hughes (S/S-S) noted that Vance had agreed to the following "action commitments:" 1) "give impetus to preparation of comments on Turkey DCA drafts;" 2) "keep in touch with McNamara of World Bank regarding Bank's cooperation on Turkish economic problems." (Ibid.) Vance was in Madrid June 1–2 for a meeting of the U.S.-Spanish Council after leaving the Hague where he attended the NATO Ministerial meeting May 29–31.

Relationship could thus be improved on a lasting basis of benefit to both countries and the region. Secretary said he shared these objectives and asked what can be done. He said he had the impression that a number of things were underway such as co-production.

6. Okcun said that a U.S. co-production team was in fact in Ankara this week and that something should start in this area. Another area of great interest to the military was facilitating the flow of military material through the pipeline to Turkey. He added that specific examples of U.S./Turkish cooperation, such as a plant or a co-production project could be used to create a good public image.

7. Secretary Vance said he was very much in favor of this and was willing to take a look at any concrete suggestions made by the Turks as well as coming up with our own ideas. He asked Okcun to let him know personally if there was any delay in the delivery of military equipment.

8. Okcun said as an example that over the last 15 months, construction of a plant should have started. He noted that Counselor Nimetz had come to Ankara in February of last year and nothing had occurred in the area of economic cooperation since then. (Secretary and Nimetz objected to this sweeping statement.) Okcun argued again that Turkey wants a concrete, politically justifiable and feasible relationship with the U.S. which over the long term would be of interest to both countries as well as democracy and the free world. Secretary said he agreed and Okcun said it was necessary to work out the details.

9. Okcun then moved to the status of U.S./Turkey base negotiations and asked Ambassador Sahinbas to describe the current situation. Sahinbas outlined the Turkish concept of a defense cooperation “umbrella” agreement with four supplemental agreements. He described the meetings with Ambassador Spiers and on the working group level. The previous 1969 DCA had been based on Article 3 of the NATO Charter; current Turkish drafts were based on both Articles 2 and 3.<sup>2</sup> Demonstrating the link between economic and defense matters, Sahinbas said that all their drafts had been given to the U.S. Embassy which had passed them to Washington. Turkey was now waiting for Washington comments and instructions to its Embassy.

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<sup>2</sup> Article 2 of the NATO Charter reads: “The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.” Article 3 of the NATO Charter reads: “In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of the Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”

10. Secretary asked when these agreements had been received in Washington. Counselor Nimetz said that we had had them for about three weeks. Secretary promised to give impetus to this process. Okcun said that this was very important in view of the expiration in October of this year of the deadline for completing the DCA. He said U.S. may have some difficulties with Turkish recommendations but it would be better to follow Turkish patterns, i.e. the "umbrella" concept with supplemental agreements. Okcun thought that such an agreement could pass both Turkish Parliament and U.S. Congress.

11. Okcun continued that Turkish concept of the DCA was a matter of substance, not just form. Secretary asked him to elaborate. Okcun said that Turkey sees its military relationship with U.S. as embodied in the concepts of defense procurement, economic cooperation, co-production and installations. These can be worked out in a practical fashion through the four supplemental agreements under an umbrella agreement and could be presented successfully to the Parliament. Secretary asked that Nimetz get response to Turkish proposals to him as soon as possible. Nimetz commented that the Turkish proposals represented a serious effort, that we were working hard on them and will do our best to frame our response in a way as close as possible to the form Turkey prefers.

12. Okcun said his third major point in the context of our bilateral relations was the need for U.S. support for Turkey with institutions such as the OECD and the World Bank as well as other Alliance countries and Japan. Okcun noted that Japan had been somewhat "shy" possibly because of U.S. He added that when he had been in Tokyo Japanese had told him that Turkey and Japan were two great countries which did not need an intermediary.

13. Secretary responded that he thought he was doing the Turks a favor by talking to the Japanese, pointing out Japanese had increased their contribution to the OECD package. Okcun said he did not know whether this was due to Secretary's efforts with Japanese or his own. Secretary Vance continued with regard to the World Bank, that he had already talked to Bank President McNamara and urged latter's cooperation on the Turkish problem. McNamara had said he would personally pursue the matter. Secretary added that he was prepared to keep in touch with McNamara on this issue if Turks wanted; if they did not think it would be helpful he would desist. Okcun indicated that further such efforts by Secretary would be appreciated.

14. Okcun then shifted discussion to Middle East situation. Said he had recently visited Saudi Arabia and Iran and was very concerned about Middle East "Balkanization," which was taking place from Afghanistan to Syria. He said that further deterioration would endanger the region and was creating problems for Turkey as well. There were



real dangers in such developments; no Western countries, including Israel, should stimulate “Balkanization” since Soviets would then enter on scene and create separate satellites or small political entities.

15. Secretary said his view on Iran had been clear from the outset. Situation in Iran was a domestic matter for Iranians. The U.S. would not interfere and cannot accept interference by others. He has adhered to this policy and both he and President Carter have been severely criticized as a result. However, the policy is right. There is a true revolution in Iran and outside intervention would only exacerbate the situation. We wish the current government well, have decent friendly relations with Prime Minister Bazargan but will not push and will keep a low profile. We will let relations develop as Iranians want. Secretary said he saw real problems for stability of Bazargan government because of dual form of government in Iran. U.S. will stay out, but this does not lessen our concern.

16. Okcun stressed the need for non-interference in the area at every level including the secret service. Conflict involving the Kurds in Iran is of great concern to Turkey. Turkey makes clear to everybody, including USSR, that dismemberment of Iran would have serious political implications for the region as a whole. Okcun noted that U.S. has “arranged” the Chinese side of things, and with SALT II European matters are going reasonably well. The most difficult current problem is in the “crescent” from Ethiopia/Somalia to Afghanistan.

17. Secretary responded that he has theory that one must deal with facts and problems in each country. Countries such as Iran and Pakistan are not identical and considering them as such risks oversimplification. Okcun responded he agreed and did not want to oversimplify. However Turkey attached great importance to its economic cooperation in the region and felt that this would contribute to regional stability. Secretary said there was no doubt of this and that all of us see Turkey as a great factor for stability. There is no difference in the U.S. on this.

18. Okcun asked if Israel was “cooking up” something in Iran. Secretary responded that there was no question of this. Initially there had been real concern about the Jewish population in Iran. Fear of a purge had caused tremors both in Israel and the U.S., however, both Ayatollah Khomeini and Bazargan had spoken out against such a purge as against Islamic tenets. There was nothing to the report of Israeli meddling in Iran.

19. Okcun then asked how U.S. intended to repair its image with the Arabs. Secretary noted that Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia would probably be coming to the U.S. by the end of summer or early fall, King Hussein about the same time and King Hassan of Morocco had visited already. U.S. has sent emissaries to the Gulf states. However, the real

indicator will be progress in the negotiations, particularly on the Palestinian issue.

20. Okcun asked if the U.S. should get in touch with the PLO. Secretary described in some detail U.S. efforts to make openings toward the PLO based on different interpretations of UN Resolution 242 and the possibility of the PLO dealing with the U.S. through West Bank Palestinians. Secretary said that Arafat is aware of his efforts, has not responded as yet, although they were close at one point.

21. Secretary said that Turkey seems to think it was necessary to re-write 242 but he thought this would be immensely complicated. We have made progress and now even Israel has agreed that the Palestinian issue cannot be swept under the rug. Thus the concerns of Arafat have been met to a large extent. Arafat has indicated he doesn't want to play his trump card. Secretary said his view is that it is time to stop playing games and make some progress.

22. Okcun said that Prime Minister Ecevit had asked him to express his satisfaction to Secretary about U.S. efforts with the Congress on Turkish military assistance and the U.S. efforts in the OECD context. This shows that the U.S. has stopped following the policy of linkage. Secretary asked Okcun to please pass his respects to Prime Minister Ecevit. Okcun said that U.S. has a good friend in Turkey. Secretary responded that he hoped the Turks felt the same way about the U.S. Okcun said that the Secretary should have no doubts about this.

23. Secretary promised follow-up on matters that Okcun had raised. Latter concluded conversation with comment on Cyprus to effect that he hoped that June 15 intercommunal talks will start as scheduled. He said it was necessary to convince Kyprianou to abandon the idea of a Cypriot unitary state. Denktash, according to Okcun, believes that Kyprianou has not abandoned this concept. Secretary said he would have to study the ten points.<sup>3</sup> Okcun said in fact Greek Cypriots had given nothing in the ten points.

Vance

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 67.

**142. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Ankara, July 19, 1979, 1230Z

5416. Subj: (S) Political Reporting: Prospects for Military Intervention. Ref: State 178919.<sup>2</sup>

1. Secret-entire text.

2. Summary: We do not think intervention by the Turkish military in the Turks political process is imminent before the October elections. The military is dissatisfied with the trend of events, however, and should the political/economic situation deteriorate further they might decide to intervene for a third time. End summary.

3. Because the Turks military regards itself as the ultimate defender of Ataturk's Westernizing and modernizing reforms and has intervened in the political process twice since 1960, a third intervention has to be regarded as possible. The failure of Turkey's politicians to find solutions to deep-seated economic and social problems and continuation of cutthroat politics as usual during the first half of 1979 has created dissatisfaction among senior military officers. Centrifugal forces at work in neighboring Iran, renewal of Kurdish activity in Iraq and internal expressions of Kurdish nationalist sentiment in Turkey's sensitive southeastern provinces have heightened their concern. As a result, there is evidence that senior military officers have discussed the possibility of a third political intervention among themselves and with elements of the Turkish political elite. However, our information suggests that intervention in the period immediately ahead is unlikely. The failure of Demirel's effort to unseat Ecevit in June has given Ecevit a breathing space at least until the October elections. Barring some dramatic event before then, it is unlikely the military will intervene.

4. In the past there have been signs of rumblings below the surface before the military moved which have been picked up by our intelligence reporting. We are not at present getting these types of signals. There were some indications that senior military figures were discussing intervention earlier during the spring but for the moment these have tapered off. (Comment: If the coup plotters were relatively junior in rank, the prospect of their carrying out preparations without it coming to our attention would be greater.)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Box 10, Ankara. Secret; Immediate; Roger Channel. Sent for information to Adana, Istanbul, and Izmir.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

5. In any case, we believe that it would be difficult for the military to intervene under present circumstances. The military establishment is heavily preoccupied with its own internal problems. In order to justify such action, maintain their prestige, and win broad public acceptance, the military would need a rationale which does not exist at present. There are, however, conceivable events which if they occurred might provide a credible justification for action:

—Revolt in southeastern Turkey: Open revolt by Kurds in southeastern Turkey or a spill over of fighting from neighboring Iran or Iraq would probably lead the Turkish military to intervene, particularly if the civilian leadership was seen as indecisive or capitulatory.

—Economic collapse: A disaster, such as a major crop failure or riots protesting high prices and shortages might lead the military to feel intervention was warranted. Agricultural production in 1979 should, however, be high. Moreover, the Turkish people are by nature stoic. Riots or nationwide strikes are not traditionally regarded as acceptable forms of protest.

—Mishandling of a major incident: Bungling a serious outbreak of violence, similar to the Kahramanmaras incidents of December 1978, the 1977 May 1 celebration in Istanbul or the Palestinian attack on the Egyptian Embassy, could prompt military action.<sup>3</sup> The 1971 coup by memorandum was sparked by the Demirel government's mishandling of the kidnapping of four American airmen. Ecevit's failure to appear decisive or consult fully with the military could prompt some form of limited military intervention.

—Political statemate—Perhaps the most likely cause for intervention would be a prolonged political crisis in which the democratic process as presently structured in Turkey appeared totally incapable of dealing with the country's many problems. Such a crisis might occur later this year should the Ecevit government fall and no clear alternative emerge. As noted in our earlier assessment (Ankara 4193), pres-

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<sup>3</sup> The Turkish city of Kahramanmaras erupted in political violence when Sunni and Alevi Muslim fighting left over 100 people dead. The incident on May 1, 1977, known as the Taksim Square Massacre, occurred during May Day celebrations in Istanbul, when gunmen shot into a crowd, killing 36 and wounding over 200. On July 13, 1979, Palestinian fighters attacked the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara, killing two Turkish security guards and taking nineteen hostages with the demand that Egypt renounce the peace negotiations with Israel and recognize a Palestinian state. The Consulate reported the May 1, 1977, violence in telegram 1503 from Istanbul, May 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770153-0400) The Embassy reported the July 13 incident in telegram 14194 from Cairo, July 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790316-0785)

tures are building up for fine tuning the political system.<sup>4</sup> A prolonged crisis could cause the military to take a hand in this process.

6. In sum, while it is our judgment that military intervention is not likely in the short run, we cannot be as confident about the medium term. Turkey's prolonged economic and political crisis has, according to our Consulates in Izmir and Adana, begun to have an adverse effect on the traditional stoicism of the Turkish public. The Consulates sense a growing inclination among some elements of the Turkish elite to want the military to intervene to "set things right." As our earlier analysis indicated, we doubt the current military leadership is inclined toward intervention, but a failure of the political system in dealing with Turkey's political/economic crisis may alter this attitude.

**Spiers**

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<sup>4</sup> Telegram 4193 from Ankara, June 4, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790252–1037.

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#### **143. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Ankara, September 19, 1979, 1433Z

6939. Subj: (S) Turkey and SALT II Verification. Ref: Ankara 6254.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S-entire text).

2. Summary: Prime Minister told Ambassador Sept. 19 that US proposals for Turkish role in SALT II verification had been discussed in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Box 27, Turkey, 3 Apr 1979–19 Sep 1979. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Henze forwarded the telegram to Brzezinski with a September 19 memorandum that commented on the U–2 issue: "The Turkish answer confronts us with the same issue we faced originally—if the Soviets really want SALT II and want to help us get it ratified by agreeing to adequate verification arrangements—then why do they work to intimidate the Turks so as to prevent them from cooperating with us? This is evidence of severe bad faith. If we go on ignoring this, we become parties to a deception—and hostage to the Soviets' own manipulation of one of our major allies." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 6254 from Ankara, August 23, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–1621. The telegram reported that Spiers renewed the U.S. request for U–2 overflight permission over Turkey, to which Ecevit replied that Turkey needed more time to consider the matter.

National Security Council and that it had decided to maintain original GOT position, i.e., Turkey wished to contribute to the implementation of SALT II, but could not do so in the face of Soviet objections or misunderstandings about the Turkish role in what was essentially a two-power accord. Ecevit stated that WB-57 alternative was more troublesome for GOT than original US proposal, but he reaffirmed GOT willingness, in spite of high political risks, to proceed as previously agreed with DepSec Christopher, if "understanding" that systems like U-2's were encompassed in national technical means, existed between treaty parties.<sup>3</sup> Ecevit said, however, that Soviets had clearly indicated their opposition to idea of U-2 flights to a recent Turkish Parliamentary delegation in Moscow. Ambassador replied that this was not our reading of the Soviet attitude, which we saw as an unwillingness to either openly support or reject the idea, but which did not rule out passive acquiescence in it. End summary.

3. Ambassador was called to see the Prime Minister Sept. 19 to receive Turkish reply to latest US proposals for SALT verification. FonMin Okcun was also present. The Prime Minister explained that an official reply to the proposals (reftel) had had to await discussion by the National Security Council. This had been essentially the same as his own, i.e., that the GOT would maintain its original position. It wished to contribute to the implementation of SALT II, but the GOT role in the verification process should not be in the face of Soviet opposition or misunderstanding, particularly since SALT II was basically a two-power accord.

4. Ecevit said that the NSC had found the US alternative proposal for WB-57 flights more troublesome than the original proposal for U-2 overflights. The alternative formula did not make Turkish participation any easier since the aircraft would be based in-country and a Turkish crew member would be on board. This would mean even greater Turkish involvement in an accord to which the GOT was not a party. The NSC could not advise the GOT to submit such a proposal to the Parliament.

5. The Prime Minister said that he hoped this would not harm our relations, which have been improving thanks to the efforts of both sides. This was not in any way a step backward from the GOT's previous position. It was rather a reaffirmation of the GOT's willingness to proceed as originally discussed and agreed with DepSec Christopher,

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<sup>3</sup> See Documents 138 and 139. The WB-57 aircraft holds one pilot and one passenger and flies at lower altitudes within a smaller range than the U-2. The United States had previously used the WB-57 for atmospheric research. The proposal to replace the U-2 with the WB-57 was based on the presumption that the latter aircraft would be more acceptable to the Turkish military.

in spite of the high political risks involved. Ecevit added, however, that last week a Turkish Parliamentary delegation in Moscow on other matters had talked with Soviet officials, in particular with Chairman of the Council of the Union Shitikov. Shitikov had indicated “rigid Soviet opposition” to the U-2 overflights. Ecevit commented that the Soviets had brought up the matter themselves and their opposition to the Turkish role was clear.

6. The Ambassador indicated that our judgment was that while the Soviets could not openly agree to such a proposal they were unlikely to create difficulties over the matter. Prime Minister stated that the Turkish impression was precisely the opposite, but that if the Soviets did change their attitude the GOT was ready to proceed as previously discussed. The Ambassador noted that previous discussions with the Soviets on national technical means (NTM) had led us to conclude that while the Soviets had expressed some sensitivity to third country involvement and made clear that they did not want language sanctioning such practices in any agreement, they nevertheless did not consider such systems as unlawful.

7. The Prime Minister noted that as a matter of policy the GOT did not discuss this issue with the Soviets, but they had received other indications of Soviet displeasure. Ecevit recalled that Brezhnev had recently spoken of Soviet-Turkish relations in a somewhat cooler tone than in the past and he felt that perhaps this might also be the Soviet’s way of sending a message on the overflight issue. He also wondered if the recent media reports which linked the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba to US forces in Turkey might not be indicative of another form of subtle Soviet pressure. FonMin added that this attitude had also been evident in his recent discussions with the Soviet Ambassador. Okcun asked that the US consider further the “political feasibility” of its proposals and their impact on Turkey.

8. Ambassador replied that the issue was both a political and substantive one in the US. It had been carefully considered and the issue of assured and dependable verification procedures could affect congressional approval of SALT. The alternative to the present proposal was [2 lines not declassified] and that might not be a politically viable alternative for the U.S. administration. Prime Minister observed that the modernization or improvement of existing in-country facilities would be a much more palatable alternative for Turkey. Ambassador replied that while we desired and were discussing such modernization, particularly at [less than 1 line not declassified], it was unfortunately not the answer to the SALT II verification problem since it could not pick up the required [less than 1 line not declassified].

9. Ambassador noted that one of our difficulties seemed to be differing evaluations of the Soviet attitude. He said that he would report

the Prime Minister's remarks in full and await further instructions on where we go from here.

11. Comment: I fear we are back to square one, and that the GOT—under present political circumstances—will not accept the onus of agreeing to monitoring flights while the Soviets are expressing opposition and might exploit this against them. If there is an understanding (preferably explicit, but possibly implicit) on both sides that “NTM” includes such systems as U-2's, Ecevit will cooperate. If there is not, they have convinced themselves agreeing will create major political difficulties internally and bilaterally with USSR. As the above indicates, we are not likely to get the Turks on board unless we can provide further evidence that the Soviets will not react in a hostile manner detrimental to Turkish interests. This in turn depends on our ability to persuade the Soviets that agreement on this issue is crucial to obtaining congressional approval for SALT II. This brings me back to one of our original suggestions, i.e., the possibility of a congressional reservation relating third country verification efforts to the definition of national technical means. If, in spite of the administration's best efforts, it appears that other reservations will be attached to the Treaty, the inclusion of one along the above lines would be most beneficial here. I also believe it would be useful for Secretary to review this matter with Foreign Minister Okcun when they meet at UNGA.<sup>4</sup>

**Spiers**

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<sup>4</sup> The meetings took place on October 4 and 5, and the Department described them in telegram 265783 to Ankara, October 11. The SALT issue did not come up during the talks. The telegram is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790465-0307.



**144. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

PA M 79–10483

Washington, October 12, 1979

**TURKEY'S OCTOBER ELECTIONS***Summary*

*The fate of Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit's tottering government hangs in the balance as Turks go to the polls on 14 October to fill 50 Senate and 5 National Assembly seats. No one expects the elections to resolve the fundamental weaknesses of the Turkish political system, however, and Turks are bracing for a prolonged period of instability. [handling restriction not declassified]*

*Defections and resignations have left Ecevit seven votes short of a majority in the crucial lower house. The opposition, led by Justice Party chief Demirel, has been unable to muster the simple majority required to win a vote of confidence. Demirel, however, stands an excellent chance of winning at least four of the five contested Assembly seats and several additional Senate seats. [handling restriction not declassified]*

*Whatever the results of the election, neither Ecevit nor Demirel will have enough seats to govern alone. The composition of the next government will thus depend on bargaining behind the scenes. Ecevit may first try to induce enough opposition defections to regain a majority; failing that—and it seems an impossible task—he is likely to seek a coalition with the Islamic-oriented National Salvation Party. Such a government would be inherently unstable—as would any coalition that Demirel could patch together. [handling restriction not declassified]*

*In any case, the government that emerges—whether led by Ecevit, Demirel, or even by a non-political personality—will be too weak to cope with Turkey's urgent economic and internal security crises before the national elections scheduled in 1981. The military—Turkey's most cohesive institution—will closely watch the political maneuvering. If civilian leaders seem unwilling to curtail political ambitions for the sake of national unity, military leaders might feel compelled to exert greater pressure in behalf of a government willing and able to do the job.<sup>2</sup> [handling restriction not declassified]*

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 82T00267R, Box 2, Turkey's October Elections. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A note at the bottom of the page reads in part: "This memorandum was prepared by the Western Europe Division of the Office of Political Analysis."

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 7644 from Ankara, October 15, Spiers described the results of the October 14 election as "a resounding vote of no confidence in the Ecevit government" and predicted that Ecevit might choose to resign shortly while Demirel's political fortunes had been bolstered. Ecevit resigned as Prime Minister the same day. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790472–0194) On November 12, Demirel, head of the Justice Party, became Prime Minister for the sixth time in 14 years.

**145. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff<sup>1</sup>**

Ankara, November 24, 1979, 1006Z

8510. Military addressees handle as Specat Exclusive. Personal for Deputy Secretary Christopher, Under Secretary Komer, Generals Jones, Rogers and Allen, Admiral Shear and Ambassadors Bennet and McCloskey. Subject: Turkish Security: My Conversation With General Evren and the Need for New Departures.

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Summary: Dinner with TGS Chief Evren a few days ago surfaced Turkish anxieties about her strategic position that we need HSB address or run the risk of further weakening in our own position. Some action suggestions are enumerated in para 9. End summary.

3. Introduction: The upheaval in Iran documents the reasons for the growing fears of Turkey's security planners. Up to only a year ago Turkey's eastern flank was occupied by an imperial power devoted to reinforcing its defenses and able to keep the Kurds in tow and Iraq, armed by the Soviet Union, at bay. Now there is chaos in Iran, the Kurds resurgent and Iraq without an effective counter weight. More significantly perhaps, up to only a year ago Turkey was the strategic half-way house to vital US and European interests in the Persian Gulf. Today, Turkey is the easternmost reach of Western influence and power. Our defensive links to the Gulf via Iran have been cut and the Turks see themselves as geographically interposed between the Soviet Union and the oil it will need to overcome projected deficits in the 1980's. In my judgment, the Turks have reason to be nervous.

4. A conversation with General Evren: In a private dinner I had with General Evren on November 19—General Saltik and two other senior members of the Turkish General Staff (TGS) also were present, as were General Thompson, General Knudson and my MSA Counselor—the chief [point] of the TGS's message was clear: in the absence of a clearer US commitment to Turkish security and a greater US willingness to address Turkey's defense requirements, Turkey would have no option but to adjust itself to the world which surrounds it. Evren did not threaten. He has no illusions about the paucity of Turkey's options. He understands his country's plight and knows that first priority must

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-81-0711, Box 19, Cartridge Frame 1-210. Secret; Niact Immediate; Specat; Exdis. Sent to USCINCEUR Vaihingen, USDOCOSouth Naples, USNMR SHAPE, USNATO, and Athens.

be given to its economic woes. He fully appreciates the amount and generosity of our economic aid and he will not ask his political masters to divert to defense money needed to repair the economy. Furthermore, he knows that his country is politically isolated from its Balkan and Arab neighbors and the wider third world. He did not ask for MAP, nor did he make a bid for more FMS credits. He acknowledged his dependence upon outside military assistance. At the same time, he did not want the TGS to add to Turkey's economic troubles by piling up increasingly costly FMS debts.

5. Evren wanted a signal, greater proof that we would stand by Turkey. He asked that we translate what limited military aid we could provide into hardware, by making deliveries from stocks. He also urged that we reduce Turkey's FMS burden so that almost half of what we give in new money is not offset by debt service requirements. He saw the installations agreement as an aspect of a broader problem: the need to restore a healthy and viable US-Turkish security relationship, which would be symbolized by the signing of a multi-year defense agreement. He summed up his points by saying that before embarking unreservedly once again on the American route to security, his country would have to be reassured that "the weather would remain fair along the entire course of the journey".

6. The response I was able to make—that until its economy becomes stronger Turkey must depend for its security on an unambiguous commitment to NATO—seemed inadequate. NATO guarantees in this part of the world are credible only to the extent our actions make them so. Having said this, no one is more aware than I that Turkey makes being generous difficult. I made this point to Evren by contrasting Turkey's manner with that of Sadat; of Turkey's holding back versus Sadat's constant search for mutually supportive initiatives. I urged Evren and his colleagues to "bet on the come", that their tie to the United States was their only real option and that they should act accordingly. But my confidence that we would respond to positive gestures had to be caveated. When Evren asked about a long-term guarantee of military aid I could offer only prospects for an improved climate and express my belief that the probabilities of good weather would be enhanced by positive Turkish actions.

7. It seems to me that the trend of events in this strategic corner of the world requires a fresh display of US determination. We have done much for Turkey already—stimulating a \$961 million multilateral economic aid program and the doubling of direct US aid in one year—but realistically more is needed and we should be ready to do more to avert further deterioration or to respond to a more Sadat-like Turkish stance.

8. I share Evren's perception of the defense agreement, that it is more important as a symbol of our reestablished relationship than as a

cover for the installations agreement. As I have stated in the past, I see little threat to the continued operations of our facilities. My apprehension has been and remains that unless we are more responsive in the security area our relations with the TGS and with the other elements of Turkey's security establishment will deteriorate with all this implies in terms of US interest. In this context signature of a long-term defense agreement may have to await our willingness to reinforce our NATO commitment to Turkish security with more tangible assurances that Turkey will have access to US defense equipment and on the best possible terms including a high but not exclusive priority to such excess defense articles as may become available. We also may have to underscore our current "best effort" pledge of continuing security assistance with an Inouye-Marcos type congressional guarantee.<sup>2</sup> I recognize that neither branch of our government has been prepared to pledge its word in these ways in view of congressional problems or lack of progress on Cyprus, etc. but events in Iran and Pakistan urge that we reassess our stance.

9. I recognize that the question of enhanced guarantees cannot be dealt with in a week, but during my consultations in Washington I would like to explore some specific suggestions as to what we might do:

—The Turks hope that I will return with the FY 81 aid figures and repayment terms.

—They are also hoping for at least a partial response to their request for FMS debt relief.

—They are closely watching the prospects for our delivering in the next year or so some high visibility items of defense equipment drawn from their equipment list. My staff has some ideas on what items would be most responsive—

Air Force: attrition aircraft including about 15 F4's, some F100's, 10–20 T37's and at a later date some more T-38's;

Navy: favorable resolution of the leases on the two gearing destroyers; and

Army: accelerated delivery of modernization kits for a small number of M-48A5's.

10. Washington doubtless will have its own ideas on what equipment it may be possible to deliver from stocks. But the point is that

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a military base agreement struck between the United States and the Philippines in January 1979. The negotiations included an October 1978 visit by Senator Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii), who convinced Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos that the terms of the aid package offered by the Carter administration were unlikely to be improved by Congress. (Bernard Wideman, "U.S. Philippines Near Pact on Military Bases," *The Washington Post*, December 8, 1978, p. A24)

something concrete and specific is needed—and quickly—if we want to deal with this crucial country's growing fear for its security.<sup>3</sup>

**Spiers**

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<sup>3</sup> In a November 26 memorandum to Vance, Brzezinski noted that Carter read this telegram and commented, "Turkey needs to reciprocate. They have been consistently negative." Henze wrote to Brzezinski the following day, calling Carter's reaction "depressing" and "betray[ing] shallow understanding of the realities of our relationship toward an indispensable ally as well as a petulance that will serve us poorly in our efforts to improve relations with Turkey in the months ahead." Henze further estimated that the new Demirel government "offers the best prospect in more than five dismal years for a solid improvement in U.S. relations," and counseled that Brzezinski should personally open a dialogue with Demirel, as the new Prime Minister considered the Department of State too weak to engender improved relations. Both memoranda are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 4, 11/79.

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#### **146. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Brussels, December 14, 1979, 1724Z

8750. Subj: (C) Secretary's Meeting With Turkish Foreign Minister Erkmén.

1. C-entire text.

2. Summary. In a pleasant and low-key fashion the new Turkish Foreign Minister Erkmén set out to introduce himself to the Secretary and establish his credentials as a long-time friend of NATO and supporter of strong relations between Turkey and the United States. He then presented a short list of requests concerning the size of military assistance for FY 1981, debt suspension for outstanding FMS loans, the supply of military equipment, and rapid conclusion of the defense co-operation negotiations. He did this in a general and non-demanding fashion. After the meeting was over, the Turkish PermRep to NATO, Olcay, presented Ambassador Bennett with a talking paper that made similar points, but in greater detail. This paper can be found at para 12. End summary.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance NODIS MemCons, 1979. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Ankara, Athens, Nicosia, and USUN.

3. Secretary Vance welcomed the new Turkish Foreign Minister and told him that he looked forward to working with him. The Turkish Foreign Minister said he was pleased that the American Secretary of State had agreed to meet with him so soon. He said that he did not want to refer back to past history in the relationship, only wanted to mention that he was a member of a government that was known to have always valued a strong relationship with the United States. He said he would have only a few issues to raise, and he would be very happy to receive a quick reaction from the Secretary.

4. Erkmén mentioned the severe economic problems faced by Turkey and the longstanding force commitments it had made to the NATO Alliance. He said that taking these two facts together should lead the United States to have broad understanding for Turkey's problems. Erkmén then recalled that in the NAC Ministerial meeting earlier in the day he had mentioned his having been the youngest member of the Turkish Cabinet that in the 1950's had decided to join NATO. Now he remarked he is the oldest member of the new Turkish Government that wishes to develop and strengthen its relationship with NATO. It was in the spirit of friendship and Alliance that he wished to raise several specific issues.

—Overdue FMS debts. He asked that these be treated with full understanding.

—The Turkish five-year equipment list: Erkmén said that the United States and Secretary Vance were surely aware of the quality problems of Turkish armed force equipment. He said that a five-year list of equipment for the 1980's had been presented to the United States recently, and he hoped that the Government of the United States would find a way to help provide for these equipment needs.

—FY 1981 budget: He said that the Turkish Prime Minister would very much appreciate hearing from President Carter, if that were possible, with respect to the US FY 81 budget requests for assistance to Turkey. Turkey hoped that a letter from the American President could make the point that the United States will be favorably inclined and will do its best to help Turkey and to strengthen the relationship. (For further elaboration, see septel on Nimetz/Sahinbas meeting.<sup>2</sup>)

—The defense cooperation negotiations: He requested that every effort be made to resolve the remaining issues so that the agreements could be signed before the January 9 date set by the previous government.

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 8746 from USNATO, December 14, the Mission reported on the meeting between Nimetz and Şahinbaş, which explored ways to speed up the defense cooperation negotiations between the United States and Turkey. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790575-0870)

5. Secretary Vance responded that the United States and the present administration sincerely valued the relationship with Turkey. The effort made last year during one of tight budget stringency to provide Turkey with 450 million dollars in assistance, an amount which was only surpassed by Israel and Egypt in the whole world, surely demonstrated that commitment. The budget for FY 1981 is presently under preparation. The Secretary told Erkmen that he is scheduled to meet with President Carter on December 18 to discuss the security assistance elements of the budget.<sup>3</sup> Vance also mentioned that he had forwarded to the President a request for a substantial sum for Turkey, but that it was premature to comment in any detail. He said that as soon as a decision was made, he would be happy to get word to Foreign Minister Erkmen. Vance reiterated that the size of the commitment undertaken by the United States last year surely demonstrates to Turkey the importance the United States attaches to helping Turkey fulfill its needs and the value the United States places on the relationship. Vance told Erkmen that in attempting to help Turkey in this way and to build the relationship, he was not referring to all of Turkey's specific economic and financial problems which the United States was also attempting to respond to.

6. Erkmen said he wished to raise one further issue in connection with the 1980 assistance earmarked for Turkey. Of the 198 million in assistance, 100 million has been received, but 98 million is apparently subject to some difficulty in the US Congress and Turkey has not been able to use any of it. He said this was currently a major problem because Turkey is facing special difficulties in purchasing petroleum products.

7. Secretary Vance asked Counselor Nimetz whether the bill was still held up in conference. Nimetz said it was, but that the dispute had nothing to do with the 98 million dollar assistance for Turkey. The US side expressed the hope that this bottleneck would be over soon. Erkmen said he did not wish to question the details only hoped the problem would be resolved in the very near term.

8. Defense negotiations: Erkmen said that his experts have reported that no major problems remain in the defense agreement negotiations and that there could be a signing very soon of the basic agreement. He then referred to some of the appendices and attached agreements and said that while it might be tempting to want to sign just the basic agreement and keep working on the others, problems were sometimes caused in this way and Turkey would prefer to resolve all of the issues promptly so that all of the agreements could be signed.

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<sup>3</sup> No substantive record of this meeting was found.

Vance agreed that the two countries were very close to consummating the basic agreement and hoped to be able to do so by January 9. Insofar as the related attachments were concerned, realistically speaking it might be hard to get them all ready by January 9, though the United States would like to accomplish that. Nimetz said that in his view the negotiations have been going well for both sides, but that the structure of all the agreements is such that it might be very difficult to get perhaps as many as 90 separate documents ready in time. The Turkish negotiator, Sahinbas, interjected that it should be possible to get all the agreements done since many of these were "standard documents." Secretary Vance suggested that Counselor Nimetz and the Turkish negotiator get together on Friday to discuss this matter further and see what could be done. (septel).<sup>4</sup> Nimetz affirmed that the United States also wanted very much to resolve this matter quickly. Erkmen then said he had no further issues which he wished to raise.

9. Cyprus: Secretary Vance said that he would like to discuss the Cyprus problem since he understands that it may be possible to get the intercommunal talks resumed soon if Waldheim issued a new invitation cum suggestion. Vance said an early resumption of the talks would be in everyone's interests. In order to get the talks restarted, therefore, Secretary Vance asked Foreign Minister Erkmen to do whatever he could to convince the interested parties to cooperate. Vance told Erkmen that he had asked Greek Foreign Minister Rallis to do the same, who had agreed. Erkmen assured the Secretary that he could be certain that the Turkish Foreign Minister would not want to fall behind Mr. Rallis in this question and that Erkmen, too, would do all that he could.

10. Secretary Vance then asked the Foreign Minister to please convey his respects and best wishes to Prime Minister Demirel and to also pass along similar expressions of respect from President Carter. Erkmen replied that he too had left this important question for last and wished to pass along Prime Minister Demirel's high regards and best wishes to Secretary Vance and President Carter.

11. In conclusion, Secretary Vance asked Counselor Nimetz to do what he could to speed up the negotiation and signing of the defense agreement and for his part, he undertook to do what he could to get the FY 81 budget figures for the Turkish Government.

[Omitted here is the Turkish talking paper.]

**Bennett**

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<sup>4</sup> Not further identified. No record of the meeting was found.



**147. Action Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Nimetz) to Secretary of State Vance<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 2, 1980

## SUBJECT

Defense Negotiations with Turkey

Foreign Minister Erkmen has now responded positively to your offer to send me to Ankara to try to finish the defense negotiations. I will be meeting with him and his associates January 6–9.<sup>2</sup> We have made it clear that this visit is to help the Turks get over their self-imposed deadline of January 9; that accepting my mission carries with it the obligation to achieve some form of initialed agreement as a result of the talks.<sup>3</sup> The Turks have reiterated that they must have hard information on our assistance plans for FY–81, as well as some indication of how we plan to respond to their request for a letter from President Carter to Prime Minister Demirel on the commitment of the United States Administration to support Turkey in the future.

I understand that the President has now given us a FY–81 mark of \$452 million for Turkey (\$250 million FMS, \$200 million ESF, \$2 million IMET). As you promised Erkmen, I will give this information to him on a confidential basis.<sup>4</sup> We have made it clear to the White House and to OMB that we would have to do this before publication of the budget in order to assure a successful completion of the negotiations.

The second major question is the Presidential letter. What we have in mind is a hortatory letter, emphasizing the importance we place on the relationship and our intention to be as helpful as we can in helping to meet their needs.<sup>5</sup> I will not show them a draft but want to be in a position to tell them that we expect to have an appropriate Presidential letter available for delivery to the Prime Minister when the agreement

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P7901290–1772. Confidential. Drafted by Dillery; concurred in by Holmes. A stamped notation at the bottom of the first page reads “CV,” indicating that Vance saw the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Vance underlined “January 6–9.”

<sup>3</sup> Vance underlined the second half of this sentence. On October 8, 1979, Prime Minister Ecevit had announced that the United States could resume operating its bases in Turkey for 3 months, or until January 1980, while negotiations on their status continue. (“Turkey to Extend Status Of U.S. Bases for 3 Months,” *The New York Times*, October 9, 1979, p. A11)

<sup>4</sup> Vance underlined the sentence and wrote “ok” in the margin.

<sup>5</sup> Vance underlined the sentence.

actually is signed; hopefully, in the near future. The Defense Agreement is an executive agreement which pledges only "best efforts" to secure needed economic and military assistance for Turkey. The letter would constitute the President's personal recognition of his responsibility to make such an effort and will allow the GOT to fall off their position that they must have a specific pledge of money or equipment. Neither OMB nor the NSC staff have indicated concern about our wish to have such a letter as long as it does not contain any specific dollar commitment.

To assure the best atmosphere for the talks, I will need to be in a position to tell the Turks that we will be disbursing part of our FY-80 ESF and that we are prepared to negotiate an agreement allowing them to place orders for \$200 million in FY-80 FMS.<sup>6</sup> I will point out that we are making this effort under the Continuing Resolution even though the Congressional Conference Committee on Appropriations has not yet acted on the FY-80 Foreign Assistance Appropriations Bill.

There will be two main contentious issues in the negotiation:

(1) The Turks want to complete the entire agreement, including all annexes before signing or initialing any of its parts. This will be almost impossible because of the sheer volume of documents, and also because a number of the technical annexes contain points of difference which we probably will not be able to resolve during my visit.

(2) The second issue is one of substance. The Turks will hold very strongly that the foundation agreement should specifically preclude any use of the facilities by American forces except for narrowly-defined NATO purposes.<sup>7</sup> We want as much flexibility as possible in potential use of the bases, even though we recognize that no activities would be possible without the complete consent of the Turks. Finding an appropriate compromise on this point will probably be the major challenge of my visit.

My goal in the January 6-9 talks is to initial a foundation agreement and, if possible, three supplemental agreements (defense support, defense industrial cooperation, and installations). These agreements would then be referred back to governments for early review, so that the Turks could feel that a signing ceremony might take place within a reasonable period.

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<sup>6</sup> Vance wrote "ok" in the margin.

<sup>7</sup> Vance underlined the two previous sentences.

*Recommendation*

That you approve these guidelines for my negotiations.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Vance checked the “Approve” option and January 3 is stamped below. The negotiations to finalize the Defense Cooperation Agreement began when Nimetz met Erkmen in Ankara on January 5. Nimetz noted that the Foreign Assistance Appropriations bill for FY 1980 was still in Congress but that the administration was moving ahead to make funds available while it waited for its passage. On a confidential basis, Nimetz provided the details of the administration’s FY 1981 request to Congress as it related to aid for Turkey: \$250 million in FMS, \$2 million in military training and education, and \$200 million in economic support. Nimetz also reported that Carter would send a letter when the Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed, which would affirm the U.S. commitment to modernizing Turkey’s armed forces. (Telegram 120 from Ankara, January 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800011–1153) For the text of Carter’s letter, see Document 148. The Defense Cooperation Agreement between the United States and Turkey was initiated in Ankara on January 10. Its most salient features were: all military bases in Turkey were considered Turkish facilities managed by Turkish commanders; utilization of the bases required final authorization by Turkish authorities; and the agreement was valid for five years and renewable on an annual basis thereafter. (Telegram 282 from Ankara, January 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800017–0947)

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**148. Letter From President Carter to Turkish Prime Minister Demirel<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 21, 1980

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Today’s signing of the Agreement on Security and Economic Cooperation marks an important milestone in the relations between the Republic of Turkey and the United States of America.<sup>2</sup>

For more than a generation the Turkish and American peoples have had a flourishing relationship as allies and as fellow members of the Atlantic community. Indeed, our friendship is older than NATO itself. That friendship is based on common democratic values, peaceful ideals, and strong cultural and humanitarian ties.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 19, Turkey: Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, 2/77–4/80. No classification marking. Henze forwarded a draft in a February 20 memorandum to Brzezinski and reported that the letter “represents the final step in the process of completing our new Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey.” (Ibid.) In the upper right corner of the letter, an unknown hand wrote: “orig. picked up by Lois Bozilov (EUR/SE) 2–21–80 10:45 a.m.”

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 8, Document 147.

The new agreement is a solemn commitment on the part of the United States to assist in strengthening the armed forces as well as the economy of the Turkish Republic. It recognizes Turkey's crucial contribution to the Alliance, and addresses critical questions of defense and economic cooperation. It is my firm conviction that Turkey should be assisted in every feasible way, and I regard this effort as a high personal priority of my own.

In signing this agreement, we enable both our countries to face the future with confidence and to look forward to a new era of mutual endeavor, based on the trust that underlies the cooperation between sovereign states that are not only allies but friends.

It is my pleasure to send you this letter by the hand of James W. Spain, our new ambassador to your country. I am confident that he will represent us well and faithfully.

Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

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**149. Letter From Turkish Prime Minister Demirel to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Ankara, March 7, 1980

Dear Mr. President,

I would like to avail myself of the important occasion of vital talks between Your Excellency and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in Washington to express my firm belief that the outcome of these high level contacts will be positive and fruitful for the whole NATO Alliance as well as for the individual members of it.<sup>2</sup>

I would like to express also on this occasion my satisfaction to see the strains placed on our bilateral ties eliminated in late September 1978, thanks to Your Excellency's considerate attention and relentless efforts. This development was welcomed by the Turkish public opinion

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 19, Turkey: Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel, 2/77-4/80. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> Following the Schmidt-Carter talks, West German officials pledged up to \$295 million in economic assistance to Turkey on the condition that the United States would match that amount. See *Foreign Relations, 1977-1980*, vol. XXVII, Western Europe.

in view of the importance that Turkey has always attached to the maintenance of a harmonious relationship with the United States.

As you are aware, Mr. President, both our Governments have acted with a sense of great responsibility to start the process of revitalizing and widening our relations within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty to the lofty goals of which our two countries are dedicated. It gives me particular pleasure to see the Agreement for Cooperation on Defence and Economy is now ready for signing.<sup>3</sup> Your Excellency's personal contribution in achieving this positive result and the understanding shown as well as the efforts made by Your Administration will constitute a new and valuable evidence of the will of the United States Government and people to strengthen the Turkish-American friendship which is fully appreciated and reciprocated in Turkey.

I look forward to seeing Turkish-American relations and cooperation gain further momentum following the signing of the new Agreement. Let me express, Mr. President, my hope that in this new era of revitalization of our mutual ties, the circumstances prevailing in the world and in this region will be the determining factor in rendering support and assistance to Turkey with a view to enabling my country to carry out properly her NATO obligations. The level of the assistance must, I believe, take also care of the necessity of offsetting the negative effects of the arms embargo. Turkey looks now more than ever to her allies and friends to get their assistance in support of her own efforts to overcome the acute problems of economic and social development.

I feel confident that Your Excellency would share my conviction that a militarily and economically strong Turkey has vital importance in the maintenance of peace and stability and that the U.S. support and assistance will materialize taking into account this basic fact, which has come to the fore in the face of the recent international developments.

With kind regards,

Sincerely Yours,

**Süleyman Demirel<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>3</sup> The Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed on March 29. The agreement, which supplemented the Defense Cooperation Agreement initialed on January 10, committed the United States to the military and economic support of Turkey, but did not specify levels of aid for either the economic or military spheres. The agreement also established a joint U.S.-Turkey military commission to foster military cooperation, and contained pledges that both countries would work together in commercial, scientific, and technological pursuits. An outline of the agreement is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 1980, pp. 30–31. For the full text of the agreement and its three supplementary agreements, which entered into force on December 18, see *U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 32, part 3, 1979–1980, pp. 3323–3388.

<sup>4</sup> Demirel signed "S. Demirel" above this typed signature.

## 150. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

PA 80-10124

Washington, March 9, 1980

Short-Term Prospects for Turkey [*handling restriction not declassified*]

### Summary

Turkey remains beset by political, economic, and internal security problems with which Prime Minister Demirel's minority government seems scarcely able to cope. Spiraling political violence is evolving into mass unrest. If unchecked, it could turn into open insurrection or civil war. Lack of foreign exchange has caused the economy to grind to a halt, further fueling the political violence. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Together with continued jockeying and partisanship by Turkey's political leaders, these developments have impelled military leaders to become more involved in the political process. Their demand in early January that the squabbling politicians unite to solve Turkey's problems nudged the government into taking stronger action on both violence and the economy and has evoked some grudging cooperation from other political parties.<sup>2</sup> But interparty feuding has continued, and the onrush of events leaves the impression of a government still lacking control. In a followup statement, Turkey's senior military leader warned that time is running out for a democratic solution to Turkey's problems, and there are other indications that the military's patience is wearing thin. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

About the only bright spots for Turkey and for Western interests in this bleak picture are the government's economic stabilization program, which contains the kind of medicine that the economy needs, and Demirel's pro-Western orientation, which has made Turkey more sensitive to the concerns of the West. Turkey's friends and allies have

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 81T00208R, Box 2, Short Term Prospects for Turkey. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A note on the first page reads in part: "This memorandum was prepared by [*name not declassified*] of the Western Europe Division, Office of Political Analysis. It has been coordinated with the Directorate of Operations, the Office of Economic Research, and the National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe. Information available through 9 March 1980 was used in the preparation of this memorandum."

<sup>2</sup> This demand was reported in U.S. news reports as a "last warning" sent as a letter signed by General Kenan Evren to Turkish President Fahri Korutürk on January 2, who in turn gave copies to Ecevit and Demirel. The letter expressed the end of Evren's patience for elements in Turkish society which had called for either a Communist revolution, a theocracy, or a fascist state. (Sam Cohen, "Turk Military Gives Politicians 'Last Warning,'" *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 3, 1980, p. 3)

reacted favorably to the government's moves and are following up their 1979 rescue effort with an even bigger aid package this year. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Whether Turkey's continued slide can be arrested—or at least slowed—will depend on a number of factors. Though hard on the public, the stabilization measures will have to be implemented firmly and left in place long enough to be effective. Turkey will need to secure prompt and relatively easy access to foreign funds to buy oil and other necessities to get industry and agriculture moving again and to alleviate public hardship. Political violence and mass unrest will also have to be contained. These are demanding requirements for Turkey's leaders and allies, and the Turkish military is likely to deem it necessary to play a more forceful role in solving the country's mounting problems. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

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#### 151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 5, 1980, 1647Z

147784. For Ambassador from Nimetz and Vest. Subject: (S) Possible Military Intervention in Turkish Political Process. Ref: A) Ankara 3964 B) Ankara 4068.<sup>2</sup>

1. (S-entire text)

2. Dept has impression that the concept of a "military solution" may be gaining support from Turks who have lost hope in their system and see no other remedy for the problems which beset it. Indeed, the current scene in Turkey seems pregnant with portent: the manifest inability of the system to cap the spiral of violence, a deadlocked Parliament, a minority government with eroding support, incessant bickering among party leaders, the slowness of the economic turnaround, repeated but ineffectual warnings by TGS leaders, the role of the mili-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870146–0473. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Noform. Drafted by James A. Williams (EUR/SE); cleared by Dillery, Ewing, and Jane Taylor (S/S). Sent for information Immediate to the White House.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 3964 from Ankara, May 30, and telegram 4068 from Ankara, June 3, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800265–0688 and D800271–0566 respectively.

tary in the Turkish constitutional tradition, and the recent 20th anniversary of the 1960 coup which overthrew Menderes. A "military solution" could take the form of a coup à la 1960 or extra-legal steps à la 1971 that would make the TGS the dominant political force in Turkey.<sup>3</sup>

3. We are less concerned by the form that such a step might take than by the prospect that it could be gaining respectability and support. USG officials have repeatedly and emphatically stated that, given adequate external resources, the Turkish Republic can overcome its massive problems. We remain convinced that this is so. Indeed, our public statements, congressional testimony, and private demarches have supported aid to Turkey *inter alia* as an investment in stabilizing the democratic system of an embattled ally and friend. We know that your Mission has been making, and will continue to make, the same points, e.g., para 8, ref A.

4. Nevertheless, in view of the growing public currency of the notion of a "military solution," it is necessary to review whether there are other appropriate and available means to reinforce our posture on this subject. It is possible that our message, through repetition and the passage of time, has lost its audience and that Turks no longer take it as seriously as they once did. If this is so, our problem is how to deal with a "military solution" phenomenon which may be reality or illusion. On one hand, we do not want to acquiesce in a brewing and real threat to Turkish democracy. On the other hand, we do not want to react to rumor-mongering. Unfortunately, the two are not always possible to differentiate. Our main concern, therefore, is to continue to make sure that Turkish leaders, civilian and repeat and military, clearly understand that the USG:

- totally opposes the concept of extra-legal military action, however defined or justified;

- believes that any such action would have a catastrophic impact on Turkey's bilateral relationship with its allies by gravely undermining their—and our—ability to respond to Turkish needs for economic and military support; and

- does not believe that present circumstances, admittedly difficult and trying, warrant even abstract consideration of this step.

5. We remain confident that Turkey will ultimately find the answers it needs within its democratic processes. The USG and other

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<sup>3</sup> Unlike the 1960 coup, the coup of March 12, 1971, did not involve actual assumption of rule by the military, but a coup "by communiqué" when military generals ordered Prime Minister Demirel to resign or face removal. Demirel promptly resigned. Eight days after the communiqué, Nihat Erim, formerly of the Republican People's Party, presided over a government described in news reports as an "above-party togetherness" coalition deemed acceptable to the military.



countries are making available massive resources to help the GOT reach that goal, and we intend to stay this course. We expect our Turkish friends to do the same.

6. Subject to your views, we believe that we should once again convey this message to selected target audiences in Turkey, in addition to your Mission's ongoing dialogue with GOT officials and political figures. Several means occur to us.

—Chief JUSMMAT could address this subject in the context of an early general discussion with a high TGS member, perhaps General Saltik;

—at the Department's daily press briefing, the spokesman could commend Turkey's tenacious efforts to resolve problems in a way consistent with its deeply rooted commitment to democratic principles; and

—similar themes could be woven into high-level press conferences, bilateral meetings, toasts, arrival and departure statements during the Secretary's attendance at the June 24–26 NATO spring Ministerial in Ankara.

7. These ideas raise delicate questions of nuance and timing. We would appreciate your views and specific comments as soon as possible.

**Muskie**

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**152. Telegram From Secretary of State Muskie to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Ankara, June 25, 1980, 1752Z

Secto 4048. Please pass President's party. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Turkish Prime Minister June 24, 1980. Ref: Secto 4035.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Subject Files of Edmund S. Muskie, 1963–1981, Lot 83D66, Box 2, unlabeled folder. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Athens, Bonn, Nicosia, Madrid, USNATO, USNMR SHAPE, USDOCOSouth Naples, and USUN. In a covering note to L. Paul Bremer, III (S/S), John H. Kelly (S/S-S) commented: "The Secretary said we would look into what could be done on Turkish debt rescheduling." (Ibid.) Muskie was in Ankara June 24–26 for the NATO Ministerial meeting.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram Secto 4035, June 25, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890018–0472. The telegram summarized Muskie's meetings with Demirel and Greek Foreign Minister Mitsotakis, both on June 24. For the meeting with Mitsotakis, see footnote 3, Document 203.

1. Secret-entire text.

2. Summary: Secretary met for approximately 70 minutes, June 24, with Turkish Prime Minister Demirel, Foreign Minister Erkmén, and other Turkish officials prior to opening of NATO Ministerial session. Demirel was preoccupied with current debate in Turkish Parliament on censure motion directed against his government but was relaxed and confident that barring unforeseen developments he would be able defeat motion next week. Without making specific requests except for re-scheduling of Turkey's debt falling due in 1981 and 1982, as well as 1980, Demirel emphasized NATO role of Turkey, commitment to democratic system, and willingness to resolve differences with Greeks through negotiations and to see resumed Cyprus talks. He indicated Turkish willingness be helpful on Iranian hostage situation. Secretary said we realized importance of strong, economically healthy Turkey and its strategic location. US was willing to continue be helpful in meeting Turkish requirements. He expressed appreciation for Turkish Olympic boycott and for willingness help on Iranian hostage problem.<sup>3</sup> Secretary also stressed importance of early Greek reintegration into NATO and of finding ways to get a solution moving on Cyprus. He said we would take another look at possibilities before the next debt re-scheduling negotiating session in July. End summary.

3. After the press and photographers had left his office, Turkish Prime Minister Demirel opened his meeting with Secretary Muskie with a 30 minute presentation. Demirel said he was happy to welcome the Foreign Ministers of Turkey's NATO allies to Ankara for the first such meeting here since 1960. He recalled that Turkey for many years had very good and friendly relations with the US which served a mutual interest for both countries. There had been some trouble during the arms embargo period but both countries knew the value of their relations to the entire Alliance.

4. Demirel said he was firmly convinced that a weak Turkey would not be in the interest of either the Turkish people, its allies, or its neighbors. He was determined to build Turkey's strength. The Prime Minister also pointed out that of the 156 members of the UN, only 23 had free democratic systems of government and of these only 2 (India and Japan) were in Asia in addition to Turkey. Turkey was geographically part of both Asia and Europe but he felt strongly that Europe and

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<sup>3</sup> On May 22, the Turkish Government decided to join the international boycott of the Olympic winter games to be held in Moscow. The boycott, led by the United States, signaled each participating nation's protest of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Carter sent Demirel a message congratulating him on his "difficult but important decision" to boycott the games. "Nowhere is this message more meaningful," Carter wrote, "than in the vital region of the world where Turkey is located." (Telegram 135348 to Ankara, May 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800253-0106)

the Western community should not end at the Bulgaria/Greek border. Turkey had been able to keep its free democratic party system for 34 years and was determined in its own interest to continue such a system. Turkey was also determined to carry out its responsibility to defend itself and to cooperate with others for the common defense of NATO. Turkey had never failed to fulfill its NATO commitments.

5. Demirel stressed the importance of economic strength. According to his figures, Turkey now ranked 52 among UN members in terms of per capita income. It has enormous potential resources, including a hardworking, able people. Economic trends have been good from 1963 to 1978 when 7 percent annual real growth had been achieved. Economic stability had been the pattern during this period, even though, according to Demirel, there had been too many governments. In the 1978/79 period Turkey had been afflicted with heavy inflation which his government in the last seven months had tried to fight through unpopular measures. There had been good support from the people and the program was having results. This approach would be continued. Demirel was grateful for Western assistance and understanding. He hoped for a very good harvest in 1980 but noted the high cost of imported petroleum.

6. With regard to equipment for the military forces, Demirel said that \$800 million was needed this year to keep the forces at the same level and that approximately \$4.5 billion would be required over the next five to six years. Turkish resources were very limited but they were doing their best.

7. Reverting again to the economic situation, Demirel noted improved price performance over the last three months as well as some increase in industrial activity. He said that the IMF, IBRD, and OECD have shown good understanding as had national assistance organizations. His goal was "expansion within stability." This would take time but he expressed confidence.

8. With respect to relations with the Greeks, Demirel said that the existence of problems and disputes should not lead to confrontation or hostile relations. Disputes should be settled through negotiation since confrontation would serve the purpose of the common enemy of Turkey and Greece. He thought it important to try to find solutions through negotiations and peaceful means and hoped that the Greeks would not think that a strong Turkey would be a greater problem for Greece.

9. Demirel commended the recently signed Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement as serving the interests of both Turkey and the US. He said that it would get through the Turkish Parliament and that having such approval would avoid potential problems later. In any event, the DECA was already in force so there was no great ruse to get

it through Parliament. Demirel said he appreciated what the US had done in the past and he realized the value of Turkey's strategic location from the US point of view.

10. With regard to Iran, Demirel said that no civilized person could approve of the holding of the hostages. Turkey had suffered from the shooting of Turkish Ambassadors abroad and felt strongly that diplomats should enjoy protection. The hostage problem was not just that of the US but of the entire world. He said it is very difficult to know who had government power in Iran but doubted that most of the Iranian people support holding the hostages. He noted the danger of pushing Iran toward the Soviets but stressed that the Turkish Government would do its best if it could be of any help in the hostage problem. They had tried in the past to be helpful. They believed it important not to cut relations with their neighbor but rather to keep open a window which might in the future be helpful.

11. In closing, Demirel said he wanted to raise one other matter, namely the recent meeting in Paris to reschedule Turkey's debts.<sup>4</sup> He thought it important that Turkey have full support during the next three to five years to pull its economy together. The particular matter where he hoped the US could do something involved debts already postponed in 1978/79. He hoped these debts could again be rescheduled covering not only 1980 but also the next two years. He said he would appreciate anything the Secretary could do.

12. Secretary Muskie responded that he was delighted to be making his first visit to Turkey. The US had strong feelings of friendship and understanding toward Turkey. The Secretary wished to convey to the Prime Minister and to the Government and people of Turkey the personal best wishes of President Carter. In the short period that he had been Secretary of State he had often discussed with the President the common interests we share with Turkey. We agree fully that Turkey must be strong. The Secretary recalled that a year ago as a Senator he had undertaken at the request of the President a mission to Europe, including West Germany where the top item for discussion was the Turkish aid package. Chancellor Schmidt had exercised effective leadership. We continued to be very supportive in all ways we could of that initiative.

13. The Secretary noted that the U.S. bilateral aid program for Turkey was one of the largest during a period of budget austerity and general unpopularity in Congress of foreign aid. We recognized that as

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<sup>4</sup> The OECD Consortium to Aid Turkey began negotiations in Paris in June on rescheduling \$2.2 billion of Turkey's debts to foreign governments. (Ann Crittenden, "I.M.F. Grants Turkey Record \$1.6 Billion Loan," *The New York Times*, June 19, 1980, p. D1)

a NATO member, the strength of Turkey was important to the Alliance and that the events of the past six months had further enhanced the need for stability in the area. The Secretary stressed that there should be no doubt about US willingness to be as helpful as we could since our mutual interest was served.

14. Following these opening remarks, the Secretary told the Prime Minister that he would like to raise several specific subjects. The US very much appreciated Turkey's support on the Olympic boycott. The latest information was that some 62 countries would not be in Moscow.

15. The Secretary said he was aware of and appreciated Turkey's interest in the hostage problem. We were undertaking quiet, indirect diplomatic approaches in an effort to persuade Iran to release the hostages. He hoped that other countries, even those which had not imposed sanctions, would refrain from full normal relations with Iran since, as the Prime Minister had said, all governments were affected. As a neighbor, Turkey might have an opportunity to influence the Iranian decision process and we would welcome any help that could be provided.

16. The Secretary said that based on Under Secretary Nimetz' visit to Athens on June 23, he believed the Government of Greece wants very much to rejoin NATO and to do so as soon as possible.<sup>5</sup> He thought the US and Turkey must find ways to make that possible. General Rogers was working on the problem with the Turkish General Staff and other NATO military authorities and had received good cooperation. Rogers and NATO would set the terms and conditions but the Secretary wanted the GOT to know of our strong interest in early reintegration. This devolved in part because our facilities in Greece served NATO defense objectives. Greek reintegration was an important objective for the US and Greece; the Greek elections in 1981 could result in a change in climate that would affect resolution of this issue.

17. Regarding Cyprus, the Secretary said he recognized that the Prime Minister knew of the interest of Congress and the widespread frustration that there had been no movement in the last year or two. It would greatly help both Turkey and the US if ways could be found to get a Cyprus solution moving. The situation was stagnant. He recognized that Demirel had other problems but he wanted to emphasize our interest in a Cyprus settlement. The Secretary said he did not fully understand the recent problems with UN intercommunal talks but he hoped something could be done.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 203.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 77.

18. With respect to debt rescheduling, the Secretary said that Congress is sometimes very reluctant to see debt relief granted and that this consideration did not involve just Turkey. There were budgetary aspects and we ordinarily engaged in debt rescheduling only in cases of greatest urgency. However, we would continue to study this matter on returning to Washington.

19. At the suggestion of the Secretary, Ambassador Spain noted Executive Branch and congressional interest in early Turkish ratification of the Prisoner Transfer Treaty.<sup>7</sup> He noted that there were four long term prisoners in Turkish prisons and asked about the Parliamentary prospects. The Prime Minister said it would go through Parliament.

20. Ambassador said he had been impressed in his recent consultations with Congress about the wide appreciation of Turkish democracy as well as the contribution Turkey makes to the strength of the free world. The Secretary said there indeed was a new appreciation of the strategic importance of Turkey. We also had a different perception of the Persian Gulf which further increased our mutual interests with Turkey. Both national interest and shared values were arguments buttressing the importance of helping Turkey and further strengthening of ties. He thought Congress wanted to be supportive but that Turkey's help was also needed.

21. Demirel stressed that Turkey was not against reintegration of Greek forces into NATO and recognized that it was in the interest of Turkey and all the other Allies. Greek forces would be welcome to come back although he noted that no one had pushed Greece from NATO. However, things had changed and there were disputes about the continental shelf and lines relating to air space. When such lines were called borders it became even more difficult. Demirel said he had talked to General Rogers and there had been frank conversations with the Chief of TGS. The GOT was willing to agree to a reasonable solution, one which could be defended to Turkish public opinion. He recognized that the GOG had its own public opinion to consider. He recalled that the GOG had refused proposals made by both General Rogers and General Haig but he thought this question should and could be worked out in military channels.

22. On Cyprus, Demirel said he thought the Greek Cypriots still wanted to go back to the pre-1974 situation. The two communities simply could not live together again. They needed to live separately with a line between two zones but within a federal state. Turkey was

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<sup>7</sup> Reference is to the International Prisoner Transfer Program. The United States began in 1977 to negotiate treaties with other countries to allow prisoners to be transferred from the country in which they were incarcerated to their native country. Turkey entered into an agreement with the United States on January 1, 1981. (32 UST 3187)

willing to have a Cyprus agreement. He noted, however, that Cyprus had been quiet for six years, the longest such period in modern history. Cyprus was costly to Turkey. Agreement on a federal system with federated states for the two communities would be the key to an agreement. Even Archbishop Makarios had accepted bizonality before his death but the Greek Cypriots subsequently retreated from that position. The Turkish side was willing to negotiate and was not causing trouble. He had stressed to UN Secretary General Waldheim in Belgrade that the Turkish side would be reasonable.

23. The Secretary asked whether in a bizonal system there could be any shifting of territory. Demirel said territory was subject to negotiation. Under Secretary Nimetz noted how hard it was even to get inter-communal negotiations started; there had been not much more than 10 hours at the table in the last 3½ years. Demirel said there was no other way. The people on the island who would have to live together must negotiate together. Nimetz said there is a Greek perception that Denktash will not start negotiating until the Greek Cypriots agree to all his pre-conditions, particularly bizonality. Demirel said that was not correct, but there could be no solution so long as they rejected bizonality. In response to a question from Ambassador Spain, the Turkish side said that the Government of Greece would not talk about Cyprus bilaterally with Turkey.

24. Demirel returned again to the importance of a favorable rescheduling of Turkey's debt covering about \$1 billion for all countries in 1981/82. He did not think the burden would be that great for the US and it would be a great help to Turkey. The US role was very important. The Secretary said we would look into it again and would consider what could be done. We had solved other problems together and perhaps this one could be resolved as well. He recognized debt scheduling was part of an integrated package. He had discussed this with Ambassador Spain and also noted that Turkey had been on the minds of the seven summit countries at Venice.<sup>8</sup> It had also been mentioned in a conversation with Schmidt.

25. In response to the Secretary's question about current political developments in Turkey, Demirel thought that barring unforeseen developments, he would have the necessary votes to defeat a censure motion which was being discussed in the Parliament immediately after the meeting with the Secretary. The actual critical vote would be next week. In response to the Secretary's comment that Demirel did not look under tension, the Prime Minister said he "loved fights"; democracy

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<sup>8</sup> The Venice G-7 Summit, attended by the leaders of the United States, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the President of the European Commission, took place June 22–23.

was not easy but it was “beautiful”. He recalled the frequent censure motions his party had defeated in the 1965/71 and 1975/78 periods. Demirel stressed, however, that he would welcome early elections since he felt in a strong political position.

26. In addition to the Secretary, US participants included Ambassador Spain, Under Secretary Nimetz, Assistant Secretary Vest, Ambassador Bennett, and EUR/Deputy Assistant Secretary Ewing (note taker). Demirel was accompanied by Foreign Minister Erkmén, MFA Secretary General Yigit and several other officials and interpreters from the Prime Minister’s office and the Foreign Ministry.

**Muskie**

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**153. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington July 12, 1980

SUBJECT

Turkish Debt Rescheduling

*Summary*

I recommend that you authorize the U.S. Delegation to the July 22 OECD Turkish debt rescheduling negotiations to reschedule payments on Turkey’s previously rescheduled debts falling due during the 18 month period, July 1, 1980–December 31, 1981. Secretary Miller concurs in this recommendation.

Our economic analysis for the next six months of this 18 month period indicates that the Turks might be able to service their debt payments, although they have said they will not be in a position to pay because they need the foreign exchange for critical imports. For calendar 1981 our analysis indicates that there is a high probability that Turkey will not be able to service its debt payments unless previously rescheduled debt is included in the debt relief agreement under negotiation. These negotiations broke off June 19 over this issue.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Special Projects, Hazel Denton, Box 64, Turkey: 3/80–1/81. Confidential. In the upper right-hand corner, Carter wrote, “Ed, cc Bill Jim. J.”



The Turkish government believes that the \$457 million in debt relief resulting from rescheduling previously rescheduled debt over the next 18 months is critical to the successful continuation of their economic stabilization program. They see the U.S. position as pivotal in the negotiations. Our European allies (particularly the FRG) are willing to go along with the Turkish request if we do. The Turks see this issue in political terms, noting our “best effort” commitment of assistance under the recently signed U.S.-Turkey Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement. Rescheduling previously rescheduled debt was the only substantive request made of me by Prime Minister Demirel. Our refusal to change our position on this critical issue affecting the Turkish economy and political stability will inevitably make it more difficult for us to work with the Demirel government effectively to get movement on Greek reintegration and Cyprus.<sup>2</sup>

Budget Director McIntyre’s views will be presented in a separate memorandum.<sup>3</sup>

### *Background*

Negotiations between the Government of Turkey and its OECD creditors broke down on June 19 over the issue of including debt service payments on debt previously rescheduled in 1978 and 1979 agreements. Creditor nations tabled a generous package, but, due to the opposition of the U.S. and some other creditors, these payments were not included in the offer. The Germans (who have been leading international efforts to assist Turkey) and the IMF supported Turkey’s request to include these payments. The negotiations resume July 22.

Following the breakdown, the Turks suggested a compromise to break the deadlock by reducing their request for a three-year rescheduling of previously rescheduled debt to eighteen months, July 1, 1980 through December 31, 1981. The Turks insist that without this relief, Turkey will be forced to default on its public and private debts, which would violate the terms of its stabilization program with the IMF, reduce new private bank lending and threaten economic and political disruption.

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<sup>2</sup> Carter underlined “to get movement on Greek reintegration and Cyprus” and wrote in the margin, “ha!”

<sup>3</sup> In a July 15 memorandum to Carter, McIntyre advocated delaying additional debt rescheduling for Turkey “until we can better assess their financial situation.” He further recommended: “The United States should provide assurances that we will review Turkey’s 1981 requirements next year. In addition, I am concerned that these debt rescheduling proposals are proliferating. Therefore, I will send instructions to the agencies that future proposals be sent to OMB under your future budget commitments process, in order to be sure that non-default reschedulings receive the same degree of analysis and budget review as any other spending proposals.” Carter bracketed the last sentence and wrote in the margin, “Ok do so. J.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Special Projects, Hazel Denton, Box 64, Turkey: 3/80–1/81)

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*Economic Analysis of the Turkish Compromise*

Our comments on the merits of providing 18 months of additional debt relief follow:

—The economic justification for additional relief during the first 6 months is uncertain: the Turkish figures support their request, while the creditor figures seem to demonstrate no additional relief is essential.

—On the other hand, for the remaining 12 months an economic justification can be made that the Turks will face imminent default.

The present creditor offer would provide debt service relief of \$1.1 billion in 1980, but only \$510 million in 1981 and \$500 million in 1982. Combining this with other receipts, we believe that the level of earnings in 1980, given our import estimate, will enable the Turks to meet their nominal foreign exchange obligations with \$137 million left over. In 1981, however, the figures indicate that Turkey would be unable to meet its obligations, heading for a financing gap of \$300 million (see attached table).<sup>4</sup>

Rescheduling 18 months of Turkey's previously rescheduled debt service would provide an additional \$144 million in foreign exchange in the first six months and \$313 million for the remaining twelve months. In 1980, this would increase Turkish foreign exchange availability. In 1981, the additional relief would correspond to the foreign exchange shortfall our figures project.

The Turks argue that to replenish depleted stocks of oil and industrial inputs needed to resume economic activity, minimum imports in 1980 will exceed our estimate by at least \$300 million. (Even at this higher level, Turkish imports will be less than their 1978 level in real terms.) They assert that all available foreign exchange, including any incremental debt relief, would be used for further imports needed to increase the chances of success of their reform program.

*Political Considerations*

The U.S. position on the issue of previously rescheduled debt is the key to ultimate agreement by the creditor nations as a group. If the U.S. resists providing additional relief, the Turks will view our position as being at variance with the "best effort" assistance commitment in the recently signed U.S.-Turkey Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement. The Turks know that a decision on previously rescheduled

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<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed are a table itemizing Turkey's foreign exchange position for 1980 and 1981 and a table comparing Turkey's foreign exchange provided by OECD creditors 1979-1983.

debt is within your power to grant and will not understand a U.S. refusal to advocate a debt relief package that supports the Demirel Government's stringent economic stabilization measures. These measures hold out a realistic hope of economic recovery.

The vote of confidence Demirel received July 2 assures that he and his policies will continue in power at least until the fall when Parliament reconvenes. The economic aid the OECD nations have already pledged and a successful debt rescheduling should allow Turkey to face this winter with added confidence. When I spoke with Demirel in Ankara, he several times emphasized the importance of rescheduling previously rescheduled debt and I stressed the need for movement on Greek reintegration and Cyprus. Evidence of U.S. support for an acceptable solution to this problem in which he has a personal interest would encourage Demirel to be responsive on the issues I mentioned to him.

#### *Congressional Reaction*

The Administration has broad authority to negotiate debt agreements, but Congressional attitudes require us to respect the latitude we now enjoy to avoid direct Congressional controls over debt negotiations. However, consultations with key Congressmen and Senators indicate no objections to using this method to provide additional debt relief for Turkey.

#### *Budgetary Impact*

If future payments on previously rescheduled debt are included in the creditor nation offer, U.S. budget receipts will be reduced by \$10.9 million in FY'80, \$54.6 million in FY'81 and \$14.2 million in FY'82, assuming that the Turks would make these payments if they were not rescheduled. With appropriations action completed for 1980, the additional rescheduling will not create Congressional pressures for offsetting reductions. In 1981 and early 1982, however, the increase in net budget outlays (by reducing receipts) could generate such pressure. However, since our analysis suggests that the Turks will not pay in 1981, agreement to improve the debt rescheduling package merely regularizes a shortfall which I believe will take place in any event.

#### *Impact on Future Debt Rescheduling*

Further rolling over these debt service payments in a new rescheduling sets an undesirable precedent. The precedent will apply to further negotiations with Turkey regarding payments beyond 1981, although we would attempt to minimize Turkish expectations in this regard at the July 22 meeting. Zaire is the only other country where the Turkey precedent is likely to apply in the next few years.

## DECISION

*OPTION 1: Include Previously Rescheduled Debt for Next 18 Months.*

You would authorize the U.S. delegation to the July 22 OECD Turkish debt rescheduling agreements to support the inclusion of payments on previously rescheduled debts on the same terms as other debts being rescheduled. This decision would cover payments on previously rescheduled debt falling due over the entire eighteen-month period: July 1, 1980–December 31, 1981. (\$79 million in U.S. debt relief) (State and Treasury support this option.)<sup>5</sup>

*OPTION 2: No Previously Rescheduled Debt but Small Face-Saving Measures*

That you direct the USG Delegation to oppose the rescheduling of any future payments on Turkey's previously rescheduled debts, but authorize the USG to make minor improvements in the present creditor nation offer to provide a face-saving gesture to the Turks. This could be done by increasing the portion of rescheduled debts from 90 to 95 percent. (6 million in additional U.S. debt relief)

*OPTION 3: No Change in U.S. Position*

That you direct the USG Delegation to maintain its present position on the debt relief package. (Additional U.S. debt relief—none)

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<sup>5</sup> Carter approved this option. He crossed out "December 31, 1981" and wrote below the paragraph, "but extend from 7/1/80 only for twelve months. J."

**154. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Ankara, September 19, 1980, 1343Z

6795. Subject: The Turkish Military Takeover—Background and Prospects.

1. (C)-Entire text.

2. Summary: Now that the Turkish military leadership has outlined its basic rationale and purposes, we offer this preliminary perspective on the September 12 takeover of the government.<sup>2</sup> Based on what we know now and on comparisons with the interventions of 1960 and 1971, we believe that the Turks plan to make fairly extensive alterations in their political system.<sup>3</sup> The objective will be to keep Turkey democratic, secular and pro-Western. The parliamentary system will be retained, but many here have urged the new architects to strengthen the Presidency. Extremist politics which had divided the country will be curbed. Overall, the revised system will place greater emphasis on the unity of the state and workability of its organs rather than on unrestricted personal liberties.

3. The major areas of continuity are Turkey's economic system and external relations. The military leaders are strongly committed to the economic reform program begun earlier this year. In foreign relations, all previous alignments and policies, including strong support for settling the Cyprus problem, are to be continued without change.

4. The timetable for transfer of power to an elected civilian government will depend on (1) progress in extinguishing terrorism, which is down but by no means out; and (2) the degree of cooperation the military is able to elicit from the civilian elite which heretofore was sharply

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 82D275, 1981 Human Rights and Country Files, Box 19, Turkey—Sept thru Dec 1980. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated for information Priority to USICA, Adana, Istanbul, and Izmir; to Athens, Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, The Hague, Lisbon, Luxembourg, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, USNATO, USCINCEUR Vaihingen, USDOCOSouth Naples, HQ USAF Ramstein, USNMR SHAPE, Nicosia, Tel Aviv, Cairo, Amman, Jidda, Damascus, and Islamabad.

<sup>2</sup> The National Military Command Center reported at 0330 EDT on September 12 that General Kenan Evren, Chief of the Turkish General Staff, took control of the Turkish Government at 2100 EDT on September 11. The Chief, Joint United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, was alerted in advance of the military takeover, and was also assured that the takeover did not signal any change in relations with the United States and that all U.S. citizens in Turkey would be protected. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-82-0217B, Box 18, Turkey 1980) It was the third such intervention of the military since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 151.

divided. Given the magnitude of the task the military has set for itself, the earliest anyone could reasonably expect a transfer of power would be, say, one year; it probably will take longer. End summary.

5. Background to the takeover: As those who have followed Turkish politics know, the September 12 "takeover" or "operation" (the terms Turks are using) is the third military intervention into politics since the founding of the Republic in 1923. All were planned and executed in conformity with Atatürk's tradition (aka "Kemalis") which entrusts to the military the role of watchdog over Turkey's democracy. This intervention, like the previous two, is viewed by most Turks as acceptable under the circumstances and as an opportunity to improve the democratic system, building on the experience of the past. The Turkish saying, "one mistake is worth a thousand pieces of advice", is their departure point.

6. In his September 12 speech, his subsequent pronouncements and his September 16 press conference, General Evren has devoted considerable attention to an analysis of the country's problems—and somewhat less on future plans. A close reading, however, reveals considerable thought and a number of significant guideposts for future action. The major theme running through his analysis is deep concern and pessimism over the polarization of Turkish society by the wholesale dissemination of extreme leftist and religious ideology through the educational system and by use of terrorist intimidation tactics. General Evren tended to lay the blame for this at the door of Turkey's politicians, whom he accused of selfishness, negligence and power-lust.

7. A second major point in Evren's pronouncements is that the parliamentary system set up by the 1961 constitution and supporting legislation had foundered on the lack of provision for self-correction. He lamented the inability of the last Parliament to get together to pass security legislation which would have permitted martial law authorities to go after the growing terrorist threat. The same point has been made recently by many Turks and outsiders. Many believe that the framers of the 1961 Constitution, in an over-reaction to the strong-man rule of Menderes, completely hamstrung the new system by penalizing the big parties and forcing governments to rule by tenuous coalition.

8. Events leading to September 12: It is fairly clear now that planning for a military takeover became serious in mid-July after terrorist acts took the lives of an MP, former Prime Minister Erim and a prominent leftist labor leader. Evren reviewed these events and the increasing polarization of the country by extremist groups, terming the violence a "covert war" which took as many lives (5,000 dead, 15,000 injured) during the past two years as the main battle for Turkish independence at Sakarya (March–July 1921). The growing violence, he said, against the background of governmental ineffectiveness and Parlia-

mentary deadlock, gave the military no option but to take temporary control of the State organs before they collapsed.

9. The Turkish military's world view: Evren also revealed that he and his colleagues were greatly concerned about the danger of external involvement in the growing anarchy in the country. He referred frequently to the exploitation of sectarian differences and ideological divisions aimed at destroying unity and leaving the country vulnerable to civil war and external manipulation. As examples, he cited two recent incidents in which leftists and religious "bigots" openly defied the unity of the State during the playing of the national anthem, shouting religious slogans or singing the "Internationale" in its place. While he did not directly blame the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, or Islamic revivalism in Iran and Libya, Evren made it clear that he and his colleagues believed that externally-directed or inspired ideological factions had dangerously weakened the democratic, secular foundations of the State. It is interesting to note that while some of the military leaders are reported to be practicing Muslims, they strongly believe in a secular political system, a cardinal Kemalist principle.

10. Foreign policy: We look for little or no change in Turkey's external relations. Because of their importance, the Turkish military established early-on close and smooth working relation with the MFA. As a result, all pronouncements and actions have been carefully coordinated with Ilter Turkmen, Secretary General and Acting Head of the Ministry. The Ambassador's contacts with Turkmen have been productive and reassuring regarding U.S. interests and the continuation of normal bilateral cooperation in the defense area.

11. Similarly, Evren has strongly reaffirmed Turkey's active support for a settlement of the Cyprus problem through the current inter-communal talks and its support for Greek reintegration in NATO. As for Turkey's relations with the USSR, Western Europe and the Middle East, there are no surprises. As expected, Evren reaffirmed Turkey's close ties with NATO, relations with the EEC and Council of Europe, and bilateral relations with the Western democracies. He underscored efforts to maintain and strengthen "friendly and brotherly" ties with the Muslim Middle East. (Israel was not mentioned, but we expect no new moves regarding Turkish-Israeli relations).<sup>3</sup> After the U.S., only the Soviet Union was given special mention, the latter in the context of a neighbor and of its special role in preserving world peace.

12. Internal reform: From Evren's pronouncements, we are not yet sure how extensively the Constitution, political parties and elections

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<sup>3</sup> Turkey recognized Israel in March 1949, the only major Muslim country to have diplomatic relations with Israel. In January 1980, the Turkish Mission in Tel Aviv was raised to Embassy level.

laws and the State organs will be revised, but he has called for major surgery in several areas. He has left no room for doubt that the revisions will provide for a free, civilian-led, democratic parliamentary system, which will respect basic individual rights. It is likely, in view of the unworkability of the old system, that new procedures for electing a President will be devised. There is also a minority, but influential view in Turkey for creating a strong presidential system which would permit the President to break parliamentary deadlocks by, for example, calling for new elections.

13. From the strong criticism Evren has levelled against the now-dissolved Parliament, it is quite likely that divisive opposition tactics such as confidence and censure motions will become more difficult to mount. Election provisions may be changed from the present provincial party-slate to a single-member constituency system, a reform that has already been advocated. Small parties will probably have greater difficulty electing members to Parliament. Undoubtedly, too, the present restrictions against the use of radical or religious ideologies for political purposes will be tightened up (witness repeated castigation of "bigotry" in Evren's public statements).

14. In addition, General Evren has called for reform of the educational system to help prevent the dissemination of radical, alien ideologies, for changes in the judiciary and the penal code (presumably to speed up the administration of justice), and for curtailing the political activities of private associations, some of which heretofore had been engaging in illegal political activities, including terrorism. There are major implications here for the degree of "openness" in the new system, but there is strong sentiment in the country favoring limits on extremism now seen as having been encouraged or at least permitted by the liberal Constitution of 1961. Among the values of their democratic system, Evren and his colleagues have indicated their preference for changes tending to unify and heal the divisions of the country, with somewhat less focus on personal liberties, which were widely believed to have been abused. The rebalancing of these elements will be among the most difficult and time-consuming tasks the new leadership faces.

15. Economic policy: The new leadership has also announced that the main elements of Turkey's present economic and financial policies will be preserved. In his speech and press conference, as well as in actions to date, Evren has reassured those who may have wondered about the country's continuing commitment to the economic reform program instituted in February 1980, and subsequent agreements with the IMF and the OECD governments providing balance of payments support. Evren has stated that the economic stabilization program will continue to be implemented. He has asked Turgut Ozal, the previous



government's chief economic advisor and strategist, to remain as the interim government's chief economic advisor (see septel this subject).<sup>4</sup>

16. Timetable for return to civilian government: The strongest thread running throughout General Evren's pronouncements is the commitment of the military establishment to democracy. The Generals realize, of course, that friends of Turkey are anxious that the transfer of power to an elected civilian government occur in the shortest possible time. General Evren is expected to establish a Cabinet shortly to handle the executive responsibilities of the nation, while constitutional changes and basic laws (political parties, elections) are drafted. When these arrangements are in place and elections held, he promised, "all personnel of the Turkish armed forces will remain outside of politics."

17. It is still too early to venture predictions on a timetable for full return of power to civilian authority. However, at this juncture it is clear that: (1) neither General Evren nor his colleagues have any passion to rule; and (2) the extensive reforms contemplated will take time. Comparing the present situation with the previous two interventions, it took about 13 months for the military-dominated National Unity Committee (NUC) to hand over power in 1960–61. For this the NUC was strongly criticized. We think it likely that General Evren and his colleagues will try to avoid the delays and drawn-out debates that slowed the 1960–61 process, which involved the personal ambitions of a group of colonels, the trials and executions of Menderes and his colleagues, and prolonged arguments over the shape of the reforms.

18. The so-called coup by memorandum of 1971 offers less basis for comparison, since the military did not undertake major political reform and operated the government from 1971–73 through a series of "above parties" coalitions and the existing parties in the Parliament. These efforts, which included a heavy crackdown on the left, were temporarily successful, but ultimately did not prevent a recurrence of divisive politics.

19. In addition to undertaking a major reform of the political system, the current military leadership will have to carry out a nationwide campaign to extinguish terrorism and deal with its perpetrators. At the moment, there is no evidence to suggest that this task can be carried out swiftly and thoroughly enough to prevent outbreaks of resistance and the recurrence of violence in the months ahead. On the contrary, we think that the extreme left, which is larger, more sophisticated, better organized and better armed than the radical left in 1971–73, will make a major effort to discredit the interim government

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is presumably to telegram 3937 from Istanbul, September 15, which noted that Özal would "apparently be retained by the new regime." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800441–0037)

and to turn the people against it, possibly by trying to provoke the military into "heavy handed" repression.

20. At the same time, Turkey's civilian leaders, to whom power will be returned, are certain to bargain vigorously over any proposed reforms which might reduce their power. Signs of this have already appeared (Ankara 6769)<sup>5</sup> in connection with the selection of an interim Cabinet. This bargaining is likely to continue as constitutional reform begins and could extend the military's timetable, despite the best of intentions.

21. Given the potential obstacles the new leadership may have to overcome, we would be wise not to guess (and that is all anyone including the Turks can do at this stage) how long this whole process will take. We think that American officials would be advised not to use figures in conversations with outsiders. If pressed, we would have to say—given the size and complexity of the task—that it could take at least a year under the best conditions; but more likely a somewhat longer period will be needed if the military leaders carry out the extensive reform program envisioned in their pronouncements to date.

**Spain**

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<sup>5</sup> Telegram 6769 from Ankara, September 18, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800445-0496.

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## 155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 20, 1980, 1937Z

251392. Subject: (C) U.S. Relations With Turkey.

1. (C-entire text).

2. Since the military takeover September 12 we have taken a series of actions to reassure Turkey of the continued commitment of the U.S. In doing so, we have recognized the need to give the new Turkish authorities time to organize themselves for the difficult tasks they face. It

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870143-1398. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Richard A. Smith, Jr. (EUR/SE); cleared by Dillery, Ewing, Nimetz, Raymond G. Seitz (S/S), and D.A. Sand (S/S-O); approved by Christopher. Sent for information Immediate to Bonn.

is important that they appreciate what we have done already and understand our needs and requirements if we are to continue to be in a position to be helpful. I leave to you the selection of the person or persons you think most appropriate to receive our general views along the following lines.

3. The first United States official statement, issued only hours after the takeover, was carefully couched in understanding tones.<sup>2</sup> It explicitly recognized the grave economic and political difficulties under which Turkey has labored for the last several years and, by inference, recognized them as the causes of the military action.

We affirmed in our statement that U.S. assistance to Turkey will continue. Further, we immediately shared the statement with all NATO and OECD capitals to ensure that Turkey's allies and friends clearly understood our position. We are convinced that this quick action muted possible adverse public reactions in some capitals. None of the official statements of the other allies have, for example, any expression of conditionality with respect to future assistance. The U.S. also worked hard in NATO to ensure that the NATO exercise "Anvil Express" was not cancelled and we supported the Turkish position with regard to the meeting of the Military Committee in Turkey.<sup>3</sup>

4. We took all of these actions rapidly, with no equivocation and without preconditions. We have not however hidden in any way our general concerns about seizure of power from a democratically-elected government. We are encouraged by the fact that the takeover was accomplished without violence and we have noted General Evren's statements emphasizing the primary goal of the restoration of a viable democratic government. We have also noted his occasional reference to protection of human rights. Statements by the military authorities supporting the Demirel/Ozal economic stabilization program were well received here. The free publication of the Turkish press and early free

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<sup>2</sup> The statement issued on September 12 is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, November 1980, p. 50. A copy is attached to a September 17 memorandum from Holmes to Christopher. The statement noted that the takeover produced no bloodshed, expressed general concern any time there is a "seizure of power from any democratically-elected government," pledged continuing support for Turkey, and a looked forward to "the early restoration of democracy in Turkey." In the memorandum, titled "Turkey: Next Steps," Holmes sought Christopher's clearance of a draft that would become telegram 251392. Holmes noted that since the military takeover, the United States continued its economic and military support of Turkey to ensure that the takeover did not become a "divisive issue" in NATO. But now the time had come, Holmes wrote, "to point out to the new Turkish military authorities what we have done and to put them on notice that while we have taken these supporting actions, our ability to continue to be helpful will be affected by what they do in the near future." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870143–1398)

<sup>3</sup> Anvil Express was a NATO military maneuver exercise carried out in Turkey. The NATO Military Committee met on September 15.

access to Turkey by international correspondents were also welcome. Finally, it is clear that there is widespread popular support in Turkey for many of the actions taken by the Turkish military.

5. We have recognized the seriousness of the situation that has faced Turkey for some time as *inter alia* our assistance programs give testimony. The military takeover has not changed Turkey's needs nor its importance. But we will need the help of the Turkish authorities if we are to be successful in obtaining widespread approval in the United States for a close relationship and continued assistance programs, as well as assistance from NATO and OECD countries.

6. Specifically, we believe the likelihood of maintaining support for our current policies in the Congress and U.S. public opinion will be enhanced if the Turkish military authorities would:

- outline a timetable, including specific actions phased over time, that will lead to the early restoration of democracy in Turkey.

- release from custody those political leaders and others against whom there is no criminal charge and reaffirm commitment to due process of law for those who are detained.

- work with General Rogers so that the reintegration of Greek armed forces into the NATO military structure is accomplished soon, in the next few weeks if possible.

- give evidence of support for and flexibility in the resumed Cyprus intercommunal talks.

7. Although we regret the suspension of democratic institutions in Turkey, the U.S. commitment to Turkey remains. We intend to ask Congress to authorize and appropriate levels of assistance for FY 82 consistent with our "best efforts" pledge. Under present conditions, we anticipate that our security cooperation will continue unchanged.

**Christopher**

**156. Telegram From Secretary of State Muskie to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

New York, September 27, 1980, 0131Z

Secto 8030. Sana for Under Secretary Nimetz. Subject: (U) Secretary's Bilateral With Turkish Foreign Minister Turkmen, September 26.

1. C-entire text.

2. Summary. On September 26, at 11:00 a.m. the Secretary met with Turkish Foreign Minister Turkmen in the Secretary's suite at the UN Plaza Hotel. The meeting lasted for thirty minutes with a short private session following the larger meeting with the following present: for Turkey, Ambassador to the U.S. Elekdag, Counselor Turkish Embassy Washington Eralp and Special Assistant to the Minister Batibay; for the U.S., Asst. Secretary Vest, USUN Ambassador Petree, EUR DAS Ewing and DeptOff Dillery (notetaker). The discussion covered current developments in Turkey, Turkish requests for U.S. assistance, Greek reintegration and Cyprus. End summary.

3. After an exchange of greetings, Turkmen began the conversation by reporting on the foreign and domestic policy positions being taken by the new Turkish authorities. He said that there will be no change in foreign policy. Turkey is looking forward to continuing productive cooperation with the U.S. and with the other NATO allies. Turkey, he said, has a strong attachment to the Alliance and also to democracy. The new authorities will move to restore democracy as soon as possible.

4. Turkmen said Turkey will be looking for U.S. support and understanding during the coming difficult period. He stressed that the economic stabilization program will continue and is showing signs of success. In addition to the efforts of Turkey itself, however, he said the companion requirement is for continued and increased foreign assistance. He said that they are now working on aid requirements for CY 81 (U.S. FY 82) and have determined that the OECD countries will have to provide a total of dollars 1.7 billion. They expect to get dollars 700 million from all donors except U.S. and FRG. Those two should plan to provide dollars 500 million each. This should, Turkmen said, be in the same two-thirds grant one-third loan ratio as last year.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Subject Files of Edmund S. Muskie, 1963–1981, Lot 83D66, Box 2, unlabeled folder. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Ankara, Athens, Nicosia, Sana, USNATO, and USNMR SHAPE Belgium. Muskie was in New York for the UN General Assembly meeting September 21–October 4.

5. On military assistance, Turkmen said that the needs of the Turkish military cannot be disputed in the light of current international and regional developments. Turkey has, he noted, transmitted a request for dollars 400 million FMS in FY 82. Of this amount, 60 percent would be needed for spare parts; only 40 percent would be available for modernization. This, he said is a bare minimum request. Turkmen further said that Turkey is uneasy about the U.S. policy of balance in military assistance between Greece and Turkey. Turkey has greater needs than Greece; the amount of military assistance should be considered in light of NATO defense requirements. Any ratio is very artificial.

6. The Secretary responded that the restrained and supportive attitude of the U.S. toward the new Turkish Government speaks for itself. We understand the problems which gave rise to the military takeover and saw that this was one option for dealing with the serious problem of violence and instability in Turkey. The Secretary went on to say that the U.S. expects an early return to civilian rule and a democratic constitution. In addition, he said, we are interested in the condition of the former civilian leaders and in what happens to them.

7. On U.S. assistance to Turkey, the Secretary said he tended to support significant assistance for Turkey. He recalled that as a result of his meeting with former Foreign Minister Erkmen in June, we had supported a significant debt rescheduling program for Turkey.<sup>2</sup> DAS Ewing noted that it was early in the assistance planning cycle for the U.S.; no specific figures could be discussed yet. The Secretary concurred but said the numbers mentioned by Turkmen were in the ballpark of our planning. But he could make no commitment at this stage.

8. The Secretary then said that in discussing military assistance to Turkey and Greece, he would have to be frank. This may, he said, be a maximum opportunity to solve Greek reintegration and the Cyprus problem. If we could resolve these problems and put them behind us, we could address other aspects of our relationship in a more normal way. The Secretary said he was troubled that there were indications of problems in both issues that ought not to have arisen. He hoped that both sides in each dispute would display a forthcoming attitude. He expressed concern that if one of the two erupted into an unfortunate phase it would affect U.S. relations with both countries involved.

9. On Greek reintegration the Secretary said it had been dragging on for some time; it had properly been left to the military to solve and should be solved soon. He said he was not aware of the formulas under discussion and did not want to know more but he could say that a solution would make it much easier to conduct relations with all concerned.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 152.

He recalled he had stressed this also to former Prime Minister Demirel in June.

10. The Secretary said he wanted to emphasize his concern on this point. The political ramifications in the U.S. of a failure to achieve reintegration could complicate the aid process and our whole relationship. There were already some stirrings in that direction.<sup>3</sup> Vest pointed out that time is running out on reintegration. If the effort in military channels is not successful the matter may have to be taken up in the spotlight of the political level of the Alliance.

11. Turkmen said that there are some good signs in the Cyprus situation. We cannot, he said, hope for an early final solution but the GOT is encouraging the Turkish Cypriots to the maximum extent possible to be flexible.

12. On Greek reintegration, Turkmen said, the Turkish military is already being accused of being too lenient and making too many concessions. They have, he said, taken a courageous stand, modifying earlier positions. In the past, Turkey had insisted on the need to solve all problems related to reintegration before reintegration actually took place. The GOT is now prepared to accept reintegration with no command arrangements in place. This, he said, is exactly SACEUR's position. The Turks had been optimistic a month ago that Greece would accept this concept. But now Turkmen understood that the Greeks were trying to give the impression that the old command arrangements would be in place. The Turks have moved fast and far, he said. Now the Greeks are jeopardizing a solution.

13. The Secretary said Turkmen had told him more about the details than he had known before. The important thing, he said, was to see progress.

14. Turkmen said that when he returned to Ankara late in August, MFA experts told him the Turkish military had gone too far in making concessions on reintegration. But, he emphasized, there is a point beyond which Turkey cannot go.

15. Ambassador Elekdag said that on reintegration, Turkey has done what it can do. What is needed now is a little bit of understanding from the other side.

16. The meeting closed with Turkmen saying that on one issue of interest to the U.S., the Prisoner Transfer Treaty, he had good news. The National Security Council would accomplish ratification soon.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 205.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 7, Document 152.

17. At the request of the Secretary, Foreign Minister Turkmen remained with the Secretary for another five minutes private conversation.<sup>5</sup>

**Muskie**

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<sup>5</sup> No substantive record of this conversation was found.

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### 157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 3, 1980, 2200Z

264497. Military addressee handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: (S) Message From President Carter to General Evren.

1. (S-entire text)

2. Please deliver the following message to General Evren as soon as possible. The message will not be released to the public. There will be no signed original.

3. Begin text:

Dear General Evren:

The profound difficulties Turkey has experienced in recent years have caused deep concern in my country and among Turkey's other friends and allies. While neither my country nor any other member of NATO can fail to express concern when a democratically-elected government is no longer able to govern, there was considerable sympathy on our part and within the Alliance for the plight in which Turkey found itself and which led to the decision of you and your colleagues to assume temporarily the responsibility for governing the country. Your public commitment to restore Turkey to a functioning democratic

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Portions of 1980 Security Assistance Subject and Country Files, Box 8, Turkey (S.A. 1980). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted from a text received from the White House; cleared by Dillery, W. Scott Butcher (S/S-O), and L. Paul Bremer (S/S); approved by Ewing. Sent for information Immediate to Athens, USNATO, the White House, and USNMR SHAPE. In an October 3 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski forwarded the draft telegram and noted: "Warren Christopher and I have signed off on the enclosed. If approved by you, it will go immediately." Carter wrote in the upper right corner of the memorandum, "OK I guess, but seems very weak and uncertain in last ¶. J." Carter, however, crossed out this caveat thus approving the draft as it stood. (Ibid.)



system was most important in enabling us, and Turkey's other friends, to react in a constructive manner to the events of September 12.

In addition to the difficult problems which particularly challenge the Turkish nation, all of us in the Alliance must respond to the grave threats to our common security exemplified by Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and the conflict between Iran and Iraq.<sup>2</sup> Clearly we in the West should—as never before—work together to bolster our collective defenses.

When we do so our record is impressive. When faced with earlier challenges we successfully deterred aggression and preserved the security of our own nations through effective cooperation in the Atlantic Alliance. Indeed, the southeastern region of NATO has always been most secure when Turkey and Greece have been effectively cooperating in the NATO military structure.

For too many years this area of the Alliance has been troubled and divided. Since 1977 the NATO military authorities, especially General Haig and now General Rogers, have been working to restore the gap in our defenses by accomplishing the return of Greek forces to NATO. It is my understanding that General Rogers has brought the problem close to an acceptable solution.

I do not wish to interfere with the efforts of General Rogers, and I am addressing this issue from the standpoint of the United States. However, it is increasingly clear to me that it is essential to resolve this matter now, and, indeed, if a solution is longer delayed it may well become impossible. That would be a tragedy for us all. I, therefore, hope that you and General Rogers during his impending visit to Ankara will be able to make a decisive contribution to the rapid resolution of this vexing problem.<sup>3</sup>

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter.

End text.

**Muskie**

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<sup>2</sup> Iraq invaded Iran on September 22.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 7270 from Ankara, October 6, the Embassy relayed Evren's response and reported on his meeting with Ambassador Spain. Evren expressed his gratitude for Carter's understanding of the situation that led to the military takeover, for which there was no other choice. Evren also rejected the perception among some NATO allies that Turkey was attempting to block Greek reintegration into NATO, but asserted that no Turkish government, including his own, could accept Greece's bid to secure "the privileges in the Aegean it had before." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 75, Turkey: 9/80–1/81)

158. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 3, 1980, 4:30–4:50 p.m.

## SUBJECT

Summary of Dr. Brzezinski's Meeting with Turkish Deputy Prime Minister  
Turgut Ozal

## PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Paul Henze, NSC Staff Member for Turkey

Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Ozal  
Turkish Ambassador Şükrü Elekdag

After preliminary reflections on Turkish-Polish historical links, Dr. Brzezinski said he was well aware of the important role Mr. Ozal had played in the Turkish economic recovery program and expressed pleasure that he had assumed such a significant position in the new government.<sup>2</sup> He said he would first like to mention two political concerns that were very important to the United States:

—The desirability of getting Turkish-Greek issues settled and Greece back into NATO so that Greece, Turkey and the U.S. could all benefit from restoration of normal relations; and

—The fact that we all needed Turkey's help and input into the Iran-Iraq situation, which now appeared likely to drag out into a war of attrition. (C)

In connection with the latter point, he asked Mr. Ozal to enlist his government in efforts, whenever the opportunity presented itself, to impress upon the Iranians that as long as Iran had a good relationship with the United States, its security was not jeopardized; since it had worsened this relationship, its own security had been drastically un-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: Brzezinski: 7–4/80. Confidential. The meeting took place in Brzezinski's office. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Henze forwarded a draft to Brzezinski on October 3. Brzezinski wrote in the margin: "Good notes. You have total recall." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 7265 from Ankara, October 3, the Embassy reported: "Turkey's military-led administration has in a very short time gotten itself organized, formed a civilian government, issued and approved an action program, passed some laws and settled in for its major tasks. On the agenda are plans for restructuring the country's political system, revising the Constitution, combating terrorism, expanding the economy and hobbling political activists in the educational and labor sectors. By any measure it is a large order, but if the momentum and public support which have been exhibited thus far can be maintained for a reasonable period, many of the goals are attainable." (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Lot 82D275, 1981 Human Rights and Country Files, Box 19, Turkey—Sept Thru Dec 1980)

dermined. This point needed to be made in connection with the hostages, Dr. Brzezinski stressed—Iran could advance its own security interests by releasing the hostages. (C)

In connection with the first point, Mr. Ozal said that he agreed fully on the desirability of settling issues with Greece, but he asked for understanding of the fact that General Evren and his military could not arbitrarily take decisions without taking into account their own constituency and public opinion. He recounted his experience in dissuading them from appointing Feyzioglu as Prime Minister to demonstrate that they are not inclined to act arbitrarily or dictatorially.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Ozal then went on to mention two issues of major concern to him and his government:

—The need for economic help in generous quantities during the coming year; and

—The urgent need for more military help to permit modernization of the Turkish armed forces so that they could play a more substantial role in the region. (C)

He expanded upon the first point by describing his successful conversations this past week in Washington and added that he had a commitment from German Finance Minister Matthoefer to match the U.S. economic aid contribution during the coming year. (C)

In connection with the second point he said that the Turkish armed forces were actually in poorer condition in respect to equipment than either the Iraqis or the Iranians but he was sure that they were far better trained and disciplined as a result of NATO membership. With better equipment they could be an important factor for strength in the area. He added that perhaps the most urgent immediate requirement was F-4's for the Turkish Air Force. (C)

He then went on to state what he described as purely personal views. He believed we understood, he said, the basic commitment of the Turkish people to democracy. "It has become part of our way of life in Turkey," he said, "so that we cannot do without it. But what we have had in recent years has not been democracy but anarchy. We have to correct the system now so that democracy can function well for a long period of time. This is going to take time. We cannot move too fast. You must not expect that we will return to democracy overnight. My own feeling is that it may take a year or two—but we want to do it well. Our military have proved that they understand the need for democracy and

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<sup>3</sup> Turhan Feyzioglu, a former Deputy Prime Minister and the Chairman of the Republican Reliance Party, was rumored to be the military's eventual choice to become Prime Minister in the days after the September 12 takeover. (Telegram 6769 from Ankara, September 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800445-0496)

there is the example of their actions in both 1960 and 1971. But don't press them too much." (C)

Dr. Brzezinski said he understood. Turkey was not like Argentina. It was much more fortunate in its military leadership. Mr. Ozal agreed. He had one final request, he said—Turkey was losing 50% of its imported petroleum supply as a result of Iraq-Iran hostilities. It might need our help in getting alternate supplies. He hoped we would keep this in mind. Dr. Brzezinski said we would see urgently what we could do. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski asked Mr. Ozal to convey his best wishes to General Evren and recalled that he had been impressed with the general when he had visited here the year before last and had enjoyed his conversation with him. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski then took Mr. Ozal and Ambassador Elekdag on a short tour of the White House before seeing them off at the West Wing portico. (C)

**159. Letter From the Turkish Ambassador (Elekdag) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 4, 1980

Dear Mr. Brzezinski,

It is with considerable interest that I read your interview in the Washington Post, especially the passage on whether the allies share the "same historic and strategic vision" and on the common danger created by events in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf that currently threaten Europe.<sup>2</sup>

Indeed, until very recently it was Central Europe that was considered the powder keg and the area where East-West confrontation seemed most probable. Yet, gradually, Middle East and Western Asia, have become the area for East-West confrontation, as in the case for Europe between 1945–1955.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, White House Central Files, Countries, Box CO–56, CO 163, 8/1/78–1/20/81. No classification marking. The salutation is handwritten.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Michael Getler, "A Balanced U.S. Foreign Policy 'Much Needed,' Brzezinski Says," *The Washington Post*, November 30, 1980, p. A1.

The developments in this area adjacent to Turkey have assumed a manifestly dangerous aspect. The political and military balance in this region from a number of perspectives seems to have shifted against the West. The countries of the region face threats from the outside as well as internally due to their socio-political structures.

Turkey, unquestionably, with its control over the avenues from the North to this area, has assumed substantially greater strategic importance. Few people would dispute that an economically and militarily sound Turkey can become an element of peace and stability in the region. Any power which may have designs on this region will have to take into consideration Turkey's strength and resilience. A robust Turkey will thus be able to deter such a threat without provocation. This leads me to underline the importance of strengthening the local conventional deterrence of Turkey for enabling her to fulfill her responsibilities within the Western Alliance.

I fully support the thesis that it is to the benefit of the United States and indeed the whole western world to assist Turkey economically and militarily. Assistance to Turkey and its continuance at sufficient levels, in my view, is the best investment for the preservation of peace and security in this increasingly volatile region of the world.

These are only a few of the thoughts that I wanted to share with you in this letter. Indeed, as you prepare to depart to serve your country in any other role that you might choose to play in the future, it would give me considerable pleasure to consult with you and seek out your support on key Turkish-American issues.

When we recently visited you with Deputy Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, we were not able to discuss within the short time frame these issues as well as the vital importance of U.S. assistance, both economic and military, to Turkey.<sup>3</sup>

I am, of course, conscious of the fact that under this Administration, Turkish-American relations substantially improved. We are indeed grateful for the commitment of this Administration to the economic and military recovery of Turkey and, you, of course, have played a singular role in this development.

In view of the above, I believe, as does my government, that the aid levels for FY 1982 for Turkey should not only reflect the commitment of this Administration to the economic and military recovery of Turkey but should also take into consideration some of the alarming developments in our region that I previously touched upon in this letter. Turkey, hurt also financially under the continuing resolution of FY 1980, has made known to the Administration its views on the aid levels

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 158

for FY 1982. Our requests represent an aid level to meet our minimum defense and economic requirements. I believe that without question such a U.S. assistance will symbolize to the Turkish public as well as to foe and friend alike the solidity of U.S. commitment.

Please accept my best wishes.

Warm regards,<sup>4</sup>

**Şükrü Elekdag**

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<sup>4</sup> Elekdag wrote "Warm regards," before signing his name. In a December 12 covering memorandum to Brzezinski, Henze noted that he had drafted a reply for Brzezinski to sign. Brzezinski's December 13 letter thanked Elekdag for his thoughts and underscored the importance of continuing cooperation both in the bilateral and NATO spheres. (Carter Library, White House Central Files, Countries, Box CO-56, CO 163, 8/1/78-1/20/81)

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# **160. Telegram From Secretary of State Muskie to the Department of State and the Embassy in Turkey<sup>1</sup>**

Brussels, December 11, 1980, 1716Z

Secto 10010. Subject: (U) NAC Ministerials: Secretary's Bilateral Meeting With Turkish Foreign Minister Turkmen.

1. (S-entire text).

2. Secretary Muskie opened the meeting by expressing US appreciation for efforts made by the Turkish Government to bring about Greek reintegration. The Secretary described this as a "real service" which served the interests of both Greece and Turkey, as well as the United States. Minister Turkmen said that the difficulties he had earlier anticipated had not arisen and the matter had gone smoothly. Although not formally involved, Secretary Muskie had undoubtedly played an important role in these events, which the Turkish Government appreciated.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Subject Files of Edmund S. Muskie, 1963-1981, Lot 83D66, Box 2, unlabeled folder. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information Priority to Athens, Bonn, Copenhagen, The Hague, Lisbon, London, Luxembourg, Oslo, Ottawa, Paris, Reykjavik, Rome, USNATO, Nicosia, and USUN. Muskie was in Brussels for the 66th Ministerial meeting of NATO December 11-12.

<sup>2</sup> Greek forces were reintegrated into the NATO military command structure on October 20; see Document 209.

3. Responding to a question from the Secretary, Minister Turkmen said that the internal situation in Turkey was progressing satisfactorily. The first task of the new government had been to eradicate terrorism, since this was a precondition for the return to democracy. The campaign against terrorists was going well, and success could be expected. Meanwhile, the National Security Council had developed a step-by-step approach to a restoration of democracy, and no one in Turkey doubted that such a restoration would be accomplished. One present problem was pressure from various European groups and Parliamentarians, including the Council of Europe and the EC. This pressure could be expected to build, peaking with the Council of Europe sessions in April and May. But there was a chance that developments in Turkey meanwhile could do something to alleviate the pressure. Secretary Muskie said that the United States was aware of the commitment to democracy of the Turkish military. But it was understandable that there would be outside pressure for a return to democracy.

4. Turning to the state of the Turkish economy, Turkmen said much would depend on oil prices and supplies which in turn depend on the Iran-Iraq War. The Iraqis had resumed pumping, but at reduced levels which were less than what Turkish experts believed possible. To meet the expected shortfalls, the Turks had contacted other producers, notably the Saudis, but negotiations with the Saudis had not started. There had also been contacts with the IEA. Secretary Muskie noted that the IEA might be able to aid Turkey through a system of voluntarism, without bringing into play the complex triggering mechanisms. He noted Turkey should certainly be the object of this kind of voluntary effort. Given the high oil stocks, a voluntary system could be effective. It would also be useful to persuade the IEA to adopt ceilings so that trigger mechanisms could come into effect next year.

5. The Secretary asked about the possibilities of a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War. Turkmen said that there seemed no chance of this at the present and that the Iraqis were digging in for the winter. Turkey had considered offering itself as mediator, but had decided not to because so many potential mediators were already on the scene and because apparently neither side was ready for a negotiated settlement. Accordingly, Turkey was maintaining a stance of strict neutrality, and thought this had gained some credit in the eyes of both belligerents. The Soviet role in the conflict was worrisome. The Soviets had refused arms to Iraq and were providing some equipment to Iran through third parties, thus positioning themselves well whatever the eventual outcome. The Turks had warned the Jordanians of the dangers of collapse in Iran. But they seemed more concerned with the danger of collapse in Iraq. They had told the Turks that if this happened, not even the Americans could save Saudi Arabia.

6. Turning to the question of economic aid, Turkmen said the Turkish balance of payments problem could become very serious unless the consortium could provide 1.7 billion dollars.<sup>3</sup> Of this amount, the Turks hoped the US would provide 500 million dollars and the FRG an equal amount. The situation was tight and would be very difficult if that amount were not forthcoming. Meanwhile, Turkey was working to control inflation, increase government revenues and reform the tax laws. In addition, Turkey hoped for 400 million dollars in FMS credits. Congress might be in a more receptive mood to approve such amounts given the instability in Southwest Asia. Turkmen also urged that FMS credits be concessionary, since the Turkish economy would otherwise be burdened with repaying 2.80 dollars for every dollar of FMS credit extended. The Secretary said he had just made the assistance budget request to the President, but the President would have to find sufficient room in the budget for the overall amounts requested. Within the overall program, Turkey had a very important place, and if the monies could be found, the request we had made would be adequate for Turkish needs. However, there was no final decision yet, and the new administration would, of course, be the determining factor after January 20th.

7. In this regard, the Secretary noted that Turkish standing was currently high in Congress. But he cautioned against further deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations, which could have a very negative effect on congressional opinion. Turkmen said the Turks had no intention of taking further steps in this area.<sup>4</sup> As it was, Turkey's relations with Israel were on a higher level than those of either Spain or Greece. He also noted that the Turks had been under some pressure to take the diplomatic steps which had been taken. Secretary Muskie said he understood conflicting pressures had to be reconciled and the Turks and Israelis continued to have diplomatic relations. What would be publicly perceived in the United States, however, was not the absolute level of such relations but negative changes. These could do great harm to Turkey's standing on the Hill.

8. Responding to a question from the Secretary, Turkmen said that reasonable progress was being made in the Cyprus talks. They had been going on for three months and a UN General Assembly debate had been avoided—both hopeful signs. The Turks and Greeks were

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to members of the OECD Consortium to Aid Turkey.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 21531 from Tel Aviv, December 1, the Embassy reported that Turkey was reducing its diplomatic representation in Israel, with the plan to have only one accredited Turkish diplomat stationed in Israel by March 1981. A Turkish official suggested that the action was related to pressure from Iraq and Saudi Arabia, or what the telegram described as "oil blackmail." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800573-0430)



working on a plan to settle the problem of Varosha, but had not yet reached the stage of drawing maps. Discussion of this issue would move more smoothly if there could be a relaxation of economic pressure on the Turkish community. The two things go together. Turkmen added that the Turks had never believed Greek protestations that they had no influence with Greek Cypriots; now, however, they saw these claims were true because they themselves had difficulties with an increasingly vocal, more powerful and intransigent Turkish population.

9. Participants on the Turkish side were: Foreign Minister Turkmen; Ambassador Olcay; Mr. Batibay, Special Counselor to the Foreign Minister; Mr. N. Kandemir, MFA Director General for International Security Affairs. Participants on the US side were: Secretary Muskie; Leon Billings; DAS Holmes; Roger G. Harrison (notetaker).

**Muskie**

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**161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 17, 1981, 0114Z

12307. Subject: Presidential Message to General Evren (S/S 8100562). Ref: State 339227 (Notal).<sup>2</sup>

1. (C-entire text)

2. Please deliver as soon as possible the following message from President Carter to Head of State General Evren. Signed original will be pouched to you. The Department does not plan to release this text but has no objection if the GOT wishes to do so.

3. Message to General Evren (dated January 14, 1981):

Begin text.

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<sup>1</sup>Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810024–0387. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by James A. Williams (EUR/SE); cleared by Dillery and Ewing; approved in S/S.

<sup>2</sup>In telegram 339227 to Ankara, December 25, the Department forwarded Evren's December 10 letter, which thanked Carter for his "untiring efforts" toward promoting peace and security around the world, and for endeavoring to establish better relations between the United States and Turkey. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800611–0009)

Dear General Evren:

Ambassador Elekdag has transmitted to me your message of December 10. I thank you for your kind sentiments, and I share your hope for the future well-being and prosperity of our peoples.

As I complete my term of office, I want to express my appreciation for the close relations our two nations have had in the past four years. I believe deeply that, working together and with others, we have had considerable success in addressing the difficult problems of the Eastern Mediterranean. I take particular satisfaction from the knowledge that sustained efforts in Ankara and Washington have put the Turkish-American relationship back on a solid foundation. The most tangible proof is the conclusion last March of the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement.

Much work remains on our bilateral agenda, and the NATO allies face major challenges in Europe and on new fronts in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf. You will have my continued support as you seek to address those issues, and as you continue your important work in leading Turkey back to democratic government.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter.

End text.

**Muskie**

# Greece

## 162. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 6, 1977

### PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Menelas D. Alexandrakis, Greek Embassy, Washington, D.C.  
Secretary of State-designate Cyrus R. Vance  
Peter Tarnoff, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-designate

Ambassador Alexandrakis began by reading the text of a communication from his government to the next U.S. administration on the subject of relations between Greece and NATO. The message relayed the Greek Government's intention to submit concrete proposals to the alliance in mid-January that are designed to meet both Greek and Allied defense needs. It expressed hope that the new U.S. administration would deal with events in the Eastern Mediterranean in "a balanced way". The Greek government also indicated its willingness to settle rapidly its differences with NATO and its hope that the U.S. will view the Greek gesture as a first step, and as helping to clear the way for bilateral talks between the two countries.

Mr. Vance replied that he was very pleased to learn of the Greek intention which seemed like a constructive step. He indicated deep concern with the present situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and an interest in trying to help resolve the problems there. Mr. Vance said that he would become involved in these issues himself after January 20.

Ambassador Alexandrakis responded that the Greek government was encouraged by the election of Governor Carter and the nomination of Mr. Vance. He added that the five points that Secretary Kissinger had proposed at the last UNGA as a starting point for a Cyprus agreement had not satisfied Archbishop Makarios who had found them vague and inadequate.<sup>2</sup> In response to a question from Mr. Vance, Ambassador Alexandrakis said that Makarios had made his negative reaction to the five points public. He urged the new U.S. administration not to pursue these five points since Makarios would prefer to meet Mr. Vance in person in order to discuss ways to reopen the intercommunal talks. For psychological reasons, it would not be "constructive" for the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Memcons Vance Pre-Inaug. Confidential. Drafted by Tarnoff.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 3.

new administration to begin work on the Cyprus problem with the same proposals as its predecessor.

Mr. Vance indicated that he would take Ambassador Alexandrakis' comments into consideration and would think about them.

Ambassador Alexandrakis then said that he was concerned that Governor Carter's recent statements before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee indicated that the next U.S. government might not become involved in the Cyprus problem.<sup>3</sup> After so many "omissions" in U.S. Cyprus policy, an attitude of "non-interference" might indicate a willingness to condone aggression. Ambassador Alexandrakis said that he was reassured to know that Mr. Vance was personally concerned with Cyprus. He looked forward to an era of new relations between the U.S. and Greece, explaining that there is no deep anti-Americanism in Greece.

Mr. Vance said that he hoped that relations between the U.S. and Greece would be friendly and fruitful. This was especially important to him because of his great personal affection and respect for the people and the country of Greece. He added that Governor Carter was also personally interested in bettering relations between the U.S. and Greece.

Ambassador Alexandrakis expressed his thanks for these statements and suggested that a visit by Prime Minister Caramanlis to the U.S. could help improve relations between Washington and Athens.

Mr. Vance said that he had heard excellent things about Caramanlis, and knew him to be an extraordinarily able leader. He and President Carter would very much look forward to a meeting with Caramanlis at a mutually convenient time in the future. It would be difficult to set a time for a meeting now but such a get-together was definitely possible in the future. Mr. Vance asked Ambassador Alexandrakis to extend his best wishes to Foreign Minister Bitsios for whom he has the highest regard. Knowing Bitsios from the UN and having worked with him on the Cyprus problem in 1967, Mr. Vance said that it would be a pleasure to collaborate with Bitsios again on issues of interest to both the Greek and American governments.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to a statement made by Governor Carter on September 16, 1976, in the House, in which he criticized the Ford administration for "tilting away" from Greece and Cyprus. No record was found of Carter making a statement regarding Cyprus before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (*Congressional Record*, September 20, 1976, p. 31388)

<sup>4</sup> Vance served as President Johnson's envoy in November–December 1967 to support UN efforts to mediate the fighting in Cyprus. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. For Vance's account of his involvement in the Cyprus issue during the Johnson administration, see *Hard Choices*, pp. 144 and 168.

**163. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 2, 1977, 1526Z

23174. For Ambassadors only. Subject: Letter From Prime Minister Caramanlis to President-Elect Carter.

Following is text of letter dated January 17 from Prime Minister Caramanlis to President-elect Carter. Advance copy of letter was delivered to Robert J. Lipshutz (Counselor to the President) by Greek Embassy prior to inauguration. Signed original delivered to White House January 24.

Begin text: Dear Mr. President, your election to the high office of President of the United States has raised hopes and expectations of a new era in your country and in the world at large. An era in which, as you have so eloquently stated, the moral values that lie at the very foundation of our common civilization, will be given their rightful place in dealing with problems of international life.

I believe that at this moment when you are considering the policies which will translate these expectations into practice, it might be helpful if I were to give you my views on Greco-Turkish differences. In this I am encouraged by the interest you have shown on the subject both during your campaign and after your election. I am taking this liberty in the belief that an objective analysis of these differences can considerably facilitate their settlement and also because I think that a constructive approach of the United States of America to these issues will help them to recover fully their influence in this area, to the benefit not only of themselves, but also of Greece, Turkey and the Western world as a whole.

In the first place, I would like to assure you, dear Mr. President, that Greece seeks neither to isolate nor to weaken Turkey. On the contrary, appreciating at its just value her importance to the defence of the West, she wishes to see Turkey becoming a factor of stability and peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. But it goes without saying that Greece can not forsake her vital interests in order to satisfy unreasonable Turkish demands. Neither is it in the interest of the West to seek such sacrifices, which, in the last analysis, will prove counter-productive. Nor is there any such need, because I am firmly convinced, that the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 7, Greece: Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis, 2/77–10/79. Confidential; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by John R. Ratigan (EUR/SE); cleared by Ledsky, Michael Hornblow (NSC), Hopper, and Peter Sebastian (S/S); approved by Hartman. Sent for information Priority to Ankara and Nicosia.

Greco-Turkish problems can be easily solved, if reason and good faith were to prevail.

Our differences with Turkey come under two headings: those that mainly affect a third government but nevertheless involve Greece for historical and sentimental reasons, and the strictly bilateral issues.

The question of Cyprus comes under the first heading, the problems of the Aegean, under the second.

I.—The recent history of Cyprus is known to you. On July 20, 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus taking advantage of the Colonels' coup against Archbishop Makarios and claiming that the purpose of her intervention was to restore legality. However, legality was restored three days later in the person of Mr. Clerides, in Cyprus and, in Greece, through my return. Thus, Turkey attained the avowed ends of her intervention and ought to have withdrawn her troops from Cyprus. Instead, three weeks later, while negotiations for a solution were under way at Geneva, the Turkish troops launched a second attack, occupied 40 percent of the island's territory, and created at the same time an immense problem of 200,000 refugees.

Granting that there was some ground for the first invasion, there was no justification whatever for the second and none was offered by Turkey. The Greek side would have been perfectly entitled to request the restoration of the Zurich regime, which both Greece and Turkey had guaranteed.<sup>2</sup> However, in a show of goodwill the Greek side accepts the settlement of the problem on a new basis, by adopting positions which can satisfy nearly all reasonable demands that the Turkish side might make.

Nevertheless, Turkey, although aware of these positions of Archbishop Makarios, refuses on various pretexts any substantive negotiation. She ignores a whole series of United Nations resolutions in spite of the fact that she has voted for them herself. Six rounds of intercommunal talks ended in failure, because Turkey refuses to state what exactly she wants in Cyprus.<sup>3</sup> She simply sits to this date on 40 percent of the island's territory and 65 percent of its natural resources, while disposing only of 18 percent of the population, and puts the intervening time to use in order to colonize the occupied area and to generally consolidate her rule.

II.—The dispute over the Aegean adverts to the continental shelf and to the airspace. Both these issues were raised by Turkey through

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the 1959 London-Zurich Agreements, which led to the creation of an independent Cyprus in August 1960. See footnote 3, Document 8.

<sup>3</sup> The round of intercommunal negotiations conducted under the aegis of the United Nations during this period is summarized in *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1976, pp. 283-303.

arbitrary acts. Greece, who favours the status quo as shaped by valid international treaties, could have denied the existence of any problem in the Aegean. Instead, she not only accepted to discuss the issues but also actively sought peaceful and reasonable solutions, through internationally recognized legal procedures.

In particular, with regard to the shelf, the Greek Government proposed on January 27, 1975, that the two governments should jointly refer to the International Court of Justice the question of the delimitation of the continental shelf of the Aegean. The Greek proposal was accepted in principle by Turkey on 7th February 1975. This agreement was reconfirmed when I met the Turkish Prime Minister in Brussels, on 31st May 1975, as shown by the joint communique issued at the end of the meeting.<sup>4</sup> Turkey also accepted at that meeting that, subsequent to the referral of the dispute to the Court, parallel negotiations be held to seek an agreed solution, which, if found, would then be submitted to the Court to be invested by its high international authority. The advantages offered by this procedure from an internal political point of view were obvious. Furthermore, it ensured beforehand that the dispute would be solved peacefully, in the event negotiations failed. But this agreement was not honoured by the Turks, who at several meetings of experts refused to discuss the drafting of the special agreement required for jointly seizing the International Court.

Not content with going back on this agreed procedure, Turkey caused an acute crisis in the Aegean, in the summer of 1975, by sending a seismographic ship to explore parts of its continental shelf that Greece considers as appertaining to her.<sup>5</sup> This was an arbitrary provocation, since Turkey ought to have respected these parts of the shelf if for no other reason but because she considered them herself to be disputed. In this case also, Greece put her faith in peaceful procedures. She applied to the Security Council and to the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, immediately after the Security Council issued its resolution,<sup>6</sup> Greece stated that she was ready to comply with its recommendations.

III.—As regards the airspace, it is a matter of record that by virtue of international agreements and regulations, to which Turkey is also a party, Greece was entrusted with the exclusive responsibility of flight control in an area over the Aegean extending to the maritime boundaries of her easternmost islands.

Since August 1974, Turkey has tried to unilaterally alter this situation. To this effect, she bisected the Aegean airspace by a line which

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 7, Document 84.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 10, Document 8.

<sup>6</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 395 adopted on August 25, 1976.

coincides roughly with the limits of the continental shelf she is claiming and, on August 5, 1974, she issued NOTAM 714 requiring arbitrarily all planes crossing this line to notify their position to Turkish air control stations. In practice, she also attempted to assume control of these flights invoking the necessity of creating a "Turkish" air security zone in the Aegean. As was only natural, Greece reacted by declaring the air-lanes as unsafe and thus air traffic over the Aegean was suspended.<sup>7</sup>

In October 1974, the International Civil Aviation Organization offered to mediate and formulated unofficial proposals, which would have resulted in removal of the measures taken by each side and restoration of the former legality. Greece accepted them. Turkey did not.

In spite of this attitude, the Greek Government again accepted bilateral negotiations which led to agreement on all issues but one, namely the exchange of information on military flights over the Aegean. Greece submitted new proposals on this point, which were accepted by the Turkish experts but were rejected by the Turkish Government. Thus, this question also remains open because of Turkey.

In a further effort to facilitate the normalization of Greco-Turkish relations, the Greek Government took a broader initiative.

On 17th April 1976, I proposed to Turkey the conclusion of an agreement banning the use of force and providing for an exchange of information on respective arms purchases.<sup>8</sup> The objective of this proposal was to bring about a climate in the relations of the two countries which would have permitted the discussion of our difference in an atmosphere free of threats and pressures. Turkey again accepted my proposal in theory and rejected it in practice. Reversing the logical order, she maintains that the agreement banning the use of force ought to be concluded after the settlement of our differences. But, of course, the conclusion of such an agreement would, then, be meaningless.

IV.—Further to these problems there is also the question of the defensive measures taken on some islands in the Aegean. On this, I would like to stress that Greece has never by any treaty surrendered her natural right of self-defence in the event her islands were threatened. In the past she provided for their defence only in times of acute Greco-Turkish crises. Now, as then, elementary security measures were taken only after the two operations against Cyprus; after threats were

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<sup>7</sup> The purpose of NOTAM 714 was to allow air traffic controllers to distinguish between civil and military aircraft. In response, Greece issued NOTAM 1018 stating that the Turkish notice was contrary to ICAO regulations and NOTAM 1157 declaring the Aegean area a "danger zone."

<sup>8</sup> Karamanlis proposed the non-aggression pact during his briefing of Parliament on the U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement. ("Greek Bids Turks Conclude a Pact of Nonaggression," *The New York Times*, April 18, 1976, p. 1)



voiced against them by Turkish officials including Mr. Demirel; after the formation by Turkey of a special Army of the Aegean and after the concentration opposite to the island of the strongest landing forces in the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, I stated in writing to the Turkish Prime Minister that the measures taken on the islands were purely defensive and that they served no offensive purposes, which would in any event be unthinkable in practice.

Dear Mr. President, the problem of the Aegean is not one of exploiting its natural resources, if any. One has the impression that Turkey aims at unilaterally changing the status quo in the Aegean which was sanctioned by international treaties and has functioned normally to this date. She is trying to change it because, if her claims on the continental shelf and the airspace were to be satisfied, they would result in enclaving 501 Greek islands and islets with a population of 330,000 in a zone of exclusive economic and strategic interests of Turkey. The territorial and political unity of the Greek state would thus be dislocated.

I think that I have shown that Greece has proven with deeds her willingness to seek peaceful and reasonable arrangements to all her differences with Turkey. But Greece will never accept her sovereignty over the islands to be jeopardized. Neither will she accept solutions directly or indirectly undermining her territorial integrity and state unity. Greece threatens no one and has no aggressive intentions against anyone. But if she ever has to defend her territory, she would, without hesitation, follow the imperatives of her history and honour. On this point, there ought to be no doubt whatever.

Even as I am writing to you, Greece is seeking peaceful solutions through talks, in accordance with the resolution of the United Nations Security Council. I am convinced that these solutions are not difficult to find. But, in order to reach this happy end, Turkey must show the same good faith and the same peaceful intent. And she ought not to be left in the slightest doubt that under no account or pretext whatsoever will she be allowed to jeopardize the peace and serenity of the world. On this particular point, your great country can play a decisive role.

The assurance given to us that the United States would oppose a military solution to these disputes and would make a major effort to prevent such a course of action will have to be strengthened and put in a more concrete form.

Furthermore, it is necessary to find a way of safeguarding peace in the event present negotiations on the continental shelf were to fail. In other words, to ensure that brute force shall be barred and that the peaceful option of jointly submitting the dispute to the International Court for an impartial decision based only on international legality and law, shall remain open.

I would like to take this opportunity, dear Mr. President, to assure you of the desire of the Greek Government and of the Greek people to continue and further strengthen the traditional friendship and cooperation of our two countries. I notice with pleasure that in your letter of 9th November, 1976, you express the same intention.<sup>9</sup> This strengthens my optimism with regard to Greek-American cooperation and to the maintenance of peace and security in this area of the world.

Please accept, dear Mr. President, the assurance of my highest consideration and personal esteem. Constantine Karamanlis. End text.

Vance

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<sup>9</sup> Not found.

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#### 164. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Athens, February 11, 1977, 1634Z

1396. Sub: Caramanlis Comments on Clifford Mission, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Relations.

1. Last night following a dinner given by President Tsatsos I had the opportunity to have a private conversation with Prime Minister Caramanlis.

2. Clifford Mission. Caramanlis began by saying he was looking forward to the visit of Clark Clifford next week and asked whether I thought the program being arranged for Clifford here was satisfactory. I said that I had been in more or less continuous touch with Washington regarding it and that the program was shaping up excellently. I said that I was sure Clifford particularly appreciated the opportunity to call on Caramanlis so soon after his arrival and the substantial amount of time that had been set aside for both a private meeting and lunch with the Prime Minister the next day.<sup>2</sup> Caramanlis inquired as to how far I thought Clifford would be prepared and authorized to go in speaking for President Carter and the new administration, and I said I

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770049-1123. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Ankara and Nicosia.

<sup>2</sup> The meeting between Clifford and Karamanlis took place on February 18. See footnote 5 below.

did not know at this stage but assumed that he was coming primarily to consult with the authorities in the three countries concerned and to learn their views and report them back to the President. Caramanlis said he was prepared to present his views fully and completely frankly to Clifford.

3. Cyprus. I said that there was continued very deep concern in Washington with the Cyprus problem and I felt sure that Clifford would want to go into this matter very thoroughly. Caramanlis said that the Cyprus problem was of course quite important and he would be prepared to discuss it. However, he went on, it was not nearly as important as Greek-Turkish problems and the Aegean. The principal difference was that the problems in Cyprus had already been caused and the challenge now was basically to find a way to repair as much of the damage as possible and arrive at a generally agreeable settlement for the two communities to live together for the future. However, there was no danger of war over Cyprus. That watershed had been passed in the summer of 1974 and under his leadership the Greeks had made a national decision that they would not fight Turkey over Cyprus.

4. Greek-Turkish relations. However, the Aegean situation was different. The potential for war was still very much there, and the disastrous aftermath of Cyprus developments in the summer of 1974 would pale against the calamity for us all that would result from a Greek-Turkish war.

5. And such a conflict was possible, Caramanlis said, and he was going to tell Clifford so in no uncertain terms. He went on. Everyone must recognize that he (Caramanlis) alone and almost single-handedly, calmed the Greek nation and prevented them from going to war against Turkey at the time of the *Sismik* researches in the Aegean this past summer.<sup>3</sup> However, he had paid a terrible price for this. He had “accepted” a humiliation from the Turks and the Greeks would never forgive him for this. His popularity in the country had declined and in the Greek armed forces questions were raised about whether or not he was cowardly or strong enough to lead Greece in the face of its many problems and enemies. He could never accept such a provocation or humiliation from Turkey again and the USG and Greece’s other allies must realize this.

5. [*sic*] The reason he was making such a point of this, Caramanlis said, was that he very much feared there would be other provocations and attempted humiliations by Turkey unless the USG and other helped to make it clear to Ankara that these would not be tolerated because the overriding interests of all of us would be too greatly threat-

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 10, Document 8.

ened. In response to my questioning and periodic comments, Caramanlis repeated his analysis, oft stated and reported in the past, of the resurgent nationalism and expansionist tendencies in Turkey which, most regrettably, were being fueled and fanned by leading Turkish political personalities. Moreover, he was now beginning to perceive Demirel's strategy for dealing with the Cyprus problem and Greek-Turkish problems in the period between now and the Turkish elections. Demirel would appear to be forthcoming on Cyprus in order to improve Turkey's international image, blunt foreign criticism, and facilitate congressional passage of the U.S.-Turkish DCA—thus restoring a full flow of military supplies to Turkey and strengthening Demirel's position with the Turkish military. At the same time, Caramanlis said, he did not believe Demirel could afford to or would make any really significant concession on Cyprus.

6. As for the continental shelf and Aegean disputes, Demirel wanted a "big victory". Caramanlis flustered and lost some of his coherence in his surge of temper and exasperation with the Turks as he discussed this point. He said that he had reached agreement with Demirel several times on how to handle the Aegean problems, going all the way back to their May 1975 meeting in Brussels up to the November 1976 Bern Agreement.<sup>4</sup> However, Demirel continued to renege on these agreements and understandings. For example, a very useful and realistic procedure had been worked out and agreed in detail in Bern last November providing for the two governments to analyze and negotiate a settlement of the continental shelf dispute, providing for ultimate submission to the World Court—in accordance with customary international practices "by civilized nations" in resolving such disputes peaceably—of any points that could not be bilaterally agreed. The procedure also envisaged the passage of up to 18 months of time which would carry Turkey beyond its elections, which was what Demirel wanted as of last November. Moreover, such a procedure provided a highly desirable framework for the two governments ultimately to present the settlement to their nations, since no matter how it came out it would not be fully satisfactory in both countries.

7. But in London last week the Turkish delegation wanted to jettison the whole arrangement. They were under instructions to proceed immediately to a discussion of the substance of the problem and see if some division of the Aegean and its resources could be agreed. "Don't propose 15 percent for Turkey and 85 percent for Greece" the Turkish representatives had said, "that would be ridiculous. Be realistic." Caramanlis said he thought that Demirel wanted him to agree that Turkey could have "30 or 40 or 50 percent" of the Aegean, to obtain such a

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<sup>4</sup> For the Bern Agreement, see footnote 7, Document 91.

Greek concurrence fairly soon, and thus have his “big victory” to present to the Turkish electorate. Caramanlis said he would never play that game and added that he very much feared the Demirel government would be pushing the *Sismik* out into the Aegean again later this winter or in the spring in another show of aggressiveness and manhood. Thus, he explained his concerns and apprehensions, and he said he would go into them in as much detail as Clifford wanted.

8. Comment: There has been no discernible change in the substance of Caramanlis’ views over the recent past, and Mr. Clifford can expect to get the full force of them along the lines we have been reporting in recent months. Caramanlis is an exceptionally strong personality—forceful, authoritarian, autocratic, demanding, clever and critical. He is also capable of and with Mr. Clifford will almost certainly be very, very charming at times. However, he has a large amount of dammed-up resentment and bitterness based on his version of Washington policies and positions over the past two and a half years, and my recommendation will be that Clifford allow him to get this off his chest during their long, substantive meeting and not challenge him and argue with him about what happened in the past as I have so often had to do. In that way we will be able to put the past behind us and move to a realistic and coherent discussion of where we are right now—and where we go from here.<sup>5</sup>

**Kubisch**

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<sup>5</sup> Although no official memorandum of conversation of the February 18 meeting between Karamanlis and Clifford was found, Clifford described the meeting in his report to President Carter. See the second attachment to Document 8. A set of handwritten notes, most likely taken by Matthew Nimetz during the meeting, outline the main points of the conversation. (National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977–1980, Lot 81D85, Box 2, MemCons) In telegram 1622 from Athens, February 18, the Embassy reported on an evening courtesy call Clifford paid to Karamanlis upon his arrival the previous day. Karamanlis noted that Clifford’s mission signified the importance that Carter attached to the Greece-Cyprus-Turkey dispute, and he told Clifford “he had to agree with Dr. Kissinger’s own admission that his biggest mistake had been handling of Cyprus crisis.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770058–1198)

**165. Letter From President Carter to Greek Prime Minister  
Karamanlis<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 16, 1977

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Immediately upon returning to the United States, Secretary Clifford met with me to give me a full account of his visit to the eastern Mediterranean as my Special Representative.<sup>2</sup> While I know that he has already expressed his appreciation for the cordial and warm reception he was accorded in Greece, I want to thank you personally for the time, the hospitality and the many courtesies you and your advisers extended to Secretary Clifford and his party.

Your willingness to discuss issues of mutual interest in a frank and open manner contributed to making Secretary Clifford's Athens stop extremely beneficial. Your eloquent and detailed exposition made a deep and lasting impression on Secretary Clifford, who in turn has faithfully communicated the spirit and essence of your remarks to me. As a result, we now have a greater appreciation of the complexity and sensitivity of the issues involved. Pending a more detailed review of these questions, based both on your January letter to me<sup>3</sup> and Secretary Clifford's report, I want to assure you that the United States is conscious of the sensitive and delicate nature of the problems you face and is ready to be of such assistance as may be appropriate.

I am hopeful that the Clifford mission has set the stage for early substantive progress toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem, and I know that you will do all that is within your power to help make this a reality. I am hopeful, too, that the Clifford mission has set the tone for a new era of close and warm relations between the United States and Greece. You have my personal assurance that I will do all in my power to work toward this goal and to build on the auspicious beginning which Secretary Clifford has provided.

I trust that we will have an opportunity to meet at an early date and exchange views on matters of concern to both our countries.

Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 7, Greece: Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis, 2/77–10/79. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 10.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 163.

**166. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

London, May 10, 1977, 7:47–8:25 a.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

The President  
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance  
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Clark Clifford  
Robert Hunter, Staff Member, National Security Council (Notetaker)  
Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis  
Foreign Minister Dimitri Bitsios  
Mr. P. Molyviatis, Director General of the Prime Minister's Political Cabinet  
A Notetaker  
One other individual

**SUBJECT**

President's Meeting with Prime Minister Karamanlis

The meeting began with a discussion between the Secretary and the Prime Minister on the latter's back problems. He indicated he had had to postpone a visit to five countries.

*The President* said that these countries had been disappointed at the postponement. Clark Clifford had reported all the friendship toward the United States he had found on his trip to Greece. The President complimented the Prime Minister on what he had done to restore the spirit of Greece.

*The Prime Minister* said that in spite of past misunderstandings between Greece and the U.S., he is one of the most pro-American politicians in Europe.

*The President* said he hoped that many leaders would compete for that title.

*The Prime Minister* said that years earlier, he had visited the United States and seen President Truman. He had been in Washington to ask for economic aid immediately after the war, when Greece was in bad shape.<sup>2</sup> Truman said that he had given Greece \$25 million six months

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 35, Memcons: President: 5/77. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Hunter. The meeting took place at Winfield House, the U.S. Ambassador's residence. Carter and Karamanlis were in London for the NATO Ministerial meeting, which took place May 10–11.

<sup>2</sup> Karamanlis arrived in Washington on August 1, 1946, as part of the Greek Economic Mission seeking aid from a number of U.S. Government and UN agencies. The telegram noting Karamanlis' arrival in the United States, sent from Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the Ambassador to Greece, does not mention the meeting with Truman. See *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. VII, The Near East and Africa, pp. 190–191.

earlier, but that the best use of it had not been made. Caramanlis had replied that Greece had so many needs, they did not know where to begin. In a different sense, this is the case now. There are so many needs, they hardly know where to begin.

*The President* said he was eager to work with the Prime Minister, as President Truman had done.

*The Prime Minister* thanked him for his interest in the problems of Greece. He thanked the President for Clark Clifford's time and talents on Greece's problems. He was certain the President was well briefed on their problems and views through his letter and Clark Clifford.

*The President* replied that he had seen Clifford last night.

*The Prime Minister* mentioned the letter he had sent just after the Inauguration.<sup>3</sup>

*The President* said he knew.

*The Prime Minister* said that Clifford would have given the President the details of issues. He didn't feel a need to speak at length of these problems, therefore. He is at the President's disposal if he wishes clarification, or answers to questions. He would like to ask if the President would let him know how the U.S. can help solve problems, which are both important and dangerous.

*The President* said it is important to know Caramanlis' position. Clifford keeps him informed. This included Caramanlis' admirable reticence, as with his response on the Aegean issue. The U.S. does not want to interfere, but is ready to help Greece and Turkey with their talks, which he hopes will go on without interruption. We will add our services as "you" (both parties?) request. It will take years, but he believes that the taking place of talks is a guard against misunderstanding.

*The Prime Minister* said if Turkey could be convinced to help take part in a serious dialogue, he would have succeeded. He did not think he had a serious interlocutor. This was the hardest problem.

*The President* said that the Cypriot problem was unfortunate for the U.S., the EC, Greece, Turkey, and the people of Cyprus. The U.S. was committed to one nation on Cyprus, living in peace, with a fair division of the two parts. He is pleased by the initiative of the Greek Cypriots. U.S. influence with Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots is limited. But he would do his best to bring the parties together. He needs Caramanlis' advice. Clifford will continue his services, if asked.

*The Prime Minister* said he appreciated the President's interest in the problems of the Aegean and Cyprus. He was sorry that the U.S. has

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.



had to take on its shoulders the mistakes of others. He wanted to tell the President the difference in the problems.

*The President* said this would be very helpful.

*The Prime Minister* said he would begin in the Aegean. It was more a direct interest of Greece and more dangerous. Cyprus is a tragedy, but not a problem that could cause war between Greece and Turkey. In all, each side puts the blame on the other. The President should believe him, as he would speak from an objective position, as though he were a third party. How was the question created? How could it be solved? The Aegean question was created by Turkey. Greece asks nothing in the Aegean. Turkey asks something of Greece. Greece favors the status quo that has existed for more than 60 years, and is contained in an international treaty.<sup>4</sup> Turkey seeks to upset the status quo at Greek expense. But its claims are ungrounded, either morally or politically. He would not give more details, but he is convinced that Turkey causes the problems in the Aegean.

For a solution, he would not ask the U.S. to bear the burden of deciding who is right and who is wrong. He would ask that the President also suggest to Turkey to begin a serious and responsible dialogue, without going back on what had been agreed. In this dialogue, there should be no provocation on either side, which would undermine the dialogue and decisions. If at the end of the dialogue and negotiations there were still points unresolved, it should be referred to the International Court of Justice at The Hague for arbitration, as all civilized nations do. He takes this position, although he could have said to Turkey that there is nothing to talk about—there is just the status quo. But he has proposed arbitration. There has been no response. Perhaps the U.S. could help persuade Turkey to take the right course. He was not asking the President to humiliate or impose on Turkey the views of Greece. Instead, he was asking the President to help ensure a dialogue, to avoid conflict and lead instead to a solution.

*The President* said he understood.

*The Prime Minister* asked if he wanted to comment.

*The President* said that after Clifford first went to see Caramanlis, he told Turkey of Greece's feeling on the Aegean.<sup>5</sup> The Turks responded that this was the first time they knew how serious the Greek view is on provocation (in the Aegean). Turkey feels that Greek fortification of the offshore islands is a violation of their agreement. Caramanlis feels that Turkey has landing forces that could attack the

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<sup>4</sup> Presumably a reference to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which established Turkey's borders after World War I.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 88.

islands. The United States will do the best it can to get Turkey to agree to sustain negotiations on the Aegean. A situation of spasmodic meetings sets back progress. The submission of claims to the World Court may not be productive. He thought that direct negotiations may be more productive.

*The Prime Minister* replied that there is no doubt that it is best to have direct contact and negotiations. But if there are no results, then that is why we have international institutions and courts. He could give an example to show how tough it is to deal with Turkey. When Turkey started the Aegean problem, he suggested that they go to The Hague. They accepted, but Ecevit criticized Demirel, who then backed off. Earlier, he had proposed the signing of a non-aggression and arms control pact. The Turks said yes. One week later he had sent a draft; the Turks refused to accept it, and asked him not to reveal the fact, since that would blow up everything. Two years ago he saw Demirel in Brussels. They agreed to refer the problem to the World Court, and to negotiate in parallel and refer the results to the Court if it worked (i.e., to put the deliberations within a new political context). Demirel agreed that the political approach was best for a Court agreement, not just on its own. They put this in a joint communique and made it public. He then asked Turkey to negotiate on a document to refer to the Court. But it refused. Demirel claimed that he had not paid attention when he had read the communique. Therefore Greece cannot sustain a dialogue under such circumstances. He would like to say that the maximum he could do is to suggest this approach (on negotiations?); and the minimum for the U.S. would be to convince both Greece and Turkey to follow it.

*The President* said he would propose it to Demirel.<sup>6</sup> It seems reasonable. What about the fortification of the islands?

*The Prime Minister* replied that it was for truly elementary defense reasons, and was done only after the invasion of Cyprus, when Turkey took almost half of the island. There were daily threats to the islands. It would have been unwise not to fortify them. They had the right of self-defense. This is fundamental, and prevails over other agreements. So the fortification of the islands was only defensive. Also there was the invasion of Cyprus, many of them began to leave. Their morale must be boosted.

*The President* said he understood, and that he would do the best he could. Caramanlis should call him or Secretary Vance or Clark Clifford, to ask them to communicate with the Turks, or to help in another way. The U.S. would not intrude. Greece and Turkey must work it out be-

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<sup>6</sup> Carter met with Demirel at Winfield House immediately following his talk with Karamanlis. The Aegean dispute was the first item brought up by Carter. See Document 94.

tween themselves. Our interference would be minimum. The parties should work it out as they can. The U.S. feels friendship towards both Greece and Turkey. The American people are inclined toward Greece, where democracy was born, and where we have special ties. Turkey feels that we favor Greece. We try to show Turkey we are fair and objective. Potential dispute is a problem.

The Cyprus question is more widely understood than the Aegean, and a deeper concern in the U.S. He had learned from Caramanlis of the threat to peace in the Aegean. There are complex technical questions on exploring for oil, overflight rights, the continental shelf, fortification. The United States offers its good services. It will try to induce Demirel and others to approach these problems from a peaceful perspective.

He hoped that Greece and Turkey will let us work without criticism. We are trying to deal with Turkey on a friendly basis. Progress on the Aegean and Cyprus depends in part on our being able to work with Turkey.

*The Prime Minister* said he also feels a desire for good relations with the United States and, to solve problems with Turkey, for the United States to have good relations with it. Turkey had not shown understanding for the past three years.

*The President* asked Clark Clifford if he had anything to add.

*Secretary Clifford* said that he had said many times in his talks with Caramanlis that the major U.S. interest in the Eastern Mediterranean is to preserve NATO, in which we have had a great investment for 30 years, with billions of dollars, and with an army in Europe. We will do what we can to keep this involvement. It has worked; it has kept the peace for 30 years. Greece and Turkey are two important allies on the Southeastern flank of NATO. Their problems lead to great U.S. concern. On Cyprus, the Greek government can help by seeing that the Greek Cypriots continue a forthcoming response to U.S. efforts. The Aegean is complex: he and Caramanlis had been over it many times. The President understands Caramanlis' interest in this matter.

Turkey has the same interest, seen from its standpoint. It is not enough for each side to say there is merit only in its arguments, but remain frozen. There will be no result. To get a settlement in the Aegean, each side must make substantial concessions. It is important that the parties continue to talk. To discuss and then break off the talks is no good. The U.S. can make efforts to keep the talks going, but if each side has a fixed position, then the problem will not be solved and will just get worse.

Greek concessions would be helpful. But now both sides are so clear that they are right, it is difficult to make concessions. The U.S. offers all its services to assist them. But it can't and won't interfere in in-

ternal affairs: not in substance. In procedures, as we can, we will urge the parties.

Unfortunately for NATO, these two allies are in serious trouble. Some outside parties would like a weak NATO and more instability in the Eastern Mediterranean. Therefore he would only add what he has learned: to get a settlement in the Aegean, both sides must make concessions. This is difficult, but it can be done with good will.

*The President* said he wanted to make one point. Later he would see Demirel. Caramanlis could see Clifford—or the Foreign Minister could—to see if there are added opportunities for progress.

*The Prime Minister* agreed. With regard to NATO, the Greek people are for it. When they left NATO two and a half years ago, it was either that or having a war with Turkey. In 1974, when he had gone back to Greece, the army was fully mobilized, and everyone wanted war. NATO took an indifferent attitude. This is why Greece had to act. He had asked the North Atlantic Council to discuss the situation, but everyone was on vacation. The only thing to control public opinion in the army was to do what he did, and get NATO to take an interest. When those things which caused the problems are gone, then Greece would again be fully in NATO. Of course, it was still in it. There were U.S. and NATO bases in Greece. But they cannot be returned unless there were renewed conditions for it.

*The President* said he had to go. He added that Greece's problems were also the U.S.' problems. He was so proud of Caramanlis.

The meeting concluded at 8:25 a.m.

**167. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Lance) and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 26, 1977

SUBJECT

Additional Military Assistance for Greece

In accordance with your recent directive on new commitments to foreign governments, Deputy Secretary Christopher requests authority to increase the Ford Administration's offer of \$700 million in military assistance to Greece by \$25 million in the course of on-going negotiations to conclude a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). The proposed increase, to be provided out of 1979 funds, consists of two elements:

- \$5 million grant military assistance (MAP) for an airborne intelligence package in addition to \$140 million previously offered.
- \$20 million in foreign military sales (FMS) financing for Greek communications facilities in addition to \$560 million previously offered.

*Airborne Intelligence Package*

The proposed \$5 million airborne intelligence package grew out of efforts to ensure that critical U.S. intelligence activities [*less than 1 line not declassified*] could continue. With the concurrence of the negotiating team, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] originally offered to provide the Greeks with a package made up of excess equipment valued at almost \$5 million. When the Greeks rejected this offer, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] agreed to contribute \$5 million from available funds toward a more sophisticated package. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] now argues (1) that it cannot divert \$5 million from [*less than 1 line not declassified*] other intelligence community funds without seriously compromising other U.S. programs, and (2) that the \$5 million should be considered a part of the overall Defense Cooperation Agreement, not an intelligence community activity.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 26, Greece: 1/77–4/78. Confidential. Brzezinski signed and forwarded this memorandum to the President on June 6, along with separate memoranda from Christopher and Brown, dated May 13 and May 27, respectively. In a covering memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski noted: "OMB gives too little weight, in my view, to the political dimension of this problem and to the fact that getting a Greek DCA is an essential part of the whole process of moving toward settling Greek-Turkish differences and restoring our relations in this part of the world to a normal condition." (Ibid.)

We understand the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] commitment to provide \$5 million in funding was made without seeking advance Presidential approval. Nevertheless, because the Greeks regard the [*less than 1 line not declassified*] offer a commitment, to disapprove the \$5 million now could interfere with prompt conclusion of the negotiations.

The commitment could be met, however, by directing [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to reprogram \$5 million for the airborne intelligence package within its 1978 budget. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] has considerable reprogramming capabilities and has often provided equipment to allied services as part of mutual arrangements. This approach would avoid a dispute with the Greeks and could be done apart from the formal Defense Cooperation Agreement, which would avoid antagonizing the Turks who are aware of the previous *quid pro quo* offer.

OMB recommends the alternative of [*less than 1 line not declassified*] funding in order to minimize the budget impact and encourage greater budgetary discipline.

NSC defers judgment on the method of providing the funds but endorses State's request that they be provided so that the process of negotiating the Greek-U.S. DCA can be concluded as soon as possible.

#### *Decision*

Approve \$5 million MAP in 1979 as part of DCA *quid pro quo*. (State recommendation)

Direct [*less than 1 line not declassified*] to reprogram \$5 million in 1978 separate from DCA. (OMB recommendation)<sup>2</sup>

Approve no U.S. funding for airborne intelligence package. (State, OMB, and NSC all recommend approval)

#### *Greek Communications Assistance*

In the Defense Cooperation Agreement negotiations, the Greeks were offered, as part of the total \$700 million base agreement *quid pro quo*, FMS financing for establishing a Greek telecommunications facility and expanding a separate Greek Defense Communications System paralleling similar U.S. facilities. Because the Greeks have sought a U.S. Government guarantee of the prices for these facilities—a guarantee the U.S. Government cannot legally offer—State is concerned that this issue may cause the Greeks to stall the negotiations or press again for joint use of U.S. facilities. To meet this contingency, State requests authority to offer an additional \$20 million in FMS credits.

OMB believes the \$700 million in MAP and FMS credits offered by the Ford Administration to be sufficiently generous to meet legitimate

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<sup>2</sup> Carter chose this OMB recommendation and initialed "JC" in the margin.

needs for a *quid pro quo*. If the Greeks wish to stall the negotiations, they will find other ways and are not likely to be bought off by another \$20 million in FMS credits. Moreover, any increase in the military assistance offered in the Greek DCA could create problems with the Turks.

Accordingly, OMB recommends you disapprove the additional FMS and that State be directed to stick to the \$700 million total previously offered.

NSC endorses State's request, believes that the additional \$20 million in FMS credits is justified to bring the DCA negotiations to a successful conclusion and does not believe that the additional authorization will create problems with the Turks because the U.S.-Turkish DCA has already been signed. NSC does not believe the Turks would wish to reopen the DCA to renegotiation because of this issue.

#### *Decision*

Approve \$20 million increase in FMS financing as part of DCA *quid pro quo*. (State and NSC recommendation)<sup>3</sup>

Approve *no* increase in FMS financing as part of DCA *quid pro quo*. (OMB recommendation)

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<sup>3</sup> Carter chose this State and NSC recommendation and wrote at the bottom of the page, "Only if this item concludes the DCA treaty. Let me know personally when the agreement is reached. J.C." In an undated memorandum, Brzezinski notified Henze of Carter's decision and added the following instructions: "Please give special attention to the President's note. He feels very strongly that this is our final position on the Greek DCA and that we should now move rapidly to a successful conclusion. All interested agencies should know this." Henze wrote in the margin: "Being done, PH. 7 June 77." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 26, Greece: 1/77–4/78)

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### **168. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State and the Department of Defense<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, July 18, 1977, 1456Z

6652. Subject: U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Negotiations Successfully Concluded.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 26, Greece: 1/77–4/78. Secret. Sent Immediate to the Department of State. Sent for information Immediate to JCS; Priority to Ankara and USNATO; and to USNMR SHAPE, USDELMC, USCINCEUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAFE, USDOCOSouth, and DIRNSA. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

1. The full U.S. and Greek delegations, headed by Ambassadors Kubisch and Chrysospathis, met briefly on Monday, July 18, to acknowledge formally the resolution of all issues in these negotiations and the completion of agreed texts for all documents (26 in all) associated with the U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement. (Addressees should consider this confidential until initialing and public acknowledgement later this month.)<sup>2</sup>

2. In describing this significant milestone as one of the high points of his three-year tenure in Athens, Ambassador Kubisch expressed his satisfaction and appreciation for Greek efforts and cooperation in making its achievement possible before his departure. He voiced his thanks and congratulations to members of both the U.S. and Greek teams for their diligence, perseverance, and professionalism in producing a body of agreed documents which are designed to serve and strengthen U.S. and Greek mutual security interests and which can be supported by both peoples in a democratic environment. Referring to his recent agreement with Foreign Minister Bitsios, Ambassador also expressed the desire that arrangements be made quickly for the announced formal concluding round ending with initialing of all the agreed texts and a public communique to this effect during the last few days in July.

3. Ambassador Chrysospathis, in a similarly congratulatory and appreciative manner, welcomed this opportunity to note the "satisfactory settlement" of all DCA issues on the eve of the Ambassador's departure. He said this meeting "seals" the agreement over which representatives of both sides had labored long and hard during the past two and one half years. Pointing toward a formal, final session and initialing this month, Chrysospathis provided a draft communique for study by the U.S. delegation. (Septel)<sup>3</sup>

4. Both sides agreed that DCM Mills and Chrysospathis and their respective team members would meet in the next day or two to refine the scenario and work out final arrangements leading to the public round and initialing which would mark the formal public end to this phase of the negotiations.

5. Comment: The primary purpose of this meeting was to lock the Greeks into the agreements which have been reached on all the texts associated with the DCA and thus make it harder for them to seek further

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<sup>2</sup> The public initialing of the DCA took place on July 28 in Athens. The full text of the agreement was not found. The Embassy sent a draft of the complete text to the Department of State in telegram 4778 from Athens, May 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770182-0797)

<sup>3</sup> The Embassy sent the draft communiqué in telegram 6651 from Athens, July 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770270-1077)



changes between now and the time the documents are formally and publicly initialed. Nevertheless, we should anticipate that they will want some minor changes, particularly as they translate into the Greek language the agreed texts covering the recent issues addressed. Hopefully, we will be able to hold any such changes to linguistic alterations and avoid anything which might impact on the policy or legal aspects of the issues involved.

Kubisch

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## 169. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

New York, September 29, 1977, 4 p.m.

### SUBJECT

The Secretary's Meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *Greece*

Foreign Minister Bitsios

Ambassador Alexandrakis—Ambassador to the United States

Ambassador Papoulias—Permanent Representative to the United Nations

#### *United States*

Secretary Vance

Under Secretary Habib

Matthew Nimetz, Counselor of the Department

George S. Vest, Assistant Secretary, European Affairs

Nelson C. Ledsy, Director, EUR/SE

**SUMMARY:** In reviewing the Cyprus situation, Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios said the new Cypriot Government was prepared to negotiate in good faith, and that all that was necessary to get the talks restarted were serious Turkish proposals. There was no need for the Greek Government to become more active itself, but if the Turks put serious proposals forward, Bitsios implied his Government would be willing to consider a more direct role. Bitsios was skeptical that early movement to resolve Aegean issues was possible, but said Greece

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, unlabeled folder. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Ledsy on September 30; approved by Anderson on October 20. The meeting took place in Vance's suite at the UN Plaza Hotel. Vance and Bitsios were in New York to attend the UN General Assembly session.

would welcome American assistance on certain procedural aspects of Greek-Turkish negotiations. With respect to Ambassador Schaufele, Bitsios said his Government's position had not changed, and that it would be impossible for Ambassador Schaufele to carry out his duties. His arrival in Athens would retard the development of closer Greek/US relations.<sup>2</sup> Secretary Vance said he would reflect on Foreign Minister Bitsios' comments, and be back in touch on this matter in the near future. END SUMMARY

### *Cyprus*

The conversation began with a general review of the Cyprus situation. Secretary Vance recalled that after the events of 1967, he and a number of colleagues who had worked on the Cyprus issue met and agreed that the problem had not been resolved, and would soon be back in their laps if something more substantive was not done.<sup>3</sup> It was clear that the problem would explode again, though obviously no one could have predicted the crisis of 1974. Vance wondered how the Greek Foreign Minister evaluated the current Cyprus situation in this interregnum period since Makarios' death.<sup>4</sup>

Foreign Minister Bitsios said there had been no real change in Cyprus with respect to the negotiating situation. The Greek-Cypriots had announced on August 23 their readiness to resume negotiations. Cypriot Foreign Minister Christophides had repeated this willingness to negotiate in the last few days. The change in presidents had not altered anything and no change after February should be anticipated. All of the likely candidates—Kyprianou, Clerides and Papadopoulos—are known quantities, who will follow a sensible, moderate line. The real problem remains to persuade the Turks to come forward with new ideas. The Foreign Minister said he would be talking to Turkish For-

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<sup>2</sup> Carter nominated William E. Schaufele, Jr., a career diplomat, to be Ambassador to Greece on June 23. The Greek Government protested Schaufele's nomination following his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 12, in which he stated: "The Aegean, essentially, is a bilateral dispute between Greece and Turkey, which in part is due to the unusual—I must admit—arrangements of geography. Greece owns territory very close to the Turkish coast. This ownership is based on long-standing international agreements. If that particular dispute cannot be urged along on the way to settlement, then it could indeed become very serious." The quote was reprinted in Graham Hovey, "Greek Anger at Schaufele Remark May Block Assignment as Envoy," *The New York Times*, July 22, 1977, p. A3. The Department of State announced on December 7 that Schaufele's nomination would be withdrawn and that he would be reassigned as Ambassador to Poland. On February 3, 1978, Carter announced the nomination of Robert J. McCloskey to be Ambassador to Greece; McCloskey arrived in Athens on March 9.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 162.

<sup>4</sup> Makarios died on August 3.

eign Minister Caglayangil on Saturday,<sup>5</sup> and would probe his Turkish colleague to see if there was anything new in the Turkish attitude.

When Secretary Vance asked if it would not be useful for both Greece and Turkey to become more directly involved in the negotiating process, Bitsios replied negatively, saying a more active Greek role was not necessary. Bitsios insisted the main lines of the Greek position were already on the table. The Greek-Cypriots had accepted a bi-zonal solution. They were prepared to accept a federation. All they asked for were territorial concessions. Thus, why was there any need for Greek Government involvement?

The Secretary expressed his understanding of the Greek position, and said it was his view that serious territorial and constitutional proposals had to be put forward at about the same time, so as to provide a basis for real negotiations. Otherwise, the same old stalemate would continue.

Foreign Minister Bitsios said that while he agreed with the Secretary's remarks, it was important to note the difference in quality between the proposals the two sides had tabled in Vienna last April.<sup>6</sup> The Greek-Cypriot proposal on territory roughly reflected the population balance on the Island. It was a proposal that clearly could provide a basis for discussion and bargaining. On the other hand, the Turkish proposal was so far from anything like an acceptable federation as to be essentially non-negotiable. When the Turkish-Cypriots submit a proposal which embodies a real federation, only then will the parties be in a position to move toward a meaningful negotiation.

Mr. Nimetz asked what would happen if the Turks revised their constitutional proposal along the lines that Bitsios had suggested. Would the Greek Government at such a point be prepared to come in more actively, and be willing to work directly with the Turks to bring about a solution? Bitsios did not answer directly, but insisted that the Turks did not really want to negotiate. If they were to whisper a serious proposal in Greek ears, they would get a positive Greek response, Bitsios said.

Secretary Vance suggested that the Greeks might see a somewhat different attitude on the part of the Turks in the weeks ahead. He suggested that Bitsios press Caglayangil to be forthcoming, and said he would be meeting with Caglayangil again, and hoped to determine in greater detail what the Turkish Government might be prepared to do. It was the Secretary's feeling that the situation in Ankara may have

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<sup>5</sup> October 1. Bitsios described the meeting to Vance on October 3. See Document 169.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 11 and footnote 3, Document 38.

changed since the Turkish elections. One could at least be hopeful on this point.

Foreign Minister Bitsios said he had received information that Caglayangil had, in fact, brought nothing with him from Ankara. He recalled that Frank Judd had recently returned from Turkey discouraged about the prospects for early movement.<sup>7</sup>

The Secretary said that, of course, we would all have to wait and see, but that he was not pessimistic. We had seen some indications of change. The Turks have told us they are prepared to discuss the Cyprus situation. They volunteered no specific proposals, and we asked for none, but we do feel that there is a somewhat different attitude—a feeling of confidence on the part of the present government in Ankara that it can carry out a policy with respect to Cyprus. Caglayangil has at least come to New York with a mandate to discuss the matter further.

### *The Aegean*

The Secretary enquired as to whether there had been any progress in resolving Aegean problems. Bitsios replied that these questions had been basically dormant over the last three months. Greece had submitted a series of proposals in June just before the Turkish elections. Turkey has never replied to those proposals, nor had Turkey suggested a further round of meetings. Bitsios said he intended to raise Aegean issues with Caglayangil when he saw him on Saturday (October 1) and would listen to what the Turks had to say. Bitsios conceded that regardless of what the Turks said, it would now be difficult for the Athens Government to organize further meetings, or negotiate Aegean questions before the November 20 elections.

When the Secretary asked if there was anything that the United States might do to be helpful, Bitsios said there were two aspects of the matter where outside involvement might be helpful. Both concerned procedural questions, but ones that were extremely delicate, and could in themselves lead to difficulty. It was because of this delicacy, said Bitsios, that the Greek Government had originally proposed that the entire matter be turned over to the World Court for consideration. Greece had now agreed, however, to negotiate but it would be helpful if outsiders could persuade Turkey (a) that matters which cannot be resolved through negotiation be jointly submitted to the World Court, and (b) that during this period of negotiations and adjudication there be no provocations of the kind caused by the sailing of the *Sismik*. On both these points, Bitsios said the United States could be most helpful.

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<sup>7</sup> Frank Judd, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, worked with U.S. officials to mediate the Greece-Cyprus-Turkey dispute.

The Secretary said that he would keep these points in mind as he talked to the Turks.

*US/Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement*

The Secretary said he appreciated the difficulties Greece faced in signing the Defense Cooperation Agreement which our two sides had initialled in July. He said he assumed that signature would now have to wait until after the Greek elections. Foreign Minister Bitsios agreed, indicating that it would be impossible for a further decision to be made on this matter until after November 20.<sup>8</sup>

*Status of Ambassador Schaufele*

The Secretary opened the discussion of this question by indicating that the Greek Government already fully understood US views. It was our opinion that the Greek Government had over-reacted, and that the request for Ambassador Schaufele's withdrawal was totally unwarranted.

Foreign Minister Bitsios agreed that this was a difficult matter. He said that as unfortunate as the incident might be for Ambassador Schaufele personally, the fact was that the Ambassador would not be in a position to work in Athens. He simply could not do his job. Bitsios then recalled the difficult history of US/Greek bilateral relations in the period from 1974–1977. He said Prime Minister Caramanlis had made great efforts to remedy the situation and restore closer ties with the United States. Ambassador Kubisch had also made a major positive contribution to this endeavor. He was tactful, patient, understanding. He had enjoyed the confidence of Prime Minister Caramanlis. The Prime Minister in turn became satisfied in mid-1977 that he could go ahead with a series of substantive steps aimed at improving US/Greek relations. Then came the Schaufele statement. What he said may not have seemed harmful or serious as viewed from an American context, but it deeply wounded every Greek. It is not true, Bitsios insisted, that the Greek Government was merely bowing to pressure from the press. The first report about the Schaufele statement came to the Greek Government from Ambassador Alexandrakis in Washington. This and subsequent reports were considered the next day in a restricted Cabinet session. The Cabinet was unanimous in its judgment that Schaufele should not come to Greece, and Bitsios assured the Secretary that the United States had many, many friends in that Cabinet. Summing up, he said that if Ambassador Schaufele came to Athens, manifestations could not be prevented and thus the whole process of US/Greek nor-

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<sup>8</sup> The signature and completion of the DCA did not occur until 1983. See Document 210.

malization would be impaired. The Greek Government would find this a most unfortunate development.

The Secretary asked if the Foreign Minister thought these sentiments would persist over time, or whether in a few months feelings on this matter might recede. The Foreign Minister replied that he did not think there would be any change of attitudes. The Greek people, he said, have a long memory.

The Secretary said he wished to reflect on these comments. He had wanted to hear the Foreign Minister's views directly and now that he had, he thought it important to be able to consider this matter further in private. Foreign Minister Bitsios interrupted at this point to insist again that the Greek Government and especially Prime Minister Caramanlis and himself were friends of the United States and wanted to do everything in their power to improve US/Greek relations. He also noted that Caramanlis was certain to be re-elected on November 20, and thus there would be a further four-year period of steadily improving US-Greek relations.

The Secretary said he accepted these statements completely and knew that Prime Minister Caramanlis and Foreign Minister Bitsios were sincere friends of the United States. The Secretary asked again to have time to reflect on the presentation of the Greek Foreign Minister, and promised to be back in touch with him on this matter in the near future.

The meeting closed with Foreign Minister Bitsios asking how press questions about Ambassador Schauffele were to be handled. It was agreed that the Foreign Minister would say that the two sides had discussed the matter and that the Foreign Minister had presented the views of the Greek Government on this question directly to Secretary Vance. It was further agreed that questions about the US response should be referred directly to the American press spokesman, who would say that the United States had heard the presentation of the Greek Government and had agreed to study it carefully and provide a response at a later date.

**170. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

New York, October 3, 1977, 10:30 a.m.

**SUBJECT**

Secretary Clifford's Meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios

**PARTICIPANTS***Greece*

Dimitrios Bitsios, Foreign Minister of Greece

Ambassador George Papoulias, Permanent Representative of Greece to the  
United Nations

Ambassador Menelas Alexandrakis, Ambassador of Greece to the United States

*United States*

Secretary Clifford

Matthew Nimetz, Counselor of the Department

Nelson C. Ledsky, Director, EUR/SE

Secretary Clifford opened the conversation by recalling his previous meetings with Foreign Minister Bitsios in Athens in February and London in May,<sup>2</sup> and suggested that he hoped to see Bitsios again fairly soon in Greece. Greek Foreign Minister Bitsios responded by indicating that Secretary Clifford was most welcome to come back to Athens, and his return at an early date would signify that the Cyprus issue might move off dead-center.

Secretary Clifford said he was particularly interested in talking to Bitsios, to get a feel of where the present situation stood. He recounted the difficulties we had all faced since the Vienna meetings in April. First had come the Turkish elections, then the difficult process of government formation in Ankara, and then the death of Makarios. All these developments taken together had retarded real movement on Cyprus for almost six months. However, Clifford said he now had the feeling that movement was possible again. The new coalition in Ankara has expressed the desire to see negotiations on Cyprus resumed, and that if the talks can be restarted, this could constitute an important step forward. We certainly do not think our efforts between February and October were wasted. The U.S. still has an important contribution to make, and there has been no diminution of US interest and determination to see this problem through. President Carter remains interested and involved.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977–1980, Lot 81D85, Box 2, MemCons. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Ledsky on October 11. The meeting took place at the Carlyle Hotel.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 8 and 166.

Foreign Minister Bitsios said he was pleased by the statements Secretary Clifford had made. Greece welcomed continued US interest and involvement, and affirmed that Cyprus was of continuing interest and concern to the Greek government. Bitsios also pledged all possible Greek government cooperation and assistance with respect to the Cyprus problem. Nonetheless, Athens remained pessimistic about the prospects for early progress. Bitsios said that on Saturday he had had a long luncheon meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil—the first such meeting since the new Turkish coalition was formed. Caglayangil essentially had nothing new to say, and this in itself was a source of deep disappointment. Instead of indicating that the Turkish government was prepared to make a territorial or constitutional offer or even to discuss a settlement in terms of percentage, Caglayangil insisted that there could be nothing more than free discussion between the parties at a resumed inter-communal conference. Bitsios said such a Turkish position might have seemed fair a year ago, but it was neither new nor fair under circumstances in which the Greek Cypriots had already put solid territorial and constitutional proposals on the table.

Bitsios said he reminded Caglayangil that the Greek-Cypriots had already accepted the concept of bizonality. They had already accepted the need for a federation. They had acknowledged that the Turkish Cypriots could hold 20 percent of the island's territory. It was now time for the Turks to say something concrete. Bitsios said he had explained to Caglayangil that he was making these statements, not to set preconditions for the negotiations, but merely to outline the current status of those negotiations.

Bitsios indicated that at one point in their nonproductive conversation, he had asked Caglayangil if he wished to “whisper something in my ear”, which could serve as a basis for a serious, substantive discussion on a key Cyprus issue. Caglayangil said that this was not the way one could proceed. Sensitive discussions would have to take place at the negotiating table, with give and take between the negotiators.

With respect to the constitutional issue, Caglayangil was even more negative. According to Bitsios, the Turkish Foreign Minister spent most of his time complaining about US interest in this subject and suggested that this was a matter better discussed directly between the Greeks and the Turks. It was at this point that Caglayangil asked Bitsios if the Greeks would be willing to sit at the table with the Turks for substantive discussions. Bitsios said his answer was firmly negative claiming, as he said he had done many times in the past, that these were matters for the Cypriots and not the Greek government.

Bitsios said he came away from the luncheon meeting extremely discouraged. It was not a good conversation—perhaps the poorest with Caglayangil in some years. As for the Aegean, Bitsios acknowledged



that Caglayangil had praised Greece's latest proposals, and said Turkey was ready to provide a positive reply whenever talks resumed. Bitsios said he had told Caglayangil that it would not be possible to organize such a meeting before November 20 and explained that he was not empowered to fix a date even after then.

Under questioning from Secretary Clifford, Bitsios said that what disturbed him more than the substantive positions taken by Caglayangil was the long list of complaints about warlike articles in the Greek press and belligerent statements by Greek politicians that Caglayangil cited at the beginning of the luncheon. Caglayangil also had a distorted report of the Greek Foreign Minister's UNGA speech, from which he made a series of further erroneous complaints about Greek political positions.<sup>3</sup> In sum, Caglayangil seemed intent, said Bitsios, on establishing the most negative atmosphere possible.

Bitsios said that while he was extremely pessimistic following his meeting with Caglayangil, he did not pass on this pessimism to the Greek Cypriots in New York, and did not want to cast doubt on prospects for future Cyprus negotiations. He hoped the US' more optimistic appraisal would prove accurate. He also thought the UN Secretary General should take a further initiative to resume the Cyprus talks, if he can obtain assurances from the Turks that there will be serious negotiations. In this regard, the Greek government favored completing the Cyprus debate in the General Assembly as soon as possible.

Bitsios said he was also certain that the Cypriots were counting on a further Clifford mission to the area. This, too, was favored by the Greek government. Indeed, all responsible factions in Greece wanted continued US involvement in the Cyprus problem.

Secretary Clifford expressed regret that the meeting between Bitsios and Caglayangil had not gone better, and said he hoped the unhappy outcome did not portend a further worsening of Greek-Turkish relations. Clifford then asked Bitsios for his appraisal of the domestic situation in Cyprus.

The response from Greek Foreign Minister was along familiar lines. He said the Greek government was pleased that the Cypriots had been able to maintain their unity and select an interim President. It was also reassuring to Athens that all the possible candidates for the presidential elections in February were committed to the goals set by Archbishop Makarios. Bitsios declined to predict who would win the February elections, but said he doubted that the leftists would emerge strengthened even if they supported the winning candidate.

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is presumably to Bitsios' speech at the United Nations on September 30.

With regard to the timing of the Greek elections, Bitsios said that Caramanlis had decided to hold them in November, rather than have all of 1978 devoted to campaigning. Getting a new government installed after November will mean Athens can then move to deal more effectively with its many foreign policy problems, among which he listed problems with Turkey, with the United States, with the EC-9 and Cyprus.

Mention of Greek-US relations led quite naturally to a general discussion of the status of the US-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement. Bitsios said that the Agreement, which had now been initialed, had been submitted to the Cabinet for study. The Agreement could not now be signed until after the Greek elections of November 20, but no decision had been made to sign it even after then. The Greek Foreign Minister said it was a fact of life that the Greek DCA was linked to the Turkish DCA, and that the Turkish DCA was in turn linked to Cyprus. This is a linkage which has been established by others but it was a linkage that no one could now break.

Bitsios said there were also mounting problems with respect to Greece and NATO. The Greek government was seeking to establish a satisfactory relationship with NATO based on its desire to have its forces ready to participate with its NATO allies in case of an emergency. The Turks were beginning to be negative with respect to every position the Greeks adopted. This made the situation in Brussels very difficult.

Bitsios said the Greek military was becoming very unhappy with this state of affairs, and if Turkish negativism continues, pressure will grow in Greece to get out of NATO altogether. Bitsios said he had spoken directly with General Haig about this matter, and Haig had suggested that further Greek-NATO talks be conducted at military rather than political levels in Brussels. This was certainly acceptable to Greece.

Bitsios then asked Secretary Clifford how he envisaged his future role. Clifford said he saw one of his next tasks as assisting the Administration move the Defense Cooperation Agreements with Turkey and Greece through the Congress. In this connection, he expressed the hope that the Greek government would soon sign its DCA, since these documents represented, in Clifford's view, a first step to strengthen the Alliance and rebuild NATO's southeastern flank.

Bitsios seemed somewhat upset by this explanation and enquired as to the current relationship of the DCAs to Cyprus. Was there not a linkage between these subjects? Mr. Nimetz and Secretary Clifford both agreed there was such a linkage, and that Turkey fully understood that the DCA could not be passed before real progress had been achieved on Cyprus.

Bitsios said he continued to be puzzled as to why the Turks were not reasonable on Cyprus. They were clearly the winners and all they had to do was find a way to confirm their victory. Why had they been so stubborn these past three years?

Mr. Nimetz suggested that perhaps they did not quite know how to act. Our impression is that they do not believe the matter can be successfully resolved if negotiations are left to the two Cypriot negotiators. This may explain why Turkey seems interested in talking directly to the Greek government about Cyprus. Secretary Clifford observed that a Cyprus solution will be difficult to obtain at best—perhaps impossible without active Greek help.

Foreign Minister Bitsios assured Secretary Clifford that we could count on Greek assistance when the time was right. He closed the conversation by noting again the great confidence the Greek-Cypriots had in Secretary Clifford. This confidence was shared by Greece as well, which was prepared to assist Secretary Clifford in any way it could in the months ahead.

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**171. Memorandum From Gregory F. Treverton of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 5, 1977

SUBJECT

Greece and NATO

You asked what should be done about reintegrating Greece into the NATO command structure.<sup>2</sup> The brief answer, I fear, is that not very much can be done now on the narrow question. The pace of Greece reintegration is likely to depend much more on a general easing of tensions over Cyprus and the Aegean. Once there is progress there we could turn more directly to the NATO issue.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 16, Greece: 1977. Confidential. Sent for information.

<sup>2</sup> Brzezinski posed this question in a November 28 memorandum to Robert Hunter: "One of our objectives for 1978 is to reintegrate Greece into the NATO command structure. What should we do about it.?" (Ibid.)

*Current Situation*

The Greeks did not withdraw to the same extent as did France; they still participate on several military committees of NATO (much to the annoyance of the Turks who argue, not without cause, that Greece continues to enjoy the benefit of NATO without bearing its share of the burden). Athens submitted a paper to NATO which in effect asks for a special relationship: the central element is that Greece would not commit its forces to NATO as a general matter but would do so only in dire emergencies, as determined by Athens itself. Naturally Turkey will have none of that arrangement; neither will we or most of the other Allies. Negotiations between NATO and Greece continue (within an Ad Hoc Committee of the DPC), but those negotiations are addressing minor technical issues, with participants unwilling to face the row that would arise if the Greek paper were taken up directly.

Over the past months there have been some advances. Greece agreed, for instance, to re-commit almost all of its nuclear capable aircraft. Within the Greek military the desire to remain in NATO is strong, and Greece has participated quietly in some NATO activities over the past few months.

*U.S. Policy*

We need to continue something like our current line of policy: enough pressure on Greece to move toward NATO where it can, but enough patience—*especially in public*—not to further politicize the issue in Greece, coupled with a focus on the process of easing Greek-Turkish tensions. Caramanlis has said that Greece cannot return fully until the Cyprus problem is resolved. The electoral showing of Papandreou, a committed NATO-phobe, may further complicate the Greek politics of the issue, although he may be chastened by the knowledge that if he is ever to come to power he must first make his peace with a Greek military in which pro-NATO sentiments remain strong.<sup>3</sup> Here is a possible scenario, incorporating comments by Henze:

—keep the NATO issue publicly in the background, while taking advantage of any opportunity to associate the Greek military with NATO activities. Make clear that we oppose any special relationship but discourage the Turks from making too much of a fuss about the Greeks and NATO;

—press the Greeks to sign the DCA;

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<sup>3</sup> Karamanlis won the election in November 1977, although Papandreou made a strong showing at the polls, effectively becoming the major opposition leader in Greece. During the campaign Papandreou called for a complete withdrawal of Greece from NATO.

—concentrate on working with both countries toward resolving the Cyprus and Aegean problems;

—if and when there is progress, and once both DCAs are signed and ratified, *then* address directly the question of bringing Greece back into full participation. (The command change that General Haig has proposed *might* help Greece return to NATO, by giving Caramanlis something to buttress the argument that he is not moving toward NATO on the same terms as before.)<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> In telegram 303919 to USNMR SHAPE, December 21, the Department reported General Haig's plan to place NATO Headquarters at Izmir under the control of Turkish commanders with U.S. deputies, effective by mid-1978. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770476–0907) Prior to 1974, NATO Headquarters at Izmir was composed of Greek and Turkish soldiers under U.S. command. Following the Cyprus conflict Greek forces left Izmir, at which point Turkey expressed dissatisfaction that an exclusively Turkish force was commanded by Americans.

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## 172. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Brussels, December 8, 1977, 5:45 p.m.

### SUBJECT

The Secretary's Meeting with Greek Foreign Minister Papaligouras

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *Greece*

Foreign Minister Panayotis A. Papaligouras

Ambassador Byron Theodoropolous, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

J. Tzounis, Director General for Political Affairs, MFA

Eustace Lagakos, Greek Perm Rep to NATO

#### *United States*

Secretary Vance

Under Secretary Habib

Assistant Secretary Vest, EUR

Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO

Mr. Raymond C. Ewing, EUR/SE, Deputy Director

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, unlabeled folder. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Ewing (EUR/SE) on December 12; approved by Anderson (S/S) on December 27. The meeting took place in the U.S. Mission to NATO. Vance and Papaligouras were in Brussels for the biannual NATO Ministerial meeting December 8–9.

After the press had been escorted from the room, Foreign Minister Papaligouras said he wished to bring to the Secretary's attention the extremely serious matter of the Defense Planning Committee communique which had been adopted on December 7.<sup>2</sup> It had already had a "seismic" effect in Greece because of its pro-Turkish content. Papaligouras said that Prime Minister Karamanlis did not feel that what was said in the communique was fair or justified. It came at a particularly bad time since the new cabinet next week would face a vote of confidence and present its program to Parliament and thus it could have an effect on Greek domestic politics. Karamanlis felt that the results of the November 20 election were in part attributable to anti-West and anti-US feelings in Greece. Despite this Karamanlis still wanted to return Greece as soon as possible to military participation in NATO.

Papaligouras recalled that Greece had entered into negotiations for a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with the US to counter-balance the DCA concluded with Turkey. He noted that Greece would be better off if neither agreement were implemented and that pending resolution of the Cyprus question he hoped the US would not proceed with the Turkish DCA.

Papaligouras said he agreed with remarks by Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil earlier in the day that both Greece and Turkey have responsibilities to help resolve the problems of the area but he felt strongly that Turkey could do more with the Turkish Cypriots than could Greece with the Greek Cypriot community. This was true because Turkey is physically on Cyprus and exercises power over the Turkish Cypriot representatives who were only a kind of "puppet".

Papaligouras said that Karamanlis had told him that if the Cyprus problem were not solved, he might ultimately feel obliged to take the question of Greece's NATO relationship to a plebiscite. If he did so, he was afraid at this point he would lose unless matters improve. Papaligouras also noted that Greece had submitted two proposals to NATO in September 1976 (sic) and January 1977 but had received no response.

Returning to the Cyprus question, Papaligouras said that if they are not directly involved, both Greece and Turkey would be in a position to exercise more influence; on the other hand if they were directly

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 103. The Turkish representatives to the Committee proposed a number of conditions to govern the new association of Greece to the NATO military command structure. Turkey was particularly concerned that Greek reintegration would make Turkish military information available to Greek authorities. (Telegram 12730 from USNATO, December 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770467-0840) The December 7 DPC communiqué noted Turkey's need to modernize its forces and the responsibility of NATO members to provide assistance for the modernization. The allies also "confirmed their view of the importance of the contribution to the solidarity and vital security of the entire Alliance of the early implementation of defence co-operative agreements relating to the South-Eastern flank."

involved, the Aegean and Cyprus problems, while perhaps linked and inter-related, would become confused and more difficult to resolve. It was therefore important to have Cyprus precede settlement of the Aegean. The Turks have direct influence on Cyprus while the Greeks did not. The two problems, if they were mixed up, could have a bad effect on efforts to solve the Cyprus problem as well as the Aegean.

Papaligouras repeated that an extremely critical situation existed in Greece and asked for the Secretary's assistance with regard to the NAC communique. He urged that the Secretary support these efforts with the Turkish Foreign Minister. The Greek Foreign Minister hoped that the communique could use language similar to the December 1976 language on the two DCAs. The Secretary said he had not yet had an opportunity to read the DPC or the draft NAC communique and thus would have to look into the matter before he could respond to Papaligouras' request.<sup>3</sup>

With regard to Cyprus, the Secretary said Caglayangil's position was that Turkish participation would allow more pressure to be brought on Denktash who was not as flexible as a Turkish representative would be.

Papaligouras said he did not agree. The Greek Government recognized the Government of Cyprus and was not able to influence the Greek Cypriot community. He repeated that the Aegean and other Greek/Turkish differences should not be mixed with Cyprus.

Papaligouras said that Turkey had done its utmost to make difficulties for Greece's ability to function as an ally. He cited the examples of the Long Term Defense Program, the naval command in the Mediterranean, and the recent Display Determination exercise.

Returning to Cyprus, Papaligouras said that if the Turks would come to the table with a logical territorial proposal, then a settlement could quickly be reached under the auspices of the UN Secretary General.

In response to the Secretary's question, Theodoropoulos said that Caglayangil seemed to be suggesting that Greece should also be involved in the Cyprus problem, but Greece could not be part of any quadripartite meeting on Cyprus since that would tend to link in the minds of the negotiators the Aegean and Cyprus questions.

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<sup>3</sup> The issue in contention was that Greece anticipated that Turkish officials would attempt to insert language in the draft communiqué of the North Atlantic Council calling for the U.S. arms embargo against Turkey to be lifted. The final communiqué contains no such language. The Embassy reported this information in telegram 11235 from Athens, December 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770462-0384) The communiqué is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 1978, pp. 30–31.

The Secretary said he assumed that Greece wanted to see the Cyprus problem settled. Papaligouras agreed. The Secretary said that Turkey says that is also its objective. Assuming that is in fact their desire, isn't there a way within the UN framework to resolve the matter?

The Secretary suggested that an effort be made to deal with the communique problem so as to avoid making it a larger problem. He also hoped that the debate during the remainder of the NAC would not heighten tensions between Greece and Turkey. Papaligouras said that Luns had pressed for moderation and he intended to not be immoderate.

Papaligouras suggested that the serious questions of interest to Greece and the US be put aside until after Parliament's Christmas recess and then an effort be made to normalize matters. But Greece essentially felt that Turkey was responsible for the current difficulties.

The Secretary asked about the Government of Greece's intentions regarding the U.S.-Greek DCA. Papaligouras said they wanted to discuss the DCA calmly, but first look for proof that Turkey had moved toward a Cyprus solution. Secretary Vance asked again whether the Greek Government wanted to go ahead with the DCA or not. Papaligouras responded by asking what the United States planned to do with the Turkish DCA.

The Secretary said the Agreement had been before Congress since January, the Administration had endorsed it in principle, but Congress had not yet been asked to take action. He asked again whether the Greek Government was prepared to sign the DCA or not.

Papaligouras said he had not expected the question to be put so bluntly. The Secretary assured him he did not need an immediate answer. Papaligouras said he thought it best calmly to discuss the matter later with the Secretary or the new American Ambassador in Athens in an effort to find solutions, but he was not prepared to give an answer at this time.

The Secretary said he understood that the Greek Government was not in a position to take up the question of the Greek DCA at a time when an important vote was about to be taken in Parliament.

Papaligouras said there were also NATO problems, including the absence of a reply to the two Greek proposals. Theodoropoulos pointed out that the Greek-US DCA was negotiated in the framework of NATO and therefore a clarification of Greece's positions within the Alliance should coincide with any action on the DCA. Turkey had sought to push Greece to the periphery of the Alliance. He pointed out that all existing US facilities in Greece were fully available to the US and that the Greek Government had never tried to blackmail the US. The Greek Government had therefore been surprised by the apparent decision of the US Government to go ahead with both DCAs.



The Secretary said that we wanted to go ahead with both DCAs, but no final decision had yet been taken. Tzounis referred to a statement on December 7 by the State Department spokesman that the Turkish DCA should be considered on its own merits.<sup>4</sup>

After reading the statement (State 292218) the Secretary said that we have endorsed but never directly linked in public statements the Turkish DCA to Cyprus.<sup>5</sup> The statement did not represent a new position. Tzounis said that the spokesman had gone further in a subsequent exchange with reporters. The Secretary said he would like to examine the transcript carefully himself.

Papaligouras said he thought that until now the DCA had always been linked with Cyprus. The Secretary said that we had never said there was direct linkage and we had always used very carefully formulated language.

The conversation closed with the Secretary promising to see what would be possible with regard to the communique. He made no promises as to language. Papaligouras repeated that the Greeks were satisfied with last year's language, although they did not feel the two DCAs needed to even be mentioned since they had not been discussed at the NAC meeting.

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<sup>4</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 292218 to USNATO, November 17, the Department transmitted press guidance regarding an alleged U.S.-Turkish deal on Cyprus. The allegation was that the United States was prepared to lift the arms embargo in exchange for Turkish concessions in the Cyprus dispute. The press guidance explicitly de-linked the embargo from Cyprus. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770455-0465)

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### 173. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Athens, January 23, 1978, 1726Z

700. Subject: Draft Report on the Secretary's Meetings With Prime Minister Caramanlis, January 21.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance Nodis MemCons, 1978. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. No final version of this report or a memorandum of conversation was found.

1. This is the draft report on the Secretary's discussions with Prime Minister Caramanlis on January 21. It has not been cleared by the Secretary or any member of his party. The Secretary, accompanied by Charge Mills, Messrs. Saunders and Carter, and Political Counselor Barbis (notetaker) met for two and a quarter hours with Prime Minister Caramanlis at his office. Also present on the Greek side were Foreign Minister Papaligouras; Byron Theodoropoulos, the MFA's Secretary General; John Tzounis, Director General for Political Affairs (notetaker); and Petros Molyviatis, Director of the Prime Minister's Political Office who acted as interpreter. Before the meeting with the Prime Minister the Secretary made a courtesy call on President Tsatsos accompanied by the Charge. Certain matters were also discussed later that evening at a small dinner hosted by the Prime Minister, which lasted about two hours, at which the Foreign Minister, Ambassador Molyviatis, Defense Minister Averoff, the Charge and Messrs. Saunders and Barbis were also present.

2. Begin summary. During extensive discussions with Secretary Vance January 21, Prime Minister Caramanlis made a detailed presentation covering the whole range of bilateral U.S.-Greek relations and issues of common concern in the Eastern Mediterranean. Caramanlis spoke along familiar lines about Cyprus, Greece's withdrawal from NATO's integrated command structure and the current state of its relations with the Alliance, the U.S.-Greek DCA, Greek-Turkish relations, and Greece's entry into the European Community. He said nothing startlingly new, but his presentation on Greece's relations with NATO and its attitude towards the DCA was perhaps the clearest exposition yet of the Greek position. Caramanlis asked for U.S. assistance in expediting conclusion of negotiations with NATO for an interim relationship which was a necessary framework for U.S. bases in Greece and would serve as a bridge for Greece's eventual full return. Caramanlis was skeptical about Ecevit's proposal for a summit meeting and argued that there should first be adequate preparations to ensure the possibility of success.<sup>2</sup> At the end of the meeting the Secretary raised the question of a new Ambassador to Greece (septel) and, at the Prime

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<sup>2</sup> The Embassy reported in telegram 132, January 5, that in the wake of the collapse of the Demirel government, Ecevit had sent an "exploratory message" to Greek officials regarding a meeting with Karamanlis. The Embassy went on to note that Ecevit had also called for a meeting with Karamanlis following the elections in June 1977. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780009-1147) In telegram 613 from Athens, January 20, the Embassy quoted a spokesman of the Greek Government who said of the possibility of meeting Ecevit that "Mr. Caramanlis has no objection to meeting anyone, anywhere. However, a summit meeting requires a minimum of preparation." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780031-0197)

Minister's request, the Secretary gave a brief report on the status of Middle East negotiations.<sup>3</sup> End summary.

3. Prime Minister Caramanlis was relaxed and outgoing during all these encounters and obviously enjoyed the opportunity to meet with the Secretary and discuss matters of common interest with him. He was confident, articulate and gave the impression of a leader in full command. After thanking the Secretary for accepting his invitation to stop in Athens, the Prime Minister made a general presentation of his views as follow:

4. U.S.-Greek relations. The Prime Minister said he welcomed these discussions because they gave him an opportunity to clarify Greek positions and, perhaps, to clear up misunderstandings that may have arisen in the past between the two governments. Relations, he said, were basically good despite the attacks and criticism from the left. There was no hostility on the part of the Greek people toward the U.S. but a certain "bitterness" remained because the Greek people felt they had been "betrayed" by a close friend and ally as a result of U.S. policies with respect to the Junta and especially because of events in Cyprus in 1974. Nevertheless, he concluded, relations were good and actually better than they appeared to be, although there was room for further improvement.

5. Cyprus. Cyprus was at the heart of all Greece's problems, the Prime Minister asserted. He had been dealing with it for 24 years and, although he thought it had been settled on a reasonable basis some 20 years ago, in 1974 when he returned to Greece from exile he found the problem facing him again. Caramanlis admitted, as he has on previous occasions, that the July 15 Junta coup was stupid and gave the Turks a pretext to mount an invasion. However after normalcy had been restored (i.e., Clerides became acting President in Cyprus and Caramanlis Prime Minister in Greece), instead of withdrawing, the Turks mounted a second invasion during the Geneva Conference. Although Greece could have asked for the return to the status quo ante, it agreed to negotiate a new status on the island with the Turks. Since then there has been nothing but a "dialogue of the deaf". The Turks are now saying they will be making concrete proposals. Caramanlis said he hoped this time they would be sincere, but on the basis of past experience he could not be optimistic. The GOG position was clear support for the intercommunal talks under the aegis of the UN Secretary General. Greece had already made important concessions in accepting a bizonal, federal solution but still did not know exactly what the Turks were seeking.

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<sup>3</sup> The septel is likely telegram 694 from Athens, January 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N780002-0030)

6. The Secretary said that in the discussions in Ankara Ecevit had indicated he had reached agreement with Denktash who would put proposals on the table with respect to the territorial and constitutional questions.<sup>4</sup> Although Ecevit did not go into any detail regarding these proposals, he supported the principle of a federal system and was opposed to any settlement that could lead to partition. The Secretary indicated he was only reporting what Ecevit said, namely that he wanted a final solution on Cyprus and that it was long overdue to remove this "thorn" from relations with Greece. Caramanlis reiterated his skepticism, which he said was based on his long experience in dealing with the Turks on this issue. Moreover, recent statements by Ecevit and Denktash appeared to contradict Ecevit's assurances of serious intentions.<sup>5</sup>

7. NATO. Caramanlis explained that the crisis in Greece's relations with NATO was also an outgrowth of the Cyprus crisis. Greece supported NATO but had faced a choice in August 1974 of either going to war (as many in Greece demanded) or taking some action to defuse the situation. He had chosen the latter, and the minimum he could do was withdraw from the integrated military structure. There were strong popular feelings in Greece against NATO because one of its members had committed aggression against Cyprus and the Alliance did not react. If a solution could be found to the Cyprus problem, Greece would return to NATO immediately. However, since we did not know when this would happen, the Prime Minister said, and since Greece did not want to cut off all military ties, it had begun negotiations with NATO for a special relationship as a bridge for Greece's eventual full return to the Alliance. Greece made specific proposals to this effect a year ago, but there has been no NATO response. Moreover, the recent announcement of a change in the status of NATO Headquarters in Izmir was a mistake because it was made at an inappropriate moment—that is, before Greece's relations with the Alliance had been clarified.<sup>6</sup> It had thus created new problems. Caramanlis went on to say he would like to see the negotiations speeded up to reach agreement by this summer, since matters can only become more difficult with the passage of time. Although he would not want to create "impressions", he said Greece may be lost to NATO if some arrangement is not made soon. With the establishment of this special relationship Greece would also request the establishment of headquarters in Greece similar to

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 107.

<sup>5</sup> The statements were reported in Milton R. Benjamin, "Greece, Turkey Cool to Prospect of Vance Mediation on Cyprus," *The Washington Post*, January 18, 1978, p. A16. Benjamin reported that Ecevit had said the previous day that the purpose of Vance's visit was to discuss U.S.-Turkish issues—not Cyprus.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 4, Document 171.

those being created in Izmir. (Ambassador Tzounis later clarified to the notetaker that what the Greeks have in mind is for the establishment of the NATO headquarters to be included in the special relationship package.) In response to the Prime Minister's request for help in expediting these negotiations, the Secretary said he would look into the matter and get back in touch with Foreign Minister Papaligouras about it.

8. Bases. Caramanlis reviewed the origins and history of negotiations for the U.S.-Greek DCA. Greece's objective had been to streamline our security arrangements and adjust the status of U.S. facilities here to present-day conditions.<sup>7</sup> Greece wants to keep the U.S. bases here. However, the signing of the U.S.-Turkish DCA in March 1976 created a serious problem for Greece because the \$1 billion aid commitment to Turkey threatened to upset the relative military balance between the two countries. This made it necessary for Greece to seek a similar aid provision in its agreement. Caramanlis argued that inclusion of aid in these agreements is a mistake and said he would be happy if aid were dropped from both agreements, in which case he would sign the DCA without asking for anything in return. Greece had shown its good faith by initialing the agreement; however, since this DCA was inevitably connected with the U.S.-Turkish DCA (since it makes that one easier) and with the question of Greece's status in NATO, it was not possible to finalize the agreement yet in the absence of a reestablished military relationship with NATO. To provide the essential framework, it would be difficult for the bases to function legitimately in a NATO context. This was an additional reason for asking the U.S. to help in connection with the NATO negotiations.

9. The Secretary pointed out that it would not be possible in the case of the Greek and Turkish DCA's (or the agreement with the Philippines) to separate out economic aspects because of the negotiating background. It is entirely possible that whether the administration raises the question of the Turkish DCA or not, it will be raised by Congress in the next few months. He understood the Republican Party had already decided to raise the issue in Congress. The Secretary added that the administration had endorsed the Turkish DCA in principle, indicating the ultimate decision would depend on developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, which is a way of saying Cyprus.

10. The Prime Minister pointed out that if Congress should approve the Turkish DCA without progress on Cyprus, the result would

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<sup>7</sup> As a result of the Cyprus crisis in 1974, Greece's subsequent withdrawal from NATO's military structure, and the U.S. moves toward negotiating a Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey, the Government of Greece threw into question the future viability of U.S. military installations in Greece. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Documents 35, 36, 40, 47, 48, and 60.

be a deterioration in the situation which would make solution of problems in the area impossible. Although he made clear he considers this to be an internal U.S. matter and did not want to interfere, he felt he should draw our attention to the implications of such a development, since the decision would affect Greece. Caramanlis said he wanted to resolve these issues in a way that would help restore the integrity of the Alliance, but that he too had to be helped in this respect by Turkey and the Alliance. The fact that he continued to follow a pro-West policy while all these issues were still unresolved had been costly to him in the recent elections. He reiterated that Greece's allies and especially Turkey should take advantage of his presence as leader of the Greek Government to solve these problems because he has both the courage and ability to settle them. If they are not settled while he is in power, the possibility of an adventure or eventually even war could not be excluded.

11. Aegean. Caramanlis said the Aegean dispute, too, had been created by the Turks who were seeking to change a situation based on international treaties and agreements. He reviewed in familiar terms the Greek position with respect to the continental shelf and Aegean airspace disputes. His basic point was that the Turks always backed away from agreements they had reached, thus making progress impossible. To be constructive he had recently proposed a three-point negotiating procedure for reaching a peaceful settlement:

(A) Start a serious and consistent dialogue based on international law and practice using precedents of other countries with similar disputes, including the U.S. and Canada;

(B) During that dialogue both sides should refrain from any provocative actions which could upset the negotiations; and

(C) Agree that any problems not solved within a certain time through these negotiations should be referred to the International Court of Justice.

Since this is a fair procedure followed by many countries with similar disputes, Turkish refusal to accept it leads to a presumption of bad faith. There is a real risk of war should either side try to impose its will unilaterally.

12. Caramanlis then reviewed the *Sismik* operations of 1976 and noted he had been able to avert a confrontation by taking the issue to the UN Security Council.<sup>8</sup> He then described how Turkish intransigence and backtracking had also made agreement on the Aegean airspace issue impossible. The GOT has not yet responded to his three-point plan, although it accepted a Greek proposal to resume continental shelf talks February 12.

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<sup>8</sup> See *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1976, pp. 320-322.

13. Caramanlis noted that Turkey had recently raised the question of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace as an issue. He cited statistics comparing the Greek population in Turkey and the Turkish population in Greece at the time the Lausanne Treaty was signed with present figures to show that there has been a dramatic reduction in the size of the Greek population in Turkey but a significant increase in the Turkish population in Greece. He presented this as evidence that the Turks are trying to create another artificial dispute.

14. Ecevit. Until now, Caramanlis said, there has been no serious Turkish interlocutor with whom he could negotiate the various disputes. Ecevit who is now in charge is the one who created all of them. In 1974 Ecevit acted chauvinistically; it is not yet clear how he will act now. Last June, however, just before leaving his brief term as Prime Minister, he had instructed Denktash to occupy Varosha, which does not give much encouragement regarding his future policy. Caramanlis thought Ecevit was trying to “create impressions” in proposing a summit meeting with him. He does not know what Ecevit has in mind with respect to either procedure or substance. To meet without adequate preparations and then find out that it is not possible to agree on how the two countries can negotiate their differences would be dangerous. (Later that evening at dinner Caramanlis was even more skeptical about Ecevit’s intentions and reiterated the need for adequate preparations before agreeing to a summit.)

15. The Secretary agreed on the need for preparation, pointing out that Ecevit had told him he genuinely wants a settlement on Cyprus but had not said anything to him on the Aegean. He suggested that perhaps it would be worthwhile to try to find out on a lower level what Ecevit has in mind on the Aegean. Caramanlis said he was not asking Greece’s friends to take a position on the Aegean; all he wants is that they ask the Turks to accept his procedural proposals as a first step towards meaningful negotiations. The Secretary volunteered that perhaps the U.S., without intervening, could be helpful in this area as well.

16. European Community. During the conversation at dinner Caramanlis stated that his main reason for taking Greece into the EC was political—to strengthen and protect Greek democracy. He had started the process with the Association Agreement in 1962 and wanted to see it completed, with Greece a full member, before he ends his political career.<sup>9</sup> The purpose of his trip to European capitals next week is to try to

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<sup>9</sup> The August 24, 1962, note by the EEC Council on the Association Agreement between the EEC and Greece is available in *Western European Union Assembly—General Affairs Committee: A Retrospective View of the Political Year in Europe 1962*, March 1963, pp. 63–64.

speed up the negotiating process. The Secretary indicated U.S. support for Greek membership and for European unity.

17. Middle East and Horn of Africa. During the afternoon meeting, at the Prime Minister's request the Secretary reviewed recent developments in the Middle East situation, including the state of play following his visit there. At the dinner the Secretary brought up our concern over the developing situation in the Horn of Africa. Karamanlis said he was concerned about all of Africa.

18. Suggested action. After the Secretary's approval or amendments, the Department may wish to consider repeating this report to Embassy Ankara. We also suggest sections in this report concerning NATO and the DCA be repeated to USNATO and USNMR SHAPE for General Haig. For our part, we would appreciate seeing reports on the Secretary's discussions in Ankara.

19. We will be pouching the verbatim draft memorandum of conversation to S/S, Peter Tarnoff.

Mills

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#### **174. Letter From President Carter to Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 13, 1978

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have asked Ambassador McCloskey to deliver this message to you and to pass on my highest personal regards.

I am pleased that a man of his stature and ability will be representing the United States at a time when both our nations are trying to resolve an array of worldwide problems, particularly those of the Eastern Mediterranean. The restoration of democracy in Greece and the strengthening of your democratic institutions since 1974 are a source of satisfaction and comfort to the entire Western world. I am aware of the historic role you played in this process; I know that role will continue as

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 16, Greece: 1978–1980. No classification marking. In a memorandum forwarding a draft letter to Carter, Brzezinski counseled that the letter "is intended simply to create good will with Karamanlis and urge him to be cooperative in working out a settlement of outstanding issues with the Turks and with ourselves, but without getting into specifics." (Ibid.)



Greece enters the European Community, an entity whose ideals and aspirations we share.<sup>2</sup>

We have gone far toward improving the relations between our nations the last several years. This progress must continue. Only through a solid US-Greek relationship, based on mutual respect and confidence, can we properly meet the challenges which confront us. In this effort I pledge to you my full cooperation.

From the beginning of this Administration, we have believed that, with good will, sustained effort and cooperation with our friends, we could achieve a just solution to the problems which have plagued the Eastern Mediterranean.

Recent developments convince me that there is now renewed hope of progress toward resolving the area's problems. Secretary Vance gave me a full account of his talks with you in January, and I know you share our desire to press ahead with resolution of these problems.<sup>3</sup> Ambassador McCloskey is arriving at a promising time. He has my full confidence and will want to work as closely as possible with you on all the issues which concern us. I hope you will share with the Ambassador your thoughts on how our nations can best work together.

I understand the difficult decisions which lie ahead if there is to be a just Cyprus settlement and a resolution of the differences between Turkey and Greece. The United States is still willing to do whatever we can to help. We all must redouble our efforts to seek a new situation in the Eastern Mediterranean which is consistent with the desires and requirements of the people of the area, and one in which we can all sustain one another as friends.

In the coming months, Greece will have an increasing role to play in the Eastern Mediterranean and in Europe. I am pleased to know that you will be leading these efforts, at a time when statesmanship and reason will be greatly needed. I will welcome your advice, and I hope that you will give me your views at any time and in any manner you consider appropriate.

With warmest greetings and personal best wishes.

Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

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<sup>2</sup> Negotiations on Greek membership in the EC began in 1976, and an Accession Deed was signed in Athens on May 28, 1979. The Greek Parliament ratified the Accession Deed on June 28, 1979, and Greece formally became a member of the EC on January 1, 1981. See Document 212.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 173.

175. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, May 31, 1978, 5–6 p.m.

## SUBJECT

Summary of the President's Meeting with Prime Minister Karamanlis of Greece

## PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter  
 Vice President Walter F. Mondale  
 Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State  
 David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
 George Vest, Assistant Secretary of State  
 Matthew Nimetz, Counselor, Department of State  
 Hamilton Jordan, Assistant to the President  
 Paul B. Henze (Notetaker), National Security Council Staff Member  
 Constantine Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece  
 George Rallis, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
 Petros Molyviatis, Director General, Political Office  
 John Tzounis, Director General, Foreign Office  
 Menelaos Alexandrakis, Greek Ambassador to the United States

The President opened the meeting by welcoming Prime Minister Karamanlis to the White House and complimenting him on his contribution to the NATO discussions that afternoon.<sup>2</sup> He then suggested he talk first. The Prime Minister gave a long explanation of Greek views of the Cyprus situation and other problems with Turkey which corresponded to positions he has taken publicly over an extended period of time.

All of the problems which exist in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Prime Minister said, were created by the Turks. "We ask nothing of Turkey; Turkey asks something of us." He emphasized that all these problems could be solved by Turkish action. The moderation which he

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President: 5/78. Confidential. Drafted by Henze. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House.

<sup>2</sup> Karamanlis was in Washington to attend the biannual NATO Ministerial meeting May 30–31. Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the final communiqué, adopted May 31, declared progress on mitigating Greek-Turkish tensions. Paragraph 12 reads: "The Allies noted with satisfaction the meeting of the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey. They expressed the hope that this dialogue on bilateral questions will contribute to the solution of the differences between the two countries." Paragraph 13 reads: "The Allies reaffirmed the importance they attach to the strengthening of cohesion and solidarity especially in the South Eastern flank. They expressed the hope that existing problems will be resolved, and that full co-operation among members of the Alliance in all aspects of the defence field would be resumed." For the full text of the communiqué, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 1978, pp. 8–10.

had shown, he said, was at the expense of his domestic political support in Greece. On two occasions, he said, he had carried his moderation to the point of taking measures to avoid war with Turkey. The first occasion, he explained, was when the Turks launched the second phase of their movement in Cyprus.<sup>3</sup> Greece did not move against Turkey and the result has been stalemate, with the Turks unwilling to budge from the 40% of Cyprus they seized. Recent Turkish proposals for negotiating on Cyprus were not worthy of serious attention, he insisted, and earlier proposals for constitutional and territorial arrangements could not be taken as a basis for setting up a new governmental system for the whole island.<sup>4</sup> The Greek Cypriot side was right in rejecting them, he said, but he agreed that the concept of a bizonal, federal system with limited powers for the central government remained a basis for working out a solution. On territory, he said, the proportion to be retained by the Turks had to be brought down to something closer to their proportion of the population—18%. He was willing to concede, he said, that they might retain 25% of the territory of the island, but no more.

"The question of Cyprus has been linked with the question of the arms embargo which is a headache for you," the Prime Minister continued, "but it is not we who have imposed the arms embargo. We accept that this is an internal matter of the United States." Nevertheless, the Prime Minister went on, the lifting of the embargo would be disadvantageous for both Greece and Cyprus and could have very adverse effects. He mentioned some of the political problems it could cause for him in Greece, encouraging the left to attack. If the Turks would simply make some real concessions, the Prime Minister said, all these dire consequences could be avoided: "I do not understand why we should be striving to rid Turkey of the burden of the embargo since it is in her power to rid herself of it." He acknowledged that the President's assessment of this situation was probably different from his own.

The Prime Minister then turned to discussion of the Aegean, saying that the problems in this region were also created by Turkey. "I could have said to the Turks that we do not recognize the existence of an issue in the Aegean. We favor the status quo which has been there for 60 years. Since the Turks have raised the issue I have accepted discussion of it with them." Efforts to carry on discussions on the Aegean, the Prime Minister maintained, had been continually blocked by Turkish unwillingness to pursue discussions seriously. He talked of his willingness to have the question of continental shelf rights in the Ae-

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<sup>3</sup> He never stated what the other occasion was. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 2, Document 52.

gean settled by the International Court in The Hague.<sup>5</sup> He said he would like to see an effort resumed to settle this problem by political talks with Turkey; if these did not succeed, he would agree to submit the problem to arbitration.

President Carter said that he had talked to Prime Minister Ecevit that morning about Aegean negotiations and asked him to explain the Turkish position.<sup>6</sup> He gained the impression, he said, that there were possibilities for serious dialogue and we were encouraging Turkey to engage in it. "There are differences of opinion between you and me concerning the lifting of the arms embargo," the President continued. "It is a difficult question for us because we value our continued friendship with Greece so highly. In all our proposals to the Congress we have maintained a balance between Greece and Turkey from our own perspective. But after three years of experience with the embargo, we have not seen any progress. Our relations with Greece are not better. Our relationship with Turkey has not improved. The relationship between Greece and Turkey has not improved and the relationship of both countries to NATO has not improved. Because of this lack of progress, which seems likely to continue with the arms embargo, we have proposed to the Congress that the embargo be lifted. We did it with some hesitation because of the concern expressed to us by Greeks."

The President continued by saying that PM Ecevit had taken a more constructive attitude than Mr. Demirel on Cyprus and that he hoped meetings between Turks and Greeks in Cyprus could be sustained so that some real progress could be made. PM Ecevit might be willing, he said, to meet with both Mr. Kyprianou and Mr. Denktaş. "As an early indication of willingness to resolve these issues we have asked the Turks to start reducing the level of troops, to open the Nicosia airport and to open the Varosha area and let 30–40,000 Cypriot Greeks return. I told PM Ecevit that the level of troops in Cyprus was excessive and that all these actions should be taken prior to agreement

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<sup>5</sup> Greece, which sought to challenge Turkish claims to the Aegean Sea continental shelf, brought the matter before the International Court of Justice on August 10, 1976. For its part, Turkey maintained that the Court did not have jurisdiction in the matter. An ICJ communiqué of April 26, 1978, noted that official hearings would begin on October 4. (Telegram 106627 to Geneva, April 26; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780179–0388) The ICJ received a letter from the Turkish Government on April 24 that reiterated the Turkish position that the ICJ was an inappropriate forum to mediate the dispute. On December 19, the ICJ upheld the Turkish position. The Embassy relayed this information in telegram 7119 from The Hague, December 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780524–0633) See also *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1978, p. 943.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 116.

between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. I consider his proposal on Cyprus to be a reasonable beginning.”

The President went on to stress that he felt that Turkish Cypriot proposals on territory and constitutional structure were simply starting points for discussion but that they offered good possibilities for negotiation. He reiterated and summed up what he had already said, “I would hope that bilateral discussions on the Aegean could begin and perhaps quadrilateral discussions concerning Cyprus. I asked Mr. Ecevit whether he would be willing to meet with Kyprianou and Denktaş and he consulted with his advisors and said it would be difficult because he would much prefer to have all four parties present at the beginning. We have no preconceived attitudes in the U.S. about the division of Cyprus and the exact form of government. We do feel that the Turkish forces should withdraw and the refugees should be handled with compassion, that there should be a strong and independent Cyprus—but negotiations may well take some time.” He added that if the arms embargo is lifted, we do not intend to upset the military balance that exists between Greece and Turkey. He explained that we strongly favor a major UN role in Cyprus discussions. The United States is willing to help if all parties want help in discussions, the President concluded, but we do not want to intrude against the wishes of the parties themselves.

Prime Minister Karamanlis then resumed his comment. Both Turkey and Greece agreed, he said, that the Cyprus and Aegean questions should be treated separately. But the Turks would rather deal with Cyprus as a Greek-Turkish issue, he declared. “I have rejected this view because Cyprus is an independent and sovereign state. I cannot make decisions for the Cypriots because even if I come to an agreement with Turkey I do not want to have to impose this agreement on Cyprus.” The Prime Minister said he had told Ecevit at Montreux that he would be willing to give good advice to the Greek Cypriots if the Turks would come up with reasonable proposals—but without this, he said, he had no basis to give advice.<sup>7</sup> If the Turks really want to facilitate lifting of the embargo, PM Karamanlis said, they should either make good proposals or no proposals at all. If they made no proposals they could maintain that until the embargo was lifted, Turkey would do nothing. If they made good proposals the embargo could be lifted. Either way the situation would be clear. Instead they have made poor proposals and insist on having the embargo lifted; this only compli-

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<sup>7</sup> Ecevit and Karamanlis met in Montreux, Switzerland, March 10–11 to discuss the bilateral problems between their countries. A joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the summit called the talks a success that would serve as a basis for future dialogue. The Embassy relayed this information in telegram 1895 from Ankara, March 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780111–0761)

cates things, he said. He added that he did not consider the territorial proposals a respectable starting point for serious discussions; and on Varosha, he said, the Greeks estimated that only 15,000 people could be resettled at best. But even if the Turkish promises were accepted, there would still be 170,000 Greek Cypriot refugees. The constitutional proposals meant *de facto* partition, which was really the Turkish aim, he maintained, because constitutional impasse would soon develop if the Turkish system were implemented. The Turkish "solutions", he said, would in the end create much greater problems than existed at present and America would again be drawn into new troubles. Turkish proposals for troop withdrawal really favored Turkey, because whether they had 30,000 or 10,000 troops, they could still maintain control. If they were pressured to take a large part of their troops off now, they would benefit their economy, for their occupation forces on Cyprus were costing \$2 billion per year and were the main cause of current Turkish economic difficulties. Cyprus had made Turkey bankrupt, he said, and she deserved little sympathy or help for getting herself into this position. "I have told Ecevit and I have stated in Cyprus that they will become the prisoners of Cyprus—the internal situation in Turkey is very bad. A big part of this situation is due to the Cyprus question."

The President interrupted to observe that he believed the Turks understood the burden the Cyprus problem caused them and were genuinely looking for a way out. He did not interpret their latest proposals as final or unalterable, he said, and he felt sure they were willing to talk on the basis of them and negotiate seriously. He urged the Greeks to consider negotiations, for "if negotiations are fruitless, then Greece will at least have done all she can."

Mr. Karamanlis returned to his review of the problem and said that he did not think that the Cypriots were willing to take a chance on new talks; there had already been 8 phases of talks. The Prime Minister felt Mr. Waldheim felt the same way. If the Turks could improve their proposals, the Greek Cypriot side might be able to accept them as a basis for negotiations. Under such circumstances, he said, he would be willing to advise the Greek Cypriots to talk.

The President said he understood that Mr. Kyprianou had told Mr. Waldheim that he was not willing to negotiate on the basis of Turkish proposals. The Prime Minister said he would discuss the subject with Waldheim on Monday. The President asked who should be party to the negotiations. Mr. Karamanlis replied that talks should be between Ecevit and Kyprianou but added, "I know this is not acceptable to Ecevit. I do not control Kyprianou but Ecevit controls Denktaş."

"This creates a stalemate," the President replied; "The Turks will not agree that they have control of Denktaş and they probably overestimate your influence with Kyprianou." "We must seek some way of

breaking the stalemate and opening up the possibility of a solution," the President insisted.

"Only Ecevit can break this impasse," the Prime Minister replied.

"You can help," the President responded.

"He is the man who conquered the island," the Prime Minister declared; "he is the one who can make concessions. No other government can do it, but he can. I do not want to accuse Ecevit of anything, but I am convinced that the solution of all these problems is in his hands."

The President observed that Ecevit, like the Prime Minister and like himself, may have political problems at home, but the Prime Minister countered, "I have more difficulties than any of you." He went on to discuss anti-Americanism in Greece and commented on the fall in his own popularity as shown in last November's elections. If the situation worsens, he said, he was not sure he could keep the situation under control. Turkey might be kept in the West, he said, at the expense of losing Greece. "If I suffer any further decline in my popularity, then there will be only *chaos*." He went on to complain that Ecevit talked too much and generated too much tension about problems. This, he said, makes the job of settling them more difficult. "The matter should be handled in a way that keeps neither Greece nor Turkey from being lost. I will do my best in that direction. I hope that Mr. Ecevit will find the courage to discuss this with me."

The President said he wished to reiterate the intense interest of the United States in its relations with Greece and in the situation in Cyprus. He observed that his Administration was devoting a great deal of time to the search for a solution to the differences between Greece and Turkey. "Without improperly intruding ourselves, we will continue our efforts to induce the Turks to make more forthcoming proposals. I would like to encourage you to keep an open mind and to be as forthcoming as possible. If you envision discussions on the Aegean as of major importance without knowing the outcome—we think it is also important to start discussions on Cyprus without knowing the outcome. Although the Turkish proposal is not adequate . . . they accept this to be just a first step," the President concluded.

The Prime Minister said he sensed that the President was drawing a parallel between the Aegean and Cyprus and emphasized that he was proposing arbitration as a means of finding a solution in the Aegean. He felt that if this problem were solved first, the Cyprus problem could be easier. He saw a political advantage for both Greece and Turkey in having a neutral element involved, he declared; "not only do I accept dialogue; I also propose arbitration."

As the meeting came to an end, the President smiled and said, "I think you realize that we have exactly the same amount of control over Prime Minister Ecevit that we have over you."

The Prime Minister, also smiling, replied, "You have *influence* over me. If we can find correct solutions, I will do exactly what you tell me."

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**176. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State (Bowdler) to the Counselor of the Department of State (Nimetz)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 2, 1978

SUBJECT

Caramanlis' Probable Reaction To Lifting US Arms Restrictions on Turkey

You asked for our assessment of the possibility that Caramanlis might resign if the US lifted the Turkish arms embargo. *Our conclusions are:*

Caramanlis' public and private responses are consistent in indicating that he does not plan any major reaction to Congressional repeal of US arms limitations on Turkey. On this basis, we can conclude with confidence that his answer to lifting the embargo on Turkey will be largely vocal. However, if the reaction within Greece proves to be stronger than we have any evidence he anticipates, he might place temporary restrictions on US official activities in Greece. But it is highly unlikely that he would close US facilities; there is virtually no chance that he would step down from the Premiership in protest.

*Government Reaction to Date*

*Official Greek reaction* to the announcement of the Administration's decision to press for lifting arms restrictions on Turkey has been restrained. Caramanlis initially issued a moderate and dispassionate statement. He noted that the US Government was "entitled to determine its relations with Turkey according to its judgment," but he added that "in any case, and regardless of the way in which the US Government will shape its policy, Greece is determined and able to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Brement Subject File, Box 64, Greece-Turkey: 6/78-1/79. Secret; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon. Drafted by S. Snow and G.S. Harris in INR/RWE.



protect her national interests.”<sup>2</sup> Over the past two months, moreover, the Greek Government has maintained a low profile in handling this issue. It has been careful not to inflame Greek public opinion.

We have much *clandestine evidence* that, privately, Caramanlis is thoroughly resigned to the lifting of arms restrictions on Turkey. Initially, he was angry, but now he is no longer greatly concerned over the issue. He is reported to believe that placing US military assistance to Turkey on an annual basis, rather than on the multiyear basis provided in the US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, would permit suitably close Congressional oversight of Turkey’s foreign policy behavior. Clandestine sources report that Caramanlis agrees that there is even a chance that the US is correct in asserting that lifting the embargo would produce greater Turkish flexibility on Cyprus.

*Factors Influencing Caramanlis’ Ultimate Reaction*

In determining his reaction Caramanlis will clearly be constrained by his calculations of external and domestic political factors. He does not want to set in motion a groundswell of antipathy toward the US that could weaken Greek ties to the West. He sees Greek salvation in a closer relationship with the EC in particular and with Greece’s traditional allies in general. Moreover, he does not want to isolate Greece within NATO by putting it at odds with other allies who are concerned at the deterioration of Turkish military capability. In short, as a sincere Greek patriot, he would be highly reluctant to do anything that would jeopardize Greece’s position in the Western Alliance.

Of course, Caramanlis would face countervailing pressures at home. Greek emotionalism would be stirred by the lifting of the embargo. Andreas Papandreou would step up his calls for whole-sale retaliation against the US. Other opposition figures would also join in the chorus, but the Center would almost certainly be more measured in its appeals.

Greek army officers, on the other hand, would probably be quite restrained in their reaction. Clandestine sources already indicate that many officers are resigned to the lifting of the arms restrictions on Turkey. One report cites a growing sentiment within the Greek military that the successful procurement and modernization program since

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<sup>2</sup> The Department of State released a statement on April 4 announcing that the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement signed in March 1976 but never approved would be renegotiated and that President Carter would ask Congress to lift the embargo and to authorize \$175 million in FMS credits for Turkey. (Department of State *Bulletin*, May 1978, p. 34) The quotation is probably from telegram 2927 from Athens, April 8, in which the Embassy reported Karamanlis’ first public statement the previous day in response to the Carter administration’s decision to lift the arms embargo against Turkey. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780152–0515)

1974 (combined with concurrent deterioration of Turkish forces) now put the Greek armed forces in stronger position than the Turks. Greek air force officers are reportedly convinced that lifting the embargo would probably have minimal effect on the present balance between the two states.

### *Caramanlis' Option*

Given Caramanlis' strong image of himself as Greece's modern savior, he is almost certain to make his ultimate decision on the basis of his vision of Greece's larger interests. He has the parliamentary backing to carry out whatever response he chooses. Greek public opinion already has had much of the shock taken away by the lengthy lead time from the first announcement of the US Administration's intent to future Congressional action.

Caramanlis will certainly complain publicly if Congress lifts the embargo. He would probably direct much of his attention to trying to calm Greek fears that the country was being abandoned by its friends in the West. And he would likely try to put Turkey on notice that this action required suitable concessions on its part in respect to Cypriot issues.

Beyond this point, Caramanlis is unlikely to go unless he perceives far more intense reaction in Greece than we have any evidence he anticipates. To head off what he considered a dangerous amount of opposition to continuing close cooperation with the US, he pulled Greece partly out of the military wing of NATO in 1974. This example probably indicates the ultimate limit of the measures that he could be driven to in the present event. On this basis, we judge that he could be brought unwillingly to place some restrictions on US installations and personnel in Greece. These would probably be of a temporary nature and would, most likely, be designed not to damage our more important activities. He would not want to take any steps that could undermine Greece's long-term relationship with the West.

As for personal gestures of protest, we doubt that he sees much scope for action. Caramanlis has long felt that US policy made his own role in Greece more difficult. Yet it is not in his character to resign at a time when he is convinced that the fate of Greece rests on his shoulders. While he has begun to make preparations against the day when he would be gone, by bringing Mitsotakis into the Cabinet, these plans would be jeopardized by too early an exit. At the moment, to leave would be to risk handing Greece over to Andreas Papandreou. Caramanlis could never assent to that.

**177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 7, 1978, 2244Z

144648. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis, New York, June 3, 1978.

1. Summary: Secretary met with Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis at latter's request at Hotel Carlyle in New York Saturday, June 3. Meeting, which lasted almost one hour, covered following topics; Greece/NATO relations; GOG attitude toward administration proposal to repeal Turkish arms embargo; Greece/Turkish relations; and Cyprus. Karamanlis did most of the talking; he seemed more relaxed and at ease than during his talks earlier in week in Washington. Also present were Foreign Minister Rallis; Ambassadors Alexandrakis and Papoulias; and Molyviatis, Director General, Prime Minister's Political Office, who acted as interpreter. Secretary was accompanied by Counselor Nimetz and EUR/SE Director Ewing. End summary.

2. Secretary said he had been sorry to miss Prime Minister's May 31 meeting with President, but it was necessary that he meet in New York with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko. Karamanlis said his meeting with President had been "very good". Understanding had been shown by both sides, a good atmosphere had prevailed, and he had appreciated the opportunity to discuss all questions of current interest.<sup>2</sup> He then spoke at length on the following topics.

3. Greece/NATO relations. Karamanlis said he wanted to draw Secretary's particular attention to Turkish intentions with regard to Greece/NATO relations. He recalled conversation with Secretary in Athens in January in which he had described his intention to build a link or bridge to eventual full return to full NATO participation.<sup>3</sup> Karamanlis said he was concerned that if Turks "continue to block" current negotiations, there would be a problem both for Greece and the Alliance which in his view would also harm Turkey's interests. The Greek position was that difficult political issues should be left aside to resolve later; it would not be possible to do so in the context of the Greek/NATO discussions. The Prime Minister asked the Secretary to do what-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780238–0762. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Ewing; cleared by Vest and Richard Castrodale (S/S); approved by Nimetz. Sent for information to Nicosia, Ankara, USUN, London, Brussels, USNATO, and USNMR SHAPE.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 175.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 173.

ever he could to convince the Turks not to create obstacles for a special relationship in NATO for Greece.

4. Karamanlis recalled that Generals Haig and Davos had agreed on general lines of an approach, but the Turks were creating difficulties.<sup>4</sup> He said that he sincerely wanted to re-link Greece to NATO and wanted to make the next step to be toward full re-integration and not away from NATO, a situation which would be to the detriment of NATO, Greece and Turkey. The only specific problem that Karamanlis cited concerned Aegean air space, a matter which had been left unsolved within the Alliance even prior to 1974 and should not be decided in a NATO context. Karamanlis claimed that the Turkish position was to settle relevant outstanding issues first before the special relationship status was clarified, but he said he could not do this without being subjected to even more opposition in Greece. Karamanlis said that involved also was the issue of U.S. bases in Greece which were connected with Greece's role in NATO.

5. Karamanlis said that while it was of no direct interest to the U.S., he was also concerned by recent problems created by Turkey for Greece in its negotiations with the EC. He cited a recent press conference statement by Ecevit in Brussels.<sup>5</sup> Karamanlis said he had asked Ecevit to try to hold down the number of public statements he made. Turkish efforts to block Greece in the EC or NATO or elsewhere were not conducive to improved bilateral relations.

6. Greece/Turkey relations. Karamanlis recalled his proposed procedure for addressing Aegean questions of dialogue followed by international arbitration or resort to the ICJ.<sup>6</sup> He acknowledged that these questions also were not of direct interest to the U.S. but he hoped that the Secretary would follow the matter, review the Greek proposal, and at some point mention to the GOT that adoption of such a procedural proposal was necessary in order to begin to settle the Aegean issues.

7. Embargo. Karamanlis expressed the hope that the administration would not characterize the GOG position on the Turkish embargo issue as mild or indifferent. He had sought to be moderate and respon-

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the so-called Haig-Davos Agreements or Arrangements of May 1978, which permitted Greek reintegration into the NATO military command structure. All the NATO members except Turkey approved the agreement. See also Document 184.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 10311 from Brussels, May 26, the Embassy reported on Ecevit's press conference on May 25. Regarding Greek entry to the European Community, the telegram quoted Ecevit as saying that "Turkey was worried at the possibility of the EC's becoming involved in Greek-Turkish problems at Greece's initiative. Such an eventuality, he continued, could lead to increased tension, particularly if Greece becomes a member before majority voting is adopted by the EC Council." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780223-0583)

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 5, Document 175.

sible and for such a posture he had been criticized by Cypriots and by his opposition in Greece.

8. In response to above points, the Secretary said he very much understood the importance of a restored Greek-NATO relationship. Following his January visit, the U.S. had been helpful in facilitating steps toward re-integration; Karamanlis confirmed this was the case. The Secretary said he was not informed on specific aspects of the military-technical talks being conducted by General Haig and he was not aware that Turkey was “blocking” efforts to reach agreement. We thought Greek return to NATO was important and we would continue to do what we could to facilitate the process.

9. The Secretary said that in any future statements or congressional testimony, we would take care not to portray Karamanlis’ attitude as one of indifference or only mild concern on the possible effects of lifting of the embargo.

10. Karamanlis said he had not wanted to become involved in the embargo question while in the U.S. and would have preferred not to appear before the HIRC on June 2, but Chairman Zablocki was anxious to hear his views. He was concerned that solving one problem (the embargo) would only create new problems. He thought the key to working out the Eastern Mediterranean problems was related to efforts to find a Cyprus solution, noting that such a settlement would help NATO and the U.S., and allow Greece to return to the Alliance. He would have expected a more forthcoming Turkish position on Cyprus which would have helped resolve these problems.

11. In response to the Secretary’s question about the May 29 Karamanlis meeting with Ecevit, the Prime Minister said that it had been a rather formal meeting and had not gotten very far into substance.<sup>7</sup> He had initiated the meeting and was pleased that the dialogue would continue between Greece and Turkey when the two MFA Secretaries General met July 4 to review the Montreux discussion and their respective positions. He again expressed the hope that GOT would accept his procedural proposal. The Secretary said he would at an appropriate time mention to the Turks our hope that progress could be made in resolving Turkish-Greek bilateral problems. He agreed that there was a unique opportunity since both Ecevit and Karamanlis had the political desire to move forward in improving relations between Greece and Turkey. Karamanlis said that he was not concerned about the result of the ICJ or arbitration procedure, but needed to have political cover for accepting a settlement. He said that principle was involved more than specific substance. “There is no oil where we are squabbling”.

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<sup>7</sup> Ecevit and Karamanlis met at Blair House in Washington.

12. The Secretary said he had met earlier in the morning with Kyprianou, and had expressed the U.S. hope that intercommunal talks could be resumed.<sup>8</sup> Kyprianou had explained his problems with that. The Secretary said that we were trying to do what we could to facilitate some kind of a meeting where both Kyprianou and Ecevit could be present, but we were doubtful that anything could be worked out agreeable to both. SecGen Waldheim had separately suggested a June 4 social gathering which we hoped Kyprianou would carefully consider. Karamanlis said that such a gathering could be useful and that he would talk with Kyprianou about it, although he stressed that Greece could not assume responsibility for the Cyprus negotiations. The GOG could, however, exercise influence on the substance of the Cyprus issues if the Turkish side presented proposals which would allow meaningful negotiations. This was not the case at present. The Secretary agreed that there must be changes in the Turkish negotiating proposals, but said we were certain that the Turks were prepared to be flexible and that Ecevit wanted to solve the problem.

13. In closing the meeting, the Secretary said he would follow up on the matters discussed. He stressed again that the administration had no intention of solving its Turkish problem at the expense of Greece.

Vance

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<sup>8</sup> See Document 55.

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## 178. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Athens, June 14, 1978, 1621Z

4966. Mil addees treat as Specat. AmEmbassy London for Asst. Secretary Vest. Subject: Cyprus, Embargo and Non-Aggression.

1. Foreign Minister Rallis struck a somber tone while discussing Cyprus, among other matters, with me earlier today.

2. Expressing general dissatisfaction with the mix of existing proposals and other endeavors on Varosha, Rallis said that more serious

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780248-0919. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Sent for information to Ankara, London, Nicosia, USNATO, USUN, USCINCEUR, USNMR SHAPE, and USDOCOSouth.

difficulty was in Turkish constitutional proposals which are simply non-negotiable for both Nicosia and Athens. He later sent me the critique prepared by the GOC which I now realize has been in the Department's possession.<sup>2</sup> Rallis did not have it in hand when we met and hence omitted detailed discussion. I drew the impression that Rallis had only recently examined the constitutional ideas and conceded merit in Nicosia's arguments.

3. Turning to the embargo, Rallis said he was worried about what he believed would be a nasty reaction in Athens "when" it is lifted. He takes congressional approval as a given. He mentioned this, he said, because he is concerned that Washington underestimates the impact repeal will cause here while overestimating Prime Minister Caramanlis' ability to control it. "He is no magician," Rallis said, adding that Caramanlis himself may underestimate the political difficulty and public clamor that will ensue. Rallis did agree with me that continuation of the embargo was in no one's interest and that it had become the psychological obstacle which frustrated relations among all interested parties, including the Congress and the Executive Branch in Washington. He reluctantly acknowledged that it would be better to have it done and out of the way sooner than later and that all of us had some responsibility to moderate the emotions which surround the issue.

4. All of this showed a much less sanguine Rallis than I first met shortly after assuming office. Maybe he recognizes the Murphy's Law that plays in every Foreign Minister's life. Whatever, he is now less critical of the GOC and President Kyprianou individually and, if not influenced by, at least taking into account the daily forebodings of this outrageous press in Athens.

5. Separately, I inquired about expectations growing out of Caramanlis' renewed offer of a non-aggression pact to Turkey.<sup>3</sup> His were not high, Rallis said, explaining that Ecevit's response to the offer was a

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is presumably to a report provided to the Department of State by the Government of Cyprus Information Office, which contained President Kyprianou's April 19 statement in which he announced the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Turkish Cypriot proposals. Kyprianou's major justification for rejecting the proposals was that, in his view, the Turkish Cypriot representatives had proposed their own separate state. Kyprianou explained that because a unified Cyprus was his government's starting point of negotiations, his rejection of the Turkish Cypriot proposals was not based on particular details but on the "whole structure" and the "philosophy" of the proposals. (Telegram 1054 from Nicosia, April 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780169–0410)

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 4900 from Athens, June 13, the Embassy reported on Karamanlis' recent non-aggression proposal to Turkey. Although unsure whether the proposal amounted to a genuine peace offering or was a propaganda ploy, the Embassy reported that early reactions from Turkey appeared positive; if Karamanlis was sincere, the proposal would well serve U.S. interests in the region. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780246–1209)

"yes, but." In any case, Greece had produced a draft text which it would introduce when the interlocutors meet July 4 and await a further Turkish response. He did not ask for our opinion but did offer me a copy of the draft which has been sent by septel.<sup>4</sup>

McCloskey

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<sup>4</sup> The Embassy relayed the draft in telegram 4958 from Athens, June 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780248-0797)

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**179. Letter From Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, August 1, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I have had the opportunity on many occasions to draw the attention of your government on the consequences which the lifting of the embargo might entail. I persist in believing that while the embargo constitutes a domestic affair of the United States, its lifting nevertheless, will not only make the solution of the Cyprus problem more difficult, but will also dangerously complicate Greek-Turkish differences in the Aegean. For Turkey will become more intransigent, especially if, through the lifting of the embargo, the present balance of the military strength between the two countries were to be altered to the detriment of Greece. At the same time the lifting of the embargo will cause strong bitterness in the public opinion of my country and will adversely affect the development of Greek-American relations.

For all these reasons, I believe that it is imperative to maintain the embargo, in order to avoid a further worsening of the present situation.

Should, however, in spite of the above the lifting of the embargo be decided, it could be possible to limit the aforementioned dangers, if Congress were to provide certain assurances for the future.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher, 1977-1980, Lot 81D113, Box 9, Memoranda to the White House—1978. No classification marking. A typed notation at the top of the page reads: "(Typed from Telex)."



These assurances should, in my view, cover the following points:<sup>2</sup>

1. Attaining a just solution of the Cyprus problem shall remain a main concern of the United States. The President and the Congress of the United States shall continuously review the progress towards the achievement of such a solution and shall determine accordingly the United States policy and the granting of economic and military assistance to Turkey.

2. Military assistance to Greece and Turkey shall be given solely for defensive purposes and shall be designed in such a way as to insure the preservation of the present balance of military strength between the two countries.

3. The United States shall actively support the resolution of differences regarding the Aegean through internationally established peaceful procedures, shall encourage the parties to avoid provocative actions and shall strongly and effectively oppose any attempt to resolve such disputes through force or threat of force.<sup>3</sup>

It should be noted that the above assurances have repeatedly been given to Greece from the American side. Thus these assurances are partly contained in the letter of the then United States Secretary of State Mr. Kissinger to the then Foreign Minister of Greece Mr. Bitsios of April 10, 1976; in the statement of the United States Secretary Mr. Vance in the International Relations Committee of the United States Congress on April 6, 1978; in the statement of the United States Under-Secretary of State Mr. Christopher in the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate on May 2, 1978 and were mentioned during the discussion I had with you in the White House on May 31, 1978.<sup>4</sup>

Moreover, all these assurances, and in particular the issue of the preservation of the present balance of military strength between Greece

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<sup>2</sup> In an August 1 covering memorandum to Carter, Christopher noted: "The assurances sought in the Karamanlis letter are already contained in the Byrd amendment which passed in the Senate. Although the assurances are contained in part in the Hamilton amendment in the House, it is probably too late to have them fully incorporated into the amendment on which the House acts today. However, we will try. There is also the possibility that they could be in the House-Senate Conference if we prevail in the House." (*Ibid.*) See Document 121.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 6333 from Athens, July 25, the Embassy anticipated the assurances sought by Karamanlis and suggested a Presidential statement accompanying the lifting of the arms embargo. In this suggested statement, Carter would declare his ongoing interest in resolving the Cyprus dispute and would reiterate U.S. opposition to the use of force in the Eastern Mediterranean. The telegram is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780304–1125.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 175. For the letters exchanged by Kissinger and Bitsios, see footnote 5, Document 107. For Secretary Vance's April 6 testimony to the House International Relations Committee, see footnote 6, Document 58. Christopher, Harold Brown, and Clifford testified at Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on aid to Greece and Turkey on May 2.

and Turkey, to which my Government attaches particular importance are covered in the resolution of the United States Senate of July 25, 1978, concerning the embargo.<sup>5</sup>

I am certain that you will appreciate these positions and that you will prevent developments or decisions which may place my country before critical dilemmas.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration and my personal best wishes.

**Constantine Karamanlis<sup>6</sup>**

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 121. The Byrd amendment also called for an additional \$35 million in aid to Greece.

<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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#### **180. Letter From President Carter to Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 3, 1978

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I appreciate your message of August 1 about the Turkish arms embargo.<sup>2</sup> I fully share your view that we must do everything possible to insure that lifting the embargo leads to positive results.

As you know, the House and Senate versions of the legislation will now be sent to the conference committee which will determine the final form of this legislation. The Byrd Amendment adopted in the Senate accords with the points conveyed in your message, and I would accept the incorporation of similar language in the bill as it is ultimately worked out in the House-Senate conference. In my statement on the House action, I stressed our belief that disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean must be settled peacefully.<sup>3</sup>

A just settlement on Cyprus is of great concern to me. In the days preceding action by the Congress, we saw hopeful signs of flexibility

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 7, Greece: Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis, 2/77-10/79. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 179.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 121.

and movement—primarily relating to the important city of Varosha. As you are aware, I became convinced that the embargo represented an obstacle to progress on Cyprus, and that resolution of the outstanding problems in the Eastern Mediterranean was unlikely as long as the embargo was in force. The United States will move actively in the search for progress on these issues. I believe it is important that all the countries in the region join in this endeavor.

There can be no question of the cardinal importance that the United States attaches to strong ties with Greece. I stand ready to work closely with you in strengthening those relations.

Another goal we share is the return of Greece to the NATO integrated military command on a basis acceptable to Greece and to the Alliance. For our part, we intend to give this matter special priority in the weeks ahead.

Furthermore, we are encouraged that you have continued your discussions with Turkey on differences in the Aegean. It remains our position—as I stated—that these differences should be resolved by peaceful procedures and that the United States would actively and unequivocally oppose any resort to force in the area.

I hope that in the coming months we can make renewed efforts to improve U.S.-Greek relations, move toward a just and durable settlement on Cyprus, and work to resolve differences between Greece and Turkey.

With warmest personal regards,  
Sincerely,

**Jimmy Carter**

# 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 29, 1978, 1522Z

248371. Military addressees handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Secretary Vance's Meeting With Greek Foreign Minister Rallis, New York, Sept 27.

Summary: Secretary Vance met with Greek Foreign Minister Rallis at UN Plaza Hotel New York Sept 27 for approximately 30 minutes. Subjects discussed included Greek reintegration into NATO, Greek Turkish relations, Deputy Secretary's upcoming visit to Athens, and Cyprus. Accompanying Rallis were Greek Ambassador to U.S. Alexandrakis, MFA Director General Tzounis and Greek UN Representative Papoulas. Also present were Counselor Nimetz, Assistant Secretary Vest, and EUR/SE Director Ewing. Nimetz, Vest and Ewing also met for approximately 90 minutes afternoon Sept 27 with Tzounis and Alexandrakis (septel).<sup>2</sup> End summary.

1. In opening conversation, Secretary Vance asked what US could do beyond what had been done already to facilitate Greek reintegration into NATO military structure.

2. Foreign Minister Rallis noted that President Carter on Sept 26 had made declaration relating to good faith of Turkish Government.<sup>3</sup> Rallis expressed doubt that progress had been made with regard to Cyprus but in terms of Greek Turkish relations GOG had recently had two "sad experiences": a) recent discussions on airspace, and b) Greek desire for special link to NATO. With regard to airspace GOG had made many concessions but GOT continued to insist that line be drawn in middle of Aegean and that GOG give up claim to ten-mile airspace around islands. GOG could not accept situation where airspace of the islands off Asia Minor was not under Greek control. Rallis said he had

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1978. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Ewing; cleared by Hopper, Arthur Houghton (S), and Thomas Reyndes (S/S); approved by Vest. Sent for information Immediate to USNATO, Nicosia, Ankara, USUN, USDELMC Brussels, USNMR SHAPE, and USDOCOSouth Naples.

<sup>2</sup> The Department reported on this meeting in telegram 247757 to Athens, September 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780397–0148)

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Presidential Determination No. 78–18, "United States-Turkey Military Cooperation." The Determination reiterated language in the final legislation on lifting the arms embargo, affirming that military cooperation with Turkey was vital to U.S. and NATO interests, and that the Turkish Government was acting in good faith to resolve the Cyprus dispute. (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book II, p. 1636) See also Document 121.

told Elekdag personally that GOT could reserve its position on this for consideration later.

3. With regard to Greek NATO relationship, GOG had been told that Turkish military rep in Brussels had informed his colleagues in Brussels that Turkey refused to accept that airspace above Greek islands should be under Greek control. Rallis said he feared approval of assessment by General Haig will be delayed because of the Turkish attitude. Karamanlis wanted to see Greece fully back into NATO but the GOG could not accept a situation which was indefinitely suspended. If the Turks insist on positions which were unacceptable to the GOG, at some point the Karamanlis government would be obliged to withdraw its request. The GOG had expected a decision in NATO in September on General Haig's assessment, which was completely acceptable to the GOG, but this process had not gotten started because of the Turkish attitude.

4. The Secretary said he would take note of this situation and would be interested in views of General Haig on how the process could be accelerated. Rallis said he very much appreciated what General Haig had done.

5. The Secretary recalled that he had talked earlier in the day with Turkish Foreign Minister Okcun.<sup>4</sup> He had the impression that on the Aegean the two sides were talking past each other. The Turks claimed that the lack of Greek desire to resolve issues had prevented progress at the talks in Athens last week on Aegean issues. Rallis then described the airspace concessions which the Greeks had made relating to notification procedures, reducing the size of the Limnos TMA area, and modifying an air corridor near the Turkish coast. Agreement had been reached on many points but the Turks had insisted on the reduction of the ten nautical mile airspace around the islands. Rallis again said that this issue could be discussed later after all else had been solved but it could not be solved now. He had told Elekdag that the Turks should reserve their position and that an agreement should be concluded which would allow flights to resume over the Aegean. Rallis said he would meet with Okcun Sept 28.<sup>5</sup> Secretary said he understood the Greek position on talks with Turkey.

6. Rallis reiterated that the GOG is anxious about its special NATO link and stressed that time was running out. He felt that Turkey sought

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 123.

<sup>5</sup> Rallis and Ökçün met on September 28 in New York to discuss Aegean Sea issues including the airspace around Greek islands and the size of the continental shelf. One Turkish official described the talk as "very cordial, even fraternal." The meeting was reported in telegram Secto 11014 from the Secretary's Delegation in New York, September 29. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780398–1217)

to involve NATO in resolution of the Aegean issues. Secretary repeated that US would do what it could to help further, although he recognized the problems that were involved. Nimetz said that we had made clear to the Turks that we regard Greek return to NATO as a high priority matter and that all Aegean political issues should not be resolved in that process.

7. Rallis said that with respect to Cyprus, the GOG could give advice to the Greek Cypriots but he did not see how early progress on that issue could be accomplished given the present Turkish attitude.

8. With respect to Oct 18–22 visit to Athens of Deputy Secretary Christopher, Secretary said he was very pleased that GOG had agreed to receive Christopher since he felt it was important to find ways to build the US-Greek relationship beyond the security focus of the past.<sup>6</sup> Christopher would be prepared to talk in depth on all matters of mutual concern. We wanted to strengthen our overall relationship and find a basis to build for the future. Rallis said the GOG agreed with that objective but was concerned that political problems with Turkey would affect the development of the relationship with the US. He wanted to have constructive talks with Christopher in Athens. If there was no solution on the NATO question and no improvement in Greek-Turkish relations, he was afraid that the talks might take place under a “heavy atmosphere”. Karamanlis had acted calmly and responsibly throughout the entire recent period, including during the embargo debate, but there were limits beyond which it would be hard to pass.

9. Rallis said the GOG had told the Turks that if the Turkish side came up with better Cyprus proposals, this would perhaps lead to a new round of intercommunal talks. He could not speak for the GOC but the Greek Government had sought to improve the negotiating atmosphere and had encouraged Kyprianou not to go to the Security Council. If, however, there was nothing new in October, the Greeks could not continue to discourage recourse to the Security Council. Rallis said he would see Kyprianou Sept 28, but feared there was nothing to tell him about developments since they last met in August.

10. At the conclusion of the meeting it was agreed that both sides would indicate to the press that discussions had covered bilateral relations, including the upcoming visit to Athens of Deputy Secretary Christopher.

**Christopher**

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 184.

**182. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

TDFIR DB-315/13640-78

Washington, October 11, 1978

1377744. Country: Greece/Turkey/Cyprus/USSR/Western Europe. Subject: Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis' Comments on the Greek Internal Scene and Foreign Relations (DOI: Early October 1978). Source: [2 lines not declassified].

Summary: In early October 1978 Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis spoke at length [*less than 1 line not declassified*] on the Greek internal scene and foreign relations. He expressed satisfaction with his domestic political position and with his relationship with opposition leader Papandreou. He expects to discuss bilateral affairs with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher; he is in no hurry to sign a new Greek-U.S. DCA and plans to insure that Greece receives the same financial and military aid as Turkey. Karamanlis is worried about Soviet intentions in the Balkans and the Middle East, where he believes it is in the Soviets' interest to foment trouble. He continues to disapprove of Cypriot President Kyprianou's method of dealing with the Cyprus situation. Karamanlis foresees no serious problems to Greece's entry into the EC, but he noted that Turkish objections are affecting Greece's full reentry into NATO; he does not intend, however, to make any further concessions to insure reentry.<sup>2</sup> Although the most recent Greek-Turkish talks did not accomplish anything substantial, Karamanlis does see some positive elements in the current Greek-Turkish relationship. End of summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the cable.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Brement Subject File, Box 64, Greece-Turkey: 6/78-1/79. Secret; Wnintel; Nofor; Nocontract; Orcon.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Turkish attempts to place several technical conditions on the terms of Greek reintegration into NATO. Greece and Turkey held bilateral talks in Athens on issues relating to Aegean airspace August 28-31. In telegram 8199 from USNATO, September 8, the Mission noted that Turkey was using the Military Budget Committee as a forum to highlight Greece's failure to pass along to NATO members air defense data collected at its early warning sites. The telegram noted this action amounted to a form of financial pressure against Greece. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780382-0612) In telegram 8535 from Ankara, October 2, the Embassy reported on Turkish insistence on linking unresolved issues of control and command of the Aegean Sea airspace to Greek reintegration into NATO. The telegram also noted Turkey's basic objective was to prevent Greece from achieving military parity. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780402-0257)

**183. Letter From President Carter to Greek Prime Minister  
Karamanlis<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 18, 1978

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

In our meetings together I have been impressed by our common agreement on one vital fact: that the United States and Greece have a fundamental interest in the maintenance and strengthening of our mutual ties. Over the last four years you have made a lasting contribution toward that goal.

Together we can do much more, and I hope it will now be possible to take new steps to increase the range and depth of our bilateral relationship as well as to expand our cooperation in regional and global issues. Deputy Secretary Christopher's visit to Athens is an important part of this effort, and I was therefore pleased that you have agreed to receive him and are taking a personal and direct interest in his mission.<sup>2</sup>

I have instructed Mr. Christopher to discuss in depth the entire spectrum of our relations. I want you to know how we perceive areas of mutual concern, and I will welcome your own analysis and suggestions regarding these matters. As you know, we have continued to work actively for the return of Greece to the NATO integrated command structure on a basis acceptable to Greece and the Alliance. In Cyprus, we are convinced that there is now a chance for real progress if all parties concerned make the necessary effort. We believe Greek-Turkish differences in the Aegean must be settled peacefully, and the United States, as you know, would actively and unequivocally oppose any resort to force in the area.

Fortunately, the Greek-American relationship rests on mutual ties and interests that go beyond the political issues which so often occupy our attention. It is my hope that Mr. Christopher's mission will also help lay the foundations for a broadened official relationship that more fully reflects how much we have in common. I hope significant progress will be made toward more effective cooperation in economic, scientific, cultural and technical fields so that we can address together many of the major challenges facing modern democracies.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 7, Greece: Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis, 2/77-10/79. No classification marking.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 9177 from Athens, October 20, the Embassy reported that Christopher's visit was the top news story in Athens. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780431-0058)



America's most important relationships are those with its democratic allies. I look forward to the next occasion when I will be able to meet with you and have the benefit of your thoughts and wisdom.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

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**184. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, October 21, 1978, 1404Z

9184. Miladdees treat as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Secretary's Visit—Session on Security Topics.

1. Summary. Deputy Secretary Christopher met morning October 20 with Foreign Minister Rallis, Defense Minister Averoff and others for a 90-minute talk on security matters. The Greeks raised the problem of NATO re-entry terms—on which discussion focused—and the need for preserving the military balance; U.S. side probed Greek-Turkish Aegean problems and offered to study the feasibility of cooperative defense ventures. Meeting was somewhat strained by Greek warning (reflecting Karamanlis' instructions to Rallis following previous evening session)<sup>2</sup> that Military Committee approval of any compromise accepting the Turkish demand for changes to the Haig-Davos Arrangement would result in (a) GOG withdrawal of its reintegration bid as well as (b) a re-examination both of its current military cooperation with the Alliance and of the legal status of U.S. facilities.<sup>3</sup> On the other

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780432–0631. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Priority to Ankara, Nicosia, US-NATO, USNMR SHAPE, USDELMC Brussels, and USDOCOSouth.

<sup>2</sup> In their meeting on the evening of October 19, Karamanlis told Christopher that the main security concern facing Greece was Turkey, and that, in the wake of the U.S. decision to lift the arms embargo, Turkey had become more intransigent in the disputes over Cyprus, the Aegean, and the terms of Greek reintegration into NATO. (Telegram 9122 from Athens, October 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780429–1147)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 177. Talks between Haig and Davos in June and July 1978 established the terms of Greek reintegration into NATO. The key arrangement agreed upon provided for Greek contribution to NATO forces at figures similar to 1974 levels, the year Greece withdrew from the NATO military structure. The basis of this arrangement was Haig's assessment that Greek reintegration was important to the viability

hand, if a MC majority accepted the Haig-Davos Arrangement with minority Turkish footnotes, Greece would maintain its proposal so the USG and other allies could discuss the matter further. In that context, Averoff said Greece could undertake not to use NATO command arrangements in the bilateral dispute with Turkey over Aegean issues. Greece's Aegean security concerns, and the resultant need for preserving the present balance, were forcefully presented, although without any specific dollar/equipment requests or any plea for equal levels of aid. Greek side welcomed proposed visit of U.S. experts to explore co-production possibilities. Neither DCA status nor expansion of ship visits was discussed. End summary.

2. The Deputy Secretary was accompanied by the Ambassador, Nimetz, Dillery, DCM, POL Counselor and POL/MIL Officer (notetaker). With Ministers Averoff and Rallis were Ambassador Alexandrakis, MFA SecGen Theodoropoulos and MFA DirGen Tzounis plus Ambassadors Chorafas and Chrysopathis and Major General Vamblis as notetakers. The discussion was more formal than the previous evening with the Prime Minister and centered on two questions: NATO re-integration and the military balance.

3. NATO re-integration: Rallis opened by describing the deterioration of Greek-American relations as a result of the Greek people's belief that the U.S. had favored the Junta and had failed to prevent the second Cyprus invasion. This attitude, he said, was exploited by the Greek left in 1975-76 to encourage large demonstrations against ship visits and the U.S. Embassy. Singularly due to the Prime Minister's efforts, he said, the atmosphere had changed entirely but he fears it is in danger of deteriorating once again simply because of what Greece is asked to accept in connection with the re-establishment of links with NATO.

4. Upon instructions of Karamanlis, Rallis then detailed why the GOG could not accept the Turkish conditions on proposals that General Haig had endorsed and for which he had congratulated the Greek military leadership. If the Military Committee changed SACEUR's original assessment and required Greece to make compensations to Turkey, he said, "it would be best to postpone taking any decisions while the USG brings political pressure to bear so that the proposals are accepted." Greece could not start negotiations and would be obliged to withdraw its proposal, with the following consequences: (a) The degree of Greek-NATO military cooperation that has been possible even though Greece has not been a member of the integrated military structure, would naturally have to be "re-examined." (b) Since the fate of

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of NATO and that the Greek military was prepared to restore the status quo of 1974. (Telegram 6869 from USNATO, July 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780287-0889)

U.S. military facilities is legally connected to Greece's tie with NATO, the absence of a "special relationship" would put them into question.

5. Christopher responded that the USG is firmly and deeply committed to Greek re-integration as soon as possible, but that matters were not as in 1974. Command and force structures have evolved, necessitating adjustments. The Haig-Davos Arrangements were consistent with Alliance principles and were basically acceptable to the allies as a workable framework for re-integration. However, there remain the delicate problems of command and control. The Military Committee decision, as yet unknown, would not be a final decision but rather an interim finding by a body that probably would feel it did not have jurisdiction to settle all problems. It was the US intention to intensify its efforts, working with other allies, to reach a political decision bringing Greece back in on a basis acceptable to Greece. Christopher remarked that in the light of Karamanlis' deep concern for maintaining Greek security, the withdrawal step Rallis warned of would have the opposite effect. He hoped that Greece would not take such an action. Moreover, the areas of agreement are already very large, and the USG acknowledges a responsibility to expedite a solution on the few remaining issues.

6. Rallis clarified that if the MC decision were unanimously to change the Haig assessment, Greece would be forced to withdraw its proposal. If, on the other hand, there were a majority decision supportive of the Haig assessment with Turkey in the minority, then Greece would permit the matter to continue to be discussed. He reiterated what Karamanlis had said, that Greece cannot return under conditions less favorable than 1974. Rallis acknowledged things had changed since 1974, but remarked that not very much had changed since Haig found the Greek proposals acceptable a few months ago. He concluded, "Greece is at the limit; nothing more can be accepted." He continued that even a split MC decision and continued discussion of open issues would cause the GOG public and parliamentary problems and concluded that, if Greece is not needed by NATO, then NATO should inform Greece of that fact and Greece would draw its own conclusions.

7. Christopher described the difficult position in which the USG finds itself, torn between two allies who have lost confidence in each other. Without wanting to take sides, he indicated the U.S. had reason to hope Turkey would take a conciliatory approach to remaining problems. On the other hand, notwithstanding some sympathy for the Greek position, it is essential to find a way to achieve re-integration without prejudicing Aegean political matters. The issue needed quiet, careful thought. Perhaps, he suggested, command arrangements could be separated from bilateral problems, as he understood Greece and General Haig wanted. Rallis agreed fully, but said that unfortunately

Turkey had hardened its positions and raised the public awareness of this problem's political aspect with recent statements, while Greece has tried to keep the matter private.

8. At this point Averoff, speaking for the first time, described the military steps Greece has taken to better relations with the U.S. (re-commitment of certain nuclear-capable units, participation in nearly all exercises, submission of NATO re-integration proposals, continued functioning of U.S. facilities "practically as they were before"), but said Karamanlis, despite his strong political position, could not do everything to improve ties. He acknowledged the Greek obsession with security of the Aegean islands and claimed that Greece could not let NATO discussions aid Turkey's claims against the islands. After discussing the military balance question, Averoff returned to the NATO problem with the statement that the U.S. representatives who helped prepare the second Military Committee draft had played a very active and, to Greece, disagreeable role when they tried to accommodate Turkish pressures. When he heard that, Averoff said, he became less optimistic and feared the Turks were being successful.

9. Christopher asked whether there is a legitimate Turkish concern that the Haig-Davos Arrangement might prejudice Turkish positions in bilateral talks. After further probing, Averoff finally stated, *ad referendum*, that Greece could undertake not to use command arrangements in bilateral political discussions if that would help. In response to a question, Tzounis said Greece could not use, for example, the line drawn in the Aegean for NATO command purposes in the continental shelf talks because that problem was resolvable on the basis of international law alone; the International Court would not accept command arrangements as relevant. On the other hand, Turkey does not want, according to Tzounis, to isolate juridical issues but wants a political discussion where she would use new command arrangements against Greece. Christopher and Averoff agreed that the urgent matter now on the table was NATO re-integration, and Averoff reiterated that command arrangements "certainly" could be settled without prejudice to bilateral political problems. (Comment: Subsequently, Theodoropoulos advised Nimetz that the statement Averoff had made *ad referendum* had been checked with the Prime Minister who agreed that Greece would not use any command arrangements made in the NATO context to bolster its position in bilateral negotiations with Turkey on Aegean issues.)

10. The military balance. Averoff cited the second Turkish invasion of Cyprus, various GOT official statements about how the Aegean islands must become Turkish, including an alleged TGS manual, as creating Greek concerns about the security of the islands. He said Greece also recognized the Warsaw Pact threat in response to which

Greece cultivates “very close” relations with Yugoslavia, strongly defends the Bulgarian border and seeks re-entry into NATO. But all that did not mean Greece could neglect defending its islands. Defenseless, they could be taken in 24 hours and could not be retaken. He stressed that armed islands were no threat to Turkey, as geography made obvious.

11. Greece, he said, had the possibility of an easy way out—the extension of territorial waters to 12 miles thereby reducing international waters in the Aegean from 50 to 20 percent. However, Greece is not following that course because it wants a solution. Meanwhile it needs a balance in the area so it can defend itself. (Averoff parenthetically allowed that the Greek-Turkish quarrel and the resultant arms race were “crazy and disastrous” for both countries.) The Greek General Staff believes there is a balance today and no Greek government could prejudice that position. A balance gives security to Greece and dissuades Turkey from foolish and destructive moves.

12. Christopher allowed that it was not for the U.S. to say whether Greece’s apprehensions were justified; clearly, they were strongly felt. The President was committed not to alter the regional balance. Congress had taken account of the Greek concern, but had broadened the context to include the Warsaw Pact-NATO balance as well as countries in the area. He said the U.S. would live up to the legislation by not providing provocative, technologically advanced weaponry to one and not the other. In addition there would be an annual review by our experts as well as the Congress in connection with security assistance legislation. He stressed, as he had to Karamanlis, that the U.S. would be as conscientious as it could not to upset the balance, but that such refined judgments would consider the overall regional picture and not be based on dollar-for-dollar comparisons.

13. Greek-Turkish differences. At various times during the discussion, Aegean air space and continental shelf matters were addressed. Christopher expressed the hope that both countries could work together to regain mutual confidence. Rallis drew on his recent meeting in New York with Turkish Foreign Minister Okcun (who he had heard was a hard man) to indicate that the latter had tried to find solutions to problems but that Elekdag had “stopped him from being rational.” It was the experts, Rallis said, who forced things to an impasse with impossible demands. When asked whether bilateral discussions had included NATO re-entry, Rallis described how he had attempted to pin Okcun down on the question of Aegean air space so that commercial traffic could be resumed. When the Turks had called for reduction of the Greek territorial air space around islands from ten to six nautical miles, Rallis had immediately offered to phone Karamanlis and strike a bargain if that were all that was required to settle the matter. Okcun

then demurred and pointed to the continental shelf, the arming of the islands, and Greek re-entry into NATO as other questions that needed to be resolved at the same time.

14. In connection with air space, Nimetz said he had thought the only major sticking point was the 10-mile question. Theodoropoulos said two basic differences remained: (a) the 10-mile airspace around islands established in 1931 and recognized by the Turks until 1975, and (b) early warning.<sup>4</sup> It had been agreed that the 10-mile issue should be deferred until the end, but the Turks kept bringing it up as a precondition. Greece was willing to have the Turks make a reservation on the issue, even though it had been explicitly acknowledged by them in pre-1975 [garble—notes] covering military exercises. With respect to early warning, Greece was willing to do so in an area west of the FIR line but Turkey refused to give Greece reciprocity east of the FIR line. Instead it wanted to divide the Aegean into two zones with the NOTAM 714 line as the early warning boundary.

15. Defense industrial cooperation. At the end of the session, Christopher offered to have a team of experts come to Greece to investigate the possibilities for the co-production of military weaponry. He noted that the U.S. would also be doing this with Turkey within the framework of NATO standardization and interoperability, and that, in both cases, there could be no guarantees that any concrete steps would flow from these feasibility studies. Averoff welcomed the offer and agreed that a mutually convenient time be set in the near future in coordination with the Embassy.

16. Broadening the relationship. Christopher asked how the U.S. could strengthen our relationship in the aftermath of the lifting of the Turkish arms embargo. Rallis replied that the relationship could not be strengthened unless the political climate were improved. That depended on solving the problems that had just been discussed, i.e. NATO re-entry and the Aegean balance, which in turn depended on the U.S. He declared the relationship would be harmed if there were an attempt to discuss health problems, for example, when national problems were not yet solved. Averoff called on the U.S. not to provide additional ammunition to the anti-American extreme left which is so adept at destructive sloganeering. The U.S. should not take actions that could be characterized by them as pro-Turkish or which gave the impression of sustaining Turkey at the expense of Greece, for this would outweigh the GOG's statements of the opposite. Averoff also asked for an authoritative account of steps he knows the U.S. took (a) to disassociate itself from the military dictatorship and (b) to stop the 1974 coup

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<sup>4</sup> The 10-mile designation was made by Greek Presidential decree in 1931, and observed by Turkey until the outbreak of hostilities over Cyprus in 1974–1975.

against Makarios. He said the record was not excellent, but it certainly was much better than was publicly believed. Authoritative clarification would have a large impact.

17. Rallis referred again to all the GOG and Karamanlis had done to improve Greek-U.S. relations since 1974, but said that current problems could undo it. Christopher concluded that the GOG could take pride in having achieved such prosperity since 1974 in the context of strengthened democracy. But, he added, he wanted it understood that the U.S. did not have unilateral control over the problems of Cyprus or NATO re-entry, and that although these were impediments to better relations they could not be solved by the U.S. alone.

McCloskey

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**185. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, October 25, 1978, 1612Z

9329. Military addressees treat as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Deputy Secretary's Visit—Taking Stock.

1. In the wake of the visit of the Deputy Secretary to Athens we believe it is useful to take stock of Greek Government positions and to assess what they imply for the United States Government.

2. The Deputy Secretary's talks with the Prime Minister and his leading associates, plus some of the background maneuvering of the Greek Government provide some telling insights into current GOG assumptions, policies and objectives in dealing with the United States.<sup>2</sup>

—A dependent relationship with the United States remains at the epicenter of Greek foreign policy. The Prime Minister and his colleagues made it clear that they harbor affection for the United States and look to the United States for leadership. They also underlined that they desire United States support on matters they consider of vital importance to Greece and displayed an exaggerated confidence that the United States can impose its will on others, particularly on Turkey.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Bremont Subject File, Box 64, Greece-Turkey: 6/78–1/79. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Nicosia, USNATO, USNMR SHAPE, US-DELMC Brussels, and USDOCOSouth.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 184.

—Our responsiveness to Greece's obsessive concern for security from the Turks has now explicitly become the yardstick by which the GOG measures Greek-American relations. Karamanlis put it best when he told the Deputy Secretary in effect: "Guarantee our security and everything else loses importance." By explicitly placing the Turkish threat to Greece at the center of Greek-American relations, the Greek Government has completed an important transition. Cyprus has now been clearly relegated to a secondary position. Given the long standing Greek fear of Turkey, this change is mostly presentational and is a reflection of the lifting of the embargo.

—In a remarkable switch, the Greek Government has moved from reluctance to rejoin NATO to anxiety because it cannot quickly rejoin the Alliance on terms acceptable to it. Privately, this new line began to emerge last January, but now the Greek public has been informed and there has been no great outcry against the GOG's posture, though for three years Greek leaders insisted that Greek public opinion would never tolerate a return to NATO absent a Cyprus settlement.

—On "balance" the GOG officials listened and did not dispute the Deputy Secretary's presentations. However, it also seems clear that they did not abandon a much more restrictive interpretation of what constitutes balance and we can expect that each time they learn of U.S. assistance to Turkey they will seek "balancing" assistance to Greece.

—The Greek Government is convinced that the United States bowed to Turkish "blackmail" in lifting the embargo. Accordingly it has adopted a very tough position on NATO reintegration, privately threatening to abort the reintegration process and to review their existing military cooperation with NATO as well as the status of U.S. military facilities in Greece if the Haig-Davos Arrangement does not prevail. GOG spokesmen have obviously backgrounded this position to the press.

—The Greek Government accepted in principle the possibility of divorcing political from military considerations on the reintegration question. Prime Minister Karamanlis confirmed that Greece could undertake not to use NATO command arrangements in the bilateral dispute with Turkey. At present we suspect that while the GOG will continue to insist on returning to NATO under pre-1974 terms, they could be persuaded not to use such an arrangement in their bilateral dispute with Turkey and to say so to Turkey if Turkey would make the same commitment.

—Its actions clearly indicated that the Greek Government is not ready to do very much, if anything, to improve the public atmosphere in which the two nations conduct their relations. This posture was reflected in the GOG's decision not to have a prepared toast at the Ambassador's dinner; in the cold, tough first draft of the joint statement



they presented us; and the Foreign Ministry's disinterest, even resistance, to expanding Greek-American cooperation in the non-security areas.

—Among the technocrats in the GOG there is a broad and deep desire to strengthen non-security cooperation between the two countries. This pressure from within the Greek bureaucracy was spontaneous and probably embarrassed Greece's foreign policy managers who attempted to belittle and diminish this aspect of the Deputy Secretary's visit. This negative attitude by foreign policymakers reflected also their fear that non-security cooperation would divert attention from our uneasy political and security cooperation, the last thing that Karamanlis and his advisers want to happen.

3. If our analysis above is correct we believe that it implies certain conclusions for the U.S. Government.

—Obviously we can expect another difficult period in our relations with Greece. Reintegration and "balance" will be the rings in which these difficulties are manifest, but Greek security concerns in the Aegean will underlie these issues.

—The GOG will continue the pressure on the United States to help it meet the "Turkish threat" in the Aegean. Particularly, as the Prime Minister so clearly suggested, the GOG will seek a more concrete, explicit "guarantee". With the relative downgrading of Cyprus as an ingredient in Greek-American relations this Greek demand will probably be more insistent and more difficult to deal with. In addition, it behooves the U.S. Government to develop for its own internal use a better sense of what we mean by such words as "unequivocally and actively oppose the use of force" should we one day face a situation in which Turkish or Greek actions call our hand. We note that even simple repetition of our standard "guarantee" formulation tends to give it concrete political form even though it continues to lack any binding legal content.

—We are going to have to take seriously Greek threats on aborting the NATO reintegration process and reviewing the status of U.S. bases should the Haig-Davos Arrangement be modified or abandoned. We continue to believe that there is some bluster and bluff in their words—the Greeks know as well as we the costs to themselves if they ever had to follow through on these words. And Karamanlis has taken a somewhat softer public stance—on October 21 he talked about Greece not being in a hurry and said Turkey would bear responsibility for the prolongation of the present situation.<sup>3</sup> However, the GOG has probably

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<sup>3</sup> Karamanlis' October 21 statement was reported in telegram 9182 from Athens, October 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780432–0172)

not thought out very well what it would do should Haig-Davos Arrangements be watered down. We can expect at least a hiatus in progress towards reintegration and perhaps worse, should the GOG react emotionally rather than thoughtfully to being offered less than what it hoped. It behooves us in the coming weeks to keep in close touch with the GOG on this matter, not as a negotiator but to counsel against the possibility of self-injury.

—We should quickly mobilize ourselves to follow through on the non-security non-political aspects of Greek-American cooperation, taking advantage of the Greek technical agencies' interest.

—We might ask the GOG how it thinks we can together deal with anti-American sentiments in Greece—perhaps exploring Averoff's suggestion (one he has been making for some time and which we believe is a personal one) that we seek greater opportunity to rebut popular beliefs that we installed the Junta and encouraged the Turkish venture in Cyprus. We should be careful not to fuel anti-Americanism through our words or deeds, but we also should not let ourselves be bullied by the GOG over threatened anti-Americanism and its impact on Greek-American relations.

—We should keep mindful that however friendly to the United States, this is a fearful nation which seeks to compensate for its weakness by looking to us. Our patience will be tried but so will our ability to understand the fears and the needs of our weak and vulnerable ally.

McCloskey

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**186. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State and the Embassy in Greece<sup>1</sup>**

Brussels, December 8, 1978, 1118Z

23208. Subject: Meeting Between Deputy Secretary and Greek Foreign Minister Rallis December 7.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780506-0222. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Ankara, Nicosia, USNATO, USUN, London, Bonn, Ottawa, Paris, USDELMC Brussels, USDOCOSouth Naples, and USNMR SHAPE. Christopher and Rallis were in Brussels for the biannual NATO Ministerial meeting.

1. Summary: Deputy Secretary Christopher met for 40 minutes with Greek Foreign Minister Rallis at Greek Mission to NATO afternoon December 7. Subjects discussed included Cyprus, Greek reintegration into NATO, Greek/Turkish relations, Greece/EC negotiations, and defense co-production. Other Greek participants were Ambassador Legacos, MFA Secretary General Theodoropoulos and Director General Tzounis. Accompanying DepSec were Ambassador Bennett, Counselor Nimetz, Assistant Secretary Vest, John Spiegel (D), and EUR/SE Director Ewing (note taker). End summary.

2. In opening meeting Deputy Secretary Christopher expressed appreciation for his visit to Athens in October.<sup>2</sup> He noted that GOG had been very helpful recently with respect to Cyprus and offered Rallis update on latest developments. Christopher described his December one meeting with SecGen Waldheim, General Assembly and Security Council deliberations on Cyprus, and Waldheim conviction that opportunity exists to move forward.<sup>3</sup> Christopher noted that Waldheim had urged Denktash and Foreign Minister Rolandis resume intercommunal talks on basis framework paper circulated by U.S. SYG had not yet received positive responses but had been encouraged by initial reactions. He hoped to hear further this month in order to travel to Cyprus for Kyprianou/Denktash meeting last week of January or first week of February which would lead to resumed negotiations in Nicosia. Waldheim and we had urged both parties to use our suggestions as basis for talks and not try to pre-negotiate provisions or achieve clarifications. U.S. also pleased Waldheim was actively seized with matter; we believe work needs to be done to make sure opening meeting leads to sustained process.

3. Rallis said the Greek Government had found the US non-paper to be very good and had so told the GOC adding that if it later rejected these proposals the GOG would make clear its opinion that the framework paper should lead to negotiations. The Greek Government could understand that both parties might wish to make a general reservation, making clear that some points in paper were not acceptable. Rallis felt the paper was balanced and congratulated Christopher on present US attitude toward Cyprus problem. Rallis said he had hoped GOC would reach decision before Moscow (and AKEL) criticized the US initiative. Before leaving Athens Rallis said he had instructed the Greek Amba-

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 184.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 306802 to USUN and Nicosia, December 5, the Department reported that the meeting centered on UN efforts to restart intercommunal talks based on the U.S. "framework" proposals. (The framework is described in footnote 2, Document 61.) Christopher told Waldheim that the United States remained committed to working closely with the UN on the Cyprus issue. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780500–0890)

sador in Nicosia to suggest to Rolandis the possibility of his going to New York to ask Waldheim to make the framework paper his own. Rallis said it was useful that some prominent Turks had criticized paper; this could encourage Greek Cypriots to accept. Rallis said that GOG thought it essential that arrangements for Varosha resettlement be done prior to resumption intercommunal talks so that resettlement could begin in phase with negotiations.

4. Christopher said he agreed with Rallis about Varosha but noted that Waldheim seemed to want to handle Varosha in plenary. Rallis said that would be most unfortunate. Tzounis suggested that the UN should discuss Varosha after both parties had accepted the framework paper. Rallis said he thought that any other approach to Varosha would cause difficulties for the Greek Cypriots. Christopher said we strongly preferred to make progress on Varosha before the intercommunal talks.

5. In response to Christopher's request for appraisal of status of Greek full return to NATO, Rallis described situation as one of deadlock. Since DepSec visit to Athens, there had been public declarations by Turkish Prime Minister and Defense Minister and recently three prominent Turkish journalists had told Averoff that there was no hope of re-negotiation [*reintegration?*] until all Aegean problems were solved. If this is the real Turkish position, then Greece cannot re-enter NATO. Rallis said he would be meeting Okcun after dinner December 7.

6. Rallis said that in recent Paris talks on Aegean continental shelf Turkish negotiator had for the first time indicated what Turks really want in shelf delimitation. When these negotiators met again in January, there was hope that further progress could be made.

7. Rallis stressed strongly that no Greek Prime Minister could at this time accept any change in Aegean air control which would involve Turkey controlling air over Greek islands. That would involve question of sovereignty. With regard to alleged Turkish anxiety about security, Greeks were prepared to provide extensive information about Greek flights over Aegean to Greek islands and were asking only for information on Turkish flights within 20 miles of coast.

8. With respect to Greece/NATO, Legacos stressed that this was not Greece/Turkey bilateral problem but rather issue involving Alliance and Turkey.

9. Rallis recalled that at Strasbourg meeting two weeks ago Okcun had suggested that two Prime Ministers meet to divide Aegean. Greek view was that only through prior preparation by experts could such difficult questions as continental shelf, minorities, air space, status of islands, etc., be handled in manner that would be acceptable to public opinion. Karamanlis simply cannot divide Aegean with Turkey.

10. Rallis reaffirmed that GOG was prepared to declare in writing that it would not use NATO arrangements for bilateral political purposes in Aegean.

11. Christopher reaffirmed that US wanted to see early Greek reintegration and thought this should be done on basis Haig/Davos Arrangements with some few areas of amplification. We were still pushing for solution and would continue to do so over next few months.

12. Rallis said that Greeks were patient but thought that only Generals Haig and Davos could find solution to present deadlock. They should, however, be instructed which questions to discuss and not attempt to review all matters. It would also be best to have such discussions after a month or so. Nimetz noted that Elekdag had told him earlier in day that Turkey wanted to isolate Greece/NATO question from other Aegean issues. Nimetz affirmed that we think Haig/Davos Arrangements reflect correct boundaries and that exchanging information about aircraft flights could help solve problem. Rallis said that these matters should be discussed later when the psychological mood in Greece was better. He stressed that Greece wants to be friends with Turkey but that third Karamanlis/Ecevit meeting without productive results would be bad for public opinion in both countries. Much has been achieved in past year; there is no clamor in either country's press for war.

13. Christopher said he agreed with Rallis it was best to let Greece/NATO cool for a few weeks and then resume consideration in military channels in order to reach conclusions.

14. Christopher recalled that he had had good discussions in Athens regarding general security problems, contingency situations, and our strong preference for peaceful solutions.

15. Theodoropoulos recalled that US co-production team had productive visit to Greece and that DOD was preparing MOU for early signing. Greeks very much welcomed this cooperative program.

16. Rallis said that at Ministerial negotiating session December 6 problems involving agriculture and Greek entry into EC had been discussed. While we were largely by-standers, Christopher said we hoped Greece could succeed.

17. Rallis and Christopher agreed that in talking with press following meeting it would be stressed that they discussed the progress which has been made in U.S.-Greek relations since Mr. Christopher made his visit to Greece earlier this year. They briefly discussed Greece's link to NATO and noted that a reply to Greek proposals is awaited.

**Olsen**

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**187. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, February 23, 1979, 1507Z

1707. Subject: (C) Foreign Relations: Greece and Cyprus—The Extent and Limits of Greek Leverage.

1. (C-entire text)

2. This report is submitted in accordance with the post reporting plan (78 Athens 10420, 78 State 315775).<sup>2</sup>

3. Summary: Greek influence on the Cyprus issue, determinative prior to Cypriot independence, now is no longer controlling. Although sources of Greek leverage still exist, there are limitations on their use in both Nicosia and Athens. No Greek government can ignore Cyprus, although the national interests of Greece and Cyprus on the Cyprus issue are not identical and Greece is far more concerned over its relations with Turkey. As she has done in the past, despite her public posture that the Cyprus issue is for the GOC to resolve, Greece will continue to counsel the GOC to avoid intransigent stands and to seek a settlement with the Turkish side. Within that framework it will be possible from time to time for us to encourage the GOG discreetly to push the GOC in a moderate direction. End summary.

4. Relations between Greece and Cyprus are close and the two governments are in frequent contact. Despite the regular consultations that take place in Nicosia (through Greek Ambassador Dountas) and whenever Cypriot leaders pass through Athens, however, the GOC does not invariably seek the GOG's advice nor does it always act on it. The relationship between Athens and Nicosia has evolved over the past 20 years. The days are long since past when a Greek government had the authority to impose its preferences for a political settlement of the Cyprus issue on Nicosia, as Athens did with the London and Zurich Accords of 1959. When Archbishop Makarios was not supported at the London Conference by the GOG in his objection to the Zurich Agreement, he submitted to the decision of Athens. Even after Cypriot independence was proclaimed the following year, sporadic direct negotiations between the GOG and the GOT on the Cyprus issue were held, over the head of Nicosia.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790086-0567. Confidential; Exdis; Noform. Sent for information to Ankara, Nicosia, and USUN.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 10420 from Athens, November 28, and telegram 315775 to Athens, December 5, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780492-0587 and D780518-0096.

5. In more recent years the trend toward a more forthright assertion of Cypriot independence has coincided with a GOG perspective that the Greek people are tiring of the Cyprus issue, that it will not be readily solved, and that the national interests of Greece are not necessarily those of Cyprus. The result of this evolution has been to increase the sense of political distance between Nicosia and Athens. This is further aggravated by the general lack of trust and confidence in President Kyprianou, who is regarded as being out of his depth by most Greek leaders. Moreover, Karamanlis is determined to avoid being drawn again into the Cyprus vortex and is anxious to avoid repeating his pre-independence experience which was costly to him in domestic political terms.

6. Despite the new equation between Nicosia and Athens, however, the GOG inevitably continues to carry considerable weight with the GOC. For one thing, Nicosia still has substantial need of Athens, its main supporter, for psychological as well as political reasons. The pervasive appeal of "Hellenism" cannot be ignored. Moreover, Cyprus needs Greece's support in the UN, and Greece gives it even though GOC recourse to the UN is sometimes made despite the GOG's advice. Greek financial assistance to Cyprus continues at substantial levels. A one billion drachmas (some \$28 million) annual line item for assistance was budgeted in 1977, 1978 and 1979, making Greece the largest foreign aid donor. In addition to the 950-man Greek force in Cyprus, which is there legally under the provisions of the London-Zurich Agreements, there are still an estimated 1000 Greek Army officers and men seconded to the 12,000-man Cypriot National Guard, whose presence is not covered by those Agreements, as well as one 300-man Greek raiding forces battalion. Thus, the GOC listens attentively to GOG advice, even though it may not always take it.

7. At the same time, there are limits to the degree that Athens is willing to seek to influence Nicosia, and limits to the extent that any such efforts can be successful. The Greek Government cannot put itself in the position of urging the acceptance of a disadvantageous Cyprus settlement. PASOK's Andreas Papandreou, and other opposition leaders, would have a field day with a credible charge that the Karamanlis government had sacrificed Greek interests on Cyprus. Similar constraints operate in Cyprus where Socialist Party (EDEK) leader Lysaridis and Communist Party (AKEL) chairman Papaioannou would be quick to charge betrayal or sellout by the GOG if it advocated a course of action that appeared to make too many concessions in the interest of a settlement. Such constraints on Athens will not become an open fourth party to the Cyprus negotiations.

8. Another considerable constraint that conditions the nature of Athens' involvement in the Cyprus question is its perception that the

GOC may not be seriously looking for a settlement of the issue. Since any settlement would entail some risktaking and, inevitably, a measure of unpopularity for the government that agreed to it (certainly in Athens as well as Nicosia, and we suspect possibly Ankara as well), the Cyprus situation has in a way produced its own stalemate. As seen from Athens, the GOC appears to find it preferable to continue with the known posture of keeping the present "struggle" going indefinitely rather than embarking on the hazards of a new settlement. If that is indeed the case, then there is even less incentive for Athens to advance beyond what is politically possible in Nicosia.

9. In this context, since the prospects for an actual settlement are assessed by the GOG as remote, underlying national interests are seen in sharper relief. And it should be borne in mind that Greek and Cypriot national interests in the Cyprus issue are far from identical. To Nicosia, of course, what is at stake are the terms of national survival. To Athens, on the other hand, the paramount issue is its relations with Turkey, and here the Aegean problems are of first priority. Nevertheless, no Greek government can appear to ignore Cyprus. Karamanlis is quick to point out, both in private and in public (as he did again during the January 16 foreign policy discussion in Parliament), that "everything begins with Cyprus" and Turkish agreement to a fair settlement there is essential. Yet the Aegean, and not Cyprus, worries Karamanlis and most Greeks and could be the cause of war, which Cyprus was not in 1974 and is even less likely to be now.

10. It is instructive to note some recent instances in which Greece has given Cyprus advice on the issue. The GOG, we know, strongly urged the GOC to accept the US-UK-Canada non-paper, despite reservations about some of its provisions, as a basis for resumption of the intercommunal talks.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately, the advice was not taken by the GOC and we find ourselves in the present impasse at least in part because of this. When Foreign Minister Rallis found the GOC's formulation for UN Secretary General Waldheim last December to be so negative that it would have been unacceptable to both Waldheim and the Turkish Cypriots, he convinced Rolandis to redraft the formula along more moderate lines. Earlier, Athens reacted strongly when Kyprianou rejected the Denktash proposals on Varosha last July out of hand and got Kyprianou to partially reverse himself subsequently. The common thread of these events is that Athens will actively try to prod Nicosia into more moderate paths when the GOG fears that Greek Cypriot intransigence may become the issue. Such a course would directly undercut the GOG's own interests, for Greek Cypriot intransigence weakens the Greek Cypriot posture before other fora, and particularly

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 61.



before the American Congress. The result might well be a lessening of American concern over any decline in the prospects for a more positive Turkish role on the Cyprus issue. In the worst case scenario from the GOG point of view, lack of constraints and attention from the Congress (and an adjusted geopolitical situation in the wake of recent events in Iran) might even lead to a real American “tilt” towards Ankara. It must, of course, be a prime goal of any Greek government to check any such development.

11. A real problem in this situation may be that since any settlement will involve political risks, Nicosia may prefer the appearance rather than the substance of forward motion on the Cyprus issue. Indeed, we think it unlikely that in the absence of our non-paper, or some other outside initiative, any movement toward resumption of negotiations would have been possible. It follows that if the Waldheim plan succeeds in getting the parties to the intercommunal negotiating table it may require artful outside pressures to keep them there.

12. Clearly, a moderating Greek influence on Nicosia, even though not decisive, can be helpful in nurturing the negotiating process and is something we should continue to encourage when we have appropriate opportunities to do so. This argues for close and frequent consultations with the GOG and keeping it informed of U.S. thinking and actions in order to gain Greek support. In doing this we should avoid pressing too hard or asking for too much, always keeping in mind the limits of Greek influence and thus of GOG resistance to becoming more directly and openly involved. The GOG would like to see a settlement on Cyprus and has demonstrated its willingness to play a role, albeit quiet and indirect, in pursuit of it. We should recognize this and act accordingly. More than that, under present circumstances, would be unrealistic to expect.

**McCloskey**

## 188. Intelligence Information Cable Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

TDFIR DB-315/08516-79

Washington, May 10, 1979

2447259. Exclusive dissemination to addressee listed in final paragraph. Country: Greece. Subject: Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis's Dissatisfaction With Standstill in Greek-American Relations (DOI: Early May 1979). Source: [3 lines not declassified].

1. Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis told [*less than 1 line not declassified*] in early May 1979 that he is becoming increasingly dispirited by the current standstill in Greek-American relations. He added that Greece's entry into the Common Market puts Greece where Karamanlis believes the country should be,<sup>2</sup> and the hoped-for return of Greece to NATO's military wing will help anchor Greece in the West, but he cannot feel secure about Greece's international position until there is a return to the quality of relations Greece had with the United States just after Karamanlis's 1974 return.<sup>3</sup> The Prime Minister said that while at that time he might have disagreed with various aspects of American foreign policy, he at least understood America's foreign policy objectives and had a valuable, ongoing dialogue with the American administration. Now, he said, he does not know who makes the decisions in Washington, what weight if any is given to Greek affairs, or even whom to ask about these matters.

2. The Prime Minister said he does not attribute the stagnation in Greek-American relations to ill will or to incompetence, but rather to a lack of direction in Washington; apparently no one has set any foreign policy objectives for relations with Greece. He is forced to wait until someone does initiate a policy, said Karamanlis, at which time he will find out how to engage in profitable interchange with Washington concerning that policy. (Field comment: This report should be read in conjunction with [*1 line not declassified*], which reported that Karamanlis has decided to begin pressuring the United States to help end Turkish opposition to Greece's full NATO reentry.)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 16, Greece: 1978-1980. Secret; Wnintel; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 174. Greece formally became a member of the European Economic Community, also known as the Common Market, on June 28 when the Greek Parliament ratified the Deed of Accession.

<sup>3</sup> Karamanlis registered similar concerns to Ambassador McCloskey, as reported in telegram 2079 from Athens, March 8. McCloskey noted that the Prime Minister asked him to convey this message to Washington. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790111-0905)

3. ACQ: [1 line not declassified].
  4. Field dissem: [3 lines not declassified].
  5. Washington dissem: To State: Exclusive for Director, INR.
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**189. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Madrid, June 1, 1979, 1400Z

Secto 4116. Subject: NAC Ministerial: Secretary Vance's Bilateral With Greek Foreign Minister Rallis (U).

1. (S-entire text)

2. Summary: Greek Foreign Minister Rallis told Secretary Vance in May 31 bilateral that latest SACEUR reintegration proposals presented to Greece on command and control in the Aegean were unacceptable. He explained that the proposals or any new ones like them took responsibility for the defense of Greek territory from Greece and thus could not be accepted by any Greek government. He said that further public airing of this issue could affect adversely Greek attitudes toward NATO and recommended that the matter be "frozen" for a time. Secretary Vance responded that he was not aware of the details of the Haig proposals, but would look into the matter. General Haig had told him that he had completed a new set of proposals which would be passed on to Greeks and Turks.<sup>2</sup> Rallis indicated no knowledge as yet of new proposals. Remainder of discussion was devoted to Middle East-related issues. End summary.

3. Present for US during May 31 Vance/Rallis bilateral were Counselor Nimetz, Ambassador Bennett, Assistant Secretary Vest, and a notetaker. Present on Greek side were MFA Secretary General Theodoropoulos, MFA Political Director Tzounis, and Greek PermRep to NATO Lagacos.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance EXDIS Memcons, 1979. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Vest; cleared by Nimetz; approved by Davis. Sent for information Immediate to Ankara, Athens, USNMR SHAPE, USDOCOSouth Naples, and USNATO. Vance was in Madrid June 1–2 for the U.S.-Spanish Council meeting after attending the NATO Ministerial meeting in The Hague May 29–31.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 191.

4. Secretary Vance congratulated Rallis on Greek accession to EEC. Rallis said that results were excellent for two reasons: Greece has entered the EEC with a good agreement and opposition leader Papan-dreou has made an enormous mistake in opposing accession which will ultimately lose him votes.

5. Rallis then outlined the current GOG position on Greek reintegration. (He spoke mostly in Greek with Tzounis interpreting.) Rallis recalled previous conversations with Deputy Secretary Christopher and Counselor Nimetz last December in Brussels on the subject.<sup>3</sup> Greece had accepted the Haig/Davos Agreements and agreed to consider some technical "amplifications". Then last March General Haig had asked to meet again with General Davos with some new ideas which were close enough to the original that they could be considered also as "amplifications." Greece agreed. Rallis noted that Greeks had accepted SACEUR's mission, specifying it to be exploratory and not mediation. Greeks were then very surprised to receive next set of Haig proposals.

6. At this point Rallis unfolded map of Aegean. He noted that latest SACEUR proposal would establish a military headquarters in Larissa placing all Greek islands except one or two in a command and control framework whereby Greek territory would not be defended by Greek Air Force but by a third party. Rallis reemphasized that virtually all islands in this area were Greek. "To make pill sweeter", proposal also included two small Turkish islands.

7. Secretary Vance, saying he was not aware of the details of the SACEUR proposal, asked Rallis to explain it. Latter said that foreign officer (sic) at Larissa, with no Greek officers present in dealing with Aegean command and control could entrust certain missions to whatever air force he wanted, including of course Turkish Air Force.

8. Rallis stressed that this solution is unacceptable to any Greek for national reasons. Greece cannot entrust the defense of Greek territory to any foreigner. There is now a deadlock. General Haig has reportedly stated he now knows the positions of both sides and will try to formulate new proposals. Rallis said that if new proposals are similar to or even only "50 per cent" of old ones, Greeks would prefer that they not be put forward. He explained that proposals would have to be rejected and Greek proposal for NATO reintegration would have to be withdrawn. Rallis said he had previously explained to both Secretary and DepSec Christopher the consequences of such a rejection. Accordingly, it would be best to "freeze matters" at this stage.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 186.

9. Secretary Vance said he had seen General Haig that morning at Ministerial ceremonies and asked him about the status. General Haig had said that he had prepared new proposals and, as Secretary understood it, had sent them on to Greeks and Turks. The Secretary then asked Rallis for his interpretation of original Haig/Davos discussions. Tzounis responded that Aegean command and control issues under this formula would be discussed after reintegration. PermRep Lagacos interjected that there had been general agreement in NATO's Military Committee that, on an interim basis, the 1974 command and control lines would be accepted.

10. Rallis went on to note that Greece had indicated to SACEUR that these arrangements would not prejudice Greek/Turkish bilateral discussions and that Greece had agreed to limitation of its NATO air space. This had been accepted by Davos and the Greek Government. Rallis repeated that it would be best now to "freeze" the situation but with two pre-suppositions: (a) Turkish side should not take advantage of the freeze to "gnaw away" at Greek rights, and (b) discussions on reintegration should not be leaked to the press. Rallis noted that General Haig had made a public statement that was an irritant to Greek public opinion as well as to the Greek political opposition.

11. If matter is further aired in public and opposition asks questions in Parliament on Greek reintegration issue, Karamanlis government would have to describe its proposals of 18 months ago and to admit there had been a Turkish "veto" of these proposals.

12. Rallis said that Americans will recall that in the 1974–5 period, the opposition had harped on the theme of Greece leaving the Alliance. At that time a state of mind existed in Greece which was inimical to NATO. He cited an example in May 1976 when he was in danger of being stoned on Rhodes when he went there in the wake of protests against a US ship visit. Now, however, Greek public opinion has changed radically as the government has succeeded in demonstrating that a Greek relationship to NATO is of benefit to Greece as well as to the Alliance. Rallis asked that the Secretary join their efforts so that this state of mind is preserved.

13. Rallis claimed that Greece has been "chivalrous" to Turkey. Last December at the NATO Ministerial Rallis had said that Turkey should receive economic assistance first because of its problems. Greece also could have postponed decisions to assist Turkey in OECD, but adopted instead an attitude which facilitated assistance to Turkey. Greece has adopted this position because it believes Turkey is at least as indispensable to NATO as Greece is. Rallis said that this does not seem to be the Turkish approach. Turkey believes that she can put forward ideas which are against Greek interests. Rallis added that he had talked to Luns and stressed to him the need to keep details of reintegration

discussions out of the newspapers if Greek Government is to be able to maintain the existing public psychology.

14. Secretary told Rallis that it was not our desire to adversely affect Greek public opinion on NATO. In fact, there was nothing further from our minds and disclosure will not come from us. Secretary repeated that General Haig had told him that he had developed a set of revised proposals. Counselor Nimetz interjected that he understood that these proposals had been sent yesterday. Rallis said that he knew nothing of this and had talked by telephone to the Prime Minister who didn't know anything either. According to Rallis, Secretary General Luns had the impression that gap on reintegration between Greece and Turkey is closing. Rallis told Luns that two sides are like "night and day" and the proposals are impossible.

15. Secretary Vance, repeating that he did not know what was in the proposals, indicated that we will follow this matter.

16. Tzounis and Legacos provided further explanation of Greek position along familiar lines. They alleged that Alliance had accepted the fact that Aegean command and control arrangements should be interim. Only Turkey has not agreed. This matter should not become a bilateral controversy. Greece had made proposals. The assessment by SACEUR was favorable, and only Turkey had objected. General Haig is not a mediator but had been given a fact-finding mission. Greeks had agreed that command and control arrangements could be discussed after reintegration. Problem now was between Alliance and Turkey; it was not a bilateral one.

17. Rallis then described Karamanlis' visits to Syria, Yugoslavia, and Romania. In all these places Prime Minister had attempted to convince government leaders to take a more favorable position toward US policy in the Middle East. Syria's Assad had bluntly refused, calling Sadat a traitor. Romania's Ceausescu had been more encouraging about Sadat's importance for a settlement but was not prepared to make a public statement to this effect. Tito had been less encouraging, but had promised Karamanlis not to take an extremist attitude. Rallis commented that Tito seemed to have kept his promise.

18. Rallis then stressed interest that Greeks have regarding access of Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Jerusalem to its holy places there. Rallis said that Greek Government had formulated a proposal on an apolitical basis that would preserve under international protection the access of all three faiths in Jerusalem to religious lands and properties.

19. Secretary Vance said that this matter had been discussed at Camp David. It had been agreed that there should be free and complete access by all religions. Each religion should have the right to administer and control its holy places. However, agreement on this concept had bogged down on the issue of sovereignty, and thus the paragraph had

to be dropped. Tzounis thought that proposals that GOG had formulated might be a way to move forward. Secretary Vance expressed interest in seeing the proposal and Rallis promised to pass it through the Greek Embassy in Washington.

20. Secretary asked Rallis to pass his regards to Prime Minister Karamanlis. Rallis concluded the conversation by expressing hope for movement towards solution of Greek reintegration problem. Failure to move on this was risky for Turks, too.

Vance

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**190. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, June 8, 1979, 1415Z

5024. Miladdees handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: (S) Foreign Relations: Discussion With Molyviatis on NATO Reintegration and U.S.-Greek Bilateral Affairs.

1. (S-entire text)

2. Summary: While the GOG is preparing to reject SACEUR's latest proposal on NATO reintegration, it has yet to conclude what course to take beyond this.<sup>2</sup> At the same time it remains obsessed with the notion that the USG has failed to use its influence to resolve this issue and, because our inclination is to favor Turkey, we are party to its irresolution. As a consequence, our bilateral relations with Greece become contaminated and further on our base rights may stand in jeopardy. End summary.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Office of the Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher, 1977–1980, Lot 81D113, Box 9, Memos From WMC to Offices/Bureaus—1979. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to USNMR SHAPE; to Ankara, Bonn, Nicosia, USNATO, USDOCOSouth, and USDELMC. In an attached handwritten note dated June 11, Christopher instructed Vest: "Let's discuss where to go from here—now that Haig's time apparently has run out."

<sup>2</sup> On May 3, *The New York Times* reported on Haig's "all-out effort" to seek a compromise between Greece and Turkey regarding the terms of Greek re-entry to NATO before his planned resignation as Supreme Allied Commander Europe in early June. At that juncture, the main stumbling block for negotiations was the issue of control over Aegean airspace. Turkey wanted to control airspace at 30 miles beyond its Aegean border; Greece rejected this area as too large. ("Greece's Re-Entry into NATO Snagged," May 3, 1979, p. A7)

3. The foregoing emerged during the course of a long and at times disagreeable conversation with Prime Minister Karamanlis' principal aide Petros Molyviatis on June 7. I asked for the meeting in order to have a candid discussion of where our relationships were leading us. There is little to be encouraged about.

4. Introducing my purpose, I said I had become increasingly disturbed by comments we were hearing and reading, the sum of which was that United States policy in the area was taking Greece for granted and that it was measured only by its desire to preserve our interests in Turkey—in a word, that our intentions here were dishonorable. These interpretations were, in turn, leading to stories that our bilateral affairs had become chilled and as a result, there was an "impasse" in our relations. While no such line had been conveyed to me by government officials I had come now to assume that it was being encouraged by officials. If this was not so I would be happy to have something to the contrary because just a few weeks ago Foreign Minister Rallis had described our relationships as "excellent." I noted that while confirming the story of the VOA negotiations being in suspense last weekend the government spokesman had, in effect, also confirmed that overall we were at an impasse.<sup>3</sup> Finally, I said we could not accept being appealed to privately to help with Greece's regional problems while we were being bullied to such an extent publicly.

5. Without addressing my remarks directly Molyviatis raised the NATO issue and produced a map. Doubtless it was the same one that figured in the Secretary's meeting with Foreign Minister Rallis May 31 in The Hague.<sup>4</sup> Inked lines on the map purport to demonstrate how the recent (leaked) SACEUR proposals would give command and control authority in the Aegean to "others" and hence are "totally unacceptable." To my question Molyviatis asserted that SACEUR's "latest" proposals made only "cosmetic changes" and were equally unacceptable. An official reply to this effect was in preparation and would be forwarded to Brussels soon.

6. In further discussion of this I sought to disabuse Molyviatis of his assumption that the USG has—if not authored the proposals—at the least inspired them. (Comment: His skepticism on this important point says something about the mindset we encounter here.) He was contending that the juxtaposition of the Deputy Secretary's remarks May 15 describing Turkey's attitude toward the dispute (on which Molyviatis put a higher gloss) and the existence (before being leaked)

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 4622 from Athens, May 29, the Embassy reported that Greek officials had decided to suspend negotiations for Voice of America transmissions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840133-2577)

<sup>4</sup> See Document 189.



of SACEUR's paper was confirmation that we had underwritten it.<sup>5</sup> He allowed he was "reassured" with my saying that our wish was that the parties find a mutually agreeable resolution, that we would use our influence toward that end but that we had not attempted to design the formula for getting there. Molyviatis registered some disbelief when I added that at given times we were uninformed about the state of play. (Comment: Obviously as a result of this conversation, MFA Director General Tzounis called in DCM this morning to show him the latest Haig proposal and to explain in great and emotional detail why GOG could "never" accept it. His arguments, which are being reported separately, boiled down to Greek unwillingness "under any peacetime conditions" to have Turkey responsible for defending any part of Greek airspace or even to have Turkish military planes flying through it.)<sup>6</sup>

7. About where to go from here, Molyviatis described the GOG as facing three alternatives: allow NATO's efforts to continue although he couldn't see how it would ensue "since General Haig has torn to shreds" the arrangements the GOG could support; freeze the issue for an indefinite period; withdraw their initiative and seek a role for themselves along the "model" of the French.

8. Reminding Molyviatis that the USG was being subjected to unjustifiable blame for Greece's real and imagined difficulties led us into an unprofitable exchange on the problem of leaks. (I confess to having felt slightly vulnerable with our deplorable record over the last year.) Beyond the misfortune of these disclosures some of which I was confident came from Greek sources, I said I was more irritated presently by a combination of stories and rumorings that I had to assume emanated from government sources; that our official relations were stalemated; that an inevitable consequence would be a denial of base rights. On the latter Molyviatis restated that our military presence is contingent on Greece's NATO membership while acknowledging my point that they serve common purpose. On the broader question he excused the government from any control over the press and demurred at my saying we knew that government sources were impugning our motives toward Greece. He professed to be unaware that the government spokesman had linked suspension of the VOA negotiations with other outstanding matters including our draft agreement on other non-security issues.

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to Christopher's May 15 appearance before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Christopher appeared before the committee in order to justify proposed economic and military aid packages for Turkey.

<sup>6</sup> The Embassy reported the Greek position as explained by Tzounis in telegram 5126 from Athens, June 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790266–0253)

9. Toward the end I emphasized that we remained willing to assist Greece and that our intentions were affirmatively more honorable than we were being given credit for in and out of government in Athens. To be accused of working against the interests of Greece was unjustified and inaccurate and unworthy of a mature relationship. We would continue to help with Greece's aspirations in its international affairs as well as in bilateral objectives and that our record to date has been creditable.

10. Comment: Once again it is clear that the NATO issue is at the center of Greek frustrations and is infecting our relationships. Our objectives here I'm afraid will remain hostage to its continued irresolution.

McCloskey

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**191. Message From the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Haig) to Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jones)<sup>1</sup>**

Mons, Belgium, June 16, 1979, 1010Z

1812. From General Haig SACEUR SHAPE Be. Subject: Greek Reintegration.

1. At the suggestion of Embassy Athens, I have asked Ambassador McCloskey to deliver the following personal message from me to Prime Minister Karamanlis:

Quote Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

It appears that we are now at an important and historic turning point in our mutual effort to return Greek forces to the integrated military structure. As you are aware, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, was charged by the Secretary General of NATO to attempt to undertake a fact finding mission with a view to bringing about the early return of Greek forces to the integrated military structure. This effort

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-82-0205, Box 10, Greece 17 Oct 79. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for information to USNATO for Ambassador Bennett, to [text not declassified] Athens for Ambassador McCloskey, to [text not declassified] Ankara for Ambassador Spiers, to [text not declassified] Bonn for Ambassador Stoessel, to the Department of State for Nimetz, to Naples for Admiral Shear (CINC-SOUTH, and to Brussels for General Knowlton (USDELMC).

has culminated in the proposal forwarded to General Davos and General Evren on 30 May 1979.<sup>2</sup>

I believe this final formulation satisfies every concern contained in General Davos' letter to me of 10 May,<sup>3</sup> with the exception of air defense coordination:

—No NATO documents are rescinded.

—National sovereignty is not infringed upon in any way. Rather, it is confirmed, especially for the airspace over the islands in the Aegean.

—COMEDEAST remains and its boundaries are not directly challenged.

With respect to day-to-day air defense operations, clearly changes must be made to accommodate the already established command in Izmir and the anticipated new command in Larissa. My proposal visualizes that the coordination formerly effected by COMSIXATAF in Izmir will now be effected by COMAIRSOUTH's advanced regional air operations center in Larissa. Most importantly, you can be assured that, in practice, CINCSOUTH's coordinating functions will neither be technically unworkable nor create unacceptable situations for Greece.

What the Turkish position on this latest proposal might be is unknown to me because it falls far short of what they have insisted upon thus far. In any event, I consider it a reasonable compromise between what have been heretofore incompatible positions. Unfortunately, time permits no efforts for further modifications by me. Therefore, upon receipt of your decision, I must then proceed to seek the Turkish reaction prior to my final report.

We both understand the complexities of the problem. However, I remain hopeful that you will be able to make a positive response which I am confident will result in the prompt return of Greece to the integrated military structure under workable circumstances.

Respectfully,

/s/

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

General, United States Army Supreme Allied Commander

Unquote.

2. Warm regards. Al Haig.

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<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

**192. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Siena) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McGiffert)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 20, 1979

SUBJECT

Conversations with MOD Averoff September 15–16, 1979

I had several one-on-one discussions with MOD Averoff on the Greek reintegration problem. The general impression I take from them is that the current SACEUR initiative is sure to fail, and that the Greeks expect us to solve the problem.

Averoff opened our conversations by saying that he saw little hope for reintegration. The problem, he said, is to preserve our bilateral relations. The latter, I said, goes without saying, but reintegration should not be written off yet. He agreed, but it is plain that he has nothing to propose. He said that Karamanlis would not act precipitously but that the pressure is great and they have been “put in a corner.”

The current proposal will fail, Averoff said, because politically Karamanlis cannot accept arrangements providing less security to Greece, as seen by the Greeks, than those which were in existence in 1974. The Greek military, the arbiter of acceptability for the government, sees the current proposals as providing less security than the pre-74 arrangements. The main concern is command and control boundaries for airspace. The naval situation, I was told by both Averoff and the Greek CNO, Admiral Konofaos, can be accommodated within the current proposals provided that satisfactory clarifications are made on the conditions under which AFSOUTH would and would not pass operational command to the Greek Commander, COMEDEAST. (This problem should be soluble with a level of generality which will not impede future actions.)

The basic Greek concern, as expressed to me, is for the security of their islands adjacent to Turkey. There is a lingering fear of invasion, and a classified Turkish manual for senior officers which they came upon fuels that fear. They read further confirmation into some of Ecevit's remarks in recent years. Averoff acknowledged that they also do not wish the Turks any advantage in the basic quarrel over rights in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–82–0205, Box 10, Greece 17 Oct 79. Secret. The upper right-hand corner of the page is initialed and dated 9/24, by Harold Brown. Additionally, “SECDEF has seen” is stamped in the upper right-hand corner.

the Aegean, something which he, at the same time, minimized insofar as Greek use of any settlement in that context is concerned. He stressed that it would be politically unacceptable to create the perception that, through reintegration arrangements, Turkey's positions on Aegean issues had the support of NATO.

Karamanlis' problem is compounded by the fact that they had the deal they wanted in the Haig-Davos arrangements, and the Turkish veto of that approach puts them in the position of a petitioner with the Turks holding that which they want. This is hard enough for the Greeks to accept. That the US is seen, rightly or not, as the behind-the-scenes manipulator, is further aggravation given their lingering disenchantment with what they see as our tilt towards Turkey. It pains Karamanlis, and galls him as well, to have the door to NATO held by the Turks with, as is alleged to the benefit of his opposition, the acquiescence of the US.

Averoff did not press me to pressure the Turks. He made plain, however, that he sees us as the only force with which the Turks will reckon. He does not expect the Turks to seek a way out of this. He is quite skeptical whether the Turks do indeed wish to see Greece back in, even though there is a mutual security interest in that. When I suggested to him that the burgeoning interest in Turkey's position in regional security might lead to a diminution of interest in Greece, which would be furthered if Greece continues to stand aside, he said, "... oh well, we'll survive."

He seemed unfamiliar, at least, and alert to the argument that Greece's remaining out of the Alliance could indeed have an unraveling effect.<sup>2</sup> I argued that now, if a country faces a hard choice (such as LRTNF), the choices are to go along or not. If Greece withdraws finally from the integrated military structure, there will be a precedent for a third choice, *i.e.*, bail out. His reaction, and those of Admiral Konofaos and the Foreign Office people on whom I pressed this point, was one of understanding and concern. This point, of course, will have little currency in Greece. It may stiffen the spines of those who wish to return. It is an argument which we might use in gathering Alliance support for a solution.<sup>3</sup>

Averoff told me that Karamanlis will not act precipitously after rejecting the SACEUR proposal. They may indeed study the proposal

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<sup>2</sup> He acknowledged without argument that the French precedent does not support the Greek position. The French Ambassador to Greece [Jacques de Folin] told me that he thought Greece should return to the Alliance. The French have been mildly helpful on this issue. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>3</sup> In the right-hand margin, an unknown hand drew a line along the side of the entire paragraph and wrote, "good point."

further for a while. But the walls are closing in, and after they have turned the proposal down the matter cannot be left to molder for very long. Karamanlis will eventually have to “withdraw his application” for reintegration unless something worth talking about further is at hand.

**James V. Siena**<sup>4</sup>  
*Deputy Assistant Secretary  
European and NATO Affairs*

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<sup>4</sup> Siena signed “Jim” above this typed signature.

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**193. Letter From Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis to  
President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, September 25, 1979

Dear Mr President,

The appointment of the new Greek Ambassador to Washington gives me a welcome opportunity to communicate with you and to express, together with my sincere esteem, certain thoughts on the relations of our two countries.

I sincerely believe that no problems exist in the purely bilateral U.S.-Greek relationship. This relationship could be exemplary, considering the traditional friendship that unites our two peoples. However, it is directly and adversely affected by problems created by Turkey, which concern vital Greek interests. It is the attitude of the U.S. Government with regard to these particular problems which at times casts a shadow over the relations of our two countries. The Government of the U.S. is undoubtedly entitled to assess its proper interests and to determine its policies accordingly. Nobody, of course, can ask it to act against its interests, although in specific cases, the validity of its assessment could be questioned. The principle itself, however, cannot be challenged. According to the same principle the Greek Government

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 7, Greece: Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis, 2/77-10/79. No classification marking. John Tzounis, the new Greek Ambassador to the United States, delivered the letter when he presented his credentials to President Carter. Tzounis was appointed Ambassador on September 4.

also has the right to make its own assessments and to point out the effect that these policies may have on its own interests.

As I mentioned before, Mr. President, all the basic conditions are there for the relations of our two countries to be exemplary. If this is not so, it is because these relations are negatively influenced by Turkey. I accept that the U.S. is interested in and desires to maintain Greece's friendship as well as Turkey's. This, however, can only be achieved if one country is not assisted at the expense of the other, particularly when the assistance is given to the country which is in the wrong.

You are aware that Turkey threatens the security of Greece. She has occupied half of Cyprus. She claims half the Aegean, which is interspersed with Greek islands. She has annihilated the Greek minority of Istanbul.<sup>2</sup> And now she obstructs Greece's reintegration into NATO.

I do not think, Mr. President, that I ought to go into detail over these problems, particularly since I had the honour and the pleasure to discuss them with you when we met in Washington last year.<sup>3</sup> But I would like to make some remarks on the turn that events have taken since.

It is a fact that the arms embargo against Turkey was lifted on the grounds that the solution of the Cyprus problem would be thus facilitated. This expectation was not fulfilled. On the contrary, as I had foretold at that time, Turkey became more intransigent. And I think that Turkey's behaviour has put the U.S. Government and Congress in an embarrassing position.

It is equally true that the problems that Turkey created to the detriment of Greece in the Aegean remain unsolved. In spite of the moderation shown by the Greek Government in order to facilitate their solution, Turkey still clings to positions which are not only politically and legally but also logically unacceptable. If these positions prevailed, they would result in breaking the unity of the Greek State. Seen in this light, the danger to peace in this area of the world is obvious. And this danger is reinforced by the fact that Turkey's aggressiveness is encouraged, if unwillingly, by the material and political assistance that she is granted, despite your Government's declared intention to maintain the existing balance of forces between the two countries. Maintaining this balance is, on the other hand, the reason for which the Greek-U.S. De-

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<sup>2</sup> By "annihilation," Karamanlis was likely referring to ethnic and religious persecution, denial of property rights, and other methods designed to force emigration of ethnic Greeks from Turkey. According to a recent study by the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Greek population of Turkey declined throughout the 20th century, but it did not cite any state-sponsored, systematic program of killing or "ethnic cleansing" of Greeks in Turkey.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 175.

fense Cooperation Agreement has been linked with the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement.

But what is incomprehensible for every reasonable man, is the way the question of Greece's reintegration into NATO has evolved. All the members of the Alliance with your Government at their head, strive with all their means to save Turkey for NATO. But at the same time they allow her to weaken NATO by her aggressiveness against Greece and particularly by frustrating Greece's reintegration, which serves the interests of the Alliance as well as those of Turkey.

As you know, Greece withdrew from NATO's integrated military structure because one of its members invaded Cyprus. An invasion for which Turkey has been condemned by the international Organizations and by the U.S., who imposed an arms embargo against her. It is equally known that Greece had declared that she would return to the Alliance when justice was meted out to the Cypriot people. Although there was no progress on Cyprus, my Government proposed our reintegration into the Alliance in spite of the reactions of Greek public opinion. But contrary to its reasonable expectation that its proposals would be accepted without reservations, it is confronted with conditions put forward by Turkey, as the latter believes that she is offered the opportunity to influence through these conditions her other differences with Greece. Unfortunately, the Alliance, instead of disapproving Turkey's behaviour, encourages her by her tolerance and recommends negotiations on proposals which are politically unacceptable and militarily impracticable.

Mr. President, to leave this situation unsolved creates indeed difficult problems for all of us and may have adverse repercussions on the particular sector of our defense cooperation that presupposes Greek participation in NATO. You certainly understand that the impression which is being created that Greece accepts conditions for her reintegration instead of posing conditions herself, offends the dignity of my country as well as that of my Government, which must as a result justify its policy to Greek public opinion. The reactions of the latter narrow the margin within which my Government has to decide whether to withdraw or maintain its proposals for reintegration. I would wish that the Alliance find ways—as I believe it has—to eliminate this dilemma.

Mr. President, the ending of the tragedy of Cyprus, the settlement of the dangerous problems of the Aegean and the reinforcement of the Alliance through my country's reintegration, depend on Turkey, because it is Turkey who created and keeps these problems alive. Greece does not object to aid for Turkey, so as to enable her to stand on her feet again. She believes, however, that parallel to the aid given to Turkey, an effort must be undertaken to make her see reason. Otherwise aid



will prove ineffective and the situation in our region might worsen dangerously.

I regret, Mr President, that even recently a statement—in my opinion an unfortunate one—made by a spokesman of your Government on the subject of the contract between the Syros Shipyards and the Soviet Company “Sudoimport” has given rise to understandable reactions in Greece.<sup>4</sup> This statement creates the impression that the United States has doubts as to Greece’s attachment to the West. I cannot hide from you my surprise at that. Not only because Greece is a sovereign country aware both of her obligations as an ally and of her rights. But also because most recently she has proved through deeds where she chose to belong, first through her accession to the European Community and second through her request to reestablish her links with NATO.

Mr. President, in this letter I have tried to review the relations of our two countries. I am convinced that, the feeling of friendship which has united our two peoples without interruption for over two centuries and manifested itself at all the critical moments of the history of our two nations, is vividly preserved deep in their hearts. I believe that by a common effort it is possible to scatter the clouds which at times cast a shadow over our relations. I think that this should not prove difficult, as these problems are due not to a clash of mutual interests but to the unfortunate intervention of a third party.

With my high regard and best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

**Constantine Karamanlis**

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<sup>4</sup> Following a visit to the Soviet Union by Karamanlis in October, an unprecedented trip by a Greek Prime Minister, Greece and the Soviet Union signed an agreement that would allow Soviet ships to undergo repair at Greek ports. Greek officials subsequently defended this decision, stating that business dealings with the Soviet Union were part of a process of normalizing bilateral relations and that this put Greece in step with other Western European nations. Greek officials further stressed that the existence of Soviet ships in the region was of minor strategic significance. The spokesman Karamanlis referred to was likely Admiral Harold E. Shear, Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, who called the Greek-Soviet deal detrimental to Western security. (Paul Anastasi, “The Greeks Have a Word For It and It’s Independence,” *The New York Times*, November 4, 1979, p. E5)

**194. Memorandum From Robert D. Blackwill of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 1, 1979

SUBJECT

Greek Reintegration Into NATO (S)

As you asked, I have looked into the problem of Greek reintegration into NATO.<sup>2</sup> The facts are these:

—The Greeks want a return to pre-1974 NATO arrangements in the region and argue anything less would wound Karamanlis and endanger Greek democracy. About six months ago, Karamanlis froze relations with the U.S. with the objective of putting pressure on us to be more responsive to the Greek position.

—The Turks, who wish to become an Aegean power and possess a veto within the Alliance, want some affirmation that the status quo in the Aegean has changed.

—The U.S. as always is caught between the two. (S)

After the Turks rejected the original Haig-Davos Agreement which called for a return to the pre-1974 arrangements, Haig attempted to square this circle with a complicated proposal which would divide air defense control of the Aegean between Greece and NATO authorities. The Greeks would control the "columns" of air space above their Aegean islands and NATO the rest of the Aegean air-space. The Turks would apparently accept this. (S)

After about a year of discussion of the SACEUR proposal, Greek Foreign Minister Rallis told Vance last week in New York (telegram at Tab A) that the GOG could not agree because 1) Air Defense control would have to change so frequently in the Aegean from NATO to Greek to NATO to Greek, etc., that the system would prove unworkable; 2) A NATO commander could assign Air Defense responsibilities

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 16, Greece: 1978–1980. Secret. Sent for information. The upper right-hand corner of the page is stamped "ZB has seen" and bears Aaron's handwritten note: "ZB—Worth reading. DA." A copy was sent to Henze.

<sup>2</sup> Five days later, Carter posed a similar question. In an October 6 memorandum to Vance, Brzezinski reported that the President had read a summary of Vance's talks with Rallis in New York. (Ibid.) Brzezinski noted in the memorandum that Carter raised a question in response to the Vance-Rallis meeting: "How can we get out of the prime role? Why should we beg them?" Brzezinski closed the memorandum to Vance by noting that "the Department [of State] should respond to the President's questions." No response was found. Regarding Vance's meeting, see footnote 3 below.

in the Aegean to a Turkish aircraft; and 3) Greek public opinion would never accept the SACEUR arrangement.<sup>3</sup> (S)

Vance did not defend the SACEUR proposal which, in effect, killed it. (The Turks will be unhappy when they find this out.) He said efforts to find an acceptable solution should continue in military channels and, if no solution had been found by the time of the NATO Ministerial in December, the GOG might wish to raise this issue to the political level. Rallis agreed, but made clear his expectation that further exchanges in military channels would produce nothing. (S)

Meanwhile, Karamanlis has written a tough letter to the President (Advance copy at Tab B) which blames Turkey, the United States, and NATO for everything except cloudy days in Athens: "Unfortunately, the Alliance, instead of disapproving Turkey's behavior, encourages her by her tolerance and recommends negotiations on proposals which are politically unacceptable and militarily impractical."<sup>4</sup>

We now have basically two choices:

1. We can mark time through desultory exchanges in the military channel until December when the Greeks may put forward a political solution. Such a GOG proposal would inevitably be unacceptable to the Turks and probably to us. We would then be faced early next year with a disappointed and angry Greece energizing its supporters in the United States.

2. We can go back to the Greeks in the near future making the following points:

- We hope the GOG will make a good faith effort in the military channel (for the record since nothing will come of this).

- We would be interested in Greek *ideas* (not a formal proposal) about what a political initiative would look like. (S)

I argued strongly in a meeting at the State Department today that we should pursue the second option. In this way we would both be responsive to Karamanlis and company and have a chance at shaping the Greek political initiative *before* it is formalized. The odds are against finding a solution acceptable to both the Greeks and Turks, especially since the Turks will have a national election in October and probably produce another weak government, but this course would at least keep

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<sup>3</sup> Tab A is not attached. The Department transmitted the memorandum of conversation of Vance and Rallis' September 25 meeting in telegram 256289 to Athens, September 29. In the conversation, Rallis informed the Secretary that Greece had rejected the latest NATO proposal for Greek reintegration. Rallis reiterated that Karamanlis was committed to reintegration but that the current proposal on Aegean command and control was unacceptable for military reasons. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790445–0622)

<sup>4</sup> Tab B is not attached, but is printed as Document 193.

the process going and show the Greeks we care. After lots of give and take at the meeting, Option 2 will be recommended to Matt Nimetz with an internal deadline of two weeks in getting back to the GOG.<sup>5</sup> (S)

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<sup>5</sup> In telegram 9221 from Athens, October 12, the Embassy reported that Nimetz and Tzounis met on October 10 to discuss the terms of Greek reintegration into NATO. Ambassador McCloskey noted that the meeting yielded Greek ideas on reintegration—as called for in Blackwill's Option 2—but that the ideas put forward by Tzounis were vague and only potentially valuable for the Greeks insofar as they could deflect criticism by demonstrating that Greece made a counterproposal rather than stall negotiations further. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790468–0136)

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**195. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner  
to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs  
Brzezinski<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 6, 1979

SUBJECT

Greek Ambassador Tzounis' Views on Greek Tactics in Dealing with the U.S.  
Government (S)

1. Attached for your information is a report of Greek Ambassador Tzounis' ideas for a change in tactics in dealing with the U.S. Government. [1 line not declassified] who talked with him in mid-October 1979. [2 lines not declassified] (S)

2. I am forwarding copies of this report to Secretary Brown, Secretary Vance, and Ambassador McCloskey in Athens. (U)

**Stansfield Turner<sup>2</sup>**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Horn/Special, Box 4, 11/79. Secret; Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals; Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants; Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator.

<sup>2</sup> Turner signed "Stan" above this typed signature.

**Attachment****Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>3</sup>**

FIRDB-312/02688-79

Washington, undated

**SUBJECT**

Greek Ambassador Tzounis' Views on Greek Tactics in Dealing with the U.S. Government (S)

1. After almost four months in Washington, Greek Ambassador to the United States Ioannis Tzounis has decided that the Government of Greece should reappraise its manner of handling foreign policy disputes with the United States Government. Tzounis is convinced that the Greek Government has placed too much faith in good relations with the American Congress while allowing relations to deteriorate with the Executive Branch, and particularly the State Department and the White House. Tzounis believes the Greek Government, in what he terms as a serious misjudgment of the American political scene, does not realize how unpopular it has become with senior American foreign policy makers. (S)

2. Tzounis was first made aware of his country's problems with the U.S. Government when he delivered a letter from Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis to President Carter at the time that Tzounis presented his credentials.<sup>4</sup> The letter was an attempt on the part of Karamanlis to reiterate to President Carter Greek problems as they relate to Turkey, military reintegration into NATO, and Greek internal affairs.

3. Not only has the Karamanlis letter not been answered by the U.S. Government, but Tzounis has been informed by "close friends in the White House" that the letter was very badly received and created great anger on the part of some senior American officials. In addition Tzounis has been informed, by people he considers to be close friends of Greece throughout the American Government, that Greece's previous policy of confrontation with the Executive Branch, in both the preceding and present administrations, has only created extremely deep anti-Greek attitudes on the part of many senior American officials. In addition, Tzounis has decided that the previous Greek policy of working exclusively with the so-called "Greek Lobby" in Congress has failed, as evidenced in the final outcome of the Turkish embargo issue, and that it was portrayed to Athens as a foreign policy weapon with far more power than it truly has. (S)

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<sup>3</sup> Secret.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 193.

4. In outlining his thoughts for a new foreign policy approach to the American Government, Tzounis strongly criticized the Greek Government for seeking "confrontation" with consecutive American administrations. He felt that Greek policy in the future should be one of verbal cooperation with the American administration. He would like to present the Greek position fairly and without emotion to senior administration officials, while at the same time adopting the posture that "we are on the same side." Tzounis particularly felt that Greece must recognize the importance of Turkey to the American administration and make peace with the issue. He said that the Greek Government should indicate its interest in assisting the Americans on the Turkish problem while proclaiming the importance of Turkey to the West. He felt that a self-proclaimed friendly Greece offering their closest ally, the United States, support in the Eastern Mediterranean would be received with open arms in Washington. Tzounis stated that such a change in policy approach in Washington would eventually be most welcome to the friends of Greece in Congress who are disturbed by what they perceive as an almost anti-American attitude on the part of the Karamanlis Government. (S)

5. Tzounis hopes to present his thoughts in the form of a personal recommendation to Foreign Minister Rallis sometime before the end of the year. At that time he would hope to meet with Prime Minister Karamanlis to discuss these proposals. In the meantime Tzounis has begun a systematic series of briefings of senior American officials, including officials at various levels in the U.S. Defense Department. He hopes by doing these briefings he will be able to take much of the emotion out of Greek-U.S. relations. Tzounis recognizes, however, that if his suggestions are not accepted in Athens, possibly for internal Greek political reasons, he will have little further influence there. (S)

**196. Telegram From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Brussels, December 14, 1979, 1707Z

8749. Subj: (C) Secretary's Meeting With Greek Foreign Minister Rallis.

1. (C-entire text)

Summary: Greek reintegration was the first issue discussed, and it was agreed that the effort of SACEUR Rogers should continue though Rallis mentioned that the Greeks could not wait for a favorable answer indefinitely.<sup>2</sup> Rallis also made a special point of raising Cyprus and urging the United States to convince Secretary General Waldheim to take an immediate initiative to get the intercommunal talks resumed. The atmosphere of this meeting was entirely cordial, with the Greek side generally attempting to suggest a willingness to be helpful in the search for solutions to these regional problems. End summary.

2. Greek reintegration: Vance informed Rallis that General Rogers had expressed some sense of optimism to him in the morning. Rogers feels that his discussions should continue, that the process is alive, and that progress can be made. Rallis noted that he, too, had had a brief meeting with Rogers and found him rather optimistic. Rallis had informed Rogers that the Greeks would prefer not to push for a solution that might be unacceptable to the parties; that it was better to wait and elaborate a solution acceptable to the two countries concerned. Rallis also wished to stress, however, that the Greek possibilities for waiting are not limitless. This limit is not one that can be accurately predicted or controlled by the Greek Government. He mentioned that opposition interest in this issue had subsided somewhat, but they still ask the government why it hesitates and waits for a better response from the Alliance that never seems to come. He mentioned that the opposition raised this issue two or three times in the last month. If the Greek Government is forced to wait too long, Rallis said it would be obliged to conclude that there is no answer and return to the situation of late 1974–1975 which would not be good for either Greece or the Alliance.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, unlabeled folder. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Athens, USUN, and Nicosia; Priority to Ankara; and to USNMR SHAPE, London, Bonn, Paris, and Rome. Vance and Rallis were attending the NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels.

<sup>2</sup> General Bernard W. Rogers succeeded Haig as Supreme Allied Commander Europe in July 1979.

3. In this regard, Rallis mentioned that no major events in Greek political life were expected until April of next year. He added that he hoped at that time Karamanlis would decide to move up to the Presidency from which he could be a guiding force in Greek political life for five more years; but such a decision was up to Karamanlis, and was not known to others.

4. Rallis then described his meeting with Rogers. He told Rogers that the Greeks will wait and hope. He said that Rogers talked about eventual concessions from both sides. Rallis responded that the possibilities for further Greek concessions were very limited. He explained that the Greek Government had always hoped that its reintegration into NATO would be applauded by the public and that Greek membership in NATO would not be something that the public or major sections of the public would oppose. Rallis then asked if the Secretary had anything further to say about reintegration. The Secretary said he had no further ideas at this point. Since Rogers was optimistic enough to want to continue on the military course a bit further, that is the course the Secretary would recommend. Rallis agreed.

5. Cyprus: Rallis mentioned that Cypriot President Kyprianou had been in Athens last Monday. Karamanlis had told him that if Waldheim comes up with suggestions for making progress before the new special Cyprus committee would supposedly begin work in March, Kyprianou should accept.<sup>3</sup> Karamanlis made clear to him that Waldheim is the only possible channel to a solution, that all other ways of seeking a solution are disagreeable to others, including Greece. The Greeks believe that Kyprianou was perhaps persuaded that a resumed dialogue is needed at the beginning of the year.

6. Rallis then told of that morning's encounter with Lord Carrington who had asked him which of the two sides was more eager to enter into negotiations. Rallis told him that clearly the Greek side, since it had 48 percent of its territory occupied, and the continuation of this unacceptable situation must eventually lead to a *de facto* partition. He also told Carrington that negotiations cannot start on the basis of the suggestions recently put forward by the Turkish Cypriots, but if Waldheim has new suggestions for starting the dialogue, the Greek Government will try to persuade the Greek Cypriots. Secretary Vance then asked whether the Greek Government believes President Kyprianou is ready to talk. Rallis said it was hard to answer such a question with a simple yes or no. He could assure the Secretary, however, that all of the non-Communist politicians in Cyprus desire negotiations and will try to reassure Kyprianou that there is no political danger for him

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<sup>3</sup> See Documents 73 and 74.



from the left if he accedes to logical suggestions. Once the talks start, the Greek Government would encourage Kyprianou. Rallis doubted that Waldheim was very willing to get engaged in the Cyprus problem again. The Greeks believe, however, that he should try and that this is exactly the moment when progress can begin.

7. Secretary Vance then asked Counselor Nimetz to describe recent American contacts with the UN. Nimetz said he expected to be in New York on Tuesday, December 18, and that he has recently touched base with the UN staff which is looking for a way to do something, but had not quite come up with a formulation. Nimetz recounted that the Turkish Cypriots had accepted the final UN language for resuming the talks, but that the Greek Cypriots had said they would only agree to their resumption on the basis of the May 19 Agreement.<sup>4</sup> Nimetz stated his belief that the Secretary General should be able to come up with a linguistic formulation that would provide a basis for resuming the talks. Secretary Vance noted that the problem is not one of just getting the two sides to the table, but one of having them actually talk.

8. To this, Rallis urged the US and the UK to tell Waldheim quite directly that he must not stop the progress at the first encounter of difficulty. He should not be asked to totally risk his prestige, but he has been so careful at times that he misses the bus at every turn. Secretary Vance sought assurances that Kyprianou had said he would come back and seriously talk. The Secretary noted in his last conversation with Kyprianou, the Cypriot President had said that he believed that he would only return to negotiations if there was a change in the format.<sup>5</sup> Vance concluded that if the Greeks were convinced, it was worth the effort the US would try.

9. Rallis said the Greek Government had convinced Kyprianou that the committee idea would not help.<sup>6</sup> (Rallis had earlier told Nimetz informally that Greece did not like the idea since it would permit other countries to meddle in the region.) On the other hand, if nothing occurs until March, Kyprianou will be stuck and will not be able to resist pressures to seek active members on the committee and get it started. Vance said the United States would make an effort with the UN to get new language, to get the talks started, and to have them keep at it.

10. There followed a discussion of whether in contacts with the UN, the United States could mention this interest of the Greek Government. Rallis said that the United States could say that the Greek Government had been in touch with Kyprianou and believes that the time is

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 67.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 73.

<sup>6</sup> See footnote 2, Document 73.

ripe for a major effort to get the negotiations going. Rallis also suggested that the United States make clear to Cypriot Foreign Minister Rolandis that this effort is being made. In this regard, there need be no secrets about the fact that the Greek Government has asked the United States to make this effort. Rallis characterized Rolandis as a very logical person who finds it difficult at times when trapped at the center of this intense political drama. But they are convinced that Rolandis wants a solution totally and should be helped.

11. Greek-Turkish relations: Rallis noted that he would be meeting on Friday with his Turkish counterpart.<sup>7</sup> It would be their first meeting. He would ask his Secretary General, Mr. Theodoropoulos, to follow up by meeting with his counterpart the next month. Rallis will try to create a good atmosphere for that meeting. He said that if the Turks propose something logical, Greece will accept. He doubted that this will happen because he feels the new Turkish Government, like its predecessors, lacks the strength to make difficult decisions.

12. Secretary Vance summarized by saying that on Cyprus, the United States will talk to Waldheim and will keep in touch on this through Ambassadors. Vance also mentioned that the United States appreciated the effort involved in the letter from President Karamanlis which Ambassador Tzounis had delivered.<sup>8</sup> The letter is being considered carefully. The two sides should stay in touch on such issues. Rallis then mentioned that Mr. Theodoropoulos wanted to make sure that the US understood that where Greek reintegration is concerned, there is a limit to how long the Greek side can wait. It is not a question of a definite limit like January 15 or February 15, rather it is a limit that is not within the control of the Greek Government. The US side said that it had understood this point.

13. The meeting concluded with general expressions of sympathy and concern involving the situation in Iran.

#### 14. Participants:

Greece

Foreign Minister Georges Rallis

Amb. Athanssiou (PermRep)

Amb. Theodoropoulos, MFA, SecGen

Amb. Tsamados, MFA, Head of NATO Affairs

Constantin Yerocostopoulos, Greek Mission

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<sup>7</sup> December 21.

<sup>8</sup> See Document 193.

US  
Secretary Vance  
Ambassador Bennett  
Mr. Nimetz  
Mr. Vest  
Mr. Blackwill  
Mr. Hopper

**Bennett**

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**197. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to  
President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 25, 1980

**EVENING READING**

**SUBJECT**

Message from Karamanlis

Greek Ambassador Tzounis called on me this morning with a personal message from Prime Minister Karamanlis regarding Greek reintegration into NATO and re-negotiation of a defense agreement. Karamanlis warned that March Presidential elections might result in unforeseen changes and instability. Very confidentially, he wanted you to know that he will seek to move up to the Presidency (requiring a more than majority vote in Parliament); if unsuccessful, he will retire from politics. He is convinced that if Greece does not reintegrate before these elections, NATO re-entry afterwards would be problematical, if not impossible. The Prime Minister stressed the importance that Greece attached to the maintenance of her military balance with Turkey. With the initialing of the US-Turkish agreement, Karamanlis wants to commence negotiations of the new Greek-US agreement promptly.<sup>2</sup> To ensure the negotiations would be successful, he asked us to reaffirm that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Counselor Nimetz, 1977–1980, Lot 81D85, Box 2, Evening Reading. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Dillery; typed in the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.

<sup>2</sup> The U.S.-Turkish agreement was initialed on January 10.

proportionality would be observed in granting security assistance to Greece and Turkey in the future. The Greek Ambassador added that proportionality would be observed on both the *amount* (7:10) and the *terms*. We have in fact always sought to maintain this ratio, e.g., the FY 81 ratio of \$180 (Greece):\$250 (Turkey).

We are informing Bernie Rogers tomorrow of the Greek initiative and will coordinate our strategy in dealing with these two issues. At Greek request, we are keeping Karamanlis' personal plans on a very confidential basis.

Also on Greece, Matt Nimetz briefed John Brademas and Paul Sarbanes on the Turkish defense agreement.<sup>3</sup> Matt also confirmed our planned aid requests for Greece and Turkey. Brademas and Sarbanes had no problems with the Turkish agreement, but they did feel it was imperative to achieve Greek reintegration into NATO before their Presidential elections. They also recommend that you increase your FY 81 \$180 million FMS request for Greece by \$20 million so that the Administration requests for Greece and Turkey would be the same as the FY 80 authorization. (They suggested adding a Greek \$20 million request to the Pakistan supplemental.) Brademas felt we should use the current crisis situation to press the Turks to be more forthcoming on Cyprus. Matt told them we would be talking to Bernie Rogers in the very near future on Greek reintegration to try to move ahead quickly on that, and that we will resume negotiations on the Greek defense agreement.

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<sup>3</sup> No record of this meeting was found.

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## **198. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

PA M 80-10127

Washington, March 17, 1980

### **GREEK REINTEGRATION INTO NATO: STATUS AND PROSPECTS**

*There has been little progress in the two-year effort to secure full Greek reintegration into NATO. Athens last month rejected General Rogers' pro-*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 85T00287R, Box 1, PA M Projects (1980) 3. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A note at the bottom of the page reads in part: "This memorandum, requested by the National Security Council, was prepared by [name not declassified] of the Western Europe Division of the Office of Political Analysis and [name not declassified] of the Theater Forces Division of the Office of Strategic Research. The paper was coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe. Research was completed on 17 March 1980."

posals for reapportioning Alliance responsibilities between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean. The Turks, who will state their formal position next week, also seem unhappy with the proposals.<sup>2</sup> *The growing political involvement of the Turkish military and Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis' desire to settle the reentry issue before stepping up to the Presidency, as well as the increased potential for Soviet meddling in the region, may have somewhat improved the chances for movement on the Greek reintegration issue. But the Greek-Turkish rivalry runs so deep that it is still questionable that the Alliance can square the Greek-Turkish circle. [handling restriction not declassified]*

### *The Dispute So Far*

The negotiations have been unsuccessful because military responsibilities for the southeastern flank cannot be separated from the broader differences that underlie Greek-Turkish rivalry. The issue of NATO air and naval responsibility for the Aegean inevitably engages the more fundamental problem of sovereignty in the Aegean. *[handling restriction not declassified]*

Prime Minister Karamanlis has sought Greek reintegration into NATO as the capstone of his efforts to anchor Greece firmly to the West. His moderately conservative government only reluctantly left NATO in August 1974, in response to political pressures arising from the Alliance's perceived unwillingness to prevent Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. Karamanlis and his colleagues nonetheless realize that NATO is the only viable guarantor of their country's security, and they are anxious to return so long as the terms of reentry are politically feasible and do not compromise Greece's position in bilateral disputes with Turkey over Aegean rights. *[handling restriction not declassified]*

Athens wants to rejoin NATO on terms that essentially restore the pre-1974 status quo which gave Greece primary responsibility for the Aegean. The Greeks have consistently reiterated that the original formula worked out between General Haig and former Greek chief of staff Davos in May 1978 and approved at the military level by all allies save Turkey is the only acceptable formula for reintegration. The Haig-Davos formula would establish Greek air and ground commands similar to those the Turks now have in Izmir, reactivate a Greek-led NATO naval command, and permit Greek air responsibility over the Aegean on an interim basis pending resolution of Greek-Turkish bilateral differences. *[handling restriction not declassified]*

Turkish governments have not objected to Greek reintegration, but they have insisted that Greece must first agree to a new division of Alliance responsibilities in the absence of a comprehensive bilateral agree-

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<sup>2</sup> An unknown hand struck out the portion of the sentence that reads: "who will state their formal position next week."

ment on mutual rights in the Aegean. The Turks have been determined to roll back what they view as earlier Greek encroachments that have threatened to transform the Aegean into a Greek lake. This determination has been fueled by the prevalence of weak governments whose responsiveness to nationalistic sentiments makes compromise difficult. The result is that Ankara rejected the initial Haig-Davos formula and remained reserved about subsequent refinements which General Haig introduced with the aim of assuaging Turkish fears that Greek dominance of the Sea would be ratified. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

#### *The Rogers Proposal*

Last fall, General Rogers informally presented to the Greeks proposals that differed little from the amended formula General Haig had come up with. Concerning command and control of NATO surface and subsurface units in the Aegean, General Rogers suggested the adoption of a task force arrangement whereby the task force commander, not the Greek or Turkish national commanders, would control the units. In regard to control of Aegean airspace, General Rogers proposed the establishment of a NATO air defense headquarters in Larissa, Greece commanded by an officer of neither Turkish nor Greek nationality. This headquarters would control the international airspace over the Aegean, thus restricting Greek control to the airspace over its territory and territorial waters. An associated proposal envisaged an automatic exchange of flight information between the Greeks and the Turks in a corridor that roughly flanked the Athens-Istanbul FIR boundary.<sup>3</sup> [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Athens rejected the Rogers plan as unworkable, noting that it also left open the possibility that the new headquarters could assign Turkish aircraft to defend Greek airspace—a serious threat to national sovereignty, security, and pride in Greek eyes. The Turks probably also expressed reservations. After further consultations with Greek and Turkish military officials, General Rogers last month unveiled a slightly revised version of his November formula, but this was also rejected publicly by the Greeks. The Turks are scheduled to give their reply soon but they too seem to have problems with it, particularly over air defense.<sup>4</sup> [*handling restriction not declassified*]

#### *Hopeful Signs?*

Meanwhile, there has been an unexpected development in the bilateral dispute between Greece and Turkey. On 22 February, the Turks

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<sup>3</sup> An unknown hand wrote at the end of the paragraph: "DIA IA Greek: NATO Reentry 16 Nov. 1979." The DIA paper was not found.

<sup>4</sup> An unknown hand wrote "Same" after this paragraph. Rogers' proposal is outlined in Document 198.

suddenly announced that they were rescinding NOTAM 714 and thus giving up their five-year old demand that civilian air traffic entering the eastern half of the Aegean report to Turkish air control authorities. Athens quickly responded by lifting NOTAM 1157 which had declared the Aegean air corridors danger areas. Civilian air traffic has now been resumed over the Aegean.<sup>5</sup> [*handling restriction not declassified*]

There are indications that the Turkish General Staff was directly responsible for the lifting of the Turkish NOTAM, and that it is tiring of civilian politicking at a time when Turkey is faced with serious economic and internal security problems and is in desperate need of foreign economic and military assistance. The military's active involvement in prodding the minority Demirel government could produce other dividends in the foreign policy area. Foreign Minister Erkmen has suggested that the lifting of NOTAM 714 signals a new Turkish willingness to negotiate Aegean issues in a piecemeal—and therefore more manageable—fashion. There is thus at least an outside chance that conciliation could spill over into the Greek reentry issue and produce some movement on the part of the Turks. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Greek policymakers, however, remain suspicious of Turkish motives. They suspect that Ankara may have rescinded NOTAM 714 simply to give the appearance of conciliation before it became known publicly that the reentry negotiations had faltered once again. These same policymakers also suspect that no further Turkish accommodation will be forthcoming. They point to another statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister in which he reiterates that his government still could not accept Greece's return to NATO under pre-1974 arrangements. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

The next several weeks will contain crucial tests of Greek and Turkish willingness to compromise. During that time, Karamanlis will have to decide whether he will step up to the presidency or remain as prime minister. If he decides to run for the presidency, he will have to make concessions on reentry beforehand since he will not have the authority to do so as president. And his successor, whether Defense Minister Averoff or someone else, may not have adequate support to follow through on the reentry bid. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Turkish leaders, both civilian and military, are surely aware of this and their actions in the coming weeks will show whether they are now inclined to facilitate—or at least not to block—Greek reentry. Should the necessary flexibility be lacking in Athens and in Ankara and should

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 7, Document 163.

Karamanlis become president, the Greek reentry bid could be derailed indefinitely. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

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**199. Discussion Paper Prepared for a Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

DISCUSSION PAPER—PRC MEETING ON GREEK  
REINTEGRATION

I. SUMMARY

On February 22, Greece announced its rejection of the latest SACEUR proposal for reintegration and stated it continues to believe the original 1978 Haig/Davos arrangements offer the solution to reintegration and that Greece is ready to accept that solution.<sup>2</sup> Turkey in the fall of 1978 formally rejected the Haig/Davos arrangements and is due to respond to the latest SACEUR proposal by late March. Although the ultimate degree of flexibility in the Greek and Turkish positions is not known, SACEUR may soon submit a report completing his efforts without having bridged the gap.

The basic problem, in addition to the traditional distrust between the two nations, is that reintegration is a surrogate for maritime/continental shelf boundary disputes in the Aegean with each side skillfully and tenaciously holding to positions which will support or not prejudice its civil case.

The Greek announcement reflects Karamanlis' concern that the reintegration issue could be used against him or his party in the presidential election to be held no later than 20 May. He had told us earlier that the imminence of the election required the issue to be resolved by the end of March. Since the Greek Government did not see the SACEUR efforts developing what were considered to be politically acceptable arrangements, Karamanlis preemptively rejected them and re-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Box 50, Foreign Countries—Greece, 1980. Secret; Exdis. In a March 18 covering memorandum to Mondale, Vance, Brown, Jones, and Turner, Christine Dodson noted that the PRC meeting was scheduled for March 19 at 3 p.m. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> The Embassy reported this information in telegram 1693 from Athens, February 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800093-0227)



verted to Haig/Davos, a position he could politically defend. Having taken this position, he probably will not need formally to withdraw Greece's reintegration request, although this possibility cannot be excluded. Foreign Minister Rallis told Ambassador McCloskey the Greeks might raise the issue at the political level during the June 25–26 NATO Ministerial, implying they will not withdraw the request prior to the Ministerial.

At a maximum, we should build on the SACEUR effort to achieve reintegration or develop some basis for improved Greek relations with the NATO military wing. We must avoid any withdrawal of Greece's application for reintegration or a serious estrangement between Greece and NATO over reintegration. In Greece, any estrangement would be blamed on the US, thereby damaging our bilateral relations and possibly endangering our military basing rights. In the US, some political elements would blame it on Turkey and the Administration's failure to overcome a "Turkish veto," and create difficulties for our efforts to provide adequate assistance. At a minimum, we need a continuation of Greece's present level of participation in the Alliance, and maintenance of US-Greek relations that allow continued operation of US facilities in Greece.

There are a number of strategies to achieve this. A basic choice lies between using NATO processes or direct US mediation. Some strategies involve greater participation by other NATO allies in established NATO bodies, or specially established sub-groups thereof, to continue the reintegration dialogue; the Greeks and Turks would participate either as members of the groups or negotiate face-to-face with them. Others involve intermediaries such as SACEUR, wisemen, or the US. The strategy selected would be dependent on the final outcome of SACEUR's current efforts. Section VI of this paper examines these strategies.

What we must do now to preclude a precipitous Greek action on the completion of SACEUR's efforts is to tell the Greeks, without in any way promising a more favorable outcome, that due to the importance of the issue, we are actively exploring with Secretary General Luns and key allies means to continue the reintegration dialogue following the completion of SACEUR's efforts.

## II. BACKGROUND

Prime Minister Karamanlis withdrew the Greek armed forces from the NATO military command structure in August 1974, because the Alliance had not prevented the Turkish intervention on Cyprus which almost led to war between Greece and Turkey. Karamanlis informed the Alliance of his decision in a letter dated August 28, 1974, the operative paragraphs of which are:

"If the Alliance was not in a position to prevent armed conflict between two of its members, would it be able to come to their succour in the event of a danger from outside? My government have, therefore, decided that they must assume themselves the protection of the independence of Greece and place again the Greek land, sea and air forces heretofore assigned to the integrated allied military organization under national command.

"... as a consequence of this decision Greece shall recover forthwith over her entire territory, airspace and territorial waters full exercise of sovereignty which was heretofore limited on account of her participation in NATO and as a result of the permanent presence on Greek soil of foreign military installations and facilities, or of the regular use of Greek airspace and territorial waters by foreign military aircraft and naval vessels."<sup>3</sup>

Greece then withdrew its armed forces from commitment to NATO and representatives from the NATO Defense Planning Committee, the Defense Review Committee, and the Executive Working Group. Greece retained representation in the NATO Military Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group. Greece pulled out of the joint US/Greek/Turkish land and air command at Izmir, but continued some degree of participation in NATO higher military headquarters; the Commander of the Greek Navy continued to wear a NATO hat as Commander, Mediterranean East Area. Greece also continued to participate in other Alliance activities such as certain exercises.

(On October 21, 1976, the Greeks quietly earmarked most of their nuclear capable forces for assignment to NATO, indicating they would come under NATO control after reinforced alert and would remain under national command in peacetime.)

In August 1975, Greece indicated an interest in reintegrating and subsequently in September and October set forth its position on reintegration. This was done, despite the fact that the Cyprus dispute remained unresolved, as part of Karamanlis' policy of binding Greece to the West through NATO and EC membership. Pressure from the Greek military to return, and the pervasive Greek fear of Turkey which closer NATO membership would help alleviate were probably also factors in the Greek decision.

Turkey objected to the Greek position in the NATO DPC because it appeared to limit Greece's contribution to NATO to the defense of Greece only and not to the entire Alliance. To clarify the issue, the DPC in November 1975 agreed on "Political Guidelines for Negotiations

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<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, Document 23.

with the Greek Government” which provided for an ad hoc “Open-ended Group” (OEG) on reintegration.<sup>4</sup> The guidelines noted that the Greek PermRep would not be a member of the OEG but could be invited to meet with the group to exchange views. The OEG was established and, after an exchange with Greece, in February 1978 agreed that SACEUR should conduct military/technical explorations with the Greeks. He was to report back to the Military Committee which would forward the report and an MC analysis to the DPC/OEG and the Secretary General as part of the development of the NATO position for use in formally negotiating reintegration with the Greeks. Other non-military/technical issues were to be addressed by other NATO bodies.

General Haig as SACEUR undertook this assignment and on June 19, 1978, reported to the Military Committee that the responses to the military questions he had received from the Greek Armed Forces Chief, General Davos, provided a workable framework for the return of Greece to the integrated military structure. The Greeks, to the chagrin of SACEUR, labelled these as the Haig/Davos Arrangements, a key element of which was the utilization, on an interim basis, of the pre-1974 air and naval command boundaries in the Aegean. These boundaries gave Greece control of the Aegean up to a line equidistant between the Eastern Aegean Greek islands and the Turkish mainland, which essentially coincides with the Greek position in the bilateral disputes between the two countries.

The rest of the Military Committee was prepared to accept these arrangements but Turkey objected, denying the validity of the pre-1974 boundaries even on an interim basis. Under the NATO consensus procedure this was sufficient to block approval of Haig/Davos. The Turks argued that when the command boundaries were developed in the 1950's, the Turkish navy had been small, Greece was an effective ally of Turkey, and there had been no significant Soviet threat identified in the Aegean. They also contended that there were problems with the pre-1974 arrangements on procedural grounds, since the boundaries, had not been endorsed at the political level in NATO and the air defense boundaries in the Aegean had been established in 1964 without seeking Turkish approval. Behind these technical reasons were Turkish concerns that the pre-1974 boundaries did not provide adequate protection for Turkey from attack over the Aegean, including from Greece, and, more importantly, the belief that the NATO boundaries might in some way be used as a precedent for denying Turkish civil boundary claims in the Aegean. The Turks also realized that, were Greece to be reintegrated using the pre-1974 boundaries even on an interim basis,

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<sup>4</sup> Not found.

the Greeks would be in a position to use the consensus procedure to block any changes.

[Omitted here is the body of the discussion paper.]

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## **200. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Policy Review Committee Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 20, 1980, 3:10–3:40 p.m.

### **SUBJECT**

Greek Reintegration into NATO

### **PARTICIPANTS**

#### *State*

Matthew Nimetz (Chairman), Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science  
and Technology

George Vest, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Edward Dillery, Director, Office of Southern European Affairs

#### *OSD*

David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs

James Siena, Deputy Assistant Secretary for ISA–NATO Affairs

#### *JCS*

Lt. General John Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman

#### *DCI*

Joe Zaring, NIO for Western Europe

#### *White House*

David Aaron

#### *NSC*

Robert D. Blackwill

Paul Henze

It was agreed at the meeting that the current Rogers effort would fail, that neither side was looking for a sensible solution and that we should try to keep the negotiating process going. The Greeks had apparently decided not to move on the problem before their Presidential election; however, there was no indication of any immediate risk that Greece would withdraw its reintegration application and no sign the Greeks were looking for a showdown. All participants were against a

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 16, Greece: 1978–1980. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

direct U.S. mediating initiative at this time because the chances of success were so slight and agreement was reached that we should instead use NATO political channels to keep the issue alive. We will propose that a small number of countries (U.S., UK, FRG) work with Greece and Turkey under the umbrella of the already-established NATO open-ended group (OEG) on reintegration. We will so inform General Rogers and Secretary General Luns and then consult with the Allies who might participate. We will also inform the Greeks that we are considering what can be done and urge that they leave the door open for further negotiations. (S)

State will draft a long-term strategy paper with a step-by-step scenario on how we should prepare the ground both domestically and with the Greeks and Turks for the time when we launch a major effort to solve the problem.<sup>2</sup> (S)

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 201.

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## **201. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

### **SUBJECT**

Greek Reintegration into NATO—Possible Next Steps

### **INTRODUCTION**

A March 20 Policy Review Committee meeting chaired by Under Secretary Nimetz decided that a major U.S. initiative on reintegration was not indicated as it would not best serve our long-term objective of a full Greek return to the NATO military structure.<sup>2</sup> A dramatic U.S. ini-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 5, 5/80. Bremer forwarded the paper to Brzezinski on May 1. (Ibid.) In a separate covering memorandum to Dodson dated May 9, Henze noted that the paper was "overtaken by events," a reference to Karamanlis' election to the Presidency of Greece. Henze asserted that "the basic strategy outlined in this paper remains sound, but there is no point burdening ZB with it at this stage." Henze also reported that he asked the Department of State to prepare a "new paper on this subject in the next week or so. We can then decide whether that needs to go to ZB." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> See Document 200.

tiative could threaten continuation of the present level of Greek cooperation with the Alliance, thereby endangering US-Greek relations and the operation of U.S. military facilities in Greece. The PRC did decide to consult with General Rogers to emphasize the U.S. view that the issue should remain in the SACEUR channel as long as General Rogers thinks he has a possibility of success. Should he not succeed, the U.S. would propose that consideration of the issue be moved to a small sub-group (US, UK, FRG) of the NATO Open-Ended Group (OEG). The Turks and the Greeks would be urged to participate.

#### *CURRENT SITUATION*

The Greeks appeared to want to force an end to the SACEUR effort by the end of March. They let that deadline slip, possibly because it became evident this tactic would not result in reintegration on their terms. General Rogers has indicated informally to us since the March 20 PRC meeting that the Turkish responses to his latest proposals may meet some Greek concerns. In order to ascertain whether that is the case, he plans to meet again with the Turkish Chief of Staff, General Evren, for further discussions and, depending on their outcome, will consider a further approach to the Greeks.

No timetable has been set for these contacts.<sup>3</sup> The Greeks, engrossed with a presidential election, have not been pressing on reintegration. The Greek constitution stipulates that a new President must be elected by the Parliament within three ballots or Parliament is dissolved and general elections held. Karamanlis, the only candidate for President, is very likely to be elected on the third ballot on May 5, when the votes required for election decrease from 200 to 180. If elected, he will probably continue as Prime Minister until June 20, when he would move to the Presidency. The Greeks may argue that the new Prime Minister, yet to be named, will not have the political strength to make concessions on reintegration. It is, however, also possible that since Karamanlis will clearly remain the dominant figure in Greek politics, he may decide to use his great influence to move forward on this and other issues while his party retains the Prime Ministership.

If Karamanlis is not elected President and early general elections are required, the situation could become more unstable and at a minimum delay further efforts to address the reintegration issue. The anti-NATO party of Papandreou, PASOK, would probably increase its strength in the Parliament, thereby making resolution more difficult.

In this electoral period, the GOG is not seeking to engage in further reintegration efforts. Any initiatives by the Alliance to pursue a solution could be misconstrued and hurt Karamanlis politically. General

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<sup>3</sup> The first meeting between Rogers and Evren took place on July 21 in Ankara.

Rogers is aware of this and is waiting to proceed until the Greek political situation is clarified. It is important in the meantime that we not imply to either the Greeks or the Turks that we have given up on the ongoing SACEUR effort.

#### *POSSIBLE OEG SUB-GROUP INITIATIVE*

The British approached us on April 4 with a range of preliminary ideas for next steps on reintegration should SACEUR not succeed. (They also talked to the Germans.) We told them of our continuing strong support for SACEUR's efforts, and our belief they could still succeed. We indicated a preference for the OEG sub-group as a fall-back approach and urged that nothing be done now which would undercut SACEUR. The British have apparently backed off and we sense from working-level contacts that the FCO now shares our general assessment of the situation.

If it should become necessary to implement the OEG sub-group strategy, we would need to get the British and Germans, as well as SYG Luns who is aware of our idea, in agreement before approaching the full OEG, the Greeks and the Turks. General Rogers has indicated he would proceed so as to leave an opening for the OEG sub-group idea if follow-on efforts to his own are needed.

We could expect the Germans, the British and Luns to agree to such a procedural approach, and the rest of the OEG would probably go along. The Turks probably would also agree, but the Greeks might balk at participating since this could be construed as negotiating reintegration with the Turks. Properly presented, however, we believe they would accept an invitation to participate.

The OEG sub-group would directly engage the USG in this issue. It would probably lead to greater pressure from the GOG and from interest groups in the United States to promote a settlement on Greek terms. It would be important, therefore, should the sub-group process get underway that the GOG be clearly informed, either by us or preferably by another member of the sub-group, that this process would work only if the GOG drops its rigid insistence on Haig-Davos and adopts a willingness to explore other alternatives.

#### *LONG-TERM PROSPECTS*

If the OEG sub-group process were implemented but did not produce definitive results, we would at some point need to consider—in conjunction with the Greeks and other Allies—either further steps or perhaps a hiatus in the effort. Our goal would be to ensure that a relationship continues between Greece and the Alliance, even in the absence of full “reintegration”, with which Greece is comfortable and which preserves our military facilities in Greece. The Greeks may conclude that ending the sub-group process would be necessary before the

Greek parliamentary elections which must be held by November 1981. In any event, together with other Allies, we will want to continue to work with the Greeks to reduce the possibility that the Greek-NATO relationship and U.S. facilities would become major campaign issues in the elections.

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**202. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European Affairs,  
Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

THE NEW GREEK GOVERNMENT:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS

*SUMMARY*

The elevation of Constantine Karamanlis to the Presidency and the assumption by George Rallis of the Prime Ministership means that Greece will continue to have a leadership with a will to pursue the strong pro-Western policies of Karamanlis, but raises the question whether it will have the ability to take initiatives on issues such as the reintegration of Greek forces into NATO's military structure. The answer to this lies in how much unity the New Democracy party can maintain under Rallis. There are divisions in the party as evidenced by Rallis' narrow victory (88-84) over Defense Minister Averof in the election for party leader. Aware of this, Rallis will initially be very wary of any actions which could create strains in the party. In his efforts, he will be influenced by Karamanlis in the Presidency. He may be inhibited in formulating policy until the relationship between the two is clarified.

Once he is comfortable in his position, Rallis may be bolder in pursuing a strong pro-Western policy. He will probably be urged on in this by Karamanlis who, secure in the Presidency, will want to see his grand design of tying Greece to the West completed.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Chron Files, Speeches and Papers of Lucy W. Benson (1979) and Matthew Nimetz (1980), Lot 81D321, Box 6, Matthew Nimetz Chron (March 1980-July 1980). Secret. Drafted by Thomas M. Coony (EUR/SE); cleared by Dillery, Terrance G. Grant (INR/WEA/SE), Ewing, and Nimetz on May 15. In a May 14 covering memorandum to Brzezinski, Tarnoff noted that the paper was a response to an NSC request. (Ibid.) See footnote 1, Document 201.



The opposition, led by Andreas Papandreou's PASOK, can be expected to react vigorously to this policy. In the past Papandreou has been constrained by the universal respect Karamanlis enjoyed in Greece. This does not apply to Rallis; the opposition will probably hammer away at him in an effort to break enough support away from the weakened New Democracy party to force early general elections. Rallis needs to delay elections, which would only help the opposition, until he builds a record and establishes his dominance in the New Democracy party.

For the U.S., this implies that Rallis, in support of a pro-Western policy, will want to maintain good bilateral US-Greek relations. We should recognize, however, that he will always be guided by his perception of Greek national interest. He will continue Greece's general support for U.S. positions on East-West issues, but will be strongly influenced by the attitudes of Greece's new partners in the European Community. For domestic political reasons, Rallis will be reluctant in the short term to appear to compromise on Greek NATO reintegration. If possible, he will also avoid raising potentially contentious issues such as renegotiation of the defense agreement with the U.S. (This may not be possible if the opposition begins to demand action in view of the new Turkish agreement.)

Rallis will probably look for and welcome evidence of U.S. interest in Greece and confidence in his government in order to increase his own stature and bolster his position with the more conservative elements of his party who tend toward Averof. We should try to maintain good relations with Rallis and his government without pressing on controversial issues or implying we will adopt Greek positions in Greek-Turkish disputes. Any major U.S. initiatives on Cyprus, the Aegean or Greek reintegration would put Rallis in a difficult position by forcing him to confront issues he would prefer to avoid at this early juncture. END SUMMARY.

George Rallis in an interview shortly after his election as New Democracy party leader and, therefore, Prime Minister, said he was committed to the basic thrust of Karamanlis' foreign policy. He wanted Greece in the Common Market and reintegrated into NATO. The Cabinet he has named supports this. The majority served in Karamanlis' government, although there has been some reshuffling. The most important change was the move of Constantine Mitsotakis from the domestic economy oriented Coordination Ministry to the Foreign Ministry. The most important re-appointment was Averof to the Defense Ministry.

Mitsotakis probably will be pragmatic in his dealings with us, ever mindful of Greece's perceived national interests. He was instrumental as Coordination Minister in pushing the recently signed Greek-US

agreement on economic, cultural and scientific cooperation through a reluctant Greek Government.<sup>2</sup> He was also, however, the moving force behind the Greek approval of the Syros shipyard contract for the repair of Soviet naval auxiliaries, and he has sought to expand Greek-Soviet commercial exchanges which he believes will benefit Greece. Averof has consistently been helpful to us and can be expected to remain so as long as he stays in government.

Initially, Rallis will hew studiously to the Karamanlis line, defer to Averof in defense matters, and avoid actions which would test the loyalty of his party members. Foremost among these is any appearance of compromise on Greek-Turkish issues. The immediate concern is Greek reintegration. Karamanlis by his February 22 announcement that only the original Haig/Davos arrangements were acceptable as a basis for reintegration has established a position from which Rallis will have difficulty moving. Moreover, he may not want to until he feels secure in his own position, reaches an understanding with Averof and the right wing of New Democracy which he represents, and clarifies the working relationship between himself and Karamanlis as President. Similarly, Rallis probably will be careful of any involvement in the Cyprus problem and take no new initiatives with Turkey on Aegean issues.

Once he feels comfortable in his new role, Rallis could be a forceful and innovative leader. As Education Minister from 1974 to 1977, he undertook a courageous effort at reforming the Greek educational system, one of the most entrenched of Greek institutions. As Prime Minister, he may be willing to do the equivalent with regard to issues of important interest to us.

Unless, however, Rallis is strongly pushed by Karamanlis, we should not count too strongly in the short or medium term on this possibility. The difference between difficult domestic issues such as educational reform and difficult foreign policy issues such as reintegration is the Turkish factor. Rallis has been a hard-liner on Turkey, and his feelings towards the U.S. are tempered by his belief that our policy towards Turkey is wrong. Greek Ambassador Tzounis has related that while Foreign Minister Rallis once told him he had nightmares about new U.S. initiatives which would be perceived as pro-Turkish in Greece and, thereby make more difficult the task of Greek leaders such as himself who wanted good US-Greek relations.

Rallis' natural inclination to go slowly on issues involving Turkey will be reinforced by his concern for strengthening his political base. If Rallis and New Democracy are going to do well in the next elections,

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<sup>2</sup> The agreement was signed in Athens on April 22.

which in any event must be held by November 1981, he must attract support from the center. Indeed, one of the reasons cited for his election as party leader over the more conservative Averof was his greater appeal to centrist elements of Greek politics. It is these same elements, however, who will be less inclined to accept compromises to achieve full Greek reintegration in the interest of Alliance solidarity and who are not as concerned about Greece's current NATO posture as their rightist colleagues. Their interest is in closer ties with Europe. They do not consider full NATO membership necessary for this. Greece's entry into the EC on January 1, 1981, will emphasize this point and Rallis can be expected until the elections to concentrate on the European aspect of Greek foreign policy rather than confronting controversial issues which could only hurt him with the constituencies he is appealing to.

We can help Rallis in this period by indicating our confidence in him and his government and not rushing him on issues he is not prepared to undertake. When he indicates that he is willing to address the difficult issues, we should be ready to respond.

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**203. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State and Secretary of State Muskie<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, June 23, 1980, 1633Z

6327. Miladdees handle as Specat Exclusive. Subj: Discussion With Foreign Minister Mitsotakis, June 23, 1980.

1. (S-entire text)

2. Summary. In businesslike manner, Mitsotakis strongly supported Greece's return to NATO at a time when Western cohesion is needed and asked that SACEUR accelerate and intensify as soon as possible his effort to find a military solution to Greek reintegration. He called attention to approaching Greek elections and stressed that favorable conditions for reentry might not exist much longer.<sup>2</sup> The Foreign Minister did not, however, miss the opportunity to hold Turkey at fault

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Portions of 1980 Security Assistance Subject and Country Files, Lot 82D197, Box 2, S.A. 80 Nimetz Trip—London, Athens, Ankara. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Ankara and USNMR SHAPE; Priority to Nicosia, USNATO, USDOCOSouth Naples, and USDELMC. Muskie was in Italy June 19–24 accompanying President Carter at the Economic Summit in Venice.

<sup>2</sup> No date for future elections had yet been set.

and to reiterate that "Haig-Davos" should be "enforced." Mitsotakis also linked conclusion of a new U.S.-Greek DCA to successful reintegration but, from the options Nimetz offered, chose to agree that preliminary DCA discussions could in the meantime proceed. No connection was drawn to the Turkish DECA, and only passing reference was made in another context to the question of Aegean balance. Mitsotakis reaffirmed the GOG's desire to work with Turkey for the reduction of mutual distrust, and expressed his appreciation for the USG's positive role in counseling the avoidance of the use of force to settle disputes in the area. On Cyprus, both sides acknowledged that recent developments were disappointing. The GOG agreed to stay in contact with the USG and to continue to support intercommunal talks under UN auspices. End summary.

3. Nimetz opened with a description of visit as helpful prelude to June 24 bilateral with Secretary in Ankara<sup>3</sup> and expressed his desire to explore ways of strengthening US relationship with the new Greek Government. Nimetz said US recognized two countries had some differing perceptions about problems in the area, but hoped both sides could look for creative solutions. He observed that the US has the political will to work for solutions; he hoped Greece also has that desire. He noted the Secretary would brief Mitsotakis on the Venice meeting and pointed to fact that we are at a significant juncture, that the next five to six years will be difficult, that the West needs to stand together to preserve peace and security, and that strong Greek-US relations are in both our interests. For these reasons, Nimetz said the US wants reintegration to proceed and wants the bilateral relationship put in a satisfactory, permanent state. To the extent that this can strengthen the political relationship, so much the better.

4. Mitsotakis replied that he would meet the Secretary, who is a politician and a statesman, in the spirit of sincerity and desiring to seek solutions to problems. The new GOG would spare no effort to reestablish traditional friendly relations with the US. Greek assessment of the international situation is the same as the US and Greece will do its best with its limited capability. Mitsotakis then turned to the question of Greek reintegration into NATO and said the Greek request to return serves all countries concerned. He pointed out that the decision in 1974 to withdraw was influenced by the "justified" reaction of the Greek people to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and that the Greek Government had submitted its reintegration request without any change in the

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<sup>3</sup> Telegram Secto 4049 from Ankara, June 25, described the meeting. Mitsotakis informed Muskies that a U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement and continued use of U.S. bases in Greece would be unlikely without Greek reintegration in the NATO military command structure. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800307-0207)

situation in Cyprus. The GOG and the Greek people cannot, he said, understand how Turkey can prevent reintegration which harms both Greece and the Alliance and Turkey. He asked why the Alliance could not explain to Turkey that such a policy is “irrational.” He noted there are technical problems and questions that have been pending since before 1974 which have to be discussed, but Greece cannot accept reintegration under conditions worse than when it left—Greek public opinion is “rightly sensitive” on this matter. Mitsotakis observed that it is surprising how well Greek public opinion has reacted to the GOG application for reentry and said the GOG is in a position to bring Greece back without facing too dangerous a local reaction. But, he emphasized, these favorable conditions will not continue much longer. Deadlines are becoming shorter and it will not be possible for this government to go to, or to win, elections next year with this question still open. Indeed, there very probably will be political changes in Greece next year.

5. Mitsotakis then raised the question of American bases in Greece which is “closely associated” with reintegration.<sup>4</sup> This was not blackmail, just cold analysis. If there is no reintegration then negotiations, possible agreement, and acceptance by the GOG and Greek people will be “very, very difficult.” Public opinion has been surprisingly receptive to reintegration, but would react differently if reintegration is rejected. Personally, he said, a DCA would then be “impossible—well, very difficult.”

6. A third problem he cited, which was linked in a “vicious circle” with reintegration and the bases, was Greek-Turkish differences. A solution must be found or the situation will unavoidably deteriorate. Reintegration would certainly make a bases agreement easier and could also improve prospects for relations between Greece and Turkey, which are marked by “fundamental mutual distrust.” As an example, he mentioned the 1978 lifting of the embargo. At that time, it was clearly stated to Greece that Turkey would be more likely to make good will gestures when not under such pressure; this belief was mistaken and a bad psychological climate has been created. Greece, he said, had no objection to seeing Turkey helped in its present crisis, but an effort should be made to let Turkey know that at least “a small gesture” must be made by them. This is the right time for reintegration to be solved. If it is not done now, he said, he did not think it would ever be done.

7. Nimetz in reply said he agreed in most respects with the foregoing analysis. On a bilateral base agreement, he said it wouldn’t be difficult if all the other problems were solved first. From an operational

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 7, Document 173.

point of view the US is quite satisfied with the present arrangements, but it understands the need politically to have a new agreement and defers to the GOG on how to move ahead in that regard. Either the two sides can wait for the situation to evolve or they can begin negotiations with the understanding that no agreement would be finalized until reintegration looks as if it will be resolved. Nimetz noted that the GOG has the Turkish DECA and offered any further information or briefings Greek experts might request. He also said the US is ready for preliminary talks on what a Greek agreement would look like, but that the US would not pressure Greece to proceed.

8. Reintegration, Nimetz said, was much more difficult for the US because it was not something the US controlled. Nimetz pointed to the problem of labeling solutions "better" or "worse." This transforms military arrangements into political issues when the real question to military experts is how can the Alliance best cooperate for the security of the region. The US understands that military solutions have political implications and therefore a method must be devised to work out reintegration in a militarily sound manner that is not disadvantageous for any country. Especially in an alliance where each member must be satisfied, the whole system would fall apart if better-or-worse for a particular member-state were the only criterion. SACEUR thus was given an Alliance mandate to work on a military technical level; political approval would follow. The US continues to hope that the SACEUR effort can be successful and wants to know whether the GOG believes that General Rogers should speed up his effort and aim for a breakthrough. Nimetz agreed time is getting short and that with elections coming in Greece and in the US progress must be made soon. No one, he said, wants to have the matter brought to the point that Greece desires to withdraw its application, but it should be remembered that the US does not have the same decision-making authority in reintegration as it does with a DCA. All governments involved have to be reasonably satisfied.

9. Turkey, he said, has given the US assurance that it does not oppose and would welcome Greek reintegration. Turkey has its own views as an Aegean nation on what its role should be in regional security. NATO also sees such a role for Turkey. The US believes it is not inconsistent with Greek security, with Greece's defense of its national territory, and with its historical position for there to be a solution that contains such a role.

10. Mitsotakis agreed that preliminary discussions on a DCA could proceed, but no final agreement would be possible without reintegration. The bases are accepted now, he said, but if reintegration fails, the question of the bases "will be raised."

11. On reintegration, the GOG's firm view is that "Haig-Davos" should be "enforced." This would bring a military solution that Greece

wants. The political aspect was introduced by Turkey. Greece, he said, does not think Turkey should not play an Aegean defense role, but he stressed again that Greece cannot accept a solution from which Turkey would benefit and therefore gain in bilateral differences over the Aegean. The GOG was not opposed to “provisional arrangements” or to leaving “some things” to be finalized later and, therefore, he wished to see SACEUR continue his effort as soon as possible and “intensify it.”

12. Nimetz thanked Mitsotakis for his positive view on the acceleration of SACEUR’s effort. On Greek-Turkish issues, he acknowledged that they are deep with a long history and noted the US tries scrupulously to maintain good relations with both countries and not involve itself in the substance of such bilateral problems. While not commenting on their substance, the US does give its views on the use of force to solve such problems. He recalled the Clifford visit when the US relayed from Greece to Turkey concerns about the risks of heightened tension.<sup>5</sup> Then, the US believed it had played a positive role. Nimetz hoped steps will be taken to dispel mutual distrust and noted that the reciprocal withdrawal of Turkish and Greek NOTAMs blocking the Aegean had been positive.

13. On Cyprus, Nimetz observed the US was distressed that more progress had not been made and was not optimistic about short term prospects. He mentioned the USG and GOG have had constructive talks and should stay in contact because problems of the area require it. The US will do what it can toward a solution.

14. Mitsotakis acknowledged the positive US role in avoiding the use of force in the area, but claimed that the fact that force was used against Cyprus and Cyprus is still a victim cannot be forgotten. In this respect, he mentioned the GOG is sensitive to the balance in the Aegean, a balance that needs to be maintained for reasons of security. He also saw no real hope of a Cyprus solution given the Turkish position. The GOG would continue to support intercommunal talks under UN auspices so as to avoid any further deterioration until a solution can be found.

15. Mitsotakis and Nimetz agreed that the above discussion would be characterized for the press as “useful and sincere.”

16. Participants: Foreign Minister Mitsotakis, MFA Deputy Secretary General Roussos, notetaker (Stoforopoulos); Under Secretary Nimetz, Ambassador McCloskey, notetaker (Dworken).

**McCloskey**

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 8.

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**204. Letter From Greek Prime Minister Rallis to President Carter<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, September 24, 1980

Dear Mr. President,

I take the opportunity of Mr. C. Mitsotakis' visit to the United States for the U.N. General Assembly session, to communicate with you on two critical issues: Greece's relinkage to the military structure of NATO and the future of the American bases in Greece.<sup>2</sup> They are both critical not only because of their importance but also on account of their urgency. Furthermore, in the light of present political realities in Greece they are interconnected.

With regard to NATO, General B. Rogers is actively pursuing the mission entrusted to him by the Secretary General. Some progress has been registered. There remain, however, a number of outstanding points. This is due to a difference of approach between Greece and Turkey. Whilst Greece is ready to return to the integrated Command under conditions prevailing in 1974, in conformity with NATO decisions and procedures then and still in force, Turkey is striving to brush them aside. A new situation with regard to command and control responsibilities favouring Turkish political and military aims, in breach of existing NATO regulations—or at the very least by letting them fall into abeyance—would be the price to be exacted from Greece for Turkish acquiescence. This is a price no Greek Government is disposed to pay. For no Greek Government would accept an infringement of its national rights or an impairment of its recognized responsibilities within the Alliance. NATO is a living Organisation and as such there is room in it for gradual readjustment and improvement. But these should be worked out in accordance with the spirit and the letter of its texts and in conformity with established procedures, and not by way of a reintegration fee to be paid in advance.

Besides this substantive consideration, any departure from valid texts and practice would create a novel situation unacceptable not only

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Portions of 1980 Security Assistance Subject and Country Files, Lot 82D197, Box 4, Greece Vol. II (S.A. 1980) 7–1–80 Thru. No classification marking. In a September 27 covering memorandum to the Executive Secretariat, Ewing noted that Mitsotakis gave Muskies the letter during their meeting in New York the previous day. Ewing suggested handling the letter "Secret/Exdis." (Ibid.) For Muskies' meeting, see footnote 3, Document 205.

<sup>2</sup> *The New York Times* reported on September 16 that Ambassador McCloskey delivered a plan to Foreign Minister Mitsotakis the previous day for the continued use of U.S. bases. Mitsotakis issued a public statement linking an agreement on the bases with Greece's reintegration into NATO. ("Greece, Given U.S. Plan on Bases, Repeats Warning," *The New York Times*, September 16, 1980, p. A6)



to the Government but also to the Greek people and Parliament whose ratification would then be legally required.

I come now to the American bases and I shall use the language of candour and sincerity that befits the relationship between old friends and allies. Foreign bases are not nowadays a popular issue, unless they operate in active partnership with the host country, in the context of an Allied military structure and in pursuit of common defence aims. Greek public opinion would hardly tolerate the continued operation of the American bases if the rift in NATO's southern flank is allowed to continue. It is the role of a Government to enlighten and to lead but it is also its democratic duty to heed the will of the people. For on the will of the people rests its survival.

Moreover what would be the practical value of military bases on foreign land if surrounded by a resentful and hostile local population?

I tried, Mr. President, to give a short and factual description of the situation. The connection between the issues of Greece's return to the military structure of NATO and the maintenance of the American bases in Greece is dictated by hard facts and it is not made for tactical reasons. This is easily discernible to anyone with even little grasp of the present political trends in Greece.

Not only that. Time is fast running short for the settlement of these twin issues. In a few months time we shall be holding general elections. No Government is prepared to submit to the people's verdict whilst such emotional issues remain pending. They will have to be disposed of, in time, one way or another.

I thought it my duty to send you this message not only for the sake of the record, but also because I am convinced that Turkey, whose veto perpetuates the present split in the southern flank of the Alliance, has many good reasons to be grateful to the United States and to other NATO Allies. The new Government of Turkey is presented with an excellent opportunity to put in practice its professions of faith to the Alliance.

Yours sincerely,

**George J. Rallis**

**205. Memorandum From Robert Blackwill of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 25, 1980

SUBJECT

Greek Re-integration into NATO

Bernie Rogers is very close to closing a deal on this matter. Although he continues to hide his cards from us, he was last week only a few words short of an agreement which both the Greeks and Turks could buy. His solution to the problem is apparently fuzzy and defers the Command Boundary decision which is the most contentious issue between the two sides.

Meanwhile the Greeks have launched an all out offensive designed to force us to put overwhelming pressure on the Turks. We have received from the British the attached letter at Tab I from Rallis to the President which was given to Mrs. Thatcher during her visit to Athens earlier this week.<sup>2</sup> As you will see, it in effect says if there is no resolution of the NATO Re-integration issue soon, the Greeks will close U.S. military facilities in Greece. The timing of this ultimatum is a function of the Greek judgment that they now have maximum influence over us because of our election, and that it is obligatory to get this issue out of the way before the Greek pre-election campaign begins in earnest at the end of the year. The election will probably occur in May or June of next year.

We have told Rogers that we are available should he conclude that he needs outside help to finish the agreement. He has not yet asked for such assistance. It would be useful for us to reaffirm that offer to Rogers after Muskie's bilateral meetings in New York tomorrow with the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 16, Greece: 1978-1980. Secret. A stamped notation on the first page of the memorandum reads "ZB has seen" and is dated September 26.

<sup>2</sup> The letter at Tab I is Document 204.

<sup>3</sup> In his meeting with Muskie on September 26, Mitsotakis noted that Greece was continuing its dialogue with the new military government of Turkey, which had taken power on September 12, regarding the "top priority" of Greek reintegration into NATO. The Foreign Minister also said that his government was operating on the idea that the Turkish Generals now in control would appreciate the "military importance" of reintegration. Muskie replied that he and Carter were "troubled" that the reintegration issue was not making progress and that if U.S. access to its bases in Greece were compromised it would "impair our ability to defend the Eastern Mediterranean and the Southeastern flank of NATO." (Telegram Secto 8032, September 27; National Archives, RG 59, Subject Files of Edmund S. Muskie, 1963-1981, Lot 83D66, Box 2, unlabeled folder) For Muskie's meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Türkmen, see Document 156.

**206. Letter From the Greek Minister of National Defense  
(Averoff) to Secretary of Defense Brown<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, September 26, 1980

My dear Minister,

From our occasional meetings, in our present capacities I was left with a lasting impression: Your devotion to the ideals of the Western Alliance and your unstinted efforts for the strengthening of its defences. It is this impression that impels me to appeal to you on the question of Greece's return to the military structure of NATO.

I do not intend to elaborate on the causes which led Greece, in August 1974, to withdraw from the Integrated Command or on the condition—still unfulfilled—that was then set for its return. Suffice it to recall that on Greek initiative, in January 1977, a process for relinking Greece to NATO's Integrated Command was set in motion.

In the spring 1978 an understanding, based on the Greek responses to the Open Ended Group issues, was reached between General A. Haig and J. Davos, the then Saceur and Chief of the Hellenic Defence Staff respectively. This understanding considered by General Haig as an appropriate framework for Greece's reintegration was aborted owing to the opposition of one member of the Alliance.

As you are aware, General B. Rogers, the new Saceur, is currently carrying out a mission of clarification on contentious issues, at the request of the Secretary General of NATO. This mission despite some progress recorded still lingers on. The reason for it, as I see it, is a conceptual difference in approach. Greece is ready to return to the military structure of the Alliance with rights, duties and responsibilities deriving from NATO decisions, documents and procedures in force in 1974 and still valid to-day. On the other side Turkey seems to approach the problem of command and control responsibilities by making short shrift of these fundamental and binding instruments. The creation of a new situation to suit the political and military aims of that member-state or, at best, the creation of a legal vacuum, seems to be set as a prior condition for lifting the Turkish veto.

No Greek Government can accept to pay a price which amounts to forsaking legal rights or relinquishing acknowledged responsibilities

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–82–0217B, Box 8, Greece 1980. No classification marking. The salutation is handwritten. At the top right-hand corner of the page, Brown wrote, "Make copy for [illegible] asking them how we can use a response to help the solution along. Also put this at Greece-Turkey tab in MBB book. HB."

under valid NATO regulations and procedures. Needless to add that NATO as a living Organisation is open to adaptation and development. But these could be brought about only in conformity with existing texts and practice, and not by way of a re-entry fee to be exacted in advance.

The time factor is also of the essence. Relinkage to the military structure of NATO, does not command, as it is to be expected approval throughout the political spectrum in Greece. Even among staunch supporters—and this is the disquieting element in the equation—there are many who consider national dignity hurt, after being left to cool our heels for four years. As the time for the next general election is approaching, it becomes more and more imperative that the reintegration endeavour be brought to a conclusion: by agreement, if possible, by abandonment otherwise.

The latter development would be doubly unfortunate since it will inevitably affect the continuance of American bases in Greece. There is a strong feeling in Greek public opinion that these bases can only be maintained in the operational context of an Allied defence structure. And this is a feeling that no democratic Government can ignore.

The United States, Mr. Secretary, has earned in its recent History titles to the gratitude of many countries and Turkey is certainly one of them. Seldom though an individual virtue, gratefulness is even less a collective one. Yet a lingering sense of moral debt could provide leverage for a clearer perception of the situation confronting us. And I am convinced that the healing of the rift in the southern flank of NATO can be perceived as being also in Turkey's enlightened and long term interest. It is my earnest hope that the new Government of Turkey will rise to the occasion, by translating into facts its proclaimed faith in the Alliance.

Asking you to accept my warmest regards, I remain  
Sincerely yours,

**Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza<sup>2</sup>**

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<sup>2</sup> Averoff added the last paragraph and closing by hand and signed "E Averoff-Tossizza" above this typed signature.

**207. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for Public Liaison (Wexler) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 2, 1980

It is generally agreed among Greek-Americans that the reintegration of Greece into NATO is their highest priority issue. It is also generally agreed, because of the new Turkish Government, that there has never been a better opportunity to do this than right now.

Everyone knows the generals don't have to be accountable to a political party.

Reports from the Greek community indicate that Secretary Muskie had an unsatisfactory meeting with the Greek Foreign Minister. Word of these meetings spreads like wild fire.<sup>2</sup>

Most Greek-Americans are democrats and would like to support the President. Greek-American political leaders are mostly democrats (Brademas, Sarbanes, Alexander, Rousakis, etc.), they would like to be helpful but cannot until there is a signal that we have made some progress on the reintegration issue and/or on the Cyprus issue. Most of them can't address a Greek-American gathering and discuss the President because of the animosity. Once there is a signal they can go to work. For example, there are three hundred thousand Greek-Americans in Chicago alone. This vote could be the margin of victory for us in the election because Illinois may be the pivotal state. Right now we would lose that vote.

I suggest we need more focus on this issue. I believe the President should assign one person the responsibility of completing reintegration within a definite time frame (not more than 2 to 3 weeks). Then we will be able to accomplish the additional political jobs we really must do. There are two reasons which can be stated to deal with the argument that any action now is political.

The first is the change in the Turkish leadership which makes progress achievable; the second, is the announcement by the Greek Government of the January 1 deadline.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 26, Greece: 5/80–1/81. Administratively Confidential. In the upper right-hand corner of the page, Carter wrote, "Zbig—Give Anne a briefing on what we're doing. Tell her to be very careful. J." Next to Carter's note, Brzezinski wrote "done" and initialed, "ZB."

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 205.

The importance of this effort to the continuance of our presence in this building cannot be overemphasized. Let me know what I can do to help.

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**208. Letter From Secretary of Defense Brown to the Greek Minister of National Defense (Averoff)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington October 10, 1980

Dear Mr. Minister:

I was very glad to receive your views on the very important matter of Greece's return to the military structure of NATO.<sup>2</sup> Your gracious observation about my efforts on behalf of the Alliance touches me, coming as it does from one of such long-standing and courageous service on behalf of the shared ideals and goals that bind our countries together. Your long record of statesmanlike support of the Alliance encourages me to reply with equal candor.

We have made clear to the Government of Turkey the importance we attach to the prompt reintegration of Greece's armed forces into NATO.<sup>3</sup> We share your view that reintegration is in the interest of all. As you point out, General Rogers is urgently seeking a means to accomplish that end, and it seems to me indispensable that we all support his efforts by every practical means. I am encouraged by the substantial progress he has already made in narrowing the differences, and while I appreciate that some difficulties remain, I am pleased that your authorities are working closely with him.

Let me make one other observation which I know you, as an historian who takes the long view, will understand. I believe that the West confronts today a challenge to its vital security interests as serious as any we have jointly faced since the early post-war years. It is a time when the very concept of collective defense is being tested in ways which will determine whether or not a coalition of free nations can protect the values of democratic tradition which link us all.

In these circumstances, Greece's role in the Alliance, always important, assumes even greater significance. The cohesiveness of NATO

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-82-0217B, Box 8, Greece 1980. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 206.

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 156 and 157.

and its capacity to defend the vital interests of its member states are necessities transcending the day-to-day problems which inevitably complicate relations between vigorous and pluralistic societies.

For its part, the United States is proud to be associated with Greece in an enterprise which promotes the common security of fifteen free nations. For that reason I hope that you, your colleagues, and General Rogers will be able to make a decisive contribution to the rapid resolution of the reintegration problem. To fail in this effort would be tragic for us all.

I hope to see you again very soon, in a meeting marking Greece's return to the NATO military structure.

Sincerely,

Harold Brown

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**209. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Athens, October 18, 1980, 0942Z

12732. Subject: Greek Reintegration. Ref: A) Ewing/McCloskey Telcon, Oct 17, 1980<sup>2</sup> B) State 277510.<sup>3</sup>

1. (Secret-entire text)

2. Foreign Minister Mitsotakis informed me last night (October 17) that Greece and Turkey had agreed on a formula for the reintegration of Greece into the military structure of NATO.

3. Mitsotakis took me aside immediately after arriving at the Residence for a dinner in his honor to tell me the following:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Portions of 1980 Security Assistance Subject and Country Files, Lot 82D197, Box 4, Greece Vol. II (S.A. 1980) 7–1–80 Thru. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis; Stadis.

<sup>2</sup> The memorandum of telephone conversation was not found.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 277510 to USNATO, October 18, the Department reported that Rogers asked the German Permanent Representative to NATO to support his efforts to complete Greek reintegration into NATO on the grounds that the final differences between Greece and Turkey were near resolution. On the same day, the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey received letters from German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher urging the "earliest possible resolution of Greek reintegration." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P910097–0029)

—Hellenic Chief of Staff General Gratsios conveyed the GOG response to SACEUR's last proposed arrangement to General Rogers in a meeting at Naples the previous day. Rogers then went to Ankara where he obtained final acceptance from the GOT. That word was telephoned to Gratsios in Athens yesterday.

—Karamanlis, Rallis, Averoff and he had given their personal endorsements to the Rogers formula. Other Ministers of the "inner" Cabinet would be informed of the decision today (October 18) and the Cabinet at-large possibly tomorrow. He was unclear about when and how Parliament would be informed.

—The GOG together with the others most directly involved are working toward a DPC meeting at the earliest possible time next week in Brussels. To this end, Mitsotakis has already sent an MFA official to Brussels to assist with preparations. Mitsotakis expects a public announcement of all this Monday, October 20. He was unclear as to the means or venue for disclosure and to what degree it will be coordinated with others. He did stress risk that things could come undone as a result of any leakage and urged that what he told me be kept secret.

—In connection with ref B, which just arrived, Mitsotakis had said that the FRG Ambassador in Athens had a day earlier relayed Foreign Minister Genscher's offer to be helpful in "greasing the skids" at Brussels. Mitsotakis said he expressed appreciation but refrained from asking for anything at that time.<sup>4</sup>

**McCloskey**

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<sup>4</sup> The NATO Defense Planning Committee agreed on October 20 to reintegrate Greek military forces into the NATO military command structure. The same day, Carter sent similar messages to Rallis, Evren, Rogers, and Luns, expressing his delight and offering his congratulations on the decision to reintegrate Greece into NATO. The messages are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 26, Greece: 5/80-1/81. Rallis replied on October 25 that he was "looking forward to cooperating with the United States in all military organs and activities of the alliance to that effect." Rallis also expressed confidence that the spirit of Greek reintegration "will prevail in the course of our forthcoming negotiations on the new Greek-U.S. agreement." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 7, Greece: Prime Minister George Rallis, 9-11/80) On November 17, Brzezinski wrote in a memorandum to Henze and Blackwill, "The President wants to push hard to conclude a defense cooperation agreement with Greece before the end of 1980." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 26, Greece: 5/80-1/81)



**210. Editorial Note**

On October 24, 1980, Greek officials informed the U.S. Embassy in Athens of their readiness to commence negotiations on a new Defense Cooperation Agreement. Ambassador Robert McCloskey reported in telegram 13098 from Athens, October 24, that “it has become increasingly evident over the past several weeks that the Greeks are doing their homework and gearing up for DCA discussions.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800511–0839) On October 29, McCloskey met with Deputy Secretary General of the Greek Foreign Ministry Stavros Roussos to discuss a draft of the Defense Cooperation Agreement. The Embassy relayed details of their conversation in telegram 13318 from Athens, October 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800511–0839) Roussos characterized the draft as “wanting,” suggesting that it failed to cover matters beyond immediate defense issues, such as defense industrial cooperation, and that any DCA must appear as a “good agreement” in the public’s perception, particularly with regard to how well it would safeguard the military balance between Greece and Turkey. Roussos said the current draft “cannot serve as a basis for speedy and thoughtful negotiation in its present form” and noted that the Ministry of Defense was preparing a counterdraft. McCloskey assured Roussos of U.S. flexibility. Negotiations continued on the DCA beyond President Carter’s term, culminating in a Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement, signed in Athens on September 8, 1983.

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**211. Telegram From the Department of State to the United States National Military Representative, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 14, 1980, 0755Z

330939. Following Secto 10014 dtd Dec 12 sent action State Athens Ankara Nicosia being repeated to you. Quote: Secto 10014. Subject: NATOMin: Muskie–Mitsotakis Bilateral, Dec. 11.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800595–0397. Secret. Drafted by M. Dworken; approved by Dillery. Sent for information. Also sent for information to USDOCOSouth, USCINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCUSAREUR, and CINCUSNAVEUR.

1. (S-entire text).

2. Summary: This was a warm, relaxed meeting in which Mitsotakis made a special effort to indicate his appreciation for the Secretary's help on Greek reintegration, and his government's belief that the outcome was well received in Greece and was contributing to possibilities for progress in Greek-Turkish bilateral relations as well as on Cyprus. Regarding the Greek-US base negotiations Mitsotakis promised to provide a draft soon and hoped agreement could be reached soon, but he mentioned no specific period and did not appear concerned about pace of negotiations. End summary.

3. Greek reintegration. Mitsotakis offered personal thanks and that of his entire government to the Secretary for his understanding and assistance on this difficult issue. The Foreign Minister explained that the political situation within Greece had evolved well following the DPC decision in October.<sup>2</sup> He now believed that a clear majority of Greek public favored Greece's association with the Alliance. The government was pleased that it had received more votes within Parliament in favor of reintegration than it held seats. He said that the reaction of the opposition has been moderate except for the orthodox Communist Party. Even Papandreou has been less intense than anticipated, though his position remains ambiguous.

4. The Secretary said that he also took pleasure in the reintegration of Greek forces. He recalled his first meeting with Mitsotakis in Ankara, which had convinced him to make it a high priority item.<sup>3</sup> He also complimented the Greek and Turkish Governments for their statemanship. Muskie noted that the reaction of all concerned groups in the United States had also been positive.

5. Base negotiations. Mitsotakis noted that with the accomplishment of Greek reintegration the GOG was proceeding with negotiations on the US bases. He said his government is preparing a draft text which he hoped would be ready in several days.<sup>4</sup> He promised good faith movement towards the conclusion of an agreement as soon as possible. Muskie agreed that it was important to move forward on this issue and said he was glad the defense relationship was moving in a normal and healthy way. The Secretary made a special point of asking if the Foreign Minister felt there were any unusual problems in the ne-

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 209.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 3, Document 203.

<sup>4</sup> In telegram 16168 from Athens, December 24, the Embassy reported that Ambassador McCloskey received the Greek draft of the basic preambular text on December 23. McCloskey transmitted the text to Washington with a request for "vetting by concerned Washington agencies to permit negotiations to begin as soon after the New Year as possible." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810014-1058)

gotiations. Mitsotakis responded that there should be no insurmountable problems, especially since the US side accepts that the Greeks would need an agreement comparable to the one the US reached with Turkey. He then described foundations for the work; (a) the 1976 US/Greek agreement signed by Foreign Minister Bitsios, and (b) the 1979 US/Turkey DECA.<sup>5</sup> He felt that from these two documents agreeable solutions could be found.

6. The Secretary said he would be delighted if agreement could be reached before he left office, though he realized any negotiations of this type were complicated. Mitsotakis answered that he could not specify when he thought an agreement might be ready for signature. He noted that it might not be possible really soon, but that it should be closer to fruition by the time the Secretary left office.

7. Cyprus. The Secretary expressed hope that positive outcome of Greek reintegration would spill over to help progress on Cyprus as well as to facilitate progress on other issues that need to be worked on between Greece and Turkey. Mitsotakis noted that the inter-communal talks on Cyprus were now moving in a way that let him feel more optimistic about the outcome. He felt the present Turkish Government was taking positions that he hoped would make possible a just and permanent solution. The Secretary added that Turkish Foreign Minister Turkmen had given him a similar impression the day before.<sup>6</sup> The Secretary wondered whether this more positive attitude was made possible by confidence of new Turkish authorities that they had backing of Turkish public opinion. Mitsotakis agreed and also noted that since Turkish military had been the ones to occupy territory on Cyprus they could more easily negotiate a solution.

8. Greek-Turkish relations. Mitsotakis reported that the general improvement in the political climate in the area, including within Greek and Turkish domestic political arenas, has contributed to improving the dialogue between the two countries. He reported that he would be meeting Saturday December 13 with Turkmen and that the two Secretaries General of the MFAs had met earlier in the week. While the tone had improved, he expected no final results from his meeting since real differences remained. They would move closer together, however. In this regard he said he was particularly happy with the attitude the new authorities in Ankara had taken toward bilateral relations with Athens, and that this made him hopeful that it would eventually be possible to reach a global, package solution.

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<sup>5</sup> Regarding the 1976 agreement with Greece, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXX, Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973–1976, Document 64. The U.S.-Turkish DECA was signed on March 29, 1980.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 160.

9. Grace notes. After a warm discussion of relations between the two countries Mitsotakis went beyond normal courtesy in inviting the Secretary to visit Greece—and Crete—as either his official or personal guest. New York meeting was never mentioned.

Muskie Unquote

Christopher

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## **212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 3, 1981, 0556Z

1449. Subject: Presidential Message. Ref: 79 State 133075.<sup>2</sup>

1. Please deliver following Presidential congratulatory message to President Karamanlis: Begin text: Dear Mr. President: I wish to extend warmest congratulations from the Government and people of the United States to you and to the people of Greece on the occasion of Greece's formal accession to the European Community. This historic event is a demonstration of the vitality of the Community, a recognition of the role that Greece has played in the development of Western ideals, and an indication of the contribution that Greece will make to the future well-being of Europe.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter. End text.<sup>3</sup>

2. There will be no signed original. No release intended, but no objection if recipient wishes to do so.

**Muskie**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810004-0679. Limited Official Use; Niact Immediate. Drafted by Eleanore M. Raven (CA/VO); cleared by Ward Barmon (EUR/RPE), Ewing, Larrabee, L. Paul Bremer (S/S), Robert L. Pugh (EUR/SE), and James E. Taylor (S/S-O); approved by Vest. Sent for information to Brussels.

<sup>2</sup> Telegram 133075 to Athens, May 25, 1979, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790237-0274.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 6532 to Athens, January 10, the Department relayed Karamanlis' appreciation for Carter's message. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D810013-0971)



# Index

## References are to document numbers

- Aaron, David L.:  
 Cyprus dispute, 5, 6, 60, 175  
 Greek NATO reintegration, 194, 200  
 Kurds, 132  
 Turkish economic situation, 127  
 UN intercommunal talks, 76  
 U.S. military aid to Turkey, 131
- Aegean dispute:  
 Bern Agreement (1976), 91, 164  
 Bitsios-Ökçün meetings, 43  
 Brussels Agreement (1975), 84, 163, 164  
 CIA memoranda, 24  
 Greek NATO reintegration and, 190, 198, 199  
 Greek-Turkish communications:  
   Bitsios-Çağlayangil meetings, 37, 169, 170  
   Elekdag-Theodoropoulos talks, 123  
   Ökçün-Rallis talks, 181, 184  
 International Court of Justice and, 175  
 Lowenstein memoranda, 11  
 Policy Review Committee  
   discussions, 5  
 Presidential Review Memoranda, 4  
*Sismik* incident, 8, 9, 88, 163, 164, 173  
 Turkey arms embargo repeal and, 22, 24  
 Turkish political situation and, 29  
 UN Security Council Resolution 395, 163  
 U.S.-Greek communications:  
   Carter-Karamanlis correspondence, 163  
   Carter-Karamanlis discussions, 107, 166, 175  
   Christopher-Rallis discussions, 184, 186  
   Clifford-Karamanlis discussions, 8, 9, 10  
   Vance-Bitsios discussions, 169  
   Vance-Karamanlis discussions, 19, 173, 177  
   Vance-Rallis discussions, 181  
 U.S.-Turkish communications, 8, 88, 91, 107, 123
- Aegean dispute—*Continued*  
 Vance-Clifford discussions, 9  
 Vance paper, 2  
 Vance-Waldheim discussions, 37  
 Afghanistan, Soviet invasion of, 28, 75, 152, 157  
 Ahmad, Sharon E., 71  
 Akmandor, Neşet, 138  
 Albright, Madeleine K., 29  
 Alexander, William V., Jr., 25, 207  
 Alexandrakis, Menelas D., 162, 169, 170, 175, 177, 181, 184  
 Allen, Gen. Lucius, 9, 145  
 Alp, Ali Hikmat, 138, 141  
 Altik, Lt. Gen. Haydar, 89  
 Anderson, David, 19, 43, 55, 172  
 Angelides, Angelos, 46  
 Arafat, Yassir, 141  
 al-Assad, Hafiz, 189  
 Atakan, Rear Adm. Zahit, 89  
 Atakol, Kenan, 65, 80, 82  
 Atalay, Nail, 53  
 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, 96, 137, 142, 154  
 Athanssiou, Nicholas, 196  
 Atun, Hakkı, 72  
 Atwood, J. Brian, 11, 17  
 Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos, 173, 184, 186, 192, 202, 206, 208
- Balkar, M. Galip, 103  
 Barbis, George M., 173  
 Barbour, Robert, 34, 35, 40, 46, 49  
 Barmon, Ward, 212  
 Batibay, Daryal, 156, 160  
 Beckel, Robert G., 111  
 Becker, Jane E., 73  
 Begin, Menachem, 107  
 Bemis, H. Jonathan, 28  
 Benjamin, Milton R., 173  
 Bennet, Douglas J., Jr., 17, 19, 110, 111, 145  
 Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr.:  
   Cyprus dispute, 104, 186, 196  
   Greek NATO reintegration, 125, 172, 186, 189, 196  
   Turkish debt rescheduling, 152

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr.—*Continued*

U.S. military aid to Turkey, 141, 146

Bern Agreement (1976), 91, 164

Bilge, A. Suat, 91

Bilhan, Murat, 23

Billings, Leon G., 160

Bitsios, Dimitrios:

Aegean dispute, 37, 43, 123, 166, 169, 170

Cyprus dispute, 5, 15, 43, 169, 170

Greek NATO reintegration, 170

U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement, 9, 168, 169, 170

U.S. military aid to Turkey, 107, 179

Blackwill, Robert D., 29, 194, 196, 200, 205, 209

Blumenthal, W. Michael, 107

Borek, Ted A., 124

Bowdler, William G., 176

Bowie, Robert, 131

Bozilov, Lois, 148

Brademas, John (*see also* U.S. Greek lobby):

Cyprus dispute, 5, 14, 15, 17, 117

Greek NATO reintegration, 197

Greek political situation, 17, 19

U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement, 17

U.S. military aid to Turkey, 13, 16, 17

U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 3, 17, 19, 110

Brement, Marshall, 29

Bremer, L. Paul, III, 73, 80, 152, 157, 212

Bridges, Peter, 77

Brown, Gen. George S., 4, 16, 106, 125

Brown, Harold:

Clifford Mission, 5, 6

Cyprus dispute, 4, 5

Greek NATO reintegration, 191, 192, 199, 206, 208

Turkish NATO participation, 103, 118

Turkish political situation, 128

U.S. military aid to Greece, 167

U.S. military aid to Turkey, 20, 118, 133

U.S. package offer to Turkey (1978), 113

U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 106, 108

Brussels Agreement (1975), 84, 163, 164

Brzezinski, Zbigniew K.:

Aegean dispute, 166

Carter-Karamanlis correspondence, 174

Brzezinski, Zbigniew K.—*Continued*

Clifford Mission, 5, 6, 7, 10

Cyprus dispute:

Carter-Kyprianou correspondence, 50

Carter-Kyprianou discussions, 45, 59

Carter-Waldheim discussions, 33

Clifford-Henze discussions, 15

Henze memoranda, 26

Policy Review Committee

discussions, 5, 6

Presidential Review Memoranda, 4

U.S.-Turkish communications,

Carter-Demirel discussions, 94

Greek NATO reintegration, 158, 171, 194, 205, 207, 209

Greek political situation, 202

Kurds, 132

Turkey arms embargo repeal, 116, 120, 122

Turkey SALT overflight request, 135, 143

Turkish economic situation, 93, 127

Turkish political situation, 29, 96, 130, 140, 157, 158

U.S. economic aid to Turkey, 131, 136, 159

U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement, 18, 167

U.S.-Greek relations, 195

U.S. military aid to Greece, 12, 167

U.S. military aid to Turkey, 12, 102

Harold Brown memoranda, 133

Carter-Greek lobby discussions, 13

Elekdağ correspondence, 159

Poats memoranda, 131

Spiers-Evren discussions, 145

Vance memoranda, 20, 92

U.S. package offer to Turkey (1978), 113

U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 12, 18

Carter-Clifford discussions, 16

Carter-Demirel correspondence, 148

Carter-Greek lobby discussions, 13

Eagleton memoranda, 1

Moore/Beckel/Bennet memoranda, 111

Treverton memoranda, 108

U.S.-Turkish communications, 89

Buffum, William B., 33, 44

Bureau of Intelligence and Research reports, 71, 201, 202

- Bureau of Intelligence and Research reports—*Continued*  
 No. 1336, "Soviet Perspectives on Turkey and Greece," 28
- Butcher, W. Scott, 157
- Butson, Thomas, 88
- Byrd, Robert C., 121, 139, 179, 180
- Çağlayangil, Ihsan Sabri:  
 Aegean dispute, 37, 123, 169, 170
- Cyprus dispute:  
 Bitsios meetings, 169, 170  
 Carter-Demirel discussions, 94  
 Clifford discussions, 8, 9  
 Greek lobby discussions, 14  
 UN intercommunal talks, 8, 100  
 Vance discussions, 15, 16, 99, 100, 104
- Soviet-Turkish relations, 36
- U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 15, 16, 91, 94, 99, 100
- U.S.-Turkish relations, 3
- Cahill, Jacklyn, 11
- Callaghan, James, 8, 10, 55, 127, 129
- Canada, 61, 62, 64, 119, 125, 186, 187
- Caramanlis, Constantine, *See* Karamanlis, Konstantine
- Carrington, Lord (Peter Carrington), 196
- Carter, Jimmy (*see also* Carter-Karamanlis correspondence):  
 Aegean dispute, 107, 163, 166, 175  
 Christopher Greece visit (1978), 183  
 Clifford Mission, 6, 7, 8, 10, 35, 87, 165
- Cyprus dispute, 46, 162  
 Chrysostomos discussions, 68  
 Clifford communications, 7, 10, 38  
 Demirel correspondence, 10, 87, 90  
 Demirel discussions, 37, 94  
 Ecevit discussions, 116, 119  
 Karamanlis correspondence, 163  
 Karamanlis discussions, 37, 119, 175  
 Kyprianou communications, 45, 48, 50, 56, 59  
 Kyprianou-Ecevit meeting proposals, 56  
 Makarios correspondence, 8, 10, 35  
 Vance paper, 2  
 Waldheim discussions, 33, 44
- Demirel correspondence, 10, 86, 87, 90, 148, 149
- Carter, Jimmy (*see also* Carter-Karamanlis correspondence)—*Continued*  
 Denktash correspondence, 8, 10  
 Ecevit correspondence, 112, 114, 121, 129, 134, 135, 137  
 Greek EC membership, 212  
 Greek NATO reintegration:  
 Agreement, 209  
 Blackwill memoranda, 194  
 Evren correspondence, 157  
 Greek-American community on, 207  
 Karamanlis correspondence, 180, 193, 194, 196  
 Rallis correspondence, 204, 205, 209  
 Statement (1980), 81  
 Vance memoranda, 197
- Korutürk correspondence, 8
- Larnaca incident, 47, 48
- NATO draft declaration, 114
- Presidential campaign (1976), 1, 2
- Rallis correspondence, 204, 205, 209
- Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 152, 157
- Tsatsos correspondence, 8
- Turkey arms embargo repeal:  
 Harold Brown-Ecevit discussions, 118  
 Christopher-Ecevit discussions, 113  
 Christopher memoranda, 120  
 Ecevit correspondence, 114, 121  
 Ecevit discussions, 116  
 Karamanlis correspondence, 179, 180  
 Karamanlis discussions, 175  
 Kyprianou correspondence, 50
- Turkey SALT overflight request, 134, 135
- Turkish debt rescheduling, 153
- Turkish economic situation, 127
- Turkish political situation, 96, 97, 157
- UN intercommunal talks, 7, 70
- U.S. economic aid to Turkey, 129, 136
- U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement, 7, 16, 18
- U.S. military aid to Greece, 12, 20, 167, 179
- U.S. military aid to Turkey:  
 Brzezinski memoranda, 12  
 Clifford discussions, 7, 10, 16  
 Greek lobby discussions, 13  
 Spiers-Evren discussions, 145  
 Vance memoranda, 12, 20, 92, 102



- Carter, Jimmy (*see also* Carter-Karamanlis correspondence)—*Continued*  
 U.S. package offer to Turkey (1978), 112, 113  
 U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement:  
   Harold Brown memoranda, 106  
   Brzezinski memoranda, 12, 18  
   Clifford discussions, 7, 16  
   Demirel correspondence, 86, 148, 149  
   Demirel discussions, 94  
   Greek lobby discussions, 13  
   Moore/Beckel/Bennet memoranda, 111  
   Vance memoranda, 20, 92, 101, 106  
 Carter, William Hodding, III, 17, 173  
 Carter-Karamanlis correspondence:  
   Christopher Greece visit (1978), 183  
   Clifford Mission, 10, 165  
   Cyprus dispute, 163  
   Greek EC membership, 212  
   Greek NATO reintegration, 180, 193, 194, 196  
   Greek-Turkish relations, 27, 193, 195  
   McCloskey ambassadorial appointment, 174  
   Turkey arms embargo repeal, 179, 180  
 Case, Clifford P., 111  
 Castro, Fidel, 71  
 Castrodale, Richard, 177  
 Ceausescu, Nicolae, 189  
 Celenkler, Lt. Gen. H., 138  
 Celik, Vedat, 40  
 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA):  
   Document not declassified, 85  
   FIRDB-312/02688-79, "Greek Ambassador Tzounis' Views on Greek Tactics in Dealing with the U.S. Government," 195  
   Makarios allegations, 9  
   PA 79-10225, "Turkey: Ecevit Government in Crisis," 140  
   PA 80-10124, "Short-term Prospects for Turkey," 150  
   PA 80-10239, document not declassified, 78  
   PA 81-10004, document not declassified, 30  
   PA M 79-10483, "Turkey's October Elections," 144  
 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—*Continued*  
   PA M 80-10127, "Greek Reintegration Into NATO: Status and Prospects," 198  
   RP M 79-10074, "The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics," 128  
   RP M 78-10231, "NATO's Troubled Southeastern Flank," 21  
   RP M 78-10331, "Greece, Turkey, and the West in the Post-embargo Period," 24  
   RP M 78-10506, "Turkey Under Martial Law," 126  
   RP M 79-10006, "Prospects for the Ecevit Government and for Turkish Democracy," 128  
   SR M 77-10078, "Turkey's Search for Alternate Sources of Arms," 95  
   TDFIR DB-315/02408-77, 89  
   TDFIR DB-315/08516-79, 188  
   TDFIR DB-315/13640-78, 182  
   TDFIR DB-315/15822-78, "Comments of Cypriot President on U.S. Cyprus Initiative," 62  
 Çetin, Hikmet, 138  
 Chanin, Mike, 68  
 Chapman, Geoffrey, 51, 61, 63  
 Chelik, Vedat, *See* Celik, Vedat  
 Chorafas, Angelos, 184  
 Christofidiss, Ioannis. *See* Christophides, Ioannis  
 Christopher, Warren M.:  
   Aegean dispute, 184, 186  
   Cyprus dispute, 70  
   Carter-Karamanlis discussions, 175  
   Carter-Kyprianou discussions, 59  
   Carter-Makarios correspondence, 35  
   Denktash-Kyprianou summit proposals, 65  
   Ecevit discussions, 113  
   Makarios-Denktash meetings, 84  
   Newlin/Vest memoranda, 77  
   Rallis discussions, 186  
   UN Committee on Cyprus, 73  
   U.S.-Turkish Cypriot communications, 52  
   Greece visit (1978), 182, 183, 184, 185  
   Greek NATO reintegration, 181, 184, 186, 190, 211  
   IMF role in Turkey, 122  
   Turkey arms embargo repeal, 22, 113, 119, 120, 179, 184

- Christopher, Warren M.—*Continued*  
 Turkey SALT overflight request, 138, 139  
 Turkey visit (1979), 129, 137  
 Turkish economic situation, 123  
 Turkish political situation, 155, 157  
 UN intercommunal talks:  
   Ecevit discussions, 63  
   Nimetz-Jacovides discussions, 83  
   Nimetz memoranda, 71  
   Rolandis discussions, 75  
   Vest memoranda, 79, 82  
   Waldheim discussions, 70, 186  
 U.S. bases in Greece, 211  
 U.S. economic aid to Turkey, 113, 129, 131  
 U.S. military aid to Greece, 167  
 U.S. military aid to Turkey, 113, 131, 145, 179  
 U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 84, 113
- Christophides, Ioannis, 32, 41, 43, 45  
 Chrysospathis, Spyros, 168, 184  
 Chrysostomos (Archbishop of Cyprus), 68
- Churchill, George T., 124  
 Clerides, Glafcos, 8, 31
- Clifford, Clark M. (*see also* Clifford Mission):  
 Aegean dispute, 8, 9, 10, 88, 166  
 Çağlayangil U.S. visit, 14  
 Cyprus dispute:  
   Bitsios discussions, 15  
   Carter communications, 7, 10, 38  
   Carter-Demirel discussions, 94  
   Greek lobby discussions, 14, 15  
   Henze discussions, 15  
   Kyprianou discussions, 15, 39  
   Makarios discussions, 9, 38  
   Policy Review Committee discussions, 5  
   Vance-Bitsios discussions, 170  
   Vance-Çağlayangil discussions, 15, 100  
   Vest memoranda, 40  
 Makarios death, 47  
 UN intercommunal talks, 8, 32, 38, 39, 41  
 U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement:  
   Carter discussions, 7, 16  
   Ecevit discussions, 88  
   Esenbel discussions, 91  
   Greek lobby discussions, 14
- Clifford, Clark M. (*see also* Clifford Mission)—*Continued*  
 U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement—*Continued*  
   Turkish General Staff discussions, 89  
   Vance-Çağlayangil discussions, 15, 100  
   Vance discussions, 9  
 Clifford Mission:  
   Carter-Karamanlis correspondence, 10, 165  
   Carter-Clifford discussions, 7, 10  
   Carter-Demirel correspondence, 10, 87  
   Carter-Makarios correspondence, 8, 10, 35  
   Clifford-Ecevit meetings, 88  
   Clifford-Karamanlis meeting, 164  
   Clifford-Makarios meetings, 8, 9, 32  
   Clifford memoranda, 8  
   Clifford-Turkish General Staff meetings, 89  
   Kubisch-Karamanlis discussions, 164  
   Policy Review Committee discussions, 5, 6  
   Vance-Clifford discussions, 9
- Clift, A. Denis, 27, 126  
 Cohen, Sam, 150  
 Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, 71  
 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 40  
 Congress, U.S. (*see also* U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement; U.S. Greek lobby; U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement):  
   Cyprus dispute, 5  
   Turkey arms embargo repeal, 113, 114, 119, 120, 121  
   U.S. military aid to Turkey, 9, 92
- Cooley, John K., 31  
 Coony, Thomas M., 202  
 Cooper, Richard N., 127, 131  
 Crawford, William R., Jr., 32, 39, 48  
 Curl, Richard E., 124
- Cyprus:  
   British bases, 8, 9, 10, 45  
   Coup (1974), 32, 46, 117  
   Enosis proposals, 32  
   Independence, 8, 31, 163  
 Cyprus, Republic of (Greek Cypriots) (*see also* Cyprus dispute):  
   Carter-Makarios correspondence, 8, 10, 35

- Cyprus, Republic of (Greek Cypriots)  
(*see also* Cyprus dispute)—*Continued*  
Clifford Mission, 8, 9, 10, 32, 35  
Economic situation, 26, 43  
Greek relations with, 187  
Larnaca incident, 47, 48, 49  
Political situation, 17, 41, 42, 79, 98, 169  
U.S. economic aid, 81
- Cyprus dispute (*see also* UN intercommunal talks):  
Bizonality. *See* Constitutional proposals *below*.  
Blockade, 65  
Carter-Clifford communications, 7, 10, 38  
Carter memoranda, 46  
Carter presidential campaign and, 1, 2  
Carter-Waldheim discussions, 33, 44  
Castro UN General Assembly speech, 71  
Clifford-Greek lobby discussions, 14, 15  
Clifford-Henze discussions, 15  
Commonwealth Heads of Government communiqué, 71  
Constitutional proposals:  
Kyprianou statement, 178  
Lowenstein memoranda, 11  
Nimetz memoranda, 119  
U.S.-British-Canadian "no-paper," 61, 62  
U.S.-Greek Cypriot communications:  
Carter-Kyprianou discussions, 45, 56, 59  
Clifford-Kyprianou discussions, 15, 39  
Clifford-Makarios discussions, 9, 38  
Vance-Clerides discussions, 31  
U.S.-Turkish communications, 8, 9  
U.S.-Turkish Cypriot communications, 8, 52, 58  
Vest memoranda, 79, 82  
Demilitarization proposals, 54, 57, 58, 119  
Denktash-Kyprianou summit, 53, 59, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 71  
European Community role, 5, 6, 9, 31, 32, 40, 63
- Cyprus dispute (*see also* UN intercommunal talks)—*Continued*  
Famagusta (*see also* Varosha issue *below*), 41, 62  
Federal Republic of Germany role, 7, 40  
Federation proposals. *See* Constitutional proposals *above*.  
Four-party meeting proposals, 55, 119  
Greek influence, 187  
Greek-Turkish communications:  
Bitsios-Çağlayangil meetings, 169, 170  
Bitsios-Ökçün meetings, 43  
Kyprianou-Ecevit meeting proposals, 54, 55, 56, 57, 117, 119  
Henze memoranda, 26  
Human rights issues, 42, 46, 48, 50, 110, 193  
International conference proposals, 23  
Kissinger five principles, 3, 31, 52, 162  
Kyprianou UN speech (May 24, 1978), 54  
Libya summit proposals, 79  
Makarios-Denktash Guidelines, 31, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62  
Makarios-Denktash meetings (*see also* Makarios-Denktash Guidelines *above*), 5, 8, 31, 32, 84  
Missing persons committee proposals, 52, 53, 57, 107, 119  
Newlin/Vest memoranda, 77  
Nicosia Airport reopening, 52, 57, 58, 75, 119  
Nimetz-Greek lobby discussions, 110  
Nimetz memoranda, 22, 98  
Nongovernmental contacts, 52, 58  
Policy Review Committee discussions, 5, 6  
Presidential Review Memoranda, 4  
Refugees, 2, 8, 31, 43, 58, 62, 81  
State Department Human Rights Report, 46, 48, 110  
Territorial division proposals:  
Clifford-Waldheim discussions, 8  
Lowenstein memoranda, 11  
Makarios-Denktash Guidelines on, 31  
U.S.-Greek Cypriot communications, 8, 9, 31, 32, 59  
U.S.-Soviet communications, 36

- Cyprus dispute (*see also* UN intercommunal talks)—*Continued*
- Territorial division
    - proposals—*Continued*
    - U.S.-Turkish Cypriot communications, 52
    - Vance-Greek lobby discussions, 3
    - Vance paper, 2
    - Vance-Waldheim discussions, 37
    - Vest memoranda, 40, 79, 82
  - Turkey arms embargo repeal and, 22, 24, 58, 121, 179, 180
  - Turkish Cypriot proposals (Apr. 1978), 52
  - Turkish invasion (1974):
    - Enosis proposals and, 32
    - Human Rights Report, 46
    - UN Charter and, 45
    - UN General Assembly Resolution 3212, 1
    - UN Peacekeeping Force and, 43
    - U.S.-Greek communications,
      - Vance-Karamanlis discussions, 19
    - U.S.-Greek discussions, 8, 9, 175
    - U.S. Greek lobby on, 16
    - U.S.-Turkish discussions, 8, 88, 94, 117
    - Vance paper, 2
  - Turkish military takeover and, 29
  - Turkish troop withdrawals:
    - Carter-Clifford discussions, 16
    - Carter-Greek lobby discussions, 13
    - Clifford-Greek lobby discussions, 14
    - Nimetz memoranda, 119
    - UN General Assembly Resolution 3212, 1
    - U.S.-British-Canadian "non-paper," 61
    - U.S.-Greek Cypriot communications, 59
    - Vance-Çağlayangil discussions, 104
    - Vance-Greek lobby discussions, 17
    - Vance paper, 2
  - UN Committee on Cyprus, 74, 75, 79, 196
    - Clift memoranda, 27
    - Newlin/Vest memoranda, 77
    - Vance memoranda, 73
  - UN General Assembly Resolution 32/128, 52
  - UN General Assembly Resolution 33/15, 61
- Cyprus dispute (*see also* UN intercommunal talks)—*Continued*
- UN General Assembly Resolution 3212, 1, 2, 59
  - UN Peacekeeping Force, 43, 53, 77
  - UN Security Council appeal
    - proposals, 58, 60, 61, 181
  - UN Security Council Resolution 414, 61
  - UN Subcommittee on the Protection of Minorities and Prevention of Discriminatory Treatment talks, 5
  - U.S.-Greek communications:
    - Carter-Karamanlis correspondence, 10, 163
    - Carter-Karamanlis discussions, 37, 119, 175
    - Christopher-Rallis discussions, 186
    - Clifford-Bitsios discussions, 15
    - Kubisch-Karamanlis discussions, 164
    - McCloskey-Rallis discussions, 178
    - Muskie-Mitsotakis discussions, 211
    - Vance-Alexandrakis discussions, 162
    - Vance-Bitsios discussions, 169, 170
    - Vance-Karamanlis discussions, 19, 173, 177
    - Vance-Papaligouras discussions, 172
    - Vance-Rallis discussions, 196
  - U.S.-Greek Cypriot communications:
    - Aaron-Dimitriou discussions, 60
    - Carter-Chrysostomos discussions, 68
    - Carter-Kyprianou correspondence, 48, 50
    - Carter-Kyprianou discussions, 45, 56, 59
    - Carter-Makarios correspondence, 8, 10, 35
    - Clifford-Christophides discussions, 41
    - Clifford-Kyprianou discussions, 15, 39
    - Clifford-Makarios discussions, 9, 38
    - Habib-Dimitriou discussions, 34
    - Nimetz-Kyprianou discussions, 57
    - Nimetz-Michaelides/Rolandis discussions, 61
    - Vance-Clerides discussions, 31
    - Vance-Kyprianou discussions, 43, 54, 55

- Cyprus dispute (*see also* UN intercommunal talks)—*Continued*
- U.S.-Greek Cypriot communications—*Continued*
    - Vance-Michaelides discussions, 49
  - U.S.-Soviet communications, 36, 91
  - U.S.-Turkish communications:
    - Çağlayangil-Greek lobby discussions, 14
    - Carter-Demirel correspondence, 10, 87, 90
    - Carter-Demirel discussions, 37, 94
    - Carter-Ecevit discussions, 116, 119
    - Christopher-Ecevit discussions, 113
    - Clifford-Ecevit discussions, 9, 88
    - Ecevit-Greek lobby discussions, 117
    - Muskie-Demirel discussions, 152
    - Muskie-Türkmen discussions, 160
    - Vance-Çağlayangil discussions, 15, 16, 99, 100, 104
    - Vance-Ecevit discussions, 19, 107
    - Vance-Ökçün discussions, 123
  - U.S.-Turkish Cypriot communications, 8, 10, 40, 52, 53, 58
  - Vance-Greek lobby discussions, 3, 17, 19
  - Vance Mission (1967), 2, 162
  - Vance paper, 2
  - Vance-Waldheim discussions, 37
  - Varosha issue, 17
    - Christopher memoranda, 70
    - Denktash announcement (July 20, 1978), 64
    - Nimetz memoranda, 22, 119
    - Nimetz-Waldheim discussions, 65
  - UN Security Council Resolution 414, 61
  - U.S.-British-Canadian "non-paper," 61, 119
  - U.S.-Greek communications, 75, 186
  - U.S.-Greek Cypriot communications, 57, 59
  - U.S.-Turkish communications, 104, 117
  - U.S.-Turkish Cypriot communications, 52, 53
    - Vance-Waldheim discussions, 37
    - Vest memoranda, 79, 82
  - Vest memoranda, 40
- Davey, Edward, 3
- Davies, Rodger P., murder of, 39
- DeConcini, Dennis W., 119
- De Cuéllar, Javier. *See* Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier.
- Demirel, Süleyman:
  - Carter correspondence, 10, 86, 87, 90, 148, 149
- Cyprus dispute:
  - Carter correspondence, 10, 87, 90
  - Carter discussions, 37, 94
  - Clift memoranda, 27
  - Muskie discussions, 152
  - Turkish troop withdrawals, 104
- Debt rescheduling, 152
- Foreign policy, 21
- Political situation, 97
  - CIA memoranda, 144, 150
  - Clift memoranda, 27
  - Evren memoranda, 150
  - Muskie discussions, 152
  - Policy Review Committee discussions, 5
  - Vance-Çağlayangil discussions, 15
  - Vance-Clifford discussions, 9
  - Vest memoranda, 40
- U.S. bases in Turkey, 9
- U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 1, 86, 94, 148, 149
- Denktash, Rauf:
  - Carter correspondence, 8, 10
- Cyprus dispute:
  - Clifford discussions, 8, 10
  - Clift memoranda, 27
  - Constitutional proposals, 9, 52, 58
  - Kyprianou summit, 53, 59, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 71
  - Makarios meetings, 5, 8, 31, 32, 84
  - Nimetz discussions, 52, 58
  - Turkish Cypriot proposals (Apr. 1978), 52
  - UN intercommunal talks, 52, 58, 61, 63, 75, 79, 83
  - UN Peacekeeping Force, 53
  - Vance discussions, 53
  - Varosha issue announcement (July 20, 1978), 64
  - Turkey arms embargo repeal, 52, 53, 58
  - Turkish Cypriot independence, 72
  - Turkish Cypriot political situation, 55
- DePorte, Anton, 22
- Derwinski, Edward J., 91
- Dillery, C. Edward:
  - Cyprus dispute, 40, 77

- Dillery, C. Edward—*Continued*  
 Greek NATO reintegration, 156, 184, 197, 200, 211  
 Greek political situation, 202  
 Turkish political situation, 151, 155, 157  
 UN intercommunal talks, 63, 71, 75, 80, 81, 82, 83  
 U.S. military aid to Turkey, 156  
 U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 46, 147
- Dillon, Robert S., 113
- Dimitriou, Nicos:  
 Cyprus dispute:  
 Aaron discussions, 60  
 Carter-Chrysostomos discussions, 68  
 Carter-Kyprianou discussions, 45, 59  
 Clifford-Kyprianou discussions, 39  
 Habib discussions, 34  
 Human Rights Report, 46  
 Vance-Kyprianou discussions, 43, 54  
 Vance-Michaelides discussions, 49  
 U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 46
- Dobrynin, Anatoly F., 36
- Documents not declassified, 30, 78, 85
- Dodson, Christine, 5, 6, 199
- Dountas, Michalis, 187
- Drobkov, V., 23
- Dulles, John Foster, 21
- Duncan, Charles W., Jr., 5, 6, 118, 131
- Dworken, Morton, 203, 211
- Eagleton, Thomas F., 1, 13, 14, 15, 25
- Eaves, John, 74
- EC-9. *See* European Community.
- Ecevit, Mustafa Bülent:  
 Aegean dispute, 8, 88, 107  
 Arms embargo repeal, 22, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 121  
 Carter correspondence, 112, 114, 121, 129, 134, 135, 137  
 Clifford Mission, 8, 9, 88  
 Cyprus dispute:  
 Carter discussions, 116, 119  
 Christopher discussions, 113  
 Clifford discussions, 9, 88  
 Henze memoranda, 26  
 Kyprianou meeting proposals, 54, 55, 56, 57, 117, 119  
 Turkish troop withdrawals, 119
- Ecevit, Mustafa Bülent—*Continued*  
 Cyprus dispute—*Continued*  
 UN intercommunal talks, 63, 71  
 Vance discussions, 19, 107  
 Foreign policy, 21  
 Greek EC membership, 177  
 Greek NATO reintegration, 125  
 Greek-Turkish non-aggression pact proposals, 178  
 Karamanlis Montreux summit (1978), 111, 112, 116, 173, 175, 176, 177
- Kurds, 132
- NATO draft declaration, 114
- Political situation, 97  
 Bureau of Intelligence and Research reports, 71  
 Christopher-Waldheim discussions, 65  
 CIA memoranda, 126, 128, 140, 144  
 Clifford-Makarios discussions, 38  
 Evren memoranda, 150  
 Henze briefing on, 96  
 Policy Review Committee discussions, 5  
 Spiers memoranda, 142
- SALT overflight request, 134, 135, 138, 143
- Soviet-Turkish relations, 23, 24
- Turkish European Community membership, 24
- U.S. bases in Turkey, 113, 118, 123, 147
- U.S. economic aid to Turkey, 113, 129
- U.S. military aid to Turkey, 113, 118
- U.S. package offer to Turkey (1978), 112, 113
- U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 19, 46, 88, 107, 109, 113  
 Vance Turkey visit (1978), 105, 107
- Egypt, 47, 48, 49, 130
- Eizenstat, Stuart L., 1
- Elekdağ, Şükrü:  
 Aegean dispute, 123  
 Arms embargo repeal, 57, 113, 116  
 Carter-Evren correspondence, 161  
 Cyprus dispute, 55, 99, 104, 117  
 Economic situation, 123  
 Greek NATO reintegration, 156, 158, 186  
 IMF role in Turkey, 122  
 SALT overflight request, 138  
 Turkish NATO participation, 118  
 U.S. military aid to Turkey, 159

Elekdağ, Şükrü—*Continued*

- U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 99, 113
- Eralp, Orhan, 63, 64
- Eralp, Yarim, 138, 156
- Erbakan, Necmettin, 9, 43
- Ericson, Richard, 11
- Erim, Nihat, 151, 154
- Erkmen, Hayrettin, 146, 147, 152
- Ermarth, Fritz, 130, 132
- Ertökün, Necati, 69
- Esenbel, Melih:
  - Arms embargo repeal, 116, 118
  - Cyprus dispute, 84, 99, 104
  - Economic situation, 123
  - U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 84, 91, 99
  - U.S.-Turkish prisoner exchange, 119
- European Commission on Human Rights report, 48
- European Community (EC):
  - Cyprus dispute role, 5, 6, 9, 31, 32, 40, 63
  - Greek membership:
    - CIA memoranda, 21, 24, 188
    - U.S.-Greek communications, 173, 174, 177, 189, 212
  - Turkish membership, 24
- Evren, Gen. Kenan:
  - Carter correspondence, 157, 161
  - Greek NATO reintegration, 157, 209
  - Political situation, 29, 150, 154, 157
  - U.S. military aid to Turkey, 115, 145
- Ewing, Raymond C.:
  - Clifford Mission, 35
  - Cyprus dispute:
    - Newlin/Vest memoranda, 77
    - UN intercommunal talks, 11, 51, 80, 83
    - U.S.-Greek communications, 186
    - U.S.-Greek Cypriot communications, 49, 54, 55
    - U.S.-Turkish communications, 87, 104
    - U.S.-Turkish Cypriot communications, 53
    - Vest memoranda, 40
  - Greek EC membership, 212
  - Greek NATO reintegration, 156, 172, 177, 181, 186, 204
  - Greek political situation, 202
  - Turkey arms embargo repeal, 22, 113
  - Turkish debt rescheduling, 152
  - Turkish economic situation, 123

Ewing, Raymond C.—*Continued*

- Turkish political situation, 151, 155, 157
- U.S. military aid to Turkey, 156
- U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 17, 46, 91, 113
- Export-Import Bank, 123
- Fascell, Dante B., 13
- Federal Republic of Germany (FRG):
  - Cyprus dispute role, 7, 40
  - Economic aid to Turkey, 127, 131, 136, 158
  - Greek NATO reintegration, 209
  - Turkish guest workers in, 125
- Feyzioglu, Turham, 158
- Findley, Paul, 111
- Fitchett, Joseph, 9
- Flanagan, James M., 124
- Ford, Gerald R., 8, 84, 102
- Foreign Assistance Act (1975), 16
- France (*see also* European Community), 127, 136, 192
- Frost, Ellen L., 127
- Funk, Gerald, 132
- Galindo Pohl, Reynaldo, 63, 64
- Gates, Robert M., 26, 60
- Geneva talks. *See* UN intercommunal talks.
- Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 209
- Getler, Michael, 19, 159
- Ghalanos, Alexis, 65
- Giese, Arthur M., 79, 81
- Gilman, Benjamin A., 119
- Giscard-d'Estaing, Valéry, 136
- Glitman, Maynard W., 5, 6
- Gobbi, Hugo, 79, 82
- Grant, Terrance G., 202
- Gratsios, Gen. Agamemnon, 209
- Greece (*see also* Aegean dispute; Cyprus dispute; Greek NATO reintegration; U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement; U.S.-Greek relations):
  - European Community membership:
    - CIA memoranda, 21, 24, 188
    - U.S.-Greek communications, 173, 174, 177, 189, 212
  - Foreign policy, 21
  - Political situation:
    - Bureau of European Affairs paper, 202
    - CIA memoranda, 24, 198

- Greece (*see also* Aegean dispute; Cyprus dispute; Greek NATO reintegration; U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement; U.S.-Greek relations)—*Continued*
- Political situation—*Continued*
- Clift memoranda, 27
- Ecevit-Greek lobby discussions, 117
- Henze memoranda, 201
- Policy Review Committee discussions, 199
- Vance-Greek lobby discussions, 17, 19
- Vance memoranda, 197
- Soviet relations with, 21, 23, 24, 28, 193, 202
- Greek-American community (*see also* U.S. Greek lobby), 7, 25, 27, 68, 207
- Greek Cypriots. *See* Cyprus, Republic of.
- Greek lobby. *See* U.S. Greek lobby.
- Greek NATO reintegration:
- Agreement, 209
- Air Defense Identification Zone issue, 27
- Blackwill memoranda, 194, 205
- Bureau of European Affairs papers, 201, 202
- Carter statement (1980), 81
- CIA memoranda, 21, 24, 182, 198
- Clifford memoranda, 8
- Clift memoranda, 27
- Greek-American community on, 207
- Greek-Turkish communications, 205, 209
- Haig-Davos Agreements:
- Blackwill memoranda, 194
- Harold Brown-Averoff correspondence, 206
- Christopher-Rallis discussions, 184, 186
- NATO-Turkish discussions, 125
- Nimetz-Mitsotakis discussions, 203
- Policy Review Committee discussions, 199
- Siena-Averoff discussions, 192
- Vance-Karamanlis discussions, 177
- Vance-Rallis discussions, 189
- Haig proposals (1979), 189, 190, 191, 194
- NATO-Turkish discussions, 125
- Nimetz-Greek lobby discussions, 197
- Policy Review Committee discussions, 199, 200
- Greek NATO reintegration—*Continued*
- Treverton memoranda, 171
- Turkey arms embargo repeal and, 22
- Turkish political situation and, 29
- U.S.-Greek communications:
- Harold Brown-Averoff correspondence, 206, 208
- Carter-Karamanlis correspondence, 180, 193, 194, 196
- Carter-Rallis correspondence, 204, 205, 209
- Christopher-Rallis discussions, 184, 186
- Haig-Karamanlis correspondence, 191
- McCloskey memoranda, 185
- McCloskey-Molyviatis discussions, 190
- Muskie-Mitsotakis discussions, 203, 211
- Nimetz-Mitsotakis discussions, 203
- Nimetz-Tzounis discussions, 194
- Siena-Averoff discussions, 192
- Vance-Alexandrakis discussions, 162
- Vance-Bitsios discussions, 170
- Vance-Karamanlis discussions, 19, 173, 177
- Vance memoranda, 197
- Vance-Papaligouras discussions, 172
- Vance-Rallis discussions, 181, 189, 194, 196
- U.S.-Greek Cypriot communications, 81
- U.S.-Turkish communications, 152, 156, 157, 158, 160
- Greek-Turkish relations (*see also* Aegean dispute; Cyprus dispute):
- Karamanlis-Ecevit Montreux summit (1978), 111, 112, 116, 173, 175, 176, 177
- Non-aggression pact proposals, 178
- Vance paper, 2
- Griffith, William E., 29
- Gromyko, Andrei A., 36
- Gundersen, Gen. H. F. Zeiner, 106
- Gunes, Turan, 88
- Güvendiren, Ekrem, 99, 100, 104
- Guyer, Roberto, 33, 44
- Gwertzman, Bernard, 116
- Habib, Philip C., 9, 34, 99, 104, 169, 172



- Hackett, Clifford P., 3, 17, 19  
Haig, Gen. Alexander M. Jr. (*see also*  
Haig-Davos Agreements *under*  
Greek NATO reintegration):  
Greek NATO reintegration, 125, 189,  
190, 191, 194, 199  
U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation  
Agreement, 16, 19  
Hamilton, Lee H., 17, 91, 109, 111  
Hammar skjold, Dag, 60  
Hanson, Vice Adm. Thor, 103, 118  
Harris, George S., 176  
Harrison, Roger G., 160  
Hartman, Arthur A., 5, 6, 31, 36, 84, 87,  
163  
Hassan II, 141  
Hellenic Republic. *See* Greece.  
Helman, Gerald, 11, 73  
Henze, Paul B.:  
Cyprus dispute, 5, 6, 15, 26, 59, 68,  
76, 175  
Greek NATO reintegration, 158, 171,  
194, 200, 201, 209  
Kurds, 132  
Turkey arms embargo repeal, 116,  
122  
Turkey SALT overflight request, 135,  
138, 140, 143  
Turkish economic situation, 93, 127  
Turkish political situation, 29, 96, 130,  
140  
U.S. bases in Turkey, 124  
U.S. economic aid to Turkey, 130,  
131, 159  
U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation  
Agreement, 18, 167  
U.S. military aid to Turkey, 12, 130,  
131, 145, 159  
U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation  
Agreement, 16, 18, 89, 111, 148  
Hirsch, John, L., 63, 65  
Holmes, H. Allen, 73, 147, 155, 160  
Hopper, Robert F.:  
Carter-Karamanlis correspondence,  
163  
Clifford Mission, 8, 9, 32, 35  
Cyprus dispute, 63, 196  
Greek NATO reintegration, 181, 196  
Turkish economic situation, 123  
U.S. bases in Turkey, 124  
Hornblow, Michael, 163  
Horowitz, Richard, 19  
Hoskinson, Samuel M., 132  
Houghton, Arthur, 55, 123, 181  
Hovey, Graham, 121, 169  
Hughes, Art, 141  
Human rights issues, 42, 46, 48, 50, 110,  
193  
Humphrey, Hubert H., 91  
Hunter, Robert E.:  
Aegean dispute, 166  
Cyprus dispute, 5, 6, 26, 68, 94  
Greek NATO reintegration, 171  
U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation  
Agreement, 1  
Hussein bin Talal, 141  
Hutcheson, Richard G., 18  
Hyland, William G., 36  
Iakovos (Patriarch of the Greek  
Orthodox Church of North and  
South America), 68  
IMF role in Turkey:  
CIA memoranda, 24  
Henze memoranda, 122  
NATO-Turkish discussions, 125  
Policy Review Committee  
discussions, 127  
U.S.-Turkish communications, 104,  
107, 112, 123  
Vance-Greek lobby discussions, 19  
International Civil Aviation  
Organization (ICAO), 163  
International Committee of the Red  
Cross (ICRC), 52  
International Court of Justice (ICJ), 175  
International Monetary Fund. *See* IMF  
role in Turkey.  
International Security Assistance Act  
(1978), 124  
Ioannides, George, 69  
Ipekçi, Abdi, 130  
Iran:  
Hostage crisis, 152, 158  
Kurds, 132, 141  
Revolution, 63, 130, 133, 141, 145  
Iran-Iraq War, 157, 158, 160  
Işık, Hasan Esat, 55, 88, 107, 116, 118,  
125  
Israel, Turkish relations with, 154, 160  
Jacovides, Andreas, 75, 80, 81, 83  
Japanese economic aid to Turkey, 136,  
141  
Javits, Jacob K., 113  
Jayne, Edward Randy, 131  
Johnson, Lyndon B., 2  
Jones, David T., 81, 82, 83

- Jones, Gen. David C., 125, 145, 191, 199  
 Jordan, Hamilton, 116, 175  
 Judd, Frank, 169
- Kandemir, Nüzhet, 160  
 Kapanli, Turhan, 103  
 Karamanlis, Konstantine (*see also* Carter-Karamanlis correspondence):  
 Aegean dispute:  
 Carter correspondence, 163  
 Carter discussions, 107, 166, 175  
 Clifford discussions, 8, 9, 10  
 Kubisch discussions, 164  
 Vance discussions, 19, 173, 177  
 Christopher Greece visit (1978), 183  
 Clifford Mission, 5, 8, 10, 164, 165  
 Cyprus dispute:  
 Carter correspondence, 10, 163  
 Carter discussions, 37, 119, 175  
 Clifford Mission, 5, 8, 10  
 Clift memoranda, 27  
 Henze memoranda, 26  
 Kubisch discussions, 164  
 Turkish troop withdrawals, 119  
 UN Committee on Cyprus, 196  
 Vance discussions, 19, 173, 177  
 Vance-Greek lobby discussions, 3  
 Ecevit Montreux summit (1978), 111, 112, 116, 173, 175, 176, 177  
 Foreign policy, 21  
 Greek EC membership, 173, 177, 212  
 Greek NATO reintegration:  
 Carter correspondence, 180, 193, 194, 196  
 CIA memoranda, 182  
 Clift memoranda, 27  
 Haig correspondence, 191  
 Vance discussions, 173, 177  
 Vance memoranda, 197  
 Greek-Turkish non-aggression pact proposals, 178  
 Political situation, 17, 27, 198, 199, 201, 202  
 Soviet-Greek relations, 193  
 Turkey arms embargo repeal, 22, 24, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 184  
 U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement, 9, 19, 40, 173  
 U.S.-Greek relations, 27, 188
- Kelly, John H., 80, 152  
 Kennedy, Mary, 80  
 Khomeini, Ruhollah, 141  
 King, John H., 71, 73
- Kirca, A. Coşkun, 103, 104  
 Kissinger, Henry A.:  
 Aegean dispute, 123  
 Cyprus dispute, 3, 8, 31, 162  
 U.S. military aid to Turkey, 179  
 U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 1, 3, 17, 91, 107
- Knoche, Enno Henry, 5, 6  
 Komer, Robert W., 103, 145  
 Konofaos, Adm. Spyros, 192  
 Korhon, Oğuz Ramadan, 58  
 Kornienko, Georgi M., 36  
 Korutürk, Fahri, 8, 97, 150  
 Kreisky, Bruno, 8  
 Krimer, William D., 36  
 Kristofidis, Ioannis. *See* Christophides, Ioannis  
 Kubisch, Jack B., 164, 168  
 Kurds, 28, 132, 141, 142  
 Kyprianou, Spyros:  
 Cyprus demilitarization proposals, 54, 57, 58, 119  
 Cyprus dispute:  
 Carter correspondence, 48, 50  
 Carter discussions, 45, 56, 59  
 Clifford discussions, 15, 39  
 Clift memoranda, 27  
 Constitutional proposals, 39, 45, 59, 178  
 Denktash summit, 53, 59, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 71  
 Ecevit meeting proposals, 54, 55, 56, 57, 117, 119  
 Four-party meeting proposals, 55  
 International conference proposals, 23  
 McCloskey memoranda, 187  
 Nimetz discussions, 57  
 UN intercommunal talks, 39, 43, 55, 62  
 UN speech (May 24, 1978), 54  
 Vance discussions, 43, 54, 55
- Larnaca incident, 47  
 Political situation, 75, 79  
 Turkey arms embargo repeal, 22, 48, 50  
 UN Committee on Cyprus, 73, 74  
 UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 43  
 U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 46
- Lagacos, Eustache, 172, 186, 189  
 Lance, Thomas Bert, 167

- Larnaca incident (Sebei assassination), 47, 48, 49
- Larrabee, F. Stephen, 26, 212
- Ledsky, Nelson C.:  
  Aegean dispute, 163, 169  
  Çağlayangil U.S. visit, 14  
  Clifford Mission, 8, 9, 32, 35, 88  
  Cyprus dispute:  
    Carter-Karamanlis correspondence, 163  
    Clifford-Kyprianou discussions, 39  
    Habib-Dimitriou discussions, 34  
    Makarios-Denktaş meetings, 84  
    Vance-Bitsios discussions, 169, 170  
    Vance-Çağlayangil discussions, 99  
    Vance-Clerides discussions, 31  
    Vest memoranda, 40  
  UN intercommunal talks, 11, 43  
  U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 17, 84, 99
- Leonard, James F., 43, 54, 117
- Levitsky, Melvyn, 63, 71, 73
- Libya, 19, 79
- Lipshutz, Robert, 163
- Long, Clarence, 139
- Lowenstein, James G., 9, 11
- Luns, Joseph M.A.H., 125, 209
- Lyssarides, Vassos, 47, 187
- Macomber, William B., 8, 84, 107
- Makarios III (Archbishop of Cyprus):  
  Carter correspondence, 8, 10, 35  
  CIA allegations, 9  
  Clifford Mission, 8, 9, 32, 35  
  Death of, 41, 42, 47, 98, 169  
  Denktaş meetings, 5, 8, 31, 32, 84  
  Health of, 37, 38  
  Territorial division proposals, 3, 8  
  UN intercommunal talks, 8, 32, 38
- Manatos, Andrew E., 25
- Maresca, Frank, 127
- Martin, Thomas G., 51
- Matthoefer, Hans, 158
- Mautner, Martha, 28
- Mavrommatis, Andreas, 80
- Maynes, C. William, 33, 44, 51, 53, 54
- McClellan, John L., 178
- McCloskey, Robert J.:  
  Ambassadorial appointment, 169, 174  
  Carter-Karamanlis correspondence, 174  
  Cyprus dispute, 178, 187  
  Greek NATO reintegration, 185  
    Carter-Rallis correspondence, 204
- McCloskey, Robert J.—*Continued*  
  Greek NATO  
    reintegration—*Continued*  
    Christopher-Rallis discussions, 184  
    Greek-Turkish communications, 209  
    Haig-Karamanlis correspondence, 191  
    Molyviatis discussions, 190  
    Nimetz-Mitsotakis discussions, 203  
    Nimetz-Tzounis discussions, 194  
    Policy Review Committee discussions, 199  
  Turkey arms embargo repeal, 185  
  U.S. bases in Greece, 211  
  U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement, 210  
  U.S.-Greek relations, 188  
  U.S. military aid to Turkey, 145
- McGiffert, David E., 103, 118, 127, 192, 200
- McGovern, George S., 121
- McHugh, Matthew, 139
- McIntyre, James T., Jr., 102, 131, 153
- McNamara, Robert S., 141
- Mezvinsky, Edward, 53
- Michaelides, Alekos, 49, 61
- Mills, Hawthorne Q., 173
- Mitsotakis, Konstantine, 202, 203, 204, 205, 209, 211
- Molyviatis, Petros, 166, 173, 175, 177, 190
- Mondale, Walter F.:  
  Clifford Mission, 10  
  Cyprus dispute, 4, 27, 33, 175  
  Greek NATO reintegration, 199  
  Turkish economic situation, 93  
  UN intercommunal talks, 70  
  U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement, 18  
  U.S. military aid to Turkey, 13, 20  
  U.S. package offer to Turkey (1978), 113  
  U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 13, 18
- Montreux summit (1978), 111, 112, 116, 173, 175, 176, 177
- Moore, Frank B., 18, 111
- Moose, Richard, 3
- Müezzinoğlu, Ziya, 107, 122, 123
- Mumford, William, F., 125
- Muskie, Edmund S.:  
  Carter-Evren correspondence, 161  
  Cyprus dispute, 152, 160, 211

- Muskie, Edmund S.—*Continued*  
 Greek EC membership, 212  
 Greek NATO reintegration, 152, 156,  
 160, 203, 204, 205, 211  
 Turkish debt rescheduling, 152, 153  
 Turkish political situation, 151, 152,  
 156  
 UN intercommunal talks, 80, 81  
 U.S. bases in Greece, 211  
 U.S. economic aid to Turkey, 160
- Nachmanoff, Arnold, 131
- Newlin, Michael H., 77
- Newsom, David D., 51, 124
- Nicolaides, Andros A., 39, 68
- Nimetz, Matthew:  
 Aegean dispute, 88, 169, 181  
 Çağlayangil U.S. visit, 14  
 Clifford Mission, 7, 8, 9, 10, 32, 88,  
 164  
 Cyprus dispute, 22, 98  
 Demilitarization proposals, 119  
 Denktash-Kyprianou summit, 63,  
 65, 71  
 Four-party meeting proposals, 119  
 Human Rights Report, 46, 110  
 Newlin/Vest memoranda, 77  
 UN Committee on Cyprus, 196  
 UN Peacekeeping Force, 53  
 U.S.-Greek communications, 169,  
 170, 175, 186, 196  
 U.S.-Greek Cypriot  
 communications, 34, 49, 55, 57,  
 59, 61  
 U.S.-Turkish communications, 88,  
 99  
 U.S.-Turkish Cypriot  
 communications, 52, 53, 58  
 Vance-Greek lobby discussions, 17  
 Vest memoranda, 40  
 Greek-American community, 25  
 Greek NATO reintegration:  
 Christopher-Rallis discussions, 184,  
 186  
 Greek lobby discussions, 197  
 Haig-Karamanlis correspondence,  
 191  
 Mitsotakis discussions, 203  
 Policy Review Committee  
 discussions, 200  
 Tzounis discussions, 194  
 U.S.-Turkish communications, 156  
 Vance-Karamanlis discussions, 177
- Nimetz, Matthew—*Continued*  
 Greek NATO  
 reintegration—*Continued*  
 Vance-Rallis discussions, 181, 189,  
 196  
 Greek political situation, 17, 202  
 Turkey arms embargo repeal, 22, 119  
 Greek response, 176  
 U.S.-Turkish communications, 57,  
 113, 116  
 U.S.-Turkish Cypriot  
 communications, 52, 58  
 Turkish debt rescheduling, 152  
 Turkish economic situation, 123, 127  
 Turkish NATO participation, 118  
 Turkish political situation, 40, 151  
 UN intercommunal talks, 71, 98  
 Stone-Pérez de Cuéllar discussions,  
 69  
 U.S.-British-Canadian “non-paper,”  
 61, 119  
 U.S.-Greek communications, 75, 80,  
 196  
 U.S.-Greek Cypriot  
 communications, 43, 61, 81, 83  
 U.S.-Turkish communications, 91  
 Vance memoranda, 51  
 Vest memoranda, 82  
 Waldheim discussions, 61, 63  
 U.S. bases in Turkey, 124, 147  
 U.S. economic aid to Turkey, 113, 131  
 U.S. military aid to Turkey, 17, 98,  
 113, 131, 141, 146  
 U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation  
 Agreement, 98, 147  
 Carter-Clifford discussions, 16  
 Greek lobby discussions, 110  
 U.S.-Turkish communications, 113  
 Vance-Çağlayangil discussions, 99  
 Vance-Dimitriou discussions, 46  
 Vance-Esenbel discussions, 91  
 Vance-Greek lobby discussions, 17  
 Vance Turkey visit (1978), 105
- Nix, John, 71
- Nixon, Richard M., 132
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
 (NATO) (*see also* Greek NATO  
 reintegration; Turkish NATO  
 participation), 2, 114, 125, 141, 155
- Nossiter, Bernard D., 34
- Nunn, Samuel, 116
- OECD Consortium to Aid Turkey, 123,  
 141, 152, 153

- Ohira, Masayoshi, 136  
Ökçün, Ahmet Gündüz:  
    Aegean dispute, 43, 123, 181, 184  
    Arms embargo repeal, 113, 116, 118  
    Cyprus dispute, 43, 117, 123  
    Economic situation, 123  
    U.S. bases in Turkey, 123, 141  
    U.S. military aid to Turkey, 113, 123, 141  
    U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 113  
    U.S.-Turkish prisoner exchange, 123  
Olçay, Osman, 160  
Olsen, Arthur J., 186  
Onan, Ümit Süleyman, 69  
O'Neill, Thomas "Tip," 111  
Owen, David, 8, 9, 10, 55  
Owen, Henry D., 127, 131, 136  
Özal, Turgut, 154, 158  
Ozceri, M. Tugay, 103  
Öztorun, Lt. Gen. Necdet, 89  
  
Papadopoulos, Tassos, 38, 52, 55, 169  
Papaioannou, Ezekias, 187  
Papaligouras, Panayotis A., 172, 173  
Papandreou, Andreas, 17, 19, 21, 24, 171, 189, 202  
Papoulias, Georgios, 169, 170, 177, 181  
Paul, Bill, 116  
Pazdral, Nuel L., 34  
Pelagias, Georges, 43, 45, 54, 55, 59, 74  
Pelikan, Robert, 131  
Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier, 31, 64, 79  
Perry, Jack, 141  
Petree, Richard W., 65, 80, 156  
Petrignani, Rinaldo, 125  
Plaza Lasso, Gala, 64  
Poats, Rutherford M., 127, 131  
Policy Review Committee:  
    Cyprus dispute, 5, 6  
    Greek NATO reintegration, 199, 200  
    U.S. economic aid to Turkey, 127, 131  
Powell, Joseph L., Jr., "Jody", 116  
Presidential Determinations:  
    No. 78-18, "United States-Turkey Military Cooperation," 181  
Presidential Review Memoranda:  
    PRM/NSC 5, "Cyprus/Aegean," 4  
Pugh, Robert L., 212  
Pustay, Lt. Gen. John, 200  
  
Qadhafi, Muammar, 19, 79  
Quandt, William B., 132  
  
Rallis, Georgios:  
    Aegean dispute, 181, 184, 186  
    Carter correspondence, 204, 205, 209  
    Cyprus dispute, 175, 178, 186, 187, 196  
    Greek NATO reintegration:  
        Agreement, 209  
        Carter correspondence, 204, 205, 209  
    Christopher discussions, 184, 186  
    Policy Review Committee discussions, 199  
    Vance-Karamanlis discussions, 177  
    Vance discussions, 181, 189, 194, 196  
    Political situation, 202  
    Soviet-Greek relations, 21, 22, 24  
Ratigan, John R., 163  
Raven, Eleanore M., 212  
Reddy, Leo, 35  
Reynders, Thomas, 63, 123, 181  
Roberts, Steven V., 9, 88  
Rogers, Gen. Bernard W.:  
    Cyprus dispute, 27  
    Greek NATO reintegration, 157, 196, 199, 200, 201, 204, 205, 206, 209  
    U.S. military aid to Turkey, 145  
Rolandis, Nicos A.:  
    Cyprus dispute, 54, 55, 57, 59, 61, 65  
    UN Committee on Cyprus, 73, 75  
    UN intercommunal talks, 63, 75, 80, 187  
Rosenthal, Benjamin S. (*see also* U.S. Greek lobby):  
    Cyprus dispute, 14, 15, 117  
    Greek political situation, 19  
    U.S. military aid to Turkey, 13  
    U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 3, 19, 91  
Rossides, Zenon, 43, 45, 54, 55  
Rousakis, John P., 207  
Roussos, Gen. Stavros, 203, 210  
Rumsfeld, Donald S., 88  
  
al-Sadat, Anwar, 47  
Şahinbaş, Faruk, 133, 138, 141, 146  
Saltik, Gen. Haydar, 145  
Sancar, Gen. Semih, 5, 89  
Sanders, Edward, 127  
Sarbanes, Paul S. (*see also* U.S. Greek lobby):  
    Cyprus dispute, 5, 14, 15, 17, 117

- Sarbanes, Paul S. (*see also* U.S. Greek lobby)—*Continued*  
 Greek NATO reintegration, 197  
 Turkey arms embargo repeal, 117  
 U.S. military aid to Turkey, 13, 16, 17  
 U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 3, 9, 17, 19, 110
- Saudi Arabia, 28
- Saunders, Harold H., 173
- Sawyer, Harold, 119
- Schaufele, William E., Jr., 17, 169
- Schechter, Jerrold, 59
- Schlesinger, James R., 3
- Schmidt, Helmut, 136
- Sebastian, Peter, 34, 87, 163
- Sebei, Yusuf, 47, 48, 49
- Seitz, Raymond G., 80, 155
- Shear, Adm. Harold E., 125, 145, 191
- Sherry, George L., 61, 63, 65, 71
- Shitikov, Aleksii Pavlovich, 143
- Sick, Gary G., 130, 132
- Siena, James V., 103, 118, 131, 192, 200
- Sismik* incident, 8, 9, 88, 163, 164, 173
- Slavin, Barbara, 88
- Slocombe, Walter B., 36
- Smirnov, Leonid V., 36
- Smith, Lt. Gen. William Y., 5, 6, 127, 131
- Smith, Richard A., Jr., 155
- Solarz, Stephen J., 91
- Solomon, Anthony, 127
- Soulioti, Stella, 64
- Soviet Union:  
 Afghanistan invasion, 28, 75, 152, 157  
 Cyprus dispute, 36, 91  
 Greek relations with, 21, 23, 24, 28, 193, 202  
 Kurds, 132  
 Turkey SALT overflight request, 138, 139, 143  
 Turkish relations with, 21, 23, 24, 28, 36  
 U.S. bases in Turkey, 23, 107, 135
- Soydan, Lt. Gen. Ihsan, 89
- Soysal, Mümtaz, 69
- Spain, James W., 148, 152, 154, 157, 158
- Sparkman, John J., 9, 91, 111
- Spector, Phil, 68
- Spiegel, Daniel, 43, 65, 107
- Spiegel, John, 186
- Spiers, Ronald I.:  
 Christopher Turkey visit (1979), 137  
 Cyprus dispute, 99  
 Cyprus political situation, 42  
 Greek NATO reintegration, 125, 191
- Spiers, Ronald I.—*Continued*  
 Turkey arms embargo repeal, 113, 115, 118  
 Turkey SALT overflight request, 138, 139, 143  
 Turkish Cypriot independence, 115  
 Turkish political situation, 142, 144  
 U.S. economic aid to Turkey, 130  
 U.S. military aid to Turkey, 109, 113, 133, 145  
 U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 42, 99, 109, 110, 113  
 Vance Turkey visit (1978), 105, 107  
 Stoforopoulos, Euthimios, 203
- Stone, Galen L.:  
 Cyprus dispute, 57, 58, 64, 66  
 Turkish Cypriot independence, 72  
 UN Committee on Cyprus, 73, 74  
 UN intercommunal talks, 61, 64, 69
- Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 134, 135, 138, 139, 140, 143
- Sukhodrev, Viktor M., 36
- Swiers, Peter B., 124
- Tarnoff, Peter R., 3, 14, 162, 173, 202
- Taylor, James E., 212
- Taylor, Jane, 151
- Theodoropolous, Vyron, 123, 172, 173, 184, 186, 189, 196
- Thompson, Gen. James, 145
- Thornton, Thomas P., 44, 45
- Tito, Josip Broz, 189
- Tobin, James E., 77
- Toon, Malcolm S., 23, 36
- Treverton, Gregory F.:  
 Clifford Mission, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 88  
 Cyprus dispute, 5, 50  
 Greek NATO reintegration, 171  
 U.S. military aid to Turkey, 13  
 U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 13, 89, 108
- Triantafyllides, Michalakis, 69
- Truman, Harry S., 94, 166
- Tsamados, Constantine, 196
- Tsatsos, Konstantinos, 8, 173
- Tuchman, Jessica, 33
- Tülümen, Turgot, 55, 99, 104, 113, 116
- Türkeş, Alparslan, 40, 126
- Turkey (*see also* Aegean dispute;  
 Cyprus dispute; IMF role in Turkey; Turkish NATO participation; Turkish political situation; U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement; U.S.-Turkish relations):  
 Debt rescheduling, 123, 131, 152, 153

- Turkey (*see also* Aegean dispute;  
Cyprus dispute; IMF role in  
Turkey; Turkish NATO  
participation; Turkish political  
situation; U.S.-Turkish Defense  
Cooperation Agreement;  
U.S.-Turkish relations)—*Continued*  
Economic situation, 93, 109, 123, 125,  
127, 152  
European Community membership,  
24  
Foreign policy, 21  
Kurds, 28, 132, 142  
Multilateral economic aid, 123, 127,  
129, 131, 136, 141, 158  
Non-U.S. arms sources, 95  
Soviet relations with, 21, 23, 24, 28, 36  
Turkish Cypriots (*see also* Cyprus  
dispute):  
Carter-Denkash correspondence, 8,  
10  
Clifford-Denkash meetings, 8, 10  
Economic situation, 26, 31, 58, 72  
Greek Cypriot economic aid  
proposals, 58, 75  
Independence proposals, 72, 115  
Political situation, 55  
Vance-Clerides discussions, 31  
Vance-Clifford discussions, 9  
Turkish NATO participation, 24, 103  
Brzezinski memoranda, 18  
Carter-Clifford discussions, 16  
CIA memoranda, 24  
Spiers memoranda, 109  
U.S.-Turkish communications, 8, 103,  
116, 118  
Vance-Greek lobby discussions, 3  
Vance memoranda, 20  
Turkish occupation of Northern  
Cyprus. *See* Cyprus dispute.  
Turkish political situation, 97  
CIA memoranda, 126, 128, 140, 144,  
150  
Clifford-Makarios discussions, 38  
Clift memoranda, 27  
Ecevit, briefing on, 96  
Evren memoranda, 150  
Henze memoranda, 29, 96, 130, 140  
Martial law (1978), 126, 127, 130  
Military takeover (1980), 29, 80, 154,  
155, 157, 158, 205  
Muskie memoranda, 151  
Nimetz memoranda, 71  
Nimetz-Waldheim discussions, 65  
Turkish political situation—*Continued*  
Policy Review Committee  
discussions, 5  
Spain memoranda, 158  
Spiers memoranda, 142  
U.S.-Turkish communications, 15,  
156, 157  
Vance-Clifford discussions, 9  
Vance-Greek lobby discussions, 3  
Vest memoranda, 40  
Türkmen, İlter, 3, 80, 83, 99, 117, 156,  
160  
Turner, Adm. Stansfield M., 4, 5, 6, 127,  
128, 195, 199  
Twaddell, William H., 31, 36, 84, 91  
Tzounis, John A.:  
Aegean dispute, 173  
Ambassadorial appointment, 27, 193  
Cyprus dispute, 173, 175, 186  
Greek NATO reintegration:  
Christopher-Rallis discussions, 184,  
186  
McCloskey-Molyviatis discussions,  
190  
Nimetz discussions, 194  
Vance-Karamanlis discussions, 173  
Vance memoranda, 197  
Vance-Papaligouras discussions,  
172  
Vance-Rallis discussions, 181, 189  
U.S.-Greek relations, 195  
UN General Assembly Resolution 32/15,  
17  
UN General Assembly Resolution 32/  
128, 52  
UN General Assembly Resolution 33/15,  
61  
UN General Assembly Resolution 34/30,  
27, 74  
UN General Assembly Resolution 3212,  
1, 2, 59  
UN intercommunal talks:  
Carter-Clifford discussions, 7  
Carter-Waldheim discussions, 70  
Christopher memoranda, 70  
Christopher-Waldheim discussions,  
70, 186  
Clifford memoranda, 8  
Clifford-Waldheim discussions, 8, 9  
Clift memoranda, 27  
Henze memoranda, 76  
Lowenstein memoranda, 11  
Newlin/Vest memoranda, 77

- UN intercommunal talks—*Continued*  
 Nimetz memoranda, 71, 98  
 Nimetz-Waldheim discussions, 61, 63  
 Stone memoranda, 64  
 Stone-Pérez de Cuéllar discussions, 69  
 UN General Assembly Resolution 32/15, 17  
 U.S.-British-Canadian "non-paper," 61, 62, 64, 119, 186, 187  
 U.S.-Greek communications, 173, 177, 186, 196  
 U.S.-Greek Cypriot communications:  
 Christopher-Rolandis discussions, 75  
 Clifford-Christophides discussions, 41  
 Clifford-Kyprianou discussions, 39  
 Clifford-Makarios discussions, 8, 32, 38  
 Habib-Dimitriou discussions, 34  
 Nimetz-Jacovides discussions, 81, 83  
 Nimetz-Michaelides/Rolandis discussions, 61  
 Vance-Clerides discussions, 31  
 Vance-Kyprianou discussions, 43, 55  
 Vance-Michaelides discussions, 49  
 Vance-Rolandis discussions, 75, 80  
 U.S.-Soviet communications, 36  
 U.S.-Turkish communications, 63, 91, 100  
 U.S.-Turkish Cypriot communications, 52, 58, 61  
 Vance-Greek lobby discussions, 17  
 Vance memoranda, 51  
 Vance-Waldheim discussions, 49  
 Vest memoranda, 79, 82  
 Waldheim report (1980), 76  
 UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), 43, 53, 77  
 UN Security Council Resolution 186, 43  
 UN Security Council Resolution 365, 1  
 UN Security Council Resolution 395, 163  
 UN Security Council Resolution 414, 61  
 UN Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD), 52, 54  
 UN Subcommittee on the Protection of Minorities and Prevention of Discriminatory Treatment, 5  
 United Kingdom (*see also* European Community):  
 Clifford Mission, 9  
 United Kingdom (*see also* European Community)—*Continued*  
 Cyprus bases, 8, 9, 10, 45  
 Cyprus dispute:  
 Carrington-Rallis discussions, 196  
 Clifford-Owen discussions, 8  
 Four-party meeting proposals, 55  
 Newlin/Vest memoranda, 77  
 U.S.-British-Canadian "non-paper," 61, 62, 64, 119, 186, 187  
 Vest memoranda, 40  
 Economic aid to Turkey, 127, 136  
 United Nations (*see also* UN intercommunal talks; Waldheim, Kurt):  
 Charter, 45  
 UN Committee on Cyprus, 27, 73, 74, 75, 77, 79, 196  
 UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 43, 53, 77  
 Urquhart, Brian, 44, 52, 61, 63, 65  
 U.S. economic aid to Turkey:  
 Guadeloupe initiative, 127, 129, 131  
 Henze memoranda, 130  
 Owen memoranda, 136  
 Policy Review Committee discussions, 127, 131  
 U.S.-Turkish communications, 113, 159, 160  
 Vance memoranda, 139  
 Vest memoranda, 40  
 U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement:  
 Harold Brown memoranda, 106  
 Brzezinski memoranda, 18  
 Carter-Clifford discussions, 7, 16  
 Clifford memoranda, 8  
 Clifford Mission, 8  
 Kubisch memoranda, 168  
 Lance/Brzezinski memoranda, 167  
 Lowenstein memoranda, 11  
 Policy Review Committee discussions, 5, 6  
 Presidential Review Memoranda, 4  
 U.S.-Greek communications, 19, 169, 170, 172, 173, 210  
 U.S.-Turkish communications, 91  
 Vance-Clifford discussions, 9  
 Vance-Greek lobby discussions, 3, 17, 19  
 Vest memoranda, 40  
 U.S. Greek lobby:  
 Çağlayangil discussions, 15  
 Carter-Clifford discussions, 16



- U.S. Greek lobby—*Continued*
  - CIA memoranda, 195
  - Cyprus dispute:
    - Çağlayangil discussions, 14
    - Carter discussions, 13
    - Clifford discussions, 14, 15
    - Ecevit discussions, 117
    - Henze memoranda, 26
    - Nimetz discussions, 110
    - Vance discussions, 3, 17, 19
    - Vest memoranda, 40
  - Greek NATO reintegration, 197
  - Greek political situation, 17, 19, 117
  - Turkey arms embargo repeal, 117
  - U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement, 3, 17, 19
  - U.S. military aid to Turkey, 9, 12, 13, 17
  - U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement:
    - Çağlayangil discussions, 15
    - Carter-Clifford discussions, 16
    - Carter discussions, 13
    - Clifford discussions, 14
    - Moore/Beckel/Bennet memoranda, 111
    - Nimetz discussions, 110
    - Vance discussions, 3, 17, 19
  - Vance memoranda, 101
- U.S.-Greek relations (*see also* Carter-Karamanlis correspondence):
  - Carter-Rallis correspondence, 204, 205, 209
  - Carter-Tsatsos correspondence, 8
  - Christopher Greece visit (1978), 182, 183, 184, 185
  - CIA memoranda, 188, 195
  - Clift memoranda, 27
  - Schaufele appointment, 17, 169
- U.S. bases:
  - Carter-Clifford discussions, 7
  - CIA memoranda, 21, 24
  - Clifford Mission discussions, 8
  - Lowenstein memoranda, 11
  - U.S.-Greek communications, 173, 203, 204, 205, 211
- Voice of America negotiations, 190
- U.S. military aid to Greece:
  - Carter-Karamanlis correspondence, 179
  - Lance/Brzezinski memoranda, 167
  - Lowenstein memoranda, 11
  - Nimetz-Greek lobby discussions, 197
  - U.S. military aid to Greece—*Continued*
    - Vance memoranda, 12, 20
- U.S. military aid to Turkey (*see also* U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement), 102
  - Arms embargo, 16, 17
    - CIA memoranda, 95
    - Nimetz memoranda, 98
    - Partial repeal (Oct. 1974), 1
    - Policy Review Committee discussions, 6
  - Spiers interview, 110
  - Spiers memoranda, 109, 133
  - U.S.-Turkish discussions, 8, 9, 94
  - Waiver rights proposal, 3
- Arms embargo repeal, 24, 121
  - Christopher memoranda, 120
  - Greek response, 176
  - Henze memoranda, 122
  - Nimetz memoranda, 22, 119
  - Soviet response, 23
  - Spiers memoranda, 115
  - U.S.-Greek communications, 172, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 184, 185
- U.S.-Greek Cypriot communications, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50
- U.S.-Turkish communications, 57, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118
- U.S.-Turkish Cypriot communications, 52, 53, 58
- Vance memoranda, 20
- Brzezinski memoranda, 12
- Carter-Clifford discussions, 7, 10, 16
- Carter-Greek lobby discussions, 13
- Clifford memoranda, 8
- Henze memoranda, 130
- Lowenstein memoranda, 11
- Policy Review Committee discussions, 6, 131
- U.S.-Greek communications, 8
- U.S.-Turkish communications:
  - Harold Brown-Ecevit discussions, 118
  - Brzezinski-Elekdağ correspondence, 159
  - Christopher-Ecevit discussions, 113
  - Muskie-Türkmen discussions, 156
  - Nimetz-Şahinbaş discussions, 146
  - Spiers-Evren discussions, 145
  - Vance-Erkman discussions, 146
  - Vance-Esenbel discussions, 91
  - Vance-Ökçün discussions, 123, 141

- U.S. military aid to Turkey (*see also*  
U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation  
Agreement)—*Continued*  
Vance-Greek lobby discussions, 9, 17  
Vance memoranda, 12, 20, 92, 101,  
139  
Vest memoranda, 40  
U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation  
Agreement:  
Harold Brown memoranda, 106  
Brzezinski memoranda, 12, 18, 108  
Carter-Clifford discussions, 7, 16  
Carter-Greek lobby discussions, 13  
Clifford-Greek lobby discussions, 14  
Clifford memoranda, 8  
Eagleton memoranda, 1  
Finalization, 147, 148, 149  
Lowenstein memoranda, 11  
Moore/Beckel/Bennet memoranda,  
111  
Nimetz-Greek lobby discussions, 110  
Nimetz memoranda, 98, 147  
Policy Review Committee  
discussions, 5, 6  
Presidential Review Memoranda, 4  
Spiers interview, 110  
Spiers memoranda, 42, 109  
Treverton memoranda, 108  
U.S.-Greek communications, 107, 173  
U.S.-Greek Cypriot communications,  
32, 34, 46  
U.S.-Turkish communications, 8  
Çağlayangil-Greek lobby  
discussions, 15  
Carter-Demirel correspondence, 86,  
148, 149  
Carter-Demirel discussions, 94  
Christopher-Ecevit discussions, 113  
Clifford-Ecevit discussions, 88  
Clifford-Esenbel discussions, 91  
Clifford-Turkish General Staff  
discussions, 89  
Vance-Çağlayangil discussions, 15,  
16, 99, 100  
Vance-Ecevit discussions, 19, 107  
Vance-Esenbel discussions, 84, 91  
Vance-Ökçün discussions, 141  
Vance-Clifford discussions, 9  
Vance-Greek lobby discussions, 3, 17,  
19  
Vance memoranda, 20, 92, 101, 106  
U.S.-Turkish relations:  
Çağlayangil U.S. visit, 14  
U.S.-Turkish relations—*Continued*  
Carter-Demirel correspondence, 10,  
86, 87, 90, 148, 149  
Carter-Ecevit correspondence, 112,  
114, 121, 129, 134, 135, 137  
Carter-Evren correspondence, 157,  
161  
Carter-Korutürk correspondence, 8  
Christopher visit (1979), 129, 137  
Clifford Mission discussions, 8  
Package offer (1978), 112, 113  
Prisoner exchange, 119, 123, 152  
SALT overflight request, 134, 135,  
138, 139, 140, 143  
U.S. bases (*see also* U.S.-Turkish  
Defense Cooperation  
Agreement):  
Arms embargo repeal and, 22  
Carter-Clifford communications, 7  
CIA memoranda, 21  
Henze memoranda, 130  
Nimetz memoranda, 147  
Policy Review Committee  
discussions, 5  
Soviet concern over, 23, 107, 135  
U.S.-Turkish communications, 3,  
113, 118, 123, 141  
Vance-Clifford discussions, 9  
Vest memoranda, 124  
Vance Turkey visit (1978), 105, 107  
Vance Mission (1967), 2, 162  
Vance, Cyrus R.:  
Aegean dispute:  
Bitsios discussions, 169  
Carter-Karamanlis correspondence,  
163  
Carter-Karamanlis discussions, 166  
Ecevit discussions, 107  
Esenbel discussions, 91  
Karamanlis discussions, 19, 173,  
177  
Ökçün discussions, 123  
Rallis discussions, 181  
Clifford Mission, 5, 6, 9, 10  
Cyprus demilitarization proposals, 58  
Cyprus dispute, 2  
Carter-Waldheim discussions, 33,  
44  
Clifford-Greek lobby discussions,  
14  
Constitutional proposals, 9  
Denktash discussions, 53  
Four-party meeting proposals, 55

Vance, Cyrus R.—*Continued*Cyprus dispute—*Continued*

- Greek lobby discussions, 3, 17, 19
- Human Rights Report, 46
- Makarios-Denktaş meetings, 5, 31, 84
- Nimetz memoranda, 98
- Policy Review Committee discussions, 5
- Presidential Review Memoranda, 4
- UN Committee on Cyprus, 73, 74
- U.S.-Greek communications:
  - Alexandrakis discussions, 162
  - Bitsios discussions, 169, 170
  - Carter-Karamanlis correspondence, 163
  - Karamanlis discussions, 19, 173, 177
  - Papaligouras discussions, 172
  - Rallis discussions, 196
- U.S.-Greek Cypriot communications:
  - Clerides discussions, 31
  - Habib-Dimitriou discussions, 34
  - Kyprianou discussions, 43, 54, 55
  - Michaelides discussions, 49
- U.S.-Soviet communications, 36
- U.S.-Turkish communications:
  - Çağlayangil discussions, 15, 16, 99, 100, 104
  - Carter-Demirel discussions, 94
  - Ecevit discussions, 19, 107
  - Ökçün discussions, 123
- Vance Mission (1967), 2, 162
- Vest memoranda, 40
- Waldheim discussions, 37
- Greek NATO reintegration, 19, 197
  - Alexandrakis discussions, 162
  - Bitsios discussions, 170
- Haig-Karamanlis correspondence, 191
- Karamanlis discussions, 19, 173, 177
- Papaligouras discussions, 172
- Policy Review Committee discussions, 199
- Rallis discussions, 181, 189, 194, 196
- Greek political situation, 17, 19
- IMF role in Turkey, 19, 104, 107, 123
- Larnaca incident, 47
- NATO-Turkish discussions, 125
- Turkey arms embargo repeal, 20, 22, 47, 49, 53, 116, 119, 177

Vance, Cyrus R.—*Continued*

- Turkey SALT overflight request, 134, 139
- Turkish economic situation, 123, 125, 127
- UN intercommunal talks, 51
  - Clerides discussions, 31
  - Clifford discussions, 9
  - Greek lobby discussions, 17
  - Karamanlis discussions, 173, 177
  - Kyprianou discussions, 43, 55
  - Lowenstein memoranda, 11
  - Rallis discussions, 196
  - Rolandis discussions, 75, 80
  - U.S.-British-Canadian "non-paper," 61
  - Waldheim discussions, 49
- UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, 43, 53
- U.S. bases in Greece, 173
- U.S. bases in Turkey, 9, 123, 141, 147
- U.S. economic aid to Turkey, 139
- U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement, 3, 9, 17, 19, 169, 170, 172, 173
- U.S. military aid to Greece, 12, 20
- U.S. military aid to Turkey, 12, 20, 92, 102, 139
  - Harold Brown memoranda, 133
  - Greek lobby discussions, 9, 17
- International Relations Committee statement, 179
- Lowenstein memoranda, 11
- Spiers-Evren discussions, 145
- U.S.-Turkish communications, 91, 123, 141, 146
- U.S. package offer to Turkey (1978), 113
- U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 20, 92, 101, 106
  - Brzezinski memoranda, 108
  - Çağlayangil discussions, 15, 16, 99, 100
  - Carter-Clifford discussions, 16
  - Clifford discussions, 9
  - Dimitriou discussions, 46
  - Ecevit discussions, 19, 107
  - Esenbel discussions, 84, 91
  - Greek lobby discussions, 3, 17, 19
  - Nimetz-Greek lobby discussions, 110
  - Nimetz memoranda, 98, 147
  - Ökçün discussions, 141

- Vance, Cyrus R.—*Continued*  
 U.S.-Turkish prisoner exchange, 123  
 U.S.-Turkish relations:  
   Çağlayanlı communications, 3  
   Turkey visit (1978), 105, 107
- Varosha. *See* Cyprus dispute, Varosha issue.
- Vest, George S.:  
 Aegean dispute, 169  
 Cyprus dispute, 40, 77, 79, 82  
   U.S.-Greek communications, 169, 175, 186, 196  
   U.S.-Greek Cypriot communications, 45, 54, 55  
   U.S.-Turkish communications, 99, 104  
   Vance-Greek lobby discussions, 17  
 Greek EC membership, 212  
 Greek NATO reintegration:  
   McCloskey-Molyviatis discussions, 190  
   Muskie-Türkmen discussions, 156  
   Policy Review Committee discussions, 200  
   U.S.-Greek communications, 172, 177, 181, 186, 196  
   Vance-Rallis discussions, 189  
 Greek political situation, 17  
 Turkey arms embargo repeal, 22, 113, 116  
 Turkey visit (1978), 105  
 Turkish debt rescheduling, 152  
 Turkish economic situation, 123, 127  
 Turkish political situation, 126, 151  
 UN intercommunal talks, 77, 79, 82  
   Nimetz-Waldheim discussions, 63  
   Stone-Pérez de Cuéllar discussions, 69  
   Vance-Kyprianou discussions, 43  
   Vance memoranda, 51  
   Vance-Rolandis discussions, 80  
 U.S. bases in Turkey, 124  
 U.S. economic aid to Turkey, 40, 113  
 U.S.-Greek Defense Cooperation Agreement, 17  
 U.S. military aid to Turkey, 17, 40, 113, 141, 156  
 U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement, 17, 19, 99, 110, 113  
 Vienna negotiations. *See* UN intercommunal talks.
- Voice of America (VOA), 190
- Waldheim, Kurt J.:  
 Cyprus dispute:  
   Carter discussions, 33, 44  
   Clifford Mission, 8, 9  
   Denktash-Kyprianou summit, 65, 67  
   Four-party meeting proposals, 119  
   Makarios-Denktash meetings, 5, 8, 31  
   Turkish Cypriot proposals (Apr. 1978), 52  
   Vance discussions, 37  
   Vance-Michaelides discussions, 49  
   Varosha issue, 119
- UN intercommunal talks:  
   Carter-Clifford discussions, 7  
   Carter discussions, 70  
   Christopher discussions, 70, 186  
   Clifford Mission discussions, 8, 9  
   Clift memoranda, 27  
   Nimetz discussions, 61, 63  
   Report (1980), 76  
   Stone memoranda, 64  
   U.S.-British-Canadian "non-paper," 61  
   Vance discussions, 49
- Walker, Col. Norman, 118
- Warnke, Paul C., 36
- West Germany. *See* Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
- Weston, Thomas G., 124
- Wexler, Anne, 207
- White, John, 127
- Williams, Brig. Gen. James A., 71, 73, 126, 151
- Wisner, Frank G., 54
- World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), 141
- Wright, Jim, 121
- Yerocostopoulos, Constantin, 196
- Yiğit, Özdemir, 152
- Young, Andrew J., 4, 33, 44, 65
- Zablocki, Clement J., 5, 91, 119, 177
- Zahedi, Ardeshir, 14, 15
- Zaring, Joseph, 127, 131, 200

