

**FOREIGN
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OF THE
UNITED
STATES**

1981–1988

VOLUME V

**SOVIET UNION,
March 1985–
October 1986**



**DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE**

Washington



Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988

Volume V

Soviet Union, March 1985– October 1986

Editor Elizabeth C. Charles
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About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purpose of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government en-

gaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume were located at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, the Department of State in Washington, and the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) in College Park, Maryland.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department's central files for 1981–1989, which were stored in electronic and microfilm formats, will eventually be transferred to the National Archives. Once these files are declassified and processed, they will be accessible. All of the Department's decentralized office files from this period that the National Archives deems worthy of permanent preservation will also eventually be transferred to the National Archives where they will be available for use after declassification and processing.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes in this subseries is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Reagan Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Reagan Library include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Reagan Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration's Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified records held in various Presidential libraries. As a result of

the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the Reagan Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign Relations* volumes have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were "Not found attached."

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to time in Washington. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chiefs of the Declassification and Publishing Divisions. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not declassified.

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important docu-

ments and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2017 and was completed in 2019, resulted in the decision to withhold 1 document in full, excise a paragraph or more in 6 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 18 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and edito-

rial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Reagan administration's policy toward the Soviet Union.

Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.
The Historian

Kathleen Rasmussen, Ph.D.
General Editor

Foreign Service Institute
December 2020

Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Ronald Reagan. This volume documents bilateral relations of the United States with the Soviet Union from March 1985 to October 1986. Due to the importance of U.S.-Soviet relations during the Reagan administration, the Reagan subseries includes an extensive examination of U.S. bilateral relations with the Soviet Union in four volumes: *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983; Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985; Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986; and Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989. In addition, several other volumes in the subseries will provide the reader with a fuller understanding of how U.S.-Soviet relations impacted the global character of the Cold War and U.S. strategy during the Reagan era. For documentation on U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations, see Volume XI, START I, and Volume XII, INF, 1984–1988. *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, Volume V, European Security, 1977–1983, documents the NATO dual-track decision and TNF/INF negotiations. Documentation dealing with nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear testing, chemical and biological weapons, and space arms control, including anti-satellite systems, will be printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XL, Global Issues I. The development of the Strategic Defense Initiative and ABM-related issues and other strategic considerations are addressed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984, and Volume XLIV, Parts 1 and 2, National Security Policy, 1985–1988. For selected documentation on the human rights situation in the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume V

This volume documents the development and implementation of the Reagan administration's policies toward the Soviet Union from March 1985 to October 1986. The volume focuses on how the administration approached the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, and his reform efforts; arms control negotiations at the Nuclear and Space Talks, which opened in Geneva in March 1985; and the Geneva Summit of November 1985 and the Reykjavik Summit of October 1986, as well

as various meetings among President Reagan, Secretary of State George Shultz, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, his replacement Eduard Shevardnadze, and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin.

Gorbachev's rise to power did not immediately change the Reagan administration's policies toward the Soviet Union or arms control. The basic four-part framework: arms control, human rights, regional issues, and bilateral relations, established in National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 75 on January 17, 1983, remained the fundamental approach in dealing with the Soviet Union. Administration officials, namely George Shultz, the President's Assistants for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane and later John Poindexter, and NSC Staff member Jack Matlock, worked toward implementing the four-part agenda in dealing with the Soviet Union. The documentation in this volume is a continuation of *Foreign Relations*, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, and demonstrates how administration officials developed policies related to the four-part agenda, mainly in the National Security Council Staff and Department of State.

A new set of U.S.-Soviet umbrella arms control negotiations, the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), began in Geneva on March 12, 1985. The NST addressed three tracks: Defense and Space, START, and INF. Throughout his administration, Reagan expressed an eagerness to reduce stockpiles of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons. Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a missile defense program announced in March 1983, the Soviet insistence that this program would disrupt the strategic nuclear balance and "militarize" outer space, and the ramifications of SDI for the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, created a constant source of tension and frustration for U.S. and Soviet arms control negotiators, as well as in discussions between Reagan and Gorbachev.

The death of Soviet General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko and the ascension of Gorbachev into the Soviet leadership role in March 1985 coincided with the opening session of the NST. Vice President George H.W. Bush and Secretary Shultz met with Gorbachev in Moscow for Chernenko's funeral services and quickly recognized that the new Soviet leader was different. Gorbachev was of a younger generation, more driven, ambitious, and showed passion and great energy during their meeting. This was a massive change in comparison to Leonid Brezhnev, Chernenko, and Yuri Andropov, who had been ailing during their tenures.

The Reagan-Gorbachev correspondence included in this volume reveals a willingness to be frank and attempt to move arms control negotiations forward to reduce nuclear weapons, while recognizing the strategic needs of the other side. The documentation related to the Geneva and Reykjavik Summits, as well as preparatory meetings between

Shultz and Shevardnadze, clearly demonstrate a change in some Soviet positions and Gorbachev's willingness to compromise when necessary to advance his larger reform efforts. In November 1985 at the Geneva Summit, Reagan and Gorbachev developed a rapport and were able to have candid, difficult conversations about how to make progress at the NST. The Strategic Defense Initiative remained a point of controversy. Reagan did not shy away from addressing human rights cases with Gorbachev. While no formal agreements were signed at the meetings, the Geneva Summit provided a starting point for these two leaders to move toward reducing nuclear weapons.

After Geneva, the NST floundered, giving Gorbachev the impetus to suggest a meeting with Reagan in order to break the deadlock. The October 1986 Reykjavik Summit provided some of the most dramatic moments of Cold War summitry, with the leaders presenting proposals to eliminate all Soviet and U.S. ballistic missiles. In the end, this hinged on limiting SDI research to the laboratory, and no formal agreements were reached. The Reykjavik documentation in this volume provides a full accounting of the meetings and preparations on the U.S. side.

All in all, the documentation in this volume seeks to provide a more nuanced understanding of the relationship that developed between Reagan and Gorbachev during this period, through their summits and correspondence. The volume also shows how the Reagan administration continued to adhere to the four-part framework it established in January 1983 in dealing with the Soviet Union, regardless of the new leadership of Gorbachev. Reagan, Shultz, McFarlane, Matlock, and other administration officials worked diligently to move the U.S.-Soviet relationship forward; the sustained level of understanding and cooperation they developed with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze played a major role in this endeavor.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of officials at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, especially Lisa Jones and Cate Sewell. A special thanks to the Central Intelligence Agency staff for providing access and assistance with Reagan Library materials scanned for the Remote Archive Capture project, and to the History Staff of the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence for arranging full access to CIA records. The editor wishes to acknowledge the staff at Information Programs and Services at the Department of State for facilitating access to Department of State records and coordinating the review of this volume within the Department of State. Sandy Meagher was helpful in providing access to Department of Defense materials. The editor also extends thanks to the family and executor of the Estate of former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger for granting Department of State historians access to

the personal papers of Secretary Weinberger deposited at the Library of Congress. Additional thanks are due to officials of the Library of Congress Manuscript Division for facilitating that access.

Elizabeth Charles collected, selected, and annotated the documentation for this volume under the supervision of David Geyer, Chief of the Europe Division, and Adam Howard, then General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. The volume was reviewed by Assistant to the General Editor Kristin Ahlberg and David Geyer. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification Coordination Division. Kerry Hite performed the copy and technical editing under the supervision of Mandy Chalou, Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division.

Elizabeth C. Charles, Ph.D.
Historian

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Sources

*Sources for Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union
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The White House Staff and Office Files at the Reagan Library provide a key source of documentation on high-level decision-making toward the Soviet Union from March 1985 to October 1986. The Executive Secretariat files, a subset of this collection, include the National Security Council (NSC) and National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting Files; National Security Decision Directives (NSDD); the Head of State File; and the USSR Country File. Other relevant Staff and Office File collections include the European and Soviet Affairs Directorate: USSR Files; Director of Soviet Affairs Jack Matlock Files; and files of the President's Assistants for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane and John Poindexter. Key collections of other members of the NSC Staff are the files of John Lenczowski, Robert Linhard, Ronald Lehman, and Sven Kraemer, which focus on various aspects of policy development, arms control, and negotiations with the Soviet Union. In some instances, NSC records related to NSDDs and NSC and NSPG meetings have remained in the Institutional Files of the NSC in Washington. The texts of the declassified NSDDs are available on the Reagan Presidential Library website.

The Department of State records most vital for this volume are in the following Executive Secretariat S/S Lot Files: Lot 91D257 Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum; Lot 92D630 Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989; Lot 93D188 Memorandum of Conversations, 1981–1990; and Lot 94D92 NODIS and EXDIS Secretariat Memorandums, 1985. The files of the Policy Planning Staff in Lot 89D149 and Kenneth Dam in Lot 85D308 provide an excellent insight into high-level decision-making in the Department. The Central Foreign Policy File of the Department includes cable traffic between the Embassy in Moscow and Washington, as well as other related cables.

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Foreign Policy File

Lot Files. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland

Lot 00D471: EUR/RUS Special Collections—Russia, Political Subject and Chronological Files

Lot 03D256: EUR Files, Records of Ambassador Thomas W. Simons, Jr. 1964–1995

Lot 2016F0003: Ambassador Arthur Hartman Files

Lot 85D308: Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files

Lot 89D149: S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff

Lot 90D397: Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989

Lot 91D231: Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Office of Soviet Affairs, 1978–1989

Lot 91D257: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum

Lot 92D52: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984–1989

Lot 92D630: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989

Lot 93D188: Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memorandum of Conversations, 1981–1990

Lot 93D592: Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Ambassadors Henry F. Cooper and Max Kampelman, Program Files for the Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms (S/DEL)

Lot 94D92: Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 NODIS and EXDIS Secretariat Memorandums, 1985

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California

White House Staff and Office Files

Files of the Executive Secretariat, National Security Council

Agency File

Cable File

Country File: Europe and Soviet Union

Crisis Management Center

Head of State File

Meeting File

National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) File

National Security Planning Group (NSPG) File

National Security Study Directives (NSSD) File

Subject File

System II Intelligence Files

System IV Intelligence Files

Files of the European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council

Files of the Political Affairs Directorate, National Security Council

Files of the Situation Room, White House
Frank Carlucci Files
Kenneth deGraffenreid Files
Donald Fortier Files
Sven Kraemer Files
Robert Lehman Files
John Lenczowski Files
Robert Lilac Files
Robert Linhard Files
Jack Matlock Files
Robert McFarlane Files
John Poindexter Files
Papers of Charles Hill
Papers of George Shultz
President's Daily Diary
Stephen Sestanovich Files

Central Intelligence Agency

Office of the Director of Central Intelligence
 Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980–1986)
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National Security Council

National Security Council Institutional Files

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Abbreviations and Terms

ABM, Anti-Ballistic Missile

A/C, arms control

ACDA, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

ALCM, Air-Launched Cruise Missile

ANZUS, Australia-New Zealand-United States (security treaty)

ASAT, Anti-Satellite

ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ATB, Advanced Technology Bomber

C, Confidential; Office of the Counselor of the Department of State

CBM, Confidence Building Measures

CC, Central Committee

CCP, Chinese Communist Party

CD, Conference on Disarmament

CDE, Conference on Disarmament in Europe

CI, counterintelligence

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency

COCOM, Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls

CODEL, Congressional Delegation

COMECON, Council for Economic Assistance (also COMCON, CEMA)

CORRTEX, Continuous Reflectometry for Radius Versus Time Experiments (a hydrodynamic yield measurement for nuclear testing)

CP, Communist Party

CPPG, Crisis Pre-Planning Group

CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CSBM, confidence- and security-building measures

CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CTB, Comprehensive Test Ban

CW, chemical weapons

D, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State

DASD, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

DATT, Defense Attaché

DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission

Dept, Department

DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD, Department of Defense

DOE, Department of Energy

DST, Defense and Space Talks

EST, Eastern Standard Time

EUR, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

EUR/RPM, Office of Security and Political Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

Exdis, Exclusive Distribution

XX Abbreviations and Terms

FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBS, Forward-Based Systems
FM, Foreign Minister
ForMin, Foreign Ministry; Foreign Minister
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FTO, Foreign Trade Organization

G-7, Group of Seven, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States
GDR, German Democratic Republic
GLCM, Ground-Launched Cruise Missile
GNP, Gross National Product
GON, Government of Nicaragua
GPS, George Pratt Shultz
GRU, Soviet military intelligence agency

HA, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State

IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization
ICBM, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IG, Interagency Group
IMEMO, Institute of World Economy and International Relations
INCSEA, Incidents at Sea
INF, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/PMA, Office of Politico-Military Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/SEE, Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JP, John Poindexter

KAL, Korean Airlines
KGB, Committee for State Security in the USSR

Limdis, Limited Distribution
LRINF, Long-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces
LTA, Long-Term Agreement on grain

M, Office of the Under Secretary for Management
MBFR, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
Memcon, Memorandum of Conversation
MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MIRV, Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle
MLM, Military Liaison Mission
MOD, Minister of Defense; Ministry of Defense
MW, megawatt
M-X, missile experimental (intercontinental ballistic missile)

NAC, North Atlantic Council
NAM, Non-Aligned Movement
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NF, Noforn

Niact, Night Action

NIO, National Intelligence Officer

Nocontract, Not Releasable to Contractors

Nodis, No Distribution

Nofor, No Foreign Dissemination

NPT, Non-Proliferation Treaty

NRC, Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRRC, Nuclear Risk Reduction Center

NSC, National Security Council

NSDD, National Security Decision Directive

NSPG, National Security Planning Group

NST, Nuclear and Space Talks

NUF, non-use of force

OAS, Organization of American States, Department of State

OBE, Overtaken by Events

OMB, Office of Management and Budget

Orcon, Originator Controlled

OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSI, on-site inspection

OVP, Office of the Vice President

P, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

PFIA, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

P-IB, Pershing IB missile

P-II or P-II, Pershing II missile

P.L., Public Law

PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PNE or PNET, Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

PNG, persona non grata

PolCouns, Political Counselor

PRC, Policy Review Committee; People's Republic of China

PROFs notes, internal White House and NSC electronic messages

RADM, Rear Admiral

RBMK, class of nuclear power reactor designed and built by the Soviet Union

Reftel, reference telegram

RR, Ronald Reagan

RV, re-entry vehicle

S, Office of the Secretary of State

SACG, Senior Arms Control Group

SAG, South African Government

SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SCC, Special Coordinating Committee; Standing Consultative Commission

SCG, Special Consultative Group

SDI, Strategic Defense Initiative

Secto, series indicator for telegrams sent from the Secretary of State

Septel, separate telegram

SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe

SIG, Senior Interagency Group

SIG/I, Senior Interagency Group on Intelligence

SIG-IEP, Senior Interagency Group-International Economic Policy

SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SLBM, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM, Surfaced-Launched Cruise Missile; Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile; Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
SNDV, Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
S/P, Policy Planning Council, Department of State; after May 7, 1985, Policy Planning Staff
Specat, special category
SRAM, Short-Range Attack Missile
SRINF, Short-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State; Secret/Sage
S/S-O, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S-S, Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
Stadis, State Distribution Only
START, Strategic Arms Reduction Talks; Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

TASS, official Soviet news agency
TNF, Theater Nuclear Forces
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams sent to the Secretary of State while away from Washington
TS, Top Secret
TTBT, Threshold Test Ban Treaty

U, Unclassified
UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNITA, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNSC, United Nations Security Council
UNSYG, United Nations Secretary-General
US, United States
USA, United States of America; United States Army
USAF, United States Air Force
USCD, United States Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva
USDel, United States Delegation
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USN, United States Navy
USNMR SHAPE, United States National Military Representative, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USTEC, U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council

V-E Day, Victory in Europe Day
VOA, Voice of America

WHO, World Health Organization
WHSR, White House Situation Room
WJC, World Jewish Congress

Z, Zulu Time (Greenwich Mean Time)

Persons

- Abrahamson, James A.**, Lieutenant General, USAF; Director, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
- Abramowitz, Morton I. (Mort)**, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State from February 1, 1985; Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research from August 18, 1986
- Abrams, Elliott**, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs until July 17, 1985; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
- Abshire, David M.**, U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from July 18, 1983, until January 5, 1987
- Adelman, Kenneth L. (Ken)**, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from April 1983
- Akhromeyev, Sergei F.**, Marshal of the Soviet Union and Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces from September 1984
- Andreas, Dwayne**, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Policy; U.S. Co-Chairman of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council (USTEC)
- Andropov, Yuri**, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from November 12, 1982, until February 9, 1984
- Arbatov, Georgii**, Director, Institute for U.S. and Canada Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow
- Armocost, Michael H.**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from May 1984
- Azrael, Jeremy**, member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, from 1984 until 1985
- Baker, James A., III, (Jim)**, White House Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President until February 1, 1985; thereafter Secretary of the Treasury
- Baldrige, H. Malcolm, Jr. (Mac)**, Secretary of Commerce
- Baraz, Robert**, Director, Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- Barker, Robert**, Deputy Assistant Director, Bureau of Verification and Intelligence, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from 1983 until 1986; Head of the U.S. Delegation to the U.S.-USSR Nuclear Testing Experts Meetings
- Barry, Robert L.**, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) from September 1985 until 1987
- Bessmertnykh, Aleksandr A.**, Chief of the U.S.A. Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, until May 1986; thereafter Deputy Foreign Minister
- Blackwill, Robert D.**, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks
- Block, John R.**, Secretary of Agriculture until February 14, 1986
- Bohlen, Avis T.**, member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State
- Bova, Michele**, Director, Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, from 1984
- Brezhnev, Leonid**, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until November 1982
- Brooks, Linton F.**, Director, Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1986
- Broomfield, William S.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-MI)

- Bukin, Alexi**, Special Assistant to Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
- Burt, Richard R. (Rick)**, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs from February 18, 1983, until July 18, 1985; thereafter Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany
- Burton, Bruce G.**, Deputy Director, Multilateral and Security Affairs, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State
- Bush, George H.W.**, Vice President of the United States
- Byrd, Robert, W.**, Senator, (D–West Virginia), Senate Minority Leader from January 1981
- Caldwell, Ray, L.**, Director, Office of Security and Political Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State
- Carter, James Earl (Jimmy)**, President of the United States from January 20, 1977, until January 20, 1981
- Casey, William J. (Bill)**, Director of Central Intelligence from January 28, 1981
- Chain, John T., Jr.**, General, USAF; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from July 1, 1984, until June 14, 1985; Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe, from June 1985 until June 1986
- Chebrikov, Viktor**, Chairman, Committee on State Security (KGB), Soviet Union, from 1982
- Chernenko, Konstantin**, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from February 1984 until March 1985
- Chirac, Jacques**, Prime Minister of France from 1986
- Clark, William P., Jr., (Judge)** President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 4, 1982, until October 17, 1983
- Clyne, Norman, G.**, Executive Assistant to Paul Nitze
- Cobb, Tyrus (Ty)**, Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983
- Cockell, William A.**, Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Defense Policy Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1986 until 1988
- Coffey, Steven J.**, Office of Theater Military Policy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
- Combs, Richard E., Jr.**, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy in the Soviet Union
- Cooper, Henry F. (Hank)**, Deputy Negotiator for Defense and Space Talks in Geneva, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985
- Courtney, William H.**, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- Craxi, Bettino**, Prime Minister of Italy from August 1983
- Crocker, Chester A.**, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
- Crowe, William J., Jr.**, Admiral, USN; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from October 1, 1985
- Dam, Kenneth W. (Ken)**, Deputy Secretary of State from September 23, 1982, until June 15, 1985
- Daniloff, Nicholas**, U.S. journalist, *U.S. News & World Report*
- Danzansky, Stephen I.**, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, International Economic Affairs Directorate, National Security Council, from 1985
- Deaver, Michael K.**, Deputy Chief of Staff and Special Assistant to the President until May 1985
- deGraffenreid, Kenneth E.**, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Intelligence Directorate, National Security Council Staff
- Dobbins, James F.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

- Dobriansky, Paula J.**, Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff
- Dobrynin, Anatoly**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States until May 1986; thereafter Director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Dolan, Anthony R. (Tony)**, Speechwriter, White House Office of Speechwriting, until 1985; Special Assistant to the President and Chief Speechwriter from 1985 until 1986; Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of Speechwriting from 1986
- Dubinín, Yuri**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States from May 1986
- Dunkerley, Craig**, Office of Security and Political Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State
- Eagleburger, Lawrence**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 12, 1982, until May 1, 1984; Career Ambassador from April 1984
- Ermarth, Fritz**, National Intelligence Officer for USSR, Central Intelligence Agency, and member, National Intelligence Council from January 1984
- Fascell, Dante B.**, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Florida), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee from 1983
- Fortier, Donald R. (Don)**, Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Policy Development Directorate, National Security Council Staff, until 1985; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1985 until August 1986
- Gandhi, Rajiv**, Prime Minister of India from October 31, 1984
- Gates, Robert M. (Bob)**, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, from January 1982 until April 1986; Chairman, National Intelligence Council, from September 1983 until April 1986; Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from April 1986
- Genscher, Hans-Dietrich**, Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany
- George, Clair E.**, Deputy Director of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, from July 1984
- George, Douglas**, Chief of the Arms Control Intelligence Staff, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, from June 1982
- Glitman, Maynard W. (Mike)**, Negotiator for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks in Geneva, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Talks with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985
- Goodby, James E.**, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) from 1983 until 1985
- Gorbachev, Mikhail S.**, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from March 1985
- Gorbacheva, Raisa M.**, wife of Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
- Gordievskiy, Oleg**, Colonel, Committee on State Security (KGB), USSR; secret agent for British Security Service from 1974 until his defection to the United Kingdom in 1985
- Grechko, Andrey A.**, Marshal, Soviet Minister of Defense, from 1967 until 1976
- Gregg, Donald**, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
- Grinevsky, Oleg A.**, Head of the Soviet Delegation to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe from 1983 until 1986
- Grobel, Olaf**, Director, Office of Theater Military Policy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
- Gromyko, Andrei**, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs until July 1985
- Haass, Richard**, Director, Office of the Regional Security Affairs, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

- Hartman, Arthur A.**, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union until February 20, 1987
- Hawes, John H.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs; Head of the U.S. Delegation to the U.S.-USSR talks on Chemical Weapons Non-Proliferation, 1986
- Helms, Jesse**, Senator (R-North Carolina)
- Hill, M. Charles**, Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State
- Holmes, H. Allen, Jr.**, Ambassador to Portugal until June 26, 1985; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from July 19, 1985; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs from April 14, 1986
- Holmes, James H.**, Director, Office of Strategic Nuclear Policy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
- Horowitz, Larry**, Executive Assistant to Senator Edward M. Kennedy
- Howe, Sir Geoffrey**, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from June 1983
- Iklé, Fred C.**, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- Isakov, Viktor**, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy in Washington
- Kalb, Bernard**, Department of State Spokesman from January 1, 1985; Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from August 12, 1985, until October 8, 1986
- Kamman, Curtis W.**, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Moscow until August 1985
- Kampelman, Max M.**, Head of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva, Negotiator for Defense and Space Talks, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985
- Karmal, Babrak**, President of Afghanistan from December 1979
- Karpov, Viktor P.**, Head of the Soviet Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva; Ambassador-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
- Keel, Alton G., Jr. (Al)**, Associate Director, Office of Management and Budget until February 1986; Executive Director of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, February 1986 to July 1986; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1986
- Kelly, John H.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
- Kennedy, Edward M. (Ted)**, Senator (D-Massachusetts)
- Kennedy, Richard T.**, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Energy Affairs from 1983
- Keyworth, George A., II**, Science Advisor to the President; Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
- Khalilzad, Zalmay**, member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State
- Kimmitt, Robert M.**, Executive Secretary and General Counsel, National Security Council, from 1983 until 1985
- Kirkpatrick, Jeane J.**, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations until April 1, 1985
- Kissinger, Henry A.**, Secretary of State until January 1977
- Kohl, Helmut**, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
- Korniyenko, Georgii**, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister until 1986
- Kosygin, Aleksey**, Chairman, Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union
- Kraemer, Sven**, Director, Arms Control, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff
- Kvitsinskiy, Yuliy A.**, Head of the Soviet Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva; Ambassador-at-Large, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Ledsky, Nelson**, Principal Deputy Director, Policy Planning Council, Department of State

Lehman, Ronald F., II (Ron), Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983 until January 1986; Deputy Negotiator for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985

Lenczowski, John, Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983

Ligachev, Yegor, member, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, from 1983; Secretary, from 1985

Linhard, Robert E. (Bob), Colonel, USAF; Director, Defense Programs, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council, until 1986; thereafter, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate

Lowenthal, Mark M., Office of Strategic Forces Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Mandel, Judyt L., Deputy Director, International Communications and Information Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1985

Marshall, Andrew, Director, Office of Net Assessment, Department of Defense

Martin, William F., Executive Secretary, National Security Council and Special Assistant to the President for Coordination from 1982 until 1986

Matlock, Jack F., Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff

McDaniel, Rodney B., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council from 1985

McFarlane, Robert C. (Bud), Colonel, USMC (Ret.); Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from October 1983 until December 1985

McKinley, Brunson, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State until 1985; thereafter U.S. Ambassador to Haiti

McMahon, John N., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from 1982 until March 1986

McNeil, Frank, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Meese, Edwin, III, U.S. Attorney General

Menshikov, Stanislav, consultant for the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Michel, Robert H., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Illinois)

Mikol'chak, Vitaliy, Deputy Chief of the U.S.A. Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mitterand, François, President of France

Mulroney, Martin Brian, Prime Minister of Canada from September 17, 1984

Nakasone Yasuhiro, Prime Minister of Japan from November 27, 1982

Niles, Thomas, M.T., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

Nitze, Paul H., Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters from 1984

Nixon, Richard, former President of the United States

Nosenzo, Louis, Deputy Assistant Director, Bureau of Strategic Programs, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA/SP)

Oakley, Robert B., Director of the Office for Combating Terrorism from September 1984; Acting U.S. Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism from November 1985 until October 1986; thereafter Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Near East and South Asia Affairs, National Security Council Staff

Obukhov, Aleksei A., Soviet Deputy Head Negotiator for Defense and Space, Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva; Head of the U.S.-USSR Working Group on Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers from 1986

Olmer, Lionel, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade

O'Neill, Thomas P., Jr., (Tip), member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Massachusetts), Speaker of the House

Orlov, Yuri, Soviet atomic physicist and dissident

Paal, Douglas, member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State

Palazhchenko, Pavel, Soviet interpreter

Palme, Olof, Prime Minister of Sweden from October 1982 until his assassination on February 28, 1986

Palmer, Robie M.H. (Mark), Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

Parris, Mark R., Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

Pascoe, Boris L. (Lynn), Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

Pearson, W. Robert (Bob), Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council from 1985

Perle, Richard N., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy

Peres, Shimon, Prime Minister of Israel

Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier, Secretary-General of the United Nations from January 1, 1982

Petrosyants, Andranik M., Chairman, State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy of the Soviet Union; Head of the Soviet Delegation to the U.S.-USSR Nuclear Testing Experts Meetings

Petrovsky, Vladimir, Head of the Soviet Delegation to the U.S.-Soviet talks on nuclear nonproliferation

Platt, Nicholas, Executive Secretary of the Department of State and Special Assistant to the Secretary from January 7, 1985

Poindexter, John M., Rear Admiral, USN; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from October 1983 until December 1985; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from December 1985

Powell, Colin L., Major General, USA; Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; promoted to Lieutenant General, March 1986

Primakov, Yevgeny M., Director, Institute for the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), USSR Academy of Sciences

Pugliaresi, Lucian S., Director, International Economic Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1986

Qadhafi, Muammar, President of Libya

Quinn, Kenneth M., Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State

Raymond, Walter, Jr., Senior Director, Intelligence Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1982 until 1983; Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, International Communications and Information Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983

Reagan, Nancy, First Lady of the United States

Reagan, Ronald W., President of the United States from January 20, 1981

Regan, Donald T. (Don), Secretary of the Treasury until February 1985; White House Chief of Staff from February 4, 1985

Ridgway, Rozanne L. (Roz), Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs from July 1985

Robinson, Roger, Director, International Economic Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983 until 1984; Senior Director from 1984 until 1985

Rodman, Peter W., Director, Policy Planning Council, Department of State until March 3, 1986; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1986

Rowny, Edward L., General, USA (ret.); Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters from 1984

Ryzhkov, Nikolai I., Secretary and Head of the Industry Department, Central Committee of the Soviet Union, from 1982 until September 1985; Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers from September 1985

Sagdeyev, Roald Z., Director, USSR Institute of Space Research

Sakharov, Andrei, Soviet nuclear physicist and dissident

Schifter, Richard, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs from October 1985

Scowcroft, Brent, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs during the Ford administration; Chairman of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces; member of the Dartmouth Group

Sestanovich, Stephen R., Director, Political-Military Affairs Directorate, National Security Council, from 1984 until 1986; Senior Director, Policy Development Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1986

Sharansky, Natan (also Shcharansky, Anatoly), Soviet dissident and refusenik

Shevardnadze, Eduard, Soviet Foreign Minister from July 1985

Shultz, George P., Secretary of State from July 16, 1982

Shultz, Helena (Obie), wife of George Shultz

Simons, Thomas W., Jr., Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State, from 1982 until 1985; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs from 1986

Sofaer, Abraham, Legal Adviser, Department of State

Sokolov, Oleg, Minister-Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Washington

Sokolov, Sergei L., Marshal, Soviet Minister of Defense, from December 1984

Solomon, Richard H., Director, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, from March 3, 1986

Sommer, Peter R., member, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff

Speakes, Larry M., Assistant to the President and Principal Deputy Press Secretary from June 17, 1981

Spiers, Ronald, I., Under Secretary of State for Management from November 23, 1983

Stearman, William L., General Counsel, Office of the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council

Steiner, Steven, member, Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff

Stockman, David, Director, Office of Management and Budget

Taft, William H. IV., Deputy Secretary of Defense

Thatcher, Margaret H., Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

Thurmond, Strom, Senator (R-South Carolina), Chairman of the Judiciary Committee

Timbie, James P., Advisor for Strategic Policy to the Deputy Secretary of State

Tobey, William, member, Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff

Tower, John. G., Senator (R-Texas) until January 3, 1985; Negotiator for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State from March 1985 until March 1986

Uspensky, Nikolai, Soviet interpreter

Ustinov, Dmitri F., Soviet Defense Minister until December 1984

Velikhov, Yevgeny P., Vice President, Soviet Academy of Sciences, and Scientific Advisor to Gorbachev

Vessey, John W., Jr., General, USA; Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff from June 18, 1982, until September 1985

Wallis, W. Allen, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (after August 1985 Economic and Agricultural Affairs) from 1982

Walters, Vernon A., General, USA; U.S. Representative to the United Nations from May 1985

Warner, John, Senator (R-Virginia)

Warnke, Paul C., Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1977 until 1978

Weinberger, Caspar W. (Cap), Secretary of Defense

Whitehead, John. C., Deputy Secretary of State from July 9, 1985

Wick, Charles Z., Director, United States Information Agency

Wolfowitz, Paul, D., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until March 12, 1986; U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia from April 11, 1986

Wright, William H., Captain, USN; Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff

Yel'tsin, Boris, First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the Communist Party from 1985 until 1987

Zagladin, Vadim, Deputy Chief, International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union

Zimmerman, Warren, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Moscow until July 1984; Deputy to the Head of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985

Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

March 1985–July 1985

“Now we have to begin everything anew”: Gorbachev’s Debut

1. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev¹

Washington, March 11, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

As you assume your new responsibilities, I would like to take this opportunity to underscore my hope that we can in the months and years ahead develop a more stable and constructive relationship between our two countries. Our differences are many, and we will need to proceed in a way that takes both differences and common interests into account in seeking to resolve problems and build a new measure of trust and confidence. But history places on us a very heavy responsibility for maintaining and strengthening peace, and I am convinced

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8590272, 8590336). No classification marking. On March 11, Reagan wrote in his personal diary: “Awakened at 4 A.M. to be told Chernenko is dead. My mind turned to whether I should attend the funeral. My gut instinct said no. Got to the office at 9. George S. had some arguments that I should—he lost. I don’t think his heart was really in it. George B. is in Geneva—he’ll go & George S. will join him leaving tonight.” He continued: “Word has been received that Gorbachev has been named head man in the Soviet.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I: January 1981–October 1985, p. 434) According to the President’s Daily Diary, Shultz and Reagan met in the Oval Office on March 11 from approximately 2 to 2:30 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Presumably Shultz delivered this letter to Reagan during the meeting for his approval and signature. In a March 11 covering memorandum to Gregg and McFarlane, Platt transmitted a draft of the letter and explained that the letter should be “hand delivered by Vice President Bush to incoming General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.” Bush traveled to Moscow as the official U.S. representative at Chernenko’s funeral, along with Shultz and Ambassador Hartman. They met with Gorbachev on March 13; see Document 5.

we have before us new opportunities to do so. Therefore I have requested the Vice President to deliver this letter to you.

I believe our differences can and must be resolved through discussion and negotiation. The international situation demands that we redouble our efforts to find political solutions to the problems we face. I valued my correspondence with Chairman Chernenko, and believe my meetings with First Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko and Mr. Shcherbitsky here in Washington² were useful in clarifying views and issues and making it possible to move forward to deal with them in a practical and realistic fashion.

In recent months we have demonstrated that it is possible to resolve problems to mutual benefit. We have had useful exchanges on certain regional issues, and I am sure you are aware that American interest in progress on humanitarian issues remains as strong as ever. In our bilateral relations, we have signed a number of new agreements, and we have promising negotiations underway in several important fields. Most significantly, the negotiations we have agreed to begin in Geneva provide us with a genuine chance to make progress toward our common ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.

It is important for us to build on these achievements. You can be assured of my personal commitment to work with you and the rest of the Soviet leadership in serious negotiations. In that spirit, I would like to invite you to visit me in Washington at your earliest convenient opportunity. I recognize that an early answer may not be possible, but I want you to know that I look forward to a meeting that could yield results of benefit to both our countries and to the international community as a whole.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

² Reagan met with Gromyko in Washington on September 28, 1984, and with Vladimir Shcherbitsky, a member of the Soviet Politburo, also in Washington, on March 7, 1985. See *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 286–287 and 378.

2. Talking Points for Secretary of State Shultz Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

Why We Must Have a Relationship with the Soviets

There are some serious people who think we should *not* have a better relationship:

- we should focus on strengthening our domestic economy and society and leave the Soviets in our wake;
- to try to get a better relationship means “detente”, and detente is another word for appeasement;
- we *should not* negotiate from a position of weakness (our situation in the 1970’s); and we *need not* negotiate from a position of relative strength (our position today), because negotiation just leads us to give things away.

Our answer should be:

- we *are* building our domestic strength. Nothing can stop us;
- we reject “detente”. It has been tried and it doesn’t work;
- we have brought a new *realism* to our foreign policy. We are not going to give positions away in negotiations, nor sign on to flawed agreements as other Administrations did in the past. We do not *have* to have an agreement; we are not panting after a treaty. This self-confident attitude has worked to our advantage in the Middle East, in Central America, and with the Soviets. Indeed, it is a major reason why the Soviets have come back to the table.

So we are better placed and more prepared than any American Administration has been *in decades* to achieve a new basis for global stability. We have the beginning of a new *Reagan Doctrine*:

- The *Rand* speech: a wholly new approach to dealing with the Soviets.²

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary’s Meetings with the President (03/11/1985). No classification marking. These talking points were included in a larger packet for Shultz entitled: “Meeting with the President, Monday, March 11 2:00–2:30 pm,” in preparation for Shultz’s trip to Moscow. In his memoir, he wrote: “I went to the White House to see President Reagan to go over ideas for the meeting our delegation would have with Gorbachev. There wasn’t a thought in his mind about going to Moscow. I recommended that Vice President Bush deliver a letter to Gorbachev inviting him to the United States. The president agreed.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 527)

² Schultz’s October 18, 1984, address before the Rand/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior in Los Angeles is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 209. See also *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 296, footnote 4.

—The *Commonwealth Club* speech: drawing the lines in our own neighborhood, Central America.³

—And we have taken the initiative to reverse decades-long trends in the Third World economies (march toward the market) and approach key regional issues creatively (southern Africa, the Pacific Basin).

To turn inward and isolate ourselves or stay aloof would be to repeat a mistake that the U.S. has made in the past.

Our job is to end the cycle of intervention/withdrawal that has characterized U.S. foreign policy historically—and to establish a new basis for global security and progress that can last well into the next century.

³ Shultz addressed the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco on February 22. His speech is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 232.

3. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, March 12, 1985

SUBJECT

The basic lesson behind any transfer of power in the Kremlin—including the election of Mikhail Gorbachev to the post of General Secretary—is that the United States must continue to conduct our defense policy toward the USSR with the same caution and prudence as we have been. In spite of the fact that we have a new face, we will be dealing with a quintessential Communist Party man, whose ability to exercise his own individual political predilections is severely constrained by the control mechanisms built into the Soviet system.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Chron File March 1985; NLR-324-11-69-2-2. Confidential. Sent for action. An unknown hand crossed out the subject line with black marker. Poindexter wrote in the margin: "Everybody agrees with this analysis. JP." According to another copy of the memorandum, the subject line reads: "Shultz-Weinberger-McFarlane Breakfast: Implications of the Gorbachev Election." (Reagan Library, Tyrus Cobb Files, Country File, USSR (1); NLR-98-4-50-1-3)

The very fact of a new face, however, tempts many Americans—and most importantly, members of Congress—to believe that a new General Secretary has similar latitude for individual decision-making as does an American President. From this assumption comes the further assumption that it is within Gorbachev's power to change radically the character of Soviet policy toward the West. Hence, such a line of thought tends to conclude that if only American diplomacy is skillful enough, we should be able to reconstitute the basic nature of U.S.-Soviet relations. Needless to say, although such thinking is not often so directly articulated, it puts much of the onus of better relations on the President. The fact that Gorbachev is a member of the new generation and gives the appearance of a smooth, pragmatic, non-ideological "moderate" tends to reinforce such public perceptions all the more. And Gorbachev's performance in England, which exemplifies the situation we face, led ineluctably to public commentaries implying the existence of "hawks" and "doves" or "Stalinists and moderates" in the Kremlin.² This theme, of course, echoes the principal Soviet disinformation theme—that there are real communists and non-communists in the Kremlin and that therefore, if Gorbachev is indeed a non-communist, then Soviet global objectives will no longer be unlimited.

Although there are indications of a healthy, skeptical "let's wait and see" attitude in the initial public commentary here, this generational succession still does present us not only with a very significant political challenge to deal with an ongoing problem of misunderstanding, but with a major opportunity to educate the public about the USSR and communism in a way that can assist our defense policy.

Because of the considerable limits on the latitude of individual decisionmaking, it is not at all clear that the generational change in the Soviet leadership will mean significant changes in Soviet policy. As part of the new generation, Gorbachev is more likely to be inclined to take Soviet power for granted than were his predecessors. He has been an integral part of the political leadership which presided over major doctrinal reformulations which asserted superpower status for the USSR in the world—a status whose legitimacy is based largely on an uninterrupted flow of international successes, including the continued accretion of military power.³

Among these doctrinal reformulations was the acknowledgement that both the East European satellites as well as the domestic Soviet

² In December 1984, Gorbachev traveled to England where he met with Prime Minister Thatcher and addressed the British Parliament. For the text of his December 18, 1984, speech, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1984*, pp. 882–888. See also *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 334, footnote 3.

³ McFarlane made a marking in the margin at the end of this paragraph.

population are vulnerable to external ideological subversion. The outgrowth of this reformulation was not only the Brezhnev Doctrine but a new and determined effort to ensure ideological conformity within the Soviet system: hence the constant emphasis in recent years on successful counterpropaganda. Insofar as the Andropov internal discipline campaign was a function of such concerns and insofar as Gorbachev was associated with it, we can anticipate that its general thrust may well continue under his regime. This should not bode well for the general human rights situation in the USSR.

In his capacity as Party Secretary for Agriculture, Gorbachev has demonstrated an inclination toward minor reforms—such as increased production incentives. Although the forms by which such incentives would be offered might differ from previous mechanisms, none appear to be radical enough to change the basic collectivist nature of the agricultural economy.

Although his prodigious rise to power would appear to imply Gorbachev's ability to wield great power personally, this career advance is largely attributable to his skill at consensus politics and "Party-mindedness." This does imply, however, his considerable skill at conducting policy deliberately, strategically and methodically—on the basis of a well-honed assessment of the internal "correlation of forces" and respect for the sensibilities of fellow Party leaders. This can only suggest that his regime will be not only a formidable opponent to the United States, but also sensitive to, and realistic about, the indices of American strength and weakness. Thus, requisite indications of our military and moral strength will be respected and can reasonably be expected to restrain Soviet adventurism.

Steve Sestanovich and Ty Cobb concur.⁴

RECOMMENDATION

That you include the above points in your breakfast conversation with Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger.⁵

⁴ Lenczowski initialed for Sestanovich and Cobb above their typed names.

⁵ McFarlane approved the recommendation and wrote "Thanks, John" above the recommendation.

4. Telegram From the Delegation at the Nuclear and Space Talks to the Department of State¹

Geneva, March 12, 1985, 2019Z

2170. Military Addressee Handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: (U) Nuclear and Space Arms Talks—Heads of Delegation Meeting, March 12, 1985.

1. This is NST–I–005. Secret—Entire text.

2. Begin summary. Ambassadors Kampelman, Tower, and Glitman met Ambassador Karpov at Soviet Mission for a three-hour heads of delegation meeting which constituted the formal opening of the negotiations on nuclear and space arms. Karpov stressed the importance of the work of the overall delegation and suggested that the round begin with five or six joint plenary sessions in which the sides would discuss the “pivotal elements” of their position, establish the interrelationships between the “working groups”, work out mandates and agree on the organization of the “working groups”. Both sides agreed on the necessity of adhering strictly to the joint Shultz–Gromyko statement.² Karpov stressed that for the Soviets the idea that the subject of the negotiations would be a “complex of questions” and the notion of interrelationships constituted the heart of the January 8 joint statement. The U.S. stressed the desirability of moving quickly into separate meetings of the negotiating groups. After considerable discussion it was agreed that there would be three joint plenary sessions of the delegation as a whole, on March 14, 19 and 21. Individual meetings of the negotiating groups will begin on March 26. Two negotiating groups will meet on Tuesdays and Thursdays and one on Wednesdays and Fridays. Karpov also volunteered that the Soviets would not object if the heads of the U.S. and Soviet negotiating groups began meeting informally before the 26th. The sides agreed that the negotiations should be guided by the principle of confidentiality. Soviets did not agree to U.S. proposal that the first round be broken into two sessions, with the first session ending on April 4 and the second beginning on May 14th. Soviets claimed that it would be inappropriate to leave Geneva after meeting together for only slightly more than three weeks. It was agreed that Executive Secretaries would meet later today to

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850167–0381. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Moscow, NATO Collective, and USNMR SHAPE.

² Shultz and Gromyko met in Geneva January 7–8. For documentation on the meetings, see *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 355–363. For the statement, see *ibid.*, Document 363, footnote 3.

discuss the question of scheduling this and subsequent rounds. Soviets declined U.S. invitation for the three Soviet negotiators to a coffee in honor of the Senate and House observers, saying that they were “in mourning” for Chernenko. They indicated willingness, however, to meet with congressional observers in the future. End summary.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the telegram.]

Kampelman

5. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, March 14, 1985, 1137Z

3137. S/S only for clearance. Subject: Memcon, Gorbachev Meeting of March 13.

1. Secret entire text.

2. Following is draft memcon of March 13 Gorbachev meeting prepared by State Department interpreter Dimitri Arensbarger. Begin text.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev After Chernenko Funeral

Date: March 13, 1985

Time: 9:55 p.m. to 11:25 p.m.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. In telegram Tosec 50092/77674 to Shultz's aircraft, March 14, the Department repeated the text of telegram 3137. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850004–0009) Under a March 19 covering memorandum to Gregg, Platt attached a copy of telegram 3137 and wrote: “Attached for your review is a copy of the interpreter's full verbatim notes of the Vice President's March 13 meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 Soviet Union February) In his personal notes on March 15, Dam commented that it was Shultz's first day back from Moscow and that Dam “joined in a meeting where he gave his impressions of the trip to Moscow and particularly his impressions of Gorbachev. He was favorably impressed with Gorbachev, who struck him as a self-confident and competent politician who was businesslike in manner. On the other hand, the Secretary does not feel that anything is likely to change very fast as a result of this change in personalities.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984–June 1985)

Place: The Kremlin, Moscow

Participants:

U.S.

The Vice President

Secretary George P. Shultz

Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman

Mr. Dimitri Arensburger (Interpreter)

USSR

General Secretary of the CC CPSU Mikhail Gorbachev

Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko

Mr. Andrey Aleksandrov-Agentov

Mr. Viktor Sukhodrev (Interpreter)

3. On behalf of the entire Soviet leadership, General Secretary Gorbachev wanted to thank the U.S. participants for paying their respects on behalf of the U.S. Government to the late General Secretary Chernenko. He especially wanted to thank President Reagan, the Vice President, and Secretary Shultz for honoring Chernenko. Gorbachev was aware that the President, along with Secretary Shultz, had visited the Soviet Embassy in Washington and had signed the condolence book. The Soviet side had taken due note of this.

4. Gorbachev continued that it was natural for U.S. officials to wonder what might change with the departure of one General Secretary and the appointment of a new one. The U.S. should proceed from the premise that there would be continuity in both the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR, as had been reaffirmed two days ago at the plenum of the Party Central Committee. Since the present conversation was being held between the representatives of two great powers, Gorbachev wanted to say on behalf of the Soviet leadership that in the future, too, the USSR would pursue an active and constructive foreign policy, cognizant of the USSR's role as a great power. (Noting the chimes of an antique clock in the room, Gorbachev remarked that the clock was old and was not intended to serve as any kind of signal). Gorbachev went on to say that the Soviet side had set a meeting time which would permit the participants to hold an exchange of views and enable them to get to know each other.

5. Referring to extensive typed notes, Gorbachev continued that in global terms the Soviet side proceeded from the premise that the task before us was to assist all countries in improving the international situation. This included creating conditions for promoting economic ties and furthering exchanges in the fields of culture, technological achievements, and so forth. As for the place assigned to the U.S. within the foreign policy of the USSR, it had previously been set forth by

Soviet officials. Gorbachev also assumed that Gromyko had discussed this during his meetings in Washington with the President and the Vice President.² The Soviet Union attached major importance to its relations with the U.S. Foreign Minister Gromyko added that he had also addressed this matter with Secretary Shultz in Geneva in January.³

6. Gorbachev continued that the USSR had no territorial claims against the U.S., not even with respect to Alaska. Gromyko noted that Alaska had indeed belonged to Russia at one time; moreover, there was even a Russian Hill in San Francisco and a number of Russian churches in the San Francisco area. Gorbachev continued that the Soviet Union had no desire to achieve military superiority over the U.S.; it had no intention of infringing on legitimate U.S. interests. At present we had a major opportunity for cooperation.

7. Gorbachev recalled that there had been periods of such cooperation in the past. Specifically, the Soviet side frequently recalled the World War II period when the two countries had been able to cooperate, differences in their political systems and ideologies notwithstanding. Gromyko added that this had been a bright page in the history of Soviet-U.S. relations; moreover, it had occurred under wartime conditions. Gorbachev continued that it was especially appropriate to recall that cooperation now when we were approaching the 40th anniversary of the victory. Gorbachev also wanted to recall a later time, the late 60's and 70's, when the two states had found it possible to cooperate to the benefit of international relations in general, and relations in Europe in particular. He pointed to the Helsinki Final Act, as well as the 1972 nuclear arms control agreements and others. That was a time when our economic, technical and cultural relations began to develop extensively. Now we have to begin everything anew.

8. Gorbachev could tell the Vice President that the USSR had never intended to fight the U.S. and did not have such intentions now. There had never been such madmen within the Soviet leadership, and there were none now. So what was the problem, he asked rhetorically; why were Soviet-U.S. relations so exacerbated at present? It would seem that both countries should be able to establish proper relations and adopt proper policies in the international arena, provided that the leadership of each recognizes the realities as they exist in the world today. It was appropriate to note in this connection that the situation had changed radically compared to the 1950's for example. The international arena now included dozens of new countries, each of which had

² See footnote 2, Document 1.

³ See footnote 2, Document 4.

its own interests and aspirations. No one, not even the USSR and U.S., could fail to take this into account.

9. Whether we liked it or not, Gorbachev continued, we have to learn to base our relations on these realities in the world. The interpretation of these realities affected the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Gorbachev suggested that this subject deserved some thought. Why, he asked rhetorically, was he saying this? Because numerous statements were being made by very highly placed U.S. officials which attempted to explain events in various countries on various continents, i.e., events involving changes of a political nature when the people of a given nation were exercising their sovereign right to determine their own course—and of course every individual desired vigorous development and well-being—as being simply the result of Moscow’s mischief-making. Moscow would seem to be almighty, it seemed to have its hand everywhere. This was being used as the basis for setting policy, for establishing relations, and for determining the positions to be adopted on various issues. Whether we liked it or not, we lived in the real world and both the USSR and U.S. had to take this real world into account. Gorbachev repeated that these realities had to be taken into account in formulating foreign policy.

10. Gorbachev continued that the USSR had no expansionist ambitions. It had all the resources it would need for centuries, be it in terms of manpower, natural resources or territory. He thought it was Palmerston who had said that Great Britain had no permanent enemies and no permanent friends, only permanent interests. This quote had come up during Gorbachev’s discussion with Prime Minister Thatcher.⁴ It seemed to him that if Great Britain had permanent interests, the same could be expected to apply to the U.S., the USSR, Mozambique, Brazil, Nicaragua, and everyone else. If there was a desire to establish healthy relations, one could not rely on the concept that might made right. The USSR would object to anyone adopting such an approach and would assess it accordingly. It seemed to him that these remarks contained the crux of our different approaches to the world’s realities. After all, Gorbachev continued, the Soviet Union believed that it was strictly up to the people of the U.S. to determine their economic policy, their political system, to select their President, their Vice President and their Secretary of State. In the same way, it was up to the Soviet people to make such decisions on behalf of the USSR and the USSR would never permit anyone to teach it how to govern the Soviet Union. This led to one important conclusion: There was no alternative to peaceful

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 3.

coexistence. As to the question of which was the better system, this was something for history to judge.

11. The foregoing constituted the first part of his somewhat extensive remarks which he had wanted to express by way of thinking out loud. At this first meeting between us, he had wanted to present the Soviet side's views in a more comprehensive fashion.

12. Gorbachev went on to say that the second problem at this time—a problem that was particularly important and timely and had a direct bearing on the future relationship between the USSR and U.S.—involved disarmament and ending the arms race. Negotiations have now begun in Geneva. He wanted to tell the Vice President that the Soviet Union was approaching them very seriously. The USSR hoped that these negotiations would produce genuine results. Aside from everything else, Gorbachev continued, the two countries had now reached a point in their arms build-up when any new breakthroughs resulting from the scientific and technological revolution—not to mention shifting the arms race to space—could set in motion irreversible and uncontrollable processes. Let the delegations in Geneva discuss the details. Gorbachev wanted to convey only one thought at this important meeting: Why were people in the U.S., including some participants of the present meeting, taking such a somber view of these negotiations? These negotiations are being depicted as requiring years and years. This makes one wonder about U.S. intentions with regard to these negotiations. Are they to be eternal? And beyond that, is the U.S. side really interested in these negotiations, is it interested in achieving results? Or does the U.S. find these negotiations necessary in order to pursue its programs for continuing the arms race, for developing ever new types of arms, in order to enforce discipline on its allies and—to put it crudely—to tell those who are advocating disarmament to “shut up?” Could that be the purpose of engaging in these negotiations?

13. The Soviet side would hope that the U.S. would take due note of the seriousness with which the USSR is approaching these negotiations, its desire for concrete results. The opportunity for progress should not be missed if there is a genuine interest in such results. On the other hand, it would be nothing but a pipedream, nothing but adverturism, for the U.S. to follow the advice of various experts about wearing down and weakening the USSR economically, reducing its role in the world. The USSR had been able to find appropriate responses in times more difficult than the present. The USSR could find an appropriate response. But would actions along such lines constitute statesmanship?

14. There was a time, Gorbachev continued, when the Soviet Union had been accused of lowering an iron curtain, but today it appeared

that the U.S. was lowering an iron curtain to seal itself off from the USSR. Contacts between the two countries have been curtailed, technology can be transferred only with the express approval of the President, trade is not permitted. This was a strange policy indeed. The Soviet Union wanted to live in peace with the U.S., it wanted to cooperate, even to be friends with the people of the U.S. The people of the USSR had much respect for the people of the U.S. and for their achievements, but the Soviet people could not understand U.S. attitudes and U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. This was beyond the comprehension of the Soviet people.

15. Thus, Gorbachev concluded, what sort of relations will the two countries pursue in the future? Were we going to resort to the press in order to exchange views and assessments, or were we going to do this at the political level, giving an impetus to better relations between our two countries?

16. The Vice President thanked Gorbachev for his comments. To begin with, he again wanted officially to extend condolences to the Soviet people upon the death of Chernenko and to thank Gorbachev for the many courtesies extended to the Vice Presidential party. This was the end of a very long day but he wished he had all the time in the world in order to explain the overall approach of the President. Yes, this approach was based on strength and realism but, the Vice President wanted to assure Gorbachev, it was also very much based on dialogue. It was not the U.S. intention to threaten the Soviet Union, though we were determined to protect U.S. interests. The Vice President had carefully noted Gorbachev's remarks and wanted to assure him that we had no aspirations of dictating how to administer the Soviet Union. This was the farthest thing from our thoughts.

17. The Vice President handed over to Gorbachev a letter from the President and expressed the hope that Gorbachev would read it carefully.⁵ The President was ready for real give-and-take, and was serious in saying that he was prepared for a meeting at the earliest convenient opportunity. A former U.S. President, Abraham Lincoln, had once said that we must think anew; Gorbachev had said that we must start anew. The U.S. was interested in both.

18. Turning to arms control, the Vice President noted that the two sides had made a basic beginning. It seemed to the Vice President that some progress had been made during the meeting between the President and Gromyko when a mutual ideal goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons had been established. We did not have any aspirations for superiority, nor did we want the talks to continue endlessly to

⁵ See Document 1.

enable us to engage in other activities. We were serious in our approach. The message the Vice President wanted to convey was that we hoped for progress and results of a positive nature.

19. Turning to regional issues, the Vice President noted that the Soviet side had mentioned Nicaragua, while we have raised Afghanistan on previous occasions. The Vice President could say that we were ready for dialogue and he thought that cooperation was possible. A major area in which the Soviet Union could play a constructive role involved Ethiopian relief efforts.

20. Addressing bilateral programs, the Vice President noted that some progress was underway on programs involving housing, environment, and trade. But he agreed that more could be done here. One specific example would be an agreement on Pacific air safety which would be a big step forward. He thought that this was possible.

21. The Vice President went on to say that we knew the Soviet Union's views on human rights. But he asked Gorbachev to understand that this issue was extremely important to the President and the American people. Progress was important on the question of Jewish emigration, persecution of Hebrew teachers, and treatment of dissidents. The Vice President would repeat names mentioned by us before: Shcharansky, Sakharov, Begun, and Orlov. This matter was very, very important in the United States. The Vice President again appealed to the Soviet leadership to understand our position. He hoped that we could start anew in this regard. Moreover, we wanted to approach and discuss this matter consistent with the spirit and letter of the Helsinki Accords.

22. Gorbachev interjected that generally speaking he would agree to think about appointing rapporteurs on human rights in order to discuss the human rights issue. The Soviet Union would have something to say about human rights in the Soviet Union and human rights in the U.S. After all, the U.S. violates human rights not only on its own territory but also beyond its borders, it disregards the human rights not only of individuals but of entire nations and countries, it brutally represses human rights. Just a few minutes ago we were talking about not teaching each other how to manage one's own affairs. But, to repeat, if necessary we could establish a forum and have rapporteurs to demonstrate to the U.S. administration and the U.S. population how things stand with human rights in the U.S. and how the U.S. administration deals with that problem abroad, i.e., how the U.S. treats the human rights of entire countries and continents. Still, Gorbachev did not think that this was an appropriate subject for discussion between our two states. Every time there was a meeting involving our two countries, the U.S. proceeded to raise these questions. Thank God there was socialism because with socialism even the people of capitalist countries had gained more rights.

23. The Vice President replied that in his view it would be useful if we could speak about these things. He wished there were time to do it now. He would be glad to present our problems and to hear out the Soviet side. Perhaps we could thereby make progress. Based on what Gorbachev had said, there would seem to be much misunderstanding of our position. According to Gorbachev, the U.S. misunderstood the Soviet side. He would leave the subject by noting that it would be appropriate to talk about it.

24. In conclusion, the Vice President wanted to note that both he and Secretary Shultz had participated in World War II. We recognized the Soviet sacrifices during the war, but we wanted to look ahead rather than backward, we wanted to emphasize the themes of peace and reconciliation. Furthermore, we did not want to overturn any post-war understandings. Rather, we wanted to see them faithfully implemented.

25. The Vice President assured Gorbachev that we wanted to make real progress. He was saying this with great conviction. The President liked to say that it was better to talk to each other rather than about each other. He wanted to make a start in that direction. While we could not counter every wild voice in the country, we did want, to use Gorbachev's words, to start anew.

26. Secretary Shultz said that just before departing Washington for Moscow he had sat down with the President for a long discussion of what should be said at the present meeting because the President views this moment as being very important.⁶ The President and Secretary Shultz had reviewed relations between the two countries and had discussed the conversation between the President and Gromyko, who was held in high esteem in the U.S. and whose words had made a big impact on the President—especially Gromyko's use of imagery. Gromyko had referred to piles of arms which both the President and Gromyko had agreed should be reduced. The President, too, was a colorful speaker. The President and Secretary Shultz had also reviewed the meeting with Mr. Shcherbitsky, who had left a powerful impression in the U.S.

27. At the conclusion of the pre-departure meeting with the President, the latter, by way of a summary, had asked Secretary Shultz to look Gorbachev squarely in the eyes like a man, and to say the following: The President believes that this is a very special moment in the history of mankind. Gorbachev was starting his term as General Secretary. Mr. Reagan was starting his second term as President. Negotiations were beginning in Geneva. Over the past year we had found

⁶ See Document 2.

solutions to some problems, though not great problems, and if it was at all possible, we must establish a more constructive relationship between the U.S. and USSR. The President had asked Secretary Shultz to convey to Gorbachev his view that in order to achieve success he personally must work very hard and that he was ready to do so. To resort to Gorbachev's words which Secretary Shultz had almost used himself, the negotiators in Geneva could discuss details and there certainly were many of them, but only people like those present here and like the President could resolve the main issues. The President was ready to work with Gorbachev. Thus, in his letter he was inviting Gorbachev to visit the U.S. as our guest at the earliest convenient time. The President believed that a letter from someone was one thing, but a personality with whom one could deal was something entirely different. For that reason, the President very much wanted to sit down with Gorbachev and review the over-all state of our relations and discuss arms control issues. The President felt that if important agreements could be found, the sooner this was done, the better. The President viewed this as a historic moment. These were the sentiments the President had asked Secretary Shultz to convey to Gorbachev, looking him in the eyes like a man.

28. Gorbachev suggested that the exchange of views had indicated the usefulness of this discussion. The Vice President agreed. Gorbachev continued that while he did not wish to offend diplomats—and Gromyko and Secretary Shultz were not true diplomats because they had other responsibilities as well, thus the only true diplomat present was Ambassador Hartman—it was most useful, he thought, that this conversation had been held not in the language of diplomacy but in the language of politics. Leaving aside the question of human rights which somehow had appeared, one could say that this exchange of views had been important and had included serious considerations which required thought. The USSR would welcome it if the comments made today by the Vice President and the words of the President, as related by Secretary Shultz, about a kind of unique moment, were to be put to good use in order to return Soviet-U.S. relations to a normal channel, and if such sentiments were serious. Gorbachev promised to study carefully the President's letter and to think about what had been said here today.

29. Gorbachev concluded by saying that he was pleased to have met his U.S. interlocutors because he believed it was necessary to know each other, to find time for meetings to discuss outstanding problems, and to seek ways to bring the two countries closer together. The Soviet side did not advocate confrontation. It did advocate an improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations. Of course, if the U.S. Government were to set itself the goal of using one or another important issue to outflank the

USSR or to attain unilateral advantage, that would hardly promote better relations. The Soviet Union advocated an honest dialogue which properly took into account the “ranking” of our two countries and of the officials leading these two countries.

30. The Vice President thanked Gorbachev for the opportunity to meet with him and mentioned that he would be holding a press conference at which he would not reveal the substance of the conversation but would characterize it as useful.⁷ Gromyko concurred that the press should be told it was positive and useful. End text.

31. No distribution without approval of Charles Hill.

Hartman

⁷ For the transcript of Bush’s press conference, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 1985, pp. 18–19.

6. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, March 15, 1985

SUBJECT

Divided Soviet Approach to Geneva Arms Control Talks

In late February, the Soviet leadership was divided and uncertain about its approach to the arms talks in Geneva, [3 lines not declassified] this uncertainty was due to 1) Chernenko’s illness and divided opinions within the Politburo, and 2) uncertainty about U.S. intentions and aims at Geneva. Nevertheless, [less than 1 line not declassified] the overriding Soviet aim at Geneva would be to prevent deployment of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). [less than 1 line not declassified] to achieve this end the Soviets would be prepared to make marginal concessions on

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (03/14/1985–03/15/1985); NLR-775–13–29–9–7. Secret; Sensitive; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon. Drafted by D.G. Simpson (INR/PMA/GPT) on March 14. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

other parts of the Geneva negotiations and in such atmosphere-affecting secondary areas as human rights and Nicaragua.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] characterized guidance currently issued to Soviet diplomats abroad as infrequent, imprecise and simplistic compared with briefings available at the time of Soviet campaigns against the neutron bomb or deployment of INF. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the decision to resume negotiations and the Soviet approach to them had been the subject of a major debate within the Soviet political and military leadership. The latter was thought to be inherently distrustful of arms control agreements, considering it a dangerous delusion for the USSR to accept constraints on its weapons systems in return for U.S. assurances. The military was also thought to dismiss apparent differences of opinion within NATO as coordinated propaganda attempts to weaken Soviet vigilance.

Political and military leaders agreed, however, that pressure must be put on the Americans to prevent deployment of SDI and resultant strains on Soviet resources. To this end, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the USSR would be prepared to exploit linkage among the three sets of talks at Geneva, play on differences in U.S. and Western European approaches to arms control, and use moderation in certain non-vital areas not connected with arms control.

In this regard, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the Soviets would be prepared, in exchange for concessions of more value to the USSR, to compromise on their demand that British and French forces be counted in INF, though they would then insist on taking account of them in START. Human rights concessions intended to influence Western opinion could include Jewish emigration, the treatment of dissidents, (possibly the expulsion of Shcharanskiy and Sakharov), and ending radio jamming. If necessary, policy could be moderated in areas where Soviet interests were opportunistic, not vital, such as Nicaragua. In contrast, no significant shift could be expected where the USSR was seeking to defend an entrenched position, such as Afghanistan or Ethiopia.

INR Comment: [*less than 1 line not declassified*] comments are interesting as an indication of what conclusions senior Soviet officials [*less than 1 line not declassified*] have reached about their government's likely strategy and tactics at Geneva—conclusions strikingly similar to those of many Western observers.

7. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, March 19, 1985

SUBJECT

Gorbachev's Debut: Tough Talk from Moscow

Gorbachev's initial moves have shown the world a tough face to match the appearance of smoothness and efficiency earlier displayed in London.² His warnings to Zia over Afghanistan³ and his bullying of Tindemans,⁴ together with Karpov's threat to "blow up the talks" in Geneva,⁵ are clear signals to the West that we are dealing with a more assertive and muscular Kremlin policy. Despite the denials by Menshikov and the uncertain sources for the story, Dusko Doder's report in the Saturday Washington Post on an Afghanistan/Nicaragua linkage is disturbing (see attached),⁶ particularly in light of recent reports that Soviet forces plan to step up the military pressure on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

It is important, in my view, that Gorbachev get the message forthwith that there are no easy pickings. We need to make clear that exploiting the current moment of opportunity in US–Soviet relations also requires responsible Soviet behavior.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 3/1–31/85. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Kaplan. Copies were sent to Chain, Wolfowitz, Burt, Murphy, Nitze, and Rowny. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

² See footnote 2, Document 3.

³ In an attached but not printed article, Dusko Doder wrote that Gorbachev "has issued Moscow's sternest warning to date to Pakistan for its support of Afghan rebels." (Doder, "Gorbachev Warns on Afghan Aid," *Washington Post*, March 16, 1985, p. A1)

⁴ In telegram 3269 from Moscow, March 16, the Embassy reported that in his meeting with Belgian Foreign Minister Tindemans after Chernenko's funeral, Gromyko "resorted to some thinly veiled bullying on the eve of the Belgian deployment decision" on INF weapons. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850181–0579)

⁵ In his opening statement at the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva on March 14, Soviet Ambassador Karpov emphasized that "if the United States moves toward the militarization of space, this would ultimately blow the negotiations apart." (Telegram 2281 from NST Delegation in Geneva, March 15; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850178–0274)

⁶ See footnote 3, above. The article noted reports that the Soviet Union was considering "unspecified actions" against Pakistan if Reagan continued U.S. military pressure on Nicaragua.

The Pakistan Angle

If the U.S., Islamabad, and Beijing stand firm, we should be able to deter any Soviet threats against Pakistan:

—A Soviet effort to take a whack at Pakistan would be very dangerous, but would lead to a strong reaction in the United States as Afghanistan remains a popular cause in the country and on the Hill.

—It would destroy in a stroke Gorbachev's "good guy" image and head off any euphoria over prospects for a new US–Soviet detente.

—It presumably would undercut severely the improvements in Sino–Soviet relations.

A Soviet threat to link Afghanistan and Nicaragua would be even more hollow. Ron Spiers doubts the Soviet capacity to stir up Baluchi insurgency in Pakistan (as Doder reported the Soviets might do in response to U.S. pressures in Nicaragua). Nor could Moscow do much more to affect the Central American situation, except by supplying heavy armaments; and that would open the door to a more decisive U.S. policy on Nicaragua.

All this said, however, we need to move out smartly on several fronts:

—Some reassurance is clearly in order with the Paks. I believe it would be useful for the President to send a letter of support directly to Zia and release the letter to the press.⁷

—The Soviets will need some straight talk so their fresh leader does not miscalculate. You should make this point to Dobrynin in your next meeting with him.

—Gorbachev's threatening language may be turned to our advantage in dampening public expectations at home, and allied hopes in Europe, and in Japan where Nakasone is seeking to score some political points on the Soviet front. You might send a letter to allied Foreign Ministers, stressing both our intention to seize the current "moment of opportunity" and our determination to hold Moscow to higher standards of constructive behavior. We should convey the need for all allies to hold together in case a vigorous new Soviet leader seeks to test our nerve in Geneva or elsewhere in the world.⁸

The Chinese Angle

Since the Arkhipov visit, the Chinese have adopted an increasingly uncertain posture on the "three obstacles"; they have also moved toward party-to-party relations with Moscow, and have not been above unhelpful comments on U.S. policies from Europe to ANZUS to Central

⁷ Not found.

⁸ Not found.

America.⁹ I believe this Chinese posturing is unhealthy, and, at a certain point, could begin to erode Sino-American relations. Fortunately, I also believe Deng and the top Chinese leadership are unlikely to ignore a real Soviet threat to Pakistan. Their actions in Southwest and Southeast Asia still seem to be fairly firm, even if their rhetoric is softening.

Nonetheless, I have suggested to Mike Armacost that he note to the Chinese that the Soviets have adopted this threatening posture. The Chinese would be well advised to bear this in mind as they pursue their new detente with the Soviets.

Conclusion

None of this is to predict that we are heading into a period of crisis with the new Gorbachev regime. However, whether due to Soviet internal political considerations, a Soviet eagerness to be more assertive abroad, or a desire to exploit the Western yearning for progress in Geneva, we could be facing a first test of American will.

It may well be that these new signals of toughness stem from a desire to overcome what Gorbachev and other Soviets see as the humiliations of the last four years and to reassert the Soviet position in the world. In a sense, Gorbachev may be seeking to do for the USSR what President Reagan did for the U.S. (in an obviously different context) after America's introspective post-Vietnam era. (Dobrynin told Bill Beecher last week about the "new sense of dynamism and activism" in Soviet foreign policy.) If this hypothesis is correct, it has important implications, both in terms of moving quickly to turn off a potentially sharper thrust of Soviet policy and in terms of building the basis for a reasonable US-Soviet accommodation based on reciprocity and respect for each other's legitimate interests.

Meanwhile, in the period immediately ahead, our declaratory policy should continue to accentuate the positive: moment of opportunity, summit, arms control, etc. But we also should make it very clear and plain that being the new top boy in Moscow does not accord Gorbachev special privileges to bully others on the world stage.

⁹ Soviet First Deputy Premier Ivan Arkhipov went to China in late December 1984, a notable visit because Arkhipov was the highest-ranking Soviet official to visit China since the Sino-Soviet split 15 years prior. According to telegram 24020 from Beijing, December 26, 1984, he met with Premier Zhao and Politburo member Chen Yun. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840822-0928)

8. **Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) and the Acting Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Hawes) to Secretary of State Shultz¹**

Washington, March 20, 1985

SUBJECT

The Soviet Proposal at Geneva for a Blanket Moratorium

As we had expected, the Soviets have attempted to seize the initiative in the Geneva talks early on by tabling a proposal for a general freeze for the duration of the talks on “the arms race” in all three areas under negotiation. Though there may be some interesting, if as yet basically undefined, suggestions of movement inherent in portions of the Soviet proposal (e.g., implicit acceptance of *some* level of US LRINF deployments), it essentially appears to be a packaging together of previous Soviet declaratory proposals—all fundamentally unacceptable to Western interests. The nature of the Soviet proposal suggests that they will doubtless go public with this call for a moratorium in the near future, (perhaps in a speech or “interview” by Gorbachev or Gromyko), trumpeting it as a major negotiating initiative on their part.

The Soviet Proposal

Characterizing it as “a first major, urgent step toward achieving the goals of these negotiations,” Soviet Ambassador Karpov tabled on Tuesday² a draft joint statement in which the U.S. and Soviet Union would agree to refrain, until final agreement is reached on the “entire complex of questions” under negotiation, from:

- the development (including scientific research), testing and deployment of space-strike arms;
- the quantitative build-up of strategic offensive arms in terms of the total number of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles; and
- a build-up of “medium-range” missiles in Europe.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (03/20/1985–03/21/1985). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dunkerley and Tefft; cleared by Palmer, Dobbins, Redman, Schwartz, Grobel, and Pifer. Patrick Moon, EUR/RPM, initialed for the drafting and clearing officials. Brackets are in the original. In a March 21 covering memorandum to McFarlane, Kraemer and Linhard sent a “background package for the President’s use during tonight’s press conference if the Soviets go public with this March 19 moratoria/freeze proposals.” (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, [Mar 1985] Chron File: [No. 82–No. 90])

² March 19.

The draft statement went on to note that verification of compliance with this general freeze would be carried out by national technical means. In presenting it, Karpov took pains to continue to stress Soviet insistence on linkage: “the resolution of questions of limiting and reducing nuclear arms will also depend upon the resolution of the question of preventing an arms race in space.” In subsequent comments, the Soviets said their proposal is intended to help the negotiating climate, and is not a precondition to negotiations.

At initial reading, much of the proposal appears familiar. The Soviets have previously proposed freezes in these areas in the context of the earlier START and INF talks and at the UNGA (on the questions of space arms). The blanket moratorium concept continues to contain basic flaws and unacceptable features: it would lock the U.S. and NATO into a position of inferiority in important areas; it would be unverifiable in several important respects; it would require lengthy, complicated negotiations to develop unambiguous provisions; and it would effectively remove any serious incentive for the Soviets to negotiate further on the reduction, as opposed to capping, of their own arsenal.

Some New Elements?

That said, Tuesday’s proposal may reflect slight movement from previous Soviet positions. The evidence in this regard, however, is as yet tentative, and in places, ambiguous or contradictory. Both Karpov’s formal plenary statement and the more informal supplementary comments by other Soviets in post-plenary conversation were deliberately vague in details (one of the senior Soviets has, in fact, commented to Mike Glitman that as a political statement, the moratorium proposal did not require further details).

On *INF*, the Soviets characterized their proposal as “halt[ing] the deployment of new U.S. missiles in Western Europe and at the same time, halt[ing] the increase in Soviet countermeasures, with subsequent reduction of medium-range nuclear systems in Europe to a level to be agreed upon.” This reiteration in more formal form of Gromyko’s comments on *INF* to you of last January may represent an implicit Soviet acceptance of the “legitimacy” of at least some level of U.S. LRINF missiles in Europe—the major sticking point in the earlier *INF* negotiations.³ On the other hand, the question of follow-on reductions to an agreed-upon level leaves open the possibility for the Soviets to press for an eventual outcome of zero U.S. LRINF by continuing to argue for compensation for French-British forces. Of course, the Soviets continue to seek to equate U.S. LRINF with their countermeasures,

³ Shultz and Gromyko discussed *INF* issues during their January meetings in Geneva. See footnote 2, Document 4.

which include shorter-range deployments as well as the continued deployment of SS-20s.

On *START*, the new Soviet proposal lays emphasis on the *quantitative* nature of their proposed freeze on strategic arms, fixing SNDVs and weapons at current levels. (They have described the weapons limit in such a way, however, as to suggest continued Soviet insistence on including gravity bombs and other short-range bomber weapons). Their earlier version in the former *START* talks placed greater stress on *qualitatively* freezing the current situation through various one-sided modernization constraints.

Karpov seemed to echo the qualitative theme by stating in the plenary that both sides should seek as an objective in the negotiations “to renounce or strictly limit programs for the development and deployment of new strategic arms (long-range cruise missiles, new types of ICBMs, new types of SLBMs, and new heavy bombers).” In post-plenary conversation, however, General Detinov stated that the proposed moratorium would allow for freedom-to-mix and no modernization constraints. If correct, such an interpretation would permit MX, ALCM and Trident II deployment, under such a moratorium, provided compensatory draw-downs in warheads and launchers were made.

On *space*, the Soviets argue that their moratorium on research, testing, and deployment of “space-strike weapons” does not go beyond the constraints provided in the ABM Treaty. In trying to capture our SDI research, they are using a familiar tactic of stretching the definition of “development” of ABM systems, which is prohibited in Article V of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets claim that by their definition research is one stage of development, which runs on a spectrum from conceptual analysis to laboratory experiments to development of components or models of components. The Soviets would, however, exempt laser research from their moratorium, on the grounds that such research is not oriented toward developing “space-strike weapons.” (How would the Soviets verify compliance with a research ban? One Soviet replied in post-plenary that “cutting off the funding” would satisfy Moscow’s concerns.)

In post-plenary conversation, General Detinov defined space-strike arms as: space-based ballistic missile defense, the US ASAT, the Soviet ASAT, and “space based systems which can attack targets in space, in the air, on the earth or at sea.” The Soviet ban would not include ground-based ICBMs which might have some incidental capability against satellites. (You’ll recall from last January’s meeting with Gromyko, Karpov in a side conversation with Bud McFarlane begrudgingly acknowledged that some current Soviet ABMs would be caught under Gromyko’s definition of space strike weapons. Although Gromyko’s own response was somewhat ambiguous, it was fair to conclude that

ABM systems were encompassed by the Soviet concept of “space-attack weapons.” This new Soviet formulation does not address this, and as such represents some backsliding from their January position in Geneva. The Soviets have thus conveniently defined their moratorium in space to have a maximum impact on our systems and research, while having a minimal impact on their ground-based systems and well-advanced laser research.

In sum, the new Soviet moratorium proposal contains some interesting new variations on previous Soviet positions which our delegation should be able to explore with the Soviets in the weeks and months ahead. The bottom line, however, is that the Soviet proposal is a political document, fundamentally unacceptable to us, and not intended as a serious basis for arms control limitations.

Next Steps

The Soviets will probably publicize their proposal for a blanket moratorium in the near future. (When directly queried on this, one of the Soviets in Geneva responded that the confidentiality agreement covered delegations, but not governments—which indeed has been our position as well). This is consistent with their standard negotiating practice of seeking to put us immediately on the defensive in the arms control propaganda battle. They will clearly expect us to reject their proposal and thus allow them to portray themselves to European and American audiences as the party most interested in serious arms control. Moscow will likely couple their moratorium proposal with their continuing efforts to depict us as somehow reneging on your January agreement with Gromyko to address seriously the “prevention of an arms race in space” within the “entire complex of questions.”

To help blunt the impact with the Allies of the Soviet call for a moratorium, we have sent a letter from Rick to his NATO SCG colleagues with similar messages to the Japanese and Australians.⁴ It advises them of the Soviet proposal and provides our preliminary reaction so that their own governments can be ready for an appropriate response when the Soviets go public. (This will, of course, also enable them to say that they have had prior consultation with the Americans

⁴ In telegram 83957 to all NATO capitals, Tokyo, and Canberra, with copies to Moscow, the NST delegation, and Seoul, March 20, the Department transmitted a letter from Burt. He wrote: “Soviet negotiators in the new arms talks in Geneva have now put forward a call for a blanket moratorium.” He continued: “our initial reading of this proposal suggests that this is essentially a packaging together of previous Soviet declaratory proposals, with all of their inherent faults and unilateral advantages for the Soviet Union. The U.S. position on the basic unacceptability of such moratoria remains unchanged.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850004-0164)

on this question). In informing the Allies, we have taken care not to appear to be dismissing the Soviet proposal out of hand, stressing that we will study it seriously, but also indicating that we see little new from previously unacceptable Soviet proposals. When the Soviets do go public, we will also express regret that the Soviets are focusing on serious reductions, and our hope that this is not the final word from Moscow.

We believe that the disadvantages for the West of such moratoria schemes are so self-evident and familiar as to help to minimize the appeal of this specific Soviet proposal. On the other hand, current interest and sometimes optimism over prospects for East-West movement that Gorbachev's ascension has inevitably sparked in Western media increases the potential for well-crafted and orchestrated Soviet public diplomacy efforts to do damage. If public interest in the proposal is not easily dampened, we may need to consider a more extensive public diplomacy effort.

9. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, March 22, 1985, 1131Z

3607. For the Secretary. Subject: March 21 Hartman-Gromyko Meeting.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Summary: My March 21 meeting with Gromyko produced what I take to be the first hint of a counterproposal to the President's invitation to Gorbachev. Gromyko indicated that the President's letter is still being studied and advised against our "pushing" for a reply.² But he asked pointedly at what "level" we would be represented at commemorations in Helsinki of the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Final Act, suggesting Moscow may prefer a meeting there to coming to Washington. While this is obviously not satisfactory from our point of view, I recommend that we not react, lest we appear too eager for summitry. Better to let the Soviets take their own time to reply.

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Arthur Hartman Files, Lot 2016F0003, Folder 17: 1984–1985 US-Soviet Relations. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² See Document 1.

3. While Gromyko strongly endorsed my view of the need for an expanded dialogue in the months between now and the UNGA, he repeatedly emphasized the need for greater “substance” in our discussions, including, implicitly, in any summit meeting. While my impression is that no decision has been made as yet, this line may presage an attempt to push for quick progress from us in Geneva as the price of a meeting with Gorbachev. Gromyko implied that he will be in Vienna for the State Treaty anniversary and suggested he might see you there.

4. Gromyko expressed a willingness to suspend judgement for the moment on prospects for NST (although he was not encouraged by preliminary reports), but complained about the Western approach in MBFR, CDE and the CD. He begrudgingly agreed to “reflect on” our concerns on Moscow’s plan to take over payrolling of Embassy employees and even to look into a suggestion that I meet with one of his deputies on U.S.-interest human rights cases. He avoided an attempt to draw him out on Soviet VE Day plans. Apparently fresh as a daisy after what must have been a grueling week and a half, Gromyko was cordial, if unenthusiastic, throughout the meeting. While he assured me of Gorbachev’s strong interest in U.S.-Soviet relations, I saw nothing in Gromyko’s presentation to suggest that the new leader has made any inroads in the old master’s brief. He very much appreciated your plaque and guffawed (an oddity in itself) when I suggested they show it to security experts. End summary.

5. Gromyko received me for an hour and twenty minutes accompanied by the MFA’s USA Department Chief (Bessmertnykh), the Ministry’s senior interpreter (Sukhodrev) and an unidentified notetaker. I had along my Political Counselor. After exchanging greetings, I gave Gromyko the sign from Geneva you had had mounted, along with your letter.³ He seemed genuinely pleased, and, after asking me to convey his thanks invited me to begin the session.

6. Summarizing high-level U.S.-Soviet exchanges since November, I told Gromyko I expected to be in Washington in April, and that I would find it useful in my meetings there to have his impressions of where the relationship might be heading in the months ahead. I noted that you had announced you would be going to Vienna in May (he remarked, “I’ve heard”) and recalled our suggestion to Gorbachev that it would be useful to have political level discussions at some point. I suggested that in the period ahead people both here and in Washington

³ Thank you letters to Gorbachev, Kuznetsov, and Gromyko from Shultz and Bush were transmitted via telegram 3204 to Moscow, March 14. It seems likely Hartman delivered another copy of this by hand to Gromyko. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850178–0187)

would inevitably want to turn their attention to internal affairs, and that there might be some value in talking about how we managed our competition to give ourselves some respite to do so. I pointed out that you had been encouraged by the business-like tenor of your last two meetings with Gromyko, and speculated that the two of you would have an opportunity to meet, if not sooner, at the UNGA next fall. What, I wondered, did Gromyko see as a useful, achievable agenda in the meantime.

7. Gromyko prefaced his response by noting that he might see you if he, too, goes to Vienna. (He later indicated he expected to tell the Austrians “very soon” whether or not he will attend the May 15 festivities). Indicating that he would eventually respond to my final query, he invited me to outline our own views of possible areas of cooperation in the period ahead.

8. I told Gromyko we had put an important part of the relationship back in motion with the resumption of the Geneva talks. It remained to be seen, especially in light of what we considered a first misstep on the Soviet side (Karpov’s interview),⁴ whether it would be possible to maintain the confidentiality of the proceedings. But we felt preliminary discussions had shown that serious work was possible and that we were prepared to deal with the real issues. While it was too early to draw conclusions on Geneva, at some point a review of progress in other negotiations might be useful. We hoped exchanges in both Stockholm and Vienna would bear fruit, and bilateral NPT talks seemed to be on track. We needed to talk more about CW.

9. We could do more on regional issues, I continued. Referring back to Gorbachev’s remarks in our Kremlin meeting on conflicting U.S.-Soviet views of behaviour with respect to the developing world,⁵ I asked whether we should not try to develop a better common understanding of the concept of “restraint” than we had in the seventies. I noted that we had already had discussions on Afghanistan and Southern Africa, and that the recent consultations on the Middle East had been useful. We were nonetheless concerned that, despite these exchanges, the Soviets seemed unwilling to take constructive steps even in areas, such as the Iran-Iraq War, where we appeared to share common overall objectives. Reports that Soviet-made rockets appar-

⁴ In telegram 3334 from Moscow March 18, the Embassy reported: “Karpov made an unusual appearance on the TV news program *Vremya* March 16. Soviet spokesmen stress that an agreement on space weapons must accompany any reduction in nuclear arms. They question whether administration support for SDI is consistent with the agreed purpose of the talks.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850183–0565)

⁵ See Document 5.

ently supplied by Libya to Iran had struck Baghdad dramatically underscored this concern.

10. Finally, I noted that there were bilateral problems we could usefully address. By way of example, I noted that four months of negotiations had created the impression on our side that certain Soviet institutions were not anxious to conclude a new exchanges agreement. The cultural and higher education ministries seemed determined not to allow even as extensive a program as had existed before 1979. We were unwilling to settle for less. It would take a political stimulus if we were to move beyond this impasse.

11. Before launching into a somewhat rambling response, Gromyko asked me one very pointed question. Had we, he wondered, given any thought to how the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act might be marked? More specifically, “at what level” should the anniversary be marked? He did not respond immediately to my reply that we had not yet definitively addressed this question. After commenting on my other points, however, he returned to Helsinki, observing that it would be well to mark the occasion fittingly. Moscow’s plans, like ours, had not yet crystallized, he said. The Soviets were considering the question of “level”. In case I missed the point, he repeated that “the level of Soviet participation” at the anniversary was being considered.

12. Taking up my points on dialogue, Gromyko recalled our Kremlin meeting with Gorbachev. Gromyko portrayed the “thrust” of the new General Secretary’s presentation as “the need to find practical means of improving bilateral relations and the international situation”. The main problem was to move from words to deeds. While the U.S. funeral delegation had expressed “solidarity” with the general idea of improving relations, it had, Gromyko chided, seemed to avoid dealing with the substance of the most acute problems facing us—those being addressed in Geneva. The Soviets had not expected an in-depth discussion of Geneva-related issues, of course; but they had “noted” the U.S. “triad’s” apparent lack of preparedness for a “concrete discussion”. Gromyko complained that he had noted the same problem in discussions of less weighty, but still important issues, in diplomatic exchanges here and in Washington.

13. On Geneva per se, Gromyko agreed with me that it was too early to draw any conclusions. He noted, however, that initial reports from the Soviet delegation did not make him “hopeful”. Reiterating that we were only at the beginning of the talks, he expressed a willingness to wait and see how they developed. He was less charitable on our approach to MBFR, Stockholm and the Committee on Disarmament. On the first, he warned that the Western attitude was leading people here to conclude that NATO capitals did not want progress. He

described the latter two negotiations as “going around in circles”, warning that Moscow would not accept unilateral steps against its interest. He interpreted the NATO position on CSBM’s at Stockholm as reflecting a greater interest in “intelligence gathering” than in security. This approach would not, he warned, lead to an acceptable agreement.

14. Gromyko acknowledged the utility of the February Middle East discussions,⁶ but complained that other bilateral exchanges on regional issues had been “cursory” in nature. The Soviets would prefer that future discussions be more “specific” and would be prepared to work with the U.S. to identify possible topics. Exchanges could then proceed through Embassies in either Washington or Moscow. The Soviets were for future regional exchanges, Gromyko concluded, feeling that they played a useful role in “keeping an even temperature”.

15. After making the point on Helsinki described above, Gromyko concluded by reassuring me that the President’s letter to Gorbachev was being “studied”, and that a response would be forthcoming. He did not believe it would be useful for us to “push” for a response. The Soviets felt it best to consider “coolly, level-headedly, and unemotionally” all facets of the message before responding.

16. After addressing a number of Gromyko’s points, I raised our concern over Moscow’s approach to the fortieth anniversary of the VE Day. That approach, I pointed out, had recently manifested itself in a particularly malign way in a *Pravda* piece (Moscow 03396)⁷ suggesting that U.S. bombing of Dresden and Tokyo in 1945 was to frighten Moscow. Another problem was the Soviets’ refrain not only that they had won the war themselves, but had been hindered by its “allies”. I reminded Gromyko of Vice President Bush’s assurances that we remembered the sacrifices the USSR had made with us during the war, and pointed out that the Western wartime allies would be commemorating the end of the conflict at the Bonn Summit with our former enemies.⁸ Our themes would be reconciliation, forty years of peace and economic progress, attempts to bring the fruits of that progress to

⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 371.

⁷ In telegram 3396 from Moscow, March 19, the Embassy reported: “A major *Pravda* commentary by Yuriy Zhukov March 18 takes the U.S. to task for its failure to plan for an adequate commemoration of V-E Day. The Zhukov article comes in the wake of Gorbachev’s reference in his March 11 Central Committee speech to the possibility that the 40th anniversary of the end of the war could be the occasion for new positive steps in East-West relations. Gorbachev’s statement and the Zhukov follow-up probably signal a new phase in Moscow’s campaign to press the U.S. on this year’s anniversaries.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850186–0414)

⁸ The G–7 was scheduled to meet in Bonn from May 2 to 4.

less developed nations, and the emergence of a new generation. We saw all too little of such themes in Soviet preparations for the anniversary, and thus had doubts about associating ourselves officially with whatever Moscow might have in mind. Noting recent rumors that Moscow would mark VE Day with a major military parade to which Ambassadors would presumably be invited, I told Gromyko that, based on what we had seen thus far, I regretted that my recommendation to Washington would currently be that I not attend.

17. Gromyko, looking more than usually pained, avoided the opening I had given him to reassure us on VE Day. Noting that he was "optimistic" Moscow would win if we compared tendentious commentary in each other's press, he suggested we "bracket" the issue, and returned to his previous line of thought.

18. Gromyko hoped that Washington would devote more "serious" attention to the main problems facing our two countries: disarmament, the limitation and reduction of conventional and nuclear weapons, non-proliferation, and stopping the arms race, including its extension to outer space. Noting that we had been talking for an hour without dealing directly with any of these questions, he emphasized Moscow's willingness to do so and stressed that "the most important thing is substance". The U.S. side's desire to talk was a good thing in itself, he observed, but it was necessary to fill the discussion with "content". As Gorbachev had informed Vice President Bush, Gromyko said, such meetings as might take place must be "substantive" and "result in progress in the relationship". Gromyko assured me he would inform Gorbachev of our discussion, observing that Gorbachev "has a great interest in U.S.-Soviet relations".

19. I made clear that we were as serious as Gromyko about the substance of the issues being discussed in Geneva and would give our delegation there full attention and support. I pointed out, however, that the time would inevitably come for decisions at the political level. I then raised two final points.

20. I expressed our deep misgivings over the Soviet plan to take over payrolling of Embassy local employees. We could not, I stressed, accept a unilateral change in a system which had worked well for all concerned. It was unacceptable that we should not be able to pay our own employees directly, or that we not be able to use rubles which had been legitimately obtained to do so. Expressing the hope that it would be possible to avoid something neither side needed at this time, I urged Gromyko to look into the matter. He agreed to do so, but pointed out that there was a question of sovereignty to be considered. I could not deny, he intoned, that the Soviet Government had a right to implement the changes it had proposed, just as we would have under analogous circumstances. I acknowledged that they of course

had the sovereign right to do this but went on to say that others also had sovereign rights. A competition in applying these we did not need. He agreed to “reflect” on what was said.

21. I then raised the question of emigration cases in which the U.S. had a direct interest—either as regards U.S. citizens or divided families. I said that we had noticed recent signs of progress in a number of cases and that we hoped these would be resolved. Returning to a suggestion that Alexander Haig had made in one of his meetings with Gromyko, I asked if it might be useful for me to meet with one of Gromyko’s deputies to identify particularly promising cases for resolution. Gromyko remembered Haig’s suggestion and asked Bessmertnykh in Russian if anything had been done. When Bessmertnykh shook his head, Gromyko said he would look into the matter. A debater to the end, however, he warned, that the MFA could consider nothing which would infringe on the USSR’s “immutable sovereign rights”.

Comment

22. There is more between the lines than on the face of Gromyko’s circumlocutions. My sense is that Gromyko has given Gorbachev his recommendations for a response to the President’s letter but does not yet have the General Secretary’s approval, and therefore must preserve all options. I take his remarks on Helsinki as a hint that we might get a counterproposal to our offer of a summit in Washington. If it is not forthcoming before then, Gromyko may well deliver such a message in Vienna. His ramblings on the need for greater “substance” in our exchanges suggests the Soviets will not be satisfied—at least initially—with a simple get-acquainted summit meeting. Instead they seem to be tempted to see if they can use the prospect of a meeting to move their favorite projects along. Gromyko’s brush-off on VE Day suggests the Soviets have concluded we will not associate with their commemorations under any circumstances, and that they can therefore indulge themselves in a no-holds barred celebration of their “victory over fascism” and link it to their current “national struggle” against the American-fed arms race. His failure to express determination to implement the payrolling plan is a good sign. We will know how good April 1.

Hartman

10. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 25, 1985

SUBJECT

Letter from Gorbachev

Soviet Chargé Oleg Sokolov delivered to Rick Burt today the attached letter to you from Gorbachev. Dobrynin had called me earlier with a preview. The tone of the letter tracks closely with Gorbachev's comments to the Vice President and me,² and could therefore reflect his personal touch.

I draw your attention in particular to the final paragraphs of the letter, in which Gorbachev says he has a "positive attitude" to the idea of holding a summit. He indicates that it would not be necessary to sign documents at such a meeting, although agreements on issues of mutual interest which had been previously worked out could be "formalized" during the meeting. He defines the main purpose of a meeting as a "search for mutual understanding on the basis of equality and taking account of the legitimate interests of each side." Gorbachev thanks you for your invitation to Washington, but asks that you agree to return to the question of timing and venue for a summit at a later point. The Soviets may be thinking of suggesting a summit in Helsinki in August, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the CSCE Final Act. In a meeting last week with Art Hartman, Gromyko pointedly asked for our plans on attendance at Helsinki.³

Gorbachev's letter is also notable for its non-polemical tone. In fact, his message seems to be that we should both tone down public rhetoric and do business in a calm way that avoids "deepening our differences" and "whipping up animosity." Predictably, he also stresses the priority he attaches to arms control and my January agreement with Gromyko on the "subject and objectives" for Geneva. Here too he picks up themes he used with George and me in Moscow.

I am holding the text of the letter very closely, and will be sending you a suggested draft response for Gorbachev in the next few days.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8590272, 8590336). Secret; Sensitive. Eyes Only for the President and NSC Advisor McFarlane. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates McFarlane saw it. An attached NSC correspondence sheet indicates that Reagan also saw it.

² See Document 5.

³ See Document 9.

In answering press inquiries about a Soviet response to your summit invitation, I suggest we reply simply that our two governments are in touch, but that as the media knows, we do not intend to discuss our confidential diplomatic exchanges in public.

Attachment

Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan⁴

Moscow, March 24, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

Let me first of all express gratitude for the sympathy shown by you personally on the occasion of a sad event for the Soviet people—the death of K.U. Chernenko.

We also appreciate the participation in the mourning rites in Moscow of the Vice-President of the United States Mr. George Bush and the Secretary of State Mr. George Shultz. I think that the conversation we had with them was—though it had to be brief—mutually useful and, one might say, even necessary under the current circumstances.

We value the practice of exchanges of views between the leaders of our two countries on the key issues of Soviet-American relations and the international situation as a whole. In this context I attach great importance to the exchange of letters, which has started between the two of us.

First of all I would like to say that we deem improvement of relations between the USSR and USA to be not only extremely necessary, but possible, too. This was the central point that I was making in the conversation with your representatives in Moscow.

For your part, you also expressed yourself in favor of more stable and constructive relations, and we regard this positively. We have also taken note of your words about the new opportunities which are opening up now.

This being the case, the problem, as we understand it, is to give—through joint effort on the level of political leadership—a proper impetus to our relations in the direction the two of us are talking about, to translate into the language of concrete policy the mutually expressed willingness to improve relations, with account taken of the special

⁴ No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy.

responsibility borne by our two countries, of the objective fact that the Soviet Union and the United States of America are great powers and that relations between them are of decisive importance for the situation in the world in general.

Our countries are different by their social systems, by the ideologies dominant in them. But we believe that this should not be a reason for animosity. Each social system has a right to life, and it should prove its advantages not by force, not by military means, but on the path of peaceful competition with the other system. And all people have the right to go the way they have chosen themselves, without anybody imposing his will on them from outside, interfering in their internal affairs. We believe that this is the only just and healthy basis for relations among states. For our part, we have always striven to build our relations with the United States, as well as with other countries, precisely in this manner.

Besides, the Soviet leadership is convinced that our two countries have one common interest uniting them beyond any doubt: not to let things come to the outbreak of nuclear war which would inevitably have catastrophic consequences for both sides. And both sides would be well advised to recall this more often in making their policy.

I am convinced that given such approach to the business at hand, on the basis of a reasonable account of the realities of today's world and treating with a due respect the rights and legitimate interests of the other side, we could do quite a bit to benefit the peoples of our countries, as well as the whole world, having embarked upon the road of a real improvement of relations.

It appears to us that it is important first of all to start conducting business in such a manner so that both we ourselves and others could see and feel that both countries are not aiming at deepening their differences and whipping up animosity, but, rather, are making their policy looking to the prospect of revitalizing the situation and of peaceful, calm development. This would help create an atmosphere of greater trust between our countries. It is not an easy task, and I would say, a delicate one. For, trust is an especially sensitive thing, keenly receptive to both deeds and words. It will not be enhanced if, for example, one were to talk as if in two languages: one—for private contacts, and the other, as they say,—for the audience.

The development of relations could well proceed through finding practical solutions to a number of problems of mutual interest. As I understand it, you also speak in favor of such a way.

We believe that this should be done across the entire range of problems, both international and bilateral. Any problem can be solved, of course, only on a mutually acceptable basis, which means finding reasonable compromises, the main criterion being that neither side

should claim some special rights for itself or advantages, both on subjects between the two of them and in international affairs.

No matter how important the questions involved in our relations or affecting them in this or that manner might be, the central, priority area is that of security. The negotiations underway in Geneva require the foremost attention of the two of us. Obviously, we will have to turn again and again to the questions under discussion there. At this point I do not intend to comment on what is going on at the talks—they have just started. I shall say, though, that some statements which were made and are being made in your country with regard to the talks cannot but cause concern.

I would like you to know and appreciate the seriousness of our approach to the negotiations, our firm desire to work towards positive results there. We will invariably adhere to the agreement on the subject and objectives of these negotiations. The fact that we were able to agree on this in January is already a big achievement, and it should be treated with care.

I hope, Mr. President, that you will feel from this letter that the Soviet leadership, including myself personally, intends to act vigorously to find common ways to improving relations between our countries.

I think that it is also clear from my letter that we attach great importance to contacts at the highest level. For this reason I have a positive attitude to the idea you expressed about holding a personal meeting between us. And, it would seem that such a meeting should not necessarily be concluded by signing some major documents. Though agreements on certain issues of mutual interest, if they were worked out by that time, could well be formalized during the meeting.

The main thing is that it should be a meeting to search for mutual understanding on the basis of equality and account of the legitimate interests of each other.

As to a venue for the meeting, I thank you for the invitation to visit Washington. But let us agree that we shall return again to the question of the place and time for the meeting.

Sincerely,

M. Gorbachev

11. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Abrams) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, March 25, 1985

SUBJECT

Approaching the Soviets for Discussions on Human Rights

ISSUE FOR DECISION

Whether to propose discreet, high-level talks with the Soviet Union on our mutual human rights concerns in your next meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

During discussions with Vice President Bush in the aftermath of the Chernenko funeral, General Secretary Gorbachev proposed the appointment of “rapporteurs” and a “forum” to discuss human rights in the United States and elsewhere. In so doing, he was attempting to turn aside the Vice President’s expressions of concern over Soviet human rights abuses by suggesting our own record be examined. But he also may have been responding to the proposal we made last year to establish a special channel on human rights between Art Hartman and Gromyko’s First Deputy Korniyenko.

While at the end of the meeting Gorbachev said that human rights is not a proper subject for the bilateral relationship, we believe we should take advantage of his “rapporteurs” suggestion. We believe that Elliott Abrams is the logical rapporteur for the United States. He could be assisted by one of our Soviet hands—either Mark Palmer or Tom Simons. If the initial talks were in Moscow, we would want to avoid publicizing them to the extent possible, but Elliott’s position would require him to have quiet private meetings with some Soviet human rights activists along the lines that have become traditional with American visitors. We would also expect Art to attend the talks with Soviet officials. To suit the Soviet desire for equity we would make clear that we seek talks on our mutual human rights concerns. In keeping with our preference for quiet diplomacy we would make clear we are interested in discreet discussions designed to encourage

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 Sept. Mtg. w/ E. Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Schmidt on March 18; cleared by Pascoe, Simons, Palmer, and Matthews. Schmidt initialed for the clearing officials. Burt wrote at the top of the page: “I’m sure the Soviets will say no, but it’s still worth a try. RB.”

progress and clear the air for advances across the board in our relations. Our idea would be to have you propose the talks during your next meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, referencing Gorbachev's proposal to Vice President Bush.

Recently, we have been receiving mixed signals from the Soviets on human rights. Internally, the crackdown on Jews and members of other religious groups continues apace. On the other hand, one of our dual nationals and several prominent Moscow refuseniks have been given permission to leave. Externally, the Soviets continue to turn aside our suggestions that Soviet movement on human rights would have a positive impact on relations overall. Ambassador Schifter's specific attempt to horse trade in advance of the Ottawa Human Rights Experts Meeting set for May was brusquely turned aside.² On the other hand, Gosbank head Alkhimov told Treasury [*Commerce*] Secretary Baldrige during the Shcherbitskiy visit that Jewish emigration would increase if relations improved, thus reinforcing a similar statement he made during the Olmer visit to Moscow.³ Meanwhile, a KGB agent assigned to the UN Secretariat has approached leaders of the American Jewish Congress with the hint that Jewish emigration levels would rise if there were public Jewish opposition to the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. These and other developments seem to suggest that the Soviets may be considering human rights concessions, but only in return for a prior improvement in relations.

The above assessment of the Soviet approach to human rights may seem to militate against their accepting our proposed gambit on the Gorbachev proposal. They will naturally assume we would use the talks to raise our human rights agenda once again. On the other hand, if they agree to talks in a quiet non-polemical atmosphere, we might be able to make some real progress on our human rights concerns. We would need to be prepared to defend our own record, but we believe it is worth the risk.

Recommendation

That you propose discreet, high-level talks with the Soviet Union on our mutual human rights concerns in your next meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin.⁴

² In telegram 105111 to Moscow, April 6, the Department reported: "Ambassador Schifter and DeptOffs have now made a number of attempts to engage the Soviets in substantive preliminary discussions on the Ottawa HREM. It is clear that as of now they are not prepared to engage in a comprehensive bilateral discussion on the HREM and related human rights concerns." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850239–0279)

³ For information on the January 1985 Moscow experts meeting, see *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 351. For information of Shcherbitskiy's meetings in Washington see *ibid.*, Documents 376–378.

⁴ Shultz initialed his approval and wrote in the margin: "add'l items for next meeting. GPS." A typed transcription of the marginal note added the date 3/26/85.

12. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany and the Mission in West Berlin¹

Washington, March 27, 1985, 0455Z

91843. Subject: Burt/Sokolov Meeting on MLM Incident.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Soviet DCM Oleg Sokolov called on Assistant Secretary Burt at 11:00 a.m. March 25 to give the Soviet version of the MLM incident.² The statement protested the “illegal” activities of Major Nicholson and Sergeant Schatz and their supposed penetration into a restricted area for espionage activities. It claimed the sentry had fired a warning shot and killed the Major only when he attempted to escape. The statement included an expression of regret over the Major’s death.

3. Protesting strongly the Soviet action, Burt told Sokolov that the U.S. viewed the incident as a very serious matter and the facts are not as he described them. Burt recited the facts as we knew them and then emphasized that there could be no excuse under any rendition for the killing of the U.S. officer. He added that we were appalled that the Soviet personnel had left the Major for an hour without medical attention and allowed to die. Noting our efforts to improve U.S.-Soviet relations in this period of a new Soviet leadership, he said that episodes like this raise concerns in the USG that their inability to control the use of military force could again derail efforts to improve the relationship.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850208–0948. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Niles, Strathearn, and Kornblum; approved by Burt.

² On March 24, U.S. Army Major Arthur D. Nicholson, assigned to the Military Liaison Mission (MLM), was shot and killed by a Soviet guard while on patrol in East Germany. In an on-the-record briefing on March 25, Burt explained that Nicholson and his partner, Sergeant Schatz, were on patrol in a clearly marked U.S. military vehicle, and both men were wearing U.S. military field uniforms. He continued: “When attacked, the two-man patrol was not in a restricted area, and no Soviet forces were visible. Major Nicholson had left his vehicle when he and his partner were fired upon at approximately 3:50 p.m. by a Soviet soldier who had emerged from a nearby woods. They were not warned in any way before the shots were fired. Major Nicholson was hit in the chest by one of the approximately three shots fired by the Soviet soldier. When his partner, Sergeant Schatz, sought to come to his assistance, he was ordered back to his vehicle at gunpoint. Several other Soviet soldiers arrived immediately and prevented the other American from administering medical assistance to Major Nicholson. At approximately 4:20 p.m. a Soviet soldier arrived with a medical kit. No effort was made to assist Major Nicholson until approximately 4:50 p.m., at which time it was determined that Major Nicholson was dead.” (Telegram 89988 to all European diplomatic posts, March 26; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850205–0174)

4. Burt asked if the Soviets intend to make the fact that they regretted the incident public and if we could then refer to it with the press. Sokolov said they would probably publicize their regret at some point. He had no problem with our mentioning it. Burt warned Sokolov against putting forward their tendentious review of events publicly. He suggested it would be better to leave time for a thorough investigation of the facts.

5. The Soviet Embassy spokesman issued a statement at approximately this time incorporating the essence of the Soviet version—without, however, expressing regret over the incident. When we heard of this from newsmen, Burt telephoned Sokolov, strongly criticizing this action and informing him it gave us no choice but to publicize the facts we had. Burt noted it was particularly distasteful that the Soviet spokesman failed to express Soviet regret over the incident. Sokolov said he understood our concern and would ensure that the Soviet regret over the incident was conveyed to the press. At this point, the Soviet Embassy did express regret when asked by U.S. newsmen.

6. Burt then followed up with an on-the-record press briefing at 3:15 p.m., providing our understanding of the facts in the case.³

7. Following is the Soviet statement as given by Sokolov:

The Soviet side deems it necessary to call the attention of the American side to the illegal actions of members of the American Military Liaison Mission accredited with the Commander-in-Chief of the Group of the Soviet Forces in Germany, which led to the death of an American man.

On March 24, 1985 around 16 hours members of the U.S. Military Mission Major A. Nicholson and Staff-Sergeant D. Schatz in Car No. 23, despite the presence of the clearly visible warning signs in Russian and German, entered the territory of a restricted military installation of the GSFG in the vicinity of Ludwigslust, Schwerin area, of the German Democratic Republic. Having left the car and driver to cover his espionage activities, Major Nicholson wearing a camouflage suit and carrying a photo camera clandestinely, through a window of the building, penetrated directly into the territory of this installation where he photographed the combat equipment which was there. Caught red-handed by a Soviet sentry guarding that equipment, he did not comply with his demands stipulated by the military manuals of the USSR armed forces and after a warning shot while attempting to escape he was killed and driver Staff-Sergeant Schatz with the car was apprehended.

³ See footnote 2, above.

The actions of the American military (similar actions have also taken place in the past) constitute a gross violation of Article 10 of the Agreement on Military Liaison Missions of April 3, 1947, which is the basis for the work of the U.S. Liaison Mission in Potsdam. Members of this Mission clandestinely penetrated the territory of a restricted military installation of the group of the Soviet forces in Germany for the purpose of obtaining intelligence information, they photographed combat equipment and did not comply with the legitimate demands of the Soviet sentry, which led to the death of one of them, and the Soviet side expresses its regret in this connection.

The Soviet side resolutely protests the above mentioned actions of the American military men and demands that necessary measures be taken so that the provisions of the Agreement of 1947 be strictly enforced.

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13. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, March 30, 1985

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Dobrynin March 30

Dobrynin came in for a little over an hour this morning. He was accompanied by his No. 2 Oleg Sokolov, I by EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Palmer. The meeting focussed on two kinds of topics: the killing of Major Nicholson in East Germany,² and what our two countries should be doing to make your meeting with Gorbachev as productive as possible.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Meetings: Shultz-Gromyko-Dobrynin-Hartman-Gromyko 1985 (1). Secret; Sensitive. According to another copy, Simons drafted and Palmer and Kelly cleared the memorandum. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers,—1985 Soviet Union File)

² See Document 12. In his memoir, Shultz commented: "As in the shooting down of the Korean airliner, the Soviets did something egregious and then blamed us for it. After expressing their 'regret' over Major Nicholson's death, they accused him of 'espionage activities' and failure to heed a warning from the sentry. We pushed strenuously to get the facts and see justice done. It was cold-blooded murder, and I said so." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 533–534)

On the Nicholson tragedy, he began the meeting by giving me their response to the proposal we made Wednesday that our two commanders meet to review what took place and what we should do to prevent recurrences.³ Essentially they accept our proposal, with the additional suggestion that working-level discussions precede the meeting of the commanders.

I told Dobrynin that I thought this was basically a good response, since agreement to try to prevent a further occurrence of this sort is important. He had to understand the outrage here not just that our man had been shot but that no first aid had been permitted. I told Dobrynin we would be giving the appropriate instructions to General Otis, and he replied that General Zaytsev already had his instructions. At the end of the meeting we talked about how to handle the media waiting for Dobrynin outside the Department, and we agreed that he would announce the basic accord and that Mark Palmer would confirm on my behalf that I was pleased we had reached agreement to discuss the incident and consider ways to prevent such incidents in the future.

Turning to broader issues in the relationship, I told Dobrynin I thought the Soviet response fit well in a larger discussion, because it should now be our job to see if we can help create an environment that will make a meeting between you and Gorbachev worthwhile. We are studying Gorbachev's letter to you carefully, and it is straightforward and good in tone.⁴ Dobrynin said it was meant to be. I said we can talk about time and place later. We should focus now on what we can do to make a meeting constructive, and I thought we need to accomplish two things.

First, we should try to avoid things that throw us off course. The main point of my RAND speech in October was that it is important to learn how to avoid negative developments and handle things that do blow up.⁵ I said we are worried about their keeping control over their military. It seemed to me that their response on the Nicholson tragedy was a constructive contrast to the way KAL had just careened ahead, and that someone had gotten hold of it in time.

³ March 27. In telegram 97024 to all European diplomatic posts and Bonn, March 30, the Department of State, in press guidance released following Shultz's meeting with Dobrynin, announced: "We are pleased that agreement was reached that our two commanders-in-chief in Europe, General Glenn Otis of the 7th Army in Heidelberg and General Zaytsev of the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany, will get together to discuss issues related to the incident and to consider ways to prevent such incidents in the future." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850220–0390) See footnote 7, Document 22.

⁴ See Document 10.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 2.

In that connection I made some points about the Berlin air corridors problem. I noted there had been some improvements after we talked about it in October,⁶ but now things seem to be moving backward. The issue is not in satisfactory shape, and our commanders should perhaps pay more attention to it. I told him I would be back to him later in a more formal way on this issue.

Second, I said, we should be looking for constructive things to do. We were pleased with the statement in Gorbachev's letter that although we might not be able to sign major agreements at a summit meeting, we should at least try to get some worthwhile things recorded. I then turned to various possibilities in our four-part agenda.

On arms control, I started with Geneva. I recalled that in his meeting with the Vice President and me Gorbachev had expressed some concern about statements from us on how difficult it was going to be to reach agreements. I then reiterated that while we are going to explain our thinking to the public, we have not broken the confidentiality agreement in Geneva, and we are prepared to work as rapidly as possible for agreements. Recalling that Gromyko had told me in Geneva that if something could be agreed we could evaluate it,⁷ I suggested that if some element could be agreed on early it would be a big plus.

Dobrynin said he understood I was talking about a "prelude to the future," preparations for a meeting of "our bosses." He then ticked off the kinds of issues Gromyko has previously suggested as things that could be agreed on without reference to Geneva: ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties,⁸ renewal of Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations, non-use-of-force, and the like. I responded in two ways. First, I referred to proposals we already have on the table on such issues—your proposal about improving calibration techniques on testing and your offer to discuss non-use-of-force commitments in Stockholm if they are willing to negotiate our confidence-building measures. Second, I mentioned a few other areas that I consider potentially promising—Dick Kennedy's bilateral

⁶ See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 296.

⁷ See footnote 2, Document 4.

⁸ The Threshold Test Ban Treaty was signed in Moscow on July 3, 1974. The Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions was signed in Washington and Moscow on May 28, 1976. "The TTB Treaty and the PNE Treaty are closely interrelated and complement one another. The TTB Treaty places a limitation of 150 kilotons on all underground nuclear weapon tests carried out by the Parties. The PNE Treaty similarly provides for a limitation of 150 kilotons on all individual underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes." (Department of State *Bulletin*, August 23, 1976, p. 269)

talks with the Soviets on non-proliferation⁹ and bilateral talks that could help us get a handle on chemical weapons proliferation.

Turning to human rights, I said we had seen both pluses and minuses recently and noted that Gromyko had told Art Hartman he would look into our old proposal that Art meet with a senior Soviet from time to time on issues like divided spouses. I then asked about Gorbachev's suggestion to the Vice President and me that the two countries designate "rapporteurs" to meet and discuss human rights issues. Dobrynin said that was an item that had not been included in his report on the meeting. I said I was not sure Gorbachev was being serious or dismissive, and we had not fixed ideas, but it seemed to me that some quiet exchanges between rapporteurs could be useful if Gorbachev wanted them. Dobrynin said that as far as he was aware the Soviet position on human rights has not changed, but I had the sense he would check back with Moscow.

On bilateral topics, I said it would be a plus if we could identify areas for increasing non-strategic trade in the Joint Commission meeting Mac Baldrige would be attending in May. I then touched on four issues that we ought to be able to break loose in short order if the political will is there, since the problems are difficult but not ideological or matters of principle: Pacific air safety measures, normalizing our civil aviation relationship, getting a new exchanges agreement and opening new consulates in Kiev and New York.

On regional topics, I told Dobrynin I did not think the meetings we have had have been very fruitful, but I had been impressed with Gorbachev's broad-gauge approach to the problems of a changing world, and by his comment that we both have a lot to think about. Regional tensions have been the most difficult issue for us to handle in the relationship, and if Gorbachev's comments suggest a different pattern of dealing with each other than simply exchange of information, this could be an interesting development. Dobrynin commented only that the Soviets think the exchanges up to now have already been useful, albeit modestly so.

Dobrynin summed up by saying that in his view our task was to try to make a meeting between you and Gorbachev, on which we have already agreed, a successful one. He saw my presentation today as designed to figure out how to make your meeting with Gorbachev successful. We will not be able to do everything, but we should move wherever we can.

Dobrynin then asked about my plans for going to Vienna. He said he had just checked with Moscow, and no decision had yet been taken

⁹ Kennedy and Petrosyants headed the delegations at the non-proliferation talks.

on Gromyko's attendance. I said I was planning to arrive May 15 and leave immediately after the ceremonies, but I could make time available May 14 if Gromyko is going to be in Vienna and would be prepared for a meeting. Dobrynin asked if I would spend April in Washington, and I replied that he and I and Gromyko and Hartman in Moscow should do what we can to move things forward. Dobrynin concluded that to him this meant we should work through the landscape to prepare for "the meeting."

14. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, April 2, 1985

SUBJECT

State Paper on U.S.-Soviet Relations

I have looked over the paper Rick Burt gave you.² It seems to be *very* thin, almost totally devoid of substance, mistaken in some particulars, and in sum totally inadequate for a fruitful meeting with the President.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron April 1985 (1/6). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for the System. Sent for information. Sent through Poindexter, who did not initial the memorandum.

² Attached but not printed is a portion of a larger State Department "game plan" paper, entitled "Priorities/Opportunities for 1985." Under a March 22 covering note, Rodman forwarded the paper to Shultz and explained: "Attached is a 'game plan' paper covering the four main issues: US-Soviet, Central America, Middle East, and Southern Africa." (Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 3/1–31/85) On March 28, Burt forwarded the Soviet portion of the paper to McFarlane and wrote: "Bud: Here is the memo we discussed on US-Soviet relations for the rest of 1985. It's part of a larger package for the Secretary to use with the President. He particularly asked for your views. Please let me know when you are ready to discuss." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron April 1985 (1/6) For the game plan paper, see *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 237.

³ In a handwritten note on a routing slip, Poindexter wrote: "Bud, I totally agree with Jack. He is working on a paper listing the issues we should be considering. I hope George hasn't discussed this with President yet. JP." McFarlane circled "we should be considering" and responded: "I look fwd to getting it." For Matlock's paper, see Document 17.

Although the paper does identify some of the principal problems we face in our public diplomacy and alliance management, and lists some occasions which can be useful in dealing with them, it does not even identify, much less discuss, the hard substantive decisions facing us.

On the tactical side, the implication is that our immediate task is to arrange for a summit. This is an important issue, and it is desirable to have one this year, but the way the paper would have us go about it is not the best way. *We must avoid strengthening the impression (which we have unfortunately already given), that the President is desperate for a summit meeting.* The focus of the tactical suggestions unfortunately has just this effect. The likely Soviet reaction is to try to wait us out in order to find out how much we will pay for one. This can only delay arrangements for a productive summit, since I assume that the President is not willing to pay a price for one.

For this reason, I think it important that, from now on, we play it cool in our diplomatic contacts with the Soviets. Gorbachev kept the ball in his court in his letter, and we should calmly leave it there until he decides to come to grips with the issue. Meanwhile, we should talk substance, in accord with our own agenda—not with the avowed aim of preparing for a summit, but on the merits of the issues themselves.

The second tactical flaw in the scenario is its handling of the question of a Presidential channel. I believe it would be a mistake to “take the initiative to use Dobrynin.” Have we not learned the dangers of that particular one-way street?

This is not to say that we do not need some sort of “Presidential channel.” We do. But to be of real use, several conditions must be met. First, we must be clear in our own minds what we want to say, and the channel will be of no utility if what we say is simply a replay of what we say elsewhere. Second, it should be reciprocal, providing us with approximately the same level and quality of access to Soviet decision makers as we grant them. Third, if we really want to explore innovative ideas without worrying about premature leaks, it should be so structured as to be publicly deniable, in case the Soviets are tempted at some point to spread a distorted version of the communications to our allies. What the President, Shultz or Bud tell Dobrynin does not meet that criterion, and this would inevitably hamper real candor, particularly in the early stages.

The other points in the “game plan” are so self-evident that I wonder why discussion with the President is considered useful. If we are to lay out a “schedule for progress” with Dobrynin, then what should be discussed is the content of that schedule. The mode of doing so is a secondary question, and I would think that letting Hartman do it with Gromyko (in advance of the Vienna meeting in May) should

be seriously considered. If we are going to deal with Gromyko, then it is better to do so directly to the extent we can.

In sum, I believe that we should all go back to the drawing board before we take the President's time.

15. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev¹

Washington, April 4, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

The visit to Moscow of a congressional delegation headed by the distinguished Speaker of our House of Representatives provides an important, new opportunity for a high-level exchange of views between our two countries. I hope your meeting with the Speaker and his colleagues will result in a serious and useful discussion.²

I believe meetings at the political level are vitally important if we are to build a more constructive relationship between our two countries. I believe my meetings in Washington with First Deputy Premier Gromyko and Mr. Shcherbitsky and your discussion in Moscow with Vice President Bush and Secretary Shultz both served this purpose. As you know, I look forward to meeting with you personally at a mutually convenient time. Together, I am confident that we can provide the important political impetus you mentioned in your last letter for moving toward a more constructive and stable relationship between our two countries.

I believe that new opportunities are now opening up in U.S.-Soviet relations. We must take advantage of them. You know my view that

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8590382, 8590419). No classification marking. Under an April 3 covering memorandum, Platt sent McFarlane a draft of the letter from Reagan to Gorbachev. On April 4, under a covering memorandum, Matlock sent McFarlane the draft letter and Platt's memorandum. (Ibid.) McFarlane then sent the draft letter to Reagan on April 4 under a covering memorandum recommending the President sign the letter so it could be delivered by Speaker O'Neill's congressional delegation. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) April 1985 (1/3))

² Speaker O'Neill led a congressional delegation to Moscow and Leningrad from April 7 to 12. On April 9, the delegation met with Gromyko. In telegram 4561 from Moscow, April 10, the Embassy transmitted a synopsis of the meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]). On April 10, the delegation met with Gorbachev. For a synopsis of this meeting, see Document 19.

there are such opportunities in every area of our relations, including humanitarian, regional, bilateral and arms control issues. In improving stability there is no more important issue than the arms control talks we have jointly undertaken in Geneva. Our negotiators have very flexible instructions to work with your negotiators in drafting agreements which can lead to radical reductions, and toward our common goal, the elimination of nuclear weapons.

In seizing new opportunities, we must also take care to avoid situations which can seriously damage our relations. I and all Americans were appalled recently at the senseless killing of Major Nicholson in East Germany.³ In addition to the personal tragedy of this brave officer, this act seemed to many in our country to be only the latest example of a Soviet military action which threatens to undo our best efforts to fashion a sustainable, more constructive relationship for the long term. I want you to know it is also a matter of personal importance to me that we take steps to prevent the reoccurrence of this tragedy and I hope you will do all in your power to prevent such actions in the future.

Let me close by reaffirming the value I place in our correspondence. I will be replying in greater detail to your last letter. I hope we can continue to speak frankly in future letters, as we attempt to build stronger relations between ourselves and between our two countries.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

³ See Document 12.

16. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)¹

Washington, April 5, 1985

SUBJECT

Your Next Meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko

I. Gromyko and US-Soviet Relations

- Nature of man:

- He's a commie. Also, suspected Trilateralist.
- To watch: has lied to nine Secretaries of State.
- Wife: short, lovely; high boots.
- Young by old Sov standards, old by new Sov standards.
- Avocations: dissembling, repressing Eastern Europe, punk rock (CIA imagery at Tab A),² reading Meister Eckhart.

- *Points to Make*

- Now is moment of opportunity for US-Soviet relations.
- Let's not blow it this time.
- Scotch, Bourbon or the whip?

II. What To Expect From Moscow Under Gorbachev

He's young, he's smooth, he's got razor blades on his elbows.

- Major changes in context of bureaucratic stagnation.
- Gorby not a liberal despite opposition to MX missile.
- Only went into politics because he failed Soviet Bar Examination.
- First moves will be to revitalize Soviet economy, end the arms race, and get Mrs. G a charge account at Neiman Marcus.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, April 1985 (44). Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System. Drafted in EUR/SOV; cleared by Senator Jesse Helms. Obviously the clearance line is meant to be tongue-in-cheek to go along with the humorous tone of the memorandum.

² Attached but not printed is a photograph with the spoof title "Top Soviet Pop Group." The caption below the photograph reads: "Russia's hottest rock group, whose name translates as 'the Enjoyable Popular Music Boys,' cut up at a press conference in Minsk following the release of their latest LP, *Never Mind the Manganese Ore Export Quotas, Here're the Enjoyable Popular Music Boys*. According to Soviet News agency Tass, the record was 'shipped iron,' signifying that it had already sold more than half a thousand copies." Although grainy, Brezhnev and Gromyko are clearly identifiable as the first two of four figures in the photograph.

- *Watch out for*

—Ugly purple birthmark across his forehead making him look like Luca Brasi.³ Don't be unnerved.

II. *Arms Control*

- Sovs like big nukes.
- Sovs have lots of gas.

- *Points to Make*

—If Soviets dismantle all SS-20s, we are willing to airbrush out Gorbachev's birthmark in US photographs.

—If Sovs reduce to zero, we might consider talking about SDI.

—Eliminate nucs, make the world safe for conventional warfare, but: if they withdraw Red Army to Urals, we will reduce General Officers in EUCOM.

—If Sovs agree to on-site inspection, particularly at Plesetsk and Sary Shagan, we will give an IBM PC to each decision-maker.

III. *Soviet Economy and Bilateral Economic Issues*

—Fishing—whale of a problem.

Point to Make

—Don't blubber. You're guilty as hell of violating whales. American people do not understand.

IV. *Regional Issues*

—Continue to be ready for regional discussions, maybe.

—No negotiations, just talks, if not too substantive and provided they don't make anybody angry.

—Recognize that *real* men don't talk to Soviets about individual regional problems.

Point to Make

—Avoid strategic miscalculation: want to talk about Antarctica, Fiji, and Burkina Faso.

V. *Bilateral Problems*

- VE Day

—Sovs tough on FRG, but want big US-Sov VE Day bash. We have counterproposal—they drop anti-revanchism line, indicate willingness to stress coop approach with FRG.

—In that context we prepared offer big 50th Anniversary Celeb for Hitler-Stalin pact; Les Gelb will represent US.

³ Luca Brasi, fictional character in Mario Puzo's novel *The Godfather* and the 1972 film adaptation by Francis Ford Coppola.

- O'Neill Codel to travel to Soviet Union in April; out of town for Congressional discussion of Nicaragua proposal.

Points to Make

- President wishes success and small hangovers.
- Advice to Gromyko: O'Neill likes to bluff.

VI. *Cultural Exchanges*

- Ready for big expansion in people-to-people contacts, live and dead.

Point to Make

- We have new proposal: why don't you send Lenin's body to US on tour. Just like King Tut exhibit.
 - We are prepared to respond by sending Jane Fonda workout group on tour of Soviet cities.
-

17. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, April 8, 1985

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations: Planning for 1985

In a previous memorandum commenting on an informal paper passed to you by Rick Burt, I expressed the view that the paper is inadequate for the basis of discussion with the President since it failed to address the real substantive issues on which the President's attention should be focused.² At this time, I would like to set forth these issues as I see them.

Fundamental Issue

The most basic tactical decision the President faces at this time is:

- (a) whether to assume that Gorbachev is unable or unwilling to make significant changes in Soviet policy this year, and therefore to

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1985 (09/01/1985–10/02–1985); NLR-362–3–25–1–8. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for System. Sent for action. Sent through Poindexter, who did not initial the memorandum.

² See Document 14.

concentrate his attention almost exclusively on public diplomacy and alliance management; OR

(b) to decide that, even though the prospects for success may be slight, a careful and private attempt should be made to see whether Gorbachev is interested in arranging a real breakthrough in one or more of the key areas under contention.

There are powerful arguments for each of these alternatives.

Regarding the first, it is clear that Gorbachev's first priority in 1985 is to consolidate his own power, and in this process he may not be able to introduce major changes in traditional Soviet policy. Therefore, we should not be sanguine that he has the authority to move in a decisive way to meet our concerns. We also should not assume that he has the desire to do so, even if his authority were well established. For these reasons, we should be cautious about raising public expectations or expending valuable negotiating capital prematurely. However, we also must recognize that, without public and allied perception of new initiatives on our part, a "stand-pat" position will come under increasing pressure and could militate against effective public diplomacy and Alliance management.

Regarding the second approach, it seems to me that there is an outside chance that Gorbachev could be attracted by the right package of proposals. Among other things, this *could* give him ammunition to move toward consolidation of his authority, using the argument that an acceptable deal with the U.S. is possible and that this would relieve pressure on the system and give it time to work on getting its economy in better shape. (One can make a devastating critique of the Soviet policies of the 70's on Leninist grounds: it amounted to "infantile Marxism"—in Lenin's words—since it underestimated the strength of the "imperialists" and represented a premature move to challenge the West before "socialism" was consolidated.)

In particular, Gorbachev will have his own reasons for moving to get the Soviet military under more solid Party (meaning his own) control. There is some interesting evidence that this process may in fact have started, when we look at the series of events beginning with Ogarkov's ouster, the appointment of the political lightweight Sokolov as Defense Minister, and the exclusion of any military representatives from the Chernenko funeral commission. Furthermore, I doubt that anyone as smart as Gorbachev seems to be could have failed to understand the high price the Soviet Union has paid (in their image abroad, which is important to them) by the KAL affair and the Nicholson shooting. We can also assume that the failure to deal effectively with Afghanistan has not enhanced the prestige of the Soviet military establishment with the political leadership.

These are, of course, no more than straws in the wind, and one should not base policy on inferences drawn from them. But they pro-

vide some evidence that Gorbachev could conceivably judge it to be in his political interest to respond positively to a U.S. initiative which provides the prospect for eased relations—at least for a few years—and some assistance in gaining mastery over the Soviet military behemoth.

If the President decides to follow the second tactical approach, it will be most important to avoid making initiatives out of the blue either publicly or—in the early stages—in official channels. In either case, even an attractive proposal will be doomed to failure if it is presented in the wrong way. In order to attract Gorbachev, we must give him the chance to maneuver behind the scenes to set the stage for acceptance. Furthermore, for our own protection, we would need to float ideas which could not be attributed to us publicly, or misused to our disadvantage in formal negotiations.

Nature of Informal Proposal

A private, informal “channel” is of limited utility unless we have something to say which is not appropriate for our official discourse. This is why it is desirable to decide first whether we have anything to say, and only then (depending on the nature of what we want to convey) to decide how to convey it.

I do not profess to have in my head a “magic formula” which just might lure Gorbachev to real negotiations. However, I believe that if the President decides he wants to test the water informally, it is best to present something comprehensive and not limited to one element or another. It is also best, in the early stages, not to be specific with numbers and other concrete details which could interfere with negotiations.

To illustrate *the sort of things* I have in mind as possible elements in a comprehensive package, I offer the following. *They are not proposals on my part.* (All would have to be thought through carefully.) I mean it only to illustrate the manner in which a package might be assembled. The package should include important elements of all the areas on our agenda, in keeping with our policy of not giving exclusive priority to any one.

(a) *Regional issues:* Propose a clear understanding (*not* to be formulated in a formal document) that neither side will act to exacerbate local conflicts by direct or indirect introduction of significant military force in places where neither side is currently involved. (This should be a precondition to the rest of the package; it would leave us free to help the mujahedin—and would not solve the problem of Nicaragua—but would serve as clear notice that all bets are off if the Soviets, for example, increase military pressure on Pakistan or try some form of armed intervention in Iran.)

Additionally, we might consider making a suggestion which goes further in regard to some specific situation, such as, for example, assist-

ance in obtaining “no-intervention” commitments from interested parties as part of a negotiated withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan or, perhaps, some understanding in regard to parallel action to end the Iran-Iraq war.

(b) *Arms Control*: Here we will need to offer enough to be interesting—and to provide a basis for arguing that we have taken Soviet SDI concerns into account—without, of course either selling the store or crippling SDI. This may turn out to be a suggestion to square the circle, but it probably is worth a try.

Informal arms control proposals can take one of two forms, or can be a mixture of the two: (1) a mutual statement of general principles and goals; and (2) a concrete framework for future negotiation.

A proposal of the first type might contain a selection and rewording of some of the principles Chernenko proposed, along with some of our own, plus a commitment to reduce offensive nuclear weapons by a certain percentage not later than a certain year, plus a commitment by both sides to “strengthen” the ABM Treaty to the satisfaction of both.

A proposal of the second type might contain:

(1) Re START: a proposal similar to (though not necessarily with the same content as) the one State was promoting last year;

(2) Re INF: “Walk-in-the-Woods” with some modifications.

(3) Re defensive arms: No limits on SDI research, but commitment on both sides to strengthen ABM Treaty and commit selves to no “surprise” testing and deployment—i.e., without advance consultation and negotiation.

(c) *Human Rights/Trade*: The Soviets remain intensely interested (though they often profess indifference for tactical reasons) in the trade relationship. It is, practically speaking, the only effective lever we have to induce more acceptable human rights practices. Nevertheless, their sensitivity toward being seen making deals in this area is so great that we can only use the lever effectively in private and informally. We need to decide concretely what we want and what we responsibly can offer for it, and then make this clear in some informal fashion. Such an informal “deal” could look roughly like this:

(1) If Jewish emigration reaches 10,000 and some political prisoners are released, the U.S. will give its blessing to the sale of licensable energy technology;

(2) If Jewish emigration reaches the rate of 25,000 per year and most political prisoners are released, we will review U.S. export controls with the goal of making them no more stringent than Cocom controls in general;

(3) If Jewish emigration reaches 50,000 and all prominent political prisoners are allowed to leave, we will take steps to grant MFN under

the terms of existing U.S. legislation, but without referring to formal assurances on the Soviet part.

(4) The suggestions above are valid only if new negative elements are not introduced into the picture (e.g., a wave of arrests; imposition of an “education tax” or the like).

It is possible, of course, to think of other elements which might go into a package. I would reiterate that the above is intended only to illustrate the sort of proposal the President might wish to consider.

Modalities

If the President decides that he wishes to have some sort of proposal floated unofficially, there are various ways of doing so.

—[1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

—There are a number of other Americans who travel periodically to the Soviet Union and have appropriate contacts there. Several are reliable and could float “deniable” suggestions, presenting them as their “personal” ideas, based on contacts with senior Administration officials.

—We could try to establish a more direct form of contact such as that discussed several times last year.

—It is *not* desirable to use Dobrynin, unless and until we have reciprocity in Moscow.

Recommendation:

1. That you discuss with the President his desires regarding the tactical approach he prefers for 1985.³

2. That you let me know if I should give any further thought to any of the ideas expressed above.

³ McFarlane did not approve or disapprove either of the recommendations.

18. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 10, 1985

SUBJECT

My Meeting Today with Dobrynin

Dobrynin came in at his request today and presented a proposal to hold meetings on regional problems. The proposal is attached and is presumably related to your proposal for regular discussions on regional topics made in your UN General Assembly speech last fall.² As you can see from the text, the Soviets are very specific about topics, dates and venues.

Dobrynin also gave me the original signed version of Gorbachev's letter to you of March 24.³ He asked if the letter being carried by Speaker O'Neill constituted a response, and I replied that there would be a full response in good time.⁴

Dobrynin also asked about Bud's press briefing today, in particular about the distinction made between "meetings" and "summits."⁵ He asked if this had some special significance in relation to your invitation to Gorbachev. I said that Bud was making the distinction between the kind of meeting two heads of state could have if they were both attending some other meeting and had a discussion together, on the one hand, or, on the other, an especially arranged and carefully prepared meeting. I also pointed to Bud's emphasis on viewing relationships between countries as a process in which meetings between heads of state serve as markers in the flow of that process. Dobrynin is leaving on Friday, April 19, for consultations in Moscow and asked to come in to see me just before his departure. I told him that we could get together next Wednesday or Thursday.

I will have further comments in the next few days on their ideas of how to implement your proposal for regional dialogue.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron April 1985 (4/6). Secret; Sensitive.

² In his address to the UN General Assembly on September 24, 1984, President Reagan stated: "I propose that our two countries agree to embark on periodic consultations at policy level about regional problems." His address is printed in *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book II, pp. 1355–1361; see also *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 206.

³ See Document 10.

⁴ See Document 15.

⁵ Reference is to McFarlane's briefing in Santa Barbara, California; see David Hoffman, "President Clarifies Position on Summit," *Washington Post*, April 11, 1985, p. A1.

Attachment

Soviet Proposal for Meetings on Regional Problems⁶

Undated

To continue and to develop the practice of holding bilateral exchanges of opinions on the level of experts on regional problems, in which, as we understand, the American side is interested too, we propose to arrange meetings of our representatives to discuss the following issues.

1. To resume exchanges of opinions on Southern Africa in order to consider the state of affairs pertaining to the implementation of corresponding UN resolutions on the granting of independence to Namibia, and ensuring the security of Angola. Such a meeting could be held in Washington or in any third country in late April.

2. To discuss the situation in the Far East and in the South-East Asia. These two themes could rather be discussed separately. Such an exchange of views is meant to take place in Moscow in the second half of May.

3. To exchange views on the situation in Central America. This might be done in Moscow or in a third country in the beginning of June.

4. To continue exchanging the views on the Middle East settlement, the situation in the region, including Lebanon, and on the Iran-Iraq conflict. This meeting could be held in Washington in the second half of June.

5. To resume the discussion of issues related to the situation around Afghanistan. We suggest to do this next July in Moscow between the U.S. Embassy and the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It would be advisable, in our view, to conduct the exchange of opinions on the level on which, for instance, recent consultations on the Middle East were held, or through the Soviet Embassy in Washington and the American Embassy in Moscow correspondingly.

If our suggestions are acceptable to the American side, appropriate practical details related to the meetings of experts could be worked out in the very near future.

⁶ No classification marking. This is the unofficial translation provided by the Soviet Embassy.

19. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 16, 1985

SUBJECT

Speaker O'Neill's Meeting with Gorbachev

O'Neill, Michel, Rostenkowski and Conte met with Gorbachev last week for nearly four hours.²

Gorbachev began by reading a translation of your letter and saying how much he appreciates the correspondence. He said that he would wait for your full reply to his letter of March 24 before answering.³

On substantive issues Gorbachev was unyielding, though he said repeatedly that he wished to solve outstanding issues in a pragmatic manner and hoped for better relations. He was particularly vehement regarding SDI, characterizing it as part of an offensive strategy on our part, and threatening to deploy more offensive missiles if we go ahead. But he stated that the Soviets are serious about the Geneva talks, and put in a plug for his moratorium proposal.

Speaker O'Neill expressed confidence in your commitment to arms reductions and he and the other congressmen also raised trade and human rights issues. On the latter, Gorbachev said he would discuss the matter when the U.S. ratifies the International Convention on Human Rights, but did accept a list of cases offered by the Congressmen "to pass on to the proper authorities."

Overall, the Speaker and his group spoke with one voice and discussed issues in a manner consistent with U.S. policy.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Gorbachev Meeting (1/2). Secret. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. A copy was sent to Bush. A stamped notation indicates the President saw the memorandum on April 16. Although not mentioned in the text of the memorandum, McFarlane indicated that he attached as Tab A a copy of telegram 4621 from Moscow, April 10. The telegram was not attached to the copy of the memorandum printed here. Telegram 4621 transmitted a synopsis of the April 10 meeting between Gorbachev and O'Neill's congressional delegation. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams N850005–0003) For information about the O'Neill congressional delegation to Moscow, see footnote 2, Document 15.

² Reference is to Congressman Silvio Conte (R–Massachusetts), Congressman Robert H. Michel (R–Illinois), Speaker of the House Thomas P. O'Neill (D–Massachusetts), and Congressman Dan Rostenkowski (D–Illinois).

³ See Documents 10 and 15.

20. **Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)**¹

Washington, April 16, 1985

SUBJECT

President's Reply to Gorbachev Letter of March 24

I have reviewed State's draft reply to Gorbachev,² and I believe that it is not an effective response to the Gorbachev letter.³ Not that I object to any of the substance *per se*, but rather to the pedestrian approach, which is devoid of personality and reeks of being staff-written. We can do better, and I believe we should try before asking the President to approve it.

Specifically, my objections are the following:

—It does not really engage Gorbachev in a dialogue. Now that there is a Soviet leader who reads his mail and who seems to enjoy a spirited debate, I believe that the President should engage him on some key issues. His letter provides several openings, and we should exploit them.

—Although it was written to include items from each element on our agenda, it really comes through as a grab-bag of disparate issues. It should be tightened, made more selective, and given a focus on some of the key issues.

Although I understand that Secretary Shultz would like to provide the letter to Dobrynin tomorrow, I believe we should take more time with it and make sure it is the best we can do. (Shultz has a number of other agenda items to take up with Dobrynin, so the letter is not really necessary for the meeting.) In principle, I think it would be better to have Hartman deliver it anyway. He will be going back to Moscow next week and it would be useful to give him the opportunity to schedule a discussion with Gromyko on the basis of his consultations here.

I am working on a redraft, and hope that we can avoid undue haste in making final decisions on the text.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) April 1985 (1 of 3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

² A draft letter, dated April 15, is attached but not printed.

³ See Document 10.

Recommendation:

That you suggest to Secretary Shultz that we work on the text further, with the goal of having something ready for the President by the end of the week.⁴

⁴ McFarlane initialed the “Approve” option and wrote in the margin: “done 4/16. He agrees.”

21. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, April 17, 1985

SUBJECT

Soviet Proposal for Regional Consultations

You will recall that the Soviets have proposed a series of consultations on regional issues, including Southern Africa, the Far East and Southeast Asia, Central America, the Middle East, and Afghanistan.²

This is clearly in response to our proposal for regular consultations on regional issues, which the President made in his speech to the UNGA last September. That background makes it important for us to respond positively, or else the President’s effort to expand the dialogue and put it on a regular basis will seem to be a sham.³

I understand, however, that there is opposition in some parts of State to agreeing to consultations on Central America. I can understand the reluctance of those who are not accustomed to dealing with Soviets to discuss these matters with them, but I believe their apprehensions are misplaced. Consultations do not mean that we tell the Soviets any secrets or give them openings they can exploit. They can be used to put down firm markers in a way which is useful, even if (as will be the case) the interlocutors disagree on virtually every point of each

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron April 1985 (4/6). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

² See Document 18.

³ See footnote 2, Document 18.

other's presentation. Furthermore, the very existence of such consultations is bound to create some healthy concern in places like Managua and Havana, and we should put ourselves in a position to take implicit advantage of this. (No matter what the Soviets tell the Cubans and Sandinistas, the latter will be nervous that their Soviet backers might be tempted by a deal with us which sells them down the river.) Finally, I think it is clear that if we refuse to discuss Central America, the Soviets will refuse to discuss Afghanistan, and I believe we can use consultations on Afghanistan to probe Soviet intentions and to make clear the dangers of increased pressure on Pakistan.

For these reasons, I believe it important for us to accept the Soviet proposal in principle, but make a few changes in the dates and the order of the consultations. For example, I believe the meeting on the Middle East should come last (since we have already had one), and should be not less than six months after the Vienna meeting. Also, instead of consultations on "Central America," they should be defined more broadly as "Latin America and the Caribbean" or perhaps "Western Hemisphere" (with the understanding that Canada is not included). At a minimum, we should make sure that Cuba is within the area discussed, and it would be useful to be able to place some markers in regard to places like Guyana and Surinam.

Since Secretary Shultz is still considering what his position should be on this matter, you may wish to discuss it with him.

Recommendation:

That you encourage Secretary Shultz to accept the Soviet proposal for regional consultations, with some adjustments as noted above.⁴

⁴ McFarlane initialed his approval of the recommendation.

22. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 19, 1985

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Dobrynin, April 18

I spent 45 minutes with Dobrynin Thursday afternoon, to give him our thoughts on a number of issues on the eve of his return to Moscow for two weeks of consultations. He said he will probably be meeting with Gorbachev while there; the timing of his return is also keyed to the Central Committee Plenum, which he confirmed will take place on April 23.

I opened the meeting by noting that we have carefully reviewed Gorbachev's March 24 letter to you, that you will be responding in short order, and that they will find your reply constructive. I emphasized our belief that a practical, businesslike approach, based on quiet diplomacy, is the way to achieve results. In this connection, I noted that Gorbachev's *Pravda* interview was not especially helpful.² I also stressed the need to avoid actions that threaten the prospects for constructive work, such as the murder of Major Nicholson. I said that, while the Soviets had handled this incident better than KAL, we continued to believe they owed us an apology and compensation for the Major's family. Dobrynin said he had already conveyed Moscow's position, and had nothing to add.

Turning to our agenda, I noted that we have many opportunities to move forward—the Geneva talks, the Stockholm Conference, banning chemical weapons, as well as a range of bilateral and economic issues. I emphasized the vital importance of human rights, noting that we had seen some positive actions on a couple of dual-national cases, and hoped this was a good sign for the future. I said I would want to talk about these sorts of issues at my meeting with Gromyko in Vienna.

On the question of a summit, I said I expected this was a subject that would come up in Vienna. I added that we assumed the Soviets

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1985 (01/12/1985–06/15/1985). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating that he saw it.

² In telegram 4473 from Moscow, April 8, the Embassy reported: "Rather than introducing a fresh style or new ideas, Gorbachev's first 'initiative' simply repackages hoary ideas of his predecessors." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850240–0387) For the text of Gorbachev's interview, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVII, no. 14 (May 1, 1985), pp. 6–7.

would tell us when they were prepared to discuss the time and place for a meeting, and noted that our invitation to Washington was still on the table. Dobrynin asked whether your letter to Gorbachev would mention timing for a summit; I said no.

I next turned to regional issues, noting that we welcomed the Soviets' constructive response to your UNGA proposal for regular meetings of experts.³ I told Dobrynin that we were prepared now to proceed with experts talks on southern Africa and Afghanistan. The Soviet proposals for talks in other areas (East Asia, Central America, Middle East) were interesting, but I would want to talk with Gromyko about these at Vienna before judging whether experts talks would be useful. Dobrynin said only that he would convey this to Moscow.

Shifting to the Geneva talks, I remarked that the first round has been largely a feeling-out process. The sides have argued a lot about linkage, but have not gotten down to business. I told Dobrynin that, while we assert the interrelationship of offense and defense, we believe that agreements in one area should not be held hostage to progress in the others. The Soviet insistence that nothing could happen until we agreed to ban "space-strike arms," I said, had the appearance of their not allowing negotiations to proceed. In any case, I would want to discuss Geneva with Gromyko, after having consulted with our three negotiators.

Dobrynin agreed with my characterization of the initial exchanges, but repeated the charge we have heard in Geneva that our negotiators are trying to walk away from the January 8 agreement establishing the framework for the new talks. He said the Soviets insist on strict adherence to that agreement.⁴

I next queried Dobrynin on his recent public comments suggesting that US experts might inspect the Krasnoyarsk radar. I pointed out that our judgment about its inconsistency with the ABM Treaty did not depend on inspection, but that we would appreciate a clarification all the same.⁵ Dobrynin back-pedalled, saying that his comments had been in response to a question, and that he had only been speculating about the possibility of US scientists visiting the radar after its comple-

³ See Documents 18 and 21.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 4.

⁵ On January 23, 1984, President Reagan transmitted to Congress a report and fact sheet on Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements. The fact sheet included a section on the large phased-array radar being constructed in Krasnoyarsk, finding that it was in violation of the ABM Treaty. (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book I, pp. 72–76)

tion 2–3 years hence—in the context, he added, of better relations than we have now.⁶

Returning to the Nicholson shooting, I said that the Soviet assurance that their troops have been instructed not to use force against Allied military liaison missions was a very important undertaking, and that it was essential this pledge be carried out. Dobrynin, in a somewhat confused account of the meeting between Generals Otis and Zaytsev, said that Soviet troops had been instructed not to shoot at our personnel in restricted areas of the GDR.⁷ Rick Burt subsequently phoned Sokolov for a clarification, and the latter said the Soviet order applied not just to restricted areas, but to the entire territory of the GDR.

I touched briefly on VE-Day. I told Dobrynin, first, that we were prepared to agree to an exchange of messages between you and Gorbachev, but that we would want to look at their text before the actual publication of the messages. I added that our message would stress peace and reconciliation. I also informed Dobrynin that Ambassador Hartman will attend VE-Day ceremonies in Moscow, but he will not attend any military parade. We were not, I added, planning to send any delegations. Finally, I said we were not trying to keep veterans' groups from attending Soviet ceremonies, but that we were not encouraging them either, particularly after the Nicholson affair. Dobrynin had no comment.⁸

The last major issue I raised was the continuing problems we and our Allies have been having with the Berlin air corridors. I said the situation was unacceptable, and posed a continuing safety hazard to Allied flights. Moreover, the Soviets' persistent refusal to take account of Allied requirements and to respect our quadripartite rights creates

⁶ In an April 16 article, Pincus wrote on "Dobrynin's remark Friday that American scientists would be invited to examine the installation when it becomes operational. 'They would have to be able to examine the computers and the sensors,' one expert said, 'and the Soviets would never allow knowledgeable government scientists to see such equipment.' State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb said yesterday that Dobrynin's statements were 'unclear,' but that the United States would study any proposal on the subject." (Walter Pincus, "U.S., Soviets May Be Easing Dispute On Whether Radar Site Breaches Pact," *New York Times*, April 16, 1985, p. A13)

⁷ In an undated memorandum to Shultz, sent through Armacost, Kelly reported that on April 13, General Glenn Otis of the Seventh Army in Heidelberg and General Zaytsev of the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany met in Potsdam to discuss the issues surrounding the shooting and death of Major Nicholson. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (04/09/1985–04/11/1985); NLR-775-13-41-7-5)

⁸ In an April 16 memorandum to McFarlane, Platt indicated three courses of action regarding cooperation in commemorating V-E Day and attached a paper entitled "US Policy on Soviet VE-Day Proposals." Platt requested clearance on the paper's language, noting that Shultz planned to respond to the proposals during the April 18 meeting. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron April 1985 (2/6))

a serious political problem. I emphasized the need for Moscow to instruct its representatives in Berlin to work cooperatively with their Allied counterparts to resolve this problem. I added that this was an issue of growing concern to the British and the French. Dobrynin undertook to report my *démarche* to Moscow.

23. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev¹

Washington, April 30, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

As I mentioned in my letter of April 4, delivered by Speaker O'Neill, I have given careful thought to your letter of March 24 and wish to take this opportunity to address the questions you raised and to mention others which I feel deserve your attention.² Given the heavy responsibilities we both bear to preserve peace in the world and life on this planet, I am sure that you will agree that we must communicate with each other frankly and openly so that we can understand each other's point of view clearly. I write in that spirit.

I had thought that we agreed on the necessity of improving relations between our countries, and I welcomed your judgment that it is possible to do so. Our countries share an overriding interest in avoiding war between us, and—as you pointed out—the immediate task we face is to find a way to provide a political impetus to move these relations in a positive direction.

Unfortunately, certain recent events have begun to cast doubt on the desire of your government to improve relations. In particular, I have in mind the public retraction of the commitment made earlier by

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8590475). No classification marking. In an April 25 memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock explained that he "redrafted" the letter to "take account of the Soviet action Monday in disavowing an essential part of what we had understood to be the Otis-Zaitsev agreement." He made substantial changes to an earlier version; see Document 20. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron April 1985 (2/6)) McFarlane then sent the letter to Reagan under an April 30 covering memorandum, indicating that "Shultz concurs in the text" and that he sent Weinberger a copy, who had yet to reply. McFarlane recommended the President sign the letter. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8590475))

² See Documents 10, 15, and 19.

a responsible Soviet official to take steps to make certain that lethal force is not used against members of the United States Military Liaison Mission in Germany.³

Mr. General Secretary, this matter has importance beyond the tragic loss of life which has occurred. It involves fundamental principles which must be observed if we are to narrow our differences and resolve problems in our countries' relations. For this reason, I will give you my views in detail. The principles are those of dealing with each other on the basis of equality and reciprocity. The current Soviet position recognizes neither of these principles.

Now, I can understand that accidents occur in life which do not reflect the intention of political authorities. But when they do, it is the responsibility of the relevant political authorities to take appropriate corrective action.

For decades, members of our respective military liaison missions in Germany operated pursuant to the Huebner-Malinin agreement without a fatal incident. That encouraging record was broken when an unarmed member of our mission was killed by a Soviet soldier. Our military personnel are instructed categorically and in writing (in orders provided to your commander) never to use lethal force against members of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, regardless of circumstances. Our forces in the Federal Republic of Germany have never done so, even though Soviet military personnel have been apprehended repeatedly in restricted military areas. In fact, some Soviet officers were discovered in a prohibited area just three days before the fatal shooting of our officer and were escorted courteously and safely from the area.

The position which your Government most recently presented to us, therefore, is neither reciprocal in its effect nor does it reflect a willingness to deal as equals. Instead of accepting the responsibility to insure that members of the United States Military Liaison Mission receive the same protection as that we accord members of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission, what we see is the assertion of a "right" to use lethal force under certain circumstances, determined unilaterally by the Soviet side, and in practice by enlisted men in the Soviet armed forces.

Now I will offer no comment on the desirability of allowing subordinate officials—and indeed even rank-and-file soldiers—to make decisions which can affect relations between great nations. If you choose to

³ An April 22 Soviet statement rejected blame for the death of Major Nicholson, maintaining that he was an "unknown intruder" preparing to take photos of a military installation. (Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Warns Soviet on Sentry Report," *New York Times*, April 24, 1985, p. A6) On April 26, the United States expelled a Soviet military attaché in response to the statement. (Department of State *Bulletin*, April 1985, p. 92.)

permit this, that is your prerogative. But in that case, your Government cannot escape responsibility for faulty acts of judgment by individuals acting in accord with standing orders.

I hope that you will reconsider the position your Government has taken on this matter, and take steps to see to it that your military personnel guarantee the safety of their American, British and French counterparts in Germany just as American, British and French military personnel guarantee the safety of their Soviet colleagues. If your Government is unwilling or unable to abide by even this elementary rule of reciprocity, the conclusion we will be forced to draw will inevitably affect the prospects for settling other issues. The American people see this tragedy through the eyes of the widow and an eight-year-old child. Consequently it will remain a penetrating and enduring problem until it is properly resolved.

Your letter mentioned a number of other important principles, but here too our agreement on the principle should not be allowed to obscure the fact that, in our opinion, the principle cited has not been observed on the Soviet side. For example I could not agree more with your statement that each social system should prove its advantages not by force, but by peaceful competition, and that all people have the right to go their chosen way without imposition from the outside. But if this is true, what are we to think of Soviet military actions in Afghanistan or of your country's policy of supplying arms to minority elements in other countries which are attempting to impose their will on a nation by force? Can this be considered consistent with that important principle?

Mr. General Secretary, my purpose in pointing this out is not to engage in a debate over questions on which we disagree, but simply to illustrate the fact that agreement on a principle is one thing, and practical efforts to apply it another. Since we seem to agree on many principles, we must devote our main effort to closing the gap between principle and practice.

In this regard, I am pleased to note that we both seem to be in agreement on the desirability of more direct consultation on various regional issues. That is a healthy sign, and I would hope that these consultations can be used to avoid the development of situations which might bring us to dangerous confrontations. I believe we should not be discouraged if, at present, our positions seem far apart. This is to be expected, given our differing interests and the impact of past events. The important thing is to make sure we each have a clear understanding of the other's point of view and act in a manner which does not provoke unintended reaction by the other.

One situation which has had a profoundly negative impact on our relations is the conflict in Afghanistan. Isn't it long overdue to reach

a political resolution of this tragic affair? I cannot believe that it is impossible to find a solution which protects the legitimate interests of all parties, that of the Afghan people to live in peace under a government of their own choosing, and that of the Soviet Union to ensure that its southern border is secure. We support the United Nations Secretary General's effort to achieve a negotiated settlement, and would like to see a political solution that will deal equitably with the related issues of withdrawal of your troops to their homeland and guarantees of non-interference. I fear that your present course will only lead to more bloodshed, but I want you to know that I am prepared to work with you to move the region toward peace, if you desire.

Above all, we must see to it that the conflict in Afghanistan does not expand. Pakistan is a trusted ally of the United States and I am sure you recognize the grave danger which would ensue from any political or military threats against that country.

Turning to another of your comments, I must confess that I am perplexed by what you meant by your observation that trust "will not be enhanced if, for example, one were to talk as if in two languages. . . ." Of course, this is true. And, if I am to be candid, I would be compelled to admit that Soviet words and actions do not always seem to us to be speaking the same language. But I know that this is not what you intended to suggest. I also am sure that you did not intend to suggest that expressing our respective philosophies or our views of actions taken by the other is inconsistent with practical efforts to improve the relationship. For, after all, it has been the Party which you head which has always insisted not only on the right but indeed the duty to conduct what it calls an ideological struggle.

However this may be, your remarks highlight the need for us to act so as to bolster confidence rather than to undermine it. In this regard, I must tell you that I found the proposal you made publicly on April 7—and particularly the manner in which it was made—unhelpful.⁴ As for the substance of the proposal, I find no significant element in it which we have not made clear in the past is unacceptable to us. I will not burden this letter with a reiteration of the reasons, since I am certain your experts are well aware of them. I cannot help but wonder what the purpose could have been in presenting a proposal which is, in its essence, not only an old one, but one which was known to provide no basis for serious negotiation. Certainly, it does not foster a climate conducive to finding realistic solutions to difficult questions. Past experience suggests that the best way to solve such issues is to work them out privately.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 22.

This brings me to the negotiations which have begun in Geneva. They have not made the progress we had hoped. It may now be appropriate to give them the political impetus about which we both have spoken. Let me tell you frankly and directly how I view them.

First, the January agreement by our Foreign Ministers to begin new negotiations was a good one. The problem has not been the terms of reference on the basis of which our negotiators met, even though each side may in some instances interpret the wording of the joint statement somewhat differently in its application to specifics. The problem is, rather, that your negotiators have not yet begun to discuss concretely how we can translate our commitment to a radical reduction of nuclear arsenals into concrete, practical agreements.

A particular obstacle to progress has been the demand by Soviet negotiators that, in effect, the United States agree to ban research on advanced defensive systems before other topics are dealt with seriously. I hope that I have misunderstood the Soviet position on this point, because, if that is the Soviet position, no progress will be possible. For reasons we have explained repeatedly and in detail, we see no way that a ban on research efforts can be verified. Indeed in Geneva, Foreign Minister Gromyko acknowledged the difficulty of verifying such a ban on research. Nor do we think such a ban would be in the interest of either of our countries. To hold the negotiations hostage to an impossible demand creates an insurmountable obstacle from the outset. I sincerely hope that this is not your intent, since it cannot be in the interest of either of our countries. In fact, it is inconsistent with your own actions—with the strategic defense you already deploy around Moscow and with your own major research program in strategic defense.

In this regard, I was struck by the characterization of our Strategic Defense Initiative which you made during your meeting with Speaker O'Neill's delegation—that this research program has an offensive purpose for an attack on the Soviet Union. I can assure you that you are profoundly mistaken on this point. The truth is precisely the opposite. We believe that it is important to explore the technical feasibility of defensive systems which might ultimately give all of us the means to protect our people more safely than do those we have at present, and to provide the means of moving to the total abolition of nuclear weapons, an objective on which we are agreed. I must ask you, how are we ever practically to achieve that noble aim if nations have no defense against the uncertainty that all nuclear weapons might not have been removed from world arsenals? Life provides no guarantee against some future madman getting his hands on nuclear weapons, the technology of which is already, unfortunately, far too widely known and knowledge of which cannot be erased from human minds.

This point seems, at one time, to have been clearly understood by the Soviet Government. I note that Foreign Minister Gromyko told the

United Nations General Assembly in 1962 that anti-missile defenses could be the key to a successful agreement reducing offensive missiles.⁵ They would, he said then, “guard against the eventuality . . . of someone deciding to violate the treaty and conceal missiles or combat aircraft.” Not only has your government said that missile defenses are good; you have acted on this belief as well. Not only have you deployed an operational ABM system, but you have upgraded it and you are pursuing an active research program.

Of course, I recognize that, in theory, the sudden deployment of effective defenses by one side in a strategic environment characterized by large numbers of “first-strike” weapons could be considered as potentially threatening by the other side. Nevertheless, such a theoretical supposition has no basis in reality, at least so far as the United States is concerned. Our scientists tell me that the United States will require some years of further research to determine whether potentially effective defensive systems can be identified which are worthy of consideration for deployment. If some options should at some time in the future be identified, development of them by the United States could occur only following negotiations with other countries, including your own, and following thorough and open policy debates in the United States itself. And if the decision to deploy should be positive, then further years would pass until the systems could actually be deployed. So there is no possibility of a sudden, secretive, destabilizing move by the United States. During the research period our governments will have ample time to phase out systems which could pose a “first-strike” threat and to develop a common understanding regarding the place of possible new systems in a safer, more stable, arrangement. If such defensive systems are identified that would not be permitted by the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, the United States intends to follow the procedures agreed upon at the time the Treaty was negotiated in 1972. In particular, Agreed Statement D attached to that Treaty calls upon the party developing a system based upon other physical principles to consult with the other party pursuant to Article XIII, with a view to working out pertinent limitations which could be adopted by amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article XIV. I presume that it continues to be the intention of the Soviet Union to abide by Agreed Statement D in the event the long-continuing Soviet program in research on directed energy weapons were to have favorable results.

⁵ For the text of Gromyko’s September 21, 1962, speech to the UN, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1962, vol. II, pp. 896–909. See also *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Document 219.

I hope this discussion will assist you in joining me in a search for practical steps to invigorate the negotiations in Geneva. One approach which I believe holds promise would be for our negotiators on strategic and intermediate-range nuclear systems to intensify their efforts to agree on specific reductions in the numbers of existing and future forces, with particular attention to those each of us find most threatening, while the negotiators dealing with defensive and space weapons concentrate on measures which prevent the erosion of the ABM Treaty and strengthen the role that Treaty can play in preserving stability as we move toward a world without nuclear weapons. Proceeding in this fashion might avoid a fruitless debate on generalities and open the way to concrete, practical solutions which meet the concerns of both sides.

I believe we also should give new attention to other negotiations and discussions underway in the security and arms control field. We know that some progress has been made in the Stockholm Conference toward narrowing our differences. An agreement should be possible this year on the basis of the framework which we have discussed with your predecessors. Specifically, we are willing to consider the Soviet proposal for a declaration reaffirming the principle not to use force, if the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate agreements which will give concrete new meaning to that principle. Unfortunately, the response of your representatives to this offer has not been encouraging up to now. I hope that we may soon see a more favorable attitude toward this idea and toward the confidence-building measures that we and our allies have proposed.

One pressing issue of concern to us both is the use of chemical weaponry in the Iran-Iraq war. This situation illustrates the importance of curbing the spread of chemical weapons, and I suggest that it might be useful in the near future for our experts to meet and examine ways in which we might cooperate on this topic. A verifiable complete global ban on these terrible weapons would provide a lasting solution, and I would ask you therefore to give further study to the draft treaty we have advanced in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

Steps to improve our bilateral relationship are also important, not only because of the benefits which agreements in themselves can bring, but also because of the contribution they can make to a more confident working relationship in general.

Several of these issues seem ripe for rapid settlement. For example, we should be able to conclude an agreement on improving safety measures in the North Pacific at an early meeting and move to discussions of civil aviation issues. We are ready to move forward promptly to open our respective consulates in New York and Kiev. Our efforts to negotiate a new exchanges agreement have, after six months, reached the point where only a handful of issues remain to be resolved. But if

I had to characterize these remaining issues, I would say that they result from efforts on our side to raise our sights and look to more, not fewer, exchanges. Shouldn't we try to improve on past practices in this area? I am also hopeful that the meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission in May will succeed in identifying areas in which trade can increase substantially, but it is clear that this is likely to happen only if we succeed in improving the political atmosphere.

Finally, let me turn to an issue of great importance to me and to all Americans. As the Vice President informed you in Moscow, we believe strongly that strict observance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and of the Helsinki Final Act is an important element of our bilateral relationship. Last year we suggested that Ambassador Hartman meet periodically with Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko to discuss confidentially how we might achieve greater mutual understanding in this area. I am also prepared to appoint rapporteurs as you suggested to the Vice President, perhaps someone to join Ambassador Hartman in such meetings. Whatever procedures we ultimately establish, I hope we can agree to try, each in accord with his own legal structure, to resolve problems in this area. If we can find a way to eliminate the conditions which give rise to public recrimination, we will have taken a giant step forward in creating an atmosphere conducive to solving many other problems.

I was glad to receive your views on a meeting between the two of us, and agree that major formal agreements are not necessary to justify one. I assume that you will get back in touch with me when you are ready to discuss time and place. I am pleased that arrangements have been made for Secretary Shultz to meet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Vienna next month, and hope that they will be able to move us toward solutions of the problems I have mentioned as well as others on the broad agenda before us.

As I stated at the outset, I have written you in candor. I believe that our heavy responsibilities require us to communicate directly and without guile or circumlocution. I hope you will give me your frank view of these questions and call to my attention any others which you consider require our personal involvement. I sincerely hope that we can use this correspondence to provide a new impetus to the whole range of efforts to build confidence and to solve the critical problems which have increased tension between our countries.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

24. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, May 8, 1985

SUBJECT

Conversation with Dobrynin and Sokolov

At the Soviet reception today both Dobrynin and Sokolov took me aside for lengthy private chats.² (We were in a room with other guests, but since we spoke Russian, the American guests who were standing nearby would not have understood what was said.) The following were the more interesting comments made:

Summit Meeting: Dobrynin volunteered that Gromyko would have a proposal regarding time and place when he meets Secretary Shultz in Vienna. He added that Gorbachev hoped to have a meeting before the end of the year. When I asked about the Afanasyev statement regarding the possibility of Gorbachev coming to the UNGA,³ Dobrynin said that the statement was not only not authorized, but was incorrect. In fact, Gorbachev did not wish to visit the UN in New York, Dobrynin stated. Dobrynin asked whether the President would be interested in visiting the Soviet Union. I replied that I couldn't speak for the President, but I believed that he might well be interested in a reciprocal visit following a meeting here, provided it went well. As for the situation now, I pointed out that there had been two summits in the Soviet Union since there was one here, and the President felt that it was our

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron May 1985 (4/5). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Sent through Poindexter, who did not initial the memorandum. In telegram Tosec 90363 to Shultz in Bonn, the delegation to GRID, and Moscow, May 9, Kelly noted: "Dobrynin and other senior Soviet Embassy people have given us new and specific details on the Soviet approach to the Vienna meeting, the summit and regional talks over the past two days. This material runs counter to the relatively tough line Gorbachev took in today's speech, but is also authoritative. We understand Jack Matlock will be reporting some of this, based on his conversation with Dobrynin, through his own channels." Kelly indicated that Mark Palmer and Thomas Simons met with Sokolov several times and also summarized these conversations. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 NODIS and EXDIS Secretariat Memorandums, Lot 94D92, NODIS May 1985)

² A V-E Day reception took place at the Soviet Embassy on May 8.

³ In telegram 2885 from Belgrade, April 9, the Embassy noted: "*Pravda* editor Viktor Afanasyev last week told a prominent Yugoslav weekly that in his personal opinion a summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev is possible at the UNGA in September, despite the fact that there has been no change in Reagan's basic beliefs and policies." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850242–0132)

turn to host. It was for this reason that he had invited Gorbachev to the U.S.

Comment: Dobrynin was careful not to telegraph the particulars of the Soviet proposal, but I would infer from what he said that it is unlikely to involve a meeting on the fringes of some other event, and also that the Soviets may well propose a meeting in some country other than the U.S. I hope my comments will discourage such a proposal, but we will probably have to wait until the May 14 meeting to know. It would obviously be desirable for Secretary Shultz to be prepared to give the Soviet proposal an appropriate response. My recommendation would be that if it is for a visit to the U.S. that it be accepted in principle (subject to fitting it into the President's calendar), but that if it is for a meeting anywhere else, that the Secretary indicate his willingness to discuss it with the President, but point out that protocol seems to require the next meeting to be in the United States.

VE-Day Messages: Dobrynin told me when I entered that he had just given Armacost a message from Gorbachev to the President. Subsequently, Sokolov said to me that the President's letter had been "very well received" in Moscow. He then said that the reason Moscow had decided against an exchange of messages was that they were dismayed to note that, in the President's speeches in Europe, not one word was said about the wartime alliance. This, he said, was simply not understood, given the very deep emotions connected with the wartime alliance and VE-Day.⁴ Therefore, the President's message was most useful in redressing, at least in part, the feeling that the President was trying to ignore the common effort during the war. (I pointed out to Sokolov that, while the President may not have said much specifically about the wartime alliance, he had also refrained from calling attention to the Nazi-Soviet pact and other historical facts which immediately come to mind when the Soviet media distort the U.S. role and U.S. intentions.)

The President's Letter: Sokolov observed that he had the feeling that both sides really wanted an improvement of relations, but were finding it difficult because of poor communication. Several recent problems,

⁴ In a May 6 information memorandum to Shultz, Kelly reported that while on the phone with Simons on May 6, Sokolov passed a message intended for Palmer: "due to a number of circumstances that do not contribute to a favorable environment, it had been decided in Moscow not to pursue the exchange of messages." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 NODIS and EXDIS Secretariat Memorandums, Lot 94D92, NODIS May 1985) However, in telegram 139471 to Moscow, London, Bonn, and Paris, May 8, the Department noted: "Although Soviets have informed us they do not intend to send a VE Day message to the President, the President has decided to send the following letter to General Secretary Gorbachev. Embassy should deliver letter at earliest opportunity on May 8." The remainder of the telegram consists of the May 8 letter, which is printed in *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book I, p. 589. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850319–0814)

he suggested, might have been handled more smoothly if there had been better communication. I told him that I thought the President had attempted in his long letter to Gorbachev to open some doors to practical steps.⁵ Sokolov responded that the letter evoked mixed feelings in Moscow; on the one hand the candor was appreciated, but on the other there is a feeling that the top people should concentrate on the big issues and a page and a half on Nicholson seemed excessive in that context. I responded that the Nicholson tragedy involves important matters of principle and that these are anything but trifles. I also pointed out that the deep emotions which the Soviet mishandling of this issue had stirred here could affect a lot of things, therefore it was essential that the President explain this if we are to find a way to avoid gratuitous damage to the relationship. Sokolov, interestingly, did not challenge my statement about the Soviet mishandling of the issue, but nodded grimly in agreement when I used the word. His only rejoinder was that, as he was sure I understood personally, there was no way the Soviet leadership could be persuaded to apologize and offer compensation.

Confidential Communications: Dobrynin took up this theme at some length during his conversation with me. Like Sokolov, he claimed that many of the problems have been exacerbated by the lack of a genuine dialogue, and then sang his usual refrain about how helpful he could be if we would use him. He then went into a long spiel about how very few people in the Soviet leadership are really authoritative on the whole range of U.S.-Soviet relations, and claimed that this circle was limited to Gorbachev, Gromyko and a few others in the “inner core” of the Politburo, plus himself, Korniyenko and Komplektov in the Foreign Ministry. I asked if Marshal Sokolov didn’t have a voice, and he said that Sokolov would be consulted only in regard to arms control and military questions and not on broader political ones.

⁵ See Document 23.

25. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 9, 1985, 0805Z

6057. Subject: Rumors of Impending Legislation Aimed at Combating Alcoholism.

1. At its April 4 regular session, the Politburo engaged in “comprehensive” discussion of the problem of alcoholism and drunkenness in Soviet society—what the published minutes of the session termed a “monstrous phenomenon.” It was revealed, via the minutes, that the Central Committee had already approved a series of unidentified socio-political, economic, administrative and medical steps designed to further combat alcoholism and drunkenness and ultimately to “eliminate” them from society. These were given additional endorsement at the Politburo session.

2. Published Politburo minutes, cut-and-dried as they are, rarely arouse popular consciousness here. But this news of an apparent frontal assault on one of the most cherished leisure-time (and work-time) pursuits of the Russians has stimulated a degree of public attention as no other social issue has in recent memory. The outward manifestation of this aroused consciousness has been a virtual spate of rumors as to what the new anti-alcohol measures might include.

3. The initial, alarmist reaction was that “dry laws” (“just like they have in Finland”) would be introduced. The implausibility of such a course was soon recognized, however, and fears of total prohibition gave way to a myriad of rumors of less drastic measures. These included:

—A rationing system whereby each adult would be limited to a specified amount of vodka or other hard liquor (one source said 500 milliliters) per month.

—Shorter working hours for liquor stores.

—Removal of cheaper brands of vodka and wine from distribution.

—Harsher penalties for drunkenness at work. Some have suggested there will be fines of up to 100 rubles for those reporting to work intoxicated, with repeat offenders fired from their jobs and either imprisoned or assigned to work in public labor crews. Party members, so goes one rumor, would be expelled from the Party if they were caught drunk at work more than once.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850324–0478. Limited Official Use. Sent for information to the Consulate in Leningrad and USIA.

—Finally, illustrative of the Soviet penchant for introduction of change through experimentation and of the esteem in which the Muscovites hold their northerly brothers, there is the rumor going around Moscow that Leningrad will be made an experimental “dry” city.

4. Some of these rumors may in fact not be too far off the mark, but the cumulative effect of the measures that have been approved will probably be less than the popular imagination would have it. An MFA official recently sought to persuade a diplomat of a neutral country (with some direct interest in the question) that the new anti-alcoholism measures would in fact not be as drastic as some expect. Prices would be raised, but not astronomically; there would be some “experimentation” with different hours for liquor stores; heavier fines would be instituted for drunkenness on the job; but there would be no rationing as such.

5. Reports now have it that the new measures will be announced and introduced during the second half of May.² The timing, clearly, is designed not to dampen popular celebrations of May Day and of the fortieth anniversary of V-E Day. Meanwhile, Soviets are telling us that there has been a run not only on liquor stores but also on savings banks. Why savings banks? Because, said one Soviet citizen, people were withdrawing their savings to put them in stocks of vodka—soon to be as valuable as hard currency.

Hartman

² In telegram 6510 from Moscow, May 17, the Embassy reported: “New legislative measures aimed at curbing the growing abuse of alcohol have been published in the Soviet central press. The measures call for application of a host of social, economic, educational and legal remedies, including increased fines for public drunkenness, some restrictions on sales, a higher legal drinking age, and steps to encourage more productive use of leisure time.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850350–0035)

26. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev¹

Washington, May 11, 1985

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

Secretary Baldrige's visit to Moscow provides me the opportunity to repeat to you my desire for a more constructive working relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. An expansion of peaceful trade can and should be an important part of an improved relationship between our countries.

I place great significance on the discussions between Secretary Baldrige and Minister Patolichev in Moscow. They are holding the first meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission in seven years, and their meeting reflects the judgment of both our governments that an expansion of our peaceful trade is now appropriate. It is my hope that their achievements will result not only in increased trade, but also in an increased desire to seek greater cooperation in areas other than trade.

I have asked Secretary Baldrige to have pragmatic discussions with Minister Patolichev, so that the meeting of our Joint Commercial Commission will result in concrete actions by both sides to expand trade where that is now possible. To leave no doubt that the United States favors the expansion of peaceful trade with the Soviet Union, I have also authorized Secretary Baldrige to join with Minister Patolichev in a public statement on the development of trade relations.

While I believe there are some actions we can take now to facilitate trade, I doubt that there can be a fundamental change in our trade relationship without parallel improvements in other aspects of our relationship. I have mentioned in my previous letters some of the areas in which improvements would contribute greatly to a climate in which

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.1, President/Gorbachev Correspondence. No classification marking. In a May 10 covering memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock explained: "Commerce has requested a letter from the President to Gorbachev for Secretary Baldrige to deliver in case he is granted an appointment. I have made some changes in the Commerce/State draft to reflect elements of the previous correspondence. In particular, I have made the reference to emigration indirect (though unmistakable), since I believe that direct mention in a letter which will have wider distribution in the Soviet bureaucracy than the confidential correspondence would be counterproductive." Poindexter initialed his approval that McFarlane forward a copy to the President. Matlock drafted and attached a May 10 covering memorandum from McFarlane to Reagan, forwarding the letter; Reagan initialed his approval and signed the letter. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron May 1985 (3/5)) Baldrige was traveling to Moscow for meetings of the Joint Commercial Commission, scheduled to begin May 20. See Documents 31 and 32.

a more complete development of trade and economic cooperation would be possible.

It is my hope that upon his return from Moscow Secretary Baldrige will be able to report to me that there are areas in which both our countries can benefit from commercial cooperation and that there is Soviet interest in parallel improvements in other parts of our relationship. Given such progress, I believe that the development of our trade relationship is a question in which you and I could usefully take a continuing personal interest. I will welcome any suggestions you may have in this regard.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

27. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Vienna, May 13, 1985

SUBJECT

Shultz-Gromyko Meeting: Unresolved Issues

As you know, tomorrow Secretary Shultz will hold talks with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Vienna. This meeting comes in the wake of your letter to Gorbachev of April 30 and your Strasbourg speech.² In both documents you made proposals for how we could make progress in the resolution of problems on our agenda in the four areas of: arms control, regional disagreements, bilateral issues and human

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—Shultz—Gromyko 05/14/1985. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Poindexter initialed for McFarlane. A copy was sent to the Vice President. In a May 13 covering note to the President, Poindexter wrote: "Bud would like some guidance on two issues that he will discuss tomorrow with George Shultz in Vienna in preparation for a meeting with Gromyko. Bud dictated the attached memo today from Vienna." Reagan responded: "I feel very strongly that we should do *no more* to indicate we are begging for a meeting. We've invited them to a meeting in the U.S. (It's our turn.) The ball is in *their* court. RR."

² See Document 23. On May 8, Reagan addressed the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France. The text of the address is printed in *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book I, pp. 581–588. The speech is also printed in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 240.

rights. Thus far, we have had no substantive reply from the Soviets to the letter or the speech.

For the past two weeks, your staff has been working with Cap and George's staff as well as with the JCS to put together positions which could be taken in each of the four areas in Vienna. This process has been relatively harmonious—John Poindexter can show you the specific details of the several positions most of which break no new ground—but on two issues disagreements remain. These are how the issue of a summit ought to be treated; and, whether or not to introduce new material or at least greater precision in our arms control positions.

Treatment of a Summit/Meeting. The Secretary of State believes that he should raise the matter of the interest expressed on both sides in a Summit/Meeting and seek to begin the development of an agenda with Gromyko. Others, myself included, believe that to lead with our interest in Summit planning will give the Soviets a gratuitous advantage by appearing to be overly anxious toward getting such a meeting. After all, our interest has always been in getting tangible accomplishments which justify a summit. If we appear to be too preoccupied with holding a meeting, it can be used against us in leveraging points in disagreement. I would have no problem with authorizing the Secretary to respond with our ideas if the Soviets raise the issue. But if not, it seems to me more prudent to let matters stand as they do. You have invited the General Secretary to come to the US. He has said he would welcome a meeting but has not declared himself as to time, date or place. We have had recent low-level soundings by Soviet staff as to our interest in a meeting in a third country or in Moscow and have responded that we prefer the US. The ball is in the Soviet court and we need not raise it, except perhaps to say that "we assume that when you have considered the US proposal you will let us know."

Introducing Specific Numbers in START and INF. Ambassador Nitze proposed that the Secretary be given contingency authority—for use *if* the situation in Vienna warrants—to flesh out the START and INF positions we introduced in Round I.³ On *INF* that contingency authority would entail a global ceiling on deployed US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads at a level of 600, a limit on deployed US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Europe at a level of 300 and an indication of US readiness to agree to a specific number of Pershing II missiles deployed in Europe (although no number would be given). In *START*, he supports contingency authority to propose associated limits on ballistic

³ Nitze presented his recommendations in a May 3 memorandum to McFarlane. (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, [May 1985] Chron File: [No. 23–No. 30])

missile warheads and ALCMs at a level of about 8000 and associated limits on ballistic missiles and bombers.

Ambassador Nitze's recommendations go substantially beyond current guidance and no other member of the Senior Arms Control Group supports this degree of new US flexibility at the Vienna meeting. In view of the Soviets having walked backward on several of their own proposals and the overall intransigence we faced during the last round, I agree that it would be counter-productive to reward such Soviet behavior with an indication of new US flexibility. We will be better served in patiently repeating our START and INF offers and listening for Soviet counter-offers.

Recommendation

That the summit issue not be raised by the US side in the Shultz/Gromyko meeting, but we should be prepared to respond if Gromyko raises the issue.⁴

That Ambassador Nitze's proposals for contingency authority *not* be used during the Shultz/Gromyko meeting.

⁴ Reagan initialed his approval of both recommendations.

28. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Vienna, May 14, 1985, 2–8:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz National Security Advisor Robert C. McFarlane Assistant Secretary Richard Burt Ambassador Paul H. Nitze Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman Ambassador Jack F. Matlock	USSR Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail S. Kapitsa Ambassador Mikhail T. Yefremov Ambassador Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Chief, USA Dept., MFA
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¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memorandum of Conversations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz/Gromyko at Soviet Embassy, Vienna May 14, 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Arensburger on May 15; cleared by Palmer on May 25 and Matlock on June 10. Palmer initialed for Matlock. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy.

Deputy Assistant Secretary R.
Mark Palmer
Mr. Dimitri Arensburger
(Interpreter)

Ambassador Aleksandr P.
Bondarenko, Chief, 3rd
European Dept., MFA
Mr. Sergey P. Tarasenko, Deputy
Chief, USA Dept, MFA
Mr. Vasiliy G. Makarov
Mr. Yuriy D. Uspensky²
(Interpreter)

Minister Gromyko welcomed the Secretary and all the other participants to the Soviet Mission and said that he was prepared to discuss questions of mutual interest to both sides. He wanted to say a few words concerning the procedure he thought ought to be adopted in the discussion of individual problems. First, he thought it would be best to tackle problems individually, exchange views on them, and after completing discussion of one problem, go on to the next one, etc. In this way our discussion would be more in the nature of a give-and-take. Gromyko's second desire was to devote primary attention to the most important and most pressing problems. In the Soviet view, precisely these most important and pressing problems needed to be discussed. Questions of lesser importance, peripheral issues as it were, could of course be addressed if either side desired, specifically if the Secretary wanted to discuss them, but the Soviet side did not believe that much time ought to be devoted to them. No matter how many hours we met today, our time was nevertheless limited.

In concluding his introductory remarks, Gromyko wanted to inquire who, in the Secretary's opinion, should initiate the substantive discussion. Perhaps the Secretary wanted to speak first. Gromyko was fully prepared to listen to the Secretary unless the latter had some other considerations. In line with Soviet tradition it would be appropriate for the guest to speak first. Of course, both sides would be setting aside the question of Austria, that is, the thirtieth anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty, because a special activity was scheduled on that subject.

The Secretary thanked Gromyko and said he agreed with Gromyko's point that it would be best to discuss issues in series as it were, pausing for exchanges between subjects instead of making extensive speeches. He, too, thought that we should save a substantial amount of time for discussion of the more important issues and, he thought, we might perhaps resort to a method pioneered by Gromyko in New York, which he had called "headlining."

² According to Pavel Palazhchenko, Nikolai Uspensky is the correct name for the Soviet interpreter. In several meetings, the notetaker used a variation in the name or mistakenly recorded the Soviet interpreter as Yuri Uspensky.

The Secretary continued that he had classified the more important subjects, the ones on which we would spend most of our time, as including arms control, what we have come to call regional issues, and some aspects of our bilateral relations. He wanted to make these introductory comments and then, if Gromyko agreed, go on to regional and bilateral issues, saving the maximum time for arms control matters. Was such a procedure acceptable to Gromyko?

Gromyko replied that what the Secretary had said coincided with the way the Soviet side envisaged these discussions.

The Secretary suggested that he might proceed with his general introductory comments and then pause to see whether Gromyko had any comments. He wanted to begin by addressing some regional issues mentioned in a recent non-paper that had been transmitted by Ambassador Dobrynin.³ He continued that this was a moment in our relations that is both promising and troubled because, it seemed to the US side, this year's political events should encourage us to look forward. On the one hand, the US President had been re-elected and had received an important mandate; also, he had a definite approach to US-Soviet relations. On the other hand, there was a new leader in the Soviet Union who was now well settled in. Thus, we were in a position to move forward in our perspectives. The Secretary wanted to add that Gromyko himself was the world's most experienced diplomat and had a special responsibility for using this experience to help move in a constructive and stable direction.

The Secretary went on to say that this was a year of anniversaries. In marking the fortieth anniversary since World War II, we emphasized peace, reconciliation and freedom in Europe. On a personal note, he wanted to say that he had a deep respect for the achievements of the Soviet armed forces during World War II and, as a participant of that war, his visit some years ago to a cemetery in Leningrad had a profound effect. He thought also that if the Austrian State Treaty, which Gromyko had mentioned earlier, contained any message, it was that problems could be solved. At times people doubted the value of negotiations, but we have come to Vienna to do some work that should disprove such a view. He wanted to pursue our meeting in that spirit.

The Secretary wanted to draw Gromyko's attention to three problems that he found particularly troubling in our relationship, and express his views thereon. First, to repeat what he had told Dobrynin with respect to Major Nicholson, we felt that an apology to Nicholson's family and compensation were in order.⁴ We also thought that there

³ Printed as an attachment to Document 18.

⁴ See Document 22.

was a need to put into place firm measures to prevent an occurrence of this kind in the future. The Secretary would also note that additional discussions at the military level might be appropriate, and he hoped that they would occur. Essentially, it was necessary to take firm measures to prevent a recurrence.

The Secretary's second point concerned the problem of the Berlin air corridors. In the past Berlin had been an area which had generated much difficulty, but recently it has been quiet. The air corridors problem clearly involved a safety aspect since the Soviet side introduced reservations that required a steep descent. Berlin involved special problems. There were six airports in the area, three Soviet airports and three Allied ones. They were used by military aircraft, civilian aircraft, helicopters, as well as fighter aircraft, all mingling together in the same air space. Berlin weather conditions were such that there was frequently an aircraft stacking problem. This meant that the margin of safety was less, there were many safety considerations that were specific to Berlin, and we were highly concerned about the reservations which required a steep descent. We believed that the regime which had existed until about a year ago was satisfactory, and that any changes to that regime should be done only through consultations. Although the Secretary did not want to devote too much time to the subject of the air corridors, he did hope that this problem could be resolved expeditiously. Still, a year has been devoted to work on this subject, but we were unable to see any successful results. The Secretary believed that a solution to this problem was clearly warranted.

Turning to the subject which fell under the label of human rights, the Secretary noted that we have long emphasized the importance of this subject. We noted some developments which we consider positive. He had found interesting and had liked what the Soviets had told Speaker O'Neill with regard to a follow-on experts' meeting.⁵ The Secretary had also liked the suggestion made by General Secretary Gorbachev to the Vice President on using the approach of rapporteurs. He had noticed that some long-standing cases had been resolved, and we have also observed that a number of Moscow Jews had been allowed to emigrate. We were watching the number of positive decisions, but saw that the level of emigration was very low. Such things as, for example, the arrest and conviction of Hebrew teachers should be stopped. We continued to worry about Academician Sakharov and his wife. Before coming to Vienna, the Secretary had been visited in Israel

⁵ See Document 19.

by Mrs. Shcharansky and Ida Nudel's sister, who had appealed to the Secretary on a very human level.⁶ Thus, this was a major problem.

The Secretary would tell Gromyko that the more able the Soviet side was to solve this problem, the more impact it would have not only in the US, but also around the world. With regard to the Joint Commercial Commission that would be meeting before long, the Secretary noted that there is a legislative relationship in the US between Most Favored Nation status and emigration.⁷ He was saying this because any solution that the USSR might undertake on this question would clearly be taken for its own reasons and as a matter for the Soviet side to decide. However, the Secretary did want to point to this relationship in terms of our legislation and in terms of the reaction by the US public. With this the Secretary wanted to return to where he had started, namely that he and the President felt that this was an important moment. We were prepared to work with the USSR and try to move along specific subjects in a constructive direction so deeds will become substance, and so as to achieve a more constructive and stable relationship. He wanted to say this before dealing with regional issues.

Gromyko inquired when, in the Secretary's view, we should begin an exchange of views on the most important questions, namely the issues of security and arms control, that is the subject of the Geneva negotiations. Whatever views the Secretary might hold, in Gromyko's opinion the most important issue was precisely the matter of security. These were principal issues in the Soviet-US relationship and involved nuclear arms, as well as prevention of an arms race, including an arms race in space. Thus, he did not wish to postpone discussion of these matters, and for his part intended to address them now. Of course, he would also react to what the Secretary had said. Gromyko wanted to begin by saying that Soviet-US relations were bad, though this was an understatement. In political terminology, the situation was strained. Of course, no one has yet invented an instrument which would make it possible to measure the degree of tension between states or in the world community. However, common sense and an objective approach should help us assess this situation.

Gromyko continued that along with all other countries in the world the USSR and the US, in its own fashion, had marked the fortieth anniversary of the defeat of Hitlerite fascism. In marking this anniversary, the USSR had emphasized the concept that the defeated enemy had been powerful, perfidious, and extremely dangerous because the

⁶ Shultz was in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem from May 10 to 12 to meet with Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir.

⁷ The JCC was scheduled to meet in Moscow on May 20; see Documents 31 and 32.

goal of the Hitlerite clique had not merely been to gain victory over one country or another, but to turn entire nations into slavery. At that time, the US had drawn a correct conclusion because its political leadership had been farsighted and had joined hands with other countries, especially our joint ally during the war—Great Britain, in order to achieve a victory over our common enemy. In marking this important forty-year anniversary, the Soviet Union had also emphasized and had tried to inform nations and countries, including the US and its leadership, that in the Soviet Union's view, notwithstanding the differences in our two countries' social systems, we were able to work toward peace and apply joint efforts against a common enemy. This had been done during the war. This thinking was part of the Soviet foreign policy. Moreover, Gromyko suggested that during various periods this thesis had been a recognized part of the US foreign policy. Despite differences in their social systems and ideologies, countries were able to join efforts toward preventing the outbreak of a new war and to promote peace. All this was consonant with Soviet policy, and it was expressed in the words "principle of peaceful coexistence of states regardless of their social systems."

The Secretary said he wanted to reaffirm our agreement with that idea.

Gromyko replied that this was very good, but that this great anniversary marked something unprecedented in history, unprecedented even if one included the major wars among countries. In any event, the US and the USSR marked this anniversary differently in terms of the basic thrust of their thoughts and ideas. The Soviet Union—and Gromyko was referring to the Soviet leadership and to Gorbachev personally—was not merely surprised that the US tried in every way to belittle the USSR's role in the war, but things had actually reached the stage where some official statements made by high-ranking individuals disparaged the role of the Soviet Union. It was as if something had been put into a pocket with a hole in it. The Soviet Union was offended by this. The Soviet Union was even tempted to think, though the Secretary might disagree, that this was precisely the US goal, that is, to insult the USSR. That was one aspect of the direction taken in the US in marking this fortieth anniversary. Efforts had also been made to whitewash the leadership of our common enemy, even to honor certain enemy detachments, detachments which are besmirched by crimes and blood. What, Gromyko asked rhetorically, did the US side and the US Government achieve by such an approach to the anniversary? The Secretary he said would know the answer as well as the Soviet side, perhaps better. Gromyko did not care to dwell more deeply on the consequences.

The Secretary wanted to make some assurances. First, the people of the US fully recognized the importance of the contribution made by

the Soviet Union in defeating the Nazi regime. Second, we fully recognize the suffering of the Russian people during the war and the heroism manifested by them on many occasions. In his own comments the Secretary had mentioned the Leningrad cemetery. However, he also wanted to affirm again what the President had said, namely that we also considered it important to emphasize what has been built since the end of the war, as well as the reconciliation with the German people. This did not in any way imply an ability even to understand the horrors perpetrated by the Nazi followers.

Gromyko said that the question arose of why the US had adopted such a line in everything it did in connection with the anniversary. The Soviet side, as well as all objectively thinking people throughout the world, would reply that the US Administration chose whatever exacerbated the confrontation between the USSR and the US. Everything that was poisoning the atmosphere between the two countries was deemed to be acceptable. Conversely, whatever promoted détente and better relations was deemed unacceptable to the US Administration. That is how the USSR assessed the situation with regard to the World War II anniversary.

Gromyko continued that the Soviet side gave a positive assessment of the exchange of congratulatory messages between Gorbachev and the President, but that did not by any means cancel the highly negative content of what had been said on the US side, nor of the activities in connection with the end of World War II. The Soviet Union took this into account. As for the role of the Soviet Union in the war and in the victory over Hitlerite Germany, this was a matter of the historical record and was known to all peoples and all countries. The chronicles of history recorded this in gold letters. In this connection, Gromyko did not risk speaking immodestly. He asserted that recent statements in the US as well as the Secretary's earlier remarks had been received.

The assessments being made by each of the two sides pertained to their activities during the war, that is events of forty years ago, Gromyko continued. What bearing did this have on the desires for the future? The Soviet Union, too, wanted to develop its relations with all countries, including countries which during the war were our common enemy. These were entirely different issues. As it was, the US side was whitewashing the forces of the past, forces which at that time were opposed to the interests of peace. With respect to the desire to develop relations with those countries that previously had fought the US and the USSR, Gromyko would say that this was well and good as long as such relations were developed on a basis of peace.

Gromyko next wanted to address briefly another urgent substantive issue namely the Geneva negotiations dealing with nuclear arms and disarmament. From time to time, the USSR and US have agreed

that this was the most important problem between them, a problem of a global nature. The problem of nuclear arms involved the need to halt the race in nuclear arms and to reduce such arms. Both sides had also agreed that the ultimate goal must be the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere and, of course, this had to be linked organically, as Gromyko had said, with the problem that had appeared recently, namely the problem involving space. There was no point to extending the arms race to space. Gromyko had to confess that having mentioned the desirability of dealing first with the most pressing problems, he had expected that the Secretary, too, would initially address these problems. But, of course, it was the Secretary's prerogative to address other matters since the two sides evidently attached a different degree of importance to these issues. Still, in Gromyko's view the most important problems were the arms race, nuclear arms, and disarmament. These issues had to be discussed, and if these matters could be discussed substantively to some degree, whether in Geneva or elsewhere, then, he thought, such a discussion would be beneficial.

Of course, Gromyko continued, there could be different assessments of the first stage of the negotiations which had recently concluded in Geneva. One could approach this matter in different ways. One could use moderate and flexible expressions in this assessment, that is, one could say that the two sides were still probing each other and that, therefore, nothing of substance could have been expected yet. The Soviet side, however, thought that it would be more useful to speak candidly. After all, who would speak candidly if we, the parties to these negotiations, did not do so ourselves. The Soviet side considered it to be its political and moral duty to tell the Secretary that, in the Soviet opinion, the US not only failed to manifest any desire to come closer together on this subject—that is, with respect to strategic, medium-range and space arms—but, the way the Soviet side saw it, was steering away from whatever could bring such agreement closer or facilitate it.

Gromyko continued that the US side evidently failed to recognize that by leaving aside space arms, by failing to consider that subject at the negotiations, a mutually acceptable agreement would be impossible, that under these circumstances no other questions could be resolved. In saying this, he was exempting those issues which were not organically linked to the subject matter of the negotiations in Geneva. The Soviet side had said that nuclear arms and space arms had to be considered in their organic interrelationship. This had been said at a meeting which was held in almost the same composition as the meeting we were holding today, a meeting at which this matter had been discussed and the sides had agreed to address this triad in

its interrelationship.⁸ Only under these conditions would it be possible to proceed toward untying the complex knots—and there were enough of those—involved in reaching agreement. The Soviet side was more than surprised how it was possible, shortly after agreeing in Geneva on the framework in which these subjects would be discussed, to all of a sudden employ an entirely different line in Geneva. Was it really possible to find people within the US Administration who thought that an agreement on nuclear arms was possible if it were divorced from the issues of space? The Secretary would know better than Gromyko whether there were such people or not. However, Gromyko did not envy the Secretary if the US Administration did indeed include such people. This was very far removed from an objective assessment of the situation.

Gromyko went on to say that the Secretary, in his introductory remarks, had addressed three issues of substance. With respect to human rights, the Secretary knew very well that since this involved Soviet domestic law and Soviet prerogatives, the Soviet Union had no intention of discussing this matter with anyone and would not discuss it with anyone. The Secretary had expressed surprise over the drop in the number of people leaving the Soviet Union, or for that matter any other country, say country X. But one could not always maintain the same level of emigration, or even increase it. At some point the number had to drop, this was elementary mathematics.

Gromyko continued that with respect to the incident involving the US serviceman, Nicholson, the Soviet side had described the actual situation. It had expressed its regret at the death of a human being, but certainly the Soviet side could not be held responsible. The responsibility lay with the appropriate US authorities, and the Secretary would know better than Gromyko who that was. The Soviet serviceman had not fired at an American; he had fired at a totally unknown individual. Gromyko thought that the US was clear about that, and thus the responsibility for this death lay with American officials. Gromyko wanted to give the Secretary some good advice and suggest that this matter be sorted out on the US side and that measures be taken to prevent a recurrence in the future. As for a meeting between military representatives of the two sides mentioned by the Secretary, it could be held and would probably be useful.

Turning to the Berlin air corridors, Gromyko expressed the view that representatives of the two countries, as well as other interested parties, should use the existing Berlin Air Safety Center. That facility

⁸ Documentation on the January meetings is in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 355–363.

covered the very area in question, and this issue was within its competence. The goal should be to remove the mutual concerns. Probably the sooner this matter was resolved, the better. The issue was largely of a technical nature and thus it might not be all that easy for the two ministers to discuss it now.

The Secretary expressed the hope that this meant that Gromyko would be giving a political signal to his people at the technical center to proceed on the basis of good will to resolve this matter involving flight safety. We would do the same.

Gromyko responded that the Soviet representatives would be instructed to discuss technical aspects of this issue from the standpoint of jointly removing all concerns of all parties. Those would be their instructions. He assumed that the US side, too, would issue appropriate instructions, and the Secretary said that he agreed. Gromyko noted that the subject involved was flight safety. Generally speaking, this was all he had wanted to say at this point. As the Secretary had seen, he, Gromyko, had addressed two subjects. The first of these involved the overall fundamental matter of interrelationship between nuclear arms and those in space, while the second concerned subjects addressed by the Secretary in his introductory remarks. If the Secretary were in a position to present his assessment of the Geneva negotiations and express his views on that score, Gromyko would be prepared to listen very attentively.

The Secretary thanked Gromyko for his remarks and wanted to say first that, like Gromyko, he thought that the question or questions involved the build-up of nuclear arms and the necessity to reduce them ultimately to zero, as had been agreed between us. Like Gromyko, we believed that we saw a relationship between defense and offense. Like Gromyko, we believed that the first round of the Geneva negotiations had not been satisfactory, but unlike him we thought that the fault lay with the Soviet Union, not the US. However, the Secretary agreed that this was an important subject which should be assessed frankly. He was prepared to provide a detailed assessment and specify where, in our view, we stood and what needed to be done. Gromyko would note the presence at this table of four individuals who were very experienced in arms limitation. That showed, he suggested, the great interest and priority we were devoting to this question.

The Secretary continued that while he intended to focus on the Geneva negotiations, he believed there were a number of other questions worth discussing. A real problem, he believed, involved the possibility of proliferation of chemical arms, a matter that he thought should be discussed. We should also address the opportunities presented by the Stockholm negotiations. Progress had been made there which, he thought, could be consolidated and should be noted. Time permitting,

this was an aspect of arms control that he wanted to touch on. There were also questions involving a regional dialogue which should be started, particularly on the matter of the Middle East, that is, the Iran-Iraq conflict in terms of chemical weapons. If time permitted, the Secretary intended to make a proposal on this score.

First, however, the Secretary wanted to address the Geneva negotiations. He would start by saying that he was disappointed by the Soviet approach in the first round of the nuclear and space arms talks. We had gone to Geneva prepared to move beyond 1983, which we felt would be in the interests of the Soviet side as well, but the Soviet side regressed. The Secretary was particularly disturbed that the Soviet side did not introduce a START proposal and that the Soviet positions went backwards in many respects. For example, in START the Soviet side had previously indicated a willingness to limit ALCMs but has now reverted to an earlier proposal to ban all cruise missiles. Given the Soviet Union's massive air defenses, we thought that this was an unreasonable position. In INF, the Soviet Union at the highest level had stated publicly a readiness to freeze SS-20s in Asia and be flexible on aircraft limits. The present Soviet position was confined to Europe only and placed what we regarded as one-sided demands on US aircraft. In the group which we called Defense and Space, "space-strike" arms, to use the Soviet term, were defined by the Soviet side at the negotiations to exclude existing Soviet ABMs, whereas in Geneva the two Ministers had agreed to include them.

The Secretary suggested that this tactic of backtracking was not useful. The Soviet side should be under no illusions that we would be willing to make concessions if the Soviet side returned to its original positions.

The Secretary continued that he was also disturbed by wholly unfounded and misleading Soviet public allegations regarding the US approach to the negotiations. In Warsaw, Gorbachev had mentioned a Soviet-proposed cut of one-fourth in strategic weapons; it looked to us as if this referred to the Soviet side's 1982–1983 START position which the Soviet negotiators indicated was no longer on the table.⁹ We

⁹ Gorbachev gave a speech on April 26 during a ceremony to extend the Warsaw Pact for 20 years. For the text of the address, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVII, no. 17 (May 22, 1985), p. 13. In telegram 5549 from Moscow, April 27, the Embassy reported: "Gorbachev's Warsaw speech was relatively restrained, in keeping with the overall effort to portray extension of the Warsaw Pact as a defensive measure. The General Secretary predictably adopted a softer line on the U.S. than in his speech to the April 23 CPSU Plenum." The Embassy continued that Gorbachev's speech contained some "noteworthy nuances" on arms control: "—an effort to add credibility to Soviet offers of 'radical reductions' in offensive systems by asserting that Moscow has already offered to reduce such systems by 'one-quarter' and would be prepared to go further." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850295–0257)

began to observe that the Soviet Union was now in violation of existing strategic arms limitation treaties and has not taken corrective action. Gromyko would recognize that compliance was important of itself. As questions arose regarding compliance, this tended to undermine confidence in the negotiating process. The Secretary was sure that it would be useful to discuss this matter in Geneva in addition to the discussions being held in the SCC.

The Secretary continued that it was the United States, in our view, that had been most faithful to the concept of interrelationship among strategic forces, INF, and defense and space arms. We have long held that there is an inherent relationship between offense and defense. This was at the heart of our approach to the Geneva talks. The Soviet negotiators' interpretation of the January agreement was not acceptable to us, for it seemed to establish a precondition for any general discussion in the two nuclear arms groups. Our negotiators were being told that unless we first accept a ban on the so-called "space-strike" arms, there was no point in seeking an effective agreement in the other areas. This turned our agreement on interrelationship into an unacceptable precondition and deadlocked progress in the other areas. Making progress in other areas contingent on our accepting the Soviet space proposal was not serious negotiating, we believed. It had been recognized that the groups could and should make progress in individual areas, and periodically review it in the light of their interrelationship. Indeed, by conditioning progress in offensive arms reductions on acceptance of the Soviet proposal on "space-strike" arms, the Soviet side was making it impossible to proceed in earnest on a range of issues as envisaged in the January 8 statement.

The Secretary said that we also must reject the Soviet charge that the US is backing away from the objective of preventing an arms race in space. We have made it clear that the Strategic Defense Initiative of the President is a research program only and that, should new defenses prove feasible, we would seek an agreed transition to a more defense-reliant balance, in which introduction of new defenses along with further reductions in offensive arms would be jointly managed. This would be the opposite of an arms race.

The Secretary noted that the Soviet negotiators had suggested that they would have numbers and specifics to introduce in the second round. He hoped that this will be the case and, if so, our own negotiators will then be prepared to engage in serious give-and-take negotiations. The US negotiating group in the defense and space forum is fully prepared to discuss the rationale and implications of the President's SDI and to present our thoughts about how possible new defensive technologies might produce a more stable and secure balance from the perspective of both sides. Thus, we have proposed that the Soviet side join us in an exploration of this subject. We were ready for this.

The Secretary pointed out that our negotiators in START and INF have broad authority to negotiate solutions. We are prepared to agree to radical cuts in intercontinental and intermediate-range nuclear arms as called for in the Geneva agreement. In our statements we have presented the desired ends to be achieved and have left considerable flexibility as to how to attain these ends. The START trade-offs concept, in particular, offers a means to achieve deep cuts while reconciling asymmetries between US and strategic force structures. In our INF position, our readiness within the context of an agreed global ceiling to discuss a commitment regarding US deployment in Europe and a reduction in Pershing missiles should also be of interest to the Soviet side.

In response to Gromyko's question about what non-compliance the Secretary had in mind, the latter mentioned the ABM Treaty, in particular the Krasnoyarsk radar, as well as the SALT II Treaty, in particular new missiles, encryption, and some other problems. These, he suggested, illustrated our concerns. The Secretary noted that in his view it might be useful to discuss these matters in Geneva because questions involving the ABM regime were related to our discussions with regard to space. In a sense, this was more than just an issue of technical compliance.

The Secretary wanted to assure Gromyko that the US side was prepared to move forward in all three areas in Geneva. With regard to strategic nuclear forces, we were proposing to reduce ICBM and SLBM RV's to levels of no more than 5,000. He thought that this was an appropriate first step along the way to achieving the goal of zero that the two sides had agreed upon, but we were willing to consider Soviet alternatives. We were prepared to limit ALCMs to levels well below those implicit in the 1983 US START proposal in an effort to develop mutually acceptable trade-offs. We should also negotiate constraints resulting in substantial reductions in destructive capability of strategic ballistic missiles. We sought to narrow differences over limits on strategic delivery vehicles and remained prepared to consider Soviet alternatives. Taken together, the above constraints would embody the trade-offs concept and thus address our concern over the Soviet ballistic missile force and the Soviet concern over US bomber/ALCM forces. At the same time, agreement along these lines would not require identical force structures. Thus, it took account of and accommodated the asymmetries in the forces the sides have.

The Secretary continued that with regard to intermediate-range nuclear forces our preferred goal—and he thought that the two sides agreed on zero—was the elimination of these systems altogether. However, within the context of agreement providing for equal global limits on missile warheads, we could accept any level from zero to 572—the

lower the better. Our position entails a wide latitude in several areas of interest to the Soviet side. In the context of an agreement providing for equal global limits, the US would consider not deploying its full global allotment in Europe. Further, in the context of such an agreement the US is also willing to apportion reductions in Pershing II missile deployments and limitations on aircraft, two major concerns of the Soviet Union. An outcome based on this position would be balanced and consistent with the security interests of both sides.

The Secretary said next that in the area of defense and space arms the US is conducting all its programs in full compliance with the ABM treaty and expects the Soviet Union to demonstrate its commitment by returning to full compliance as well. As he had mentioned earlier, this included, in particular, the Krasnoyarsk radar, which we believed is a clear violation of the ABM treaty, both in terms of its location and in terms of its direction. The Secretary noted that there was no way of accomplishing effective verification of compliance with an agreement that would limit research. The Secretary went on to say that should this research prove the viability of such a regime, we were prepared to pursue discussions as to how these systems could be developed, tested, and deployed, concurrent with further agreed reductions in offensive nuclear forces in a controlled manner. Our intent would be to enhance security on both sides and strengthen strategic stability. Such developing, testing, and deployment would be carried out in accordance with procedures as defined in the ABM treaty; however, we would not allow a Soviet veto over actions we believe are necessary to improve our security and enhance strategic stability. These points, in our view, provided a basis for forward movement in all three areas and took full account of interrelationships among the issues. Of course, lots of details would have to be negotiated and agreed, in particular provisions for effective verification. But these ideas provide a framework in which our negotiators could work and, as the Secretary had said, we were prepared to take into account the Soviet position, ideally on a give-and-take basis.

In response to Gromyko's question regarding the figures cited by the Secretary, the latter said that in case that question reflected a misunderstanding on Gromyko's part, he wanted to note that the figure 572 pertained to intermediate-range systems, whereas the figure 5,000 applied to ballistic missiles in START. Finally, he would note that Ambassador Nitze had prepared a statement summarizing the first round of the Geneva negotiations, and in case Gromyko had not seen it, the Secretary handed over a copy thereof. He added that if Gromyko liked the statement, Nitze might be talked into autographing it.¹⁰

¹⁰ Document not found. Nitze summarized the first round of the Geneva talks in a May 1 address to the National Press Club. For text of the address, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 1985, pp. 44–47.

Gromyko responded that the Secretary had just revealed a “major secret,” especially considering that Gromyko had read this statement approximately one day after it had appeared.

The Secretary concluded by saying that the above is what he had wanted to say regarding the Geneva negotiations, though, as he had noted earlier, there were other important arms control areas.

Gromyko noted that the Secretary had initially addressed regional issues and had only then turned to questions of nuclear and space arms limitations. He, too, intended to address those subjects, but he wanted to begin with the last subject addressed by the Secretary. He thought that relegating these issues to the back would generate a protest from these issues themselves. Of course he did not know how the Secretary viewed that Gromyko had not noted the Secretary’s disappointment over the course of the Geneva negotiations. He was willing to believe this but that disappointment was for reasons of a different nature. The US was disappointed because the USSR had failed to depart from the agreement of principle achieved in Geneva, whereas the Soviet side’s disappointment was caused by the US side’s departure from that agreement. The Soviet side was trying to convince the US side that if the latter insisted on separating the question of space from that of nuclear arms, there could be no progress. No matter what extensive speeches and statements might be made in various fora—large or restricted—such statements and speeches could admittedly confuse people who were ignorant on the subject, but in fact they merely harm Soviet and US long-term interests because that would result in no agreement being reached.

Gromyko continued that the US position, the US statements and declarations, reflected something very simple: All Soviet proposals were bad, no matter how good they were in substance and all US proposals were good because they promoted US military and political advantage. The US side has been trying to employ this lever in all its statements, from beginning to end. The Soviet side occasionally asked itself why the US was wasting so many different words to prove something that was objectively incorrect. But the US side continued to adhere to its line no matter what. The US favored everything that was useful to it and that gave it a unilateral advantage. To that end it was trying to convince the Soviet side that the US approach was correct. On the other hand, anything that was not to the US advantage, no matter what the reasons, were not acceptable to the US side.

Of course, Gromyko continued, the Secretary did not enjoy hearing this, but, then, the Soviet side, too, had not been particularly pleased at what it had heard. Nevertheless, when there were different points of view, especially contradictory points of view, when there were two concepts, two positions, especially diametrically opposed positions,

there nevertheless was only one truth, only one of the approaches was correct. This is why Gromyko felt that he had to be frank about this with the Secretary. He did not know how many times he would have to repeat that there would be no accord unless the most pressing issues that is space arms, strategic arms and medium range arms were considered in their interrelationship. Life itself dictated that these issues were interrelated in a single chain. No one could discount this genuine law. Gromyko was trying to convince the Secretary of this.

Gromyko noted that the Secretary had already expressed some specific considerations by naming figures and specific categories. Of course serious negotiations inevitably required this. But could the current negotiations be considered serious if one of the sides failed to address this aspect of that “famous triangle.” Thus, the considerations and figures presented by the Secretary would still not make it possible to reach accord along those lines because it was necessary to agree on this aspect first. The Secretary was presenting his suggestions on the assumption that space could be set aside. The Soviet side thought this kind of agreement was inconceivable. It would be a different matter if the negotiations on all the three areas agreed to in Geneva—agreed to by the Soviet side as well as the US side—were to be conducted in their original interrelationship. In that case everything the Secretary had said would have meaning. The considerations he had mentioned should be studied, but only in context. Today, however, given the current US position, this did not help us move forward.

The Secretary, Gromyko continued, had asserted earlier that previously the Soviet Union had held positions with regard to nuclear systems from which it had now retreated. The Secretary was merely imagining this. The US, on the other hand, did not stand still, it was pushing its program on land, in the air and at sea. The Soviet Union was not altering anything, it continued to adhere to the same positions of principle. By way of a detail, Gromyko would note that the Secretary had “lost” the issue of sea-launched cruise missiles. It was as if this issue had dropped out of his pocket. Yet there was such an issue.

Another question, Gromyko continued, was why we could not view any individual issue only within the context of Europe, why was it always necessary to bring in Asia; why did Asia have to be tied to Europe. For that matter, let us take a look at the systems available to the US which were not located on US territory. Let us take a look at the military-strategic situation. What about US nuclear systems in the Pacific, on Okinawa, in the seas around Japan, in the Persian Gulf, in the Indian Ocean and in South Korea? The Secretary could take a ruler and a map—whether a US map or a Soviet map—and measure the distance from these sites to the USSR. He would see that the US had no need for strategic arms to cover almost the entire Soviet territory;

it could employ medium-range systems. Was the Soviet Union expected to close its eyes to this, not notice this, and imitate an angel no matter what the other side was doing? The fact was, however, that all this constituted an enormous threat. If the two ministers were to exchange places, how would the Secretary react if he were in the Soviet position? Thus, in global terms, it was necessary to take all of this into account. Gromyko added that he had not provided an exhaustive listing. For example, the US had carrier-based aircraft which seemed to be in some kind of a suspended state—they were not being counted in Europe, nor among strategic systems, nor anywhere else. The Secretary knew as well as the Soviet side the mission of these arms, and their effectiveness. He knew their significance. The Soviet side had raised this issue in the past and would continue to raise it in the future; these systems had to be taken into account. The rational way would be for both sides to respect the agreement of principle that had been achieved. This would make it possible to discuss Soviet as well as US proposals. However, we needed an objective and honest approach. One should not try to fool the other side. That was no way to reach an agreement.

Gromyko continued that the Secretary was chiding the Soviet side for its insistence at looking at all three types of problems in their organic interrelationship. He had said that this was akin to a precondition. But if that was the case, US and Soviet proposals would also have to be called preconditions. There was nothing of the sort. Were this the case, the Geneva accord reached between the two ministers would also have to be viewed as a precondition. In fact, this was not the case. This argument worked both ways, but the most important thing was that the US side's approach did not withstand criticism. After all, the Soviet side was not saying that we should first reach agreement about space and that we could only then go on to strategic systems, for example. Had the Soviet side adopted such an approach the Secretary would be entitled to call it a precondition, to express doubts, etc.

The Secretary thanked Gromyko for this clarification.

Gromyko said he wanted to remind the Secretary that the Soviet side had been consistently approaching the negotiations in terms of the organic interrelationship between all three problems, it had been doing so only in these terms. The Secretary would have to recognize that it was necessary to preclude a situation in which an agreement on strategic arms, for example, might be concluded and brought into force without an accord on space issues. These things were intertwined. The Secretary had to understand this. In the course of the negotiations on these three types of problems the sides would encounter individual elements that would require discussion from the standpoint of the timing of their implementation—this could be done only in terms of the organic interrelationship. Gromyko continued that the Soviet side

has heard many statements by US officials at various levels to the effect that the Soviet Union was allegedly violating various agreements, including the ABM Treaty. Gromyko had to say that he did not understand the purpose for which such statements were being made. This remained a riddle. Perhaps those who make such statements really believed what they were saying, or perhaps they were attempting to convince the public of US peaceful intentions in order to gain support for the US positions. Ignorant people might even believe this. Gromyko assured that eventually he would solve this riddle. Perhaps a few people were confused, but the majority understood the true situation. After all, the Soviet Union is being accused of doing what the US is only planning to do, namely deployment of a large scale ABM system. He felt that military people understood the situation well, and believed that civilians, too, should not find this very difficult to understand.

Gromyko continued that the sides had discussed the Krasnoyarsk radar. The Soviet side had provided clarifications and necessary explanations in the SCC. The Soviet side had explained the facts. As for the other issues raised by the Secretary, they were pure inventions. It was the US which was taking the path of violating agreements. Just because the US side had baptized something as being defensive did not change anything. The ABM Treaty pertained to certain agreed facilities and categories of systems, and if a side were to conceive of the possibility of developing something new on the basis of new principles it was restricted to the legally permitted framework. A territorial ABM defense was completely out of the question. Gromyko was looking the Secretary in the eyes and clearly the Secretary understood this. Nothing could justify what the US side was calling "defensive." The Soviet side had a different term for this. Still, the US side was saying one and the same thing again and again. Consequently the Soviet side had concluded that since people in the US knew the real situation, but were nevertheless insisting on their approach, this meant that the US was not interested in agreement. After all, US officials understood that the Soviet Union understood what the US understood. Accordingly, the Soviet side had drawn the appropriate conclusions. In short, the US accusations were groundless. The Soviet Union was not trying to act contrary to the ABM Treaty, it valued that treaty and would not violate it. By the same token, the US side should understand that the Soviet Union would develop whatever it required if the US continued its program. Gorbachev had said that for the Soviet Union this would be a forced measure, necessary to insure security of the Soviet Union. Gromyko felt he had to convince the Secretary that this was not the road to be taken by the two sides. He thought that the US would agree with that, were it not trying to achieve dominance. The US side was trying to argue that it was engaged in scientific research. In fact, how-

ever, it was talking about large-scale systems which would radically alter the strategic situation. This was quite different from the research permitted by the ABM Treaty. After all, US and Soviet scientists and politicians know that in some areas scientific research involved something on the order of 92 or 95 percent of the effort needed to develop a new weapons system. After that there remained nothing but testing and deployment. The US arguments did not impress the Soviet side. Perhaps the US was impressed by these arguments. After all, modern psychology made it possible to become convinced of the most implausible things. Still, that was no way to reach an agreement with the USSR.

Gromyko noted that the Secretary had not mentioned the moratoria proposed by the Soviet side—specifically in a speech by Gorbachev.¹¹ One moratorium was being proposed within the European framework, and another one within a global framework. Why Gromyko, asked rhetorically, had this been done? In order to create a more favorable atmosphere for the negotiations. Nobody would lose anything. On the contrary, this measure would improve conditions. Of course, it was necessary to include space, that is, not extend the arms race to space. Gromyko repeated that the Secretary had failed to mention the Soviet moratorium proposal. He continued that a moratorium would serve to demonstrate the intentions of the sides and that, too, would facilitate the negotiations. Yet, as it turned out, the US did not want a moratorium, be it in European or in global terms; it did not want to assume a commitment on non-first use of nuclear weapons; and it did not want to assume an obligation on the non-use of force. Gromyko noted that this question was under discussion in Stockholm, but those negotiations were moving very slowly and the Soviet Union had gained the impression that Washington did not want an agreement. Gromyko went on to say that the problem could not be taken care of by resorting to some joint statement which, for example, would repeat the words contained in the UN Charter or Helsinki Final Act. That would give us nothing. Even after the UN Charter was drawn up there have been wars, wars with which the Secretary was familiar. Accordingly, there was a need for a firmer obligation on the non-use of force. Gromyko remarked that he had focused on intentions because intentions, too, would help the negotiations, as well as the possibility of reaching agreement.

Gromyko expressed the view that ratification and entry into force of the 1974 and 1976 treaties would constitute a very useful step from the standpoint of altering the atmosphere at the negotiations dealing with the most important and pressing problems.¹² Moreover, this

¹¹ See footnote 2, Document 22.

¹² See footnote 8, Document 13.

would be a useful step from the standpoint of the subject matter of these two treaties as such. The same could be said with regard to agreement on a comprehensive test ban. He noted that cessation of testing and entry into force of the relevant agreement involved a separate issue that was not related to the other problems. But Washington evidently did not want an accord. Just like other positive steps which would improve the relationship between the two countries, as well as the international situation, it was of no interest to the US.

Gromyko said that he had already referred to the Stockholm Forum. The situation there was not satisfactory. We were not close to agreement, and there seemed to be little movement. The Soviet Union objected to suggestions that some states be permitted to engage in espionage against the Soviet Union and other Socialist States. This would not benefit the USSR. He asked the Secretary to see whether the US might not adopt a more objective position with respect to the Stockholm negotiations.

Unfortunately, Gromyko continued, the Vienna negotiations were not going anywhere either. The US was familiar with the Soviet proposal and though a formal reply has not been received, it appeared that Washington was adopting a negative attitude toward the proposal of reducing Soviet and US troop contingents by twenty and thirteen thousand.

Gromyko noted that the Secretary had correctly referred to an abundance of anniversaries this year. There will be another such occasion in Helsinki in early August to mark the signing of the CSCE Final Act. Gromyko went on to tell the Secretary that in the Soviet view it would be appropriate if the participants were represented at the level of Ministers.

Gromyko said that the Secretary had correctly noted the importance of the issue of banning chemical weapons and destroying their stockpiles. The USSR considered this to be an important and pressing issue. Whether or not one included the Iran-Iraq war it was an important problem in any event. The Soviet Union was puzzled by the US position on banning chemical weapons. It would appear that the US administration did not want an agreement on that score. No matter how one approached this subject—in political, geographic, humanitarian or strategic terms—the Soviet side believed that it was necessary to find a solution to the issue of chemical arms, that is, ensure a complete ban on them.

Gromyko noted that the Secretary had properly touched on the matter of non-proliferation of nuclear arms. The Soviet Union attached importance to this issue in the past and continued to do so now. Incidentally, if we were to reconstruct the genesis of this issue, we would see that the positions of the two sides coincided. This matter

had been close to the hearts of both the US and the USSR. The USSR advocated implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and expansion of the number of countries that had signed it. In this connection, he did not exclude the idea of some sort of agreed statement which, he thought, had been voiced by the US side in Helsinki, more specifically by Ambassador Kennedy, who he believed was with the State Department. Perhaps that would be advisable. He believed that this was the US position and did not mind saying that the USSR liked this US idea. Presumably one could draw up either a joint statement, or identical or similar statements to be delivered at the same time. Gromyko suggested that for obvious reasons a joint statement would be more impressive. Perhaps this could be discussed at some upcoming meeting. It was worth thinking about.

Gromyko wanted to say a few words on other issues addressed by the Secretary, though he would have wanted to make these remarks even in the absence of the Secretary's comments. Both the US and the USSR understood perfectly well the delicate and acute nature of the situation in the Caribbean surrounding Nicaragua. The US understood the situation because the US was a factor in exacerbating it. The Secretary knew very well that the USSR resolutely condemned US actions against Nicaragua. These actions were a violation of the UN Charter, of international law and international decency. Gromyko had to say that for a long time now, US foreign policy has felt most uncomfortable over the US position with respect to tiny Nicaragua. Who would believe that Nicaragua posed a threat to the US, that Nicaragua was a vehicle for Soviet penetration of Latin America and thus a threat to the US? In the Soviet Union it would be impossible to find even a lunatic who would believe that. For a long time now Gromyko has been reading that the USSR was supplying or intending to supply heavy arms and certain types of aircraft to Nicaragua. The Secretary knew as well as Gromyko that this was not so. But the propaganda apparatus was going full force. The USSR was not doing anything of the kind. Sure, it had provided some material and humanitarian assistance to Nicaragua, just as had many other countries, even US allies. But what did this have in common with the perfidious intentions that were being ascribed to the USSR, Nicaragua and Cuba. The Soviet Union sympathized with and supported the Contadora process, as did the entire world, with the exception of the US. It would be good if the Contadora group were able to assist Nicaragua in removing the existing tension.

Turning to the Middle East, Gromyko said that the Soviet Union adhered to a position of principle. It was opposed to tensions and aggression, and was in favor of liquidating the consequences of aggression. The Secretary knew very well that the USSR advocated the independence of Israel, but it was opposed to Israeli aggression and advo-

cated liberation of the occupied Arab territories, believing that this cause was just. We would see whether Israel was serious about withdrawing from Lebanon, about leaving no Israeli military personnel there. We would see how things developed. Perhaps the Secretary could clarify the situation. As for an independent Palestinian state the Secretary was familiar with the Soviet position, a position it was adhering to now and would adhere to in the future.

Gromyko said that as far as the Iran-Iraq war was concerned, statements by US officials would even seem to suggest that the US favored termination of this war, but frankly it seemed to Gromyko that the US could do more in this regard. This was a senseless war in which people were losing their lives and in which blood was flowing in streams. Iran was sending thousands upon thousands of adolescents into the war. The Soviet Union definitely thought that Iraq would like to end the war and begin negotiations, but Iran was not interested. Gromyko did not think that the Iranian position was very far-sighted. He thought that the current Iranian leadership was incapable of looking out toward the horizon.

Gromyko continued that Afghanistan would be the subject of consultations between our representatives and thus it was hardly necessary to discuss it here. Clearly, an agreement was possible on an equitable and objective basis. However, interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and encouragement of Pakistan to pursue this course would lead to nothing. The Soviet Union would not abandon Afghanistan. It would be good if Washington were to take a broader look at this situation.

Gromyko, turning to Southern Africa, noted that in the South Africa-Namibia-Angola situation, South Africa was the cause of all the complications. It engaged in aggression against Angola and one had to be blind not to see this. South Africa was an aggressive state. Gromyko wanted to say something most countries could subscribe to, namely, that if the US Administration wanted South Africa to adopt a more realistic position, not to say a more equitable position, we would of course not witness anything of the sort that was occurring today. It had to withdraw its armed forces from Namibia. At one time both the US and the USSR had subscribed to relevant UN resolutions concerning peace in Namibia. Naturally, South Africa also had to end its aggression against Angola.

Gromyko went on to say that in order not to make separate statements he wanted to say a few words on related bilateral matters. The time was at hand to resume exchanges between our two countries, that is either conclude new agreements or revive old ones.

The Secretary said that he believed it was time for such agreements.

Gromyko continued that with respect to agreements on exchanges in science, culture, etc., we should speed up those which were in an

embryonic stage. Some agreements were formally in existence, but were in a state of paralysis. These agreements had a weak pulse and needed a little medication in the form of appropriate political decisions. Gromyko concluded by saying that he was unsure whether he had addressed all the questions covered by the Secretary, though he did think he had mentioned everything that deserved attention.

The Secretary thanked Gromyko for his very comprehensive statement. He wanted to comment on the points made by Gromyko and make some suggestions along the way. He would start with Geneva. The Secretary urged Gromyko to consider carefully the matter of compliance. That involved important implications. The Secretary wanted to assure Gromyko that the statement in which he was raising questions about a number of US positions would be answered at the second round. The Secretary hoped in turn that the Soviet side would be prepared to make explicit proposals. He wanted to assure Gromyko that the SDI research program was being carried out within the limits permitted by the ABM Treaty. Gromyko had mentioned research on topics in which completed research amounted to ninety-five percent of the way toward completion of a program. Gromyko seemed to know something that we did not know in this area. Perhaps he did because as we knew the Soviet Union has been engaged in such work for a long time. The Secretary wanted to point out the importance of engaging in an exchange in the Space and Defense group. He thought Gromyko should give careful thought to such an exchange in which we were prepared to participate. On the question of what was and was not covered by the Geneva Space and Defense Group, the Secretary would ask Gromyko to study carefully his notes towards the end of the last meeting in Geneva, in particular the exchange between Mr. McFarlane and Ambassador Karpov which was subsequently confirmed by the two Ministers, which the Secretary suggested, entailed a specific agreement that the ABM systems currently in place were part and parcel of the discussions now being held in Geneva.¹³

The Secretary said he had listened carefully to Gromyko's statement on interrelationship as distinct from preconditions. If he had understood correctly, he could agree that Gromyko had provided a fair statement concerning the Geneva discussions by the two Ministers. He wanted to restate his understanding to ensure that he had understood accurately. Each of the three groups should pursue its work on the relevant issue and each, its own way, should see what agreement it could find. Questions on whether some agreement should be implemented needed to be considered in the light of interrelationships. It

¹³ See *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 362.

may or [may] not turn out that both sides want to implement such an agreement. The US side had said in Geneva that it would probably wish to implement such agreements but that it also recognized that this would have to be looked at in each particular case. No agreement could enter into force unless both sides favored this. On this basis the Secretary would suggest that both he and Gromyko tell our negotiating teams to prepare to return to the second Geneva round, ready to submit concrete proposals and counterproposals in each of the three groups, and to work at this in a constructive and energetic manner. He could assure Gromyko that the US negotiators would manifest such a spirit.

The Secretary noted that he had a long list of subjects still to cover. Gromyko said that the Secretary should go ahead.

On the question of the various proposals for moratoria, the Secretary continued, they of course have been made before and we retained the view that they would effectively freeze existing imbalances and distract the work in Geneva to less important matters. Gromyko also recognized that these moratoria would present problems of verification and would take a lot of work by themselves. The Secretary said that Gromyko was well aware of our views with respect to non-first use of nuclear arms. These views had not changed.

Turning to the 1974 and 1976 treaties the Secretary said that we agreed that it would help the atmosphere if these matters started moving. We were aware, however, that the verification problems were considerable and believed that some step, perhaps an unrelated step, might improve the situation. In particular, the President in his UN address a year ago, had invited your observers to our test sites—on a reciprocal basis with our observers at Soviet sites—for the purpose of improving calibration of national technical means for measuring megatonnage during tests.¹⁴ If this contributed to improved confidence in verification we could consider moving forward with these treaties. We believed that discussion of a CTB should await resolution of this more modest effort.

The Secretary went on to say that the US side would be making a statement there with respect to the Vienna MBFR negotiations and thus he did not wish to comment further on this subject here. With respect to the question of non-use of force, which was being discussed at the Stockholm CDE negotiations, the Secretary wanted to say that the US was prepared to move toward an agreement and would like to see progress this year. We needed additional assurance that the Soviet

¹⁴ In his September 24, 1984, address to the UNGA, Reagan stated: "And I propose that we find a way for Soviet experts to come to the United States nuclear test site, and for ours to go to theirs, to measure directly the yields of tests of nuclear weapons." See footnote 2, Document 18.

Union was prepared to work on concrete CBMs going well beyond those in the Helsinki Final Act. In this connection, he recognized that the Soviet side had indicated its readiness to accept notification and observers at maneuvers. However, the Soviet side had not said anything which had much content, or which would have more than minimal effect. However, we were ready to do business in Stockholm: specifically, we were ready to reaffirm a non-use of force commitment in the context of an agreement that improved considerably on the Helsinki CBMs.

Speaking of CBMs the Secretary wanted to draw attention to the four suggestions made by the President in Strasbourg, and hoped that the Soviet side would respond, perhaps through diplomatic channels.¹⁵ They included an exchange of observers at military exercises and locations, an exchange of senior defense officials and a joint military communications link. The Secretary was prepared to elaborate and if Gromyko wished he was welcome to respond now or at some other time. The Secretary thought that all of these were interesting questions which should be explored.

The Secretary also wished to call Gromyko's attention to the President's Strasbourg speech in which the latter had expressed concern about mobile ballistic missiles with multiple warheads as distinct from those with single warheads. We believed that this development merited consideration and further discussion.

Continuing to address the individual issues in the order in which Gromyko had dealt with them, the Secretary noted Gromyko's mention of the upcoming tenth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act and his view that representation there should be at the level of Ministers. While we have not come to a final decision on that score, the presence of Gromyko at that meeting would have a major impact on the Secretary's own decision. He assumed that this would provide an opportunity for a comprehensive exchange of views between the two Ministers. The Secretary felt that an exchange of views with Gromyko was always useful.

Addressing chemical weapons, the Secretary thought that there was agreement between the two Ministers that this was an area in which there was a particularly serious potential problem of proliferation and that we should do whatever we were able in this regard. The Secretary noted that the US side also was concerned with compliance with the present understanding; we had tabled a complete draft text on the subject. We were ready to discuss it, including the verification provisions which, as the Secretary understood created trouble for the Soviet

¹⁵ See footnote 2, Document 27.

side. The Secretary had to say that verification was a difficult but important part of that draft Treaty. The Secretary wanted to make three specific proposals and suggested that Gromyko might want to respond through diplomatic channels or here. First, he would suggest that we expand the bilateral contacts with a view to facilitating progress within the CD itself. Second, he wanted to invite Soviet negotiators to visit the US this summer to view destruction procedures and relevant technology pertaining to a chemical weapons ban. Third, he suggested that Soviet and US experts meet,—we were glad to do this in Moscow—in the next few weeks to exchange information on the chemical weapons situation as it pertained to the Iran-Iraq war and to examine ways in which we might jointly express our concern to Baghdad and Tehran.

The Secretary said he liked Gromyko's comments about nuclear non-proliferation and thought that we should consider the areas in which we might be able to collaborate effectively. Given what Gromyko had said on the idea of such a joint statement we would pursue this matter at the level on which it has been discussed, and hopefully something could be produced before long. This seemed to be an area in which we might be able to move ahead. The Secretary hoped that this would be the case.

Turning to regional issues, the Secretary wanted to say first that we welcome the Soviet response to the President's suggestion made at the UN on regularly discussing some of these regional problems. He was pleased to see that one such discussion on Afghanistan and another on southern Africa had been scheduled. We will do everything to make these discussions useful. The Secretary was prepared to comment on each of the areas mentioned by Gromyko, as well as on one additional area which was contained in the paper received from the Soviet side,¹⁶ but not mentioned today by Gromyko. First, he had already noted that we would be discussing the subject of Afghanistan. The Secretary thought that Pakistan had shown flexibility and he found this to be promising. We supported the UN process. We wanted to see a political solution involving the orderly withdrawal of Soviet troops linked to other elements of an overall agreement. We supported a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan government which had the support of the Afghanistan people and recognized the long standing interest of the Soviet Union not to have neighbors on its borders who were hostile to the USSR.

The Secretary went on to say that with respect to Southern Africa this area would be discussed by experts, as Gromyko had mentioned. He believed that some progress on Southern Africa had been made.

¹⁶ See Document 18.

The Lusaka Agreement called for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola which, the Secretary thought had been accomplished. We believed that South Africa would go along with UNSC Resolution 435 concerning Namibian independence if there was an agreement on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.¹⁷ The presence of foreign forces in the area constituted a threat here. We also hope to see successful containment of the guerilla activity in Mozambique and thought that South Africa shared this view. In South Africa, of course, apartheid was totally unacceptable to anyone. The problem was to change it and we were continuing to work at this, though it was a difficult task.

East Asia was one of the areas in the Soviet suggestion for talks, and the Secretary agreed it was an important area for discussion. Perhaps that would be the next area to be discussed at the level of experts. The Secretary noted that he could only keep so many balls in the air at one time. We should proceed on a phased basis.

Gromyko remarked that the Secretary needed to train himself to keep more balls in the air. The Secretary responded that Gromyko was more experienced and could keep five balls in the air.

The Secretary then said he wanted to make five points on East Asia. First, it seemed to him, both as a former businessman and now as the government official, that Asia this was one of the most dynamic and interesting areas of the world. In this connection he recalled a comment made by Gorbachev at a meeting which the Secretary attended. Gorbachev said that we should look at the new countries in the world which are very dynamic. The Secretary suggested that this was nowhere more the case than in East Asia. He noted that there were major points of tension in the area, one of them being Cambodia. The Secretary viewed Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia as a very destabilizing development. We endorsed the principles worked out by ASEAN and endorsed by the International Conference on Kampuchea with regard to the withdrawal of foreign forces and international supervision of elections. We were strongly opposed to a settlement which would restore Khmer Rouge control, but the Khmer people would not

¹⁷ According to an April 16, 1985, *New York Times* article: "South Africa and Angola reached an American-brokered agreement at Lusaka last year calling for a withdrawal of South African troops from the country in exchange for an Angolan promise to restrict the activities of the South-West Africa People's Organization near the South-West African border. The two sides set up a joint monitoring commission, made up of 300 soldiers from each side, to supervise the agreement." ("South Africa Says Troops Will Leave Angola," *New York Times*, April 16, 1985, p. A13) Telegram 818 from Cape Town, April 15, summarized the agreement. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850258–0414) On September 29, 1978, UNSC Resolution 435 called "for the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia and for the transfer of power to the people of Namibia."

choose the Khmer Rouge in free elections. We thought that Soviet involvement in Vietnam's adventure contributes to instability, and he suggested that the Soviet side consider using its involvement with Vietnam to move the process forward in a more constructive way.

With respect to the two Koreas, the Secretary continued, it would seem that direct talks would be the best way to obtain a solution. We continued to urge them and we would welcome developments that could lead to a reduction of tensions. We were of course interested in improving our relations with China. We were interested in a more stable situation and obviously China was a key country in the area. The Secretary said we were watching with interest the experiment, or new efforts, in the economic field and were doing our part to be helpful.

Finally, the Secretary said our mutual security relationship with Japan was a fundamental aspect of ensuring peace and stability in that part of Asia. In terms of the USSR, the Secretary wanted to urge Gromyko, as he had done in Washington, to consider returning the northern territories to Japan.¹⁸ There is much that can be said about East Asia, he concluded, and perhaps at some point views on this area would be exchanged by experts.

The Secretary, turning to Central America, noted that this was an area of great sensitivity to us, as it was connected by the Western Hemisphere land mass to us, and a great many refugees from a number of countries in the region were coming to the US. Our goals were constant. We were in favor of stable democratic societies, we helped economic development massively and were opposed to the use of force to obtain changes. We favored peaceful political solutions. Major progress has been made in most countries in the region, with the exception of Nicaragua. We believed Central America was on the way to more progressive and democratic development. But Soviet support for aggressive interventionist activities of Nicaragua and Cuba was a negative element in our relationship and destabilizing in the area. The Secretary noted new military shipments, including Soviet Mi-24 helicopters. He thought that Managua's arsenal was now far beyond its needs and urged the Soviet Union to cease all such shipments. He thought that Nicaragua should, as it had promised the Contadora group, engage in a dialogue with those in its own country opposed to the present government. Unless this was done there could be no solution. It should also stop the process, about which there could be no doubt, of engaging in subversion against its neighbors.

¹⁸ Shultz and Gromyko met in Washington on September 29, 1984. See *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 288.

Returning to the subject of the Middle East, the Secretary expressed agreement with Gromyko that the Iran-Iraq war should stop. However, he had thought this was one war the Soviet Union would not blame the US for. At any rate, we supported the UN efforts, a frustrating process, and believed that since Iran was refusing to engage in overall ceasefire negotiations, the best solution would be to cut off Iran's arms supplies. The US has had some success in this regard and the Secretary asked Gromyko to use Soviet influence with its friends in the Warsaw Pact, Libya, which has supplied Scuds, Syria and North Korea to cut off the supply lines.

As far as Lebanon is concerned, the Secretary thought, to the extent that one could be certain about anything in such a turbulent place, that Israeli military units would be withdrawn from Lebanon by the end of May. He believed that Israel wanted to pursue a policy along this border which it called "live and let live." In other words, if Israel was not attacked from Lebanon it would not attack across the Lebanese border from its side. Presumably Syria might be able to do something in this regard and the Soviet Union might want to tell Syria something on this score. This might be useful.

As for Arab-Israeli issues, the Secretary said, we continued to view direct negotiations as the best solution to outstanding problems. During his brief visit to the area during the last several days, the Secretary seems to have sensed a slight raise in optimism, but then any realist would have to be very subdued in this regard.¹⁹ The Secretary thought that the Soviet Union's own role in this region would be helped by establishing diplomatic relations with Israel and by putting an end to the anti-semitic and anti-Zionist propaganda in the Soviet Union. The USSR should also consider its treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union.

Turning to bilateral issues, the Secretary noted that he had already referred to the Joint Commercial Commission. He also hoped that we could conclude a cultural agreement and have more exchanges. He wanted to mention in passing three other issues which, it seemed, were tied into a package. First, there was the matter of Pacific air safety and as he understood it, the Soviet side had informed us that it was proposing to hold a meeting on this subject in Moscow on May 20. We would be accommodating. As for the substance, we had proposed a limited agreement which would be restricted to practical measures, rather than philosophical issues, measures which basically have been agreed upon. The Secretary thought that this would open the door to other things. We understood that the Soviet Union had conducted productive negoti-

¹⁹ Following his visit to Israel (see footnote 5, above), Shultz met with President Mubarak in Cairo on May 12 and then with King Hussein in Jordan May 12 to 13.

ations with Pan American on resuming air service. We welcomed that. We were ready to discuss our civil aviation agreement, that is Aeroflot issues. At the same time we had under discussion the question of consulates in Kiev and New York. Dobrynin had pointed out that Aeroflot was connected to the New York consulate, while Gromyko had referred to an exchange agreement. The Secretary suggested that this set of things could be realized if given a push. The Secretary concluded by expressing the view that he had commented on all the points raised by Gromyko.

Gromyko said that he wanted to comment very briefly on the four ideas set forth by the President in one of his speeches.²⁰ With respect to exchanging observers at military exercises and facilities in the US and USSR, this would be a lopsided measure because it would provide unilateral advantage to the US. It would mean that the US would be able to observe military activity throughout the entire territory of the Soviet Union whereas US military activities would be largely left out since most US maneuvers were conducted outside the continental US, that is in areas scattered throughout the world. Thus, such a penetration of the Soviet Union would not serve to build confidence between the two countries. Gromyko further suggested that permitting observers at military sites was an artificial issue. To claim this would promote goodwill did not sound very convincing. Moreover, the US had no reserves of goodwill for the Soviet Union.

As for contacts between defense officials, Gromyko suggested that there were enough such contacts right now. Military officials were already meeting from time to time in various fora and different delegations; that was sufficient. If this were desirable all these fora and delegations could be used for discussing individual issues.

As for non-use of force, Gromyko noted that he had already mentioned consideration of this issue in Stockholm, and that while the Soviet Union favored such an agreement it had seen no indication that the US was interested in this kind of accord. On the other hand the Soviet Union had no interest in letting the US and NATO have a complete look at Soviet territory. As far as the military communications link was concerned, this seemed to be an artificial suggestion which was unjustified. We already have the Moscow-Washington Direct Communications Link which operates quite reliably and which could be used by the side if they wished to exchange relevant information. Of course, this does not preclude the possibility of technically upgrading that link if the sides agreed that this was appropriate.

²⁰ Reference is to Reagan's speech in Strasbourg. See footnote 2, Document 27.

Gromyko said that he was most surprised to say the least at the Secretary's efforts to support the completely unfounded and entirely absurd Japanese claim to the Kurile Islands. The Soviet Union did not own any Japanese territory, it had only its own territory and had no intention of giving away any of its own territory. It would behoove those who were not familiar with the situation to learn the relevant facts and ascertain that the US recognized only Soviet territory here. By analogy, there was only one US, there was no second US.

Turning to the Secretary's comments about Vietnam, Gromyko noted that the Secretary had hinted at Soviet help to Kampuchea, though he had not actually said so. He had referred to "adventure." This was not true, for it involved assistance. Kampuchea was entitled to decide for itself how it wanted to arrange things in its own home. So much for "adventure." It would be better if the US took the path of defending Kampuchea, at least those Kampucheans who have survived Pol Pot who had been acting with the blessings of certain individuals well known to the US as well as the USSR. It would be useful if the Secretary and US authorities were to take a good look at the balance scale.

Gromyko noted the Secretary's request that the Soviet Union use its influence to end the war between Iran and Iraq. Gromyko wished to say that the Soviet Union was doing all it could in this regard. While the Soviet Union continued to exert its influence to end that war, it would be most useful if the US were to act in the same direction. The US could do some things that would be useful. The USSR would not be so audacious as to say what would be most appropriate because the US knew this better.

Gromyko continued that Soviet relations with Israel were an open book. In fact, as the Secretary was aware, Israel was probing the possibility of reestablishing diplomatic relations. An Israeli representative, the Israeli Foreign Minister,²¹ had visited Gromyko in New York during the UNGA and Gromyko had to tell the Secretary what he had told the Israeli representative, namely, that the Soviet Union would reestablish relations if the conditions were right, that is, if there were a change in Israeli policy. At present, however, no one in the Soviet Union would understand if these relations were reestablished. Specifically, Israel should abandon its aggressive policy and learn to differentiate between its own and someone else's property. In that case the Soviet attitude on this issue would change.

Gromyko next confirmed the existence of the questions relating to Aeroflot and consulates. But it was not the Soviet Union that was

²¹ Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir.

blocking their resolution, it was the US. He thought that we ought to authorize representatives of the two sides to hold a meeting and agree on the specifics and timing introducing any extraneous matters. Resolution of these two issues would improve our relations.

Gromyko suggested that since it was now 8:00 pm it might be appropriate to conclude our discussion, all the more so that we would be late at a reception to which we had been invited. If the Secretary wanted to address any other issues, perhaps that could be done during the reception.

The Secretary inquired what words we should use to describe this meeting to the press.

Gromyko suggested that we be guided by common sense and not go into any details. As for how the Secretary intended to assess the meeting in general, that would be a matter of his own conscience. In any event, Gromyko hoped that the Secretary would not make any comments which would force Gromyko to voice an objection. By the same token, we will probably not be able to work out a joint statement today, that would require us to remain in Vienna for an additional day.

The Secretary said that he intended to use such words as “useful, comprehensive, detailed, and exhaustive but not exhausting.”

29. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House¹

Vienna, May 15, 1985, 0640Z

Secto 9112. Department for S/S Only. Subject: Memorandum to the President on Gromyko Meeting.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Memorandum for: The President

From: George P. Shultz

Subject: My Meeting With Gromyko in Vienna May 14

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memorandum of Conversations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz/Gromyko at Soviet Embassy, Vienna May 14, 1985. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Palmer and McKinley; approved by Shultz. Sent from the Secretary's delegation in Vienna. All brackets are in the original.

3. Our meeting went on for almost exactly six hours, and was basically an exhaustive review of the whole agenda of issues between us.² While there was Soviet movement on some issues, Gromyko had very little new to say, especially in the arms control field. Hence the discussion was fairly sterile, frequently repetitive and generally predictable. Overall, it seemed to confirm the view Art Hartman has been giving us in his reporting that Gorbachev's preoccupation at this point is to consolidate his domestic political base, with foreign policy creativity taking a back seat at least for the time being. As an anecdote illustrating this, one of Gromyko's aides, in a side conversation with a member of my team, appeared more interested in talking about the the upcoming crackdown on vodka consumption than in Afghanistan or Nicaragua.³

4. I set the scene by saying that this is a moment in our relations that is both promising and troubled. On the positive side, I mentioned your solid new mandate to pursue your approach with the Soviets, and the fact that Gorbachev is now settling in, so that we are in a position to proceed from a long-term perspective. On the negative side, I went through three major obstacles the Soviets have created to forward movement. First, I reiterated our demands that the Soviets offer an apology and compensation to the family for Major Nicholson's killing, and that we reach agreement on concrete measures to prevent any recurrence. Second, I stressed the dangers created by Soviet unilateral reservations in the Berlin air corridors, and the need for joint management to ensure safety on these routes.

5. Finally, I made a presentation on human rights. Here I reiterated the permanent importance of these issues on our agenda, and reviewed previous discussion of Gorbachev's proposal to the Vice President and me that we appoint rapporteurs, and the Soviet undertaking to Tip O'Neill to get back to our congressional group on their human rights cases. I noted that we had seen some small promising signs in recent weeks on the composition and levels of Jewish emigration and hoped for sustained movement. I also noted that there is a link between emigration and MFN trade treatment for the Soviets. Finally, I pointed to persecution of Hebrew teachers as an urgent issue, and to Dr. and Mrs. Sakharov, Shcharanskiy and Ida Nudel as cases where Soviet gestures could have an important effect. Gromyko, as usual, claimed this was an area the Soviets do not discuss.

6. Gromyko for his part started by expressing surprise that I had not yet mentioned arms control, and keen disappointment at the way

² See Document 28.

³ See Document 25.

we had handled the VE-Day anniversary, particularly the fact that we had not mentioned the Soviet contribution to the common victory during your trip to Europe. He said the Soviets considered your anniversary message to Gorbachev a “positive” development, but made it clear that Gorbachev himself was “hurt”—his word—by our overall treatment of VE-Day.⁴

7. The rest of the meeting consisted of a detailed run-through of every area and almost every topic of our agenda, beginning with an hour-long Gromyko presentation on arms control. The exchange on the Geneva negotiation was without surprises: Gromyko avoided detailed discussion and in the main eluded contact. On other issues, nevertheless, discussion was less sterile. In fact, there were limited signs of progress on such topics as nuclear non-proliferation, exchanges on regional issues and a number of bilateral issues. So it was a mixed picture of the kind we expected.

8. On arms control, my main impression was that Gromyko had no mandate to get into the substance of the Geneva talks. I laid out the proposals we have put forward in Geneva in some detail, stressing the flexibility you have given your negotiators and our disappointment at Soviet regression from positions they had previously put forward and their unfounded public charges about our approach. Gromyko scarcely defended their conduct during Geneva I; instead, he simply hammered away at the theme that we are responsible for lack of progress because of SDI. I pressed him on a number of points of detail, including their existing ABM system and Bud’s conversation on this topic with Karpov in Geneva.⁵ I also raised compliance in general as a problem for arms control and for our relations, and a whole series of specific compliance issues in particular—the Krasnoyarsk radar, telemetry encryption, and new missile types. Finally, I raised our concern about their new mobile MIRVed ICBM. He did not respond to most of these points, and where he did the responses were standard (and hence unsatisfactory). The only new element I detected was greater attention than before to the ABM treaty. The point he seemed to be making was that since the treaty forbids research aimed at creating a nationwide defense, our research in this direction is not consistent with it.

9. Exchanges on other arms control issues were only marginally better. I reiterated the four proposals to enhance confidence you put forward in your Strasbourg speech, but Gromyko commented nega-

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 24.

⁵ No record of this conversation between Karpov and McFarlane was found.

tively in response.⁶ For his part, he raised the non-use-of-force treaty the Soviets have proposed at Stockholm, non-first-use and a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) in predictable terms. In response, I said we are prepared to move forward at Stockholm along the lines of your Dublin speech proposal.⁷ On the Limited Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties, Gromyko urged us simply to ratify them; I urged them to accept your UNGA address offer of reciprocal exchanges of experts visits to improve verification procedures. Until we got further on these more modest testing measures, we were not prepared to discuss CTB.

10. I raised chemical weapons, stressing how serious a problem they are and how we need to work both for a complete and verifiable ban and against proliferation. Here I invited Soviet negotiators to the U.S. this summer to view destruction procedures and technology related to a total ban, as we have done with other negotiators, and I proposed that our experts get together in Moscow bilaterally over the next few weeks to exchange information on the Iran-Iraq situation and explore ways to express our concern about it. Finally, on nuclear non-proliferation, we agreed that our bilateral talks have been very useful, and Gromyko—in a rare forward lean—praised our initiative in proposing a joint statement supporting the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and seeking a constructive NPT review conference this fall.

11. On regional issues, we exchanged views on all five of the areas that are under discussion for possible experts' level talks—Southern Africa, Afghanistan, the Middle East, the Far East and Central America/the Caribbean. The discussion itself was neither very novel nor very constructive. It seemed to me that he put more stress on Central America than in past meetings, and was tougher in presenting Soviet views, but that is perhaps natural after the Contra vote and the Ortega visit to Moscow.⁸ Basically, the views expressed were standard. We did however reiterate the agreement previously reached to have experts' talks on Southern Africa in Paris May 30 and on Afghanistan in Washington June 18, and I suggested that the Far East should be the next region we talked about in that format.

12. In contrast to the other areas, Gromyko was relatively upbeat on bilateral issues. This was particularly true on our exchange agreement

⁶ See footnote 2, Document 27. The four proposals were: exchange of military observers at military exercises, regular high-level contacts between U.S. and Soviet military leaders, prompt CDE action and agreement on confidence-building measures, and establishment of a permanent military communications link.

⁷ See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 224, footnote 3.

⁸ According to the *Washington Post*, Daniel Ortega met with Gorbachev in Moscow on April 30 to request more assistance for Nicaragua from the Soviet Union. (Celeste Bohlen, "Ortega Meets Gorbachev," *Washington Post*, April 30, 1985, p. A1)

negotiations and on revitalizing our cooperative activities under existing agreements. Nor was he negative when I urged him to break the current logjam involving Pacific air safety, civil aviation and consulates by completing a Pacific air safety measures agreement quickly. So there may be some modest latitude for forward movement here. Just before the meeting the Soviets had signalled they are about to propose another round on Pacific air safety in Moscow May 20, and we and the Japanese are gathering our negotiating teams to be there.

13. At the end Gromyko asked to see me alone briefly to ask about attending the meeting to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act in late July-early August. I said we had made no decision yet, but I think it highly likely we will both be there and should have another meeting to continue the bilateral dialogue. We will want to get our NATO allies' agreement to attendance at Foreign Ministers' level before announcing a decision.

Shultz

30. Talking Points for Secretary of State Shultz Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated

Private talk with Gromyko

—After the ceremony yesterday in Vienna, *Gromyko asked to speak to me alone*, without aides or interpreters. We went off into a side corridor.

—Gromyko had two points to make:

Between now and any summit, we should try hard to *create a period of stability* and an atmosphere that avoids major problems.

We should try to think of ways to *give as much substance as possible to the summit*.

—I replied that I agreed that we should try to manage things in a stable manner, i.e., avoid creating events that are difficult to manage,

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary's Meetings with the President (05/16/1985). Secret. These talking points were included in a larger packet for Shultz dated May 16 and entitled "Meeting with the President on Middle East Trip and Gromyko Meeting," prepared in advance of Shultz's May 17 meeting with Reagan. Shultz returned to Washington on May 17 and met with Reagan that afternoon from 1:36 p.m. until 2:32 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

and manage the events that do take place in a way that keeps them under control. I told him not to make *Berlin* into a problem, and to do the right thing about *Major Nicholson*.

—I also agreed to his second point. *A number of items are within reach*. We should take steps to create an atmosphere for practical progress.

—Gromyko took this as a reference to *human rights*. “Anything we do,” he said, “would have to be in conformity with our laws.”

—Then figure out how to do it in conformity with your laws, I replied.

—On *venue for a summit*, I urged him to think about Washington. It would be good for Gorbachev to see the U.S. and good for our people to see him.² Gromyko said we should put it out of our mind. It is not possible. We can find a *European city*. He mentioned Moscow. I said that the President cannot go there until Gorbachev has come to Washington.³

—Gromyko’s mood was good. I regard this private talk as a *plus*.

² In his memoir, Shultz recounted this private discussion with Gromyko in Vienna. As he was preparing to leave the meeting, an aide said: “‘Gromyko would like a private word with you.’ I went over to the corner of the room where he was standing. ‘Is there anything else you want to talk about?’ Gromyko asked me. ‘No,’ I answered, ‘I’ve gone through everything.’ ‘What about the summit?’ he asked. ‘What about it?’ I replied. ‘Gorbachev will not go to the United Nations [for the September opening of the General Assembly],’ he said. ‘November would be better. President Reagan would be welcome in Moscow.’ ‘It is your turn to come to Washington,’ I replied, as the most recent summits had been held in Moscow, Vladivostok, Helsinki, and Vienna. ‘Out of the question!’ Gromyko exploded. ‘It should be in Europe, in a third country.’ ‘I will communicate that to Washington. Are you suggesting Geneva?’ I asked. ‘If you say Geneva, I’ll have to say Helsinki,’ Gromyko growled.

“So we were launched on our way to a summit. We agreed not to speak of this in public, and I held the information close: I did not even mention it in my cabled report to the president. I would ensure against a leak by reporting to President Reagan in person. Gromyko, I could see, had been instructed by Gorbachev to get the process started, to set the time and place. But Gromyko did not seem to have authority to engage on anything else. He was merely putting points down for the record. In six hours he turned not one new phrase, but simply waited for me to ask about a summit. The meeting had been sterile and peculiar—but at the final moment, productive.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 563–564; brackets are in the original)

³ In his memoir, Shultz also discussed his meeting with Reagan: “Back in Washington on Friday, May 17, I went to the Oval Office to report. I found the president leaning backward. He wasn’t sure about a summit in November. Maybe later. We should ‘think about it some more, play hard to get.’ I disagreed. There were big possibilities ahead, I told him, including in arms control. ‘Many key people in your administration do not want a summit,’ I said. ‘You have to make up your mind. You have to step up to the plate. And when it comes to the divisions in your administration over this issue, you can’t split the difference. Think about it,’ I said. ‘I will come back to you in a couple of days.’” (Ibid., p. 566)

31. National Security Decision Directive Number 169¹

Washington, May 17, 1985

U.S.–USSR JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION MEETINGS (U)

In January 1985, I approved guidelines for a meeting in Moscow of the “Working Group of Experts” under the U.S.–USSR Long-Term Agreement for Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation (NSDD–155).² Among the purposes of the working group meetings was to help determine if there were sufficient grounds for a meeting of the U.S.–USSR Joint Commercial Commission (JCC). Upon the return of the U.S. delegation, the SIG-IEP met and recommended that the U.S. convey its willingness to the Soviet Union to proceed with a JCC meeting to be co-chaired by Commerce Secretary Baldrige and Soviet Trade Minister Patolichev. I approved this recommendation and, in consultation with the Soviets, a JCC meeting date was set for May 20–21, 1985. (S)

The working group meetings in January identified a number of areas in which mutually beneficial non-strategic trade could be expanded in conformity with our present export control policies. Since January, work has proceeded on these and other issues in preparation for the upcoming JCC meeting. (C)

The six U.S. agenda items for the JCC and the approved guidelines are as follows:

- *Joint statement in support of trade*—a joint statement along the lines of the U.S. draft can be negotiated and issued at the conclusion of the meeting.
- *Bid invitations*—seek written agreement to put all interested U.S. firms on bid lists.
- *Equal treatment*—seek visible actions by Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry that indicate elimination of discriminatory treatment.
- *Possible signing of long-outstanding contracts*—seek the signing of contracts that are near conclusion but in other than the energy area.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 169 05/17/1985 [US-USSR Joint Commercial Commission Meetings]; NLR-751-8-13-2-3. Secret. In a May 9 covering memorandum to McFarlane, Robinson provided a memorandum from McFarlane to Reagan and a draft of the NSDD, recommending the NSDD for transmission to the President. McFarlane forwarded the NSDD to Reagan for his signature on May 16.

² Dated January 4. See *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 351.

- *Agree on future project areas*—explore possible projects in nine sectors—Agribusiness, pulp and paper, pollution control, textiles, land reclamation and irrigation, materials handling, transportation, petrochemicals, and consumer goods. Agree to explore the establishment of a Projects Working Group.

- *Soviet Support for USCO*—seek termination of the Soviet ban on company seminars and exhibitions at U.S. Commercial Office in Moscow. Explore further the Soviet offer to pay half the cost of a program to help small U.S. companies sell in the Soviet Union. (S)

The U.S. delegation's response to eight Soviet proposed agenda items should be as follows:

- *MFN and Human Rights*—U.S. should stress that major improvement in human rights practices must accompany any fundamental improvement in trade relations.

- *Furskins Embargo*—U.S. should explain that, in return for greater access to the Soviet market, the Administration will seek to introduce legislation to remove the furskins ban in a manner to be determined.

- *Nickel Certification*—U.S. should reiterate offer to consider a Soviet Foreign Trade Organization (FTO) as signatory to certification if the Soviets provide a written commitment that FTO is acting on behalf of the Soviet Foreign Trade Ministry.

- *Aeroflot Landing Rights*—U.S. should reiterate our readiness to enter into civil aviation discussions when North Pacific safety measures are agreed and an equitable package of concessions for U.S. carriers is negotiated.

- *Port Access*—U.S. should restate that a reciprocal arrangement should be negotiated in our bilateral maritime framework.

- *Tax Protocol*—U.S. should reiterate offer to move forward in negotiating and signing a protocol.

- *Supplier Reliability*—U.S. should state that we value highly contractual commitments and the fulfillment of these commitments. It should also be explained that there are circumstances which could arise which require the President to retain the authority and flexibility to abrogate contracts but only when he judges it in the overriding national interest.

- *Antidumping*—U.S. should seek to improve Soviet understanding of U.S. law and practices. (S)

On the issue of all energy-related matters, including U.S. oil and gas equipment sales to the USSR, the guidelines I established in NSDD-155 should continue to be strictly observed. In addition, the JCC meetings should be used to continue to express our serious concerns about Soviet human rights abuses and emigration policy. We must make it clear to the Soviets that their continued poor performance in these

areas will have a serious negative effect on any effort to establish a more constructive bilateral relationship, including our economic and commercial relations. (S)

Finally, the head of the U.S. delegation should state our abhorrence of the senseless killing of Major Nicholson and cite it as another example of a Soviet military response to a situation which has a severe impact on our overall relations. In this connection, we should reiterate our belief that the Soviet Union should apologize for this action and provide compensation to the Nicholson family. Our economic relations with the Soviet Union cannot be realistically isolated from other aspects of our overall relationship. (S)

Ronald Reagan

32. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 20, 1985, 1828Z

6602. Dept for Secretary and White House for President and McFarlane From Baldrige. Subject: My Meeting With General Secretary Gorbachev.

1. (Secret—Entire text.)

2. Summary: I met with General Secretary Gorbachev for two hours and fifteen minutes accompanied by Art Hartman and Jack Matlock. The discussion ranged from horses and films to the serious questions of our general relationship and the inter-relationships of politics, arms control, trade and political will. In an impressive mixture of advocacy and a rather one-sided painting of recent political history, Gorbachev went on at some length to describe how the Soviet Union would not and could not be put at a disadvantage. He ended, however, with upbeat notes on his desire for improving relations and a meeting with you (the President) and expressing appreciation for the exchange of views which we had. I corrected some of his history, assured him of your desire to be realistic, to seek ways to improve the relationship, to find paths toward peace and to use such items as trade as a way of bringing about a more normal relationship. My overall impression is

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

that he starts from a very ideological and, I would say, historically inaccurate base, but that when you do see him, you will enjoy the exchange and hopefully will be able to set him straight on some of his misconceptions. End summary.

3. Gorbachev was accompanied by Trade Minister Patolichev and the General Secretary's long-time foreign policy advisor Alexandrov-Agentov. The interpreter was Viktor Sukhodrev. Gorbachev had several pages of notes in front of him but referred to them only fleetingly. After I mentioned that I had seen both a horse farm and a circus, he described his own origins in Stavropol, which is one of the Caucasus areas where the Cossacks came from. He told several stories about his childhood memories of the area and his visits to the horse-raising areas of the region. He then welcomed me and said that the Soviet side regrets that it has been seven years since an American trade minister had visited.² He said this is surely not normal, and it is surely not normal that we can't find the will and the wisdom to adjust the relations between us, not just in trade, but more generally in politics in order to bring about a more normal relationship and avoid tragic endings and a bad turn in the world situation. (We had given your letter to the Soviets prior to the meeting so that he would have a chance to read it.)³ In reading your letter, he said he could not agree more that there will not be a fundamental change in our trade relationship without parallel improvements in other aspects of our relationship. Interpreting this in a broader sense than we do, he said we must have better general relations in order to be able to improve trade on a realistic basis. The real question is how we build confidence and that is the most important question.

4. He then went on to set forth his views and those of the Soviet leadership that an improvement in relations with the U.S. is of great importance both for bilateral purposes and for the international security situation in general. But, he said, "we are realists. We recognize the great contributions that the American people have made to world economics, culture and politics." He said, "We pay tribute to the American people's contribution, but at the same time we want the U.S. leadership today and tomorrow to be more realistic about the Soviet role and to appreciate the role we have played. This seems to be lacking on the U.S. side. An analysis of the last ten or fifteen years would show that there has been a zig-zag in U.S. policy—punishing the Soviet Union, teaching us lessons, sometimes the whip, sometimes the cookie.

² Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal and Secretary of Commerce Kreps attended a meeting of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council in Moscow on December 6, 1978. See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 161.

³ See Document 26.

We can't accept this. We don't approach the U.S. this way. But in Vienna we came a little closer to agreeing on a meeting at the summit. We want to use these contacts to shape our relationship and put it on a more normal basis."

5. Gorbachev then went on and pursued a line of thought which, I gather, he had used before with the Vice President and Congressman O'Neill—that they could perhaps sit back and wait until the U.S. decides what it wants on a more realistic basis, but they think that is wrong. There is no time to lose because of the giant strides being made in science and technology. "We are not begging for alms. We have enough power to assure equality with the U.S. It would be a terrible mistake of U.S. leaders not to recognize equality as the basis for our relations. Basing policy on strength is not the way to achieve progress." He then recalled the progress of the seventies on European security, nuclear affairs, in the ABM and SALT I agreements and later in SALT II. He said, "We are capable of solving problems, and the memory of those agreements encourages us to try once again."

6. He said he and the leadership were giving concrete thought to a future meeting with the President. "We have just begun new negotiations in Geneva—that is perhaps a sign of progress." But he expressed great discouragement about the first round of negotiations. (He even referred to the head of the U.S. delegation as recently saying that the U.S. wanted enough power to destroy the Soviet Union. I denied this and said that he must be misinformed about such a statement.) He said that perhaps the tactic was to wait for Soviet concessions. "There will be no unilateral concessions," but he said the Soviet goal is radical and real reductions in nuclear arms. He hopes the second round will get specific, but if these negotiations just run on, or if we just want to draw them out to convince people that something important is going on and keep the peace groups and our allies quiet, the Soviet authorities will find a way to show up our true designs. "We will not participate in a delusion, but if the U.S. meets us half way, we will join." He hopes that the U.S. can live without its nuclear stick. When he reads statements by U.S. experts, he wonders if the U.S. can conduct foreign policy without a war machine. But, he said, "We have not lost hope. We hope that the President is not under this illusion because we will respond to any challenge as we have in the past. As I told Congressman O'Neill's group, it is ten times cheaper to overcome SDI with a bigger offense." He had the feeling the President wanted a realistic response. "Perhaps both of us have positioned ourselves in a corner, but we must find a way out."

7. Getting around to trade, he said that the President was right in saying that it must reflect our basic political relations. In 1972 we signed a trade agreement in October, but it was preceded by a political

agreement in May.⁴ We had a solid basis for building something, but then in 1974 it was buried by the Jackson-Vanik linkage to human rights. (At this point he even threw in the bombing of a sect in Philadelphia to show how little we care about human rights.⁵ I countered him on this one as well by saying that a black mayor was dealing with a very dangerous local situation involving blacks.) He said when the Soviets take action, we never see them. In sixty years the Soviets had put together a multi-nationality system which had raised the standards of many backward peoples. "Those are real human rights. If you want to discuss human rights, we are prepared, as I told Congressman O'Neill, but only after the U.S. signs and ratifies the U.N. Human Rights Convention. The emigration issue has buried trade. Today it is only grain, but even in that sector, if the U.S. tries to make propaganda benefits by saying that you are feeding the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union is perfectly capable of buying its grain elsewhere. It's as if you want to conduct economic warfare and not act as a partner who is predictable."

8. Gorbachev said that they are now in the process of making general plans for the next fifteen years and detailed plans for the next five years. If projects are not in the plan and particularly if there are no plans for purchasing from the U.S.—"the train will have left. But we are in favor of trade if it is profitable and we are in favor of trade with the U.S. So far this seems to be only in agriculture." He said he sympathized with the task that Patolichev and I have, but he can say that the Soviet leadership supports what Patolichev agrees to. If we don't trade, we both lose.

9. In summing up, he said we need to unfreeze Soviet-American cooperation and freeze the arms race and the enmity that has grown up. Cooperation in trade, science and economics could be the litmus test of our true intent. If there is no desire to improve these, then perhaps there is no desire to have better political relations. "If you are here to remedy this situation, that is a good sign. Our basic interest is in improving the political situation and we think trade will help."

10. I began by saying that I was not going to claim equal time. I appreciated his directness and I would be as direct as he was. I had just a few simple things to say, but I meant them deeply. It looks as

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Document 65. Documentation on the May 1972 summit is in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972.

⁵ Presumably a reference to a May 13 bombing in Philadelphia. According to William K. Stevens of the *New York Times*: "A state police helicopter this evening dropped a bomb on a house occupied by an armed group after a 24-hour siege involving gun battles." ("Police Drop Bomb on Radicals' Home in Philadelphia," *New York Times*, May 14, 1985)

though since a Commerce Secretary has not been here for seven years, the General Secretary had saved up many issues to throw at this one today. I promised to report to you the points that he had made, but I said that I could not let pass certain things that he had said that do not accord with the facts. Our American negotiator could not have said what the General Secretary reported him to have said. I then commented on his use of the tragic situation in Philadelphia. In general, I said as an American listening to what he had to say, I felt it was a very one-sided presentation and particularly that it did not in any way represent the positions of the President of the U.S. I encouraged him to talk to you because I was sure that he would find that your goals and policies were quite different from what he appeared to have as preconceptions. I said that it should be clear from the various communications that you want better working relations—that you want progress in arms control, general political relations, trade, and cultural relations. I have heard you use those exact words. I said that you had sent me here because you had decided that trade could form a part of this general policy to improve our relations. I thought that there have been some constructive developments in this field, but that the General Secretary was right that first we must rebuild confidence and then we can think of more significant moves after that. I mentioned several examples of areas where an exchange could perhaps be mutually beneficial—in the areas of management, food packaging and storage and in learning about various service industry techniques. This also could be helpful to them in getting greater access to Western markets more generally. I said that in this goal of improving our trade relations they should not be diverted by what they read in the press because these are not the thoughts of the President of the U.S. I know from having talked to you that the U.S. policy is not one of economic warfare and you have said this publicly. In general, trade will help the rest of our relationship.

11. I said with respect to emigration and human rights that I had raised this problem in the first private meeting with Minister Patolichev not to have a philosophical discussion but rather to state facts realistically.⁶ I could say with some assurance that Congress would not change

⁶ Prior to the opening session of the Joint Commercial Commission on May 20, Baldrige met with Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai Patolichev. The Embassy reported in telegram 6725 from Moscow, May 22: "In a sometimes tense and confrontational meeting, Secretary Baldrige and Minister Patolichev disagreed over Soviet emigration and the question of sending letters to the respective business communities to urge them to do more business with each other. Patolichev said that all our bilateral trade difficulties were the fault of the United States, and it was up to the United States to solve the problems. In a sharp clash of views, he refused to comply with Secretary Baldrige's request that he tell Soviet FTO's that they should put U.S. companies on bid invitation lists and that they should not discriminate against U.S. firms. Baldrige told

the MFN situation if there were no change in emigration practices in the Soviet Union. This was a practical statement of fact.

12. At Jack and Art's suggestion, I also asked that the General Secretary look carefully at your recent long letter.⁷ The proposals contained in that letter were designed to improve our relations. I said that I was sure you did not expect all the concessions to come from the Soviet side, just as we cannot be expected to make all the concessions.

13. After I had made the point on emigration Gorbachev interrupted with some heat and asked if we were next going to ask the Soviets to give up socialism. He said Soviets were not like Latin America where we could tell Pinochet what to do or replace him. How, he asked, can we hope to improve relations if Congress thinks it can dictate to the Soviet Union. He could tell us formally and firmly that this (dictation) was ruled out. He then, as we stood to leave, returned to the positive side to say how much he wished to improve our relationship. He complimented me by saying that he thought he could work with me and paid his by now traditional compliment to the fact that the meeting had taken place. But it was a definite upbeat note about the desirability of concrete actions to improve both our trade and our over-all relationship.

14. In addition to any other places that the General Secretary may be getting his misinformation about America, a rather interesting exchange took place in which he indicated that he is a faithful film watcher, and I am afraid he may be getting from those films some of his impressions of our country. He mentioned particularly that while he enjoys the films, there is a lot of emphasis on guns and shooting, "which can't be good for young minds." The Ambassador tells me he will try to improve the General Secretary's film diet. In sum, this is a tough fellow, but I think you will eventually enjoy talking to him.

15. As we were about to leave and I asked how we should treat this conversation in statements to the press, we had an interesting exchange. He said that the less said, the better about summitry and that he thought that the Foreign Ministers after Vienna had been suitably restrained. He said it was all right to confirm that there was support on both sides for such a meeting and that it was useful and necessary, but that the President and the General Secretary were in contact on

him that he could not accept that response. If Patolichev was not willing to send a letter saying that Soviet side wanted to increase trade with the U.S., then we had come half way around the world for nothing and there was little point in going further. After consulting with his colleagues, Patolichev changed his position and said that since the matter was so important to the Secretary, he would agree to send such a letter. Meeting then ended cordially." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850359–0503)

⁷ See Document 23.

this matter. Thus, we could confirm that it was mentioned and that there was a willingness in principle on both sides to meet, but that the rest was “under discussion.” He also said that we should not say too much about the rest of the content of our discussions. He said that we should be “very considerate of these contacts,” implying that they should be treated as fragile plants. He ended by asking me to pass on to you his greetings and his appreciation for your recent letters, which will be carefully considered, and he again expressed hope for positive results.

Hartman

33. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, May 21, 1985

SUBJECT

Meeting with the President on May 22—US-Soviet Relations—May 22, 1:45 pm

For your meeting with the President, we have attached talking points (Tab 1) and a calendar of US-Soviet events through the end of the year which you might hand him (Tab 2).²

The key issue for decision is how to respond to the Soviets with regard to timing and venue for a summit meeting. I believe we should agree to Gromyko’s proposal for November, thereby pocketing it.

On venue, I see three options:

- Simply reiterate our offer of Washington.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary’s Meetings with the President (05/22/1985). Secret; Sensitive. Sent through Armacost.

² Attached but not printed. At Tab 1 are the undated talking points entitled “US-Soviet Relations” and at Tab 2 the undated “Calendar of Upcoming US-Soviet Events.” According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan met with Shultz on May 22 from 1:45 to 2:20 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) In his personal diary, Reagan wrote: “Back to the W.H. for a late lunch then met with George S. re a meeting with Gorbachev. George will be seeing Gromyko before long—at Helsinki. I told him to suggest mid November here in Wash. & if they insist on a neutral locale—make it Geneva. We’re going to offer Wash. with a commitment that a subsequent meeting would be in Moscow.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I: January 1981–October 1985, p. 461)

- Propose that we have a summit meeting in the United States in November, agree that the next summit would be held in the Soviet Union and announce both elements.
- Work out a third country venue such as Geneva.

Standing pat on our present position will not move the process of reaching agreement ahead. On the other hand, it seems unnecessarily early to fall back to a third country venue. We can consider doing that later if it becomes clear the Soviets will not come to the United States under any circumstances.

However, if you want to proceed now with regard to a third country venue, we believe that Geneva is the best approach. While Gromyko retorted with Helsinki, it's probable they will drop off if we insist on Geneva. We will have made a major concession by not insisting on the United States, they know the optics of Helsinki are bad for us given its location on the Soviets' border, and they have agreed to Geneva frequently in the past. We have thought about other sites but each has problems: Vienna was the last Carter meeting,³ Stockholm boosts Palme, Iceland is a NATO country so the Soviets might not agree.

Jack Matlock and I think there is some chance Gorbachev would find the middle option attractive and that it is worth a try before we decide whether to fall back to a neutral site. You laid the groundwork for it in Vienna by mentioning that the President would like to visit Moscow in the future but that it is the Soviets' turn to come to the United States.

The talking points also urge that we invite Gromyko down to Washington to see the President again during the UNGA. This could be used in setting the stage for the November summit meeting.

If you and the President agree to this approach on summit timing and venue, you could call in Dobrynin this week to present it.⁴

³ Carter met with Brezhnev in Vienna in June 1978; see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 199–201.

⁴ In his memoir, Shultz recalled the May 22 meeting: "I went to President Reagan later that day with my full proposal for a November summit. He had thought it over further himself, I could see. He agreed with the plan—and also to inviting Gromyko to come to Washington at the time of the opening of the UN General Assembly, which Gromyko would attend in September. I now had the running room I needed to nail down time and place." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 566) See also Document 30.

34. Editorial Note

A May 22, 1985, Central Intelligence Agency memorandum addressed to Director of Central Intelligence William Casey, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane, and the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State Morton Abramowitz reported comments of Soviet Politburo member Nikolai Ryzhkov on a potential summit between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. Jack Matlock, Soviet specialist on the National Security Council Staff, received a copy of this memorandum on May 23. The memorandum explained that Ryzhkov reportedly [*text not declassified*] that "some Soviet officials are advising the Soviet leader to recommend a full length summit meeting which would allow sufficient time for the two leaders to engage in social amenities, as well as discuss issues." The memorandum noted that Ryzhkov "cautioned that Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Gromyko may not be aware that the idea of a full summit meeting is being discussed." (Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1985, 400537)

Forwarding the memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock stated in a handwritten covering note: "To me, the most intriguing paragraph is No 4—Ryzhkov's reported statement that Gromyko may not be fully informed of Gorbachev's intentions. Since Ryzhkov is a close Gorbachev associate, he may in fact be more privy to Gorbachev's thinking than Gromyko. One can also speculate that Gromyko's statement to Shultz that a meeting in Washington is 'out of the question' may have reflected *Gromyko's* view and not Gorbachev's. (Gromyko prefaced his comments on summitry with the curious statement that he was expressing his 'informal personal opinion.' Until I saw this report I was puzzled by this, but it could be a signal that he was not necessarily conveying Gorbachev's view completely.) This report strengthens my view that the President should reply to Gromyko's probe by inviting Gorbachev to the States in November and suggesting that, if Gorbachev wishes, a return visit by the President to Moscow could be announced simultaneously for sometime in 1986. Jack." (Ibid.)

On May 29, Abramowitz sent Secretary of State George Shultz a copy of a similar CIA memorandum, dated May 29 and addressed to Casey, McFarlane, and Abramowitz. In a covering note to Shultz, Abramowitz wrote: "Mr. Secretary: I think you should read the attached. [*1½ lines not declassified*]. Interestingly Art told me in Moscow that he thought Gromyko was on the way out, but he provided little basis for this judgment. I find it hard to believe Gorbachev would move on Gromyko before the Party Congress in February next year. I am not distributing this report unless you want me to." The memoran-

dum explained that Ryzhkov, [*text not declassified*] stated that "Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko is being excluded from all planning and preparations for a summit meeting between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and the U.S. President because Gorbachev considers Gromyko 'too combative' on the subject." The memorandum also noted that "Ryzhkov stated that Gromyko will soon be replaced as foreign minister, but he did not identify any possible successors. Gromyko will almost certainly refuse the title of president if it were offered, according to Ryzhkov, but may accept the post of chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers when the current chairman Nikolay Tikhonov retires." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, May 1985)

35. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 25, 1985

SUBJECT

Conversation with Dobrynin—May 24th

At a reception last night, I had the opportunity to take Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin aside to discuss the question of a Summit. I told him first that I wanted him to pass on to Gromyko that, should the Foreign Minister come to the UN General Assembly this late September as usual, he would be welcome to come to Washington and meet with you in the Oval Office at that time.

Second, I told Dobrynin that I had passed to you Gorbachev's proposed time frame for a meeting between the two of you, and that you were agreeable, preferring sometime in the week beginning Monday, November 18.² I stated that you felt a one-day meeting would probably not be sufficient and that a two-day meeting with three substantive sessions would perhaps be best. Concerning the venue, I reiterated your invitation for Gorbachev to come to Washington, observing that for protocol reasons, Washington would be most appropriate since it was our turn to host such an affair. I added, however, that in any follow-on meeting after such a Washington summit, you would be quite prepared to visit Moscow. I noted to Dobrynin your view that it would be better for the leaders of the world's two most powerful countries to meet in each other's capitals than in some third country.

Dobrynin promised to convey back to Moscow both the invitation for Gromyko to visit Washington in late September and your proposed time frame for a meeting with Gorbachev. On the question of venue, he stated that Gorbachev wanted you to visit Moscow because he thought it would be good for you "to look around" and see the Soviet people and society. I reminded Dobrynin that you would be prepared to visit, but that it was the turn of a Soviet leader to come to the U.S. I noted that in any joint announcement of a Washington meeting, we would willing to add that the next meeting would be in Moscow.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 Soviet Union May. Secret; Sensitive. A typed note in the top margin reads: "5/25 Orig +1 via Special Courier 1310 p.m. per S/S." Under a June 1 covering memorandum, McFarlane forwarded the memorandum to Reagan. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron June 1985 (1/4))

² See footnote 3, Document 30.

Dobrynin said that he would report this to Gorbachev, but mused whether our interest in a Washington venue was solely a matter of protocol. I told him it was. We both agreed that if such a meeting were to take place, it would best if it could accomplish something tangible. Dobrynin added that from his own experience, once agreement on a Summit was reached, the respective bureaucracies “begin to move” to produce progress.

I concluded by reminding Dobrynin of the need for the Soviets to take special care in the weeks and months to come not to take any unfortunate action, deliberate or otherwise, which might have the effect of derailing this process. (I took this moment to pass to Dobrynin a non-paper noting our strong concerns over the plight of Soviet hunger-striker Balovlenkov).³ I also stated that, while the other NATO Foreign Ministers might not decide until the Lisbon NAC, it was likely I would be going to the Helsinki commemoration in late July where I meet with Gromyko again. I suggested that the two sides should soon begin work on an agenda for that meeting.

³ The non-paper was not found. In telegram 6822 from Moscow, May 23, the Embassy reported that Yuri Balovlenkov, “who is married to an American citizen, for six years has sought permission to emigrate from the Soviet Union to the United States in order to be reunited with his wife and two children.” It continues: “On March 25 Balovlenkov began a hunger strike in support of his demand to be permitted to join his family in the United States.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850365–0050)

36. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, May 29, 1985

SUBJECT

Shultz Conversation with Dobrynin on Meeting between the President and Gorbachev

Secretary Shultz has sent a Memorandum to the President reporting a conversation with Dobrynin May 24,² when Shultz provided a reply to the suggestion Gromyko made in Vienna regarding the time and locale of a summit meeting. Shultz suggested the week of November 18, and pressed for a meeting here, to be followed by a visit to the USSR by the President.

This puts the ball back into the Soviet court regarding time and place, and it will be appropriate to await an answer before doing anything further. However, *I detect a distinct difference in tone between what Gromyko told Shultz in Vienna and what seems to be emanating from Gorbachev more directly.*³ In sum, I believe Gorbachev is in fact interested in coming to the United States, while Gromyko is discouraging it and pushing for a third country. This is speculation on my part, but it is speculation based on a number of clues. Since these clues have a relevance not only to arrangements for a summit meeting, but also for dealing with Gorbachev on substantive issues, I will review some of them.

Evidence of Gromyko-Gorbachev Differences

1. The curious way Gromyko introduced the question in Vienna. According to our interpreter, Gromyko said literally the following: "Please tell the President that *in my informal personal opinion* the General Secretary is thinking along the lines of November, most likely the second half. As for the place, the General Secretary will not be attending the UNGA and thus the meeting could be held in the Soviet Union. This invitation stands, and if the President wishes, we would be prepared to host him in the Soviet Union. If for some reason that did not suit

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron June 1985 (1/4). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. McFarlane wrote in the top margin: "I agree."

² See Document 35.

³ See Documents 28 and 29.

him, the meeting could be held in some mutually acceptable European country.”

The question arises: Why, if Gromyko was passing a message, did he say it was *his* “informal, personal opinion”? Gromyko is careful with his words, and it seems to me the implication is clear that what he was saying is not necessarily identical with Gorbachev’s personal view.

2. The earlier intelligence reports that Gorbachev was seeking various invitations in the U.S. [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. I have checked these out with the Agency in detail and they are convinced that the reporting of the messages was accurate. The reports indicate not only that Gorbachev is definitely thinking of coming to the United States (in contrast to Gromyko’s comment that a visit to Washington is “out of the question”), but also that he has not necessarily kept Gromyko fully informed and indeed prefers to resolve the question without using Gromyko.

3. Protocollary slights to the Foreign Ministry: Except for Sukhodrev, the interpreter, no Foreign Ministry officials were present for Gorbachev’s meeting with Baldrige, and none for his earlier meeting with Andreas.⁴ Also, Gorbachev made a point of telling Baldrige that, as regards a summit meeting, Baldrige could say to the press that Gorbachev and the President agree that one would be useful, and that “arrangements will be made between the President and the General Secretary.” I was struck by his implication that this is a matter between the two personally, and not necessarily one to be settled through diplomatic channels.

4. Anomalies in Soviet comment on the issue: *Somebody* authorized *Pravda* editor Afanasiev to tell foreign correspondents that Gorbachev was thinking of coming to the U.N. in September.⁵ That almost had to be Gorbachev or someone close to him, since *Pravda* is the organ of the Party Central Committee. Gromyko and Dobrynin have denied that this statement was authorized. What this seems to mean is that Gromyko thinks it should not have been authorized.

5. Some evidence of Gromyko-Gorbachev political rivalry: Actually, what we have is more gossip and inference than real evidence, but many Soviet intellectuals and some East European officials are convinced that Gromyko opposed Gorbachev’s accession to power, and therefore assume that Gorbachev will move against Gromyko when

⁴ See Document 32. Dwayne Andreas, the U.S. Co-Chairman of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council (USTEC), met with Gorbachev on December 3, 1984, prior to Gorbachev’s appointment as General Secretary. (Telegram 15339 from Moscow, December 4, 1984; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840774–0127)

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 24.

and if he has sufficient power to do so. Even if this is not the case, it would be natural for the General Secretary to try to assume direct control of foreign policy, which would require, at a minimum, some denigration of Gromyko's predominant role.

Conclusions:

1. If the Soviets fail to accept our suggestion regarding a meeting here, we should not rush to think about a site in a third country, but attempt to get a message to Gorbachev directly [*less than 1 line not declassified*], in an attempt to arrange the meeting here.

2. We should bear in mind the growing evidence of tension between Gromyko and Gorbachev, and not rely entirely on the Foreign Minister for an accurate portrayal of Gorbachev's positions.

3. Some means of communicating directly with Gorbachev would be in our interest, not only as regards summit questions, but also on substantive issues.

Recommendation:

That you send the memorandum at TAB I to the President, if he has not already seen Secretary Shultz's report.⁶

⁶ Attached but not printed at Tab I is a June 1 memorandum from McFarlane to Reagan, to which Shultz's May 25 memorandum to Reagan is attached as Tab A. McFarlane approved the recommendation.

37. **Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to Secretary of State Shultz¹**

Washington, May 29, 1985

SUBJECT

Some Observations On the Current Soviet Scene

I pass along as of possible interest some brief rough reflections on three days of conversations in Moscow with Soviets, Americans, and foreign diplomats.

—Gorbachev has created an obvious stir in the Soviet Union. People are impressed with his leadership and particularly his style of direct, highly personal communication. Since he is new the Soviet people probably remain skeptical that he can produce; they have heard many of his words before. They are, nevertheless, expectant and relieved that a real human being seems finally in charge. Gorbachev still doesn't have the respect as well as fear that Andropov generated, but that could be a function of time. Curiously, almost every Soviet I talked with said his open style reminded them of Lenin.

—The First Secretary Gorbachev may be, but he is not yet truly preeminent and there is a sense that his leadership still remains to be consolidated. Most expect it to take place, but it hasn't happened yet.

—The economy is foremost in Gorbachev's approach. This means dealing with what the Soviets see as the three evils of the system—bribery, drunkenness, and loss of morale. I have no sense, however, from anyone except Americans that the Soviets think they have a crisis or that it requires fundamental change in the Soviet economy à la China or even Hungary. Gorbachev evidently believes he can move economic growth from two to three percent to three to four percent simply through greater productivity, reducing vast Soviet inefficiencies and abundant labor waste. This, it is said, can be accomplished by managerial reforms and greater discipline. At some point in his emphasis on discipline, Gorbachev sounds like Stalin, but there is no indication yet that this message is not going down well. This strictly reformist approach, of course, does not deal with the technological and societal problems of the long term, but it could buy time. Gorbachev does not

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, May 1985. Confidential. Not for the System. Drafted by Abramowitz on May 28. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley wrote in the top margin: "See the Secretary's request p. 3."

appear deeply stricken with any notion of the inferiority of the Soviet economic system. He clearly recognizes the Soviets are behind in technology but it does not seem to faze him.

—SDI is on everybody's lips. Troubled though the Soviets are about SDI and its defense implications, I find few observers who believe that the Soviets are not prepared to compete militarily or to mobilize the necessary resources. They did so in the '30s in the case of mechanized warfare and in the '50s and '60s in strategic missiles. The Soviets clearly are worried about the arms race, but much of the concern arises from its economic impact. They also believe that the US economic activity will soon turn downward.

—Whether tactical or not, the Soviets do not appear in any hurry to talk turkey to us nor are most of them obsessed with competition with the US, as many in Washington think. This, of course, is an impression they would want to convey.

—Gorbachev has said nothing new either domestically or in foreign policy, particularly toward the West. All his present economic proposals have been heard before and in foreign policy statements and conversations he keeps reverting to old chestnuts like the Asian collective security concept. Gorbachev has not shown himself an innovator and until he does I will be skeptical that this posture is the result of his still unconsolidated leadership or waiting for the Party Congress. None of this is inconsistent with an activist diplomatic posture, with a major public relations component, toward the US and Western Europe.

—In foreign policy the focus is much less on developing countries than on improving the Soviet position essentially around their periphery—North Korea, China, India, Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, and Eastern Europe. Eastern Europe clearly remains their biggest headache, one which they recognize is worsened by Soviet economic stagnation.

In short, while the Soviets are greatly concerned and clearly surprised with American developments since the advent of the Reagan Administration, they are presently more focused on getting greater economic growth and without generating too much second thinking about the system.

On the question of Soviets working in our Embassy I have gotten something of a different perspective which I will pass on at another time if you are interested.²

² Shultz wrote in the margin: "Pls do so. G." A typed note indicates that the marginalia was written May 30.

38. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 29, 1985, 9:40–10:53 a.m.

SUBJECT

Continuation of Secretary Baldrige's Report on His Trip to China, India and the Soviet Union (U)

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Secretary Malcolm Baldrige
Donald T. Regan, Chief of Staff
Admiral John Poindexter, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lionel Olmer, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade
Ambassador Jack Matlock, NSC Staff
Roger Robinson, NSC Staff

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

Secretary Baldrige turned to the human rights situation in the Soviet Union and observed that he sensed in his meeting with Gorbachev that Soviet insecurity about being treated as equals is a theme which seemed to run through the General Secretary's remarks. He then turned to Lionel Olmer for additional comments in this area. *Mr. Olmer* told the President that the refusniks in the Soviet Union had an overwhelming admiration and respect for him and that the President is viewed as being the difference between utter despair and hope. He added that the refusniks view the next 12 months as crucial and that they see a clear connection between trade and human rights. *Mr. Olmer* commented that the refusniks are not talking about the trade which affects our national security. He said that they believe that in the past there have been too few carrots in our trade relations and too many sticks. In other words, that the current pressure on the refusniks could be eased with a commensurate easing up of our trade policy toward the Soviet Union. (C)

The President stated that he still believes that quiet diplomacy is the best approach—similar to the way in which the U.S. achieved the release of the Pentecostals from the basement of our Embassy in

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron May 1985 (5/5). Confidential. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. No drafting information appears on the memorandum of conversation. Robinson sent it to McFarlane under a May 30 memorandum, recommending McFarlane approve it.

Moscow.² He commented that it puts the Soviets in the corner by talking about our human rights objectives publicly. The President indicated that if we do not mention our specific human rights objectives publicly we can help them (refusniks) because of the greater flexibility of our system. (C)

Secretary Baldrige proposed considering a 3–4 month hiatus period on the emigration issue where we would “put away the two by four and see what happens.”

The President stated that there was no question about the Soviet inferiority complex which he said is also hurting us in Geneva. He continued that the Soviets rely totally on their military, and it is only the military which makes them a superpower. The President then went through a hypothetical discussion to illustrate his point on human rights along the following lines: we want to increase our trade with the USSR, but we are under pressure from our people to increase emigration; increased emigration would help us be more forthcoming on things the Soviets want; we are not talking about interfering in their internal affairs but rather showing how their internal provisions are merely constraining our ability to be more helpful. (C)

Secretary Baldrige then turned to Jack Matlock (NSC) and asked if he had any further comments on human rights. *Ambassador Matlock* stated that he believes there may be merit in examining the idea of conveying to the Soviets unofficially what sort of U.S. reaction could be expected from specific Soviet steps in the human rights area. For example, if emigration increased to, say 10,000, we might give more encouragement to currently licensable exports of equipment for energy exploration and production. With 25,000, we could take further steps, and so on. *Chief of Staff Regan* stated that we have to be very careful with such an approach. (C)

The President stated that is what we did in the mountain retreat with Dobrynin on human rights. He stated he conveyed to Dobrynin that we could not live for four years with those people in the basement (Pentecostalists) and all of a sudden one day it was resolved. When we lifted the grain embargo (n.b. probably meant renewed the long-term grain agreement),³ it was portrayed as something we wanted to do anyway. (C)

² Documentation on this is in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, and vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 12, 34, 46, and 74.

³ A renewal of the Long-Term Grain Agreement with the Soviet Union was signed on August 25, 1983. See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 76.

As the meeting concluded, *Secretary Baldrige* told the President that he wanted to take a look at some of our technology controls, particularly in cases where three or four countries are providing the same technology that we are controlling. He restated he thought we should look at this issue inside of the Administration. *The President* responded that he thought so too. (C)

39. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, June 3, 1985

SUBJECT

Briefing Papers on Soviet Union for President

In response to your profs note, I am attaching at TAB I a suggested list of topics on which briefing papers might usefully be submitted to the President.² I believe that this exercise can be most useful in dealing with broad and fundamental factors, and should not be used as a surrogate for specific briefings on issues requiring decisions. I would anticipate papers about 4–6 pages long, which would avoid voluminous

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron June 1985 (1/4). Secret. Sent for action. A copy was sent to Fortier.

² Tab I, listing 24 potential paper topics, is attached but not printed. In a May 28 electronic message to Matlock, McFarlane wrote: "We may be heading for a summit and we may not. Under any circumstances, however, it will be important for the President to develop a much more thorough knowledge of the Soviet Union, their history, culture, bureaucratic process, Gorbachev, the man and the survivor as leader, their negotiating style etc. I would like to initiate the practice of sending the President about one paper each week as pure background on the top 25 dimensions which bear on the relationship. Could I ask you to think about this Jack and to rough out an outline of the several topics which it would be useful to treat and in what order. Then let's get busy with the first paper to be submitted no later than next week. Many thanks." (Ibid.)

data but aim at illuminating the underlying issues and principles.³ I also believe that the suggested list should not be considered sacrosanct, but rather as a suggestive outline, subject to alteration as we go along. We may find that the President wishes further discussion of some topics, and that some can be combined into a single paper.⁴

In addition to this exercise, I would also suggest that you schedule an occasional discussion (maybe as often as once a month) to give the President a chance to discuss some of these issues. At some point a meeting with some emigres might be useful, and there are also U.S. scholars, and USG specialists who can deal perceptively with some of these topics. In regard to Gorbachev's personal style, having observed him for over two hours with Baldrige, I believe I could "role play" his mannerisms and mode of presentation, if this would be useful at some point.

I will also pursue the idea of having the Agency work on one or more video tapes. They have done one on ideology in Soviet society, but it is very poor and needs considerable work before it would be appropriate to show to the President. There may be one or two additional topics amenable to video presentation.

If and when a date is set for a meeting, the schedule can be adjusted to allow the final 2–3 weeks to concentrate on the specific issues relevant to the meeting.

³ In his memoir, in a section entitled "Education of a President," Matlock wrote: "Even before it was decided when and where Reagan and Gorbachev would meet, Bud McFarlane asked me to think about how we could see that the president had more and better knowledge of the Soviet Union before he faced the Soviet leader. Dealing as he did with Reagan every day, he was struck by the president's spotty command of historical facts. Reagan had had very few contacts with Soviet officials and still tended to base many of his judgments more on generalities, even slogans, than on a nuanced understanding of Soviet reality. To his credit, the president was acutely aware that there were serious gaps in his knowledge of our adversary, and always welcomed thoughtful discussions and well-written articles that provided insights into the country and its people. I suggested a series of papers for the president to read and then discuss. Together they would cover the ground of a college textbook on the Soviet Union, but with particular emphasis on the Soviet leaders and the way they thought. These briefing papers would be supplemented by periodic meetings with specialists from inside and outside the government, with some recommended books and films, and with video presentations of appropriate topics—such as, for example, Gorbachev as a public leader." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, pp. 132–133)

⁴ In his memoir, Matlock wrote: "We began work in early June on what came to be called 'Soviet Union 101,' as if it were a college course. I suggested twenty-four individual papers, most eight to ten single-spaced pages long, organized to give a rounded picture of the country and its people. The first section, entitled 'Sources of Soviet Behavior,' included three papers covering topics such as psychology, the Soviet view of the country's place in the world, and whether the Soviet Union was Russian or Communist (I said it was both). The second segment included nine papers on 'The Soviet Union from the Inside,' and others went on to cover foreign policy, national security, and U.S.-Soviet relations in Soviet eyes. Finally, two papers assessed Gorbachev the man and his aims for his meeting with Reagan." (Ibid., p. 133)

Recommendations:

1. That you approve the outline at TAB I as a general guide for the papers to be produced.
2. That you authorize me to ask Gates and Abramowitz to supply research material relevant to these topics.⁵ (I will attempt to do most of the final drafting myself.)⁶

⁵ As Matlock subsequently wrote: "I called my friends Morton Abramowitz, director of the Bureau of Intelligence Research in the State Department, and Robert Gates, deputy director of the CIA, and asked each to assign his most knowledgeable analyst to write a paper on each of the topics I listed. These were to be sent to me, with no more than minor stylistic editing, with the name of the author. I reserved the right to select the paper I considered best, or to combine elements of both drafts, but any product sent to the president would bear the name of the author and not be the responsibility of the agencies where the analysts worked. In effect, I asked them to show which agency had the best specialist on the topic in question and promised to give credit to that individual for his or her work." (Ibid., pp. 133–134)

⁶ McFarlane did not indicate his approval or disapproval of either of the recommendations. See Document 60.

40. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, June 12, 1985

Mr. Secretary:

Don Kendall debriefed me on his meeting with Dobrynin last night:²

—Dobrynin was critical of the Soviet failure to publish important statements by Gorbachev. For example, Dobrynin claims Gorbachev recently made a statement in Leningrad advocating private ownership of agricultural land, private ownership of homes, etc. None of this was reported in Soviet media.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 Soviet Union June. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Whitehead, Armacost, and Nitze. On June 14, Kenneth Dam, who had served as Shultz's deputy since October 1982, left the Department of State for a job at IBM. Dam was replaced by John Whitehead.

² Donald Kendall was the co-founder and former Chief Executive Officer of PepsiCo, Inc.

—According to Dobrynin, Gorbachev cannot come to the United States for a summit meeting. He is in the process of consolidating his hold on power, and must for now deal with the old guard. Statements by the President, Cap, and Perle feed the negative predispositions of the old guard, who take the line that it is impossible to do business with the United States. Dobrynin says such U.S. statements have a devastating impact.

—According to Dobrynin, Gorbachev will in time make sweeping changes in the Soviet system, including sweeping personnel changes next February. For now, however, he must deal with the old guard, cannot appear weak, and coming to the U.S. would do just that. Dobrynin says Gorbachev wants to start improving relations with the United States, but cannot do so now because he is being held back by the hard liners.

—Gorbachev wants very much a meeting with the President, and would like to invite the President to the Soviet Union, which would strengthen Gorbachev's position. Alternatively, a meeting could be held on middle ground.

—Dobrynin claims he has no relationship with anyone in this Administration. George Shultz and Gromyko have a good working relationship, but no progress is being made on any issue. Dobrynin does not expect any progress to be made before a Gorbachev/Reagan meeting.

Don asked that this debrief be held to senior officials of the Department.

Kenneth W. Dam³

³ Dam initialed "KWD" above his typed signature.

41. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 12, 1985

SUBJECT

Dobrynin Delivers a Letter to You from Gorbachev

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin came at his request last night to deliver General Secretary Gorbachev's response to your April 30 letter. He noted that your letter of June 9 had not been received in Moscow at the time this was dispatched and therefore Gorbachev does not refer to the Interim Restraint issue.² We will be providing you with an analysis of the letter, but at first glance it does not contain anything particularly new.³

There is a brief mention at the end of the letter of the question of a summit. It appears that the week of November 18 is probably acceptable although Gorbachev did not respond directly on timing. Dobrynin said it was his assumption that there would be no problem with this period since Gromyko had discussed the "second half of November" in Vienna. But the idea of a Washington meeting and a later meeting in Moscow is specifically not accepted. In his letter, Gorbachev says: "As to the place for holding [a summit], I understand that there are motives which make you prefer the meeting to be held in the U.S. But I have no less weighty motives which, taking into account the present state of Soviet-American relations, makes this variant unrealistic." Thus a European site is now on the table, and it is up to us to say whether this is agreeable. I think they have a clear idea by now that Helsinki and Vienna are not acceptable to us. We will need to discuss how to respond.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 Soviet Union June. Secret; Sensitive. Brackets are in the original. Kelly sent Shultz the memorandum under an undated action memorandum, recommending that he send it to Reagan. Jonathan Benton (S/S-S) noted on the action memorandum: "GPS gave Sec—Pres to Bud McFarlane 6/12/85—JSB." Reagan initialed the copy of the memorandum from Shultz. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) June 1985 (2/2))

² For the April 30 letter, see Document 23. In telegram 176092 to Moscow, June 10, the Department transmitted a June 9 "Letter from the President to Gorbachev on Interim Restraint;" however, no text of the telegram was found. The same day, the President approved NSDD 173, "Building an Interim Framework for Mutual Restraint," sent a report to Congress on "Soviet and United States Compliance with Arms Control Agreements," and issued a public statement declaring that the United States would seek to "establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book I, pp. 743–745) The NSDD is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988.

³ See Document 42.

In talking about a summit, Dobrynin noted that we had four or five bilateral issues on which agreements could be ready to sign in November. He commented that the Geneva negotiations would obviously be the major summit topic, said we were now deadlocked, but offered no ideas on how to achieve a breakthrough in these areas.

Turning to other topics, I expressed my astonishment to Dobrynin at the TASS statement about your decisions on Interim Restraint.⁴ I quoted some of the statement's worst distortions and said it was almost as if TASS had produced it in advance of your letter. Noting that we have serious concerns about compliance matters, I urged that they get on with meeting these concerns and take a more reasonable approach in Geneva. Dobrynin tried to defend their position by saying that it looks to them as if we are saying that they must stop violations (which he said they are not committing) and change positions in Geneva to focus only on reductions and ignore space weapons. Otherwise, they will face a list of problems in November from Weinberger, and the US will again change its approach toward SALT. ("You are putting us on probation and setting yourself up as the Judge.") He also said he felt people in Moscow would take offense that your letter to Gorbachev on Interim Restraint did not mention space once, in contravention of the January agreement.

I also raised with Dobrynin a number of serious current human rights cases—an American's husband on a hunger strike in Moscow, a recently-convicted Hebrew teacher and one whose trial is coming up, and uncertainties over the current situation of the Sakharovs. Referring to Gorbachev's letter, Dobrynin said we should stop interfering in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. He did say he had sent a cable to Moscow on the hunger striker in response to my earlier demarche.⁵

A copy of the embassy's English translation of Gorbachev's letter is attached.

⁴ In telegram 7868 from Moscow, June 12, the Embassy reported on the statement: "The Soviet Union will not allow the United States to determine which arms control obligations should be observed and which ignored, according to a formal TASS statement issued June 11 in response to the President's Interim Restraint policy. TASS portrays the U.S. decision as merely the continuation of a policy aimed at destroying the framework of arms limitations. TASS makes no apologies for the Soviet record of compliance with existing agreements, but no commitment to honor them in the future." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850414–0072) The June 11 TASS statement is printed in *Documents on Disarmament*, 1985, pp. 352–354.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 35.

Attachment**Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan⁶**

Moscow, June 10, 1985

Dear Mr. President,

I noted the intention expressed in your letter of April 30 to share thoughts in our correspondence with complete frankness. This is also my attitude. Only in this manner can we bring to each other the essence of our respective approaches to the problems of world politics and bilateral relations. Saying this I proceed from the assumption that in exchanging views we shall look to the need to move forward on the key matters, otherwise one cannot count on a turn for the better in Soviet-American relations. I understand that you agree, too, that such a turn for the better is required.

To aim at a lesser goal, say, at simply containing tensions within certain bounds and trying to make it somehow from one crisis to another—is not, in my opinion, a prospect worthy of our two powers.

We paid attention to the fact that you share the view regarding the need to give an impetus to the process of normalizing our relations. It is not insignificant of itself. But to be candid: a number of points in your letter perplex and puzzle, and those are the points on which a special stress is made.

What I mean is the generalizations about the Soviet policy, contained in your letter, in connection with the deplorable incident with an American serviceman. As to the incident itself, we would like to hope that the explanations which were given by us were correctly understood by the American side.⁷

Now turning to major problems. I also believe that agreement with regard to general principles alone is not sufficient. It is important that such agreement were also reflected in the practical actions of each side. I emphasize, precisely, each side, since it clearly follows from your letter that you see disparities between the principles and practice in the actions of the Soviet Union.

It is very far from reality. There is nothing corresponding to the facts in the assertion that the USSR in its policy allegedly does not wish to conduct affairs with the U.S. on the basis of equality and

⁶ No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy.

⁷ See Documents 12 and 22.

reciprocity. No matter what area of our relations is taken, it transpires from a really objective assessment that it is precisely the Soviet Union that comes out consistently for equality and reciprocity, does not seek advantages for itself at the expense of the legitimate interests of the U.S. And it was exactly when a similar approach was taken by the American side, too, that substantial agreements could be achieved.

It is not an accident that all agreements reached on the subject of arms limitation became possible only because the sides adhered in working them out to the principle of equality and equal security. At no point in time did the Soviet side demand more for itself. But as soon as the U.S. departed from that principle, the process of the arms limitation and reduction was ruptured. Regrettably this remains to be the case at present, too.

If, nevertheless, the question of equality and reciprocity is to be raised as a matter of principle, then it is the Soviet Union that is surrounded by American military bases stuffed also by nuclear weapons, rather than the U.S.—by Soviet bases. Try to look at the situation through our eyes, then it will become clear, who can have a real, substantiated concern.

Take then practically any issue from the sphere of our bilateral relations, whether trade, or, for example, air or sea communication. Is it that the actual state of affairs in those cases determined by the Soviet Union being against equality and reciprocity? Quite the contrary: the low level of those relations is a direct consequence of the American side's policy compatible neither with conducting affairs as equals, nor with reciprocity in the generally recognized meanings of these notions.

Or take the following aspect of the question with respect to principles and adherence to them. With regard to third countries, we impose neither our ideology, nor our social system on anybody. And do not ascribe to us what does not exist. If the question is to be raised without diplomatic contrivances as to who contributes to the international law and order and who acts in a different direction, then it appears that it is precisely the U.S. that turns out to be on the side of the groupings working against legitimate governments. And what about direct pressure on the governments whose policy does not suit the U.S.? There are enough examples of both on various continents.

I addressed these issues frankly and in a rather detailed manner not to embark upon the road of mutual recriminations, but, rather, in the hope that it will help you to understand correctly our approach to principles and their practical implementation, to appreciate our willingness to build our relations with the U.S. on the basis of equality and reciprocity in a positive and similar perception of these notions.

I think a lot about the shape the affairs between our countries can take. And I ever more firmly believe in a point I made in my previous

letter: an improvement in the relations between the USSR and U.S. is possible. There is objective ground for that.

Of course, our countries are different. This fact cannot be changed. There is also another fact, however: when the leaders of both countries, as the experience of the past shows, found in themselves enough wisdom and realism to overcome bias caused by the difference in social systems, in ideologies, we cooperated successfully, did quite a few useful things both for our peoples and for all other peoples. Of course, differences and different views remained, but it was our interaction that was the determining factor. And it opened up confident, peaceful vistas.

I took note of the fact that you also express yourself in favor of each social system proving its advantages in peaceful competition. Yes, we proceed from the assumption that in this competition the USSR and U.S. will defend their ideals and moral values as each of our societies understands them. But it will result in nothing good, if the ideological struggle should be carried over into the sphere of relations between states. I believe, you understand, what I mean.

The main conclusion that naturally follows from the mutual recognition of the need for peaceful competition is that the attempts should be renounced to substitute the dispute of weapons for the dispute of ideas. One can hardly count on serious shifts in the nature of our relations so long as one side will try to gain advantages over the other on the path of the arms race, to talk with the other side from the "position of strength".

Mr. President, for understandable reasons the political leadership of both our countries must have a competent judgement regarding the existing and prospective weapon systems. It is extremely important to avoid miscalculations whose irreversible consequences will manifest themselves, if not today, then after some time.

In the past, a rigid, but at the same time quite fragile relationship was established between the strategic nuclear weapons and anti-ballistic missile systems. The only correct conclusion was made—the Treaty of indefinite duration to limit ABM systems was concluded. It is only due to that that it became possible at all to tackle as a practical matter the problem of the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons.

The attempts to develop a large-scale ABM system inevitably set in train a radical destabilization of the situation. Even the factor of uncertainty as such will not only prevent any limitation of nuclear weapons, but will, instead, lead to their build-up and improvement. Therefore, when we resolutely raise the question and state that the militarization of space is impermissible, it is not propaganda and not a consequence of some misunderstanding or fear of "falling behind technologically". It is a result of a thorough analysis, of our deep

concern about the future of relations between our countries, the future of peace.

There is also another aspect of the program of “strategic defense,” which remains as if in a shadow for the broad public. But not for responsible leaders and military experts. They talk in Washington about the development of a large-scale ABM system, but in fact a new strategic offensive weapon is being developed to be deployed in space. And it is a weapon no less dangerous by its capabilities than nuclear weapons. What difference does it make, what will be used in a first disarming strike—ballistic missiles or lasers. If there is a difference, it is that it will be possible to carry out the first strike by the new systems practically instantly.

So, from any point of view, already the very beginning of the work to implement this program is destabilizing, regardless even of its final results. And it is precisely for this reason that it cannot fail to serve as an impetus to a further upswing of the arms race.

I think you will agree that in matters affecting the heart of national security, neither side can or will rely on assurances of good intentions. Any weapon system is evaluated by its capabilities, but not by public statements regarding its mission.

All facts unambiguously indicate that the U.S. embarks upon the path of developing attack space weapons capable of performing purely offensive missions. And we shall not ignore that. I must say this frankly. I ought to confess that what you have said about the approach of the U.S. to the question of the moratorium on space and nuclear weapons, enhances our concern. The persistent refusal of the American side to stop the arms race cannot but put in question the intentions of the U.S.

And what is going on at the negotiations in Geneva? The American side is trying to substitute only a part of the agreed mandate for the negotiations for the whole of it. An integral element is being removed from the really agreed formula for the negotiations—the obligation to prevent an arms race in space, to consider and resolve all issues in their interrelationship. The American side has so far done nothing to bring agreement closer. On the subject of preventing an arms race in space the U.S. delegation did not present a single consideration at all. I emphasize, not a single one. What for should after that one be surprised: why, indeed, there is no movement on the nuclear arms reduction?

I wish to mention, in passing, that the American representatives maintain—this point is also contained in your letter—that it is impossible to verify prohibition on scientific research. However, a different thing is involved: a federal program of research activities directly and specifically oriented towards the development of attack space weapons, a large-scale ABM system with space-based components. The very announcement of such a program is in clear contradiction with the

ABM Treaty. (Incidentally, if one is to take the entire text of the “agreed statement” to the ABM Treaty, and not only its part which is quoted in your letter, it is easy to see that it is aimed not at weakening, but at strengthening the central provision of the treaty—dealing with the sides’ renunciation of the development of large-scale ABM systems).

As to the assertions that the USSR is allegedly engaged in its own “large research program in the area of strategic defense”, here, as Americans put it, apples are confused with oranges. The Soviet Union does nothing that would contravene the ABM Treaty, does not develop attack space weapons.

Thus, the question of verification is in this case a far-fetched question, if one is clearly to proceed from the premise that nothing can be done—no matter what names one can come up with for it—that is unambiguously prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

Mr. President, I would like to hope that you will have another close look at the problem of non-militarization of space, at its interrelationship with solving the problem of nuclear weapons, and from that angle—at the prospects for the Geneva negotiations. It is in this objective linkage that there lies a resolution of the problems of the limitation of nuclear arms, a real possibility to get down to their radical reduction and thereby to proceed to the liquidation of nuclear weapons as such. We shall not be able to avoid anyway having precisely the complex of these issues as a determining factor both for our relations and for the situation in the world as a whole. This follows from the special responsibility of our two countries.

I am convinced that we must and can be up to this responsibility. In this connection I note with satisfaction your words to the effect that our two countries have a common interest prevailing over other things—to avoid war. I fully agree with that.

Now, with regard to what other steps could be taken, among other things, to stimulate progress in Geneva. We are convinced that of very important—and practical—significance would be the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. In this area a lot can be done by our two countries. Specifically, we propose the following practical steps. Putting into effect the up till now unratified Soviet-American treaties of 1974 and 1976. Coming to terms on the resumption of trilateral—with the participation of Britain—negotiations on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and, acting vigorously, working towards their speedy and successful conclusion. Finally, we propose that the USSR and U.S. interact in carrying out such a specific and very substantial step on the part of all nuclear powers as a moratorium on any nuclear explosions would be. We are in favor of introducing such a moratorium as soon as possible.

The problem of prohibiting chemical weapons needs to be resolved. But its resolution should be sought realistically. I must say that the

positions which the U.S. has so far had on a number of important aspects of this problem, do not meet this criterion. We would like the American side to pay attention to the proposals we have put forward. We agree that bilateral consultations between our representatives would be useful, for example, within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. It should be recognized, however, that the efforts which are being made in the U.S. for the chemical rearmament, above all, as concerns binary weapons, are not a favorable prerequisite at all for removing chemical weapons completely and forever from the military arsenals of states.

The state of things at the Stockholm Conference leaves one with an ambiguous impression. On the one hand, it would seem that there is common understanding regarding the need for an agreement on the basis of an optimum combination of major political obligations and military-technical confidence-building measures. On the other hand, the Western representatives, the American representatives first of all, clearly do not hasten to fill this understanding with specific mutually acceptable—I emphasize, mutually acceptable—content. We are for having a substantial understanding, really helping to enhance confidence. Such are the instructions of our representatives. They are prepared to listen to constructive considerations which the American delegation may have. To put it briefly, we are for working towards a successful conclusion of the conference.

I would like, Mr. President, to draw your attention to the negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Sometimes we hear from the American representatives that our proposals made last February “stimulate interest”.⁸ But it does not show at all at the negotiations themselves. It would seem that reaching agreement on initial reductions of the Soviet and American forces in that area would be in your and in our interests in the interests of a military relaxation in Europe. Could you look into it to see whether you might find it possible to advance things in this area?

One of the sources of tension in the relations between the USSR and U.S. is a difference in the assessment of what is going on in the world. It seems that the American side frequently ignores the in-depth causes of events and does not take fully into account the fact that today a great number of states operate—and most actively, too—in world politics, each with its own face and interests. All this immeasurably complicates the general picture. A correct understanding of this would help avoid serious mistakes and miscalculations.

⁸ The proposal was summarized by a Soviet spokesman in a February 14 news conference statement. See *Documents on Disarmament*, 1985, pp. 81–82.

In the past we used to have a positive experience of interaction in lowering tensions in some areas, in preventing dangerous outbreaks. But it worked this way when the readiness was shown to take into account the legitimate interests of each other and the positions of all the sides involved in a certain situation.

We positively assess the agreement of the American side to have exchanges of views on some regional problems. We expect it to accept our proposal that a wider range of regional problems be the subject of such exchanges and that those exchanges look to seeking specific ways of settling tense situations. In this connection I took note of the readiness, expressed in your letter, to work together with the Soviet Union, so that the situation around Afghanistan would be moving toward a peaceful settlement. I would like to have a more clear understanding of how the American side is seeing it. Such an opportunity is provided by the upcoming consultations of our experts.

However, our opinions in this matter as well will be based upon practical deeds of the U.S. From the point of view of achieving a political settlement, and not only from that point of view, we cannot accept what you say in your letter with respect to Pakistan. We perceive the behavior of that country not only as not corresponding to the goal of a political settlement around Afghanistan, but also as dangerous and provocative. We expect that the U.S., being closely linked with Pakistan and also taking into account its own interests, will exert restraining influence on it. The curtailing of its direct support to antigovernment armed formations intruding into Afghanistan from Pakistan, would be a positive signal from the American side. In other words, the U.S. has the possibilities to confirm by actions its declared readiness to achieve a political settlement around Afghanistan on the basis of a just solution of the questions connected with it and to eliminate tensions in this region as a whole. Such a mode of action will not be left unnoticed by our side and would clearly work toward straightening out Soviet-American relations.

Some kind of movement seems to be discernable in the area of strictly bilateral relations between our countries. You, evidently, have noticed that we support this trend. However, there should be no misunderstanding concerning the fact that we do not intend and will not conduct any negotiations relating to human rights in the Soviet Union. We, as any other sovereign state, regard and will regard these questions in accordance with our existing laws and regulations. Let us, Mr. President, proceed from this in order not to aggravate additionally our relations. The development of our ties can be based only on mutual interest, equality and mutual benefit, respect for the rights and legitimate interests of each other.

We consider as positive the fact, that in some instances the once diversified structure of Soviet-American relations starts—although not

very intensively, to put it outright—to be restored and to be filled with content. In particular, we consider useful the talks between our ministers of trade which took place in Moscow recently. We intend to look for mutually acceptable solutions in other areas as well, which constitute the subject of discussion between us, and to expand the range of such areas.

It is encouraging, that contacts, including those between parliaments of our two countries, have become more active recently. As I have already said to the representatives of the U.S. Congress, we live in a time, when people shaping the policy of the USSR and the U.S., must necessarily meet, have contacts with each other. To speak in broad terms, we stand for building vigorously a bridge to mutual understanding and cooperation and for developing trust.

In conclusion, I would like to confirm my positive attitude to a personal meeting with you. I understand that you feel the same way. Our point of view on this matter was outlined by Andrey A. Gromyko to Mr. Schultz during their stay recently in Vienna. As to the place for holding it, I understand that there are motives, which make you prefer the meeting to be held in the U.S. But I have no less weighty motives due to which, taking into account the present state of Soviet-American relations, this variant is unrealistic.

Important international problems are involved and we should use the time to search for possible agreements which could be readied for the meeting. For our part, we are entirely for this.

Sincerely,

M. Gorbachev

42. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 15, 1985

SUBJECT

Analysis of Gorbachev's June 10 Letter: Familiar, Except for Afghanistan

We have now taken a closer look at Gorbachev's latest letter to you. A second look confirms that there is very little new substance.²

As in his face-to-face encounters, Gorbachev avoids harshness or excessive polemics in the letter, and he tries to respond directly to some of the issues you raised in your April 30 letter to him.³ I noted his response to your summit invitation in my initial report. He also addresses your long, stiff opening statement on Nicholson, calling the tragedy "a deplorable incident" and then passing on to arms control.⁴ Clearly the Soviets are on the defensive about Nicholson, and would like to see the matter dropped.

Despite this effort to be responsive, however, except for Afghanistan and bilateral issues the substance is standard and covered with Gromyko fingerprints:

—Half the letter is devoted to arms control, and most of that consists of pursuing the public Soviet SDI argument in private, even toughening it up with the odd statement that merely announcing an SDI research program is in contradiction with the ABM Treaty. The list of other arms control topics is also familiar: a nuclear testing moratorium, ratification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties, resumption of comprehensive test ban talks with the British, moving in the Stockholm and MBFR negotiations. Gorbachev mentions chemical weapons because you did, but he claims to be pessimistic about the Geneva negotiations on a global ban because of our own CW program, and there is no reply to the proposals I made to Gromyko concerning experts' talks on Iran-Iraq CW use and Soviet observation of our CW destruction procedures.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 Soviet Union June. Secret; Sensitive. A typed notation in the upper right-hand margin reads: "6/15 The Secretary will hand carry to White House per S/S—cdb." Burt sent Shultz the memorandum under a June 14 action memorandum, recommending that he sign it. According to Burt's memorandum, the memorandum to the President was drafted by Simons and cleared by Palmer and Burt.

² See Document 41.

³ See Document 23.

⁴ See Documents 12 and 22.

—Gorbachev supports our exchanges on regional issues and says he expects an answer to the Soviet proposal for exchanges on new regional topics, i.e. beyond Southern Africa, Afghanistan and the Middle East. (I suggested to Gromyko in Vienna that once we saw how the exchanges on Southern Africa and Afghanistan went, the Far East might be the “next best” topic to consider.)

—Gorbachev treats bilateral issues directly for the first time in your correspondence, and appreciates that in this area we are again “filling the relationship with content,” as the Soviets put it. Indeed, he says he wishes to move faster and extend the range of the topics we are discussing in the bilateral area. We should keep the pressure on them to close on items where there has been some progress.

—On human rights Gorbachev does not give an inch, but he at least responds. Before he had buried the topic obliquely under objections to “interference in internal affairs.” Here he leaves out the phrase, even while insisting they will not negotiate. In this area, as on Nicholson, the language has a defensive air.

On Afghanistan, Gorbachev is once again responding on a point you stressed at some length in your last letter, where you warned against Soviet intimidation of our Pakistani ally. Predictably, he harps on the question of “outside interference.” But it may be of interest that he identifies “curtailment”—note he does not say “elimination”—of Pakistan’s direct support to Afghan freedom fighters operating from Pakistan as a potential “positive signal from the American side” that would help Soviet-American relations. He asks us to clarify our position for him, using the experts’ talks now scheduled for June 18–19 as an opportunity. We will have to see what approach the Soviets take in those talks before we can determine whether there is anything new here.

With these few exceptions, however, this latest letter from Gorbachev is largely a rehash of existing positions. We may have reached the point of diminishing returns from such lengthy exchanges on matters of principle and attempts to cover our entire agenda. I will have a suggested response for you next week which will be shorter and more sharply focussed.

43. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 17, 1985, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary

National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane

Ambassador Paul Nitze

Assistant Secretary Richard Burt

Soviet

Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin

Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov

The Secretary opened the meeting by saying that he had a two-part agenda. The first part concerned our response to the last discussion we had had on a summit meeting.² The President would have a response to Mr. Gorbachev's latest letter,³ but we wanted to respond on the question of a summit venue now. We are disappointed with Gorbachev's reply on venue. We continue to think two great powers like the United States and the Soviet Union should be able to meet in their respective capitals, but so be it. We will accept the Soviet suggestion that we meet in a third country and thus the most obvious place is Geneva.

Ambassador Dobrynin then asked "you don't like Helsinki?" In an aside he admitted that a November summit in Helsinki would be cold;

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Eggplant I, June, July, August 1985 NP. Secret; Super Sensitive. The meeting took place in Shultz's office. No drafting information appears on the memorandum of conversation. In his memoir, Dobrynin recalled this meeting: "Finally on June 17 I had a meeting with Shultz that showed we were heading into the final stages of a summit arrangement. With McFarlane and Paul Nitze present, Shultz said the president reluctantly accepted Gorbachev's proposal to meet in a third country, and suggested Geneva. Then he read from a text which boiled down to the idea that the United States was ready to slow its Star Wars program in exchange for a Soviet agreement to make sizeable cuts in its strategic missiles. The rationale for this was that if the Soviet force of offensive missiles were reduced, the United States could then justify slowing down SDI, which it regarded as a defensive project. This was really a sort of compromise within the administration between Shultz and Weinberger rather than a compromise with us, because Weinberger had started out by refusing to accept any limits at all on SDI. We of course had always assumed that the size of missile forces would be on the table in negotiations." (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, p. 573)

² See Document 41.

³ Printed as an attachment to Document 41.

that Helsinki is nicer in the summer. He then stated that he would pass our suggestion on to Gorbachev.

The Secretary said that on the question of broader substantive issues, President Reagan had written to Gorbachev a long letter, and Gorbachev had sent a lengthy reply. That reply seems to us to involve a misunderstanding about what the President is trying to say. One approach would be to continue this back and forth. But maybe a more hopeful way would be to sidestep some of the lesser issues and try to come to the heart of the nuclear arms control problem, recognizing of course that other issues are still very important and that we should be able to make progress on some of them.

On nuclear arms control, from our review of Soviet positions and statements, we don't see much evidence that Moscow wants to get anywhere. The sooner we know that, the better. On the other hand, we recognized that Dobrynin was going to return to Moscow in the near future. So the Secretary wanted to explore with him whether it was possible to create a better political environment for progress in Geneva.

Dobrynin interjected that their approach proceeds from the January common understanding; in their view, the U.S. negotiators are trying to re-write the mandate agreed to in January during the Shultz-Gromyko talks.⁴ *Dobrynin* noted that on the Secretary's earlier point, with regard to Moscow not wanting to get anywhere in Geneva, this was definitely not the case.

The Secretary said we have no new proposals to offer. To do so would be premature and not helpful. But we are prepared to indicate a general approach which should make it possible for both sides to move forward in Geneva. The Secretary then made four points:

—As we see it, the key to resolving the current arms control puzzle is in the interrelationship of the offense to the defense, in particular, the potential effectiveness of each to that of the other.

—Radical reductions in the power of the offense, in particular, its capability effectively to weaken the retaliatory power of the other side, can undoubtedly have a major impact on the defensive needs of the other side. If we could reach agreement that that capability was reduced to tolerable levels, the need for compensatory defenses would be diminished.

—Absent such reductions, we have no choice but to compensate for Soviet advantages in offense through the deployment of effective defenses.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 4. Documentation on the talks is in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 355–363.

—The central idea, which we believe could be the key to a more constructive approach to the arms control questions before us, is seriously and discretely to address the proper relationship between the offensive and the defensive potential of the two sides.

The Secretary then handed Dobrynin a non-paper covering these points.⁵

Dobrynin (read the points and) commented that basically this is what has been said in Geneva. What the US seems to be suggesting now is a backchannel to discuss these issues.

The Secretary said that the problem is that the Geneva negotiations aren't really going anywhere. *Dobrynin* asked whether the Secretary was suggesting that we should broaden the Shultz-Gromyko understanding. *The Secretary* then said perhaps Bud McFarlane or Paul Nitze would like to comment.

McFarlane said that the US can not tolerate what appears to be a foundation principle of the Soviet side in the negotiations; that is that the Soviets have a first strike capability while the United does not. The United States can not tolerate such an imbalance. Given this imbalance, the United States must look at defensive options. It has been left with no alternative. However, we could have a stable transition to an effective mix of offense and defense.

The Secretary then noted that what we are saying is that if we can agree on less offensive forces then our defense requirements would be less.

Nitze then noted that the four short paragraphs we had provided to Dobrynin are inherently important. He was struck by Akhromeyev's statement on the offensive/defensive relationship. Nitze thought this was very rational.⁶

Dobrynin said that he wanted to disagree with McFarlane's suggestion of a massive Soviet offense build-up. The United States also was building up its offensive forces. *McFarlane* responded that this was not really true. The Soviet Union could simply not expect a situation where only the Soviet Union would have a first strike capability. *Dobrynin* retorted that the United States has one too. *McFarlane* said that this

⁵ Attached but not printed. A handwritten note on the non-paper reads: "Given Dobrynin by the Secretary 17 June 1985." The non-paper repeated these four points verbatim.

⁶ Presumably a reference to Akhromeyev's June 4 article in *Pravda*. In telegram 7398 from Moscow, June 4, the Embassy explained that Akhromeyev stated that the ABM Treaty is "the cornerstone of East/West détente and strategic stability." It continued: "This carefully crafted article responds to U.S. claims that SDI is consistent with the ABM Treaty, as well as to U.S. charges of Soviet non-compliance." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850391-0768) For the text of the article, see *Documents of Disarmament*, 1985, pp. 327–330.

was not the case. Only the Soviet Union has that capability. Dobrynin then noted that maybe we should not debate this point here, but instead focus on Secretary Shultz' approach.

The Secretary said that what we should aim for is a situation in which neither side has a first strike capability.

Dobrynin said that he would report this conversation to his government and try to get back to the Secretary this week. Perhaps Friday. The Secretary noted that this would be good as he plans to be away part of next week.

44. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, June 18, 1985

SUBJECT

Gorbachev's Reference to Remarks Attributed to You

You will recall that I mentioned to you the report from the Italians that Gorbachev had told Craxi that he had just received a cable from Dobrynin which reported that you had "confirmed nonchalantly" that the negotiations in Geneva had no prospect of success and had "insisted on the importance of a summit meeting."² Hartman reported this from

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron June 1985 (2/4). Confidential. Sent for information.

² Gorbachev met with Bettino Craxi, the Italian Prime Minister, in Moscow on May 27. Telegram 7272 from Moscow, May 31, reported: "Dobrynin-McFarlane conversation? The Italians dropped a bomb on us during their debrief on the Craxi visit. According to them, Gorbachev during his treatment of space arms referred to a telegram he had 'just received from Dobrynin' on a conversation Dobrynin had had with Bud McFarlane. Gorbachev said Bud had indicated the USG 'did not expect results' in the second round in Geneva—a statement Gorbachev portrayed as evidence we felt under no pressure to negotiate seriously. Gorbachev also reportedly indicated that Bud had 'insisted' to Dobrynin on the importance of a summit. This is, of course, fourth hand, and may have lost or gained something in the telling. But the Italians have passed it on to six NATO Embassies in Moscow as fact, and we'd like to be in a position to comment. Anything to it?" (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850383–0176)

Moscow and was instructed to inform those allied missions briefed by the Italians that the purported quotations were a total fabrication.³

State subsequently raised the matter with Sokolov, pointing out that such misquotations damage Dobrynin's reputation as a reliable reporter. Sokolov said that he would discuss the matter with Dobrynin and attempt to obtain an explanation.

The next day, Sokolov telephoned Simons to say that Dobrynin had sent two cables to Moscow, one reporting conversations at Ken Dam's farewell reception, which included conversations with you and Secretary Shultz, the latter touching on the summit question, and one reporting on his luncheon conversation with Kampelman, which dealt primarily with the Geneva negotiations. Dobrynin speculated that Gorbachev had read both cables and had mixed up the identity of the interlocutors.

Comment: Even if it is true that Gorbachev mixed up a cable reporting a conversation with Kampelman with one reporting on a conversation with you and/or Shultz, it does not explain why Gorbachev received such a distorted view of what was said. Certainly Max was not as negative on the prospects for Geneva as was reported, nor could Shultz's comments on the possibility of a summit be considered "insisting on its importance."⁴

I believe that we should consider this incident as clear warning of the danger of depending largely on Dobrynin to convey our messages to Moscow. It is obvious either that his reporting is inaccurate, or that his commentary puts a twist on the conversation so that his report leaves a distorted impression on his readers. The lesson for us should

³ In telegram 171439 to Rome, June 15, Van Heuven informed Holmes: "Moscow had earlier reported by O-I that Gorbachev had brandished before Craxi a message from Dobrynin reporting a conversation with McFarlane, alleging that Bud had seen no expectations of progress in Geneva II and 'insisted' on the importance of a summit. Queried informally through Jack Matlock, Bud responded that this was a total fabrication, that everyone whom the Italians had told about it should be told this, and that the Italians should be asked for as much detail and precision as possible. Curt Kamman is spreading the word in Moscow, and I am asking you in this message to go back to Bottai and Badini to see what further 'precision and detail' can be elicited. Clearly the issue has something to do with Dobrynin's credibility here. The only time Bud and Dobrynin have exchanged words recently was at Ken Dam's farewell reception, and Bud denies saying anything like that quoted." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850396-0558)

⁴ In telegram 171439 to Rome, Van Heuven also noted that Kampelman reported meeting Dobrynin privately on May 27: "the report registers extensive discussion expectations for Geneva II, but nothing bleak from Max, and a few mentions of the summit, none of them 'insisting' on either side on its importance. I am getting Warren Zimmermann to plumb Max's memory further, but Warren is confident the answer will be, if not 'total fabrication,' then total distortion." (Ibid.)

be clear: *if we want to be understood accurately in Moscow, we better make sure that the message is conveyed directly by our own people.*⁵

⁵ McFarlane drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin and wrote: “agree.”

45. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, June 18, 1985

SUBJECT

Summitry

Mark Palmer mentioned to me last night that he understood that you and Secretary Shultz would be meeting with Dobrynin to deliver a reply on Gorbachev’s meeting suggestion, and that he understood that we would be proposing Geneva.²

I hope Mark’s information is garbled, and that this is not the case. On the possibility that he misunderstood the current state of play, I would like to submit the following thoughts for your consideration:

1. It is undesirable to respond too quickly to Gorbachev’s proposal for a meeting in Europe, since that will reinforce the impression that the President wants a meeting more than he does. This is particularly true given the conflicting signals we have received regarding Gorbachev’s own desires.

2. The fact of the matter is that a meeting in a third country in Europe is, in most respects, the *least* attractive of the three alternatives. I say this because it is the variant which puts the *least* pressure on the Soviets to change some of their policies in order to insure a successful meeting. These pressures are greater if they receive an American President there, and also if they send their leader here. And our historical

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron June 1985 (2/4). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. McFarlane wrote in the top margin: “Set up a mtg w/ Jack.”

² It seems likely Matlock’s memorandum arrived too late, as McFarlane and Shultz met with Dobrynin the previous evening, June 17, to discuss the summit and venues. See Document 43.

experience has been that meetings in third countries tend to be either failures or sterile (Kennedy-Khrushchev in Vienna and Carter-Brezhnev, also in Vienna—the latter sterile in the sense that SALT-II had already been negotiated, and even if that is considered an achievement, it was not an achievement of the meeting). I believe these factors should be carefully considered by the President before he is encouraged to move in the direction of a meeting in a third country.

3. If there is some difference between Gromyko's desires regarding a meeting and Gorbachev's, then a quick acceptance of the proposal in the letter (which bears all the earmarks of having been written in the Foreign Ministry) simply hands Gromyko an easy victory. We should be cautious about doing this until we get a better feel for Gorbachev's real desires.

4. For this reason, I would strongly recommend that we delay a reply for a couple of weeks, and use the time to have the Agency contact try to find out from Ryzhkov what Gorbachev really wants. I still suspect that he would prefer to come to the U.S., and if this is the only way he can get a meeting, he might well agree.

5. Rather than agreeing precipitously to a third country, we should give careful thought to the advantages and disadvantages of the President going to Moscow. I don't like the idea of his making the trip first any more than the others, but I believe that if we cannot have a meeting here, one there would almost certainly be more productive than one in a third country. Given the Soviet approach to these things, it would put them under pressure, at a minimum, to moderate their propaganda attacks and start making some gestures in the human rights field. It would make it most difficult for them to continue to portray the President as a threat, since the symbolism of his visit would undermine this claim—certainly among the Russian people and probably also in Western Europe. None of these advantages are gained from a meeting in a third country, which in fact maximizes the liabilities (high public expectations) and minimizes the leverage for Soviet performance.

In sum, unless an irrevocable decision has already been made, I would strongly recommend that we slow down, give some careful thought to these nuances, and play our cards deliberately.

I would appreciate an opportunity to see you briefly as soon as you can make time, in order to obtain your guidance on several ongoing issues.

46. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 25, 1985

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Dobrynin June 24: Gorbachev's Response on Interim Restraint

Dobrynin came in yesterday evening to deliver Gorbachev's response to your June 10 letter on interim restraint.² His English translation and the original Russian text are attached. After looking through the letter, I commented that it seemed extremely contentious, but we would respond to it carefully in due course.

The letter is long and worth more analysis, but at first glance the main point seems to be that the Soviets will not recognize any right of ours to depart from the provisions of SALT II and other arms control agreements by unilateral decision. Most of the letter is a catalogue, written very much in Gromyko's style, of things we have done that make them suspicious that this is our real intention. The steps we have taken give them every right to break commitments, the letter says, but they have not done so in the hope that "sober reasoning" and US self-interest would bring more restraint from us, and this has happened "to a certain, though not to a full, extent." By implication, your interim restraint decision reflects such restraint, but they remain suspicious that they are being asked to agree we have a right to violate commitments in response to violations they deny having made. The letter denies in advance that we have any such right, and says they will wait and see how we act in the future: "It depends on the American side how things will shape up further, and we shall make the appropriate conclusions."

Dobrynin drew attention to the concluding paragraphs of the letter, where Gorbachev states that "arms limitation has been and will be the central issue both in our relations and as far as the further development of the entire international situation is concerned." Thus our two countries have a "special responsibility," he goes on to say, and they remain committed to working with us on a "solution to the central issues of

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary's Meetings with Dobrynin June 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Under a June 25 action memorandum, Burt sent Shultz the memorandum to Reagan and recommended that he sign it. Burt's action memorandum indicates that he drafted the memorandum to Reagan. According to a covering memorandum, McFarlane forwarded Shultz's memorandum and Gorbachev's letter to the President on July 1. Reagan initialed the covering memorandum. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8590382, 8590419))

² Not found. See footnote 2, Document 41.

security on the basis of equality and equal security.” This is the strongest language on the importance of arms control and US-Soviet negotiations for the world generally that I have seen from the Soviets, and it suggests that we do in fact have a good deal of leverage in negotiations if we can maintain our strength and steadiness.

Dobrynin had no other instructions, either on a meeting with you or anything else, but we had a relaxed exchange in which I made a number of points.

I noted there had been several occasions where we seemed on the verge of having things get better, and then something happened to throw us off course—most recently, their shooting of Major Nicholson and their subsequent handling of the incident. It was a disturbing pattern. Looking at bilateral issues, we were not specific on any one, but agreed that with the right atmosphere there were a number of things that could be resolved easily. On regional issues, we agreed that not much had been accomplished in our talks, but that those on southern Africa had perhaps been more constructive than before. I was interested that he thought Afghanistan issues might well be pursued further. Perhaps things Rajiv Gandhi said here have registered in the Soviet Union.³ In connection with the Middle East, I brought up the hostage problem and called attention to the importance of Syria’s role in Lebanon. He had nothing to say on Syria, but remarked that hijacking and hostage taking were outside the bounds of civilized behavior. I suggested that his government might say so.

In conclusion, we also discussed the upcoming meetings in Helsinki and the possibility of meetings here with Gromyko in the fall, as opportunities to move things along. He will be going back to Moscow for his summer leave next week, and I may have another conversation with him before that.

³ Prime Minister of India Rajiv Gandhi made an official visit to the United States from June 11 to 15. On June 13, he addressed Congress and made an appeal for “independence and nonaligned status for Afghanistan.” (Bernard Weinraub, “Gandhi, In a Speech to Congress, Calls for Nonaligned Afghanistan,” *New York Times*, June 14, 1985, p. A1) Just prior to his U.S. visit, Gandhi made an official visit to the Soviet Union from May 21 to 26. Telegram 14092 from New Delhi, June 7, provided the Department with a summary of his trip. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850401–0842)

Attachment

Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan⁴

Moscow, June 22, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with your letter of June 10, in which you outline the U.S. Government's decision on the SALT II Treaty made public the same day, I deem it necessary to express the viewpoint of the Soviet leadership on this matter.

I shall start by stating that your version of the past and present state of affairs in the key areas of Soviet-American relations, that of the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, cannot withstand comparison with the actual facts. Evidently, it was not by chance that you chose 1982 as your point of reference, the year when the American side declared its readiness to comply with the main provisions of the SALT II Treaty, unratified by the United States. Unfortunately, however, it was not this that determined the general course of your administration's policy and its practical actions with regard to strategic armaments.

It is hard to avoid the thought that a choice of a different kind had been made earlier, when it was stated outright that you did not consider yourself bound by the obligations assumed by your predecessors under agreements with the Soviet Union. This was perceived by others, and in the United States too, as repudiation of the arms limitations process and the search for agreements.

This was confirmed in practice: an intensive nuclear arms race was initiated in the United States. Precisely through this race, it would seem, and began to see and continues to see to this day the main means for achieving "prevailing" positions in the world under the guise of assuring U.S. national security.

In this sense, the few steps of the American side that you mentioned that went in a different direction and took account of the realities of today's world, are they not just temporary, "interim?"

It is not for the sake of polemics, but in order to restore the full picture of what has occurred, that I would like to return briefly to what has been done by the United States with regard to the current regime for strategic stability.

⁴ Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy.

One cannot dispute the fact that the American side created an ambiguous situation whereby the SALT II Treaty, one of the pillars of our relationship in the security sphere, was turned into a semi-functioning document that the U.S., moreover, is now threatening to nullify step by step. How can one then talk about predictability of conduct and assess with sufficient confidence the other side's intentions?

It is difficult to evaluate the damage done to our relationship and to international stability as a whole by your administration's decision to break off a process of negotiations that the USSR and the U.S. assumed a legal obligation to conduct. Such an obligation is contained in the very text of the SALT II Treaty, as well as in the accompanying "Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limitation of Strategic Arms."⁵

The chain ensuring the viability of the process of curbing the arms race, put together through great effort, was consciously broken.

Today it is especially clear that this caused many promising opportunities to slip by, while some substantial elements of our relationship in this area were squandered.

The United States crossed a dangerous threshold when it preferred to cast aside the Protocol to the SALT II Treaty instead of immediately taking up, as was envisaged, the resolution of these issues which were dealt with in the Protocol. Those issues are of cardinal importance—the limitation and prohibition of entire classes of arms. It is no secret as to what guided the American side in taking this step: it wanted to gain an advantage by deploying long-range cruise missiles. As a result, already today one has to deal with thousands of such missiles. The U.S. sought to sharply tilt in its favor the fine-tuned balance of interests underlying the agreement. Now you see, I believe, that it did not work out this way. We too are deploying cruise missiles, which we had proposed to ban. But even now we are prepared to come to an agreement on such a ban, should the U.S., taking a realistic position, agree to take such an important step.

The deployment in Western Europe of new nuclear systems designed to perform strategic missions was a clear circumvention, that is non-compliance, by the American side with regard to the SALT II Treaty. In this, Mr. President, we see an attempt by the United States, taking advantage of geographic factors, to gain a virtual monopoly on the use of weapons in a situation for which our country has no analogue. I know that on your side the need for some regional balance is some-

⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Documents 241 and 242.

times cited. But even in that case it is incomprehensible why the U.S. refuses to resolve this issue in a manner which would establish in the zone of Europe a balance of medium-range missiles, whereby the USSR would not have more missiles and warheads on them than are currently in the possession of England and France. Such a formula would not infringe upon anyone's interests, whereas the distortion caused by the American missiles in Europe is not a balance at all.

In broader terms, all these violations by the United States of the regime for strategic stability have one common denominator: departure from the principle of equality and equal security. This and nothing else is the reason for the lack of progress in limiting and reducing nuclear arms over the past 4–5 years.

However, I would like you to have a clear understanding of the fact that, in practice, strategic parity between our countries will be maintained. We cannot envisage nor can we permit a different situation. The question, however, is at what level parity will be maintained—at a decreasing or an increasing one. We are for the former, for the reduction in the level of strategic confrontation. Your government, by all indications, favors the latter, evidently hoping that at some stage the U.S. will ultimately succeed in getting ahead. This is the essence of the current situation.

Should one be surprised, then, that we are conducting negotiations, yet the process of practical arms limitation remains suspended? It would probably not be too great a misfortune if this process simply remained frozen. But even that is not the case. The “star wars” program—I must tell you this, Mr. President—already at this stage is seriously undermining stability. We strongly advise you to halt this sharply destabilizing and dangerous program while things have not gone too far. If the situation in this area is not corrected, we shall have no choice but to take steps required by our security and that of our allies.

We are in favor, as you say, of making the best use of the chance offered by the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space arms. Our main objective at those negotiations should be to reestablish the suspended process of limiting the arms race and to prevent its spread into new spheres.

The SALT-II Treaty is an important element of the strategic equilibrium, and one should clearly understand its role as well as the fact that, according to the well-known expression, one cannot have one's pie and eat it too.

Your approach is determined by the fact that the strategic programs being carried out by the United States are about to collide with the limitations established by the SALT II Treaty, and the choice is being made not in favor of the Treaty, but in favor of these programs. And this cannot be disavowed or concealed, to put it bluntly, by unseemly

attempts to accuse the Soviet Union of all mortal sins. It is, moreover, completely inappropriate in relations between our two countries for one to set forth conditions for the other as is done in your letter with regard to the Soviet Union.

I am saying all this frankly and unequivocally, as we have agreed.

One certainly cannot agree that the provisions of the SALT II Treaty remain in force allegedly as the result of restraint on the part of the United States. Entirely the contrary. The general attitude toward the Treaty shown by the American side and its practical actions to undermine it have given us every reason to draw appropriate conclusions and to take practical steps. We did have and continue to have moral, legal and political grounds for that.

We did not, however, give way to emotions; we showed patience, realizing the seriousness of the consequences of the path onto which we were being pushed. We hoped also that sober reasoning, as well as the self-interest of the U.S., would make the American side take a more restrained position. That was what in fact happened to a certain, though not to a full, extent. And we have treated this in businesslike fashion. Without ignoring what has been done by the American side contrary to the SALT II Treaty, we nevertheless at no time have been the initiators of politico-propagandistic campaigns of charges and accusations. We have striven to discuss seriously within the framework of the SCC the well-founded concerns we have had. We also have given exhaustive answers there to questions raised by the American side.

Unfortunately, the behavior of the other side was and continues to be utterly different. All those endless reports on imaginary Soviet violations and their publication did not and cannot serve any useful purpose, if one is guided by the task of preserving and continuing the process of arms limitation. Why mince words, the objective is quite different: to cast aspersions on the policy of the Soviet Union in general, to sow distrust toward it and to create an artificial pretext for an accelerated and uncontrolled arms race. All this became evident to us already long ago.

One has to note that your present decision, if it were to be implemented, would be a logical continuation of that course. We would like you, Mr. President, to think all this over once again.

In any event, we shall regard the decision that you announced in the entirety of its mutually-exclusive elements which, along with the usual measures required by the Treaty, include also a claim to some "right" to violate provisions of the Treaty as the American side chooses. Neither side has such a right. I do not consider it necessary to go into specifics here, a lot has been said about it, and your military experts are well aware of the actual, rather than distorted, state of affairs.

One should not count on the fact that we will be able to come to terms with you with respect to destroying the SALT II Treaty through joint efforts. How things will develop further depends on the American side, and we shall draw the appropriate conclusions.

The question of the approach to arms limitation has been, is, and will be the central issue both in our relations and as far as the further development of the overall international situation is concerned. It is precisely here, above all, that the special responsibility borne by our two countries is manifested, as well as how each of them approaches that responsibility.

In more specific terms, it is a question of intentions with regard to one other. No matter what is being done in other spheres of our relationship, in the final analysis, whether or not it is going to be constructive and stable depends above all on whether we are going to find a solution to the central issues of security on the basis of equality and equal security.

I would like to reaffirm that, for our part, we are full of resolve to strive to find such a solution. This determines both our attitude toward those initial limitations which were arrived at earlier through painstaking joint labor, and our approach to the negotiations currently underway in Geneva and elsewhere.

I wish to say this in conclusion: one would certainly like to feel tangibly the same attitude on the part of the United States. At any rate, as I have already had a chance to note, we took seriously the thought reiterated by you in our correspondence with regard to a joint search for ways to improve Soviet-American relations and to strengthen the foundations of peace.

Sincerely,

M. Gorbachev

47. **Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)**¹

Washington, June 27, 1985

SUBJECT

Summit Venue and Current Soviet Propaganda

A few bits of information and scattered thoughts on the question of the summit venue:

1. Gorbachev's speech yesterday:² His harsh rhetoric is particularly striking, in view of the conciliatory gestures in the meeting with Dobrynin last week.³ Also note that, according to press reports, he *read* this section from the prepared text, rather than delivering it *ex temp* as he did much of the rest of the speech. *Speculation*: Have the Soviets concluded that the President wants a meeting so much that they have the opportunity to intensify pressure for greater substantive give? It looks like this to me, and I must wonder if the quick suggestion for Geneva did not contribute to this.

2. Context of a Geneva Summit: Besides his plan to visit France in October, we are getting reports of Soviet probes to other European countries for Gorbachev visits, and also of attempts to arrange an address to the European Parliament. *Suspicion*: The Soviets may have in mind sandwiching a meeting with the President in between visits to other countries, and perhaps an address to the European Parliament,

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron June 1985 (4/4). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for system. Sent for information. Sent through Poindexter.

² In telegram 8694 from Moscow, June 27, the Embassy reported that Gorbachev gave a speech at a factory in Dnepropetrovsk on June 26, which provided "another pep-talk on the need to get the Soviet economy rolling again." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850454–0742) In a separate telegram reporting Gorbachev's specific attack on the U.S. negotiating position in Geneva in the same speech, the Embassy provided the following comment: "Although similar to his plenum speech, Gorbachev's remarks on the Geneva talks in Dnepropetrovsk are a shade more bitter, and his hint that the USSR might abandon the talks a shade more direct. He also puts less emphasis on the possibility of a change in U.S. policy. We interpret the hint of a walkout not as a guide to Soviet intentions but as a deliberate attempt to make U.S. allies and the peace movement nervous. As usual, Gorbachev places on the U.S. the whole burden of progress in the talks, portraying SDI as the barrier to radical nuclear arms reductions. By repeating the same line he has taken in the past, Gorbachev digs himself in deeper behind the current Soviet position and postpones the day when he can gracefully show flexibility." (Telegram 8649 from Moscow, June 27; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850453–0780)

³ See Document 46.

so that the summit can be played as incidental to a “triumphal” tour of Europe. Thus they would insulate Gorbachev from the imagery of a failed summit, and set up the President to look second best in comparison. (We can be sure that Gorbachev will not go to Bitburg, and also that the conservatives in the European Parliament are sufficiently civilized that they would not walk out on him.)

3. Gorbachev’s Role in Foreign Policy: Mark Palmer told me of an interesting private conversation he had with Sokolov at Chautauqua day before last.⁴ (They were walking around the lake; in private, Sokolov can be rather frank.) He asked Sokolov if Dobrynin had grasped the significance of what was said to him last week. Sokolov said yes, he had, but that we should not expect a quick reaction from Moscow. He explained that, while Gorbachev is reading voraciously and getting briefed on foreign affairs, he has not really taken charge of it yet. He opined that Gorbachev would not do so until the time and place for a summit had been set, at which time he would focus “on Afghanistan and other issues,” since he would have a personal stake in the outcome. Until the time and place is set, he suggested, *it is probably useless for the U.S. to make suggestions for breaking deadlocks, because Moscow is simply unable to respond.*

Implications: (1) Gromyko still is tying things up, but Gorbachev will have an interest in breaking out of the stalemate if a meeting is arranged; and (2) we should not be in a hurry to push new ideas, particularly with Gromyko.

Comment: The suggestion, from a Soviet diplomat, that we not waste our time at the moment being conciliatory is really astounding. It is very rare (though there are precedents) for a senior Soviet diplomat to suggest that the U.S. should act contrary to official Soviet policy demands. I can only infer that Sokolov senses that Gromyko’s days as foreign policy tsar are numbered and is trying to position himself not to get burned in the fallout.

4. Summit Venue: The more I think through the question of what locale would provide the greatest pressure and incentive for *Soviet* concessions, the more I am convinced that the order of desirability *from the U.S. standpoint* is (1) Moscow and (2) Washington. As for a third country, I believe it far better not to have a meeting than to go there. I know this flies in the face of the President’s current thinking, but I wonder if all the relevant factors have been called to his attention.

⁴ From June 24 to 28, the Chautauqua Conference on Soviet-American relations took place in Chautauqua, New York, hosted by the Chautauqua Institution. (Louise Sweeney, “Diplomacy by day, culture by night. Soviet and US Delegates make music at Chautauqua,” *Christian Science Monitor*, July 5, 1985)

I can write down the considerations which have brought me to this conclusion in more detail if you wish.

As possibly relevant, I would note that during my conversation with Suzanne Massie yesterday I asked her,⁵ putting the question abstractly, which locale for a meeting, in her opinion, is most propitious for the U.S., from the standpoint of Russian psychology. Her answer was unequivocally Moscow. She gave a number of reasons, the principal one being that the gesture alone would demolish the Soviet propaganda image of the President as a malign, threatening force, which would permit Gorbachev to play the meeting as a success without intense attention on who gave way on what point. It would also give Gorbachev and his immediate staff the bureaucratic grounds for taking charge of the visit. She also opined—and I agree—that a Gorbachev visit to the U.S. before the Party Congress next February carries great political risk for Gorbachev and predicted that he would be most reluctant to undertake it unless he was sure in advance of substantive concessions which he could tout as a “victory” upon his return. She thought that a meeting in a third country could be a “disaster,” since Gromyko would be in a position to control most arrangements, and he is unlikely to have an interest in a productive meeting which Gorbachev could use to bolster his personal authority in foreign affairs. At the same time, the President would be burdened by a thousand or so journalists asking every minute on the minute for evidence of concrete results.

If you think it would be useful for the President to hear Suzanne’s views on this, she of course would be delighted to come down to Washington again at any time.

⁵ In telegram 846 from Leningrad, June 6, the Consulate reported that Suzanne Massie “spent much of April and May in Leningrad doing research for her current project on the history of Pavlovsk.” A reception took place in her honor on May 16, which “provided her the opportunity to explain her work and to thank those Soviets who provided assistance.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850429–0365) Presumably the purpose of Massie’s meeting with Matlock on June 26 was to report on her stay in the Soviet Union.

48. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, June 1985

Gorbachev, the New Broom

Summary

Gorbachev has demonstrated in his first 100 days that he is the most aggressive and activist Soviet leader since Khrushchev. He is willing to take controversial and even unpopular decisions—like the antialcohol campaign—and to break with recent precedent by criticizing the actions of his colleagues on the Politburo.² [*portion marking not declassified*]

He has thrown down the gauntlet on issues as controversial as the allocation of investment, broadgauged management reform, and purging the system of incompetent and corrupt officials. The very insistence of his rhetoric allows little room for compromise or retreat. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Gorbachev is gambling that an attack on corruption and inefficiency, not radical reform, will turn the domestic situation around. While a risky course, his prospects for success should not be underestimated. Although his approach is controversial, his near term prospects look good. Unlike his immediate predecessors, he has already managed to firm up his base of support in the Politburo and Secretariat. He can also count on some support from middle level officials of the bureaucracy who were frustrated by the stagnation of the Brezhnev era. The public as well has responded favorably to his style, judging by initial reaction filtering back through Western sources. His aggres-

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1985 (1/8). Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis, Directorate of Intelligence. In an attached June 27 covering note to Reagan, Casey wrote: “Dear Mr. President, You may find this good airplane reading. It is a good picture of Gorbachev’s style, objectives and operating methods as shown in the first 100 days of his leadership. You will sympathize with his targeting the massive bureaucratic apparatus, which, he complains, implements the Central Committee decisions so that after they are finished ‘nothing is left.’” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980–1986), Box 17, Folder 432: DCI Memo Chron (1–30 Jun ’85)) On June 28, in a forwarding memorandum, Matlock sent McFarlane Casey’s note and the CIA paper, explaining: “Bill Casey has supplied, for the President’s reading, a well-written paper on Gorbachev’s first hundred days in office. Although I received the paper after the President’s departure for Chicago today, I believe it is very appropriate for weekend reading.” McFarlane approved the recommendation to forward the paper to Reagan, who left for Chicago on June 28 for a series of meetings. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1985 (1/8))

² See Document 25.

siveness has placed the opposition on the defensive. His opponents are probably biding their time hoping he makes a major misstep. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Gorbachev's Style

Gorbachev has moved to draw a sharp contrast in style to his recent predecessors, who treated the bureaucracy gingerly and approached change cautiously. Brezhnev and Chernenko voiced concern about the deepening economic and morale problems in the country, but they were not prepared to confront the bureaucracies standing in the way of solutions. Brezhnev's solicitous attitude toward the bureaucracy limited the power of his office as officials came to believe they had lifetime tenure. Andropov moved to break this mold, but he was handicapped by his poor health and the lingering presence of Brezhnevites, including Chernenko and Premier Tikhonov. Learning from Andropov's experience, Gorbachev has consciously created an environment of urgency and made clear he intends to confront problems. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Gorbachev's populist style has not been seen since Khrushchev's frequent forays among the public and bare knuckles approach to dealing with the bureaucracy:

—He has visited factories in Moscow and Leningrad and found other opportunities to rub shoulders with workers in an effort to bur-nish his image as a man of the people. Soviet television has highlighted his easy give-and-take with ordinary citizens.

—He is carefully managing public relations. *[4½ lines not declassified]* Gorbachev played to the photographers.

—Gorbachev has also moved his wife Raisa into the spotlight. She has appeared in the Soviet press and on television, and a protocol officer reportedly has been assigned to handle her activities. The wife of Politburo member Vorotnikov, who recently visited Canada, was overheard to say that all wives of Politburo members must now accom-pany their husbands on foreign trips. *[portion marking not declassified]*

While these traits mark Gorbachev as an unconventional Soviet politician, it is his no-holds-barred approach to confronting chronic domestic problems that underscores his new style as a leader. Gorba-chev may feel that an aggressive approach is essential if he is to avoid getting bogged down like Andropov. A wide spectrum of Soviet offi-cials complained of drift and corruption under Brezhnev and became discouraged when Andropov's ill health caused his initiatives to lose momentum. They provide a well-spring of potential support for Gorba-chev's approach:

—He has instituted a sweeping crackdown on the deep-rooted problem of alcoholism, reportedly even denying a request from Foreign Minister Gromyko to exempt diplomatic functions.

—He criticized his Politburo colleagues in public during his visit to Leningrad, terming their recent decision on the allocation of land for private plots inadequate and dismissing objections apparently raised by his colleagues.

—He has assailed ministers by name for lack of innovation, laziness, and poor management and has strongly implied that they will be removed. He has attacked the complacent attitude toward corruption within the party bureaucracy and called for promotion of younger and more competent officials at all levels. While such rhetoric is not new in itself, he has already underscored his intention to back up his tough rhetoric with dismissals by sacking some middle-level officials.

—[*less than 1 line not declassified*] claims that Gorbachev has begun to boss around high officials with a “wave of his hand,” asking for information and then issuing orders without consultation. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Gorbachev will systematically replace old guard holdovers both in Moscow and the provinces with young and technically competent officials. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Gorbachev has made it clear that he believes his policies are justified by the growing foreign and domestic problems facing the USSR:

—He has studded his speeches with language that evokes the image of a crisis, and suggested that the USSR is now at a turning point. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] he has decided to raise Russian national consciousness and to impose “super-enforcement” of order and discipline.

—At the April Central Committee plenum, he was sharply critical of the economic laxity under Brezhnev and the failure to follow through on decisions which had been taken by the leadership.

—In his speech to the S&T conference in early June, he warned that accelerated economic growth was an imperative due to the need to sustain current levels of consumption while making the investments in defense required by current international tensions. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Consolidating Power

Gorbachev is using time honored methods for building his power, advancing his allies into key leadership positions, but he is off to a faster start than any of his recent predecessors. More changes are likely soon:

—By advancing three allies to full Politburo membership in April he has probably achieved a working majority on most issues.

—The designation of Yegor Ligachev—one of the three promoted—as unofficial “second secretary” isolated his major rival, Secretary Grigoriy Romanov, who has been nearly invisible politically. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Ligachev—who is Gorbachev’s close friend—has now eclipsed Foreign Minister Gromyko and Premier Tikhonov in political importance.

—KGB boss Chebrikov—who was also promoted—appears to be another close ally, giving the General Secretary an important advantage in exerting political pressure against would-be Politburo opponents, most of whom are tainted by corruption.

—Gorbachev also placed a younger protege in charge of the department that oversees personnel appointments, further consolidating his control over personnel policy and setting the groundwork for potentially sweeping personnel changes preceding next February's party congress. He is off to a fast pace in replacing his opponents in the bureaucracy. He has retired one deputy premier and three ministers, and named nine new regional party bosses and three new Central Committee department heads. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Domestic Strategy

Using his strong political position, Gorbachev's first priority is to push his domestic economic program. While some Soviet officials have indicated he is sympathetic to the use of pragmatic methods, including tapping private initiative, his statements and actions underscore his overall commitment to the current economic system and his determination to make it work better. Having acknowledged the gravity of the economic problem, Gorbachev exudes an optimism that he and his team can eliminate waste, tighten discipline, increase the quality and quantity of production, and accelerate economic growth. While expressing great pride in the historical accomplishments of central planning, he has sharply criticized its recent performance, and called for "revolutionary" changes in the way the system works. [*portion marking not declassified*]

His first priority fix is to reduce waste and tighten discipline, particularly among managers:

—Gorbachev has cited cases of such waste, such as the 20 percent loss of the harvest. Figures published in the Soviet press indicate Andropov's discipline campaign has reduced losses in working time about 20 percent, and Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitskiy recently announced that the campaign had saved several hundred million rubles. Gorbachev probably hopes to squeeze out similar resources.

—Soviet officials indicate that Gorbachev has reinvigorated Andropov's discipline campaign. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Gorbachev has reinitiated document checks and crackdowns on drunks and deadbeats, even threatening to fire managers who have failed to correct such problems among their workers.

—His speeches indicate he will extend earlier efforts to tie pay more closely to productivity both for workers and managers, not only rewarding good workers but penalizing—perhaps even docking the salaries—of poor performers. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Building from a base of improved worker discipline and management effectiveness, Gorbachev's hopes to further boost *long-term growth* entail a modernization of the capital base by increased investment in machine-building and retooling existing factories. While the effects of this approach will not be felt for some time, he has remanded the draft Five-Year Plan for 1986–90 to redirect it toward growth based on increased productivity rather than expanded resources. More specifically:

—He has called for investment in modernizing factories to be increased from $\frac{1}{3}$ to $\frac{1}{2}$ of investment,³ and demanded that investment and output in civilian machine-building be doubled. He even called for “mothballing” some new construction projects, as an unusually candid admission of a major Soviet problem in the construction sector. His stress on conservation rather than increased output of raw materials also indicates a heightened emphasis in this area. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Beyond this, he has been less specific on other economic initiatives, but his statements suggest he may intend to press even more controversial policies touching on the powers of the bureaucracy:

—His public statements suggest he wants to amalgamate ministries and redirect them and the State Planning Committee (Gosplan) away from day-to-day management decisions.

—He would like to see greater autonomy for plant managers and will probably push for reduction of centrally dictated indicators.

—He has criticized intermediate management bodies that choke off initiative, hinting that they should be streamlined or eliminated. His aim is to eliminate some of the massive bureaucratic apparatus that, as he complained in his speech to the S&T conference, implements Central Committee decisions in such a manner that after they are finished “nothing is left of these principles.”

—He may advocate legalizing some parts of the “second economy” and allow a limited expansion of the role of private agriculture, despite potential ideological opposition. He hinted at this in his Leningrad speech in May. Gorbachev may feel some limited concessions—like tolerating private repairmen or allowing greater access to summer gardens for urban dwellers—could help improve the quality of life without undermining the system or forcing a showdown with ideological purists in the elite who have traditionally resisted such steps. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Foreign Policy

Gorbachev’s impact on foreign policy has so far been mostly stylistic. He has revealed no urgent agenda to match his determination to accelerate economic growth at home. Some of his gambits—like the INF moratorium—are stable leftovers from his predecessor. His immediate goal has apparently been to demonstrate to both allies and adversaries that there is now a strong and active leader in the Kremlin. Despite the press of domestic business, Gorbachev has received a steady stream of European and Third World leaders. He has been more activist than his immediate predecessors and will reportedly embark soon on a vigorous schedule of personal diplomacy and foreign trips. He is slated

³ Soviet bureaucrats, both ministerial and party, have traditionally called for new construction. Such projects have been doled out to satisfy local lobbies like pork barrel projects. In his S&T conference speech, Gorbachev condemned this approach and insisted on focusing investment on where it was needed most. [Footnote in the original.]

to travel to Paris in October for meetings with Mitterrand and he may visit India later this year. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Although he has not yet made any serious new initiative toward the US, he has already made his presence felt on Soviet policy. He reportedly ratified the return to the bargaining table in Geneva even before Chernenko's death in March. He softened Soviet conditions for a summit with President Reagan soon after entering office. Since then, he has apparently sanctioned the recent expansion of bilateral exchanges and met with several US delegations. *[portion marking not declassified]*

In public statements and private discussions, however, Gorbachev is clearly intent on presenting *[less than 1 line not declassified]* a tough hardline image abroad and convincing American policymakers that bilateral relations will improve only if US policy changes. He and his colleagues evidently do not believe an early improvement in relations is likely:

—A variety of sources make clear Gorbachev will concentrate on cultivating an image of strength, not conciliation.

—*[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]*

—*[less than 1 line not declassified]* Gorbachev's chief foreign policy adviser believes he is not disposed to concessions, in part because he does not believe arms control can significantly reduce domestic economic problems.

—In talks with American visitors he has bristled at efforts to raise human rights issues, demanded that the US not take a "carrot and stick" approach, and insisted that Soviet leaders will be ready to deal only when the US starts treating the USSR as an equal.

—Moscow's more recent decision to play hard to get on a summit dovetails with this strategy. *[portion marking not declassified]*

[1½ lines not declassified] claim Gorbachev will expand previous Soviet efforts to drive wedges between the US and our allies. He has already spoken publicly of a "community of interest" between the USSR and Western Europe, met with a series of European leaders, and indicated that Moscow is now prepared to establish political relations with the European Community:

—*[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]*

Gorbachev has also taken a tough line within the Warsaw Pact, reportedly sending ripples of concern through the more Brezhnevite regimes, such as Czechoslovakia. His public statements have stressed the need for bloc unity and closer economic integration. Despite his reported sympathy for East European economic reform, he allegedly told party leaders at their summit in April that "something is rotten in Denmark," which they took to signal his dissatisfaction with corruption and economic laxity in this region. *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

claimed that Gorbachev's tough guy attitude was meant not only for the West but to signal to allies that he is not to be trifled with. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Gorbachev's early actions have also signaled strong support for allies in Afghanistan and Central America:

—Soviet forces in Afghanistan continue to pursue the more aggressive military approach that we began to see last year.

—He met Nicaraguan leader Ortega only days after the US Congress turned down the President's original request for aid to the Contras and pledged increased oil deliveries to bolster the regime. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Opposition to Gorbachev's Juggernaut?

Opposition to Gorbachev for now appears disorganized. The old guard in the Politburo—such as Premier Tikhonov, Moscow party boss Grishin or republic bosses Shcherbitskiy and Kunayev—are probably on the defensive due to charges of mismanagement or corruption in their organizations. Secretary Romanov, a potential focus for opposition, has been outflanked by Gorbachev's personnel moves and probably is no longer an effective rallying point. [*portion marking not declassified*]

As a result, those threatened by Gorbachev at the Central Committee level lack an effective spokesman. While they can resist by footdragging on his policies, he can probably remove them if they don't appear to be falling into line. Many elderly Brezhnev-era holdovers may well find it easier to retire than fight. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Despite his strong position, Gorbachev does not have an entirely free hand. Other Politburo members can still slow up his initiatives. Independents or even allies might balk at some aspects of Gorbachev's freewheeling style. There are some signs, moreover, that Gorbachev's initiatives have already been watered down or met resistance:

—Judging from his remarks in Leningrad, the Politburo rejected his more far reaching proposals for expansion of garden plots, evidently on the grounds that this amounts to encouraging private enterprise.

—Some evidence suggests that the timing of a US-Soviet summit has become entangled in leadership politics. [*9½ lines not declassified*]

—[*1½ lines not declassified*] Gorbachev's bold domestic strategy is also controversial at the lower levels, and he will have to contend with thousands of local party officials who are unwilling to accede to the wishes of the central party leadership. Many rank-and-file workers will probably also resent the increased demands for productivity and be fearful that they might lose their job security.

—[*1½ lines not declassified*] Gorbachev's edicts on alcoholism, if carried out to the letter, will create serious problems among the working class. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] his campaign against corruption will not win him any friends. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Soviet media treatment of Gorbachev's speeches suggests that his policy agenda is meeting some high-level resistance:

—Press versions of Gorbachev's speech in Leningrad toned down his criticism of the Politburo decision on extending the private plots.

—Published versions also eliminated references to Gorbachev's personal sponsorship or support of economic reform initiatives.

—On some occasions, the media have published full accounts of his speeches only after a delay of several days. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Nonetheless, the strength of Gorbachev's position suggests that his detractors will have to wait until he makes a major misstep or overreaches on a controversial issue in order to give them an opportunity to coalesce. The real test may come when evidence begins to roll in on the success or failure of his program. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Can Gorbachev Succeed Where Khrushchev Failed?

Gorbachev's efforts to force greater efficiency out of the system is still a risky gamble, despite the disorganized state of resistance. Khrushchev, for instance, succeeded for nearly ten years in keeping the opposition on the defensive through endless reorganizations and campaigns, but eventually he alienated his own supporters. Khrushchev's approach was so helter skelter that the bureaucrats often could not discern what he really wanted them to do. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Having witnessed Khrushchev's mistakes, Gorbachev's signals are likely to be much clearer and more consistent. Yet, a number of these clear signals are likely to produce resistance. Gorbachev's investment strategy may cause him the most problems with the bureaucracy. The allocation of investment is closely tied to the power of officialdom, who can dole out "pork barrel" projects as a kind of political payment for loyalty. By sharply reducing investment funds in some sectors and requiring a new approach to management, moreover, Gorbachev's approach is bound to alienate many in the bureaucracy upon whom he must depend for policy implementation. While he can use the power of hiring and firing to discipline this group, such an approach—as Khrushchev discovered—potentially has its cost in terms of production and political support. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Gorbachev's call for faster economic growth may also come back to haunt him. Efforts to reconstruct existing factories may lead to declining output at a time when he is proposing a return to higher economic growth rates. While his four percent growth prediction for the next Five Year Plan may not be entirely out of reach, it forces managers into the position of choosing between increasing output and re-equipping their factories. Massive shifts in investment priorities could

also create bottlenecks and disruptions in the economy. For instance, shifting resources from energy extraction—at a time when both coal and oil output is declining—to the production of more energy efficient machinery might exacerbate the energy balance in the short term. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Gorbachev will have to carefully calibrate his policies in order to avoid pitfalls in a system where emphasizing specific priorities at the top frequently translates into slackened effort on other areas. The prospects for a radical reorientation of Soviet managers toward quality rather than quantity are also not good—it runs counter to the approach of the last 55 years. But, Andropov's experience demonstrated that a concerted effort on management discipline—backed by the threat of firing—can probably have beneficial effects. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Looking Ahead

With the urgent rhetoric and ambitious agenda he has set so far, Gorbachev will be under the gun to show continuing evidence of momentum or else risk allowing potential opponents to draw together and work against him. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Consolidating power. Gorbachev is likely to be elected President at next week's Supreme Soviet session. He might also advance other allies into junior slots in the leadership at a plenum preceding the Supreme Soviet. Gorbachev will almost certainly use the party elections campaign before the party congress next year to replace many Brezhnev holdovers among regional party and government leaders. Party Secretary Romanov, once Gorbachev's major rival, is already in decline, and a recent smear campaign linking him to Gorbachev's opponents may be intended to pave the way for his removal. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Gorbachev will continue to oust symbols of the Brezhnev old guard in the economic bureaucracy. The ministers he named at the S&T conference are almost certain to go. Gorbachev's attacks on the ministries have made Premier Tikhonov's position increasingly untenable, and he could be gracefully eased out even before the party congress. The retirement of Gosplan chief Baybakov, a symbol of resistance to change since the Brezhnev era, would send a strong message to the bureaucracy. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Domestic Agenda. If Gorbachev wants to signal a new tone, he could defer the traditional summer vacation and work on getting the draft Five Year Plan and party program in shape for the congress. The draft program might be unveiled at the next plenum and should certainly echo his themes of increased discipline and technological progress. When the draft of the economic plan is made public, it should reflect

his demands for increased economic growth rates and a new investment strategy. *[portion marking not declassified]*

He could also make additional forays outside of Moscow to demonstrate his leadership and activism. He is currently visiting the Ukrainian capital Kiev and might undertake a visit to somewhere in Siberia to further increase his exposure. He could use these trips to keep up the rhetorical pressure on the economic bureaucrats. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Foreign Policy. We will probably begin to see a growing Gorbachev impact on foreign policy. Gromyko's influence will decline further from its high point in the Chernenko regime. A meeting with President Reagan would also burnish his image as a statesman, and an early move by Moscow to arrange a summit cannot be ruled out. *[portion marking not declassified]*

His activism may also be reflected in bolder efforts to put pressure on current US policy. We could, for example, see more skillful attempts to woo Tokyo by exploiting trade frictions between the US and Japan, or a symbolic gesture toward Beijing designed to disrupt Sino-US relations. New initiatives to undermine NATO cooperation on SDI and COCOM restrictions are also likely. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Signals of Setback for Gorbachev

Opponents will be looking for opportunities to slow Gorbachev's momentum. An early indicator of political difficulties would be his failure to get the Presidency. While there may be reasons for a General Secretary to delay assumption of the Presidency—Andropov may have for instance—Gorbachev would have to consider the cost of losing political momentum, especially when he so clearly linked the offices of General Secretary and President in nominating Chernenko as chief of state last year. *[portion marking not declassified]*

—*[less than 1 line not declassified]* Gromyko might be in line for the job, and Gorbachev might prefer him in this ceremonial post instead of being Foreign Minister. On balance, however, Gorbachev would probably still benefit more from holding both posts, and it would facilitate his engagement in personal summitry with foreign heads of state. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Another sign of resistance would be delays in the publication of the draft Five Year Plan or party program or the failure of the drafts to show new approaches to economic and social policy. If Gorbachev fails to follow up on his tough rhetoric by firing the ministers he has criticized, it would be widely read in the USSR as a setback. He has made personnel turnover a major issue, and failure to make changes in the top echelon of the party and ministries would signify that his Politburo colleagues are unwilling to go along. *[portion marking not declassified]*

49. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, June 28, 1985, 1701Z

8769. Subject: Soviet Fall-Back Options in the Nuclear and Space Talks. Ref: (A) Moscow 6824,² (B) Moscow 8120,³ (C) Moscow 7398,⁴ (D) Moscow 8052.⁵

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary. In view of the unyielding Soviet negotiating position in the Nuclear and Space Talks, a discussion of possible changes in their stance may give the impression that Embassy officers are “smoking something.” In recent weeks, however, officials of the Space Research Institute have floated some unorthodox ideas with foreign visitors:

—An agreement to reduce nuclear arms which would be invalidated if the United States “deployed SDI.”

—The impossibility of banning SDI research.

—The possibility of expanding the ABM treaty to allow additional ground-based defensive sites.

3. To explore whether other informed Soviets would express interest in these ideas, an Embassy officer visited Arbatov’s USA/Canada Institute. His interlocutors acknowledged the difficulty of banning SDI research, but stuck to the official line that the pursuit of SDI makes nuclear arms reductions impossible. They also foreswore interest in expanded terminal ballistic missile defenses.

4. We conclude that knowledgeable Soviets regard a ban on SDI research as unrealistic, in spite of the ethical demand for one. Since

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850461–0299. Secret. Sent for information to USNATO, NST Delegation Geneva, and Secretary of Defense.

² In telegram 6824 from Moscow, May 23, the Embassy reported that Sagdeyev “has floated with an Italian visitor the idea of offensive arms reductions contingent on no deployment of ‘SDI.’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850365–0086)

³ In telegram 8120 from Moscow, June 17, the Embassy reported on a meeting between Fritz Ermarth, NIO who was visiting the Soviet Union, and officials at the Space Research Institute on June 14. The Embassy noted “somewhat unorthodox ideas” such as “SDI research cannot be banned, but testing in space could be; the ABM Treaty might be modified to allow more than one land-based ABM site; Soviet air defenses are unneeded, but institutional inertia preserves them.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850426–0405)

⁴ See footnote 6, Document 43.

⁵ In telegram 8052 from Moscow, June 14, the Embassy reported on a *Pravda* article by Andrei Kokoshin criticizing SDI and a limited space-based ballistic missile defense. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850423–0084)

Soviet specialists are willing to grant that a research ban could not be effectively verified, this aspect of the official position is likely to change at some point. As alternative thresholds at which the Soviets might propose to stop SDI, Soviet experts have mentioned “the development of systems” and “testing in space.”

5. Although the USA Institute analysts would not endorse the other ideas of their colleagues from the Space Research Institute, these proposals may constitute fall-back options under study by Soviet officialdom. We speculate that both ideas hold some attraction for the Soviets, and that Space Research Institute officials would have discussed them with Soviet officials before floating them with foreign visitors.

6. A nuclear reductions agreement contingent upon non-deployment of SDI, for example, would express the interrelationship of offense and defense as well as the current Soviet demand for a prior ban on “space weapons” before nuclear reductions. A proposal for a contingent agreement would allow the Soviets to call for specific, deep, and publicly attractive reductions in nuclear weapons. At the same time, such an agreement might effectively block any U.S. decision to deploy the fruits of SDI research because of the consequent loss of the reductions in offensive arms.

7. Similarly, the idea of permitting expanded ground-based terminal ballistic missile defenses may appeal to Soviet officials. Militarily, such expanded defenses could reduce the increasing vulnerability of Soviet ICBMs and command centers. Politically, such a proposal could be portrayed as an attempt to meet the United States half-way, while preserving the basic aims of the ABM Treaty.

8. Although we assume the Soviets have fall-back positions under consideration, they of course, have given no sign of eagerness to change their negotiating approach. When and if they ever do, however, the proposals discussed here could receive official sponsorship. End summary.

[Omitted here is the body of the telegram.]

Hartman

50. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 1, 1985

SUBJECT

SDI, NST Talks and East-West Relations

Mr. Secretary—

It is timely to stand back and take as objective and analytical a view as possible of the developing situation with respect to SDI, the NST talks, and East-West relations. Important elements of the situation are:

A. The possible evolution of Soviet attitudes and the factors which drive those attitudes. Those attitudes manifest themselves in what is said:

- at the Gorbachev level,
- at the Gromyko level, and
- at the negotiating level in the Geneva NST talks and elsewhere;

and in what the Soviets do with regard to:

- force structures,
- foreign policy actions, and
- negotiating positions.

B. The factors driving those attitudes include external political, military, and to some extent internal political factors (such as Gorbachev's need to consolidate his power base).

The *external political factors* have included a desire to exploit divisions within political parties in Europe and the US, between parties, and between countries. There has also been a desire to cover over the Soviet return to the negotiating table despite NATO's having ignored the Soviet precondition of a prior withdrawal of US LRINF missiles from Europe. A further desire has been to exhibit Soviet adamancy and thus push those who wish to help move the situation toward peace to bring pressure on the US to take more accommodating positions, rather than on the Soviets who "cannot" be influenced.

Political factors mitigating such an adamant stance include the Soviet desire to maintain the perception of its leadership in the fight for peace and concern that too irresponsible positions will backfire in the struggle for world opinion.

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, June–July 1985. Secret; Sensitive.

The *military factors* include a determination, not only among the military leadership but also among the highest levels of the Politburo and the nomenklatura, to maintain their current margin of military superiority. They see that that advantage would be threatened by our insistence on the right to *de jure* equality in LRINF systems globally and *de facto* equality in Europe, by our drive for deep reductions in their large MIRVed ballistic missile force, which is the heart of their margin of intercontinental nuclear superiority, and now by our drive to develop and perfect SDI technology.²

Even some of those Soviets apparently more disposed than others to seek an agreement with the US insist that, if we persist on our current course, they have no alternative but to force a major showdown before the correlation of forces could be drastically shifted by SDI to the Soviet Union's disadvantage (in a recent conversation with US scientists, Academician Velikhov specifically used the term "pre-empt").³ The general principle in this case may well be to achieve decisive results but to take the minimum risk required to achieve such results. In this context the new Soviet leadership may be willing to take greater risks than Soviet leaders have been willing to take in the past, and may see the correlation of military forces to be more favorable now than in the past. Past experience and conventional wisdom may, therefore, not be an adequate guide.

A possible scenario to achieve decisive results would be for them to bring ascending pressure on the West, and particularly on us, until such results are achieved. The deadline for achieving such results would be earlier than SDI could shift the correlation of military forces in a meaningful way.

Opportunities for exploiting a series of interrelated initiatives against politically and militarily weak salients on the Western side certainly exist. Support for worldwide terrorism, and for guerrillas in Central America, Africa and elsewhere can be expanded. Access routes to Berlin can be disrupted. Pressure on the Afghan-Pakistan border can be increased. Middle East factions can be manipulated to exacerbate

² See Document 49.

³ In telegram 7608 from Moscow, June 7, the Embassy reported on arms control discussions between U.S. and Soviet scientists at the Soviet National Academy of Sciences from June 4 to 6. The U.S. delegation briefed Embassy personnel on the meetings noting the following topics were discussed: "1. Stability of strategic forces; 2. Boundaries of the ABM Treaty and how to prevent its erosion; 3. Weapons in space; ASAT; 4. Biological weapons proliferation; 5. Freezing of nuclear weapons; 6. Balance of conventional forces in Europe and the impact of stability of tactical nuclear force deployments." The delegation also noted the final topic was not discussed "because of lack of time." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850402–0650)

tensions. The Iran-Iraq war can be exploited. An attempt can be made to build bridges to Peking, etc.

The Soviet leadership will also weigh the overall correlation of forces. While the correlation of military forces now favors the Soviets, the overall correlation—including economic, political, and ideological factors—has turned against them in the last few years. This could prompt the Soviets to adopt one of two courses. On the one hand, they might choose to seek a genuine accommodation, or perhaps a pause in the competition, with the West so that they can turn their attention and energies inward to address internal problems. On the other hand, the Soviets may be tempted to exploit their advantages in the military balance in the near future, before the overall correlation shifts further to their disadvantage.

The objective of our policy should be to diminish the chances the Soviets will act now (i.e. “preempt”) out of fear that their overall position is slipping. We instead want to increase the chances that they will adopt a more benign policy.

C. As one looks at the SDI/NST picture, several alternative futures present themselves.

One is that the Soviets will agree to something approaching our concept—a radical reduction in offensive nuclear forces and a jointly managed phased introduction of SDI systems should they prove survivable and cost-effective. One can ask what the odds are that the Soviets will find it to their interest to cooperate with this concept. I should think they are no greater than one in ten.

What are the odds that the Soviets will do whatever they regard as necessary to offset the risks to them of SDI before it can become effective? I should think they are high, higher than one in two.

What are the chances that we would in fact be able to abrogate the ABM Treaty and thus be free to deploy SDI without Soviet consent while holding together an internal consensus and allied support? It would appear that the odds are low unless the Soviets had earlier demonstrated clear prior Soviet effective abrogation of the SALT treaties. Would it not be wise, if that were a likely alternative, to prepare for it by taking actions to concentrate on the Soviets’ responsibility for the possible breakdown of the negotiating process and the remaining SALT restraints.

What are the chances of an accountable give-and-take compromise in Geneva which would alleviate the risks of the above emerging issues? At this time I would say they are less than 50 percent.

D. How should we organize ourselves within the Executive Branch and within the State Department to analyze and deal with this range of

issues and branching decision points? When you have an opportunity, I would like to discuss this with you.

Paul Nitze⁴

⁴ Printed from a copy with this typed signature.

July 1985–August 1985

Sizing Up Shevardnadze and the Soviet Union 101

51. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, July 1, 1985

Jack, I have discussed our concerns over the possible schism between Gromyko and Gorbachev with the Secretary. Coincidentally, he had received a reply from Dobrynin on our earlier agreement to a meeting in Geneva during the week of November 18.² Separately, Shultz and I had met with Dobrynin two weeks ago to lament the sterility of exchanges on central issues between us and raised the possible value of establishing a backchannel (“... direct communications between the President and the General Secretary. . .”).³ I never had any illusions about their (Gromyko's) acceptance of such a proposal but it was an unavoidable square to fill if we were to bring the Secretary to the realization that the Gromyko-Gorbachev disconnect is intrinsically counter to the notion of such a channel in Gromyko's eyes. At any rate, my fears were proven out in a second paper given to Shultz today by Dobrynin which provides a “boilerplate” turn-down to our earlier proposal.⁴ With that in hand, I talked to the Secretary who found appealing the idea of exploring the establishment of backchannel through Ryzhkov. I told him I would work up a message which could

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1985 (10/03/1985–11/18–1985); NLR-362-3-26-2-6. Secret; Sensitive. McFarlane signed “Bud” next to his typed name.

² See Document 52.

³ See Document 43. In his memoir, Dobrynin wrote on this June 17 meeting: “Shultz said he was authorized by the president to propose that he and I conduct through the confidential channel a discussion ‘in a broad, philosophical sense’ of the key arms control questions already under negotiation in Geneva. The exchange could be continued by him and Gromyko late in July, when the two foreign ministers were due to meet in Helsinki for the next Conference on European Security and Cooperation. I recommended to Moscow that we accept this framework for discussion because it meant that Shultz proposed to reactivate the confidential channel. I thought it meant that the administration was serious about dialogue following Reagan's re-election, although that remained to be proven. Two weeks later Moscow accepted November 19–20 in Geneva as the date and place for the summit, but declined the confidential discussions in favor of continuing to work through the regular Geneva arms negotiators.” (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, p. 573)

⁴ Not found.

be sent for his consideration. He agreed. I never mentioned you in any context.

Accordingly, please modify your earlier draft tonight in light of the above so that I can give it to Shultz and hopefully get his agreement to its dispatch promptly.⁵ Even though we are at the point of announcing the agreement on place and time, you might still mention our doubts while at the same time expressing our willingness to proceed as agreed through the Gromyko channel.

Many thanks.

⁵ Not further identified.

52. Editorial Note

On July 1, 1985, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin met with Secretary of State George Shultz and provided him with a written statement that reads in part: "Mikhail S. Gorbachev is agreeable to having his meeting with President Ronald Reagan take place in Geneva. As to the dates, taking into account the considerations presented by us and by the American side, it is being proposed that the meeting be held on November 19–20, 1985." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary's Meetings with the President (07/03/1985)) Shultz explained in his memoir that during their July 1 meeting, he and Dobrynin agreed to make announcements on the Summit. (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 571) In a July 2 memorandum to Shultz, sent to prepare the Secretary for a July 3 meeting with President Ronald Reagan at 9:30 a.m. and the Summit press conference at 1:30 p.m., Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs John Kelly reiterated that the United States wanted to make "progress" on the four-part agenda: arms control, regional issues, humanitarian concerns, and bilateral cooperation. Kelly concluded: "The President approaches this meeting with Mr. Gorbachev with a constructive and serious intent. The United States is a strong and vigorous nation, fully capable of protecting its interests whenever and wherever required. But the President would like to engage the Soviet leadership in a process of finding concrete solutions to the host of problems that confront us. He looks forward to his meeting with Mr. Gorbachev with a sense of the difficulties we face, but also with a willingness to achieve greater understanding, mutual restraint, and where possible, some actual

agreement.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary’s Meetings with the President (07/03/1985))

On July 3, Shultz held a press conference at the Old Executive Office Building announcing the agreement for a meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev in Geneva. (Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1985, pages 29–33)

53. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, July 2, 1985, 0836Z

8857. For the Secretary From the Ambassador. Subject: Gorbachev Moves Again.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. The man who nominated Chernenko for Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in April 1984 and so persuasively argued why it was essential to keep the jobs of head of state and head of party in one man has turned his lawyerly skill to the opposite case. In a short and emotionless intervention Gorbachev made an equally good case for not combining the jobs. His basic point was that to galvanize the party in its “leading role” it was essential for the General Secretary to concentrate his energies on party work.²

3. What he did not say but what must have been understood by the loyal party folk in the hall is that he has managed in these short days since his elevation to eliminate his major opponent (Romanov), promote his most loyal and competent aides (Ligachev, Ryzhkov, and Chebrikov), and do what the Central Committee bureaucrats have

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850465–0985. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.

² Gorbachev maneuvered during the session of the Supreme Soviet for the “elevation of Gromyko to the Chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and his replacement as Foreign Minister by former Georgian party boss Shevardnadze,” which signaled the “end of an era in Soviet foreign policy” and the remaking of the “political landscape of the Soviet Union.” (Telegram 8886 from Moscow, July 2; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850466–0753) On July 2, Reagan wrote in his personal diary: “N.S.C. briefing had to do with Gorbachev’s latest movement, the naming of Gromyko as Pres. of the U.S.S.R. It is a ceremonial job & possibly it was given to get a new face in the Foreign Ministry.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I: January 1981–October 1985, p. 478)

wanted to do for a long time—i.e. get Gromyko out of the way.³ He has also managed to put the military in a secondary position. Rumors are flying that a major shake-up in the Central Committee staff will soon take place. The two new secretaries appointed on July 1 are definitely Gorbachev's team. The main last change to be made—Prime Minister—apparently awaits the Party Congress.

4. Thus the conclusion must be drawn that he has amassed power faster than most experts had thought possible. He now faces the near-term tasks of re-making the Central Committee and drawing up the new edition of the party program and the next Five Year Plan—all of which should be in place by the time of the February 1986 Party Congress. He also faces all the continuing internal problems and difficulties within the empire—which will probably be more difficult for him to overcome. But he does this with a confidence that appears to come from youthful energy, a strong belief in orthodox communism, and a fine political and public relations sense.

5. On foreign affairs he has not yet set his mark. Appointing a neophyte like Shevardnadze to be Foreign Minister will make it easier for Gorbachev and the party apparat to step into what has been for almost thirty years the preserve of Andrei Gromyko. Shevardnadze is now a full Politburo member but essentially a man known for rooting out corruption and making agriculture work more efficiently. Over time we should see many changes at the top of the Foreign Office. Exciting times. I assume that Shevardnadze will go ahead with Gromyko's schedule and you will have an opportunity to size up this handsome, southern activist who has a lot of success behind him but unknown views on foreign policy. My colleagues who have met him in Georgia say that he has always had a big interest in foreign affairs and spoke knowledgeably from a brief.

Hartman

³ In telegram 8886 from Moscow, the Embassy also reported: "Despite the effective support that Gromyko provided in garnering the General Secretaryship for Gorbachev, he has nevertheless been gracefully moved to the sidelines in the foreign affairs field. The post of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium has little substantive content unless combined with another job. The naming of Eduard Shevardnadze to the Foreign Ministry, however, has deprived Gromyko of his institutional base. Our sense is that Gromyko moved upstairs only reluctantly and would have preferred to serve out his time as Foreign Minister." See footnote 2, above.

54. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, July 2, 1985

SUBJECT

Gromyko's "Elevation": First Thoughts

Some of my initial thoughts on the personnel changes announced today are as follows:

Gorbachev Takes Charge: The most obvious is that Gorbachev has pulled off a brilliant tactical move which puts him in direct charge of foreign policy. He did this by passing on to Gromyko the trappings of high office, while seizing the real power lever. It is an excellent example of his instinct for political maneuver in the Soviet context. A weak leader like Chernenko needed the chief-of-state title to project a public image of authority which was in fact lacking. Gorbachev has the strength and shrewdness to settle for the power itself. The trappings can come in time, when potential rivals, or powerful barons (boyars in Russian terminology), are eliminated or severed from their power base.

Shevardnadze: Originally a tough policeman (he was for several years Minister of Interior in Soviet Georgia), he subsequently made a reputation as a no-nonsense executive, an enemy of corruption (for which Soviet Georgia is notorious), and a mild "reformer" of administrative practices, particularly in agriculture. He handled some explosive issues involving Georgian nationalism deftly, giving way just enough to take off the steam when faced with demonstrations over such issues as forcing more use of the Russian language in Georgia. (On this particular point, the Georgian nationalists actually won; as a Georgian, Shevardnadze may well have been sympathetic, and if so, demonstrated consummate skill in staying in Moscow's good graces while giving way to Georgian national feelings.)

Like Gorbachev, he seems to have a flair for PR, and may be adept at projecting an attractive image to foreign audiences, in sharp contrast to the dour Gromyko. He was a favorite of Andropov and may have collaborated with the latter in his campaign to undermine Brezhnev's authority. (Shevardnadze's predecessor as Georgian Party chieftain, Mzhavanadze, was personally close to Brezhnev, and the charges of corruption against him foreshadowed the later campaign Andropov

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1985 (1/8). Secret. Sent for information.

organized against Brezhnev's family.) So, like Gorbachev, he is a wily operator, but as Foreign Minister he owes his position entirely to Gorbachev, who is also well placed to control his future, so we can assume he will work as a faithful executor of Gorbachev's wishes.

Possible Purge of Foreign Ministry: To gain total mastery of foreign affairs, Gorbachev must do one of two things—or a little bit of both: (1) Bring the Foreign Ministry staff under his own control, through Shevardnadze, and/or (2) Beef up the status and operational clout of his own CC Secretariat staff dealing with foreign affairs. Regarding the former, it will be interesting to see whether Shevardnadze keeps Gromyko's "U.S. affairs team" in place (people like Dobrynin, Korniyenko, Komplektov and Bessmertnykh) or replaces them. My guess is that some will be replaced, though some may be fast enough on their feet to convince the new boss of their indispensability. As for the Central Committee Secretariat staff, Gorbachev has already removed Zamyatin from head of the International Information Department. Rumors are flying in Moscow regarding other possible changes; with changes might come increased authority if Gorbachev wishes to build up an institutional counterweight to the entrenched MFA bureaucracy.

Implications for U.S.-Soviet Relations: I expect to see no major changes in the Soviet policy toward the U.S. in the *immediate* future. However, I suspect that both Gorbachev and Shevardnadze may be more inclined to step up attention to U.S. Allies, China and the Third World, rather than making U.S.-Soviet relations the linchpin of Soviet foreign policy as Gromyko tended to do. Coming from a region bordering on Turkey and Iran, Shevardnadze may well have a greater interest in Third World issues than Gromyko had (despite his rhetoric to the contrary). Furthermore, we have already seen signs of greater activity towards China, and I believe we will see much more in Western Europe, with perhaps more than one trip by Gorbachev there in the fall. (France seems certain in October, and Geneva plus perhaps something else in November.) We can expect some very attractive-looking blandishments waved in the faces of our Allies and their publics in coming months, whatever else happens.

Nevertheless, when all is said and done, relations with the United States will continue to preoccupy the Soviet leadership. The forays into other areas will be seen primarily as attempts to weaken U.S. influence and to put pressure on our positions. In the final analysis, though, they must deal with us, and they know it.

Implications for the Summit: Certainly, from now on, Gorbachev will take personal charge of the "preparations." The Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Helsinki (which I presume will go forward as planned) may provide few signals; it may be little more than Shevardnadze's warm-up for his presumed trip to the U.N. in September and the

meetings he can expect here then. While he is getting his team in place, or establishing his authority over the existing team, I doubt that he will be inclined toward policy innovation. As we near November, however, minds will be increasingly concentrated on how Gorbachev can come out of the Summit looking a winner.

I suspect that we will see something of a “double track” approach. On the one hand, we will see a schedule of activities in Europe, and very likely some “initiatives,” which will make Gorbachev look good at home whatever happens at the Summit, coupled with steady pressure on us to give way on SDI—which the Soviets have set up as *the* symbolic issue in the relationship. On the other hand, we will probably experience a growing number of probes to determine where there may be some “give” in our current positions. The best summit result for Gorbachev would be to carry back something he could tout as a trophy, on the background of a triumphal tour of several West European capitals.

We have our work cut out for us.

55. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 3, 1985

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Jack Matlock, NSC
Mark Palmer, EUR

Ambassador Dobrynin
Oleg Sokolov, Soviet Embassy DCM

SUBJECT

Reagan-Gorbachev Summit; Helsinki Meeting

The Secretary opened by saying that in his press conference this afternoon and in this meeting he wanted to convey that the President regards the upcoming summit as a very serious matter.² We expect

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1985 (2/8). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe and Palmer on July 6. The time and location of the meeting were not noted. On July 3, Shultz sent Reagan a one-page memorandum summarizing this meeting. (Ibid.)

² See Document 52.

the process of advance discussions and work to make as much progress as possible. We regard the meeting today as the beginning of a process which will unfold through contacts between our governments and embassies in Moscow and here, in his meeting with the new Foreign Minister in Helsinki, and presumably in a meeting in New York as well. The Secretary noted that the President's invitation for the Soviet Foreign Minister to come to Washington stands. We presume that Shevardnadze will be coming to the UNGA. Dobrynin said that he also has this presumption, but he did not know this for a fact.

The Secretary then noted that in his press conference today, he had been asked if he was going to Moscow. He had responded that there is no plan for him to do so. This did not mean that he necessarily would not go. The President thinks that we should do all that is necessary to make the summit a good meeting. The Secretary further noted that we are aware of the many differences between us, that we have two differing systems, but we want to find some accommodation.

Dobrynin asked what kind of preliminary agenda we had in mind? What issues do we expect our leaders to cover? How would we use the month before Helsinki? General Secretary Gorbachev had said that we should use this time before a summit for active work on issues to see what we can accomplish and to exercise mutual restraint. We have a kind of stage-by-stage process, including the meetings between the Secretary and the Minister.

The Secretary said that before we started on the process and substance of summit preparations, he would like to know what kind of guy the *new Soviet Foreign Minister* is.³ Dobrynin said that he is more direct than Gromyko, less reserved. By this he didn't mean that Gromyko was any different when he was with his own people than he was with the Secretary. That was just his character. Shevardnadze has a sense of humor. He is more natural. He does not have much experience in foreign affairs. He has been on some foreign trips, parliamentary and party, and he has held international symposia in Georgia, but he has not been in a negotiating situation government to government. He will have a different style from Gromyko.

The Secretary then said he would like to begin by talking about *procedures*. We have not heard back whether the Soviets accept the time

³ On July 3, Reagan wrote in his personal diary: "We're all agreed the new Soviet Foreign Minister is there to hold the fort for Gorbachev. We also decided—now that the meeting with him has been announced—that we must do nothing to raise public expectations. I said we must paint with a broad brush & not give the press specifics as to our agenda." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I: January 1981–October 1985, p. 478) See also Documents 53 and 54.

of 2:00–5:00 p.m. in Helsinki.⁴ Dobrynin suggested that maybe we had not had an answer because Gromyko foresaw there was going to be a change. The Secretary said we need to nail it down now. We had thought that since the meeting will be in our mission, if the new Foreign Minister wishes, he would be happy to invite him to a light lunch at 1:00 p.m. This would not be for business and there would be just the two of them with interpreters. Dobrynin asked if he was suggesting a *tete-a-tete* that would precede the meeting from 2:00 to 5:00, and the Secretary said yes, for about an hour.

The Secretary continued that if it seemed after the regular meeting that it would be useful to have more time, he was prepared to do that. If the meeting runs a little longer than three hours, that would be OK because there is some time before the Finnish dinner that evening. But he also noted that some of the most productive times with Gromyko came when there were more than one meeting, and both sides had time to consider between sessions and then get back together. Therefore, he was prepared to stay through lunchtime the next day, if necessary. He was not pushing for this second meeting because he will have been travelling a lot and wanted to get back to Washington as soon as possible.

The Secretary said that we should be discussing here and in Moscow what combination of substantive issues we want for the summit and the beginnings of an *agenda*. When you get two strong-minded men in a room, they frequently find their own way, but it would be useful to have some sense of how they will spend their time. Dobrynin said that we also will need to see what can be done in advance.

The Secretary said this will be an important meeting; things will be going on in advance and if it is successful it will establish an agenda for us to carry out afterwards. Dobrynin interrupted to emphasize that we should aim at things that could be solved before and announced at the summit. The Secretary said he agreed with that. We should use the deadline of the meeting to make as much progress as possible.

The Secretary then said we need to block out the kind of approach that we should take. Perhaps the way that Gromyko and he had proceeded in January in Geneva provides the model. There were morning and afternoon meetings; they kept pretty much to times that had been set; met again the next morning and left open time for a fourth meeting. There were not a lot of social events. This worked out pretty well as we needed the time to work between meetings. Of course, the US did

⁴ In a July 3 memorandum to Shultz, Kelly noted that there were “practical possibilities for working in more time with Shevardnadze” in Helsinki, and he suggested Shultz discuss this with Dobrynin during their meeting. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (7/3/1985); NLR-775-13-72-3-5)

give a little reception. Dobrynin said this would have to be mutual; there would have to be two events this time. He said that we have a lot of time to decide about social events, but it is something Shultz and Shevardnadze could discuss in Helsinki.

Turning to substance, the Secretary said both sides feel arms control is the centerpiece. He gave a quick appraisal of how we see things. With regard to MBFR, we would not lay a big wager on progress. It is not that we should not try, but history shows that this is not a fast moving negotiation. Dobrynin said that he regretted the Secretary's view on MBFR. Couldn't our two bosses get this moving and get some Soviet and American reductions. We could begin with some withdrawals which would be a symbolic gesture—ten, fifteen, or twenty thousand—just to show some willingness. This could cut through all the complications. We have five months left, but already the Secretary is saying nothing can be done in this area.

The Secretary said he was not precluding progress here, but trying to construct a mental chart with headings about probabilities and importance. This could help us to focus on what is more likely to yield results if we push. In MBFR, there are some very important verification problems. If the Ambassador was saying this is a priority item for the Soviet Union, we would be glad to know that. Dobrynin said this is not the highest priority, but in a second category.

Continuing, the Secretary said that there are also the issues under discussion in *Stockholm*. We have created working groups and the structure of a deal has emerged. This is a place to push. We know that Ambassador Goodby has been invited to visit Moscow.⁵ In our view, there is more potential here. This is a multilateral negotiation and so we cannot do it just between the two of us, but when we are together, generally the others go along. One way to push this is to say let's start to develop the language of an agreement. This does not mean we are now in agreement, but drafting gives a focus and a way of getting a handle on how to phrase things and resolve problems.

The Secretary continued that the third arms control area he wanted to mention was that of *chemical weapons*. He felt in Vienna that Gromyko had agreed that this is an important area. Chemical weapons have potential for getting out of hand around the world. It is hard to see how we can get agreement overall, but we are prepared to talk about it. We made concrete suggestions in Vienna. The Soviet side has not taken them up, but we urge you to look at them again. They might

⁵ In telegram 4568 from Stockholm, June 18, Goodby reported that in a private meeting on June 14 Grinevsky extended him an invitation for further consultation in Moscow in late August. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850429–0214)

move the ball slightly. Would you want to set out on a quiet effort to see if we can get somewhere on this? Dobrynin agreed that chemical weapons were rather dangerous. He said the Soviets proposed that our representatives get together on this subject in Geneva. They were disturbed that our representatives had had nothing to say. The Secretary suggested that the Soviets should do a little and we do a little; we can see what we can do.

The Secretary turned to *nuclear non-proliferation*, noting that we had proposed a statement and that this was apparently agreeable to the Soviet side. We were prepared to have the two leaders do this in their meeting.

Dobrynin asked about *nuclear testing*. The Secretary said we are prepared to talk about it. We put an interesting proposal to him and we thought at one time that he considered it interesting too. But after we did it, they found it less interesting. We understand sensitivity about changing treaties that we already agreed to, but we could do things separately that would improve our ability to do calibration and verification. Dobrynin commented that apparently we had nothing new on this. What about resumption of CTB talks between the UK, the US, and the USSR? The Secretary responded that they should think some more about our testing proposal. They have a new General Secretary and a new Foreign Minister—live a little. Dobrynin said that he had gotten the Secretary's message. The Secretary then noted that these are sensible things that could be done. They are not terribly intrusive and would change the environment here.

The Secretary then turned to *regional issues*. In Helsinki, we would like to have more discussions of these issues with the new Minister. We can talk in our own right and as preparation for the meeting between our two leaders. We have started down the path of experts talks with meetings on the Mideast, southern Africa, and Afghanistan. You have also proposed discussions on East Asia and Central America and the Caribbean. We think that East Asia is the next logical topic and will be ready to talk about this in Helsinki and maybe set it up. We can then consider Central America and the Caribbean. These are healthy things to have and we welcome them.

In the *Afghanistan* talks, the Secretary said we were somewhat disappointed because there was no motion. Of course, there is the UN setup which we support. We had the impression from Rajiv Gandhi that the Soviets are taking another look at Afghanistan and that if we also take another look, there might be some progress.⁶ The Indians seem more willing to work on this issue. We might talk about this in

⁶ See footnote 3, Document 46.

Helsinki. We want to support Cordovez.⁷ Our perception is that you are putting a lot of pressure on the Pakistanis and also inside Afghanistan with military offensives. Maybe that reflects your desire to deal with this issue on the ground, but if not we want to assure that we have no interest in keeping the war there going. We want a political settlement.

Dobrynin said he wanted to draw the Secretary's attention to two points in Gorbachev's letter to the President.⁸ They had hoped the US would show some sign of urging the Pakistanis to be more moderate and to reduce US assistance inside the country. Gorbachev had pointed out that this would not go unnoticed in our relations. Although he considered the US-Soviet talks on Afghanistan to be useful, they did not lead anywhere. The US is increasing support to the rebels. Moscow is for peace in Afghanistan and ultimately for withdrawal. We welcome your and Mr. Armacost's statement that you are not set on "bleeding" us.⁹ The Secretary said that that was the word that Gromyko had used and we were pointing to it. Dobrynin said he would pass the message to his Minister. The Secretary said he would like to discuss Afghanistan in Helsinki, but if neither of us had anything new to say, we could of course pass on to other subjects.

On *Europe*, continued the Secretary, we still have the question of the *Nicholson case*. Maybe the military discussions are making some progress, but the more unequivocal the Soviet statements are, the better. We also see some improvement in the *Berlin air corridors*. The distances allotted are better, but they are not enough. Gromyko had said and Gorbachev's message reiterates, that we should try to manage so that the period leading up to the summit would be stable. We agree with that. Dobrynin responded "What about Nicholson?" The President's letter dwells on this at too great a length.¹⁰ The Secretary said that at the moment what is needed is a clearer understanding on how Soviet forces will conduct themselves so that our men will not get shot. Nicholson was in a clearly marked car, in uniform, etc. Dobrynin said that they had delegated this matter to their military authorities. They are on the spot and know best how to handle it. We (presumably the MFA)

⁷ UN Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs Diego Cordovez was appointed in February 1982 as the Secretary General's Personal Representative to negotiate a political settlement in Afghanistan.

⁸ See Document 46.

⁹ In telegram 190216 to Moscow, June 21, the Department transmitted a summary of Armacost's June 19 meeting with Dobrynin after the June 18–19 U.S.-Soviet talks on Afghanistan during which he "reiterated that our objective was not to bleed the Soviets, but to achieve a settlement." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

¹⁰ See Document 23.

are leaving it to them. The Secretary said that the question is what emerges from those discussions. Dobrynin said that on the Berlin air corridors, the US had received a clearcut answer. This was based on post-War agreements. This had been dealt with at the technical level, but because the US had brought it up at the government-to-government level, we replied in the same way.

Dobrynin continued that he needed to know what the Secretary wanted to discuss in Helsinki with Shevnardnadze at Helsinki. He needed to inform him so the Foreign Minister could be prepared on the details. Should our two leaders spend time on such questions as these? This is unnecessary. The US has the right to raise any subject, but is this just being used as an example of the sort of thing that should not happen before the summit or a subject for the discussions? The Secretary said he was not suggesting that the two leaders spend all their time on issues like the Nicholson case and the Berlin air corridors, but that we must handle such issues well so that they do not blow up on us. They are examples of two things that should be resolved so they do not affect the atmosphere. We should handle these in a manner so they do not come up. Neither has been dealt with to our satisfaction to date.

The Secretary then returned to *Afghanistan* for a moment, noting that the US had made a proposal to let the ICRC work on the prisoners issue and was awaiting a response.

He then turned to the “Madrid/Helsinki issues” (i.e. *human rights*). The Ambassador, Gorbachev, and Gromyko always say that you will not negotiate about these issues and that you cannot be asked to violate your own laws. We are not seeking to do that. It is not necessary to go through all the cases; you are familiar with them but it is important for you to point out to your leaders that this is a sensitive area. The Ambassador knows this country well and should tell his leaders that this is a fact. The USSR can take actions unilaterally, consistent with your laws and this would help a great deal. Divided spouses, in particular, is an issue covered in the Helsinki agreements. This is a subject where Soviet unilateral action—not bargains, not negotiation—would make a big difference.

Moving to the *bilateral* area, the Secretary noted Mac Baldrige had had what we considered a good visit to Moscow.¹¹ Dobrynin interrupted to say that they also considered it to have been a good visit, not for solving problems but for achieving some basic understanding. The Secretary continued that we were prepared to move ahead on non-strategic *trade*. We will have talks on fishing soon; we are working on

¹¹ See Documents 32 and 38.

the fur skins issue. There are a lot of nuts and bolts to do in this area. If we can make a little bundle of non-strategic trade issues and prepare that for the summit, that would be good. Also, some time before the summit, there could be an agriculture visit to the Soviet Union. Secretary Block could go to the Soviet Union in September or October.

The Secretary then noted there is a list of things that the Ambassador was familiar with that we should try to get accomplished. On *Pacific Air Safety*, we hope the Soviet side will come to the next meeting with a constructive position. If that issue is resolved, we can open up discussions on *civil aviation*. Both sides have had talks with Pan Am; they feel the need to make money on the Moscow route this time. Dobrynin confirmed that they had had talks with Pan Am and said a Soviet delegation is coming here for additional talks this month. The Secretary commented that there is an obvious pattern to these issues—a walk, if you will. There is also a relationship to the *consulates*. If we get into the civil aviation discussions and the Soviets still want a consulate in New York, then we could quickly set up our Kiev and New York consulates. It is up to us to manage the process and to push it ahead.

The Secretary continued that we also have the *exchanges agreement* negotiations. We think it is important to recognize that television has a role in the modern world. Dobrynin said that they had given Ambassador Hartman time on Soviet television. The Secretary said we think it important to have this in the exchanges agreement. We also think that exhibits are very important to have as before.

The Secretary said that if we had agreements in all of these areas, we could wrap a ribbon around the four agreements and hand them to our two leaders at the summit. We suggest that we work to push these issues under negotiations and that we keep in close contact here and in Moscow on them.

The Secretary continued that he hoped your new Foreign Minister will meet with Art Hartman soon so we can get to know him better. On the question of an agenda for a summit, we should come forward with our ideas but should avoid getting caught up arguing over the agenda. It is also important to think about how to use our time in Helsinki, whether we should set aside some special time to discuss Geneva issues. Dobrynin said we should concentrate on things in this period that we can get done. The Secretary said he agreed that we should concentrate on important things and try to get them done. The sooner we can hear the Soviet views on the Helsinki schedule and about Washington and New York in the fall the better. The President's time is always tight. Dobrynin asked if the President would go to the UNGA. The Secretary said he would not go up early, but perhaps around October 24 when the special commemoration would be held.

The Secretary noted that Gromyko usually came for several weeks and that he too would go up as usual to hold his “dentist’s office.” Assuming that Shevardnadze comes to the UN, it would be good for him to spend some time with the President personally. Dobrynin said that we would probably get news about the Helsinki meeting earlier than we would about New York and Washington.

56. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz in Bangkok¹

Washington, July 8, 1985, 2115Z

207459/Tosec 130140. Subject: Message From Paul Nitze. For the Secretary From Nick Platt. Three copies to S/S Quinn only.

1. Entire text Secret. Paragraphs 2–10 contain the text of a highly sensitive memorandum from Paul Nitze to the Secretary in the Eggplant series. Please make certain that no one besides the Secretary and Charlie have access to it.

2. I have reflected on our June 17 presentation and the July 1 Soviet response.² I am increasingly convinced the Soviets in fact misunderstood your original presentation.

3. In the points we passed to Dobrynin the essence of our idea was that, were there radical reductions on the offensive side, the need for compensatory defenses would correspondingly be “diminished.”³ The Soviets could have misread this to suggest that, with large cuts on the offensive side, we would seek to deploy fewer new strategic defenses than we might otherwise seek to deploy. They may well have missed the trade we were actually suggesting.

4. It is likely the Soviets misread our June 17 approach as simply a reiteration of the offer of discussions regarding a possible transition to a more defense-reliant balance that Max has been pressing in Geneva. In fact, Max has told the Soviets this round—again in the context of a

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Eggplant I, June, July, August 1985 NP. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Adam. Drafted by Nitze; cleared by Pearce and Platt; approved by McKinley. Shultz was in Bangkok from July 8 to 10 to meet with Prime Minister Prem and other Thai officials.

² See Document 43. The July 1 Soviet response was not found.

³ See Documents 43 and 55.

possible transition to a more defense-reliant balance—that reductions in offensive arms would reduce the need for defenses. A close reading of the paper Dobrynin left off on July 1 suggests a Soviet interpretation of our June 17 presentation as more of the same.

5. There is conceivably much to gain, and little to lose, in making sure the Soviets in fact understand what we had in mind. Our offer—adequately clarified—could provide the framework for a settlement of the nuclear and space arms questions. Failing that, it would still leave us well-positioned to make the case with publics, allies and Congress that we had made every effort to break the impasse in Geneva. But as things stand now, the record is not clear on our offer.

6. I have also done some thinking about when we might want to correct this Soviet misunderstanding, that is, make clear the nature of the actual deal that we are prepared to explore.

7. One alternative would be for you to do so in Helsinki. This would let you outline the deal directly to Shevardnadze, could give him a “plum” to take back to Moscow, and could get your working relationship off to a good start.

8. On the other hand, several reasons argue for us to move to correct the Soviet misunderstanding prior to Helsinki, preferably by an approach here before Dobrynin departs.

—The longer we leave the July 1 Soviet response on the record without any response, the more difficult it will be to correct their misinterpretation. If we leave their response unchallenged, your approach to Shevardnadze in Helsinki would appear to be a “new” offer. It could suggest to them that we are overly anxious for agreement were they to believe we were coming forward with a “new” offer just six weeks after they had turned down one high-level approach. For tactical reasons, we should thus seek to tie any clarification to the June 17 presentation, making clear they are one and the same. This is easier done sooner rather than later.

—If we do not clarify our offer until your meeting with Shevardnadze, we cannot expect that he will be prepared adequately to explore our approach, let alone to set in motion a process that could lead to agreement at the November summit. He most likely would instead note your presentation and say he would get back with a response later. If, on the other hand, we clarify the deal here and ask that Shevardnadze be prepared to address it in Helsinki, you should be able to have a real dialogue.

—Waiting until Helsinki to clarify our offer costs us not only three weeks in our timetable for the November summit; it could delay high-level substantive discussions by nearly two months. Clarifying our offer to Shevardnadze at the end of this month means that subsequent

exchanges would have to take place via letter or through Embassies; you would not have another chance for a face-to-face session until late September at the UNGA.

9. I know you are preoccupied with other issues at the moment but felt these points should be called to your attention. I have not spoken with Bud about this, nor have I shown him the draft talking points I prepared July 2 in response to Dobrynin's non-paper.⁴ If you share my view that on balance there is something to be gained by removing a probable misunderstanding prior to Helsinki, it would be important to attempt to catch Dobrynin with such clarification prior to his departure; in the absence of Dobrynin, then Sokolov could send the clarifying points to Moscow. Although in similar circumstances Art Hartman would be ideal for such a communication, he is not aware of the substance of the June 17 meeting. Hence, clarification should be done here in Washington. I have tried to see Bud (to close the loop on Max's draft aide memoire), but he continues to be difficult for me to reach.⁵

10. I will take no action until instructed by you.

Armacost

⁴ The draft talking points were not found.

⁵ Not further identified.

57. Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to Secretary of State Shultz in Bangkok¹

Washington, July 8, 1985

WH 3145. Please deliver the following message from Bud McFarlane to Secretary Shultz Eyes Only in a sealed envelope at opening of business.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Eggplant I, June, July, August 1985 NP. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. "Return for certified destruction" is written across the top of the message in an unknown hand. This message was sent via "Privacy Channels." Shultz was in Thailand from July 8 to 10.

Subject: Odds and ends.

1. Secret entire text.

2. With apologies for interrupting your trip, I wanted to give you some thoughts on issues which will be upon you soon after your return and seek your reaction in the next week or so. The first is the Helsinki trip. Over the weekend, as I devoted some time to the directions our relationship with the Russians is taking, I was more and more drawn to the conclusion that the role of the Helsinki meetings has become very different from what it was two weeks ago. First, we have seen the Russians introduce their percentage proposal at Geneva.² This is not so striking for its substance as it is for the apparent intention it may represent to use Geneva for serious purpose. Time will tell, but taken with the fairly flat turndown they gave us on the concept of a private channel, there seems to be a fairly clear signal that Gorbachev is not yet ready to deal with the issue himself. Even more importantly, however, their lack of pick up on our signal raises for me a caution that we ought not be introducing new ideas before they have shown at least some interest in the channel itself. To do so contains the real risk of our appearing overly anxious, a position which all of us recognize is to be avoided. Then, too, there is the very valid requirement for Shevardnadze to get his feet on the ground and for you to establish your relationship with him. At a setting with that purpose you certainly don't need the appearance that someone from the White House is looking over your shoulder. Consequently, I am beginning to think that my presence would be gratuitous and perhaps inadvertently harmful to your purpose. Finally, there is my growing concern that we will have more than enough to do back here in shepherding the terrorism work of the VP's task force and the near-term work on Libya. I hesitate to be away at that time. All this is to the point that I am beginning to believe that I ought to stay here. I haven't mentioned it to the President and would appreciate your thoughts before doing so.

3. Dobrynin. Dobrynin has invited me to lunch this week. I don't hold any particular brief for doing it. As I indicate above, I don't think we want to be offering new arms control positions right now. I could go over the President's thinking on his expectations for the meeting in November, but you have done that and there really aren't any late-breaking issues which need to be treated before he goes back. But if you see some value in it please let me know.

² In telegram 6370 from the NST Delegation in Geneva, July 5, the delegation indicated that the Soviet "percentages proposal" was discussed in detail during a July 1 meeting of the head NST negotiators. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850475-0678)

4. Libya. At the last NSPG on terrorism, a consensus was emerging that we needed to continue to pursue the Salvadoran option but also explore making a serious effort toward Libya.³ You will recall that part of the concept which John Poindexter's CPPG has worked on is to engage Mubarak to see what degree of interest there might be in playing a role, if only to be a cheerleader at the right moment. The work is continuing—Mike may have updated you—but it seems to me important that we engage Mubarak soon; I would think within the next two weeks. Consequently, I would like to propose that we work up talking points for the presentation of the concept as a basis for drawing the Egyptians out on what they are willing to do. It seems to me that the demarche ought to be done by someone from the White House. An undertaking of this magnitude clearly requires that the diplomatic, military and intelligence aspects be presented. The plan overlaps State, Defense and CIA areas of responsibility. Then too, given the Carter legacy on this issue with Mubarak, it will be important that he see it as clearly having the President's backing. My candidate for the mission is John Poindexter. In addition to fulfilling the several criteria mentioned above, John has been the linchpin of the plan's development, working with Mike and reps from DOD and CIA. I would appreciate your thinking this over and letting me know within the next few days.

5. Otherwise things here are relatively quiet, what with the Congress just getting back. The VP reported today on his European trip.⁴ He found them less anxious on SDI, generally supportive on the need to counter terrorism (but here more willing to speak quietly than to take action), and pleased with the SALT II announcement and the setting of the date for the meeting with Gorbachev.⁵ Separately we have reached an impasse on the budget resolution conference and are working on some kind of compromise which will still yield \$50 billion (plus) first year reductions, although Dave Stockman and everyone else acknowledge that only about \$35 billion (most of which is Defense cuts) will yield real savings. I will try to send a word or two each day to keep you informed on comings and goings here. I hope your meetings in Kuala Lumpur go well.⁶ Please let me know if we can be reinforcing from here at any point.

Warm regards, Bud

³ A record of the July 3 NSPG meeting on terrorism, which examined the TWA Flight 847 hijacking as well as terrorism in El Salvador and Libya, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XLVII, Part 2, Terrorism, June 1985–January 1989.

⁴ Bush traveled to Europe from June 23 to July 3.

⁵ On June 10, Reagan made a statement on U.S. and Soviet compliance with arms control and sent a report to Congress. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book I, pp. 743–745; see also footnote 2, Document 41.

⁶ Shultz attended the ASEAN Post-Ministerial meetings in Kuala Lumpur from July 10 to 12.

58. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 10, 1985

SUBJECT

Recent Soviet Policy Moves: An Emerging Strategy?

1. You should be aware of a number of recent moves by the Soviets which, taken together, suggest they may be positioning themselves to exert greater pressure on us, particularly on arms control, as we enter the fall run-up to the summit. End summary.

2. In the START negotiations, Karpov has told Ambassador Tower that the negotiations are now at a point where there can be discussion “in principle” of reductions and models of agreements, to which both sides can agree when space arms issues are resolved. Their ideas may resemble, in some respects, the State Department “common framework” approach of imposing dual constraints on aggregate launchers and warheads with certain sub-ceilings. The Soviets have begun to outline their START position, introducing a “percentage” scheme.² Although Soviet descriptions of this scheme have been conflicting, it appears to be that within a nuclear weapons aggregate, no more than a certain percentage of the weapons could be on any one leg of a side’s triad. In addition, in his last post-plenary discussion with Ambassador Tower, Karpov suggested that the Soviets might be prepared to accept thirty to forty percent reductions in existing levels of strategic weapons and launchers, and invited Tower to suggest a percentage. (Of course, by strategic weapons the Soviets have in the past meant gravity bombs and SRAMs as well as RVs and ALCMs; our START position has not limited gravity bombs and SRAMs, only bombers that carry them.)

3. Since the Soviets have resisted our delegation’s efforts to pin down precisely what percentages they have in mind, our delegation does not consider that the Soviets have submitted a genuine proposal, and has told the Soviets so. The Soviets have countered that they do indeed have a proposal. Should they wish, they can publicize it as such at the end of the round. It is a scheme that could excite considerable

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 NODIS and EXDIS Secretariat Memorandums, Lot 94D92, Exdis July 1985. Secret; Exdis. Sent through Armacost. Drafted by Tefft; cleared by Nitze, Hawes, Palmer, Simons, Burton, Dunkerley, Courtney, and Timbie. Neither Burt nor Armacost initialed the memorandum; however, a stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

² See footnote 2, Document 57.

interest on the Hill and among the allies. They could also add numbers at any time.

4. On the question of space arms, Gorbachev has put an interesting new twist on the Soviet position in his latest public statement—a letter to the American Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS).³ As part of a standard recitation of Soviet negotiating aims and criticism of the U.S., Gorbachev called on the U.S. to join the USSR in reaffirming the ABM treaty in a “binding form.” (A UCS letter to Gorbachev called on him to agree to such a reaffirmation.) The concept is designed to suggest to the UCS, which has strongly opposed SDI, that the Soviets are flexible and more ready than the U.S. to cut a deal in Geneva. In the same letter, Gorbachev called for a ban on SDI testing and development but did not explicitly mention research. While the press has played up this new formulation, it is still possible that Gorbachev’s statement reflects the Soviet tendency to subsume “research” under the rubric of “development” or “creation.” It is thus too early to say with any certainty that the Gorbachev statement signals greater Soviet flexibility on this point. There are other Soviet hints of interest in expanding the ABM treaty to allow more ground-based deployments. Chief of the General Staff Akhromeyev hinted this recently to Egon Bahr.⁴ So did Space Research Institute Chief Sagdayev, in a talk with CIA USSR NIO Fritz Ermarth.⁵

5. On INF, the Soviets, as you know, have maintained a particularly sterile, unconstructive line in Geneva. They have not abandoned their 1983 position of zero U.S. LRINF deployments in Europe and equal numbers of Soviet and British/French forces. Here too, however, there is the potential for Soviet mischief-making as we head up to a summit. Although the Soviets so far have shown little interest in playing the Dutch card, today’s intelligence suggests that they are continuing to convert SS–20 bases (for the SS–25); this raises again the possibility that the Soviets could be down to below 378 SS–20’s deployed at bases before the Dutch decision in November on U.S. deployments (current figures are 432 operational missiles, 396 at bases). In a move that may

³ The July 6 letter is printed in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVII, no. 27 (July 31, 1985), p. 5. The letter is also printed in *Documents on Disarmament*, 1985, pp. 376–378.

⁴ In telegram 18920 from Bonn, June 28, the Embassy reported on a conversation between Rowny and Egon Bahr, during which Bahr stated that “when he had raised the matter of defensive systems with General Akhromeyev during Willy Brandt’s recent trip to Moscow, he had had the impression that the Soviet Union might be willing to talk in Geneva on cooperation on defense, albeit only on how to prevent the introduction of weapons into space.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850458–0652)

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 49.

relate also to Soviet strategy toward the PRC, the Soviet INF negotiator is now implying that the Soviets might make a freeze in Asia dependent on U.S. actions there, but not necessarily on Chinese forces as well.

6. Outside the arms control field, the Soviet-Hungarian communique of July 8, issued after Shevardnadze's meeting with Hungarian Foreign Minister Varkonyi, also contains some interesting if still inconclusive variants on standard Soviet language.⁶ It called for a radical change in East-West contacts and an effort to "revive and strengthen" the process of detente. According to the communique, this can best be done by developing relations between countries with different social systems and a constructive dialogue based on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

7. Andropov, Chernenko and Gorbachev have all endorsed "detente," but "revive and strengthen" is the strongest formulation so far, and will have appeal in Western Europe. It will complement the active diplomacy the Soviets are now pursuing toward Western Europe, e.g., the Gorbachev-Mitterrand summit and overtures for greater EC-CEMA cooperation. The communique also called for "an early beginning" at CDE for substantive talks to adopt "major" and "concrete" CBMs in "the political and military field." This more "positive" general line was mirrored in the authoritative *Pravda* international review Sunday. Since the text is usually reviewed personally by the Foreign Minister before publication, it may bear Shevardnadze's first footprint in his new job.

8. On Shevardnadze, the Israelis are expressing cautious optimism about prospects on issues of interest to them, and this is based in part on reports from Jews of Georgian origin that portray him as someone who has been understanding and helpful in assisting Georgian Jews to emigrate to Israel. One Israeli official who emigrated in 1971 and claims to have known Shevardnadze personally describes him as "a great friend of the Jews." We would note in corroboration that Moscow Embassy officers visiting Tbilisi in the late 1970's were told by local refuseniks that Tbilisi University was one of only two places in the USSR where Hebrew language is officially available.

⁶ In telegram 9230 from Moscow, July 9, the Embassy reported on meetings between Hungarian Foreign Minister Varkonyi and Shevardnadze in Moscow from July 7 to 8, stating that "the reported results of the visit included the predictable congruence of views on bilateral relations, socialist bloc ties, economic issues and an array of European and international issues." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850482–0809) On July 9, the *Washington Post* quoted a portion of the communique: "Despite the complexity of the existing international situation, there were real possibilities to curb the forces of imperialism, bring about a radical change in the course of developments and revive the process of détente." ("Soviet Policy Statement," *Washington Post*, July 9, 1985, p. A12)

9. Implications: At this point these are so many straws in the wind. With regard to Shevardnadze in particular, he will take his cues from Gorbachev and the collective leadership, and there are no good indications that leadership policy on human rights in general or Soviet Jews in particular is softening or about to soften.

10. On the other hand, the straws seem to be pointing in one direction as far as arms control policy is concerned: the assembly of a broad Soviet package that could include increasingly explicit hints of deep cuts on strategic arms, a call for a reaffirmation of the ABM treaty intended to undercut SDI, and perhaps steps in other arms control areas such as CDE, all wrapped in a generally conciliatory public line toward the West, particularly Western Europe. The result could be considerable pressure on our negotiating position at Geneva as we move towards the summit. We will need to think hard about how to handle and perhaps take advantage of such a Soviet strategy both in Geneva and in our public diplomacy.

59. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, July 15, 1985

SUBJECT

Soviet Probes for Private Channel

Two developments last week—the first almost certainly and the second potentially—indicate that Gorbachev or members of his office are attempting to establish a personal channel to prepare for the Geneva meeting.

The first of these involves Bill McSweeney of Occidental Petroleum and the second Larry Horowitz of Teddy Kennedy's staff. I will describe each in turn:

McSweeney:

Mark Palmer has reported to me a call by Bill McSweeney last Thursday.² He asked me to pass this information on to you with the

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1985 (3/8). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for System. Sent for action. Sent through Poindexter.

² July 11.

proviso that he would like to have the opportunity to report it directly to Secretary Shultz when he returns and therefore would appreciate your not mentioning it to the Secretary until Palmer has had a chance to put him in the loop. In the meantime Palmer is not informing anyone else at State regarding the matter.

McSweeney told Palmer the following: During his last trip to Moscow (early July), Occidental's Soviet employee in Moscow, one Mike Bruk (aka Brook) insisted on taking him from a performance at the Bolshoi for "an important message." (Bruk is a well-known KGB official who has been working for the Hammer organization for some time—obviously to keep an eye on their operations and to act as an official go-between.³ He is bright, capable and speaks perfect, unaccented English. The Occidental people know of his affiliation, but Hammer took him on and keeps him on because he considers it useful to have the contacts Bruk provides.)

Bruk's message purported to be from Alexandrov-Agentov, Gorbachev's principal foreign affairs adviser in his immediate office. (Alexandrov held the same job with Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko. Many of us marvel at his staying power, but he does seem to be in solidly with Gorbachev. He, not a Foreign Ministry official, attended Gorbachev's meetings with Baldrige and with Andreas.⁴ Bruk and Alexandrov are known to be close personal friends, often—for example—spending their vacations together.)

The message was that Gorbachev very much wanted a private channel to the President in order to make appropriate preparations for their meeting. McSweeney was told, however, that under no circumstances should Armand Hammer be involved in any effort to set one up. Bruk said the Soviets consider him unreliable because he is "garrulous" and indiscreet. McSweeney agreed not to inform Hammer, and Bruk then asked whom McSweeney would recommend as a point of contact in the Administration. McSweeney said that the person he knew best was Mark Palmer and that he had found Mark both reliable and discreet. Bruk then agreed that the message should be passed to Mark.

As an example of the sort of thing Gorbachev wanted to discuss, Bruk cited his desire to arrange for regular, annual meetings, which could be announced at the Geneva meeting. Otherwise he mentioned no substance but laid out a "communications plan" with code names for the various people who might be mentioned in messages. The code names included ones for the President, Shultz, yourself, Charlie Wick (!?) and Palmer. On the Soviet side, Gorbachev, Alexandrov and Gro-

³ Armand Hammer was Chairman of the Occidental Petroleum Corporation.

⁴ See Documents 32 and 38 and footnote 4, Document 36.

myko were covered. According to this system, Palmer—if so authorized—could pass messages to McSweeney, who would then communicate with Bruk by the Occidental telex, using the code names provided.

That was the extent of the message itself, but McSweeney mentioned to Palmer two other matters which tend to substantiate the hypothesis that this is a real probe. First, McSweeney said that when he was in Moscow in mid-June (an earlier trip than the one when he was given the “message”) Bruk had asked him one evening to tell Art Hartman that Romanov would soon be removed and that Gromyko would be “kicked upstairs.” McSweeney said he was unable to do so since he had to leave Moscow early the next morning and did not want to do it by telephone. He therefore told Bruk he would have to find another channel. This occurred nearly two weeks before the Romanov / Gromyko change was made, and suggests two things: (1) That Gorbachev (or, at a minimum, Alexandrov) wanted to get word to us in advance, probably anticipating that we would consider it welcome news; and (2) It was an attempt to validate Bruk as a channel to the top.

The second matter has a bearing on McSweeney’s relationships with Bruk and Alexandrov. McSweeney told Palmer that he, Bruk and Alexandrov had been involved (to the distaste of all three, he claimed) as middlemen in getting expensive gifts from Hammer to Brezhnev, and possibly Brezhnev’s successors. When Brezhnev or members of his family wanted an expensive bauble, the word came by this channel and Hammer always was obliging. McSweeney did not say specifically whether Andropov and Chernenko also made use of this arrangement, but did say that on his most recent visit Alexandrov had asked for the “Heritage Edition” of the Encyclopedia Britannica for Gorbachev and the regular edition for himself—both of which have already been dispatched through the McSweeney-Bruk channel. (I find this both fascinating and curious. I can understand why Alexandrov, who speaks good English, might like a copy of the Encyclopedia Britannica, but Gorbachev? Is his English better than we have assumed? Does he just want it because the leather-bound volumes look good on the shelf? Or is Alexandrov indulging in a little free lancing? And whatever the answers to these questions may be, the incident seems to indicate that these fellows are not so devoted to their “anti-corruption” campaign that they let it interfere with their own ability to solicit some largesse from a soft touch.)

Horowitz:

Larry called me Friday to say that he had been invited to make a sudden visit to Moscow and that he would be seeing, at a minimum, Alexandrov and Zagladin. He said he just wanted us to know and that he would come over and brief John Poindexter and me when he gets back next week.

Given the fact that we responded to a message Zagladin sent through Horowitz last year—and that the whole matter was handled discreetly on all sides—the purpose of calling Horowitz over at this time could be to activate another probe for a channel.⁵

Comment:

1. Regarding McSweeney: There are many unsavory aspects of this connection, and it is obviously unsuitable for passing any substantive messages. It does *seem* to be a genuine effort on the Soviet side, however, and we might consider sending just one message back to the effect that if there is interest in private communications they should have an appropriate member of their party in Helsinki contact Palmer or me to discuss.

2. Regarding Horowitz, there is nothing to do until we find out what he comes back with. However, the invitation to him, coming on top of the various probes made to Agency sources, indicates to me that Gorbachev is indeed trying to make a connection and that we should find some way to accommodate him.

RECOMMENDATION

That you discuss the general question once again with Secretary Shultz and decide what our stance should be if we are approached in Helsinki, and also whether we should find some way through the various channels which seem to be available to let the Soviets know in advance that we will respond cooperatively if they wish to make a concrete suggestion. (Please protect Palmer regarding McSweeney's approach to him until Mark has a chance to brief the Secretary directly.)⁶

⁵ During a previous trip to the Soviet Union in January 1984, Horowitz met with Zagladin and passed information to Matlock. See *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 163 and 180.

⁶ McFarlane initialed his approval of the recommendation.

60. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Paper on the Soviet Union

As background information while you prepare for your meeting with Gorbachev, I have asked my staff to prepare a series of papers dealing with basic aspects of the Soviet system and typical Soviet attitudes.²

Attached at Tab A is the first of these papers, which discusses the fundamental question of whether the Soviet Union is an ideological power or simply an expansionist power in the traditional Russian mold. I think you will find it interesting reading.

Tab A

Paper on the Soviet Union³

Washington, undated

THE SOVIET UNION:

A COMMUNIST POWER OR A RUSSIAN IMPERIAL POWER?

When outsiders observe and assess Soviet actions and policies, many tend to interpret these in one of two ways, depending on their own psychological and ideological bent. One group operates on the assumption that the Soviet Union represents a new type of revolutionary power, motivated and driven by its ideology, which provides all the clues needed to determine Soviet motivations. The other group believes that the ideology is no more than window dressing and that at the core the Soviet Union is simply a continuation of the Russian Empire, committed primarily to pursuing Russian national interests. Both groups can advance powerful arguments to support their approach.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1985 (3/8). Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted by Matlock. The memorandum is unsigned.

² See Document 39.

³ No classification marking. Drafted by Matlock.

Those who see ideology as the ultimate motivation point to the obvious facts that the Soviet regime bases its entire legitimacy on its ideology and therefore cannot abandon the ideology without destroying itself. Furthermore, all actions are explained in terms of ideology, and the ideology is used to subvert other nations and provide a rationale for Soviet penetration of other countries, and if the opportunity exists, for Soviet control of them. The “Brezhnev doctrine,” which holds that the Soviet Union has not only the right but the duty to prevent the overthrow of “socialism” in another country, is seen as the ultimate expression of an ideological imperative.

Proponents of the “Russian imperial” approach would concede that the Soviet regime is clothed in ideological trappings, and that the ideology is used as an instrument of foreign policy and propaganda. But they would point out that very few Soviet officials really believe it, and that the ideology is simply used, in totally cynical fashion, to advance Russian national interests. Since Lenin’s pronouncements go all over the lot, citations can be found to justify *any* policy decision. Therefore, Soviet political leaders can decide what they want to do, without any regard to ideology, and their propaganda technicians will always find an “ideologically correct” justification.

Those who denigrate the role of ideology as a *motivating* force, would also point out that many key characteristics of the Soviet system simply cannot be explained by communist ideology. Take hypersecrecy, for example. This is a pronounced Russian trait, going back to the Middle Ages, and has no basis in Marxism. And—this group would add—how can you reconcile Marxism with a policy which outlaws the workers’ movement in Poland? Doesn’t the Soviet attitude toward Solidarity have more in common with nineteenth century Tsarist repression of Polish “rebels” (who also had the support of virtually all Poles)?

The truth is that both sides of this argument have cited factors which are critical for understanding the Soviet Union, but neither offers a full explanation. Their debate is like an argument over whether brass is copper or zinc. It is both, and the Soviet Union is both an ideological power and a modern-day embodiment of Russian imperial urges. What is important is not to debate which element is predominant, but to understand how the amalgam works.

The Ideological Element

The Soviets call their ideology Marxism-Leninism, but it should be called simply Leninism. Marx, after all, predicted that the working class would revolt against the ruling bourgeoisie, establish a dictatorship of the working class (not of an individual or a small group), and after eliminating other classes, live in a state of brotherly love and

cooperation, without needing a government or repressive instruments. In fact, the state itself would “wither away” and no longer be necessary. This vision, though fundamentally flawed in itself, has nothing in common with the Bolshevik Revolution and the regime it established, a regime which controls the working class rather than being controlled by it, and which built the most awesome instruments of repression in human history, along with an enormous, bureaucratic state.

It was Lenin’s adaptations—some would say distortions—of Marxist philosophy which created the ideological basis of the Soviet state. Lenin, seeing that the “working class” in Russia was small and unorganized, postulated that a small number of intellectuals and professional revolutionaries were the “vanguard” of the working class and could act in its name. Therefore, he created an elite party which arrogated to itself the right to determine the “true” interests of the workers, and to rule the country on their behalf. And what is more, he established a structure of authority and discipline in the elite party itself so that it could be controlled from the top. This was the structure which Stalin inherited (and Mao Tse-tung borrowed for China) which provided the instrument for the most repressive regimes mankind has known.

Leninism, therefore, is simply a mechanism for seizing, consolidating and perpetuating power. The fact that it is clothed in high-sounding phrases about social betterment does not alter its essence. Nevertheless, the pretense that the goal of this power is to improve the lot of the “masses” is better suited to propaganda than Nazi “master race” theories, which are guaranteed to turn off anyone not a member of the “master race.”

The Role of Ideology

Most persons who have dealt extensively with Soviet officials, even those officially charged with propaganda, are struck by how few really believe the ideology. In private, most are frank to say that the social theories are not consistent with reality and that Soviet-style “socialism” does not work very well in terms of meeting human needs. In Soviet schools, obligatory classes in ideology are considered dull make-work, good only for cynical jokes and material for opportunists who must master the “catechism” to make a career with little work. None seem to see their ideology as offering a practical guide to policy decisions. One senses none of the revolutionary elan today which observers described in the 1920’s and 1930’s.

But the loss of revolutionary elan is not the whole story. The fact is that those who run the Soviet system cannot give up the ideology, whether they believe it or not. They cannot because it provides the sole source of their own legitimacy as rulers. Their power does not stem from constitutional processes; it can only be justified on ideological

grounds, both to their own people and to the world at large. When so much at home seems to be either unsuccessful or inconsistent with the proclaimed ideology, it becomes important to the rulers to claim victories of the ideology abroad. Such claims have a legitimizing impact and contribute an important element to Soviet objectives which were absent from the motivations of monarchs and would be absent from those of a real constitutional republic.

Leninist ideology has, moreover, struck deeper roots than the pattern of cynical manipulation which we often observe would suggest. The fact is that so much Soviet discourse has been forced into the mold of Leninist reasoning that it affects the thinking even of those who would privately profess disbelief in its fundamental tenets. Entirely aside from its use as a propaganda tool, it provides a framework for looking at the world and analyzing developments.

Thus, Soviet citizens are inclined to interpret events in democratic countries in terms of the "class struggle," and—paradoxically—to assume that official statements put out by other countries are as duplicitous as those put out by their own. They tend to see other countries as ruled by elites which oppress the "masses" and deny them social services such as free education and medical care. And while the Soviet rulers do not find clear-cut answers to policy dilemmas in the ideology, the ideology acts to define options and to channel decisions in particular directions.

The ideology is also a dandy tool for an expansionist foreign policy. Its rhetorical element promising power to the masses and economic betterment for the poor has an appeal to naive reformers and provides a cloak of benign intent to cover Soviet attempts to extend their influence and establish control over others. Its Leninist core provides a rationale to would-be dictators to gain and retain power, and a propaganda "justification" for accepting "fraternal assistance" in the form of Soviet arms and Cuban troops.

The Russian Tradition

Leninist ideology explains a lot, but it does not explain it all. The Soviet system also exemplifies a number of characteristics which are deeply rooted in the non-communist Russian past.

One of the most striking and pervasive of these involves the relationship of the state and its citizens. Russia has no tradition of individual rights or of the rule of law binding on both rulers and the ruled. All inhabitants were considered servants of the state (or of the Tsar), and virtually the sovereign's property. A ruler might be liberal or repressive, but "rights" were not inherent but rather privileges dispensed from above. And he who giveth can also take away. This is still a deep-seated Russian attitude which underlies much of the regime's

behavior on human rights issues and explains why the population as a whole is relatively indifferent to them. This tradition produces an unspoken and perhaps subconscious attitude which holds that foreigners who press for the right of emigration are, in effect, out to rob the Russian regime of its property, and those who want to leave are guilty of disloyalty which smacks of treason.

Another deepseated Russian tradition is that of hypersecrecy, especially as regards foreigners. Western visitors to Muscovy as far back as the fifteenth century wrote about this trait, which even then was carried to absurd extremes, not only by the authorities, but by ordinary people as well. Often the secrecy stemmed from a desire to cover up weaknesses or potential embarrassments and was connected with a feeling of technological and cultural inferiority in comparison with Western Europe. Even today tourists are often harassed by ordinary citizens if they photograph buildings in disrepair or primitive-looking open-air markets. The popular assumption seems to be that any foreigner is a potential threat, actively trying to uncover weaknesses which can be exploited in some fashion. The Communist regime exploits and fans this attitude in its "vigilance" campaigns, and the traditional attitude bolsters official resistance to intrusive verification measures of arms control agreements. As Gromyko once remarked when pressed to agree to additional confidence-building measures, "What you want is a license to spy on us."

The Russian attitude toward Western Europe has always been ambivalent. On the one hand, the material prosperity, civic spirit and (for intellectuals at least) political freedoms have been envied. But, feeling that Russia was backward in all these respects, Russians indulged in psychological compensation by telling themselves that they were spiritually superior. Historically, this took various forms, sometimes with claims that their values were more spiritual and not so materialistic as the West, and sometimes with claims that they were more devoted to the good of the whole community rather than that of the most vigorous individuals who, in the West, were held to exploit others. Communist ideology exploits this deepseated ambivalence in numerous ways, by claiming that sacrifices are required today to build a better society for tomorrow, by picturing Western societies as marked by ruthless exploitation and callousness toward the unfortunate, and by stimulating the implicit xenophobic strain in these attitudes.

Traditionally the Russians have always been suspicious of their immediate neighbors and have striven to dominate them. Muscovy grew steadily from a tiny city state in the fourteenth century to a giant empire by adding, piece by piece, the territory of its neighbors. Usually territorial expansion was "justified" by claiming that the neighbor threatened them, or might be used by another powerful state to threaten

them. Sometimes the threat was real, but often it did not exist at all. But whether or not the threat really existed, the Russian people as a whole seemed persuaded by their leaders' claims.

Expansion of the Russian Empire was also justified by many on grounds of ideology and religion. For centuries, it was commonplace to speak of Moscow as the "Third Rome," in the sense that it was the successor of Rome and Constantinople as the seat of true Christianity. According to this concept, Russia had both the right and duty to spread her rule over Orthodox Christians to protect them from the Turks (and Western Protestants and Catholics.) The great writer Dostoevsky, for example, a fierce enemy of Marxism and all forms of socialism, supported aggressive wars against the Turks to protect Orthodox Christians in the Balkans.

At first it might seem that this has little to do with atheistic communism. But in fact it does, because the "Brezhnev doctrine" is really only a secular version of the traditional Russian messianic vision. What the Communists have done in this case, as in the others, is to fuse a distorted Marxian concept with a traditional Russian one. If Orthodox Tsarist Russia had the duty to "protect" Orthodox believers by establishing its rule over them, then the communist Soviet Union has a comparable duty as regards other "socialist" states.

The Amalgam

One of the achievements of the communist regime in Russia has been to convince the Russian people in general that the Soviet system is "theirs"—that is, authentically Russian. This is important, since even those who complain about its failures rarely consider it an alien imposition. And for many, outside criticism of the system—even for failures they know are real—is resented as damaging to their national pride.

Russia's communist leaders have been able to do this precisely because they grafted elements of Leninist ideology on to the tree trunk of Russian nationalist tradition, so that they are able to tap and mobilize attitudes which have deep roots in the national psyche.

The result, however, resembles not so much a plant with grafts as a chemical amalgam, with ideology and Russian traditions intermixed in an intimate and complex fashion. In this intermixture, those traditions useful to centralized, totalitarian rule have been accentuated and those traditions which do not fit it have been resisted.

The Russian Empire was well known for its secret police, forced labor camps and censorship. The Bolsheviks adopted these institutions and made them much more efficient, pervasive and oppressive.

Religion is a good example of a tradition which was not adopted, but opposed. The Russian peasantry, in particular, has traditionally been deeply religious. The Orthodox Church, however, for several

centuries operated under tight state controls. The communists did two things. They waged an unrelenting campaign against the practice of religion, by propagating atheism and at the same time trying to build up the cult of Lenin and the Party as a replacement for religious belief. At the same time they utilized the Russian tradition of state control of the Orthodox Church to bring the Church under their ultimate control, which makes it possible to monitor and limit what the Church does, and when the opportunity occurs—as with contacts with foreign religious groups and “peace” organizations—to use it as an instrument of official policy.

Ideas of Western-style constitutional government and the rule of law penetrated the Russian intellectual class in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and Russia seemed to be evolving belatedly in that direction when World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution cut this evolution short. The Revolution, however, swept away most of the educated class which espoused these ideas. Many were killed, many others were driven into emigration, and those who survived and stayed in the country were driven to the fringes of society and were further decimated in the purges of the 1930’s. In their place there arose a new “upper class” which came primarily from the peasantry, a group steeped in traditional, non-Western attitudes and little touched by the influx of Western ideas.

The regime has never succeeded in extirpating either religion or Western ideals of constitutional government. By all accounts, the practice of religion is growing, particularly among the young, and the dissident movement and figures like Andrei Sakharov make clear that, while they may be down, those who strive to establish a government of limited powers subject to the rule of law are not entirely out. Up to now, however, the communist regime has demonstrated the capability of keeping the practice of religion within tolerable bounds and of preventing ideas of constitutional government from spreading to the population as a whole.

For us, the fundamental fact to bear in mind in managing our relations with the Soviet Union and dealing with its leaders is that the system and its motivations cannot be explained exclusively in either ideological or traditional Russian geopolitical terms. We are dealing with a superpower which combines, in ways unique to it, ideological and traditional attitudes, institutions and motivations. Subsequent essays will probe in more detail how this “amalgam” works out in practice.

61. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz in Nadi¹

Washington, July 17, 1985, 2149Z

219113/Tosec 130580. For the Secretary From Rick Burt. Subject: (S) Information Memorandum: Our Strategy for the Summit (ES Sensitive 8520824).

1. S—Entire text.

2. This memorandum provides our initial thoughts on how we might best manage the period between now and the summit. It examines the public, congressional, allied, and Soviet dimensions of managing both expectations and preparations. The memo also outlines what we should try to accomplish in the summit itself. I look forward to discussing all this with you upon your return.

Managing the Summit

3. The history of summitry is a complex one. Summits bring with them the possibility of pitfalls as well as progress. We should not allow ourselves to become mesmerized by the May 1972 experience; success can be achieved on a more modest scale.² More common were summits which may have set back U.S. interests. The 1961 Vienna summit was one such meeting, where we not only had open disagreement but a possible Soviet misunderstanding about the President's resolve, which in turn may have contributed to Khrushchev's decision to put the missiles into Cuba.³ The 1967 Glassboro summit demonstrated another danger—it created major expectations which then led to a big letdown when results were not soon forthcoming.⁴ Most important to avoid is another summit along the lines of 1973, when a weakened President sought to create an illusory sense of progress and accomplishment only to communicate a sense to the Soviets that we needed success more

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Moscow. Drafted by Pascoe, Simons, and Haass; approved by Armacost, Burt, Palmer, McKinley, and Pace. Shultz traveled to Perth and Canberra for the ANZUS Ministerial meeting July 13–16, then traveled to Nadi, Fiji, on July 16 to meet with Prime Minister Mara.

² In May 1972, Nixon and Brezhnev met in Moscow, where they signed the SALT I and ABM Treaties. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Documents 257–302.

³ Kennedy and Khrushchev met in Vienna in June 1961. See *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, vol. V, Soviet Union, Documents 82–89.

⁴ Johnson met with Soviet Premier Kosygin in Glassboro, New Jersey, in June 1967. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, Documents 228–236.

than they.⁵ The lessons are clear: We do best when we are well-prepared, when we do not appear to need a summit more than the Soviets, and when we do not go about promising more than can be delivered.

4. Our ability to put these lessons into practice is in part affected by Soviet behavior. As usual, predicting Soviet behavior is difficult, as is fathoming Soviet objectives. A key factor this time around is that we have a new Soviet leader establishing himself. Gorbachev is clearly more active and is busy creating the impression of new vitality on the Soviet domestic scene. Announcement of his summit meeting with the President together with his October trip to Paris and other steps is the international counterpart to his domestic “vitality”.

5. On the international stage, and in the context of the summit, we believe Gorbachev may be pursuing a two-track policy. One element of his strategy is to try to use the summit to get concessions from us. The Soviets are working on the Europeans and the Asians to try to persuade them that it is possible to work out a better relationship with the Soviet Union. This is not because the Soviets have written us off, but because they probably want the Europeans and the Asians to work on us prior to the summit. This tactic also corresponds with movements and blandishments directly addressed to the United States—hints about SDI and START.

6. The cumulative effect of these moves in arms control and with the allies, the Chinese, and others is to try to create the impression that there is real potential for results from the summit, that the Soviets are showing “goodwill”, and that the only question is U.S. willingness to change its existing positions. SDI and U.S. “inflexibility” on arms control more generally is certain to receive considerable attention as the key obstacle to progress. In other words, they are trying to create a situation in which the rest of the world and domestic opinion in the U.S. will believe that it is incumbent on us to produce in Geneva.

7. The reason that this is a two-track approach is that the Soviets cannot be sure it will work. They thus may believe that they need a fallback, one of a long-term strategy of working more closely with the Europeans and the Asians. In a sense, this would convert a pre-summit tactical approach into a post summit element of Soviet foreign policy, one through which Moscow would seek to weaken alliance bonds and anti-Sovietism in both Western Europe and Japan. Development of Soviet relations with these two partners could thus become an end in itself and an alternate mid-term strategy to dealing principally if successful would leave the USSR positioned far better to deal with us,

⁵ In June 1973, Brezhnev came to Washington for a summit with Nixon. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Documents 123–129.

in that our key alliances would be diluted as would be the threats the Soviets would face to their immediate west and east.

8. Our goal ought to be to frustrate this likely Soviet attempt to place us in a defensive position both across the table and at home and among our allies with an offensive strategy of our own. We should emphasize that we see November's summit as the first in what we hope will be a more regular pattern of meetings, that we are prepared to discuss the full range of issues and are ready to make agreements wherever possible, but that in all cases the new Soviet leadership must be prepared to demonstrate that it is not simply younger but also more flexible and reasonable. We must also consult and use the media so Moscow realizes we cannot be pressured through the back door of our allies or domestic opinion.

9. An important factor determining the summit's outcome could well result from which country or leadership needs a successful summit more. Although Ronald Reagan has passed his last election and thus is more immune to pressures than earlier Presidents have been, the United States is at a structural disadvantage here. Because of our open, democratic society and because of our allies' expectations, pressure is greater on us than on the Soviets. A Soviet leader probably could survive an unproductive summit more easily than most Western leaders. Gorbachev will score points simply by being himself. The world is hungry for signs of reinvigorated Soviet leadership. That said, while Gorbachev has moved quickly to consolidate his position, he is still a new leader and does have to face a party congress in February. He also needs to prove his mettle; people will be on guard after being so ready to praise him during his visit to London. Indeed, we should work to ensure that Gorbachev does not receive a second uncritical free ride.

10. Ultimately, though, the key to a successful strategy for us becomes the interplay between managing expectations here at home and with our allies, and on the other hand managing substantive preparations with the Soviets. The best possible combination is to work to increase the chances for progress as we move toward the summit, while keeping expectations low and pressures on us for producing results low. Conversely, the worst possible outcome would be to fail to keep down expectations, to place ourselves under considerable pressure, and to have little happen at the summit.

11. Between now and November our priority within the bureaucracy and with the Soviets is to work for meaningful results. This does not mean great breakthroughs. It would be unrealistic to expect a summit on the order of May 1972 with its major arms control and political statements. At the same time, we should recognize that an austere, get-acquainted only, no results meeting is almost certain to

meet with criticism and cause strains within the West and place us under pressure to meet Moscow more than halfway on any new occasion. We should therefore aim for something in between. Thus, I recommend that we concentrate on modest but concrete steps which are possible in each of the four areas of our agenda, and that we seek to institutionalize the summit process, possibly by getting the Soviets to agree to follow-up summits in Washington and Moscow.

12. Dampening expectations will be no small challenge in light of the four months remaining before the summit and the intense media interest that is sure to emerge. We need to pursue the same rhetorical stance which you took in your press conference immediately following the announcement of the summit. While not ruling out results, we should emphasize the intrinsic benefits of the two leaders getting to know one another, of a serious substantive exchange, and of their providing guidance for future work. We should indicate that if we can achieve something in Geneva so much the better, but that it is an accomplishment by itself for the leaders of the major nuclear powers to get together. We should also emphasize that this meeting need not solve all outstanding problems between the two countries, but rather that this meeting is part of a larger process of negotiations and other meetings.

13. Getting these themes across will require considerable effort over the next four months. Your initial presentation was helpful, but repetition will be vital. We need to bring in the allies and other elements into this process of political and public management. For example, at your meeting with the allied Foreign Ministers at Helsinki we think it would be important for you to set out our approach. This would be strengthened when you meet again with your allied counterparts on the margins of the UNGA early this fall and through letters from the President to allied heads of state. Your press conference in Helsinki and other contacts with the media will also be important in this regard. And we will want at an appropriate time to discuss this approach with key members of the Congress.

The Agenda

14. We should strive for the optimal substantive outcome of the summit as the focus of our activities over the next few months, remembering to prepare ourselves and public opinion for a lesser outcome. In your recent meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, you outlined our substantive approach.⁶ Our more detailed ideas on what might be accomplished at Helsinki and Geneva and in-between are given below.

⁶ See Document 55.

Arms Control:

15. Regardless of what can be accomplished on other agenda items, the centerpiece of discussions at the summit will inevitably be the major arms control issues now under discussion in Geneva. Gorbachev said in his June 22 letter that “arms control has been and will be the central issue in our relationship and in the development of the entire international situation.”⁷ There is a lot of hyperbole in this, of course—it is an old Soviet line designed to pressure us and we need to ensure that our entire agenda is addressed. But, there is some truth in Gorbachev’s statement and it is certainly perceived that way world-wide. We are discussing ideas that could lead to some progress on these issues by the summit, although no one expects anything like a Vladivostok-type agreement.⁸ I am working with Paul Nitze on developing suggestions in this area. We do not deal with it in this memorandum.

16. Beyond the Geneva talks, there is some possibility of movement at CDE that could be codified at the summit. You suggested to Dobrynin that we move on to the drafting stage in the CDE process as a way to focus our work. We believe you need to discuss this personally with Bud so that you will be able to be more specific with Shevardnadze in Helsinki. The next step after that would be for Jim Goodby to engage the Soviets in detailed discussions during a visit to Moscow in early September and to go over what may emerge with our allies before the reconvened CDE session later in September.⁹ With drafting in the fall session and your meetings with Shevardnadze to nudge the process forward, we may be able to announce some of the elements of an agreement in the summit communique.

17. There seems to be some new interest and activity on MBFR issues in Europe, and we are assessing what it means for our position. However, the problems of moving forward in this area are substantial given the bureaucratic obstacles here and differences among the allies. Also, if we make an effort on the more promising CDE issues, we risk overloading the circuit if we push simultaneously on MBFR.

18. Profound differences over verification have kept our discussions with the Soviets on a chemical weapons ban at the CD in Geneva from any progress. In the Helsinki and summit context, there may be other more promising avenues in the CW field. For example, we believe it would be useful to try out with the new Soviet leadership our two earlier invitations: to observe the destruction of our CW stockpiles,

⁷ See Document 46.

⁸ In November 1974, President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev met in Vladivostok, agreeing to the basic framework for the SALT II agreement. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Documents 90–93.

⁹ See footnote 5, Document 55.

and to send a team to Moscow to discuss the use of CW in the Iran-Iraq War and the more general question of CW proliferation. We will also work with ACDA to come up with some language on CW non-proliferation that might appear in a summit communique. The Soviet response to date on CW actions outside the CD has not been encouraging, but it is conceivable that in the context of summit preparations, the Soviets will be more flexible.

19. The Soviets were generally positive on Dick Kennedy's suggestion for a statement on nuclear non-proliferation, but owe us a formal response.¹⁰ I raised it again with the Soviets this week and you should give it another push at Helsinki. Ideally, Dick and his Soviet counterpart could issue this before the NPT review conference beginning August 27. We could then build on this statement in a summit communique.

20. On nuclear testing, you have approved the draft of a Presidential letter which *inter alia* offers a calibration visit to our Nevada site, this time without reciprocity, in contrast to the President's 1984 UNGA offer.¹¹ With Shevardnadze, you can review the President's offer and also renew your earlier proposal to Dobrynin and Gromyko for a side understanding involving reciprocal calibration testing which would allow us to move ahead to ratification of the TTBT and PNE treaties. The Soviets also may be considering a move of some sort on testing in the next couple of months. The current speedup of their testing program may be part of a planned limited moratorium on testing that would be announced before or during the review conference. (We are doing a separate memo for you on this subject with suggested responses.)

21. At your meeting in Helsinki and again at the summit, we will want to put forward the other CBMs listed in the President's Strasbourg speech—exchange of observers at military exercises, high-level contacts between military leaders, and a permanent military-to-military communications link.¹² Military-to-military contacts are worth continued effort, and with Gromyko out of the direct operational chain of command, the Soviets may show some new interest. You should also talk with Bud and Cap about setting a new time—well before the summit—for us to host the postponed Incidents at Sea meeting in the U.S. This should be on your Helsinki agenda to be used in conjunction with an approach on military-to-military contacts.

¹⁰ In telegram 1671 from Helsinki, April 17, the Embassy reported that Ambassador Kennedy passed a draft statement on non-proliferation in the form of a non-paper to Petrovsky during a plenary meeting in Helsinki on April 15. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

¹¹ Regarding the draft letter, see Document 64. For Reagan's offer in his UNGA address, see footnote 14, Document 28.

¹² See footnote 2, Document 27.

22. Finally, while it is unrealistic to think we can resolve compliance issues in the near future, it is important that you and the President lay out our concerns to Shevardnadze and Gorbachev. In both presentations, we will want to emphasize the importance of resolving these issues to progress on arms control.

Regional Issues:

23. We must be particularly careful in managing expectations on regional issues before and at the summit. There will be no major breakthroughs on these issues, and we should make that clear early on. The emphasis, as in the past, should be on the importance of discussing these issues to avoid miscalculation and confrontation.

24. You have laid out for Dobrynin our positive view of the regional discussions at the Assistant Secretary level and the possibility of future talks on East Asia and Central America. It would be useful to have had both sessions before the summit; you could agree on dates and ground rules for the East Asian talks with Shevardnadze in Helsinki. We believe it might be valuable to use the summit to routinize our discussions of regional issues, taking the mystery out of them and reducing the political freight they have been forced to carry. If you agree, the ground for this could be laid at Helsinki and the concept noted in the joint communique.

25. We will want to keep Afghanistan to the fore during this period. You and the President both should press the Soviets hard for movement toward a negotiated settlement. Progress will be difficult in the short term, but getting our message through in this formative period of Gorbachev's policy is critically important. Our theme should continue to be that the Soviets cannot wait out the Mujahideen (or their friends), the time for moving toward a negotiated settlement is now, and the U.S. only wants the Soviets to get out, not to humiliate or bleed them in Afghanistan.

26. We are talking with Bob Oakley about possible ways to open a constructive dialogue with the Soviets on the terrorism issue, but I am skeptical. Our limited exchanges to date have not been particularly useful, but some believe the agreement to use the Hotline in the event of a nuclear terrorism incident and events surrounding the release of the TWA hostages suggest this topic may be worth looking at once again. Shevardnadze himself had a particularly bad hijacking incident in Georgia a couple of years ago and may be more sensitive to the problems than Gromyko. In looking at this topic, we should be aware of the downsides to any such discussion: the talks are unlikely to achieve much, the Soviets have supplied terrorists and their friends against us, and they will have their own agenda in any discussion (e.g. the Contras, training camps in the U.S., separate memorandum on whether to pursue this subject with Shevardnadze.)

27. In our view, it would also be useful to engage Shevardnadze in a discussion of the seeming Soviet propensity to resort to force rather than diplomacy, either as a government preference or through lack of adequate political control over the military. The Nicholson case, Berlin air corridors, and KAL all would come into such a discussion. A recent example of the same problem is the buzzing of U.S. oil exploration rigs in the Navarin Basin by Soviet aircraft.¹³ This subject is primarily for discussion with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev, not for a communique.

Human Rights:

28. You will want to emphasize to Shevardnadze that progress in the area of human rights should be part of the preparatory work for the summit, and the President should stress their centrality to any relationship geared to resolving concrete problems. Gorbachev is pursuing a different approach than Gromyko—he no longer refuses to discuss human rights, but goes on the offensive when the subject is raised. There is every indication that Shevardnadze will come to Helsinki similarly primed to strongly defend Soviet human rights practices and to counter-attack with their standard themes against human rights practices in the West. You should try in Helsinki to use their new willingness to “discuss” human rights to see if we can shake loose the establishment of a more formal mechanism for discussions with them on human rights issues on a consistent basis.

29. Also in the Helsinki meeting, you will want to emphasize that steps by the Soviet side leading up to the Geneva summit will improve the atmosphere for the meeting and could lead to further steps on our side. You can repeat the linkage you made in Vienna between movement on commercial issues that interest the Soviets and progress on human rights matters.¹⁴ You should reinforce your points with Dobrynin that we are not trying to negotiate the human rights issue with the Soviets—we want results that the Soviets can produce quietly on their own. The draft Presidential letter takes this line and suggests a focus on clearing the decks of longstanding divided-spouse and dual-national cases and making headway on Jewish emigration by the

¹³ In telegram 219395 to Moscow, July 18, the Department reported that “Burt called in Soviet Chargé Sokolov July 16 and delivered a strong protest of yet another instance of Soviet harassment of U.S. off shore drilling operations in the Bering Sea.” On July 14, “a Soviet DC3 type aircraft circled a U.S. drilling platform” at a “very close distance.” The telegram reported similar incidents on June 26 and July 3. Burt stressed this type of “aggressive use of force by the Soviets” made it “difficult for us to proceed with a constructive dialogue.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850509–0063)

¹⁴ See Documents 28 and 29.

summit.¹⁵ Such steps to improve the atmosphere before the summit have precedents in the past, and we should try to maximize the Soviet incentive in this period to show results unilaterally.

Bilateral Issues:

30. Progress on bilateral questions cannot carry a summit, but they remain the most promising area for movement in the period leading up to it. You laid out clearly for Dobrynin the need to resolve the Pacific air safety/civil aviation/consulates issue and finish up the exchanges agreement before the summit. Dobrynin's comments on the need to have agreements to sign at that time suggest we may be able to speed up the process appreciably in this period. The first test will come in a meeting this week in Tokyo on the Pacific air safety issue. If the Soviets are ready to sign a basic agreement (which will provide for technical implementing agreements negotiated among air control specialists), we will do so at that time. Provided Aeroflot also convinces Pan Am it can do some business if it resumes service to the USSR, we could then move on to the civil aviation and consulates discussions. You can give these and the exchanges negotiations a boost in Helsinki and perhaps resolve outstanding problems in New York.

31. The recent buzzing incident with the oil exploration rigs points to the need for another round of Pacific maritime boundary talks. The last talks were in July 1984, and at the very least another round would encourage Soviet "competent authorities" to moderation. At best, it could produce agreement: the directness of our proposed solution (a 50/50 split) might just appeal to Shevardnadze and Gorbachev. We should probably have our delegations get together again between now and November to see if any progress is possible. As you know, these talks have become controversial as a result of a campaign about the settlement's effect on the status of Wrangel Island (which the U.S. has never claimed).

32. Our efforts to reinvigorate the various bilateral agreements are moving forward. We have had joint commission meetings on trade and agriculture, Secretary Pierce is planning a meeting in September, and EPA Administrator Thomas is scheduled to be in Moscow at the time of the summit for a joint commission meeting on the environment. This area can use some additional thought; we will review what else might be done in this period consonant with our overall approach to these exchanges.

33. Finally, there is the area you described to Dobrynin as a "bundle of non-strategic trade issues." Along with a statement in the communique supporting increased non-strategic trade, we will want to include

¹⁵ No draft letter on human rights was found.

something about non-discriminatory access to the Soviet market. We should encourage the Soviets to demonstrate their willingness to fulfill the promise they made to Mac Baldrige about non-discriminatory treatment by signing some major deals with American companies in the pre-summit period.

The Procedural Outcome:

34. The range of substantive choice is therefore wide, but no single issue is easy. We cannot expect to move along on all fronts equally, nor forecast at this time that there will be agreements ready to sign by November. The Soviets are not going to accept all our ideas and it is all too easy to become bogged down in the specifics.

35. We should recognize therefore that the substantive package we can put forward as the outcome of a summit may well be small. Depending on how the meeting goes, it may turn out that the major accomplishment of the meeting could be announcement of additional summits in Washington in 1986 and Moscow in 1987; or to emphasize the continuing process involved, in the spring in Washington and the fall in Moscow—thus holding two summits in 1986. To the extent we achieve substantive results in Geneva, there will be impetus for further progress at these later meetings. To the extent that we do not, there would be important incentives for both sides to hold earlier and regular summits to obtain more substantive progress.

Whitehead

62. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 18, 1985

SUBJECT

Agenda for Your Helsinki Meeting with Shevardnadze

Issues for Decision

How to structure your July 31 meeting with Shevardnadze in Helsinki, what issues we should address, and who should participate from our side.

Essential Factors

The Soviets have agreed to your meeting with Shevardnadze from 2 to 5 PM July 31 in Helsinki but said a busy schedule precluded the informal luncheon you offered and a possible follow-up meeting the next day.² Since time will be short, we have urged the Soviets to agree to simultaneous translation.

Given the time constraints, the introductory nature of the meeting, and your previous session with Dobrynin on the issues to consider in the runup to the summit,³ we see your meeting with Shevardnadze falling into two parts:

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 Soviet Union July. Secret; Sensitive. Sent through Armacost. Drafted by Tefft and Simons; cleared by Burton, Pascoe, and Palmer. A copy was sent to Ridgway. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. All brackets are in the original. On July 18, Roz Ridgway was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs and Richard Burt became Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany. In a covering note to Shultz, Armacost wrote: "Mr. Secretary, The participation question needs urgent attention. I've talked to both Roz and Rick. Roz is keen to go, feels—since confirmation is behind her—she should get on with the job, and, in that connection, would find Rick's presence a bit awkward. She will, of course, adjust to whatever decision you make. Rick recognizes that Roz must be there as a full participant, would like to go along, but will likewise abide by your wishes without making a Federal case of it. Given the fact that both are confirmed, that Roz will have follow-on work, and that the meeting is an initial encounter with a new man, I would give precedence to Roz." Shultz responded in the margin on July 22: "Roz should go and take part in the meeting. GPS."

² In telegram Tosec 130500/216653 to the Secretary, July 16, Burt reported that on July 15 he met with Sokolov, who gave him a "non-paper conveying Shevardnadze's agreement to meet with you in Helsinki July 31 from 2 to 5 pm. As you will see from the non-paper which follows, Shevardnadze also said that a busy schedule prevents him from accepting either the informal lunch you offered or a second meeting on August 1." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

³ See Document 55.

—a brief assessment of relations since Vienna [but not another detailed tour d’horizon], which includes a restatement of our overall approach to the summit; and

—a discussion with Shevardnadze of specific issues that could constitute our preferred summit agenda.

I. Opening Exchange of Views on the Relationship and Our Approach to the Summit

Since you will be the host in Helsinki, it is appropriate to begin by giving the floor to Shevardnadze, while making some graceful comments about Gromyko and your desire to develop a candid and constructive relationship with Shevardnadze. You will also want to obtain his agreement to a specific discussion of issues after brief opening statements.

Your response to Shevardnadze’s introductory comments will, of course, depend in part on whether and how he reacts to the ideas you presented to Dobrynin. I believe strongly that you should at least recapitulate briefly our philosophy about a summit. The Geneva meeting should provide the President and Gorbachev the opportunity to get to know each other and hold a discussion covering the range of issues in our bilateral relationship. We do not require that concrete agreements be reached in Geneva, but if there is a possibility for progress in any part of our relationship we will be prepared to seize it.

In briefly reviewing post-Vienna developments, on the positive side you should underline our agreement on the summit and also note the conclusion of two new understandings in the SCC⁴ and our agreement to revitalize agricultural cooperation as fresh evidence of our ability to do business. You should also stress the importance of the President’s decision on interim restraint as evidence of our willingness to promote progress in arms negotiations.⁵

But you will also want to cite obstacles to progress beyond small steps—our continuing concerns resulting from the Nicholson case; the Berlin air corridors, as a case which still has dangerous potential; the bleak human rights picture; Soviet pressures on Pakistan. As an exam-

⁴ In telegram 201655 to all NATO capitals, Canberra, and Tokyo, July 2, the Department reported that the 28th session of the SCC resulted in the signing of two common understandings between the United States and Soviet Union. The first was that both sides “agree to refrain from concurrent operation of ABM components or ballistic missile reentry vehicles with air defense components at ABM test ranges.” The understanding provided an exception for when air defense was necessary. The second “clarifies the responsibilities of the parties under the 1971 agreement on measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war in the event of a nuclear incident, or threat thereof, involving unknown or unauthorized individuals or groups.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850465–0326)

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 41.

ple of mixed and unnecessarily ambiguous behavior, you could cite the combination during the TWA hijacking of welcome Soviet statements against terrorism with inflammatory propaganda about US intentions. In raising Nicholson and more recent incidents in the GDR and the Bering Sea, you may also want to repeat the points we have made earlier about the seeming Soviet propensity to resort to force rather than diplomacy, either as a Government preference or through lack of adequate political control over the military.

II. *Discussion of Specific Issues*

In discussing with Shevardnadze the specific issues that could constitute our preferred summit agenda, you may again wish to use the “headline” approach to cover much material quickly. Consistent with the summit strategy memo I recently sent you,⁶ I would suggest you make the following points on key issues in our agenda:

A. *Arms Control: Geneva Talks*: The second round has closed with the Soviets maintaining their tight linkage of an agreement on offensive arms to US renunciation of SDI. While they have also shown no flexibility on INF, they have, as you know, presented some new ideas in the START group [informal suggestions about the possibility of percentage reductions and limits on strategic arms—an idea in the direction of the “common framework” concept]. I will be working with Paul Nitze to develop further suggestions in this area, so that we will be prepared to demonstrate our readiness to move forward at the summit on this central issue. Should Shevardnadze raise their START “model,” you will want to probe for further clarification of these ideas. If he hints at a possible softening in the Soviet stance against SDI research, you will want to again press for specific details.

B. *Other Arms Control*: Four topics are worth touching on, as we look toward the summit.

—With regard to Stockholm CDE, you will want to reiterate the point you made to Dobrynin that we should begin drafting a concluding document combining concrete CBMs with political understandings on non-use of force. We would also want to try for agreed elements to put in a summit communique. Goodby has accepted his counterpart’s invitation to visit Moscow at the beginning of September, and that would be the time to explore how to proceed when the CDE reconvenes later in September.

—On nuclear *non-proliferation*, you should ask whether the Soviets are prepared to make a joint statement as Dick Kennedy proposed in April.⁷ Oleg Sokolov was generally positive when I raised this on July 15, but time is running out if we are to issue a statement before the

⁶ See Document 61.

⁷ See footnote 10, Document 61.

NPT review conference beginning August 27. We could then build on this statement in a summit communique.

—On *chemical weapons*, I believe it would be useful to try out again with the new Soviet leadership our proposals: to observe the destruction of our CW stockpiles and to send a team to Moscow to discuss the use of CW in Iran-Iraq and the more general question of CW proliferation.

—On *nuclear testing*, you will want to ask Shevardnadze for a response to the President's unilateral offer to send a team to the Nevada Test Site to measure a nuclear test. You can also renew your earlier proposal to Dobrynin and Gromyko for a side understanding involving reciprocal calibrations tests which would allow us to move ahead to ratification of the TTBT and the PNE Treaty.

C. *Regional Dialogue*: You will want to emphasize that we found the recent regional talks on southern Africa and Afghanistan useful for clarifying positions, but were disappointed at the lack of Soviet readiness to tackle central issues. You could reaffirm US readiness to discuss guarantees of an Afghan settlement if the Soviets were prepared to discuss a timetable for withdrawal. You told Dobrynin July 3 that your meeting in Helsinki might well be the time to agree to a round on East Asia. I would like to talk with you and Paul Wolfowitz about this possibility on your return from East Asia. You will also want to raise Cambodia, Vietnam and any other issues you have promised our friends in the region that you will discuss with Shevardnadze.

D. *Human Rights*: It is quite possible that Shevardnadze will not take Gromyko's approach of refusing to talk about human rights. He may well come back at you and refer to supposed US human rights failings. This may not be all bad; while we don't want to get into harsh, sterile polemics, you may be able to turn his willingness to talk into a dialogue on the issues of concern to us. You will want to emphasize to Shevardnadze our overall approach on human rights: no desire to intervene in their internal affairs or to do anything against their laws, but there are practical steps they could take. Progress on human rights should be part of the preparatory work for the summit, and that steps by the Soviet side leading up to the summit will improve the atmosphere for the meeting. Following up the latest Presidential letter,⁸ you should focus on clearing the decks of longstanding divided-spouse and dual-national cases and making headway on Jewish emigration. You will want to refer to your Helsinki speech, in which you mention other prominent cases such as the Sakharovs and Shcharanskiy.

⁸ Not found.

E. *Bilateral Issues*

—*Steps in Economic Relations*: It would be worth making a reference to Baldrige visit follow-up, noting our efforts to lift furskin embargo and need for them to give US firms a better break in contracts, and encourage him to focus on further steps.

—*Pacific Air Safety Measures*: If this month's third round in Tokyo does not produce basic agreement, you should urge rapid conclusion that would permit us to move on other bilateral issues.

—*Civil Aviation*: Reiterate that once we reach a basic Pacific air safety agreement and Pan Am is satisfied that conditions are right for resuming service to the USSR, we will be prepared to move rapidly through renegotiation of our civil aviation agreement to provide for this. [Aeroflot is sending a delegation to Pan Am in mid-July to try to nail this down, and we will know the result of those talks as well as the third Pacific air safety round by the time you meet.]

—*Exchange Agreement Negotiations*: You have our status report on the talks.⁹ You stressed to Dobrynin July 3 that TV appearances are important and exhibits at previous level are essential. You may wish to make the same points to Shevardnadze, and invite him to agree that negotiators should move promptly through remaining issues.

—*Consulates in Kiev and New York*: Suggest both sides prepare to announce this at the summit.

—*Reinvigorating bilateral agreements*: You can note that we have had joint commission meetings on trade and agriculture and our satisfaction that Secretary Pierce will be traveling to Moscow in September and that EPA Administrator Thomas will be in Moscow at the time of the summit for a joint commission meeting on the environment.

Participation

You have told Dobrynin we would have Bud and Paul there, and I suggest that you also field the rest of the Geneva/Vienna team: Art, me and/or Roz Ridgway and Jack Matlock as notetaker. If the Soviets have one more than we, as they did in Vienna, I suggest we again insert Mark Palmer; this will provide some EUR continuity. We have identified a better interpreter for the Helsinki meeting. The new man interpreted for a CODEL meeting with Shevardnadze in Georgia in 1979. We are making arrangements for you to meet with him before Helsinki.

Recommendations:

1. That you authorize us to proceed with preparations and talking points on the basis of the framework and the issues above.¹⁰

⁹ No status report was found; however, negotiations on the exchange agreements were ongoing, as referenced in telegram 8777 from Moscow, June 29. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850461–0417)

¹⁰ Shultz did not initial his approval or disapproval of the recommendations.

2. That you agree to meet with Paul Wolfowitz and me to discuss whether to propose a regional experts meeting on East Asia.

3. That the basic team you had in Vienna also accompany you to Helsinki for the meeting with Shevardnadze.

63. Letter From John Denver to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Aspen, Colorado, July 18, 1985

My dear Mr. Shultz:

As you may know, I have just returned from a 12-day concert tour of the Soviet Union, where I was privileged to perform before audiences in Leningrad, Tallinn and Moscow. I was accorded the greatest hospitality from my Soviet hosts, many of whom I had met on an earlier private visit to Moscow and Leningrad last November. Indeed, I have been invited to make a third visit to the Soviet Union later this year, even though the cultural agreement between our two countries expired in 1979.²

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Tyrus Cobb Files, Country File, USSR 1985 (10); NLR–98–5–10–1–6. No classification marking.

² In telegram 887 from Leningrad on June 25, the Consulate reported: “John Denver performed four public concerts to enthusiastic full houses in Leningrad June 20–23. His Soviet tour continues with two concerts in Tallinn June 25–26 and three concerts in Moscow June 29–30. Denver and his group left Leningrad well satisfied with his reception. He hopes this tour may lead to another visit to the USSR in 1986, with performances for larger audiences hopefully under the auspices of a cultural exchanges agreement.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850446–0068) Denver wrote in his memoir: “The following spring, 1986 [Denver is in error; this trip was in 1985], marked the first time an American artist was invited to give public performances in the Soviet Union since the cultural exchange agreement had been abrogated. In Leningrad, Tallinn, and Moscow, I got to hear my audiences sing ‘Annie’s Song’ in English and they got to hear me sing it in Russian.” (John Denver, *Take Me Home*, p. 198)

The Consulate continued in telegram 887: “While on balance the audiences at all four concerts were highly enthusiastic, we detected some small signs of discontent here and there. There was some anxiety in the audience during the first half of the second concert, due largely to the inability of the audience to understand the songs (despite John’s explanations), but in some parts perhaps due to his introductions stressing peace and brotherhood. One couple was observed to walk out after the third song, saying that they constantly hear these exhortations to work for peace. Two of our unofficial artist friends who attended the third concert also said that while they enjoyed the songs and appreciated John’s sincerity, they felt he came across as naïve with regard to the Soviet system. On the other hand, John obviously pushed a button, even though perhaps a programmed one, when he mentioned his support for better U.S.-Soviet relations and for the Geneva talks. This received a sustained burst of applause.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850446–0068)

My goal in visiting the Soviet Union is to further the development of friendly relations between our two peoples. In my travels, I have found that the music enables people who do not share a common language, cultural heritage or political system to communicate with each other and to build bridges of friendship and understanding.

I met with appropriate State Department and National Security Council staff both before and after my visits to the Soviet Union to exchange information and to ensure that my presence there was fully consistent with Administration policy.

Yesterday, I met on Capitol Hill with a number of Senators and Congressmen to brief them on my most recent visit and to seek their counsel on how best to proceed. I also had an opportunity to discuss U.S.–Soviet relations with Mr. Richard Burt, who is leaving his post as Assistant Secretary of State to become our Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. Secretary, I would very much appreciate an opportunity to meet with you next week to discuss the progress of talks aimed at renewing the cultural agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and how my personal diplomacy can help further America's foreign policy objectives. Congressmen William Broomfield and Dante Fascell believe a meeting between us would prove useful.

I will be returning to Washington on Wednesday, July 24 to perform for President Xiannian and Vice Premiere Peng of China, and would be available to meet with you that afternoon or the following morning. I am mindful of your heavy responsibilities and your busy schedule, and will, of course, make myself available at your convenience.³

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your interest in this matter and your consideration of my request.⁴

Peace,

John Denver

³ President Xiannian of China made a State visit to the United States from July 21 to 31 and in Washington from July 22 to 25.

⁴ In an August 22 response to Denver, Parris wrote: "I have been asked to reply to your letter on behalf of the Secretary. As a member of my staff explained to your representatives at Gray and Company, the Secretary was called out of the country during late July when you were in Washington. He asked me to express his regrets that he could not meet with you to hear about your recent successful trip to the Soviet Union." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, P850139–1123)

64. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, July 18, 1985

SUBJECT

Draft Presidential Letter to Gorbachev

Regarding the State Memo with a draft of a letter from the President to Gorbachev and your profs note on the subject, the background is as follows:²

The President now has two unanswered letters from Gorbachev, one of June 10 which was in reply to his long letter which touched on items on the entire agenda, and one of June 22 in reply to the President's letter on his interim restraint decision (copies are at Tabs IV and V).³ Pursuant to your decision, State was also tasked to prepare the invitation to send nuclear testing experts to our test site in the form of a Presidential letter. They felt, and I concur, that it would not be a good idea for the President to send a letter on this subject and ignore the unanswered letters he has received.

As for the non-paper, I don't believe State considered the President's letter as an answer to it. Rick in effect answered it on the spot when he told Sokolov that it was acceptable to us.⁴

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1985 (3/8). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

² The Department of State memorandum and draft were Tab II, which was not found attached. Attached at Tab III is a July 16 electronic message to Poindexter, in which McFarlane wrote: "in any Presidential letter we might send, we ought not be laying out the laundry list of issues in the four areas with the view toward making progress between now and November—THAT IS FUNDAMENTALLY WRONG—and is the surest sign to them that we are panting to get some kind of agreement (and implicitly, that they can leverage our overanxiousness against us). The worst possible way to negotiate. Any letter ought simply to say that the President looks to the meeting as an occasion for setting an agenda and priorities and possibly a game plan for moving on the several issues in the years ahead—period. I wouldn't even advert to the possibility of reaching agreements before then—surely no more than to say ' . . . it may be that some headway may be possible before we meet but I don't think that is essential, especially given your preoccupation with other matters now.' Please pass this to Jack and ask that he staff this promptly."

³ Not found attached. See Documents 41 and 46.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 62. In his PROFs note to Poindexter (see footnote 2, above), McFarlane commented: "the Shultz answer to the Shevardnadze non-paper ought to go back as a non-paper. And it ought to be short and sweet. That is, we ought to say—probably in an oral note to Sokolov this week—roger your last and we'll see you in Helsinki."

COMMENT:

I believe it is appropriate for the President to react to the Gorbachev letters of June 10 and 22 when he makes his nuclear testing proposal. However, I agree with you that the State draft is defective in some basic aspects. First, it does not really answer the two Gorbachev letters. And second, as you point out, by concentrating on the possibility of agreements in advance of the Geneva meeting, it is likely to leave the impression that we are panting for them.

I have redrafted the letter totally, except for the section on nuclear testing which I have left intact. In doing so, I have tried to do several things: (1) Answer some of the more egregious claims made by Gorbachev in his letters, since the Soviets tend to consider failure to answer charges as tacit confirmation of their accuracy; (2) Avoid extensive and detailed polemics, while reserving the President's position on all those matters not mentioned; (3) Include the testing invitation in the context of meeting an expressed *Soviet* concern, with the suggestion that Gorbachev must show comparable regard for the concerns we have expressed; (4) Eliminate all talk of possible agreements before the Geneva meeting, while leaving the door open for some if the Soviets wish; (5) Put the Geneva meeting in the context of an agenda-setting exercise.

This redraft is at Tab I.⁵ I believe it meets your concerns. I would note, however, that I have not shown it to State, and anticipate a good bit of pain when they see it. (They will cite the last paragraph of Gorbachev's letter of June 10, in which he expressed an interest in using the time before November "to search for possible agreements which could be readied for the meeting". In my opinion, however, we should just let this stand and let the Soviets move toward some agreements if they really want them.)

Before spreading my draft further, I will need your reaction—and your instructions in this regard. Perhaps it would be best, if you concur that my redraft is preferable, to deal directly with Secretary Shultz on the matter. I believe that it allows the Secretary full scope to discuss the whole range of issues with Shevardnadze in Helsinki, but at the same time positions the President well tactically. In effect, he will be saying, if you guys want some agreements, you know what you have to do. It's no skin off my back if you hang in tough and we don't have any for the meeting in November.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you approve or amend the draft at Tab I, subject to any coordination you may direct.⁶

⁵ Not found attached. The final text of the letter was sent via telegram on July 29; see Document 69.

⁶ McFarlane approved this recommendation and wrote "exactly."

2. That you approve my coordinating the arms control sections with Bob Linhard.⁷

3. That you either handle the State clearance directly with Shultz, or authorize me to provide the draft to Rick Burt.

A. I'll handle with Shultz

OR

B. Supply the draft to Rick and get their reaction⁸

⁷ McFarlane approved this recommendation.

⁸ McFarlane approved recommendation B. He crossed out "Rick" and wrote "Roz as of 7/19," when Ridgway took over as Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, and below this commented: "but elevate it quickly i.e. this week."

65. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, July 19, 1985

SUBJECT

Horowitz Trip to Moscow: "Messages" from Soviets

Larry Horowitz briefed me today on his trip to Moscow this week, with the caveat that the information should be held very closely. Essentially, he meant to you and John Poindexter, plus—of course—the President and Secretary Shultz to the degree you feel that would be interested. Horowitz, as you know, is a member of Senator Kennedy's staff, and said that only the Senator has been briefed and that Kennedy gave instructions that no other members of his staff, or anyone else on Capitol Hill, should be briefed on the matter.

Horowitz passed on a very specific and detailed message from Shevardnadze's Special Assistant, the comments of several other senior officials (including Academician Velikhov), and shared several of his

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1985 (06/16/1985–08/31/1985). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Poindexter initialed the memorandum and a note in the top margin reads: "RCM has seen." All brackets are in the original.

impressions as to the general atmosphere in Moscow and regarding the persons who are playing important roles now in foreign affairs.

The Shevardnadze "Message"

The most detailed comment on U.S.-Soviet relations came from Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's new special assistant, one Alexei Bukin, who was described as a very bright 29-year-old who speaks perfect English. Bukin read his points from a prepared paper, and insisted that Horowitz take notes (even supplying the pad for that purpose), in an apparent effort to stress the importance of what he was saying. While Bukin asked only that Senator Kennedy be informed of this statement, Horowitz assumes that it was also intended for us.

Bukin made the following points, which I have reproduced virtually verbatim from Horowitz's reading of his notes:

—Shevardnadze was personally aware of Horowitz's visit, and recalled his meeting with Senator Kennedy in Tbilisi in 1974.² This meeting had made a deep impression on him, and he recalled several of the things Kennedy had said to him at that time.

—Preparations are underway for the President's meeting with Gorbachev in November. The U.S. seems to want to cover systematically every problem in the relationship, but the Soviets feel that before we can solve problems, we must have an agreement on the framework of our future relations, some "rules of the road," so to speak.

—The Soviets also believe that we both need to agree first on some of the more important problems, such as the Stockholm CDE and Vienna MBFR, before we can make much headway otherwise.

—Dobrynin's discussion with Shultz July 3 was considered not very constructive; in fact in some respects it represented a step backward.³

—While Shultz agreed that arms reduction is a central area for our relationship, he stated that he did not see the prospect of progress before November and turned his attention to other matters. Dobrynin had called his attention to MBFR, but Shultz had said that no immediate progress is likely there.

—The Stockholm CDE presents a different picture. It seems that both sides wish to reach an agreement involving a non-use-of-force declaration and CBM's. We have scheduled a very important meeting

² Senator Kennedy visited the Soviet Union in April 1974, traveling to Moscow, Leningrad, and Tbilisi. (Telegram 5944 from Moscow, April 22, 1974; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D740093-1005; and telegram 6195 from Moscow, April 25, 1974; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D740099-0108)

³ See Document 55.

in Moscow in September, and it should be possible to wrap up an agreement in time to announce at the meeting in November.⁴

—[A statement was then made on CW, but Horowitz's notes were not clear and he did not remember precisely what was said.]

—Regarding non-proliferation, the U.S. has offered an outline of an understanding and the Soviets are prepared to agree and to announce this at Geneva.

—Regarding the Geneva negotiations, however, the U.S. has changed its position since the January agreement. It is the Soviet understanding that the U.S. wants to conclude an agreement on just one of the three areas—which would be inconsistent with the January agreement. Also the Soviets will not enter into an agreement which "legalizes" SDI.

—The Soviets were struck by the fact that Shultz did not mention the TTBT or PNET, and that he refused to discuss a testing moratorium, and consider this disturbing.

—On regional issues, Shultz said the U.S. is willing to discuss bilaterally various regional issues, including the Middle East, Afghanistan, East Asia, Southern Africa and Central America. The Soviet position is that all are discussable, *including and particularly Afghanistan*.

—In regard to Afghanistan, *if the U.S. would suspend temporarily and publicly assistance to the resistance, there would be a solution*. Gorbachev has decided to solve the problem. [Horowitz asked what solution he had in mind, and Bukin said that he was not prepared to describe the solution, but that one is possible and desirable and that Gorbachev had made the decision to proceed with it.]

—Regarding human rights, the Soviet Union will ignore U.S. demands in this area since they constitute impermissible interference in internal affairs.

—Regarding trade, there are upcoming discussions with Block and the Soviets are willing to enter into further agreements in this area

⁴ According to telegram 12354 from Moscow, September 6, Goodby "held consultations with Soviet CDE Ambassador Oleg Grinevskiy in Moscow September 2–3. Discussions covered CBM's, non-use of force, procedural issues, and the relationship of CDE to the Vienna review meeting." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850633–0127)

[NB: It is not clear whether this refers to the Agricultural Cooperation Agreement or something else.]⁵

—Shultz also cited a “package” of bilateral questions: North Pacific Air Safety; a Civil Air Agreement, Consulates and an Exchanges Agreement. The Soviets are prepared to wrap these up and announce them at the November meeting.

—Therefore, there seems to be the prospect of six agreements for announcement in November: CDE, non-proliferation, and the four bilateral ones named.

—If the White House wants to settle for this as the concrete results of a meeting, then the Soviets will agree.

—However, from the Soviet point of view, such a result would mean that the meeting had *failed*, since none of the main problems would have been touched.

—Several high-level meetings are coming up, but the White House has been derelict in not preparing adequately in regard to the issues under negotiation in Geneva and Vienna.

—The Soviets expect the Gorbachev-Mitterrand meeting to be much more productive.⁶ They expect good agreements in the economic area and substantial agreement on major topics such as SDI, Eureka and INF.⁷

—The U.S. should be aware that November is the terminal date for the Soviet moratorium on INF deployments. *If there is no agreement in a significant area at the November meeting, there will be dramatic and*

⁵ In telegram 12179 from Moscow, September 4, the Embassy provided a wrap-up of Block's visit from August 25 to September 1, stating that the visit “resulted in Soviet assurances that they would honor the provisions of the five-year agreement on grains (LTA) and buy the remaining 1.1 million tons of wheat by September 30. The Secretary also signed a protocol with the Agriculture Minister V.K. Mesyats on the exchange of young agricultural specialists and was treated to an exceptionally good (by Soviet standards) tour of farm enterprises near Moscow, Kiev and Leningrad. Perhaps most important, he had the opportunity to develop good rapport with accompanying Deputy Minister of Agriculture, V.G. Kozlov—a man of considerable stature whose influence is likely to grow in the years ahead.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850628–0539)

⁶ See footnote 6, Document 114.

⁷ In the spring of 1985, France proposed a “common Western European research project in high technology areas similar to those covered” by SDI. (Michael Dobbs, “French Plan Gains Backing in Europe,” *Washington Post*, May 23, 1985, p. A29) According to telegram 11634 from London, May 22, the program, known as Eureka, called for “increased European collaboration in specific areas of advanced technology.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850359–0718) By July, 17 European nations “agreed on broad outlines for a research drive that would coordinate new and existing research projects in fields such as supercomputers, robotics, biotechnology, and telecommunications.” (William Echikson, “Europeans join forces on ‘Eureka’ research. Now 17 nations are talking about rival to US ‘star wars’ project,” *Christian Science Monitor*, July 19, 1985)

sudden additions to the Soviet INF deployments. This will be necessary to show the world that any interpretation of the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting other than a failure is impossible.

—In addition to ending their moratorium on INF deployments, the Soviets will also consider terminating the Geneva negotiations, although no final decision on this has yet been made, as is the case in regard to substantial new INF deployments.

—They hope Senator Kennedy could use his influence to encourage “more serious” preparations on the American side for the November meeting.

—Regarding the Geneva negotiations, the Soviets are confused about some aspects of the current American position. The Soviet delegation had asked Kampelman whether, if the Soviet Union proposed deep reductions, this would have a positive effect on the American position in regard to space weapons. Kampelman had replied that significantly lower levels of offensive weapons would help both sides to lower the levels of space weapons.

—However, when Soviet negotiators asked what the American reaction would be to a Soviet proposal to cut offensive weapons by 50%, Kampelman replied that no decision had been made regarding deployment of space weapons; that this would depend on the outcome of the negotiations. The Soviets regard these two statements as inconsistent with each other.

—Furthermore, the Soviets were disturbed when, following these exchanges in Geneva (which they considered encouraging even if not fully consistent), they read a speech by Gen. Abrahamson in Europe which stated that even if there were a 50% cut in offensive weapons, SDI would be necessary.⁸ This was regarded as a calculated answer to the Soviet probe at Geneva.

—The U.S. says that there have been no sound Soviet proposals and that the U.S. has proposed a reduction to 5000 warheads. But the Soviet Union believes that the American number is unacceptable because it ignores cruise missiles. The Administration refuses to discuss an overall concept for reductions which includes cruise missiles.

—The Soviets, however, think there may be some promise in looking at the ASAT question. It is clear that there is an integral link between ASATs and ABMs, since satellites are necessary for the latter—for detection and targeting if nothing else.

—The Soviets are prepared to discuss an agreement on “rules of the road” for satellites—something analogous to the Incidents at Sea

⁸ Speech not found.

Agreement. They proposed something like this in 1983 and think the time may be ripe to return to it. If agreement could be reached in this area, it would be seen as a major first step in resolving the SDI problem.

This was the extent of the “message,” which I will comment on later, but Horowitz also reported on an interesting conversation with Velikhov.

Velikhov's Comments:

When Horowitz arrived at the airport he was taken directly to Velikhov's house, without even stopping at the hotel to change. A conversation ensued which went on until 1:00 A.M. The salient points Velikhov made were the following:

—The next “crisis” in U.S.–Soviet relations is likely to occur over Midgetman. The Soviets cannot accept that the U.S. should have the MX, the D-5 and also the Midgetman and hold to the SALT-II quantitative limits.

—When Horowitz mentioned the Soviet two new types, Velikhov denied that a second “new type” was involved, claiming it was only a permissible upgrade, and reiterated that the SALT-II limits will not be observed if the Midgetman is deployed.

—Horowitz reminded Velikhov that Senator Kennedy is a strong supporter of Midgetman, which seemed to take Velikhov by surprise.

—As for the contours of a possible agreement, Velikhov stated that the key to solving the impasse at Geneva may be to define the boundary between SDI research and testing. If the boundary can be defined, SDI research could be allowed to continue.

—If this definition could be achieved, he stated, the Soviets would be willing to offer deep reductions in warheads—up to 50% if this can be applied flexibly with each side determining the distribution among systems.

—In return for this, the Soviets would accept a time-limited moratorium on SDI *testing* (as defined by negotiation). The time limit could be in the range of 4–5 years.

—Velikhov commented on the time-limited moratorium with the observation that this would get them past the Reagan Administration, and they would have to take their chances with his successor.

—Horowitz brought up the problem of the Krasnoyarsk radar. Velikhov, somewhat to his surprise, stated that the Soviets would accommodate our concern in this regard if we could reach an agreement on the central issues. [He did not, however, describe how, except to say that on-site inspection would be possible in the context of an agreement to reaffirm the ABM Treaty.]

Other Observations:

Horowitz made several interesting observations about the current mood and role of individuals:

1. The atmosphere was totally businesslike and non-polemical; there was no railing against the U.S. in emotional terms as was the case during his visit last year.

2. His contacts told him that Alexandrov-Agentov is in full charge of U.S.–Soviet relations in Gorbachev’s immediate office. He has very close ties, including a long-standing personal relationship, with Shevardnadze. Horowitz spoke to Alexandrov on the telephone—he was on vacation in Riga (Horowitz added that he was staying with Mike Bruk there).⁹

3. Gorbachev’s other key staffer is Nikolai Kruzhina, who was described by Soviets as his “Don Regan”—the chief of staff. They stated that *all* paper going to Gorbachev passes through him. He does not seem to have a formal substantive role, but obviously has the opportunity to give advice as he sees fit.

4. Zagladin was out of the country when Horowitz was there. He was told that Zagladin is “in close” with the Gorbachev group and also plays an important role. (He is now in East Germany receiving treatment for a liver ailment, but Horowitz was told that it was not serious.)

5. All of Horowitz’s contacts expressed delight that Gromyko is “out”—and some stated “even if we had to make him President to get rid of him.” There seemed no doubt that he will have no effective role in foreign policy in the future.

COMMENT

I will provide more detailed comment when I have had time to digest all of this, but I can think of two possible motivations—not mutually exclusive—for the Soviets to pass so much information to Horowitz:¹⁰

1. They want to make points with Kennedy, both to stimulate Democratic opposition to some of the President’s policies, and also because they see him as a possible Presidential candidate in ‘88.

2. They genuinely wished to get some of these messages to the Administration.

⁹ See Document 59.

¹⁰ See Document 66.

My hunch is that both motivations are present. I would by no means discount the second; I think it may be as important to them as the first.

Several situations were of course presented in distorted fashion, in their characterization of U.S. policy and the Administration's attitudes. [I tried to set Horowitz straight on the more important of these.] There is also a major element of special pleading, and transparent threats. Nevertheless, I believe that we would be remiss if we did not give careful thought to some of the nuggets here.

The basic message may well be authentic. That is, that the Soviets will go out of their way to portray the November meeting as a failure if they feel they get nowhere on any of the issues they consider the key ones. The comment on the INF decision (to deploy many new weapons suddenly) would explain their current activity in constructing numerous new bases.

Though the most extensive in detail, this is just one of many "messages" we are getting these days. Either the Soviets are genuinely probing to see if a deal is possible in the nuclear/SDI area, or else they are going to enormous efforts to confuse us. We need to find a way to smoke them out without going out on a precarious limb ourselves.

66. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, July 20, 1985

SUBJECT

Reflections on Horowitz Message

My overall reaction to this,² as well as the plethora of other indirect "messages" we have been getting of late is that this is one helluva way for great powers to communicate (or mis-communicate).

Many of the particulars of this "message" must be treated with great caution for several reasons:

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1985 (5/8). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for System. Sent for action.

² See Document 65.

a. One of the Soviet motivations was doubtless to sow seeds of dissension (or water the growths already present) in our own political system.

b. Even if we discount this factor, we must recognize that Horowitz (who I believe is acting in good faith) is not a specialist on the various issues involved and also is not a stenographer. He may well have missed critical details and in some cases misunderstood the point being made. (For example, there are some inner contradictions in the points made, which may not have been in the original presentation. In particular I do not grasp (and Horowitz could not explain) the contradiction they say they found in the positions Kampelman was said to have taken in Geneva.

c. There is clear and obvious misrepresentation in some of the details given Horowitz (e.g., that the Soviets discussed warhead reductions down to 50% at Geneva).

The Message

Having noted these caveats, however, I believe that in this and other messages we have received, the Soviets are trying to convey to us the impression—either for constructive purposes or for disinformation—the following basic points:

1. Gorbachev needs to come out of the November meeting with a breakthrough on at least some of the key issues as they define them.

2. He is willing to take a hard look at existing Soviet positions, whether they be on Afghanistan, SDI, or the extent of offensive nuclear weapon reduction, but must have something significant in return if he alters the Soviet position.

3. If he doesn't get this in at least one of the areas they deem critical, he will do all he can to make the meeting seem a failure. (And he knows we know about the SS-20 base construction, therefore can be counted on to grasp the plausibility of the threat to increase the number substantially after November.)

Gorbachev's Real Position

My hunch is that this basic message is authentic, and not disinformation, although its utility in pressing for unilateral concessions is obvious. I believe it fits with the facts as we know them of Gorbachev's internal position, and also with the typical way Soviet Russians look at issues. The most salient perceptions which give rise to my hunch are the following:

—It is clear that Gorbachev's fundamental aim is "to get the country moving again." He faces an enormous task in this, since it will require replacement of the great majority of personnel in key positions.

—As he proceeds down the road of internal reform of management and leadership style (*not* of the system itself, which he has no intention

of changing), he needs fewer pressures on the international scene, and in particular an excuse to refuse to throw a steadily increasing proportion of investment resources into the military sector. (The question is not whether to cut back—they won't do that—but only how much *more* will be required.)

—Imagery is vitally important to him, as a Russian, as a communist, and as the leader of a superpower. He cannot be seen making concessions from a position of weakness.

—Therefore, with all his *relative* pragmatism (and I believe he has proved to be pragmatic by Soviet standards), he is quite capable of following an irrational course in military terms, just to make a political point. For this reason, I do not believe the SS-20 threat is a bluff. (Whether we need to worry much about it is another question.)

The Specific Issues

With these assumptions in the background, I have the following thoughts on the specific issues raised by Bukin and Velikhov:

1. The reference to the need for an “agreement on the framework of future relations” is a very typical Soviet attitude of trying to find a conceptual framework within which actions can be taken without carrying overtones of compromise with principles. (In formulating them, of course, the Soviets try to derive maximum advantage, but that is a separate matter.)

This compulsion to agree on a theoretical framework first, then proceed to details, is not fundamentally inconsistent with the President's desire to set an agenda, priorities and map out a game plan for the future. In practice, if the Soviets are willing to proceed in good faith, the two could amount to the same thing. We need to explore this concept further to find out what, precisely, the Soviets have in mind.

2. The comments on CDE and on the four bilateral issues *probably do not mean that the Soviets are prepared to agree to our terms*. I believe that what they are saying is, “If *you* want these agreements to announce at the Geneva meeting, that's OK with us. OK, but not enough.” I think it is clear that they have misinterpreted Secretary Shultz's “inventory approach” as meaning that we are setting these issues up as candidates for announcement at the Geneva meeting.³ It is important for Shultz to clear up this misunderstanding at Helsinki, and also important for us not to jump to the conclusion that we have a “commitment” that the Soviets will come to terms with our positions. It is entirely possible that they have interpreted what was said as a signal from us that we will come to terms with *theirs*.

³ See Document 55.

On the first two points, let me digress with some experiences from the past which shed light on Soviet negotiating behavior. Before each of Nixon's summits, Kissinger met with Dobrynin—and from time to time with Gromyko and Brezhnev—to settle in principle what would be achieved. In addition to the key issues, a list of "target agreements" was compiled and left to the bureaucracies to negotiate, but with a clear push from the top. As Director of SOV in State, it fell to my lot to coordinate all the negotiations in the non-arms control areas. We always had a White House directive listing the areas in which to seek agreement, and the admonition to "negotiate them on their merits." But whenever we held in tough on some important points, telephone calls always came from the NSC to "be reasonable." Usually these were the result of direct appeals from Dobrynin to Kissinger—in a couple of cases Dobrynin actually told me he would "call Henry and see that you are overruled." (Actually, we never were formally overruled since neither Kissinger nor members of his staff wanted to take responsibility in writing for overruling us, and I and my superiors insisted on instructions in writing if we were to deviate from our judgment regarding the merits of the issues.)

My point is simply that the Soviets, given their experience in the past when they, unlike we, had essentially the same staffs working the issues as are active today, probably expect Shultz or somebody in authority to engage them in advance regarding the contours of the "results" of the meeting in November. When we catalog issues and say that we think some can be solved by November, they are likely to interpret this as a signal that that is what we want from the meeting, and also that we will make most of the negotiating concessions to get it if they agree in principle that it can be done. Also, if we don't find some way to discuss, in fairly precise terms, how some of the critical impasses might be broken, they will doubtless interpret this as an attempt by us to evade addressing the key issues.

3. MBFR: The Horowitz "message" implies greater interest in MBFR than I would have anticipated. Given the complexities of this issue with the Allies, I do not think we should encourage them to think it is a promising area. Nevertheless, I think it probable that they feel genuinely that the West has not yet adequately adjusted its position to take account of their moves on verification in '83. The emphasis on symbolic reductions is related to the "imagery" problem, even though that does not explain it totally.

4. Nuclear testing is different. The Soviet interest in ratification of the TTBT and PNET keeps cropping up. The President's offer in his letter (if it gets out) might stimulate some movement here.⁴ Also I

⁴ See Document 64.

believe it would be well if Shultz reviewed our position on the issue in Helsinki, to make sure the new Soviet team really understands it. (I am growing more and more dubious that Gorbachev is getting the straight skinny from the MFA bureaucracy on what our position really is.)

5. Regional Issues: I was struck, as I am sure you were, by the statements on Afghanistan. I don't know whether anything is really here or not, but there may be. I suspect that Gorbachev would really like to get this one off his plate if he can, and realizes that if he lets it drag on for another year, it will be *his* war and thus more difficult to resolve without damage to his own prestige.

I would suggest two steps for the Helsinki meeting:

a. A proposal to schedule the remaining "regional consultations" which have been proposed. (Shultz told Dobrynin July 3 that we are now prepared to proceed with the others.)

b. Some pointed questioning on Afghanistan, with perhaps a suggestion that since the meeting of experts was largely sterile, we might want a higher-level meeting soon. If the Soviets are really serious about striking a deal they will seize on this, or else give a signal in another way. (As for "higher level," I have in mind perhaps Mike Armacost one-on-one with one of the First Deputy Foreign Ministers for a day.)

6. Human Rights: The flat and completely negative statement on this issue is ominous. I think our approach should be to state (in Helsinki): "You know what needs to be done in this area. It does not require contravening your laws or changing your system. It only requires the political will to do what you have agreed to do in the Helsinki Final Act. All I have to say is that many issues of mutual benefit, particularly in the trade area, are not going to be resolved until these matters are resolved."

My guess, by the way, is that *if* the Soviets are inclined to allow some movement in this area, they will try to arrange things so that someone other than the President implicitly gets the credit for it: Mitterand, for example, or perhaps some of our Congressional figures or private groups—or even the Israelis, if Gorbachev has decided to try to strike a bargain for the renewal of diplomatic relations.

7. Gorbachev's Paris Visit:⁵ The comments given Horowitz smack of rather outrageous blackmail. Some of it is doubtless bluff (I cannot imagine that Mitterand, even in his most irresponsible mood, would give them anything useful on INF). However, broadly speaking, there is considerable potential for Gorbachev here. If he makes some attractive-

⁵ See footnote 6, Document 114.

looking trade offers, praises Eureka,⁶ and throws a human rights bone or two, he can doubtless have a visit which can be touted as an unalloyed success—and potentially give us some collateral problems. But he will do this anyway, and there is not much we can do about it other than keep in close touch with Mitterand along the way and try not to give him any gratuitous cause to make problems.

8. Nuclear/Space Issues: Velikhov's comments about the contours of a possible agreement were much more precise and coherent than Bukin's. The latter's mention of an "Incidents in Space" agreement is intriguing, particularly since in the past Soviet specialists have tended to belittle the idea as relatively meaningless. The fact that both Bukin and Velikhov used a 50% reduction factor (in both cases applied to warheads) is interesting in light of the rumors from other sources, and is most curious in light of the behavior of the Soviet negotiators in Geneva. Could the thinking in Moscow be moving faster than the instructions to the delegation?

In any event, I think it would be appropriate for Shultz to ask some questions in Helsinki designed to draw Shevardnadze out on the various issues involved here.

CONCLUSIONS

A. *Re the Helsinki meeting:*

1. Shultz should make a crystal-clear presentation of our view of the Geneva meeting when he meets Shevardnadze in Helsinki.

2. He should focus primarily on eliciting Soviet ideas as to how the deadlock on some of the key issues might be broken, without making very many suggestions himself.

3. He should also try to elicit a sense of Soviet priorities, so that we can mull them over before the September meetings.

4. He should avoid the usual "inventory" approach lest this be misunderstood as representing either the focus or the sum total of our aspirations for the Geneva meeting.

B. *Re communications in general:*

1. All possible factors of deliberate Soviet misrepresentation and calculated special pleading notwithstanding, it seems clear that important elements of our policies and our approach are simply not getting through to Soviet decision makers.

2. If we had an arrangement whereby a well-informed U.S. official could review these matters with a Soviet counterpart, it could be

⁶ See footnote 7, Document 65.

extremely useful to both sides. In the first place, we could be more confident that we are understanding precisely what they are saying. In the second, it would provide an opportunity to call attention to misrepresentations of our position and faulty interpretations of our reaction (such as conclusions that particular speeches—perhaps reported inaccurately—are intended as signals). And finally, it would provide a vehicle for a franker discussion of what is in the ball park than is possible in formal sessions, given the Soviet propensity for concentrating, in their public and their formal diplomacy, on issues which are often not in fact the center of their concern.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you indicate your reaction to the various thoughts above.⁷
2. That you authorize me to work with State next week to try to cast Secretary Shultz's Helsinki talking points in the framework I have suggested above.
3. That, before my departure next weekend, we discuss the whole situation in case there is an opportunity for some private discussion with Soviet officials in Helsinki.⁸

⁷ McFarlane approved all three recommendations.

⁸ Poindexter wrote in the margin: "Good analysis, Jack. I wish we could either put you in Moscow or set you up in a private channel. JP."

67. Electronic Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) and Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, July 26, 1985, 5:58 p.m.

SUBJECT

Conversation with Sec Shultz

I just had a long talk with Secretary Shultz by secure phone in California. He is about to go into the Bohemian Grove and consequently will be out of pocket until Sunday.²

I opened with the several Soviet issues taking first the backchannel matter. I described the two variants for responding developed by Jack and Mark Palmer explaining the differences (State wanting to prejudice or at least imply Shevardnadze's involvement; we preferring to leave the format to them without foreclosing anything). He agreed basically but did want to make one change to what I suggested to Jack. Jack's version states that we have received their proposal and are willing to engage and would welcome their views on how, when etc. I added a line to the effect that Secretary Shultz would head a delegation to Helsinki and that the Soviets could convey their preference as to format to either Mark or Jack.³ The Secretary would like to add his name so that now the message would state that Sec Shultz will head our delegation to Helsinki and that if the Soviets wish to do so, they may convey their ideas as to format to Shultz, Matlock or Palmer. I don't mind that.

We then discussed what I believe is a fundamental difference as to our approach to the meeting. In my view, State was taking the tack of saying up front to the Russians, "Look, a meeting will take place which ought to involve concrete agreements and that for that to happen we need to focus our attention on those pending negotiations where agreement appears possible." To me that opens us to being leveraged to make concessions because of our self-imposed deadline. I preferred the approach of saying that their leadership has changed; that warrants the setting of a foundation of viewpoints between our leadership cen-

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1985 (7/8). Secret.

² July 28.

³ Two draft messages, as described in this message, from Palmer and Matlock respectively, along with contingency talking points for the upcoming Helsinki meeting, are in the Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1985 (7/8).

tered upon exchanges, first at Helsinki but then followed by analogous dialogue between Reagan and Gorbachev on how each side views its international responsibilities and the threats to their individual and collective interests posed by the other side. This could devolve into a discussion of the several baskets of the relationship (Regional, bilateral, human rights and arms control) but in the context of summarizing how we view the issues and determining, if possible where priority attention ought to be focussed after the November meeting toward resolving some of the disagreements. In so doing, we might find in the wake of Helsinki that the Soviets come forward with positions which make possible agreement in a given area—or we might not. In my view, the President would surely live with either outcome. The Secretary said he agreed with my characterization!! Jack should therefore, work up the Helsinki talking points accordingly.

I then turned to the letters. The Secretary said that he had not seen Mark's draft and would not until at least Sunday but that he did not really see the need for a letter at all.⁴ I told him that I originally felt the same way but had been persuaded by Jack that it was in order 1. We have two unanswered letters from them;⁵ 2. With Shevardnadze appointed, and a date set for a RR–G meeting, it was reasonable for our President to state in a foundation letter how he saw our relations proceeding in the coming months—if for no other reason than to put the ball in their court; and 3. To give them something concrete to think about as they come to Helsinki and thereby make that meeting more worthwhile. Shultz acknowledged the merit of these points but said that he thought it just as defensible to answer the pending letters after the⁶

⁴ In a July 25 covering note to Shultz, attached to a draft letter to Gorbachev, Armacost wrote: "Mr. Secretary, No letter to Gorbachev is preferable to this one. Jack Matlock, seemingly pressed by Bud, has argued for a letter that focuses on our nuclear testing inspection offer and on rebutting a Soviet claim that SDI is a weapon of mass destruction. Privately with Matlock, EUR has strongly opposed a letter dominated by such narrow and uninteresting themes. But Jack says Bud is keen on them. EUR has tried to add other points to give the letter balance, but to my mind it is beyond repair."

"A letter to Gorbachev that develops our thinking on how to approach the Summit, and offers concrete ideas where progress might be made, could be useful. But the attached letter does not do this. I recommend that you make the following pitch to Bud: 1) on the eve of the Shevardnadze meeting it would confuse the Soviets to send Gorbachev a letter that neither sets the stage for the meeting nor appears designed to advance Summit planning, 2) let's hold off on the letter until after the Helsinki meeting and then consider our options, and 3) in Helsinki I'll convey the offer on testing inspection." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 Soviet Union July)

⁵ See Document 64.

⁶ The remainder of the message is missing from the copy printed here. No complete version was found.

68. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Ridgway) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Gorbachev Testing Moratorium/Presidential Letter on Our Testing Proposal

Sokolov brought me today a letter from Gorbachev to the President stating that they intend to announce a moratorium on nuclear testing for the period August 6 to next January 1 (Tab 1). As you know, we have been expecting something of this sort tied to Hiroshima and just before the NPT Review Conference,² and the proposal for a Soviet calibration visit to our testing site has been developed as a counter. Our proposal was included in the draft letter to Gorbachev that none of us particularly liked.³

With the Soviet letter—and a probable announcement in Moscow today or tomorrow—our problem now is one of timing. We need to get our proposal out immediately so we can announce it as a counter to the Soviet ploy. We believe this could be best done by sending a letter to Gorbachev this afternoon including the nuclear testing proposal only (Tab 2).⁴ It would not mention the Soviet letter, but would parallel it as a one-issue, pre-announcement notification. We believe this would be far preferable to a letter along the lines that was earlier proposed. We have discussed this by telephone with Mike. He agrees it would be useful to get our initiative out in some form, but he has not had a chance to review this memo.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 NODIS and EXDIS Secretariat Memorandums, Lot 94D92, NODIS July 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on July 28 by Pascoe; cleared by Palmer and Holmes.

² In telegram 10430 from Moscow, July 30, the Embassy reported: "Gorbachev's statement announcing a five-month unilateral moratorium on Soviet nuclear explosions appears to be a public relations effort timed to coincide with the tenth anniversary observances of the Helsinki Accords, the fortieth anniversary of Hiroshima, and the upcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. The announcement builds on several earlier statements proposing a multilateral nuclear weapons test moratorium and it adds another Soviet unilateral disarmament proposal to a growing list." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850540–0744) Gorbachev's July 29 statement is printed in *Documents and Disarmament*, 1985, pp. 444–445.

³ See Documents 64 and 67.

⁴ Attached but not printed is a draft cable containing the text of a letter from Reagan to Gorbachev. See Document 69.

Embassy Moscow could hand over the letter early tomorrow morning. We would then announce our proposal shortly after the Soviets announce theirs. At Tab 3 is a draft announcement that emphasizes the importance of our proposal and criticizes theirs in appropriately moderate terms.⁵ We have further Q & A's prepared on both subjects that can be used tomorrow.

I recommend you discuss this with Bud immediately on your return.

Tab 1

Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan⁶

Moscow, July 28, 1985

Dear Mr. President,

I would like to inform you of the following.

Striving to promote cessation of the dangerous rivalry in building up nuclear arsenals and desiring to set a good example for other nuclear countries, the Soviet Union has taken a decision to cease unilaterally, starting August 6th, 1985, any nuclear explosions. Our moratorium is declared till January 1, 1986. However, it will continue to be in effect even longer if the United States, on its part, refrains from conducting nuclear explosions. All this will be contained in an official statement.

We hope, Mr. President, that the United States will duly appreciate this peace-loving step by the Soviet Union and will follow its example. A mutual Soviet-American moratorium would be an important contribution toward a healthier international situation and lessening the danger of war.

In taking this decision we proceeded, in particular, from our desire to promote a more favorable atmosphere in view of the forthcoming meeting between you and me in November as well.

I take this opportunity to wish you once again the speediest recovery.⁷

Sincerely,

M. Gorbachev

⁵ Attached but not printed.

⁶ No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. In telegram 231307 to Moscow, July 28, the Department sent the text of Gorbachev's July 28 letter. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no file number])

⁷ On July 12, Reagan had surgery at Bethesda Naval Hospital to remove polyps from his colon. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary).

69. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, July 29, 1985, 0422Z

231315. Subject: Presidential Letter on Nuclear Testing.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Chargé is to present text of letter from the President to General Secretary Gorbachev immediately, and in any case no later than noon Moscow time, to highest available MFA official.² You should note that the President had signed it on Saturday July 27; we will address separately the letter received today, July 28, from General Secretary Gorbachev.³

3. Begin text: The White House, Washington

July 27, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I appreciated your kind message following my recent operation, and am pleased to assure you that my recovery has been rapid. Actually, the cancellation of my public activities last week allowed me more time than I otherwise would have had to concentrate my attention on substantive issues, including those which have been part of our dialogue.

I have given the most careful attention to your letters of June 10 and June 22.⁴ Obviously, our views are still far apart on the practical aspects of most of the key issues facing us, and I believe that both of us will wish to pursue these matters in greater detail when we meet

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. The telegram was drafted by Pascoe from the text received from the White House; cleared by Palmer, Ridgway, Van Heuven, and McFarlane; approved by McKinley. Various drafts of the letter are in Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1985 (6/8); and Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1985 (8/8). See also Documents 64 and 67.

² In telegram 10346 from Moscow, July 29, the Embassy reported that “Chargé delivered text of President Reagan’s July 27 letter to General Secretary Gorbachev at 1:15 p.m. July 29 (Korniyenko had just returned from seeing Shevardnadze off to Helsinki and therefore was unavailable for earlier meeting). Chargé explained that the President had signed this letter before receiving Gorbachev’s letter of July 28 on nuclear testing. The President’s letter therefore did not constitute a reply, and Chargé anticipated that a response to Gorbachev’s letter would be forthcoming. After reading the letter, Korniyenko ‘speculated’ that Gorbachev would not be fully in agreement with its contents, just as President Reagan had not entirely agreed with Gorbachev’s letter.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

³ See Document 68.

⁴ See Documents 41 and 46.

in November. Since we will be meeting before the end of the year, I will confine my comment at this time to a few observations which I hope may help us prepare for a constructive and productive meeting.

To be frank, my overall impression from your letters is that you have not yet seriously addressed many of the matters of deep concern to me which I have noted in our correspondence. However, if we are to narrow our differences and prepare the way for significant agreements, we must both be prepared to deal, in explicit and concrete terms, with the concerns of the other.

Reading your letter of June 10, I was astounded to note your allegation that the United States is developing "a new strategic weapon" to be deployed in space, as well as your statement that lasers could be used as disarming first-strike weapons and your subsequent charge that the United States is developing space weapons "capable of performing purely offensive missions."

Mr. General Secretary, our scientists have informed me repeatedly that no element of our Strategic Defense Initiative is capable of application to weapons of mass destruction or to weapons which would be effective against hardened point targets on Earth such as missile silos. Now I am not debating intentions here (even though our intent is clear to confine our research to the (begin underline) feasibility (end underline) of defensive weapons), but am referring rather to hard scientific and technical facts as I understand them.

If our scientists really disagree on these points, I would appreciate concrete examples of what specific aspects of a program to investigate the feasibility of defense against missiles which have been launched could be distorted to produce an offensive weapon capable either of mass destruction on Earth or of use in a disarming first strike. Alternatively, we could arrange for our specialists to meet for a thorough discussion of this very point. If there is such a possibility, it would certainly be incumbent on both of us to act to preclude its realization in practice.

Since we have agreed to be candid, I must also tell you that the argument that Soviet research programs in the same scientific areas as those in our Strategic Defense Initiative are somehow fundamentally different from ours can hardly be expected to be persuasive to an impartial observer. As I see it, the only difference in our respective approaches to this research results from differences in our political systems. Ours requires us to debate every program in public; yours does not. Yet the research is in the same scientific areas, and I can perceive no basis for a claim that such research is destabilizing only when it is conducted by the American side. Have we not agreed to deal on the basis of equality?

So let us now finally get down to particulars and try to find a solution to the interrelated issues of offensive and defensive weapons.

We will not find a mutually acceptable solution by recourse to propaganda or refusal to enter into the concrete negotiation necessary to realize our mutual goal of setting the world on a course toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

In respect to your letter of June 22, I can only say that it does not alleviate the concerns over compliance with past agreements which I described to you in my letter of June 10. I hope that the two of us and our representatives will find the way soon to address and resolve these concerns in specific fashion, since resolution of these questions is a key element in making progress on equitable arms reduction.

I am, of course, prepared to address your concerns as well, and have a suggestion which I believe would lay to rest one of the issues which your government has raised with us. This is in the area of nuclear testing.

As you know, in my address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 1984, I proposed several measures that could help increase mutual understanding between our two countries. Among these proposals, I asked that we find a way for Soviet experts to come to the test site in the United States, and for ours to go to yours, to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapons tests.⁵

Since my address to the United Nations, I regret to say, U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the measurement of nuclear test yields has not yet been achieved. Most recently, the Soviet Union alleged that the U.S. nuclear test of April 2, 1985, exceeded the 150 kiloton threshold, and that the United States deliberately took steps to prevent Soviet national technical means of verification from establishing the true yield of the explosion. I wish to assure you, Mr. General Secretary, the yield of that test was less than 150 kilotons, and the United States took no steps to interfere with Soviet national technical means.

The United States has evidence provided by its national technical means of verification that the yield of a number of Soviet nuclear tests has exceeded 150 kilotons. Yet, the Soviet Government says that these tests had yields under that limit.

It is evident from our exchanges on this question that there are large uncertainties in the procedures used by both sides to estimate the yields of underground nuclear tests conducted by the other side.

⁵ On July 29 in Washington, Speakes read a statement at the daily press briefing announcing the President's invitation to the Soviet Union to observe a nuclear test at the Nevada test site. (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book II, pp. 953–954) For Reagan's speech, see *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 206; see also *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 289, footnote 4.

These uncertainties create mistrust that undermines the arms control process.

I take the Soviet concerns over U.S. compliance with the 150 kiloton testing limit very seriously, and believe they should be resolved promptly and definitively. Accordingly, Mr. General Secretary, I invite you to send Soviet technical experts to meet with their U.S. counterparts to discuss and review U.S. data obtained from a direct yield measurement of the April 2 test. I am confident that expert Soviet examination of these data will confirm that the yield of this test was less than 150 kilotons. I am willing to have such a meeting take place at or near the Nevada test site to allow Soviet experts to inspect the site of the April 2 test.

I also invite you to send Soviet technical experts to the Nevada test site to measure the yield of a U.S. nuclear test. The Soviet experts are invited to bring with them any instrumentation devices they deem necessary to measure the yield of this test. Upon your acceptance of this invitation, our experts can meet without delay to set a date and make arrangements for this visit.

I am making this invitation without preconditions to ensure that there are no obstacles posed by the United States which would make acceptance difficult. I believe it will be a useful step if we can eliminate the concerns the Soviet side has expressed on this matter and initiate increased cooperation between our two countries in this area.

Let me turn to several other issues. During the past two months our experts have held talks on Southern Africa and Afghanistan. I think the tenor of these meetings has demonstrated the usefulness of this dialogue. I want to reiterate my commitment to a process of regular exchanges on regional issues. On Afghanistan, in particular, I believe the talks underscored the recognition on both sides that the situation in that tragic country is an ongoing problem in our relations. We continue to be ready to discuss concrete steps that can contribute to the UN Secretary General's efforts to develop a negotiated solution and lead to the withdrawal of Soviet troops. I am still convinced that a solution is possible which will protect the legitimate interests of all parties, that of the Afghan people to live in peace under a government of their own choosing and that of the Soviet Union to ensure its southern border is secure.

Beyond arms control and regional issues, I know that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will have an opportunity to review those other elements of our bilateral relationship that might lend themselves to early resolution. There is also, as you know, a set of humanitarian concerns. You have stated that these are an internal matter. We believe they involve political commitments undertaken by the Soviet Union when it signed the Helsinki Final Act, particularly

the issue of emigration. Apart from this, the desires of American citizens to be reunited with members of their families, as well as those who are entitled to American citizenship under our law and who wish to live in our country, are legitimate concerns. No changes in your laws or system are required to resolve these or the other matters we have raised with you.

Mr. General Secretary, we have an important, historic opportunity to put our relationship on a sound footing, sustainable for the long term. Our agenda is full of proposals which, if realized, can form the substance of a more constructive relationship. I am pleased that our Foreign Ministers will be meeting in Helsinki, and subsequently in New York to address them. I also hope to have the opportunity to discuss them personally with Minister Shevardnadze when he is in the United States this fall.

I am looking forward to our meeting in Geneva and believe that we should aim to draw up a joint agenda for steps to be taken to improve the relationship of our countries. If we can also agree upon mutually acceptable approaches to be followed by our negotiators on some of the important issues between us, that would be most helpful. In the meantime, it may be that some headway can be made on several of the issues that divide us, and if so, I would certainly welcome it.

Nevertheless, I feel that the value of our upcoming meeting should not be measured by the presence or absence of agreements to conclude, but rather by the degree to which it can contribute to narrowing our differences in critical areas and charting a course for constructive action in the future.

I will continue to give serious thought to the considerations you have raised in our correspondence, and hope that you will do the same in respect to the concerns I have voiced and the various suggestions I have made. As we prepare for our meeting, I hope you will continue to call to my attention those matters which you feel I should address, just as I will be communicating my thoughts to you. This should assist us both in ensuring that our meeting is as constructive and productive as possible.

Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan

Shultz

70. Letter From the Ambassador-Designate to the Federal Republic of Germany (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 30, 1985

Mr. Secretary:

Although I have been “out of the loop” on arms control and strategic topics for more than a week now (a long time for Washington), I wanted to send you some ideas on this broad subject before departing for Bonn.² In this memo, I will step back a bit from the current negotiating situation in Geneva and analyze the evolving US-Soviet strategic balance. I then will ruminate on what these trends mean for our negotiating strategy in Geneva. Finally, I will make a few suggestions on how to relate our negotiating posture to the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting.

Strategic Trends

Despite the overall success the Reagan Administration has had over the past four years in accelerating the modernization of US strategic offensive forces, the momentum of the Soviet offensive buildup has continued unabated. Thus, the Administration still faces basically the same problem it confronted when it entered office in 1981: The Soviet buildup is gradually, but steadily undermining the US strategic deterrent—the lynchpin of American defense policy and NATO’s strategy of “flexible response.” In particular, the vulnerability of US fixed ICBMs (the *Minuteman* force), bomber forces, SLBM ports and command, control and communications facilities to increasingly accurate Soviet ICBMs has grown, and thus remains the principal weakness of the US deterrent. Looking ahead, the Soviet acquisition of less vulnerable strategic systems (mobile ICBMs like the SS-24 and 25), combined with increased vulnerability of US systems, means that the credibility of the US deterrent will be further eroded over the next decade.

It is, of course, debatable what this means for strategic stability and East-West relations in the 1990s. I do not believe that the shifting strategic balance foreshadows, at some stage, a Soviet nuclear “bolt from the blue” designed to disarm the United States and to thus secure, for the USSR, worldwide domination. Nor do I believe that, on the basis of a Soviet perception of nuclear advantage, we are likely to experience a “nuclear ultimatum” issued by Moscow, designed to force us to back down from “front line” positions around the world. (We

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (7/29/1985–7/31/1985); NLR-775-13-80-5-4. Secret; Sensitive.

² Burt was appointed Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany on July 18 and presented his credentials on September 16.

should recall that the high-point of Soviet nuclear diplomacy—Khrushchev's "saber-rattling" in the late 1950s and his installation of missiles in Cuba in 1962—were a function of strategic weakness, not strength.) Instead, the emergence of what Sam Nunn has called a condition of "parity-minus" is likely to have two critical implications: First, in intense regional crises of the future, the United States will be deprived of its own ability to play the nuclear card, as for example, President Nixon skillfully did in ordering a nuclear alert to deter direct Soviet military intervention in the 1973 Middle East war. Second, the growth of Soviet strategic nuclear power will gradually, but inevitably lead to a loosening of Alliance ties, with Europeans increasingly questioning the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee and Americans, reflecting on the danger attached to the commitment to NATO, increasingly seeking to circumscribe that commitment. Indeed, some Americans, on both ends of the political spectrum, will assert that the time has come to shuck Alliance responsibilities altogether. Thus, in the next decade, the Soviet strategic buildup could mean (a) that the United States will be deprived of an important tool for crisis management and (b) that the United States and its key Allies will drift further apart.

The Potential Role of SDI

There are, of course, a number of theoretical ways we could cope with this problem. The United States, in close consultation with the Allies, could begin a process of disengagement from Western Europe and Northeast Asia with the understanding that the Europeans and the Japanese would pick up the slack. As superficially attractive as such an option would be for some, it is neither politically nor economically feasible. How would the US nuclear umbrella over Germany and Japan be replaced? Would these nations, together with other Allies, spend what was necessary to sustain credible conventional defenses? The net result of pursuing this option would most likely be an unprecedented crisis within the West and a weakening of overall military capability—a situation that Moscow would be only too willing to exploit.

Another, more realistic option is for the United States to respond to growing Soviet offensive nuclear capability by accelerating its own offensive programs; in particular, reducing the vulnerability of existing US systems by deploying more survivable replacements. Of course, this is largely what we are attempting to do right now: the ALCM and the ATB are meant to enhance bomber survivability and penetrability, the longer-range *Trident* SLBMs give submarines greater ocean-operating area and thus greater protection and the Midgetman SICBM would be mobile, thus escaping the vulnerability of fixed-site missiles. The problem here is not our technical capacity to respond to increasing strategic vulnerability, but our political and economic willingness over the long haul to take the necessary steps. The MX is a sad case in point.

It has been under development for more than a decade and when it finally is deployed, it will be in numbers too small to affect the overall balance (the Carter Administration wanted 200!) and, of course, it will also, mainly for reasons of domestic politics, be as vulnerable as the *Minuteman*. I am pessimistic, then, about the US ability to keep pace with the Soviet offensive by offensive improvements of our own. Already, an arms race “weariness” is setting in among the American public and on Capitol Hill, not to mention the Allies. The President has done a magnificent job in explaining why the strategic balance must not be permitted to worsen further, but can we count on future Presidents to be so courageous and persuasive?

Obviously, this is where SDI comes in. Whatever the potential for strategic defenses to render nuclear weapons obsolete in the 21st century, it is clear, as the President said in his Strasbourg speech, that the near-term promise of SDI is to enhance deterrence, not to replace it with some alternative strategic doctrine. I have seen enough analytical work to convince me that if coupled with a prudent program of offensive modernization (cruise missiles, *Trident* and the MX), a moderately-sized, layered defense system (perhaps not even utilizing boost-phase intercept) would, in the mid-1990s, neutralize Soviet offensive advantages. As a number of SDI advocates have pointed out, even with an increase in Soviet warheads, Moscow’s ability to convincingly threaten fixed ICBM and other high-value military targets would be vastly degraded if we possessed the ability to complicate—to a significant degree—Soviet nuclear targeting plans. This, in turn, would strengthen the US hand in future crises and strengthen the credibility of US and NATO strategy. Given our technological strength in competing in the area of strategic defense and our political weakness in competing in other areas, SDI seems the way to go.

Needless to say, SDI—like offensive force improvement—also faces tough political sledding. The idea that we are moving the arms race into a new realm continues to have currency, in Europe and at home. And the fact that SDI deployment would require wholesale changes to the ABM Treaty, if not its abrogation, makes a serious effort at strategic defense all the more controversial. The home-grown concern over SDI has not escaped the Soviets and is one reason they have made it Public Enemy Number One. Another, more important reason is undoubtedly that we have plunged onto technological terrain on which the Soviets know they will find it difficult to keep pace. But whatever the reason, the Soviet decision to vilify SDI as an impediment to arms control and as an American attempt to regain strategic superiority has only compounded the pressure on the program from those in the West who worry about irritating the Soviets.

SDI and Geneva

Is there a way out of this dilemma? In theory, arms control could provide an answer. If we are able with the Soviets to negotiate substantial reductions in both sides' offensive systems, then the requirement for strengthening deterrence through the judicious exploitation of strategic defense would decline and, depending on the characteristics of any actual agreement, could even disappear. The question is whether an agreement covering offensive forces, one that significantly reduces the vulnerability of US systems, is really negotiable. On this, the jury is still out. In the 1982–83 START negotiations, the Soviets showed little inclination to discuss reductions in the most threatening component of their strategic forces, land-based ICBMs. But the United States, for its part, was equally unwilling to address trade-offs that might have made an offensive arms agreement possible.

Two developments have emerged that may have changed this situation. The first, of course, is SDI. It is possible that in confronting a race in new strategic defense technology that they fear they will lose, the Soviets are now finally ready to accept balanced cuts in offensive forces in order to place constraints on SDI. It is not the purpose of this memo to describe in detail what such a deal might look like (I have outlined some specific ideas in an earlier memo to you),³ but a plausible arrangement might consist of (1) 30–40 percent reductions in overall offensive forces (SNDVs and warheads), including appropriate sublimits on fixed and heavy ICBMs and (2) a ten-year ban, excluding research, on SDI and ASAT testing and deployment, coupled with an extension of the six-month notification requirement to abrogate the ABM Treaty to two to four years. Under the logic of such a proposal, the near-term necessity of SDI deployment would be obviated by the constraints placed on the Soviet offensive buildup and the United States, over the longer term, would preserve the option, through continuing SDI research, of transitioning to a greater reliance on defense. That said, in making such a proposal we could also tell the Soviets that rather than simply reaffirming the existing ABM Treaty, it could be modified to permit both sides to deploy defenses to protect their offensive forces. To enhance our leverage in negotiations, I would also explicitly state that in the absence of an agreement that reduced the threat to our offensive forces, we would abrogate the ABM Treaty in the not-too-distant future.

The second new factor is Mr. Gorbachev's ascendancy. Gorbachev, after years of stagnation in Soviet policy, is an activist and, as Oleg

³ Possible reference to Document 62.

Sokolov told me recently, we should not underestimate his plans to transform both Soviet domestic and foreign policy. It is unclear, however, whether Gorbachev is serious about achieving a meaningful agreement in Geneva or is more interested in utilizing sophisticated propaganda and public diplomacy in an effort to pressure us to abandon SDI unilaterally. Gorbachev's possible penchant for the latter course—nuclear grandstanding—is perhaps revealed by his recent nuclear testing initiative.⁴ However, in truth, there is no way of telling how Gorbachev would respond to a US proposal linking substantial offensive cuts to limits on SDI. I believe that Gorbachev is most likely to try to have it both ways: Early on, pressuring us through a propaganda offensive into unilateral concessions while preserving the option for real negotiations later should his arms control gamesmanship fail.

Under these circumstances, a strong case can be made for continuing to fence off SDI from the Geneva bargaining process and waiting Gorbachev out while engaging in active arms control gamesmanship ourselves. After all, didn't this strategy serve the Administration well over the last four years or so? While the answer to this question is essentially yes, there are several reasons to believe that this approach will not work now. As sketched out above, we are moving into a period of greater Soviet activism. Soviet hints of flexibility in START, combined with suggestions that they are prepared to live with SDI research, will reinforce Western voices calling for negotiations on strategic defenses. Secondly, as much as we try, it will not be possible to keep expectations surrounding the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in November completely in check, particularly if, as I expect, the unfolding Soviet peace offensive is meant to put the President on the defensive in Geneva. And even if we make it through Geneva without putting SDI on the table, over the longer haul fencing off SDI in the negotiations will pose considerable political risks here at home and abroad. The Soviet campaign is sure to continue and more importantly, the SDI program will sooner or later bump into the ABM Treaty, which will only serve to strengthen the claim that SDI spells the end of arms control.

Seizing the Initiative

Accordingly, I favor a different course. We should seize the arms control initiative and force the Soviets to put their money where their mouth is. By this, I mean formulating an approach, like the one outlined above, which would hold out the possibility of fixed-duration limits on SDI deployment in return for meaningful offensive arms reductions. Would the Soviets go along with such an arrangement? In a way, it doesn't matter, because we should be able to profit both from Soviet

⁴ See Document 68.

acceptance and intransigence. If Gorbachev is willing to play ball, we would be in the position—for the first time—to curb the growing Soviet offensive threat. By agreeing to permit continuing SDI research, we would also keep the strategic defense option alive. Politically, meanwhile, the President would be in a strong position in Geneva because it would be he, rather than Gorbachev, that was seen as taking the lead in the negotiations.

If, on the other hand, it becomes clear that Gorbachev isn't interested in a deal along these lines, we would then be in a far stronger position to proceed with SDI on our own, including the eventual abrogation of the ABM Treaty. The problem we face now is that SDI is viewed by many as an excellent bargaining chip that so far we have been unwilling to use in the negotiations. Thus, if we came forward with a proposal that envisaged constraints on strategic defense and the Soviets then turned us down, we would be in the strongest possible position with the Allies and the Congress to proceed with near-term SDI testing and deployment. Although there would still be those that opposed SDI under any circumstances, I think we could make a convincing case that having tried the arms control route and failed due to Soviet obstinacy, there was no other responsible alternative to pursue.

The kernel of my argument, then, is that the INF experience is relevant for SDI. Our ability to deploy controversial systems is directly dependent on our being seen as making a serious effort to achieve an arms control solution. My worry is that by failing to heed the INF lesson, we will not only lose whatever opportunity exists for achieving a good agreement in Geneva, but that we could also lose the opportunity to create a strong consensus around SDI. Ironically, then, rather than posing a threat to SDI, Geneva may be an indispensable element in saving it.

Needless to say, there are potential pitfalls in the approach outlined here. It is always possible, and indeed likely, that the Soviets could avoid a direct response to a new US proposal and by temporizing, push us to agree to more prohibitive SDI constraints and/or less significant offensive reductions. Such attempts must be strongly and publicly resisted. We must be able to explain to the Congress and the Allies the overall concept of a new negotiating approach—responding to the Soviet challenge to stable deterrence—and why a second-rate agreement would not meet this objective. But having watched this Administration cope before with Soviet negotiating tactics, I'm sure you could succeed in this task. In sum, there are strong arguments for formulating a new position in the coming weeks that could be previewed in the meetings here and in New York with your new Soviet counterpart. I believe that such a proposal would: (a) give the President the high ground in November; (b) allow us to take the initiative in the Geneva

negotiations; (c) create a strong foundation of public support for SDI and (d) contribute ultimately to the stabilization of deterrence through the end of the century.

It's worth a shot.

Richard Burt⁵

⁵ Burt signed "Rick" above his typed signature.

71. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Helsinki, July 31, 1985, 2–5 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. SIDE

Secretary Shultz
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Kampelman
Ambassador Nitze
Assistant Secretary Ridgway
Ambassador Matlock
Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer
Interpreter D. Zarechnak

SOVIET SIDE

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Ambassador Dobrynin
MFA Deputy Minister
Komplektov
Ambassador Kvitisinskiy
Lt. General Detinov
MFA Press Spokesman Lomeiko
MFA Chief of Staff Chernishev
MFA Deputy Director Tarasenko
Translators: Pavel Palazhchenko
Mr. Uspenskiy²

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, F.2, Memcons—Shultz/Shevardnadze Meetings Helsinki and New York. Secret; Super Sensitive. The meeting took place at the U.S. Ambassador's residence in Helsinki. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Under an August 7 covering note to McFarlane, Matlock forwarded the memorandum of conversation and noted: "You may want to peruse it quickly to get a feel for the presentational style employed by Shevardnadze, which is more businesslike and less polemical than Gromyko's, but which—in Helsinki at least—hewed closely to traditional Soviet positions. For the most part, both sides refrained from making totally new proposals. (The one exception was our proposal to renew negotiations on a space cooperation agreement.)" In his memoir, Dobrynin commented on the meeting: "Shultz and Shevardnadze came no closer to resolving the problems that divided us, but the atmosphere was noticeably more friendly than during similar meetings with Gromyko, and Shevardnadze came away with an appreciation of Shultz's professionalism and the personal contact with him." (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, p. 577)

² Nikolai Uspenskiy is the correct name for the Soviet interpreter. In several meetings, the notetaker used a variation in the name or mistakenly recorded the Soviet interpreter as Yuri Uspenskiy.

Secretary Shultz introduced Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to the system of simultaneous translation equipment, and noted that this was just an experiment. If it worked, fine, but if it didn't, he should feel free to say so. Shevardnadze agreed.³ He then said that for Georgians, women are very special. By including Ambassador Ridgway in our delegation we were trying to disarm him.

The Secretary said that he had what is alleged to be an old Georgian saying "May your feet bring luck to this house". He wanted to add the hope that Shevardnadze's presence would bring luck to all the efforts we are making to bring positive results to our countries. The Secretary went on to say that he had to rely on Ambassador Nitze as an historian—but it is said that some SALT I negotiating sessions took place in the room they are meeting in, so that is a certain part of history.

The Secretary then said that he would like to welcome Mr. Shevardnadze on behalf of the United States. He wished to send his regards to President Gromyko. They have logged many hours across the table together and he believed they have a good working relationship. Sometimes their sessions had been stormy and sometimes productive, but they were able to maintain a relationship and the Secretary wanted to convey his warm regards and congratulations on his new position. Shevardnadze responded that Gromyko had always told him about the Secretary and their relationship.⁴ If there was to be any change, he

³ In his memoir, Soviet interpreter Pavel Palazhchenko explained: "Through diplomatic channels, Shultz had proposed that most of the discussion be with simultaneous rather than consecutive interpretation, which would save time if it worked well but could be dropped if it didn't." He continued: "It did look like a risk at the time, particularly because Shevardnadze had so little time to prepare for the meeting and because simultaneous interpretation created greater pressure and required quicker reaction. So the decision to accept Shultz's suggestion was made almost at the last minute. It later became the rule that most of the full-scale meetings with delegation members and experts were interpreted simultaneously, while the one-on-one or small-group meetings had consecutive interpretation. The arrangement worked well, since both forms of interpretation had their advantages suited for particular settings or situations. But in Helsinki it was a first." (Palazhchenko, *My Years With Gorbachev and Shevardnadze*, pp. 31–32)

⁴ Palazhchenko wrote of the meeting: "I was also worried about Shevardnadze. If he had been so nervous just reading his speech, how would he fare in a face-to-face meeting with the experienced George Shultz? I was to be pleasantly surprised. Shevardnadze seemed much more confident and relaxed than the day before, and he went through the meeting with Shultz with little apparent effort." He continued: "Shultz was watching Shevardnadze closely, in a sharply appraising way. One could see that he was keenly interested—there was none of that characteristic cool and even seemingly indifferent look of his. He spoke confidently, with the calm assurance of a pro but, I felt, without arrogance. The two men were to spend hundreds of hours together in the next few years. I don't know whether on that day in Helsinki they believed they would establish a personal and very human relationship, and whether they wanted such a relationship then. None of it was yet apparent; the beginning was quite formal. But neither was there any animosity or mutual anger. Shultz and Shevardnadze were not in the combative mood that had characterized U.S.–Soviet relations in the previous years." (*Ibid.*, pp. 34–35) Both Shultz and Shevardnadze spoke at the ceremony marking the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki Accords. For Shultz's speech, see footnote 5, below. For Shevardnadze's speech, see footnote 18, below.

could only hope that their meetings would be more productive. The Secretary said that he agreed and that they might establish more of a conversation.

Shevardnadze said that the way that he saw the meeting today was that they should proceed from the fact our two countries face a very responsible moment—when General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan will soon be meeting. This is awaited not only by our people but by the entire world. A lot depends on this meeting, including the political climate in the world. He would structure his comments as follows: First he would see how this meeting should be approached overall. Then he would look at certain components of it. Since there was not much time, he would try to use his prepared remarks.

The Secretary said that he fully agreed that our responsibilities are great. We must ensure that we do our work well so that the meeting of the two leaders can be as productive as possible.

Shevardnadze said that this is a meaningful time. The world expects us to have a constructive approach. We should strengthen the basis of peace and confidence.

Shevardnadze pointed out that the fact that an agreement had been reached for our leaders to meet was a positive element. The goal of the present meeting should be to delineate the general political and practical steps to be taken to prepare for the summit. Both sides needed to give a political impulse to our relations, and restraint should be exercised in our bilateral relations as well as in our international affairs in order not to make the situation more complicated and in order to provide for a good summit meeting. The main task of the summit would be to move forward on the essential issues between the two countries. The principal such area is the area of security. This is the question which determines our relations in practice, and this is the issue we should begin with.

If our two countries wish to end their confrontation and end the arms race, producing a more stable climate, they need to improve their relations. Avoiding or postponing the resolution of these issues is not possible, and to continue to have the type of confrontation that has existed in previous years is very dangerous. The “safety margin” has been eroded. For this reason it is necessary to get down to specific work on all aspects of our security relationship and not to waste time. The Soviet side would be ready to orient itself towards a constructive dialogue, and towards mutually acceptable solutions to a very wide range of issues. It hoped that the U.S. side was also prepared to do this. Our peoples expect that the talks will be productive. Our countries do not have the right to fail.

The Secretary asked whether Shevardnadze intended now to go into specific areas. If so, perhaps the Secretary could do his general

introductory points now. Shevardnadze said perhaps he should continue, but Dobrynin said no, to let the Secretary go ahead.

The Secretary said he agreed that we needed a work program and that it should be productive. As we see it, the meeting between our two leaders is kind of a high exclamation point in an ongoing process. We should do as much as we can beforehand, have as many results as possible. But the meeting should also be for agenda-setting, a kind of springboard. It should give a political impulse as Shevardnadze had said. President Reagan regards the relationship as leaving much room for improvement. He had asked the Secretary to say that the U.S. is ready to work at this; we are prepared to make agreements if they are in our own interest, and we assume that you feel the same way. Therefore, we need to define things which are in our mutual interest.

The Secretary said that he wanted to make one amendment to Shevardnadze's outline. While agreeing that security issues—arms control and regional questions—are essential, another essential element in the relationship involves the interplay of views in the realm of human rights. The Secretary referred to the points he had made to Shevardnadze at the Finnish dinner the previous night.

(At that time, the Secretary had told Shevardnadze that he had raised the names of individuals and made a strong point about human rights in his speech that day because the Final Act requires attention to this subject. He also wanted to be certain that Shevardnadze understood that these cases are very important to us, that movement on these cases is important. This is simply a fact of life. Having made this the centerpiece of his speech and having raised it again with Shevardnadze that night, he did not feel obliged to continue at great length in their meeting on Wednesday.⁵ But it was critical for Shevardnadze to understand the central role of human rights for Americans and for our relationship. Shevardnadze rejoined in a fairly friendly manner that when he came to the United States he could speak about black unemployment and that would embarrass the United States. The

⁵ Reference is to Shultz's July 30 speech delivered at the 10th anniversary ceremony of the Helsinki Accords. In his memoir, Shultz wrote of this speech: "Early in the opening session I delivered a hard-hitting speech on Soviet violations of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act: denial of emigration and travel, suppression of religion, repression of individuals who constituted a Helsinki watch group (including Andrei Sakharov and Yuri Orlov), and jamming of radio and TV transmissions. I named names. The president had approved of this departure from our usual approach of private diplomacy. On the anniversary of this agreement to respect human rights, the United States had to speak out publicly about Soviet violations. I saw Shevardnadze again during a break in the session. 'Did you have to deliver such a tough speech?' he asked me. 'I just stated the facts, and I look forward to discussing this subject privately with you,' I replied." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 573) For the full text of Shultz's speech, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1985, pp. 30–33.

Secretary said so be it; Shevardnadze could do what he had to do. This was the gist of their conversation on Tuesday evening).⁶

The Secretary said that human rights is a subject the President has in mind. Thinking of Shevardnadze's point about the need for a positive atmosphere, they could do things here which would help.

Shevardnadze said that if we are to talk seriously about human rights, we need to talk about the need to live in peace; the right to life itself is the most fundamental right of all. Thus, security issues are the core issues and avoiding them is not possible.

The Secretary said he agreed that there is a certain indivisibility of these issues.

Shevardnadze then read a lengthy prepared text. He said that sometimes our views don't agree, but we need to find ways to reach agreement. Shevardnadze indicated that he wished to convey the Soviet approach to the issues, realizing that they did not always coincide with the U.S. approach, but a frank expression of the Soviet position was important for reaching future agreement.

U.S.S.R.–U.S. relations have a profound effect on international relations. The entire world is very worried that Soviet-American relations are at a very dangerous point. One might think that there are difficult issues which require time and effort to resolve. But, it is difficult to understand when there is refusal to take comparatively easy steps which could increase stability and trust. One such area is the question of no first use of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union took an obligation before the whole world not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.⁷ If the U.S. would also take such an obligation, many issues could be viewed differently. The same applies for adoption of CBM measures and the principle of non-use of military force. The U.S. should ratify the TTBT and PNE Treaties and resume negotiations on a CTB.

Shevardnadze said that he would like to stress the new initiative taken by General Secretary Gorbachev, i.e., the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions beginning on August 6 and lasting through January 1, 1986.⁸ The Soviet moratorium would continue to be in effect after that date if the U.S. were to agree to a similar moratorium beginning January 1.

⁶ Tuesday, July 30.

⁷ In a message to the UNGA Special Session on Disarmament read by Gromyko on June 12, 1982, Brezhnev pledged that the Soviet Union would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. See *Documents on Disarmament, 1982*, pp. 349–352.

⁸ See Document 68.

The two sides could do much that was positive and should do so. Gorbachev had indicated in his message to President Reagan that the U.S. side should see this step as one which is aimed at the reduction of nuclear arms. It would be a good example for other countries and an important contribution to improving the international climate and decreasing the military danger. Such productive steps should be examined in preparing for the summit. The question of a freeze on nuclear weapons should also be examined in this context.

The pivotal issue in our relations is the question of security. The last round of negotiations in Geneva produced no movement on the U.S. part. The Soviet side felt that the U.S. was not willing to see and resolve issues in accordance with the agreement reached between Shultz and Gromyko in January. There had been many meetings, but no agreement. And this was not accidental since the practical steps being taken by the U.S. are leading to the creation of new space attack weapons. Instead of reaching an agreement on the non-militarization of space, the U.S. side is proposing to create rules on how to militarize space, on how many and which weapons to have there. If the arms race is extended into space, the efforts to reduce nuclear arms will be futile, and the competition in the military area will become more dangerous in all its aspects.

Despite the U.S. explanation, the U.S. does not wish to have a mutual agreement, but closes all the doors which open such a possibility.

In the area of strategic arms and medium-range nuclear arms in Europe, the U.S. was continuing to adhere to those principles which led to a dead end before. In the area of strategic arms, the U.S. delegates in Geneva proposed a solution which would not decrease them, but increase them as a result of deployment of long-range cruise missiles of all types. These weapons are new and very dangerous, often attack weapons.

The U.S. side has a similar approach with regard to medium-range nuclear weapons, i.e., it does not wish to have an agreement, but wishes to use the negotiations for other purposes. It is clear that U.S. medium-range missiles are an addition to the U.S. strategic arsenal. Their purpose is not only to upset the regional balance but to gain global superiority and a first-strike capability on the part of the U.S. and its allies. There are even those who speak of a decapitating strike.

This is particularly serious since it is joined with the U.S. concept of an anti-ballistic missile shield to cover U.S. territory. The U.S.S.R. makes its judgments not only on the basis of what is said in Geneva (although that, too, is significant), but also on the basis of statements by officials of the U.S. Administration, and especially on the basis of the practical steps taken by the U.S. in the military area. The Soviet

conclusion is that the U.S. wants to accelerate the arms race. The U.S. "Star Wars" plan brings the world closer to a much less stable situation.

How should the Soviet Union respond to this? It will not simply disregard it, but will take the necessary steps to prevent being left at a disadvantage.

The Soviet side considers that security should be achieved not through military superiority but through honest resolution of the issues of nuclear and space arms on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. The Soviet Union is not seeking unilateral advantage. Future generations would not forgive us for commencing a race in space arms. So long as space attack weapons still do not exist, it is easy to put a stop to such a race. The Soviet Union wants to have strategic equilibrium at a lower level.

Turning to medium-range nuclear weapons, Shevardnadze said that efforts should not be made by one side to outsmart the other. There is no possibility of doing this because of the great intellectual and technological capabilities of our countries. Our strategic weapons should be reduced, and channels should not be created to by-pass this. In considering medium-range nuclear weapons, not only the weapons of NATO, but also those of England and France must be taken into account, as should U.S. carrier-based aircraft, since they are an important part of the strategic balance. Neither side should have first-strike weapons near the borders of the other.

If there is agreement in Geneva, the Soviet side would be prepared to halt its deployment of SS-20s in Asia as long as there was no substantial change in the strategic situation in that area. The U.S.S.R. has also taken another constructive step, i.e., it has declared a moratorium until January on all counter-measures which it is taking in Europe. The U.S., however, was not following suit, and this was a shame, since this is an opportunity which should not be wasted.

The Soviet side has been told there are untested elements of flexibility in the U.S. position. But where are they? Do they really exist? On the basis of equality and equal security, there can be agreement on a significant reduction of nuclear weapons on both sides, and the Soviet Union is prepared to go quite far in this direction. The Soviet Union is in favor of genuinely radical reductions in nuclear weapons. The U.S. should think carefully about what we are offering.

Shevardnadze recalled the Soviet proposal for a moratorium on all types of nuclear weapons under negotiation in Geneva.⁹ The Soviet side has proposed such a moratorium as the beginning of the process of reduction and final elimination of nuclear arms. This would be the

⁹ See Document 8.

first step and within a month or two specific levels could be proposed, provided that space weapons were banned. Space should remain peaceful. It is regrettable that the U.S. side does not wish to respond on the essence of the proposal. The U.S. also does not wish to talk about the Soviet proposal of a separate moratorium on space weapons, including anti-satellite weapons, and medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. It is clear that such partial measures would be easy to implement and would have a positive influence on everything else. The Soviet side considered that the proposals made by it in Geneva should be looked at anew by the U.S. side. Accusations which have been made regarding alleged Soviet intransigence or that there has been an absence of Soviet proposals are ill-founded.

The U.S. assertion that it is lagging behind the Soviet Union in nuclear arms is not correct. An objective approach needs to be taken. There needs to be a political will to prevent the occurrence of a dangerous military event.

There was a great deal to think about regarding areas of forward movement, and this would be important in preparing for the summit. The above complex of questions would be an important and perhaps the central issue at the summit. There are, of course, other items on the agenda.

The question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a permanent fixture of the Soviet-American agenda. The sides have areas of mutual interest in this, and they recognize it. There are, however, also questions of concern which the Soviet side has transmitted to the U.S. side. There has been a preliminary exchange of views between the two sides on the possibility of a joint statement at the summit regarding the area of nuclear non-proliferation. On the whole, the Soviet Union is in favor of this, and the two sides need to work on how they should stress their commitment to it.

The NPT Review Conference will take place in about one month, and the Soviet side suggests that U.S. and Soviet representatives could get together after the conference, and, bearing the results of the conference in mind, could draft a text for examination by the leadership of the two countries. Whether this would be a separate statement or part of a larger concluding document could be decided later.

Shevardnadze indicated that he would like to say a few words about chemical weapons. At present our representatives in Geneva are talking to each other about this subject, and the Soviet side is in favor of stepping up the pace of their work. If the U.S. side agrees, instructions could be given to the delegates there to have consultations on all aspects of a chemical weapons convention. Such consultations would be useful. It would be very important to have a ban on chemical weapons. There are many complex sides to this issue, and experts need to get together

to talk about it. Sometimes, talks are one thing, and practical political actions are another. Both sides must monitor the progress made in the area of chemical weapons and their destruction.

The U.S.S.R. is concerned about U.S. binary weapons. If the U.S. side prefers to have an agreement on chemical weapons, the Soviet side would be ready, and at the summit as well, to try to arrive at a common understanding on questions on which a convention on the banning of chemical weapons and destruction of stockpiles would depend.

Shevardnadze wished to say a few words about the CDE Conference in Stockholm. The Soviet side had recently heard from the U.S. side about the latter's readiness for constructive work on CBM's, security and disarmament. But the Soviet side was afraid that U.S. actions do not correspond to its words. At the conference, there is a desire to start concrete work on a draft final document, a desire to combine non-use of force as well as military technical measures. We hope the U.S. would be more constructive and would urge some of its allies to be more constructive also. The time is ripe for this. All of the CDE participants could put together an outline of a concluding agreement. The U.S. could be assured that any positive change in the situation would be noticed by the Soviet side. The entire situation would be positively influenced by productive dialogue between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The Soviet side believes we can make this an asset for the summit.

Shevardnadze wished to dwell briefly on the MBFR negotiations. It seemed that these negotiations were treated as an "unloved stepson" by the United States. The Soviet side was surprised that Secretary Shultz had indicated to Ambassador Dobrynin that there were no prospects of reaching an agreement on MBFR at the summit.¹⁰ The U.S.S.R. considers that consultations on this issue should continue. It considers that this is one of the issues that could be agreed between the sides without a great deal of effort, although at present the two sides do not have much to show for it. The Soviet side would like to ask the U.S. leadership to look again at its proposals concerning an initial reduction of U.S. and Soviet forces. The two countries could give a good example of increasing security and cooperation in Europe.

Shevardnadze said that he had spoken about the importance of European cooperation yesterday. The Soviet Union is in favor of continuing the CSCE process and doing so substantively. This has always been its position of principle and reflects the conviction that relaxation of tensions is important for all countries, and all countries should work towards it. Most of the CSCE participants take such an approach. The

¹⁰ See Document 55.

Helsinki Final Act was an expression of the good will of the participating states and their desire to find mutually satisfactory solutions and balance the interests of all concerned.

The past ten years of the Helsinki process have been uneven, and have not gone as well as first envisioned. The Helsinki process has been idling in place, and, what is more important, questions of European security have been left off to the side. What often happens is that questions of human rights are put to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in order to cover up the dangerous actions of the other side and to disclaim the other side's responsibility for not fulfilling its obligations under the CSCE.

Shevardnadze said he was astonished at Secretary Shultz' speech the preceding day.¹¹ The Soviet Union considers that such issues are its own internal affair. The Soviet side wonders why the U.S. made no mention of questions of security and cooperation in Europe, or mentioned them only in passing.

If we are to expect serious results from the summit, we should create a good environment for that meeting. What would happen if Shevardnadze would come to the U.S. and read a list of unemployed and homeless people, giving their names? He would not want to do this.

The sides should look to the future in a constructive vein. The next CSCE Review Meeting was scheduled to take place in Vienna in 1986. The main thing was to develop a positive experience in Europe.

The U.S.S.R. considered that the Cultural Forum to be held in Budapest this fall and the Human Contacts meeting in Bern in April should be conducted in a businesslike way, and that normal intergovernmental relations should not be replaced by other issues.

With regard to regional issues, if the U.S. and U.S.S.R. wished to improve their relations, they needed to see what could be done with regard to regional issues; a great deal depends on this. It is important to establish a dialogue and to look for points of convergence. There have already been meetings on the Middle East, Southern Africa, and Afghanistan. However, the Soviet side is waiting for a reply from the U.S. on arranging consultations on the Far East, Southeast Asia, and Central America. In such consultations, we would need to seek political solutions of differences through peaceful means. It is difficult to seek

¹¹ Dobrynin commented in his memoir that Shevardnadze asked: "Did you really have to make such a speech?" Shultz seemed very complacent and quite satisfied by the mass of publicity the speech had received in the United States. But Shevardnadze clearly realized that such public statements by the secretary of state made it more difficult for him and Gorbachev to search within the Politburo for a flexible new approach to the Reagan administration." (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, pp. 576–577)

mutually acceptable measures if no restraint is shown in practice in the Middle East, Central America, and Southern Africa.

The Soviet side feels that there needs to be discussion of Central America. It has expressed to the U.S. leadership its concern over the policies and acts of the United States which lead to an increase of tension in relation to Nicaragua and Cuba. Such a policy on the part of the U.S. cannot but influence Soviet-American relations.

The last issue Shevardnadze wished to turn to was the issue of bilateral relations. He said that although there had been changes for the better in these relations recently, these changes were not yet tangible. It was the U.S. side that initiated the worsening of these relations and the Soviet side would expect it to take concrete steps to change this abnormal state of affairs. The Soviet side is prepared to work on the specific issues which it has described.

A package of issues exists in our relations. Agreement has now been reached in Tokyo with regard to flights in the North Pacific area, and the Soviet side believes, and the U.S. should agree, that this will lead to a discussion of renewal of the Air Transportation Agreement between the two countries. This can also effect the establishment of consulates general in Kiev and New York and the renewal of the Exchanges Agreement.

This, of course, did not exhaust all of the bilateral relations between the two countries, but resolution of these issues could lead to the resolution of other issues as well; for example, the Soviet side was waiting for a reply from the U.S. side about continuation of discussions on the Soviet-American maritime boundary in the Bering Sea. This could also be one of the areas for discussion at the summit.

Shevardnadze indicated that these were the types of questions which should be discussed by the two leaders at the summit. Both sides should work with each other in order to prepare thoroughly for it.

Shevardnadze concluded by joking that perhaps he had violated the rules for these meetings by talking so long.

The Secretary said that Shevardnadze was not at all out of order, since they must take whatever time is needed. In fact, the Secretary may himself need even more time as he has got all of his own material to go through and in addition wanted to address Shevardnadze's points as well. Shevardnadze said that they didn't think all questions could be responded to today. These were complex matters and all he had wanted to do was give an outline. Also this was their first meeting.

The Secretary said that for him the simultaneous translation process had gone well. Shevardnadze should see how it works for him. Shevardnadze said that since the Secretary had endured it, he would too. The Secretary said no, that if it were not right for him, he should stop using it. Shevardnadze then said "as is convenient to you."

The Secretary said that he found much to agree with and much to disagree with in what Shevardnadze had said. He would try to sort this all out. First he would make a comment overall. On the Geneva meeting between the two leaders we were in broad accord with one exception (human rights.) He noted as a general set of things that the topics are exactly the sort of things that they should be trying to advance. So in general, we are in accord. He now wanted to take the issues one by one.

But perhaps first one comment about the importance of being careful not to upset things, as Shevardnadze had said, and to take positive steps to enhance the prospects for the meeting between the two leaders. There are a number of activities that tend to inflame things. We have had some discussions of the Nicholson shooting. We need to handle such matters much better and we still have a long ways to go on this case. The other incident in the zone was handled quickly and well and is not an issue at this point. We had discussions of the Berlin Air Corridor. At the technical level some progress has been made. But nothing can blow up faster than Berlin. Some of your statements during the TWA hijacking were inflammatory. The U.S. finds the buzzing of our rigs in the Bering Sea unnecessary and an example of the type of thing where restraint is called for. As a general proposition, we are ready to work with the Soviet Union. We recognize that we have different systems and that we are competitive, but we don't want this competition to explode. We have no military or aggressive intentions. He wanted to assure Shevardnadze of this fact.

The Secretary then said that he wanted to turn to security issues, following the outline which Shevardnadze had made. He had a general comment which cut across this field. We don't feel there is much to be gained by broad declaratory statements that cannot be verified. That goes for big things like Geneva and lesser things as well. We need content and procedures to verify what has been established. We say this in the spirit of what it takes to build confidence and also with our Congress in mind. They have to ratify agreements and the first question they ask is how we can be sure to verify what is being carried out.

The Secretary then said he wanted to turn to nuclear testing. It would be a positive advance to put some controls over testing, but we have concerns with verification. This is precisely the problem we have with the 1974 and 1976 agreements (TTBT and PNET) which Shevardnadze had mentioned. He had discussed this with Ambassador Dobrynin and undoubtedly the Minister was also very familiar with it. There are things that can be done and in that spirit the President had made his proposal last year and again this weekend to advance verification.¹² That is part of our problem with the Soviet moratorium

¹² See Document 69.

as well. Beyond that, we are concerned with the moratorium because as we view it, the Soviet side has moved ahead with more modern weapons so they need testing less. In addition, we have the experience of the early 1960's when the Soviet Union had broken out of a moratorium with a big testing program. President Kennedy had then said we should never again be involved in a moratorium without the means of verification. For that matter, a freeze also presents problems of the same type.

By contrast, the President's proposal is operational and practical. It also recognizes the Soviet point that it is not a good practice to change agreements that have already been signed. This is not necessary. If you carry out the suggestion we have made, it will lead in a positive direction. The Secretary asked the members of his delegation whether he had left anything out. He noted that Nitze usually kicked him if there was a problem. Shevardnadze looked around to find Kvitsinskiy and said that he forbade Kvitsinskiy to interfere as he had been unable to reach an agreement.

The Secretary said that he would like to turn now to the Geneva issues which are of transcendent importance and should be addressed by our leaders. To the extent these matters can be advanced, they should be. Our negotiators are ready to give and take; they are there with good faith and good will. The President has shown his commitment by his decision on interim restraint.¹³ We have had two positive SCC agreements. But basically on substance in Geneva no special advance has been made. We think that this is not our fault, but yours. We pick up newspapers and find so-called new Soviet ideas. Congressmen go to Moscow and something is raised with them. But we get nothing in Geneva. The Union of Concerned Scientists gets a letter that some say provides a signal that research would not be banned; but when we ask, we are told that this is a misinterpretation and that research is included in the ban.¹⁴ Still we hear nothing in Geneva. We recognize that there is going to be some propaganda. Each side will be working with various groups.

But we feel we have sent competent negotiators to Geneva. Our people feel we have a professional crew. If the Union of Concerned Scientists or Congressman Solarz receive proposals, they are not in a

¹³ See footnote 2, Document 41.

¹⁴ Gorbachev's July 6 letter to the Union of Concerned Scientists stated "in all certainty that the Soviet Union will not be the first to take weapons into outer space. We shall make every effort to persuade other countries too, and above all the United States of America, not to take such a fatal step." (*Documents on Disarmament*, 1985, pp. 376–378)

position to evaluate them.¹⁵ When you go out like that, we don't take you seriously. There are three competent negotiators and you should take them seriously. We feel we haven't seen that. There was a bit more conversation in the second round, but it still wasn't great.

The Secretary continued that we feel the groups are related; this was agreed in Geneva. Each side gave its views. We felt that discussions in the three groups could go forward. If in one of the three groups there was progress, this could be brought forward and we could look at it. We don't think it is the right way to have nothing in the strategic and intermediate range groups if we are not in agreement in space/defense.

We need to get at it in Geneva. There is much to say, but we are not negotiating here. Let us make the people in Geneva earn their living, and make them work. We agree they need a political impulse if they are to get something accomplished. If there are stumbling blocks, then it is up to Shevardnadze and the Secretary to see what they can do. If there is still a problem, then the President and the General Secretary can kick rear ends. But we must clarify what the problems are.

The Secretary said he wanted to look at his notes on the comments that Shevardnadze had made here. He noted Shevardnadze's statement that we had other purposes in mind with arms control. The Secretary wanted to state that we don't have any other purposes; that we would like to see the negotiations succeed and we would like to see them result in radical reductions. Both sides have set as a goal no nuclear weapons. But we have to take a radical step to get there. We believe that if we take radical steps, if the United States and the Soviet Union move to much lower levels, we can then go together to the other nuclear states and say that they must join us if we are to proceed to zero nuclear weapons. This is how we should approach the French, British and Chinese.

¹⁵ This is likely a reference to a message on various arms control issues passed to Representative Stephen Solarz during a meeting with Colonel General Chervov, when Solarz led a congressional delegation to Moscow from July 3 to 6. In telegram 9121 from Moscow, July 8, the Embassy provided a summary of the meeting, which covered prohibition of SDI research, warhead reductions in the "context of an agreement on SDI," the Krasnoyarsk radar, and chemical weapons on-site inspections. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850479–0681) In telegram 229633 to Moscow, July 26, the Department reported that "according to a July 11 *New York Times* article that was also apparently picked up by the *International Herald Tribune*, Colonel General Nikolai Chervov, of the Soviet General Staff, told Rep Solarz on July 3 in Moscow that the USSR would be prepared to accept a total ban on chemical weapons if the Soviets were allowed on-site inspection of private American chemical plants as well as govt-owned facilities." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850533–0547) See also Leslie H. Gelb, "Soviet General Amplifies Offer of 25% Arms Cut," *New York Times*, July 11, 1985, p. A1.

In sum, the United States is preparing for the next round with great care. We are ready to make it a genuine and concrete round. Shevardnadze and he should tell the negotiators to produce something useful for the two leaders—not half-baked, but something good. The Secretary went on that with regard to the President's SDI program, it has no offensive capabilities. The only potential nuclear explosion in space is from the Soviet ABM system around Moscow. The United States has no ABM system at all and no ASAT system at all. We are paralleling what you are doing; we are very impressed with what you are doing in defense. So we are for examining a concept in which stability is strengthened and the danger of a first strike lessened. This ought to be attractive to you and we want to discuss it with you. We find it interesting that Mr. Gromyko used to call for a more effective defense; he was right.

The Secretary said there was one other thing with regard to the ABM Treaty. We are very concerned with what we consider to be a violation. Krasnoyarsk is a problem in itself and a problem with regard to the ABM Treaty—which, incidentally was also predicated on reductions in offensive arms. We also have a Congress which is deeply concerned about what appears to us to be a violation.

The Secretary, looking in Ambassador Ridgway's direction, said that during our last election campaign Vice President Bush got into trouble when he talked about "kicking ass"; but that is what we've got to do with our delegations.¹⁶

With regard to non-proliferation, the Secretary welcomed Shevardnadze's comments that there is some convergence here. We could look at whether a statement on this would stand by itself or be part of a communique. We have given the Soviet side a draft and we are prepared to have Ambassador Kennedy work with his counterpart right after the Review Conference. So it is agreed by both sides that we will do that. We are disappointed that you did not want to do this before the NPT Review Conference; in any case we will move in accordance with your suggestion. The Secretary had made reference a number of times to the fact that this has been a productive area for us. At the Review Conference itself we should stay away from polemics and the U.S. will conduct itself this way.

The Secretary continued that with regard to chemical weapons we agreed with the need to work on them. This could be the sleeper in the arms area. If possession and use escalate, and chemical weapons

¹⁶ Reference is to a remark Bush made after a Vice Presidential debate with Democratic nominee Geraldine Ferraro. See Dale Russakoff, "Bush Boasts of Kicking 'A Little Ass' at Debate," *Washington Post*, October 13, 1984, p. A8.

are much easier for countries to produce than nuclear weapons, this could be very bad. So we are ready to tell our representative in Geneva to step up activity. We note your statement about binaries. They are safe to store and have been developed only as a deterrent. We would like to do away with chemical weapons, but here again a major problem is verification. This is a very hard problem to solve.

We have two suggestions of an operational sort that don't solve the CW problem, but they help. We have advanced them before. One is an invitation for Soviet experts to visit the United States and discuss the technical aspects of destruction. This might help give the technical people a better view of the problem. This is not a big thing, but at the technical level it would be worthwhile. Our second suggestion is with regard to the Iran-Iraq war. There is no question chemical weapons have been used and there is a potential for major use. We are prepared to send a team to Moscow to see if we can do something about it. We don't know precisely what, but perhaps a joint demarche or some kind of statement in Geneva. So we agree that we need to work actively in Geneva and we have a couple of suggestions.

The Secretary then went on to CDE. He noted that the Soviet side has invited our negotiator to come to Moscow early in September. We have accepted. We agree that this is an area in which we can make progress. And we agree that the way to do this is to get into drafting.¹⁷ This highlights the issues and helps us to see what the guts are. What we are seeking to do is to make a combination of the idea of non-use of force with practical technical confidence building measures which give confidence to the idea of NUF and strengthen a sense of security in Europe. He noted that Shevardnadze had said CDE could become an asset in Geneva for the two leaders. The Secretary agreed and said that we should go ahead and try.

On MBFR the Secretary said we will work at it. People seem to make whole careers out of this, and even pass files on to their grandchildren. He noted that Shevardnadze had said we should make some headway. So let us scratch our heads and see what we can come up with.

On CSCE the Secretary noted that Shevardnadze had made some comments. We support the process. The Secretary had identified yesterday some of the benefits. One of them is that you get to meet people whom you don't normally see. He noted that Shevardnadze had commented that he found the Secretary's speech "astonishing" and that he rejected it and would make some comments when he comes to the United States. He should help himself. It would be easy to get such

¹⁷ An unknown hand drew a bracket in the margin next to this paragraph and underlined the sentence "And we agree that the way to do this is to get into drafting."

lists together as there are people who spend their time gathering such information freely. We are strong on self-criticism in the United States. If Shevardnadze has suggestions, we would be glad to have them.

But the things that the Secretary had mentioned are part of the CSCE process, like freedom of religion. He just wanted to say once again that, aside from the fact that each of us is responsible for internal decisions and each has his own laws, motion in these fields which affect deep human emotions would have a very positive effect on the atmosphere. Shevardnadze had said that he did not like certain aspects of the Secretary's speech; the Secretary could pick on parts of Shevardnadze's speech.¹⁸ At the press briefing yesterday, Roz Ridgway had put it well when she said "you gave your speech, and we gave ours."¹⁹

Turning to regional questions, the Secretary said he agreed with what Shevardnadze had said about the usefulness of experts' talks. We can't say that we can point to any breakthroughs, but we have shared information; these talks do help make our views more clear and they help avoid miscalculations. So we consider it positive to do them. The Soviet side had suggested East Asian talks and we think this is a good idea. In your paper you have suggested holding them in Moscow, and we are prepared to do them there—in the first two weeks of September, if that is agreeable. If the Soviet side will let us know about this period we can then find specific dates. We will send Paul Wolfowitz, who is Roz Ridgway's counterpart and an Asian expert to head our team. He and I traveled in Asia recently.²⁰

We also agree that talks on Central America would be useful after we have had the East Asian talks. We will find some time this fall to have those discussions. You mentioned concerns about Central America. We are very concerned about Nicaragua. We are seeing the establishment of a pattern of government that is not in line with what is happening in the rest of the hemisphere. We have incontrovertible evidence that they are interfering in other nations in the region. They are arming at a level beyond all others. You know our position. At

¹⁸ In telegram 10516 from Moscow, July 31, the Embassy reported that the highlights of Shevardnadze's July 30 speech carried in the Soviet press avoided "polemical extremes," reaffirmed the "value and necessity of detente and peaceful coexistence;" emphasized "European relations for the international climate and international security;" and placed "greater emphasis on nuclear issues in general than on space-strike weapons." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850543-0881) For the text of Shevardnadze's speech, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVII, no. 31 (August 28, 1985), pp. 1-5. An excerpt of the speech is printed in *Documents on Disarmament*, 1985, pp. 446-449. See also footnote 4, above.

¹⁹ No record of the briefing was found.

²⁰ An unknown hand placed a bracket in the margin next to this and the next paragraph.

the same time we would welcome your thoughts and we can have a discussion after the Asian experts meet.

The Secretary continued that in the East Asian area he had just returned and again had been impressed by the dynamism of countries from Korea to Japan and down through Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. The big sore point in the region is the occupation by Vietnam of Kampuchea. We believe ASEAN's approach to solving this problem is correct and we support it. We oppose restoration of the Pol Pot regime and we feel that if free elections are conducted that would not be the result. Whatever the Soviet Union can do, and it has considerable influence with Vietnam, this would be a positive contribution. We have people who go to Hanoi quite a bit, so we have a first-hand experience. There is a sharp contrast with Thailand and other countries there. Hanoi is standing still with regard to economic development; isolation is bad for them, but this is the result of their actions in Kampuchea. On Korea, we favor dialogue and something is developing. We support the simultaneous entry of both Koreas into the United Nations. This might help them and us as well.

Afghanistan is a problem which cries out for resolution, the Secretary continued. We noticed that when Rajiv Gandhi visited the United States he seemed to have positive thoughts. All sorts of conditions have been laid down. But it is possible to state the matter simply in our view. There are three million refugees outside the country. There is a need to create conditions that would allow them to return within a framework acceptable to the Afghan people. This can't be done while Soviet troupes are there. We have no interest in using this issue. We are prepared to do our part to help bring about a settlement. We have no interest in an Afghanistan hostile to the Soviet Union. We understand that it is as close to your borders as Nicaragua is to ours, so a non-aligned Afghanistan would be fine with us.²¹

On bilateral matters, the Secretary continued, there are a number of things which are being worked on and should be pushed. The meeting Secretary Baldrige had in Moscow was positive. He was among those who have been received by Gorbachev and come back to say that he is a good interlocutor.

We are pleased that our representatives have been able to reach agreement in Tokyo on North Pacific air safety. We are anxious to see that implementing procedures are put in place. This has to do with straying aircraft so we can make this agreement operational. So we don't see any difficulty if we both put pressure on here and move ahead. On the assumption that this is going forward we are prepared

²¹ An unknown hand drew a bracket in the margin next to this paragraph.

to have talks on civil aviation. We understand that Pan American and Aeroflot have talked. We also understand that the agreement has lapsed. We suggest that we start early in September to discuss a new agreement and we are prepared to host talks in Washington. Any agreement should have equitable treatment of the companies, including traffic service.

Shevardnadze had mentioned consulates. The Secretary thought that if we could get going, this is among the things that we could get together before the Geneva meeting. But there are things that need to get done now. This is not just a question of an announcement. We need to have a good look at the buildings in Kiev. We are prepared to do this and do it simultaneously. We are ready to go.

The Secretary continued that on the exchanges agreement there are some remaining issues. He would just highlight TV appearances and exhibits at least at previous levels.

The Secretary noted that Shevardnadze had mentioned talks on the demarcation line (Maritime Boundary Talks.) We agree that this is desirable and we are prepared for another round early in the fall—say September or early October. We are prepared to hold the talks in Washington; we should set them up through diplomatic channels.

Shevardnadze had also mentioned other areas and the need to reinvigorate them. We have reached accord on an agricultural cooperation agreement. Secretary Block would be in Moscow in late August, Housing Secretary Pierce would be there in September, and Environment Administrator Thomas would be there in November. As a general matter we agree on the need to reinvigorate such bilateral agreements.

The Secretary said that he had one additional suggestion; that we move more aggressively to expand cooperation in the peaceful uses of space. We did have cooperation in this area. We continue to believe that a joint simulated space rescue mission would be a good idea. We are prepared to negotiate a new agreement to replace that which lapsed in 1982. It could cover areas like planetary exploration, life sciences and other area. He then gave Shevardnadze what he described as a “non-paper”.²² He commented that he did not know whether the Soviets had such a bureaucratic term. When the Soviet side had time to consider it, we would be pleased to hear from them.

The Secretary then said he had some comments with regard to some arrangements for the meeting between the two leaders in November. The physical atmosphere makes a difference. We have a team in

²² The text of this non-paper is in telegram Tosec 150032/232636 to the Secretary's Delegation in Helsinki, July 30. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

Geneva and understand that the Soviets also have one there. We don't know the Soviets' conclusions. The Swiss have suggested that we use one of their chateaux; they would make it available as a meeting site. They have told us that they are concerned about providing absolute security, so they want a place with some space from the road, an area not very populated where they can let the press in and out. From our point of view, it is important for the leaders to have a place where they can talk in a relaxed manner and perhaps take a walk in the grounds. So, the Swiss suggestion makes sense to us. We would be happy to set a time fairly soon to have our two teams go there and make a selection. It is well to get this settled early so arrangements can go forward.

The Swiss also said they would like to host a fairly sizeable reception. As they are the host, we are inclined to accept. Of course, we need to decide this together. We think that November 20 would be a good evening for this reception. Beyond that we think we should not schedule anything during the lunchtimes so that each delegation will have the time to focus on business. But we are ready to see what informal dinners could be held. We would be pleased to host a dinner, and if you wanted to do so as well, that would be good. We believe that we should keep these quite small so that while we would have them informal, they would consist of the people involved in a direct way—not necessarily just those in the meetings, but directly involved.

The Secretary said there were one or two aspects of a more personal nature which he would like to do separately with Shevardnadze and the two Ambassadors for a few minutes in the next room. But before doing that, he just wanted to note that Shevardnadze would be coming to New York and that would be a time to advance the issues. The Secretary and his wife also want to be sure that Mrs. Shevardnadze is entertained properly. So we need to get an idea with regard to dates. We know that General Secretary Gorbachev will be meeting with Mitterand October 2–5. This means that Shevardnadze would be leaving the United States before then. We need to focus on scheduling his meetings in the United States as soon as possible because the President's calendar is always very busy. He and Shevardnadze should meet first in New York, as is usual, and then he could come down to Washington to see the President.

The Secretary then asked how it had gone for Shevardnadze with the earplug. It had saved them one hour and twenty minutes. He found it o.k. Shevardnadze affirmed that the "experiment" worked well.

Shevardnadze continued that his overall impression was that a group of questions were emerging around which there could be positive solutions. He and the Secretary and the experts in various fields in preparation for the summit could begin practical work. He saw some

positive elements. The very fact that the leaders would be meeting and a group of questions can be agreed upon—maybe not the most important, but still serious issues—this was good. So, we have a minimum program that can be achieved, but we should strive for a maximum program. We should come up with serious proposals for the summit. It seemed that destroying detente was not hard, but recreating it would not be so easy. He wanted to say frankly that if SALT II had been ratified, matters would have proceeded more normally. But he would not rake up the past. We had had some bright moments, of which our wartime cooperation was an example.

The Secretary agreed, and said that this cooperation was for an objective of tremendous importance and we all should be grateful for the defeat of Hitler's Nazism. Shevardnadze said that he had just received a group of war veterans, including an American, and that we could learn from that generation. The Secretary noted that he had fought in that war (Shevardnadze interjected that he knew the Secretary had been in the war), in fact had been in the Pacific as a Marine. Marines felt that this was the highest calling. One of the most moving things that had happened to the Secretary was the time he spent in the war cemetery in Leningrad.

Shevardnadze commented that, therefore, there was a lot to borrow from history and also some things not to borrow. He had been struck by remarks of Richard Nixon about the possibility of using nuclear weapons having been explored against certain countries. We should go forward and remove the differences facing us today. The Secretary had raised some questions for which there was not time today. But on the Nicholson and Berlin Corridor questions, the Soviets have known official positions which he would not change. A lot depends on the group working in Geneva. Much depends on a successful outcome in Geneva. He could guarantee that they will push Kvitsinskiy. He has nowhere else to go; otherwise he will be unemployed. He had been told that the U.S. representatives were building a building there. But we must make serious preparations for progress in this round. There were wars that lasted ten years, thirty years, one hundred years, but there is no time now to postpone solutions. He had talked with Kvitsinskiy and their scientists. He was not an expert, but he is convinced that we are now in a state of rough parity, and above all in nuclear weapons. If we don't proceed on this basis, we will have serious trouble. If we accept that we have rough parity, then solutions will come. This is an issue of basic importance. You are in favor of verification; we are in favor of prohibition. Which problem is basic and which relates to superstructure? First let's agree on the problem and then do verification. Surely we can determine whether a side is exploding nuclear weapons with all of the scientific advances that we have.

Shevardnadze noted that the Secretary had raised the ABM system around Moscow and Krasnoyarsk. There is nothing in the Soviet Union that violates the ABM agreement. The U.S. knows why we are building Krasnoyarsk. We declared formally and there will be no other declaration here. The Soviet side will not violate the principles of this agreement. He could give an example of a building in Greenland that is a violation. We should not go down this path.

Shevardnadze noted that the Secretary had raised Vietnam; he would not reply on the others. Perhaps it would not be diplomatic, but he must say that if the Vietnamese are not living a good life, the American hand was certainly there. If it had not been for the war, they would not be in this situation. So he did not think this was an appropriate statement. The Secretary interjected that he wanted the record to show that this was one point on which they did not agree.

Shevardnadze continued that it was nice that there is emerging a more normal tone in their discussion of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union is in favor of a political solution (the Secretary interjected “good”). The two states there should find a solution. Pakistan and Afghanistan. We should facilitate that process.

On verification, Shevardnadze said he recalled there was discussion of this in the tripartite talks that had taken place on a comprehensive test ban. So here is something to look at.

So, Shevardnadze concluded, there are a large set of questions before us. It is important concretely to determine our attitude. In Washington and in Moscow we need to study our positions, to study what has been stated here and to decide what to put to our leaders. We need to speed up this process. At the next session between the two of them, he and the Secretary can have a more concrete discussion of those things they are readying for the summit, and those things that are not quite ripe for settlement. The main thing was not to disappoint people. As for practical arrangements, he was not quite ready yet. The U.S. side knows the tradition—today we host, then you host. Tehran had been the only exception. This can be discussed and explored. This is not too complex to resolve. He knew his General Secretary was looking forward to the meeting and that he was prepared to make his contribution. Shevardnadze said that he was so new himself that his own schedule was not quite ready. But he hoped in a week to be able to communicate to the Secretary. He thought this had been a useful and a frank meeting. If our representatives take less walks in the woods and work more, then the summit can proceed at a good level. He would like to say that he had thought a lot about his meeting with the Secretary in advance, about the Secretary’s experience and the fact that he was a newcomer and inexperienced. So our meeting looked to be of an unequal nature. But then he had found out that you have experience, but we have the truth.

The Secretary said he would leave that comment lying there, but he had a few comments to make. First, our two leaders should have a good meeting. This was the main thing. They should have a useful and productive exchange. We need to do our preparations for this to happen. So, the two men are the main thing. Second, we have a lot of things that we are working on; surely we can get something accomplished, other things ought to be done, and still others will perhaps be more difficult. We should not force the pace where this is not in our interest, but we should try if there is something positive to do. This is all for the good. In any case, the President will want to have a discussion of those issues. So, we should get done what we can get done. Third, we should try to get out of the meeting a sense of the future. We want it to be prospective to establish a perspective and an agenda for the future. So here the main thing is to chart a course and to give an impetus to further work.

The Secretary continued that we will have to say something to the press afterwards. He would comment briefly to the press and then Ambassadors Ridgway, Hartman, and Matlock would have a back-grounder but they would not provide detail. It would be useful to agree what words we will use to characterize the meeting. He thought of words like interesting, useful, frank, businesslike, and productive. We had tried an experiment with regard to simultaneous interpretation and it had worked. We had accomplished in three hours what it otherwise took us six hours to do. The meeting was productive in the sense that it advanced our planning for the November meeting; we identified things to work on. We discussed the full range of things before us; arms control, bilateral and regional issues, and we discussed human rights, since you challenged my speech. Shevardnadze turned to the members of his delegation and asked whether it wouldn't be desirable to agree on a common approach. He noted that this is the first stage in preparations for the summit, that this is the main aspect of their meeting, and that we should roll up our sleeves and make that meeting between our leaders productive.

The Secretary and Ambassador Hartman then took Shevardnadze and Dobrynin into an adjoining room. The Secretary noted that Mrs. Reagan plans to travel with the President to Geneva and hopes that Mrs. Gorbacheva will be coming. If Mrs. Gorbacheva is interested, Mrs. Reagan would like to plan some joint activities. Could the Soviets let us know how Mrs. Gorbacheva feels about this? The Secretary also suggested to Shevardnadze in the context of the Soviet desire to create the right climate for the Geneva meeting that it would be useful for them to moderate their propaganda approach. Shevardnadze noted that while the Soviets could control their side of that equation, he wondered whether the USG could reciprocate. He noted that he had

just read an article that reported a sale of thousands of videogames to American children which had them carry out an attack on Moscow. But he agreed that this was an area we should look into.

The Secretary then escorted Shevardnadze out to his car.

72. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House¹

Helsinki, July 31, 1985, 2052Z

Secto 15017. Department for S/S (Platt). Subject: Memorandum for the President. Memorandum for the President From George P. Shultz. Subject: Meeting With New Soviet Foreign Minister.

The three-hour meeting today with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze produced no new substance, but there seemed to be a greater willingness to move from polemics to practical work.² We will have to wait to see whether there is any more flexibility at the negotiating tables and in the upcoming high-level meetings. However, Shevardnadze cast his entire presentation in terms of intensive and positive preparations for your meeting with Gorbachev in November.

Shevardnadze noted that he could already see the ingredients for a minimum positive outcome, and pointed to a number of areas of relatively modest importance where agreement seems quite likely between now and November. But a really successful “summit” in their view requires progress on major security issues, particularly the Geneva arms control talks. [He] stressed three points with regard to your meeting in November. First, the main thing is for you and Gorbachev to have a useful, productive and substantive exchange, and this requires

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to the Department of State.

² See Document 71. In his memoir, Shultz wrote: “Overall, the substance of the Soviet position was unchanged. But I was struck by Shevardnadze’s tone: it was far less polemical. This might just be a different style, but it might also indicate that the Soviets were taking a new look at themselves. The next day, I heard of an interesting sidelight on the meeting. A member of the Soviet staff told one of our senior foreign service officers that Shevardnadze had wanted to ‘toss out’ all of his prepared papers and just talk to me informally, to ‘wing it,’ as he put it. Dobrynin had nearly gone crazy trying to hold Shevardnadze to his script. I smiled. That was a good sign.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 574) On July 31, Reagan wrote in his diary: “George Shultz called from Helsinki on ‘safe phone.’ He reported an interesting 3 hr. meeting with Shevardnadze—new Soviet Foreign Minister. Before I could reply we lost the connection. I hope he doesn’t think I hung up on him.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I: January 1981–October 1985, p. 487)

preparation. Second, there are a lot of things we are working on: surely some things can get accomplished, but others will perhaps be more difficult. We should get done what we can get done, but not force matters where they aren't in our interests. Third, we should try to get out of the meeting in November a sense of the future—it should be forward-looking, establish an agenda and provide political impetus for further work.

It was striking that Shevardnadze adopted our traditional agenda in structuring his own remarks today. He went from arms control to regional issues and on to bilateral matters. The only exception was human rights, which he hasn't accepted as an item on the agenda, and where he showed no sign of flexibility—just a willingness to counterattack when I hit him first in public with my speech and then raised it again last night and today more directly.³

On arms control he followed the line you have seen so often. They are supposedly ready for real reductions, but SDI stands in the way. I pushed hard for them to stop posturing by presenting “initiatives” to visiting American congressmen and scientists. If they have something serious to say, the place to say it is to our negotiators in Geneva. Shevardnadze did say we need to prepare carefully for the next round of talks there and to try to make some real progress before your meeting with Gorbachev.

He listed a number of other areas of arms control where he thought early steps were possible.⁴ He stated that the Soviets are willing to agree to a joint public statement on non-proliferation at your meeting in November. He also thought something might be done on chemical weapons, though he did not comment on our specific suggestions. We agreed that our negotiators in the Stockholm talks should get down to drafting, and he pushed for an agreement in the Vienna talks which would involve initial, modest withdrawal of some Soviet and American forces. On nuclear testing we had an entirely predictable exchange—with Shevardnadze pushing their moratorium and Comprehensive Test Ban proposals and my stressing the necessity for improved verification in order to place any limits on testing and thus the merits of your proposal to Gorbachev. I also picked up on his listing of declaratory agreements that they would like to reach and pointed out that we insist on agreements with content that can be verified.

On regional issues we both agreed on the usefulness of exchanges among our experts. We specifically agreed to have talks this fall on

³ See footnote 4, Document 71.

⁴ During a dinner conversation later that evening, Nitze and Kvitsinskiy discussed the upcoming summit and particulars of arms control. Documentation is in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, Document 111.

East Asia and Central America. I underlined our concern with Soviet conduct in various regions, particularly Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and support for the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. He stressed their concern about the “tension” we are creating around Cuba and Nicaragua. I also stressed our concern about their conduct in Europe, specifically the murder of Major Nicholson and their limitations on the Berlin air corridor.

In the bilateral area, I noted the signing on Monday⁵ in Tokyo of the Pacific Air Safety Agreement and stated that assuming the implementing discussions on strayed aircraft proceed smoothly, we are prepared to go ahead with negotiation of a new civil aviation agreement leading to resumption of Pan Am and Aeroflot service. He noted that this would allow us to go ahead with opening consulates in Kiev and New York, and said that our new exchanges agreement also should move ahead. We agreed to hold another round of our maritime boundary talks. And finally I handed him the non-paper prepared by the NSC which proposes a new agreement on peaceful space cooperation.⁶

At the end of the meeting I took Shevardnadze aside to discuss arrangements for the meeting in Geneva. I stressed our desire for an environment in which the two of you could get to know one another and have a productive set of exchanges. I noted our agreement with the Swiss proposal for a single site for the meetings and raised the question about your wives. Shevardnadze noted that the tradition had been for meetings to alternate—“today you host, tomorrow we host.” But he said this whole matter can be explored and that they are not yet ready to give their view. He stressed that Gorbachev is looking forward to his meeting with you, that he is prepared to make his contribution, and that they want to create the right conditions for a successful meeting. I stressed that one thing they could do in coming months is to begin to moderate their anti-American propaganda.

Overall I come away from this meeting conscious of the deep differences that divide us in virtually all areas. But I am also mildly hopeful that we now have a team that is somewhat more willing to work with us even as they present a more skillful challenge. As you will see when Shevardnadze comes to Washington, he is a more agreeable man to deal with than Gromyko. He largely avoided gratuitous polemics, and he seemed eager to get on with a work program leading to your meeting with Gorbachev. But only time will tell whether the new leadership is any more flexible on the key issues or just has a different style.

Shultz

⁵ July 29.

⁶ See footnote 22, Document 71.

73. National Security Decision Directive 183¹

Washington, August 8, 1985

MEETING WITH SOVIET LEADER IN GENEVA (U)

As we prepare for my meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva November 19–20, it will be important for personnel of all agencies active in the sphere of U.S.-Soviet relations to understand clearly the context of the meeting and United States objectives.² (U)

I invited the Soviet leader to a meeting as soon as he assumed his position, because I consider it important for the leaders of the two most powerful nations to know each other and to establish a dialogue which can assist us in managing a relationship which is inevitably adversarial but which must be conducted in a manner which improves stability in the world. (U)

Accordingly, the primary purpose of the meeting will be to establish personal contact and, if possible, to develop an agenda for negotiations to be undertaken in the future. The meeting will not be a substitute for negotiations in normal channels, nor is its aim the signing of formal agreements. It should rather be viewed as part of an ongoing process of dialogue with the Soviet leadership, which can give direction and momentum to our negotiating efforts. (U)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron August 1985 (3/6). Secret. Under an August 8 covering memorandum, McFarlane sent NSDD 183 to Bush, Shultz, Baker, Weinberger, Baldrige, Casey, Regan, Vessey, and Wick, indicating the President approved the NSDD. Martin signed the cover memorandum on behalf of McFarlane. In a covering memorandum forwarding the NSDD to Reagan for his signature, drafted by Matlock, McFarlane explained: "Preparation for a fruitful meeting and encouragement of realistic public expectations will require close coordination of preparations and a clear understanding within the bureaucracy of the purposes of the meeting." He continued: "The NSDD at Tab 1 is designed to describe your view of the meeting and your goals, to ensure appropriate discipline among U.S. Government officials in commenting on it, and to establish a mechanism for coordinating the various strands of activity in U.S.-Soviet relations by means of a White House Coordinating Group."

² In a July 18 memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock wrote: "In order to establish the necessary coherence to our negotiations and public presentation of our policies during the run-up to the President's Geneva meeting, I believe that we need an authoritative statement for the bureaucracy regarding the President's view of the context of the meeting and procedures to be followed in coordinating preparations. The most effective way to do this could be with an NSDD signed by the President, which would also serve as a signal to the President's active command of the process despite his operation." Matlock continued: "I have tried my hand at drafting such a document, which is at Tab 1. At this point it has not been cleared with anyone." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Geneva Meeting: Memcons, Geneva (1); NLR-351-52-11-1-1) Reference is to Reagan's July 12 surgery. See footnote 7, Document 68.

Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in various areas should continue to be conducted on their merits, and should neither be hastened nor delayed because of my upcoming meeting. While I do not preclude the possibility of signing or announcing possible agreements which may be reached during the intervening period in the normal course of negotiation, this is not the purpose of the meeting, and the planned meeting should under no circumstances be allowed to influence the United States negotiating position. (S)

Since historically public expectations for meetings between American and Soviet leaders have been inflated and have led to a damaging cycle of euphoria and then disillusionment, it will be important to convey to the public a realistic picture of the context in which my meeting will take place. In particular, nothing should be said to encourage the expectation that the meeting will result in a fundamental change in the nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, or in major agreements. This must be done, however, without denigrating the importance of the meeting or of kindling suspicions that the United States is not serious in its efforts to resolve problems in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. (S)

Given the importance of maintaining a clear and consistent treatment of U.S.-Soviet relations in our public statements and public diplomacy, it is imperative for all U.S. Government officials to adhere totally to the press guidance established by my own statements and those approved by the State Department and the White House.³ No official is authorized to originate public statements regarding the Geneva meeting, or to provide comments in background briefings that go beyond statements made publicly by the White House or Department of State. All written remarks concerning U.S.-Soviet relations must be approved in advance by the White House or the Department of State. Should public statements or background briefings by other U.S. Government officials on particular aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations seem desirable, they may be undertaken only following the specific approval of the White House Coordinating Group for the Geneva Meeting. (C)

In this connection, I am compelled to note that our negotiating position continues to be undermined by unauthorized, and often inaccurate or distorted information provided to the public media by anonymous government officials. It will be particularly important in the months ahead to put a stop to this damaging practice, and I would remind every agency head that it is part of his executive responsibility

³ In his July 18 memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock explained: "You will note that it provides very stringent guidance on dealing with the press. Perhaps this is quixotic, but I believe it would be useful for the President to go on record with the bureaucracy regarding the need for discipline in this area." See footnote 2, above.

to control access to sensitive information in a manner which insures its integrity from unauthorized disclosure. (S)

Issues under negotiation with the Soviet Union will continue to be staffed in the normal interagency process, culminating in the National Security Council or National Security Planning Group. Overall arrangements for the Geneva meeting, including its public diplomacy aspects, will be coordinated by my Chief of Staff and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. (U)

To insure that the various strands of U.S.-Soviet relations are properly coordinated for presentation to these cabinet-level bodies, I hereby establish a White House Coordinating Group for the Geneva Meeting, with the following mandate:⁴

1. To monitor and ensure consistency of substantive preparations for the meeting in Geneva, except for those which come under the aegis of the Senior Arms Control Group. (S)

2. To coordinate policy guidance for public handling of issues related to the meeting in Geneva. (S)

3. To provide guidance to the White House Advance Office and other units responsible for arrangements and logistics in respect to substantive implications of arrangements for the meeting. (S)

The White House Coordinating Group for the Geneva Meeting will operate under the Chairmanship of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Jack F. Matlock, and will include representatives designated by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, along with such other officials as my Chief of Staff and the Assistant to the President for National Security shall deem necessary. (S)

Ronald Reagan

⁴ Matlock continued, in his July 18 memorandum: "the principal action item is the creation of a White House Coordinating Group, which I would chair. I believe this is necessary, since we do not at present have a handle on all that is going on, and the monitoring process will become even more critical as we get closer to November." See footnote 2, above.

74. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 8, 1985

SUBJECT

Paper on the Soviet Russian View of the World

Attached at Tab A is the third in a series of papers we have prepared as background reading on the Soviet Union.² It deals with the Soviet and Russian view of their place in the world and follows on the two you have already seen on the nature of the Soviet Union and Soviet psychology.³

Taken together, these three papers are intended to set forth key factors which operate as sources of Soviet behavior. The next group of papers will describe how the Soviet system operates on the inside.

Recommendation

That you read the paper at Tab A.⁴

Tab A

Paper on the Soviet Union⁵

Washington, undated

*RUSSIA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD:
THE VIEW FROM MOSCOW*

Russia has a long tradition of contradictory self images. For two centuries visions of Moscow as the seat of universal truth have clashed with perceptions of Russia's technical and economic backwardness.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron August 1985 (2–6). Confidential. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Bush and Regan. A stamp in the upper right-hand corner reads "The President has seen" with the date "8/9/85" handwritten.

² See Documents 39 and 60.

³ On July 27, McFarlane forwarded to Reagan the second paper in the series, "Soviet Russian Psychology: Some Common Traits," written by Matlock. Reagan initialed McFarlane's covering memorandum, indicating he saw the paper. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Geneva Meeting: Briefing Papers: Duplicates)

⁴ Reagan approved the recommendation and added a check mark.

⁵ No classification marking. Prepared by Matlock with contributions from Robert Baraz, Department of State.

But it made a big difference whether Russians were looking west, to Europe and the United States, or south and east, to the Islamic World, China and Japan. The attitude toward the West was deeply ambivalent, with urges to emulate and “catch up” conflicting with those to declare themselves superior and to prevent the penetration of Western influences. Toward the East, however, there was less ambivalence; relations were viewed as fundamentally hostile and Russia was considered an agent of Christian, Western civilization, holding at bay threatening hordes. The injection of communist ideology with the triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution brought important changes in policy, and added new contradictions, but the underlying popular attitudes toward the world outside the Soviet Union persisted.

LOOKING WEST

Russian intellectual history in the nineteenth century was in large part a conflict between “Slavophiles” and “Westernizers.” The Slavophiles had a romanticized view of the Russian nation as the carrier of religious orthodoxy, profound spirituality and universal morality. The Westernizers decried Russia’s backwardness, and saw emulation of Western science, technology, economics and political reform as the cure for it.

The revolution which brought Lenin’s Bolsheviks to power in 1917 was in a sense the ultimate victory of the most radical heirs of the Westernizers’ tradition. It did not, however, put an end to conflicts of self images. The old ones persisted in transmuted forms, and new ones arose.

On the one hand the Bolsheviks saw themselves as the vanguard of the inevitable world proletarian revolution envisioned by Marx as the prelude to a communist society. On the other, they were keenly aware of Russia’s backwardness. It was only after a bitter debate that Lenin won agreement to a separate peace with Germany. Many Bolsheviks wanted to turn World War I into a revolutionary campaign. They felt that a revolution in backward Russia would have no meaning if it did not immediately kindle revolution in the advanced countries of Europe.

Stalin later sought to deal with the paradox of Russia’s backwardness and pretention to world leadership by arguing that building “socialism” in one country was a necessary step to pave the way for world revolution. Nevertheless, Soviet propagandists still had to juggle conflicting self images of the USSR: boasting that the Soviet Union was an example for the world in abolishing unemployment while trumpeting Stalin’s call to catch up with America.

Impact of World War II: Glory in the Ashes

The Soviet Union came perilously close to defeat when Hitler invaded, suffered heavy human and economic losses in the war, but

in the end emerged as a victor. Soviet propaganda strives to keep fresh—even passionate—the story of patriotism, sacrifice and ultimate victory. Psychologically, World War II is a much more recent event in the Soviet Union than it is in the United States. It left its own discordant self images.

One legacy is an abiding fear of war. The populace gets jittery in periods of tension. During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and again during the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 we heard that rural stores ran out of matches, kerosene and soap as peasant women hoarded in fear of war. Soviet leaders play to this popular concern over peace; their habit of repeatedly seeking declaratory statements of peaceful intent is one part of this.

The other legacy was a new pride that the USSR had at last graduated into the ranks of the great powers and had new and far greater influence on world affairs. Communist officials in particular take pride in the fact that the Soviet Union has moved from an outcast power on the fringes of European geopolitics in the 1920's to one of the world's two acknowledged superpowers, and see this as perhaps their most important and lasting achievement.

The Parvenu Superpower

The short leap from the darkest days of World War II to sputnik and strategic parity with the United States must have been a heady experience for Soviet leaders. It created a new self image of the USSR as one of the world's two most powerful countries. But at the same time, it sharpened the contradictions in Soviet views of the U.S.

The idea that the USSR could be the equal of the U.S. took on new meaning. When Khrushchev renewed Stalin's theme of catching up with America economically, the notion had a new plausibility. After all, the Soviet Union had achieved a major first in space. Leninism postulated enmity between "socialist" Russia and the most advanced capitalist country of the world. But it also assumed communism would be built upon the foundation of the best that capitalism had developed. America's productivity and consumer goods were, in effect, the vision of the good life to come. Catching up with the U.S. was thus a powerful theme for Khrushchev's Soviet audience, conditioned as it was (despite heavy propaganda to the contrary) to see America as the land of milk and honey and the embodiment of most of its aspirations. But it was again a clear admission of the shortfalls of the Soviet economy, an admission that Gorbachev implicitly reverts to today when he appeals for better economic performance and alludes to a serious lag in adopting new technology.

Eastern Europe: A Special Case

Perhaps because the margin between defeat and victory in World War II was so narrow, the Soviets have long been troubled lest their

gains from the war prove transitory. The effort to freeze the postwar *status quo* on the Soviet side of the dividing line they imposed on Europe has run like a red thread through virtually all of Soviet diplomacy on European issues for forty years. The instrumentalities have varied enormously—the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the MBFR negotiations, the Conference on Disarmament in Europe have all been vehicles for it. But the purpose has all been the same—to write a public law of Europe which in the absence of a peace treaty formally ending World War II would make permanent the East-West division of Europe and provide implicit recognition of the Soviet right to take whatever steps it deemed necessary to perpetuate its domination of countries on “its” side of the line.

Entirely aside from the ideological reasons the Soviet political leadership advances to “justify” its interventions in Eastern Europe (the Brezhnev doctrine), Soviet efforts to dominate Eastern Europe find broad support from the man and woman on the street. Their attitude seems to be that Eastern Europe is made up of small nations prone to “make trouble” if given the chance. Since they might be used by a larger power to threaten Russia (as Russians are convinced they have been in the past), they must be kept in line. Furthermore, Russians are keenly aware that the East Europeans have a higher standard of living than they do, and this they resent.

When Solidarity was at its height in Poland in 1981, the aspirations of the Polish workers attracted little support among the Russian working people. One heard relatively mild and self-deprecating comments like, “The problem with the Poles is that they want to work like Russians and live like Americans,” but more often the comments were bitter, like “If the Poles think they can refuse to work and then expect us to feed them, they’ve got another think coming.” And many Russians are convinced that East Europeans live better than they do because of Soviet assistance and subsidies. “They all have their hands in our pockets,” is not an unusual comment in Moscow. Deep down, Russian workers may also be ashamed of the evidence that Poles, Hungarians and even Czechs at times will rise up and fight for their interests while the Russians rarely have the guts to do so.

The popular Soviet feeling that East Europeans are likely to make trouble if left to their own devices means that, whenever the Soviet leaders decide that various forms of intervention are necessary to maintain their position in Eastern Europe, most Russians can be expected to agree.

LOOKING EAST AND SOUTH

When Russians turn their gaze south to the Islamic World and India, or east to China and Japan, they never experience a desire to

emulate or “catch up,” which is such a prominent aspect of their attitude toward the West. For Russians, their subjugation by the Mongols in the twelfth century, and the “Tatar yoke” which persisted for more than two centuries and cut them off from Western Europe during one of its most creative periods, is still a relevant historical experience. The experience and its “lessons” are drummed into every schoolchild, and books and films continue to be issued which tell of Russia’s erstwhile degradation and subsequent redemption through relentless struggle. Along with subsequent invasions—by Swedes, Poles, French and Germans—the Mongol domination is used to explain and excuse Russia’s economic and technological backwardness, and to bolster the feeling that everything must be sacrificed to a powerful military establishment.

Whatever disabilities the Mongols inflicted on Russia, the damage has long since been avenged and the tables turned on the Asian peoples bordering the Russian land. Nevertheless, the Asian is still considered a potential threat, and the Russian populace has never totally freed itself from the nightmare image of Asian hordes sweeping across the “motherland.”

This residual fear should not be exaggerated. It does *not* (despite the claims of some apologists) totally explain the Soviet preoccupation with military strength. Russians know very well that the Chinese cannot really threaten them in the immediate future. But they do worry—and probably rightly so—about what would happen if they faced a modernized and militarily powerful China, still smarting from the imperial Russian seizure of lands once under its sway.

What is equally relevant to current Russian attitudes is that their fear has also been mingled with loathing. To put it bluntly, most Russians are racists underneath. They consider themselves “Europeans,” implicitly measure themselves against European standards, and have never thought that they had anything to learn from the East. To a Russian—even a relatively sophisticated intellectual—there is no greater insult than to call Russia an “oriental despotism.” “Despotism” they might accept, but “oriental” never.

Communist Ideology and Geopolitical Opportunism

The persistence of racist attitudes, a mingling of fear and contempt, and the absence of cultural affinity did not prevent the communist regime from embarking on a policy of exploiting social and political grievances in the underdeveloped world. If the “imperialist powers” of the developed West were too strong to take on directly, their power could perhaps be sapped by undermining their control of their empires, and their predominant influence in weakened countries like China.

During the 1920’s and 1930’s, these efforts were carried out primarily through the Communist International, which was totally under

Stalin's control. While the effort to foment revolution in undeveloped countries had no basis in Marx's original concept—which was that the revolution would occur only after an economy had gone through its “capitalist stage”—it flowed easily from Lenin's theory of imperialism and the Bolshevik attempt to skip the capitalist stage in Russia. The effort, therefore, combined ideological and geopolitical aims.

After World War II, as Soviet power grew, attention was shifted to dealing with rising nationalists, even if they were not communists, and with newly independent governments which might be induced to take an anti-Western stance. If the opportunity to deal with established governments seemed sufficiently promising, the Soviets did not hesitate to abandon the local communists when they were repressed by the regime the Soviets were courting.

Soviet experience since the war must have taught them two important lessons—neither of which they can admit openly, but both of which are implicit in their actions. The first lesson was that communist ideology in itself was not sufficient to ensure Soviet control—Tito and Mao broke with the Soviet Union and split the world communist movement. The second was that the most powerful instrument of influence the Soviets possessed in dealing with the Third World was its ability to supply arms to revolutionary movements and the wherewithal and ideology of repression to those leaders whose power was threatened from inside their countries. The ideology thus became a mere handmaiden to force, which was applied in a totally opportunistic fashion.

Despite all their efforts to penetrate countries in the Third World, and all the crocodile tears shed in their propaganda about the lot of the poor and oppressed, one thing both communist officials and ordinary Russians lack is a real interest in the fate of these countries, and real empathy for their problems and cultural values. It is difficult to imagine, for example, the Russian population getting particularly exercised over the famine in Ethiopia, even if it were given all the facts. Life is tough enough at home to worry much about the misfortunes of others, particularly if their skins are dark.

SUPERPOWER DILEMMAS

From the standpoint of the Soviet leaders, the USSR's superpower status is both their most tangible achievement and the source of some of their greatest problems. It is apparent to them that this status rests on one factor alone—military strength—since the USSR is not an economic superpower, and its ideological prescriptions for satisfying human needs have been discredited both at home and increasingly throughout the world.

While the people are largely passive in regard to foreign policy formulation and play none of the direct role that publics do in democra-

cies, their views are not unimportant to the leadership. To act contrary to deeply-held popular views risks damaging public morale, which is already quite low, and provides ammunition for potential rival factions in the party.

The Russian people doubtless take satisfaction in their country's superpower status, both because it bolsters their national pride and because they see it as insurance against another war on their own soil. The regime, however, must be careful to avoid leaving the impression that its policies risk war. The leaders are probably acutely aware that there would be little public support for direct military action distant from Soviet borders. Covert supplies of military equipment, training and advisors and also support of surrogate troops is sustainable. These actions carry limited risk of direct confrontation with the U.S. and can be conducted largely without the knowledge of the Soviet population. But it is hard to imagine a Soviet leadership deciding to try to defend Cuba or Nicaragua or Angola with its own forces.

Another persistent trait of Soviet interaction with the outside world has been the absence of experience with and propensity for what we call alliance management. The U.S.S.R. has no real alliances, only countries under its control or those used for discrete temporary goals. Even in World War II, when the alliance with the Western powers was a matter of life and death, Stalin never treated it as a true alliance, but only as a very limited marriage of convenience to be terminated as soon as the war was won. (The Russian people, in contrast, looked at it differently, and their experience of and gratitude for the wartime alliance has served to undercut massive anti-Western propaganda ever since.)

Soviet unwillingness or inability to understand and respect the interests of smaller and weaker countries and to develop with them mutually beneficial long-term policies limits the potential of Soviet diplomacy. In the short term, the Soviet leaders can reap the benefits of a "divide and conquer" policy, since they put most of their efforts on exploiting bilateral relationships to their own benefit. This enhances their ability to disrupt and undermine international structures and efforts which leave them on the sidelines. Witness, for example, their ability to derail efforts to achieve a peace settlement in the Middle East by providing support to forces in the area which oppose a settlement.

In the long run, however, the sheer opportunism of Soviet policies tends to stimulate local resistance to Soviet influence, and a turn of the political wheel in a given country can result in the sudden expulsion of Soviet representatives—as occurred, for example, in Sadat's Egypt. But this long-term vulnerability only reinforces the Soviet proclivity to seek domination of other countries rather than relations based on mutual respect. The Soviets are totally incapable of maintaining with other countries the sort of relationship we have with Canada and

Mexico, and their inability to do so creates serious problems both for them and for the entire world. To gain some sense of the Soviet dilemma as most Russians perceive it, we need only imagine the problems we would face if we felt we had to occupy our neighbors and impose puppet regimes on them in order to be secure and to play our destined role in the world.

These Soviet and Russian attitudes toward the outside world pose many problems for American policy. Though the Russian populace tends to see Soviet policies and actions as defensive, its underlying fears and sense of wounded national pride is exploited by the communist regime's cynical manipulation. The fact is that the Soviets define their "security" in terms which amount to absolute insecurity for everyone else. It makes little difference to a Pole or an Afghan that Russians feel they have to dominate them to be secure; for them the end result is the same as it would be if the avowed Soviet rationale were imperial conquest. It is important, therefore, never to accept the Soviet argument that their aggressive actions are justified by legitimate security concerns, and to do all we can to make clear to the Soviet people that such policies undermine their security in the long run rather than bolstering it.

Furthermore, the fact that the Soviet Union is a superpower only in military terms creates its own set of problems. Attempts to extend Soviet influence by military means must be countered, but it would be an illusion to think the Soviet leaders can be persuaded to foreswear such means, since they are the only means at their disposal to demonstrate their status and "rights" as a superpower. The Soviet Union is non-competitive in a peaceful world, and its leaders know it. Therefore, they can be dissuaded from applying or threatening force in given situations only by being convinced either that their efforts are doomed to failure, or that they would run unacceptable risks such as a dangerous military confrontation with the United States or a political defeat damaging to their prestige.

Fortunately, other elements in the typically Russian view of the world make our problem more manageable. There is little if any public support for Soviet military involvement far from their borders, particularly if justified solely on ideological grounds. And countries which receive large numbers of Soviet "advisors" quickly develop a virulent antipathy, since most Russians simply do not deal with Asians, Africans and East Europeans with the respect they reserve for West Europeans and Americans. Whenever the perceived need for Soviet arms diminishes, the Soviets are usually given the boot, provided they have not managed to establish military control over the country.

75. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 13, 1985

SUBJECT

Soviet Views on Gorbachev/Shevardnadze Meetings

The Soviet charge d'affaires came in this afternoon to share Moscow's current thinking on arrangements for Geneva and Shevardnadze's September visit to the U.S.²

Geneva Arrangements

On Geneva, the Soviets feel "strongly" that meetings should alternate between their mission and ours. While we continue to feel that the advantages of a neutral site justify one more attempt to bring them around, we could minimize the difficulties of dual locations by using your residence as "our" venue. As the building normally used by the Soviets in Geneva is in fact the residence of their Consul General, there would be no symmetry problem.

On social events, Moscow shares our view that informal dinners the evenings of November 19 and 20 would be most appropriate. They have proposed, however, that the Swiss reception be the evening of November 18, which would make your first encounter with Gorbachev a public one. This is clearly not acceptable from our standpoint, and the Charge's reaction when we shared our concerns with him suggested the Soviets may ultimately be receptive to our arguments that the reception should come before dinner on the twentieth. We will try again.

The Charge indicated Gorbachev will arrive in Geneva the afternoon of November 18, and that he has agreed to meet with the Swiss President. Mrs. Gorbacheva will accompany him, but there are as yet no details on her program or interests in Geneva.

Shevardnadze Visit

Shevardnadze would hope to meet with you at the White House September 27. (He will be accompanying Gorbachev to Paris during

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Reagan-Shevardnadze Meeting 9/27/85 (1 of 7). Secret; Sensitive. According to another copy, the memorandum was drafted by Parris and cleared by Palmer and Ridgway. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (08/13/1985); NLR-775-14-10-3-2)

² In a covering memorandum to Shultz attached to another copy of the memorandum, Ridgway noted that she met Sokolov on the afternoon of August 13. (Ibid.)

the first days of October, and will return to Moscow directly from Washington the morning of September 28 if we agree on the twenty-seventh). Depending on whether a morning or afternoon session was most convenient for you, he would come down from New York the night before your meeting or the same day.

Shevardnadze proposed that he and I meet in New York September 25 from 2:00 to 6:00 p.m., and indicated that he would be prepared to have a second meeting with me on the twenty-seventh if time permitted. As you will recall, such a scenario worked well last year with Gromyko. If you agree, we will confirm to the Soviets that you are prepared to see Shevardnadze the morning of September 27, and propose that he and I hold a follow-up session that afternoon.

76. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 13, 1985

SUBJECT

Is There a Sensible Nuclear Testing Initiative in the Cards for the Gorbachev Meeting?

In preparing for Geneva both George Shultz and I have tried to focus press and public thinking on this being a “beginning” of a process with the new Soviet leader rather than a “culmination” of previous negotiations involving signature of several agreements. On the whole, people understand that when they reflect on the state of paralysis in the Kremlin and the Russian inability to focus on foreign affairs for the past six months. While this effort to lower expectations for the number of agreements to be signed is taking hold, we do want to nurture such opportunities as may exist for taking the initiative with bold proposals where such proposals are in the national interest. One possibility is in the area of nuclear testing. Both sides have recently made public proposals—the Soviets, a grandstand call for a moratorium; the U.S. a modest step forward by inviting them to come measure

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Sensitive Chron 1985; NLR-362-7-38-12-8. Top Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed at the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. An attached covering note reads: “Original of memo to Weinberger and Vessey handcarried to Washington by Ron Lehman August 16, 1985. Eyes only for JM Poindexter.”

one of our tests with on-site equipment.² After the public exchanges died down, there appears to have remained some interest on the part of the Soviets in trying to make some progress in this area. It is possible that we can come up with some ideas although everyone acknowledges that for as long as we have nuclear weapons some testing will be necessary, if only to be confident that the aging weapons will still work. But within that framework, we ought to be able to move gradually to get a better handle on measuring those test yields, or to lower the threshold or to improve confidence on both sides that the other is not violating the threshold. In order to determine just what might be feasible, I have prepared the attached memo to Cap and General Vessey asking that they review the matter. I am handling this in a very limited (couriered) fashion so as to try to minimize the possibility for leaks. Cap and Jack will also courier their responses to you.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Secretary Weinberger and General Vessey at Tab A.³

² For the July 29 Soviet statement, see footnote 2, Document 68. The text of the July 29 White House statement made by Speakes is printed in the *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book II, pp. 953–954.

³ Attached at Tab A and printed as Document 77. Reagan initialed his approval of the recommendation.

77. Memorandum From President Reagan to Secretary of Defense Weinberger and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Vessey)¹

Washington, August 14, 1985

SUBJECT

Limitations on Nuclear Testing (U)

It has been two weeks since we received the most recent correspondence from General Secretary Gorbachev outlining the latest

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Sensitive Chron 1985; NLR-362-7-38-12-8. Top Secret; Sensitive. See Document 91.

Soviet nuclear testing moratorium proposal.² Even though we have yet to receive a formal response to our most recent offer to have Soviet experts directly measure the yield of a U.S. nuclear test at the Nevada test site,³ I would like to be in a position to reply to the most recent letter from General Secretary Gorbachev on this subject in the very near future. (S)

In considering any response, we must certainly recognize that the security of the United States and our Allies depends upon a credible nuclear deterrent. That deterrent, in turn, depends to a large degree upon an appropriate level of nuclear testing needed to maintain our confidence in the reliability of our existing nuclear weapons stockpile, to develop weapons to support needed modernization, and to sustain a robust technology base against all future contingencies. The Soviets also face similar requirements. (S)

We must also recognize that any limitations on nuclear testing must not only permit U.S. and Allied security requirements to be met, but must also impose equal and verifiable limits on both the United States and the Soviet Union. This is one of the reasons that we have not been able to pursue ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). (U)

The record of the Soviet Union argues strongly that the ball on the nuclear testing issue remains firmly in the Soviet court. Nevertheless, I want to be absolutely sure that we have explored every possibility. Therefore, recognizing our requirements for national defense, for significant progress in U.S. monitoring confidence, and for resolving Soviet non-compliance, and drawing upon the sizeable body of work that has been done on nuclear testing limitations over the last four years, I would like your views on the following issues. (C)

1. Do current U.S. modernization plans permit compliance with the TTBT and PNET? For example, can we develop the TRIDENT D-5, MIDGETMAN and other needed nuclear weapons under the restrictions imposed by these agreements? (TS)

2. Can we assure the reliability and safety of the existing U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile within the TTBT and PNET agreements? (S)

3. Are there potential options, within the context of appropriate and proportionate responses to Soviet non-compliance, which could not be undertaken under the TTBT and PNET agreements? (TS)

4. Are there planned or potential aspects of research under the Strategic Defense Initiative which could not be conducted under the TTBT and PNET agreements? (TS)

² See Document 68.

³ See footnote 5, Document 69.

5. In the context of the above considerations, could the TTBT/PNET threshold levels be lowered? (S)

6. Apart from the issue of the level of yield, are there other actions which the U.S. could propose to improve the nuclear testing limitations regime? For example, we have long had in mind certain monitoring improvements. Are there other procedures and safeguards which should be considered? (S)

Both the questions that I have posed for your consideration and your responses on these issues to me should be treated as matters of utmost sensitivity. Therefore, I would like access to this memorandum and your response restricted only to those who absolutely must contribute to this effort. Please provide only to those who absolutely must contribute to this effort. Please provide your views directly to me through my Assistant for National Security Affairs by August 23, 1985. (S)

Ronald Reagan

78. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 19, 1985

SUBJECT

Soviet Use of Chemical Agents to Track U.S. Officials

Bill Casey has sent you a letter describing an intensive Soviet effort to “tag” U.S. officials in Moscow with a chemical substance which, when transferred to persons with whom the tagged officials are in physical contact, would permit tracking of contacts.

The fact that the KGB has occasionally used chemical agents as “tagants” has been known for some time. But Casey’s letter contains the very disturbing news that laboratory analysis has indicated that one compound used by the Soviets is strongly mutagenic (and thus potentially carcinogenic), and also that the practice is much more widespread than we had earlier assumed.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1985, 400938. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Matlock. A copy was sent to Bush. According to another copy of the memorandum, on August 19, Matlock sent a copy to McFarlane requesting he send the memorandum to Reagan. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, “Tagants” Issue)

We have planned the following actions:

—John Whitehead will deliver a strong protest to the Soviet Charge d’Affaires this afternoon, and demand that the practice cease forthwith. Dick Combs, our Charge in Moscow, will follow up with a parallel demarche there tomorrow morning.²

—A team of specialists will be sent to Moscow Wednesday to brief Embassy personnel.³ [*1½ lines not declassified*]

—We intend to task NIH and EPA to study the potential effects of the substance and to advise on precautions which should be taken.

Since we are under an obligation to brief our own personnel regarding the possible risks they and their families are running, and probably should also brief Allied Governments and other resident Americans in Moscow (e.g., resident journalists), we must assume that this matter will soon become public knowledge. We are, therefore, considering the advisability of making a public statement as soon as our personnel are briefed.⁴ One of our problems, both in briefing and in the public handling of the issue, is that we do not now know what procedures will be effective in removing the substance from personnel and their belongings. The objective of the NIH/EPA study mentioned above would be to seek such procedures.

It is self-evident that a big public issue over this reprehensible KGB practice will not contribute to a constructive atmosphere at your upcoming meeting with Gorbachev. The Soviets may even claim that it has been introduced as an “artificial issue” in order to doom your meeting. Nevertheless, I believe we have no alternative but to go ahead with the procedures described above. It is an issue we cannot sweep under the rug, even if we desired to do so—and we should not do so, since the Soviets should be forced to face the consequences of their own actions when these are totally irresponsible as regards health and safety.

² In telegram 11461 from Moscow, August 20, 1440Z, the Embassy reported that Combs “protested Soviet use of potentially harmful chemical tracking device per instructions reffed. First Dep For Min Korniyenko categorically rejected protest as fantasy and without foundation, reminiscent of earlier microwave charges when USG subsequently was forced to admit there was no harm to US personnel. Chargé disputed Soviet version and stressed Soviet responsibility for this development.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]) In telegram 255692 to Moscow, August 20, 0006Z, the Department noted that the Acting Secretary would be meeting with Isakov at 4 p.m. that day to deliver the same message in Washington. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

³ August 21.

⁴ In telegram 258597 to all diplomatic and consular posts, August 21, the Department provided instructions and the text of a public statement released at noon on August 21 on the “KGB use of potentially harmful chemicals to track the movement of diplomats in Moscow.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850596–0223) For the text of the public statement, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1985, p. 37.

In addition to our diplomatic demarches, I would recommend that you send a personal message to Gorbachev, drawing his attention to this matter and making clear that you expect him to see to it that the practice of contaminating American personnel with chemical compounds be terminated forthwith. Such a message might be more effective if delivered orally, since a message in writing will almost certainly simply result in a written denial of the facts (though the practice could, nevertheless, be stopped).⁵

Recommendation

That you authorize John Poindexter to deliver to the Soviet Charge tomorrow morning the oral message at Tab A from you personally to Gorbachev.⁶

Tab B

Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan⁷

Washington, August 17, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

Over the last year or so we have had the greatest successes ever in getting detailed information about the operations of the KGB. [*9½ lines not declassified*]

Over the last week or so he has given us greater detail about a KGB activity conducted against United States officials in Moscow and elsewhere which we believe calls for an immediate response on our part. We have had sporadic intelligence reporting for some time that the KGB has used chemical tracking and tagging substances against US personnel in the Soviet Union. We collected positive samplings of yellow powder from the clothes and cars of US officials in Moscow in 1976, in 1977, and in 1979, three samplings in 1980, none in 1981, and three more in 1982. Our evidence through this period indicated that the exposure of our personnel was infrequent and unsystematic, and we were unaware of any potential health hazard. The three samplings in 1982 resulted in identifying this yellow powder as nitrophenyl pentadiene (NPPD). [*less than 1 line not declassified*] had this material subjected to something called the Ames/Salmonella test. This test was developed ten years ago at the National Institute of Health and is currently the

⁵ The draft message is attached at Tab A but not printed.

⁶ Reagan initialed his approval of the recommendation. See footnote 2, above.

⁷ Secret.

most widely used short-term test to determine whether a chemical can cause genetic mutations. Damage to genetic material (mutations) can result in adverse genetic effects in future generations, specifically cancer and inherited birth defects. Substances failing the Ames test have been shown to have a 75–90 percent probability of being carcinogenic in humans.

[3 paragraphs (20 lines) not declassified]

In May and June 1985 we implemented a sampling program for NPPD in the Soviet Union and East European countries. Laboratory testing is still incomplete, but the preliminary results indicate that the contamination of US personnel in Moscow and Leningrad is more widespread than we had previously assumed. Further sampling will be required to determine the full extent of the exposure of official US personnel in the USSR to NPPD and other chemical substances, but it is clear that several US officials and their family members have been contaminated. NPPD does not occur in nature so the presence of the chemical is not accidental. The exposure is deliberate and specifically directed against US officials. Additional sampling and laboratory testing are required to identify conclusively what other substances are involved and to determine whether they are also potentially harmful.

[1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]

Just this week I received a telegram *[less than 1 line not declassified]* which specifies half a dozen of our people in Moscow who are scratching themselves and relating it to powder or sprays placed in their automobiles, in the train compartments, which they reserve for week end visits to Helsinki, and picked up in other ways. *[less than 1 line not declassified]*

Yesterday, John Poindexter and I reviewed all this with John Whitehead, representing State, Will Taft, representing Defense, Clair George, chief of our clandestine service, and Jack Matlock. We saw it as containing implications similar, but more direct, provocative and ultimately dangerous than the Soviet microwave radiations against the American Embassy in Moscow which, during the Ford and Carter Administrations, created great concern about health risks among our people in Moscow and public questioning of whether we had responded strongly enough to the Soviets and adequately protected the health of our people.

At yesterday's meeting there seemed to be general agreement about the need to promptly lodge a strong protest to the Soviet Government and take steps to advise and protect our people against possible hazards to their health and welfare.

Respectfully yours,

William J. Casey⁸

⁸ Casey signed "Bill Casey" above his typed signature.

79. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, August 27, 1985

SUBJECT

Background Reading on the Soviet Union: Internal Problems

Though Gorbachev has been more active than his predecessors in pushing the Soviet foreign policy line in the media, his preoccupation is probably with consolidating his own power and in tackling the burgeoning internal problems which afflict Soviet society and the communist system.

Attached are three papers which deal with the more important of these problems: the growing malaise in Soviet society, the significance of dissidence and religion, and the implications of having to rule an empire made up of many nationalities.²

In reading the paper on Soviet nationalities, it is important to bear in mind that non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union are quite different from the ethnic groups in our own society. Most live in their ancestral territory and continue to speak languages other than Russian as their first tongue. There has been very little "melting pot" effect, although many speak or understand Russian as a second language. Almost all are proud of their own national language, culture and heritage and are determined to preserve it in the face of persistent pressures to become more Russian.

I believe these papers will give you some insight into some of the problems Gorbachev will have on his mind—but will avoid mentioning—when he meets with you in November. Certainly, he must take them into account as he makes foreign policy decisions.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron August 1985 (6/6). Secret. Sent for information. Drafted by Matlock. A copy was sent to Bush. A stamp in the upper right-hand corner reads "The President has seen," and Reagan wrote in the upper margin, "Thanks. RR." See also Documents 39, 60, and 74.

² Two of the papers, "USSR: A Society in Trouble" and "The Soviet Union's Nationality Problem," are attached but not printed. The third paper, "Dissent in the USSR," was not attached, but is in the Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron August 1985 (5/6).

September 1985–November 1985

Personal Diplomacy: Reagan, Gorbachev, and the Geneva Summit

80. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

SOV M 85–10159X

Washington, September 6, 1985

Current Soviet Posture Toward the November Meeting

Summary

In the period leading up to the Geneva meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in November, the Soviets will continue their vigorous effort to portray the Reagan administration as opposed to progress in arms control and improved US-Soviet relations. This campaign is likely to include broad propagandistic appeals—such as the Soviet draft UN treaty on the “non-militarization” of space—as well as more subtle overtures to US and West European audiences hinting at substantive Soviet concessions at the November meeting if Washington indicates a willingness to forgo or drastically limit its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Gorbachev’s recent interview with *Time* magazine is consistent with this strategy, claiming that Moscow is preparing “serious” proposals for the meeting while charging that administration officials are portraying it as a “get-acquainted” session.² The Soviets also will continue pressing the idea in diplomatic and other private channels, as Gorbachev did in his 3 September meeting with a delegation of US Senators, that the USSR is interested in reaching agreements with the United States and in exploring possible areas of compromise on arms control issues.³ [portion marking not declassified]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—SACG—September 20, 1985. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A typed note at the bottom of the first page reads in part: “This paper was prepared by [names not declassified] the Office of Soviet Analysis.”

² Gorbachev’s interview in *Time* magazine appeared in the September 9 issue. Excerpts of the August 28 interview are printed in *Documents on Disarmament*, 1985, pp. 558–569.

³ Senators Byrd and Thurmond visited the Soviet Union and had a 3-hour meeting with Gorbachev on September 3. In telegram 12225 from Moscow, September 4, the Embassy transmitted a record of this meeting. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850627–0606) Reagan wrote in his personal diary for September 10: “Then Sen. Byrd & the Sen’s. in his Moscow junket came by to report on their meeting with Gorbachev. Really not much new—he’s clever, articulate etc. They think he may be willing to make some changes.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I: January 1981–October 1985, p. 494)

The objective of such public and private diplomacy will be to portray the meeting as a key branch point in US-Soviet relations for the balance of the administration. Tactically, the Soviets thus hope to leave US policymakers with little latitude between engaging in a pre-meeting dialogue that fosters public expectations of substantial progress on arms control—thus implicitly suggesting US flexibility on space weapons limitations—or running the risk of adverse political fallout within NATO and with domestic constituencies by seeming not to respond to Soviet initiatives that Moscow will claim address US concerns. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The Soviets no doubt intend to keep their own options open for exploring US receptivity to their private hints about possible areas of convergence and for responding to any alternative arms control possibilities floated by Washington for discussion at the November meeting or in the Geneva talks. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Washington in late September probably will be viewed by Moscow as a fact-finding mission to gauge US intentions on arms control issues and the Reagan-Gorbachev discussions. At the same time, however, the Soviets probably hope to be well positioned by their diplomatic and propaganda efforts to place the onus on Washington if the November meeting should go badly from Moscow's perspective. Soviet actions during the period leading up to the November meeting will also be aimed at influencing the forthcoming US decision on mutual restraint within past SALT understandings and Congressional debate on funding for the administration's defense programs. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Moscow's diplomacy prior to the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting will also be aimed at courting West European opinion, both as a means of influencing US policy and as a way of exploiting any West European dissatisfaction with US policy should US-Soviet relations fail to improve. Continued lobbying against SDI and possibly efforts to influence the Dutch decision on INF basing in November will figure in Moscow's maneuvering. In particular, the Soviets may be in a position to reduce the number of their SS-20 launchers deployed at bases to fall at or below the overall level of 378 that the Dutch have said would constitute a basis for reconsidering their commitment to GLCM deployment. Gorbachev's visit to France in early October will provide an opportune occasion to try to capitalize on French reluctance to endorse SDI—perhaps by airing the possibility of some sort of Soviet association with EUREKA—or to highlight a new Soviet initiative on INF aimed at influencing the Dutch basing decision. In any event, Gorbachev will no doubt seek to manipulate the charismatic image that has been painted of him in Western media in hopes of appearing as a pragmatic, flexible proponent of arms control and improved East-West relations. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The Soviets also may view the third round of the Geneva NST negotiations, which opens on 19 September, as an opportunity to influence the substance and tone of the Reagan-Gorbachev discussions on arms control issues. They thus might offer specific new initiatives during the round in the hope that these could form the basis for discussion during the November meeting. [*portion marking not declassified*]

81. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, September 10, 1985

SUBJECT

Gorbachev's Summit Preview

Gorbachev's *TIME* interview and statements to visiting U.S. senators provide additional proof, if any were needed, that his primary Summit objective is to kill SDI, and he has given us a remarkably candid description of how he hopes to do it.²

Clearly the most interesting of Gorbachev's recent statements was his professed willingness to tolerate SDI "fundamental science" research which he agreed could not be verified. By agreeing with us on this point, he hopes to see us hoist with our petard. The key to this tactic was provided in the following sentence in the *TIME* interview:

"But the main thing is that if all this work on space weaponry were to stop at this [research] stage, then no one would have any more interest in going over to the next stage in the process of designing and developing, because nobody would think of appropriating any more money for these purposes if it were known that money could not subsequently be used."

This statement reflects a disturbingly sophisticated understanding of what Congress could and probably would do to SDI should we agree even to seriously discuss not going beyond the research stage.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Crisis Management Center, NSC Records, 1981–1985, NSC Information Summary Memorandum to Poindexter. Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Matlock, Linhard, Lenczowski, Kraemer, Steiner, and Christopher Lehman. A stamped notation reads: "RCM has seen." McFarlane wrote in the margin: "Thanks Bill." Brackets are in the original.

² See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 80.

The fact that none other than Senator Nunn said Gorbachev's new tack was "good news" is a clear harbinger of things to come. Nunn did object to Gorbachev's excessively narrow interpretation of "fundamental research," but I daresay, Gorbachev will, in due course, indicate a willingness to broaden his definition if this leads to stopping all further SDI development. Of course, Gorbachev further sweetened the pot by offering "radical" strategic arms and INF proposals after we agreed to "prohibit the militarization of space."

Interesting additional evidence of Soviet single-mindedness in seeking SDI's demise was Gorbachev's indirect, but still surprisingly candid (interview) explanation of why he wants a bilateral nuclear test moratorium: "The U.S. needs nuclear testing to provide the nuclear element for space lasers."

Bearing all the above in mind, it is obvious that Gorbachev wants to force the President to get down to brass tacks on SDI in Geneva. He, indeed, hopes to make "progress" on this issue the principal criterion for the success or failure of the Summit. While, as you know better than I, the Soviets have agreed to discuss regional, bilateral and other arms control issues, SDI will be front and center. Even reaching agreement on a secondary bilateral issue will be touted as evidence that the Soviets are ready and willing to reach agreements on larger issues, especially SDI.

Gorbachev clearly wants to avoid an exchange of charges, a bout between "supergladiators," not just to avoid our slings and arrows, but primarily to save time for hard negotiating. In this connection, he is obviously disturbed by reports that we want "an introductory meeting, only an agenda for the future things to that effect."

He will also hope to get the President to repeat and reinforce the statements which, Gorbachev claims, are bringing the Soviets to Geneva: "War was inadmissible . . . nuclear war was not winnable . . . the U.S. was not seeking superiority over the Soviet Union." In the propaganda battle which is bound to follow the Summit, the Soviets will try to use such truisms to demonstrate either our inconsistency and hypocrisy or the advent of a new period of detente—depending on how things go.

We can, in any case, be thankful that Gorbachev has recently provided us with such detailed insights into Soviet Summit and pre-Summit tactics. Now all we have to do is counter them.

82. Notes of a Meeting¹

Washington, September 11, 1985

BRIEFING THE SECRETARY ON
McFARLANE-NITZE MEETING 9/10/85

—I met with Bud last night after our brief discussion, and presented him with the talking points paper on Arms Control Strategy for Geneva, along with our elaborative piece on “laying down a marker.”² He read through both, and then raised the issue of a “recommitment” to the ABM Treaty.

—That morning he had met with the President to discuss nuclear weapons arms control. The President made it clear that he wants to protect our ability to test SDI technology, including tests in space, in order not to foreclose the opportunity of abolishing nuclear weapons.³

—Bud pressed the President then on how we should respond if Gorbachev accepted the US proposal for mutual limits of 5000 on ballistic missile re-entry vehicles coupled to a Soviet proposal on SDI. The President acknowledged that we could not just sit there, and would have to have a response.

—Bud asked me whether in my opinion a test of kinetic energy system in space would be permissible under the ABM Treaty. I replied that, if the system included a guidance platform carrying one or more small kill-mechanisms that could in fact take out an object in space, testing such a system in space would indeed be a violation of the ABM Treaty; such a device could in fact be able to substitute for an “ABM interceptor.” I said subcomponents such as sensors and communication links could be tested, but, without amendment to the Treaty, not actual systems or components.

—Bud said he thought the strategy talking points would be appropriate for you to use at Friday’s NSC.⁴ After re-reading them, he com-

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, August–September 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Nitze wrote the meeting notes.

² Attached but not printed are the undated “Arms Control Strategy for Geneva Meeting” and September 10 “Laying Down a Marker” papers.

³ Reagan and McFarlane met on September 10 from 9:44 a.m. to 9:55 a.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) That day, Reagan wrote in his personal diary: “Later with our staff I made a decision we would not trade away our program of research—S.D.I. for a promise of Soviet reduction in nuclear arms.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I: January 1981–October 1985, p. 495)

⁴ September 13. In a September 10 memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock explained that no formal NSC meeting would take place on Friday, September 13. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron September 1985 (2/6)) A “special meeting of selected presidential advisors” was held; see Document 86.

mented that maybe the elements could satisfy the President's requirement.

—Bud said what was necessary was a clear indication by the President of what he wanted, then the community would fall in to get it done. He hoped the President would do this on Friday.

83. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 11, 1985

SUBJECT

My Meeting Today with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

Dobrynin called on me today to discuss several details of our meetings with Shevardnadze and your meeting with Gorbachev. I took the opportunity to raise the latest Military Liaison Mission incident and their treatment of our regional discussions on East Asia.² We plan to get together next week to have a more substantial discussion.

Dobrynin asked about the plans for your meeting with Shevardnadze. I told him that we were proceeding with a schedule very similar to the one last year with Gromyko—a photo session, the meeting in the oval office, and lunch in the private quarters. He asked about the length of your meeting. I said it was not finally set, but we hoped for the same as last year.

On Geneva, Dobrynin said Gorbachev welcomed the chance to start with a brief private meeting with you. We agreed this would be a useful opportunity for the two of you to meet and make some points

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Meetings—Shultz-Gromyko-Dobrynin Hartman-Gromyko 1985 (3). Secret; Sensitive. Another copy of this memorandum indicates it was drafted by Pascoe on September 10 and cleared by Parris and Palmer. (Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1985)

² Presumably Shultz was referring to a September 7 MLM incident. During the September 10 Department briefing, the spokesman responded to a query about the incident explaining that "one of our MLM teams was detained for several hours on September 7 after their vehicle got stuck in a ditch." (Telegram 278329 to all European diplomatic posts, September 11; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850643–0109) Regional discussions on East Asian issues were scheduled to take place September 12–13 in Moscow. (Telegram 19178 from Tokyo, September 16; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850883–0816)

privately. Dobrynin also talked elliptically about negotiating a communique. I told him the question of negotiating some sort of joint statement before the meeting depended on whether we had made sufficient progress by then to warrant it. He also confirmed that Mrs. Gorbacheva will go to Geneva, and I handed over Mrs. Reagan's letter to her.³

I again made the point that we prefer the Swiss idea of a single meeting place in Geneva rather than alternating sites. Dobrynin seemed to be somewhat confused about whether this would mean you and Gorbachev would stay at one villa. I set him straight on what we had in mind. He promised to ask Moscow once again if they would consider a single meeting place.

Dobrynin said they proposed my talks with Shevardnadze in New York concentrate on security issues and that we take up regional and bilateral issues in our Friday meeting in Washington. I suggested that we start with arms control/security issues and then move down our agenda, covering as much as we could in New York and the rest here. I also told him we would have two hours for the Friday afternoon session before my informal dinner for Mr. and Mrs. Shevardnadze in the evening.

I protested the latest MLM incident in Germany, noting that the incident on Saturday once again reinforced the impression that Soviet political authorities do not sufficiently control their own military. I also complained about their apparent bureaucratic downgrading of our upcoming consultations in Moscow on East Asian issues. Dobrynin said he had nothing on the MLM incident. He expressed surprise that Moscow was talking about less time for the meeting between Paul Wolfowitz and his opposite number and said he had sent back an inquiry after our complaint yesterday.

We agreed to meet again early next week.

³ Not found.

84. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan¹

Moscow, September 12, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

I would like to communicate some thoughts and considerations in continuation of the correspondence between us and specifically with a view to our forthcoming personal meeting.

I assume that both of us take this meeting very seriously and are thoroughly preparing for it. The range of problems which we are to discuss has already been fairly clearly delineated. They are all very important.

Of course, the differences between our two countries are not minor and our approaches to many fundamental issues are different. All this is true. But at the same time the reality is such that our nations have to coexist whether we like each other or not. If things ever come to a military confrontation, it would be catastrophic for our countries, and for the world as a whole. Judging by what you have said, Mr. President, you also regard a military conflict between the USSR and the USA as inadmissible.

Since that is so, in other words, if preventing nuclear war and removing the threat of war is our mutual and, for that matter, primary interest, it is imperative, we believe, to use it as the main lever which can help to bring cardinal changes in the nature of the relationship between our nations, to make it constructive and stable and thus contribute to the improvement of the international climate in general. It is this central component of our relations that should be put to work

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8591009). No classification marking. The Department of State Division of Language Services translated the text of the letter from Russian. A copy of the original letter in Russian is *ibid*. Shevardnadze summarized the letter for Shultz at their September 25 private meeting in New York and then handed the letter to Reagan during their September 27 meeting. See Documents 100 and 105. Under an October 7 covering memorandum, McFarlane sent Reagan a copy of the letter, noting that Shevardnadze had presented it to Reagan during their September 27 meeting in the Oval Office. McFarlane commented: "You will note that its content is virtually identical to Shevardnadze's initial presentation to you. The one matter which was not mentioned in your meeting is the suggestion at the close of the letter that we consider 'an appropriate joint document' to be issued after your meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva. We are now giving thought to whether this is a good idea. If you can reach agreement on some items for a future agenda, a joint communique laying out the concepts might be useful. There are also potential risks, and we will want to weigh them carefully before proceeding." Reagan wrote in the top right-hand margin: "Bud I'd like a copy of his letter to have for reference purposes. RR." A notation in an unknown hand next to this reads: "Done 10/8."

in the period left before the November meeting, during the summit itself and afterwards.

We are convinced that there are considerable opportunities in this regard. My meeting with you may serve as a good catalyst for their realization. It seems that we could indeed reach a clear mutual understanding on the inadmissibility of nuclear war, on the fact that there could be no winners in such a war, and we could resolutely speak out against seeking military superiority and against attempts to infringe upon the legitimate security interests of the other side.

At the same time we are convinced that a mutual understanding of this kind should be organically complemented by a clearly expressed intention of the sides to take actions of a material nature in terms of the limitation and reduction of weapons, of terminating the arms race on Earth and preventing it in space.

It is such an understanding that would be an expression of the determination of the sides to move in the direction of removing the threat of war. Given an agreement on this central issue it would be easier for us, I think, to find mutual understanding and solutions of other problems.

What specific measures should receive priority? Naturally, those relating to the solution of the complex of questions concerning nuclear and space arms. An agreement on non-militarization of space is the only road to the most radical reductions of nuclear arms. We favor following this road unswervingly and are determined to search for mutually acceptable solutions. I think that in this field both sides should act energetically and not postpone decisions. It would be good to be able to count on having obtained some positive results by the time of my meeting with you.

In connection with certain thoughts contained in your letter of July 27 of this year,² I would note that on several occasions we have explicitly expressed our views on the American program of developing space attack weapons and a large-scale anti-ballistic missile system. It is based not on emotions or subjective views, but on facts and realistic assessments. I stress once again—the implementation of this program will not solve the problem of nuclear arms, it will only aggravate it and have the most negative consequences for the whole process of the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms.

On the other hand, quite a lot could be done through parallel or joint efforts of our countries to slow the arms race and bring it to a halt, above all in its main arena—the nuclear one. It is indeed for this

² See Document 69.

and no other purpose that we have taken a number of unilateral, practical steps.

Mr. President, both you and I understand perfectly well the importance of conducting nuclear explosions from the standpoint of the effectiveness of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Consequently, the termination of nuclear tests would be a step in the opposite direction. This is what guided our decision to stop all nuclear explosions and appeal to the U.S. to join us in this. Please look at this issue without preconceived notions. It is quite clear that at the present level of nuclear arms our countries possess, a mutual termination of nuclear tests would not hurt the security of either of them.

Therefore, if there is a true desire to halt the nuclear arms race, then there can be no objections to a mutual moratorium, and the benefit it brings would be great. But the continuation of nuclear tests—albeit in the presence of somebody's observers—would be nothing else but the same arms race. The U.S. still has time to make the right decision. Imagine how much it would mean. And not only for Soviet-American relations.

But a moratorium on nuclear tests, of course, is still not a radical solution to the problem of preventing nuclear war.

In order to accomplish that, it is necessary to solve the whole complex of interrelated matters which are the subject of the talks between our delegations in Geneva.

It is quite obvious that in the final analysis the outcome of these talks will be decisive in determining whether we shall succeed in stopping the arms race and eliminating nuclear weapons in general. Regrettably, the state of affairs at the Geneva talks gives rise to serious concern.

We have very thoroughly and from every angle once again examined what could be done there. And I want to propose to you the following formula—the two sides agree to a complete ban on space attack weapons and a truly radical reduction, say by 50 percent, of their corresponding nuclear arms.

In other words, we propose a practical solution of the tasks which were agreed upon as objectives of the Geneva negotiations—not only would the nuclear arms race be terminated, but the level of nuclear confrontation would be drastically reduced, and at the same time an arms race in space would be prevented. As a result, strategic stability would be strengthened greatly and mutual trust would grow significantly. Such a step by the USSR and U.S. would, I believe, be an incentive for other powers possessing nuclear arms to participate in nuclear disarmament, which you pointed out as important in one of your letters.

We view things realistically and realize that such a radical solution would require time and effort. Nonetheless, we are convinced that this problem can be solved. The first thing that is needed is to have our political approaches coincide in their essence. Secondly, given such coincidence, it is important to agree on practical measures which facilitate the achievement of these goals, including a halt in the development of space attack weapons and a freeze of nuclear arsenals at their present quantitative levels, with a prohibition of the development of new kinds and types of nuclear weapons.

In addition, major practical measures could include the removal from alert status and dismantling of an agreed number of strategic weapons of the sides as well as mutually undertaking to refrain from the deployment of any nuclear weapons in countries which are now nuclear-free, and undertaking not to increase nuclear weapons stockpiles and not to replace nuclear weapons with new ones in the countries where such weapons are deployed.

Naturally, the issue of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe also requires resolution. I would like to emphasize once again: the Soviet Union favors a radical solution whereby, as we proposed in Geneva, the USSR would retain in the European zone no more weapons of this type, using warheads as the unit of count, than Britain and France possess.

Our delegation at the Geneva negotiations has appropriate instructions, and it intends to present our specific proposals on this whole range of issues and to give comprehensive clarifications in the near future. We count on the positive reaction of the U.S. side and hope that it will be possible to achieve certain results at the present round of talks.

Meaningful practical steps could and should be taken in the area of confidence-building measures and military measures aimed at easing tensions. I have in mind, in particular, that our two countries, together with other participants of the Stockholm Conference, should make a maximum effort to work towards successful completion of the conference. Such an opportunity, it seems, has now emerged. I would like to repeat what has already been said by our Minister of Foreign Affairs to the U.S. Secretary of State—we are in favor of making the subject matter of the Stockholm conference a positive element of my meeting with you.

Whether or not an impetus is given to the Vienna talks largely depends on our two countries. During the meeting in Helsinki the Secretary of State promised that the U.S. side would once again closely look at the possibility of first reducing Soviet and American troops in Central Europe as we have proposed. I am sure that such an agreement would make a favorable impact on the development of the all-European

process as well. I see no reason why it should not be in the interest of the U.S.

In proposing practical measures concerning arms limitation and disarmament we, of course, have in mind that they should be accompanied by relevant agreed verification measures. In some cases it would be national technical means, and in other cases, when it is really necessary, the latter could be used in conjunction with bilateral and international procedures.

I have not attempted to give an exhaustive list of measures to limit arms and relax military tensions. There could be other measures as well. We would listen with interest to the proposals of the U.S. side on this score. The main thing is for both sides to be ready to act in a constructive way in order to build up a useful foundation, which, if possible, might also be included in the summit meeting.

Mr. President, for obvious reasons I have paid particular attention to central issues facing our countries. But of course we do not belittle the importance of regional problems and bilateral matters. I assume that these questions will be thoroughly discussed by E.A. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz with a view to bringing our positions closer and, better still, finding practical solutions wherever possible.

We hope that in the course of the meetings which our Minister of Foreign Affairs will have with you and the Secretary of State, as well as through active work at the Geneva talks, in Stockholm and in Vienna, and by means of exchanges through diplomatic channels, it will be possible in the time left before my meeting with you to create a situation making for a truly productive meeting.

We believe that the outcome of this preparatory work as well as the results of my discussions with you at the meeting itself could be reflected in an appropriate joint document. If you agree, it would be worthwhile, I think, to ask our Ministers to determine how work on such a final document could be best organized.

Sincerely yours,

M. Gorbachev

85. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, September 13, 1985

SUBJECT

Billington's Letter: Further Thoughts on Strategy for Geneva²

Flowing out of the meetings this week and our previous discussion, here are some thoughts about how to structure our public and private approach to the Geneva meeting:

1. We must regain the public diplomacy offensive by mid-October, and reach a peak as the President goes into the meeting in November.

2. To be and seem serious, we need to lay the private groundwork (with the Soviets) during the Shevardnadze meetings.

3. We should be prepared to present first to the Soviets, then to the public a comprehensive vision of the future, stated in as positive terms as possible, which shifts the focus to our strengths and Soviet weaknesses.

a. The greatest Soviet weakness (in world public opinion) is their policy of building, then using military force. It is what underlies all the other problems.

b. We have to get this point across to them, and not be deflected by other issues in concentrating on it. The point to them should be the hard-headed one that it is dangerous and it won't work—not that it is immoral (the latter point is for the public).

c. Proceeding from this issue leads naturally into a discussion of the virtues on both sides of an evolving posture based more on defense, both conventional and nuclear.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron September 1985 (2/6). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for System. Sent for action. Sent through Poindexter, who wrote in the right-hand margin: "Bud, this looks very promising." McFarlane responded below: "I agree. Let's share it with Shultz."

² James H. Billington, who was then Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, sent McFarlane a letter on September 3, attached but not printed, providing analysis on Gorbachev and the Soviet positions and possible opportunities the upcoming summit could present. In an undated, handwritten cover note to Matlock forwarding the letter, McFarlane wrote: "Jack, This is imaginative. We need some 'new' ideas. Please review personally w/o coord and give me your private views. Thx Bud." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron September 1985 (2/6)) On September 5, Matlock responded in a brief memorandum to McFarlane, explaining he was leaving for a speaking engagement in Nashville and would "send more careful thoughts" later. The longer September 13 memorandum, printed here, provided Matlock's more complete analysis.

d. Simply talking to the Soviets about it is, of course, not enough. We need an eye-catching proposal that we can put out in public—discuss it with Shevardnadze in some (perhaps not complete) fashion, then make it part of the President’s “vision” in his UN address.³

e. Another basic Soviet weakness, as seen by everybody, is their closed society. We can exploit that best by making positive proposals which have the effect of opening the closed society or forcing the regime to defend its indefensible stance on the matter.

4. Though a proposal to deal with the use of force in practical terms would help put matters in the proper context, we also need a more striking public—and private—enunciation of our arms control goals. This need not (indeed should not) embody “concessions” but should be a redefinition of what we have been saying all along, but presented in a way that it seems new, and captures the heart of the President’s vision.

5. These can then be buttressed by additional proposals in the area of cooperation, communication, contact and dialogue. Some of Jim Billington’s ideas are relevant here. It would fit the vision as steps which promote understanding and peaceful interaction. Some should be very ambitious, and not seem trivial or belittling.

6. All of the above is easier said than done. Whether it really works will depend on whether we can come up with a coherent package soon enough. As a very tentative, and purely illustrative, first stab, I would envision it as having elements like the following:

a. Propose that the U.S. and Soviet Union commit themselves not to use their own military forces or support military intervention of other outside powers in civil struggles in other countries, with the proviso that any forces now engaged in such struggles will be withdrawn within 18 months, at which time the pledge will become operative. (Obviously, it would have to be worded so that it does not impinge upon the right to collective self defense against external aggression, and would be dependent upon strict agreed definitions of what constitutes a civil struggle and what constitutes support to interventionist surrogates.)

We may find in trying to draft this one that it is too tricky to work. Certainly, I have no illusions that the Soviets would agree to the sort of conditions which would be acceptable to us. But if we could find a way to phrase it, such a proposal could give us a lot of high ground. After all, *they* are fighting in Afghanistan and we don’t have our own

³ Reagan addressed the 40th session of the UN General Assembly on October 24; see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book II, pp. 1285–1290. See also *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 253.

troops in combat anywhere. We would be saying, if you knock it off, we will not be constrained to counter you militarily—which I believe in fact gets at the nub of the matter.

b. On strategic arms, translate our current proposals into numbers—or figures which can be easily grasped, concentrating on the degree of reductions. This need not contain anything radically new, but we need something to capture imaginations. For example, 50% reduction in warheads over a seven year period, with a commitment to negotiate another 50% reduction in the decade which follows. The more ambitious the reduction seems, the better. The further out the commitment, the less practical—but the better it will look in headlines. (Obviously, a lot of thought must be given to the precise figures used, and the time periods; my point is that we have to make it simple and ambitious.)

c. On INF (which we should not neglect, given European attitudes), I believe Mike Glitman has some ideas which deserve careful thought.

d. On defense and space, we should stress the point that we take the commitment to avoid an arms race in space seriously. The most dramatic step to avoid such a race would be a radical reduction of ballistic warheads which use space. Then a discussion of the desirability of using space for defense, not offense could follow. Then, if we could find a responsible formula which would convey the nub of how we might achieve an agreed transition with protection to both sides, it would round out our position on this issue.

The objective of b, c and d, taken together, would be to move the terms of the debate away from the perceived and false proposition that SDI is the enemy of nuclear reductions. We need to find a way to demonstrate in relatively simple terms why this is not so. In other words, on this as well as the other issues, we need more than a critique of the Soviet position; we need to state our case in positive, practical terms.⁴

e. Regarding communication, the basic thrust should be that we are two very different societies which must learn to live with each other in peace. Anything which breaks down the barriers to communication and bolsters confidence will contribute to a peaceful world in the future. We must break the barriers which keep our peoples from sharing their thoughts, hopes and dreams—and the riches of the cultural life in both countries. We must no longer be content with trivial steps; the problem is too deep for them to have much effect. So far as contacts are concerned, we could propose some dramatic things:

⁴ McFarlane drew a vertical line in the left-hand margin and wrote "I agree."

—A massive exchange of undergraduate students. As a start, at least 5,000 each way for a year of study in the other country.⁵

—A substantial increase in exchange professors: from the score or so at present to a few hundred, at least.

—Regular mechanisms for exchanging views in the media, such as:

- Annual TV messages by the leaders of both countries;
- At least an hour each month of televised discussion by officials of each government on TV in both countries.
- Regular exchanges or articles in the print media—specified numbers and frequency.

—Establishment of cultural centers in our respective countries, including libraries, exhibition space and facilities for the performing arts, all with uncontrolled access.⁶

—A massive expansion of “sister-city” relationships, with at least one “people-to-people” visit each year, each way. Goal: 100 cities paired within a year.

f. Some new “cooperative” projects:

—Peaceful use of space: already proposed, no response. We should flesh out and include this in the public presentation.

—A joint “environmental preservation” project along the rim of the Bering Sea could have possibilities. As you will recall, Robert O. Anderson was pushing this last year; State was cautious but not totally negative; I don’t know what sort of problems Defense might see in it—there are doubtless some.⁷ Although it could have considerable symbolic value, I am inclined to think we don’t have time to staff it properly.

—A proposal to cooperate in developing microcomputer educational software for secondary school instruction might be a relatively safe one which has Soviet interest (Velikhov has mentioned it to me) and could serve a dual purpose: the massive introduction of microcomputers into Soviet society—if they ever let it happen—could do a lot to open up the flow of information and to bring real pressures to bear on centralized controls. But the offer would seem magnanimous: help in solving one of their real and acknowledged problems.⁸

⁵ McFarlane placed a check mark in the left-hand margin next to this and the subsequent two points and wrote “good” next to each.

⁶ McFarlane placed a check mark in the left-hand margin next to this and the subsequent point.

⁷ Robert O. Anderson, Chairman and CEO of Atlantic-Richfield Oil Company, proposed the project to Velikhov during a trip to the Soviet Union in May 1984. See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 244, footnote 3.

⁸ McFarlane put two check marks in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.

—Some CBM's could also be worked in, either here (as cooperative measures) or as adjuncts to arms control.

7. What is excluded: I have omitted trade and human rights from the above. I have done so because I believe this should, for a time at least, be handled very privately. The message should be: we expect some meaningful changes; you know what they are. If you move there, we will take a careful look at what we can do to promote peaceful trade, and you will see some meaningful movement. If you want more details, we can talk about it privately. The important thing, however, is what happens. And there should be no illusion that we will consider the meeting a success if there is not some significant movement in this area.

8. Shevardnadze meeting: I believe the President could lay the private groundwork for the public enunciation of his vision by telling Shevardnadze at the outset that he is dissatisfied with the state of preparations for the Geneva meeting. He has reviewed the preparations, and while he has no problem with anything, it seems to him much too cautious. He can talk a bit about the enormous responsibility he and Gorbachev have, and why he thinks we need major steps to get the two countries on a more positive course.

This would lead him into presenting some of the ideas above, and allow him to set the context for discussion. He would not debate the ideological points but go right to his agenda, describing it and the rationale for it.

9. The public diplomacy follow-up: We should subtly shift our current presentation by putting increasing stress on what the President wants to achieve; if asked why we have "lowered expectations" we should explain that we have done so because the Soviets have not yet been willing to engage us on the concrete issues sufficiently for us to judge that they will be constructive, but that we want to make the most out of the meeting that we can.

In his October 24 speech, the President would set forth the high points of his proposals. We could then make sure that every day something is done to keep them in the public eye. Then, on the eve of his departure, he could do a TV address to the nation in which he conveyed his vision of the future, making clear that he can't do it alone, and if progress proves difficult, it is not because he failed to reach out and offer a less threatening and more cooperative future.

10. To conclude, I believe we risk allowing ourselves to be maneuvered into a position whereby the Soviets are defining the agenda for the public, unless we formulate our policies in forward-looking, positive terms. The Soviets doubtless calculate that they are putting the pressure on what they believe to be our weakness: our need to bring our people along on any policy in a free and open debate. It is not

really a weakness, however, unless we act as if it is. And we are acting as if it is so long as we confine ourselves largely to criticism of the Soviet positions—however valid this criticism may be. The public wants to be given hope that problems can be solved—or at least alleviated. To say they are insoluble may be true, but sounds like defeatism, which is not the way Americans address problems.

Our basic national strength is our democracy. We have to use this creatively and mobilize its virtues behind a creative and visionary (in the best sense) policy. We should not act as if we are afraid our people can be hoodwinked (although, of course, some can be), but go forward with a positive message. The greatest asset we have is our President, who has an unparalleled capacity to lead the nation when he sets an ambitious course. So let us not get bogged down in debating every secondary and tertiary issue, but help him find a positive message which can rally the nation behind him as he goes to Geneva, and protect his leadership if Gorbachev is unable to respond.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize me to organize two very small groups to work up some concepts along these lines in the regional issues and bilateral areas. I could provide the interface with the Lehman/Linhard group for the arms control component. Don Fortier and Steve Sestanovich could be helpful on the regional issues side, plus perhaps Peter Rodman from State. On the bilateral, informational and contacts side of things, I believe I should work with Walt Raymond, Mark Palmer and perhaps one of Charlie Wick's people. (Individually, these are not quite as sensitive as some of the others, but we will need to draw on specialist advice.)

If you agree in principle, I will provide a precise list of the people to be involved for your approval before proceeding (and of course would welcome your suggestions). What I have in mind is, in effect, three discrete groups: (1) regional issues; (2) bilateral, information and communication, and (3) arms control (identical with the one being organized by Lehman and Linhard). A very small group (say, one from each of the three subgroups) would then assemble the components for principals.⁹

⁹ McFarlane did not initial his approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

86. Notes of a Meeting¹

Washington, September 13, 1985

McFarlane opened the meeting by saying that President Reagan would have the first meeting in six years between the leader of the West and the leader of the Soviet Union.² During those six years, the Soviet Union had attained strategic superiority by building more than we had, and that there is little hope of change in Soviet purposes. Their position had been reduced, however, by our recovery and national will to compete and resist Soviet expansion. We do this from a strong position, the best economic and political systems, a willingness to commit 6% of GNP to defense,³ a strong alliance and a leader who, having directed this revival and commanding 49 states in the popular election, is the leading political figure on the globe.

Gorbachev is proclaimed as something new, a new force, yet there is nothing new about their approach to building arms, human rights, Afghanistan, sinking economy, declining mortality. Gorbachev has heavy debts in the military and KGB.

We need to enter into the forthcoming discussions soberly with our powder dry. We need to recognize that the main thing the Soviets have is military power which threatens us and gives them their clout. We need to balance this to achieve long-term stability. For 20 years we

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980–1986), Box 18, Folder 435: DCI Memo Chrono (1–30 Sep '85). Secret; Sensitive. Casey prepared the meeting notes. In a September 11 memorandum forwarding papers and preparatory materials to McFarlane, Linhard wrote: "Given the sensitivity of the meeting, we have not framed this as an NSC meeting, but rather a special meeting of selected Presidential advisors." He continued: "The memorandum to the President recommends limiting attendance to the Vice President, Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, Director Casey, General Vessey, Admiral Crowe if available, Ken Adelman, Mr. Regan and yourself." (Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chron, Presidential Meeting on Arms Control—09/13/1985; NLR–334–6–47–1–2) According to the President's Daily Diary, the group met in the Situation Room from 11:03 a.m. until 12:04 p.m. on September 13. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

² In a September 17 covering note to various addressees, Casey explained: "Here are some notes on a recent meeting and also some suggestions which Ken Adelman developed out of that meeting. The most important to come out of the meeting, as I see it, are these: 1. Don Regan's call for a 'surprise' initiative makes sense from our standpoint to blunt and counter the Soviet anti-SDI thrust. 2. Ideas for the President's notion to develop a free hand while offering assurances that a working missile defense system would be made available to other countries." Adelman's suggestions are in a September 13 memorandum addressed to McFarlane, attached but not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980–1986), Box 18, Folder 435: DCI Memo Chrono (1–30 Sep '85))

³ An unknown hand inserted "6% of GNP" in a blank space between "commit" and "to."

had military superiority. For the last ten years or so there has been something which loosely can be described as parity or strategic equivalence. We are now coming back to strengthening and modernization of our military capability.

Deterrence has worked so far. We must recognize that the basis for offensive deterrence is eroding. New systems coming on call deterrence into question because we will increasingly know less about the what and where of their new military systems, mobile missiles, cruise missiles, etc.

The magnitude of the Soviet effort to build defensive systems also calls into question deterrence.

We must ask ourselves, will deterrence work in the year 2000? If there is a question about this, how do we handle it? The answer is continued modernization, rely on deterrence over the short term, go on with developing our defensive systems, practice diplomacy to negotiate to a safer situation. The net is that we have a defensive balance which may be eroding and we have a decreasing ability to verify. To offset this, we need defense to weaken, complicate and offset the offense. The United States has the leverage—offensive modernization and defense element is under way in a program backed by the President's popularity and our superior technology.

If we are to scrap SDI in return for a reduction in offensive missiles, it would be to the Soviet advantage because they could continue with much of their defensive efforts and could succeed in offsetting reductions in offensive weapons through concealment, mobility and developing greater accuracy.

Suppose Gorbachev were to accept our START proposal and agree to bring their INF down to a level equal to ours? McFarlane said if we rejected that the press would say, did you not make this proposal in your speech at Eureka, Illinois?⁴ The answer is at that time you did not have the -24 or -25. Also, the agreement for the ABM was obtained by agreeing not to build offensive missiles.

The Secretary of State generally agreed with McFarlane's position. He said we should try to develop a formula where we could continue testing, and we had to be careful not to give anybody a veto power over deployment if the testing works out. He did say that large reduc-

⁴ On May 9, 1982, Reagan gave the commencement address at his alma mater, Eureka College, and stated: "In Geneva, we have since proposed limits on U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles, including the complete elimination of the most threatening systems on both sides." For the full text, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1982*, Book I, pp. 580–586; see also *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 99.

tions would make us safer and we should work to see what we can give to get large reductions.

Secretary Weinberger developed more fully that there is no change under Gorbachev, that they continue to design and test new weapons, and that we have a moral duty to continue with SDI, etc.

I generally agreed with what McFarlane, Weinberger and Shultz had said, but expressed greater skepticism than Shultz about the value of reductions. Of course we should seek any mutual reduction of offensive missiles which is in our interest and which we can get. But we must remember reductions can be offset by the greater accuracy of new missiles and that a reduction which retains first-strike capability will not make us much safer.⁵ Defense offers the best hope in negotiating reduction and we can't justify it to our people or through posterity by accepting an invitation which would weaken this prospect of finding our way to a safer world. I said we should bear in mind that there is more to a summit meeting than strategic arms or arms control. We should remember that the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba followed the Eisenhower Summit with Khrushchev, that the invasion of Czechoslovakia followed the Johnson Summit at Glassboro, that the final offensive in Vietnam and the invasion of Angola, South Yemen, and Ethiopia followed the Nixon Summit, and Afghanistan followed the Carter Summit and SALT II. We must remember that the primary value of the Soviet nuclear arsenal may be their intimidating effect in weakening resistance to the Soviet style of aggressive subversion in so many countries around the world.

I closed by saying that the major problem in the necessary policy of not yielding on SDI is that of making that position fully acceptable to the public. We should rely on the moral obligation to preserve and explore and develop the ability to defend against the nuclear horror, and perhaps the best way to do this would be to be willing to share our defensive capability with other nations when we make defense sufficiently effective.

Work on this will be tasked to the senior group of Armacost, Gates, Ikle, and Moreau.⁶ We should get our best thinking going on the problems and probable methods and procedures which might make a commitment to develop a defensive capability available to the other side. Similarly, we should think about how to articulate and implement a willingness to make a developed defensive capability available to the other side. The big problem I see on this is how that would leave

⁵ An unknown hand wrote in the right-hand margin: "40% more RV on SS-15."

⁶ Admiral Arthur S. Moreau, Jr., Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

the defense of Europe against conventional attack and we still need to search for a way to handle that.⁷

⁷ An unknown hand inserted “conventional” and “we” and then “need to search for.”

87. Note From the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Gates) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter), the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Ikle)¹

Washington, September 16, 1985

John—

Attached is an assessment of the Soviet gameplan leading up to and following the summit. It also includes some thoughts on Soviet perceptions of their “America problem.” It was prepared by [*name not declassified*] the Assistant National Intelligence Officer for the USSR. Both Bill Casey and I think it is an excellent piece of work and commend it to you.

Robert M. Gates²

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency³

Washington, September 9, 1985

GORBACHEV’S PROSPECTIVE COURSE

What Moscow Wants

The Soviets failed badly in their external goals during the past half decade because of Western, and particularly US, policy changes—

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—Pres/Shevardnadze September 1985. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Poindexter wrote in the margin: “very interesting. J. The salutation is handwritten.”

² Gates signed “Bob” above his typed signature.

³ Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

higher defense budgets, tighter trade controls, tougher negotiating positions, support for insurgencies against Soviet clients, etc.—that newly challenged the USSR at a time when the Soviet Union was befallen by enfeebled leadership and economic stagnation. The Soviets responded to these difficulties essentially by putting their heads in the ground: following up Andropov's prolonged illness and death by naming Chernenko before they could bring themselves to give the mantle to Gorbachev; stooping to increasingly demoralizing exhortations and promises lacking any prospects of turning the economy around; responding to the Administration's toughening stance by becoming more belligerent, threatening, and going so far as to assert that the "risk of war" was growing. Moscow's decision to deepen its conflict with the West rather than show flexibility, culminating in its walkout from the INF and START talks and war scare talk in 1983–84, was highly counterproductive.⁴

The Soviets have recently adopted a range of revised approaches to their problems. Gorbachev and many of the people he is promoting represent a new generation of leadership; a series of significant, if not dramatic, changes are being inaugurated aimed at economic revitalization; and a new tack has been taken toward the West. Since last Fall, beginning with the leadup to the Shultz-Gromyko meeting at Geneva in January, followed by the reopening of arms talks in Geneva,⁵ and now the Reagan-Gorbachev summit, the Soviets have backed off their conflictive diplomatic course in favor of recreating a more cooperative atmosphere which ideally, as they relate in their own rhetoric, would see a return to the "detente" atmosphere of the 1970s. The Soviets believe that if they can nudge the US back to a posture of pursuing a cooperative, problem-solving relationship with the USSR as a first order of business rather than first demanding Soviet concessions that would reduce major asymmetric threats to Western security—for example, the Soviet hard target capability—they can then better reduce the US's long-term threat to the Soviet military posture, SDI, and gain Western support for the Kremlin's other major priority, economic rejuvenation.

The Soviets know how badly they have failed in their bellicose diplomacy toward stopping first INF and now SDI in that INF deployment was begun notwithstanding Moscow's pulling out all the stops and SDI has not been halted or slowed by Soviet threats and recriminations. Rather the lesson appears to be that these programs have pros-

⁴ The Soviet Union walked out of the START negotiations in December 1983 after the U.S. decision to deploy INF missiles in Western Europe. For information on the war scare, see *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 135 and Appendix A.

⁵ See Document 4.

pered if only because of Soviet behavior. Meanwhile SDI threatens at a minimum to upset the pace of the strategic competition, one which Moscow is comfortable with, and add much uncertainty to where the “correlation of forces” will lie for many years ahead; if things work out the way the Administration would like, it could render much of Soviet doctrine and investment in strategic forces to the ashcan. Moscow’s nightmare, far into the future as it may be, is that US strategic defense technology might ultimately provide the US a one-sided first strike capability that would restore to the US broad global supremacy over the USSR.

Related to this, Gorbachev and the new Soviet leadership are deeply concerned that the USSR’s current economic problems will make it difficult to aggressively compete with the US for at least the next several years. Moreover, they want Western economic support to help overcome these economic problems. The Soviets fear SDI and other strategic weapons programs favored by the Administration not only because of the new military dangers and uncertainties they pose, but also because these programs threaten to force the diversion of significant incremental resources—financial, technological, and manpower—that the Soviet Union can ill afford. Nor is Moscow now likely to feel so able to afford the procurement in the 1990s of aircraft carrier task forces for global power projection as was probably anticipated a few years ago. The Soviet economy also can no longer afford to undertake new largescale economic programs to the Third World.

More than this, though, Soviet leaders appear to believe they need Western economic support to regain higher growth rates and install the modernity that the Soviet economy needs to again become vibrant and satisfy domestic consumer demands. To obtain the technologies and production capabilities that the USSR needs in key areas, Soviet leaders want the West—to which the US is the key—to relax COCOM controls, again become receptive to the construction of turnkey facilities and jointly undertaken major infrastructure projects in the USSR, and otherwise transfer capital and skills to the USSR for Soviet exploitation. Moscow needs a much more cooperative atmosphere in East-West relations to bring this about; it can see that such an environment is important both by how they have suffered in recent years and how things have loosened up a bit during the past year since US-Soviet relations have become more businesslike if not friendly.

The Solution

Gorbachev’s strategy is to induce and cajole the Administration in the leadup to the summit to accept a framework for further NST talks at Geneva that would have the US agree to restrain the pace of its SDI effort (hopefully to restrict it to the laboratory) in return for which the

USSR would agree to consider non-trivial mutual reductions in strategic offensive forces. The Soviets want first-off to gain US agreement to the principle that SDI is negotiable; gaining this, they might even countenance significant offensive force cuts insofar as they minimally detracted from their overall strategic posture, most critically their hard target kill capability. Moscow would hope that US agreement to such a framework would lead to increased domestic and allied pressures on the Administration to reach an agreement as soon as possible, that pressure causing the Administration to accept a minimal price rather than stick to a demand that the USSR give up its first strike advantages. Prior to such an agreement, the Soviets want to suggest that they will pay a price, even a big one; once they have the agreement, they probably calculate, the resulting changed atmospherics will end the need for them to deliver very much. At worst, they might see themselves accepting force reductions to levels that would not alter Soviet strategic advantages.

The Soviets see such an agreement in principle at the summit as a major goal in their strategy to reimpose a detente atmosphere on East-West relations and pick its fruits. Through that substantive and environmental achievement, from Moscow's perspective, lies the solution to the current strategic and economic dangers to the USSR, and also more favorable prospects for other Soviet global goals:

Improving the likelihood of reduced US defense spending.

Improving the prospects of socialist gains in major West European elections and weakening the Nakasone wing of the LDP in Japan.

Reducing China's resistance to and preconditions for closer relations with the USSR.

Curtailing US support for the insurgencies in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Angola.

Restoring the vitality of the Western European peace movement.

Gaining Soviet entry into Middle East peace efforts.

Reducing Western resistance to Vietnamese domination of Indochina.

To build pressure on the Administration to accept this course, the Soviets have hinted at various levels of offensive force reductions they might accept and conducted a diplomacy aimed at portraying new reasonability and earnestness. Their approach, though, is aimed at gaining leverage on the Administration through the US domestic scene and the allies more than it is aimed at persuading the President and his advisors. The Soviets will seek to add to this pressure in the weeks ahead through Shevardnadze's efforts at the UN and Gorbachev's summit with Mitterand. Shevardnadze also will press Moscow's proposals in his meetings with US leaders and seek to measure Soviet prospects while he is here. In Paris, Gorbachev might unfold an INF proposal meant to appeal to NATO that is linked to Soviet satisfaction on SDI

as well as to the Dutch INF decision due 1 November. Moscow probably would also like to score other regional gains if it could to further cajole the US, but there are no signs yet that the Soviets are willing to make tactical concessions that might achieve this in their relations with China, in the Middle East, or elsewhere.

Post Summit Courses

Gorbachev probably intends to play his current hand out before he considers other options. He wants to see if he can get something for free in real strategic terms before doing anything else; if he becomes convinced he can't before the summit, he might possibly make a tactical concession in a regional arena to pressure the Administration as noted above. But he is not likely to commit himself to any broad alternative approach until after the summit. He might then consider a number of different courses, more roundabout, dangerous, accommodating, or delaying along the following lines:

Roundabout: The Soviets make a series of diplomatic gestures and even concessions to a few US friends and allies such as China, West Germany, Japan, and Israel aimed at altering regional realities in ways adverse to the US, regaining the initiative in international affairs, and undermining allied support and domestic confidence in the Administration's course. In doing so, Moscow would be making, in its view, tactical concessions in the hope of reaping broader strategic advantage. Such a course might appear to have some promise for the possible regional gains in themselves; it might look even better as a means of weakening US steadfastness as the Administration's time in office begins to expire.

Dangerous: Gorbachev could conclude following a no-gain summit that the USSR, and he in terms of his own political position, could not afford to look unsuccessful or weak in dealing with the US and had to make the Administration pay a price. At a minimum, he might believe the US had to realize it was dangerous to so refuse Moscow. The objective would be to shatter US confidence in its ability to diplomatically control events and lead Congress and the allies to believe the Soviet Union had to be accommodated to some degree. Accordingly, for example, the Soviets could in this mode send jet combat aircraft to Nicaragua, take a stronger stance toward Pakistan, walk out from the NST talks, attempt to impose its will on Iran, and so forth.

Accommodating: The Kremlin might regard all other near-term paths as promising no net gains in the end result; it might also regard its economic needs as being so great that it might accept the necessity to concede a substantial portion of its strategic doctrine and first strike capability to obtain US restraint on SDI and the political atmosphere it wants. Moscow would regard such a concession as the ultimate it was prepared to go. Even in this sullen, defeatist mood the Soviets would not be prepared to trade the MBFR concessions the West wants that would curtail the Soviet military threat to Western Europe. This theater advantage would remain unabated by a US-Soviet return to the doctrine of mutual assured destruction and would gain new life insofar as SDI threatens it.

Delaying: The Soviets could alternatively decide to try to tough it out, making no major concessions to anyone and avoiding major risks of confrontation themselves. Rather their gaze would be fixed on the 1986 US Congressional elections and 1988 Presidential election in which they would calculate the Republican Party would lose seats and the President position in the first, while the second would likely see the succession to office of a President no worse and probably less hostile to the USSR than is President Reagan. The Soviets could believe that high interest rates, the budget deficit, and trade deficit, will gradually force President Reagan or his successor to accept lower defense budgets while their own efforts at economic revitalization—personnel changes, management reforms, greater emphasis on science and technology, and other actions—will provide a great enough growth increment to address their most urgent requirements. Further encouraging Gorbachev in this direction would be his new team's more appealing diplomatic style in the West.

So far Gorbachev has shown no inclination to make any serious tactical concessions that might gain net regional advantages, despite numerous hints that Soviet policies are now more fluid and flexible. If he concluded that such gains were to be had, he would make such moves for their own sake; he would certainly do so if he thought they also would lead to net gains vis-a-vis the US. It, of course, would be risky for Moscow to make regional concessions that it anticipated would not gain local advantage but might gain worthwhile advantage with the US; that is their dilemma.

Pursuit of a more confrontational course in the early 1980s led the Soviets to where they are now including the major failures and problems they currently confront. Tactically, they gave up on this course a year ago; to go back to it promises no greater likelihood of success. If this were a good option in the broad sense, it may be asked, why have the Soviets not already taken this road? The answer likely lies in their calculation that the net gains regionally are dubious and perhaps even more dangerous to the USSR than to the US. Pursuit of this course is not out of the question, but would represent the bankruptcy of Soviet policy and Moscow's determination to pursue a policy of frustration rather than make substantive policy adjustments or even sit tight.

It is possible but unlikely that the Soviets will feel enough pressure in the near-term to make strategic concessions. (They almost certainly would not concede their theater advantages.) Giving up their hard target capability would mean repudiation of one of the Brezhnev era's two most important strategic gains—the other being broad parity—and be an enormous gain to the US while representing a loss of credibility for the USSR. Politically, any accommodation would be exceedingly risky to Gorbachev. The Soviets will never speak publicly and would find it hard to speak privately of the utility of this course.

The final course, waiting the Reagan Administration out, is likely to be most appealing to the Kremlin for the reasons already mentioned.

Rather than accept the need for the third course, the Soviets also could graft moderate elements of the first two courses on to this fourth one. Soviet rhetoric and media statements are likely to increasingly forecast a combination of the first two policy alternatives as most likely if the Administration appears unlikely to deliver what Moscow wants as the summit approaches. In the aftermath of a failed summit, from the Soviet perspective, Moscow probably will start saying it intends to wait the Administration out.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁶

Washington, September 9, 1985

Moscow's View of the Reagan Administration

The Soviets believe President Reagan and his long-time, closest advisors share a conscious, deep-seated hostility to the Soviet Union and would like to turn back the clock of history if they could. They see the President as much more of an ideological warrior than his predecessors; they believe that while the latter also would have liked the USSR to be different, they thought this impossible to bring about, accepted the Soviet Union as a second superpower, accorded it a grudging respect, and pursued policy lines that acknowledged a Soviet role in all aspects of international affairs. President Reagan, the Soviets believe, accords the USSR no such acceptance and, given the opportunity, he more so than his predecessors would act to roll back Soviet gains in recent decades.

The Soviets find ideological confirmation of this view in the President's muscular support of individualism, private enterprise, less government, and what they term "capitalism" at home and "imperialism" abroad.

They regard references to the USSR as the "evil empire" and jokes about declaring the USSR "illegal" and "start the bombing in five minutes" as indicative of deeply held feelings.⁷

They regard US support for insurgents in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, and elsewhere as rejection of the status quo and attempt to reverse Soviet gains in the Third World.

⁶ Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].

⁷ See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 15 and 263.

They believe the Administration's commitment to SDI and the other strategic programs it would like to pursue are aimed at outmoding Soviet strategic forces and regaining US strategic superiority for the purpose of dictating political terms to the USSR.

They think the Administration wishes to create political and military pressures that will undermine the Soviet economy enough to make it unable to compete militarily and force internal changes in the Soviet system that would threaten its very nature.

To be sure, the Soviets do not consider the Administration to be threatening war or even seriously raising the risk of it in the foreseeable future, notwithstanding their frequent rhetoric about the "risk of war." They see the Administration as hostile and tough, but not crazy or violent; their vociferous rhetoric results from their having to face rather unexpectedly, in light of their experience in the 1970s, an adversary that rejected assumptions that implicitly accorded the USSR a global role which Moscow had come to take for granted. Nor does Moscow believe the US has the capability to accomplish any of these goals in the foreseeable future. Beyond this, moreover, the Soviets are encouraged by what they consider Administration vulnerabilities:

They believe the US has its own economic problems and that the prevailing high interest rates, budget deficit, and trade deficit could ruin the US economy; and if they do not, it will be at the cost of a lower defense budget and worsened relations with US allies and the Third World.

They believe the American public, pluralist US political system, and the Congress impose severe constraints on the Administration's preferred policies and provide major avenues for Soviet manipulation.

Similarly, Moscow sees the NATO allies and Japan as having concerns and agendas that offer major opportunities to constrain Washington or cause the allies to diverge from Washington to Soviet gain.

The Soviets also may believe the Administration, in its second term, is somewhat more pragmatic and less ideological than it was previously insofar as they perceive US economic problems and domestic and allied pressures for positive developments in US-Soviet relations growing. It is in this light that they understand US willingness to accept last Winter the current framework of the NST discussions at Geneva and the President's interest in a Summit this Fall. Moscow also may believe that National Security Advisor McFarlane's replacement of Judge Clark in practice means a shift toward a more pragmatic policy perspective, and that Secretary Shultz, whom the Soviets view more favorably than Secretary Weinberger, has gained greater influence. They certainly have been pleased by Ambassador Kirkpatrick's departure from office.

The Soviet leadership nevertheless still fears the steadfastness of the Administration in its positions and the control over US security policy that it does have. Even more important, the Soviets believe the Administration calculates that broadly speaking it has nothing to gain

in an atmosphere of greater US-Soviet cooperation and everything to lose. From Moscow's perspective, the Administration prefers an atmosphere charged with hostility, conflict, and tension because this provides an environment more conducive to higher US defense spending, tough anti-Soviet trade policies and greater allied support for them, US political-military diplomacy aimed at curbing Soviet global influence, and tough positions on arms control. To the extent the Administration engages in cooperative diplomacy with the USSR, the Soviets believe, it is the result of domestic and allied pressures. Manipulating and adding to those pressures is, in Moscow's view, the key to managing its America problem.

If the Soviets can more satisfactorily manage the US during the next several years, they probably believe that the succeeding Administration will not be worse from their point of view, with a fair chance it will be better. The basis for such hope lies in a probable calculation that no likely successor will be more ideological in orientation than President Reagan.

Nevertheless, we have at this point no evidence beyond occasional odd comments that the Soviets are thinking seriously about attempting to wait out the Reagan Administration instead of dealing with it as best they can. Rather the Soviets appear to be feeling considerable pressure from the Administration and seeking relief from it, although they have not yet shown any willingness to make serious accommodations. They still hope to get something for free; if they become convinced they cannot, at that point they will decide whether to offer serious concessions, adopt another cause, or simply try to wait out the Administration and seek to gain unilateral concessions from its successor. The Soviets will regard improved prospects of 1988 Presidential hopefuls less ideologically hostile to the USSR than the President and of Republican losses in the 1986 elections as added pressure on the Administration to compromise its positions before it leaves office.

88. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 16, 1985

SUBJECT

Preparing for Geneva

I believe we should take a much more positive and commanding attitude toward the Geneva meeting than is at present apparent to the public. We sought the meeting and we got it. We have important objectives. We have a strong position from which to work and we are ready to engage with the Soviets and confident that we can represent ourselves and the free world strongly.

The Soviet Union needs to know from the top how determined we are not to be pushed around or have others pushed around in various parts of the world. They need to know that we will defend our interests. They need to see on the basis of concrete proposals that we are ready for give-and-take to reduce the burden of the arms race and reduce the risk of war.

We need to take charge of the Geneva meeting and manage it visibly and aggressively. Procedurally we need to:

- A. Work strongly with friends and allies around the world both before and after the meeting.
- B. Engage in a serious and visible preparatory effort.
- C. Engage the Soviets bilaterally in the effort.

With the allies, you may want to take advantage of the presence of counterpart heads-of-state at the United Nations to seek their views visibly so they feel involved in the process. We might consider sending a special envoy around, say in the latter part of October or the first part of November, such as I did as a private citizen before the Versailles Summit.² Someone like Larry Eagleburger could do this well. It would be partly substance and partly imagery.

We need to construct our “delegation,” as distinct from who actually sits in the meetings, so as to be able to quickly and effectively shape our positions on the spot.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary’s Meetings with the President (10/10/1985); NLR-775-18-85-1-8. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Regan and McFarlane.

² The G-7 met at Versailles from June 4 to 6, 1982.

After the meeting we will want to fan out the members of our delegation to capitals of friends and allies to give them a first-hand feel for what happened.

Assuming you will get back to Washington by mid-afternoon Thursday following the meeting, you might call in the Congressional leadership that afternoon and brief them.³ You could, in addition, send me to brief members of the Senate and House separately the next day in meetings open to any member who wishes to come, as I have done on other occasions. Whatever the outcome of the meeting, a direct report by you to the American people should be considered, so that whatever is filtered through the press is not the only story. After Thanksgiving, you might send me or someone around for follow-on discussions to consolidate the support of our friends.

With regard to preparatory work, there are a number of important decisions to be made and that process is moving along. But there is also a great deal of preparation to be done, first in connection with Shevardnadze and then, of course, for the Gorbachev meeting. I think that the visibility of this process should be raised following your U.N. visit. Briefings in informal settings, such as in the Family Dining Room or up at Camp David, ought to be considered. The real work needs to be done with your own advisors in the government, but it may be quite useful to pull in people from outside and hear their views, as was done before the China trip.⁴

With regard to public affairs, I think we need to hew to a forceful and confident line without being unduly confrontational. We should increasingly emphasize our serious preparatory efforts and the unity of your Administration and the Congress behind you in this great undertaking. When we get to Geneva, I think there is a powerful argument for a “no contact with the press” rule for everyone in the delegation, with very little said and that only by the Spokesman. Or if you decide something should be said, it would be by explicit decision. There would be no backgrounders, no leaks, no meetings with the press of any kind. When the meeting is over, there will be plenty to say and we need a plan for how to say it.

Mike Deaver is a genius at thinking out the management of a major event of this kind. He is willing on a completely private and unpublicized basis to help brainstorm this subject. I would like to take advantage of his willingness.

³ November 21.

⁴ Reagan traveled to China from April 26 to May 1, 1984. Documentation on his trip is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXIX, China, 1984–1988.

I have always thought that letting Reagan be Reagan means a self-confident and positive approach.⁵ With the strong position we are in and the important objectives to be served, we should stop poor-mouthing this gigantic event and take it on as the important challenge and opportunity it really is. This is not the opening game of the little-league season. This is THE SUPER BOWL. We can and must win, whether it turns out to be a propaganda battle, an acrimonious exchange, or a constructive effort with a promise of more to come. We want the constructive effort and so do our friends, allies, and the American people.

⁵ In a memorandum to Shultz, September 16, Ridgway reported on a breakfast meeting between Hartman and Dobrynin in Moscow: "Dobrynin expressed notable misgivings about the scheduled private meeting between the leaders in Geneva. He said that Gorbachev very much wants the private session, but that he (Dobrynin) was concerned about what might transpire. He commented that there had been many angry words exchanged between our leaders in the past to no avail whatsoever and hoped that would not be the case this time. Dobrynin agreed that Gorbachev was likely to want to spend some time on 'how we got where we are' in the relationship and 'where we are going,' but he showed some concern about what we might have in mind by our references to an 'agenda for the future.' Art emphasized the importance of our leaders setting the course and having a good talk about the internal and foreign policy issues on their minds, but Dobrynin clearly remained uncomfortable with an unstructured meeting that could have unpredictable results." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (09/14/1985–09/16/1985); NLR-775-14-31-5-7)

89. Minutes of a Meeting¹

Washington, September 17, 1985, 4–5:18 p.m.

VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH GYORGY ARBATOV

SUBJECT

Academician Gyorgy Arbatov's Visit (U)

PARTICIPANTS

Office of the Vice President

The Vice President

Mr. Craig Fuller

Mr. Donald Gregg

State

Mr. James Wilkinson

NSC

Tyrus W. Cobb

Minutes

The Vice President expressed his pleasure at seeing Dr. Arbatov at the meeting at the Aga Khan estate in Geneva.² He indicated he felt the frank and candid discussions they had there were useful and productive. Vice President Bush noted that he had been studying with care recent reports emanating from the Soviet Union with respect to the upcoming meeting between the President and the General Secretary. Vice President Bush indicated that he understood Arbatov had the confidence of the General Secretary and would be conveying the substance of this discussion to Mr. Gorbachev. (C)

Dr. Arbatov replied that, in fact he was only a consultant to the leadership. However, he did have a continuing relationship with General Secretary Gorbachev and knows that the new Soviet leader strongly desires to see serious results come from the November meeting. Arbatov added that the General Secretary believes the preparations for that

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Tyrus Cobb Files, Country File, USSR (6); NLR-98-5-1-6-1. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Vice President's office. Under a covering note dated September 23, Cobb sent Gregg a draft of the minutes and wrote: "Attached are my draft minutes of the Vice President's meeting with Arbatov. I understand that Wilkinson has already sent over his notes, but I have not seen them. If you want, I can revise these by incorporating his, or other changes you may wish. Or, if this is sufficient, stand down. Let me know—we have it on the word processor." Gregg responded: "I thank you. Excellent memo. One small change on pg 2." An unknown hand struck through "State's version attached, FYI" and wrote next to it "you have it." "Pls send me back a corrected copy."

² No record of this meeting was found.

meeting are firmly under way on both sides. But, Arbatov added, Gorbachev is under the impression that the Americans do not see any chance for real progress in Geneva. (C)

Vice President Bush responded that this was clearly an erroneous impression. He indicated that the Soviets often had problems understanding our true policy because of the quantity of information, true or false, that is conveyed in our media daily. This is a fact of life and the Soviet leadership should only pay attention to what the President himself is saying and doing. He pointedly added that President Reagan is quite serious regarding both the arms control talks in Geneva and for the meeting with the General Secretary in November. (C)

The Vice President asserted that the Soviet practice of floating proposals prior to the meeting is most unhelpful. We must, instead, conduct negotiations in private. He said he would never claim that the United States is without blame in this public debate—both sides employ rhetoric. But what concerns us, the Vice President indicated, is that the Soviet propaganda was much more intense and heated than earlier. The point was that if we didn't immediately start to negotiate earnestly in private, we ran the danger of locking ourselves into non-negotiable positions. He stressed that there was a real danger of polarizing our stands and prejudicing the outcome of the meetings. (S)

In particular, the Soviet rhetoric was poisoning the atmosphere before the two leaders had even met. The Vice President stated that he felt the personal chemistry between the General Secretary and the President could be good. Vice President Bush stated he knows this President and wanted to convey this to Arbatov straight from the shoulder. (C)

Arbatov replied that, of course many things could be discussed, but in reality having only two sessions leaves a total of eight to nine hours of discussion to cover all of the issues: arms control, bilateral and regional. Arbatov frowned and noted that the introduction of human rights concerns could lead to a negative outcome. According to Arbatov, addressing the human rights issue depends largely on how the Americans attack the problem. If the U.S. pursued this matter strongly, particularly with harsh public rhetoric, the Soviet side would have no alternative but to raise American behavior—at home and in places like Nicaragua. On the other hand, if the U.S. were to offer helpful thoughts on resolving this issue, we may have a productive dialogue. (S)

Vice President Bush told Arbatov that he knows how the President operates. He will speak openly, candidly and frankly—just as this discussion is being conducted now. The President is receptive to such a dialogue. President Reagan would not be harsh in his approach; e.g., if the General Secretary raised Nicaragua as an issue, the President

would respond that it is a valid question for discussion that could be addressed by two responsible leaders. (C)

What was important, noted the Vice President, was that the meetings established an agenda for future discussions. Further, that the November sessions establish a climate conducive to conducting a productive Soviet-American dialogue. (C)

Arbatov replied that while he did not know the President, having met him only once, he felt it necessary to stress that if the meeting with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev were as ideologically charged as was the President's meeting with Shcherbitskii,³ then there would be little chance for establishing any sort of future agenda. Arbatov stated that what particularly concerned the Soviet delegation was the President's strong ideological stance. Continuing, Arbatov said the most provocative statements were the President's false quotations from Lenin and his ascribing significance to obscure statements made by some unknown Ukrainian diplomat (probably referring to Maniluis-kii's 1931 comments on the world revolution). (C)

Arbatov continued that he felt no "respect" for the Geneva discussions. He felt they were going nowhere and the buildings housing the negotiations should be referred to as the "tomb of unknown Soviet proposals." Serious offers on demilitarization of outerspace and prevention of an arms race had not been addressed. The Americans instead sought to propagandize their own approach by belittling Soviet proposals. (C)

The Vice President characterized Arbatov's presentation as completely false. He noted that it was in fact impossible for us to convey a clear picture of our responsible position to the Soviet public. Unfortunately for us and world peace, President Reagan has no opportunity to speak directly to the Soviet citizenry. The Vice President noted that he wished that we had the opportunity to participate in an interview such as that Gorbachev had with *Time Magazine*.⁴ All of the questions were thrown up "like a slow, fat pitch" that the General Secretary could knock out of the ballpark. (C)

Vice President Bush added that he was not nearly as pessimistic as Arbatov. Relations were not as bad as they had been in the past; for example, during the Berlin crisis or the 1973 Mid East conflict. He added that it was difficult to understand why the Soviets painted such a bleak picture. The Vice President noted that he was concerned with the cumulative effect of the Soviet actions. (C)

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 378.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 80.

Dr. Arbatov stated that this was a serious and genuine attitude. He commented that the U.S. in fact was even more negative. For example, as was our Defense Secretary on *Face the Nation* last Sunday.⁵ The Vice President responded sharply that the Soviets had to understand that we were deeply concerned with continuing incidents against our military liaison missions. Further, we didn't create the "Spy Dust" controversy,⁶ nor were we conducting a "hate campaign" that poisons the atmosphere. Arbatov replied that he understood this but when we go to such "extremes" as preventing Soviet officials from going to a volleyball game, it seems to add up to some sort of American plot. (C)

The Vice President stated that we needed to move quickly off this rhetoric. We were only two months from the November meeting, and if we were to have progress, we needed to be conducting serious negotiations privately. Arbatov said he was in agreement, but our refusal to join them in a nuclear test moratorium and the rejection of the Soviet proposals on ASAT limitations, taken together indicated an unwillingness on the part of the United States to move forward. The Vice President stated firmly that he would not seek to convince Arbatov that there were not divisions within our government on specific issues, but we were united in a desire to move the Soviet-American relationship on to a more stable plane. (C)

Arbatov nodded but asked where the way out of this dilemma lay. He stated that the Soviets pay attention to what the American administration and President says. Specifically, they were very offended by the President's unkind characterizations of the Soviet system—like evil empire, throwing them on the ash can of history. The Soviet leadership pays close attention to these speeches. (C)

The Vice President asserted that Arbatov now had a definitive high-level source who stated unequivocally that we saw progress in the Geneva discussions. He stated firmly that our characterizations of the Soviet Union paled in comparison to Soviet portrayals of the United States and particularly of this President—as a Nazi regime for example. Thrusting examples of such cartoons and articles from the Soviet press in front of Arbatov, the Vice President stated that this is what contributed to a tense relationship. (C)

Dr. Arbatov summarized that perhaps both sides were at fault but the requirement was to get on with the discussions. He stated that Gorbachev saw the November meetings as a watershed in our relationship. If we do not achieve progress in these meetings, it may be the

⁵ September 15. Reference is to the CBS News public affairs television program then hosted by Leslie Stahl.

⁶ See Document 78.

last for some time. Remember, the last summit was held six years ago. It would be dangerous and foolish to wait any longer. (C)

The Vice President agreed that this was a meeting of great importance. He added that it was important that the agenda be established in advance and not be overly ambitious. Arbatov agreed that this was the case but the impression in Moscow was that Washington saw no hope for any progress. Vice President Bush countered that we were prepared for progress and cited our chemical weapons ban as one proposal the Soviets needed to seriously address. Given the Soviet experience with war, it would seem this is an area where we could achieve progress. In particular, if Moscow were to show flexibility on our requirement for on-site inspection, progress was indeed feasible. (S)

Arbatov did not directly respond but stated that if inspection was an honest U.S. concern, some movement could be found. But likewise, we should be prepared to move on the comprehensive testban. This is an area where we need to resume talks immediately—it was unclear why the Americans refuse to do this. (C)

In conclusion, Dr. Arbatov stated that Mikhail Gorbachev believed that the upcoming meeting should be more than just a get-together session. It must have a serious agenda. He again stressed that the Soviet leader was prepared to establish a good relationship with the President but warned that personal allegations cast against the General Secretary or the Soviet system would imperil the success of the summit. The Vice President countered that we have been subjected to vile propaganda from the Soviet side, and it was time for a cessation of this harsh and untrue rhetoric. Arbatov nodded agreement, but asserted that each society had different regulations and systems of rules. We could not impose one another's system on each other. In response to the Vice President's repeated complaint of our lack of access, Arbatov conceded the point and expressed the hope that as relations improve, more opportunities would be created. He did not rule out the establishment of some mechanisms to foster this. (C)

The Vice President thanked Dr. Arbatov for coming to the White House to see him. Arbatov expressed his appreciation to the Vice President for this opportunity to continue their productive dialogue that has continued over the years. The Vice President stressed again the importance the President ascribed to the November meetings and the very real possibilities for progress that could be achieved in Geneva. (C)

90. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 17, 1985

SUBJECT

Dobrynin Meeting

Dobrynin came in late the afternoon of September 16 for a follow up to our meeting last week on preparations for the Shevardnadze and Gorbachev meetings.²

Dobrynin's main point was that Shevardnadze will have a message from Gorbachev on the Geneva talks. The message will "clear up the mystery" of Gorbachev's *Time* interview comments on arms control—presumably by giving more details on his expressed willingness to accept radical reductions in offensive forces and "fundamental research" on strategic defense.³ The message will be delivered to you directly. Its substance will then be transmitted to the Soviet delegation at the Geneva arms talks for introduction as a formal Soviet initiative.

Dobrynin stressed repeatedly that Gorbachev wanted his meeting with you to produce results. If immediate solutions were not possible, he hoped for movement toward ultimate solutions. I made clear you were no less eager for a successful meeting, and that if progress which served the interests of both sides were possible before November 19 we would welcome it.

Pointing out that the experience of past summits suggested that thorough preparation was the best guarantee of success, I emphasized the need to develop a specific work program for the period ahead. Dobrynin agreed, adding that, while the Shevardnadze and Geneva meetings would hopefully stimulate progress at the Geneva talks, obstacles could still be expected. It would be important that we be able to "come back to each other" to overcome them. He did not make clear what he had in mind, but may have been signaling the need for another Foreign Minister level meeting before the November meeting.

Comment

While Dobrynin was at pains to suggest that Shevardnadze will come armed with new ideas, the Foreign Minister will have none of

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Leaders, 1983–1986, Meetings—Shultz-Gromyko-Dobrynin Hartman-Gromyko 1985 (3). Secret; Sensitive.

² See Document 83.

³ See footnote 2, Document 80.

his senior arms control negotiators with him in Washington or New York. This suggests he will simply convey whatever message he has rather than seek to engage us in a detailed discussion. Although Dobrynin indicated initially that Shevardnadze would give the message to you alone, he later hinted I might get an advance look at it in New York.

91. Editorial Note

In August and September 1985, Robert McFarlane, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, worked closely with members of his staff, mainly Robert Linhard, Senior Director for Defense Programs and Arms Control in the National Security Council Staff and Jack Matlock, Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs in the National Security Council Staff, to make the interagency process more responsive to the challenges of formulating a policy on arms control with the Soviet Union. This process resulted in the formation of the Arms Control Support Group and in a memorandum and Presidential tasking, "Contingency Planning Against Potential Soviet Arms Control Positions," September 17, 1985 (see Document 92), prepared by Linhard under instruction from McFarlane.

Starting in early August, in a series of electronic messages (or PROFs notes), McFarlane, Linhard, and Matlock discussed how to approach possible contingencies that Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev might present to President Ronald Reagan at the upcoming Geneva Summit in November 1985. In an August 5 electronic message to Linhard, Matlock wrote: "I think Bud is absolutely right to anticipate that we will need to think through our response to a possible Soviet offer to combine a reduction of offensive weapons with some limitations on SDI." He continued: "The question is: what are the dangers in moving in this direction? Also, the dangers in not moving if the Sovs make the offer? I defer to your judgment regarding the delicacies of interagency management. But I think Bud is right in trying to get a handle on the substance of the issues. If we are not prepared to move rapidly when and if the time comes, we could quickly be pushed off the high ground." (Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Responding to Soviet Arms Control Options Special Tasking—Creation of ACSR (Arms Control Support Group) September 1985; NLR-334-6-44-5-1)

In an August 8 reply, Linhard agreed with Matlock's assessment and wrote: "we need to do the contingency work. Our problem is how

to do it without it (1) blowing up into an interagency fight that spills over into the press, (2) or that puts Bud in the lead in such a way that it feeds an assault on him, or (3) that it gets framed initially in such a way that the system will fight the problem vice work the problem in the national interest. Bud wants to talk to this in some way at tomorrow's SACG [August 9]. I'm not sure this is the wisest course. I think that what we need is for Bud to charter a small, close-hold 'strategy group' reporting to him and the SACG without identifying immediately this as a first project." (Ibid.)

On August 13, McFarlane forwarded to Linhard an August 5 electronic message: "All of us are conscious of the growing possibility that the Russians may try to grasp the propaganda high ground with an offer to accept the US position on ballistic missile warhead reductions (or something close to it) in exchange for limits on SDI. We have tried in various ways—our NSDD after the SALT II decision and today's memo to Cap on MX basing—to try to generate the intellectual elements of a sensible response if they should do the unexpected. But I'm not sure that Defense will tackle the point of dealing with a Soviet initiative as outlined above unless we congeal it for them in writing with formal tasking, i.e. a memo which says 'What if the Russians make the following proposal . . . how would it affect the military balance; what risks would it create; to what extent can we pursue a sensible SDI program to identify feasible systems without transgressing the ABM Treaty; if the latter is not possible what should be our approach and when, if changes in the treaty are warranted, should we propose such changes . . . etc? I am not naive as to the bureaucratic risks in such a memo nor to the press vulnerabilities if such a memo leaks." Linhard responded, August 14, that a "direct tasking" for this might "be misinterpreted. Since at the end of the day this will have to be worked by a small 'select' group feeding the SACG, I still think that we could better protect our options by establishing the group now (perhaps via Presidential tasking) to look at contingencies." NSDD 173, June 10, and the memorandum to Weinberger are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988. See also footnote 2, Document 41.

On August 14, McFarlane wrote back to Linhard: "I would appreciate your doing a memo from the President to Cap and Vessey saying that he is concerned that the conventional wisdom is driving toward the prediction of a deal—the trade-off of SDI testing, development and deployment for deep offensive cuts. It is not at all clear that such a deal would be consistent with our national security interests although a return to a stable offensive balance at or about 4–5000 ballistic missile warheads could be constructive if we were able to continue a vigorous research program in SDI. The dilemma we face is that to even task the

study of such an option would risk, through leaks, the forfeiting of capital with the Russians to the extent that it signalled we were interested in a deal. Go on to say that Bud has hesitated to even introduce the subject in the SACG for this very fear. Still I (the President) have to deal with the real prospect that Gorbachev may indeed introduce such a proposal and consequently I need to know what the facts are from a military point of view in order to avoid being put on the defensive. As to how to wring this out, it seems to me (the President) that we need to try to form a 'Skunk works' consisting of no more than 4 or 5 trusted aides to do the close hold analysis to put us in a position to deal with this issue." (Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Responding to Soviet Arms Control Options Special Tasking—Creation of ACSG (Arms Control Support Group) September 1985; NLR-334-6-44-5-1)

In an undated electronic message to McFarlane, likely later on August 14, Linhard wrote: "Per your guidance, provided below is a draft memorandum tasking contingency work requested. Even with best efforts to fireproof this memorandum, even in draft, it remains pure dynamite—therefore, have tried to use the PROFs system to get it to you (and Admiral Poindexter) and let you decide who else sees the document. Jack Matlock has not seen this draft. (If successful in my attempt to get directly to you privately via PROFs, and even more so if not, hope our fine gentlemen in the Secretariat will understand the reasons for this attempt.) Remain very concerned that this links the work too directly to the President, but have made the arguments fully to you before and need not repeat them again. You need to consider carefully to whom this memorandum is sent. You had indicated that it should go to SecDef and CJCS. This would permit us to work a military assessment. The DCI would be a useful participant even in this, and would recommend you consider this add. State and ACDA should be considered also from a process point of view, but their participation hinges on what you wish to do with the product." (Ibid.) McFarlane responded, on August 14, at 10:22 p.m., "Many thanks Bob for busting your ass to do this. At first blush it is what I asked for. You ought not share it with anyone at this point. Let me think about it overnight." (Ibid.)

The development of this contingency paper and the discussion between McFarlane and Linhard led to the creation of the Arms Control Support Group (ACSG). In a memorandum to President Reagan, August 31, drafted by Ronald Lehman, Director for Defense Programs and Arms Control in the National Security Council Staff, McFarlane explained: "The attached draft Memorandum establishes a working level group to do sensitive contingency planning in support of the Senior Arms Control Group and asks the Secretaries of State and

Defense, the Directors of the Central Intelligence and Arms Control and Disarmament, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to nominate a qualified representative.” Reagan initialed his approval of the recommendation. In a September 4 memorandum to Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Director of Central Intelligence Casey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vessey, and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Adelman, the President stated: “Whether the Soviet Union undertakes serious negotiating initiatives in the various negotiating fora or not, we can expect a number of fast breaking events and significant arms control milestones throughout the next several months. To assist the Senior Arms Control Group in its endeavors to make certain that the U.S. Government is well prepared for all major contingencies, I hereby establish the Arms Control Support Group. This group, chaired by the National Security Council Staff, will prepare sensitive contingency planning materials to be considered by the Senior Arms Control Group and will perform other related tasks as the Assistant to the President for National Security may deem necessary.” (Ibid.)

92. Memorandum From President Reagan to Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Director of Central Intelligence Casey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Vessey), and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Adelman)¹

Washington, September 17, 1985

SUBJECT

Contingency Planning Against Potential Soviet Arms Control Positions (S)

In the upcoming November meeting, we face one of the most important questions with respect to managing U.S./Soviet relations that we have faced in the post-war period. At issue is whether, at this juncture, we can fashion a more stable basis for dealing with each other

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Eggplant II, September–December 1985 NP. Top Secret; Owl. Handle Via Owl Channels. A typed note at the top of the page reads: “(Placed in OWL after compartment established).” According to the paper produced as a response to this tasking, the Owl Channel was created “to handle this and related papers.” See Documents 97 and 91.

in a peaceful and business-like manner. In order to deal intelligently with this issue, we must focus on U.S. national objectives and, in light of these objectives, identify both the opportunities and risks offered by the situation. (C)

Over the last forty years, the U.S./Soviet relationship has exhibited a regular pattern of swinging from one extreme position to the other, from confrontation to so-called detente. At one extreme, we have the cold war experience where we felt we had almost no hope but to confront and compete. For example, during Korea, we were spending up to 10% of our GNP on defense. On the other extreme, during periods of so-called detente, we reached the point at which some felt that we had the possibility of a fundamental change in the ambitions of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, during such periods, the relative military strength of the Soviet Union—relative to the U.S.—tended to grow, and we saw the fruits of direct Soviet action in Angola, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, etc. (C)

Some convincingly argue that the Soviets know the value of encouraging and exploiting this cycle in the Western body politic—and actively exploiting Western impatience with confrontation to permit periods in which gains can be made and consolidated. As a minimum, this regular pattern that we can find in the history of the relationship clearly suggests that:

(1) it is illusory and dangerous to expect that fundamental Soviet ambitions and behavior will change; and

(2) to keep Soviet ambitions in check, we must show the clear national will to confront and compete as needed. (C)

As the United States approaches the November meeting, we have a number of strengths that we should recognize. The U.S. economy is strong. The U.S. has demonstrated a commitment to spend 6+% of its GNP to maintain its defenses. As a result, the U.S. military capability is being restored. The NATO Alliance has weathered a number of attempts by the Soviets to undercut its solidarity, and it remains fundamentally sound. In short, we can approach the meeting in a strong position economically, militarily and politically. (C)

General Secretary Gorbachev approaches the meeting with a nation which is militarily very strong, but in substantial decline in virtually every other measure. He faces an economy which appears in worse overall shape than it has been recently. Gorbachev may draw some advantage from the fact that he is a “new” Soviet leader, and possibly the only leader of a major power that can look to remaining in power through the end of the century. But, on the other hand, he is certainly the product of a very structured system in which his leadership stability holds a certain indebtedness to both the military (which provides the basis of the Soviet Union’s superpower status) and the KGB. (C)

It may be that Gorbachev represents a new generation of Soviet leadership which brings a different set of priorities to its task and, therefore, offers the chance to alter the U.S./Soviet relationship as it pursues these new priorities. This certainly is a possibility that must be considered and a hypothesis that must be tested. However, we have to give proper weight to the historical record and ensure that we fully protect our own national interests, and security as this testing is accomplished. (C)

The U.S./Soviet relationship has many aspects. The issues upon which we differ range from human rights to arms control, from fundamental differences in the philosophy of government to specific regional problems. The thrust and character of that relationship cannot be judged, as many observers all too often do, on any one of these issues. At the same time, we cannot forget that the sole basis upon which the Soviet Union holds the status of a superpower is because of its military strength. Economically, it certainly is not a superpower. Nor has its political philosophy demonstrated itself to be so compelling that it would provide the Soviet Union a special place in world affairs. Given this reality, in dealing with the Soviet Union as the other world superpower, the issue of the military balance is necessarily at the very heart of the U.S./Soviet relationship. (C)

As long as maintaining some positive motion, from their perspective, in the correlation of forces remains important to the Soviet Union, and as long as reversing the erosion of the military balance is essential to the security of the U.S. and the West, the maintenance of stability in the military balance will be a continuing problem for us. Therefore, how we approach maintaining stability in the military balance is absolutely central to how we hope to manage the U.S./Soviet relationship in the future. (C)

For at least the last 20 years, the Soviets have clearly been accumulating both strategic offensive and defensive capabilities and gaining advantages in several strategic categories at a steady rate. There is certainly some question as to whether, if the Soviets maintain their pace of activity in both offenses and defenses, the West will show the necessary prudence and will to be able to stay the course and to maintain the balance in traditional ways. (C)

In addition, the nature of future offensive weapons may be such that we in the West may not be able to gauge accurately the nature of the balance. For more traditional systems, like submarine launched ballistic missiles and silo based ICBMs, we could always be assured of being able to count the submarines or the ICBM silos as they were built. We are now entering a generation of cruise missiles and of mobile ballistic missile systems, with relatively small launchers that will be hard to account for during construction and hard to detect once

deployed. Given our free society, the Soviets will have little trouble tracking the numbers and disposition of U.S. systems. However, for the West, uncertainties about the overall size and disposition of Soviet forces will almost certainly increase. (C)

Finally, we also have to recognize that the Soviets are pursuing strategic defenses with great vigor, investing as much on strategic defenses as on offensive forces. Adding to their already deployed defenses the extensive and long-standing Soviet research program in both traditional and exotic defensive technologies, we face a distinct danger that the Soviets may acquire a militarily significant defensive capability that could also radically alter the military balance. (C)

Based on the threat that we must deal with as outlined above, we have put the nation on a course that involves:

(1) the needed modernization of our offensive forces for the maintenance of deterrence in traditional fashion in the near-term;

(2) the pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to provide alternative future options for deterrence, as a prudent hedge against Soviet defensive breakout, and to see if we can alter the "rules" of the military competition to lessen the threat and increase longer-term Western competitiveness; and

(3) the use of diplomacy and negotiation to support the above. (C)

The Soviets have clearly indicated that they are disturbed by our SDI program, and will vigorously attempt to divert us from pursuing it. This gives the U.S. certain leverage. The challenge we face, however, is determining how to evaluate the opportunities the short-term situation may present in terms of long-term U.S. national interest. The key question before us is what mix of power—offensive and defense—can best assure stability and U.S. national security. (C)

Over the last four years, we have very carefully positioned ourselves in our negotiations with the Soviets not only to achieve equitable and verifiable reductions in the level of nuclear arsenals, but to do so in the context of a broader overall plan of action. We all recognize that such reductions, and the overall arms control process, are not ends in themselves; rather, they are instruments available to us to strengthen U.S. and Allied security and stability. Our arms reduction efforts should complement our needed strategic modernization so that we can ensure effective deterrence today. They should also complement our efforts in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program to seek options for a better, more stable means of deterrence in the future. (C)

All the elements of this overall plan—negotiated reductions, strategic modernization, and SDI—have the potential of making critical contributions to U.S. and Allied security. These elements, however, must be held in balance. To do this, we must keep our eye on our overall broad, national security objectives. Failing to do so in pursuit

of any one of these elements, we may take actions that appear attractive in the short-term but that are fundamentally counterproductive to longer-term goals of increased security and stability. (C)

I have confidence that our current U.S. position is well structured to keep all elements in balance and to support our longer-term goals. However, given Soviet posturing, the Soviets may shortly try to put us at a very critical crossroads. They may try to present us with a choice between two very different, general courses—one, our current path, and the alternative, the offer to join us in deep reductions in offensive forces at the price of our moving sharply to meet their desires for significant restraint on SDI. I am also growing increasingly concerned that the conventional wisdom of some outside the Administration is pushing us towards such a crossroads by the repeated prediction of the Soviet offer of a deal which trades off U.S. SDI testing, development and deployment for deep cuts in certain categories of existing offensive nuclear forces. (C)

It is not clear to me that such a deal would be consistent with our national security interests, especially as the systems, numbers, and counting rules presented by the Soviets are likely to be designed to preserve or enhance significant Soviet advantages. On the other hand, we must be thoroughly prepared to face the contingency of such an option being proposed to us by the Soviet Union. As part of our preparation for such a Soviet proposal, I believe that we should study the implications of such a contingency. We must fully understand what the implications would be if we were able to achieve a stable offensive force balance at or about the 5,000 ballistic missile warhead level, complemented by a sustained and vigorous SDI research program, but with SDI development and deployment options foreclosed by the terms of an agreement. (TS)

The dilemma we face is that even to task the assessment of such a Soviet offer as a serious contingency risks serious consequences through leaks. It could result in the misperception that we were not as serious as we actually are about the imperative of SDI research to generate options for moving to a better basis of deterrence in the future. Such a misperception alone could undercut the entire rationale and support for the SDI research program. A leak could also result in the unintended signalling to the Soviets that we might be interested in such a deal. As a result, it would be more difficult to sustain support for our sound, current position. It could also cause us to forfeit precious negotiating capital. Still, we have to deal with the real prospect that Gorbachev may indeed introduce such a proposal. Consequently, we must know the facts in order to avoid being put on the defensive. (TS)

For that reason, I direct that we identify no more than five or six exceptionally qualified, highly trusted individuals to do the close-hold

analysis needed to put us in a position to deal with this issue. The fact of the existence of this group, its charter, and its work should be protected by an appropriate, unique security compartment. As a minimum, this group should focus on the attached questions.² The group must complete its task quickly and quietly, and I would like to see a first cut at a product that we could discuss by September 24. In sum:

- this work should be done on a priority basis by the best small group we can assemble;
- the group should have access to each of you as needed to ensure that it understands your thinking;
- it should have a blank check discretely to draw upon any assets needed for timely help without a problem;
- the first cut of a quality product should be completed for my review by September 24; and
- this work must be done without any leaks. (TS)

While this group undertakes its work, I would ask each of you to focus on the questions that are posed for the group. When the group's task is completed, I will want each of you to be in a position to comment on it and to give me your best answers to the same questions posed to the group. (TS)

It is essential that we enter the meeting with Gorbachev prepared to handle any Soviet maneuver drawing upon the answers to the attached questions. Once we have the benefit of these answers, we then must consider what the U.S. approach to the November meeting should be. (S)

It goes without saying that this memorandum and all subsequent actions which result from it must be held only to those who absolutely must know. I cannot overemphasize how closely I want this work held. (S)

ORIGINAL SIGNED
Ronald Reagan

² Attached but not printed at Tab A is a set of four questions. The Arms Control Support Group addressed each of the questions in the paper which was distributed on September 24. See Document 97.

93. **Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan**¹

Washington, September 19, 1985

SUBJECT

Preparing for Gorbachev

Early this week I gave you my views on the *attitude* we should take toward your meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva.² And I put down my thoughts on *organizing* our approach to the American people and our allies.

This memo is about substance. That means arms control. We have a wide range of issues on the agenda and we do not want to encourage the perception that arms control is the be-all and end-all at Geneva. The reality, however, is that the meeting will not be seen as a success without some progress in that area.

Media and Congressional attention to the arms control issue at Geneva is building up fast. As usual, it is not helpful and distorts the reality. But we should not let it distort *our* preparations.

As always, the Soviets are saying that arms control negotiations can go nowhere unless we make unilateral concessions. It's the same old line:

- In the 1970's they said no progress was possible unless we abandoned the cruise missile.
- Then they said no progress was possible if we deployed PII's and GLCMs in Europe.
- When we did deploy, they said no progress until we dismantled them.
- Then MX was designated as the obstacle to progress.
- Now, of course, SDI is supposed to be the mortal enemy of arms control.

So the debate at the moment, in the press and on the Hill, is over whether we should "bargain away" SDI in order to get substantial offensive cuts on the Soviet side.

This, of course, is nonsense. We have to resist it. There can be no question of our deviating from going ahead with SDI. Only if a strategic defense system is seen to be deployable within the next decade or so,

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron September 1985 (4/6). Secret; Sensitive. In a handwritten note on the attached routing slip, Poindexter wrote: "Route to: Jack Matlock. Ron Lehman (share with Bob Linhard) Hold close—don't acknowledge that you have it. JP."

² See Document 88.

and only if our will to deploy it is proved credible, can we expect to change the basis of global security and stability for the better.

But even our own internal debate—especially as it appears in the press—seems to assume that the choice we face is *either* to go full speed ahead with SDI without reference to Geneva *or* to somehow “bargain it away.”

That’s not the way we should define the question.

As I see it, the point is (1) how *to ensure that we get the full benefit of SDI’s enormous potential*—not only in terms strategically significant to our security, but in negotiations as well; and (2) what is the best way *to ensure that SDI becomes a permanent fixture* of our strategic posture, and not another costly program under perpetual attack by the media and voted on by Congress every few months, under constant threat of emasculation or cancellation.

There is one key reality that we must face: SDI will not be deployable before the end of your Administration.

So at the time in 1989 when we must hand over the SDI program to your successors in office it will be a fact that:

—the research program will not yet have achieved the necessary criteria of effectiveness;

—effective deployed defenses will still be a long way off;

And, as circumstances develop, it may well be that:

—the program then will be under attack by Congress and the media for its cost, for its alleged violations of the ABM treaty, and for having undermined the traditional arms control regime based on the concept of deterrence through the threat of massive destruction.

—and the Soviets could be well into a program of offensive buildup designed to saturate our defenses.

We want to avoid this situation. We want to *protect* SDI against its enemies and ensure that it will be a sustained program over the next several decades. To do so, we need to shape it so that by 1988 it will be in the form of a legacy that your successor will want to honor and be able to sustain.

And this, in turn, will depend upon whether SDI is part of an arms control process which the Soviets are locked into *or* is a “U.S.-only” program going forward while arms control efforts are going nowhere.

So the best way to keep SDI alive and widely supported may be to demonstrate that it is *the key* to real arms reductions heading toward a future of *no nuclear weapons*.

This suggests that we need to use the enormous leverage provided by the SDI program *now*, while it is at its maximum, *to produce an agreement* serving our goals of reducing the risk of war by radically reducing the number and effectiveness of offensive nuclear weapons.

This is what Margaret Thatcher advocated in her September 12 message to you—"We would maintain and strengthen the existing arms control regime while building a better one for the future."³

The agreed reductions would in no way foreclose but would facilitate a jointly managed, phased transition to greater reliance on defenses.

Our approach also would include these aspects:

- The ABM Treaty would be retained.
- The deep cuts would have to be tailored to be strategically significant. Numerical reductions alone would not necessarily solve the problem.
- We would demand that the Soviets come into compliance with all existing arms control treaties.
- SDI research, with the development and testing permitted by a fully clarified ABM Treaty, would continue to preserve the long-term option of SDI deployment and to hedge against Soviet non-compliance with the agreement.

Admittedly, this approach seeks to get the best of both worlds for us: SDI goes forward as the wholly new development that it is but at the same time we use it to try to get the kind of real reductions in offensive weapons that have been sought for years.

So by proceeding to research SDI and holding its deployment over the Soviet's heads, we provide it with the best chance for *long-term existence* and effectiveness—yet at the same time making the most of it in terms of *short-term progress* and increased Congressional and allied support.

This is the context of the attached talking points, prepared in the format of something for your use with Gorbachev at Geneva.⁴

³ On September 12, Thatcher wrote Reagan to convey her thoughts on the upcoming meeting with Gorbachev. Thatcher's letter and Reagan's response are in the Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 September Mtg w/ E. Shevardnadze. The letter is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. VIII, Western Europe, 1985–1988.

⁴ Attached but not printed at Tab 1 are the talking points. In his memoir, Shultz noted: "I put together talking points to show the president how he might express these matters to Gorbachev. I had long since learned that the president's mind was engaged not so much through briefing books as through an active process that involved him in give-and-take and a feel for his operational role. My talking points included the idea that we 'cannot excise from men's minds the knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons, particularly nuclear missile systems. Unless you and we have nonnuclear defenses capable of countering such delivery systems, there would exist an enormous temptation for men to build them clandestinely in the hope this would enable them to exercise immense power in the world.' The talking points helped to engage President Reagan actively, to set him thinking about his personal role. But the occasion itself was a long way off. I wanted to see him get involved, but I didn't want him to leave his fight in the dressing room." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 576)

94. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, September 20, 1985, 11 a.m.–12:07 p.m.

SUBJECT

Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's Visit (U)

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Office of the Vice President

The Vice President

Mr. Craig L. Fuller

State

Secretary George P. Shultz

Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway

Treasury

Secretary James A. Baker III

Defense

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

Dr. Fred C. Ikle

Justice

Attorney General Edwin Meese III

CIA

Mr. William J. Casey

Mr. Robert Gates

OMB

Dr. Alton Keel

JSC

General John A. Wickham, Jr.

Admiral Arthur S. Moreau

White House

Mr. Donald T. Regan

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

Admiral John M. Poindexter

NSC

Ambassador Jack F. Matlock

COL Tyrus W. Cobb

¹ Source: National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSC Meetings, Box SR 105, NSC Meeting 121. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Although no drafting information appears on the minutes, Cobb sent the minutes under a September 21 covering memorandum to McFarlane, with concurrence from Matlock, suggesting that Cobb drafted the minutes. (Reagan Library, Tyrus Cobb Files, Country File, USSR (1); NLR-98-5-1-4-3) In preparation for this meeting, Cobb wrote in an undated letter to Matlock: "Jack, This has been a hell of a week. Primary concern right now is the NSC meeting tomorrow on 'Shevardnadze'. Below is the agenda/participants notification package that has undergone at least three modifications. The anodyne version you see here represents the lowest common denominator of agreement that could be reached regarding the purpose of the meeting. Also attached is a rough draft of the NSC paper to Bud and the McFarlane-Pres. The primary problem is that nobody seems to know why we are having this meeting. Hence, numerous versions of these packages. Originally, Weinberger asked for 20 minutes to discuss SDI; he, Casey and Keyworth had planned to make this the showdown session on arms control in general and SDI in particular. Bud reacted strongly against. Decided at first to make it more of a broad strategic overview session in which the President could talk broad philosophical principles on our policy toward the USSR. Then it was changed to a discussion of the other three issue areas, with no arms control to be discussed. I think that's where we are now, but you need to look at these papers on an urgent basis to determine what you want to be the focus of this meeting. Then we can prepare Bud's talking points. Ty." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Reagan-Shevardnadze Meeting 9/27/85 (4 of 7))

Minutes

Mr. McFarlane opened the meeting by noting that this NSC session would serve as a forum to provide the President with a strategic overview of the broad direction we hope to pursue in dealing with the Soviet leadership between now and the meeting in November. He added that we would also be reviewing the major issues on our bilateral, human rights and regional agendas. *Mr. McFarlane* explained that arms control had been dealt with earlier and would be addressed specifically again next week.² (C)

Mr. McFarlane noted that the process that had been set in motion two months ago by the President's invitation to the Soviet General Secretary was well underway. Our preparations for these meetings have enabled us to prepare solid positions in the four areas that will be on the agenda. This includes bilateral issues such as air safety, the opening up of new consulates, and the renewed exchanges agreement; human rights concerns; regional issues, on Afghanistan, Central America, and other parts of the globe; and security issues, particularly arms control. (C)

Prior to turning the discussion to the substantive issues, *Mr. McFarlane* indicated that he wished to review briefly for the President the major public diplomacy events leading to the Geneva meetings. Our program, he explained, is designed to ensure that the President has solid support from three key audiences—our Allies, the Congress, and the U.S. public. We have selected activities and events that will demonstrate that we are prepared for substantive results in Geneva and that we go there with a comprehensive and reasonable agenda. We feel the Soviets moved quickly and early to seize the high ground in this area with a blistering propaganda campaign. However, we feel that the Soviet effort has been perceived for what it is—old propaganda in new packaging—and has made no lasting impact on Allied or American public opinion. (C)

Mr. McFarlane noted that the Secretary of State's speech in New York next week, followed by his meeting with Shevardnadze, would initiate a series of critical events in our gameplan for Geneva. This would be followed by the President's very important meeting with FM Shevardnadze on Friday.³ We believe that the Foreign Minister will bring a fairly elaborate and concrete arms control proposal, to be revealed either during his UN speech or presented here on Friday. General Secretary Gorbachev will be in France from October 2–5. We

² Presumably a reference to the meeting on September 13. See Document 86.

³ September 27. See Documents 105 and 106.

can expect a flurry of media attention but we doubt that any concrete results will come from his meetings with Mitterand. (S)

We believe the tide of public opinion will be shifting to our favor given the substantive thrust of our proposals. While most of the media attention to date has been on arms control issues, these events will enable us to demonstrate that our agenda includes efforts to engage the Soviets on the other sources of tension between us—human rights, Afghanistan and their expansionist policies. We will make it clear that our themes for the November meeting—Realism, Restraint, Reciprocity—offer real hope for substantive progress. (C)

Mr. McFarlane indicated he would now turn to the Secretary of State who will provide us an overview of the three issue areas that are the focus of today's meeting—human rights, regional concerns, and bilateral issues. (U)

The Secretary remarked that he was not ready to fully discuss the three issue areas that were at the heart of today's meeting, but was better prepared to carry the discussion to the issues and objectives we have for the Shevardnadze and Gorbachev meetings. (C)

The Secretary pointed out that we had not achieved substantial progress on any of our bilateral issues: most remained on dead-center. The most fruitful discussions had taken place on the North Pacific Air Safety Agreement, but we still have not reached any operational understandings with the Soviets on improved procedures. A cultural agreement, providing for a resumption of our formal exchange program with the USSR, shows some promise of being ready for signature prior to November. The proposal to open up new consulates in New York and Kiev respectively, is proceeding, but we remain concerned with the increase of Soviet personnel this would place in New York. A boundary dispute in the Bering Sea is also under intense discussion. (S)

Under the regional concerns, there are four principal areas we will want to address. *The Secretary* noted that we have had extensive discussions with the Soviets on Afghan, Asian and African problems, and expect to discuss Central America prior to the President's meeting with Gorbachev. While no substantial progress has been achieved, we are interested in institutionalizing the concept of these meetings on regional concerns. This will help promote the idea that we and the Soviets are seriously talking about problems around the world. (S)

The Secretary stated that there was a general feeling that the area that might best lend itself to substantive progress is Afghanistan. The Indians, in particular, have made this point to us. He pointed out that in the President's meeting with the General Secretary, he would want on the one hand to stress our readiness to seek a resolution of the Afghan situation. At the same time, the President would want to demonstrate the depth of our concern with the continuing Soviet occupation

of that country. *The Secretary* stated that it was important thereby to demonstrate to Gorbachev that he (the President) had steel in his backbone. (S)

Secretary Shultz stated that human rights were certain to be the thorniest issue on the agenda. The Soviets resent the perceived intrusion into what they regard as internal matters and have roiled at our linkage with their behavior in this area to bilateral trade. We have traditionally made it clear that there is a direct relationship between Soviet compliance with agreements they have signed with regard to human rights and the extent to which we are willing to increase non-strategic trade. (S)

The President noted that Bob Michel had sent over a pertinent excerpt from Forrest Pogue's biography of General George Marshall.⁴ In a discussion with Marshall near the end of World War II, General Deane made an interesting comment on the traditional Soviet way of dealing with foreigners. *The President* quoted Pogue:

"In a careful analysis of the situation Deane explained that part of the trouble arose from Russian suspicions of foreigners. They simply cannot understand giving without taking, and as a result even our giving is viewed with suspicion. Gratitude cannot be banked in the Soviet Union. Each transaction is complete in itself without regard to past favors. The party of the second part is either a shrewd trader to be admired or a sucker to be despised. He made it clear that the picture was not all bad—the individual Russians were likeable, and he thought that they would be friendly if they dared." (S)

Secretary Shultz noted that we must be careful in the language we use in our public presentations, i.e., we need to avoid using the phrase that we are "flexible". To the Soviets, this would connote a weak stance on our part. It would be much better to use the phrase, "We are prepared for a serious give-and-take". (S)

The President added that he agreed with that and drew attention to the alleged Soviet historical fear of invasions and suspicions of foreigners. *The President* added that this paranoia reaches extreme proportions in some cases. For example, during World War II the Eighth Air Force suffered extensive casualties flying bombing runs over German troop positions and, particularly, when they had a return over the same routes. This was because the Soviets denied them permission to land in Soviet-controlled areas. (C)

Secretary Shultz pointed out that the most useful instruments we had to break down that suspicion were the exchanges and exhibits we were able to send to the Soviet Union. Turning to Ambassador Matlock,

⁴ Forrest C. Pogue wrote a four-volume biography of General George C. Marshall.

the Secretary asked how he evaluated the utility of these exhibits. *The Ambassador* agreed that these exchanges had considerable value and cited the example of just one of our exhibits that drew 250,000 visitors from one single city. He added that these exhibits were staffed with Russian-speaking American guides, thus providing Soviet citizens with perhaps their most informative look at the American way of life. (C)

The President cited another example of the Soviet tendency not to seek a compromise. A defector recounted the story of when his father, a high-ranking general, was driving along a narrow mountain road and encountered another car. While there was room for the general to move over further, he directed his driver to stand fast. In the general's mind, any concession to move from his position would have been degrading. (C)

Mr. McFarlane noted that Director Casey would now present an intelligence perspective on Soviet objectives for the Shevardnadze and Gorbachev meetings. (C)

Mr. Casey stated that it is difficult to say with confidence precisely what the Soviets seek to achieve. We are fairly certain that their principal concern at the present time is our SDI program. A second major concern to the Soviets will be alleviating drains on their sluggish economy. Overall, there are three primary Soviet objectives: 1) limit our strategic defense program, particularly preventing any testing or deployment of weapons with real potential; 2) create the public impression that progress in the arms control area is directly dependent upon American willingness to cooperate; and 3) reduce tensions between the superpowers. *Mr. Casey* hastened to add that the rationale for doing so was not because of a desire to improve relations per se, but to increase trade between the USA and the USSR, which they realize depends on better ties. (S)

Mr. Casey pointed out that the Soviets will try to prevent SDI, through technical means, but if they are unsuccessful, they will seek to halt our program politically by influencing American and European public opinion. Thus, we understand that Shevardnadze will be bringing a major arms control proposal with him. We believe that he will introduce the proposal during his address at the United Nations, but he could make it public as early as this Sunday, or to increase the attention to his Washington visit, present it to the President during their meeting next Friday. (S)

The intelligence community sees little chance for progress in the arms control area and speculates that the Soviet proposal will provide little in the way of substance. It is important to the Kremlin to convey a picture of reasonableness at this time. On trade, *Mr. Casey* stated that the Soviets would not be coming "hat-in-hand" but would be seeking to promote trade by stressing the mutual advantages such an increase

might bring. *The Director* emphasized that the Soviets strongly wish to avoid any discussions of human rights. However, we have some indications, principally from Edgar Bronfman's discussions in Moscow,⁵ that they may create a publicity windfall by permitting the emigration of a few well-known Jewish activists. Finally, the Soviets will not stress bilateral issues during these meetings. (S)

Mr. McFarlane then asked the Secretary of Defense to provide a brief defense perspective on the upcoming meetings and the three issue areas under discussion. (C)

Secretary Weinberger stressed the importance of our SDI program in Soviet thinking. They will be looking for ways in which they can secure an advantage. The consular agreement currently under discussion presents serious concerns to us. *The Secretary* claimed that the Soviets send over only "fully-equipped spies," reporting directly to either the KGB or the GRU. (S)

The Secretary continued that both Shevardnadze and Gorbachev will be seeking to blame us for contributing to the creation of a charged atmosphere prior to these meetings. They will allege that this was the rationale behind our raising the "Spy Dust" issue, when this was in fact a blatant Soviet violation of standard diplomatic custom.⁶ We believe that attention should also be addressed to the Soviet failure to resolve satisfactorily all of the problems revolving around our military liaison missions (MLMs) in the Berlin area. *Secretary Weinberger* pointed out that the latest incident was not serious, but could have been.⁷ *The Secretary* concluded that he agreed with Mr. Casey that they will be seeking oil and gas equipment from us, and stated that it was imperative that we not allow them to use our technology to their own advantage. Finally, *the Secretary* noted that we should be prepared to counter strongly any allegations they will accuse us of in the human rights area, by stressing the nature of our free society and Soviet non-compliance with the Helsinki Agreement. (S)

Secretary Weinberger recommended that the President should be firm on the Afghanistan issue. The Soviets should understand that this is a matter all Americans feel strongly about. The Soviets need to withdraw from Afghanistan and we should be prepared to assist them

⁵ In telegram 12917 from Moscow, September 16, the Embassy reported: "World Jewish Council (WJC) and Seagrams Director Edgar Bronfman visited Moscow September 8–11," noting that while his delegation was not received by Gorbachev, "Bronfman reportedly considers visit a 'qualified success.' The Zagladin meeting was the visible high point." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850656–0890) For a summary of the September 9 meeting with Zagladin, see *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLI, Global Issues II; Document 78.

⁶ See Document 78.

⁷ See footnote 2, Document 83.

in doing so. In Kampuchea, Moscow should be using its influence on Hanoi to get the Vietnamese to withdraw. And in Central America, we should tell the Soviets to stop interfering in the region. (S)

The President returned to the issue of how best to handle human rights. In studying our successes and failures in the past, he noted that quiet diplomacy had produced substantive results. However, when the glare of publicity was brought on these negotiations, the Soviets quickly hardened their position. *The President* thought that we might speak privately to the Soviets and indicate that we were prepared to cooperate on this issue. In particular, we would not publicize their concessions if they complied fully with the Helsinki Agreement. (S)

Mr. McFarlane stated that he found himself in basic agreement with the President but wished for the sake of discussion to assume a devil's advocate position. If Gorbachev wished he might play this private dialogue back to American public opinion to create the impression that we were not sincerely interested in pressing this issue. Still, the thought had considerable merit. Perhaps the best tactic would be to approach the Soviets at the ministerial level. *The President* agreed and cited the success of one quiet arrangement, whereby we had rescinded the grain embargo with the result that there were some happy people now living in the West. That one, he explained, was worked quietly through Ambassador Dobrynin.⁸ (S)

Vice President Bush agreed that human rights would be one of the most divisive issues on the agenda. In his meeting with Georgy Arbatov, it was clear that the Soviets will either seek to avoid discussion or launch a concerted counterattack on us.⁹ *The Vice President* felt, however, that many of these problems could be resolved along the lines the President suggested; that is, through quiet agreements by high-level diplomats working privately. (S)

Secretary Shultz indicated that the CIA had produced a very useful paper suggesting that the Soviets may have a serious interest in reaching an arms control agreement.¹⁰ Economic conditions, their situation in Afghanistan, and Gorbachev's focus on his domestic agenda, could impel them to seek resolution of some of their international difficulties. We need to treat this possibility seriously and decide how best we can take advantage of potential opportunities. It is important, *the Secretary* stated, for us to strive to achieve our objectives. If we earnestly do so, it is very possible we can bring them to realization. *The Secretary* pointed

⁸ Reagan lifted the grain embargo in April 1981. See *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Documents 44 and 46.

⁹ See Document 89.

¹⁰ See Document 80.

out that we simply can't just continue claiming that all the Soviets have in mind is creating a propaganda screen. (S)

Mr. Casey agreed but stressed that the Soviets will still focus on stopping our SDI program. *Secretary Weinberger* concurred and added that they will seek to preserve their lead in areas where they are ahead. *The President* added that the Soviets traditionally only make agreements where they see clear advantages. *The President* agreed with the Secretary of State that the most acute problem facing the Soviets at this time is the state of their economy. The question is how far Gorbachev will be prepared to go because of this. We must be prepared to seize any opening presented to us. In this regard, Richard Nixon's recent statement was entirely à propos. The former President pointed out, "We want peace. They need peace."¹¹ Thus, the Soviets will have some motivation to reach agreements. (S)

Secretary Weinberger concurred that the Soviets will perceive a need for reducing their arms burden but suggested that only at a later date will they be persuaded to move in this direction. *The President* agreed and pointed out that SDI may very well be our most important leverage. *The President* stressed that he was prepared, once any of our SDI programs proved out, to then announce to the world that integrating these weapons in our respective arsenals would put international relations on a more stable footing. In fact, this could even lead to a complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We must be prepared to tell the world that we were ready to consult and negotiate on integrating these weapons into a new defense philosophy, and to state openly that we were ready to internationalize these systems. (S)

Mr. McFarlane stated that this concluded the NSC meeting and indicated that more sessions will be held the following week as we finalize our preparations for Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit. (C)

The meeting adjourned at 12:07 p.m. (U)

¹¹ Presumably a reference to a September 1 article by Nixon, "Reagan and Gorbachev: Superpower Summitry," in *Foreign Affairs*.

95. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 21, 1985

SUBJECT

Your September 27 Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

This memorandum provides some thoughts on how we can best exploit your meeting with Shevardnadze, along with my separate sessions September 25 and 27, with a view toward your Geneva meeting.

The Soviet Approach

The Soviet game plan is becoming increasingly clear. They are seeking to create the impression that they have left no stone unturned to achieve an arms control breakthrough in Geneva. Dobrynin confirmed to me September 16 that Shevardnadze will present *concrete proposals to you next week on the nuclear and space talks*.² Our guess is that they will be an elaboration of Gorbachev's recent expressions of willingness to accept deep cuts in exchange for constraints on strategic defense beyond the "fundamental research" stage. Shevardnadze will presumably also be pushing *previous Soviet initiatives* (Gorbachev's July nuclear testing moratorium, the non-militarization of space proposal Shevardnadze will present to the UNGA, perhaps a new twist on the Soviet chemical weapon-free zone in Central Europe concept), while seeking to capitalize on our ASAT test.

Our Objectives

Our task will be *three-fold*. We will want to:

- Probe to determine the *seriousness of any new Soviet proposals*;
- Give Shevardnadze as much information as possible and appropriate to set the stage for a *productive November meeting and progress at the Geneva talks*;
- Lay the basis for *further steps in our regional dialogue and on the range of bilateral and human rights issues*.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Reagan-Shevardnadze Meeting 09/27/85 (5 of 7). Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum is stamped "Eyes Only" in the top right-hand margin. Another copy of the memorandum indicates it was drafted by Parris on September 16 and cleared by Ridgway, Hawes, and Stafford. Ridgway sent this copy of the memorandum to Shultz under a September 17 action memorandum, recommending that he sign the memorandum to the President. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 Soviet Union September)

² See Document 90.

Your Meeting, Friday, September 27

Given the constraints on your time, you might most usefully concentrate on laying the groundwork for an in-depth exchange with Gorbachev on the most pressing issues in the relationship. I recommend that you:

—Respond to Shevardnadze's proposals with a strong statement of your own commitment to meaningful arms control, explaining to Shevardnadze your views on the *need for deep reductions and the potential promise of SDI research*. (As Shevardnadze will not be accompanied by his own arms control specialists, he will not expect a detailed reply to his message, which I hope he will preview with me in New York).

—Outline your plans for a wide-ranging discussion of perceived *intentions and motivations*. (You might suggest to Shevardnadze that you and Gorbachev be prepared to describe your respective domestic agendas as a means of *getting beyond stereotypes* to the roots of policy).

—Express your concerns about *Soviet regional policies*, focusing on *Afghanistan*, where we have recently seen some hints of a greater Soviet willingness to consider a negotiated withdrawal.

—Reemphasize to Shevardnadze the importance you attach to movement on *human rights and emigration* (perhaps in your tete-a-tete at the conclusion of the meeting).

As with Gromyko last year, *lunch* could be given over to an elaboration of views on regional issues,³ providing an opportunity to rehearse points you will later make to Gorbachev on the impact of Soviet international behavior on our perceptions. You could also use the occasion to get some sense from Shevardnadze of current political dynamics in the Kremlin.

My Meetings: Wednesday and Friday afternoon, September 25 and 27

Dobrynin has indicated I may get a first look at Shevardnadze's arms control message during our initial session Wednesday. While I will press him to be as specific as possible, we may not have a complete picture of what Moscow has to offer until your meeting. I will also put some ideas of our own on the table.

—On *the Geneva talks*, I will try to engage Shevardnadze in a comprehensive discussion of the offense/defense relationship. This will serve the purpose of smoking out details of his private message and giving him some direct exposure to our thinking on the subject.

—On *nuclear testing*, I will stress the importance we attach to verification, reaffirming our willingness to ratify the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties if the Soviets will cooperate in satisfying our concerns. I will propose that special representatives from both sides explore this possibility this fall.

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 287.

—On *ASAT*, we are not in a position to take the initiative, but I will need to address any proposals Shevardnadze may make.

—On *chemical weapons*, we are working interagency a proposal that we exchange lists of CW precursors as a first step toward collaboration in preventing the spread of CW possession and use; and

—On *nuclear nonproliferation*, I will confirm our willingness to make a joint statement on cooperation at your Geneva meeting.

As arms control issues will dominate the New York session, *regional and bilateral matters* will probably slip to my Friday afternoon meeting. I will follow up in greater detail on regional points you make and formally propose that we *regularize the expert-level talks* we have had over the past year on the Middle East, Afghanistan, Southern Africa and Asia. (We are proposing Central American/Caribbean talks be held in October.)

I will raise *human rights and emigration* initially in a brief *tete-a-tete* on the margins of our New York meeting, broaching an idea discussed with Mac Baldrige: that concrete steps by the Soviets to meet our concerns might be met with some liberalization of our non-strategic trade controls. I will return to human rights and emigration in my final session, reinforcing the points you would make in your meeting, and presenting an up-dated list of cases in which we are interested.

There is a good chance that at some point in our meetings Shevardnadze will raise two additional issues: whether there should be a formal *communique* in Geneva and whether there should be *follow-up meetings between you and Gorbachev*. I will inform him that we remain open as to how the meeting should be documented, and that our final decision will depend on what substantive results can be expected. On follow-up meetings, I will indicate that we are willing in principle, but feel that future meetings should be in capitals. I will reiterate our view that it is the Soviets' turn to come to Washington.

Media Arrangements

As with Gromyko last year, I will plan to make two statements in connection with Shevardnadze's visit: the first, a short, informal comment following our New York meeting; the second, a longer review of where we stand following your meeting and lunch. We plan back-grounders by Roz Ridgway, Jack Matlock and Art Hartman after both my exchanges with Shevardnadze to shape public perceptions of the visit and of its implications for the Geneva meeting. You might want to consider a radio address focusing on US–Soviet relations, perhaps the following Saturday.⁴ We will also plan to do the usual talk shows after the meetings are over.

⁴ On September 28, Reagan gave a radio address on his meeting with Shevardnadze. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book II, pp. 1149–1150.

96. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, September 23, 1985

SUBJECT

Preparations for Geneva Meeting: Proposals to Broaden the Agenda

Following your approval of my earlier memorandum, commenting on Jim Billington's suggestions,² I convened two very close-hold groups over the weekend to work out some ideas regarding the sort of proposals we could make to give greater emphasis to the regional issue and bilateral elements of our agenda, and thus diminish the almost exclusive focus on SDI which has developed as a result of Soviet tactics.

Attached are concept papers covering these two areas. The first, on regional issues, was worked by Steve Sestanovich, Mark Palmer, Peter Rodman and Eric Edelman from State. The one on contacts and communication was worked by Bud Korengold, Mark Palmer and Max Robinson from State. I believe that both provide sound and imaginative approaches.

If these approaches are approved in principle, I would see the sequence of events as follows:

1) Lay *groundwork* for making the proposals in the meetings with Shevardnadze this week, but not make actual concrete proposals.

2) Plan to make the regional proposal by diplomatic channels next week or shortly thereafter, then follow it with a speech by the President on the subject.

3) Plan to make the proposals on contacts and communication over the next couple of weeks, and have a presidential speech on the subject a week or so before his UNGA address.

4) Wrap it all together, along with a public formulation of our arms control proposals, in the UNGA address.

5) Have the President give, on the eve of his departure for Geneva, a TV address to the American people (which might also be carried on

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron September 1985 (4/6). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for System. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Poindexter and Fortier. McFarlane wrote in the top right-hand margin: "Terrific Jack. But you'd better bring Gates or Fritz plus Will Taft into this Group to assure Cap & Casey's support. Bud." On September 24, Matlock sent a memorandum to Taft discussing the five approaches. (Ibid.) No memorandum to Gates or the CIA was found.

² See Document 85.

EURONET), in which he would set forth his vision of what the future of U.S.-Soviet relations could be like if Gorbachev is willing to engage us in a constructive way.³

This, I realize, is a very ambitious scenario, and will require a lot of fast work. Still, I believe it is doable if we get a rapid go-ahead to proceed with the preparations. Therefore, I would recommend that you authorize us to proceed to make plans along these lines, which require the following:

1) Drafting appropriate talking points for the meetings this week (some suggestions are attached);⁴

2) Setting times (on a close-hold basis) for the public appearances required;

3) Formulating the concrete proposals and drafting the speeches.

Palmer has forwarded copies of the papers at Tabs I and II to Secretary Shultz for his consideration as well.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you approve proceeding with a “regional conflict initiative” as outlined in Tab I.⁵

2. That you approve proceeding with the initiatives in the bilateral contacts area, as outlined in Tab II.

Tab I

Paper Prepared by an Interagency Working Group⁶

Washington, undated

Regional Conflicts and US-Soviet Relations: Concept Paper

In preparation for the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, we have sought to emphasize the importance of a broader agenda than arms control alone, without seeming to make our objections to Soviet conduct a pretext for avoiding serious negotiation of strategic issues. This goal

³ For the November 14 address, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book II, pp. 1388–1391.

⁴ Attached to Tab II below but not printed are the undated talking points and an undated paper entitled “Possible Initiatives.”

⁵ McFarlane approved both recommendations.

⁶ Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted by Sestanovich, Palmer, Rodman, and Edelman.

goes beyond preparations for the meeting in Geneva: we want the Soviets and the public to see that a fundamental improvement in relations is possible only if the problems created by Soviet Third World activities in the late 70's are dealt with.

Basic Concept

A major Presidential initiative to advance these goals would have the following form:

—First, a proposal for cease-fires and negotiations among the warring parties in the key countries where Soviet (or proxy) involvement has created the greatest Western concern—Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, the Horn, Southern Africa.

—Second, with the opening of such negotiations, a separate set of Soviet-American talks to eliminate each side's military presence in the country and its role in the flow of arms into the area of conflict.

These two levels of talks, if successful, would lay the basis for a third element of a long-term solution—the reintegration (with American assistance of some sort) of these countries into the international economy.

Advantages

The critical test for any such proposal is whether it can be seriously presented and defended in public: does it clarify US policies without creating any unmanageable opportunities for the Soviet side? From this point of view, the above formula has several important advantages.

1) Unlike global approaches that are sometimes put forward (e.g. the Basic Principles of 1972 or other "codes of conduct"),⁷ this plan deals with concrete cases that are known to have worsened US-Soviet relations.

2) It can be presented as a realistic approach that tries to get at the underlying conflicts that have drawn the superpowers in, rather than simply trying to negotiate US-Soviet agreement from the top down.

3) By requiring negotiations among warring parties, it legitimizes the freedom fighters that oppose pro-Soviet regimes. Here the plan follows the pattern of the President's March proposal on Nicaragua. It reflects the interest he has taken in such liberation struggles.

4) The proposal also follows directly from the President's recent statements about Soviet "intentions." The great uncertainty created by more expansive Soviet conduct during the 70's was precisely that it was

⁷ The Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations was issued on May 29, 1972, during the Nixon-Brezhnev summit. For the text, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 633–635. See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 233.

based not on traditional inter-state ties but on creating new, repressive Communist regimes.

5) The timing of the plan would allow the President to say that it builds logically on the US-Soviet regional discussions that grew out of his 1984 UNGA proposal. By improving understanding of each side's position, these have cleared the ground for a serious initiative.

6) Finally, the main measure of seriousness will be what the proposal offers the Soviets. In fact, it seems to offer them a version of something they have long wanted—discussion of the US global presence. This version, however, protects us by making talks contingent on (and separate from) political negotiations that their clients almost certainly cannot accept. It also limits the talks to specific areas. These features make it hard for the Soviets to accept without detracting from the plan's credibility.

Possible Complications and Objections

We would have to deal with some obvious difficulties in the initiative.

1) Some would find its scope one-sided—why not add the Middle East, or the Philippines? Is South Africa itself included? The first point would be answered on grounds of realism: our focus is on problems that have most damaged relations by raising the most extreme fears about Soviet purposes. The Philippines is not yet such a problem. The Middle East also has a different place in US-Soviet relations; its conflicts do not fit the pattern of this initiative. Including South Africa might increase the appearance of comprehensiveness; the SAG would certainly resent it, but calling for dialogue wouldn't alter our basic orientation there.

2) The appearance of condominium is a possible, but superficial, objection. We ought to repeat ceaselessly that the plan's goal is to keep the superpowers *out*. Keeping their discussions separate from the internal talks would strengthen this point.

3) Some affected allies or friends would worry that their interests might be slighted. Pakistan may be the most serious case of this, but couching the proposal in broad terms would probably make it much less unsettling than an initiative limited simply to Afghanistan. In any event, full pre-briefing on the plan would be necessary.

4) Certain on-going mediation processes might also seem to be undercut by the plan. (For example, Angola-Namibia.) We should emphasize that the strength of the approach lies in its *broad* applicability; implementation may vary, case by case. At the same time, we would note that existing processes have not brought peace, and this initiative can add to the incentives that other approaches have tried to create.

5) A call for cease-fires and negotiation may appear somewhat empty in the absence of any mediation mechanism. We might consider spelling out the kinds of structures that could play this role. The existence of Contadora in Central America has been invaluable; comparable (not necessarily parallel) devices should be considered in other regions, as well as the involvement of recognized impartial outsiders. (In some cases, our European allies might play a role.)

6) Finally, resources should not be over-promised. Proposals dressed up as a “Marshall Plan” for this or that area arouse suspicions that they are empty grand designs, not likely to be funded. The plan’s emphasis must be on reintegration into the world economy, with resources from diverse sources, not on a US aid program. (We can note, of course, our commitment to the Kissinger Commission’s aid levels,⁸ Ethiopian relief, etc.)

Implementation

The sequence for presenting this approach to the Soviets, and publicly, should be as follows:

1) A discussion of the problem with Shevardnadze. The President’s presentation would be firm: we must find a way to restrain the use of force, particularly by the superpowers, in regional disputes. Otherwise, the U.S. will be constrained to act more forcefully itself.

2) A formal proposal by diplomatic channels a day or two before a Presidential speech on the topic.

3) A major Presidential address on the overall problem with an announcement of our proposal.

4) Further mention of the proposal, as part of our four-part agenda, in the President’s UNGA address.

5) On the eve of the President’s departure for Geneva, a televised Presidential message to the American people which would set forth his “vision” of what the meeting could accomplish if Gorbachev is willing to build a more constructive relationship.

Soviet Responses

Rejection is most likely, but the Soviets might also counter with a re-worked proposal, either redefining the areas (e.g., adding the Middle East), turning it inside-out (superpower talks first, local ceasefires later), or proposing one case at a time. They would be most tempted to accept in Cambodia, given their client’s military strength and our own difficulties with a Khmer Rouge role.

⁸ For more on the Kissinger Commission, see *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 139, footnote 6.

Tab II**Paper Prepared by an Interagency Working Group⁹**

Washington, undated

*NEW INITIATIVES: CONTACTS, COMMUNICATION
AND COOPERATION*

As part of a program to emphasize the four areas of our agenda with the Soviets, we should develop a forward-looking set of proposals for a massive expansion of contacts and exchanges with the USSR. This will focus attention on one of the greatest Soviet weaknesses: its closed society.

The approach is best summed up in the speech the President gave last year to the Conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges, namely, that “nothing is more worthy of our attention than finding ways to reach out and establish better communication with the people and the government of the Soviet Union.”¹⁰

Focus will be on three areas:

- Working cooperatively *now* on today’s toughest human problems.
- Opening up our societies to each other.
- Preparing our next generations for better understanding and a more just and secure peace.

Specifically, the new initiatives would range over a wide spectrum, from joint consultations on stemming terrorism and drug abuse to vastly increased educational, television and youth exchanges, bolstered tourism and sister-city programs, an invitation to a Soviet cosmonaut to ride our space shuttle and even an offer of National Football League highlights to Soviet television.

To maximize the chance that the Soviet Union will give serious consideration to our ideas, we must present them officially to the Soviets before we announce them publicly. The President could lay the groundwork in his meeting with Shevardnadze, and we could follow up with specific proposals in diplomatic channels over the next couple of weeks. Then, about mid-October the President could deliver a speech on the subject.

⁹ Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Korengold, Palmer, and Robinson.

¹⁰ See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book I, pp. 916–918.

Under Tab *A* is a set of suggested talking points for the President to prepare the ground with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. He would reaffirm his hope that agreement will be reached in Geneva on matters already on the table but stress his desire that he and Gorbachev can seize this historic chance to chart an even more ambitious cooperative program for the sake of future generations.

Under Tab *B* you will find an outline list of possible initiatives. If approved in principle, we will proceed to staff them in detail with an eye to making formal proposals over the next two weeks.¹¹

¹¹ Tabs A and B are attached but not printed.

97. Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group¹

Washington, September 24, 1985

CONTINGENCY PLANNING AGAINST POTENTIAL SOVIET ARMS CONTROL POSITIONS (U)

INTRODUCTION. The attached paper was produced by the Arms Control Support Group to respond to the Presidential tasking at *Tab I*.² Per instructions, the special access compartment OWL was created to handle this and related papers. This paper will be handled only within OWL channels. (C)

QUESTION 1 (U)

How would we evaluate on its merits, and in light of national security requirements we face today and will likely face in the future, a Soviet contingency proposal to basically accept the U.S. START and INF positions in return for limiting SDI to research only? (TS/O)

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Eggplant II, September–December 1985 NP. Top Secret; Owl; NoFORN. Handle via Owl Channels. McFarlane sent the paper to Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, Vessey, and Adelman under a September 27 covering memorandum, indicating that Reagan would like to receive observations on the paper. Weinberger forwarded the JCS response on September 30; see Document 104. Casey provided a response on October 2. (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Summit—Geneva [3 of 3]) Nitze provided a response on October 3. (Ibid.) See also Document 91.

² See Document 92.

a. *What systems, numbers and counting rules (considering both strategic and INF forces) would the Soviets likely propose under such a contingency? (TS/O)*

The DCI's representative's guess as to the details of Soviet proposals that the Soviets could claim accept the U.S. START and INF positions is at *Tab A*.³ One of these offers would be laid out over the next two months. Even the offer on the table in mid-November will have some give in it. (S/NF)

In addition, an even simpler Soviet proposal which potentially could be stressing to the U.S. would include the following elements:

- offer whatever reductions the U.S. can accept in strategic offensive forces;

- propose a ban on SLCMs, ASAT, nuclear testing, and a freeze on INF deployments; and

- propose a joint statement by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to reaffirm the ABM Treaty.

This approach could have more political value to the Soviets than the more detailed concepts provided at *Tab A*. Under either approach, the Soviets will continue to press for close linkage between progress in START and INF and restrictions designed to constrain SDI. (S/NF)

The content and timing of how the Soviets will lay out their proposal for future strategic force reductions will likely be evolutionary. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will lay out the basic direction and goals of the Soviet approach. He probably will avoid giving a specific numerical limit for weapons until counting rules for weapon loadings on ballistic missiles and bomber aircraft are discussed. The Soviet Foreign Minister also will be seeking to gauge U.S. reactions, will, sincerity and purpose, so that he can report comprehensively to the politburo. The following week, the Soviet NST delegation will also address Soviet goals and lay out more details of the Soviet proposal. In November, General Secretary Gorbachev may well seek some kind of an understanding with the President, such as a joint statement to guide the negotiators in the future, perhaps similar in concept to the

³ *Tab A*, an undated paper entitled "One Guess at Soviet Strategic Arms Control Package, that Encompasses US Proposals," is attached but not printed. The paper begins: "If the Soviets were to address the US proposals (e.g., which would limit each side to 5,000 ballistic missile warheads), they would propose counting rules that would credit their MIRVed ballistic missiles with fewer warheads than they are capable of carrying. They would also demand a very low overall weapon limit and count all US cruise missiles and short-range air-to surface missiles to ensure that US bomber weapons were severely limited. They would continue to insist on a package that links closely reductions in offensive forces to constraints on space-based defenses."

Vladivostok framework.⁴ What the Foreign Minister and General Secretary describe to the U.S. will be an arrangement that favors Soviet positions and that they almost surely would be prepared to accept. However, it will not be their final offer. (S/NF)

The possibility also exists that General Secretary Gorbachev might offer in November a comprehensive arms control package with strategic nuclear forces as its center piece. *Tab B* outlines what the DCI's representative thinks such a package might include. (S/NF)⁵

In any case, the Soviets will continue to make proposals (in public and, on occasion, in private), as well as attempt more broadly to influence the U.S. and European publics and governments, in an effort to appear reasonable. Soviet initiatives likely will incorporate efforts to downplay or hide the anti-U.S. thrust and benefits to the U.S.S.R. In addition to its intended impact on U.S. policy and programmatic decisions, this will set the stage for blaming the U.S. if progress is not achieved and if the Soviets decide to walk out of the negotiations again. (S/NF)

b. *Assuming such a Soviet proposal, can we envision achieving an offensive balance at lower overall force levels, with a vigorous SDI research program protected, as being in the long-term U.S. national interest? Would we be assured of being able to maintain sufficient force under such conditions to maintain deterrence and implement our national military strategy, if required, with reasonable assurance of success?* (TS/O)

This question has two important parts: (1) would offensive forces alone (even with Soviet acceptance of meaningful, verifiable reductions, but forswearing SDI deployment) be adequate to meet our long-term national security needs; and (2) if not, could we work from a Soviet proposal as suggested in *Tab A* without seriously endangering our future defensive force options? (TS/O)

Can we rely on offensive forces alone over the long term? Our ability to rely exclusively on offensive nuclear arms to meet our long-term deterrent requirements *vis-a-vis* the Soviet Union has been eroded over the last decade. The Soviet offensive build-up continues apace. The U.S. strategic modernization program, if funded and executed, would provide sufficient forces to implement our national strategy for at least the near-term against known and currently forecast Soviet offensive forces. However, public and Congressional attitudes call into ques-

⁴ In November 1974, President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev met in Vladivostok, agreeing to the basic framework for the SALT II agreement; see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Documents 83–95.

⁵ *Tab B*, an undated paper entitled "What if the Soviets Table a Comprehensive Arms Control Package?" is attached but not printed.

tion our ability to maintain necessary full funding of this critical program. (S)

What is more, Soviet defensive activities (which are largely unmatched by the U.S.) are beginning to call into question the capability of those offensive forces we *do* have to perform their assigned functions—and, thereby, to ensure deterrence. The U.S.S.R.'s aggressive pursuit of active (e.g., air and ballistic missile defenses—involving both traditional and more exotic technologies) and passive (e.g., leadership protection, civil defense and means of enhancing the resiliency of their offensive forces, such as hardening, mobility and deception) measures, in the aggregate, threatens significantly to degrade our deterrent's credibility over time. (S)

In short, there is reason for considerable concern that we will be unable to meet the full range of our national security requirements were we to continue to rely on offensive forces exclusively. Even if we were to succeed in reaching agreement with the U.S.S.R. on sharp, meaningful and verifiable offensive arms reductions, in light of the numbers and capabilities of Soviet offensive forces likely to remain, and in view of existing and projected Soviet defensive activities, it appears that our long-term security needs will require us to preserve the option to deploy defenses which meet our criteria for such defenses. (TS)

The aforementioned reality argues strongly for us to reject Soviet efforts aimed at obtaining an explicit US commitment to forego permanently strategic defensive deployment options. The President has made quite clear his determination to resist such ploys. (TS)

Impact of Offense/Defense Trades on Future U.S. Defensive Options. What is perhaps more worrisome is the danger that we will be asked instead to accept a Soviet proposal which merely *implies* a willingness to give up future applications of the SDI. Such a proposal could take several forms. Examples are described at *Tab A*. Another could be an additional commitment of limited-duration not to violate or not to exercise our option under the ABM Treaty to withdraw from it. As innocuous as such options may appear, and however much they may seem to be compatible with our stated policy of not violating the ABM Treaty, we must be under no illusion about the common danger they pose. They all create a political and programmatic climate which will inexorably prejudice our ability to exercise future US options for SDI deployments. Critics of SDI in the Congress will seize upon a new US-Soviet undertaking not to undo or otherwise depart from the ABM Treaty as an invitation to and pretext for eviscerating the SDI program. Similarly, the arguments of friends of the program will be undermined. If the Congress consequently were to act to curb the SDI program, this could be accomplished by funding cutbacks and/or legislative

restrictions which would quite likely preclude the realization of the feasibility assessment SDI was created to perform. (S)

In sum, we believe that a truly “vigorous SDI research program” cannot be adequately “protected” in an environment where offensive force reductions are made contingent on new U.S. commitments relating to defensive forces—commitments which seriously prejudice U.S. ability to sustain the SDI program and, as appropriate, to exercise future U.S. defensive options. (S)

JCS Military Assessment. Under a proposal such as those suggested at *Tab A*, the United States would not have sufficient strategic forces to execute current U.S. military strategy with reasonable assurance of success, while we judge that the Soviet Union would have the minimum required forces to achieve targeting objectives. The DCI’s representative is skeptical that the Soviet Union would, in fact, be able to achieve all of their objectives under such proposals. (TS)

—The proposals at *Tab A* would reduce weapon levels below those permitted by the current U.S. START proposal. It should be noted that there is some military risk in the U.S. START proposal. That risk would be present even considering full execution of the President’s strategic modernization program. The military risk has increased as the number of Peacekeeper missiles has been decreased from 200 to 50. Under the postulated Soviet proposals, modernization would be further curtailed in that the Trident D-5 missile and the small ICBM would be prohibited. Also, there would be problems with and inequities in LRINF warheads which would be contrary to the 1979 NATO guidance. (TS)

—A proposal at these low levels of strategic weapons would weaken the U.S. strategic deterrent far more than that of the U.S.S.R. The U.S. must be able to attack about twice the number of targets in the Warsaw Pact countries as the Soviets have to attack in the U.S. and NATO. At the low levels of strategic offensive weapons in the Soviet proposals at *Tab A*, the U.S. would be several thousand weapons short of its needs, while the JCS judge that the U.S.S.R. would possess approximately the number required and a minimum reserve. (TS)

—With regard to INF, the proposals would leave the U.S. with a four-to-one disadvantage in LRINF warheads in Europe and an eight-to-one disadvantage globally. A freeze in Europe could be seen as giving tacit compensation for UK and French systems. The absence of global limits would make the unequal European levels even more unbalanced and would disadvantage our Asian allies. A freeze at the November 1985 levels would probably result in a Dutch decision not to deploy, with the possibility of substantial political ramifications. (TS)

Conclusions about Question 1b. In short, a Soviet proposal along the lines suggested at *Tab A* would not provide a basis for an acceptable agreement that would be in the long-term U.S. national interest. Provi-

sions that would adversely affect our security include the following: (TS/O)

—*Constraints on SDI*. The Soviets will press for restraints on research now permitted by the ABM Treaty, a recommitment to the ABM Treaty, and specifically an explicit or implicit commitment not to withdraw from or abrogate the ABM Treaty in order to deploy an SDI system. Such restrictions would curtail important parts of the planned SDI research program as well as add further major obstacles to deployment, both of which would undercut support for sustaining the program. (S)

—*ASAT Ban*. This would leave the Soviets with a monopoly in fully tested ASAT systems and would also adversely affect the SDI program. (TS)

—*Offensive Reductions*. A Soviet proposal along the lines indicated at *Tab A* would not permit the U.S. to maintain sufficient forces to execute our current national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success. In addition, such a Soviet proposal makes no distinctions between missile warheads and more stabilizing bomber weapons, force drastic cuts in our own bomber force, and rule out modernization of the SLBM force with the Trident D–5 missile. Such a Soviet proposal would be designed to have less impact upon Soviet forces. The Soviets could continue to maintain a substantial force of large ICBMs. (S)

—*Verification*. Elements of the Soviet proposals at *Tab A* cannot be verified or perpetuate verification ambiguities of past agreements. Unverifiable elements include the SLCM and ASAT bans. Continuing problems include: ambiguity concerning “new types” of weapons, counting mobile systems; and, depending upon the nature of counting rules, weapons limits. Verification measures that the Soviets might propose will likely not resolve these problems. (C)

c. *What would be the scope and character of SDI research that we would want to protect and maintain under such a contingency? Would we need to renegotiate the ABM Treaty in order to maintain such a program of SDI research? If so, what modifications and when would be required?* (TS/O)

The foregoing dictates that the ability of the SDI program to reach and validate conclusions about the feasibility of providing an effective and robust strategic defense for the United States and its allies is among our highest national priorities. As such, we should conduct that research, testing and development necessary to provide the basis for sound and considered full-scale development and deployment decisions. (S)

The U.S. SDI program is presently designed to be compatible with traditional interpretations of the ABM Treaty’s limitations, recognizing that this commitment has cost and schedule implications for the pro-

gram. At present, it is believed that—having paid those costs—sufficient work can be conducted within these interpretations to permit reasonable feasibility judgments on full scale development and deployment to be made. However, several important caveats to this statement are in order.

(1) As the SDI program proceeds, technical difficulties may be encountered which invalidate this assessment.

(2) A more restrictive view of the ABM Treaty's limitations is held by some who believe that some of the work we now have in train, which we assert is legal, actually violates the Treaty. This view may prevail.

(3) Finally, the Soviets and/or the Congress may press for agreements to "tighten" the loopholes of the ABM Treaty and define grey areas which would severely complicate—if *not make impossible*—the SDI's mission. (S)

On the other hand, new questions have recently been raised about the validity of some of our traditional interpretations to the effect that they have been unduly restrictive and, in any event, of a wholly unilateral character. If a more lenient interpretation is adopted by the Administration, the OSD representative believes that it will almost surely permit us to sustain for quite some time to come our current declaratory policy of strictly adhering to the ABM Treaty while conducting the full range of research, testing and development work necessary to reach our feasibility assessment objectives. Some others believe that such an interpretation would not be sustainable and, therefore, could undercut support for the SDI program. (S)

Conclusions about Question 1c. In short, it is probably impossible, pending further clarification of the aforementioned caveats and conditions, to make an accurate assessment of the exact impact of the ABM Treaty on the SDI program. Similarly, we cannot at present identify exactly what and/or when changes to the Treaty might be necessary to allow the SDI to accomplish its mission objectives. What can be said is that based on our knowledge today, no changes to the ABM Treaty are necessary to allow the U.S. to reach a decision on whether to go beyond research into currently prohibited development provided that:

[(1) the "traditional approach" to interpreting the ABM Treaty (as reflected in the Administration's FY 1985 Report to Congress) is maintained;]⁶

(2) the ABM Treaty restrictions are not expanded; and

⁶ Brackets are in the original. On January 23, 1984, the President sent a message to Congress on Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements. See *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 159, footnote 11.

(3) additional restrictions on ASAT testing are not imposed. (TS)

QUESTION 2 (U)

If the answers to the questions associated with question 1 indicate some possibilities, how do we evaluate them relative to the current U.S. course of action? (TS/O)

Based on the answers to the questions associated with question 1, we need not address question 2 and its associated questions. However, questions 2a and 2b do suggest some useful observations. (U)

a. *If such a Soviet proposal were offered, what response should the U.S. make to channel any subsequent discussion into relatively more acceptable circumstances or conditions? What must the U.S. immediately exclude from discussion and subsequently avoid?* (TS/O)

The foregoing analysis dictates that any proposal the Soviets might make which entails either an explicit or implicit commitment on the part of the United States which prejudices the ability of the U.S. to pursue future strategic ballistic missile defense options should be eschewed. Our analysis indicates that we should avoid being drawn into discussion based on the Soviet proposal and endeavor to channel any discussion onto the proposals the U.S. currently has on the table. (S)

b. *What precautions would we need (e.g., types of limits, counting rules, verification measures and safeguards) to ensure that promised Soviet reductions would actually result in the types of real reductions that would be required to protect U.S. and Allied interests?* (TS/O)

In addition to meeting our other basic requirements for such an agreement, any additional strategic arms reduction agreement with the Soviet Union should: increase openness; incorporate the most rigorous and, if necessary, intrusive verification provisions so as to ensure prompt and effective detection of Soviet non-compliance activity; and prompt the Executive Branch (in cooperation with the Congress) to create safeguards to deter violations and provide for prompt U.S. reactions should they occur. (S)

The DCI's representative has provided the short paper at *Tab C* which suggests examples of additional verification measures and associated safeguards.⁷ (S)

As a general proposition, the lower the levels of strategic forces permitted, the greater the incentive for Soviet attempts to cheat and the more militarily significant any such cheating is likely to be. Consequently, it is particularly important that regimes entailing sharp reduc-

⁷ Tab C, a September 24 paper entitled "Precautions the US Should Consider," is attached but not printed.

tions like the US START proposal and the notional Soviet proposals at *Tab A* have as integral parts verification mechanisms going beyond National Technical Means (NTM) of verification as necessary. These mechanisms must be available to provide maximum confidence not only that the terms of the agreement are being observed with respect to dismantlements, but also that the forces remaining conform, over time, to the treaty limitations. (S)

At the same time, the best verification regime in the world will be worth little if it is not accompanied by a credible compliance policy. The likely or assured detection of Soviet violations is demonstrably inadequate to prevent such violations from occurring. In any future strategic arms control regime—as with existing treaties—the United States must be perceived as being willing to respond appropriately and meaningfully to Soviet non-compliance activities. (S)

QUESTION 3 (U)

If the answers to the questions associated with Question 1 lead to unacceptable conclusions, how could we best handle such an offer if presented by the Soviets? (TS/O)

a. *Given U.S. objectives, as well as the inherent flexibility built into our current, sound negotiating positions, are there steps that we could take to reduce our vulnerability to such a Soviet proposal? If so, how could such steps be implemented?* (TS/O)

We should seek to reduce our vulnerability to such Soviet proposals in a number of ways. (U)

—We should publicly and privately stress the key problems and pitfalls in the Soviet positions. In doing so, we should develop a handful of simple, catchy characterizations of these problems and of the virtues of our approach for public use. (U)

—We should develop for public release a study of the Soviet propaganda campaign and political offensive against SDI. This could appear before or after the Reagan/Gorbachev meeting depending upon tactical timing considerations. (C)

—We should consider having the President present at the UNGA, or using some other appropriate platform, a formulation of our position in a way that can capture attention. For example, one possible approach could be to propose a “concrete plan/calendar for offensive force reductions” identifying specific percentages of reduction in selective categories and time frames. A paper describing such an approach submitted by the ACDA representative is attached at *Tab D*.⁸ (S)

⁸ Tab D, an undated paper entitled “20-Year U.S.-USSR Strategic Plan for Arms Control,” is attached but not printed.

Among the most effective things that the United States can do to reduce our vulnerability to a Soviet proposal purporting to reject the value and desirability of strategic defenses would be a campaign aimed at more effectively publicizing the Soviet Union's all-encompassing pursuit of precisely such defenses. Particularly when combined with an authoritative critique of the incompatibility of some such Soviet activities with their arms control obligations, this line of attack can serve both to undercut their hypocritical propaganda effort and bolster the case for our own, prudent SDI program. (U)

A carefully orchestrated campaign of this kind could employ numerous tools: closed session briefings to the Senate and the House of Representatives, timed to coincide with the release of the new White Paper on Soviet Strategic Defense; briefings to the Allies in capitals (perhaps building upon the planned compliance tour); more aggressive public speaking in domestic and foreign forums along the lines of the speech made by Paul Nitze in Chautauqua and the presentation made by DASD Frank Gaffney to SIPRI;⁹ and a more dynamic media offensive both here and abroad. A continuing review should be conducted to determine if more classified information on this subject can be made available for public consumption. (C)

Another strategem we might usefully employ is to shift the public discussion of the November meeting's agenda away from the arms control focus central to Soviet propaganda efforts and onto grounds which are both more appropriate to such a meeting and more supportive of U.S. objectives. For example, we could take the tack that while arms control should take its appropriate place, to make the most fundamental progress on arms control, the heads of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. should focus on the root causes of retaining the arms: differences on basic bilateral and regional issues. Having done this, we might also look for some common problem, world-wide in scope, which the two leaders could use to build trust and cooperation through common action as allies. Some believe that issues like world hunger, regreening drought stricken Africa, research on cancer, etc. could be considered. However, selection of such a topic would require detailed study to ensure that the second or third order consequences of such a proposal can not be manipulated by the Soviets to be made contrary to fundamental U.S. interests. (S)

⁹ In his June 28 speech at the Chautauqua Conference on Soviet-American Relations, Nitze described in detail the Soviet program of research in anti-missile defense. (Hedrick Smith, "Nitze Details U.S. Charges Soviet Has Own 'Star Wars'" *New York Times*, July 12, 1985, p. A6) Gaffney's presentation to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has not been found.

b. *What should be the direct U.S. response to such a Soviet offer? And, in such a situation, what reinforcement can we give at the negotiating table or through public diplomacy in support of our current, sound positions? What alternative proposals (if any) should the U.S. be prepared to consider?* (TS/O)

It will be important in any U.S. response to a Soviet proposal to ensure that public, Allied and Congressional support is maintained for the key elements of Western deterrence: strategic modernization, support for conventional forces, protection of SDI, and preservation of the cohesion of our alliances.

The question addresses two elements: the immediate U.S. response and the consideration of a counter offer. (U)

With respect to the nature of the immediate U.S. response, as the answer to Question 1 makes clear, we do not want to work from the Soviet proposal. We should avoid expressing an interest in “studying” any Soviet offense-for-defense trade-offs proposal. Doing so would only whet the appetite and raise the expectations of those who want us to take the next logical step and accept some version of the Soviet cap on defenses. Rather, our response should:

- focus on our proposals while noting, in the context of our proposals, any acceptable elements of the Soviet offer;

- address those elements of the Soviet offer that we find unacceptable (e.g., constraints on SDI research and deployment, no distinction between missile warheads and bomber weapons, retention of an excessive ICBM force, curtailment of important U.S. offensive modernization programs like Midgetman and the Trident D-5 missile, ASAT ban, inequitable LRINF constraints, verifiability, etc.) and explain why such provisions cannot be the basis for an equitable agreement;

- stress that with respect to our SDI research program, we will not accept restrictions or limits beyond those already existing in the ABM Treaty, but we will continue to conduct our SDI research program in compliance with that Treaty; and

- note that it is essential that the Soviets come into compliance with existing obligations, particularly by correcting the Krasnoyarsk and telemetry encryption problems. (C)

In considering a U.S. counter to a Soviet offer along the lines of Tab A, we should seek to achieve the following objectives:

- Strategically significant reductions of a nature and magnitude that, coupled with ancillary measures permitting appropriate unilateral efforts, will permit us to improve the survivability of our land-based forces.

- Protect and support a vigorous SDI program to determine the feasibility of new defenses that would permit us to base our security more on defense of the United States and its Allies and less on the threat of retaliation.

—Support and promote the necessary measure of public and Congressional backing to sustain our defense program, particularly the strategic modernization program.

—Broad appeal that lends itself to effective public diplomacy to counter Soviet propaganda initiatives. (C)

Some believe that we could test Gorbachev to see if there is any willingness to engage in serious give and take behind their propaganda facade—specifically by exploring the possibility of agreement on basic elements which could serve as guidelines for our negotiators. Under this approach, the elements we would need are listed below:

—Soviet commitment to strategically significant reductions in offensive land-based, ballistic missile forces.

—Acknowledgment that the ABM Treaty permits SDI research, including clarification of the demarcation between permitted and prohibited activity.

—Lay down markers to preserve the option of a cooperative transition toward greater reliance on defensive systems—and ultimately toward complete elimination of nuclear weapons—should future research demonstrate the validity of such an approach.

—Treatment of INF in a way that meets U.S. and Allied concerns.

—Satisfaction of our verification and compliance concerns, including the Krasnoyarsk radar and telemetry encryption. (S)

The current Soviet line—that offensive reductions must follow a ban on SDI—is clearly out of the question. Some believe that we could explore the possibility of simultaneous discussion of offense and defense under which strategically significant reductions would complement the ABM Treaty. The new limits on offensive nuclear arms and already existing limits on defensive systems would be mutually contingent. (S)

According to this view, to be strategically significant, reductions must be of a nature and magnitude that, when combined with unilateral steps (mobility, multiple shelters, etc.), they would enhance the survivability of land-based deterrent forces. An example would be reductions in ballistic missile warheads by about 50% to a level of about 4500 on each side, of which no more than 3000 would be on ICBM warheads, with collateral limits on throwweight and warhead weight and provisions for mobility and multiple shelters. In this context, we could agree to associated limits on ALCMs and SNDVs. These constraints would be incorporated in an agreement of indefinite duration, with the initial reductions implemented over 10 years. (S)

Supporters of this view believe it would have the following advantages:

—It would meet our objectives of deep and strategically significant cuts in offensive systems and reversal of the erosion of the ABM Treaty regime.

—It would explicitly allow the current, vigorous SDI research program and explicitly preserve the option of a cooperative transition to greater defense reliance.

—Moreover, it would preserve the option for a non-cooperative transition, because we would not cede our right, pursuant to Article XV, to withdraw from the Treaty if required by supreme national interests.

—If the Soviets reject it, this initiative would get us off the defensive and enable us to deal much more effectively with Soviet propaganda, without prejudicing our positions in Geneva. (S)

Others believe, however, that any linkage of offensive reductions to the reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty through any of the alternatives discussed above, will have the political effect of placing an even greater impediment in front of any transition to an increased U.S. reliance on defenses. This consideration is key to SDI's future. If the research proves out, such a transition may well prove impossible. Even before that time, such a linkage could reduce support for SDI as the desirability of a "no-defense" world would be reaffirmed and the basis for aggressive pursuit of defensive options would consequently be attenuated. Historically, the justification of needing a hedge against Soviet programs has not proven sufficient to sustain meaningful levels of research activity needed to provide real deployment options. (S)

The OSD representative holds the view that a frantic effort to compete with the Soviets proposal-for-proposal should be studiously avoided. It should be self-evident but it is, nonetheless, worth noting that we are permanently disadvantaged in such a competition because we—unlike the Soviets—*must* be able to live with the substance of our proposals. We do not have the luxury of demagoguery bereft of responsibility, self-effacing allies or state-controlled legislature or press. History is replete with notorious moments when it seemed like a good idea for the United States to advance hastily or unilaterally arms control proposals of little—if any—intrinsic merit; in fact, it rarely worked to our advantage. It is almost certainly not going to work to our advantage now if we appear to be engaged in a frantic bidding-war with the Soviet Union, attempting to persuade all comers that we are more "serious" about arms control than they are by virtue of having made the most recent—albeit fleetingly so—proposal. The OSD representative also feels that it would be profoundly ill-advised if we were to consider making a move—if for some reason, not obvious at present, it were deemed desirable to do so—in response to Shevardnadze's opening gambit. (S)

QUESTION 4 (U)

Should the existence of such an evaluation leak, how could the U.S. best limit potential damage? Are there additional steps that we should take to position ourselves against the danger of such a leak? (TS/O)

Simple press guidance should be prepared indicating that as a matter of standard practice the USG analyzes all possible options—especially those which the Soviets can be expected to advance in light of existing, clear Presidential guidance on this general area. The fact that analysis of this kind is routinely performed is not, in and of itself, an indication of a favorable US disposition toward such likely Soviet proposals and should not be confused therewith. (U)

**98. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Operations,
Central Intelligence Agency (George) to President Reagan,
Vice President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of
Defense Weinberger, and the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹**

Washington, September 25, 1985

SUBJECT

Discussions by Soviet Officials of the SDI and Other Arms Control Issues

Introduction

1. This information, [*2½ lines not declassified*]. The report covers two presentations on the arms control issues, one made by Geneva arms

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Kenneth deGraffenreid Files, NSPG-Soviet SDI Briefing for the President—1985; NLR-139-18-56-2-5. Secret. A routing slip indicates Poindexter received the memorandum on September 26 and McFarlane on September 27. An attached note reads: "Meeting: NSPG—Soviet SDI Briefing for the President, Briefer: Larry Gershwin, Time/Date: 2:00 p.m., Monday, October 7, Location: Situation Room." Reagan wrote in his diary on October 7: "We had an NSPG meeting to have a briefing on the Soviet Unions progress in defensive weapons against nuclear missiles. They are raising h—l about our research & they've been at it for 20 yrs. & we're just starting." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I: January 1981–October 1985, p. 503) Preparatory documents and memoranda on the October 7 NSPG meeting are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988. The briefing materials and PowerPoint presentation for the October 7 meeting are in Reagan Library, Kenneth deGraffenreid Files, NSPG Meeting/Minutes—10/07/ 1985 (Draft); NLR-139-18-57-1-5.

control talks negotiator Yuliy A. Kvitsinskiy at KGB headquarters and another by Soviet officials at the Soviet embassy in London. [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

Kvitsinskiy's Assessment of the Geneva Arms Negotiations

2. On 21 May 1985, Yuliy A. Kvitsinskiy, the chief Soviet negotiator for SDI, addressed 800 senior KGB officers at their Moscow headquarters on the Geneva arms control negotiations. Kvitsinskiy surprised many of his audience by the harshness of his accusations against the United States for their alleged failure to engage in serious negotiations. Although Kvitsinskiy's words were sharp, he spoke without emotion. He seemed to want to show that he was realistic in his assessment of the Americans as being sophisticated and cunning adversaries.

3. Kvitsinskiy said that the SDI remained the central problem in the negotiations. If agreement could be reached on SDI, it would not be difficult to deal with strategic arms and INF. Kvitsinskiy gave his audience the impression that not only was there a rough equivalence in Soviet and American nuclear arsenals, but each also had a massive overkill capability. As both sides were due to replace some of their older systems, it was realistic to think in terms of deep cuts. Kvitsinskiy also gave the impression that the Soviet leadership recognized that INF deployment would continue, but did not think that it would be an irreversible process. Because the Soviet Union had so many SS20's, it should be possible to negotiate an accord. For the time being, the Soviets would keep this card in their pocket.

4. Despite these possibilities, Kvitsinskiy's tentative conclusion was that, for the time being, the United States was not interested in achieving real progress in the negotiations. The United States, he pointed out, was not just working on the development of its SDI program, but it also needed another one to three years to complete work on other new weapons systems—MX, Midgetman, Trident II (D5), more accurate cruise missiles, and the stealth bomber. There was, therefore, little hope of achieving progress during the rest of the Reagan Administration's term of office. His successor might be more disposed to negotiate.

5. After Kvitsinskiy's 45 minute talk, there was a 20 minute question period. Kvitsinskiy was asked why the Soviet Union should, given his assessment, continue to take part in the negotiations. He replied that the Soviet leadership believed that it was important to continue to explore the possibilities of a settlement and at the same time expose the fact that the United States was simply using the negotiations as a facade behind which it wished to prepare to negotiate from a position of strength. For these reasons the Soviet Union would stay at Geneva.

6. Another member of the audience asked for Kvitsinskiy's impressions of his American counterparts. He said that they were extremely

polite and highly civilized. By these devices they sought to conceal their true objectives which were, as he had said, to enable the United States to negotiate from a position of strength. He added that on one occasion his counterpart had dropped the mask of politeness. The American negotiator had said “he hated the Soviet Union and if he was in power he would eliminate us. But he had been sent to negotiate with us and as a man loyal to the President he was simply following his instructions.”

GRU Officer's Briefing on SDI

7. [1½ lines not declassified] spoke to diplomatic staff about SDI and its implications for the Soviet Union. [name not declassified] presentation was based on guidance from GRU headquarters, supplemented by work done by his own staff. It was a typical military briefing complete with slides and viewfoils to illustrate the main points.

8. [name not declassified] emphasized the following points:

A. Although the SDI system was very complicated, it was not unrealistic to think that the US would be able to implement it, sooner or later.

B. The main problems which the Americans faced in developing SDI were creating enough energy, and storing it, for space based lasers to be effective. These technical problems meant that it was particularly important for the Americans to increase the accuracy of the systems so as to minimize the energy required to destroy Soviet missiles.

C. It was possible that SDI would eventually be able to intercept 90 percent of the Soviet Union's strategic missiles.

9. Although [name not declassified] had pointed to difficulties that Americans would have in developing SDI, he was pessimistic about the Soviet ability to match the United States. It was an illusion, he said, to believe that Soviet nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines could hope to get under the SDI umbrella by launching their missiles from close to the US coast. SDI would be a three-tiered system, and the third tier would still be able to intercept missiles launched in this way.

10. [less than 1 line not declassified] although it would probably be possible in due course for SDI related systems to protect Western Europe from Soviet SS20 missiles, much important European territory would remain vulnerable to the SS22's.

11. After [name not declassified] briefing, and a certain amount of discussion, the Soviet ambassador, Viktor I. Popov, told the audience that [name not declassified] had proved that the SDI was a serious threat to the Soviet Union. Every effort was to be made, therefore, to gather information about the development of the SDI program and the views of different groups within the US and Western Europe on it. Particular

attention was to be paid to differences of opinion between the US and Western Europe.

12. From what [*name not declassified*] and the ambassador had said, and the guidance which the embassy had received from the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the diplomatic staff knew that they were to make the following points to their contacts:

A. SDI represented a dangerous leap forward in the arms race in general, but especially in the nuclear arms race. SDI could disarm the Soviet Union of its strategic nuclear forces, thus leaving it without a real deterrent.

B. SDI represented an aggressive act by the United States, aimed at creating conditions in which the US could blackmail the Soviet Union and even possibly eliminate it.

C. SDI makes the threat of a nuclear war more likely.

D. The American intention to press ahead with SDI research and development and their refusal to talk seriously in Geneva were a violation of the Shultz-Gromyko accord of 8 January 1985.

E. SDI is a violation of the ABM treaty.

F. The Soviet Union would be forced to match American developments related to SDI or, more likely, find ways of rendering the US system ineffective.

G. Western Europeans had to realize that the SDI could only protect the US, not Western Europe. This meant that the US would be prepared to wage a nuclear war against the Soviet Union, knowing that Western Europe would be destroyed in retaliation even if SDI gave the Americans considerable protection. For this reason there was a fundamental conflict of interests between the US and Western Europe concerning SDI.

13. The ambassador ended by insisting that minutes of all conversations with British and foreign contacts had to include what had been said to them about the Soviet position and their response.

14. This report is being made available to the chief US arms control negotiators in Geneva.

Clair E. George²
Deputy Director for Operations

² An unknown hand signed for George above this typed signature.

99. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 25, 1985, 2–6 p.m.

US PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Shultz
Assistant to the President McFarlane
Assistant Secretary Ridgway
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
DAS Palmer
Interpreter Zarechnyak

SOVIET PARTICIPANTS

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Assistant to Minister Chernyshov
Minister Counselor Sokolov
MFA Advisor Tarasenko
Interpreter

Shevardnadze opened the meeting by stating that he hoped it would be productive and continue the dialogue which he had started with the Secretary in Helsinki.² In his many meetings this week, all of his interlocutors have brought up the summit meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan in November and had expressed their keen interest. People everywhere attach big hopes; this is the major event not only of this year but perhaps of recent times. That is at least what people want. The meeting today is a significant part of the preparations for the two leaders' meeting. They would probably not manage today to discuss everything as there are so many questions. Shevardnadze said he was grateful for the meeting he would have with the President as well as the subsequent time he would have with the Secretary.

The Secretary thanked Shevardnadze for his welcome and noted that as it happens the Soviet Mission is just a few blocks from the place where he was born. So he felt at home. He also noted that now that Shevardnadze had seen New York City he would understand why the Secretary decided to live in California. Shevardnadze said that he had

¹ Source: Department of State, EUR/RUS Special Collections—Russia, Political Subject and Chronological Files, Lot 00D471, Shevardnadze Visit, New York 9/25/85, Washington 9/27/85. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in New York. No drafting information appears on the memorandum of conversation. Brackets are in the original.

² See Document 71.

not seen anything because of all his meetings. The Secretary said that in fact New York was a great city, with the best and the worst of everything. He agreed that everyone wants to talk about the meeting between our leaders in November; but mostly others want to tell us what we should do. There are high hopes. The President and he share these hopes. It is the job of Shevardnadze and the Secretary to do what they can so that these hopes are fulfilled. He had agreed with Ambassador Dobrynin's suggestion that we start on security matters and then turn to regional and bilateral issues. We should see these meetings as a continuum; where we end here, we can pick up in the next one. The Secretary knows that Shevardnadze intends to leave Saturday afternoon;³ he had arranged his schedule so that he could be available Saturday morning if this turns out to be useful and necessary. He was also prepared to have a private meeting about fifteen minutes before the end of their session today.⁴ After they had reviewed the various arms control areas, beginning with the NST talks, perhaps they could spend a little time on arrangements for the November meeting if there are some things to say.

Shevardnadze noted that there had already been much discussion of these Geneva matters and we can always continue to work on the details. He would give Secretary Shultz the opportunity as guest to speak first. He recalled that in Helsinki he had gone first and covered all items at once and perhaps this had caused problems. The Secretary said that perhaps they could establish here that they take one subject at a time, go back and forth and have a conversation on it and then go on to the next subject. Only then can we understand each other and move ahead.

The Secretary then noted that the Geneva negotiations are of central importance to the relationship. He noted that in Shevardnadze's address to the UNGA, the Soviet Foreign Minister had praised the concept of deterrence for its role in avoiding nuclear war and that deterrence at a lower level of forces was better than at a higher level.⁵ The Secretary said that we agree. Shevardnadze also had questioned whether current technological and weapons developments were not threatening to upset deterrence. We agree that it is important to retain a stable deterrence, although we may have different views about what is upsetting deterrence. It is good for us to discuss this subject because it goes to the heart of what we want to do in the Geneva negotiations.

³ September 28.

⁴ See Document 100.

⁵ For Shevardnadze's speech to the UN General Assembly, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVII, no. 39 (October 23, 1985), pp. 5–9. An excerpt of his September 25 speech was printed in the *New York Times*, September 25, 1985, p. A8.

The Secretary continued that we did agree in January that our grand objective is the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We believe that a stable deterrent is threatened for two classes of reasons. First the assumptions on which SALT I and more particularly the ABM treaty were based are being called into question. If defense was to be constrained, we had agreed that offensive systems would have to be brought down and kept down. Each of us now has far higher levels than was assumed at the time. We also assumed that in the ABM treaty we had identified certain systems and limits that would be critical barriers on the way to prevent any breakout.

The other class of developments that threatens a stable deterrence stems from scientific and technological developments. We see the development of offensive weapons that have an accuracy which is astonishing to laymen; we also face MIRVed and mobile systems. It is therefore increasingly difficult to identify and count systems.

The Secretary noted that the American proposals in Geneva address these problems in keeping with the agreement reached in January. We see these problems as interrelated. If we want to get to the point where there are no nuclear weapons, then we have to make major reductions. He and Shevardnadze had used “radical” reductions. That is a step which would get both sides towards zero and also get us back to the assumptions of 1972. It also would mean that we have greater confidence at those levels. So we have proposed in Geneva sharp reductions to 5,000 ballistic missile warheads, and we have proposed to eliminate altogether intermediate range missiles. Or if this is not desired, then limiting these intermediate range systems on a worldwide basis. Obviously if we get down to some level like that we would want to look not just at ourselves but also at the French, British, and Chinese because they have nuclear weapons. These are not large in number but they become more important as we move down. We presume we would want to go to others and go down to zero together with them. All of this highlights the importance of the non-proliferation regime. We have worked well together in this area. We will need to strengthen it if the great powers are to give up nuclear weapons. We don’t want to see others get them.

This leaves us nevertheless with the present situation as it will take a long time to deal with the problems of mobility and accuracy. At the same time we see in technological developments that we may have some answers with regard to defense. We have taken a leaf out of your book. You have always been more defense oriented. You deployed a system of ballistic missile defense and have long had a research program. So we have been slow but the light has gone on a bit. We want to describe our concept. We have been trying to engage you in Geneva in two ways. First there has been an erosion of the ABM treaty. Second

we want to tell you about our conception of an ABM defense which is being conducted in the framework of the ABM treaty. We want to discuss how it should be carried out if it proves technically feasible and why we think this would be the right way to proceed.

The Secretary continued that we were pleased the Soviet side in Geneva had received a briefing from General Abrahamson.⁶ One can say that we have an experience with deterrence based on equal offensive capabilities. There is a stability to that but technological and scientific changes are making this more and more problematic. We also can describe a situation in which there would be a greater element of defense on both sides and how this will raise the quality of deterrence and make it impossible for each side to believe that it can gain from a first strike. Instability comes if one side or the other understands how to do strategic defense and proceeds unilaterally to deploy such a system. This creates a situation in which one side is tempted to proceed without the other. Then instability is created.

For that reason President Reagan had said that if it is found that such a defense measure is possible, then we would have to negotiate so it came about through a process of discussion and not unilaterally. We want to preserve the deterrent. Some have said that if the US discovers this first, it is fine for President Reagan to have said that he would do it cooperatively but how can this be trusted. The Secretary pointed out that this is not a question of trust. It is not in the interest of the United States to cause instability that might be overwhelmingly negative for the Soviets and therefore dangerous for us both. So we are for a negotiated transition. We want a deterrent that is at a better qualitative level and takes into account the problems caused by changes in offensive capabilities.

This is the basis for our proposals for radical reductions and what we have said about defense. If we can find a basis to give our negotiators in Geneva a chance to move ahead that would be good. We welcome the statement in Shevardnadze's address that he has proposals to put forth to us.

The Secretary then said he would like to ask Ambassador Nitze who was present at the creation of all this and Mr. McFarlane who

⁶ Telegram 6338 from the NST Delegation in Geneva, July 3, reported that the "Defense and Space group hosted a post-plenary meeting on June 27 which consisted of a luncheon for Soviet counterparts, followed by a post-plenary discussion during which an SDI briefing was held." The briefing was "given by Major Liesveld; follow-on questions, as noted below, were answered by LTG Abrahamson." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850471-0546) The SDI briefing was transmitted to the NST Delegation in Geneva in telegram 196560, June 27. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850451-0784)

chairs the interagency group on this subject to make any comments they might have.

Ambassador Nitze said that the Secretary had made a clear presentation which set forth the President's and our thinking. He did not believe it was necessary to add anything.

Mr. McFarlane said that this had been an eloquent presentation, the core of which is President Reagan's thinking that the need for strategic defense was brought about by Soviet programs over the last ten years. Also that this would provide us a more stable basis for deterrence and to do so in a way which would be stable; through discourse and phases.

Shevardnadze said he would like to raise several issues in connection with what the Secretary had said and to state the view of his delegation. The Secretary was right in pointing out that the focal point should be preparations for the meeting of our leaders. The Soviet Government and people attach paramount importance to that meeting and proceed from the assumption agreed in Helsinki that the two sides would work for a constructive meeting with results, for solutions particularly to the central problems. He agreed that matters of security are the centerpiece for work over the time remaining before the meeting. It was the Soviet wish that both sides would continue to give active consideration to the issues and above all those that would contribute to the success of the meeting.

Shevardnadze continued that while we are doing these preparations we will have to reckon with the general background that is being created for the meeting. He would like to speak candidly today. In scanning the horizon of US-Soviet relations there were unfavorable trends. If one assesses the situation these negative trends had even increased in some ways. He was not talking about distinctions being made in principle about differences between the two societies. He follows American speeches and statements closely and knows that these matters are being discussed. These differences do exist and will continue. But he had said in his address to the UNGA that work must proceed within the framework of coexistence and be built on a basis of realism. This realism presumes renunciation of any drive for military superiority.

If one analyzes what has been done concretely in the last several months by the Soviet Union and the United States, then the conclusion is not in favor of the US. Just citing facts, the US refused to stop tests of nuclear weapons, refused to stop INF deployments, refused to stop its test of an anti-satellite system. He could make the list longer but he was not raising this to make polemical points. The US side is aware of the unilateral steps taken by the Soviet Union and the Soviet proposals. The most important thing he wanted to stress is that the Soviet

leadership believes it is not too late to make up for the things which have been missed in the relationship.

Shevardnadze said he would now like to turn to the Geneva negotiations. He and the Secretary had touched on this in Helsinki and had made their views known there. Solution of the tasks facing the delegations in Geneva would be of paramount importance. This is an elementary truth, but it is true nonetheless. But if we do not succeed, we will get dragged into a military confrontation and it will be impossible to get out of it. In his view even if we put aside science, self preservation alone should motivate us. There is an acute necessity to give an impetus to the negotiators. He would like to be clear that the Soviet side was fulfilling its side of the agreement which had been reached. These matters had been analyzed at the highest level and they take the view that new steps are possible with regard to the upcoming meeting. But in order to achieve anything both sides must move.

Of key importance, Shevardnadze continued, is agreement on a full and complete ban on space strike arms. To give their assessment, the differences are great indeed. The Secretary had just now been trying to explain the American view about some defensive umbrella. But we Soviets call a spade a spade. These are space strike weapons. The Soviet side is not advancing a ban on space strike arms as a precondition. To present a picture of the Soviet Union trying to block production in nuclear weapons is simply untrue. The Soviet side is for an interrelated consideration of all three issues: space, strategic and intermediate weapons. This should be done simultaneously but not in favor of one side. You cannot sabotage the talks on space arms. The line taken by the US is to undermine the ABM treaty; it is not designed to avert the militarization of outer space. The US had been saying that somebody was violating the ABM treaty; but the Soviet side proceeded from the fact that the ABM treaty is a pillar of the stability between us. Intentional discrediting and devaluing of legal undertakings binding the US and the Soviet Union would not bring anything good. He would like to say most seriously that the ABM treaty serves the interest of strategic stability.

The Soviet Union has not done anything and is not doing anything that contravenes this treaty. This is not stated for propaganda reasons but to stress that they will not be the first to put weapons in space. The US test of an anti-satellite weapon on a live target in space ignores this readiness of the Soviet side to ban space strike arms including anti-satellite weapons which are in existence. They cannot but term this as a step designed to whip up the arms race in space. The US side admits that this system is closely linked to development of components banned by the ABM treaty. In this connection we see unfounded assertions by certain statesmen that development of space weapons and

testing are not banned by the ABM treaty; that just deployment should be discussed with the Soviet Union. He presumes that his partners here at the table know the provisions of the ABM treaty—not to develop, test or deploy.

Shevardnadze said he would like to repeat what he had said from the rostrum of the UN; that the Soviet Union is against a new spiral in the arms race. They propose to renounce development and deployment of space strike arms once and for all. Without resolution of this problem, reductions of offensive arms are impossible. The Soviet side does not want to exaggerate. They just want to preclude any misunderstanding. Agreement on space arms is of key importance for radical reductions in offensive arms. So far the Soviet side had not seen a businesslike approach by the US Administration; that was true not just with regard to space but also offensive arms. The US side was proclaiming a lot about reductions. But its program would involve a further buildup including in the level of nuclear arms in Europe. These infringe unilaterally on the security of the Soviet Union and its allies. This problem can only be resolved on the basis of equality and equal security. They had made their move on that (INF) and would wait for our move. So this is their general concept.

Shevardnadze wanted to stress that we must proceed from the fact that approximate parity now exists. Any other basis would not work. The US says that the Soviet Union ran way ahead; some say two to three times ahead. But science shows that there is approximate parity. This parity hinges on the ABM treaty. The scheme which the US proposes would erode and destroy the whole system of strategic equilibrium.

Shevardnadze had asked allies of the United States whether this was a peaceful or a military program. They didn't reply but we know that it is a military program with new types of space strike weapons. The Soviets had been told that they did not understand that science cannot be stopped. But they had not said that scientists could not go on. They know that scientists will continue. They were very proud of their own country for its high standard in fundamental research. The question was how to understand the substance of research. Comrade Gorbachev had made the point explicit and clear. One thing is when a research scientist has something in his head or in a laboratory. But it is another thing when there are mockups, field tests and subsequent deployment; and that is what the US envisages. Shevardnadze was grateful that the Secretary had listened to their speech in the UNGA. Shevardnadze had said that they should not repeat the mistake of 1946

when Soviet and American scientists had warned that we should not use atomic energy for weapons.⁷ The Soviet side is ready to cooperate.

Shevardnadze also had said in his UNGA address with good reason that the Soviet delegation returns to Geneva with solid luggage. They were ready for compromises and mutual concessions but not to the detriment of mutual security.

Korniyenko said that he would like to touch on two or three problems. The Secretary said that strategic stability and deterrence had been weakened because offensive weapons had grown more than was envisioned and that this was the alleged rationale for new space weapons. Then the question arose—the eloquent statement about the development of accuracy and the appearance of MIRVed and mobility of offensive arms. But suppose we proceed to your proposal for drastic reductions. We are also for sharp reductions of offensive arms, but how are we to understand what you mean. On the one hand you are saying let's get rid of what happened with regard to offensive arms at least in terms of quantity. But you intend to keep the effect; that is strategic defense is a sacred cow which cannot be touched at all, or even mentioned.

Korniyenko continued that what the US suggests in its various models of reductions is that the Soviet Union reshape its offensive forces in accordance with the US model. The US wants to have 2,500 warheads on its ICBMs and for the Soviet Union to have the same number. But you would not limit cruise missiles. You would have the freedom here to have 5 or 10 thousand. The Soviet Union was supposed to take the path where everything is done according to the US pattern. You are planning to create a space based ABM system and you propose that when you are ready and have proved that you are ready, then you would have negotiations with the Soviet Union so that it would do the same thing. And here again you consider your plans to be a sacred cow.

But the United States must think that people are very naive on the other side if it thinks that they would sit idle and wait until the US proves the possibility or impossibility of such a system, Korniyenko continued. It is clear that the other side would do the same, or not necessarily the same and you would have an uncontrolled race.

Korniyenko continued that the Secretary had mentioned that as the United States and the Soviet Union reduced towards zero the question emerges of third countries. This is so. As reductions in the number of the

⁷ Presumably a reference to the Baruch Plan of 1946, a U.S. proposal to the UN Atomic Energy Commission, calling, among other things, for the elimination of atomic weapons and establishment of effective safeguards to protect complying states against violations. The Soviet Union rejected the Baruch Plan.

two sides' weapons take place, the relative weight of other countries' weapons rose. Would it be right to adopt the same approach not just for strategic but also INF weapons; that is British and French weapons. The United States proposes zero for the US and the Soviet Union but forgets those for Britain and France.

(At this point Dobrynin asked whether the Secretary wanted a break as two hours had elapsed. The Secretary said he would raise his hand if he needed a break.)

The Secretary said that maybe we are getting somewhere. He wanted to make a few random comments and asked Nitze to make a few points on some questions the Soviets had raised and then ask a question. On the nuclear weapons test moratorium, the United States is worried about verification and made some proposals. We call them to the Soviet side's attention again. We are prepared to appoint someone to privately go off and explore with them the nature of the President's proposal to be sure that the Soviets understand it. This would be done without any obligations. The Secretary noted that the Soviet side had said INF deployments were a problem. But the decision had been made in 1979 at the urging of the Europeans in response to Soviet weapons deployments—their SS–20s. We didn't begin; this was an answer.

The Secretary continued that as for the test of our ASAT, we have observed many of the Soviet tests; a number something like 20. So the Soviets have a system which has been tested and deployed. It seems odd to the US that the Soviets are criticizing us for doing even just our first test. We think ours is better than yours, but a test is a test. He did not want to go through and nitpick.

The Secretary did want to mention two positive things. Perhaps there was some chance of motion. Shevardnadze had said that he did not intend to use the space talks to block the other two groups, while preserving the relationships. We welcome that. It may be that there is something to work with in what Korniyenko had said with regard to reshaping Soviet forces and that we were not prepared to discuss cruise missiles. If those represent blocking points, the Secretary wanted to say that we fully recognize that we start from different configurations and that we must come down in a manner that doesn't reconfigure, but that comes down on the basis of equality. Senator Tower is prepared to talk about this and also about ALCMs. So maybe there is room for maneuver there based on correcting that impression.

Korniyenko said that he was not talking about air-based but about sea-based cruise missiles.

The Secretary said that he heard Korniyenko but maybe they could have a side meeting and Korniyenko could tell him how to verify sea-based cruise missiles.

Korniyenko said that the Secretary had mentioned non-proliferation and that we both value the NPT treaty. But can we indeed verify the obligation of the parties not to transfer elements of nuclear bombs to other parties. No we cannot. But nonetheless we don't consider this just a piece of paper as we have a self-interest in it. In the same sense if we have an interest in not starting an arms race in space, verification would not be a problem. This is not to say that there would be no verification at all as in the NPT. The key thing is for the sides to have an interest not to develop these weapons. Similarly if you are interested in banning sea-based cruise missiles, maybe not a 100% certainty but certainly some and in any case not the 100% lack of certainty as in the NPT. Nonetheless we value the NPT.

The Secretary said that the US is very careful about any nuclear materials leaving the United States, and we believe the Soviet Union is also. Full scope safeguards do provide a reasonable way for verification. If we could get down to zero then the sense of discrimination on the part of other NPT members would disappear. Verification is of extraordinary importance as Shevardnadze had said in his address. We must be prepared to put technical equipment on the other's territory or for challenge on-site inspections to ensure confidence. As you said, we have to look for good verification. Otherwise we will have endless distrust.

Shultz/Shevardnadze Memcon (September 25)—Part II

Shevardnadze indicated that the Soviet side was interested in verification, but that this issue should not be taken to the point of absurdity.

Shultz said that he would like to ask Professor Nitze to lecture on the ABM Treaty from the point of view of what is permitted and what is prohibited from the U.S. point of view.

Ambassador Nitze stated that he would like to start with a different area—space strike weapons.

Shevardnadze interjected with a smile that the audience was not really an appropriate one for a "lecture".

Nitze said that he would like to begin by recalling what Minister Gromyko had said on January 8 concerning the definition of space strike weapons. He had said that space strike weapons were systems in space which were designed to counter objects in space and on earth, as well as systems on land which were designed to counter objects in space. This kind of definition presented a great deal of difficulty for the U.S. side, since it does not believe that Treaty limitations should be based on intent. This is too subjective a criterion. The U.S. side believes that limitations should be based on capabilities which can be deduced from observation of characteristics or testing. If we look at the systems with inherent ASAT capabilities, this would include the

Soviet Golosh system, all ICBM's, as well as SS-20's and Pershing II's. Most ballistic missiles have inherent ASAT capabilities. It was not clear, moreover, that tests needed to be conducted against objects in space to assure such a capability. It might be possible to run the test with a computer simulation. Beyond that, any satellites in space which are maneuverable have an inherent possibility to be placed next to another satellite. So it would be difficult for the U.S. to see how there could be concepts of verification of deployment of systems with a capability of countering objects in space. The U.S. has not been able to solve this problem, but if Soviet negotiators in Geneva have any suggestions about this range of issues, indicating not design criteria, but practical views about determining inherent capabilities so that realistic judgments could be made with regard to verification, the U.S. side would be very interested in hearing such a proposal.

Nitze went on to discuss the question of research and testing under the ABM Treaty. He stressed that the word "research" does not appear in the Treaty. In his testimony before the Supreme Soviet, Defense Minister Grechko said that the ABM Treaty, although significantly limiting the deployment of ABM's, nevertheless permits research aimed at protecting the country.

Nitze continued that when Shevardnadze outlined those things which were to be prohibited, he listed certain steps which could be observed, such as testing of prototypes. The question remains, however, "a prototype of what?" The articles of the ABM Treaty limit systems and components. The components are defined in Article 2 to be those things which can be used in an ABM mode, as interceptors or launchers. The negotiators of the Treaty were not interested in limiting subcomponents, such as computers, chips or sensors. Article 5 of the Treaty limits systems and components which are space-based, and land-mobile, air-mobile, or space-mobile ones.

Nitze continued that agreed statement (d) foresaw the creation of systems and components which could substitute for ABMs using other physical principles in the future. This agreed statement limits the deployment of such systems which could be used as substitutes for ABM components unless there has been prior agreement between the two sides on the basis of Article 13 and agreement on the basis of article 14, which concerns amendment of the Treaty. What the U.S. side has proposed is in compliance with the procedures as outlined by the negotiators.

Nitze indicated that there was an impression that the Soviet side was saying that to propose the things that the U.S. side is proposing is undermining the ABM Treaty. But this is not so.

Nitze said that he would like to touch upon one or two points made by Minister Korniyenko. Korniyenko had suggested that all new

developments were begun by the U.S. side. This was not so. It was clear that the first ABM system was deployed around Moscow before the U.S. deployed its system, and that the U.S. MIRVed its missiles because of the threat which it foresaw from broad scale Soviet ABM deployment.

Nitze said that he would like to touch upon British and French systems in the INF context. The U.S. side does not accept the Soviet assertion that British and French SLBM systems, which have the same capabilities as Soviet SLBM strategic systems and U.S. SLBM strategic systems, are medium-range systems. Such systems were brought into the INF negotiations on the basis of the theory of the Soviet Union that they should be taken into account in order to assure equal security from the point of view of all military factors, including geographical and political ones. The U.S. would be prepared to take them into account if all other factors were taken into account, including political, geographical and other military factors. But this was not accepted by the Soviet side.

Shultz said that perhaps the point of all this was that in Geneva, each negotiating group, recognizing the interrelationship between them, and recalling the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons, should think about a radical reduction of offensive weapons.

Shultz continued that regarding space or ABM weapons, the Soviet side had indicated that it liked the ABM Treaty. The U.S. side felt the same way, and both sides should explore in detail what each thinks that the ABM Treaty says, so that there is clarity about what the treaty permits and what it does not permit.

Shultz indicated that with regard to the doctrine of deterrence, he would re-read Shevardnadze's statement and comments carefully, and would ask Shevardnadze to look over the notes which his side had taken when Shultz had replied to what Shevardnadze had said, to see if progress could be made at the Geneva negotiations on this basis. This should be done in a spirit of cooperation to move things along, not just to argue.

Shevardnadze said that he was not a specialist in this very complex area, and joked that he would be glad to hear another lecture on it, but there was no time for it. He then quoted one phrase from the Treaty to the effect that it is the responsibility of both sides not to develop, test or deploy ABM space-based systems. Shevardnadze agreed that this question needed to be discussed by experts, but unfortunately such discussions in Geneva had given no results, despite the fact that there were competent specialists there on both sides. He agreed with Shultz that in principle a new impetus should be given to our negotiators in Geneva to work on getting good results. There needs to be agreement in principle that militarization is militarization and that new

types of space strike weapons are militarization of space, and we need to work against such militarization.

Korniyenko interjected that this was what was agreed to in January.

Shevardnadze stated that if there was an agreement in principle on this, we should go farther, and should not create weapons which would lead to the militarization of space.

Shevardnadze hoped that the aim of the two sides was to help the leaders of the country find such basic solutions of global issues. If the two sides come to an agreement on space weapons, the Soviet side, as Shevardnadze had already indicated yesterday and today, would not come with empty hands, and would offer a radical reduction of offensive strategic weapons.

Shevardnadze pointed out that in the area of medium-range missiles, the Soviet side had a specific program which it has often proposed, and which he hoped would be a basis for a good compromise solution. It was Shevardnadze's hope that there would be discussion and agreement on basic issues. If the two sides were to begin to argue who was at fault, we would again get back to 1946.

Shultz asked Shevardnadze when we would hear the Soviet proposal.

Shevardnadze replied by asking when the Soviet side would hear the U.S. proposal about space weapons.

Shultz said that he had attempted to describe the U.S. approach today, and the same had been done at the negotiations in Geneva. The U.S. welcomed the Soviet side's statement, made a while ago, that, recognizing the interrelationship between the subjects, they should be taken individually and worked out individually. Shultz had thought, on the basis of Shevardnadze's comments, that he was ready to make a proposal, but this apparently was not the case.

Shevardnadze stated that the Soviet side had made proposals in all three of the groups at the negotiations in Geneva, i.e., space weapons, strategic weapons and medium-range weapons. Shevardnadze understood that the second area was a very important one for the two sides, and the Soviet side was prepared for radical reductions here, but the U.S. side had said nothing about space weapons, even of a general nature.

Shultz pointed out that Mr. Sokolov had been going to the Congress and to the press indicating that the Soviet Foreign Minister was coming with a big proposal. Shevardnadze had made indications to this effect in his statement and Ambassador Karpov had told Ambassador Kampelman to get ready for a big proposal this week. When would such a proposal be made? Would it be made to the President?

Korniyenko interjected that the U.S. side should tell Kampelman to make proposals on space weapons.

Shultz replied that Kampelman had attempted to do this.

Shevardnadze said that general assertions were made about perhaps a 20, 30 or 80 percent probability of a proposal, but would the U.S. side give its proposal on space weapons? The January statement contains an assumption of a cessation of the arms race in space.

Shultz stated that the concept of "radical reduction" caused difficulties for him. He said that he plays golf, a game which Shevardnadze probably does not know, and in that game a small ball is used, and there is a green of nicely cultivated grass which has many undulations which the ball needs to traverse to get to a hole. A golfer needs to calculate how much the ball will break. If he does not know the green, then someone, in this case the caddy, can help him. As Shultz was playing the other day, it was difficult for him to figure out the green, and he asked the caddy how much it would break. The caddy replied, "not as much as you think". This gave Shultz pause. And he had the same difficulty with the concept of "deep cuts".

Shultz indicated that he had a question in the area of space weapons. Did the Soviet Union wish to abandon or change the ABM Treaty, or keep it and live with it?

Shevardnadze replied that the Soviet side had indicated many times that it considered the ABM Treaty to be the basis not only of the strategic balance but of global relations in general.

Shultz stressed that this was why he proposed that the two sides should carefully explore how each understood the ABM Treaty, since there are very obvious differences in the interpretations of the two sides. For example, (and Shultz did not wish to pursue this at length), the U.S. side feels that the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar is not consistent with the ABM Treaty, whereas the Soviet side thinks it is. This implies that there is a difference of interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

Shevardnadze said that this was not a new issue, and that it had been mentioned in Helsinki, where Shevardnadze had explained the aim of the radar. He had also mentioned U.S. violations of the Treaty, which he would not list at this point.

Shevardnadze realized that there was concern about such matters on both sides, and the Standing Consultative Commission had been created in order to eliminate such unjustified concerns. Both sides had qualified specialists who understood all the details of these issues. The SCC would be able to remove mutual concerns in all these cases.

Shultz indicated that he had two comments. The first was that Shevardnadze had spoken about the intention of that radar, and Shultz wished to return to Ambassador Nitze's comments concerning capability. The other point was that it was one thing to have a discussion of

whether or not a given action was in violation of the treaty. This goes on in the SCC with various degrees of success. Shultz was proposing that in light of the reverence which the USSR had for the ABM Treaty, and in light of the U.S. indication of its adherence to that Treaty, perhaps our negotiators in the space and defense group in Geneva, not in the context of determining violations, but in the context of determining the meaning of the Treaty, should sit down to clarify it. This could be an avenue in which progress could be made.

Shevardnadze indicated that he would like to return to his first thought, i.e., that it was the task of the two sides to help the leaders of the two countries to prepare for their meeting, and the sides were getting farther away from this task.

Shevardnadze said that Shultz knew the history of the Treaty better than he did. This also applied to the SALT I and SALT II Treaties. The attitude of the U.S. to the latter and the fact that it was not ratified was well known. Unfortunately, there were many such examples. Shevardnadze thought that we should not have an additional precedent of the violation of the basis of our relations, especially in the area of strategic arms. All of these things could be studied, but Shevardnadze thought that there was no basis to review the principles of the ABM Treaty.

Shultz replied that he agreed with this. He indicated that he was baffled by the fact that the Soviet side was talking about the non-militarization of space, since space had already been militarized by the Soviet Union and others. There were military satellites in space and space already had other military uses, e.g. ballistic missiles went through space, so space was already a militarized area. Many of the satellites in space are useful to both sides for verification.

Shultz continued that the sides needed to have a way of resolving operational questions related to the outcome of the Summit meeting in Geneva, and talk of “non-militarization” is not the way to handle this.

Shultz indicated that he would like to turn the floor over to Mr. McFarlane.

McFarlane indicated that he thought it was ironic that all of our time had been devoted, in the discussion of strategic defenses, to the U.S. program, which was only in its beginning phase, and had ignored the Soviet program, which had been quite substantial for a number of years. Did this imply that the Soviet side denied that it had such a program? McFarlane said he would like to ask if it is the Soviet position that present Soviet activity in the area of laser weapons, particle beams, directed energy and conventional surface-to-air ballistic missile defense did not exist, or was the Soviet side proposing to cease all such activity?

Shevardnadze said that Ambassador Nitze had quoted Grechko's statement made thirty years ago (Dobrynin corrected Shevardnadze

that this was said at the ratification of the ABM Treaty), but the statement made by Sokolov two or three months ago was a clear reply to the question now being discussed.⁸

Shevardnadze continued that the USSR does have systems which are permitted under the Treaty. The U.S. is aware of this and the USSR has never denied it. General Secretary Gorbachev had indicated that the Soviet Union is conducting basic research in this and other areas. Shevardnadze wished to say that the Soviet side is in favor of reaching agreement and achieving compromise, but, as he had stated before, would not allow anyone to achieve superiority over it. The Soviet side was not imploring the U.S. for anything, but was proposing a reasonable and acceptable approach for stopping the arms race and not letting it get into space. As Korniyenko had said, if the U.S. makes new weapons, the Soviet Union makes new weapons.

Shevardnadze had indicated that there were incompatible contradictions in U.S. statements. In some it was stated that the Soviet Union had two or three times more arms than the U.S. In others by equally respected individuals it was stated that the USSR copies or steals U.S. technology. There was no logic to this. If the USSR copies technology, how can it be ahead?

Shultz indicated that he thought that the points which McFarlane wanted to make was that the Soviet Union considered that its research program was consistent with the ABM Treaty, and this is essentially the approach that the U.S. takes with regard to its research. So, why is there objection? The two sides should be clear about what is permitted and not permitted under the Treaty. Perhaps such examination was a way to handle the question which Shevardnadze had stressed.

Korniyenko interjected that Article 1 of the ABM Treaty indicates that each side is obligated not to deploy an ABM system for territorial defense of its country and not to create the basis for such a defense. But the U.S. President has said that the aim of the U.S. program was the creation of such a defense system, not only of a territorial nature, but of a global one. This was not something that the Soviet side had

⁸ In a July 1985 *New York Times* article, Nitze quoted Grechko's 1972 statement on ABM research: "Marshal Grechko told the Supreme Soviet, the nominal parliament, that the treaty 'imposes no limitations on the performance of research and experimental work aimed at resolving the problem of defending the country against nuclear missile attack.'" (Hedrick Smith, "Nitze Details U.S. Charges Soviet Has Own 'Star Wars,'" *New York Times*, July 12, 1985, p. A6) See footnote 9, Document 97. In a May 5 interview, Soviet Defense Minister Sokolov asserted that U.S. SDI research was a threat to peace and denied that the Soviet Union was researching a space-based anti-missile system. ("Kremlin's Military Chief Calls 'Star Wars' a Threat to Peace," *New York Times*, May 6, 1985, p. A12)

thought up. These were official statements, indicating violation of U.S. obligations under the Treaty.

Shultz stressed that what he was trying to get at was not to debate individual issues, but to achieve progress. The question is, what is being done, and what is the meaning of “development”? Similar questions need to be asked with respect to other aspects as well.

Shultz said that the U.S. side could think about the things that the Soviet side had said at the meeting, and the Soviet side could consider what the U.S. side had said. The President also had his thoughts on the subject, and perhaps Shevardnadze had something to convey to the President. After that, Shultz and Shevardnadze would meet, and additional time would be allotted, if necessary. There were many items on the agenda, and only one of them had been discussed.

Shevardnadze indicated that he thought the time had not been spent in vain.

Shultz agreed.

Shevardnadze indicated that this was a difficult question and approaches to it had been developed over many years. The fact that the discussions had been frank was a positive one, and the two sides should make changes and try to think about how to find points of contact. In this regard, there are a number of issues which could probably be agreed, which could be presented to the leaders of the countries. As he had stated before, Shevardnadze indicated that he did not feel that U.S. and Soviet interests were destined to collide. If the two sides really wanted to, a basis could be found for acceptable solutions to help improve the situation in the world.

Shultz said that he had noted some of the words which Shevardnadze had used, which could be used to characterize the meeting to the press. Shevardnadze had said that the meeting was a useful one, and Shultz agreed. Shevardnadze had indicated that the atmosphere was frank, and Shultz wished to add that they had found it easy to talk to each other without difficulty.

Shultz also indicated that he would tell the press that the time had been spent largely on the discussion of the security area and the material being discussed at the Geneva negotiations. Shevardnadze had indicated that we had looked for points of contact in our positions and for areas of mutual understanding. Did we find agreement? No, but we continued to work towards it. Were there any new proposals? No, but we carefully described our positions. This would be the general nature of what the U.S. side would propose to say to the press.

Shevardnadze replied that he had no argument with such an evaluation of the situation, and recalled that in Helsinki the sides had spoken in a similar way about the results of the meeting. It had been useful and frank.

At this point, Shultz and Shevardnadze went off to the side for a one-on-one meeting with interpreters.

Shevardnadze first wanted to thank Shultz for the fact that he had come to listen to his speech. The relationship between them could be called a frank one, and this would let them help their leaders to find wise solutions. The sides should not be afraid of dispute, for truth is born of dispute. The main thing is to look realistically at the world.

[Omitted here are the notes of the private meeting. See Document 100.]

100. Notes of a Private Meeting Between Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze¹

New York, undated

Shultz/Shevardnadze Tete-a-Tete

In the private tete-a-tete between Shevardnadze and Shultz at the end of the meeting, Shevardnadze indicated that he had been instructed by Gorbachev to pass on a letter to President Reagan.² Shevardnadze said that he wished to tell Shultz confidentially that this letter was one of substance in which Gorbachev expressed his thoughts on U.S./Soviet relations and on preparation for the Summit. One might call this a general concept of the Summit meeting.³ In the letter, Gorbachev indicates that as a result of the Summit, the sides could agree on the inadmissibility of nuclear war, bearing in mind that such a mutual recognition should be accompanied by practical measures to limit the arms race.

Secondly, Shevardnadze indicated that the sides should think about and agree on the possibility of having a final document after the Summit.⁴ Shevardnadze indicated that he felt that Shultz was an action-

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memorandum of Conversations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz/Shevardnadze and Reagan/Shevardnadze at the UN and in Washington September 1985. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the notes. Although undated, this tête-à-tête took place immediately following the formal September 25 meeting at the Soviet Mission; see Document 99.

² See Document 84. An unknown hand underlined "letter" in this sentence.

³ An unknown hand underlined "a general concept of the Summit meeting."

⁴ An unknown hand underlined "a final document" in this sentence.

oriented person, as was the President, and the Summit should have a logical conclusion. Shevardnadze recalled that the question of a final document had been discussed in Helsinki and Shultz seemed not to have any objections to such a concept.

Shultz replied that one would first need to see the content of such a document, and hope and work to produce an appropriate content to give meaning to the document.

Shevardnadze indicated that he was just about to come to that. If there were an agreement in principle to have such a basic document, it could consist of four basic parts: Security issues, especially any points of view which would have been agreed to, regional issues and bilateral issues; in these three areas there could be expression of general agreed common understandings, as well as any specific concrete agreements which would have been worked out before the meeting. The final parts i.e., the fourth one, would consist of an outline of tasks for the future.⁵ Shevardnadze stressed that the sides should think about whether such an important meeting should end with a serious final document and repeated that the peoples of the world had great hope for this meeting. The outline which he had given would allow formulation of agreements in appropriate language.

Shultz replied that he had no objection in principle to such a document, but indicated that the wisdom of having one would depend on its content. If it would be only an empty vessel, it wouldn't serve much purpose. But if meaningful results were achieved, it could be helpful to highlight them. Shultz indicated that he would look at what Shevardnadze had said. He was not in a position to say that the U.S. side could agree with the proposal, but would consider and work on it while Shevardnadze was in the U.S.

Shultz also indicated that he and Shevardnadze would have to make arrangements to continue work on the present meeting and that both he and Shevardnadze would need to spend a great deal of time on this, and perhaps meet again before the Summit in November.⁶

Shultz indicated that Shevardnadze's outline did not touch on the subject of human rights.⁷ He was not sure that this topic should be included in a public document, but the topic was an important one in our relationship. Apparently things happen in this area when the Soviet

⁵ In this sentence, an unknown hand underlined "four basic parts," "Security," "regional," "bilateral," and "future."

⁶ An unknown hand underlined "perhaps meet again before the Summit in November."

⁷ An unknown hand underlined "human rights" in this sentence.

Union decides they should happen, and does not feel any pressure in this regard from the U.S. Shultz gave the example of the Pentecostals.⁸

Shultz said that Ambassador Hartman would be giving Minister Korniyenko a list, as is the custom, of divided families involving American citizens. Jewish emigration would also be included.

Shultz indicated that for one reason or another the subject of Human Rights was related to trade, and although he did not believe in linkage, the U.S. would be prepared to discuss trade in items which are of interest to the USSR, which have not been traded recently. That subject and the subject of human rights could be discussed in a private meeting of one representative from each side. Shultz would nominate Ambassador Ridgway to be the U.S. representative at such a meeting.⁹

Shevardnadze replied that he was not against discussion of human rights even at the Summit, and if a basis exists for legally helping people, the appropriate decisions could be taken. However, he indicated that U.S. and Soviet concepts of human rights differed. He indicated, however, that the question of trade needed to be given some thought.

Shultz stressed that such a meeting between the two sides would be very confidential.¹⁰

Returning to Gorbachev's letter, Shevardnadze indicated that he would give the letter to President Reagan, and relate its basic contents, emphasizing certain elements for clarity. This would probably be more acceptable than simply to have the President read the letter, since it was not a short one.

Shultz indicated that what Shevardnadze was proposing could be done in several ways. If he wished, Shevardnadze could give Shultz a copy, perhaps tomorrow, and Shultz could pass it to the President and to others so that they could read it and be better prepared to discuss it.¹¹ But Shevardnadze could certainly take whatever approach he would choose.

Shevardnadze indicated that he preferred to give the letter to Reagan personally, and that Gorbachev was not expecting an immediate reply.¹² Gorbachev's main point was that he would like to avoid unexpected questions or proposals at the meeting in November, and he was ready for a serious meeting.

⁸ See footnote 2, Document 38.

⁹ In this paragraph, an unknown hand underlined "Human Rights was related to trade," "a private meeting of one representative from each side," and "Ridgway."

¹⁰ In another copy of these notes, the next line read: "Shevardnadze agreed."

¹¹ An unknown hand underlined "give Shultz a copy."

¹² An unknown hand underlined "preferred to give the letter to Reagan personally."

Shultz said that he would tell the President that Shevardnadze would pass to him a substantive letter from Gorbachev, whose outline had been just discussed.

101. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

New York, September 25, 1985

SUBJECT

My Meeting With Shevardnadze

Despite all the advance publicity, as I told you over the phone, Shevardnadze had no new arms control proposals in our meeting this afternoon.² In a private exchange with Bud McFarlane, however, Dobrynin said they would be forthcoming on Friday.³

Shevardnadze told me in our *tete-a-tete* that the Gorbachev letter he will deliver to you contains Gorbachev's views on how the November meeting should go.⁴ Shevardnadze said that Gorbachev would focus on four areas: security, regional, and bilateral issues; and an agenda for the future. He indicated that the letter would suggest that these points be covered in a final document. I told him I thought we could begin work on such a document, but that our final position would be determined by how the substance was shaping up.

The tone of the general meeting was basically positive. There was a good deal of give and take; far more than with Gromyko and with more people on each side participating. Except for an initial exchange on our mutual desire for a positive November meeting, virtually the entire four hours were devoted to the issues being covered in the Geneva arms control talks.

I gave Shevardnadze an extensive presentation of our views on how to enhance nuclear stability, stressing that the underlying assump-

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 Soviet Union September. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in New York.

² See Documents 99 and 100. No record of this telephone conversation was found.

³ September 27. No record of this conversation between Dobrynin and McFarlane was found.

⁴ See Document 100.

tions of the ABM Treaty and SALT I have been undermined. I made clear that we now need to get on with the process of radical reductions in offensive arms, reversing the erosion of the ABM Treaty, and ensuring that the Treaty is fully observed. I made a particular point of emphasizing that we have concrete proposals on the table in Geneva which would produce substantial reductions in offensive weapons. I reaffirmed our intention to continue to abide by the ABM Treaty, and elaborated on our concept of strategic defense.

Shevardnadze basically had nothing new to say. While he stressed the need to define points of convergence in our positions (and even used the Soviet word for “compromise”), he reiterated at length the standard Soviet linkage between a ban on “space strike weapons” and offensive arms reductions. He did say that fundamental and laboratory research is permitted by the ABM Treaty. But when Bud McFarlane asked whether Soviet laser, directed energy, and ballistic missile defense programs were consistent with the Treaty, he ducked. An extensive discussion of the specifics of the ABM Treaty produced no agreement, but may be worth having our negotiators pursue in Geneva.

In a separate conversation, Dobrynin told Bud McFarlane that Gorbachev had made a special effort to be asked in his *Time* interview about you, so as to be able to say something positive.⁵ Bud said we’d noticed it, but could hardly be expected to be grateful for appropriate courtesies. Dobrynin indicated Gorbachev is looking for ideas for the personal touches which could be done in Geneva to create good imagery, including activities involving wives. Bud pointed out the negative impact of Soviet public shrillness and rhetoric in this regard and urged that the Soviets find a way to close the Nicholson case and avoid further MLM incidents.

I had a strong sense that Shevardnadze is a different, more approachable, person in private than when he is surrounded by his advisors. I believe your *tete-a-tete* with him Friday will be a good opportunity to get our views across and that I may be able to do some business during my private dinner that evening.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 80.

102. Memorandum for Record by the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze)¹

Washington, September 26, 1985

SUBJECT

Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's Meeting, September 25, 1985

Questions to be addressed as a result of the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on September 25, 1985.²

1. Is what I said about the Soviet proposal for a ban on space-strike weapons correct?

- Did Gromyko's definition of such weapons in January at Geneva differ from what I said in describing it? After the meeting while we were waiting for the two principals to join the rest of us, Korniyenko said that the formulation of that definition included the Russian word, which we interpret as "create", which implies testing as well as design.

- Is testing of an ICBM's ASAT capability required before either side would have sufficient confidence to consider using it for that purpose? Korniyenko raised this point as well after the meeting.

- The Soviet position suggested an even more fundamental issue. Is there a commonality of interest between the two sides in preserving satellites against the threat of ASATs or does the US put greater value upon using ASATs to develop a space-based ABM capability. The argument which I used at the meeting could be read to imply that we did have a common interest in preventing ASATs if it were possible to work out a reliable and verifiable way of so doing, but that we did not believe it possible. Is this a correct and supportable position or is it not?

2. What is the best way to deal with the issues of interpretation of the ABM treaty raised by Korniyenko?³

- What is the best rebuttal to Korniyenko's argument that SDI is in violation of the Article I provision that each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense?

- After the meeting Korniyenko asserted that it was unfortunate that I had quoted Agreed Statement D without reference to the intro-

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, Aug–Sept 1985. Secret; Sensitive.

² See Documents 99, 100, and 101.

³ The full text of the ABM Treaty, its Articles, and Agreed Statements are available in *Documents on Disarmament*, 1972, pp. 197–204.

ductory wording of that statement: “In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty. . . .”

I pointed out to Korniyenko that Article III deals only with the undertaking not to deploy. I said I had emphasized that Agreed Statement D prohibits deployment of systems based on components capable of substituting for ABM components unless such deployment occurred after discussion in accordance with Article 13 and amendment in accordance with Article 14. I added that what I had said was clearly consistent with the introductory phrase of Agreed Statement D and with Article III.

3. How should we deal with the Soviet complaint repeated by Korniyenko that we refuse to discuss their proposal for a SLCM ban? Secretary Shultz said that we know no way verifiably to limit such weapons. This suggests that we would be willing to limit them were there such a way. This may not be true in view of the fact that other nations possess SLCMs whose numbers and range will undoubtedly increase over time. This was reinforced by the fact that it appears to be inherently impossible to assure that a conventional SLCM cannot be converted to a nuclear SLCM. In any case would it not be wise to work out a detailed logic chain with respect to this issue?

4. How do we best deal with Korniyenko’s argument that the NPT Treaty is wholly unverifiable with respect to the obligation of the nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear powers but is still valuable?

- There is a commonality of interest not to violate these undertakings whether verifiable or not. Is it not true that almost all limitations at the margin of small numbers are very dubious as to verifiability? They may still be worthwhile if any strategically significant violation would raise a significant prospect of detection.

- The question still remains as to the best chain of argument to use in rebuttal of Korniyenko’s point.

Paul H. Nitze

*Special Advisor to the President
and the Secretary of State
on Arms Control Matters*

103. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Ridgway) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, September 26, 1985

SUBJECT

The President's 9 AM Pre-brief for his Meeting with Shevardnadze, Oval Office, September 27.

An hour has been set aside to pre-brief the President for his meeting and luncheon with Shevardnadze.² The Vice President, Don Regan, and Bud McFarlane will join you along with Art Hartman, Paul Nitze, Jack Matlock, and I.

I suggest you use the meeting to raise both procedural and substantive points. Procedurally, it is still unclear who will brief the press following the President's luncheon. The NSC staff is unclear as to whether or not Bud wants to do it. We suggest that you tell the pre-brief participants that you are prepared to follow last year's precedent and provide a half-hour briefing in the White House press room at 2:00.

You should also be aware that Bud has called a SACG meeting for 4:30 to debrief the arms control community on the Soviet arms control proposal and plan follow-up action. I suggest that you put down a marker at the pre-brief that, while it will be important to do a comprehensive analysis of the Soviet ideas, the Administration will need to speak with one voice in giving both our public and private reactions. We do not want OSD or others issuing a preemptive response which limits our flexibility.

Bud and Art Hartman debriefed the President Thursday morning on your meeting with Shevardnadze in New York.³ Most of the discussion centered on arms control and how the President should handle the letter which Shevardnadze is bringing from Gorbachev containing

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (09/27/1985); NLR-775-14-38-2-3. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Tefft; cleared by Burton, Parris, and Palmer.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, this pre-brief took place in the Oval Office, 9:05–9:56 a.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

³ September 26. According to the President's Daily Diary, this meeting took place in the Oval Office from 10:05 to 11:06 a.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) On September 26, Reagan wrote in his personal diary: "An N.S.C. briefing for my visit tomorrow with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. I'm getting d---n sick of cramming like a school kid. Sometimes they tell me more than I need to know." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I: January 1981–October 1985, pp. 499–500)

the new Soviet arms control proposal.⁴ Since the Soviets have indicated that the letter is quite long and technical, it was agreed that the President should ask Shevardnadze to summarize it but not get into a detailed discussion. We would in any case want to see what the Soviets say about their proposal next week in Geneva before getting back to them in detail.

The President asked whether he should use tomorrow's meeting to preview his approach to the November meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva. Art Hartman and others encouraged him to do so. Bud has provided the President with a hefty package of briefing material pulled together by Jack Matlock (at Tab 1).⁵ The proposed talking points reflect broadly the material prepared for your use. You should be aware, however, that separate note cards are being done for the President which may or may not track with this material.

I suggest you use the prebrief to reinforce three points:

—As he did with Gromyko last year, the President should emphasize his desire to do serious business *if* the Soviets are ready to reciprocate.

—The President should respond to the new Soviet arms control proposal with a strong statement of his own commitment to meaningful arms control, explaining to Shevardnadze his views on the *need for deep reductions and the potential promise of SDI research*.

—The President should emphasize that while arms control is central, we *want positive movement across the board*: on regional issues (particularly Afghanistan), on the various bilateral issues that are ripe for solution, and on *human rights and emigration*, to which the President personally attaches great importance.

We have attached talking points (at Tab 2) for your use in expanding on these themes.⁶

⁴ See Document 84.

⁵ Attached but not printed.

⁶ Not found attached.

104. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Vessey) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

JCSM–334–85

Washington, September 26, 1985

SUBJECT

Nuclear Arms Control Negotiations with the Soviet Union (U)

1. (TS/S/OWL) The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly support the President's goals of deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms and the eventual establishment of deterrence based on defense rather than offense. As the President's discussions of these issues with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and General Secretary Gorbachev draw near, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe it would be helpful to set forth their assessment of certain essential military requirements.

2. (TS/S/OWL) The establishment of a deterrent posture based on defense is a goal to be reached in the future based on the work done through SDI. Until we begin to rely on defenses, we must continue to base deterrence on strategic offensive forces. Such deterrence has served us well for 40 years. A combination of the strategic forces we have today and those coming into the inventory through the President's full strategic modernization program should provide reasonable assurance that we will deter for years to come. Even before we move to deterrence based on defense, some reduction of the levels of our strategic offensive forces would be possible if the Soviets were to reduce also. There is, however, a minimum level independent of Soviet force size below which US forces would be militarily insufficient. To assure that the risk of any proposal for limiting offensive strategic nuclear forces is within acceptable bounds, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should certify whether a particular approach is militarily sufficient as directed by NSDD 160, 24 January 1985.² Of particular concern would be approaches which would result in weapon levels below those in the US START position. The level to which strategic offensive forces can be reduced is dependent upon the mix of strategic offensive and defensive

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Summit—Geneva II (3 of 3). Top Secret; Sensitive; Owl. In a September 30 covering note to Reagan, Weinberger wrote: "Mr. President: Attached is the unanimous military advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to you, with respect to any agreements on nuclear arms with the Soviet Union. Very respectfully, Cap." See Documents 92 and 97.

² For the text of NSDD 160, "Preparing for Negotiations With the Soviet Union," see *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 369.

forces. In addition, in light of the overall conventional and strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, approaches which specify continued, time-phased, offensive weapon reductions with no end point are militarily insufficient.

3. (TS/S/OWL) In the discussions with the Soviet Foreign Minister and the General Secretary and in the negotiations themselves, two military requirements must be foremost.

a. First, additional limitations on defenses should not be accepted. SDI must be protected and our right to deploy defensive systems should not be further limited. The Soviet emphasis on defense is clear. They have substantial defensive programs in existence including construction of the illegal Krasnoyarsk radar. In this regard, we must avoid a "trade" involving Soviet willingness to reduce offensive weapons for a US willingness to constrain defenses. Even at deeply reduced offensive force levels, the Soviets could inflict unacceptable damage on the United States in the unlikely event that deterrence failed. The United States must not forego its right to develop and deploy defenses in the face of such a Soviet capability.

b. Second, any limitations on the US right to modernize its forces would have grave consequences. Reductions in US strategic offensive forces emphasize the need to continue to modernize those forces. The completion of the President's strategic modernization program is essential to allow full achievement of the US START goals.

4. (TS/S/OWL) As the United States considers any Soviet proposal, the proposal should be measured against the following criteria:

a. The United States should take no action which would jeopardize the right to develop and deploy required defenses.

b. It is essential to protect modernization including completion of the President's strategic modernization program.

c. Verification should be enhanced by requiring the Soviets to comply with current agreements and change their deception and coverage practices; e.g., stop encryption on missile tests.

d. Research of all types must be protected to guarantee our continued security over time as well as to provide a hedge against Soviet cheating or breakout.

e. The forces remaining after any reductions must provide sufficient capability to maintain deterrence and, if required, implement our national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success.

In observing these standards, it is essential to maintain the support of the public, Congress, and US allies in order to protect the key elements of deterrence, not only SDI and completion of the strategic modernization program but also support for conventional forces and preservation of our alliances.

5. (TS/S/OWL) The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that you forward the views expressed in this memorandum to the President of the United States.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

John W. Vessey, Jr.
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

105. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 27, 1985, 10 a.m.–noon

SUBJECT

The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze of the Soviet Union (S/S)

PARTICIPANTS

Vice President Bush
Secretary Shultz
Donald T. Regan
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Jack F. Matlock
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Ambassador and Asst. to the FM Chernyshov
Minister Counselor Oleg Sokolov
Counselor to the FM Sergei P. Tarasenko
Mr. Pavel R. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron September 1985 (6/6). Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the memorandum of conversation. Brackets are in the original. Matlock sent the memorandum of conversation to McFarlane under a September 28 cover memorandum, requesting that McFarlane approve it. There is no indication McFarlane approved or disapproved the recommendation. On September 27, Reagan wrote in his personal diary: “into a jam session on the upcoming Shevardnadze meeting. He arrived at 10 A.M.—a 2 hr. meeting, then I had 10 min's. alone with him & then lunch (St. Dining Room) until 1:30. He's a personable fellow but we had our differences. My goal was to send him back to Gorbachev with a message that I really meant 'arms reductions' & I wasn't interested in any détente nonsense. For the 1st time they talked of *real* verification procedures.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I: January 1981–October 1985, p. 500)

The President greeted Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and led him into the Oval Office for a photo opportunity which ended at 10:10, at which time the other participants entered the room and the President opened the meeting. (U)

The President began by observing that in preparing for this meeting he had had a chance to look at how the United States is portrayed in the Soviet press. He observed that the picture is less than flattering. He said that he raised this not to make Mr. Shevardnadze uncomfortable but to make a point. This meeting and the meeting that he would have with Mr. Gorbachev in November would provide an opportunity for each of them to get a more accurate view of the other. He wanted the Soviet leadership to begin to get a true picture of who he, Ronald Reagan, is, what he stands for and what he wants to accomplish. He would like to get the same picture of Mr. Gorbachev and his colleagues. (S/S)

The President continued by pointing out that we need to get beyond stereotypes and talk frankly about our differences, to explore constructively what we can achieve together between now and November 19, and after that meeting as well. (S/S)

The President noted that when he met with Foreign Minister Gromyko last year he discussed his view of the world and our two countries' place in it.² Since Mr. Shevardnadze was familiar with what he said then he would not repeat himself but he did want to emphasize two things that he said at that time. The first is that our philosophies and political systems are very different and will remain so, but we live in one world and must handle our competition in peace. The second is that neither of us will ever allow the other a military edge, but if we are ever going to clear the air, reduce suspicions, and reduce nuclear arms, there will never be a better time. (S/S)

The President then noted some of the things which he wished to cover in his November meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. He said he wanted to discuss several points—why the Soviet Union should feel threatened by the United States when the United States has never started a war and never will. He wanted to explain why we see the Soviet military build-up and Soviet attempts to expand its influence in the world as threatening to us, and to explain that this is why the United States is rebuilding its strength. We are doing so to defend ourselves and make sure a war is never conceivable. But he also wanted to go beyond a discussion of rivalry—he would like to share with General Secretary Gorbachev our hopes and plans for our people since we both have

² See footnote 2, Document 1.

much to do at home. It might make it easier to reduce suspicion if the two of them could understand each other's priorities better. (S/S)

The President then turned to *international issues*, saying that disputes in third countries have frequently been the cause of the most serious strains between us. He pointed out that efforts during the seventies to develop understandings came apart in our view because of the Soviet Union's failure to act with restraint. When our friends are militarily threatened by the Soviets and their Allies, they ask us to help and we must respond. We will continue to do so, but we would like to end this cycle. (S/S)

The President noted that we had started discussions on several areas in the world and that he was glad we had done so. We find these exchanges useful and we will have a formal proposal to regularize these discussions. (S/S)

We must go further, however, in dealing with the problems caused by outside military involvement in regional disputes. We need to give greater thought, creative thought, to how we can remove the military element from our rivalry and he would welcome Mr. Gorbachev's thoughts on this. He then noted that there is a lot that could be said about particular issues but he would defer that until later in order to present some thoughts on arms control. (S/S)

Regarding *arms control* the President made the following points:

— Arms control is one of the most difficult of the issues before us. Frankly, we do not know if your government is serious about making progress in arms control. We are prepared to make progress; we are prepared to keep our objectives high. (S/S)

— Our two governments have underway a number of formal negotiations. In addition, the U.S. has proposed that our representatives get together soon on a number of other specific issues. I believe that what is actually achieved at these negotiations and discussions should be the basis for what General Secretary Gorbachev and I can accomplish in this area in November. (S/S)

— As a first priority, the United States seeks stabilizing and radical reductions in the levels and power of offensive nuclear arms. These are the weapons that most threaten mankind. This goal should be paramount to both of us. (S/S)

— We must also consider the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. Your country has long had a massive strategic defense program, including major improvements in your existing ABM system deployed around Moscow and your new radar at Krasnoyarsk which is in violation of the ABM Treaty. We are also seeing the upgrading of your strategic air defenses. (S/S)

— We are now conducting a research effort in the area of strategic defense technologies, as you have for years. We are morally bound to seeing whether or not strategic defenses can offer a better, safer way of maintaining the peace than is possible by the accumulation of offensive nuclear arms. (S/S)

— I have directed that our strategic defense research be conducted within the bounds of the ABM Treaty. (S/S)

— Now is the time to take a bold step by agreeing to deep cuts in nuclear forces in a manner which enhances stability. Now is the time to establish stability and begin a serious dialogue on the offense/defense relationship. (S/S)

— If we are successful then we can look forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war, perhaps based on an increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against nuclear offensive arms. (S/S)

— This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we believe the U.S., the Soviet Union and all other nations can agree. (S/S)

— I would like to underscore, in strongest personal terms, my commitment to the pursuit of arms reduction. (S/S)

— We also ought to look at other ways our senior defense and military officers can have more regular contact. We should ask our experts to explore such approaches. (S/S)

— However, we still seem to have a problem with incidents involving our military officers in Germany.³ We must insist that you take effective steps to enforce discipline on your troops so that our people are treated with the respect we show yours in Germany and lives are not threatened and no one is abused. The incident which affected our people most was the murder of Major Nicholson. This matter is not closed. (S/S)

The President then turned to *bilateral issues* noting that these are very important. He then made the following specific points:

— If we are to make real progress in solving the critical problems, we are going to have to take major steps to improve the climate. (S/S)

— We must find a way to live on this planet in peace. Doing that will be much harder if our people don't have more contact and don't have better means to communicate. (S/S)

³ See footnote 2, Document 83.

— For this reason, those issues we have under negotiation are very important. We have to make sure our negotiators get on with the talks and start producing some results. There has been too much haggling over minor points, and we have to break that pattern. (S/S)

— But, you know, even though it is important to conclude these efforts, they are not nearly enough. The fact is that our societies are dangerously cut off from each other, and we need truly major steps to improve that situation. (S/S)

— Frankly, I think our bureaucracies have not been imaginative enough in preparing for our meeting in Geneva. I have instructed our people to go back to the drawing boards and to come up with some ideas which are commensurate to the need for better communication and more cooperation. (S/S)

— I have in mind things like:

— Giving our students and young people more opportunities to meet and study together;

— Working together in an area like computer education;

— More contact between our military people;

— Joining efforts to find cures for cancer and other diseases;

— Getting some help from you in improving Russian-language instruction here. (S/S)

— I have instructed our people to develop some ideas along these lines, and will be passing them along in diplomatic channels. (S/S)

— I hope you will also be thinking of more ambitious ways to expand communication and cooperation between our societies. Tell Mr. Gorbachev that I don't think we should be limited by our cautious bureaucrats. The two of us can lead our countries to some real breakthroughs if we set that as our goal. (S/S)

The President concluded his initial presentation by saying that this is how he sees the overall picture. He regretted that he took so long, but thought it important to give Shevardnadze his thoughts on the October meeting. He then solicited Shevardnadze's views. (S/S)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze thanked the President for receiving him, and for the attention given to his visit and his delegation. He regarded the reception as an expression of the President's attitude toward his country and its leadership. Shevardnadze noted that he had seen Gorbachev before leaving Moscow and that Gorbachev sent greetings and best wishes to the President and said that he was looking forward to their meeting in November with interest and hope. (S/S)

Shevardnadze stated that he had arrived with instructions from the Soviet leadership and that he wanted to deliver to the President a letter which is quite substantial and of major importance. He did not expect an immediate reply because of the letter's length, but would

make some comment on it. He then handed the letter to the President.⁴ (S/S)

Shevardnadze then noted that there had been a recent tradition of communication between our leaders and these messages had been a positive element in our relations. He also pointed out that Mr. Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership are engaged just as the President is in serious preparation for their meeting. This meeting will be of importance to more than our two countries. In New York he had had the opportunity to meet with many Foreign Ministers, and he found that they were less interested in discussing bilateral questions than in discussing the prospects for the forthcoming meeting between the President and Gorbachev. This demonstrates that nations and governments of the world have great hope for that meeting. (S/S)

As far as the Soviets are concerned they hope that crucial questions, global questions, will be resolved at that meeting. The people of the world live in fear. They know our two countries have tremendous devastating potential and not only for each other, since we can destroy the earth and even affect the entire solar system. Shevardnadze reiterated that Gorbachev had worked hard on his message and had sought and taken the advice of his colleagues. He regards the message as a concept for the summit meeting in November. (S/S)

Shevardnadze said that Gorbachev agrees with the idea which appeared repeatedly in the correspondence that there are substantial differences between our countries, and also that many of these problems will continue to exist. There are obvious political, economic and social differences between our countries. Nevertheless he believes, like the President, that we must co-exist on this planet and learn to cooperate, and indeed mankind looks to us for such a decision. When American visitors have seen Gorbachev he has said to them, "Either we live together or die together," and he has expressed this thought in the letter. (S/S)

Shevardnadze pointed out that the prevention of nuclear war is the principal task today, and that Comrade Gorbachev believes that at the Geneva meeting the two sides could come to a mutual understanding regarding the prevention of nuclear war. Such an understanding must be based on the essential principles of the inadmissibility of military superiority on either side and the inadmissibility of encroaching on the security of either side. This was the first thought. The second was that both sides need to confirm their recognition of the need to limit and reduce nuclear arms. This can be done by terminating the arms race on earth and preventing it in space. That would make a

⁴ See Document 84.

radical improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations possible. Gorbachev thinks that we need to work for this, both before and after the summit meeting. (S/S)

What the Soviets have in mind is working on the various problems in a comprehensive way. Indeed questions of space and nuclear arms must be approached in a comprehensive way. The Soviets look at the situation as follows:

1) The prevention of the militarization of space is the road to the reduction of nuclear arms.

2) We must look for solutions in a dynamic and active way for the summit, if it is to have tangible and positive results. Stopping the arms race in its main area, the nuclear area, is essential. Shevardnadze asserted that the Soviets have stopped nuclear tests but that their moratorium is not an unlimited one. It would be good if the United States would give thought to meeting the Soviets on this issue. If we have an agreement to end nuclear tests, it would not be the final step, but a step along the way to solve the problem of preventing nuclear war. (S/S)

There has not been much progress in the Geneva negotiations. Each side says it is the fault of the other. The Soviets will be proposing a formula and a concept which could be the basis of that formula; it is in the General Secretary's letter. It involves (1) a complete ban on space strike weapons and (2) a 50% reduction of appropriate nuclear arms on both sides. (S/S)

The picture would be as follows if there could be such an agreement: Nuclear arms capable of reaching the territories of each other would be reduced. He noted that the United States has more delivery vehicles than the Soviet Union, but the Soviets are prepared to take the step because it would preserve strategic equivalence between the two countries. Equality would be assured at equal but lower numbers of nuclear weapons. [Note: The proper translation of the Russian word "zaryad" is "weapon", not "charge", as the Soviet interpreter was saying.] Both sides would have 6,000 nuclear weapons, if one assumes a base of about 12,000. This would be a practical solution to the task set for the negotiators in Geneva. (S/S)

If we could reach such an agreement, Shevardnadze continued, strategic equilibrium and stability would be assured and trust between our two countries would be established. He added that Gorbachev said in his letter that an agreement on our part would be a good stimulus for the other nuclear powers. There is a need for political will on both sides to bring this about. In connection with the agreement the following would be resolved: (1) stopping work to develop space strike systems, (2) freezing nuclear arsenals at current levels, (3) banning new types of nuclear weapons. The purpose would be to take out of

operation and dismantle an agreed number of strategic arms on both sides plus a mutual obligation not to deploy nuclear weapons in countries where there are none now deployed. In other words an agreement not to build up stockpiles and not to put new ones in where weapons are now deployed. (S/S)

Shevardnadze indicated that Gorbachev's letter also contained a few ideas regarding *medium-range missiles in Europe*, stating that the Soviet Union is prepared for the most radical reduction in their numbers and that the Soviet Union would agree not to have these weapons in a greater number than the weapons in UK and French hands, on the basis of warhead numbers. These are simply fundamental considerations on the broad questions; they obviously need to be considered by our specialists. (S/S)

Shevardnadze then referred to the President's remarks on confidence-building measures and stated that the subject matter of the *Stockholm CDE Conference* can become a part of the meeting. In outline, the picture there is that there seems to be a general understanding in three or four of the confidence-building areas. It would seem, based upon conversations with the US representative in Moscow recently, that there are no great differences in these four areas. (S/S)

Regarding the *MBFR negotiations* in Vienna, the Soviets believe that a positive solution could be found. The United States has raised verification questions and we agree that this is an important issue—we are no less interested in verification than you are. He quoted Gorbachev as saying "We are in favor of real and effective verification." He is willing to consider any comments made by the US on this matter. (S/S)

Regarding bilateral and regional problems, he proposed that we prepare a list of issues so that there can be a basis for agreement at the summit meeting in November. If the process continues in a normal manner and it is mutually desired, a concluding document for that meeting could be prepared. He added that he had presented to Secretary Shultz a general outline and that we will continue to have contact in diplomatic channels to work this out. (S/S)

Shevardnadze then turned to the President's remarks, stating that he had said much regarding the strategic defense initiative. The Soviets understand that the programs in the United States have defensive elements to them, but they believe that the militarization of space should be banned and that space strike weapons should be banned. Those arms under development have not only defensive but offensive potential. Therefore, the Soviet position is to ban all stages except for laboratory research. He thought this position had not been well understood by the Administration. In fact both sides have basic research and this will continue and the Soviets are not trying to ban that. He

then quoted from Article V of the ABM Treaty which states that “Each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM Systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based.” The provisions not to develop, test or deploy are extremely important in the Soviet view. (S/S)

The Soviets believe, he continued, that there is today a strategic equilibrium and that its basis is the SALT I and II Treaties and particularly the ABM Treaty. Other undertakings and treaties are relevant but those are the basis of our relations which must not be destroyed. Any other approach would mean a spiralling arms race, both quantitative and particularly qualitative. (S/S)

Shevardnadze then observed that they read our press just as we read their press and in the American press he had seen the idea—perhaps it was not the official US government-view, that the Soviet Union can be exhausted by competition in the arms area. Those who assert this, even hope this, are mistaken. Such people are not aware of the Soviet potential, both economic and scientific. We are against war, he added, but we are not weak. The Soviet Union can withstand competition but does not want it to happen. It is sometimes said that the Soviet Union is a totalitarian regime, he observed. We have a different view—we have in addition to economic strength a moral and political unity and this is a force no less important than that of nuclear weapons. We take pride in it. (S/S)

Regarding nuclear explosions, the Soviet Union has declared a moratorium. We expected a positive response. Instead we had a proposal to invite our representatives to observe a nuclear explosion in the United States. We did not come and this was not a capricious decision. We have sufficient scientific potential that we do not need to observe the tests to know what is going on. (S/S)

For example, since the Soviet moratorium proposal, the United States has conducted one announced nuclear test but also there was one unannounced test—it occurred on August 15th at 1700 hours GMT in Nevada. It had a power of less than two kilotons. The Soviet specialists detected this test and they have no need to come to Nevada to know what happened. You have a beautiful country, of course, which it would be nice to visit, but one can record nuclear explosions in Moscow just as well as on the spot. Instruments exist which can differentiate between earthquakes and nuclear explosions. (S/S)

In this respect he found the President’s news conference after Gorbachev’s proposal was received of considerable interest.⁵ He was inter-

⁵ On August 5, during a news conference, the President responded to a question about Gorbachev’s nuclear testing moratorium. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book II, pp. 975–976. For Gorbachev’s letter to Reagan announcing the moratorium, see Document 68.

ested in a sentence which the President uttered at that time which he did not believe was accidental. It was to the effect that the United States has a projected program and after this program is completed, can revisit the problem. He thought that a date, perhaps January, had been mentioned by the President. Subsequent to this, others have tried to re-interpret the President's remarks but he, Shevardnadze, found the words of interest. (S/S)

Shevardnadze continued by saying that he had spoken with Secretary Shultz in Helsinki about creating a good atmosphere for the meeting.⁶ This is as important as anything else. In the Soviet Union we criticize each other in a sharp manner. Therefore, it is not that we are sensitive to criticism; we are accustomed to it. But some statements made in the United States, and not only by correspondents but even by responsible American officials, seem like they are designed to be like an artillery barrage before a battle. Sometimes the arguments are not at all convincing. For example, the talk about the Soviet Union being ahead of the United States in its weaponry. At the same time American officials are saying that the Soviet Union is engaged in stealing technology from the West. There is no logic in this. Now I don't want to sound offensive but our people are offended by statements like "evil empire". When I heard that I thought the President had the old empire in mind, not the Soviet Union of today. (S/S)

Every country has its pride and identity and those things which are sacred to it. We for example would be pleased to pay tribute to George Washington—even our first-graders know about George Washington and the role he played in American history—but you know we are very much offended by some of the things that have been said about Lenin. We haven't done that sort of thing to you. Explaining historical processes that are going on in Africa, Latin America and Asia by incitement by Lenin is quite unjustified. Lenin signed the first Decree on Peace and he formulated this idea even before the Revolution. He called upon the Soviet Union to cooperate with the United States even when the United States did not recognize the Soviet Union. Many of you are religious believers—I am not—but what sort of offense to believers would it be if we denounced God. For us Lenin is sacred. In addition some of the quotations used and attributed to him are not accurate—he never said anything like that. Now, of course, any personality can be criticized, but one should take into account the opinion of people and the effect upon them. (S/S)

Now when we mention certain elements in the relationship we are not trying just to win arguments. Gorbachev's letter and his concept

⁶ See Document 71.

shows that we do not want rhetorical arguments. Such arguments would not be at all dangerous if neither of us had nuclear missiles pointed at each other, but under the circumstances it is not a desirable thing. (S/S)

In the Soviet Union everyone welcomes the statement that you want to go down in history as a peacemaking President. We sincerely believe that our own proposals are consistent with this. (S/S)

Shevardnadze then concluded by thanking the President for his hospitality. He mentioned that it was his first visit here, although he had read much about the United States and knew that the American people are a great people. He felt the people of the Soviet Union have their own qualities and would like to use these riches for the benefit of mankind as a whole. (S/S)

The President said that Mr. Shevardnadze had raised many points of interest and he would like to comment on a few of them. (S/S)

He welcomed his comments on *verification matters* observing that this was the first time in his view that such an offer had been made by the Soviet Union. He was very pleased to hear it and hoped that this would indicate a willingness of the Soviet Union to give greater attention to this area. (S/S)

As for the proposal regarding 6,000 nuclear weapons, the President noted that the U.S. proposal was for a level of 5000 missile warheads. He asked if the Soviet proposal would be presented at Geneva, observing that up to now their proposal had not been concrete enough for negotiation. Since this is the first time that they will have made a concrete proposal as opposed to general statements, he was most gratified. (S/S)

Regarding the *assertions that the United States is behind the Soviet Union in areas of military strength*, the President noted that in 1972 the United States had a slight edge regarding warheads on ICBM's. Since then the Soviet Union has gone ahead, far ahead. In fact they have a three to one advantage now in land-based missile warheads. It is true that the United States has a better balance in its triad of forces. The United States has no intention of forcing the Soviet Union to a different structure it does not desire. Counting all nuclear warheads the Soviet Union also has an advantage—about 9,000–7,000. (S/S)

In conventional forces the Soviet Union is far ahead of the United States. Furthermore, we feel that the Soviet Union is building a potentially offensive force. (S/S)

Regarding the *SALT agreements* which the Minister had referred to it has been precisely since those agreements were signed that the Soviet Union has gone ahead so decisively in the area of ICBM warheads. (S/S)

As for *space systems* we must remember that everyone knows how to make nuclear weapons today. Suppose we and the Soviet Union reduce our arsenals to zero. No one could be sure that there are no nuclear weapons in the world. For example, in 1925 when countries agreed to ban chemical weapons, they did not give up the gas mask, they kept it, and we have had experience with madmen in international relations. Nevertheless, gas was not used in World War II. It was not used because all knew the others had it and could use it against them, and because we all had gas masks. Now our Strategic Defense Initiative is a research program. It is being carried out within the framework of the ABM Treaty. If a weapon could be developed to intercept nuclear missiles, defensive systems would be like the gas mask. One would not have to worry about others having the weapon, because there would be a defense against it. If our research is successful we would not view it as necessary to deploy the system. We would sit down with you and others to discuss how it might be used. (S/S)

As far as the *militarization of space* is concerned, nuclear missiles fly through space, and this is militarization. There was once the idea of orbiting nuclear weapons, and we have agreed to ban that. But regarding defensive weapons, both countries should go ahead with research and see what is possible. Today, it is simply uncivilized to say that we can only maintain the peace by threatening innocent people. We need to find a better way and that is why we believe we need to go forward with research in this area. (S/S)

So far as his earlier reference to an “evil empire,” perhaps he was responding to charges he had heard repeatedly from the other side that we are blood-thirsty imperialists. However, the point about atmosphere is a correct one. We should do more talking to each other rather than about each other. So far as the quotations of Lenin are concerned, the point is that the idea of our ultimate destruction is inherent in his thought. We have people from every strain on earth in our population. But there is a difference: here our people can dictate to their government what it does, while in your country the people don’t have much to say about policy. But you have chosen the system you have and we have chosen another. We must live in peace and we must cooperate more. We could get together to put an end to some of the conflict in other regions. We would hope that you could find a way, for example, to withdraw from Afghanistan. This would have a very good effect on our mutual relationship. (S/S)

Shevardnadze responded that the President had mentioned certain details regarding who has more weapons and such. This is something our specialists should discuss. He had also mentioned some types of Soviet missiles but he had not mentioned cruise missiles and U.S. missiles in Europe which are strategic for the Soviet Union. But this is

not the basic question. The basic question is: will the United States abide by the ABM Treaty? If the United States wants to revise or withdraw from that Treaty it should say so forthrightly, because its announced program is incompatible with it. So far as the Krasnoyarsk radar is concerned, we (the Soviets) can also name things such as U.S. radars in the U.K. and Greenland. But this is something our specialists should discuss. The radar near Krasnoyarsk has not been turned on yet. When it is, you can come and see it, and see that it is in compliance with the ABM Treaty. (S/S)

The President returned to the matter of nuclear testing, pointing out that our instruments show that there have been Soviet tests above the 150 kiloton limit. The Soviets say that they have not tested above that limit, and have charged us with violating that limit. This was the reason for the invitation, not just to come and witness a test, but to bring instruments and to calibrate them. (S/S)

Shevardnadze said that what Gorbachev is proposing leads to a final goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. We must think of that as the final goal. Our negotiators can discuss numbers, whether it is 5,000 or 6,000, and weigh the impact of the various elements and the details. So long as there is stability one can be flexible about these things. (S/S)

The President noted we had been the only ones to put a concrete figure down. He is delighted that the Soviets intend to table some figures for our people to deal with, and he agreed that any agreement must be only a step along the way to total elimination. (S/S)

Shevardnadze agreed that any reduction should be progressive and should lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz described the problem with the radar near Krasnoyarsk. He noted that the Soviets had said it is under construction and when completed could be looked at. However, the theory of the ABM Treaty is that certain things would not be undertaken. Large phased array radars are big, they take a lot of time to build, and they are necessary for a defense of the national territory. One must complain when one sees construction which is in violation of the Treaty. It needs to be stopped, not completed. This radar is not on the periphery of the Soviet Union and pointing outward. But this all suggests that if the Soviets think this is compatible with the ABM Treaty, then we should review what we both think the Treaty means. This is what he suggested to Minister *Shevardnadze* in New York,⁷ and this is different from talking about what is in violation or not. (S/S)

Shevardnadze referred to his statement in New York and mentioned that he had discussed this with their experts in preparation for the

⁷ See Document 99.

meetings. We have discussed radars at Krasnoyarsk and in Greenland. The United States has not convinced us that Krasnoyarsk is a violation of the Treaty: it has a space tracking function. If you think otherwise, if you think this is not the fact, then the doubt must be removed, but then we must also apply this procedure to your radar in Greenland. Regarding the ABM defense in Moscow, this is legitimate in terms of the ABM Treaty. We cannot accept criticism for that. You could have a defense in Washington or New York if you wish, and that would be allright, but the points of real concern should be discussed. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz pointed out that we are not charging a violation of the ABM Treaty because of the ABM system around Moscow. But we do need a discussion of what the Treaty means and how we obtain a mix of offense and defense in our deterrent strategy. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane referred to the ABM system around Moscow and pointed out that there are restrictions in the Treaty regarding what that system can contain. Limitations regarding such matters as rapid reload capacity, mobility of its components and so on, are a part of the Treaty. Certain activities can be called into question if it seems that the Treaty is not observed. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane continued that it is right to answer these questions in Geneva, but it is also fair to ask about fundamental principles. For example, regarding the Soviet reference to a ban on all new types, it seems that this would ban U.S. new types such as midgetman and the new submarine-launched missile, but would not apply to the new Soviet systems such as the SSX-24 and SSX-25 since the Soviets do not concede that these are new systems. He also noted that the Soviet proposal refers to nuclear weapons (or "charges"), because it seems they want to count U.S. weapons which are directed against the Soviet air defense system, while the U.S. has no air defense system. If these are included, it is not a reasonable basis for a balanced agreement. Therefore, we must conclude that some elements in the Soviet proposal are an apparent attempt to achieve an imbalance in the Soviet Union's favor. (S/S)

The President pointed out that we are acting fully in compliance with the ABM Treaty. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane called attention to Agreed Statement D in the ABM Treaty. It places no prohibition on research, testing or development, only on deployment. (S/S)

Korniyenko argued that the first sentence of Agreed Statement D, "In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty," makes these agreements subordinate to Article III where there is a commitment not to deploy a nationwide system. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane pointed out that the commitment is not to deploy. (S/S)

Korniyenko then referred to Article V of the Treaty which states that “each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based.” (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane pointed out that the terms of the Treaty do not preclude the development and testing of systems based on new physical principles. This illustrates the need to talk about our interpretation of the Treaty. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz mentioned that those in the space and defense group at the Geneva negotiations have a lot to talk about. (S/S)

Korniyenko said that the Soviet negotiators will have instructions to discuss the prevention of an arms race in space. (S/S)

Shevardnadze remarked that they seem to be stealing the work of our negotiators. The Soviets have brought in a proposal which seems quite clear. It is important to establish a basic approach to these questions. The Soviets have often been reproached for having no proposals and although they have mentioned percentages for reductions they had not received a reply. Their proposal is not a demand. It is up to the United States to respond as it wishes. (S/S)

The President asked if they would be putting the proposal on the table in Geneva. (S/S)

Shevardnadze responded that, yes, they would table the proposal on Monday.⁸ He added that as he had said in New York, we could go back all the way to 1946 in assessing the situation—the whole tragedy with nuclear weapons began then. (S/S)

The President remarked that that was the period when the truth was made evident that this country has no aggressive intent toward anyone. We had an economy untouched by war damage, we had nuclear weapons—the only country in the world to have them—and we did not threaten anyone. In fact, we helped others with postwar reconstruction and did not expand our territory. Why should one think now, when we face so many weapons on the other side, we would suddenly become aggressive? (S/S)

Shevardnadze said that he mentioned 1946 not in order to criticize our cooperation in World War II, but only in regard to the postwar development of nuclear weapons. The United States used the weapon against Japan when it was clearly defeated. [At this point both Secretary

⁸ September 30.

Shultz and Chief of Staff Regan objected]. The USSR developed the weapon only after the United States did. (S/S)

The President mentioned the offer that had been made in the Baruch Plan. (S/S)

Shevardnadze said that the Soviet Union had proposed that all nuclear weapons be eliminated. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz observed that the problem is not getting people to make declarations, but to get people to agree to make concrete arrangements to carry out these declarations. He added that the President had reacted positively to *Shevardnadze's* comments on verification, because this is indeed the root of many of the problems. (S/S)

Korniyenko said that it is not correct to say that the Soviets have not made proposals on verification. He recalled the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban where an offer of on site verification was made by the Soviet negotiators. The United States broke off these negotiations. They should be resumed, in the Soviet view. (S/S)

Shevardnadze remarked that these were historic negotiations and they need to be continued. (S/S)

At this point the President noted that the time for the meeting had ended and suggested that the participants proceed to the Residence for lunch and asked that Minister *Shevardnadze* stay behind for a few minutes for a private meeting.⁹ (U)

⁹ No record of the private conversation between Reagan and *Shevardnadze* was found.

106. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 27, 1985, 12:15–1:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

President's Lunch with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The President
Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Secretary Weinberger
Secretary Baker
Donald T. Regan
Robert C. McFarlane, NSC
Assistant Secretary Rozanne Ridgway
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Ambassador Paul H. Nitze
Jack F. Matlock, NSC
Colonel Robert E. Linhard, NSC
Charles Z. Wick, USIA
Mrs. Eugenia Arensburger, Interpreter

USSR

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
Ambassador and Assistant to the Foreign Minister Albert S. Chernyshov
Counselor to the Foreign Minister Sergei P. Tarasenko
Head of Public Affairs at the Foreign Ministry Viktor B. Lomeiko
Minister Counselor Oleg Sokolov
Minister Counselor Viktor Isakov
Mr. Pavel R. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

Following some initial exchanges devoted to Hurricane Gloria and its effects on the travel of the participants, *The Vice President* mentioned

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron September 1985 (5/6). Secret; Sensitive. The luncheon took place in the State Dining Room at the White House. No drafting information appears on the memorandum of conversation. Matlock sent it to McFarlane under a September 28 cover memorandum, requesting that McFarlane approve it. There is no indication McFarlane approved or disapproved the recommendation. In his book, Matlock recalled of this lunch: "Polemics ended during lunch, when conversation was relaxed. Reagan, Shevardnadze, and the others around the table conversed with one another as fellow human beings with much more in common than the political tension between their governments would imply. A year before, when Gromyko dined in the same room, there was an overall feeling that our countries were locked in a zero-sum game. This year, that mind-set was no longer so pronounced. We were still at odds on most key issues, but somehow these disputes seemed more tractable than they had appeared a year before." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, p. 142)

that he was making a trip to China soon and solicited Shevardnadze's view of the situation there.² (C)

Shevardnadze mentioned that he had met with the Chinese Foreign Minister yesterday, who had described the changes that were going on in China. He characterized them as a generational change, and said that they were for the better. They extended mutual invitations to visit. In general, he would characterize Soviet-Chinese relations as undergoing gradual improvement, step-by-step. The Soviets, he said, want an improvement. He asked if the Vice President would be making a long trip. (S/S)

The Vice President said he would be staying four to five days. (C)

Shevardnadze asked when the Vice President was in China as Ambassador. (U)

The Vice President replied that he was there in 1974 and 1975.³ At that time our relations were better with the Soviet Union than they were with China. (U)

Secretary Shultz observed that, in developing their economy, the Chinese want to create more stability around their borders. They want modernization. (U)

Shevardnadze said that the Chinese Foreign Minister had told him that China is still a developing country. It is good that the U.S. and China are developing normal relations. (U)

The Vice President replied that an improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations is also to be welcomed. (U)

Shevardnadze remarked that in relations with some countries there is an accumulation of distrust. It takes some time to remove this. (S)

Secretary Shultz observed that the idea of economic development is not well understood. But in the last few years, the U.S. economy has developed more rapidly than most in the world. It has happened for the same reason that applies when poorer countries like China have developed rapidly: the presence of incentives. (C)

The President then spoke of his visit to a Chinese farmer on a state farm. He had described how his life had improved since he had gained the right to farm a private plot.⁴ (U)

Secretary Shultz asked whether *Shevardnadze* thought the President and Gorbachev could reach agreement in November on things like expanded student exchanges and greater cooperation in medical research, such as cancer research, as the President had suggested. (S)

² Bush traveled to China from October 13 to 18.

³ Bush was head of the Liaison Office from October 1974 to December 1975.

⁴ Reagan visited China from April 26 to May 1, 1984.

Shevardnadze replied that some of the matters were under discussion and that we should keep working on such ideas. (S)

The President called attention to Lincoln's portrait in the room, and exchanges followed with references to the American Civil War and the Civil War in the Soviet Union. (U)

Shevardnadze remarked that in Lincoln's time, U.S.-Russian relations had been good, and in fact had usually been good in our history. (U)

The President said this reminded him of the story of a wife who recalled to her husband how, when they were first married, they sat very close in the car, often with her head resting on his shoulder. The husband answered, "Well, dear, I haven't moved." (U)

The remainder of the conversation was devoted to stories and anecdotes reflecting the various ethnic groups which are present in the two countries. (U)

The lunch concluded with *Shevardnadze* thanking the President for his hospitality and toasting his health, and *the President* toasting the health of his Soviet guests. (U)

107. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 27, 1985, 6:30–10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. SIDE

Secretary Shultz

Mrs. Shultz

Interpreter E. Arensberger

SOVIET SIDE

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Mrs. Shevardnadze

Interpreter V. Churkin

During the course of the dinner Secretary Shultz said to F.M. Shevardnadze that he's known President Reagan for a long time, and that this is a man who, before he has dealings with someone, wants to "size the man up," see what kind of man this is, try to understand him. From what little he has seen of Gorbachev, the Secretary continued, he thinks that Gorbachev is the same type of person. Therefore, it is

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary's Meetings with Shevardnadze (09/24/1987) (2); NLR-775-21-40-1-3. Secret; Sensitive. The dinner took place at Shultz's residence. No drafting information appears on the memorandum of conversation.

very important that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have a chance to get together in Geneva, just the two of them (and their interpreters), in order to come to know one another. The Secretary suggested that he and Shevardnadze be instrumental in arranging such a meeting in Geneva. It need not necessarily be before the official sessions; it could be in between, or even after. But he felt very strongly that such a meeting is most important, because these two powerful men can do more for the world than any other force.

Shevardnadze agreed that Gorbachev is like President Reagan in wanting to understand, get to know, the man he is dealing with. The type of meeting the Secretary has suggested could be useful and important, but he did not have any particular ideas on time.

Shevardnadze said he has known Gorbachev for many years. He characterized Gorbachev as resourceful, strong, energetic and wanting much for his country. Gorbachev has recently been touring the country, talking to many people in all walks of life, and one message is heard everywhere—peace. The Soviet people are afraid of and do not want war. They have suffered too much from war. He said that he himself is the last of four brothers. His three older brothers died in World War II.

Personal note: Both F.M. and Mrs. Shevardnadze spoke with enthusiasm of their home in Georgia, where Shevardnadze grows his own grapes and makes his own wine, keeps honey bees, and plants his own garden. Now that they're in Moscow, Mrs. Shevardnadze said, someone else is collecting the honey and the grapes. Otherwise, Shevardnadze was not forthcoming at all on his personal interests, turning such questions into a description of the natural beauties of his native Georgia.

108. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 28, 1985

SUBJECT

My 9/27 Meeting and Dinner With Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

In my two-hour plus conversation yesterday afternoon with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, we reviewed your morning meeting, discussed arms control items at some length, and—most usefully—went through our list of regional and bilateral items. The atmosphere was good, but Korniyenko again sometimes marred the exchange by making propaganda points or pulling back Shevardnadze when we seemed to be communicating. The informal dinner later that evening gave Obie and me a good opportunity to establish personal contact with the Shevardnadzes without the interference of his staff.²

About two-thirds of the time at our afternoon meeting was taken up by arms control items, much of it a standard recitation of Soviet positions by Shevardnadze. He pushed hard on their testing moratorium, and we talked at length, although to no effect, about chemical weapons—including their use in the Iran-Iraq War. Shevardnadze also floated what purported to be a new approach on INF designed to appear more flexible than the unyielding position given in the letter to you from Gorbachev, although it was equally unacceptable. He referred to my earlier expression of interest in discussing separately any of the items at the Geneva NST if progress can be made that way—our standard position since January. He then put forward his own “interim proposal” consisting of a freeze on INF deployments and some cuts, followed by discussion of more radical reductions. This proposal will presumably be set out more fully in Geneva.

The most useful part of the discussion was a run-through of our agenda on regional, bilateral, and human rights issues. We agreed our regional discussions had not accomplished much, but nevertheless marked the start of an ability to exchange information on problems in various parts of the world. We can probably agree to regularize them

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1985. Secret; Sensitive. A typed notation in the top left-hand margin reads: “Sent to WH 9/28 pm by SWO per BMCK.” No drafting information appears on the memorandum. According to a covering memorandum to Shultz from Ridgway, attached to a draft of Shultz's memorandum, the memorandum was drafted by Pascoe and cleared by Parris and Palmer. On this draft, Shultz made extensive edits which were incorporated into this final text.

² Shultz's wife, Helena; see document 107.

for the future. We agreed to have the Central America/Caribbean talks in Washington in late October. I again raised the question of Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Soviet forces, but he did not appear interested in any real discussion.

I again offered confidential discussions on human rights issues, noting the obvious connection with trade. Shevardnadze reiterated that they were interested in discussing individual cases, but not broad principles of human rights actions by the Soviet Union. I went quickly through points on finishing up our work on civil aviation, consulates, and exchange negotiations by November, and informed him of our desire to move ahead with the Incidents at Sea talks. We both agreed that any final document from your meeting with Gorbachev should be based on the substance we have achieved, although he repeated the Soviet interest in broad formulations.

In conclusion, we agreed that preparations for your meeting in Geneva had high priority for both governments. Both sides would work hard to make the meeting as productive as possible.

At dinner, Shevardnadze agreed on the importance of you and Gorbachev having some time alone together in Geneva. He described Gorbachev to me as a man who is resourceful, strong, energetic, wants much for his country, and is acutely aware of the Soviet people's desire for peace.

109. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Papers on the Soviet Union: Soviet Instruments of Control

You have previously read two groups of papers, dealing with the sources of Soviet behavior and the problems of Soviet society. Those attached here deal with the principal instruments by which the top Communist Party leadership controls the society.²

The Soviet Union, of course, has a governmental structure which in theory is not much different from that in other countries, except that there is literally no private sector. Everything, from farms to schools to factories to banks to sporting clubs, is administered by the government. The government even has a department which oversees those churches which are allowed to operate legally. The formal government, however, though omnipresent, merely administers the country. It is in fact subordinate to the Communist Party, which uses it to implement policy the Party sets, and in fact is run by persons who are themselves Party members and subject to Party discipline. The whole country is run by a chain of "interlocking directorates" which receive decisions from above and are expected to implement them with total discipline.

The lines of real authority, therefore, run top-down from the Communist Party leadership, with the ultimate policy makers being the thirteen full members of the party Politburo. Though the Communist Party calls itself a political party, it is of course totally unlike anything we would call a political party. It is not made up of private citizens who join together to campaign and try to win elections, but of a co-opted elite group, selected on the basis of loyalty and discipline, whose function is to see to it that the policies set by the top leadership are implemented throughout the society. Even the Soviet Constitution, which sounds very liberal in theory, provides that the Communist Party

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron September 1985 (6/6). Secret. Sent for information. Drafted by Matlock. The memorandum is unsigned. A copy was sent to Bush. Matlock forwarded the draft memorandum and the attached papers to McFarlane on September 30.

² See Documents 39 and 79. Under a September 10 covering memorandum to Shultz, McFarlane forwarded six papers and wrote: "They were put together by Jack Matlock with input from INR and CIA analysts. Though they are not particularly sensitive in themselves, the fact that they were used for briefing the President is, and I would appreciate your holding them closely." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron September 1985 (1/6))

will be the “leading core” of all organizations, whether governmental or “non-governmental.” Not even a sporting society or a chess club can be organized without the sufferance and supervision of Communist Party officials.

The paper at Tab A describes how the Communist Party is organized and how it applies its control to the society.³ Over the decades of communist rule in Russia, a new controlling elite has formed under Communist Party auspices, usually called the *nomenklatura*: those persons who occupy supervisory, influential or prominent positions, and whose appointment therefore requires the approval of higher party authority.

The *nomenklatura* forms the privileged class in the Soviet Union, those who enjoy a significantly higher standard of living than their compatriots, and also the trappings and perquisites of authority. It shows a tendency of becoming hereditary, since members use their connections to get their children into the best schools and into *nomenklatura* jobs. It also has an international aspect, since similar elite classes have been created in those countries under Soviet domination, with the result that—for example—the *nomenklatura* in Czechoslovakia tends to identify its interests with the *nomenklatura* of the Soviet Union, not with their fellow Czechs and Slovaks. (It is a bit like the aristocracy in seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe, which tended to support each other across national boundaries if there was a challenge from within to the rule of the aristocracy.) The paper at Tab B describes how it is organized and how it operates in the Soviet Union.⁴

In many ways, the Soviet Union is run more like an organized criminal organization in the West than like a government. Using this analogy, one can say that if the Party forms the control elite, the secret police (KGB) and the military are its “enforcers,” the first in a direct sense, and the second as a reserve if things ever threaten to get out of hand. Both institutions are totally controlled by the Communist Party, and provide the muscle if physical coercion is required. Papers describing these two institutions are at Tabs C and D.⁵

³ Tab A, “The Communist Party of the Soviet Union,” is attached but not printed.

⁴ Tab B, “Nomenklatura: The USSR Patronage System,” is attached but not printed.

⁵ Tab C, “The Soviet Political Police,” and Tab D, “The Soviet Military,” are attached but not printed.

Recommendation

That you read the papers attached as general background for your upcoming meeting with Gorbachev.⁶

⁶ Reagan did not indicate his approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

110. Information Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (McNeil) to Acting Secretary of State Whitehead¹

Washington, September 30, 1985

SUBJECT

Gorbachev's Drive to Improve the Soviet Economy

Policies to revive the Soviet economy confront an array of deep-seated problems, including:

—The lack of incentives and rewards for initiative and competence, resulting in a passive work force that has little enthusiasm for raising productivity.

—The need to exploit increasingly remote and poor quality raw materials, whose inefficient development and use stem from price distortions and a cumbersome planning system.

The attached Issues Paper maps out Gorbachev's emerging economic strategy, explores his chances for improving economic performance, and touches on what success or failure might mean.

Strategy—The Tried and True. Gorbachev has not gone Chinese; he is not introducing market socialism, nor contemplating changes in pricing policy. He concentrates on making the existing system work.

—The Policy Fix. Emphasize planning to enhance “intensive” growth and concentrate investment in priority areas.

—The Technology Fix. Introduce hi-tech and automation to key civilian sectors in industry.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 NODIS and EXDIS Secretariat Memorandums, Lot 94D92, Exdis September 1985. Confidential. Drafted by J.T. Danylyk (INR/EC/CER); cleared by I.N. Belousovitch (INR/SEE). A stamped notation indicates Whitehead saw the memorandum on October 1.

- The Management Fix. Provide greater independence and responsibility to enterprises, and give managers *real* incentive for performance.
- The Administrative Fix. Replace deadwood and streamline the bureaucracy, especially in industry.

None of these fixes can produce startling gains, but taken together they could sustain a gradual improvement in economic performance. To the extent that programs succeed, conflicts over military and civil claims on resources would ease. Failure would require Gorbachev to make tough resource allocation choices.

Attachment

Issues Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research²

Washington, undated

GORBACHEV'S CHANCES FOR IMPROVING THE SOVIET ECONOMY

Since becoming General Secretary in March 1985, Gorbachev has made clear that his priority task is to revive the Soviet economy. Its relatively poor performance over the past decade has the leadership worried that a problem-plagued economy will jeopardize the USSR's strategic interests over the longer term. To get the economy back on a fast track, Gorbachev has launched a wide-ranging program that addresses its major shortcomings. His program leaves room for some enlargement of the private sector—principally for providing food and consumer services to the population—but focuses on advancing the technological base of the economy and improving planning and management. We see no evidence that Gorbachev is contemplating systemic changes along the lines of market socialism, or changes in the present system of administered prices. In his search for economic efficiency he is looking for a self-regulating mechanism with which the center can maintain control.

Gorbachev's Economic Strategy

Gorbachev outlined the major elements of his strategy—a mix of policy and administrative changes—in his June 11 speech on science

² Secret; Exdis.

and technology.³ He plans to move on four fronts, seeking shifts in investment policy, application of new technology, changes in administrative controls, and better management.

Gorbachev's goal, which has eluded his predecessors, is for the economy to achieve a fundamental improvement in productivity growth so that it can simultaneously meet the USSR's perceived needs for increased investment and defense spending and higher living standards. He hopes to accomplish this by accelerating the modernization of Soviet industry—specifically by focusing on retooling existing capacities at the expense of new capital construction, by continuing Andropov's campaign to heighten labor discipline, and by improving economic management.

1. *Change in Investment Policy.* Gorbachev rejected the draft Five Year Plan for 1986–90 in his June address, instructing the planners to provide for the transition to “intensive” growth and to concentrate investment in priority areas—especially in machine building. He said that continuation of the old, “extensive” growth strategy would require increases in the output of fuels and raw materials, capital investment, and the labor force that were not possible.

2. *Emphasis on Science and Technology.* The key to Gorbachev's “intensive” growth strategy is the mass infusion of advanced science and technology into the economy. Specifically, he sees the acceleration of technological development as the means not only for raising the level and quality of output, but also for achieving economies in the production process itself. These savings—as distinct from reduced costs associated with more efficient management—would include reduced consumption of factory inputs associated with design improvements, use of new, more energy-efficient machinery, and increased automation. Gorbachev hopes to implement his S&T policy with a strengthened incentive system, which would reward innovative managers who successfully introduce new technology into the production process. He

³ In telegram 7871 from Moscow, June 12, the Embassy reported: “In a lengthy speech to a special high level meeting on science and the economy on June 11, Gorbachev discussed a much broader range of economic issues than suggested by the conference's stated topic. Speaking in the blunt and forceful style which has become his trademark, the General Secretary criticized Party organizations, ministries, the national economic bureaucracy, and local leaders for pursuing parochial interests, failing to implement changes, and wasting resources. The particular harshness of Gorbachev's attacks on the ministries raises the political stakes. By throwing down the gauntlet to several individual ministers (and perhaps indirectly to Tikhonov as well), Gorbachev may lose credibility if the individuals are not removed.” The telegram continued: “The General Secretary also gave the clearest outline yet of his thinking on key economic policy questions in the 12th Five-Year-Plan including accelerating growth rates, increasing investment in machine building, and raising the share of investment in reconstruction of existing enterprises.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850414–0021)

also is putting increased emphasis on upgrading the quality of S&T personnel through improved training and better salaries. Borrowing from Brezhnev, Gorbachev plans to apply to civilian industries the lessons learned in defense industries on management techniques and advanced technologies.

3. *Expanding the Economic Experiment.* In its second year, the economic experiment providing greater independence and increased responsibility to enterprises has become one of Gorbachev's major vehicles for implementing change. Now embracing some 12 percent of industrial production, the experiment is to be extended in January 1986 to all machine-building and consumer-related ministries—those ministries upon which so much depends for modernizing the economy and for attracting and sustaining popular support for the program. This would bring 50 percent of industrial output into the new system. All of industry is to be under the new system in 1987, according to some reports.

A recent managerial reorganization at the Ministry of Instrument Manufacturing introduces important modifications. It reduces the number of plan indicators used to evaluate performance, eliminates an entire layer of management between the ministry and the enterprises, and establishes new scientific production associations to bridge the gap between research and production. Measures allowing enterprises to retain a sizable portion of their ruble and hard currency profits also are to be introduced in a number of enterprises to promote their financial independence and encourage production for exports. The Soviets may be placing additional hope on the latter given the dim prospects for expanded energy exports, which now account for more than half of the USSR's hard-currency earnings.

4. *Streamlining the Bureaucracy.* Gorbachev often has stated the need to eliminate unnecessary bureaucratic layers in the economy. His first significant step in this direction was the experiment introduced at the Ministry of Instrument Manufacturing and touted as a model for the rest of the economy. It eliminates the industrial associations which ironically were introduced in the 1960s to promote efficiency by grouping together related enterprises under a single management. Another major streamlining possibly in the works involves the combining of three entire agricultural ministries and portions of two others into a single, super ministry. If successfully implemented, this too could become a model for the rest of the economy. An obvious candidate is Gosplan itself, where a leaner organization might focus on strategic economic planning rather than remain enmeshed in minute detail. This would be consistent with efforts to grant the enterprises more independence and responsibility, particularly in the area of planning. It would, however, increase the risk of plan imbalances which would have to be bucked upward for resolution.

Assessing Gorbachev's Chances

Gorbachev is relying on orthodox Soviet methods to get the economy back onto a fast track. Indeed, the selective implementation of better technology and practices in bottleneck sectors, appointment of more competent managers, and continuation of the discipline campaign should lift the economy in the short run. However, Gorbachev is likely to be frustrated in his longer-run search for efficiency—as were his predecessors—so long as his efforts to find the proper mix between central control and enterprise independence precludes a role for market forces.

Even under the best of circumstances it would take time to implement Gorbachev's programs. While he lambasted Brezhnev's regime for its inactivity, he clearly wants to avoid rushing forward with well-intentioned but ill-conceived measures to revitalize the economy. Indicators of Gorbachev's success—in addition to continued gains from the discipline campaign—will be his ability to take timely corrective action to keep reform on track. The recent decree on moving enterprises toward financial self-sufficiency suggests that he has a talent for this. But the catalyst to S&T progress—microelectronics, computer technology, instrument making, and the whole of information science—is precisely the area in which the USSR significantly lags behind the West. On balance, very little—if anything—being tried now is new. Gorbachev may be more determined and resourceful than his predecessors, and that might be the decisive difference.

What Success or Failure Could Mean

In a May 17 speech, Gorbachev said that national income would have to grow by a minimum of 4 percent annually to avoid cutting back on programs aimed at raising living standards.⁴ Hardly a month later, he called the USSR's social and military programs untouchable. Given the constraints on investment capital and labor, the Soviets need productivity increases to meet their overall targets. To the extent that

⁴ In telegram 6768 from Moscow, May 22, the Embassy reported: "The May 22 *Vremya* newscast carried in full a major address delivered by Gorbachev on May 17 in Leningrad's Smol'nyy Institute. While the substance of the speech indicates that Gorbachev is still biding his time before offering concrete new programs for the economy, it nevertheless served to sharpen the sense of his impatience and dissatisfaction with the current economic situation. In the short run, while banking on such staples as squeezing reserves through greater discipline, thrift, and better use of science and technology, Gorbachev's major goal appears to be continuing and accelerating personnel turnover. If Gorbachev does succeed in coming months in 'getting out of the way' substantial numbers of those who oppose change, he may then be in a position to flesh out an action program for the economy. For now, Gorbachev's televised tour de force at the Smol'nyy Institute demonstrated his impressive abilities to 'sell' his ideas to the Soviet public." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850362-0486)

Gorbachev is successful in raising productivity and quality of output, he will lessen the hard choices on allocating resources among investment, defense, and consumption. Four-percent growth would even allow a slight acceleration in defense spending without cutbacks in investment and consumer programs. Failure would require Gorbachev to make tough resource allocation choices and manage the accompanying negative fallout.

111. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 1, 1985

SUBJECT

Sensitive Planning for Your Meeting With Gorbachev (S)

You have recognized for some time that in order to reach agreement with the Russians on some of the more sensitive issues (human rights cases, one or two bilateral matters and arms control) it would be necessary to establish direct communications with Gorbachev. You have taken the initiative twice to do so. Two years ago you asked Brent Scowcroft, who was on a trip to Moscow with a private group, to carry a message to Andropov.² Gromyko sabotaged that effort. Then last week in your one-on-one with Shevardnadze you proposed that such a direct channel be established.³ There are one or two signs that the Russians are taking this effort seriously. This memo summarizes these signals and makes recommendations for how you might want to have the US end of the dialogue handled. (S)

While in New York last week for the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting, I had dinner with Henry Kissinger. Henry had been contacted by Arbatov—the Academician who heads the USA Institute.⁴ They met

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Sensitive Chron 1985 (1); NLR-362-7-39-6-4. Secret; Eyes Only.

² See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 193.

³ See footnote 9, Document 105.

⁴ On September 23, Kissinger reported to Charles Hill on his meeting with Arbatov. In the memorandum of conversation, Kissinger stated: "Our talk was so out of the ordinary that I thought I should report it to the Secretary right away." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Eggplant II, September–December 1985 NP)

for an hour before Arbatov went back to the Soviet Union. According to Kissinger, Arbatov was speaking from a written brief and appeared to be under instruction from Gorbachev. His purpose was to probe for the basis for a compromise. It was interesting that he chose Kissinger who, as you may know, had just written perhaps the strongest defense of the need to keep SDI (published in the Post) of anything yet to appear.⁵ Arbatov wanted to know “. . . what do the Americans want . . . on arms control. . . ?” While disclaiming any authority to speak for the Administration Kissinger laid down two markers as “personal views.” (S)

—The Soviet Union cannot expect the US President to live with conditions in which the USSR maintains a first strike capability and the US has no corresponding offensive deterrent (which is the case today). (S)

—Nor can the Soviet Union expect the US to discontinue its strategic defense program, faced with the massive Soviet programs in both offense and defense. (S)

After some further probing, Arbatov focussed upon what possible outcome might be acceptable to you. Kissinger again disclaimed any authority to speak for you but said in his personal judgment, a joint statement which treated both offense and defense such as the following, would be the minimum that any President would need to insist upon. (S)

(With respect to Offense) Both parties would commit publicly to concluding within (6 months, or one year) an agreement providing for the reduction by both sides of ballistic missile warheads to a level of 5000 (give or take a thousand) with corresponding reductions in bomber systems. (S)

(With respect to Defense) Both parties would commit to engage promptly on a detailed exchange of views on the relationship between offense and defense with a view toward establishing how this relationship ought to be managed in the coming years (with the clear prescription that research and testing would be allowed). (S)

Arbatov stated that “I think we could come to terms on something like that.” This was an interesting exchange. One has to ask about Arbatov’s bona fides. It is not yet clear where he stands vis-a-vis Gorbachev. He was prominently present during the Time interview but he has a lot of detractors both in the government and the party. He may be trying to establish a basis for currying favor with Gorbachev, but a Kissinger connection would not necessarily accomplish that. If ulti-

⁵ Henry A. Kissinger, “We Need Star Wars,” *Washington Post*, September 8, 1985, p. C8.

mately you decide to establish a private channel, I would not recommend that it be through Kissinger. (S)

A second interesting signal came after your meeting with Shevardnadze. Dobrynin contacted me Friday afternoon to ask what you intended in suggesting the private channel.⁶ He was no doubt angling for us to propose that he be the Russian point of contact. I demurred on how they would handle their side of it but said simply that you could envision that the several ongoing bilateral negotiations—not just arms control—might hit snags and that if so, it would be useful to have a means to quickly elevate the problem to the two leaders for resolution. I added that we would await their response and that you would decide how we would engage if they showed any interest. But the prompt show of interest reflects something new on their side. (S)

At this point we are in a waiting stance; Gorbachev could decide to propose various channels. It is likely that they will measure your seriousness toward the effort by the degree in which our side includes participation of individuals seen to be clearly representative of your thinking. In addition it will be important that the individual be knowledgeable in the technical matters to be discussed. You can choose from a number of candidates. In the arms control area Paul Nitze is probably the most experienced, although were he to go alone, the Soviets might see that as a downgrading of its importance. So you might choose to send Paul plus someone else. There are many options. I will discuss this with George Shultz and together we will make recommendations at the appropriate time. (S)

As a final point Mr. President, it will be imperative that this channel be absolutely private. This past Saturday the papers carried the details of the new Soviet proposal and it is my strong belief that the leak came directly from among your senior staff here in the White House.⁷ Consequently I have discussed this with no one and would propose that your final decision not be shared with anyone beyond the Vice President and the Secretary of State. (S)

You may wish to destroy this memo.

⁶ September 27.

⁷ On September 28, several news articles reported on the Soviet arms control proposal. Presumably McFarlane's reference is to Bernard Weinraub's article, "Soviet Reported to Offer 50% Cut in Nuclear Arms." (*New York Times*, September 28, 1985, p. 1) While the *Washington Post* and *Los Angeles Times* also reported on the new proposal, Weinraub's article repeatedly quoted an unnamed "administration official" and provided more particular details.

112. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Courtney) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)¹

Washington, October 2, 1985

SUBJECT

The Soviet Arms Control Proposal

Following are my personal thoughts on the Soviet proposal, elaborated in NST Geneva 9029.²

At the end of his "TIME" Magazine interview Gorbachev made perhaps his most revealing public comment to date on Soviet foreign policy:

"I don't remember who, but somebody said that foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy. If that is so, then I ask you to ponder one thing: If we in the Soviet Union are setting for ourselves such truly grandiose plans in the domestic sphere, then what are the external conditions that we need to be able to fulfill those domestic plans? I leave the answer to that question to you."

Gorbachev appears to be saying that major changes in Soviet foreign policy—which has been rigid and harsh toward the West, and unsuccessful—are needed to bring it into better synch with the domestic priorities of revitalizing the economy and raising Soviet morale. If so, his penchant for tackling domestic problems head on suggests he might also take a direct approach to external problems. Soviet leaders claim the central one is arms control.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, 1985 NODIS and EXDIS Secretariat Memorandums, Lot 94D92, NODIS September 1985. Secret; Sensitive. In an October 2 covering note to Shultz, Armacost wrote: "Attached is a memo written by Bill Courtney giving his personal thoughts on the new Soviet arms control proposal. Bill is quite knowledgeable about arm control issues and has served in our Embassy in Moscow. I thought you might be interested in reading it." In telegram 303840 to USUN for Armacost, October 2, Courtney noted: "I met with CIA analysts at Langley this morning to discuss the Soviet proposal. Their views are broadly consistent with those I sent you on Monday evening." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Eggplant II, September–December 1985 NP)

² In telegram 9029 from the NST Delegation in Geneva, September 30, the delegation summarized the primary portions of the Soviet arms control proposal, which the Soviet delegation had tabled that day. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850693–0396) The full Soviet statement was transmitted to the Department in telegram 9098 from NST Geneva, October 1. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850698–0517)

A Bad Deal?

Were it not for these broader considerations of Soviet policy, and an expectation that the USSR will fall off a number of its demands, the new Soviet NST proposal would seem unworthy of U.S. interest:

—Unequal Intercontinental Forces: Their INF forces (SS-20, SS-22, Backfire, Badger, Blinder) would not count against the 6,000 ceiling on charges, but our Pershing, GLCM, F-111, F-4, and F-16 in Europe, and A-6 and A-7 on aircraft carriers would count, leaving us with fewer weapons than the Soviets for intercontinental attack.

—Dangerous INF Imbalance in Europe: The U.S. could deploy no GLCMs, yet the USSR could retain 1,200 or so SS-20 warheads to offset British and French SLBMs.

—Bomber Penetrativity Jeopardized: The U.S. would get no advantage in bomber weapons (SRAM and gravity bomb) to offset unrestricted Soviet air defenses; also, ALCMs would be banned, thus jeopardizing the penetrativity of our remaining B-52 bombers and of the B-1 bomber in future years.

—SDI and ASAT Killed: The SDI research and ASAT programs would be stopped in their tracks.

—U.S. Offensive Modernization Prevented: The U.S. could not deploy new, more capable and more survivable weapons systems, such as the Trident D-5 and Midgetman missiles, nor nuclear-armed SLCMs.

—Soviet Offensive Modernization Preserved: The USSR could deploy the new SS-X-24 and SS-X-25 ICBMs and SS-NX-23 SLBM since they have been flight tested (D-5 and Midgetman have not); it could also deploy a new SS-18 follow-on ICBM, which the Soviets would call modernization of an existing system, not a new type.

—No Guaranteed Stabilizing Reductions: The Soviets could (but are unlikely to) keep all their hard-target-kill SS-18s, with 3,080 warheads.

Traditional Soviet Motives

Motives for this proposal seem rooted in the USSR's traditional approach to arms control:

—an urge to use arms control to improve Soviet military capabilities relative to those of the U.S.;

—a perception that arms control can lead to better East-West relations which in turn can improve Soviet access to western economic and technological resources, increase the prestige of the Soviet Union and its leadership, and, consequently, raise domestic morale;

—a drive to decouple the U.S. from European security, and to gain nuclear superiority in the Eurasian military theaters, especially Europe;

—a compulsion to have substantial, prompt hard-target-kill forces for large-scale preemptive strikes, and active programs for air and

missile defenses, so as to be able to cripple U.S. military potential and national resolve, and protect the motherland from nuclear devastation;

—a fear that U.S. advantages in high technology could upset the military balance in the future;

—an incentive to limit U.S. hard-target-kill capability (in the D-5 missile), so as to enhance the survivability of similar Soviet capabilities, concentrated in the vulnerable, silo-based SS-18.

What's New?

What is new in the Soviet proposal is a willingness to reduce intercontinental attack weapons to as low as 6,000. Because of their conservative strike planning requirements, the Soviets seek nuclear forces with large numbers of weapons. But the new proposal would require them to reduce the number of warheads on ballistic missiles. For example, the 3,600 Soviet ICBM warheads (60 percent of 6,000) might be allocated to 1,800 SS-18 warheads (enough for two-on-one targeting against the remaining U.S. hard targets), and 1,800 SS-24 and SS-25 warheads, some of which would serve as a reserve of prompt ICBM capabilities.

The Soviets may be willing to cut their SS-18 force by about one-third for several reasons—the U.S. would probably reduce its number of ICBM silos (i.e., targets) under the new arrangement, and more accurate SS-18, SS-24, and SS-25 follow-on ICBMs will reduce the need for redundant targeting.

A Reason for Optimism?

Soviet interest in radical reductions in strategic warheads offers ground for modest optimism:

—A meaningful reduction in nuclear capabilities may have become a political imperative in the East as well as in the West. The Soviet political leadership has made a bold decision, a sharp departure from past positions which sought to preserve well over 10,000 warheads for Soviet strategic forces. The difficulty of making this decision may indicate Gorbachev's commitment to achieving arms control progress, and perhaps the political pressures in Moscow that may allow further Soviet concessions as the negotiations gain momentum.

—As Ogarkov's May 1984 article hinted, the Soviet military may now want nuclear reductions in order to free more resources for high-technology conventional forces, and to reduce the risk of NATO escalation to nuclear conflict in Europe.³

³ Nikolai Ogarkov, "The Defense of Socialism: The Experience of History and the Present Day," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 9, 1984, p. 3.

Still Grounds for Pessimism

Despite Soviet interest in reductions, the new proposal offers plenty of reason for pessimism. For example, the negotiations cannot progress unless the Soviets drop outright their frivolous demands, such as a ban on cruise missiles, a ban on modernizing strategic forces, and a ban on all SDI research (a demand Gorbachev appeared to concede in his "TIME" interview) and on our ASAT program. Past experience suggests these demands will eventually fall away. But for the moment they may represent a military wish list.

If these problems are overcome, the talks may center on several divisive issues:

—Europe: While in SALT I and II the Soviets dropped their demands for inclusion of forward based forces, they are unlikely to do so this time. The new U.S. INF missiles and new MIRVed British and French submarine missiles will give NATO upwards of 1,700 missile warheads by the mid- to late-1990s. Only a fraction of these warheads could destroy most worthwhile targets in the western USSR. The Soviets will insist on some compensation. A walk-in-the-woods-type formula (which would allow 225 Soviet SS-20 warheads in Europe and somewhat more in Asia, while restricting the U.S. to 300 GLCM warheads in Europe) might be barely acceptable to the Soviets. They could well, however, stick on a harder position.

—Bombers: We will insist on treating slow-flying bomber weapons, which face air defenses, differently from fast-flying ballistic missile weapons. Equal limits on bombers would give us some advantage, however, because of the greater payload of U.S. bombers. The Soviets will refuse to treat Backfire the same as B-1, and, in view of the new findings on Backfire range, we probably will have to find a way to count it as a theater rather than strategic aircraft. OSD will resist, however, citing the Backfire's capability for one-way missions.

—Stabilizing Reductions: We will want guaranteed Soviet cuts in SS-18s of more than 100, and cuts in ICBM warheads to below 3,500. With flexibility on both sides a compromise might be reached, though OSD will fight for impossible-to-get cuts.

—SDI and ASAT: In view of the President's recent comments, it is unclear whether he would agree to hold the SDI program to the research phase for a long period of time. Bill Beecher's⁴ eastern source recently floated the idea that the Soviets might ask that it be held to research for only 5–10 years, as a price for an offensive agreement. The Soviets will seek to kill our ASAT miniature vehicle program, but may

⁴ Reporter for the *Boston Globe*.

settle for nothing, or a high-altitude ASAT test ban (we have no plans to develop a high-altitude ASAT).

The Future

It is too early to predict where each side will come out on these difficult issues. We may also not know for some time the magnitude of the Soviet leadership's commitment to achieving meaningful arms control. Even if a sea change in Soviet thinking has occurred—and we should not presume it has—past Soviet negotiating style teaches us that the haggling will be painful and protracted. Like us, the Soviets will not make most of the political decisions needed to get an agreement until they are forced to do so. No one can predict how those decisions will come out.

At the same time, the new signs of Soviet willingness to put its money where its mouth is on radical reductions reflect a change from the immobilism that has gripped Kremlin decisionmaking in recent years. We should test the new Soviet approach with serious dialogue, and counterproposals of our own. For example, a possible counter might include 5,000 ICBM and SLBM warheads (our current position), a limit of 60 percent on any one leg and 150 heavy ICBMs, 100 strategic bombers, and a walk-in-the-woods formula for INF. This would bring deep cuts in ballistic missile warheads, reduce Soviet hard-target-kill capabilities, preserve some U.S. advantage in bomber payload, and allow us a substantial INF deployment in Europe.

113. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 3, 1985

SUBJECT

Response to Soviet Arms Proposals

Your arms control policy has been successful in bringing the Soviets to the bargaining table, and now in eliciting the first Soviet proposal for real reductions. As expected, their proposal is one-sided and self-

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Geneva Meeting: Arms Control Negotiations 11/19/1985–11/20/1985 (1/2). Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System.

serving, and cannot be the basis for an equitable agreement.² We must be prepared for difficult and protracted negotiations.

The Soviet proposal is obviously designed for public appeal. It gives the impression of being comprehensive and equitable. It appears to provide equal reductions in warheads by 50 percent, and to give the United States an advantage in the number of weapon systems, even though in fact it does not do either. It will take astute, forceful and carefully coordinated handling by all of us to highlight for our public and allied publics the unacceptability of the Soviet proposals.

I believe that in addition to a vigorous campaign to counter their propaganda, this is the time to advance a U.S. counter-counterproposal along the lines you and I and Bud have discussed. Such a U.S. proposal is described in my memorandum of September 19, and in the Support Group paper of September 24.³ The combination of strategically significant reductions and reversal of the erosion of the ABM Treaty would be a strong and defensible position. It would permit the SDI program to continue as planned, and preserve the option for a cooperative, or a non-cooperative, transition to greater reliance on defense.

It would be to our advantage to advance our counter-counterproposal in a prompt response to Gorbachev, and in parallel through our negotiators in Geneva, during the current round. The U.S. proposal could then serve as the basis for your discussions with Gorbachev. Otherwise, while you are trying to bring new life to U.S. proposals which have been on the table for over two years, the focus of those discussions would be on the Soviet proposals.

² See Document 112.

³ See Documents 93 and 97.

114. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, October 12, 1985

SUBJECT

Conversation with Stanislav Menshikov: Private Contacts and Geneva Meeting

Menshikov came in at 11:00 and we had a conversation which went on for over four hours, with several interruptions.² (The interruptions occurred because he had to cash some traveller's checks; I drove him out to the American Express office near Bethesda (the nearest one we could find open), and then took him to lunch at a Chinese Restaurant at H and 18th.) Our conversation was reasonably orderly, despite the interruptions, but neither of us took notes. I will group his observations by topic, even though the comments in some cases were interspersed in our conversation in a different order. *Both of us made clear at the outset, and reiterated occasionally, that we were not speaking on the basis of instructions but were conveying informally our own personal views of the various topics that came up.*

Private Channel:

Menshikov began the conversation by saying that he had no specific message, but that Gorbachev had taken note of the President's comment to Shevardnadze about the need for more direct and private communication. Gorbachev agreed, but wondered what we had in mind: specifically how did we want to arrange it and what did we want to talk about? Menshikov added that this was an important matter not only for the period leading up to the Geneva meeting, but could be useful during the meeting itself. He said that when Gorbachev was in Paris, there was an arrangement whereby just after each meeting, personal

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron October 1985 (5/12). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for the System. All brackets are in the original. Poindexter wrote in the top right-hand margin: "Very interesting! JP." McFarlane sent the memorandum to Reagan under a handwritten October 14 covering note: "Attached is a report of a long (4-hr) conversation between Ambassador Jack Matlock—my Soviet expert—and a leading Soviet party official. It provides a fascinating insight into current Kremlin (party) thinking which I take to be very plausible. Some of the hints on arms control are not far from some concepts I have developed on a close-hold basis. Due to its sensitivity perhaps you could return it to me directly on Tuesday. No other copies exist. V/R—Bud." (Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1985 (10/3/1985–11/18/1985)) Tuesday was October 15.

² Menshikov was a consultant for the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee who specialized in economics and the United States.

representatives of each met privately to discuss the preceding session, seek clarification of points not clear, and exchange views on what might be covered at the next session. (He did not name the persons involved, but I inferred that it was either Alexandrov or Zagladin on the Soviet side and possibly Verdrine on the French.)

He then said that he did not expect precise answers or specific proposals. However, if I had any comments that might guide their thinking, he would convey them to Zagladin orally on Monday,³ and that Zagladin would pass them on, also orally, to Gorbachev. He added that there would be a Central Committee plenum Tuesday, primarily to deal with issues related to the Party Congress, but also possibly for “organizational changes.” This means that both Zagladin and Gorbachev will be tied up Tuesday, and Zagladin leaves for the SI meeting in Vienna on Wednesday. However, he thought he might have some sort of reaction next week.

I told him that I thought the President felt that private consultations could be useful across the board of the various issues facing us. Frankly, we are having some problem determining just what Gorbachev’s aims are, and this makes it difficult to make sure that our own moves are given the connotations we intend. The President wants their meeting in Geneva to achieve as much as it can, yet it seems to us that the Soviet approach is still largely propagandistic. But we don’t want to jump to negative conclusions. The President genuinely wants to start solving some problems, and if some private consultation will help, he is all for it. As for the idea of having representatives consult quietly between sessions in Geneva, I said that this was an interesting idea and that I would pass it on to you, but refrained from either encouraging or discouraging it. Menshikov said that he understood perfectly, and indeed was not making a concrete proposal, only floating an idea.

Menshikov then asked whether we could use Dobrynin as Kissinger had; this had worked in the past and they were not sure why we opposed it now. (He added that he was not arguing for this arrangement; he only wanted to be in a position to explain why we did not find it satisfactory.) I told him that I doubted that we could accept Dobrynin as the sole interlocutor. For us it was a matter of reciprocity and of insuring that the communication is as direct as possible. The principle of reciprocity would require us to insist that Hartman have the same access to Soviet decision makers as Dobrynin does with ours. But we also see utility in having persons who occupy roughly comparable positions in the decision-making process on each side talk directly.

³ October 14.

This could speed up communication and permit greater frankness, informality and confidentiality.

[NOTE: I did not at the time know of Gorbachev's letter—which was delivered to Woessner after Menshikov had left.⁴ He did not refer to it directly, but I believe his question about Dobrynin stemmed from his knowledge that they were likely to make this proposal and also realized that it probably would not be acceptable to us.]

Menshikov asked who on our side might be in a position to conduct such a dialogue. I told him that this had not been decided; that we would try to find an appropriate counterpart if Gorbachev is interested and indicates whom he would like to use. I added that, in my personal view, there are several U.S. officials who might be used. Regarding arms control, Nitze is the obvious candidate. As for the other issues, persons like Ridgway, Palmer and myself are sufficiently close to the policy-making process and sufficiently discreet to be used in the process if so designated. Menshikov commented that "for some reason" some Soviet officials were negatively disposed toward Palmer, but he didn't know why or whether the view was held strongly enough to make any difference. (I told him that any negative view of Palmer is quite mistaken; he is honest, discreet and genuinely committed to solving problems if we can.)

Menshikov also asked how such contacts could be arranged logistically, in order to minimize the number of persons who are witting. I suggested that, if the idea was approved on both sides, Geneva might be an appropriate locale since officials on both sides have good reasons to visit there periodically in advance of the meeting. He agreed that this seemed the most workable arrangement.

As we were discussing these matters, Menshikov apologized for the snafus in the past. Regarding the Scowcroft mission last year, he said that Zagladin thought he had it wired, but that when Gromyko was approached, he put the kibosh on it.⁵ Gromyko also turned down the proposal for special representatives on arms control. Chernenko, he said, was unwilling or unable to assert himself on these matters, but "things are different now." Gorbachev, he claimed, understands the utility of direct communication and is eager to do something. Gromyko is now out of the picture. Though Gorbachev works closely with Shevardnadze and will doubtless keep him in the loop personally, they both understand that these communications cannot work through the MFA bureaucracy.

⁴ See Document 115.

⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 193.

Before we parted, Menshikov asked how we should communicate if Gorbachev decides to name someone for an authorized contact. I told him that, so far as I am concerned, it would be all right just to telephone me and suggest that someone meet a specified person at a specified time and place. I would then undertake to get a prompt reply as to whether it is possible and if so who would come. I gave him both my office and home telephone numbers. Regarding possible contacts during the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, he suggested that we might consider using Dwayne Andreas' apartment there. I told him that we considered Andreas reliable and discreet and that I would pass on the idea.

The Issues

Most of our conversation was devoted to a tour d'horizon of the various issues before us. In the interstices, Menshikov made several comments regarding Soviet actions and motivations for recent actions. I will describe these first, then summarize his comments on the issues. (Mine followed our usual talking points, except as noted.)

Current Soviet Assessment

I asked Menshikov early on what Gorbachev's aims are for the meeting. He said, without hesitation, "He wants to achieve something. Something significant. But we wonder what the President wants." I assured him that the President was dead serious about making as much progress as possible, but that we really felt we were getting conflicting signals from them.

Menshikov observed that "some may think" that, because Gorbachev is likely to be around for a long time, he is playing a waiting game, but we should understand that this is not the case. He knows a lot needs to be done and is not the sort to procrastinate; this is contrary to his entire nature. I replied that, as a matter of fact, Arbatov's people were putting out just such a rationale: that Gorbachev is in a position to outwait the President and deal with his successors. I cautioned that this would be a major and fundamental mistake on their part, since any American President who might be inclined to settle for less than President Reagan simply wouldn't be able to deliver. Menshikov said that he hoped we did not consider Georgy Arbatov as an authoritative spokesman. I said that, as a matter of fact, we thought of him more as a propagandist than a policy maker. Menshikov said, "Then you have an accurate picture. That is precisely his role."

Menshikov said that Shevardnadze had been pleased with his meeting with the President (not that he liked *everything* said), and had reported his favorable impression of the President to Gorbachev and the Politburo. Gorbachev's answers to Dan Rather's questions in Paris

were designed to convey this to us, and they hoped we noticed.⁶ [I don't have a transcript at hand, but Menshikov said that Gorbachev said twice that the meeting left a good impression.]

In response to Secretary Shultz's private comments to Shevardnadze in Helsinki (about the need to improve the atmosphere and minimize the rhetoric)⁷ orders have gone out to the Soviet media not to criticize the President personally. (Menshikov added that this was very sensitive and that he should under no circumstances be quoted as saying it.) He added that if we see an exception or two it will be because not everyone got the word; if, however, attacks resume we will know that the orders have been changed.

Arms Control

Menshikov's approach to these issues, as to the others, was not in the spirit of debating, but of questioning as to whether this or that approach would work. His more significant comments were as follows:

SDI: Gorbachev knows that the President will not "give up" SDI, and this is not required. But he must have some assurance, other than verbal ones, that SDI will not be used to complement a US first strike capability. Defining the line between research and the rest might be one possibility, he suggested (to which I gave no encouragement), but there could be other approaches. The main thing is that Gorbachev has to persuade the Soviet military that SDI is not a threat. (Menshikov implied, but did not directly state, that Gorbachev is not really persuaded that it is a threat—at least not for a decade or so. He accepted my comments about the Soviet program and the absurdity of their accusing us of breaking agreements when they were doing the same research without demur.)

START: The Soviets know that much of their present proposal will not be acceptable to us. It is a negotiating position, and a conscious effort was made to include elements which will accord with the President's

⁶ Gorbachev was in Paris for meetings with Mitterrand from October 1 to 5. In telegram 13792 from Moscow, October 1, the Embassy wrote: "Gorbachev's Paris visit is both an indication of Soviet interest in a return to détente and an opportunity to enhance the General Secretary's image as a reasonable statesman with whom the West can do business. Soviet contacts have described Gorbachev's trip as an 'overture' to the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting which, if successful, would put the onus of a failure in Geneva all the more on the U.S." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850696–0670) In telegram 39858 from Paris, October 4, the Embassy reported on the Gorbachev-Mitterrand press conference. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850709–0417) French Ambassador in Moscow Raimond provided a full read-out of the Gorbachev visit to Hartman, which the Embassy in Moscow relayed to the Department in telegram 14327, October 10. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850722–0317)

⁷ See Document 72.

position. These include cuts up to 50%—a major change in the Soviet position—as well as limits on warheads and the principle of sublimits. We should consider these as “building blocks” from which we can pick and choose and rearrange to our liking. The important thing is to use some of them.

The Soviets recognize that we are particularly concerned about the heavy ICBM's. These can be cut, and cut substantially, if we go about it in the right way. We have to start with agreeing on some elements: e.g., 50%, etc., and then work toward the others. If we start with focussing on the heavies, the Soviet military will freeze the process. They don't want to give up anything. We have to use the negotiations to ratchet the numbers into the proper relationship.

When I pointed out the retrograde elements in the Soviet proposal, particularly the inclusion of all types of nuclear weapons in the same category, our INF weapons but not theirs, counting carrier-based aircraft, etc., Menshikov said, in effect, that they had no expectation of reaching an agreement on this basis. It is simply a negotiating ploy. Obviously, he said, if we can reach a separate agreement on INF, this question will be removed from START. As for the rest, it is negotiable.

Menshikov observed that he really couldn't predict what the Soviets would agree to as a bottom line. The important thing is that Gorbachev is in a mood to negotiate, and if the U.S. wants to proceed, it will make another proposal, using some elements of the Soviet proposal, so Gorbachev can present this as acceptance of some elements of the Soviet position and thus keep things moving.

INF: Menshikov claimed that the offer to negotiate with the British and French was *not* designed to “split the Allies” as had been alleged. (He observed that they knew well what the British and French positions are.) Instead, it was designed as a preliminary move to justify reaching a deal with us on INF. When I expressed some skepticism, he explained that Gorbachev could justify a deal with the U.S. if the offer to negotiate some time in the future with the British and French was on the table. That would provide a rationale for excluding British and French systems from START (he admitted that they are strategic systems, and that they are not dedicated to NATO defense). A deal with the US would be possible if *some* compensation for British and French systems is permitted. I told him that I personally thought this is a non-starter; I didn't see how we could allow any compensation. He said that this could be the ultimate sticking point, then. It was the major thing they had against the walk-in-the-woods formula. He then explained that they are prepared to wait for negotiations with the British and French until after we have achieved radical reductions, in the order of 50%, but that they feel they will have no negotiating leverage at that time unless there is some compensation now for the British and French systems.

However, he said repeatedly that a separate deal on INF is possible, and he wondered if we should not think about the possibility of coming up with a general formula that could be agreed to at the Geneva meeting. He implied that this could be the “major achievement” Gorbachev is looking for. He also stated that some formula that would produce a moratorium on further NATO deployments in return for a reduction of the SS–20’s could be very attractive. [I listened, but gave no encouragement to this idea. It is in fact an element in an idea Glitman has been thinking about.]

Nuclear Testing

Menshikov pressed hard on this issue, claiming that Gorbachev had overruled the Soviet military on the issue and therefore had a lot at stake. He said that the main object is to get a handle on unbridled “modernization” in the future. (I, of course, pointed out the one-sided impact at present.) He observed that the Soviet position on verification is not set in concrete; much more could be done here if we approach it in the framework of a goal of eliminating testing sometime in the future. Without that, they just don’t see the point, and feel that any threshold is going to be harder to verify than a CTB. Also, he said, if the U.S. is willing to discuss ways to limit qualitative improvements from some point in the future (i.e., implicitly allowing for completion of current programs), this would be well received and could lead to some progress on the testing issue. [I gave him no encouragement that movement is possible in this area unless we tackle the verification issue first; his argument is that they just cannot agree to that without at least a commitment to try to negotiate something more. But he did ask several questions regarding our current proposal, which still seems not to be thoroughly understood.]

Terrorism

Menshikov raised the issue, asking whether the President would be interested in some agreement to cooperate in this area. I said I thought he would, depending of course on the nature of the proposal. He replied that he thought Gorbachev would be interested. [We did not pursue the matter further; the Soviets have been leery of this in the past, but it is possible that their attitude is changing. The kidnapping of their people in Lebanon may have had some impact on their thinking;⁸ I also note that they have made a remarkably favorable public

⁸ According to telegram 5613 from Beirut, October 1, four Soviet diplomats were kidnapped in West Beirut on September 30. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850697–0349) One diplomat was killed and the three remaining hostages were released on October 30. (Telegram 6190 from Beirut, October 30; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850775–0510)

statement regarding our interception of the Egyptian aircraft—probably considered “payment” for our public statements when their people were kidnapped, but also possibly indicative of some change in policy.]⁹

Regional Issues

I pointed out to Menshikov that there are many issues other than arms control which are on the agenda, and gave the standard pitch regarding the importance of the regional ones. He asked which ones might be good candidates for some constructive discussion at the Geneva meeting. I said that, of course, Afghanistan would be high on our list, and asked what the Soviet aim is there. Menshikov said simply, “We want out. Are you willing to help?” I said that depended upon what “help” meant, but yes, we would do what we reasonably could to make it easy for them—meaning that we would give whatever commitments they needed that we would not use Afghanistan to their detriment if they left. He asked if we could accept Babrak Karmal, and I said it wasn’t up to us to accept or reject him; we wanted no role in choosing the Afghan government. That had to be done by the Afghans, and in a way that the refugees could return.

Bilateral Issues

Menshikov said that they had noted the President’s comments on expanding contacts. To my surprise, he said that this had made a favorable impression, and he thought Gorbachev would be attracted by such ideas as expanding student exchanges and the like. [We shall see.]

Human Rights

I made clear to him the importance of this issue. He said that we could expect some movement, but it was still difficult for them. He noted their private negotiations with the Jewish leaders, and said that emigration would rise somewhat as the result of that, but not to expect too much right now. As for divided spouses, he was sure this could be solved if the President made a private appeal to Gorbachev. “Everyone has to admit you have a legitimate interest in these cases,” he said. As for Shcharansky, he felt that a deal could be struck if the proper

⁹ In telegram 314027, October 11, the Department reported: “At about 2230 GMT U.S. military aircraft had intercepted, in international airspace, the Egyptian charter aircraft carrying the four Palestinian terrorists responsible for the hijacking of the *Achille Lauro*.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850727–0353) Documentation on the hijacking is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Part 2, Terrorism, June 1985–January 1989.

“trade” could be arranged.¹⁰ I made clear to him that, without movement in this area, a lot of other things were going to be hung up.

Trade

He asked if there could be any discussion of trade at the Geneva meeting. I said that we didn’t exclude the possibility, but frankly what could be done would be heavily dependent on solution of the human rights problems. If they want to talk about this directly and privately, fine. We’ll try to specify what we mean. If they don’t want to talk about it, we’ll try to respond appropriately to private moves on their part. He said he would check out the question and see if there is interest.

Future Summits

Menshikov asked if the President would like to establish a regular pattern of meetings in the future. I told him I had not heard the President discuss the matter and did not know how he felt about the question. He said that some officials were saying that regular meetings would be a good idea. I allowed that this is possible, but reiterated that I really did not know how the President regarded the question.

COMMENT:

I don’t have time tonight to provide detailed commentary, but Menshikov is either engaged in a massive disinformation effort, or else the folks in the Central Committee Secretariat are really casting about for ways to “achieve something” at the meeting.

Just after we parted, I learned that TASS had accepted the interview. This is really unprecedented. Maybe the guy over there is more serious than we suspected.

We now have the letter proposing Dobrynin for a channel. I would suggest that we accept with the proviso that Hartman will deliver our messages and ask for an interlocutor to be designated. (I would suggest Ridgway or Armacost for Dobrynin.) Then, if Zagladin sends a message requesting a private meeting, we should respond on that track as well. Should keep everybody happy so long as the key players are kept informed.

¹⁰ On October 9, 3 days before this meeting, William Drozdiak published an article in the *Washington Post* about a potential exchange to secure the release of Shcharanskiy, as well as Sakharov. (“E. German Said to Aid Dissidents,” *Washington Post*, October 9, 1985, p. A34) In telegram 311562 to Bonn and Berlin, October 10, the Department addressed this article and the “alleged” negotiations providing minimal press guidance to the Embassy and the Mission in Berlin. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850723–0016)

115. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan¹

Moscow, October 12, 1985

Dear Mr. President,

Our Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze has informed me in detail about his conversation with you in Washington on September 27.²

While there exist substantial differences in the positions of the two sides regarding concrete issues, which surfaced also in the course of that conversation and which I shall not touch upon in this letter, we deem it important that you, like us, proceed from the objective fact that we all live on the same planet and must learn to live together. It really is a fundamental judgement.

Here I would like to give you my answer only to one specific question you raised during the conversation with Eduard A. Shevardnadze, namely with regard to a confidential exchange of opinions between us bypassing, should it become necessary, the usual diplomatic channel. I am in favor of this. Indeed, there may arise the need to contact each other on matters on whose solution depend both the state of Soviet-American relations and the world situation as a whole.

On our side to maintain the confidential liaison with a person who will be designated by you for this purpose is entrusted to Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin.

Sincerely yours,

M. Gorbachev

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8591143, 8591239). Strictly Confidential. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy.

² See Documents 105 and 106.

116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, October 17, 1985, 0131Z

318694. For the Ambassador. Subject: Exchanges Initiatives for Geneva.

1. As you know, the President told Shevardnadze in their meeting at the White House that he would like to go beyond the traditional contacts and exchanges covered by the general exchanges agreement and come up with some bolder, more imaginative ways to increase cooperation and mutual understanding between our two countries. The President touched on a number of possible areas for cooperation, including education and language, drug and alcohol abuse, military to military, and sports and cultural activities.²

2. We would now like to propose to Shevardnadze a more complete list of the kind of bold initiatives the President had in mind. You should propose to Shevardnadze that we begin discussing these ideas with a view to announcing agreement on a package of them at Geneva, when we also hope to be in a position to sign the general exchanges agreement. You should stress that these initiatives are not inconsistent with the basic thrust of the exchanges agreement, but build on it and go beyond the traditional exchanges it provides for.

3. You should indicate to Shevardnadze that we are looking for new ideas which demonstrate a sincere effort on both sides to promote better understanding, work cooperatively on some of today's most difficult human problems, and genuinely open up our societies to each other. We welcome their ideas in this same vein. We recognize that it will not be possible to move equally rapidly on all of these ideas. However, it is important to begin. We want to emphasize that the

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850011–0134. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Robinson; cleared by Ridgway, Wick, McKinley, Matlock, Palmer, Parris, Van Heuven, and L.D. Sell (EUR/SOV); approved by Shultz. On another copy of the telegram, Shultz wrote in the margin: "President signed off @ meeting on 10/16." A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on that copy of the telegram. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary's Meetings with the President (10/16/1985); NLR-775-18-87-1-6)

² In telegram 14805 from Moscow, October 18, Hartman reported that during his meeting with Shevardnadze, he presented the Foreign Minister with the list of areas for cooperation. Hartman wrote: "I recalled that the President had told Shevardnadze of his desire to explore visible ways for the people of our two countries to get to know each other better." He continued: "In presenting the list, I stressed the ideas on it were purely illustrative; we welcomed their ideas on how to cooperate on pressing human problems and genuinely open up our societies to each other. It was important that the Soviet side understand that this initiative was inspired and fully backed by the President." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850011–0180)

differences which separate us require bold new programs if we hope to begin to resolve basic differences and draw our future generations closer together.

4. You can share with Shevardnadze the following list of possible exchanges, which has been reviewed by NSC, USIA, Defense, and other concerned agencies.

5. Exchanges Initiatives

Educational Exchanges

An offer to cooperate in the development of microcomputer educational software for secondary school instruction.

Nomination of two distinguished educators or other public figures, one American, one Soviet, to undertake a major study of ways that we can increase mutual understanding by promoting the study of each other's language in our respective countries.

A massive exchange of undergraduate students. As a start, at least 5,000 each way for a year of study in each other's country.

Establishment of chairs of American studies at 10 Soviet universities with a reciprocal establishment of Soviet affairs chairs at 10 U.S. universities—all twenty to be filled annually by eminently qualified Soviet and American scholars.

Creation of a Soviet-American scholarship program similar to the Rhodes Scholars that annually would send 10 of the best and brightest students from each country to study at a distinguished university of the other.

People to People Exchanges

An ambitious "youth exchange" program for a year, or a summer, involving at least 5,000 secondary-school age youths who would live with families in the other country and either attend school or engage in cooperative summer camp projects with their local counterparts.

A massive expansion of "sister-city" relationships, with at least one "people-to-people" visit each year each way by city officials or delegations with an accompanying effort to increase general tourism between participating cities. The program could begin with 50 pairings the first year.

Increased Consultations

Inauguration of regular bilateral consultations on cooperative efforts to halt terrorism. These could be on the model of the regional consultations already underway.

Joint, regular consultations about efforts to combat alcoholism and drug abuse and trafficking.

Wider Information Exchanges

Establishment of national out-of-Embassy cultural centers and libraries in each other's countries, with uncontrolled access.

Inauguration of regular media exchanges, with Soviet columnists writing once a month in American journals and American writers given similar regular space in Soviet publications. Regular TV discussion shows, at least an hour a month, between American and Soviet journalists and/or officials. Annual TV addresses by the leaders of our two countries to the people of the other. More exchange of radio and television programs coupled with an end to all jamming of foreign broadcasts.

Facilitation of Soviet satellite transmissions to America via “Gorizont” and Worldnet and other U.S. broadcasts to the Soviet Union.

Increased publication and distribution for each nation’s books and publications in the the other, including establishment of a book store in the Soviet Union as an outlet for American publications similar to book stores here which sell Soviet publications.

Sports Cooperation and Exchanges

A reciprocal televised exchange of each country’s best sports competitions, such as football, soccer, basketball and hockey.

An exchange of American football and baseball teams for a series of exhibition games and workshops in the Soviet Union, with reciprocal tours by Soviet hockey and soccer teams.

A proposal for joint sponsorship of an annual, televised Washington to Moscow or Moscow to Washington sporting “great race”. It could be open to entrants from any country and could be for cars, bicyclists, light planes or other vehicles. The Paris-Dakar auto race is one model.

A dramatic increase in binational sporting competitions across the entire sporting agenda, all to be jointly televised.

8. Action Requested

You should seek an early appointment with Shevardnadze to make the above points and stress our desire to announce new cooperative programs in Geneva when the general exchanges agreement is signed.

Shultz

117. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Papers on the Soviet Union: The Soviet Union in the World

You have previously read four groups of papers on the Soviet Union. They dealt with the sources of Soviet behavior, the problems of Soviet society, the instruments of control, and Gorbachev's domestic agenda.² The attached group looks at the Soviet Union's international position.

The first paper (Tab A) deals with Eastern Europe and the international communist movement.³ Soviet leaders view control of the contiguous countries of Eastern Europe and East Germany as essential not only to their security but also to the maintenance of their rule at home. The Warsaw Pact command, which is totally under the control of Soviet officers, is used both as a counterforce to NATO and as an instrument for controlling the East European countries. The Soviets have also tried to unify control over the East European economies through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, but this effort has been less successful than the military integration achieved through the Warsaw Pact Command.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron October 1985 (6/12). Secret. Sent for information. Drafted by Matlock. The memorandum is unsigned. Matlock forwarded the draft memorandum and the attached papers to McFarlane on October 18. On another copy of the covering memorandum from Matlock, McFarlane wrote: "Forward on 10/25 for Camp David reading. Pls provide cy for me. M." Matlock recommended that McFarlane also approve copies to Shultz and Regan; McFarlane initialed his approval and added in a handwritten note "and VP." (Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Geneva Meeting: Background Materials for the President (5/6)) In his book, Matlock explained that "Reagan read these papers with care, often jotting notes in the margins. Sometimes, at his morning staff meeting, he would pass one around and recommend that everyone read it. We organized meetings for him with some of the authors so that he could discuss the questions raised in whatever detail he desired. We also arranged for him to meet specialists from outside the government and to read some of their writings. Nina Tumarkin of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University did a paper on the image of Lenin, and Suzanne Massie, author of *Land of the Firebird*, a cultural history of Russia, had several meetings to discuss the Russian character. Reagan found their advice helpful as he considered ways to approach Gorbachev personally. He also enjoyed Massie's book, which he was still reading in Geneva as he prepared for his meeting with Gorbachev." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, p. 134)

² See also Documents 39, 74, 79, and 109.

³ Tab A, "The Warsaw Pact and the International Communist Movement," is attached but not printed.

Outside Eastern Europe Moscow maintains relations with some 80 nonruling communist parties and tries to assert a leading role among them. These parties vary greatly, however, in their willingness to support Soviet policies, and disunity within the world communist movement promises to remain a fact of life.

The second paper (Tab B) deals with Western Europe.⁴ Here the Soviets employ a variety of approaches, ranging from direct threats to blandishments. Image building and style play a large role, particularly now that Gorbachev has become General Secretary. The Soviets continue to court the European left and work to establish privileged dialogues with certain West European states, particularly France and Italy. They have promoted greater economic ties with Western Europe, which have so far weathered periods of strained political relations. On arms control issues the Soviets try to encourage European fears of an arms race in space and promote regional discussions of arms problems which exclude U.S. participation.

While the Soviets often seem preoccupied with Western Europe and the U.S., China looms as a major factor—and significant potential long-range threat. In addition to the major ideological and tactical disputes which led to the open Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960's, there were major border clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops in 1969. These have fostered Soviet fears of the potential for alignment among China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States.

However, the Sino-Soviet relationship has improved somewhat in recent years. Trade, for example, has increased and regular political consultations have been established. Some gradual improvement of relations is likely to continue, but there seems little likelihood that the two countries will become allies in the foreseeable future (Tab C).⁵

Soviet entree into the developing world as a whole has largely been through arms sales. Arms account for some two thirds of Soviet exports to the non-communist developing world, with most going to the Middle East and North Africa. Soviet successes in the developing world, however, have not kept pace with the early advances of the 60's (Cuba) and 70's (particularly Ethiopia and Angola). Many nations have become disillusioned with the Soviet economic model and the Soviets' inability to provide significant financial assistance, and several Soviet proteges are beset by significant military resistance (Tab D).⁶

⁴ Tab B, "The Soviet Union and Western Europe," is attached but not printed.

⁵ Tab C, "Sino-Soviet Relations," is attached but not printed.

⁶ Tab D, "The Soviets in the Third World," is attached but not printed.

Recommendation

That you read the attached papers as background for your upcoming meeting with Gorbachev.⁷

⁷ Reagan did not indicate his approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

118. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, October 19, 1985, 1155Z

14821. Subject: Akhromeyev Article on Arms Control: The Military Stakes Out Its Position.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary. In a major *Pravda* article October 19 Chief of Staff Akhromeyev provides authoritative military endorsement for major elements of the Soviet arms control proposals tabled at Geneva.² Akhromeyev is sharply critical of McFarlane's October 6 statement on the ABM Treaty, while ignoring subsequent statements by Secretary Shultz of the U.S. intention to pursue the SDI program in accordance with a more restrictive definition of the treaty.³ Akhromeyev also mounts a vigorous defense of the role of land-based ICBMs in the Soviet strategic forces structure. The Akhromeyev article may be calculated to demonstrate military support for Gorbachev's arms control initiatives. But it also strikes us as a strong military warning that further steps toward more restrictive limits on Soviet ICBMs could pose an unacceptable risk to fundamental Soviet security interests. End summary.

3. The Akhromeyev article is the first public, authoritative military comment on arms control since the tabling of the Soviet counterproposal in Geneva and Gorbachev's visit to France.⁴ Akhromeyev pro-

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850747–0686. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to the Moscow Political Collective.

² See *Documents on Disarmament*, 1985, pp. 718–725. See also Gary Lee, "Soviet Warns of Retaliatory SDI Move," *Washington Post*, October 19, 1985, p. A14.

³ For the full text of McFarlane's October 6 "Meet the Press" interview, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1985, pp. 32–34.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 112 and footnote 6, Document 114.

vides a strong endorsement of the Soviet proposals and accuses U.S. spokesmen of efforts to discredit Moscow's initiatives. The Chief of Staff also provides detailed, although standard, refutations of major U.S. criticisms of the Soviet proposals.

4. In a lengthy passage on SDI and the ABM Treaty, Akhromeyev is sharply critical of National Security Adviser McFarlane's October 6 remarks and statements on the meaning of Agreed Statement "D" of the ABM Treaty by U.S. spokesmen. Akhromeyev ignores Secretary Shultz' San Francisco speech and Brussels news conference on U.S. intention to pursue SDI in accordance with a more restrictive definition of the ABM Treaty.⁵ (Comment: Akhromeyev's approach contrasts with that of authoritative MFA officials who have told us privately this week that the Secretary's most recent statements on the ABM Treaty were welcome and more positive. End comment.)

5. Akhromeyev provides a lengthy but standard discussion of the distinction between fundamental research permitted under the ABM Treaty and activities which are proscribed. He adds a warning that the U.S. has underestimated Soviet capacity to respond to SDI. If the program goes forward, Akhromeyev asserts that the Soviet Union will answer with new offensive and defensive weapons, including space-based weapons.

6. The article devotes considerable attention to a defense of the role of land-based ICBMs in the Soviet strategic force structure. Akhromeyev rejects U.S. arguments that Soviet ICBMs are more destabilizing than SLBMs and bomber weapons (including cruise missiles) in which the U.S. has an advantage. He notes that Moscow has proposed a sixty percent limit on the number of warheads that could be concentrated in any one leg of the triad, but rejects proposals that would focus

⁵ In a memorandum to Reagan, Shultz reported: "At a meeting of NATO Parliamentarians in San Francisco yesterday [October 14] and in Brussels at a special session of the North Atlantic Council today, I had an opportunity to continue our consultation with the Allies on where we are in the run-up to Geneva, with some emphasis on arms control. The reaction, both from legislators in San Francisco and from my colleagues in Brussels, was encouraging. I found that our allies recognize the Soviet arms control counterproposal for what it is—a one-sided repackaging of old ideas with a couple of new twists. Gorbachev's effort to portray it in positive terms for Europe has not found many takers." He continued: "I used my speech in San Francisco to describe in some detail the principles that drive our arms control position, our comprehensive proposals, and our evaluation of the Soviet counter proposal. I stated our position on the ABM Treaty, emphasizing our belief that a less restrictive interpretation of the Treaty is justified. I told them of your decision to carry out the SDI research program within the bounds of the more restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty; this was greeted with an ovation." Shultz continued that he repeated much of the same messaging in the Brussels sessions. (Telegram Secto 21011 from Shultz's aircraft, October 15; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850011-0102) For the full text of Shultz's speech to the North Atlantic Assembly in San Francisco, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1985, pp. 20–25.

reductions disproportionately on ICBM warheads. Akhromeyev asserts that it is precisely strength in such forces which has created the existing strategic balance and which enables the USSR to retaliate against any U.S. attack. He concludes that there will be no “onesided” disarmament of the USSR.

7. Comment: The Akhromeyev article represents an authoritative military endorsement of Gorbachev’s recent moves in arms control on the eve of the Warsaw Pact summit and Shevardnadze’s trip to the U.S. At the same time, the Chief of Staff minces no words in setting forth military concerns about both SDI and strategic offensive forces. In this sense, the Akhromeyev article may be an implicit warning that the current Soviet proposals are the maximum consistent with military views of Soviet national security. Specifically, Akhromeyev appears to argue that more restrictive limits on ICBM warheads than those envisaged by the 60 percent ceiling would pose an unacceptable risk. While this is far from the open debate that shapes U.S. arms control policy, it is as clear a statement of military concern as we are likely to see in the Soviet context.

Hartman

119. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, October 21, 1985

SUBJECT

Gorbachev, Human Rights and Jewish Emigration

Summary: Gorbachev has taken an assertive stance toward human rights and emigration, refusing to be put on the defensive and accusing the West of neglecting the “economic and social” dimensions of human rights. Gorbachev’s rhetoric is consistent with Soviet policy, which has included increased repression of dissidents, a severe cutback in emigration, and efforts to manipulate Western and Israeli concerns

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda / Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 10/1–31/85. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by VanOudenaren on October 11. Shultz initialed the memorandum and wrote in the top margin: “PR/R², I need some strong talking pts for the Moscow trip.” With this note, Shultz was tasking Peter Rodman and Rozanne Ridgway.

about Soviet Jewry for foreign policy purposes. Despite these negative trends, the Soviets clearly are interested in influencing Western publics before the Geneva meeting, and might be receptive to resolving major human rights cases. The U.S. therefore should intensify efforts to win the release of Sakharov, Shcharanskiy and other dissidents and to resolve family reunification cases.² However, the U.S. should not allow progress on high visibility cases to obscure broader human rights issues, and should resist Soviet efforts to defuse the Jewish emigration issue by dealing with private Jewish groups in the West. *End summary.*

Gorbachev and Human Rights

During his recent visit to Paris, Soviet leader Gorbachev demonstrated a new and more assertive Soviet approach to human rights and emigration. Despite persistent questioning by the Western news media, Gorbachev refused to be put on the defensive. In a pre-summit interview with French television, he astonished Western audiences by claiming that Jews enjoy more rights in the Soviet Union than in any other country. In addition to upholding the Soviet human rights record, Gorbachev tried to put the West on the defensive by talking about “economic and social rights” and pointing to unemployment, racial tensions and other problems in the West.³

Gorbachev’s handling of human rights suggests that he may be overly self-confident about his ability to sway Western audiences with clever propaganda arguments. In comparing the plight of Jews in the Soviet Union with that in other countries, Gorbachev overstated his case and undermined his own credibility. In stressing the allegedly democratic character of the USSR’s Supreme Soviet, he offended many West Europeans by charging that “workers and peasants” are not represented in European parliaments. He also disappointed Western observers by his public attack on Anatoly Shcharanskiy.

Gorbachev’s blunt, almost brutal approach to human rights is consistent with the overall pattern of Soviet policy in recent years. The Soviets have intensified the repression of dissidents and have cut back on the numbers of Jews, ethnic Germans, and Armenians granted permission to leave the Soviet Union. The Soviets have been unresponsive to Western demands that Shcharanskiy, Sakharov and other well-known dissidents be allowed to emigrate.

Despite the harsh Soviet posture toward Shcharanskiy and other dissidents, rumors persist that Gorbachev may be considering a pre- or post-November gesture such as a negotiated release of Sakharov or

² See footnote 10, Document 114.

³ See footnote 6, Document 114.

Shcharanskiy. While the Soviets show few signs of wanting a breakthrough on this issue, the possibility that Gorbachev will try to influence the pre- or post-meeting atmosphere by a major human rights gesture cannot be excluded.

The one area of human rights on which Gorbachev has shown some flexibility is that of family reunification, which can be portrayed as an "administrative" rather than a "political" issue. Discussing family reunification cases with the U.S. does not require the Soviets to concede even implicitly that they obstruct emigration or unjustly persecute Soviet citizens. In any case, the Soviets can block the emigration of particular individuals by claiming that they had access to "state secrets."

Jewish Emigration

Jewish emigration from the USSR has declined from over 51,000 in the peak year of 1979 to 896 in 1984. The drastic decline has been accompanied by an increase in the intensity and a change in the character of official repression of Soviet Jews. The most striking feature of the present campaign of repression has been the arrest and imprisonment (on various pretexts) of teachers of Hebrew. Alarmed at these developments, Soviet Jews have looked to the West for support and have urged the world Jewish community to use "quiet diplomacy" in dealing with the USSR on the emigration issue.

The way in which the Soviets have responded to Western and Israeli attempts to raise the issue of Jewish emigration strongly suggests that the current Soviet leadership believes it can exploit concerns about Soviet Jewry for foreign policy purposes. At a minimum, the Soviet leadership would like to eliminate emigration as a subject of U.S.-USSR government-to-government discussion and transfer the issue to private, non-publicized channels. This would help to prevent U.S. administrations from "linking" trade and other issues to emigration.

In addition, the Soviet leaders hope that a subtle policy of carrots and sticks toward Israel and the world Jewish community will succeed in defusing Jewish emigration as an international political issue. Soviet officials traveling in the West have hinted that direct emigration flights from Moscow to Tel Aviv could result if French Jewish groups were to moderate their protests against Gorbachev during his visit to France. In an apparent gesture to the Soviets, Israeli Prime Minister Peres is reported to have tried to discourage large anti-Gorbachev demonstrations by Jewish groups in Paris. When World Jewish Congress (WJC) director Edgar Bronfman visited Moscow in September, Soviet officials are reported to have pledged that Jewish emigration will rise over the next several months, but linked continued increases to "positive

signals” from the world Jewish community.⁴ Many Israeli and WJC officials are highly skeptical of Soviet intentions, and oppose concessions and goodwill gestures. But others are willing to work with the Soviets in searching for common ground.

Policy Implications for the U.S.

As the November meeting approaches, the United States should:

- intensify efforts to negotiate the release of Sakharov, Shcharanskiy and other well-known dissidents;

- “pocket” Soviet gestures on family reunification, but not allow Soviet moves in this area to divert attention from broader human rights issues;

- continue to press the Soviets on the Jewish emigration issue, but in doing so carefully consult with the WJC, the government of Israel and other interested parties;

- continue to undercut Soviet efforts to talk about “economic and social rights” by pointing out Soviet failures in these areas.

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 94.

120. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev¹

Washington, October 22, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Thank you for your letter of September 12, which was delivered to me by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze at the White House on September 27. The discussions that Secretary Shultz and I had with the Foreign Minister were frank and useful. In my view they demonstrated that we both are working seriously on the problems which divide us as we near our meeting in Geneva. As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, I look forward to the meeting and to the prospect of

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8591090, 8591097). No classification marking. In an October 22 covering memorandum to Reagan, McFarlane explained that this letter was in response to Gorbachev’s September 12 letter, and it “gives Gorbachev advance notice of the regional initiative you will be proposing in your speech to the UN General Assembly on Thursday.” For Gorbachev’s letter, see Document 84.

more constructive relations. I am considering carefully the arms control proposals contained in your letter and will be in touch with you on these questions in the near future.

This week I will address the UN General Assembly at the commemoration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations.² This anniversary is a valuable opportunity to reflect on the importance of the UN to world peace and security, as well as its unrealized potential. I think we both agree that the UN can and must be more effective in dealing with regional conflicts. In this connection, I noted Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's statement to the United Nations General Assembly that the Soviet Union viewed with alarm the fact that "it has not been possible to settle a single regional conflict or to extinguish a single hotbed of military tension."³

We both recognize that the UN cannot by itself prevent such conflicts. All nations, particularly those directly involved, must devote their best efforts to reducing tensions and pursuing negotiated solutions to the most dangerous regional conflicts. Certainly our two nations have a major responsibility to encourage such efforts.

As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, we have found our regional experts' discussions useful and propose to hold them on a regular basis. It is also desirable to try to build on this start by moving beyond the clarification of viewpoints to the search for concrete solutions to real problems. I hope that you and I can discuss this larger question in detail when we meet at Geneva. Even before then, however, I will put before the UN General Assembly an initiative to deal with an important group of conflicts in Asia, Africa and Central America. I want you to be aware in advance of the proposal I will make.

Through our regional exchanges we have made clear our views on the nature of these problems and their impact on our overall relationship. Although our views on many aspects of these problems vary greatly, we believe that these disputes require political, not military solutions, and we are prepared, if the Soviet Union is willing, to seek ways to help resolve conflicts through negotiation.

Because I believe in promoting a search for political solutions, I propose that we concentrate our efforts on those conflicts that did most to erode our relationship in the past. This would include Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola and Ethiopia. Of course, each of these conflicts has its own character and requirements, and we approach

² See footnote 3, Document 85.

³ For Shevardnadze's October 24 statement, see "The U.N. Anniversary; Excerpts from Shevardnadze Talk," *New York Times*, October 25, 1985, p. A14.

them with this fact in mind; other conflicts will need separate treatment altogether.

The peace program that I will put before the General Assembly seeks progress at three levels: internal reconciliation, superpower restraint, and economic reconstruction.

Because these conflicts are rooted in local disputes and problems, the starting point must be negotiations between the warring parties in each conflict; in the case of Afghanistan, this would obviously mean your own government. These talks may take different forms, but we believe that, together with improvement of internal political conditions, they are essential to achieving an end to violence, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and national reconciliation.

Once the parties to the conflicts make real progress, a second level of the process would be useful: separate U.S.-Soviet discussions, aimed at supporting the negotiating process between the warring parties. These talks would not be formal peace negotiations; needless to say, it is not for us to impose solutions. In some cases, however, it would be appropriate to consider guarantees for agreements reached. In every case the primary U.S.-Soviet role would be to support regional efforts to reduce and eliminate outside military involvement, including withdrawal of foreign troops and restraint on the flow of outside arms.

If the first two stages are successful, a third would then become possible: the reintegration of these countries into the world economy. The United States is prepared to contribute generously at this stage.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze noted in his remarks at the United Nations General Assembly that in many cases mechanisms for mediation were already in place. We want to strengthen these existing mechanisms, and believe that this proposal will complement and reinforce them.

I feel that if we are unable to resolve these problems through negotiation among the real parties and through mutual restraint, they will only grow more difficult to resolve. This could lead to increased tensions—a situation that neither of us should welcome. I hope the Soviet Union is prepared to work constructively to help promote solutions to these conflicts, and will offer early support for my proposal. If so, you will find us willing to do our part, and to make the most of opportunities thereby opened for progress on other critical issues.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

121. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, October 24, 1985, 4–4:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

The President's Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

PARTICIPANTS*U.S.*

President Reagan
 Secretary Shultz
 Chief of Staff Regan
 Assistant to the President
 McFarlane
 Assistant Secretary Ridgway
 Ambassador Matlock
 DAS Palmer
 Interpreter Zarechnak

Soviet Side

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
 Ambassador Dobrynin
 Deputy Foreign Minister
 Komplektov
 Assistant to the FM Chernishev
 Assistant to the FM Tarasenko
 Interpreter N. Uspenskiy²
 Interpreter P. Palazhchenko

The President welcomed Shevardnadze and they chatted together informally while two waves of press took pictures and tried to get them to answer questions.

The President then opened the meeting proper by stating that we had limited time today. We have been discussing a variety of issues in advance, and hoped that we could reach agreement on at least some of the lesser issues. We need to go on to the more vital questions, but he regretted that we had been unable so far to settle any of the lesser issues.

Shevardnadze said he would like first of all to thank the President for this meeting. He knew how tight the President's schedule was. They considered this meeting to be another demonstration of the President's personal attitude toward the meeting next month. There is little time left. In terms of practical preparations, finalizing an agenda and final positions, we need to work more intensively in the coming weeks. There really is very little time left. He would be speaking in purely practical terms the next day with Secretary Shultz and other representatives of the United States. They would review what has been done

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron November 1985 (8/10). Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. The meeting took place in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. The President was in New York for the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the United Nations. Matlock sent the memorandum to McFarlane under a November 15 covering memorandum.

² Nikolai Uspenskiy is the correct name for the Soviet interpreter. In several meetings, the notetaker used a variation in the name or mistakenly recorded the Soviet interpreter as Yuri Uspenskiy.

already on preparations including the main documents and main positions. Also they need to cover what General Secretary Gorbachev put forward in his message to the President.

The President said yes, that he had received Gorbachev's letter. We appreciate the arms control proposals which they have made. We are giving them careful study in Geneva and here; we are doing this with great care and we will be prepared to respond to them. Some things in their proposals present difficulties.

The President continued that we need to get at the overall things which affect our relationship. We need to get on to overall matter of peace. We need some understandings. Then arms control will be a simple matter.

Shevardnadze said that he agreed with the President that probably this was the main problem; this is the issue of security or in a different form arms control. This needs to play a decisive role in the Summit meeting and the Soviet side is prepared in this regard. These are complex questions. Problems have accumulated over many years. It is difficult at one meeting to resolve all of them. But the Soviets do not exclude the possibility of progress as far as fundamental questions are concerned. They have some general ideas which they would be prepared to discuss with the Secretary the next day. This would include language with regard to security problems and arms control.

Shevardnadze continued that the President knew the Soviet proposals. They had been outlined in the Gorbachev message and all of them were on the table in Geneva. They tried not only to put forward proposals, but had also already taken practical steps, unilateral steps. These included their moratorium on nuclear explosions affective until January first; also the cessation of the deployment of medium range weapons in Europe and their statement that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. It was not a simple thing for them to take these steps.

Shevardnadze said that both sides have an interest in making progress on the major arms control questions. This included banning of space strike weapons. They also had a proposal for reductions of strategic nuclear weapons. The third group was medium range weapons—here they have several compromise proposals. Speaking frankly they had difficulty in understanding steps the United States had taken in response. The U.S. position was not clear. He would repeat that they understand these matters require careful study but with little time left both sides should accelerate their efforts so that the Summit can have a positive effect.

Shevardnadze continued that we also have bilateral, regional, and Stockholm confidence matters to consider. In this group of questions a certain convergence of views is emerging. At the same time they had

noted that some members of the administration had been toughening their positions, for example in Stockholm and in the cultural exchanges talks. He mentioned this as there is very little time left and we need to use it in the most effective way.

Shevardnadze noted that last time he had seen the President he had said that all peoples and governments are looking forward to this meeting in Geneva with Gorbachev. They have no right to disappoint the world. Given mutual desires he believes we can develop positive things for the Summit which would make world public opinion more comfortable. However, he could not avoid saying that they fail to understand some of the statements of some in the administration with regard to a so-called Soviet threat and statements that there is a need for a new interpretation of past agreements which are the basis for the present strategic stability. It appears to the Soviet side that such actions are not conducive to preparations for a successful Summit.

The President said that some of the things we have suggested we would like to do even before Geneva. As a result of his earlier meeting with Shevardnadze, Ambassador Hartman had given Shevardnadze a list of things we could do.³ The main thing the President wanted to say is that he stands fully behind them. But the Soviet side seems to be dragging its feet. If we could move on this thing it would be an indication that both sides are serious about making settlements.

Shevardnadze responded that he had met Ambassador Hartman just a few days earlier. With regard to all of the matters which Hartman had raised with him, the leadership of the Soviet Union had same day been given instructions to do preparations. These were important matters, though they were not the most important. The next day he would have an opportunity to review things with the Secretary. Maybe there would also be a need for a second stage before the Summit. It would be good if Secretary Shultz could come to Moscow. The Soviet side would be pleased to welcome him before the Summit to review both organizational and substantive problems. We could also have final discussions on language.

The President said that we were planning on the Secretary making this trip.

The Secretary noted that he had told Dobrynin that we were ready to go ahead.

The President said that with regard to dates, he understood it would be early November.

Shevardnadze said yes, the first ten days of November.

³ See Document 116.

The Secretary noted that Dobrynin had mentioned that November 4 and 5 would be convenient.

Dobrynin noted that another possibility would be November 11–12.

The Secretary said that the 4th and 5th would be better given everything that is underway here. The next day they had a couple of hours to identify what needs to be done so that in Moscow they can move things along as the President had said we wanted to. We would be prepared to be responsive.

Shevardnadze said that we need initial impulses for the various delegations. So far as the Soviets are concerned, they will do this.

The Secretary said that the President already had been giving impulses to him, Bud, Roz, Jack and others. They all felt thoroughly prodded.

Shevardnadze said that they also were being given impulses.

The Secretary said there was one minor matter but it could cause great consternation if not handled well. Their invitation is a news item. So they needed to agree on how and when to make this known publicly. He had suggested to Dobrynin that they might do this the next day following his meeting with Shevardnadze, but there might be other ways.

Shevardnadze said that this depended on all of us, and that it was fine with him to do it the next day. He said in conclusion that Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership had asked him to give the President best greetings on behalf of the Soviet government.

The President stated that he appreciated these greetings and looked forward to his meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva.

The President then asked Shevardnadze to remain behind alone for a few minutes. The rest of both sides delegations left the room.

The *tete-a-tete* began at 4:30 and continued until 4:45.

D. Zarechnak was the interpreter on the U.S. side. N. Uspenskiy was the interpreter for the Soviet side. The mode of interpreting was consecutive.

The President indicated that he realized that the subject of human rights was considered to be an internal affair by the Soviet side, but he wished to point out that in the U.S. system of government, anything that the two sides would agree to would need to be ratified by the Congress, which in turn would need to see if it had public support. This is an important part of the structure of the U.S. Government.

The President continued that the U.S. side was not attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, but it would be easier for the Congress to ratify some matters if it saw that there was movement on some humanitarian issues. The President said that he

was referring to those rights of human beings which were agreed to in Helsinki, such as family reunification. He indicated that he knew of one woman in the U.S. whose husband was in the Soviet Union, and they had not seen each other for four years.

The President indicated that the U.S. is unique in that Americans come from every corner of the world—either they themselves have come from other countries, or their parents or grandparents have. Americans are of many different backgrounds—Irish, Italian, Russian, etc. They have strong feelings for the lands of their heritage and about the denial of rights which they feel occurs for some people in those lands.

The President said that now, before the Summit, something ought to be done in the area of humanitarian deeds. He stressed that deeds were necessary, not just words. There were some people who were not permitted to emigrate. Their names were both nationally and internationally recognized.

The President indicated that his son is a free-lance journalist⁴ and he had visited Moscow for the May Day celebration and had met two Soviet men who were denied permission to emigrate. One of them was the husband of the woman whom he had just mentioned.

The President said that if some action was taken on these issues, in connection with names that had been transmitted by Ambassador Hartman and perhaps would be mentioned tomorrow morning, it would be easier to reach agreement on other issues.

Shevardnadze replied that the President had mentioned this issue at their last meeting. He wished to assure the President that everything which had been mentioned by the Secretary of State by the President and by Ambassador Hartman was being given very serious study. Such issues were always seriously studied, even without special request. The Soviet Government places no barriers to such requests if they do not involve security matters. That is the main thing. So the Soviet side would see if the emigration of these individuals was legal, and if it was, they would be permitted to leave. If it was not, the Soviet side would explain why such permission was not possible.

Shevardnadze said that he had explained to Ambassador Hartman that the U.S. side should not think that people in the Soviet Government had hearts of stone. All requests for emigration were taken to heart.

⁴ Ronald Reagan, Jr.

122. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, October 25, 1985, 7:30–9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

The Secretary's Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

PARTICIPANTS

US

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Soviets

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
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Secretary Shultz welcomed Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and noted that we have a tradition of working breakfasts and lunches. Shevardnadze said that he believed that this is a good tradition. Shevardnadze noted that the President had had a reception in the same room the day before. The Secretary said that the President had met with Thatcher, Craxi, Kohl, Mulroney, Nakasone—noting that we meet with the group of seven on economic issues each year. All of them had been present except France, which had other things to do. The Secretary noted that we had a well-known comic with a long nose named Jimmy Durante. He had a saying “everybody wants to get into the act”. It seems that everybody has advice for us with regard to President Reagan’s meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev.

Shevardnadze agreed that this was the case, and noted that at every meeting he had had when he was last in New York and again

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Shultz/Shevardnadze Meeting in New York, 10/25/1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Palmer. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

² Nikolai Uspensky is the correct name for the Soviet interpreter. In several meetings, the notetaker used a variation in the name or mistakenly recorded the Soviet interpreter as Yuri Uspensky.

this time all of his interlocutors raised the meeting next month. This is the center of discussion. The Secretary said that this shows people attach great importance to the meeting and everything it covers. Shevardnadze said that now literally the whole world is living day to day with thoughts about this meeting. The Secretary noted that during the meeting he had held with Gromyko last January in Geneva there were around 1500 journalists. We imposed a rule that we would say nothing for two to three days, so they had zero to report. They were reduced to interviewing each other. Shevardnadze said that this time journalists in New York had more food for reporting as there are more heads of government here; although the majority of the heads seem to have already departed. The Secretary noted that the President still has bilaterals with Nakasone and Kohl, and he would then be seeing the family of Mr. Klinghoffer.³ He was the man murdered on the Italian ship under tragic circumstances. Indeed, one of the issues he wanted to raise this morning was this question of terrorism. He noted it now because the Klinghoffer family lives here in New York.

Shevardnadze noted that they did not have much time as far as he understood the situation. The Secretary said that they had until 9:30 a.m., they would have their eggs right now and then be ready to proceed. He understood from our Ambassador to the United Nations that the social schedule up here at the UN was such that you could eat 10 to 15 times a day. Shevardnadze responded that we need to take a closer look at what our people are doing there. He said that he had a warm recollection of the time he spent at the Secretary's house in Washington.⁴ The Secretary said that he and his wife had enjoyed having them and that he had asked his wife about how her lunch with Mrs. Shevardnadze had been. She had noted that Mrs. Dobrynin had been a very able interpreter. Mrs. Shultz has decided that she would like to accompany him to Moscow. The Secretary asked whether Shevardnadze had thought further about how the trip would be announced. Shevardnadze said that they assumed Mrs. Shultz will be coming, and they are ready for an announcement to journalists today. He would say that the Soviet Union had invited the Secretary and that we have now agreed that such a trip would be useful and would take place.⁵

³ Leon Klinghoffer was murdered during the hijacking of the Italian cruise liner, *Achille Lauro*, in October 1985. See footnote 9, Document 114.

⁴ Shevardnadze and his wife, Nanuli, were dinner guests of Shultz and his wife, Obie, on the evening of September 27, during his trip to Washington. See Document 107.

⁵ According to an October 25 article in the *Washington Post*, "the announcement came as Shultz wound up a two-hour meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze." The article continued: "the invitation for Shultz to visit Moscow for summit planning came as a surprise and was known only shortly before Shevardnadze arrived in New York." (Don Oberdorfer and David Hoffman, "Shultz to Meet Gorbachev on Summit Plans," *Washington Post*, October 25, 1985, p. A1)

The Secretary noted that he would probably be asked whether he would see Gorbachev in Moscow. He would say that he looks forward with interest to meeting with Gorbachev. He would discuss with Ambassador Dobrynin the details of the trip and could do this on the next Tuesday as he would be away in Canada on Monday.⁶

Shevardnadze said that one thing is clear about the meetings in Moscow—this would be the closing stage of preparations for Geneva. We should have that in mind as we put together the program for Moscow. The Secretary said that we should try to get as much settled as possible in Moscow, though he would not preclude ambassadors continuing the work on some problems afterwards but we should do as much as we can in Moscow. Shevardnadze said that we can start here and finish in Moscow.

The Secretary noted that we have worked out an innovation with regard to interpretation. We will go with simultaneous interpreting. If at any moment either side wants it to be slower, the simultaneous will stop and we will pick up with consecutive. There are items when we will want to be sure of what is being said and we should take the time to be careful.

Shevardnadze said that he agreed and that as he understood it he should raise his hand if he wants clarification. This will not be a sign of protest. The Secretary noted that in the United States this was traditionally a sign that you wanted to go to the bathroom.

At this point the food was cleared away and the formal part of the meeting began. The Secretary welcomed Shevardnadze back to New York. We had looked forward to the discussion here. As Shevardnadze was the guest, the Secretary would invite him to go first. The Secretary noted that he had a lot to cover himself as well.

Shevardnadze thanked the Secretary. He said that on behalf of his delegation he wanted to give a cordial greeting and to thank the Secretary for the attention and hospitality which had been given to him personally, his family, and their delegation. Shevardnadze noted that this was his fourth meeting with the Secretary if Helsinki is included. The focus of recent contacts had been addressing the issues which needed preparations for the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. In this meeting, their purpose was to review what they had been able to do and how to go about making the Summit successful and meeting the hopes for the future. The day before he had mentioned to the President that the Soviets had taken certain steps. On the one hand, they had made some large-scale propos-

⁶ Shultz met with Canadian Secretary for External Affairs Clark in Calgary from October 27 to 28.

als with regard to security. For example, they had proposed a prohibition on space-strike weapons, deep cuts on strategic weapons, as well as addressing medium-ranged weapons in Europe. That is how they see the proposals which they are bringing to Geneva. They have adopted serious steps. Unfortunately, all of these steps are of a unilateral nature to date. They also have pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. They have placed limits on medium-range missiles in Europe. They have put into effect a unilateral cessation of nuclear tests. They have proposed a ban on ASAT tests to be followed by destruction of ASAT systems. This is a program of unilateral measures which the Soviet government has announced. Many of these unilateral measures are in effect. Gorbachev in Paris mentioned to the French Parliament that the number of medium-ranged nuclear weapons will be equal to the number in June 1984. He also said that they have begun dismantling of these missiles.

Shevardnadze continued that they are convinced that these acts are conducive to accomplishment of the main task. Unfortunately, he had to note that on the part of the US Administration these had not been met by understanding. It seems to the Soviets that one side has an interest in preparing for the Summit while the other side is not interested and is dragging its feet and delaying. They have this impression with regard to the Geneva negotiations. Gorbachev had sent a letter to President Reagan which laid out their concept with regard to these negotiations. Their delegation had then elaborated in Geneva. They are following the course of these negotiations with big interest. So far they have not seen any encouraging signs. He wanted to take an objective stand. He knew that within a week or a month it was hard to answer all questions. But now is the time for the other side to make a contribution. Given past experience, it is possible to bring positions together. With very few days to go, each side must take a responsible approach. They need to use every hour. The leadership in the Soviet Union and you in the United States have a responsibility to shoulder. This was mentioned by your President at the meeting the day before.

Shevardnadze continued that it cannot be said there is nothing positive in the relationship. He and the Secretary had had four meetings. Shevardnadze had met with the President. They had a variety of bilateral consultations. There were the meetings in Geneva. But this was not enough. What they had in mind today is to review what had been done and to formulate what they could bring to the Summit; what the results of that meeting could be. With the Secretary's permission he would like to continue for some time and to discuss some practical problems.

Shevardnadze noted that during his last meeting they had proposed 50% reductions of appropriate weapons; of course with banning

space-strike weapons. Since then the Soviet delegation had presented this in Geneva. On the basis of discussions among the two delegations, they need to think how best to prepare for serious discussions at the Summit of Soviet proposals. Detailed consideration requires time. Thus at this stage, it would be better not to focus on details, but search for a mutually acceptable approach. They would like to instruct the delegations to explore language that could be included in a final document. As he understood, there is agreement that there could be a concluding document. They are thinking not of a detailed paper but one which reflects similarity of viewpoints. In Gorbachev's letter of September 12, they had put forward suggestion with regard to a concluding document. Regarding a document, there could be a joint statement on the inadmissibility of war. It was Shevardnadze's impression that the President agrees about the inadmissibility of war. He would like to outline the content of such a pronouncement [Soviet Embassy will provide precise language—promised October 26th].⁷

Shevardnadze continued that they believed such a joint statement could be an important part of the Summit. It could be a separate statement or it could be part of a concluding document. Perhaps the Secretary would like to say something with regard to this issue or Shevardnadze could go on to medium-ranged missiles. The Secretary said that he would have comments but it was better for Shevardnadze to finish and then he would present his materials.

Shevardnadze stated that the Soviets assume the United States will have some remarks. This is draft language. It will require work to reach agreement.

Shevardnadze said he would now like to turn to medium-range missiles. The Soviet side was working to achieve a radical solution to medium-range systems in Europe. The US side has said it is ready to reach an agreement. But the two delegations have not been able to find convergence in order to reach a radical and final settlement. Considering all the circumstances, it is possible to accommodate the US proposal for an interim solution. The Soviet delegation has set forth a proposal. As of December 1, they would set aside deployment of medium-range systems. They would also discontinue implementation of other counter-measures in Europe and there would be a freeze in other areas with the understanding that there was no substantial change in the strategic setting in Asia. There could then be staged reductions in Europe. In eighteen months to two years you could end up with 120 US cruise missiles and have a Soviet number of medium-range warheads equivalent to the number of warheads on US missiles and the relevant arms

⁷ Not found.

of the UK and France. In the meantime, we could continue to work for a more radical solution including aircraft. So what the Soviet Union is proposing is a practical approach. If an accord could be reached, this also could be reflected in a concluding document. If, however, there is a need for additional work, then the Soviet side proposes that the delegations in Geneva explore what can be mutually agreed upon as soon as possible. This exploration could then continue in Moscow.

Shevardnadze stated that he also wanted to make some suggestion with regard to the SALT II Treaty. December 31, 1985 is the date when SALT II becomes ineffective or expires. What should we do beyond that. It seems to the Soviet side that at least we should extend it through 1986, that the US and the USSR should continue to adhere to the extent they're now doing. They have language to suggest in this regard [Soviet Embassy to provide].⁸ Shevardnadze noted that they would be prepared to consider any formulation the United States wanted to put forward on this subject.

Shevardnadze said that we also would have to consider the question of the large American radars in Greenland and the UK. These have been raised in previous meetings. They are clearly in violation of the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union had expressed this concern in the SCC. Despite US assertions, this is not modernization of old stations. Instead of a non-phased array, the US is building phased array. He would like to say emphatically that depiction of Krasnoyarsk as incompatible with the Treaty is not true. This station is designed for tracking space objects. It has nothing to do with early warning. The Soviet Union is in favor of jointly looking for a settlement. This could be done by means of ceasing construction at Krasnoyarsk, in Greenland and in Britain. If this is acceptable, then a basic agreement could be reached at the summit and more detailed agreement at the SCC.

Shevardnadze continued that with regard to non-proliferation there are some positive things. The representatives of the two countries have prepared a draft text. This text could be adopted at the Summit as it has the necessary set of elements. If the Secretary has no objection, they can consider this agreed at their level and can submit it to their leaders for the Summit. There are no great differences on this question.

He then wanted to say a few words about their moratorium on nuclear weapons tests. They did not consider that this was off the agenda. For almost three months the moratorium had been in effect, and it would continue to January 1, 1986. It would continue beyond that if the United States decides to refrain from tests. Frankly, reluctance by the US to follow does not appear logical. The US has been saying

⁸ Not found.

that it is in favor basically of a full cessation of nuclear tests. If that is true, the time has come. References to verification are not appropriate. It would be readily verifiable. Nuclear explosions can't be concealed. Soviet instruments and probably US instruments are capable of recording explosions on any scale. They had mentioned a specific test by the US. A positive attitude by the US side towards refraining from tests and resumption of CTB talks would open the way to solving verification and finding reasonable compromises there. The Soviet side was certain solutions could be found. He hoped there would be concrete discussions with the US side on this question.

Shevardnadze continued that at their previous meetings Stockholm had been discussed and they had seen some positive trends towards a resolution. They had agreed on drafting. This is, of course, good but agreements in principle need to be put in practice. The approach proposed by the neutral countries would make possible moving with a certain rhythm, including giving concerted attention to working out an agreement on non-use of force and a set of confidence-building measures. The Soviets had agreed on an annual exchange of information on military activities. They hoped that general agreement on this score would make difficult preparations for a secret war. But their recent information from Stockholm is that the US delegation is slowing things down. There is a toughening of the US position, it is more rigid with regard to non-use of force. The Soviet side had heard that nothing terrible would happen if there is no agreement until the fall of 1986 and the problem is just transferred to the Vienna conference. They hope that no factors will be allowed to impede progress. Most delegations are favorable to positive movement. The Soviet side believes it would be desirable to include Stockholm in the conclusions of the US-Soviet summit. They attached importance to Stockholm and with the other participating parties intend to work for an early successful conclusion.

With regard to the Vienna negotiations, Shevardnadze noted that in several days there would be the 12th anniversary of the talks. Unfortunately, there is a complete stalemate. In February, the Warsaw Treaty countries had put forward a proposal for initial reductions of US and Soviet forces followed by a freeze. What they have in mind is a partial agreement on what is possible now. He recalled comments by the US that it would soon determine its position. This is a problem ripe for solving.

Shevardnadze asked whether he was abusing the amount of time available. The Secretary said that he was watching Shevardnadze's pile of briefing papers gradually decrease, but that he should continue. Looking toward the simultaneous interpreters, Shevardnadze said that this is a better way of using the time (as opposed to consecutive interpretation).

Shevardnadze continued that last time they had had a useful exchange on chemical weapons. They had looked at this again. Banning these weapons is quite possible. In the stream of efforts to ban chemical weapons, the Soviet Union now has said that it is ready to work out a non-proliferation regime. If we had been able to do this with regard to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, where our two countries had done a lot of the work, why couldn't a similar approach work with regard to chemical weapons proliferation. The problem of chemical weapons will become more complicated if the US deploys binaries. The Soviet side hopes for a serious approach on chemical weapons to be included in the summit. It would be useful there to reaffirm that both sides are for banning these weapons and for an international convention. If we agree in principle, then we could agree on giving an impulse here.

Shevardnadze then stated that in quite a few areas of bilateral relations there has been positive movement. This has progressed quite a bit. On the North Pacific Air Safety Talks we have a memorandum of understanding in effect and we have begun negotiations on a technical agreement.⁹ Unfortunately, the first round did not bring about agreement. The US side is insisting on a number of provisions which go beyond the framework of the memorandum of understanding. The Soviet side fails to understand the decision of the US side to suspend the talks on air travel between the two countries. A question arises whether the US really wants an agreement on these matters. We need clarity on this issue. The exchanges negotiations are in their final stages. They are impeded only by a US demand that is not consistent with what they have in the Soviet Union and also the practice in the United States. So whether or not there will be an agreement is up to the United States. But these questions and the consulates are quite realistic.

Shevardnadze continued that the day before he had said to the President that they are making preparations with regard to the proposals of the President on such matters as computer education, exchange of students, study of Russian and others.¹⁰ They had instructed the Soviet ministries and departments to analyze these proposals of the President. They would be prepared in Moscow to give the Secretary a preliminary answer on these matters. Overall, both sides need to clear the roadblocks that block bilateral cooperation. They need to set

⁹ In telegram 231777 from State, July 29, the Department repeated the text of telegram 15384 from Tokyo, which reported on the signature by Japan, the Soviet Union, and United States of the Memorandum of Understanding on Pacific Air Safety. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850538–0304)

¹⁰ See Document 116.

aside what makes agreement more difficult and focus on where they have a sufficient degree of mutual understanding.

Shevardnadze said that he would now like to raise for discussion the question of creating a prototype thermonuclear fusion reactor with socialist countries, China, the United States, West European countries and Japan. This is a fundamentally new source of energy and is practically inexhaustible. Thermonuclear fusion has been confirmed by Soviet and US scientists who have been working together. Our cooperating on a project of such a reactor has been under development in the International Atomic Energy Agency since 1978. The Soviet side now thinks we should begin work on a prototype. This would not be inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. We could get practice on this and then produce commercial reactors. This is a very large scale and promising area. Realization of it would demonstrate more broadly the possibility of peaceful cooperation among states. The Soviets understand that the U.S. will need to study this idea. We could then explore it further in Moscow.

Shevardnadze then said that with regard to regional problems, it is positive we have had bilateral discussions on different regions. They will continue towards the end of this month with talks on Central America.¹¹ On the basis of all these discussions, it seems difficult to the Soviet side for the leaders to adopt concrete proposals on separate regions. Therefore, the Soviet side proposes that at the meeting of the leaders that they note the common commitment of the two states to resolve urgent regional problems. They would name the regions in question, where urgent solutions are required and say they were in favor of solutions including of bilateral conflicts. It would be important to reaffirm the need for restraint and taking into account the legitimate interests of each other and of other nations involved.

Shevardnadze said that as he had noted to the President, it was now of basic importance to give additional impulses to all of our delegations—in Geneva, Vienna, Stockholm and elsewhere. On bilateral relations, we need to give additional instructions to our embassies. We need more intensive preparations for the main documents, we need to formulate the main things that would conclude the summit meeting, having in mind that during the visit to Moscow we will have more concrete discussions of all the problems. We need to agree there on

¹¹ In telegram 322243 to Guatemala, San Salvador, Tegucigalpa, and San Jose, October 19, the Department informed posts that "U.S. and Soviet delegations of experts will meet October 31–November 1 to discuss Central America and the Caribbean as part of a series of exchanges on regional issues. USDel will be headed by A/S Elliott Abrams. We intend to use the session essentially to warn the Soviet side of the costs and risks it runs by its machinations in this region vital to U.S. interests." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850011–0197)

language for a joint overall concluding document. This is the overall way the Soviets envisage the principal format that could become the basis for discussion at the summit meeting. Of course, the Soviets recognize that everything cannot be considered and resolved at one summit meeting. They intend meetings to continue to take place. They want to set an outline for the future, for prospects beyond the meeting next month.

The Secretary thanked Shevardnadze for his comprehensive presentation. There was much that was constructive. The U.S. will have to study what he had said. Some things we can agree on; some offer promise, but will need to be worked through; and there are some where we clearly disagree. The Secretary agreed that we need to continue to give impulses to those working in various areas before our leaders meet. He said that he wanted now to go through the areas which will be discussed in Geneva. He would start with bilateral matters. Rather than going through subject by subject, what our positions are and where there are problems, he would just like to give Shevardnadze a written statement (Secretary handed over three page, non-paper).¹² This paper is presented in the hope that we can bring focus on the problems and if possible prior to Moscow or during and after that, but prior to Geneva see what can be resolved.

The Secretary continued that he could not say he had foreseen the Soviet proposal for a prototype thermonuclear fusion reactor. His own company had worked in this field, he had thought it was far away from development, but let us look at this proposal.

The Secretary said he would now like to comment on regional issues. He noted Shevardnadze's points in his speech the day before to the UNGA.¹³ Both sides recognized that these matters present in themselves problems and problems between the two of us. Getting at this is the intention of the President's proposals. As he noted, the regional experts' talks have been useful. We have proposed regularizing them, perhaps putting this in the joint document. We have no answer from the Soviet side, although perhaps what Shevardnadze had said about regional consultations implied that they accepted this proposal. But we need to solve, not just discuss these problems. Shevardnadze had said that there was no fated clash between us. He also had said that these regional crises obstruct economic development and

¹² Not found.

¹³ In his October 24 speech, Shevardnadze declared that the Soviet Union was proposing a "world without weapons in space," the reduction and then elimination of nuclear arms, a U.S. and Soviet ban on nuclear explosions, and U.S. and Soviet renunciation of the development of new nuclear weapons and banning of anti-satellite systems. See footnote 3, Document 120.

had talked about the tragedies of small wars—although some are not so small anymore. So the US hopes that this means that the Soviets are ready to help solve some of these problems.

The Secretary continued that what the President proposed is a framework for US-Soviet efforts, principles and processes which we might both act upon, recognizing that each area has its own history and in some respects is unique. We need in the first instance to work on those conflicts—Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Angola and Ethiopia—which directly contributed to the deterioration of our relations. These issues are at the core of international tensions and were largely responsible for shattering efforts to improve US-Soviet relations in the 1970's. So if we are to have the kind of sustained improvement in our relations that we both seek, it is important that we have movement on these issues. This is particularly true with regard to Afghanistan which more than any other example demonstrates for the American people the use of force by a great power against a small nation and which basically ended chances for ratification of SALT II. The Secretary mentioned this as with all due respect to arms control agreements, they can be readily derailed by an atmosphere created by regional conflicts. These troubles often arise from local situations but outside influences made them worse and gave them an East-West dimension.

The Secretary stated that we never made any secret that our sympathies are with those who fight for independence but we need negotiated solutions. He noted what Shevardnadze had said in this regard. So the US is prepared as the President said for military disengagement by both our countries.

What we have in mind is a peace process to address these conflicts at three levels. First there should be negotiations between the warring parties, designed to achieve an end to violence, national reconciliation and withdrawal of foreign troops. Second, once these negotiations make real progress, then appropriate, separate discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union would begin. These talks would not be formal negotiations but would support what the groups inside another country had been trying to arrive at. In some cases, this would mean guaranteeing arrangements reached in negotiations but in every case our role would be to help reduce outside military involvement and to limit the flow of outside arms. In the third stage, if there is more stability in a given country and we are able to help, then it would be possible to reintegrate these countries into the world economy. This would require a multilateral reconstruction effort. The US is prepared to play its part and we assume the Soviet Union would as well. So the process is one of reducing violence, then supporting it through bilateral efforts and third sponsoring economic reconstruction.

If Shevardnadze agreed, the Secretary would be prepared to develop language for our leaders to use in Geneva in a document. In any case, we would hope that the General Secretary would discuss these regional matters with President Reagan in Geneva. There are things he could say about each area but he would not take the time as they have limited time left. But the United States does not limit its interest to the five countries mentioned. They had discussed Iran and Iraq as part of their discussion of the Middle East, and he had some thoughts about Iran and Iraq. Both agree that the war is not in our interest. Iran is the intransigent party. They think they have a vertical hot line so there is no way to talk with them. Thus the way is to stop the flow of arms to Iran. The US has been trying this and with some success. According to US information, the major flow of arms is coming from North Korea, some countries in Europe and Libya.

The Secretary continued that with regard to Shevardnadze's comments about banning chemical weapons, they were being used in this war; and there was a potential major outbreak of the use of these weapons. There is a common view that there is a stalemate; this was the Secretary's view. But if Iran succeeds, this would give fresh impetus to spreading its backward doctrines in that region. So the US thinks there should be a stop to the flow of weapons.

In general there is a great deal to talk about in the regional field, where we could be a constructive force, help stabilize our bilateral relations, and more broadly East-West relations. Perhaps in Moscow they could return to regional issues; there was not time today to go through his considerable stack of materials. It was important to help bring about political settlements—this would help our relations and of course help the problems themselves. This is security in the most fundamental way. If we can stop arms from being used in these regions, then we can lay the basis for arms control.

The Secretary wanted to say a word about terrorism. They might talk about this further themselves and address it to our leaders. Each of us has been the victim of terrorism in recent weeks. At least one American has died; a Soviet diplomat also has died. Each of us has hostages who are being held by terrorists in Lebanon. The U.S. made a strong statement about your hostages and the dead Soviet, and he wanted again to express our sympathies.¹⁴ The US knows the Soviets are making a major effort to get their people released just as the U.S.

¹⁴ One of the four Soviet hostages in Beirut was found dead on October 2. The reference to a U.S. statement is unclear. However, in telegram 323071 to Moscow, October 21, the Department reported that Shevardnadze sent a reply to Shultz's October 2 "letter of sympathy concerning the Soviet hostages seized in Beirut." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850753-0113)

is doing. The U.S. believes the Soviet hostages are being held by a small Sunni group very close to the group holding our people. Both groups are heavily influenced by Iran which has not been trying to obtain their release. Syria is constrained by relations with Iran and by the confused situation in Lebanon. In the case of the TWA hostages Iran's last-minute endorsement, at Syria's urging, appeared to be a key factor in their release. This is one area where we can and should stand together. We should let the world know. The U.S. noted some greater understanding initially on your part with regard to the Achille Lauro incident, although subsequent Soviet press treatment was opportunistic.

The Secretary continued that we have some joint experience with regard to discussing certain issues such as nuclear terrorism and hostage taking. Here US-Soviet cooperation would be quite dramatic. If nothing else it would show the terrorists that they are isolated, that they have no sanctuary. This could have an impact.

Next, the Secretary wished to turn to arms control. The US continues to study the Soviets' ideas thoroughly. As the President and he had said, the US sees seeds which could be nurtured in the Soviet proposal. We will be responding. The Secretary noted that the US had had proposals on the table since last spring and had had a long wait to hear concrete Soviet proposals. Nevertheless, these are issues that had been studied by both sides for years, they are not new subjects. He would therefore give some reactions. First the fact that the Soviets had put forward a specific proposal which contemplates deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons was welcomed. We welcome also their indication that they are prepared to reach a separate agreement on intermediate range nuclear forces and their acceptance of the fact of NATO deployments in Europe. At the same time, the US is disappointed in many of the details of their proposal. They are one-sided in the Soviet favor. Of course we wouldn't expect them to be one-sided in our favor.

But, the Secretary continued, the Soviet proposals would decrease rather than enhance stability. Neither we nor our allies, can accept a definition of "strategic" which includes systems that protect our allies—LRINF, aircraft in Europe and Asia, and on aircraft carriers at sea—when the Soviets place no constraints on the systems which threaten our allies. The US approach is that if you strike my friend, you strike me. The Soviet proposal unfairly imposes limits on the modernization of US strategic systems, while locking in the advantages the USSR has accrued through massive military buildup over the last decade—in particular, Soviet heavy ICBMs. The Soviet proposal would permit them to retain a significant number of prompt, hard target capable warheads on heavy missiles—the most destabilizing of all strategic

systems—while imposing severe limitations on the US strategic deterrent force. Finally, the Soviet proposal would block the US strategic defense program while allowing the Soviet program to proceed. Obviously, the US cannot accept such unequal proposals. Once the US finishes its analysis we will be trying to find ways to bridge the gaps between the US proposal and the Soviet proposal.

Turning to nuclear testing, the Secretary noted that they had discussed this issue before and US views had not changed. The Secretary agreed about the importance of chemical weapons and maybe they could get at it, but verification was the heart of the problem. On non-proliferation the Secretary had met with the Soviet delegation and had received a lecture on testing and had given a lecture back.

On CDE, it may be that something can be worked out. A year and a half ago in Dublin the President had proposed the same framework we are now discussing—non-use of force and concrete confidence measures which go beyond those in the final document.¹⁵ So we wish to move these things along but we need a more constructive attitude on the Soviet side. If the two sides are to move to drafting from the informal stage which they entered on October 14, we need a more positive approach by the Soviet side to resolve outstanding differences. We believe our efforts should be focussed on finding areas for common agreement on genuine confidence and security-building measures that fall within the Madrid mandate. Talking about areas outside the mandate, such as independent air and naval maneuvers, only diverts attention from the task at hand. We need to see what we can work out in CDE.

On MBFR, the Secretary said he had nothing beyond what had been said before.

The Secretary then said that the US had given thought to the subject of a joint statement or communique, and in particular to the views Shevardnadze had expressed to him and that the General Secretary had raised in his letter to the President. As we had said at the time, US willingness to have a formal communique or document very much depends upon its contents. We have no interest in tying up time or resources in a futile debate. The enemy of good discussions could be an argument over communique language. If we can get agreed language before Geneva, that would be different. The Soviets had suggested certain substantive areas. So the US has blocked out an approach. Shevardnadze had given some suggested language. So the Secretary would give him some of ours (Secretary hands over draft joint commu-

¹⁵ See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 224, footnote 3.

nique).¹⁶ It may be that in the end we may decide not to do this. So this is not given to the Soviet side as finally decided. With that in mind and noting that there are lots of brackets to be filled in, we think there are elements in our draft for the Soviets to consider.

Dobrynin, noting the length of the US document said that this was quite a draft. The Secretary noted that when he was a professor he used to get out a scale to weigh his students' papers. The Secretary noted that they were running out of time. It was very important to have a good exchange on arms control but also a discussion of regional tensions was important as these issues have upset our relations in the past. He hoped we could reach agreement on the bilateral matters. It was not good for our leaders to spend much time on these bilateral issues. They give special content, but are not at the center of matters.

The Secretary stated that he knew the President had spoken to Shevardnadze separately the day before and would only underline the importance of the subject which the President raised. This was of extreme significance for the United States. The Secretary then asked whether McFarlane, Nitze, Ridgway, Matlock or Palmer had anything to add. The Secretary noted that McFarlane chairs the interagency group on arms control.

McFarlane noted that he finds the Soviet approach an innovative way to provide full employment for the US arms control community. There is a basis for serious negotiations at hand and there is a prospect that progress can be made. Discussions in Moscow can further address arms control.

Shevardnadze then thanked the Secretary for the detailed presentation. He noted that the US draft would be studied in depth. He hoped that everything which had been set forth by the Soviet delegation would be studied by the US side. He noted that in Moscow it would be possible to explore matters in greater detail. But he also noted that there is little time left before the meetings in Moscow. There are deep-seated differences. Realistically, therefore, some central problems will remain but we should work on them. He saw this as his central task.

Shevardnadze continued that without diminishing the importance of regional matters, terrorism and bilateral issues, they are still convinced that the principal area at the summit should be security and arms control, in particular avoiding an arms race in space and reducing nuclear arsenals. This is their conviction and it will continue despite all complications. This is the most promising area as here a lot hinges on the two powers with the greatest arsenals. As far as regional matters are concerned, not everything depends on our two countries. The US

¹⁶ Neither draft was found.

and the Soviet Union cannot become international judges. There is the Security Council and other mechanisms for that purpose.

Shevardnadze said that some of the problems raised by the President with him the day before will be studied in the most careful manner. He said that both sides need to intensify their efforts and in Moscow discuss everything in greater detail. It appeared to him that we should try to leave as little as possible for the leaders. It is necessary to prepare the groundwork for them; we need a productive approach to preparing the meeting. Many layers of distrust have accumulated. He was not issuing an appeal or making a banal statement but trying to reflect reality.

The Secretary said he agreed, so we should dedicate ourselves to this task. In terms of handling the press, he thought that they should say the meetings in New York and the upcoming meetings in Moscow should be seen as part of a continuing effort to prepare as carefully as possible for the President's meeting with Gorbachev. He would note that they had ranged across the issues in the relationship, including, of course, our own special concern. With regard to the visit to Moscow, he would say that this was at the Soviet's invitation and demonstrated the seriousness of both sides. He would say that he is looking forward to his meeting with the General Secretary. The dates of November 4th and 5th were agreed.

Shevardnadze said that there is very serious and difficult work to be done in Moscow. This would be the last time to prepare for the Summit. The rest of it would just be technology which can be dealt with by our ambassadors. The Secretary said that if this meant "logistics" that is fine. He expects to work hard in Moscow.

123. National Security Decision Directive 194¹

Washington, October 25, 1985

MEETING WITH SOVIET LEADER IN GENEVA: THEMES AND PERCEPTIONS (U)

It is important that all agencies have a clear understanding of what I consider key themes that need to be emphasized as we approach my November 19–20 meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev. I will be emphasizing the opportunity that the Geneva meetings provide to address a variety of important issues in a businesslike and constructive manner. For their part, the Soviets are trying to focus public attention almost exclusively on arms control, particularly my strategic defense initiative, while virtually ignoring a host of regional and bilateral issues that separate us. (S)

To help ensure that my message reaches as wide an audience as possible, I urge all government officials who will be discussing the Geneva meetings in public forums to draw from the attached themes and perceptions. (S)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 194 [Meeting with Soviet Leader in Geneva: Themes and Perceptions]. Secret. Reagan's signature does not appear on the NSDD. Matlock sent McFarlane a draft of the NSDD under an October 18 covering memorandum, along with a draft memorandum to Reagan which reads: "You recently reviewed and approved a package offering our current thinking on how best to approach the November meetings with Gorbachev. We believe it will be useful to distribute the themes and perceptions portions of that package as guidelines for use in the public discussion of the Geneva meetings." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron October 1985 (6))

Attachment

Paper for National Security Decision Directive 194²

Washington, undated

ROAD TO GENEVA AND BEYOND

Themes and Perceptions for Public Presentation

Theme: BUILDING A SAFER WORLD

Basic Messages:

—We want countries to *stop trying to expand their influence through armed intervention* and subversion.

That is why we are proposing negotiated settlements, withdrawal of outside forces, and international efforts to build economies and meet human needs.

—We have the mandate and opportunity to *reduce the danger of nuclear war* by drastic cuts in nuclear arsenals.

That is why we are proposing radical, verifiable and balanced reductions of offensive nuclear weapons and are pursuing research to identify defensive technologies—which threaten no one.

—We must *defend human rights* everywhere, since countries which respect human rights are unlikely to unleash war.

That is why we insist that the Helsinki accords and other international commitments be observed.

—We must *establish better communication* between our societies, since misunderstandings make the world more dangerous.

That is why we are proposing dramatic increases in people-to-people exchanges, programs to share information, and enhanced cooperation in meeting human needs.

—The meeting in Geneva marks *a new phase in this process*. Our efforts to reach these ambitious goals will continue.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE GENEVA MEETING

Working for a Safer Future

The President seeks to build the foundation for peaceful and constructive relations with the Soviet Union. This will require a long-

² Unclassified.

term, sustained effort. It must be based on the principles of fairness, reciprocity and honest fulfillment of all agreements.

Soviet Behavior: The Roots of Tension

The use or threat of force by the Soviet Union and its proxies is an underlying cause of Soviet-American and world tension. The President is determined to defend the United States and its Allies. The USSR must cease using arms and force to expand its influence if tensions are to diminish.

Leading from Strength

The President's hand is strong: he has reversed the decline in American strength and has a robust economy, a united public and strong alliances behind him. He is able to defend us whatever the Soviets do. But he wants more: he wants to lower arms levels, reduce tensions and create a more cooperative relationship with the USSR.

Promoting Democratic Ideals

The President will speak out for democracy, freedom, justice and decency everywhere since these values are the surest foundation of a just and peaceful world in the future. He does not attempt to impose our political or economic system on others, but will insist that the Soviet Union also refrain from attempts to dominate others.

Probing Soviet Intentions

We can have a more cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union only if the Soviet leaders also want it. The Geneva meeting will determine whether there has been a change in Soviet policy or only in Soviet style.

Realistic but Determined Effort

The President is preparing seriously for the meeting in Geneva. He has no illusions about the profound differences in our philosophies and societies but will go the extra mile for enduring peace and a safer world. He will bring creative and ambitious ideas to the meeting. His efforts will not end when the Geneva meeting is over. He is in this for the long haul.

124. National Security Decision Directive 195¹

Washington, October 30, 1985

The U.S. Position: Nuclear and Space Talks (U)

Four weeks ago, at the Nuclear and Space arms control talks in Geneva, the Soviet Union presented a counterproposal in response to the detailed proposal for offensive arms reductions introduced by the United States last March.² The fact that the Soviets have finally put forward a counterproposal that seems to accept the principle of deep reductions is certainly a welcome development. It underscores the soundness of the basic U.S. negotiating position. It also demonstrates that our strategy of pursuing this principled position in a patient and determined manner, complemented by the solidarity demonstrated by the NATO Alliance over the last five years, has paid off. (U)

My upcoming meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev provides a rare opportunity to take a fresh start at improving the overall U.S./Soviet relationship. In this context, the presentation of a positive Soviet arms reduction counterproposal could not have come at a better time. Unfortunately, the Soviet counterproposal that was presented is both flawed and largely self-serving. It contains a number of elements which are clearly unacceptable both to the United States and to our Allies, and which limit the utility of this counterproposal in moving both the U.S. and the Soviet Union towards an equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreement. The Soviet offer is designed to present the promise of significant, equitable reductions, but that promise is left unfulfilled. Their counterproposal is carefully crafted to result in unbalanced reductions which would permit the Soviet Union to retain major advantages in weapons, ballistic missile throw-weight, and nuclear delivery systems. (U)

For example, the Soviet counterproposal would limit U.S. systems that are critical to the defense of our allies in NATO and Asia, without limiting comparable Soviet systems that threaten these same allies and

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 195 [U.S. Position: Nuclear and Space Talks]. Top Secret.

² See Document 112. According to the President's Daily Diary, on October 29 an NSPG meeting on arms control took place at 11 a.m. in the Situation Room. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of this meeting was found. However, in a preparatory memorandum to Shultz, Timbie explained that the scheduled meeting was "to discuss the [Soviet] Counterproposal" and he provided Shultz with necessary information on the developing U.S. positions. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Eggplant II, September–December 1985 NP)

friends. The Soviet offer also would block needed U.S. strategic force modernization critical to maintaining the credibility of our deterrent, while allowing ongoing Soviet modernization programs to proceed. Finally, it continues to demand a halt to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research in spite of the fact that the Soviets themselves have been deeply involved for years in strategic defense programs, including advanced research in many of the very same areas now being explored by our SDI program. (U)

Nevertheless, I am determined to ensure that every opportunity to achieve equitable and verifiable reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals is exploited fully and to the best of our ability. Our challenge is to attempt to find, within this flawed Soviet counterproposal, seeds that we can nourish in the hope of promptly adding needed momentum to serious give-and-take on the critical issues facing us in the Geneva negotiations. Therefore, I have decided that the U.S. delegation should present the following U.S. proposals to the Soviet delegation prior to the end of the current round of the Nuclear and Space Talks. (U)

Strategic Arms Reductions (U)

In the area of strategic arms, Ambassador Tower should make it clear that while the previous U.S. negotiating position remains on the table, the United States agrees with the objective of a fifty percent reduction in strategic offensive forces. However, the United States cannot agree to a Soviet approach which would have the U.S. abandon its allies and our legitimate right to SDI research. Also, the U.S. cannot agree to apply the principle of fifty percent reductions in ways that are destabilizing. Therefore, the U.S. proposes the following approach which appropriately builds upon the fifty percent reduction principle contained in the Soviet counterproposal. (C)

Strategic Weapons. With regard to strategic ballistic missile warheads, ballistic missile throwweight, and Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs), the U.S. is prepared to propose the following: (U)

—Reductions to an equal limit of 4,500 on the number of warheads carried on U.S. and Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs, which would result in roughly a fifty percent reduction in this category of weapons. (C)

—Reductions to an equal limit of 3,000 on the number of warheads carried by U.S. and Soviet ICBMs. While higher than the current U.S. proposed limit of 2,500 on such warheads, which the U.S. continues to prefer, this would represent roughly a fifty percent reduction from the current level of warheads on Soviet ICBM forces. (C)

—A fifty percent reduction in the maximum overall strategic ballistic missile throwweight possessed by either side (in this case by Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs). (C)

—Contingent upon the fifty percent reductions in the warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs represented by the 4,500 warhead limit, and upon a fifty percent reduction in Soviet ballistic missile throwweight, the U.S. would accept an equal limit of 1,500 on the number of long-range ALCMs carried by U.S. and Soviet heavy bombers. This would represent roughly a fifty percent reduction in the number of ALCMs currently planned by the United States. (C)

Given the sizeable and unconstrained Soviet defenses against the U.S. retaliatory bomber force, the United States cannot accept any direct limit on the number of gravity bombs and Short Range Attack Missiles (SRAM) carried by heavy bombers. The U.S. also cannot agree to a proposal which aggregates under one common limit ballistic missile warheads, which arrive on their targets in minutes largely unhampered by defenses, and ALCMs, which take hours to arrive at their targets and face sizeable defenses enroute. However, if the Soviet Union were to accept the U.S. proposed 4,500 limit on the warheads carried on U.S. and Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs and the U.S. proposed 1,500 limit on long-range ALCMs carried by U.S. and Soviet heavy bombers, this would result in a reduction in the overall number of ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs to an equal total of 6,000. (C)

Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles. With respect to the numbers of U.S. and Soviet ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, the U.S. would propose the following: (U)

—While still preferring the lower level associated with our previous position, the U.S. could accept reductions to an equal limit on the number of U.S. and Soviet strategic ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) of between 1250 to 1450 on both sides. This would result in a forty to fifty percent reduction from current, higher Soviet ballistic missile levels. (C)

—In the context of an appropriate agreement, the U.S. could accept a further reduction from the previous U.S. proposed equal limits on U.S. and Soviet heavy bombers of 400 to an equal limit of 350 heavy bombers on each side. This 350 limit would result in roughly a forty percent reduction from U.S. SALT accountable heavy bomber levels. (C)

As with the case with strategic ballistic missile warhead and ALCM limits, and for the same basic reasons, the U.S. cannot agree to a proposal which aggregates under one common limit ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. However, if agreement were reached in the 1,250 to 1,450 range on U.S. and Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs and on a 350 limit on U.S. and Soviet heavy bombers, this would result in a reduction in the number of ballistic missiles and heavy bombers to an equal total between 1,600 and 1,800. (C)

Other Elements. In addition to the above, the following additional elements should also be placed on the negotiating table: (U)

—Given their especially destabilizing character, the U.S. proposes a ban on all new heavy strategic ballistic missiles. The U.S. would intend this ban to include a ban on all modernization of the existing Soviet SS–18 ICBM force. (C)

—Given the increasing difficulty posed in verifying the number and status of mobile ICBMs, and in determining with certainty that any type of mobile ICBM carries only one warhead, the U.S. also proposes a ban on all mobile ICBMs. (C)

—To ensure that the reductions proposed above promptly take effect, the U.S. delegation should reiterate the U.S. “build-down” proposal. In doing so, the delegation is authorized to adjust the level of ballistic missile warheads to which the build-down would proceed to 4,500 to synchronize this element of the build-down mechanism with the approach towards strategic ballistic missile warheads outlined in this decision. (C)

Having presented the above approach, Ambassador Tower should inform the Soviet delegation that we are prepared to consider Soviet counterproposals based either upon the new elements which we will have just presented or on our previous position, which remains on the table for consideration by the Soviet Union. (C)

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (U)

In the area of intermediate nuclear forces, Ambassador Glitman should make it clear that the previous U.S. negotiating position remains on the table. He should also restate the U.S. preference for a U.S./Soviet zero-zero outcome and the U.S. continued commitment to ultimately achieving the total elimination of the entire class of land-based LRINF missiles. At the same time, as one potential interim step towards this goal, he should propose an approach containing the following elements: (C)

—The United States would be prepared to cap U.S. LRINF missile deployments in Europe at their December 31, 1985, level (140 Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) launchers) in return for Soviet agreement to reduce Soviet SS–20 missile launchers within range of Europe to that same launcher number. (C)

—Under this approach, there would be freedom to mix systems of the types deployed by December 31, 1985 (for the U.S., Pershing II and GLCM; for the U.S.S.R., the SS–20) with the exact mix, which could result in an equal warhead level on U.S. LRINF missiles in Europe and SS–20s within range of Europe of 420–450, a subject for discussion. (C)

—The Soviet Union would also be required to reduce the number of SS–20 launchers in Asia (outside range of Europe) from December 31, 1985, levels in a manner proportional to Soviet SS–20 launcher reductions within range of Europe. (C)

—The end result would be that both sides would be limited to an equal global LRINF missile warhead number. (C)

—Appropriate constraints should also be applied to Shorter-range INF (SRINF) missiles. (C)

—Should the Soviet Union raise the issue of limitations on LRINF aircraft, the U.S. delegation is authorized to respond that the U.S. would be prepared to discuss constraints on comparable LRINF aircraft on both sides in the context of an appropriate agreement. (S)

In presenting the above approach, the U.S. delegation should protect the following:

—the U.S. right to relocate U.S. LRINF missiles permitted under the agreement within Europe as decided by the U.S. and its NATO allies;

—the U.S. right to equal global LRINF missile warhead numbers, whether or not this right is immediately exercised;

—the U.S. right to convert Pershing II missiles reduced under the terms of the agreement to Pershing IB missiles; and,

—the U.S. right to match Soviet Shorter-range INF (SRINF) missiles in range of Europe and on a global basis, as appropriate. (TS)

Having presented the above approach, Ambassador Glitman should inform the Soviet delegation that we are prepared to consider Soviet counterproposals based upon the new elements presented or on our previous position which remains on the table for consideration by the Soviet Union. (C)

Defense and Space (U)

In the Defense and Space area, Ambassador Kampelman should once again make it clear that the U.S. is committed to pursue the U.S. SDI program as permitted by, and in full compliance with, the ABM Treaty. In addition, the following elements should be added to the U.S. position in the Defense and Space area: (U)

—Propose and seek Soviet commitment to explore with the U.S. how a cooperative transition to more reliance on defenses could be accomplished. (C)

—Propose that the Soviet Union join the U.S. in an “open laboratories” initiative. Under this initiative, both sides would commit to provide, on a regular and reciprocal basis, briefings on each other’s strategic defense research programs and opportunities to visit associated research facilities and laboratories. (C)

Compliance and Verification (U)

In addition to the above proposals in the individual negotiating areas, Ambassador Kampelman should stress the criticality of the related issues of verification and compliance with existing agreements to progress in reaching any future agreements. In this context, he should

note that the U.S. continues to insist that Soviet Union take the necessary steps to correct their current instances of non-compliance with existing agreements. He should also suggest that the Soviet Union alter certain of their current practices which hamper U.S. verification of their compliance. One such step which the Soviet Union could take would be to alter its current telemetry encryption and revert to practices with regard to telemetry in use at the time of the signing of SALT II. (C)

Presenting the U.S. Proposals (U)

The U.S. proposals outlined above should be initially tabled at the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva by Ambassadors Kampelman, Tower and Glitman before the end of the current round. The U.S. delegation should seek Soviet agreement to extend the current round sufficiently to permit a full presentation of the new U.S. proposals and to permit the Soviet delegation to seek additional information as needed to ensure that the Soviet Union fully understands these new U.S. proposals prior to the U.S. and Soviet delegations departing Geneva. (S)

Ronald Reagan

125. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 30, 1985

SUBJECT

Gordiyevsky's Suggestions

You will recall that Margaret Thatcher gave you a paper summarizing points made by Soviet KGB defector Gordiyevsky regarding dealing with Gorbachev.² Gordiyevsky worked for British Intelligence for years before his defection and provided the information on which the recent mass expulsion of Soviet agents from the UK was based. Therefore, there seems no reasonable doubt of his *bona fides*. His view would be

¹ Source: Reagan Library, System II Intelligence Files, H401, Folder #2, 8490035–8890278. Secret. Not for System. Sent for information. Drafted by Matlock. Reagan initialed at the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² Attached at Tab A below. Reagan and Thatcher had several meetings during the UN General Assembly in New York the previous week; presumably she gave him this paper during one of those meetings.

that of a person who worked in the most “sensitive” Soviet security organization and was well informed about the attitudes of those around him and of his superiors, but one who did not have direct access to the highest policy making levels.

His observations and assessments are in general accord with my own. I would agree with him that the principal Soviet concern over SDI is not so much that they consider it a threat as that they feel that it forces them to accelerate their own program in a way that they cannot afford if they are to tackle the economic problems plaguing their economy. But there can be little doubt that they will try to keep up with us if they feel they have to.

I also think that Gordiyevsky is right when he says that they will not be persuaded by the argument that we would share the results of our research with them. Soviet leaders (like many other people) tend to judge others by their own standards. They know that they would under no circumstances share such information and cannot be persuaded that such offers on our part are made in good faith. Rather, they would be inclined to view such arguments as a blatant attempt to deceive them.

Gordiyevsky’s suggestions for dealing with this problem, however, are a bit unclear. When he speaks of removing Soviet “paranoia” “by making lots of practical suggestions for bureaucratic devices,” we cannot be certain of the precise meaning. However, he may have in mind certain types of confidence-building measures, proposals for specific negotiations, and proposals for cooperative efforts in areas of Soviet interest. If so, we are well off in this respect, having made a number of suggestions in these areas.

On the other hand, I am dubious about his suggestion regarding the argument that money saved on reducing offensive weapons can be applied to strategic defense. I don’t see how Gorbachev could find this persuasive; it would be asking him to forego an area where his military-industrial complex has an excellent track record (turning out offensive weapons) for one where he knows they would be competing at a disadvantage (developing new complex technologies).

I would think that a better way to approach this problem is to press Gorbachev to tell you exactly what he finds threatening about SDI. Why does he think it might be part of a first-strike strategy on our part? A discussion along these lines might give us some further clues to his real concerns and reveal whether there are practical steps we could take to meet them (in exchange for sharp reductions in offensive weapons, of course) without crippling our SDI program. It is conceivable—though not likely—that Gorbachev is looking for a fig leaf to justify turning down demands by the Soviet military for massive increases in their SDI budget. Even though the odds are that this is

not the case, we should probe to make sure, since if it is the chances of reaching an agreement for radical nuclear arms reduction would be much improved.

I agree with Gordiyevsky that the Soviets are to a degree under the influence of their own propaganda. Often, of course, they manipulate the truth quite cynically, but over time the perpetrators of lies often begin believing them—or at least half believing them. Therefore, I agree that you need to be very clear and forceful (though at the same time reasonably tactful) in pointing out how we see Soviet actions and why we see them as a threat.

Gorbachev's need for a "personal diplomatic success"—which I believe is real—does give us a certain leverage, if we apply it correctly. This may incline Gorbachev to pay some concrete prices in areas of interest to us in return for the appearance of having extracted U.S. respect and treatment as an equal. Such leverage is limited, however, and will not be very effective on the larger issues. One relatively cheap way to flatter Soviet egos without running into larger problems is to praise their role in World War II.

Gordiyevsky's comment about the Soviet military becoming increasingly dissatisfied about the deterioration of the economy is interesting. If true, and if agreements with the U.S. can be "sold" as improving Soviet ability to cope with their economic problems, this attitude could mitigate to some degree the traditional reluctance of the Soviet military to agree to real arms reduction.

George Shultz and I will probably have a better feel for some of these matters following our trip to Moscow next week, and we will keep them in mind as we prepare the materials for your Geneva meeting.

Tab A

Paper Received From British Prime Minister Thatcher³

Undated

SUMMARY OF GORDIEVSKIY'S POINTS

1. Strongest wish of the Soviet Union not to be involved in strategic defence, which would impose a terrible economic strain.
2. They would see the American proposal for sharing information about the SDI but not stopping research and development as a trick.

³ Secret.

They would believe that the United States was trying to ruin the Soviet economy.

3. The Russians could be brought aboard only if the Americans could remove Russian paranoia about the aims of the United States and of the West generally. This could be done by making lots of practical suggestions for bureaucratic devices.

4. Another argument would be to say that money saved on *reducing* offensive nuclear missiles can be devoted to strategic defense. This would avoid the need for an overall *increase* in military expenditure.

5. But the Soviets will invest heavily in strategic defence if it has to. The leadership would justify this to their people by means of a greatly stepped up propaganda campaign against the United States.

6. The Soviet leaders are too self-confident and too much under the influence of their own propaganda. The United States needs to set out its views on permissible Soviet behaviour more forcefully.

7. The President also needs to explain to Gorbachev the real nature of developments in various parts of the world. Gorbachev's own information will be heavily influenced by propaganda.

8. Gorbachev's priorities are arms control and Soviet/United States relations. Everything else is secondary.

9. Gorbachev's main motives for improving Soviet-United States relations will be to gain better access to U.S. technology and science; and to score a personal diplomatic success. It is also psychologically important for the Russians to feel that they are the equal of the United States. United States/Soviet co-operation in World War II was very flattering for them.

10. They need to have the security of feeling equal above all in the nuclear field. They think there is nuclear parity at present but fear the situation is changing in favour of the United States.

11. It will be very difficult for the Soviet leaders to improve the functioning of the Soviet economy, and much more so if they have to go for the SDI. But the Russian people are probably prepared to accept further hardship if necessary.

12. Gorbachev and the Party are not dependent on the people. The military complex is a real power: and the military are increasingly dissatisfied with the deterioration in the economy.

126. Memorandum From John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, October 31, 1985

SUBJECT

Putting the Onus on the Soviets

A significant part of the Soviet propaganda strategy in preparation for the Geneva meeting is to put the onus for success or failure squarely on the shoulders of the President. In addition to focusing on arms control as the principal terms of debate, the Soviets would like to convince the Western public that the USSR has a *reactive* foreign policy rather than a *pro-active* or revolutionary foreign policy. Once we become convinced of this, we began to accept the idea that Soviet aggression is simply a response to our stimuli, and that it is necessary for us to change the stimuli *unilaterally* to achieve peace. The fact that tensions persist must mean that the U.S. is too aggressive, provocative and insufficiently interested in peace. Needless to say, such propaganda puts the U.S. on the defensive.

Unfortunately, given the attitudes of significant segments of the public and press, we are already forced into this position. Under the circumstances, the President faces the risk of being seen as having failed in his peace meeting with Gorbachev if he falls off either side of the tightrope: 1) If expectations are raised too high, the President faces the prospect of "post-summit let-down." This will inevitably occur when the Soviets shoot down another airliner or U.S. Army Major, and many will attribute it to the President's "failure" as a peacemaker; or 2) If we succeed in lowering expectations but, in the process, appear too confrontational, the President will also be criticized for failing to try hard enough to make peace.

A Suggested Solution

There is only one way to avoid these two pitfalls, and that is to lift some of the onus of peacemaking from the President's shoulders. *This can be done by educating the press and the public about the limits the Soviet system imposes on Gorbachev in terms of what he personally can do to reduce tensions with the U.S.*

¹ Source: Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, Subject File, U.S.-Soviet Union (20); NLR-324-10-20-13-4. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation reads "RCM has seen."

To do this, Administration spokesmen and other prominent ex-officials must make the following points in background briefings to the press:

—Gorbachev is part of a Party dictatorship, but he personally is not a dictator.

—Therefore, despite his apparent success in consolidating power quickly and putting his own people in office, his own individual decisionmaking power is severely limited.

—In fact, a Soviet Party leader has much less discretion and latitude in his decisionmaking than does an American President, whose Constitutional powers in foreign affairs come much closer to those of a king.

—The Soviet Party leader is constrained principally by a system of political conformity which is enforced by a collective leadership that uses ideology to set the standard against which deviationism is measured.

—For anyone to advance in the Party as far as Gorbachev has, it is necessary to demonstrate one's ability to discipline oneself to subordinate all of one's individual predilections to the ideological dictates of the Party.

—Gorbachev is thus constrained to stick within the general parameters of communist ideology whether he believes it or not, lest he risk being ousted by his own colleagues for excessively individualistic political actions—the same way Khrushchev was removed. Such individualistic deviation from Party norms is regarded as a threat to the cohesion and therefore the power of the Party and the very existence of the Soviet system.

—Thus, we are dealing here not with an individual so much as we are dealing with a *system*. This means that many of the results of conventional personal contact cannot apply in this situation.

—This does not mean that this meeting cannot serve a number of worthwhile purposes. But it does mean that we must be realistic about the limitations that the Soviet system imposes on its leaders.

—The fact is that no Soviet leader can ever accept the *permanence* of any arrangement in the world whereby the U.S. remains a democracy. This would be tantamount to accepting a "social status quo" which is contrary to what the Soviets consider to be morally and strategically acceptable.

—When the Soviets say that they are for "peace," they do not mean the same thing that we do. As they see it, true peace cannot be achieved until the causes of war have been eliminated. Since their ideology brands the "capitalist" system as the source of war, peace cannot happen until the political-economic system in America has been destroyed and transformed into a communist system. For the Soviets, the word "peace" is synonymous with "communism."

—Similarly, their expression “peaceful coexistence” does not mean what we think it means—i.e., “we may hate each other but we will live and let live.” Rather, for the Soviets, “peaceful coexistence” is defined as a “form of struggle against capitalism” where all forms of struggle are permissible except all-out war.

—Unless we understand that these are the realities of the Soviet system and its foreign policy, we will continually be disappointed in our search for peace. A successful and realistic effort to seek peace must recognize that there is only so far the Soviets can go in reaching some kind of accommodation with us.

—Our challenge, therefore, is to work within these constraints to build a safer world.

Pros and Cons

Having presented these recommended talking points to Jack Matlock, he observed that there is a danger in making these points insofar as they risk excusing Gorbachev in advance for not changing his positions, whereas our strategy is to try to pressure him to make changes (See Matlock comments at Tab I).² Thus, Jack suggests that we reserve such points for after the meeting to explain why Gorbachev may have failed to rise to our challenge.

I believe that Jack makes a very good point. But I believe that if we wait exclusively until after the meeting to make the general point that Gorbachev is constrained by the system, we will look as if we are rationalizing a failure and inventing excuses for ourselves. Recognizing the risks of excusing Gorbachev in advance, I still believe that it would be helpful to make these points publicly—not necessarily prominently, but nevertheless on the record in some fashion. That way, should the Soviets fail to be forthcoming, we will be able to point to the fact that our expectations were not unrealistic. These points about the Soviet system, after all, are true. They are also not well understood by the public whose general distrust of the Soviets may be intact, but whose understanding of the communist system is woefully deficient. With all the media focus on this meeting, we have a golden opportunity to educate the public about certain realities with which we all will have

² Not attached; a copy of Matlock’s handwritten comments are in the Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Chron File October 1985; NLR–324–12–37–10–7. Matlock wrote: “I think this should be worked with the Public Diplomacy group, which is charged with putting together a comprehensive and coherent strategy. Some of the points are very well taken, but there is danger in relying on them exclusively. Basically, we want to put pressure on Gorbachev to change his positions and not excuse him in advance for not being *able* to do so. If he can’t rise to the challenge, then our focus should be on the reasons for this *after* the meeting. Jack.”

to live for a long time. If the public understand them, they will be far less likely to blame the President.³

³ McFarlane wrote below this paragraph: "I have been making this point about why significant Sov chg is unlikely for several months. I agree with you."

127. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev¹

Washington, October 31, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

As I told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in New York October 24, I have been giving careful consideration to your letter dated September 12.² The issues you raise are important ones, the ideas you have put forward are in many ways interesting, and I have wanted to study them thoroughly before replying.

Many of the specific points you addressed in your letter have been or will be dealt with by our delegations in the Geneva arms control negotiations or by our Foreign Ministers. In this letter I will therefore focus on what I consider the most significant issues you have raised.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8591135). No classification marking. On October 31, McFarlane forwarded Reagan revised text of the letter for his signature, which included a revision that Reagan asked for in a handwritten note on a draft of the letter. His note asked that "This be amended to state our proposal—now being tabled at Geneva." McFarlane's covering memorandum, drafted by Matlock, stated: "Gorbachev's letter notified you that the Soviets would be making new proposals at the Geneva negotiations. Now that we are prepared to reply to that offer, it would be appropriate for you to respond to Gorbachev's letter by notifying of our new proposals. This letter also serves to give your personal endorsement to George Shultz's mission to Moscow next week." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, 1985 Correspondence, Related Material (5/5))

² In telegram 15660 from Moscow, November 1, the Embassy noted that Hartman delivered the letter to Shevardnadze on November 1 at 9 a.m. Moscow time. Hartman explained to Shevardnadze that the letter "set forth the President's thoughts on the overall bilateral relationship and the upcoming Geneva meeting. In particular, the letter explained the basis for our response to the Soviet counterproposals outlined in Gorbachev's September 12 letter to the President. And it provided the President's reaction to some of the proposals Shevardnadze had put forward to us in New York." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850011–0538) See Document 121. For Gorbachev's letter, see Document 84.

You suggested in your letter that we might reach an understanding on the inadmissibility of nuclear war and other general principles which should guide us. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has since proposed specific language for our consideration. As I have repeatedly made clear, it is indeed my view that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. I therefore have instructed Secretary Shultz to discuss this matter with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in their meetings next week.

As we address this and other elements which may figure in any document we may issue in Geneva, I believe it is important to give the most careful consideration to our words. The experience of the past has been that overly vague or rhetorical language has led to expectations which, given the competitive aspect of our relationship to which you referred in your letter, cannot be sustained.

If we are to avoid subsequent misunderstandings and disillusionment, our own statements should be clear and based on concrete achievements. I am convinced that there is substantial common ground on the range of areas we have been discussing in connection with our forthcoming meeting, and I would hope that this common ground can be expanded during our meeting in Geneva.

You raised several specific areas in the security field where this might be possible. Secretary Shultz will be prepared to discuss all your ideas in concrete terms while he is in Moscow. I believe you will find that we are indeed prepared to go our fair share of the way to ensure our meeting is a productive one.

I do, however, want to address your response to the proposals we had previously made in the Geneva arms control talks, which was foreshadowed in your letter and which your delegation subsequently tabled in Geneva.

We have been carefully assessing your counterproposal over the last month. As I stated in my address to the United Nations on October 24,³ I believe that within it there are seeds which we should nurture and that in the coming weeks we should seek to establish a genuine process of give-and-take.

In order to foster such a process, I have approved a new and comprehensive proposal designed to build upon the positive elements of your counterproposal and bridge the positions of our two sides.⁴ I have asked our negotiators to extend the current round to permit your experts to achieve a full understanding of our approach. This new proposal deals with all three areas under discussion in the Geneva

³ See footnote 3, Document 85.

⁴ See Document 124.

negotiations. Its essence is a proposal for radical and stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive arms and a separate agreement on intermediate-range nuclear missile systems, both of which bridge US and Soviet ideas. We also propose that both sides provide assurances that their strategic defense programs are and will remain in full accord with the ABM Treaty. Such assurances assume a resolution of our current differences over compliance with the Treaty.

In the area of strategic arms, the United States agrees with the objective of a fifty percent reduction in strategic offensive forces. Our proposal builds on this, applying the fifty percent principle in a manner that is both equitable and can enhance stability. In the area of intermediate-range nuclear forces, we have also looked for elements we find in common. While I continue to firmly believe that the best outcome would be the complete elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles on both sides, in our new proposal, we have also moved in your direction. In defense and space we must begin now to establish a framework for a cooperative transition to more reliance on defenses and we would like to see a more developed dialogue on how such a transition could be jointly undertaken.

We have designed our approach to provide for a mutually acceptable resolution of the range of nuclear and space arms issues; to take account of the interrelationship between the offense and the defense; and to address those concerns that you and your negotiators have described as being of great importance to you. I am convinced that this new proposal can provide the basis for immediate and genuine progress on the numerous and complex issues facing us in the nuclear and space area, and I look forward to discussing it with you in Geneva later this month.

We will also have the opportunity in Geneva to discuss the other areas which make up our relationship. Much work remains to be done if we are to be able to announce specific progress on regional and bilateral issues. I hope that Secretary Shultz's Moscow visit will be a stimulus to rapid progress in the weeks ahead.

In conclusion, may I say once more that I am looking forward to our meeting and that I sincerely hope we will be able to set our countries on a less confrontational and more cooperative course in the years ahead. I will personally spare no effort to help bring this about.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

128. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev¹

Washington, November 1, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

This is in reply to your letter of October 12, 1985, concerning the possibility of a confidential exchange of opinions on a non-official basis. My reasons for mentioning this possibility to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze were twofold.

First, it seemed that there could be some intrinsic value in exchanging opinions informally and privately without the constraints imposed by official formality. But I also wished to resolve certain ambiguities in how we communicate. From time to time in recent months Soviet officials have approached American officials or private citizens who are in touch with senior officials in our government and have offered comments which, they suggest, represent your views. Naturally, I have paid close attention to these comments since I take your opinions very seriously and wish to do the utmost to understand them with full clarity. However, the comments received in this manner have not always been consistent and thus I have difficulty determining to what degree they in fact represent your views. It therefore seemed worthwhile to seek a clarification.

I judge from your reply that you consider established channels adequate for communication between us. That is agreeable to me. Consequently Secretary Shultz will continue to look forward to receiving Ambassador Dobrynin at the State Department. Similarly, we will expect that Ambassador Hartmann will enjoy corresponding access to you in Moscow.

I hope that the meetings Secretary Shultz has in Moscow will lay the groundwork for a productive meeting between us in Geneva. I am very much looking forward to meeting you there and continue to hope

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8591143, 8591239). No classification marking. McKinley, signing for Platt, sent a draft of the letter to McFarlane under an October 31 covering memorandum, explaining: "The Soviets have responded to our suggestion of a special channel of communications between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev by nominating Ambassador Dobrynin. Gorbachev's letter of October 12 is attached at Tab 2. The Department believes that we should respond symmetrically by nominating Ambassador Hartman as our Moscow point of contact. The draft Presidential response at Tab 1 makes the point that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze should be part of the process." McFarlane wrote in the right-hand margin: "I put a draft on PROFs which is a pro-forma assertion that since they don't want a private channel we will deal in normal channels." An NSC routing slip indicates Reagan signed the letter on November 1. For Gorbachev's letter, see Document 115.

that we will succeed in setting relations between our two countries on a more constructive course.

Sincerely yours,

Ronald Reagan

129. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Papers on the Soviet Union: The Soviet View of the United States

You have previously read six groups of papers on the Soviet Union.² They dealt with the sources of Soviet behavior, the problems of Soviet society, the instruments of control, Gorbachev's domestic agenda, the USSR's international position, and the Soviet view of national security. The attached group examines the Soviet view of the United States.

As discussed in the paper at Tab A on the Soviet image of the United States,³ the Soviets see the U.S. as their main rival for influence in the world and the greatest single threat to their security. Concern about the U.S. is reinforced by the traditional Russian "fortress mentality" (born of the experience of numerous foreign invasions across open frontiers) and by the works of Marx and Lenin, with their portrayal of a hostile capitalist world bent on destroying socialism.

Soviet views of the U.S. are also colored by a deep historical sense of inadequacy in the face of western economic and technological development. The Kremlin's felt need to "catch up" with the West economically flows out of this tradition, and the American standard of living serves in many ways as the model for the Soviet future.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron November 1985 (1/10). Confidential. Sent for information. Drafted by Matlock. The memorandum is unsigned. Matlock forwarded the draft memorandum and the attached papers to McFarlane on November 1.

² See Documents 39 and 117.

³ Tab A, "Soviet Image of the United States," is attached but not printed.

American military preeminence since 1945 is also a major factor in Moscow's attitude toward the United States. Moscow's leaders tend to equate military power with political power. They feel they have been living under a U.S. political/military shadow since World War II, with the Cuban missile crisis being perhaps the most graphic expression for them of this U.S. predominance.

Despite efforts in recent years to develop a core of U.S. specialists in the Soviet Union, Soviets in general have little understanding of the American political system. Democratic traditions are alien and, in some cases, incomprehensible to them, and they have particular difficulty understanding the role of an independent legislative branch of government. This does not stop them, however, from trying to lobby Congress on behalf of Soviet foreign policy positions.

Soviet aims in dealing with the United States (paper at Tab B) are essentially threefold: to contain American military capabilities, enhance their own international reputation, and promote the transfer of needed goods and technology. Militarily, the Soviets expend enormous resources to meet the perceived U.S. military threat. At the same time, they see the value of negotiating to try to contain further western military development.

Moscow realizes that its competition with the United States is dangerous, but also feels that it enhances the USSR's international image. It perceives the mere fact of frequent contact with the world's leading power as an achievement.

Economically, the Soviets were optimistic in the 1960's that western technology might help boost their sagging economy. For a variety of reasons, however, including the American linkage between trade and human rights, Soviet hopes were never realized. Today Soviet trade with the United States is limited to a relatively narrow range of items, including agricultural products and some non-sensitive computer equipment. The leadership would like to see this trade continued and even expanded. At the same time the Soviet people have long since learned to cope with economic hardship and shortages, and western imports clearly are not a matter of economic survival for the Soviet Union.

Tab B**Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁴**

Washington, undated

SOVIET AIMS IN DEALING WITH THE UNITED STATES

Moscow's objectives vis-a-vis the US are essentially three: to contain the growth of US military power, enhance the international reputation of the USSR, and promote the transfer of needed US goods and technology. In pursuit of these objectives, the Soviets have demonstrated considerable flair in using the open political processes of the West. Nevertheless, the results of their efforts have been uneven. Moscow has rarely been able to push the US to alter basic defense commitments or policies. On the other hand, the Soviets have been able to use their relationship with the US to reinforce their international standing and reputation. Trade and economic transfers have been of only limited importance despite Soviet interest in special US commodities such as grain, and high-tech products.

Containment of US Military Capabilities

Given its enormous military capabilities, the USSR today is decidedly less fearful of external enemies than at any time in its history. The Kremlin leaders nonetheless remain extremely anxious about the nuclear and conventional military strength of their main rival. Paradoxically, however, the Soviets have felt compelled to use or threaten military force almost exclusively against socialist regimes—East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, China, and Poland, as well as Afghanistan. Yet it is the strategic capability of the United States which, if ever unleashed, could imperil the physical, let alone political, survival of the USSR.

The Soviet leaders have expended enormous energies and resources to maintain forces adequate to meet any possible US military challenge. In order to reduce the danger they believe confronts them, they have sought in parallel to contain the development of US defense capabilities through negotiations. And they consistently seek, directly and indirectly, to dissuade the American political leadership from undertaking development of new weaponry.

In support of such efforts, the Soviets have demonstrated some skill in manipulating the open political systems of the US and its

⁴ Confidential. Drafted by M.S. Schwartz (INR/SEE).

NATO allies. Kremlin leaders by now well understand that the political processes of the Western democracies offer promising possibilities for directly influencing Western public opinion and even policy decisions. In his TIME interview, Gorbachev observed that in preparing for their upcoming meeting, “neither the President nor I will be able to ignore the mood in our respective countries or that of our allies.” The TIME interview itself, as well as his more recent performances in France, clearly show Gorbachev’s interest in shaping the “mood” of Western opinion. In recent years, the Soviets sought to affect the outcome of the 1983 West German elections, to dissuade European governments from deploying the Pershing and cruise missiles, and are currently engaged in a major public relations effort to influence the Dutch decision on INF deployment and US arms control policy at the Geneva NST talks, especially regarding SDI.

As part of the effort, much Soviet energy and attention has been devoted to lobbying the US Congress. Impressed by the impact of Congressional opposition on the policies of Presidents Johnson and Nixon, and particularly the Congressional inclination to give increasingly careful scrutiny to military appropriation bills, the Soviets have intensified their cultivation of both House and Senate. In 1974, the parade of representatives from the Soviet Embassy actively lobbying on Capitol Hill against the Jackson amendment led one observer to describe the scene as a “spectacle . . . suggestive almost more of a platoon of out-of-town shoe manufacturers worried about tariff protection than of emissaries from America’s most deadly rival.”

The diplomats are now more discreet but just as active, and are often joined by Soviet journalists and visiting academicians. In addition to visiting Washington, the ubiquitous Georgiy Arbatov of the USA Institute spoke at meetings in San Francisco, Philadelphia, and New York and was on an ABC-TV show in the first half of September. Meanwhile, Andropov and Gorbachev did their part by meeting with influential congressional delegations visiting Moscow (*inter alia* those headed by Pell, Byrd and O’Neill).

Despite these endeavors, the Soviets do not appear particularly satisfied with their accomplishments. They have found American audiences largely unresponsive to their message, the American political environment basically hostile, and no political constituency in the United States especially sympathetic to Soviet interests. Not only is the American Communist Party weak, with no representation in the Congress in recent memory, but the “left” as a whole is feeble. Though heartened by activities of the anti-war movement and of individual congressmen in support of the nuclear freeze movement, Soviet observers have learned to have little faith in the consistency of the Congress or the public at large on foreign policy issues.

The Soviets also actively court the NATO allies—in the more immediate hope of generating pressure on Administration policies than of dividing the West Europeans from the US. Gorbachev's recent trip to France was designed to exploit Mitterrand's stance on SDI in the hope this might increase pressure on the President before the November meeting. The most recent Soviet arms control positions—and possibly even their SS-20 deployments—were shaped with an eye to influencing the Dutch decision on INF deployment due November 1. In addition to lobbying European policymakers, Moscow targets former government leaders, opposition officials, media, trade union and cultural figures and even former NATO military officers, but after the failure of their massive anti-INF campaign, the Soviets have learned not to expect significant results.

Enhancement of the USSR's Reputation

Despite the risks involved, Moscow sees its world-wide military-political competition with the US as enhancing the USSR's standing as a world power; the very fact of frequent contact and negotiation with the world's major power adds to its stature. President Nixon's state visit to the Soviet Union in 1972 was interpreted as symbolic acknowledgment of the USSR's special role in world affairs. As Soviet President Podgorniy declared when toasting President Nixon; "This is the first visit by a President of the United States of America in the history of relations between our countries. This alone makes your visit . . . a momentous event."

Despite speculation in Washington that Brezhnev might call off the summit in response to American bombing of Haiphong Harbor, the Soviet leadership never seriously considered cancellation. Even more gratifying than the visit itself were the agreements signed in Moscow in which the US explicitly acknowledged the "special responsibility" of the USSR (along with the US) for preserving world peace and controlling international tensions, and endorsed the principle of equality, as well as the notion of peaceful coexistence. According to defector Arkady Shevchenko, this was "the most powerful boost to the Soviet egos. . . . Nothing would sound better to the Soviet leadership suffering for years under an inferiority complex."

US participation in arms control negotiations with the USSR for some 30 years is also interpreted as tacit acceptance of the USSR's equality of status. The first leaders to engage in this activity of course saw in the negotiation process an opportunity to shape the international strategic environment in which they at the time were at a serious disadvantage. Discussions with Western diplomats and arms control experts, especially in formalized settings such as summit conferences, also helped propel the post-Stalin Soviet Union onto the world's diplo-

matic stage and cement Moscow's international standing. From the 1963 signing of the Partial Test-Ban Agreement through the mid-1970s when agreements were concluded on a host of arms control issues, Soviet diplomats basked in the satisfaction of the USSR having the right "to have a say," in former Foreign Minister Gromyko's phrase, "in settling any question involving the maintenance of international peace."

Trade and Technology Transfer

By the late 1960s, the notion had emerged in Moscow that trade with the West generally, and the US in particular, could help Brezhnev revitalize the sagging Soviet economy—without confronting the risks of large-scale economic reforms. For a variety of reasons having to do in part with congressional concerns about Jewish emigration (which resulted in denial of most-favored-nation status and limits on credits available to the USSR), as well as the difficulties the Soviets have had in assimilating Western technology, the results of these efforts to tap Western resources have been relatively minor.

Soviet reliance on US grain has dropped considerably since the 1960s. In 1979, grain from the US amounted to approximately 70% of total Soviet grain imports; today the figure is roughly 40%. Argentina and the European Community now supply much of the USSR's grain imports—and this year the USSR for the first time has failed to meet its minimum wheat purchase requirements under the Long-Term Grain Agreement.

Economic transfers, on the whole, tend to be limited to specific requirements. In addition to agriculture, the Soviets remain interested in such American products as computer technology and software, as well as equipment that will help break bottlenecks in the energy and agro-industrial sectors. Needless to say, the Soviets also spend considerable resources to acquire modern, military-related technologies.

Nevertheless, there is no imperative domestic need to acquire Western goods. The Soviet economy, it is true, remains weak, particularly in the consumer goods sector—housing, clothing, consumer durables, and the variety of food supplies, but this is nothing new. The Russians have had long experience with doing without and making do. And Gorbachev's economic programs to stimulate production still promise to yield returns. Western imports clearly are not a matter of survival.

The November Meeting

But a number of domestic factors will condition Gorbachev's approach to the November meeting in Geneva, as well as his ability to achieve his three major objectives there. The Soviet military leadership, for example, will tend to resist significant reductions of their

arsenals in any trade-off with the US. The Party as a whole, which takes great pride in Moscow's new-found status as a world power, would also look askance at any major reduction of Soviet military power. Moscow's military power and international prestige are truly popular at home. This helps explain why, though the word peace is always on their lips, arms control for the Russians has always been, as one informed observer once put it, "an unnatural act."

Moscow's oft-noted inferiority complex helps explain the Kremlin's neurotic worries about any slights to national sovereignty, real or imagined. Concern regarding sovereignty underlies its bitter reaction to US human rights demarches. Washington's public criticism of Soviet policy toward its dissidents or emigration are all seen as a crude intrusion into Soviet domestic affairs, an attempt to treat the USSR as a second-class power.

Clearly more self-assured than his predecessors, Gorbachev has been willing to speak directly to the issues of Jewish emigration and family reunification, but he too insists that Moscow's treatment of its own citizens remains a domestic matter. Thus he is unlikely to do more at Geneva than make a few show-case gestures by releasing some dissidents and allowing a small number of Jews to emigrate.

130. Note From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 1, 1985

Mr. President,

In follow up to your direction that we give some thought to how we might form a cooperative SDI research/development program, my staff has been thinking and consulting quietly with outside experts. They have come up with one rather novel idea—a jointly manned spacelab from which experiments would be conducted on applied technologies holding promise of intercepting ballistic missiles in flight. We would also invite the other nuclear powers to participate (Brits, French and Chinese).

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Sensitive Chron 1985; NLR-362-7-40-10-7. Secret.

Clearly there are some things we ought not share—supercomputers, for example. But this concept is worth pursuing in my judgment. Is this the sort of thing you had in mind?

Bud

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff²

Washington, undated

Points on Sharing SDI Technology with the Soviets

1. Sharing our SDI technology with the Soviet Union is one way to ease the transition from a world of nuclear offenses to anti-nuclear defenses. But we must remember that it is one thing for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to move independently along parallel tracks towards a world in which they have better defenses and less offenses. It is a very different matter for the Soviet Union to be building its defenses *and future offensive systems* with full knowledge of our defensive technology. For example, if we told the Soviets how we searched for and tracked ballistic missiles, they would have a much better idea of how to evade that search. While we do not object to Soviet defenses, we should not teach them how to beat our defenses, particularly at a time when their offensive force is larger than ours.

2. Sharing SDI technology could reduce our technological lead in non-nuclear military areas. SDI technology, in many cases, can be used to strengthen other Soviet military capabilities. Super computers will be at the heart of SDI. Sharing those with the Soviets would also help the Soviets find our submarines, and design better fighter aircraft. We must eliminate the threat of nuclear war. We must *not* do so at the price of increasing Soviet *non-nuclear* military capabilities.

3. We have gone to our European allies and asked them to help with our SDI research. If we now give it to the Soviets for free, they will be justly upset. They, and the Chinese, will view U.S.-Soviet collaboration on SDI as a project that will neutralize their small nuclear arsenals. How will China feel if its small nuclear force is neutralized by Soviet defenses using American technology, while the Soviets still have hundreds of missiles aimed at China? We should think more

² Secret.

about how to share our military technology in sensitive areas with our allies before we begin to share it with the Soviets.

4. The Soviets, however, have been attacking us for “militarizing space.” This, of course, is incorrect; they militarized space long ago. But if we proposed joint, multi-national research into the feasibility of space-based anti-ballistic missile weapons, their attacks on us might be answered. This research could take the form of the Apollo-Soyuz space mission of the mid-1970s. We could talk to the Soviets about creating an international space-lab to do research into non-nuclear ways to destroy ballistic missiles in flight. As with Apollo-Soyuz, we would be careful not to transfer technology that would have undesirable military applications (other than ABM, of course). We should invite Great Britain, France, and China to participate, since their nuclear ballistic missile forces would be affected as well. The fruits of that research would be unclassified, and would be made available to all, as is done with other forms of scientific research.

5. The first step would be to propose to the Soviets a scientific commission involving the five nuclear ballistic missile powers to investigate the possibility of international manned experiments in space on anti-ballistic missile weapons.

6. We would continue with our existing SDI research in the meantime, just as we would expect the Soviets to continue their own independent work on anti-ballistic missile defenses.

131. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 1, 1985

SUBJECT

Soviet Views of the New US NST Proposal

The Soviets will find large parts of the US offer unacceptable.² It poses a difficult choice for Gorbachev. The absence of any movement on his principal concern, SDI, could be so embarrassing as to call for his labelling the summit a failure. At the same time, he would see similarities to the overall Soviet framework as affording some common ground on which to engage the US in an arms control dialogue. On balance, we tend to believe the Soviets will be sharply critical of the US proposal, but nevertheless will eventually begin to bargain.

Although the START offer builds in part on the Soviet framework, Moscow will find the specifics distasteful:

- Soviet modernization would be crimped more severely than that of the US; we could deploy the hard-target-capable MX and Trident-II while Soviet ICBMs are left vulnerable by banning mobile deployment of their new ICBMs;

- It allows too few ballistic missile RVs for them to meet their likely targeting requirements, given the relatively small US ICBM reductions they would anticipate; and

- Exclusion of gravity bombs and SRAMs, and Soviet expectations that the Backfire bomber would be included, perpetuate the US bomber advantage.

Nevertheless, at the November meeting, the Soviets might see principles common to both sides—a 50% reduction and an interim INF freeze—as grist for a joint declaration. Later, at NST, the Soviets will be tempted to modify their counter-proposal in light of the new US offer. While their position on SDI is unlikely to change, in START they would eventually begin to bargain. While they will probably view higher limits as acceptable, they would not want to be seen as proposing them. In INF, they will likely add to the US offer of 140 launchers in Europe a number of Soviet systems equal to those of

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 Soviet Union November. Secret; Noform; Exdis. Drafted by V. Van Diepen (INR/SFA/SF) and K. Puschel (INR/SEE); cleared by M.M. Lowenthal (INR/SFA) and R. Baraz (INR/SEE); approved by J. Kahan (INR/FAR). Abramowitz wrote "Mort A." next to his name in the "From" line.

² See Document 124.

the UK and France; in Asia, they might reduce SS-20s by about 30% (codifying a dismantlement apparently already planned). But they would do all this only in the context of continuing pressure on the US SDI position.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research³

Washington, undated

SOVIET VIEWS OF THE NEW US NST PROPOSAL

The Soviets will see the new US proposal as having major defects, and fundamental ones on SDI, and as an effort to recapture some of the public relations high ground going into the November meeting.

A Soviet Military Perspective

The following evaluation from a Soviet viewpoint of the new US NST proposal is based on our understanding of Soviet strategy, military programs, and past arms control proposals.

Defense and Space: A Disappointment. The new US proposal will be seen by the Soviets as confirming their view that a deal on SDI is not possible—at least for now. They will no doubt reject any idea of “open laboratories” as an attempt to legalize the SDI program rather than circumscribe it.

Gorbachev will find himself in a dilemma. His prior personal statements on SDI make it embarrassing for him to respond positively. He will no doubt press his points in November. If he cannot gain any concessions on SDI the possibility cannot be excluded that he would denounce the summit as a failure. However, the Soviets probably did not realistically expect a deal on SDI at the meeting, and they would probably see continuation of an arms control dialogue as their only means to try to circumscribe SDI.

The Soviets will continue to assert that there can be no deal on START unless some limits are put on SDI. Past Soviet statements and proposals clearly indicate they want a ban on development, testing, and deployment of SDI; they also would like to define more explicitly what is permitted research. The Soviets are likely to go on resisting being drawn into a dialogue on facilitating a transition to a “defense-

³ Secret; Noform; Exdis.

dominant” world. They also will continue to deplore US efforts to reinterpret the ABM Treaty, which they view as symptomatic of US rigidity on SDI.

INF: Perhaps a Silver Lining. Given Soviet demands for the inclusion of FBS and for equality with total NATO INF, they would still see the US and Soviet positions as being far apart. They would, however, see opportunities for further discussion. The proposed limit of 420–450 warheads on LRINF missiles in Europe (which appears to envisage a limit of 36 Pershing–IIs) and the proposal to allow conversion of Pershing–IIs (P–IIs) to shorter-range Pershing–Ibs both signal a willingness for significant reductions in US P–IIs. This is important because the Soviets regard the P–II’s accuracy and short flight-time as a threat to their command-and-control. The US formula for reducing SS–20s in Asia is vague, and could leave the Soviets with 54–81 of their 162 Asian SS–20s depending upon how it is calculated.

START: Not Good Enough. The new proposals contain some elements the Soviets would regard as improvements over previous US positions: more ICBM RVs are allowed, and limits on heavy bombers and ALCMs are made explicit. The Soviets would see these factors, however, as being outweighed by what they would regard as the negative aspects of the proposal. (See attached examples of US and Soviet forces under the US proposal.)⁴

—*Too few ballistic missile RVs are allowed.* The 4500 limit (500 less than under the last US proposal) is too low to meet Soviet targeting requirements as we understand them, even with the reductions the US is likely to make. The Intelligence Community estimates that 4300–4900 weapons would be needed in a comprehensive Soviet strike against the US. Factoring in withheld reserves, unreliability, and unavailability pushes this up to 6400–7600. The Soviets also may have requirements for additional weapons to compensate for expected wartime attrition and to cover targets in other areas. A reduced number of US targets due to the proposal would only lower Soviet requirements by 200–300 weapons, as the US could retain over 80% of its ICBM force. Not only are the Soviets reluctant to substitute bomber weapons for missile RVs in the initial strikes, but the US proposal does not allow then enough bomber weapons to take up the slack if they so chose.

—*US bomber advantages remain.* While the two sides are allowed 350 heavy bombers and 1500 ALCMs, the Soviets probably would interpret the US proposal as counting the Backfire intermediate-range bomber as a “heavy bomber.” The USSR thus would be forced to reduce

⁴ Attached but not printed is an undated chart entitled “Example of Soviet View of Strategic Forces Under New US NST Proposal.”

its theater and maritime strike force (420 Backfire are projected to be deployed by 1990), and to trade off between their remaining Backfire (which do not carry ALCMs) and the intercontinental-range Bear H and Blackjack. Furthermore, gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) are not limited—the US could deploy at least 1800 of these under its proposal.

—*The ban on mobile ICBMs.* This will abort an expensive 30-year push by the Soviets to improve the survivability of their ICBM force, and will disrupt long-made deployment plans. The SS-25 road-mobile ICBM is already deployed, with 27 operational and bases for up to 108 more under construction. While it could be deployed in silos, we do not believe the Soviets currently plan to do so. A very expensive infrastructure to support rail-mobile deployments of over 100 SS-X-24s (which could begin in 1987) also is under way. Strategically, the Soviets could argue that mobiles meet US concerns over stability and therefore should be permitted.

—*Soviet modernization is disproportionately affected.* Not only does the US proposal preclude planned mobile deployments of the SS-X-24 and SS-25, but would specifically cancel the SS-18 Follow-on heavy ICBM program we know to be in train. The RV limits would also force the Soviets to limit deployments of the SS-N-20 SLBM/Typhoon SSBN, and would be unable to retrofit the new SS-NX-23 SLBM into existing Delta-III-class SLBMs. Fewer bombers could be deployed, and large numbers of single-RV ICBMs and SLBMs would have to be dismantled.

In contrast, the US could deploy all currently programmed MX ICBMs and B-1 bombers. Trident SSBN deployment would have to terminate with the twelfth boat in 1990, but Trident-II SLBM deployment could go ahead. (With MX and Trident-II unconstrained, the US's prompt hard-target capability would be growing at the same time the mobility ban would leave the USSR's ICBMs vulnerable.) Only about half as many US ALCMs could be deployed as planned, but the US could simply refrain from converting some B-52s for ALCMs and would have to dismantle only a few. US and Soviet SLCMs would remain unconstrained.

How Might the Soviets Parry?

At the summit Gorbachev will no doubt be sharply critical of the US proposal, and in particular will renew his demands on SDI. At the same time they may examine the US proposal for possible language that could be included in a joint declaration at the end of the meeting.

—While objecting to a number of provisions in the US proposal, they probably see the basis for agreed language centering on both sides' willingness to work toward a 50% reduction of offensive forces, the details to be worked out at the NST talks.

—Given that the proposed INF freeze would occur before the next NST round, they might hope that an agreement can be announced at the meeting itself on a cessation of further INF deployments, coupled with a commitment for further negotiations on reductions.

At subsequent NST Rounds the Soviets may begin to bargain on START and INF in the hope that progress in these areas may give them renewed leverage on SDI. If so, they might attempt to meld their present position with what they would regard as the encouraging elements of the new US proposal. Such a response might embody the elements described in the following paragraphs.

START. The Soviets are likely to continue to propose overall limits on *weapons* (i.e., gravity bombs and SRAMs as well as RVs and ALCMs). While the Soviets would be reluctant to be publicly identified as the proposer of *higher* limits, they might hint that such higher levels are acceptable. To the extent that Soviet public rhetoric commits them to a 50% reduction, it will be difficult for them to advocate smaller cuts.

One option would be to take the US's 6000 figure for RVs and ALCMs, and add to it the 2000 or so other bomber weapons the US apparently is reserving the right to deploy. This limit of 8000 weapons might then include a sublimit of 6000 ballistic missile RVs (this would be closer to actual Soviet requirements, while not too far above the old US position of 5000). To address US concern about the number of ICBM RVs, the Soviets might offer to deploy no more than 45% of the 8000 weapons on any one leg of the triad; this would result in 3600 ICBM RVs, as does their present counterproposal. They might also propose 1250 SNDVs (the magic 50% from their current position), probably would retain SALT-II-type modernization constraints, and certainly allow mobile ICBMs.

Until the SS-X-24 Follow-on ICBM was deployed in the early 1990s, the Soviets probably would not have enough hard-target-capable RVs to cover all US ICBMs. However, all US hard-target-capable ICBMs (MX and Minuteman III) probably could be covered from the outset of an agreement. The Soviets are unlikely to accept direct limits on ballistic missile throw-weight (these might even be unnecessary, as the 3000 RV ICBM limit effectly constrains them). They may subsequently propose trading the throw-weight reductions for something the US finds equally unacceptable, such as FBS inclusion in START.

INF. The Soviets might try to pocket the US offer of 140 LRINF missile launchers in Europe, and add to it a number of launchers or warheads equal to those of the UK and France. In Asia, they might offer to reduce their SS-20s about 30%—in effect, proposing to “concede” what they already appear to be preparing to do (i.e., dismantling the five SS-20 bases at Novosibirsk). They are unlikely to accede to the equal global limits concept. In sum, while there can be movement on INF, the two sides would remain far apart.

Defense and Space. The Soviets are unlikely to change their position. At some point they might offer to delineate permitted research. To induce the US to negotiate over SDI limits, the Soviets might be prepared to signal willingness to accept wider SDI activities than they have to date.

132. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 1, 1985

SUBJECT

Soviet Strategy for the Geneva Meeting

SUMMARY: Assuming that the Geneva Meeting is unlikely to yield a breakthrough on arms control, the Soviets really have a choice between two strategies. They could treat the Geneva meeting as a halting step forward in a still potentially improving relationship; or they could use the “failure” of Geneva for intensive political warfare to undermine our Congressional and allied support over the next year. *END SUMMARY.*

One of the clichés of recent months has been that we are on the defensive because of Soviet arms control proposals and Gorbachev’s public relations barrage. I have never believed this. In fact, with SDI getting its funding doubled by the Congress,² and with our allies in

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda / Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 11/1–30/85; NLR-775–14–63–9–8. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Rodman and VanOudenaren.

² In a *Washington Post* article, “Panel Rejects Funding For Chemical Weapons: House Committee Bars Further Cuts for SDI,” October 25, Margaret Shapiro wrote: “On the SDI missile-defense proposal, known as ‘Star Wars,’ the committee agreed to provide \$2.5 billion after voting, 31 to 23, against an amendment that would have cut funding for the controversial research program to \$2.1 billion. The amount voted by the committee was less than the \$3.7 billion originally requested by Reagan last February but identical to what the House approved in the defense authorization in June. Concerned about efforts to reduce SDI funding further, Reagan called Appropriations Committee members to the White House Tuesday and told them that cuts below \$ 2.5 billion would hurt his position at the Geneva summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev next month.” (*Washington Post*, October 25, 1985, p. A14)

the process of being bought off via participation in SDI,³ we are objectively in a quite solid bargaining position. If this continues, the Soviets will be forced to make increasingly attractive offers of offensive reductions in order to try to lure us into a trade of SDI limits; or else, ideally, they will reconcile themselves to SDI and talk to us seriously about a joint transition to SDI coupled with offensive reductions.

A Worst-Case Scenario

The risk we face, in my view, is not that we are under pressure now. With or without the last new US offers, we really are not. The risk is that a summit that yields no breakthrough on arms control could be used by the Soviets as an excuse for an intensive campaign of political warfare to undermine the Congressional and allied support which we now enjoy. They could use the dramatic event of the Summit as a moment, in the spotlight of world publicity, to portray us before our people and our allies as the obstacle to arms control and world peace.

The liberals in Congress are quite capable of turning on SDI next year—if not to kill research, then to try to confine the research to areas (like terminal defense) which arms controllers consider more respectable. They would try to “help out” the prospects for arms control by forcing us into limits on SDI to meet the Soviet concerns.

I need not elaborate on what mischief the Soviets could make in the Alliance by renewed all-out political warfare against SDI.

In his TIME interview and on two other recent occasions, Gorbachev has raised the possibility of a Soviet walk-out from the Geneva arms talks if we do not abandon SDI. I doubt they would carry out this threat, because their boycott of the INF and START talks in 1983–84 was a failure; it *undercut* their propaganda campaign against us in Western Europe.

I still see, however, the possibility that they could keep the talks going pro forma while waging another intensive campaign. They could reject a final communique at the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, hold some nasty press conferences, reject a follow-on Summit, and reject all the secondary kinds of agreements that we would have been able to point to as limited progress in the relationship. The fact that all meetings are cordial now could be only part of building a record that they have tried hard for a successful outcome—as, indeed, we too are doing.

³ In telegram 347875 to all NATO capitals, November 13, the Department wrote: “The progress of our discussions with several allied governments on SDI research involvement, and the development of varied policies on the subject, have highlighted the need for specific guidance on the implications of those policies for their firms’ potential participation in the SDI research effort.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850812–0206)

An Alternative Hypothesis

Obviously, what we would like to see, if the meeting yields no breakthrough, is that both sides treat it nevertheless as a worthwhile chance to meet and as an occasion to give impetus to all the ongoing negotiations. In other words, there would be a few modest accomplishments and an atmosphere that gives hope of future improvements in the relationship.

Having said all the above, I would have to say that the Soviets have some reasons to go along with this and *not* to go with the worst-case scenario.

An excellent recent INR analysis pointed out that the Soviets will always retain the option of political warfare against SDI—next year, as well as now.⁴ They wouldn't be giving up this card now by permitting a mildly positive Summit.

Gorbachev also faces some important domestic decisions in advance of his Party Congress in February. He may well not want to declare failure at the Summit, because he would then be obliged to follow through by expanding military programs.

Moreover, the worst-case scenario sketched above is a high-risk course. They could overplay their hand in Europe, as they have so often done, and end up themselves seen as stubborn and overbearing. We too have been building a record of positive proposals, which the Soviets might pay a price for rejecting out of hand. The ability of the Great Communicator to get *our* view across should never be underestimated.

Implications

Nevertheless, much of recent Soviet propaganda suggests that they are at least preparing for the possibility of failure and preparing for themselves the option of playing hardball.

Our best counterstrategy now is to continue to build the record of our forthcomingness. Should the Soviets do the worst in Geneva, we will be able to react effectively by:

- continuing to take the “high road,” expressing our willingness to meet with the Soviets and stressing that our latest arms control proposal remains on the table;

- undertaking a program of extensive briefings in which we outline the shortcomings of the Soviet counterproposal;

- doing all we can to associate Soviet behavior after November with the Soviets' post-INF sulk of 1983–84, stressing that Soviet moods are temporary and calculated to influence Western opinion; and

⁴ Not found.

—reacting very strongly to Soviet efforts to communicate with Congress and non-governmental groups in the U.S., stressing that the Soviets failed to get what they wanted from an elected U.S. government, and hence would try to exert pressure on the government through other channels. Such an approach could scare off Congressional critics tempted to legislate restrictions on the SDI program in order to appease Soviet concerns.

133. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 4, 1985

SUBJECT

Papers on the Soviet Union: The Soviet View of National Security

You have previously read five groups of papers on the Soviet Union.² They dealt with the sources of Soviet behavior, the problems of Soviet society, the instruments of control, Gorbachev's domestic agenda, and the USSR's international position. The attached group discusses the Soviet view of national security.

The first paper (Tab A) deals with Soviet strategic thinking. It points out that Americans have a common tendency to attribute their own views and values to other peoples, and have often made the mistake of assuming that Soviet strategic thinking is like their own. The Soviets, they would reason, face the same overwhelming nuclear

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Geneva Meeting: Background Materials For the President (5/6). Top Secret. Sent for information. Drafted by Matlock. A copy was sent to Bush. Reagan initialed the memorandum in the top right-hand margin, indicating he saw it. A stamp in the top right-hand corner reads: "The President has seen."

² See Documents 39 and 129. In his book, Matlock wrote: "By mid-October, general education gave way to discussion of concrete issues, sometimes as we prepared public statements, and then as Reagan reviewed specific talking points for his upcoming meetings. Reagan would usually review detailed suggestions from the State Department and then comment on them, sometimes ordering changes. I would alter them according to his instructions and then summarize the points so that they would fit on a few three-by-five-inch cards. Material from the State Department was always too voluminous for the meetings, but sometimes it dealt with key issues that the president needed to master in depth. He did not need, however, extensive discussion of secondary questions that were unlikely to arise—indeed, in some cases, were all but certain *not* to arise. Too often material sent from the State Department ignored this consideration and was bloated with minutiae that even the secretary of state had no need to read." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, p. 134)

threat as the United States and, as rational people, presumably see that threat much as Americans do.

The Soviets, however, come from a vastly different historical tradition, in which the princes of tiny Muscovy built a powerful autocratic state through centuries of military expansion. While Americans see military power as an unpleasant but necessary means of preserving freedom, the Soviets view it as the way to maintain and expand their authority. The basic aims of Soviet military power are to ensure the survival of the political system and enhance its ability to project power abroad.

The Soviets appreciate full well the tremendous destruction that would accompany any nuclear exchange. At the same time they continue to believe in the possibility of victory in nuclear war, and through the 1970's believed that the trend of worldwide political and military forces was moving in their favor.

Recent developments, however, particularly SDI research and the new non-nuclear technologies for conventional defense, are worrisome factors for the Soviets. They have the potential to undermine the offensive pillars of Soviet strategy.

Actual national security decision-making in the Soviet Union (paper at Tab B) is in the hands of a small circle of top leaders.³ The Politburo itself is the top forum in which all national security decisions are discussed and decided. It is, however, in one of the Politburo's committees, the Soviet Defense Council, that most of the detailed discussion of national security decisions is thought to take place.

The Defense Council is comprised of both civilian and military leaders who deal with political or military and technical policy. Gorbachev, like his predecessors, is its chairman. We do not know its exact composition, but likely members include the heads of the KGB, State Planning Committee, and Military-Industrial Commission and the Commander of Warsaw Pact forces. The Soviet General Staff acts as its secretariat, coordinating the flow of information to the Council.

The Defense Ministry, particularly the General Staff, seems to exercise predominant influence over the formulation of defense policy—to a degree unparalleled in the West. Military information is not shared with civilian agencies, and there is no nucleus of civilian specialists who can offer alternative views to those of military planners.

Rumors of civilian dissatisfaction with the military's near monopoly on technical expertise occasionally surface. This dissatisfaction is undoubtedly fed by the system's inability since the late Brezhnev years

³ Tab B, "Soviet National Security Decision-Making," is attached but not printed.

to come to grips with serious security-related questions like U.S. arms control proposals. Instead, an aging leadership has been locked in a transition power struggle which nearly paralyzed its ability to act decisively.

Gorbachev has moved quickly to remove members of the old guard to help reinvigorate the Soviet system. It remains to be seen, however, whether he wants to challenge seriously the traditional system of national security decision-making, with its heavy emphasis on the military and tightly controlled channels of information, or make available to the leadership a greater variety of informed civilian opinion.

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency⁴

Washington, undated

SOVIET STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC THINKING

Underlying all the destructive weapons and forces are ideas about strategy. From the mid-1960's well into the 1970's, many influential Americans believed—despite persuasive evidence to the contrary from Soviet military writings and agent sources such as Colonel Penkovsky—that Soviet strategic thinking had to be very much like our own.⁵ In our familiar American tendency to attribute our own views and values to other peoples and their leaders, we tended to believe that, because we and the Soviets both faced the awesome problem of nuclear weapons, and we were both basically sensible peoples, we had to think about management of this problem in roughly the same way. Maybe the Soviets weren't quite as sophisticated as we with all our think tanks and academic journals, but they would more or less follow our lead in strategic thinking.

Today, while this mistaken “mirror imaging” of our views on the Soviets persists in some circles, we know a lot better. The manner and size of the Soviet strategic and other force buildups of the last twenty years showed that the Soviets thought differently than we about strategy and military power, including nuclear power. Study of the Soviet buildup, of Soviet military exercises and command structures, of their military writings (including very sensitive documents collected clan-

⁴ Secret. Prepared by Ermarth.

⁵ See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. X, National Security Policy, Document 13, footnote 2.

destinely) has taught us a great deal about Soviet strategy and military thinking. It underscores some important differences from our own.

This shouldn't have been surprising to us. After all, the Soviets are coming from a different place in geography, in history, and in political culture. Although now a global military superpower, at least in nuclear terms, Soviet Russia remains a continental superpower and, like Tsarist Russia, places a high store on dominating its continental periphery. The influence of history and political culture is often misunderstood as follows: Having been frequently invaded by Europeans and Asiatics over the centuries, Russians are seen as pathologically insecure; hence they feel the need for massive military power. There is some truth in this, but the essence is different. First of all, growing from a small principality in Muscovy, Russia has spent much more time invading and conquering than being invaded and conquered. The Russian state was built by the autocratic princes of Moscow, not by the merchants of the more westward-looking cities, such as Novgorod. For this reason, Kremlin rulers have from Medieval times to the present seen their security, indeed the legitimacy of their rule, to rest upon as much control over people, their own and those around them, as they could get. These attitudes toward political power have also shaped Russian and Soviet thinking about strategy and military power.

Americans tend to think of military power as an unpleasant but necessary means of preserving live-and-let-live conditions in a sometimes dangerous world. The Soviets think of military power as a means of preserving and expanding their authority. This makes their strategy both very defensive and very offensive at the same time.

The structure, or architecture, of their strategy and their overall military forces displays this quality. The basic aims of Soviet military power in war, and also in peace, are to assure the *survival of the political system at home* and to enhance the *projection of its power in the surrounding world*. Hence the Soviets have been engaged in strategic, air, civil, and ABM defense from the beginning of the nuclear era. We had strategic defenses in the 1950's, but gave them up in the 1960's, in favor of the deterrent "balance of terror" concept based on nuclear offensive forces.

The second basic mission of Soviet military strength is to project power into the surrounding regions of Eurasia, especially Europe, but also in East Asia and southward toward the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Hence the enormous land combat forces, with their accompanying air and nuclear power, far more than they would need to retain control of East Europe or to deter attacks. By contrast, the US and NATO have seen our general purpose forces as a heavy trip wire to release the nuclear deterrent or as a means of dealing with very limited contingencies outside of Europe.

The Soviets see their long-range nuclear offensive forces as a deterrent, as we do. But to a much greater extent, they have also regarded

these forces as long-range artillery support for backing up the other two primary missions of their forces: strategic defense of the homeland, through counterforce attacks on US nuclear forces and their command and control; and dominance of the Eurasian periphery, through attacks on nearby enemy forces and their bases.

In their thinking about nuclear weapons and nuclear war, the Soviets have never made the distinction between deterrence and war-fighting capabilities that have been characteristic of US thinking. Nor have they discarded the notion of victory in nuclear war despite the assertion of Soviet leaders that nuclear war should not occur (which they believe) and cannot be won (which they do not believe).

Even when, in the 1950's and early 1960's, they had too little nuclear force to implement their view, the Soviets developed and held to the notion that real deterrent power had to be real warfighting power as well. This is because they believed that they had not only to deter attacks on them, but as far as they could, to encourage acceptance of their aims around the world short of a major war. This required nuclear warfighting strength. Moreover, they believed that nuclear war could actually occur, and, if it did, it would have to be fought for rational political and military aims, despite the awesome destructiveness of nuclear weapons. This is why they have developed a comprehensive array of counterforce nuclear weapons, such as the SS-18 against our silos and SS-20s against Eurasian military targets, and homeland defenses, including civil defense.

Soviet political and military leaders appreciate full well that any large nuclear war would be horribly destructive for their country and potentially lethal for their system. This has not, however, nullified their belief in the possibility of victory in nuclear war. For one thing, the ideology on which their system rests prevents that belief from being discarded. For them to really believe that the handiwork of humans, such as nuclear weapons, could write the end to Soviet and even human history would mean that Marx and Lenin were wrong in a fundamental respect. More important, however, the Soviets have never believed that nuclear war, even a very large scale war, was likely to take the form of a mindless exchange of massive attacks on cities. Rather they have tended to believe that a major nuclear war would involve attacks of varying intensity and timing on a wide range of military targets, after which one side or the other would quit or collapse, but societies as such could survive, especially if they provided for active and civil defense.

Over the years they have built up offensive and defensive capabilities for this kind of nuclear war. Moreover, as their capabilities have grown, their concept of a major war between the superpowers has evolved as has their concept of victory. This evolution continues, and we are trying to track it in their military exercises and literature. What

appears to be happening is a growing Soviet belief that their powerful nuclear forces, along with their general purpose forces, can enforce a different kind of victory by deterring US use of nuclear weapons at least on a large scale, while general purpose forces, supported if necessary by the required nuclear strikes, can conquer Europe and perhaps other regions nearby. The US would have to accept the result rather than be destroyed in a massive exchange. But the US would be reduced to a secondary power, while the USSR would emerge preeminent.

The key to this kind of thinking lies in the combination of all Soviet forces: strategic nuclear, general purpose and homeland defense. The Soviets do not separate them into distinct categories quite the way we do. In combination, they could allow victory in a large scale, general, but still not absolutely allout nuclear conflict. The Soviets do not see this outcome as certain by any means; but it is a possibility that the design of their forces and strategies can make more probable if it ever comes to a war.

In the meantime, the Soviets believe that this overall force combination, along with increasing ability to project power at a distance, e.g., into the Third World, enhances the image of the USSR as a superpower and enhances their "persuasiveness" (i.e., ability to intimidate) vis-a-vis neighboring countries. Power projection into the Third World, which includes military deliveries, insurgency and counterinsurgency operations, as well as military bases and forces, has become a fourth pillar of the Soviet strategic architecture, along with strategic defense, Eurasian dominance, and long-range nuclear strike.

From another perspective one can say that Soviet strategy has been designed over the past forty years to defeat American strategy in war and also in peacetime power politics. Historically, the US has relied on long-range nuclear sanctions plus relatively weaker forward forces to protect its exposed allies near the USSR. The USSR has built forces to dominate over the regions where US allies are located while also negating the credibility of US long-range nuclear guarantees. Desiring to avoid any war or major test of strength, the Soviets have hoped that this combination would gradually demoralize the US and its allies in peacetime, leading to the erosion of our security commitments, the collapse of our alliances and the replacement of the US by the USSR as the predominant world power.

In the late 1970's the Soviets developed a detectable confidence that trends in the "correlation of forces", by which they mean political as well as military forces, were moving in a direction favorable to this prognosis. In the 1980's, however, the US and its allies have been more determined to resist these trends, undermining Soviet confidence that this is the way things will go. On the contrary, they now see factors that could—not necessarily will—turn these trends around.

From a strictly military point of view, the most worrisome new factors, other than the increase of US defense efforts and renewed commitment to global security, lie in the combination of SDI and the new non-nuclear technologies for conventional defense the US is pursuing. All sources of information indicate how concerned the Soviets are about SDI. Interestingly, Soviet marshals write even more eloquently about their concern over the new conventional defense technologies. Together they challenge the primacy of the twin darlings of Soviet military power: the long-range ballistic missile and the tank. If the US and NATO actually develop and deploy such capabilities, they will undermine the offensive pillars of the Soviet strategic architecture. The USSR may be no less secure in the strictly military sense, as a result, but it will be less capable of casting an intimidating shadow over its neighbors. This is why Soviet propaganda, diplomacy, and arms control policy are trying to stop SDI and other US defense programs and, more generally, to encourage the US to return to the behavior and strategic doctrines we exhibited in the 1970's, which the Soviets found quite comfortable. Because Soviet superpower status rests so heavily on offensive military power combinations, the loss of this edge, so the Kremlin fears, will negate Soviet superpower status and ultimately undermine the legitimacy of Kremlin rule itself.

In the end, the challenge of the USSR to Western security and values stems more from the nature of its system than from the content of its strategies and military thought. If the rulers of the Soviet Union could somehow be brought to relent in their determination to control everybody they can reach, at home and abroad, their marshals and generals—who are intelligent and rational men—could readily come up with military strategies and force postures which would allow the USSR to be a secure and constructive participant in the world community. For that to happen, however, they have to be shown that the strategies they have followed patiently for thirty years will not work.

134. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, November 4, 1985

SECRETARY SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE
AT THE MFA GUEST HOUSE
W/SOVIET INTERPRETER DZARECHNAK

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze began by sincerely welcoming Secretary Shultz and the U.S. delegation on Moscow soil and he expressed the wish that their stay in the Soviet capital be pleasant and useful. He said that they had tried to the extent possible and in so far as their capabilities allowed, to influence the weather, and that it was relatively normal. He observed that this was the first visit of a U.S. Secretary of State to Moscow in seven years, and the fact of the visit was a positive factor in U.S. Soviet relations.² The fact that there had been no visit for so long is typical of recent Soviet/American relations which, to be honest, have been characterized by conflicts and tension more than by understanding. But 1985 has been characterized by the fact that there have been contacts at high levels and on a systematic basis. This is the fifth meeting that has taken place this year. Shevardnadze said he has met the President twice, and there had been other meetings and political consultations, as well as the negotiations in Geneva.³ So in terms of contacts, political and other contacts, this year has been positive.

However, in terms of the results of the work of the Geneva negotiations, as well as negotiations in other places, so far, there are no grounds to express satisfaction; in some areas, the positions of the sides have become more rigid on regional and bilateral issues.

He continued by noting that Secretary Shultz' visit completes preparations for the Geneva Summit meeting; therefore, this visit has great significance. He said there was more need to talk about the importance of the agenda of the summit meeting itself, since the two Foreign Ministers have already exchanged their respective views on

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Files, Memoranda of Conversations (09/1985–11/1985); NLR-775-23-5-1-0. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the memorandum of conversation. A typed notation in the upper right-hand corner reads: "Day 1, Part 1." Another draft copy of this memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memorandum of Conversations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz/Shevardnadze/Gorbachev in Moscow November 4 and 5, 1985. Minor editorial corrections that have been incorporated in the text printed here suggest that this is a draft. No final text was found.

² Secretary of State Vance visited Moscow March 27–30, 1977, and April 19–23, 1978. For documentation on his meetings with Brezhnev and Gromyko, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 17–23 and 99–103.

³ See Documents 71, 105–108, and 121–122.

that. He said that he wanted to emphasize, though it was hardly necessary, that this meeting highlights the importance of the Foreign Ministers' responsibility at such an important stage of preparation for the summit meeting.

He said that at their last meeting, they had laid down certain aspects of the forthcoming meeting and proposed formulas for a final document to come out of the Geneva Summit, observing that doubtless, there would be such a document. He noted that the U.S. had transmitted to the Soviet side the contents of its proposed draft.⁴ The Soviet side had likewise prepared a draft which reflected Soviet proposals on the prevention of an arms race in space and for terminating the arms race on earth, as well as formulas proposed in general on security issues and regional and bilateral questions.

He said he had been informed that the U.S. had submitted an additional draft. He said he thought that the two sides should be very energetic in correlating and agreeing on the drafts in order to come to the summit meeting with a draft document in more or less agreed form.

He said they would like the Secretary of State to give consideration to a whole range of questions proposed by General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan as well as to what was expressed to the U.S. side in talks in New York and Washington.

He said that the Soviet side was counting on the fact that these meetings would be constructive and bring about results.

Secretary Shultz responded that as he had said at the airport, he appreciated the graciousness of the reception in the Soviet Union, and the fact that he and his wife and party had been met by the Foreign Minister and Mrs. Sh—at the airport. He said he had been to Moscow many times in the 1970's as well as more recently. The last two times were somber occasions. He noted that on this trip, there was an opportunity to see how it is possible to contribute to the future and in that sense, it is a more welcome and auspicious trip.

He said he concurred with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that there is much important work to do today and tomorrow. He said the U.S. side had prepared itself and the fact that the U.S. side had sent another draft of the communique is a suggestion of the effort that has been made. The U.S. has accepted, at least procedurally, the Soviet

⁴ Shultz provided a draft communiqué to Shevardnadze during their October 25 meeting in New York; see Document 122. Telegram Secto 25015 from Shultz in Helsinki to Moscow, November 3, transmitted a revised draft. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850787–0198) According to telegram 15790 from Moscow, November 4, the "PolCouns delivered the text of revised draft communique early a.m. November 4 to MFA's Deputy Director of USA Division Chetverikov." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, no [film number])

thought about seeing what kind of communique can be put together, but whether or not it is a lengthy one or is a good idea depends on the content of the communique. He said that if it is possible to find substantive content, then there can be a lengthy communique; if not perhaps it might be better to have a shorter communique and have separate views expressed by individuals representing the respective sides.

However, he said, the idea of getting a draft is one way to focus on the issues. He said it would be possible to go through the drafts and in such a fashion test them out in a sense to see how we can report on the November meeting, and whether we can find understanding on the substantive issues. So, he said, in that sense he agreed that going through the drafts is a good way to proceed, for it would touch on the unresolved questions.

He noted that while on his way to this meeting he had thought that one way to proceed might be to start with the general area of arms control.

He said he would like to set forth briefly the U.S. counterproposal, describing the proposal as the U.S. sees it. He continued that after the Soviet response, it would then be possible to go through the draft communique item by item. He said he had not seen the Soviet communique, but the two drafts could be lined up and compared, and in such fashion it would be possible to go through them, if the Soviet side found that a good way to proceed.

Shevardnadze responded by saying they could try to do so, but he did not know what practical outcome would result. He suggested that before discussing the drafts, perhaps the Secretary of State should first read the Soviet draft. He noted that the principle the Secretary proposed was correct, but in practical terms he did not know what the result would be. He added that perhaps it would be possible to lay out the sides' points in principle and then representatives could go through the drafts. However, he noted that if Secretary Shultz wished, they could proceed in a way he had suggested and see what happened.

Shultz responded that in the U.S. draft, all subjects were included in some way or other. In many cases, the U.S. side simply assumed the Soviet response to various questions, though the U.S. side could not know for sure what the Soviet response would be. This, however, is one way to see where there are still outstanding issues to be resolved. He said that he agreed that sitting here and arguing about the draft communiqués was not the best way for them to use their time; however, the drafts could be a guide to areas needing resolution.

Shevardnadze said perhaps it would be possible to lay out the substance of the sides' proposals on the issues and the language could be agreed later. This, however, would help pinpoint outstanding issues.

He said the U.S. could lay out its principal approach to issues, and the Soviet side could too, and afterwards, representatives of the respective sides could take what had been said into account in correlating the specific language of the draft document. He said that if each side read out its draft, however, he did not know what results that would give. He thought that the U.S. side should first study the Soviet draft.

Ambassador Dobrynin added that the U.S. side had to know what was in the Soviet draft.

Shultz said the U.S. side could take the Soviet draft, read it, and then the meeting could be reconvened. He said perhaps just reading the two drafts would be enough to show that there is no way to put together a joint statement between now and November. He said that was one approach, but he noted there was a second approach as well. He said obviously the U.S. side would read the Soviet draft later in the day. The U.S. side could take the draft and tell the Soviet side what it thought about each topic. There could be such a conversation and then representatives of the sides could spend time on that conversation to see if it would be possible to get results. He said he would be glad to use the time either way. It was up to the Soviet side: either stop now and read the documents or do so in the evening.

Shultz said he wanted to offer some advice on the basis of his three-and-one-half-year diplomatic experience. He had observed that communiques are the enemies of substance and common sense, since all the available time is spent on words and not enough is spent on issues. He said that in this respect the Soviets might be better than the French. He noted that the U.S. draft lists topics as does the Soviet draft. He said it would be preferable to talk more about those topics themselves and not so much about the communique. Shevardnadze said that the Soviets are not as complicated as the French, but neither are they simple.

The gentleman on Shevardnadze's right observed that the Soviet side had not yet seen the revised and completed U.S. draft; nor had the U.S. side seen the Soviet draft. He said it would be counter-productive to read the drafts out point by point. He said the Soviets were prepared to discuss substantive matters and to start as the U.S. had proposed by talking about the Geneva negotiations. Each side could outline its considerations. There would be an opportunity perhaps at a second meeting today or even tomorrow. In sum he suggested not to read the texts, noting that from the start the Soviet side had thought to approach things in this way.

Shultz observed that this was their first agreement. He said perhaps it would be possible to present briefly U.S. thoughts on the Geneva negotiations. U.S. negotiators had presented proposals there, and the U.S. believes they offer a real opportunity to make progress. U.S. negoti-

ators in Geneva have presented a new and comprehensive proposal designed to build upon positive elements in the Soviet Union's recent counter-proposal, to bridge the positions of the two sides. That, he observed, was how the U.S. had worked. Shultz pointed out that at the same time, he wanted to emphasize that previous U.S. negotiating positions remain on the table for Soviet consideration as well. He said that as had been noted, the U.S. proposal deals with all three areas under discussion in the Geneva talks, because the U.S. believes a relationship exists between the areas. The U.S. proposal has been shaped to achieve deep reductions. The U.S. agreed and agrees to focus on areas and weapons which are more de-stabilizing. In the area of strategic offensive arms, the U.S. focused on the 50 percent reduction principle contained in the counterproposal of the Soviet side. The U.S. proposal also incorporates reductions which would result in a total of 6,000 ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs. The U.S., too, attempted to use that number, and like the Soviet side, to address itself as well to re-entry vehicles on land-based ballistic missiles.

Shultz said he had been speaking about what the U.S. agreed with. Now, he would address things the U.S. did not agree with. He said the U.S. must insist that numbers and percentages to which reductions would apply be used for the correct categories. The U.S. side could not agree with a definition of "strategic delivery systems" that includes a category of delivery system on the U.S. side while it excludes that system on the Soviet side.

Further, the U.S. cannot agree to limits on the number of gravity bombs and SRAMs on heavy bombers in light of the sizeable and unconstrained Soviet air defenses which the U.S. retaliatory bomber force must face.

Moreover, the U.S. cannot agree to aggregate under a common ceiling such dissimilar items as ballistic missile warheads, which arrive at their targets in minutes and which are at present, at least, unhampered by defensive systems, with cruise missiles, which take hours to arrive at their targets and face sizeable defenses on their way.

Moreover, the U.S. cannot agree to make limits on offensive systems contingent on restrictions on the U.S. SDI program beyond the limits imposed by the ABM treaty. He noted that the President has said that the U.S. SDI program will proceed on the basis of a relatively narrow definition of the ABM treaty, despite the fact that the U.S. believes that a broader definition of that treaty is justified given the history and wording of the treaty.

Shultz said that the U.S. has proposed to apply the 50 percent reduction to the strategic weapons of the two sides in the following way: Each side would reduce the number of re-entry vehicles carried on its ICBMs and SLBMs to a level of 4,500, i.e., a reduction of roughly

50 percent by each side in this category of weapons. Each side would reduce the number of RVs on its ICBMs to 3,000, i.e., about a 50 percent reduction from the current Soviet level and this more or less splits the difference between the limit of 2,500 previously proposed by the U.S. side and the limit of 3,600 previously proposed by the Soviet side.

This would also include a 50 percent reduction in the maximum throwweight of strategic ballistic missiles of ICBMs of either side, i.e., 50 percent of the Soviet ICBM and SLBM throwweight.

Then, if this were agreed, the U.S. would be prepared to agree to an equal limit of 1,500 on long-range ALCMs on the heavy bombers of each side. This would represent about a 50 percent reduction of the ALCMs currently planned by the U.S.

On the basis of arithmetic, it is possible to come to the conclusion that the sum of the numbers of ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs on each side would be the 6,000 figure proposed by the Soviet Union.

Concerning strategic nuclear delivery vehicle reductions, they are somewhat less than the reductions proposed for weapons in order to encourage both sides to rely more on single-RV systems which are more stabilizing.

The U.S. proposes that each side reduce its number of ICBMs and SLBMs to a level between 1,250 and 1,450, which would be a reduction of about 40–45 percent from the current Soviet level.

In the context of agreement on ballistic missile reductions, the U.S. could agree to reduce the heavy bombers of each side to equal levels of 350. That would represent about a 40 percent reduction from the current level of U.S. SALT-accountable heavy bombers.

The U.S. cannot agree to aggregate under one common limit heavy bombers and ballistic missiles. However, it is possible to mention that arithmetic shows a sum of between 1,600 to 1,800 ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, if agreement were reached on the delivery vehicle reductions that the U.S. proposes.

Concerning constraints on modernization, the U.S. has two other points to propose: First, since heavy ICBMs are especially destabilizing because of the threat they pose to the retaliatory capabilities of the other side, the U.S. proposes to ban all new missiles of this category. This would include a ban on modernization of existing SS-18 ICBM forces. Second, to reflect the difficulty of verifying the number and status of mobile ICBMs, the U.S. proposes a ban on all land-mobile ICBMs.

Shultz noted that the President had been struck by Shevardnadze's emphasis on verification, and Shultz noted the problem of verification is a particularly difficult one.

He said the U.S. believes there should be an agreed build-down schedule which shows how to achieve the reductions.

The U.S. believes that the aggregate result of its proposed reductions and limitations would be a more stable world, where the number of arms would be radically reduced to comparable levels on both sides, and the threat to the retaliatory capabilities of each side would be significantly diminished; there would also be better opportunities and prospects for verification.

Turning to the area of intermediate range nuclear arms, Shultz said the U.S. proposed an interim step toward the goal of complete elimination of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles. Here, U.S. proposal develops further certain ideas advanced by the Soviet side.

The U.S. is prepared to cap U.S. LRINF missiles in Europe at 140, i.e., the number employed as of December 31, 1985, in return for Soviet agreement to reduce Soviet LRINF missile launchers within range of NATO Europe to the same number. Under this approach, there would be freedom to mix systems of the types deployed on December 31, 1985. The exact mix of these systems would be subject to discussion.

The U.S. would also need Soviet agreement to reduce the number of SS-20s launchers located in Asia in the same proportion as the reductions of SS-20 launchers within range of NATO Europe.

The end result would be that both sides would agree to equal numbers of LRINF missiles on a global basis.

It would also be necessary to agree on constraints on INF missiles with shorter range. After achieving agreement on such an interim stage, the U.S. envisages follow-on negotiations leading toward the complete elimination of this type of missile worldwide.

In the area of defense and space, the U.S. is committed to conduct its strategic defense programs as permitted by and in full compliance with the ABM treaty.

As is known to the Soviet side, the U.S. is fully aware of extensive research programs and of massive efforts conducted by the Soviet Union in the area of strategic defense.

So, the U.S. would expect a reciprocal commitment from the USSR regarding its strategic defense programs. Furthermore, the U.S. would also expect the USSR to take action to correct those instances where the Soviet SDI program is not in compliance with the ABM treaty.

Regarding the area of compliance with the ABM treaty, the U.S. urges the Soviet Union to join it in an "open laboratory" initiative. The two sides would provide each other briefings similar to the one the U.S. gave the Soviet side in Geneva in the summer of 1985. In addition, each side would also give the other an opportunity to visit laboratories and research facilities connected with strategic defense research, so each side would know what the other was doing in that area.

The U.S. furthermore proposes that the two sides begin exploring new means for a cooperative transition to greater reliance on defensive

systems. If the research of either side should indicate that defensive systems are feasible, the sides should begin to plan now for a cooperative transition to more reliance on defensive systems.

These are the elements of the U.S. approach to bridging the past positions of the two sides.

Critical considerations here are the issues of verification and compliance, which will require particular attention and effort in the future.

Shultz again noted that the President had been impressed during Shevardnadze's visit by the Soviet Foreign Minister's emphasis on questions of verification.

Shultz continued that activities which corrode the confidence necessary for the arms control process must stop if existing accords are to be preserved, and if new arms control agreements are to be created between the U.S. and the USSR. Verification and compliance are today pacing elements if the sides are to achieve progress. The U.S. believes that more effective and meaningful approaches to verification are necessary. This may mean putting up technical devices and on-site inspection on Soviet and U.S. territory.

The U.S. is prepared to work diligently with the Soviet Union to develop such approaches as are necessary.

Regarding compliance, the U.S. must continue to insist that the Soviet Union take the necessary steps to correct those of its actions which do not correspond to existing agreements. The U.S. has identified those actions for the Soviet Union in the SCC and in demarches in diplomatic channels.

For example, the Soviet Union should alter its current practice with regard to telemetry encryption and revert to practices that it followed at the time of signing the SALT II Treaty.

In sum, the U.S. has designed an approach which could provide for a mutually acceptable resolution of a range of nuclear and space-arms issues, taking into account the relationship between offense and defense, and while also addressing those areas which the Soviet side has described as having great significance for it.

If acceptable to the Soviet Union, this approach could provide the basis for an understanding between the sides that could provide direction to the future efforts of the two delegations in Geneva to work out effective and durable agreements on all these issues.

Shultz said that in the new draft communique, the Soviet side would find language implementing all this, and he added jocularly that if the Soviet representatives would initial the document immediately, it would then be possible to go on to other business.

There was considerable joking at the table from the Soviet side to the effect that they would initial the U.S. draft if the U.S. would initial the Soviet draft.

Shultz continued that there were many other issues concerning security and bilateral and regional issues, but he said he believed both sides agreed that the Geneva negotiations are of central importance to this cause.

He noted that the U.S. would be willing to discuss whatever subject the Soviet side should desire. He noted that the U.S. regarded as constructive the fact that the Soviet side had agreed to prolong the third round of the Geneva talks so there could be consideration in Geneva of the U.S. proposal by those Soviet representatives who work directly with these issues.

Shevardnadze suggested that perhaps Shultz would continue and present U.S. views on all the relevant questions so as to know how much time would be necessary for discussions.

Shultz poured himself more water so as to continue, and Shevardnadze observed that the situation in the USSR was fine with mineral water, but otherwise with wine.

Shultz remarked that in the draft communique there were some points that he would not comment on here as well as others that he would address. He said that some items of a more sensitive nature he might discuss individually with Shevardnadze. Regarding some points concerning bilateral relations, specifically exhibits and T.V. appearances, he said there are still some difficulties.

Concerning exhibits, the U.S. side prefers one or two exhibits in nine cities for up to 28 days each. The Soviet side would prefer fewer cities and to have the six to nine city option clearly stated in the agreement.

At the same time, the U.S. is insisting on language which would give each side the right to have its representatives appear on the other country's television. He said if the Soviet Union would agree on the television appearances, the U.S. would be willing to agree to language which would make it clear that within the number of 6–9 cities, the sending side could determine the number of cities and the length of stay of its exhibits in the various locations.

Concerning "new initiatives," the U.S. side had given the Soviet side a list of such suggestions. The Soviet side said they would be studied, but so far there has been no response. The U.S. is interested in the Soviet reaction to the proposals. The Soviet side knows, for example, that the President talked about the possibility of military-to-military contact as well as cancer research, which could be part of this or a separate agreement. The U.S. is interested in the Soviet response to these proposals.

The U.S. has investigated the Soviet proposal for cooperation in the area of fusion research and believes this is a good idea.⁵ The U.S. is ready to work with the Soviet Union to develop this area in the next two weeks so that the leaders of the two countries can make an announcement about such a joint project in Geneva. In this connection, the U.S. thinks that before the Geneva meeting, the following steps should be taken. As noted by the Soviet side, there are other countries which have experts and resources, and they should also be involved. They should be discreetly contacted before the joint announcement in order to maximize their receptiveness. In this context, probably some agreed talking points and parallel efforts would be helpful.

This is a very ambitious undertaking, and goals should be set. The U.S. sees two such goals: designing, building and starting up a prototype reactor in ten years; also, realizing the practical application of energy produced from fusion by a definite date. U.S. specialists have suggested the year 2020. This seems like a long time off. Perhaps in the Soviet Union there are experts who think less time would be required. In any case, it is necessary to set goals for these ambitious but realizable plans.

Shevardnadze remarked that he and Shultz should open the reactor and cut the ribbon together, so he suggested leaving that date.

Shultz continued that another area that should be discussed before getting other parties involved is where to locate the prototype reactor. He suggested Geneva, where there has already been successful international scientific work. He noted that it would be necessary to consult with the Swiss Government, which may or may not favor having the reactor there.

He said it would also be wise to begin thinking about how this project would be organized and managed. In the U.S. view, the managerial structure would have two components. There would be the political aspect, involving control of it, and then the technical component, involving scientists, engineers, technical people, etc. It is necessary to get some feel for these two aspects and to define the Soviet role and the U.S. role in the project, then if the leaders announce it in Geneva, it will be possible to work together and invite other countries to join the U.S. and the USSR and get the project rolling.

⁵ Negroponte sent Shultz an undated memorandum on fusion research cooperation, which concluded: "a political commitment to proceed with a worldwide cooperative effort to design and build a prototype fusion reactor could advance the introduction of fusion energy into commercial use by forcing the acceleration of the R&D process. At first consideration the Russian proposal appears to be an attractive possibility which is difficult but probably can be accomplished." The memorandum was drafted on October 27 in OES/NTC. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Papers Ambassador Matlock took to Moscow: Letter-Eyes Only Jack F. Matlock; NLR-351-62-2-1-0)

Shultz said if the Soviet side could agree, the U.S. was prepared to consult Japan, some Western European countries and the Chinese, as well as another country the U.S. had in mind, in order to get ourselves in a position for the leaders to make an announcement about this in Geneva. These approaches to other countries should be made quietly, so as not to detract from the Geneva announcement. Shultz said the U.S. also wanted to add Canada. He also noted that in general, in involving others in such projects, they should have something to bring to the project if they desire to participate.

Shultz further discussed the question of consulates in Kiev and New York. He noted that the U.S. has a group prepared to go to Kiev November 12–16, and that there is time for this prior to the Geneva meeting. However, he pointed out that adequate sites for inspection by the team are essential to make their trip worthwhile. He said if there are no such adequate sites, then the delegation would not go to Kiev. He said it is critical to identify acceptable buildings or sites, and that the U.S. side expected to see buildings and sites other than the ones that had been presented before. He further pointed out that simultaneous occupancy of the respective buildings was essential. He noted that the U.S. had advised the Soviet Embassy in Washington that the staff members of the New York Consulate would not count in the country-wide Soviet personnel ceiling. He said the U.S. side would like Soviet assurances before his delegation leaves Moscow that the Kiev inspection team would be able to see such new sites.

Concerning North Pacific Air Safety and Civil Aviation, the Secretary noted that the U.S. had given the Soviet side information about this while the Soviet delegation was in the U.S., and that negotiations on this topic are resuming today (11/4/85) in Washington. However, the Soviet Union has reopened some issues that the U.S. believed to have been resolved. The U.S. has procedures that it desires to have written down. This is no more than what other ICAO countries do, and without such written procedures, any signed agreement has little effect. The U.S. side repeats that the question of North Pacific Air Safety has to be resolved before the U.S. can consider signing any new civil aviation agreement. Moreover, the U.S. has no interest in signing a civil aviation agreement unless it assures an equitable share of air traffic for U.S. companies. There is a gap here as the U.S. sees it, and these matters should be settled.

In the draft communique, the U.S. also refers to other bilateral areas that are not controversial. Shultz said he was referring to measures worked out by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce and the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade. He said he would just mention those briefly.

Shevardnadze interrupted at this point to ask whether Shultz would soon be concluding his presentation. Shultz responded that he

was going through all the points as he understood the Minister had suggested. Shevardnadze said that he simply was wondering what to do in terms of a lunch break.

In response, Shultz asked whether Shevardnadze had ever heard of John L. Lewis.⁶ He said he was a colorful bargaining figure who liked the good life. He conducted negotiations in the following fashion. He would go to a resort where a number of mine operators had been invited for a meeting, and the first meeting would go on until one of the operators moved to adjourn for lunch. Then, there would be no further meetings until after Lewis had worked on an agreement privately with the mine operators.

In those days, the mines and mining towns were scattered and isolated. Mining companies owned stores in the towns. There would always be arguments about prices in the company stores. Lewis would come to the negotiations with a number of notebooks. He would pick one up and read complaints from it about the high prices in those stores of pork, beans and so on. He would read page after page of outrageous prices and then take another book and do the same. Time would pass—1:30, 2:00, 2:30—he would go on reading. Finally, one of the mine operators would ask to be recognized and observe that all of this was “fascinating,” but that everyone was hungry and he would suggest adjourning for lunch. Lewis, an impressive man, would stand up and point to the books and say “sit and listen and know the gnawing hunger of the miners who have to pay those outrageous prices.”

Shevardnadze remarked that it is difficult for hungry people to agree on anything.

The lunch break began at 1405.

⁶ John L. Lewis, President of the United Mine Workers of America, 1920–1960, and founder of the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

135. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, November 4, 1985, 3:30–6:25 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>U.S.S.R.</i>
The Secretary	Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Mr. McFarlane	G.M. Korniyenko, First Deputy FM
Ambassador Hartman	A.F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to USA
Ambassador Ridgway	V.G. Komplektov, Deputy FM
Ambassador Nitze	A.A. Bessmertnykh, Chief, USA Dept
Ambassador Matlock	A.C. Chernyshev, Principal Aide to
Mr. Palmer (EUR)	Shevardnadze
Mr. Parris (EUR/SOV)	Yu. A. Kvitsinskiy, Soviet Rep to NST
(Notetaker)	INF sub-group
Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)	I.A. Khripunov (Notetaker)
	N.N. Uspenskiy (Interpreter) ²

The Secretary suggested he continue his presentation of the rationale behind the language of the U.S. draft communique.³ He started with the Soviet suggestion in New York that a joint communique include references to the inadmissibility of nuclear war. Our alternative language was based on the consideration that the Soviet concept was not broad enough. Non-nuclear wars could lead to nuclear war. It was also important to make clear the steps our two sides were willing to take in order to lessen the risk of war. Our language was preferable because it described how arms control could contribute to strengthening strategic stability and reducing the risk of war.

The Secretary noted that we had also raised the idea of centers which could explore ideas for reducing the risk of military confrontation. Senators Nunn and Warner had mentioned their ideas along this line to General Secretary Gorbachev and we had noted with interest his response that such ideas could be considered.⁴ The Secretary sug-

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memorandum of Conversations 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz/Shevardnadze/Gorbachev in Moscow November 4 and 5, 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in the Foreign Ministry.

² Nikolai Uspensky is the correct name for the Soviet interpreter. In several meetings, the notetaker used a variation in the name or mistakenly recorded the Soviet interpreter as Yuri Uspensky.

³ See footnote 4, Document 134.

⁴ Senators Nunn and Warner were a part of the Byrd/Thurmond congressional delegation that visited the Soviet Union August 27–September 4; see footnote 3, Document 80. They discussed the proposal for Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers with Gorbachev during a September 3 meeting. (Telegram 12144 from Moscow, September 3; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850623–0169)

gested that U.S. and Soviet experts meet to explore this and other ideas which could reduce the risk of military confrontation.

The Secretary noted that he had already outlined the new U.S. NST proposal and observed that he would not comment further on it, other than to refer the Soviet side to the appropriate paragraphs in our draft communique.

Following up on the Soviet suggestion in New York for language on SALT II interim restraints, the Secretary indicated that we had carefully studied the Soviet proposal. There was agreement that mutual restraint in the area of strategic weaponry could add stability and improve the atmosphere for the Geneva negotiations. The Secretary pointed out that President Reagan had clearly expressed this view in his June 1985 announcement that the United States would continue to refrain from undercutting the Treaty to the extent that the Soviet Union exercised comparable restraint, and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursued arms reduction agreements in the NST talks.⁵

The United States, he observed, had scrupulously observed its arms control commitments. We expected no less of the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union knew, we had recently dismantled a Poseidon submarine in accordance with our policy. We continued to insist that the USSR take the necessary steps to correct actions not in compliance with existing agreements. In this regard when the President announced the USG's policy, he indicated his willingness to go the extra mile and invited the Soviet Union to join in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. The Secretary had to say we were disappointed with the Soviet response. He called attention once more to the need for resolving U.S. concerns over telemetry encryption, the Krasnoyarsk radar and the SS-25 new type. To demonstrate our commitment to make progress in the Geneva negotiations while we worked to resolve our differences, however, we were willing to note our policy in a joint communique.

Turning to non-proliferation, the Secretary noted that our respective ambassadors had developed language on which we could both agree. There were some minor discrepancies in the language included in the two sides' drafts on NPT, but these probably reflected technical errors and could be worked out. *Ambassador Dobrynin* interjected that he had called Ambassador Petrovskiy to be certain the Soviet version was correct. The *Secretary* repeated that this problem should be resolved at the working level.

On chemical weapons, *the Secretary* stated that two things needed to happen. The first was a global treaty on the possession and use of

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 41.

chemical weapons. There was a U.S. proposal on the table in Geneva and we hoped it would be possible to realize progress. At the same time, a bilateral dialogue could be desirable with respect to proliferation and [omission is in the original]. As an example, in the Iran-Iraq war there had been a clear case of CW use and there was a danger of further use. In his September 27 meeting with Shevardnadze, the Foreign Minister had indicated the Soviet side had no information on the use of CW in the Iran-Iraq war.⁶ The Secretary handed Shevardnadze a 1984 UN report on the subject which left no doubt whatever of the facts. The Secretary restated our earlier proposal for experts discussions on CW use in the Iran-Iraq context. Such talks could be useful in their own right, and, if successful, could lead to a broader discussion on CW non-proliferation.

While on the subject of the Iran-Iraq war, the Secretary recalled that we had in the past agreed that the war served neither U.S. nor Soviet interests. The U.S. continued to believe that the President and General Secretary Gorbachev should discuss the issue in Geneva. The two sides had also previously shared the view that Iran was the intransigent party. That being the case, we again urged the Soviet Union to take steps to restrict arms flows from Soviet friends to Iran, so as to deny Iran the means to continue the war.

On the Stockholm CDE talks, the Secretary noted Shevardnadze's remark in New York that the U.S. appeared to be dragging its feet. We had carefully examined our feet and they seemed to be moving. The President's Dublin offer on non-use of force (NUF) stood.⁷ The other side of the coin must be concrete CSBM's. We hoped that the informal exploratory phase which the conference began just before the end of the last round would be fruitful in narrowing differences on the specific content of the concrete CSBM's we have proposed. In frankness, a more constructive Soviet approach would be needed. There was nothing to be gained by reopening previously settled issues or by trying to change the Madrid mandate. If we could agree on the general outline of an agreement consisting of genuine CSBM's falling within the mandate, excluding independent naval and air activities, combined with a reaffirmation of our non-use of force commitment, we could agree to give our ambassadors parallel instructions to commence drafting. This would be a signal we were beginning to make headway. We had agreed this was an area where a push could be helpful; the U.S. was ready to push if we could agree where the push should come.

⁶ See Document 108.

⁷ See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 224, footnote 3.

On MBFR we continued to regard the Vienna talks as an important part of our work on arms control. We continued to study the Soviet February 1985 proposal.⁸ While it had inadequacies, we were closely consulting with our allies on ways to move forward. The Secretary had nothing to say of a specific nature today, but he indicated that there could be a positive Western initiative at some point in the future which he felt the Soviets would find forthcoming. He asked Shevardnadze not to ask what he meant by “near future”. *Shevardnadze* quipped that perhaps he meant the year 2000.

The Secretary then raised a number of issues relating to Berlin, pointing out that the city had in the past been a source of U.S.-Soviet tension. He first touched on the problem of Berlin air corridors: an issue, he noted, he had discussed earlier with both Gromyko and Dobrynin. The Secretary noted that the problem was one of safety. There was currently a 10.5 mile reservation-free area; we wanted 17 miles. We knew the issue was being discussed at a technical level in Berlin. But the Soviets’ technicians needed to have a signal that their mileage was too small and that they should give greater consideration to our proposal.

Also with respect to Berlin, the Secretary raised Soviet conduct toward U.S. military liaison missions (MLM’s). The killing of Major Nicholson remained a sore point. A positive Soviet gesture to the family would be very much appreciated. It was well that U.S. and Soviet military staffs were working to prevent further incidents. But we would welcome learning what steps the Soviet military was taking to prevent use of force against MLM personnel.

The Secretary expressed the USG’s view of the desirability of enhanced military contacts, observing that U.S. proposals remained on the table both in the context of expanded exchange activities and on their merits. In this connection he welcomed the rescheduling of the Incidents-at-Sea annual review for the following week in Washington. In last year’s session the Soviets had raised the idea of reciprocal ship visits. We considered this an excellent idea that should be pursued in this year’s review.

Turning to regional issues the Secretary indicated he would be brief in view of his extensive treatment of the subject in New York. He first recalled the U.S. proposal for regularization of regional experts talks. These exchanges had been frank and useful. But we had yet to hear a Soviet response to our regularization proposal. Reviewing the

⁸ The Soviet proposal was submitted on February 14 in Vienna. For the statement by the Soviet Delegation spokesman describing the proposal; see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1985, pp. 81–82.

history of the talks, the Secretary observed that the original idea had come in the President's 1984 UNGA address. Subsequently, Ambassador Dobrynin had proposed a cycle of discussions of regional issues, which we had now completed. The world had not changed as a result, but the talks had been useful and might achieve more if continued.

We had in mind a schedule of meetings on all of the areas we had discussed this year, at the same level and in roughly the same sequence as in the past. The Secretary suggested that we might start in March 1986 with the Middle East. Southern Africa, Afghanistan, East Asia, and Central America and the Caribbean could also be discussed. The details could be worked out in diplomatic channels. The exact sequence would, of course, be a function of the availability of personnel on both sides, as well as the course of events in the regions themselves.

Komplektov intervened to clarify the meaning of the Secretary's reference to "East Asia". *The Secretary* indicated that the term referred to all of East Asia, including Southeast Asia.

Beyond our regional experts talks, the President had put forth in New York an initiative on resolving problems in certain areas. The Secretary noted that he had discussed these proposals with Shevardnadze at some length in their last meeting. We had noted the Foreign Minister's response that the U.S. and Soviet Union could not become international judges and that not everything depended on the two countries. We agreed with that assessment. The President's proposal was meant to build on existing mechanisms, not supplant them. The Secretary solicited Shevardnadze's thoughts on the President's regional conflicts proposal.

Noting that they had discussed the topic at lunch, the Secretary raised terrorism, noting that the phenomenon affected both countries. He welcomed the good news that Soviet citizens had been freed in Beirut, noting, however, that one diplomat had been lost.⁹ The Secretary pointed out that the U.S. still had six hostages in Lebanon and that British and French has also been seized. We all had interests in combating terrorism. We thought consideration should be given to discussing the problem at the Geneva meeting. An additional possibility would be a jointly sponsored resolution in the U.N. General Walters had been discussing this option in New York.

Concluding his presentation on the U.S. draft communique, the Secretary noted that we had agreed that attention should be given in Geneva to an agenda for the future. Agreement on the things we had discussed would have great importance for the future. So would the tone of the Geneva meeting. We also felt it important that the leaders

⁹ See footnote 8, Document 114.

state their readiness to meet again. Whether their statement would be limited to that or should be more specific was up to them. We had provided some language in our draft and would be interested in the Soviet reaction.

Noting that the next page of his briefing book was blank, the Secretary indicated that he had concluded his presentation and invited comments from Shevardnadze.

Shevardnadze thanked the Secretary for his thorough remarks on all matters on which both Governments were focusing as subjects for discussion in Geneva. The Secretary had commented at length on the new U.S. Geneva arms control proposals. Shevardnadze had had a chance to review those proposals and had two questions on which he would like the Secretary's response. After that, he would ask Ambassador Kvitsinskiy to comment very briefly on the U.S. proposals. Shevardnadze recalled that Ambassador Nitze had during a previous meeting given an extensive lecture on the Soviet position.¹⁰ Shevardnadze would permit no such lectures from the Soviet side this time.

Shevardnadze's first question was: How does the U.S. proposal address the problem of the interrelationship of preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth?

His second question: How do the U.S. proposals take into account the double threat posed by nuclear weapons located both on the territory of the U.S., and outside the U.S. but capable of reaching the Soviet Union?

The *Secretary* indicated that he would offer a preliminary response and then allow Mr. McFarlane and Ambassador Nitze to comment. The Secretary said that to understand the interrelationship one had first to take each of the negotiating groups by itself and then reunite them. The U.S. had proposed radical reductions in the START and INF areas. The Soviet proposal also called for reductions, so we were going in the right direction. In the space and defense field the fundamental objective of strategic defense was to eliminate the first-strike threat, and, perhaps ultimately, the utility, of nuclear missiles. It might be possible to get them to zero—something both sides have stated is a long-run objective.

What the U.S. was doing in its research program reflected a restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. We would like to hear from the Soviets that their extensive work was similarly restricted. Of course the key question was: what if research is successful? What about deployment? Once again, we proceed in accordance with the Treaty, but we believe the subject should be addressed now—in its interrela-

¹⁰ See Document 99.

tionship—both philosophically and operationally so that we have some idea before it becomes truly operational how we handle it.

Korniyenko interrupted to ask a clarifying question “to facilitate” the Secretary’s reply. What the Secretary had said, *Korniyenko* stated, was not a reply to the question that had been posed. The Secretary was talking about numbers, but there had been no reply on stopping the arms race in space. *Korniyenko* recalled that the January 1985 agreement had two parts: to prevent an arms race in space; and to terminate it on earth. The Soviet question had addressed the first part of the agreement. Perhaps Mr. McFarlane could as well in his comments.

The Secretary indicated that he thought his comments on the interrelationship between these two areas were clear, but asked McFarlane to make his comments. Regarding the interrelationship, *McFarlane* acknowledged that there ought to be one. One had to recognize, however, that certain systems—offensive systems—exist today while defensive systems do not (*Korniyenko* interjected: “and should not”) except on the Soviet side. McFarlane indicated he would like to comment on how to reduce offense while maintaining the capability to exploit defensive systems.

Regarding our offensive forces, it was possible until now to bound the problem by counting the number of forces the other side possessed and building a corresponding force of one’s own for deterrence. But new Soviet systems could no longer be counted. The U.S. was thus driven to defensive systems because there was no adequate counter. Further, non-nuclear systems held the promise of a safer means of deterrence.

Regarding Shevardnadze’s second question, with respect to strategic and INF systems, McFarlane pointed out that the issue had been debated for ten years, and resolved at least twice. There was no reason to reopen it again. A final historical point: the Soviet deployment of SS-20’s, while primarily a threat to our allies, caused them to ask us to deploy LRINF to counter the Soviet actions. It was still possible, however, to limit, and ultimately eliminate, all these systems through negotiations.

Ambassador Nitze asked to say a few words with respect to *Korniyenko*’s question. The negotiators of the ABM treaty had sought carefully to define their terms and definitions so as to be able to determine whether components, as we then knew them, were being tested in an ABM mode. Nitze cited the rigorous definition on radar power-aperture to illustrate his point that, while it had been possible to define adequately components based on existing technology, the same was not true for unknown technology. The Soviet side had at the time argued in principle against limiting things which could not be defined. When pressed as to how to cover such situations, the Soviets had suggested

consultations. When asked what recourse there would be should consultations not resolve possible disagreements, the Soviet answer was that the disagreeing side could withdraw from the treaty.

The U.S. felt that this was an extreme remedy and that measures short of this were needed. The result was Agreed Statement D which calls for consultation pursuant to Article XIII and agreement pursuant to Article XIV in the event such a situation arose. To date, systems of the type he had described had not been created. We have proposed not only to comply with the provisions of Agreed Statement D with respect to consultations, but to begin discussions now to determine what should be done if such systems were to be developed.

Nitze noted that, at Soviet insistence, an article had been included in the treaty which allowed for modernization. Agreed Statement D made clear that only deployment was limited by the treaty. It makes no sense to speak of an arms race in research.

Korniyenko cut in to state that Article V forbids not only deployment but development and testing as well. He stressed, however, that his question had to do with not the ABM treaty but the January 1985 statement. The Geneva Talks dealt with preventing an arms race in space; SDI was a clear contradiction of the 1985 statement.

Nitze protested that his remarks addressed that question. The ABM treaty involved not research but deployment. Research was permitted. *Korniyenko* was confusing the intent of research with the outcome of research. One of the best ways to reduce the need for defense in space, he added, was to radically reduce offensive systems.

The Secretary commented that Ambassador Kvitzinskiy was shifting in his chair and appeared anxious to make his comments. We wanted to hear him out, but the Secretary had one additional comment.

The U.S. was a part of the NATO Alliance. We were legally and morally bound to help defend the Alliance against attack. In addition the U.S. had a physical presence on the ground in Europe. When the USSR aimed its SS-20's at European targets, it aimed at us. In that sense there was a double threat to the U.S.: a threat to the U.S. itself; and a threat to our role vis-a-vis our European allies. It should not be surprising, therefore, that our allies asked for U.S. deployments in response to Soviet deployments aimed at Europe. Thus, if the USSR was exposed to a double threat, so were we. In any case, we have separate negotiations on INF. We think this is appropriate. We think there should be an interim agreement as we have proposed. But we also think that this class of weapons should be eliminated entirely.

After being motioned to do so by *Shevardnadze*, *Kvitsinskiy* began his presentation. *Kvitsinskiy* observed that detailed comments on the new U.S. proposals would be premature since they were still being

presented in Geneva, and required careful study. He allowed that there were some similarities between the recent Soviet counter-proposal and newly presented U.S. ideas. There were also some very big differences which made the U.S. proposal, unlike the Soviet, “unbalanced and unfair.” He had three main points in this regard.

First, the U.S. proposal did nothing to limit the strategic arms race. The limits it envisaged omitted SLCM’s and its bomber limits left a large “hole.” The 1,500 ALCM’s provided for could be carried on 75 aircraft; that left 285 bombers. What would they carry? SRAM’s? Bombs? This was not included in the 6,000 limit; it was something totally different.

Second, the U.S. proposal ignored the FBS threat to the Soviet Union. In addition to its strategic delivery vehicles (SDV’s), the U.S. has more than 800 forward based systems (FBS). After deep cuts, using the 1250 to 1450 figures, the U.S. would increase SDV’s by 1,000: a two-fold increase in the significance of such systems. Kvitsinskiy asked how this tallied with the U.S. intention to eliminate Soviet heavy ICBM’s and to cut throwweight by more than half. This cut is a “bargain” in the wrong direction.

On a more general plane, radical reductions in missiles would increase the significance of FBS and aircraft—a major advantage to the U.S. Nor was there any mention of British and French systems. This was a further attempt to obtain one-sided advantages for NATO. The U.S. proposal for dealing with INF, moreover, did not provide for the suspension of missile deployments. The U.S. now had 209 warheads. Under its proposal that figure would climb to 420. The Soviet Union would meanwhile have to reduce. Kvitsinskiy also protested the U.S.’s call for reductions in Soviet Asian LRINF, noting that this issue had not arisen in some time.

As for space, the U.S. proposal did nothing to block the arms race. The U.S. draft communique referred only to programs which are permitted by and in compliance with the ABM Treaty. It did not ban space strike weapons. This implied an arms race in space and a violation of the ABM Treaty. Article I, paragraph 2, of the Treaty prohibited the establishment of a territorial defense; the U.S. sought to protect its territory and that of its allies. Article V clearly prohibits development of the kinds of systems the U.S. plans to create. Kvitsinskiy could not agree with the U.S. interpretation of Agreed Statement D, since no Agreed Statement can take precedence over the basic articles of the Treaty. Therefore, Agreed Statement D must be read in the context of Article III of the Treaty, referring to permitted types of equipment within permitted areas. If not, the ABM treaty would “collapse”.

The Geneva negotiations had two goals: to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth. The two were interrelated. To

try to focus only on the problem of nuclear arms would be to solve only half of the problem. Thus, the U.S. proposal was unbalanced and unconstructive. If there were no decision on space, there would be no decision on nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Soviet Union very much wished to hear the constructive part of the U.S. proposals on space—if it existed.

The Secretary noted that we had had a fascinating re-run of arguments we had heard for some time. SLCM's were a good example. They had been discussed a lot but no one had answered the question of how they could be verified. We had invited the Soviet Union to address this question and had received no reply. It did not seem sensible to agree to limit something if one could not verify it. As for Kvitsinskiy's point on aircraft, if it were true that aircraft become more important as missiles were reduced, so did the role of air defenses—an area in which the USSR had an advantage. *Kvitsinskiy* questioned whether Europe did not have air defenses. *The Secretary* replied that the Soviets' were more extensive. They should not be complacent, said the Secretary, he meant it as a compliment. His point was that if bombers face defenses, those defenses needed to be taken into account.

Korniienko countered that, applying the SDI analogy, air defenses should make aviation unnecessary. *The Secretary* replied that both conventional and nuclear forces had to be considered. But that did not reduce the importance of the nuclear threat.

The Secretary noted that Kvitsinskiy had referred to 140 in his comments on the U.S. proposals. That figure, the Secretary clarified, referred to the number of U.S. LRINF launchers to be deployed by December 31, 1985. The U.S. had to that degree adopted the Soviet freeze idea.

Korniienko noted that Kvitsinskiy had been speaking about warheads. How did the U.S. get 420 warheads? The U.S. had 209 warheads now; would it reach 420 by January 1? *McFarlane* noted that the confusion was a function of the U.S. proposal's provision that the mix of Pershing II and GLCM warheads would be a subject of negotiation. *Kvitsinskiy* alleged that that was not what the U.S. delegation was saying in Geneva.

Nitze indicated that by December 31 there would be 108 P-II and 32 GLCM launchers in Europe. We would, under our proposal, discuss the mix between these two systems with the Soviet Union. We wanted an equal outcome of from 420 to 450 on each side, i.e. about 90 GLCM and 50 P-II's. The mix could be changed as needed after such a discussion. The right to alter the mix would be retained. *Kvitsinskiy* replied that the mechanics of the U.S. proposal were clear to him. It was equally clear that when the U.S. indicated it would suspend deployments of missiles in Europe, it would continue to deploy warheads.

Nitze asked *Kvitsinskiy* if he would prefer 236 warheads and a corresponding number of warheads on the Soviet side. Were they prepared to reduce their SS-20 launchers to a third of that number? *The Secretary* interjected that we would be prepared to go down to zero.

Komplektov asked to inject a historical note with respect to long-range cruise missiles. He recalled that in SALT II GLCM's and SLCM's had been limited. That Treaty did not fail to come into force through the fault of the Soviet Union. The weapons which its provisions had limited started to appear first on the U.S. side. Now the U.S. complained that it was impossible to verify SLCM limitations. The same was true for mobile missiles. *Nitze* pointed out that *Komplektov* was referring only to the SALT II protocol—a document of short term because of uncertainties as to the systems it covered. *Komplektov* acknowledged this, but stressed that it was aimed at a solution to the cruise missile problem.

McFarlane remarked that the conversation had begun by addressing the January 1985 statement's linkage of offensive and defensive systems. He noted that offensive systems had been a threat for years and that there was, therefore, considerable experience in reducing them in a stable fashion. We should continue to do so. As for defense, there was no experience except on the Soviet side. But two factors gave cause for confidence, or at least hope: defensive systems could be non-nuclear, and therefore preferred; and we had the time to talk about the role they may or may not play before they become a reality. Since some defensive systems already existed on the Soviet side, we had a double interest in discussing them. But it was hard to limit something that didn't exist.

Komplektov suggested in English that the same point could be made with respect to SLCM's. We didn't know what to do with them before they existed; now they exist.

The Secretary threatened jocularly that, if the other participants didn't stop to allow for a translation on behalf of Mr. Shevardnadze and himself, the two would throw the others out and talk among themselves.

Continuing, the Secretary noted that British and French systems seemed to be brought up every hour and a half. He described his view of the problem. The five permanent members of the Security Council were the countries with nuclear weapons. The scale of these countries' nuclear arsenals varied, but all regarded themselves as sovereign in having weapons. What other nuclear powers might do in the future with their weapons was their decision, but the U.S. had to compare itself to the USSR, not to the others.

At the same time, the U.S. and USSR had in January agreed that their objective was to eliminate all nuclear weapons. If the two countries

were to reduce to 4500 reentry vehicles on each side, then the ratio of our forces to those of other nuclear powers would be reduced, especially as third country forces were being built up. Thus, if we were developing a schedule for reducing to zero, it would be important at some point to bring in other countries, so as not to leave them with nuclear weapons. We should call that card. They have said they would join. We have said we want radical reductions. We have said we want zero. We should handle this by doing the reductions and then involving not only the British and French but the PRC as well.

The Secretary then offered a procedural suggestion. We were prepared to stay and talk as long as the Soviets wished or thought it worthwhile. But we needed to keep in mind that the meeting between our leaders would occur in mid-November. It was our job to get the discussion focused. It was useful to have the preliminary Soviet reaction to our Geneva proposal, and to have that reaction described as “preliminary”. We would relay the gist of Soviet remarks to our negotiators in Geneva.

In the meantime we needed to figure out how to give focus to our work; how to accomplish as much as possible so that our leaders can have useful discussions. In that connection, we should try to make as much progress as possible on a communique. The leaders should not have to waste their time arguing in Geneva. We should settle what we can. If there are some arguments which haven’t been decided before the leaders meet, they can write that down. But there should be a structure. We need to answer the question: are we to have a lengthy communique like the one the U.S. tabled, or not? The answer will depend on whether we can get the necessary substance. We need to pin this down a bit.

In addition, the Secretary indicated, it would be important to have a clear idea for our leaders of the flow of subjects in Geneva—how they should allocate their time. This could, of course, change if they chose to do so. But we could provide a loose structure. It is also true that there are a number of unanswered questions beyond the communique. We need to get them to gell. We had tried to set out our views on these items in our own presentation. As Shevardnadze had pointed out, we had not seen the Soviet draft communique, and vice versa.

Shevardnadze agreed on the need to find formulas for procedure for organizing further discussions. Why had this situation arisen? The Soviets had not planned a detailed discussion of the U.S. proposal. But since the Secretary had provided the gist of the U.S. approach and criticized that of the USSR, the Soviet delegation had felt obliged to respond in equal detail.

Shevardnadze did not wish to suggest that the Soviets saw only negatives in the U.S. proposal. The very fact that the proposal had

been made was positive. However, having come on the eve of the summit, it left little time for detailed study. He did not, he stressed again, exclude that the U.S. position had positive elements—a “grain of rationality”. But with each successive explanation from the U.S. side, the grains became fewer and fewer. At the end of the day, there might be no grains left at all.

Returning to procedure, Shevardnadze pointed out that the Secretary had done all the talking, and suggested it was now his turn. He indicated he would need an hour and a half to two hours to make his remarks adequately. If the U.S. side was prepared to continue this evening, there could be a break and then the discussion could proceed. Alternatively, the delegations could meet again the following day at 2:00 p.m. The Soviets would frankly prefer the second option, as it would allow for both sides to read the other’s draft. The only negative was that the Secretary would meet the General Secretary without hearing the Soviet side’s views. But the Soviets were not in a hurry. They were at home. They could work tonight, tomorrow, or even over the coming holiday.

The Secretary noted that in the Minister’s line of work there were no holidays. While he feared there might be frowning faces, he suggested the sides meet the following afternoon. There were some substantive items and some communique-related items to discuss.

The Secretary offered a suggestion. The delegations could allow a couple of hours to read the communique, and then ask a sub-group to meet and compare notes in a preliminary way. The Secretary personally wanted to focus his thinking on his meeting the following morning with Gorbachev. He would ask Matlock, Palmer and Linhard to meet with the Soviet group. They would make no decisions, but could compare notes with the Soviet team and scout the ground.

Shevardnadze agreed to the Secretary’s suggestion and nominated Komplektov to lead the Soviet sub-group. He suggested the groups meet at 8:30 p.m. The next morning they could inform the Secretary and Shevardnadze of their impressions.

The Secretary agreed to Shevardnadze’s scenario. He indicated he had a few additional thoughts to transmit to Shevardnadze that evening, indicating that McFarlane and Ambassador Hartman should stay behind. Shevardnadze agreed to continue the discussion, designating Dobrynin and Korniyenko to remain with him. A one and a half hour private meeting followed (separate memcon).¹¹

¹¹ See Document 136.

136. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, November 4, 1985, 6:15–7:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>U.S.S.R.</i>
Secretary Shultz	Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Mr. McFarlane	Deputy FM Korniyenko
Ambassador Hartman	Ambassador Dobrynin
D. Zarechnak (Interpreter)	N. Uspenskiy (Interpreter) ²

Secretary Shultz thanked Shevardnadze for the additional time allotted and indicated that he would like to express some thoughts on human rights which reflect a different way of looking at the question, which he had set down on paper. Shultz essentially proceeded to read the paper which he had prepared:

There is one problem area where our differences are deep that I would like to discuss in a new way. I'd like to try to take a fresh look at the human rights issue.

Let me tell you how I have been thinking about it.

The United States is a nation of immigrants, not like yours. This means that every American administration—past, present, and future—has to be responsive to two fundamental concerns of the American people: the conviction that people everywhere should have the right to emigrate; and the intense concern of American ethnic groups with the well-being of people in the lands of their family origin.

These concerns are absolutely fundamental to us. There is no way that the American government can avoid raising these issues. President Reagan has instructed us to work reasonably and quietly and cooperatively to address these issues. But if quiet diplomacy does not produce results, then loud, public campaigns and publicity cannot be prevented.

I do not say this as a threat of any kind but rather as a description of political dynamics. It is a reality that is rooted in the fundamental nature of the American nation. It is just a "given" that needs to be

¹ Source: Department of State, EUR/RUS Special Collections—Russia, Political Subject and Chronological Files, Lot 00D471, Shultz-Shevardnadze 11/4–5/1985. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Soviet Foreign Ministry Mansion. Another copy of the memorandum of conversation indicates it was drafted by Zarechnak on November 5. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Files, Memoranda of Conversations (09/1985–11/1985) (11/05/1985); NLR-775-23-9-2-5)

² Nikolai Uspensky is the correct name for the Soviet interpreter. In several meetings, the notetaker used a variation in the name or mistakenly recorded the Soviet interpreter as Yuri Uspensky.

understood and managed if this issue is not to become a permanent impediment to improved Soviet-American relations.

I know that there are “givens” on your side as well. I understand that you regard human rights to be economic in nature, in contrast to our view that they are political and moral. We don’t accept your view. We think you are wrong; economic well-being is no substitute for the political liberties that western civilization brought into being through centuries of struggle. So our debate over that will continue. But this does not mean we can’t try to find a way to lessen the sources of specific aggravation between us.

There are two parts to the problem: how to resolve these immediate cases, and how to find a long-term solution.

In my letter to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, I cited some cases that seemed to fall clearly in the categories where you had indicated early action was possible; for example, people who have established claims to American citizenship and divided spouses—all of whom have waited long periods of time.³

And there are the cases that have become prominent all around the world as examples of harsh Soviet behavior toward individuals in distress. It is frankly hard for me to figure out why the Soviet Union does not take the relatively simple decisions needed to relieve itself of all the very unfavorable publicity which these cases constantly generate.

I spoke to Ambassador Dobrynin last week about Anatoliy Shcharanskiy and Ida Nudel. I know Mrs. Shcharanskiy and Ida Nudel’s sister. These are humanitarian cases, cases of divided families. It would be very good to make the decision now to allow them to go. As I hope you are aware, President Reagan is deeply concerned about these two people.

But the long-term situation needs our attention as well. I am sure that you do not want to see just an endless series of cases like these. I can understand very well that you would see little value in permitting increased emigration in the short-term if it only results in more demands and greater pressure on you over the long-run.

Let me briefly give you my point of view. I hope that in future meetings we could talk about this at greater length.

I know that you want to increase the economic progress of your country. So do we. Both our nations are still developing.

³ In telegram 14807 from Moscow, October 18, Hartman explained that he met with Shevardnadze and delivered the letter from Shultz on divided families. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850011–0181)

One truth we have learned is that freedom is one of the major contributions to economic development. An economy can only go so far if it does not offer the individual wide opportunity for advancing his own well-being and that of his family.

That's what we believe. Our experience proves it. You probably disagree.

But as we look to the future of our economies it is all the more true. The industrial age is coming to an end. In some places it is over. The economy of the future is going to be based upon information technologies. And information flows require freedom—freedom of thought and communication.

It's just a reality that the more open societies are going to be the successes in this coming "information age." Closed societies are going to fall behind. Ideology has nothing to do with this; it's just a fact of life.

So if you believe that human rights consist mainly of jobs, housing, health care, and other economic benefits, it seems to me that your society is going to be best able to fulfill those rights if your people are permitted a greater degree of what *we* regard as human rights: freedom of speech, of religion, of movement, of personal choices in their everyday lives. *Our kind of human rights can be a contribution to your kind of human rights.*

Practically speaking, it seems to me that if you took a more open approach, for example, to Jewish emigration, a great many Soviet Jews would want to leave. But if your open approach also involved greater measures of freedom of thought, religion, expression, and personal choice, then over time fewer and fewer Soviet citizens would want to leave. Your policy of greater freedom would contribute to your economic growth. Your people would see more hope and opportunity in your society. More and more would wish to remain and build their futures willingly in their own country. And this in turn would even further contribute to your economic success.

So those choosing to leave the Soviet Union would ultimately dwindle in proportion to the economic, social, and political progress which you preside over in the coming years.

I want to stress that I am not suggesting that you adopt policies that could drive a wedge between the Soviet government and the Soviet people. On the contrary, your people are known to be among the most patriotic in the world. The approach I have described would in my opinion only deepen the Soviet people's allegiance to their governmental system and to their Motherland.

That's my version of how your human rights goals and ours, although different, might both be realized through a basically agreed course of action. And a range of problems that has severely aggravated

our relationship could over time become eased and perhaps eventually solved.

Those are just my general thoughts. I can't expect you to agree with me, but I hope you will reflect on them and that we can continue to talk about this subject in a responsible and productive spirit.

Shultz concluded by indicating that he hoped that the approach which he had outlined could offer hope for avoiding the prospects of endless wrangling over such issues in the future. We think that this offers a strategy to permit change over a period of time—to your advantage and to help you solve your problem. He said that he would turn into a non-paper if the Minister wished. *Shultz* ended by thanking the Minister for hearing him out.

Shevardnadze replied that he first wanted to speak about the list which was transmitted to them by the U.S. side, not because it was transmitted by the U.S. side, but because these were cases involving Soviet citizens. If it was found legal to resolve their cases, they would be resolved. The appropriate Soviet agencies were giving them very serious attention.

Shevardnadze then began to talk in a more general vein. He indicated that the Soviets have a great regard for Soviet law. He knew the U.S. opinion of Soviet society, but wished to say that Soviet society was the most democratic in the world, a society where people voted on laws within a framework of bodies such as the local Soviets and the Supreme Soviet. These laws were considered to be sacred.

Shevardnadze said that *Shultz* was aware that the Soviet side had indicated that deviations had been permitted from Soviet law in the past. But the Soviet government had promised its people that it would no longer permit such deviations.

Shevardnadze said that *Shultz* had mentioned Jewish emigration. He indicated that in Georgia, over 20,000 Jews had been granted exit visas for Israel, the U.S., and Austria. Similar things had occurred in the Ukraine, in Moscow, and in Leningrad. All of this was done within the law. But if something is against the law, there can be no compromise, because if laws are violated in one area, this could lead to violations in others.

Shevardnadze indicated that he respected *Shultz*, but he had to say that when one spoke of "freedom" in the Soviet Union, one needed to be careful to see how one understood the meaning of the word. It is a sacred word. In the U.S., people have a poor misunderstanding of Soviet society. This includes the U.S. Administration. It is sometimes almost laughable. He said he had spoken of some of these things in his conversation with the President. Perhaps it was even inconvenient to speak of this, but there were those who had said that the Russian

language does not even contain the word for “freedom.” He would not say who had said that. Shultz could imagine what an insult that was for the Russian people and all the Soviet people. Forces probably existed which were interested in disinforming the President and representatives of the Administration.

Shevardnadze said that Shultz had indicated that in Helsinki *Shevardnadze* had said that human rights and freedoms were only economic ones. What he really had said was that people should have not only the right to things like work, but also the possibility of realizing this right, and not only with regard to employment, but other things such as medical services, social amenities, etc. Such rights also included state support of cultural and physical development of individuals. They also included the self-determination of national ethnic groups.

Shevardnadze said that if he were to begin to criticize U.S. society, the sides would need to put off their meeting with the General Secretary. How would it be if he were to give Shultz a list of the millions of unemployed in the U.S. or the list of the homeless or those who sleep in the streets or the difficult situation of the migrant workers. He would not even mention the issue of national ethnic groups in America.

Shevardnadze said that he had noted the President’s words that the U.S. people have the blood of all the peoples of the world. On the one hand, this is an attractive phrase. On the other hand, a complete assimilation of these different peoples takes place in the U.S. Shultz might be offended by *Shevardnadze*’s stressing of this fact. How many millions of Poles were there in the U.S.? Five or six? Why not give them autonomy? There were also more Jews in New York than in Israel. Why not give them their own state?

Shevardnadze said that it cost the Soviet government a great deal of money to give Georgians a real right and possibility to get an education in their own language—not only on a secondary level, but on the level of higher education as well. And this was true not only in Georgia, but in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, etc. There were more than 100 nationalities in the Soviet Union with their own national identity who were given assistance by the state. He would not have spoken of this matter, but as Shultz had taken the initiative, he wished to draw attention to the situation of the original Americans in the U.S.

Shevardnadze continued that the Soviet Union annually spent dozens of billions of rubles for assistance in the development of the culture of national ethnic groups, even very small ones living in the far North.

Shevardnadze indicated that he was not trying to convince Shultz of the correctness of Soviet ideology with regard to freedom and relations among people. This was up to Shultz, but the U.S. side should leave the Soviet Union alone. To those who pester the U.S. government about

this, it should say that the Soviet Union is a sovereign state and that the U.S. has no right to interfere in its internal affairs.

Shevardnadze stated that to have the improvement of U.S.-USSR relations depend on human rights is not correct. The Soviet side is no more interested in the improvement of these relations than the U.S. The U.S. had been one of 12 countries which did not recognize the Soviet Union early on, and did so only in 1933. The Soviets had built their socialist society without the U.S. If the U.S. wishes to cooperate, that's fine, otherwise the Soviet Union would build its Communist society without the U.S. The U.S. should have no illusions that only one of the two parties was interested in cooperation.

Shevardnadze mentioned that there were people who left the country, hundreds, perhaps thousands of them. This was all illegal. There were people who had not found themselves. There were also thousands who wished to return, and the Soviet government was looking at these cases. And how many people left the United States every year (sic)? So, counting the number of people who leave a country does not give the whole picture. He wished to repeat that the U.S. should not make success at the Geneva meeting contingent on these issues.

Shevardnadze indicated that he had not yet described in the course of the day the Soviet proposed communique, but he wished to say at this point that the Soviet side was not interested in reaching agreement at any price. Agreement should be on the basis of equality. It was good that Shultz had raised this issue, since it gave *Shevardnadze* the chance to say what he had wished to say. He repeated that the Soviet side would carefully study the list which the U.S. side had transmitted, but since Shultz had raised a broader philosophical issue, he had replied in the same vein.

Shevardnadze said that he realized that Americans were proud of their country, and this was rightly so, but one must realize that the Soviet citizen is also justifiably proud of his country, and he has his own understanding of what freedom means, and this needs to be respected.

Korniyenko said that Shultz had indicated that the U.S. was a country of immigrants, and therefore, was interested in the fate of other peoples. But in that case, the U.S. people and its government should be interested in the freedom of immigration, and not have limitations and quotas on such immigration. Such quotas do not exist in the Soviet Union. The attitude of the U.S. to Mexican immigrants was one of the cases in point. One could talk all night about this issue.

Korniyenko continued that Shultz had said that pressure to resolve such issues comes from the people, and the Administration had to pay attention to this. But, on the Soviet side, there were people, such as Ambassador Dobrynin, who had been in the U.S. for 25 years, and

Korniyenko himself, who had spent five years in the U.S. 20 years ago.⁴ At that time, there had been no such pressure with regard to emigration from the USSR. Therefore it was clear that this issue was something artificially imposed from the top.

Shevardnadze indicated that there was one other thing which *Shultz* had said that was offensive, i.e. that if these issues were not resolved quietly, a great deal of noise and demonstrations would occur. He asked *Shultz* to indicate what, exactly, would happen. At any rate, it didn't matter. The President had launched a crusade against communism, and what had happened? If people are aroused with regard to human rights in the Soviet Union, what would happen? There would only be an increase in tension, which some people in the U.S. would like, nothing more.

Shultz said that at least he had heard more from the Soviet side about this issue than in the past. He said that he found much misinformation about the U.S. in what *Shevardnadze* had said. At any rate, he had offered his thoughts in a constructive spirit. At various times the sides have flirted with the idea of letting one or two representatives explore this subject confidentially and quietly. Before he had met *Shevardnadze*, when he had been at *Chernenko's* funeral, he had met with General Secretary *Gorbachev*, together with Vice President *Bush* and Ambassador *Hartman*. *Gorbachev* had proposed that the two sides should establish a commission to quietly examine these issues, and the Vice President had agreed. But the sides had not followed through and the U.S. would like to do so, not to create a hullabaloo but to improve the level of understanding of these issues in order to resolve them to the extent that was possible to do so. The U.S. would be ready to do this at any time. He also indicated that the Soviet side should not underestimate the political pressure behind these issues in the United States.

Shultz continued that this pressure came not only from American Jews, but all ethnic groups. These issues have been around for a long time. He indicated that he had done research and had found what others had already known, namely that in 1911 there was a serious incident between the U.S. and Russia with regard to emigration.

Dobrynin interjected that this involved Jewish emigration.

Shultz continued that such pressure was a real force in the U.S., and it involved not only the Soviet Union, since there were people from every country in the world in the U.S.

⁴ Korniyenko served as Minister-Counselor at the Soviet Embassy for part of the Johnson administration.

Korniyenko indicated that the Secretary had not properly understood or had not properly conveyed what the General Secretary had said. He had not proposed that a commission be created to quietly look at human rights issues. He had said, "Let's get a group together—two people from your side, two people from our side, and they could talk day and night about this. We would give you our ideas about you and your society, and you would give us yours." This was not what Shultz was proposing today.

Shultz replied that the U.S. was not interested in argument, but in achieving results.

Shevardnadze said that when the U.S. side gave its list, the Soviet side did not object and did not return it, but indicated that if the cases could be resolved in a legal way, they would be, provided that the cases concerned U.S.-Soviet relations. If, however, the cases concerned emigration to Israel, such lists would be returned. But since Shultz had raised the discussion to a philosophical level, the Soviet side had replied as it had, and would always do so.

Shevardnadze continued that the Soviet side looked at this issue realistically. As contacts between people increased between the two countries, it was natural for questions of family reunification to arise, but such questions could be more readily resolved if relations between the countries were better. He repeated that the list of names would be examined, and if something could be done legally, it would be, and if not, an explanation would be given as to why not.

Shevardnadze said that the state was a living organism and the relationship of the state to a man was a relationship between people, and there was mutual respect.

Shultz asked if the Soviet side would like to have his remarks in the form of a non-paper, as *Dobrynin* had indicated before Shultz had read it.

Shevardnadze replied that it would be up to Shultz, and that the Soviet side would take it if he wished (*Korniyenko* and *Dobrynin* seemed to be indicating at this point that a non-paper might not be necessary, since they had been taking notes.)

In conclusion, *Shultz* brought up the meeting with the General Secretary, scheduled for the following morning, indicating that the proposed attendance was to be quite small, i.e. only Ambassador Hartman, Mr. McFarlane, and himself on the U.S. side. This would be acceptable, although in Washington a larger group of Soviets had met with President Reagan. But perhaps the Soviet side had a special reason to keep the group small. *Shultz* indicated that he had thought of adding two people to the U.S. side—one would be Ambassador Nitze, a very distinguished American with a long background in the area, and the

other would be present as a notetaker, since he knows Russian—Mr. Matlock. But if the Soviet side wished to keep the group small to have a better exchange of views, Shultz did not wish to disrupt this. He was making a suggestion, but not pushing it hard.

Shevardnadze replied that in Washington the President had indicated the number of those who would be present on the U.S. side, and the Soviets had an equal number. He indicated that he thought Gorbachev would want a smaller group in order to speak more frankly.

Shultz indicated that this was acceptable.

Shevardnadze said that he would let the U.S. side know if there were any changes. Dobrynin, however, was indicating to *Shevardnadze* that *Shultz* had agreed to the smaller group.

137. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House¹

Moscow, November 4, 1985, 1914Z

Secto 25026. White House for President Reagan. Subject: November 4 Meeting With *Shevardnadze*.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. I met with *Shevardnadze* for some eight hours today, including a restricted two-hour session on human rights.

3. The Soviets invited us to make a full presentation of our views in all areas, and we did. They had little to contribute themselves.³ The

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850012–0024. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² On November 4, Reagan wrote in his diary: “In the middle [of lunch] I got a secure phone call from George S. & Bud in Helsinki [*Moscow*]. They’d just had 8 hrs. of meeting with *Shevardnadze* with little or nothing accomplished. Tomorrow they meet with Gorbachev.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 536)

³ In his personal notes for November 4, Hill wrote: “Summation of the day (cordial, but Sovs are not very far along in their thinking). —S went over CMQ [communiqué] lang in great detail to Sovs discomfort. —They did *not* appear well organized or prepared in their minds for Geneva. Altho maybe they just saving the content for Gorba to use tomorrow. —Long HR argument—longest ever. —Their talks on Geneva A/C NST was standardized. They asked Q the A’s to which they already know. Overall, we have no better idea of their thinking than we did when we arrived in Moscow this morning.” (Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, Entry for November 4, 1985; NLR–675–3–25–1–1). The editor transcribed the text from an entry in Hill’s handwritten notebooks.

discussion of the Geneva arms control talks was rather standardized, with the Soviets asking familiar questions whose answers they already knew. They had nothing much to say about other issues on our agenda. On human rights, we argued back and forth about the state of human rights in each country. They did say, however, that they are looking carefully at the specific dual citizenship and divided family cases that we have raised, and are examining our other special requests in the light of what they say are their laws on such cases.

4. About the only positive note was the discussion of an initiative concerning cooperation on fusion energy. I presented our preliminary ideas on this subject, and the Soviets considered them to represent a constructive response.

5. At my suggestion, a smaller group is meeting tonight to explore what possibilities there are for agreed elements that might go into a joint document.

6. The atmosphere was cordial throughout, but it was clear that the Soviets either are not very far along in their thinking about their objectives for your meeting in Geneva, or were holding back today to let Gorbachev deliver their views tomorrow. At this stage, therefore, we have no better idea of where they might be heading than we did when we arrived in town this morning.

Shultz

138. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, November 6, 1985, 1550Z

15987. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Gorbachev, Nov. 5, 1985.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. This is uncleared memcon being cabled to be distributed by Charlie Hill only.

3. Memorandum of Conversation

Place: Moscow, Kremlin, Gorbachev's Office

Date: November 5, 1985

Time: 10:00 a.m.–2:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS:

Soviet Side:

General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev

Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze

Ambassador to U.S. Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

N. Uspenskiy³ (Interpreter)

U.S. Side:

Secretary of State George P. Shultz

National Security Advisor Robert C. McFarlane

Ambassador to Soviet Union Arthur A. Hartman

D. Zarechnak (Interpreter)

4. After some initial exchanges in which Gorbachev suggested that disinformation in the U.S. about the Soviet Union made it impossible to build healthy bilateral relations, the Secretary said that President Reagan had a saying that we should talk to each other rather than about each other. Gorbachev said he was married to a philosopher and

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Memoranda of Conversations 1985. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Adam. Special Encryption.

² Talking points prepared for Shultz for this meeting are in the Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Official Personal Notes of Secretary Shultz (10/01/1985–10/23/1985); NLR-775-23-61-1-8. Secret. On November 6, Reagan wrote in his diary entry: "Then George S. & Bud came upstairs with Don R. & George B. to report on their Gorbachev meeting. It seems Mr. G. is filled with lots of false info about the U.S. & believes it all. For example Americans hate the Russians because our arms manufacturers stir them up with propaganda so they can keep selling us weapons." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 537)

³ Nikolai Uspensky is the correct name for the Soviet interpreter. In several meetings, the notetaker used a variation in the name or mistakenly recorded the Soviet interpreter as Yuri Uspensky.

they had a saying that you move from less to more complete knowledge. He felt that was what experience teaches us, but philosophers joke that sometimes we move from small knowledge to even greater lack of knowledge. Secretary said he was an economist and they say they are the profession that can go straight from an unwarranted assumption to a foregone conclusion.

5. Gorbachev indicated that the two delegations had worked so late the previous evening that Shevardnadze had only the chance to convey a short account of the results. But morning is the time for serious work with a clear head. This was, after all, the last meeting before our two leaders would meet in Geneva. He, therefore, wanted to ask the Secretary to briefly give his assessment of where things stand. What luggage are we carrying? He wanted to know if we are going to build this bridge across the river or along the bank. After hearing from the Secretary, he would then ask the Foreign Minister to comment.

6. The Secretary thanked Gorbachev for the courtesy and cordiality with which the U.S. delegation had been greeted. He said that he and Shevardnadze had developed a good personal rapport since their first meeting in Helsinki, which had been followed by meetings in New York and Washington. There were no barriers to communication. He also pointed out that Mrs. Shevardnadze and Mrs. Shultz get along even better than the two Ministers. Gorbachev interrupted to say that maybe we should put the wives in charge in place of the Ministers—a little bit like a column that appears in newspapers here where people can say what they would do if they were directors or ministers.

7. The Secretary said that he had given a warning to President Reagan and he would give it also to Gorbachev. He said, “you will end up liking President Reagan as a person,” and he had told the same thing to the President about Gorbachev, whom he had described as an attractive and stimulating person to talk to. Gorbachev interrupted again to say that this just illustrated the caution of the State Department because they were afraid such a meeting might actually lead to improved relations. He said, “now if you were cautioning me about Weinberger I could probably understand that better.” But he said “We know all about that. We know that the two of you worked together in the same company.” The Secretary interrupted to say that the important person to focus on was President Reagan because he is the boss, and Gorbachev said that he understood that.

8. The Secretary said that the President has a great deal of support from the American people. He won the last election in an unprecedented sweep and the polls show that he is still immensely popular. He speaks with authority and if he makes an agreement, he will get support for that agreement. It was important to know in negotiations that the person you are dealing with can deliver on his promises.

9. Gorbachev replied that it was indeed important, especially if you take account of previous agreements which had been signed but not ratified. Those who signed them did not bring them to fruition. In preparing for Geneva, he said, he had looked at many old documents and agreements, including the Basic Principles of Relations which had been signed in the early 70's between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.⁴ He said that this last document, which had been signed by Brezhnev, was an excellent one. He could sign it today and maybe we could save the State Department and the Soviet Foreign Ministry a lot of suffering by using it instead of trying to prepare a new document.

10. The Secretary replied that we have an old saying that "actions speak louder than words." He said he did not wish to downplay the importance of words. But we should mean what we say and carry it out. He said that both of us needed to reflect on how actions in one area can have an impact in another quite different field. For example, Gorbachev had mentioned agreements which had not been ratified. This was obviously a reference to SALT II, but he would like to recall that President Carter withdrew that treaty from Senate consideration because the Soviets had just invaded Afghanistan. Thus it appeared to him that the action of invading Afghanistan was not in accord with the spirit of the words that had been spoken.

11. Gorbachev immediately interrupted again and in a very animated way said that such arguments were best left to the press. He said that we are not un-instructed on these issues and the U.S. Government representative should not resort to such arguments with people like us who know the real story. He said that he knew full well that SALT II had been buried and was long dead before the events of Afghanistan. The problem was of quite a different nature. He said that we are well aware that U.S.-Soviet relations were deteriorating even before the Reagan administration came to power and that there was a process at work brewing in U.S. society a deep distrust. He had thoroughly studied this question and he knew all about the Vietnam and Watergate syndromes. He knew that there was a feeling that America had been weakened and that the Republicans had played on this and pushed for greater military activity to give America a feeling of having come back. He said that we have books about this period and he particularly cited the Hoover Institute study called "America in the Eighties."⁵ He said that he understood Ronald Reagan was close to this institute and perhaps had been an honored member. "Everything in that study has come to pass in present-day U.S. politics. Social programs begun under

⁴ See footnote 7, Document 96.

⁵ Presumably a reference to Peter Duignan, ed., "The United States in the 1980s," (Palo Alto, Hoover Inst. Press, 1980).

previous administrations have been curtailed. Military expenses have been increased. Indeed, American military strength has been used and demonstrated. So," said Gorbachev, "don't use such arguments with us. It shows that you do not respect us. The SALT II Treaty was buried because scientific achievements had come along which required that the U.S. drop the restraints contained in that treaty. So you had to get rid of it to carry out your programs and thus the invasion of Afghanistan was used as the excuse."

12. Gorbachev went on to say that it had been an idea of Nixon's to call for linkage. "But," he said, "this was old hat and should be put in mothballs." He said he wanted to speak frankly.

13. This was the start, he hoped, of a process and we should not play games on how to build this relationship. We should be trying to take advantage of the present juncture. But if it is to the liking of the American administration that we not make a change in this relationship, then we can go on forever as we are and we on the Soviet side will lose interest if you continue to argue as the Secretary had just done. He said that would not be a conversation person-to-person, but rather like reading each other's newspapers. "If that is what you want to do, we don't have to have a meeting."

14. He said, "I really don't want to dwell on this anymore, but if we don't reach agreement on the fundamental principles in the main area (arms control) and if we don't try to avoid confrontation and move toward cooperation to benefit everyone, then we are not going to be able to solve smaller specific problems. Our side has tried to signal a desire to improve relations and the only response we get from you is that you call this 'propaganda.' We must try to reach agreement on basics because there are inseparable links in these issues. To solve issues across this gap of seven years requires courage. To move toward improved relations requires courage and struggle and honesty. We sincerely want a change for the better, but you say that this just shows we are weak, and then when we don't show an interest in building a better relationship, you say we are intransigent. So, (and here Gorbachev repeated himself) if we do something and make suggestions, you say it is propaganda and we are weak. If we don't, you say we are intransigent."

15. Gorbachev then gave his analysis of U.S. politics by saying that if the U.S. Republican administration wishes to stay in power, it would be worthwhile to look around and see how progress can be made in this area. The administration should not be so tied to the military-industrial complex, which just chews up money and programs by the billions. "You need new policies and space is right there in the forefront if we are going to tackle the question of security. Without that, there can be no progress. All other issues are peripheral questions and these could be easily resolved once the main ones are out of the way."

16. Gorbachev continued that the Soviet Union wishes to know the desires of the Reagan administration: does it wish to improve relations with the Soviet Union or rather to complete its eight years in office with no change, and, therefore, not disappoint the military-industrial complex. Peace demands not only the appearance of peace, but also actions. If our two countries do not come to agreement now, it will be even more difficult to do so three years from now. We are ready to meet you half way and not because we are weak, but rather because we recognize we cannot afford delay. The dangers will increase if we wait.

17. Gorbachev went on in still heated fashion to say that he asked for this meeting to be kept to such a small restricted group so that he could speak more frankly and with the utmost candor. The basic question, he said, is whether our two countries will continue this tug of war, trying to out-play each other, or whether instead a sober assessment is not still possible. We could think about how to improve the relationship on the basis of reality and a correct evaluation of present and future policies. Or does the United States consider that its present policies of force—exercising pressure, strength—that these policies have brought the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table. If that is the type of thinking which seems to motivate people who surround the President, then no success is possible.

18. Gorbachev said that as he reads our interviews, including the President's, he finds that the administration is sticking with old positions and, therefore, he does not feel that this will lead to an improvement in Soviet-American relations on the basic issues. He indicated that he had decided to refrain from answering positively any of the requests—and he had received some 57 already—for interviews at the present time since this would force him to react to these statements. He said that he had decided to give no interviews before Geneva because he hoped that there would be a serious impetus to something positive. But maybe this is also the view of the American side. Or perhaps the American side doesn't see any chance. Or maybe this is all being said for public consumption. He hoped that the United States would consider it to be in its national interest to improve relations with the Soviet Union. He was offering this as free advice. He noted parenthetically that Dobrynin had told him that Kissinger was getting 150,000 dollars a year for advice, but he was offering this advice freely. He also added that Kissinger seemed to be making more money than he had when he was Secretary of State. The Secretary interrupted to say that he too was earning more money outside than he is currently earning as Secretary of State and, what's more, he was earning his living building things, which was a lot more positive than some of the things he does in the government.

19. The Secretary went on to say that he had found much in what Gorbachev had said with which he could not agree, but he did not wish to go back and argue over all these points. Rather he wished to come to the main question of “where do we go from here?” This is the real question. (He also at this point handed over to Gorbachev the two letters from the President, one of which he already knew the contents, and the other of which discussed and replied to the question of channels of communication.⁶ Gorbachev said at this point that he agreed with the suggestion for channels and welcomed this as a first agreement.)

20. The Secretary said that what he really wanted to do today was to discuss the President’s approach to the coming meeting in Geneva, and also his approach and his view of the general state of relations between our two countries. He indicated that he had known Ronald Reagan for over two decades. He had worked with him when the latter was Governor of California and he had also worked in the President’s election campaign. Now he was Secretary of State. So he believed that he knew very well how President Reagan looks at things. He said that he had not the slightest doubt that President Reagan has a great desire to see a more constructive relationship between our two countries which would enable us to deal with one another in a realistic and pragmatic way. Realistic because each side should know that we operate under two very different systems. “You think yours is better and we think ours is better. But there is a responsibility on these two great powers which is tremendous and which leads to the conclusion that they both must work for a more constructive relationship. We know that the present state of our relationship is unsatisfactory, but the reason for the coming meeting was to do better and that is the way the President wished to approach in a very serious manner the upcoming meeting in Geneva.” (Gorbachev interjected at this point that “if that is so, and these words are carried out, then perhaps we can succeed.”)

21. The Secretary continued that the reasons why this meeting is so important are not just negative ones, although negative reasons like the avoidance of war, especially nuclear war, are important, but there are positive reasons as well. For example, what sort of world do we want to build for the future? And these weigh very heavily with the President. The world is changing very rapidly. You wish to see progress and so do we, but this progress is going to be a reflection of what happens in the world and how we handle the opportunities presented to us.

⁶ See Documents 127 and 128.

22. The Secretary recalled that when he had come to Moscow with Vice President Bush, he had been impressed and struck by a comment made by Gorbachev about the number of new countries in the world and his view about the changes that this would bring about. “You were right, but it is not only the creation of new national entities that is going to bring change to the world, but rather also the great variety that will exist and the stimulus that this will bring to innovation and creativity, but obviously with differences in different parts of the world. So the United States and the Soviet Union will be interacting all over the world as it changes, sometimes in volatile situations which may not even be created by the two big powers, but which would affect them. We would need to see how these could be managed.”

23. The Secretary said that beyond these changes we realize that science and technology are moving very quickly and that this affects everything, including military weaponry, but it also affects how we produce things and how we live. We may, in fact, be reaching the end of the industrial age and moving into what we might think of as the information age, where we will have to think about new ways of working, how people behave, possibly relocating populations, and how decisions are made. Society was beginning to reorganize itself in profound ways. In fact, this reorganization was so advanced in scope that, at least in our country, there is a search by people for their roots. He said all of this creates opportunities for us to work together and there are many possibilities for the United States and the Soviet Union to mutually grasp these opportunities or to move in a different direction and abort these possibilities.

24. The Secretary said that the President has a deep sense that we should be moving toward greater stability in the world and an improvement in our relations. He is sincerely committed to this. The question was how to proceed. The Secretary thought we could move on two tracks. One track would involve the development of increased confidence between us through exchanges that bring about greater realism to justify this confidence. The other track would involve finding ways to deal with the substance of issues. Obviously the central ingredient is in the type of issue being dealt with in Geneva in the negotiations, but there are other things as well that must be dealt with in our relationship. The Secretary indicated that he and Shevardnadze had had long and serious exchanges. They had had a full review of the whole range of issues between our two countries. The previous evening, representatives from both of our delegations had met and listed 26 specific issues—some big and some small.⁷ From that number—and perhaps

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 142.

I would not agree with these categories—they agreed that four can be easily solved and we can find language to express our agreement. Seventeen others were put in the possible category where we might be able to achieve agreement, but it was not clear whether it could be achieved before our meeting later in the month. The chances were perhaps fifty/fifty at best. And then there was a last category of issues where we were unlikely to achieve agreement. This list covers everything that we have talked about.

25. Gorbachev interrupted to ask what were the issues in the unlikely category. The Secretary replied that these included the President's regional initiative, specific regions, Berlin issues, nuclear testing and radars. But this was not really the point. We were actively working on all these areas and perhaps progress was possible in all of them. But it is true that the Geneva negotiations are of central importance. Some of the issues we have listed are big and also there is possible linkage between them, although each issue should stand on its own feet.

26. Now, however, the Secretary said, he would like to talk about Geneva and the problems in the negotiations there. And after he is finished, he would like his close friend and collaborator, Mr. McFarlane, to speak as well. The proposals which President Reagan wrote you about last week will prove that arms control is important to us. In Shevardnadze's speech to the U.N. he spoke of the centrality of deterrence.⁸ Stable deterrence is what we all agree is critical. We believe a stable deterrent, as provided for in SALT I and the ABM Treaty, is threatened today from two directions, and what we seek in our positions is to address these threats to deterrence. First, certain given assumptions were spelled out on both the offensive and defensive side, but these assumptions have not held up. What we now have is a situation that is vastly different from what we expected when these two treaties were signed. One assumption was that as we constrained defense, offensive forces would be significantly reduced, but the situation today is that we both have more missiles and warheads. This accounts for our interest and perhaps your interest in radical reductions. We both said that our objective is to reduce to zero, but in the meantime we are interested in a drastic lowering of offensive arms. This is why we were attracted by your fifty percent reduction proposal, and we have tried to respond in that framework of fifty percent.

27. The second assumption was that while defenses were held in check—some were permitted, others were restricted—critical path items were constrained in order to stop the creation of a national anti-ballistic missile defense. We abandoned our strategic defense plans—

⁸ See footnote 3, Document 120.

you kept yours around Moscow as was permitted under the ABM Treaty—although I just want you to know that we believe certain things you have done are contrary to the treaty. But we recognize that you have long had an interest in defense and this is perhaps understandable for a country that has been repeatedly invaded as short a time ago as forty years. We also know that you are doing major research and that, therefore, the assumption of deep constraints on defense is not as strong as it was in 1972 when these treaties were signed.

28. There are also, the Secretary went on, other classes of development in science and technology, for example, that have gone on since the early seventies. What we see is the development of ballistic missiles with extraordinary accuracies, MIRV'd, and now we see mobile systems which, because of their great mobility, make them difficult to count and verify. Gorbachev interrupted at this point to say, "but if you are mistaken by ten missiles, that does not change the strategic equation. The real question is what can we do or what are we going to do. Are you saying that the ABM Treaty is obsolete because of the quality of weapons? What are you suggesting?"

29. The Secretary went on to say that the ABM Treaty remains of tremendous importance and the President had ordered that all our activities should remain within the bounds of that treaty, in its narrow definition. But what we need to address even before research results are available is how in the future we might wish to handle deployment or manage the transition to an increased dependence on defense. In other words, how can we have a cooperative transition which would be safer? The Secretary said that Soviet leaders have pointed out in the past that deterrence based on some elements of defense is more stable. We have, in effect, switched to your line of argument. All these issues that I have mentioned are related. We need deep reductions in offensive arms. This would relieve the offensive threat to the stability of deterrents. We should examine the collaborative management of a transition to some defense, and we are prepared to talk and negotiate about all that, but reductions and eventual elimination of offensive weapons are the key. (Some of the above was never translated because when the interpreter got to the question of the ABM Treaty, Gorbachev interrupted vociferously, as follows:)

30. Gorbachev said that we are now finding new interpretations of the ABM Treaty. He said he was amazed that McFarlane would base his judgment on the advice of a lawyer who had previously only had experience prosecuting drug and pornographic cases. He knows that McFarlane has a high reputation and he wonders how he could take such a study as the basis for his speech. Gorbachev said that the Strategic Defense Initiative was an attempt to justify an ABM system by unworthy means. He said that we are knowledgeable people and

we know what is going on in the United States and why the United States is doing this. "You," he said, "are inspired by illusions. You think that you are ahead of us in information and technology and that you can somehow use these things to gain superiority over the Soviet Union. But this is an illusion. Others in the post-war period recognized this, including some of your leaders. It was President Johnson who said that he who dominates space, dominates Earth."

31. The Secretary interrupted and said that there were no illusions on the part of the Secretary of State or the President about the capabilities and strengths of the Soviet Union. "That is why we are sitting here today."

32. Gorbachev then came back and said, "We don't have illusions either but I can tell you that I know that you do." He said, "I have special information about what was said in the meeting of the Six."⁹ (He looked genuinely angry at this point, but never did reveal what his secret information was.)

33. The Secretary replied that everyone in the meeting of the Six was impressed by the offensive missile strength of the Soviets and by their preoccupation with defense. (At this point it became difficult to follow the argument because Gorbachev was interrupting the translator.) "In reference to statements by Soviet leaders," he said, "I suppose you are referring to Kosygin's statements, but I'll talk about that later. You always make it seem that you are catching up with us." (All during this rather heated exchange, Dobrynin was pumping up Gorbachev and egging him on. It seemed clear to our side that Dobrynin must have supplied a lot of his ammunition.)

34. Gorbachev then drew a solemn conclusion, in which he said that you can rest assured that we will not help the United States get out of its ABM Treaty obligations. We will not assist you with the politics of it or in a technical way so that you can take the arms race into space. The Secretary said that we have not had to have statements by Soviet leaders to tell us what your policy is on defense—we have figured that out for ourselves just by watching your programs, and we don't see anything wrong with defending yourselves. Gorbachev shot back that the Soviet Union will not retreat on the ABM. It is carrying on only fundamental research. It is interested only in peaceful uses of outer space. Of course, some of these things it is working on could be used for defense purposes, but everything that the Soviet Union is doing is strictly within the ABM Treaty, and the Soviet Union

⁹ Presumably a reference to the leaders of six nonaligned countries meeting in New York during the UN to discuss nuclear issues. See Don Oberdorfer, "Six Nonaligned Countries Offer to Monitor a Nuclear Test Ban," *Washington Post*, October 29, 1985, p. A14.

is resolutely against transferring the arms race to outer space. He went on to say that it is very difficult to continue to sit at the table (presumably in Geneva) with the United States while it plans these programs. If the U.S. goes ahead with its space program, as President Reagan seems fervently to wish, we will be in the most arduous times.

35. Gorbachev then warmed even more to his theme and said that there was a basic flaw in the way the U.S. approached these problems. He said that we were full of illusions and he offered to list some of them. First, we believed that the Soviet Union was less economically powerful and, therefore, it would be weakened by an arms race. Second, that we had higher technology and, therefore, the SDI would give us superiority over the Soviet Union in weapons. Third, that the Soviet Union was more interested in negotiations in Geneva than we were. Fourth, that the Soviet Union only thinks of damaging our interests in regions around the world. Fifth, that it would be wrong to trade with the Soviet Union because that would just raise its capability. He described all of these as illusions and said that we apparently fail to draw lessons from history. He recalled that even when the Soviet Union was very weak immediately after the Revolution, they were able to restore their economic health and prepare themselves for their greatest challenge in the Second World War. But the question was, was the U.S. interested in improving relations? You have economic problems. You have this big budget deficit, a large part of which is due to military expenditure. Eighty percent is financed by borrowing money and this causes high interest rates. Your military program creates employment (he mentioned the figure of eighteen million) but everyone knows that those jobs cost three times as much, and therefore, this is a wasteful use of resources. He went on to say that perhaps the Soviet Union could place orders in the U.S. and relieve the U.S. economy of having to be dependent on making arms. Perhaps the American administration has lost its way in trying to find a policy toward the Soviet Union. Even the signals that we send to you are distorted by you. It is not easy for us to advance peace proposals. We also have military circles—maybe not like yours—but if there is no reaction from your side, we will have to abandon our attempts and then there will be nothing to hope for. They tell us stop trying, but we say, “No, the U.S. has all the necessary qualities to evaluate the situation and to understand that we need to think about what we are doing.” (This last sentence was not translated, as the Secretary attempted to interrupt.)

36. The Secretary attempted to interrupt by saying that we recognize we have certain problems. Gorbachev said, “Maybe we will help you tackle those problems. Look at all those social programs you have cancelled.” The Secretary responded rather heatedly to all of this “analysis” of the U.S. society and economy by pointing to the rising general

quality of life in the United States. The fact that eight million jobs have been created since the beginning of the Reagan administration. That infant mortality is down and the average age expectancy is up and per capita income is up. Americans are better off than they ever have been before, but we are not satisfied. We don't want to devote resources to unproductive activities. The Secretary said that he had a sense of tragedy when seeing all of this spending for military purposes.

37. The Secretary said that he would like to now come back to the nuclear area and ask Mr. McFarlane to comment. But before that he wanted just to mention that in talking about collaborative efforts the Soviet idea of building a fusion reactor was one of great interest to us. Gorbachev said, "Yes, that would be wonderful," and the Secretary said that we responded positively and you only suggested this one week ago. Gorbachev said something about this could be worked on in Vienna. The Secretary said that we have a very large effort if we are to proceed. This is based on talk between our scientists and we have learned a lot from them. If created, it would be a great boon to mankind. We would be working together with a vast range of science and high technology because, after all, we would be creating conditions on the sun. Gorbachev said we are ready, but he said, "Not if you take the arms race into outer space. This is what we are trying to persuade you not to do. Dobrynin tells me that people in the United States are still listening to those who think in terms of illusions." He then asked rhetorically, "Are you afraid that you might lose your position if you admitted this?" and the Secretary replied that he had news for the General Secretary—he has tenure on a university faculty and that shows how he thinks ahead. Gorbachev said that is what we ought to be doing—we ought to be thinking ahead—If one thinks only of today, our policies won't be worth anything and we will lose our way. He continued quite excitedly, saying that it isn't easy to make policy. For seven years he had headed up the committee developing economic policies to prepare for the 26th Congress, but it was not easy. It was a struggle, there were many opposing voices. But finally it has all been published. But it is not easy to make the right policy. He said that deep convictions are most difficult to challenge, but they must be challenged if there are good grounds. There is nothing so expensive as mistakes in policy. We don't want to open a stage where it will be hard to deal with each other. Is this the way that we should be going? Are you interested in just today? Or do we want to look at the policy of the future and what our national interests are? I hope it is the latter, but I don't see anything new in U.S. policy. Only a propagandistic repackaging of yesterday's policies. We favor peaceful cooperation. Both sides should change. We are prepared for new constructive relations, but we can't go alone. We must do this together, but you

have no new proposals, only old ones. We have suggested new policies. Yours are only propaganda. Mr. McFarlane sells these with a new technological basis because he knows that modernization is needed. Gorbachev concluded by saying that he wanted to talk before Geneva because he wanted to try and move things in a positive direction. He wasn't attempting to have an argument, but we have been talking very frankly, perhaps like you do in your office. The Secretary said that we think there is an opportunity now to make progress and we should work at that. We should be doing everything that we can to have something for the meeting with the President, but he would now like Mr. McFarlane to speak about this situation.

38. Mr. McFarlane began by welcoming the chance again to present his views. He said that we have needed to have this occasion to talk to each other for more than five years (Gorbachev nodded his agreement). McFarlane continued that in preparing for this trip, his wife had read some of the TASS accounts and was astonished at the way he was portrayed. At this point Gorbachev went off like a rocket and said that we should know how the American press had treated him after the French visit and the ways that they discussed the personality of the General Secretary and his wife. "Why should our press spare you?" In fact, President Kekkonen of Finland used to deliberately put negative things about himself in the newspapers because he thought this made him even more popular. McFarlane tried to continue by saying that perhaps all this is caused by the absence of an exchange between our two governments on fundamentals. This allowed a body of misinformation to grow up and color the thinking of our leaders. We don't want to waste time but it is important to have some perspective on the effects of substantial changes on our thinking. These are really in two areas. First, on the military side, we have seen a tremendous expansion in very accurate missiles that create a military risk that the other side might see the benefit of a first strike. And this destabilizing tendency we would want to see eliminated. Secondly, on the political side, the expansion of nuclear power has been accompanied by attempts by the Soviet Union to expand its influence in distant areas. Neither of these trends is healthy. How do we restore the balance? In Geneva we are looking for major reductions in offensive forces to avoid the first-strike threat, but we are also conscious of new Soviet programs which are going to create a new set of problems. The new mobile land-based systems are particularly upsetting to the offensive balance, because it makes it very difficult for us to count and, therefore, to see what the balance is. We cannot count with confidence that an imbalance could not develop without our knowing it. We have said that mobility can add to stability if it preserves the invulnerability of our deterrent, but that is true only if you know how many missiles there are. President

Carter had a plan for mobile missiles that would be survivable, but he wanted to put them in a geographically limited area so that there would be no question of quantity. What worries us is that the entire Soviet Union could be the area for the new mobile missiles.

39. McFarlane went on to say that in the past we have relied on a strategy of damaging the other side. "You don't like being the target for missiles and neither do we. So we pose the question—if today, unlike ten years ago, there isn't a technical system for deterring weapons and, therefore, not threatening anyone with the weapon? We are conscious, however, that if defenses are built while keeping offensive strength, then there could be a first-strike capability." Gorbachev then interrupted to say that Weinberger had said it would be a catastrophe if SDI was not built and he did not say anything about helping a first-strike capability. McFarlane came back, however, and said that every morning he sees the President and he can assure the General Secretary that he, the President, is committed above all to reducing tensions with the Soviet Union. That he wants a more stable and safer relationship and this, indeed, is why he has stressed major reductions in offensive systems. But he would like to begin today to see how defensive systems might be introduced for greater stability. We don't know today if the technology can be produced, but first we need a concept so that dangers will not be increased. That is the President's intent. Now you have been portraying me as having an aggressive intent toward the ABM Treaty. But that is wrong. You can acknowledge that the treaty allows certain things, but that is different from saying that you intend as policy to pursue that goal. Like the Soviets, we think the authority is there, but we don't intend to use it.

40. Gorbachev interrupted heatedly to say that we had only invented this interpretation last spring. Before that our interpretation was like that of the Soviet Union, but then, he said, "You got a new idea on what Article 5 meant because you wanted to get out of the ABM restraints. Thus you needed a broad interpretation. We are very suspicious of what is going on." McFarlane then picked up again and said that the Secretary of State had made a constructive contribution. We could cite public concern in our country over broader interpretations given by Marshal Grechko or others, but we wanted to be more constructive and to see what to do in the future, so we decided to define our intentions. President Reagan is clear that we are shaping our program on the basis of the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Gorbachev did not agree with this and did not think SDI was compatible with the ABM Treaty. He said it is like people putting rumors around that prices are going to be raised ten percent, all the while intending that they will only go up three percent and that way people will not be unhappy. The Secretary said in a real capitalist

system, all that would be frustrated because the market tells what the real price is. Gorbachev came back and said, "All right, let's take taxes then. Let's raise them by twelve percent next year. Then everyone can breathe a sigh of relief when they are only raised three percent. It's a way to get people to do what you want. You have always intended as part of the political game to bring the broad interpretation back to the narrow one. We understand what is going on. It isn't our intention to create a ruse or a trap. We are not addressing the crowd. The Soviet Union doesn't want unilateral advantage. You should not try either."

41. Gorbachev then said something about having to go to dedicate a Lenin statue and that, therefore the meeting would have to end in another half hour, but he went on in vigorous terms to say that he understood that we were moving in a unilateral direction. He said, "We have put our proposal forward in Geneva. You have made your proposal. You have rejected ours. As Mr. McFarlane has done, you should speak of balance and security. The talks can go on, but negotiations need compromise. We will only compromise on condition that there is no militarization of space. You want us to help you legitimize the introduction of an arms race in space." He added solemnly, "I hope this is not your last word. If so, nothing will result from the negotiation. There will be no fifty percent reductions. You are operating from a different logic. If you want superiority through your SDI, we will not help you. We will let you bankrupt yourselves. But also we will not reduce our offensive missiles. We will engage in a build-up that will break your shield. We don't want war, but neither are we going to allow unilateral advantage. Therefore, we will increase nuclear arms. But we are patient and we still have hope."

42. Mr. McFarlane tried to get the focus back on Geneva by saying that our concept was to try and relieve a problem that had arisen in the past—trying to reduce the incentive on either side toward a first strike. We, therefore, had proposed lowering ballistic missiles on both sides to 4,500. Second, avoiding new systems that destroy confidence in the balance, namely, mobile missiles. Third, we want to jointly explore over time moves away from threats of offensive nuclear weapons and instead to come to rely more on defense rather than offense. We did not consider doing this except that (1) Soviet moves to build mobile missiles forced us in this direction; (2) Soviet defensive efforts were much more than ours for ten years; and (3) we need greater reliance on defense in order to avoid the threat of accurate land-based offensive missiles. The basis of our position is equality, verifiability and stability.

43. Gorbachev then began a kind of summing up of his attitude toward the current situation. First, he said that the Geneva meeting is important as a starting point. Second, he was against an approach on

this meeting that was too restricted, e.g., to get acquainted, setting an agenda for the future. In other words, no new steps. They would not be good as a way to avoid worsening the situation. Third, he said we are not idealists, however, and we realize the difficulties which have piled up over the years will not be solved in one meeting. Fourth, we also take the view that if there is only the fact of the meeting, that would be a disappointment to our people and the world. We will try to explain the meeting, but if that is all, why is it necessary and should we have another one? What we should be thinking about is the interests of the world and how they can be served by moves that would lead to a major political impetus to get a drastic improvement of our relations. Gorbachev went on to say that we had stated that we need a realistic assessment of the world and "You, Mr. Secretary, reminded me of the conversation we had earlier this year. Reality should be the source of our policies. It is international business to build an international life. All countries must be involved, not just ours. But we can help because we have great weight in these affairs. Certainly, we need policies that meet this preoccupation with world problems. As far as present policies are concerned, the great question is of war or peace. That is in the forefront and that is what preoccupies people everywhere. How can we stop the arms race and the threat of nuclear war? We should have as our intent the development of a dialogue to reduce confrontation, encourage detente and peaceful co-existence. That is what the world wants. The reality of the present world is that economic, social and ecological concerns are evident in capitalist and socialist countries and, most particularly, in the developing world where there is a grave threat to living standards. Never before have we seen such an interdependence among all of us. All this should be taken into account in all our policies, but especially in the Soviet Union and the United States. As far as we are concerned, we want to take steps to improve our relations. You have our peace proposals. We have made proposals in Europe, in Asia, in Africa and we are ready to cooperate with you."

44. Gorbachev went on to say, coming back to his old theme, that the U.S. should think of making new proposals and not sticking with old policies. "You should understand that the Republican administration can't leave office with only old proposals. You can't continue to wrap these up as if they were new. You need to re-think these questions, to catch up with the new reality. We must take account of national interests in all countries and not just see the hand of Moscow everywhere. Much depends on what is going on in the less developed world where transnational corporations are milking these countries. They can't pay their debts; they are starving. I said this to Congressman O'Neill and the Ambassador was here at that time.¹⁰ The countries of

¹⁰ See Document 19.

Latin America are being robbed. What they need to do is to raise their productivity. There is no hand of Moscow. That is not true. Africa and Asia are exactly like Latin America. The reality is that we are not plotting maliciously to do things there.”

45. Gorbachev went on to say that they were exercising restraint and engaging in mutual help, but he wanted to say that because of their belief in their principles they will continue to support national liberation movements. “You want us to give up, but we cannot. It is a matter of principle with us. You, on the other hand, should give up your illusions and then we can move along together even on such questions as human rights. For example, there have been more than 400 marriages and almost all the people involved have left. The only ones who have stayed behind have state secrets. But everyone (sic) does that. But we are reviewing even these cases. It is in our self-interest to keep our security and for both of us to take account of the other’s security. This is a universal truth. The key is trying to get security at lower levels of deterrence and we are ready for that search, even to reduce to zero on condition that we prevent the militarization of space. This would apply not only to the U.S. but to the U.S.S.R. as well, if it were signed by both sides. The Soviet side would also be prohibited from having such systems. Such an agreement would be in the two countries’ interest and would improve the international climate. Sometimes it is presented that if the United States were to change its position on outer space, this would be a defeat for the United States, but this is not true. It would bring a huge political gain if the United States were capable of taking a step of such importance.”

46. Gorbachev continued his peroration by saying that we could think about the formulation to use to describe this, but it was clear that we could recognize research directed at the peaceful uses of space and the mastering of new technology. But only research, not development or testing of elements of a space-based ABM system. We will not agree to that and would need to re-evaluate our position in such circumstances. It certainly will be unproductive to try and persuade us that weapons in space are useful. We have concluded that this is not the case based on solid analysis and not on whim. We are not amateurs here. We have experts.

47. On other subjects, Gorbachev said that he was prepared to discuss at Geneva regional, bilateral and other problems. Consultations on these subjects to get a better understanding of each other’s position could lead to a better atmosphere and they would maybe do some good. He ended by saying that the Secretary should convey to the President his earnest request that we think all this over.

48. The Secretary thanked Gorbachev for his time. He said that he could find some things to agree with without reservation. Geneva

should be full of as much genuine content as possible. That was why we had been making all our efforts. We have a broad agenda that indicates the scope of our concern. On some of the remarks about economic development, we certainly see things in a different way, and we have never really discussed how to solve these problems. Our approach to different problems in different regions may vary. There are some areas where tension may arise. President Reagan has a process for our deliberation regarding regional problems; we have in one area a war that is going on—in Iran and Iraq, but there are no tensions between us. This is a quarrel between them, but maybe we could cooperate to help end this war. We think that would be worthwhile. (Gorbachev agreed.) The Secretary went on to say that as we prepare for Geneva, we welcome the Soviet proposal for reductions in nuclear weapons and we hope that it will be possible to go all the way to zero. We don't obviously see the Strategic Defense Initiative in the same way, but we need to talk to see if we can deal with that problem. We also need to remind ourselves that perhaps we have gotten into the habit of disagreeing, both in your country and in mine. It takes courage to disagree, but maybe it takes equal courage to agree. Our list of issues includes some large and some small ones. We hope that we can get into a position to deal with as many of these as possible in the Geneva meeting. Do we think the meeting can be successful? Well, it could be if we can make progress, and it is in that spirit that we will try to make this a significant meeting. Meantime, we ought to keep negotiating in the Geneva arms talks because perhaps they could make some progress.

49. Gorbachev ended the meeting by saying that he will think over what we have said and he hopes that we will think about what he has said. He hopes that we appreciate the utter frankness with which he conveyed his strong views. He said he has not given up his optimism and he looks forward to the meeting with the President and sends him his best regards.

Hartman

139. Personal Notes of Secretary of State Shultz¹

Moscow, undated

G Summary

1. Geneva meeting great importance²
2. against approach that says only for exchange, get acquainted, and agenda for future
3. not idealists or over simplify—much over years has piled up so one meeting can't solve all
4. also if only fact of meeting, that would be disappointment to all = was it necessary at all—another?
5. serve all if this meeting gives a number of political impetus to improvement
6. need realistic assessment of world developments—refers to earlier conversation and this is source of nourishment of USSR politics + need to build new international life
7. but we meet and we understand the weight and responsibilities in world situation
8. both of us need policies to meet worries and problems felt everywhere
9. recent policies take account
 - a. war and peace are at center of attention
 - b. people pre-occupied by arms race and stop threat of nuclear war
 - c. present everywhere is urge to develop better relations and peaceful coexistence

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Official Personal Notes of Secretary Shultz (10/01/1985–10/23/1985); NLR–775–23–61–1–8. No classification marking. These notes were transcribed by an unknown person in the Department of State from Shultz's handwritten notes of his November 5 meeting with Gorbachev. Shultz's handwritten notes are *ibid*.

² In his personal notes, Hill wrote: "R/O of S-Gorba 10–2. *Combative. Interrupting*, to the point that 'even some of my gems didn't get translated.'—Headline? STALEMATE ON EVE OF SUMMIT. S: 'What's wrong w/ that'" line is *I did my best boss, now it's up to you*.—Art [Hartman]: Gorba was posturing, showing how tough. Try to intimidate us. Everything linked to SDI. Nothing possible unless we give it up. Will start a new arms race, he said. Rather than offensive cuts, it will lead to Soviet off. buildup.—Gorba revealed *deep ideological* feeling and mind set. Also a void (McF term) of information & understanding about the U.S. with our feeling that much of it due to Doby's *slanted reporting*. (But sure don't need Doby to do that—all the info available here is utterly false. A universe of falseness. TO SUM UP VISIT—Shev refused to talk. Gorba sought to intimidate. S invited here in order to be frightened by Soviet approach." (Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, Entry for November 5, 1985; NLR–675–3–25–1–1). The editor transcribed the text from an entry in Hill's handwritten notebooks.

d. _____ in world are great problems of economic, ecological in all countries, especially developing world³

e. also now more interdependent than ever

—all this should be taken account of in our policies—USG and USSR

10. USSR has taken steps to meet these problems: war and peace, Europe, Asia, Africa

11. But US should also think about new approaches

12. R² in next three years should think ahead to stay in power

—now trying to make old look like new

—bring policies in line with realities of national interests

—problems around the world always blamed on Moscow = nonsense

—blames transnationals for debt

—points to Latin America and poverty

—US “robbing them”

—this will explode into a problem for everyone

—same in Africa and Asia

—restraint should be exercised and interests of each side’s interests into account

—but must support “internal independence” as a matter of principle

13. can move ahead on this based also solving human rights and divided families—exceptions involve State secrets

14. key question is approach to receiving security at lower level

—ready to work to go down to 2000

—with condition of preventing militarization of space = a barrier for both sides

15. should not regard such a decision as a “defeat” but rather would gain strength over the whole world

16. Geneva meeting = instructions to give on outer space

—technologies

—research fundamentals

—but not arms in outer space and creation of defense

—otherwise rethink everything

³ Blank underscore is in the original.

17. unproductive to try to persuade USSR of the usefulness of a space weapon = policy based on deep analysis and “we are not amateurs”—have deep knowledge of what is involved.

18. regional, bilateral, all others
—when we can consult and even act together

140. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, November 6, 1985, 1700Z

15988. For S/S Only. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting With Shevardnadze, November 5, 1985.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. This is uncleared memcon being cabled to you for clearance. Do not distribute outside S/S.

3. Place: Foreign Ministry Mansion

Date: November 5, 1985

Time: 3:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.

Participants:

Soviet Side: Foreign Minister Shevardnadze; First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko; Ambassador Dobrynin; Deputy Foreign Minister Komplektov; Chief MFA USA Division Bessmertnykh; Senior Assistant to Foreign Minister Chernyshev; Arms Control Negotiator Kvitsinsky; Deputy Chief MFA USA Division Tarasenko; Soviet Interpreter

American Side: Secretary Shultz; National Security Advisor McFarlane; Ambassador Hartman; Ambassador Nitze; Ambassador Ridgway; Ambassador Matlock; Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer; NSC Staffer Linhard; DCM Combs (Notetaker); Interpreter Hopkins

4. Shevardnadze opened the meeting by reading from a lengthy typewritten document. We believe, he said, that today’s meeting with

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² On November 5, Reagan wrote in his personal diary: “Geo. S. called from Moscow on scramble phone—6 more hours of talks—4 of them with Gorbachev. Apparently not much progress. Gorbachev is adamant we must cave in on S.D.I.—well this will be a case of an irresistible force meeting an unmovable object.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 536)

General Secretary Gorbachev was useful. We have reached the decisive stage in preparing for the summit, and there is no need for me to make a further statement about that. However, there are some specific issues that I would like to mention. Yesterday you set forth your views on many important issues in the area of national security. The most important of these deals with space strike weapons and nuclear weapons. The fact that you have presented us with a counter-proposal is viewed as a positive development. We do not as yet have a complete picture of your position. As we learn more about it, we hope your proposal will look better than it now does. Yesterday you must have realized that what you have said so far in Geneva has been disappointing to us. Our assessment rests upon fundamental principles which are absolutely unchanged. First we are negotiating on the basis of the clear mandate of January 8. We worked out a fair understanding, a formula whereby nuclear weapons would be reduced if the arms race in space were halted. This is not a theological argument. Playing with words will not change reality. As Gorbachev has made clear, it seems to us that the United States has designed a new way to continue the arms race and gain superiority over the Soviet Union.

5. We made a number of critical observations yesterday, Shevardnadze continued, and we will continue to discuss the inequality of your proposals. We are not interested in polemics. We want you to have a clear idea of our own position, which is to draw a line at banning space strike weapons. Beyond that line (i.e., if space weapons are not banned) nothing is possible. But by banning space strike weapons various compromises become possible. We believe the concept of strategic defense is fundamentally flawed. You propose to let the genie out of the bottle; then you will decide what to do about it. You argue that so long as there are no space arms, there is no need for a ban in this area. This is analogous to the situation with submarine launched cruise missiles: since they are not verifiable, they should have been banned prior to their development and deployment.

6. The second fundamental flaw in your thinking about space strike weapons stems from the fact that they are more offensive than defensive. In fact, they are another class of offensive weapons, and the militarization of space would have a highly destabilizing effect.

7. A third problem, Shevardnadze continued, stems from your claim that deployment of space strike weapons will make possible reduction of nuclear weapons. But space strike weapons cannot be tested under realistic circumstances. Can the United States base its entire defense upon an untested system? Would a future Secretary of State or National Security Advisor advise the President to scrap all nuclear weapons and rely upon an untested defensive system? It would be much better for the two sides to agree to have no space strike

weapons and then to commence immediately the elimination of nuclear weapons.

8. Shevardnadze said he would like to bring up another important aspect of the Soviet proposal, in the spirit of a realistic approach to the overall problem. The fifty percent radical reduction put forward by the Soviet Union is based upon defining strategic weapons as those capable of reaching the territory of the other side. This definition most fully embodies the principle of equal security. Given the existence of rough parity in nuclear weapons, the situation of the two countries is not equal. The Soviet Union faces a double threat: from weapons situated on the territory of the United States, and from U.S. forces located elsewhere. This question is vital to us: it is not a matter of theory. We would like the U.S. side to leave Moscow convinced that the Soviet leadership genuinely desires to eliminate nuclear weapons.

9. We are, of course, aware that the negotiation of an agreement in Geneva will take time. The Soviet side has put forward not only radical proposals involving space arms, but also a series of less sweeping measures. As yet we have received no response to them. The most important of these is our proposal to suspend all work on the testing, development and deployment of space strike arms. This would be accompanied by other steps to achieve stability and confidence. For example, while the United States proposes installing a new kind of telephone and raises other such secondary questions, the Soviet side offers to remove 200–300 ICBMs from alert status. There is no answer from you. There is no answer to our proposal to ban new types of nuclear weapons and to freeze existing nuclear weapons at current levels. We have also proposed a ban on deploying nuclear weapons in countries not presently possessing them, and on increasing the stocks of nuclear weapons in those countries which currently have them.

10. Shevardnadze said he wished to discuss the question of ASAT, a very important issue which remains on the agenda. The Soviet side views this both in the broad context of a ban on space strike weapons and as a specific arms control issue. The Soviet Union has made clear in formal negotiations and in bilateral contacts that it is prepared to resolve this question. We note that U.S. specialists say control over ASAT systems is necessary to protect space-based weapons. What is involved here is a test of the genuine intention of each side to abide by the January 8, 1985 undertaking not to allow the arms race to spread to outer space. We propose agreement on a separate accord for the complete banning—including testing, development and deployment—of such systems, as well as the elimination of existing systems. Until now we have not received a positive answer.

11. The next question, Shevardnadze said, involves nuclear testing. It has been three months since the Soviet Union announced its unilateral

moratorium on such testing, effective until January 1, 1986. This moratorium is still in force. If the United States follows our example, it can be extended beyond January 1. The United States has often said it favors in principle a complete ban on nuclear testing. Clearly, a mutual suspension of such testing would be a major step in this direction. The Soviet side is no less interested than the United States in strict compliance with a test ban. We both know such a ban can be verified. We have had adequate practical experience, on the basis of existing technical means, to be convinced of this. The U.S. administration still has time to ponder our position and take the right decision.

12. The Soviet side has repeatedly raised the issue of radars in Greenland and the United Kingdom. U.S. explanations that these radars are only being modernized is entirely unconvincing. This is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. There is not enough time today to discuss fully U.S. concern about the Krasnoyarsk radar, which is designed to track space objects. The U.S. side was the first to suggest informally a way to resolve this issue. The Soviet Union, pondering this opportunity, proposed removal of this irritant to our bilateral relations by an agreement to stop construction on all three radars. We are trying to understand why the United States is not interested in this proposal. I will not name the persons responsible for this. Those here at the table know who they are. Perhaps these persons are interested in preserving the irritant rather than eliminating it.

13. You raised the question of chemical weapons, Shevardnadze said. We favor inclusion of this problem in our final document. But if one is interested in eliminating this inhumane weapon, then one should not propose production of a new type of chemical weapon—and I refer here to binary weapons. It seems to us artificial to raise the issue of chemical weapons in the context of the Iran/Iraq conflict. Our efforts are better directed at working out an international convention prohibiting chemical weapons. It is not possible for us to accomplish anything regarding the use of chemical weapons in the Iran/Iraq conflict.

14. Shevardnadze next wanted to say several words about the impermissibility of nuclear war. This was particularly important for any general statement regarding the international responsibility of our two countries. A statement on this issue would show that our respective leaders were concerned to eliminate the threat of war and to establish a more stable foundation for our bilateral relations. The language on this issue we have conveyed to the U.S. side takes into account statements by President Reagan. Such language could be put into a separate document or be made part of an overall document in connection with the Geneva summit.

15. On regional issues, said Shevardnadze, you have spoken broadly about geographical regions and about the bilateral consulta-

tions we have conducted. You have spoken favorably about continuing these. I believe we could make a general statement on this matter, and I understand our experts did some work on this last night. It would hardly be possible to produce a joint statement on individual regions. The Soviet side favors political settlements in every part of the world; we also favor continuing these consultations on a more systematic basis.

16. Shevardnadze then turned to bilateral questions. We are near agreement on a number of issues, he said. While only final steps remain, we understand that such steps are often the most difficult. However, we have had to conclude that in certain respects the U.S. position on these issues has of late hardened. The Soviet negotiating groups—and I say this with all responsibility—have been instructed to conduct businesslike discussion of these issues. Regarding North Pacific air safety, in its most recent discussions with us the United States has gone beyond the framework of the July 29, 1985 memorandum.³ In effect, we see a plan to place responsibility on the Soviet Union for insuring the safety of the entire Pacific Ocean international air corridor, even though Soviet civilian aircraft do not use this corridor. No specific decisions have been reached on civil air negotiations, and you seem to want to place us in a disadvantageous position. These talks resumed on November 4. It would be good to finish them before the Geneva meeting.

17. Yesterday you spoke about an exchanges agreement. The text of that agreement is in principle agreed. The document could be prepared for final signature if the U.S. were not insisting upon inclusion of a new issue, namely, access to television. This would be contrary to standard practice in the United States as well as in the Soviet Union. The United States is also interested in the number of exhibits and such issues as the number of cities. There is now no misunderstanding on these matters, provided, of course, the United States withdraws its position on television. Should this happen, the text could be prepared for signature. In any case, this does not appear to be an important question of principle.

18. On consulates we are prepared to receive a U.S. group which would go to Kiev to look at the properties earlier chosen by the U.S. side for the consulate office and for staff housing. We are also prepared to show the U.S. group certain additional options—and such options do exist. The Soviet side intends to send a similar group to New York. Following these visits we could meet to discuss and resolve all questions concerning the Kiev and New York consulates. This should be done promptly.

³ See footnote 9, Document 122.

19. The United States has recently proposed an expansion of bilateral exchanges in various fields. We can now say that relevant Soviet agencies have been instructed to look carefully at these proposals. Some deserve attention, others require further study and examination. Our agencies will provide their views at an early date; we will be in touch with you through our embassies after we have given this matter appropriate study.

20. Shevardnadze next turned to the issue of the agenda for Geneva. The basic issues are clear, he said. The agenda items and their sequence have largely been determined and, of course, our leaders will be free to raise any issue they wish. You have provided your ideas on the sequence of topics for discussion at Geneva. A preliminary agenda would, in our view, be as follows:

- November 19 morning—tete-a-tete, general discussion of current and future U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations in their global setting.

- November 19 afternoon—questions of space arms and nuclear weapons, plus other disarmament issues as time allows.

- November 20 morning—remaining disarmament issues, regional and bilateral issues as time allows.

- November 20 afternoon—continuation of bilateral relations; discussion of the future agenda, including instructions to our Geneva arms control delegations; and agreement regarding future meetings.

- November 21—possible joint press conference; possible signature of documents; private meeting for final exchange of views.

This is how we see the structure of the overall summit, Shevardnadze said. We would welcome your thoughts, but we believe this agenda would achieve the maximum results eagerly awaited by our two peoples as well as the world at large.

21. The Secretary said he would like to comment on the proposed agenda as well as on some of the other matters Shevardnadze had raised. We agree on the subjects to be covered in Geneva and on the order in which they are raised. We caution, however, against the danger of spending so much time on arms control that no time is left for other issues. We therefore think an effort should be made to conclude the discussion of arms control on November 19, as the Soviet side had just indicated. We understand that the November 20 meeting will be at your Mission. Protocol would have it that the visitor is invited to speak first. So, while agreeing to your listing of topics, I have one reservation. The President might wish to comment on regional issues at the beginning of his November 20 morning presentation. At the same time, we do want to see that all arms control issues are adequately covered. We agree with your description of November 21. Let's leave that day's agenda open for now.

22. Regarding a joint document, or communique, we have both worked at this. We have discussed a list of topics and some of their content. When you first suggested a document, we agreed it could be worthwhile, if we could produce one with genuine substance to it. On the basis of the experts meeting last night, plus your comments today, I would say it is not yet clear whether we can find the necessary content to justify such a document. We could go either way—either an overall document that is justifiable in terms of its content, or perhaps several individual items that could be read or signed. We don't think it would be particularly useful to produce a document which focused on areas about which we could not agree. What we are prepared to do—and we trust you to join us in this—is to energize our negotiators to complete their work if possible. On certain issues like terrorism we have provided you with draft language. Our Ambassador is here and will be prepared to receive your comments.

23. We have listed 26 topics that might be included in a final document, the Secretary continued. Based upon the small working session last night, we judge that four of these are agreed or likely to be agreed, 17 perhaps could be agreed, and five are unlikely to be agreed. It is worth noting that these 26 issues have different time horizons. At one end of the spectrum is the question of ship visits. The Soviet side has suggested reciprocal visits, we agreed and now the Soviet side seems to have second thoughts. But there is no particular timing issue associated with this topic; it can be agreed without delay. At the other end of the spectrum is your proposal for a joint project on nuclear fusion. We are interested in this idea but considerable time will be needed before it can be profitably considered by our two leaders. In short, we need a rational plan of work that takes into consideration the time required to work out these various issues.

24. I can pledge this, the Secretary said. Our team here at the table, as well as others who are not present, will be prepared to work to the maximum to prepare this very important meeting as well as is possible in the time remaining. We should consider each of these 26 topics to see what we can piece together into an overall concept. We have exchanged draft documents, and we will certainly give your documents careful consideration. Ambassador Hartman will be here continuously until he departs for the Geneva meeting. I will be available at any time. Ambassador Ridgway and her staff as well as Bud McFarlane and Paul Nitze will also be engaged. So we'll all be working on it. Our approach will be to work out problems, not debate them. We will concentrate on those areas which promise a specific result.

25. The Secretary said that Mr. McFarlane and he worked for the President as a very close team. The Secretary would ask Mr. McFarlane if he would like to comment at this point. Mr. McFarlane said the

general conclusion he would draw from our exchanges would be that the gap remains very broad in our respective understanding of fundamental as well as specific bilateral issues. Perhaps this was a consequence of the lengthy period that has transpired since the last U.S.-Soviet summit. If so, there is all the more reason for the upcoming meeting to be held. It is also possible that we have been too ambitious. Perhaps this new beginning does not lend itself to agreements in specific areas. There is no point, however, in regarding the glass as one-half empty. We remain, as President Reagan surely does, hopeful, that we are at the beginning of a new effort at problem-solving. We have come to Moscow in that spirit. We leave in that spirit and we all look forward to the Geneva meeting.

26. The Secretary said with a smile that (given the lateness of the hour) Ambassador Hartman and Ambassador Nitze—who is the wisest and most experienced person on our team—have nothing to add to the discussion. Ambassador Nitze said he did want to make one point. The Soviet side had earlier suggested that SLCM's did not exist prior to discussion of them at the negotiating table. In fact they were tested much earlier, abandoned by the United States, but developed and indeed supplied to many countries by the Soviet Union.

27. Shevardnadze said he would like to add a few words. Of course the agenda at Geneva will depend upon our two leaders. Secretary Shultz is right to say that we do not need a document reflecting our differences. It would not be worthwhile, and it would be too long. Despite all disagreements and differences, our two drafts provide a basis for work, and that work should continue. Individual proposals are important, but one cannot avoid general principles and provisions. One such general principle is the January 9, 1985 Geneva undertaking which provides a mandate for the Geneva arms talks. It illustrates the Soviet side's understanding of the relationship between general guidelines and specific proposals. We agree that our two sides have much serious work to do in fashioning a summit document. The Soviet side is prepared to cooperate to this end actively and constructively.

28. Gorbachev pointed out earlier today that we were optimists regarding the outcome of the summit, Shevardnadze continued. Our government and our people have great hopes for this meeting. The Soviet Government and its leaders are very serious in their approach to it. Our exchanges have been frank and have amounted to an important stage in summit preparation. I agree with Mr. McFarlane that many difficulties and problems remain before us but if this were not the case, a summit would not be necessary. And so, in the time remaining we must do our utmost to prepare our leaders for a successful meeting. We understand that after Geneva we will have numerous occasions to meet and to exchange views.

29. Shevardnadze added that he wanted to take this occasion to thank Secretary Shultz for the warm hospitality the Secretary provided during Shevardnadze's recent visit to the United States. This was highly valued. (At this point for the third or fourth time waiters appeared with large trays of coffee and tea; Shevardnadze looked at them with a weary smile and said "please give that liquid to somebody else.")

30. The Secretary said he appreciated Shevardnadze's comments. He wanted to clarify his own comments about differences being reflected at the summit. We would have no objection to reflecting some differences—this would probably add to the credibility of the meeting. Yet it would not be good if only differences were registered there. The Foreign Minister spoke of our forthcoming agenda items as guidelines, citing the example of the January 1985 NST understanding. This could be a promising approach, and perhaps we can supply new guidelines at the forthcoming meeting.

31. The Secretary noted that he would be meeting American newsmen shortly and did not intend to provide them with details of the discussion.⁴ He would propose to say, as Shevardnadze himself had said, that the current visit marked an important stage in preparing for the Geneva meeting; that the discussions were frank; that we had identified our respective positions and had encountered some serious differences, which of course provided one basic reason for a summit meeting. The Secretary would say that the two sides both hoped for a successful meeting in Geneva and pledged to work to that end.

32. Shevardnadze commented that how the Secretary characterized the visit to the press was certainly up to the Secretary. Perhaps the terms "useful" and "productive" could also be employed, as General Secretary Gorbachev had done, but again that was up to the Secretary. It might also be said that we were at an important and decisive stage in preparing for the summit and we approached all of the matters under discussion in that light.

Hartman

⁴ Shultz held a news conference in Moscow on November 5; see the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 1986, pp. 57–60.

141. Draft National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 11–18–85

Washington, undated

Domestic Stresses on the Soviet System

KEY JUDGMENTS

The Gorbachev regime faces a complex of social maladies rooted in economic stagnation and the decline of the Soviet political system's capacity to motivate constructive behavior in the elite, the work force, and the population at large. Alleviating or at least stabilizing these maladies in the context of accelerated economic growth and revitalization of the ruling elite is clearly the top priority and the most difficult challenge now facing the new Soviet leadership. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The Soviet political system will not confront a serious challenge to central control, nor is the economy in danger of collapse, during the next five years or for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the highly interconnected domestic problems of the USSR, embracing almost all areas of Soviet life, present major obstacles to the economic growth and technological modernization goals of the regime, the attainment of which is vital to the alleviation of the problems themselves. Our overall assessment is that Gorbachev will not make significant progress in improving the welfare and general social state of the USSR during the next five years. [*portion marking not declassified*]

¹ Source: Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, Subject File, U.S.-Soviet Union (21); NLR-324-10-21-2-5. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. In a November 6 covering memorandum to McFarlane, Gates explained: "1. The DCI has instructed that I make available to you the *uncoordinated draft* of the forthcoming National Intelligence Estimate 11-18-85, 'Domestic Stresses on the Soviet System,' so that its themes can be of use in preparations for the meeting between the President and Gorbachev." He continued: "2. Please be reminded that this draft does *not* represent coordinated national intelligence. So far it is only the product of the National Intelligence Officer/USSR and select analysts of CIA/SOVA. Since we have not previously tackled this range of internal Soviet problems, it is more than usually difficult to anticipate final agency positions. I anticipate that some will take the position that this draft exaggerates the depth of Soviet internal difficulties and their constraining impact on Soviet foreign and military behavior. Others may feel that these Soviet problems make it more likely than this draft judges that the Gorbachev regime will compromise on security issues to achieve a relaxed and predictable course for East-West relations. Nevertheless, while dissents may be vigorous, I doubt they will be radically at variance with this draft." The final version of NIE 11-18-85, "Domestic Stresses on the Soviet System," dated November 13, is available in the Electronic Reading Room of the CIA FOIA website. A copy is in the Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. The draft NIE's "Key Judgments" section was rewritten for the final version; however, the content and message remain similar. The "Discussion" section of the draft and final NIE are almost identical.

System-wide internal problems became particularly acute in the late 1970s and early 1980s, although most have been abuilding for many years:

—Protected by Brezhnev's relatively passive policies and solicitude, the ruling elite became stagnant, cynical, corrupt, and ineffective in driving the economy and governing the society. It also became demoralized by paralysis at the top from Brezhnev's last years through Chernenko. *[portion marking not declassified]*

—The stagnating economy of the late 1970s brought consumption growth to a virtual standstill. The production morale of an already poorly motivated work force turned down as a result. The quality of life for most ordinary Soviets stagnated after years of steady improvement, and actually deteriorated in some areas. The early 1980s saw a food crisis and some rationing. Health standards have continued a long-term decline, with adverse demographic effects on the pinched labor force. *[portion marking not declassified]*

—Rampant materialism and escape from social responsibility into private pursuit of often illegal gain spread throughout the elite and the population. Respect for positive social values and even the authority of the party suffered. Under lax central leadership, subcultures of corruption and private activity proliferated, tending to escape any real control. Ideology further lost its grip on leaders and led alike. *[portion marking not declassified]*

—Specific social pathologies increased, among them alcoholism, drug use, crime, and family instability. *[portion marking not declassified]*

—Although the regime effectively suppressed dissident activity during this period, dissenting attitudes in the population and some elites appear to have expanded; the most vivid have been anti-Russian nationalism, adherence to religion, and general alienation from the system, especially by youth. Our evidence indicates that the incidence of strikes and other spontaneous protesting activity increased during the 1970s and early 1980s. *[portion marking not declassified]*

—Information from and about foreign societies and about events abroad, especially in Poland, contributed to the disgruntlement of the Soviet people. *[portion marking not declassified]*

These phenomena represented a steady decay of the implicit social contract of the Soviet system in which the regime provides a modicum of welfare and security in return for obedience and a modicum of work from the population sufficient to sustain growth. *[portion marking not declassified]*

Especially under the influence of Polish developments, the top Soviet leadership became increasingly alarmed from the late 1970s on. The Brezhnev regime took little or only half-hearted action to stem adverse social and economic trends, resting hope in the power of exhortation and fearing the destabilizing effects on the elite of bold action. Andropov set the tone for a more activist policy line. He began leadership cadre renewal and a social discipline campaign, especially against elite corruption, which persisted somewhat under Chernenko and

emerged as the launching points for Gorbachev when he became General Secretary. [*portion marking not declassified*]

By consolidating his personal power rapidly, continuing the replacement of aging and incompetent leaders, and punctuating the discipline campaign with draconian measures against alcohol abuse, Gorbachev has revived a degree of optimism and self-confidence in the Soviet ruling establishment, and some hope for the future in the Soviet population. He has begun to define an economic revival strategy that initially rests a great deal on “human factors” to boost productivity, i.e., increased labor discipline and more competent, demanding management. He intends to sustain future growth by a sharp acceleration of technological modernization in industry, underwritten by a shift of investment emphasis into machinebuilding. He promises to achieve further progress by reforming economic management in ways—yet to be specified—that make central planning more effective and give more room for much needed enterprise initiative. [*portion marking not declassified*]

We expect Gorbachev’s domestic policies for the next several years to be relatively cautious and conservative. He will not go very far in adopting market mechanisms for the economy or in legalizing private activity. Beyond disciplinary measures, he will concentrate on streamlining central planning and accelerating technology advance in industry through centralized levers. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Although we believe it likely that Gorbachev can achieve improved growth rates over the next five years (2.5–3.0 per cent per annum), he will probably fall short of his announced aims (4.0–5.0 per cent). Consumption levels overall will probably remain virtually stagnant, and the economy faces a number of crisis-prone prospects, such as a turndown in oil production and the perennial vagaries of weather in agriculture.² For economic reasons as well as the fact that many of the USSR’s social problems are caused by the repressive nature of the system itself, the prospect that social stresses within the Soviet system can be significantly alleviated in the next five years is not good. In some respects Gorbachev’s policies are likely to increase, not decrease, social stresses: [*portion marking not declassified*]

—Cadre renewal policies will produce unfamiliar insecurity and turbulence in the elite. This will probably incite political opposition to Gorbachev’s programs. [*portion marking not declassified*]

—Increased labor discipline and other measures to increase productivity, without immediate material returns for the population at large, are likely to produce disappointments following the recent upswing

² An unknown hand underlined “perennial vagaries of weather in agriculture” and wrote an exclamation mark in the left-hand margin.

in popular expectations. Wage differentiation and, more generally, policies that reward strong performers and penalize the weak will increase tensions in the Soviet working class. [*portion marking not declassified*]

—As the regime experiments with new policy lines, however cautiously, elements of the intelligentsia are likely to press the uncertain boundaries of permissiveness and engender unfamiliar political disputes. [*portion marking not declassified*]

We believe dissenting attitudes in the Soviet population, particularly anti-Russian nationalism and religion, are likely to increase. We also expect episodic strikes and other forms of worker protest to continue, although the regime is likely to be able to keep them from being prolonged or combining into nationwide disorder. [*portion marking not declassified*]

Soviet internal problems do not make the USSR other than a powerful international actor seeking to aggrandize its power at the expense of the West and through control over others. But they do pose constraints on ideological appeal, military modernization, and diplomatic flexibility that might open Soviet society to foreign influences. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The immediate impact of these problems on Soviet foreign policy has been to set the Gorbachev regime in quest of a low or no-cost restoration of a detente atmosphere in East-West relations.³ This would allow him to balance his growth strategy with modest defense increases and stable consumption in a predictable environment while improving access to Western technology and giving up nothing in Soviet aspirations to expanded influence in the Third World. [*portion marking not declassified*]

The essential dilemma of the Soviet system is that it tends by its nature toward stagnation, while it depends on growth which requires technological and social modernization, which in turn require systemic liberalization. But liberalization cannot be undertaken without endangering system stability. [*portion marking not declassified*]

How well the Soviet leadership will manage this dilemma in the long term is unclear to us and to the Soviets themselves. The inadequacy of palliative measures of the sort we expect to be taken in the near future will raise the pressure for further experiments in liberalization, could precipitate reversion to repressive measures to contain the effects,

³ In the final version of the NIE (see footnote 1, above), a footnote provided a dissenting view on Gorbachev's reforms, stating: "There is an alternative view—held by the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force—which holds that the Gorbachev regime regards the advancement of its foreign and strategic goals as the primary determinant of, and motivating factor behind, Soviet behavior in the international arena, not Soviet internal problems." (NIE 11–18–85, Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files)

and gradually increase the tension between social aspirations and regime control. We cannot foresee the time, but we can see the tendency for this tension eventually to confront the regime with challenges to its political control that it cannot effectively contain. [*portion marking not declassified*]

[Omitted here is the Discussion portion of the NIE.]

142. Memorandum From Peter Sommer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, November 12, 1985

SUBJECT

SWM Breakfast, Wednesday, November 13: Meeting with Gorbachev²

My understanding is that tomorrow's weekly breakfast agenda will have only one topic: the President's meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev. Defense reportedly has asked that Geneva be the sole topic because of a general feeling that they have been left out of the non-arms control side of the process. Thus, my further understanding is that Secretary Weinberger does not plan on raising any specific arms control items. As you know, tomorrow's NSC meeting will also cover the non-arms control aspects of the Geneva agenda.

State is well aware of Defense's complaints and is positioning Secretary Shultz to take the lead in going over in detail all aspects of the Geneva meeting. In blunt terms, State sees tomorrow's breakfast as a hand-holding session.

The two items that apparently have caused Defense specific heart-burn are the nuclear fusion reactor project and certain aspects of the U.S.-Soviet exchange agreement. In both instances, I am told that Defense's problem is technology transfer. However, I understand that any relevant exchanges would have to be approved by the Technology Transfer Committee.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Tyrus Cobb Files, Country File, USSR 1985 (12); NLR-98-5-20-7-9. Secret. Sent for action. Matlock, Linhard, and Cobb concurred, with Sommer initialing for Matlock and Linhard. An unknown hand wrote "Copy for Ty" in the upper right-hand corner.

² SWM: Shultz, Weinberger, McFarlane.

Beyond these points, the overall subject of a joint communique is a sore point with Defense.³ This is basically because Defense did not see the original draft communique language before it was handed to the Soviets. Defense also reportedly believes that the current communique language is vague in a way that papers over differences. Furthermore, Defense is convinced, despite assurances to the contrary, that State is continuing to work with the Soviets on a joint communique. I do not believe that Defense is aware that the Soviets have provided us a revised draft communique.

I believe you are aware that all the specific arms control questions, to include not only NST but also CDE, MBFR, and CW, are all being worked in the arms control support group, with Defense participation.

Recommendation

That you draw on the above for tomorrow's breakfast.⁴

³ In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "The mere thought of a joint communiqué with the Soviets alarmed Cap Weinberger and others in the Defense Department. They were driving Bud McFarlane wild with charges that he had to 'stop Shultz' from doing any such thing." He continued: "The president did not like the acrimony and decided that we should put 'on hold' efforts with the Soviets to develop what they described as a possible joint communiqué. But he did agree with me on the importance of developing language for what we called an 'agreed statement' privately so that I would have some ideas and language 'in my pocket' should we have the opportunity for something constructive in Geneva. We would just skip over this interagency squabbling." Of the breakfast with Weinberger, Shultz wrote: "On November 13, I went over to the Defense Department for breakfast with Cap. I reviewed for him the twenty-six items that we planned to take up with the Soviets. I was on top of my brief and felt confident. The breakfast went well, to my surprise." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 596–597) A list of 26 issues for discussion in Geneva is in Shultz's preparatory materials for a November 6 meeting with Reagan. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary's Meetings with Shevardnadze (09/24/1987) (2); NLR-775-21-40-1-3)

⁴ McFarlane did not approve or disapprove the recommendation

143. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 12, 1985

SUBJECT

What to Expect from Gorbachev in Geneva

My meeting last week in the Kremlin with Gorbachev provided us with our most detailed look yet at the new Soviet leader.² I was struck in our conversation by the curious blend of new and old in Gorbachev. He displayed the intellectual quickness and articulate debating skill which have impressed other western leaders. At the same time he showed us the blunt, sometimes browbeating style characteristic of so many of the older generation of Soviet leaders.

Substantively, he trotted out many of the old Soviet negotiating ploys and fell back repeatedly on many of the old stereotypes about the United States which we heard so often from the older leaders. While some of this undoubtedly represented a tactical approach to put me on the defensive, there is no question that Gorbachev and his younger colleagues really share much of this old "collective wisdom." It is also clear that however much Gorbachev represents the "new Soviet man," he and his colleagues are not about to squander the legacy of Soviet power and influence bequeathed to them by Brezhnev, Andropov and the old guard. The question is whether they are ready to deal with us on the basis of real equality.

Since Gorbachev will undoubtedly put forward many of these same points in your conversations in Geneva, I have had my Soviet experts examine parts of our conversation to give you a flavor of what to expect. They have extracted key statements Gorbachev made to me and prepared points which you might draw on in responding to Gorbachev. In every case, I think the best response is to rebut his point forcefully and then reiterate our concrete proposals for addressing the

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron November 1985 (4/10). Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. According to an undated action memorandum from Ridgway to Shultz, under which Ridgway sent Shultz a copy, it was drafted by Burton and Tefft; cleared by Parris and Palmer. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 Soviet Union November) McFarlane forwarded the memorandum to Reagan on November 14. Reagan wrote on the covering memorandum: "I kept the memo to take with me. RR." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron November 1985 (5/10))

² See Document 138.

problem in question. If Gorbachev rejects our ideas, you should press him to put forward a practical means of resolving our differences.

NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS/OLD U.S. PROPOSALS

Gorbachev Statements

Our side has tried to signal a desire to improve relations and the only response we get from you is that you call this “propaganda.” If we do something and make suggestions, you say it is propaganda and we are weak. If we don’t, you say we are intransigent.

The Administration is sticking with old positions. This will not lead to an improvement in Soviet-American relations on the basic issues. . . . The U.S. should think of making new proposals and not sticking with old policies. You should understand that the Republican Administration can’t leave office with only old proposals. You can’t continue to wrap these up as if they were new.

Analysis

It is a standard Soviet negotiating tactic to disparage U.S. arms control ideas as nothing new. At the same time they will repeatedly call on the U.S. to explore the so-called “new ideas” embodied in their proposals when there is in fact little if anything novel. The approach is designed to put pressure on the U.S. to come forward with further concessions, before the Soviets reveal any further compromises. The best way to get beyond such a semantic debate is to call a spade a spade and agree to probe those elements in which both sides have some interest.

Response

—There’s some question about just how “new” your proposals are; for example, Soviet calls for a moratorium on nuclear testing have been around for years. Back in the 1960s, we accepted one of those proposals, and you took advantage of it to prepare the ground for the most concentrated nuclear test series in history.

—I have to be candid. A lot of your proposals look pretty empty to us. We cannot accept declarations of benign intent or calls for freezes which give you unilateral advantages.

—You and I should get beyond these declarations and secondary matters, and get to work on the heart of the problem—deep reductions in real systems that are dangerous to stability.

—When we have found positive elements in your proposals, we have said so. I stated in my UN speech last month that we found seeds worth nurturing in your Geneva counterproposal.³ We responded

³ See footnote 3, Document 85.

within a month. Have you said anything similar about *our* latest offer? When will we see a new move from you?

—And as for new ideas, we're still waiting for a positive response from you on the many ideas we've put forward in arms control and other areas—to name a few, confidence-building measures, people-to-people exchanges, resolution of regional conflicts, human rights.

—We don't expect you to take all of these ideas as proposed, but we do expect a fair hearing and a constructive response.

SALT II AND THE DECLINE OF DETENTE

Gorbachev Statement

We know full well that SALT II had been buried and was long dead before the events of Afghanistan. . . . There was a process at work in U.S. society, a deep distrust. The SALT II Treaty was buried because scientific achievements had come along which required that the U.S. drop the restraints in the Treaty . . . the invasion of Afghanistan was used as the excuse. . . . The Administration should not be so tied to the military-industrial complex, which just chews up money and programs by the billions. . . . The Soviet Union wishes to know the desires of the Reagan Administration: does it wish to improve relations . . . or complete its eight years in office with no change and therefore not disappoint the military-industrial complex.

Analysis

At several points in the meeting Gorbachev referred to the influence of the political right in the Republican party. He cited what he called the Administration's ties to the military-industrial complex and its support for American military superiority over the Soviet Union. Like other Soviet leaders he took pride in what he saw as his insight into our political life. To demonstrate his "knowledge" of the U.S. political scene, for example, Gorbachev cited the Hoover Institute study "America in the Eighties" whose conservative defense and social programs he alleged have been totally adopted by the Administration.⁴ In fact, Gorbachev's knowledge, undoubtedly based on material from Ambassador Dobrynin, reflected a shallow perception of the dynamic of American politics. You will want in your comments about your domestic agenda to give Gorbachev a more sophisticated appreciation of our political process.

Response

—As you acknowledged to Secretary Shultz, both our countries have sectors of society that are concerned with national defense. They

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 138.

push us in that direction. Within limits, I welcome their concern with our national security. In any case, that's a fact of life.

—But to say these sectors are the arbiters of public views toward the Soviet Union is far off the mark. The American people have no animosity towards the Soviet people. They want nothing more than peaceful relations with your country, and relief from the defense burden. They have no desire for endless confrontation and competition.

—But they also have a deep-seated mistrust of the Soviet government's objectives and purposes—and that's the result of Soviet actions, not plots by American defense contractors or political currents.

—The fact is, we hoped detente would bring about a new period of restraint on your part. It did not.

—Beginning in the mid-1970s, we saw a string of Soviet military interventions in the Third World. You kept building up your military forces against the U.S. and our Allies. It was these events, not defense contractors or American political factions, that damaged our relations.

—Everything that caused so much harm to our relations in the 1970s is still happening. You are still building up your nuclear arms. You or your allies are still engaged in the conflicts of the 1970s.

—You and I have an opportunity to make a new start. Frankly, that's going to require some very concrete steps on your part. We're willing to do our share.

—I have made specific proposals to deal with all these problems. If you don't like them, I'd be glad to hear some fresh, concrete thinking from you.

SOVIET RESPONSE TO SDI

Gorbachev Statement

If you want superiority through your SDI, we will not help you. We will let you bankrupt yourselves. But we also will not reduce our offensive missiles. We will engage in a build-up that will break your shield. We don't want war, but neither are we going to allow unilateral advantage. Therefore, we will increase nuclear arms. But we are patient and we still have hope.

Analysis

Stopping the SDI program was Gorbachev's primary theme in his conversation in Moscow. At several points during the conversation he attacked your recent decision on ABM reinterpretation. He and his colleagues are undoubtedly motivated by fear of U.S. technological capability and by the threat they perceive SDI eventually posing to the massive Soviet offensive strategic arsenal assembled at great cost during the 1970's and 1980's. Your meeting provides an opportunity to explain the potential benefits of SDI, if it proves feasible, and to determine where Gorbachev draws his bottom line on strategic defense.

Response

—You are very aware of political developments in the U.S. and Europe, so you should know that SDI has strong public support, not just in my country but in others as well.

—The reason it has this support is that people believe, as do I, that if there is a better way to preserve peace and maintain security than by making each other nuclear hostages, we have a duty to look into it.

—It's hard to understand why you object so strenuously to our research program, when you know very well that you are doing the same kind of research, and when you have long placed a very high military premium on strategic defense.

—There is nothing obscure about our research program and our objectives. Both have been well publicized. It's a different case with the Soviet strategic defense program. You have acknowledged that the Soviet Union is also engaged in fundamental research. But what are your objectives? What do you plan to do with the knowledge gained?

—We have made no secret of the potential difficulties of a transition to greater reliance on defenses. We have tried hard to engage you on this in Geneva. Let me ask you what you plan to do if your own research proves that you can develop and deploy an effective strategic defense. Are you planning to discuss a joint, cooperative transition with us?

—In the last analysis, we have an historic opportunity here; a chance to get a grip on the technology at an early date and see if we can turn it to the task of securing peace and stability. That's going to require hard thinking by both our countries. We're willing to engage in this process. What about you?

*U.S. ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION**Gorbachev Statement*

Gorbachev said that the U.S. was full of illusions. First, that the U.S. believed the Soviet Union was less economically powerful and therefore would be weakened by an arms race. Second, that the U.S. had higher technology and, therefore, the SDI would give the U.S. superiority over the Soviet Union in weapons. Third, the Soviet Union was more interested in negotiations in Geneva than the U.S. These are all illusions . . . the U.S. apparently fails to draw lessons from history.

Analysis

It was ironic that Gorbachev lectured me on our illusions about the Soviet Union even as he reiterated many standard old Soviet misconceptions about the United States. His comments reflected a standard Soviet view that no one understands the security threat which is posed by adversaries on every side. As you have said, one of the benefits of

your meeting with Gorbachev will be the opportunity to air the suspicions and misconceptions which have arisen between our two countries over the years. You will want to recognize legitimate Soviet security concerns, but insist that Gorbachev must take into account the concerns of the U.S. and our allies.

Response

—I have no doubts that you or any other Soviet leader will take the steps necessary to assure your security, whatever the cost. You can be assured that I, and my successors, will do what's necessary for the defense of America and its allies.

—We're not trying to bankrupt you. I have never considered that an option.

—We are proud of our technological prowess, but we know full well that the Soviet Union has a formidable ability to produce advanced arms. Indeed, that's one of the major causes of tension between us—from our standpoint, you produce many powerful weapons that far exceed legitimate needs.

—If all we wanted to do was bleed you in arms race, we wouldn't be negotiating in Geneva and elsewhere to lower force levels.

—We're not seeking unilateral advantage in these talks, but rather equality. We see fair agreements as profiting both sides, not just one partner.

THE SOVIETS AND THE THIRD WORLD

Gorbachev Statement

Because of our belief in our principles, we will continue to support national liberation movements. The U.S. wants us to give up but we cannot. It is a matter of principle with us. You on the other hand should give up your illusions and then we can move along together even on such questions as human rights.

Analysis

The Soviets make much of the clause in their constitution calling for support for national liberation movements. They use it to justify ideologically and pragmatically their activities in the Third World. While we do not deny the Soviets legitimate interests in the developing world—we would like them to provide their share of economic aid—they cannot use “their principled position” to justify intervention in the affairs of less developed countries or the use of force in unstable Third World regions. This issue goes to the heart of American disillusionment with the Soviet policy of detente, which attempted to exclude Soviet activities in the Third World from its legitimate place in our overall relationship.

Response

—We don't accept your claim to a right either to intervene in the affairs of others or to use force to impose your system on others.

—We don't have any obligation to accept or respect what you claim is a constitutional right to foist wars of national liberation on other peoples.

—Your efforts to carry out your so-called principles have cost thousands of lives, driven millions of people into refugee camps, and wrecked the economies of the countries involved.

—No other factor has done more to make the American people deeply suspicious of your ultimate objectives and worried about their own security. I can tell you that so long as you operationalize this "right" or "duty", there will never be "normal" relations between our two peoples in any meaningful sense.

—We are not going to sit by idly. Our sympathies lie with peoples who are fighting for genuine self-determination. They are the real movements of national liberation. We are going to help them.

—But I want to stress this is not the way we prefer to go. It is not the way to reduce tensions between us.

—The question is, how do the U.S. and Soviet Union go about correcting the situation?

—I gave you my ideas about how we can clear up the five most pressing active conflicts. I've gotten no positive reaction from you, which is disappointing.

—Perhaps you have your own ideas; if so, I'd be glad to hear them.

—But if you don't have any fresh thoughts of your own, you should reconsider what I offered in New York.

U.S. SEEKING MILITARY SUPERIORITY

Gorbachev Statement

Does the United States consider that its present policies of force—exercising pressure, strength—that these policies have brought the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table? If that is the type of thinking which seems to motivate people who surround the President, then no success is possible.

Analysis

The Soviets continually attack us for seeking military superiority. At the same time they insist that our relationship must be based on the principles of "equality and equal security." It is wrong in their view for the U.S. to seek any form of military advantage, but they reserve the right to maintain military force equivalent to that of all their adversaries put together. The question of what constitutes genuine

equality in military forces goes to the heart of your discussions with Gorbachev on the geopolitical balance. It affects not only the NST negotiations in Geneva but other arms control negotiations such as MBFR and CDE. You will want to put our views on this core issue on the record forcefully early in your meeting with Gorbachev.

Response

—Whenever I hear these kinds of complaints, I’m reminded of the story told to me by an American who was once in your country.

—The American was watching your annual military parade. As the missiles and tanks rolled by, a Soviet woman turned to her, after realizing there was an American present, and said, “There, you see how much we want peace!”

—That woman recognized that strength *is* a necessary ingredient of peace. Anyone familiar with your media, or who followed your treatment of this year’s 40th anniversary of the end of World War II, knows that in the Soviet Union this principle is axiomatic.⁵ That’s no less true for the United States than it is for the Soviet Union.

—We think you’ve been trying to establish nuclear superiority for years. Now you say we are trying to get the edge. The question is what you and I are going to do about this situation.

—I have said many times that we do not seek military superiority. We *do* want a stable balance of forces at radically lower levels. That’s what we’ve been trying to negotiate with you for years.

—Our experience is that negotiations work only when both sides have incentives to reach an agreement, and that means that one side cannot outweigh the other.

—More important, the ultimate objective must be equality; anything less will be inherently unstable.

—Look at our negotiating proposals and you’ll see that when we propose limits on Soviet systems, we put our own comparable systems on the table as well. Can you say that about the Soviet negotiating positions at Geneva?

LINKAGE

Gorbachev Statement

Gorbachev went on to say that it had been an idea of Nixon’s to call for linkage. He said this was old hat and should be put in mothballs.

⁵ See footnote 7, Document 9.

Analysis

The Soviets have repeatedly rejected the concept of linkage in principle, but have in fact practiced it to the present day. For example, they have linked the opening of new Consulates in Kiev and Moscow to our agreement to a resumption of Aeroflot air service to New York. While we should expect them to continue to criticize linkage, particularly in regard to making progress on human rights, we should have no illusions that linkage will remain a political fact of life in our relationship.

Response

—My Administration has never dwelled on linkages, and you know that.

—But you should also recognize that linkages are a fact of political life. It is naive to think that what happens in one area of our relationship won't have an impact, for better or worse, on the others.

—Actions by the Soviet Union in violation of international agreements—whether that means repression of the Helsinki monitors, or building of the Krasnoyarsk radar—inevitably affect our relations.

—When the Soviet Union invades Afghanistan, suppresses freedom in Poland or fuels conflicts in other regions of the world, Americans very naturally begin to worry about your purposes in the world, and about their own security.

—I have never said that nothing will be solved until everything is solved. I am ready to make as much progress in all areas as possible, but I recognize that some matters will have to proceed at their own pace. The important thing is to get to work to start narrowing the differences between us. If we succeed, the linkage question will take care of itself.

*HUMAN RIGHTS**Gorbachev Statement*

[Although Gorbachev did not directly rebut our position on human rights in Moscow, he has in the past responded by attacking U.S. practices along the following lines:] You talk about human rights in the Soviet Union but you ignore the terrible injustices of American society—poverty, hunger, unemployment, crime, racial discrimination, maltreatment of your Indians. We don't have these problems in the Soviet Union.

Analysis

While the older Soviet leadership responded to our human rights complaints by rejecting them as illegal intrusions on Soviet internal affairs, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze have responded by actively

rebutting our points and trying to turn the tables on us. You should be ready in Geneva to respond to an aggressive attack on our human rights record and refocus the discussion on Soviet violations.

Response

—The United States isn't perfect. We have never made any secret that many of our citizens haven't been able to share in the prosperity enjoyed by the majority of Americans.

—But we're working hard to change that—and I'm proud of the record of my Administration. We've created some eight million jobs since I came into office. Our health services are making stunning improvements in such things as higher life expectancies, lower infant mortality rates, and pioneering new techniques for curing diseases.

—I could cite figures to demonstrate how much we are spending on social programs and the considerable progress we are making. Perhaps the best demonstration, however, of the attraction of the American dream of prosperity and freedom is to point to the thousands of immigrants who want to come to our shores, sometimes at great risk when they leave their native countries.

—We are working hard to eradicate poverty, feed the hungry, house the homeless, to find jobs for the unemployed. We will never be satisfied that we've done enough.

—Pointing to our shortcomings, though, doesn't relieve you of yours. Human rights is a central aspect of our relationship, a matter of deep concern to all Americans. You have international obligations which you've freely assumed. In the end, there can never be much trust and confidence between our peoples when the Soviet Union ignores fundamental humanitarian principles.

144. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting¹

Washington, November 13, 1985, 1–1:46 p.m.

SUBJECT

Regional and Bilateral Issues for Geneva

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

The Vice President's Office

Donald Gregg

State

Secretary Shultz

Assistant Secretary Ridgway

Treasury

Secretary Baker

Defense

Secretary Weinberger

Justice

Attorney General Meese

CIA

Director William Casey

CJCS

Admiral William J. Crowe

DOE

Danny J. Boggs

OMB

James C. Miller III

Dr. Alton Keel

White House

Donald Regan

Robert C. McFarlane

NSC

Jack F. Matlock

Tyrus W. Cobb

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Geneva Meeting: NSC (National Security Council) Meetings. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. On November 13, Reagan wrote in his personal diary that three meetings related to the upcoming summit took place. He wrote: "A full cabinet meeting to brief them on plans for Geneva—then some talk about the '87 bud. (even though they haven't come up with one for '86). Then an N.S.C. meeting—again on practical details for Geneva. Cap came in with full report on Soviet treaty violations (more reading)." This report, along with a November 13 covering letter to the President from Weinberger, are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988. Another copy is in the Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Memoranda of Conversations, Moscow (09/11/1985)–(11/13/1985). Reagan continued, noting that later that day "Bill Casey brought in 3 of his experts on the Soviet U. Their presentations on the people of Russia were great & confirmed things I had heard from unconfirmed sources. The Soviet U. is an ec. basket case & among other things there is a rapidly spreading turn by the people to religion." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, pp. 539–540) This meeting with CIA analysts presumably covered the NIE on Soviet Domestic Economic Stresses, sent to the White House on November 6; see Document 141.

Minutes

In opening the meeting, *Mr. McFarlane* pointed out that the President goes to Geneva able to deal from a position of strength. While the Soviets, and many of the President's critics, have attempted to turn this into an SDI summit, the President has been able to successfully broaden the agenda. The Soviets now concede that the Summit should address issues that are of fundamental importance to the Soviet-American relationship—including regional, human rights and bilateral matters. While arms control remains a critical part of the agenda, it will not dominate the Geneva sessions. (C)

The President's firm stance, *Mr. McFarlane* added, has made it clear that the root of our bilateral problems lies not in the arms race. In doing so, the President has secured the support of the American people and the Congress, and persuaded the Soviets to treat these issues seriously. George Shultz raised these points in Moscow and while the Soviets have not agreed with our point of view, they are prepared to discuss them.² (C)

Secretary Shultz noted that the discussions he had in Moscow were not particularly productive. However, the sessions were conducted in a very cordial and businesslike manner. They have agreed to the President's proposal to discuss various regional problems, which we have moved forward at the Assistant Secretary level. Your UNGA speech provided the impetus for forward progress by suggesting a process whereby these concerns could be addressed.³ It appears, the Secretary said, that the Soviets haven't yet figured out what their response will be to the President's regional initiative. We expect Gorbachev to be evasive on the question of regional problems, and achieving progress on this will be one of the most difficult challenges facing you in Geneva. The Secretary said that Gorbachev told Bud and him that both superpowers needed to exercise restraint, and both have obligations. Specifically, the General Secretary said the USSR would support "national liberation movements." Still, the Secretary concluded, the Soviets have not offered us anything specific. Our task is to ensure that Gorbachev understands that these regional crises represent potential "flash points." (C)

On human rights, *Shultz continued*, the Soviets have said they are prepared to discuss, to varying degrees, these issues. In the Soviet view, there are basically three categories of human rights concerns. First, there are those cases which the Soviets believe have some legitimacy; i.e., the Soviets concede our arguments have some merit. For

² See Documents 134–140.

³ See footnote 3, Document 85.

example, divided spouses may be reunited as long as the individual had no exposure to national security information. We presented a list to them, but no action has been taken, although they have promised some movement here.⁴ Secondly, there are those cases the Soviets regard as internal matters and the broader question of emigration. The Secretary recommended that the President also remind the Soviets not only of their commitments in Helsinki, but specific pledges with respect to Seaman Medvid and the soldier, Sukhanov, who entered our Embassy in Kabul.⁵ The Secretary concluded that this will be a rough session, and we should expect that Gorbachev will counter by citing alleged abuses in this country. Specifically, the Soviets may cite a study by the Hoover Institute that called for increased arms expenditures at the expense of social entitlements. In response, we should cite the number of jobs we have created. *The President* responded that he knew it would be difficult, but thought that he might stress to the Soviets that the key difference is that we do not have fences to keep our people in. The Secretary agreed and noted that the key would be to note that we wanted to handle these issues privately. (C)

The Secretary noted that there are many bilateral issues on the agenda, some of which were moving to solution:

—*Cultural Exchanges*: It appears that we will have this agreement ready for signature. However, we have a remaining disagreement regarding reciprocal access to television and on exhibits.

—*Environment*: EPA Director Lee Thomas is now in Moscow, but it is doubtful that we will have anything ready on environmental matters.

—*Air Safety*: We continue to bang away on this issue, emphasizing that the Soviets have a responsibility regarding air safety in the North Pacific. There is a good chance that we can bring this agreement to fruition.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 136.

⁵ Seaman Miroslav Medvid and Soviet soldier Aleksandr Sukhanov were both potential Soviet defectors who chose to return to the Soviet Union. Reagan addressed both cases in several entries in his personal diary. On November 1, he wrote of Sukhanov: "Well the Goblins didn't get us but we have another Soviet defector case. In Kabul—our embassy—there is a deserter from the Soviet mil. asking asylum." Then on November 2: "Our defector in Kabul cant make up his mind. He's 19 yrs. old. The Soviet Ambass. visited him in our embassy and gave him a fatherly pitch as to how he could go back to Russia—no punishment etc." Of the Medvid case, Reagan wrote on November 7: "Ed Meese came in to brief us on the Medved [*Medvid*] affair—he is the sailor who jumped ship (a Russian ship) in New Orleans to be a defector. Then he recanted and is back on ship board." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, pp. 535–539) More information on Medvid is in telegram 332820 to Moscow, Leningrad, and Athens, October 30. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850773–0359) More information on Sukhanov is in telegram 335592 sent for information to Moscow, November 1. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850781–0401)

—*Civilian Aviation*: We have an agreement in principle, but several specific problems remain. Pan American is still unhappy about financial arrangements. While it may be difficult, we believe we will have this agreement ready for signature.

—*Consular Agreement*: The Soviets are holding this agreement hostage to the CivAir accord. We have a survey team in Kiev, searching for alternate sites. If we find a suitable site, we will consider moving forward, but we will not sign an agreement unless we have located suitable property and can insure simultaneous occupancy.

—*INC/SEA*: There is a possibility for cooperation in this area, but it is doubtful that anything will be ready for Geneva.

—*Berlin*: We need to continue hammering at the Soviets regarding problems in this vital city. First, we must stress how important it is to guarantee safety in the Berlin Air Corridors. Secondly, in the wake of the Nicholson murder, we need to come down hard on the necessity of ensuring the safety and operational capabilities of our military liaison missions.

—*Trade*: We have no great expectations in this area, but Mac Baldrige will lead a mission to Moscow in December.

—*Fusion*: The Soviets have proposed a multi-lateral cooperative venture designed to investigate the potentials of nuclear fusion for energy production. This would involve the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and other countries. We have stressed that participation would be restricted to those countries actually contributing. We have cooperated with the Soviets in this area in the past and have profited from this cooperation. *The President* asked where this prototype would be built. *The Secretary* responded that this was a critical point. The Soviets are pushing for Vienna, but we prefer Geneva. He added that this would be an unclassified project, but we have serious concerns, particularly about sharing computer technology. Whatever technology transfer occurs will have to be within COCOM guidelines. *Secretary Weinberger* pointed out that if adequate controls are not in place, we may just want to agree only to discuss funding, costs and mechanisms for implementation. He noted that DOD was very concerned with the problem of computer technology, as well as the possibility of diverting DOE funding away from SDI. (S)

Director Casey pointed out that he felt Gorbachev would stress the importance of Moscow playing a role in the Mid-East peace negotiations, and he would criticize President Zia's involvement with the Afghan resistance. *President Reagan* said that he might point out to Gorbachev that while we recognize his obligation to support so-called national liberation movements, we cannot agree that this should be done by the provision of arms. We, too, support legitimate revolutions—the problem is distinguishing a genuine insurgency from one

supported by outside powers. The difference is that we are not subverting legitimate governments, but we are supporting democratic forces. The President added that much of the Soviet claim to legitimacy depended on fulfilling the Marxist-Leninist dictum that communism cannot succeed until the world revolution occurs. *Secretary Shultz* added that the President was quite correct, and, interestingly, it won't be necessary to quote Marx or Lenin on this—the Soviets would agree with him. The President mused that perhaps what was required was some sort of supervision of elections. On the human rights issue, the President indicated that he planned to handle this issue primarily in the one-on-one sessions. He added that he would point out that it would be necessary to see progress here in order to gain public and Congressional support for movement in other areas. (C)

Deputy Secretary Boggs noted that we have a fairly successful ongoing program with the Soviets on fusion cooperation. He pointed out that the two big problems with an expanded fusion program were funding and protection of technology. Although fusion will involve primarily civilian utilizations, we need to stay alert to technology transfer problems, particularly with respect to computers. We anticipate a budget requirement of about \$150 million per year. This is a very attractive venture in that if it were successful, it would bring enormous benefits to mankind—virtually cost-free energy. We need to subject this proposal to more interagency scrutiny. (S)

Admiral Crowe noted that INC/SEA could yield some attractive cooperation. Some modest military to military contacts have been established. In the past, we have also had reciprocal port visits. *Secretary Shultz* added that we have some proposals on the table for expanding this cooperation, but the Soviets have not yet picked up on them. (C)

On the point of denial of religious freedom in the USSR, *the President* said he has been struck by the rise in anti-semitism there. He speculated that the restriction on Jewish emigration was largely based on their fear of allowing such talent to leave the country. The President speculated that if the Soviet leaders would allow the Jews to attend services in their Temples, then much of the desire to emigrate would be eased. *Secretary Shultz* noted that despite the official atheism, many of the funerals there have distinctly religious overtones. (C)

The meeting concluded at 1:46 p.m.

145. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 14, 1985

SUBJECT

Insights into Gorbachev's Policies and the Role of the Soviet Military

The [*less than 1 line not declassified*] sensitive CIA report purports to describe Gorbachev's goals and motivations regarding arms controls issues at Geneva and the role the Soviet military plays in his plans and economic policies.² [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

—Gorbachev is not prepared to make major concessions to the US prior to 26th Soviet Party Congress in February since it could harm his image as a tough leader, but he realizes concessions will be necessary to achieve arms control agreement.

—Gorbachev must convey the impression that he is an effective leader on foreign policy matters in order to be able to remove the “old guard” at the 26th Party Congress, and thereafter the “old guard” in the bloc.

—Gorbachev's immediate interest would be served by a series of declarations on arms control, trade and international security at the summit. If he fails to get that much, Soviet propaganda is ready to blame the US.

—The Soviet military has already been promised a percentage increase in its budget totally independent of what is to be decided for the civilian economy in the normal five-year plan and Gorbachev has committed himself to extensive modernization of military production facilities. In return the military supports his arms control approach.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (11/15/1985); NLR-775-14-76-5-8. Secret; Sensitive; Noform; Nocontract; Orcon. Drafted by A. Friedt (INR/SEE).

² The CIA report was not found attached.

146. Personal Notes of Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, November 14, 1985

NSPG 11/14

—Today's mtg is on preventing violence—rather than Soviet phrase of arms control.

—You deter attack by being strong

—In 1960's, people began being interested in arms control—being strong [not—inserted above being]

—be sure that you are strong enough to deter BEFORE you put faith in political document

—Keep peace by deterrence

—threat has been nuclear, conventional, sub-terrorism

—13 years ago an offensive nuclear balance and no defense

—assumptions don't work

—in key measures they are ahead

—3 options:

1) they reduce

2) we build

3) build defense to offset

*1st reason for SDI

2nd—they have an extensive defense

3rd—you keep building—systems mobile proliferate—etc

—ISN'T IT TIME TO MOVE/TRANSITION to defense

—From considering security they get into arms control

—Soviet agenda is to get you to forget about imbalances and agree to their proposals

—Areas

—NST

—MBFR

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Summit Material, 11/19/85–11/21/85 OA 92178 [2 of 7]. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the text from Linhard's handwritten notes of the November 14 NSPG meeting. An image of the notes is Appendix A. No formal record of the meeting was found. According to the President's Daily Diary, the NSPG meeting took place in the Situation Room from 11:05 to 11:56 a.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) On November 14, Reagan wrote in his personal diary: "An N.S.P.G. meeting to talk about arms control & how we present (& what) to Mr. G. in Geneva." He also wrote: "Met with our 3 arms negotiators who have just recessed the 3rd session. They are aware that the Soviets have gone farther in the sense of actually proposing numbers but still the Soviets shade things in their favor." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 540) Later that day, he met with Kampelman, Tower, and Glitman in the Oval Office from 1:04 to 1:36 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No substantive record was found.

- CDE—where they want no use of nuke
- CW
- ETC

—In all areas, Soviets have proposed language we feel (you have said) no move on language

Sec State:—Will want to talk about NST and SDI

—Just as China called on Taiwan, can expect SDI early—need to keep strong on that—he will feel the strength of your conviction

—Really detailed discussions of proposals will not be called for—but some things ie

1. 50% is a good number if applied to right thing
2. If we can get an impulse to Geneva good thing, you *may* want to tell him your views on guidelines

—Tell Soviets what you intend to say

—In other areas, some are in better shape than others

—looks like we could move along on CDE—maybe something here

—MBFR—we have reached agreement with UK/FRG—may have something Monday [November 18]

—CW—danger of proliferation is great

VP—why turn you off in Moscow

SecState—Didn't. We offered Iran/Iraq but may be interested in CW

SecDef—Important to see all thrust on their part will be arms control—need talk that too

—50% reductions should lead to parity—parity in effectiveness, not just warhead numbers

—result is parity, measured by effectiveness and modernization

—No further commitment to SALT

—Greater reductions on them to get to parity

—Verification at top, not bottom

—Ver not enuff—also need compliance

—US should not have double-standard

—Also don't know what Congress will give us

—On SDI—do nothing at all restricting research or deployment

—*don't reaffirm ABM Treaty*—a delay on deployment

—I have heard that before deploy, nego, but not 10 years

—Agree on CW—some non-proliferation aspects worthy discussion

—Outcome

—no restriction on SDI

—reductions on offense to parity

—verification

—CBMs and future meetings are good

—Any commitment to SALT or a restrictive interp of ABM Treaty

—No words in any communique in parity

—both sides agree on compliance

—both terrorism

—Poor [or Pool?]

CJCS—Con show how strongly feel on SDI

—Don't go any further than SDI research with ABM

—Don't dignify Soviet compliance—not complying

—In INF—seek GLOBAL limits—not just balance in Europe

—In CW—can't accept limits on modernization need mod

DCI—Gorbachev looking for atmosphere to bring home

wants: 1) reaffirmation of ABM Treaty

2) extension of SALT

1—would be an 'indefinite' commitment

2—would let them off the hook on violations

—If you reaffirm without any exception would hurt us

—SALT II extension allows SS-24/25 to go

ACDA—Time to do something on CW (5 from 14/16 nations)

—Guidelines worked for contingency is sound—but will guidelines really help arms control

—1973 did some things—6 years later

—if we try for guidelines and fail—a failed summit—*avoid*

—Gorbachev—"friendly smile but iron teeth"

—figures in folklore—witch or evil princess

Rowny—They do need to "feel" SDI. Respect strength

—50% across board on things that count is very catchy

—Conviction on SDI

President—On 50% across board, they start ahead of us—would not get to 0 first

RCM—We pick their higher number to start from—50% of theirs

Nitze—Pres has always said deploy requires consultation and amendment

SecDef—Don't want more restrictive interpretation

—No reaffirmation—would pull back from last decision

—Not bar deployment—will not to mod treaty

Meese—Avoid reaffirming treaty in more restrictive provisions

—also avoid any commitment to agree

Nitze—not correct—if no agreement, we would have to withdraw

Meese—But [Best?] avoid any commitment

Shultz—Best as [going?], ambiguous—avoid discussion

Cap—Yes, first lets not get further to commit us *NOT TO DEPLOY*

Ken A—No veto—They are already violate therefore don't reaffirm

Pres—Soviets see defenses as their way to black mail without fear

We could use to avoid threat

Nothing could stop us from going forward

After devel weapon—see if nuclear powers would give up nukes
in return for defense—keep gas masks

But no veto—either join or we go ahead—no 10 years of [omission?]
goal is: can they bring about end of nuclear threat

Casey—They want reaffirm ABM for propaganda no other purpose

Pres—no need to talk about it—we are in treaty

Shultz—Questioned if need for ABM Treaty

Response—no need to reaffirm

Pres—The press will ask—we should answer before reaffirm, must
have compliance therefore they are not

Meese—they want to get commit to use with a future Pres.

Casey—Be careful—will hit on head with this

Cap—All need to say is we are proceeding in ABM Treaty—you
are not

RCM—Pres has said our SDI program is on record within ABM
Treaty—never say it is not

Cap—ABM Treaty has permit withdrawal

Casey—They would love to give up K-radar to get you locked in

Pres—But my idea of consultation—isn't in treaty

—Want to say I hope their concerns means they will comply

Adelman—SDI can get us to reduce nuclear weapons—but also
other types—battlefield, aircraft etc

—Not all problem, but most problem

Pres—4800 miles away—30 min MX impacted

—Concerned about *most* destabil system

—Tell Gorbachev—can understand their [or them?] seek 1st
strike—we are not

147. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) and the Legal Adviser of the Department of State (Sofaer) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 15, 1985

SUBJECT

ABM Treaty Negotiating History—Soviet Arguments and U.S. Responses

At the summit, the Soviets may raise the issue of whether the ABM Treaty bans testing and development of an SDI system or components. This memorandum articulates some of the arguments that the Soviets might make (based on the U.S. version of the negotiating record), along with potential U.S. responses.

1. The Soviet Interpretation

The Soviets contend that Article V's ban on the development, testing, and deployment of non-fixed land-based ABM systems and components applies to future systems and components based on "other physical principles." The Soviets view Agreed Statement D as merely reinforcing the limitations on deployment of future systems imposed by Article III.²

[U.S. Response: The ABM Treaty deals with future systems exclusively in Agreed Statement D, which bans only their deployment. The definition of "ABM system" in Article II does not apply to future systems based "on other physical principles," but applies only to systems based on interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars. Article V similarly does not apply to systems or components based on other physical principles."]

2. The Soviet Argument

A. The Soviets might concede that they began the negotiations opposed to any restrictions on future ABM systems and components.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (11/16/1985–11/20/1985); NLR-775-14-77-10-1. Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original. Drafted by M. Sigler (INR/SFA/SF) and B. Feldman (L); cleared by Nitze. An unknown hand initialed for Nitze.

² An undated memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, entitled "The Meaning of Agreed Statement D of the ABM Treaty Based on the Negotiated Record," explained the "record of negotiations of the ABM Treaty in order to shed light on the purpose and meaning of Agreed Statement D." The memorandum provided an "overview of the issues and a summary of conclusions, followed by a chronology of statements and events which bear on the interpretation of Agreed Statement D." (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Summit—Geneva (3))

As the negotiations progressed, however, they accepted the U.S. argument that such limitations were necessary. By the fall of 1971, the Soviets might argue, the Soviet delegates had sought to alter the proposed text of Article V in a manner designed to secure a ban on future components that were not fixed land-based.

[*U.S. Response:* The Soviet delegates stubbornly resisted U.S. efforts to regulate future systems. In September 1971, they forced the U.S. to drop a provision that expressly would have extended the ban on mobile systems (contained in Article V) to “other devices for performing the functions” of interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars. Although the Soviets eventually agreed to ban the *deployment* of systems based “on other physical principles,” they did so only after prolonged opposition to any regulation of “unknown” systems. Even then, they refused to address such systems in the body of the Treaty, but would accept only a side understanding. The Soviets never agreed to apply the Article V ban to systems based on “other physical principles.”]

B. By December 20, 1971, the Soviets might argue, discussions had made clear that the Article II definition of “ABM system”—and, therefore, the entire text of the Treaty—was intended to apply to future systems as well as to those then in existence. On that date, the Soviets complained that Article II lacked connecting language between the paragraph defining “ABM system” and the following three paragraphs defining components. They proposed to add the connective “namely” or “consisting of” to the text. A U.S. delegate, seeking a more “precise” connective, suggested the phrase “currently consisting of.” He argued that both sides recognized that future systems could be devised and that, although the question of constraints on future systems would be settled elsewhere than in Article II, the correct way of indicating a connection between systems and components in Article II would be to include the word “currently.” The Soviets ultimately agreed, and the phrase “currently consisting of” appears in the final text.

[*U.S. Response:* This is a distortion of what occurred. The Soviets proposed to use “namely” or “consisting of” after the first paragraph in Article II in order to *restrict* the functional definition of “ABM system” to the specific types of components listed in the next three paragraphs; that enumeration was limiting, not illustrative. Indeed, Karpov had earlier stated explicitly that the Soviets sought to limit only systems that used interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars. The Soviets accepted the term “currently consisting of” only after the U.S. delegate assured them that this would *not* resolve “the question of constraints on future systems [, which] would be settled elsewhere than in Article II.”]

C. The Soviets might contend that at that point, with the Article II definition extended to cover future ABM systems and components, and with the development, testing, and deployment of future systems and components that are not fixed land-based banned by Article V, what remained was to extend Article III limits on deployment of fixed

land-based systems to future (“other physical principle”) systems. That was done in February 1972, in the form of Agreed Statement D, which requires discussion and agreement prior to deployment of such systems.

[*U.S. Response:* The parties debated the provision that became Agreed Statement D (previously Article V (3)) intensely for six months. *At no time did any delegate suggest that this provision applied only to future fixed land-based systems.* Nor did the delegates treat this as an incidental “clarifying” provision; rather, they fought over whether any restriction on unknown systems was appropriate. Moreover, if the Soviet reading of Article II were correct (*i.e.*, the definition encompassed future systems), then Agreed Statement D would have been unnecessary, because Article III already specified the only type of fixed land-based system that could ever be deployed.]

3. *Some Supporting Statements*

A. On September 15, 1971, during discussion of a Soviet-proposed change to the draft text of Article V, Soviet advisor Karpov confirmed that the Russian word that the Soviets proposed to use for the U.S. word “components” would mean “any type of present or future components” of ABM systems. This, the Soviets might argue, effectively included future components in the ban on sea-, air-, space-, and mobile land-based systems and components.

[*U.S. Response:* Karpov made this comment on the same day that the Soviets forced the U.S. to drop language that expressly would have applied Article V to “other *devices* for performing the functions of these components.” They replaced that language with the word “components.” The Soviets recognized that the word “devices” was broader than “components”; the latter was understood to refer to interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars, while the former encompassed substitutes based on other physical principles. Moreover, the Soviets continued their principled opposition to placing any limits on unknown, future systems for at least three months after Karpov’s September 15 statement.]

B. In a discussion on December 4, 1971, Soviet advisor Chulitsky argued that “the prohibition on air-based, space-based, land-based, etc. ABM systems [Article V] is adequate to cover the problem of future systems.” The Soviets might argue that Chulitsky’s remark referred to what were later called “other physical principle” systems, and that the Article V prohibition on development, testing, and deployment extends to those systems if they are not fixed land-based.

[*U.S. Response:* In the same conversation, Chulitsky reiterated Soviet opposition to attempting to regulate what “no one knew”; he said “it is difficult to argue with the technical people [that unknown systems should be proscribed].” His statements make sense only if he meant that the Article V prohibition applied to systems based on technology

available when the Treaty was ratified, even if built in the future—not to systems developed in the future based on other physical principles.]

C. In a January 7, 1972 discussion, Soviet delegate Shchukin stated that an effective territorial defense of a country against a major attack was not feasible using then-current technology, but that it was important to give assurances that a base for such a defense was not created, because “perhaps future advances in technology would make such a defense possible.” The Soviets might argue that, because preventing a territorial ABM defense is the overriding purpose of the Treaty, Shchukin’s remark indicated that the Soviets considered all the Treaty provisions—including Article V—to apply to future ABM systems and components based on other physical principles.

[U.S. Response: Shchukin’s statement is consistent with the U.S. interpretation. The parties’ central concern was to prevent *deployment* of territorial ABM systems, whether based on current or future technology. Deployment of *current* systems (other than specified fixed land-based) was banned by Article I, III, and V. Deployment of systems based on *future* technology (i.e., “other physical principles.” was banned by Agreed Statement D. Shchukin’s statement does not suggest that the Treaty limited development or testing of such systems.]

D. On January 11, 1972, Soviet delegate Kishilov conceded that Articles I, II, and III together would ban future ABM systems and components. The Soviets might argue that this statement demonstrated their acceptance of the applicability of these articles (including the Article II definition of “ABM system”) to future systems and components.

[U.S. Response: The Soviet statements at this meeting were flatly contradictory. For example, Grinevsky stated that the Treaty *would* allow either party to deploy a system using future components, even without the other side’s agreement. He went on to argue that “the treaty referred to ABM systems, which were defined in Article II. It could not deal with unknown other systems.” Moreover, Kishilov’s remark involved only the deployment of future systems.)

[Note: You may also wish to emphasize two points about prior Soviet interpretations of the Treaty:

1. Initial Soviet criticisms of SDI were wide-ranging and argued that *deployment* would violate the ABM Treaty. But not until very recently—after the McFarlane statement—did the Soviets publicly claim that SDI development and testing would violate the Treaty.

2. According to Ambassador Cooper, Soviet delegates to the current Geneva talks repeatedly made statements consistent with the “broader” interpretation prior to the recent debate. For example, on July 18, 1985: “Detinov said that as far as the ABM systems covered by Article V were concerned, it would be possible to develop devices which would not fit this definition—that is without involving ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or ABM radars. He did not preclude the possibility of such devices in the future.”]

148. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Ikle) to Secretary of Defense Weinberger¹

Washington, November 15, 1985

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting, 11:00 a.m., Today

The agenda for this meeting has apparently been prepared by Jack Matlock (NSC). The discussion/presentation may be merely on the sequence of the meetings. See Tab A for currently known agenda.²

Thus, I am not sure there will be an opportunity for making substantive points. I have two concerns at this time:

(1) That the staff adhere to the President's preference *not to work* on a Joint Communiqué. The "eager detente beavers" who want such a communiqué now trot out the argument that Gorbachev would refuse to agree on follow-on summits unless we bought a Joint Communiqué. I can see scenarios in Geneva where, if Mr. Gorbachev plays hardball, this could lead to panic on our side.³

(2) *The Fusion Reactor Project*

The interagency effort has, fortunately, led to a certain pulling back: we would reach, at most, only a preliminary agreement, abide clearly by COCOM restrictions, work out cost sharing before becoming fully committed, etc.⁴ Yet, "the pressures of Geneva" may lead us to go further than cooler heads now advise.

- The project can hurt SDI:
—divert DOE funds

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Fred Ikle Files, Geneva—November 1985 (Pres-Gorb). Secret; Eyes Only.

² Tab A did not include a meeting agenda; instead, it contains the schedule for the President from November 16 until November 21 in Geneva. According to the President's Daily Diary, an NSC meeting took place in the Cabinet Room from 11:05 to 11:58 a.m. on November 15. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No formal minutes of this meeting were found. Reagan wrote in his personal diary: "An N.S.C. meeting was a run through by George S. of the Geneva day to day summit schedule. Then Geo. & Bud and I had our usual Fri. meeting—nothing very important." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 540)

³ See Document 149.

⁴ A November 14 draft "Fact Sheet" on "Multilateral Fusion Research Proposal," prepared after a meeting of the Fusion Working Group explained that "the successful development of a fusion nuclear reactor would provide the world with clean technology that could produce an inexhaustible energy supply. Fusion energy offers the potential for cost savings in energy production." (Reagan Library, Fred Ikle Files, Geneva—November 1985 (Pres-Gorb)) See also footnote 6, Document 134.

—divert talent in universities from the “Reagan SDI research” to the “Gorbachev fusion project.” The left in US will love it! *See Keyworth letter to Bud (Tab B).*⁵

—Gorbachev praised day before yesterday to a group of Nobel prize winners the fusion project as the alternative to SDI.

—The head of the Soviet fusion project is Y.P. Velikov who is the leading Soviet critic of our SDI program and heads vital aspects of the Soviet space weapons program. He has extensive contacts with American scientists and he has been searching for ways to head off our SDI program. Velikov is influential in the United States because of his anti-SDI stand. If he is awarded this major fusion project we will be enhancing his prestige and influence massively and assuring a major boost to the Soviet political offensive against our SDI program.

Fred C. Ikle⁶

⁵ Attached but not printed.

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

149. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)¹

Washington, November 15, 1985

SUBJECT

Soviet Desire for Joint Statement: Hartman-Shevardnadze Meeting November 14

Secretary Shultz has sent the President a Memorandum which reports on the meeting Art Hartman had with Shevardnadze yesterday.² Not surprisingly, Shevardnadze made quite an issue out of our

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron November 1985 (6/10). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action.

² Attached at Tab A but not printed. In a November 14 covering memorandum to Shultz, sent through Armacost, Ridgway sent Shultz a draft of the memorandum to the President. She explained that during his meeting in Moscow with Hartman “Shevardnadze expressed ‘amazement’ that there could be any question of our willingness to sign onto a joint communique in Geneva.” She surmised that “he was clearly discomfited—a reaction which could show up in a hardening of positions on outstanding bilateral issues.” She recommended that Shultz initial the memorandum to the President. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (11/14/1985))

position that there will be no joint communique. Art considers this clear evidence that the Soviets badly want some sort of joint document to emerge from the meeting.

Assuming that *if* we get agreement on a sufficient number of concrete items, we are not adverse to formulating it into some form of a joint document (*not*, of course, a communique in the traditional sense), I believe we can use the Soviet eagerness for a document as some modest leverage. It is also my understanding that this is not counter to the President's wishes, since there would still be separate statements dealing with the meeting as a whole, and any joint statement would be confined to those specific actions on which both sides have agreed.

I have drafted a cover memorandum to the President on these assumptions. You should, of course, amend it if it does not reflect your thinking.³

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward the Memorandum at Tab I to the President.⁴

³ Attached at Tab I but not printed.

⁴ McFarlane first initialed the Approve option, then struck it through. He initialed his disapproval and wrote in the margin "Handled orally."

150. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, November 19, 1985, 10:20–11:20 a.m.

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA

November, 1985

First Private Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

United States

President Ronald Reagan

Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Yuri D. Uspensky,² Interpreter

After the official photographers and the rest of the staff left the room, *President Reagan* began the conversation by telling the General Secretary that the two of them could really talk now. The President indicated that he approached this meeting with a very deep feeling and hoped that both of them could realize its importance and the unique situation that they were in.

The President indicated that both he and the General Secretary had come from similar beginnings which were quite different from

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Reykjavik Meeting—Geneva Materials 10/12/1986–10/13/1986 (1). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Zarechnak. The meeting took place in the Maison Fleur d'Eau. In his memoir, written with the benefit of hindsight, Gorbachev described this first, private meeting with Reagan: "we had a private meeting which lasted over an hour instead of the scheduled fifteen minutes. As I reread the minutes, I am amazed at the extremely ideological stands taken by both partners. In retrospect, they read more like the 'No. 1 Communist' and the 'No. 1 Imperialist' trying to out-argue each other, rather than a business-like talk between two leaders of the two superpowers. I myself spent time trying to fend off accusations of human rights abuses, even though I was not always convinced that these were not justified. For his part Ronald Reagan was busy warding off my judgments on the role of the military-industrial complex in American politics and the existence of a powerful propaganda machine directed against the USSR. To top it all, we traded accusations of responsibility for the mad arms race which had led the world to the brink of a catastrophe." Gorbachev continued: "We were both right and wrong at the same time. Both countries shared responsibility for splitting up the world into two blocs and fomenting the threat of war, as well as for the extreme tension that prevailed in Soviet-American relations. Yet neither of us was ready to admit this then at the Geneva summit. Nonetheless, we had a frank, meaningful conversation from the start." (Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, pp. 405–406)

² Nikolai Uspensky is the correct name for the Soviet interpreter. In several meetings, the notetaker used a variation in the name or mistakenly recorded the Soviet interpreter as Yuri Uspensky.

their current positions. He, Reagan, was born and began his life in a small farming community, and now the two of them were here with the fate of the world in their hands, so to speak. The U.S. and the Soviet Union were the two greatest countries on Earth, the superpowers. They were the only ones who could start World War III, but also the only two countries that could bring peace to the world.

The President said that the two of them would talk about many things, including arms, in the main meeting, but he wondered if the primary aim between them should not be to eliminate the suspicions which each side had of the other. The resolution of other questions would follow naturally after this. To talk about arms while such suspicions exist is an empty exercise as both sides are defensive at the various negotiations because of these suspicions. Countries do not mistrust each other because of arms, but rather countries build up their arms because of the mistrust between them.

The President expressed the hope that in their meetings they could get at the sources of the suspicions which exist. The Soviet Union did not approve of the U.S. system of government, and the U.S. did not approve of the Soviet system, and each could follow its own way, but with peaceful competition.

General Secretary Gorbachev said that he would like to return to the beginning, and thank the President for receiving him. He agreed with the President that this meeting was important in itself and he was glad that it was taking place. There had been no meetings between the U.S. President and the General Secretary of the USSR for six years, and many problems had developed in U.S.-Soviet relations and in the world in that period. He would also speak of these issues at the larger meeting, but would now like to avail himself of the opportunity which such a private meeting affords. He had met with members of the U.S. Congress and representatives of the U.S. Administration, but the Soviet side recognized the importance of a meeting with the President, and he, Gorbachev, would like to talk quietly, with respect for the United States and for the President, about many issues.

Gorbachev indicated that the Soviet side had prepared many months for this meeting, and he had tried to get a better understanding of the U.S. from Soviet and American sources. He had familiarized himself with all of the President's statements, and had paid special attention to the most recent ones. The main conclusion he had come to was that he was convinced that he and the President could not ignore each other. Nothing good would happen if the two sides took a different approach. But he was convinced that he could begin to change our relations for the better. This was his main theme, and the starting point for the meeting. After he had come to this conclusion, he had reviewed it a thousand times: perhaps it was too simplistic,

bearing in mind the tremendous differences between the two countries? This was, of course, so, but on the other hand the two countries were so interrelated.

Gorbachev continued that in the Soviet Union it was considered that serious measures ought to be undertaken to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. This would demand political will at the highest levels. A veritable avalanche of information was descending upon Gorbachev and the President, both internally and from all around the world. Gorbachev was convinced that there was not only the fear of mutual destruction, although this did exist, but a realistic evaluation showed that the U.S. and the Soviet Union could cooperate, and they had done so in the past, without changing their political systems, culture or ideologies. They had cooperated in the area of economics, trade and culture while respecting the choices made by the U.S. people, and, obviously, the Soviet people as well.

Gorbachev said that there had sometimes been squalls in the bilateral relationship which had been severe, perhaps extremely so, but he could definitely state that in the USSR there was no enmity toward the United States or its people. The Soviet Union respected the U.S. and its people. The Soviet people and the leadership of the Soviet Union recognized the role of the U.S. in the world, and wished it no harm. They realized that international relations could not be built on a desire to harm American interests.

At this point Gorbachev indicated that he would like to pause to permit the President to speak, and then he would like to say a few things about the Soviet side's understanding of the present international situation and what he thought should be changed in our policies in order to have a more constructive relationship based on greater realism.

The President replied that there was no question but that the Soviet and American peoples, if they learned more about each other, would find that they had many things in common, and that friendship between them would grow. Unfortunately, it was not people but governments that created arms.

The President continued that prior to this meeting there had been a wave of good wishes from the people of the United States, primarily expressing the desire to have peace. He knew something about the Soviet Union and its concern about war because of the suffering which the country had undergone in the Second World War—the courage, the sacrifices and the fact that 20 million people had been lost. People do not like war. Americans hate war. America is too good a place to be when there is no war.

The President continued that people did not get into trouble when they talked to each other, but rather when they talked about each other.

There has been too much of the latter on both sides, and not enough of talking to each other. In the meeting with the larger group, where he and Gorbachev should soon move, the sides could explain why there is mistrust between them, but could make a beginning to try to eliminate this mistrust.

Gorbachev replied that they would discuss specific questions during their Geneva meetings, but he wished to give his evaluation of the present international situation as the Soviet side saw it, while they were still in their one-on-one meeting. He thought that a new policy was needed which would be adequate for the present international situation. The first thing that was needed was a policy aimed at resolving the central issue of the present time, that is, the question of war and peace. In the Soviet Union, in the United States, and in the whole world this was the question which was in the minds of everyone, even ordinary people, not to mention those who were more familiar with international processes.

Gorbachev continued that if the two sides reached a substantive agreement in Geneva, which would increase people's hope and would not destroy their view of the future with respect to the question of war and peace, this would be a great accomplishment. The question of ending the arms race was of critical importance in international politics, and we needed to say something to the world about this. The Soviet side is in favor of this. The U.S. side says that nuclear war cannot be permitted, and that it is for peace. We need to find a formula at this meeting which would give impetus toward moving towards resolution of the more important issues. This was the first thing.

Gorbachev continued that he would not like to seem irresponsible vis-a-vis the President, vis-a-vis his own country and vis-a-vis the world with regard to this main issue. Young people were wondering about whether they would be alive or not, and the older generation, that had suffered so much, was also thinking about this. Yes, we have a meeting in Geneva, and we need to create an impetus. If no such impetus is created, there will be great disappointment, and no statements or press announcements will justify the meeting. People will say that we are irresponsible. And the two sides should not subject themselves to such a fate.

Gorbachev said that he would like to say two brief things about what realities Soviet and U.S. foreign policy should take into account. There were many problems in the world, involving capitalist countries and socialist countries, not to mention third-world countries, where the problems were the greatest. The problems involved questions of economics, structural change, ecology, sociology, etc. All of these issues demanded our attention and required solutions based on cooperation rather than confrontation. This was the second thing that Gorbachev wished to say.

Gorbachev continued that the third thing was that the two countries had had conflicts, both openly and privately, with regard to regional, third-world issues. But there was a great number of developing countries, and dozens of newly-created ones. They had great amounts of natural and human resources, but they were not only behind the developed countries, but the gap between them was growing greater. There was hunger, illiteracy and disease, causing a great deal of turmoil. We need to take a new political approach to these issues in order to resolve them. This was the basis for Gorbachev's approach to foreign policy, as well as that of his colleagues.

Gorbachev indicated that the issue of national interests had arisen. The Soviet Union had its national interests and the U.S. had them as well. Other countries also had their national interests. In the international context, we could not speak of advancing some of these interests at the expense of suppressing others. Without such an approach it would be difficult to act in the international arena. He had spoken sincerely about these three things. The Soviet Union was not playing a two-faced game. If it were playing such a game with regard to the United States, if it harbored secret intentions, then there could be no improvement in the relationship. He was sincere about this, and this applied to both countries.

Gorbachev apologized that he had taken so long, and said that he would be ending shortly. Perhaps the President was aware that a slogan had been used during the time of this meeting in Geneva which said that Reagan and Gorbachev should bear in mind that the world did not belong only to the two of them.

The President replied that he had not heard about such a slogan, but he wished to reply briefly to what Gorbachev had said, and then he thought it would be better for them to join with the rest of the group. He agreed that the two countries could mutually help the developing countries, but one of the things that created mistrust of the USSR by the U.S. was the realization of the Marxist idea of helping socialist revolutions throughout the world and the belief that the Marxist system should prevail. The U.S. felt, however, that the most important thing for a country was its right to self-determination. The U.S. and USSR could help these countries, given our advanced technologies. We could help them to improve their standards of living. But the U.S. felt that the Soviet Union attempted to use force to shape the developing countries to their own pattern, and that such force was often used only by a minority of the people of the country. The U.S. believed that if the competing factions would settle their social and other differences themselves, the U.S. and USSR could then be ready to assist them in improving their economies. Both our countries should eliminate the mistrust which exists between them by discussing the causes of this mistrust.

The U.S. had a very firm belief that people in all countries had the right of self-determination and the right to choose their own form of government.

The President indicated that when he and Gorbachev would go into the main meeting, he would greet the members of the Soviet Delegation, and Gorbachev should greet the members of the U.S. Delegation, after which there would be a photo opportunity next to the fireplace before they sat down at the table.

Gorbachev replied that they would continue to discuss these issues in the larger meeting, but he would like to say some more before they left the room. There had been those who considered that the American Revolution should have been crushed. The same applied to the French Revolution and to the Soviet Revolution. Over a long period of time millions of people had engaged in such struggles—in India, Indonesia, in Algeria (where one-and-a-half million people had died in their struggle for freedom). The Soviet Union did not consider that a way of life could be imposed if a society were not ready for it. These were only empty phrases. All these things which happen in the world have their national roots. The U.S. should not think that Moscow was omnipotent and that when he, Gorbachev, woke up every day he thought about which country he would now like to arrange a revolution in. This was simply not true. Gorbachev indicated that after his interpreter had translated what he had just said, he would like to convey some confidential information to Reagan, after which they could move to the next room.

Gorbachev said that before leaving for Geneva he had received some information from the Soviet Academy of Sciences, specifically the Institute for Earth Studies, where the scientists have become convinced that there would be a major earthquake in the area of California and Nevada within the next three years. Soviet scientists had always worked with U.S. scientists on these issues, and Reagan probably had knowledge of such information already, but this information was in addition to what had already been known. The Soviet scientists considered that the probability of an earthquake of a magnitude of 7 or 7.5 on the Richter scale was two-thirds and the probability of one of 6 or 6.5 was three-fourths. The Soviet side was ready to have its scientists give all the details to U.S. scientists. They have not yet been published.

The President replied that he realized that such an earthquake was considered to be overdue. He mentioned that an entire area along the Pacific, Asia, South America, and North America was considered to be a “ring of fire” because of the volcanoes there. This had recently been demonstrated in Colombia, before that in Mexico and in the U.S. with Mount St. Helens: these volcanoes were showing greater activity. Because of faults in the earth and shifting plates, we know that such

an event is overdue. A great deal of tension has been created along the San Andreas fault, and this tension had not been released by little quakes. The President indicated that he had not heard any specific time frame mentioned of the type that Gorbachev had spoken of, but all of our scientists knew that this was overdue and could happen at any time.

151. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, November 19, 1985, 11:27–12:15 p.m.

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA November, 1985

First Plenary Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

United States

President Ronald Reagan

George Shultz, Secretary of State

Donald T. Regan, Chief of Staff, White House

Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Arthur Hartman, Ambassador to the USSR

Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Robie M. Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Reykjavik Meeting—Geneva Materials 10/12/1986–10/13/1986 (1). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Palmer and Matlock. The meeting took place in the Maison Fleur d'Eau. On November 19, in his personal diary, Reagan summarized the morning meetings: "This was the day. Mr. G & I met. We were scheduled for 15 min. of pvt. one on one—we did *an hour* which excited the h—I out of the Press. Then we joined the plenary meeting. I gave him the floor 1st and he did a pitch about us not trusting them etc. We should have *no* pre-conditions set before any agreement about better relations. 'Our ruling class (munitions makers) keep our people upset at the Soviets so they can sell more weapons.' He also took off on the Heretage [Heritage] Foundation & think tanks that do the same. He said we had declared zones of special interest around the world but attacked the U.S.S.R. when they did the same thing. We must recognize right of people to a revolution. Well finally it was my turn and I took them all the way through the history of Soviet aggression etc. We broke for lunch but I assured him he'd have the floor to rebut me after lunch. Our gang told me I'd done good." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, pp. 541–542; brackets are in the original quote)

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev

Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States

Aleksandr Yakovlev, Chief, Propaganda Department, Central Committee, CPSU

Leonid M. Zamyatin, Chief, International Information Department, Central Committee, CPSU

Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to General Secretary Gorbachev

Sergey P. Tarasenko, Assistant to Minister of Foreign Affairs

Yury P. Uspensky,² Interpreter

The President and the General Secretary emerged from their private meeting and greeted each member of the other's delegation. There was then a photo opportunity. The two delegations were then seated.

The President opened the meeting by stating to the General Secretary that he was pleased that the meeting is finally underway. He noted that the two of them had been talking about how important their meetings are, and then turned the floor over to the General Secretary.

Gorbachev thanked the President. He noted that he and the President had agreed that it was important to have a constructive exchange of views at this meeting. As he had already said during their private meeting, the Soviet Union attaches a lot of importance to this meeting and to the fact that it is taking place after almost seven years since the last summit. A lot of things have changed in the world and in both of our countries. Many problems have come up which are of concern to the American people, to the Soviet people and to their leaders. We regard this meeting as a positive event, he added.

Gorbachev then returned to the question of how to proceed and at what level. He shared the view that we need to bolster confidence in our relationship. We need to think together about a mechanism for implementing this idea. This should include a political dialogue at various levels. It is not good when for extended periods our relationship is reduced to having our entire dialogue take place via the press. He understood that this was the President's idea about dialogue. The President had said that he was for talking to each other rather than about each other. The task before us is strengthening confidence. We should be looking for opportunities in various areas, for example trade and economic relations can be helpful.

Experience has shown that the Soviet Union and the United States can live without each other in the area of trade and economics. But they cannot hope that a strong peace and understanding will emerge

² Nikolai Uspensky is the correct name for the Soviet interpreter. In several meetings, the notetaker used a variation in the name or mistakenly recorded the Soviet interpreter as Yuri Uspensky.

without active links and relationships. Economic and commercial ties are important not only in themselves but also as a political link. There needs to be a material basis for the political process.

Some underestimate this fact, he continued. Sometimes these relations are used in a way which is detrimental to the process we want. This had happened in the past. He would note that the President had seen that, and had lifted the grain embargo. But, unfortunately, this action was not followed by other steps. There is interest among U.S. businessmen and in Soviet economic circles. Commercial ties can be part of the mechanism of trust.

Gorbachev said that he welcomed the President's idea for a broad based exchange of people in science, culture and other areas. He was pleased that American people are interested in a greater understanding of the Soviet people and noted that American travel to the Soviet Union was going up and had reached some 50,000 annually. He also welcomed a more lively and dynamic set of contacts between foreign ministries and embassies. High level summits should fit in with this and be the centerpiece of our mechanism for building trust.

The General Secretary said that he would build on this subject of dialogue in greater detail. He mentioned it now since he understood that it is a subject of special importance to the President.

He then returned to what he called the central point: that after many years the two leaders are meeting at a time when relations are at the lowest level ever. He did not know whether the President and his Administration find this good. The President's recent statements seemed to indicate that he wants improved relations. This is definitely the Soviet desire. They feel that despite all the existing differences and without simplifying difficulties, the two sides have to get down to steering their relations into a normal channel. He had said in their private meeting that the Soviet leadership as a whole is for this improvement, that he did not see any opposition to this view. The Soviet leadership is united in a desire to improve relations, if that is the U.S. desire. The Soviet Union is willing to accommodate the United States without preconditions. He stated this because the U.S. has set conditions for an improvement in relations. This has been unacceptable in the past, and continues to be unacceptable.

He mentioned that in Moscow he had said to Secretary Shultz and National Security Advisor McFarlane that he wanted our relations and the process of making policies to be free of delusions.³ There seem to be several delusions on the part of the American ruling class, to judge by some studies put out by U.S. "think tanks." These include such

³ See Document 138.

ideas as the contention that the Soviet economy is in a perilous state and therefore it can be subject to the pressure of an arms race to give more leverage to U.S. foreign policy. Or that the Soviet Union is lagging behind in high technology so that the United States can rush ahead and achieve military superiority. Or that the Soviet Union seeks military superiority.

He would note here what he had said to Shultz and McFarlane. The Soviet Union is often accused of causing problems for the United States in Europe and in the Third World. The two sides may have differences on concrete situations and on specific bilateral and international matters. But the USSR proceeds from a recognition of the role and weight of the United States in international affairs. The Soviets duly appreciate American achievements in technology, service and other spheres—the fruits of labor of the American people. The Soviets greatly respect the Americans. This is most important. Yes, there are differences: political, ideological, and in terms of values. But we have managed to stay alive for many years. And we have never been at war with each other. Let us pray to God that this never happens. The broad and fundamental approach he had described would make an improvement in relations possible.

He continued that it would be bad if instead of policy we have only public reactions and pinpricks. This can happen on occasion, but it is a different matter if this becomes the policy itself. This would make both the United States and the Soviet Union insecure. There needs to be a long-term prospect for the future of our relations. The Soviet Union holds that it is necessary to develop a new policy. Our countries should not be captive to outdated approaches. Life has changed and it is always changing.

He continued that whatever the two sides try to do in setting policies, the peoples of the world attach priority to the issue of war and peace. If the two of them are unable to tackle this issue, it is difficult to see how they can deal with others. This would devalue the whole process. They must deal with the critical, pivotal issue of peace and war. Their meeting must conclude by giving an impulse to the negotiations in Geneva. Of course they can send their negotiators back to Geneva. But if he and the President go home without giving any greater hope or impulse to the process, they will take a scolding in their countries and in the world. Isn't this precisely the issue which must be at the center of their attention?

Gorbachev continued that there are people linked to military affairs in both countries. He realized that there are people who earn their living from these matters. But studies in both countries have shown, what for example, Japan and the FRG have been able to do with little expenditure on the military. They have experienced an economic

upsurge. Soviet and American scholars have shown that one job in the military sector is three times as costly as in the civilian sector. More jobs can be created if money is channeled into civilian areas. The situation is so acute that if they returned without saying anything about arms control, about the first priority issue, people will maintain that this meeting gave birth to a mouse.

The United States has economic problems and the Soviet Union has them. Each knows his own problems better. But both could do better if they could release resources to the civilian economy. He knew what institutions like the Heritage Foundation—which advised the Administration particularly when the President was running for office the first and second time—were saying. Before this meeting, they had been saying that the United States should use the arms race to frustrate Gorbachev's plans, to weaken the Soviet Union. But history teaches that this was not possible earlier even when the Soviet Union was not so strong. Now that it is even stronger, this is a delusion. The Soviet Union is an enormous country which will take care of its problems.

Gorbachev continued that of course there are many problems which are particularly acute in the developing world. It makes the United States and the Soviet Union selfish to devote so much money to the military when the destiny of millions and billions of people is at stake. It should not be a surprise that there are protests against this in Latin America, Africa and elsewhere. The military is devouring huge resources. The two of them must take a realistic approach to this.

Gorbachev added that he believes there is a basis for movement to meet each other's concerns. The President had recently said that a nuclear war must never be fought.⁴ He agreed. The President had said that they should proceed on an equal basis. He agreed. The President had said he was for exchange among our peoples. The Soviet side agreed with this as well, so long as it was within a framework of respect for sovereignty and the values each society had developed. There must be a respect for the path each side has chosen.

He then said that they often hear the United States argue that there should be no agreement signed, no document signed that is not consistent with United States national interest. He would not quarrel with this, but how is one to understand national interests if there is no restraint in defining them? Can there be a right to exploit others or

⁴ See "Radio Address to the Nation and the World on the Upcoming Soviet-United States Summit Meeting in Geneva," November 9, 1985, *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book II, pp. 1362–1364; and Address to the Nation on the Upcoming Soviet-United States Summit Meeting in Geneva," November 14, 1985, *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book II, pp. 1388–1391. For the second address, see also *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 255.

to impinge on the security of others in the name of one's security? He could say for himself that this is not the way to define one's interests. He recalled a conversation with Prime Minister Thatcher in which she quoted Lord Palmerston that nations have no permanent enemies only permanent interests. He agrees with this and would say that the Soviet Union is implementing its interests in the community of nations. Both of us must take the interests of others into account.

However, what is the Soviet Union to think if the United States asserts a vital interest in areas distant from it, areas which often are very near the Soviet Union? Many zones are declared vital interests of the United States. The Soviet Union fails to understand how the United States cannot take account of other countries' interests.

Gorbachev stated that he was hopeful that when they came to the afternoon discussion, both sides could express their views about war and peace and disarmament. He would like in conclusion of his overview of the world situation to state that the Soviet Union believes that the central question is how to halt the arms race and to disarm. For its part, the Soviet Union would not put forward proposals which would be detrimental to the United States. They are for equal security. If anything detrimental to the United States was proposed, this would not be acceptable to the Soviet Union because it would not make for stability. The Soviet Union has no ulterior motives. What the President has said about equal security, no superiority and movement toward halting the arms race are the conditions for building a cooperative relationship. The United States is losing a big market in the Soviet Union; the Soviets have good economic cooperation with other countries.

Gorbachev continued that we can live in this world only together, so both must think how to put relations on a new track. If the United States thinks that by saying these things, Gorbachev is showing weakness, that the Soviet Union is more interested than the United States, then this will all come to nothing. The Soviet Union will not permit an unequal approach but if there is on the U.S. side a positive will, the United States will find the Soviets an active participant in the process.

President Reagan then began his presentation. He said that as he had noted earlier, if the two sides are to get down to the business of reducing the mountains of weapons, then both must get at the cause of the distrust which had led to building these weapons. Why does the distrust and suspicion exist? We fought together in two wars. Americans who had been bringing in supplies to help the Soviet Union in the second world war are buried near Murmansk. When that war ended, the Americans were the only ones whose industry had not been bombed and who had not sustained great losses. The Americans were the only ones who had a weapon of great devastation, the nuclear

weapon. They were the only ones able to use it if they had wanted to. But they reduced their armed forces from twelve million to a million and a half and allowed their navy to go down from a thousand ships to less than half that number. And the United States began making proposals to the Soviet Union and the world about sharing nuclear technology and doing away with the weapon. Eighteen times before this meeting the United States had proposed meetings to discuss arms reduction and for twelve of those times the United States had nuclear superiority. The United States was willing to give it up. Most of these times the United States did not get cooperation from Gorbachev's predecessors.

The President stated that this is the first meeting where we have sat down to consider reducing arms. The other meetings dealt only with regulating the increase in these weapons. In 1980 he had said that he could not condone this approach, but that he would stay at the negotiating table as long as it might take to get real reductions. He recalled that the Soviet leaders had talked about a one-world communist state and had been inspiring revolutions around the world. The United States had watched the Soviet military buildup, including in nuclear weapons. This came after dozens of United States proposals. The United States has fewer nuclear weapons than in 1969, but the Soviet buildup since then has been the greatest in history. Yes, he had made a promise to refurbish the American military and this has been done, but the United States is still behind: The Soviet Union has 5.4 million men in their armed forces: The U.S. has 2.4 million men. The United States also sees an expansionist Soviet Union. It has a satellite in Cuba just 90 miles off our shores. We had problems there with nuclear missiles but this was settled. Now we see Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola and Yemen—with for example 35,000 Cubans in Angola.

The President stated that he was setting out all of this to explain the basis for American concern and distrust. With regard to our military industry having a policy effect, he noted that our budget for humanitarian affairs—for the elderly and handicapped and for other social needs—is greater than our total military budget. Two thirds of our military spending pays for manpower; only a small percentage is spent on equipment. The total military budget is a very small percentage of our GNP; of course we would be better off without it. The basic interest of our industry is consumer products, for example the automobile and airplane industry. The United States has no economic interest in continuing a military buildup.

The President said that now the two sides have come to this meeting he had said frankly why the American people had fears. Maybe not fears of war, but that the Soviet Union could acquire such an imbalance of strength that it could deliver an ultimatum. The United States has

seen violations of arms control agreements already signed. The United States is ready to try to meet the Soviet Union's concerns if the Soviet Union is ready to meet ours. But more than words are needed. We need to get on to deeds. If we just get in bargaining over the numbers of particular types of weapons we are likely to go on trying to keep advantages. But deeds can relieve mistrust, if we can go on the basis of *trust*, then those mountains of weapons will shrink quickly as we will be confident that they are not needed.

The President continued by saying that we are the two superpowers. No other nations in the world can do what the Soviet Union and the United States can. They are the only ones which can bring about a world war. The only ones. That is a measure of their responsibility. The two must remove the causes of distrust. History since World War II has shown that if the United States had any hostile designs it was in a position to impose its will with little danger to itself. Indeed the United States had set out to reduce its superiority.

The President then said that today he wanted to talk about one specific question. Gorbachev had said that the United States was interested in achieving a first strike capability by having an anti-missile shield which would destroy missiles before they hit the target. The United States did not know whether this would be possible. The United States had a research program. The Soviet Union had the same kind of program. The United States has some hope that it might be possible. If both sides continue their research and if one or both come up with such a system then they should sit down and make it available to everyone so no one would have a fear of a nuclear strike. A mad man might come along with a nuclear weapon. If we could come up with a shield and share it, then nobody would worry about the mad man. He didn't even want to call this a weapon; it was a defensive system.

The President said that he hoped he had made clear that it is the sincerest desire of the United States to eliminate these suspicions. When he thinks of our two great powers, and of how many areas we could cooperate in helping the world, he thinks about how we must do this with deeds. This is the best way for both of us to assure the other that they have no hostile intent.

Gorbachev asked whether there was any more time. Should they stick to their schedule?

The President responded that he thought they should stick to the schedule as it calls next for lunch.

Gorbachev said this was fine and he would respond when they resumed after lunch if the President would give him the floor.

The President said that the floor was Gorbachev's.

Gorbachev said that he understood they would get into more specific discussion in the afternoon.⁵

The President agreed, and the meeting ended at 12:15 P.M.

⁵ In his memoir, *Gorbachev* recollected of the first plenary: “The first round of talks showed the extent and sharpness of the existing antagonism, mutual mistrust and ‘political deafness.’” He continued: “We had lunch at our residence, and I shared my impressions of my tête-à-tête with Reagan with my colleagues. Reagan appeared to me not simply a conservative, but a political ‘dinosaur.’ We agreed that we must take a firm stand in the talks but at the same time stick to our principal objective, without missing the slightest opportunity to achieve a breakthrough towards reasonable solutions.” (*Gorbachev, Memoirs*, p. 406)

152. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, November 19, 1985, 2:30–3:40 p.m.

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA

November, 1985

Second Plenary Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

United States

President Ronald Reagan

George Shultz, Secretary of State

Donald T. Regan, Chief of Staff, White House

Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Arthur Hartman, Ambassador to the USSR

Paul Nitze, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters

Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Robert E. Linhard, Senior Director, National Security Council Staff

William Krimer, Interpreter

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Reykjavik Meeting—Geneva Materials 10/12/1986–10/13/1986 (1). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Matlock. The meeting took place in the Maison Fleur d’Eau. Brackets are in the original. Reagan wrote in his diary on November 19: “In the P.M. session he had quite a prepared thing that had us suspicious without cause etc. Again I rebutted with some pretty solid examples—WWII then refusal to let Am. warplanes use Soviet fields etc. When I finished I suggested he & I leave the group & do another one on one.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 542)

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev

Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States

Aleksandr Yakovlev, Chief, Propaganda Department, Central Committee, CPSU

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Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to General Secretary Gorbachev

Sergey P. Tarasenko, Assistant to Minister of Foreign Affairs

Soviet Interpreter

The President offered Gorbachev the floor to comment on the President's presentation during the morning session.

Gorbachev said that they both had discussed how to conduct their meetings and during the preparations had discussed whether to focus on the causes of tensions or on solutions. Both sides had said a lot about causes. He is convinced that if they start making up a list of objections, they will not get far toward normalization, more trust and more respect—and most importantly, toward giving some impulse to the Geneva process, which is at a crucial stage now.

He will be reasonable in what he proposes. He does not plan an extensive debate over what President said. But, as he said during the private meeting this morning, the Soviets reject a “primitive approach” toward the world around us—that is that everything can be traced to some Soviet plan for supremacy or world domination. We have discussed this many times, and when it raises regional issues, the U.S. frequently charges the Soviet Union with expansionism—in Afghanistan, Angola, even South Yemen.

Hotbeds of international conflict do sour international relations, Gorbachev continued, but the Soviets cannot share U.S. views of the causes of regional conflict. You say that the Soviet Union and Soviet expansionism is responsible. But that is either a mistake or a deliberate distortion. If U.S. policies are based on this mistaken view, it is difficult to see the way out of these problems. An assessment of Soviet policy in the Third World on the basis of such a misconception can lead only to undermining international security.

Let me give you our view, Gorbachev said. We take a “principled approach” to the developing countries and their problems. First, we have no monopolies in these countries which exploit their manpower and resources. We seek no commercial concessions, but rely on our own resources one hundred percent. Therefore, we have no selfish interests or expansionist aims, and desire no military bases.

Second, if you look at the developing world in an unbiased way, you will see that there is a long-term objective process which began after World War II. It is a natural one of third-world countries first

pressing for political independence and then striving to gain control over their own resources and labor. This is the root cause of what is happening.

You overestimate the power of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev observed. The U.S. attributes to USSR the power and capability to upset the whole world, but we are realistic pragmatists who categorically oppose attempts to dominate other countries from the outside. We do oppose the export of counterrevolution. Attempts have been made to crush revolutions in the past. This happened with the American revolution, with the French Revolution and with the October Revolution. But the idea that small numbers of people from outside a country can turn it to revolution is not realistic. India, Indonesia, Korea—these are all countries with millions of people.

The U.S. speaks of Afghanistan and Ethiopia as if it were the Soviet Union that stirred the pot there. But we first heard of revolutions there on the radio. We had good relations with Haile Selassie and were not the cause of the revolution there. It is wrong to think we are plotting; this is just not right. But people want freedom and we do support “progressive movements.” We make no secret of this and it is in the Party program. But we have no secret plans for world domination.

The U.S. has its values and the Soviet Union has its own. Regional problems are caused by a social struggle evolving over many stages. Sometimes you support one faction and we another, but both of us can play a role together to solve problems, and in some areas we already do so.

In Afghanistan, the Soviet Union supports a “regularizing process” around that country, a political settlement under the United Nations, and you could help. The U.S. however does not help. You say the USSR should withdraw its troops, but actually you want them there, and the longer the better.

Gorbachev continued, saying that the Soviets are ready to promote a package solution involving a non-aligned Afghanistan, Soviet troop withdrawal, the return of refugees, and international guarantees of no outside interference. There are possibilities for a political reconciliation, he added, and said that Afghanistan is already ready to cooperate, but requires the cooperation of all groups.

He then asserted that the Soviet Union has no plan for using Afghanistan to gain access to a warm water port, to extend its influence to the Persian Gulf, or to impinge on U.S. interests in any way. It is a situation which could be used to improve our overall relationship, by fostering cooperation by the conflicting sides and abstaining from interference. It is an area we should explore, he concluded.

Gorbachev then stated that these are just examples to illustrate the Soviet policy toward the Third World. Basically the issues are internal

problems for the states involved. We can continue to work on these issues with our discussions by specialists on regional matters.

Gorbachev then noted that the President had charged that it is the Soviet Union which had been building up its arms while the U.S. acted with restraint. This is a major question. Much depends on the character of the present strategic situation and how it will develop in the future. It is the central question of our relations.

Gorbachev continued by saying that twenty years ago there was no strategic balance; U.S. had four times as many strategic delivery systems than the USSR and also forward-based systems. He then asked rhetorically what the U.S. would have done if the Soviet Union had possessed four times as much? The U.S. would have had to take steps, just as the Soviet Union did, to establish parity.

In fact, Gorbachev asserted, the U.S. has tripled the number of its nuclear weapons and has more nuclear weapons than the Soviet Union. Negotiations began as we approached parity, and the Soviets have not violated the nuclear balance and are not trying to surpass the U.S., since superiority cannot be the basis for normal relations. All institutes which study the problem, including the ISS in London, conclude that there is strategic parity. Force structures are different, but they support different strategies.

The Soviet Union wants parity at a lower level, he continued. We are for equal security and agreed to embark upon the negotiations in Geneva. We must meet each other half way if we are to find a way to reduce strategic weapons. The time has come for us both to muster the political will and realism to make progress and to end efforts to outsmart or overrun the other side. Even now, due to computer technology, one side could get ahead in space. But we can match any challenge, though you might not think so. We know that the U.S. can meet any challenge from us and we can meet any challenge from you. But why not make a step which would permit lowering the arms level?

Gorbachev then said that they, the Soviets, think SDI can lead to an arms race in space, and not just a defensive arms race but an offensive arms race with space weapons. Space weapons will be harder to verify and will feed suspicions and mistrust. Scientists say any shield can be pierced, so SDI cannot save us. So why create it? It only makes sense if it is to defend against a *retaliatory* strike. What would the West think if the Soviet Union was developing these weapons? You would react with horror. Weinberger has said that if the USSR had such a defense first, it would be bad. If we go first, you feel it would be bad for the world, feeding mistrust. We cannot accept the rationale which says it is good if you do it and bad if we do it.

Gorbachev then said that he knows President is attached to the program, and for that reason the Soviets have analyzed it seriously.

The Soviet conclusion is that if the U.S. implements its plan, the Soviet Union will not cooperate in an effort to gain superiority over it. We will have to frustrate this plan, and we will build up in order to smash your shield.

You say the Soviet Union is doing the same, he continued, but asserted that this is not the case. Both of us do research in space of course, but Soviet research is for peaceful purposes. The U.S. in contrast has military aims, and that is an important difference. The U.S. goal violates the ABM Treaty, which is of fundamental importance. Testing is also inconsistent with the Treaty, and can only exacerbate mistrust.

If the U.S. embarks on SDI, the following will happen: (1) no reduction of offensive weapons; and (2) Soviet Union will respond. This response will not be a mirror image of your program, but a simpler, more effective system. What will happen if you put in your “seven layers” of defense in space and we put in ours? It will just destabilize the situation, generate mistrust, and waste resources. It will require automatization which will place important decisions in the hands of computers and political leaders will just be in bunkers with computers making the decisions. This could unleash an uncontrollable process. You haven’t thought this through; it will be a waste of money, and also will cause more distrust and more weapons.

Gorbachev then referred to the President’s remarks regarding the need for a defense against some madman in the future who might get his hands on nuclear weapons. He observed that they should remember that they will have sufficient retaliatory force for a long time to deter such use.

Gorbachev then concluded by saying that verification will not be a problem if the basic question is solved. The Soviets are prepared for full verification of a ban on space weapons. If such a ban is agreed upon, then the two countries could negotiate on their respective proposals for offensive weapons reduction. The Soviets are ready to compromise. If space weapons are banned, the situation would be completely different; it would create a new attitude on the Soviet side. The process would be different, however, if they leave Geneva without any agreements. If agreement on this point is not possible, then the Soviets would have to rethink the current situation.

The President then made the following points:

—Gorbachev’s presentation illustrates the lack of trust between us. It is difficult for us to understand the level of suspicion which the Soviet Union holds.

—Even when we were allies in World War II we encountered inexplicable Soviet suspicion. For example, permission was not given for U.S. bombers to land on Soviet territory in order to reduce the

dangers of bombing our common enemy. We cannot understand this kind of suspicion.

—Gorbachev spoke of parity, but there is none today. True that U.S. once had nuclear superiority, but in June, 1946, offered to place all nuclear weapons under international control. It has also made numerous other offers, and the President listed twelve such between 1953 and 1969.

—Since SALT-I was signed, the Soviet Union has added 6,000 nuclear warheads. Since SALT-II, 3,850 have been added. Meanwhile, the U.S. removed 2400 warheads from Europe, while the Soviet Union threatened Europe with its SS-20's. Our Allies requested protection and it fell to President to implement their request when Soviets refused to conclude an agreement to remove the threat.

—Now we are locked in a Mutual Assured Destruction policy. The U.S. does not have as many ICBM's as Soviet Union, but has enough to retaliate. But there is something uncivilized about this. Laws of war were developed over the centuries to protect civilians, but civilians are the targets of our vast arsenals today.

—The Strategic Defense Initiative is the President's idea. History teaches that a defense is found for every offensive weapon. We don't know if strategic defensive weapons will be possible, but if they are, they should not be coupled with an offensive force. Latter must be reduced so it will not be a threat. And if strategic defenses prove possible, we would prefer to sit down and get rid of nuclear weapons, and with them, the threat of war.

—Regarding Afghanistan: Their "leader" was supplied by the Soviet Union. Actually he was their second choice, since the first one did not work out as they wished. The Soviet invasion has created three million refugees. He made suggestion for solution at UN. Specifically, how about bringing about the mutual withdrawal of all outside forces, then forming a coalition of Islamic states to supervise the installation of a government chosen by the people of Afghanistan?

—Regarding Cambodia: We signed an agreement with North Vietnam. It was violated and the North Vietnamese took over South Vietnam and also Laos and Cambodia. It now rules Cambodia. We should put an end to this and together supervise establishment of a government chosen by the Cambodian people.

—Regarding Nicaragua: The Soviets have advisers there. The Sandinistas have built a tremendous military machine, far more than they need for defense. They have declared an aim of spreading revolution elsewhere. The President then reviewed the history of Somoza's removal—the appeal to the OAS, and the Sandinista promise of free elections and a free press. But then when Somoza was removed, the

Sandinistas forced other groups out of the coalition and are trying to establish totalitarian control. The Contras are only trying to reinstate the goals of the original revolution.

—Such things as those noted are behind our suspicion and mistrust.

—Every military judgment has it that Soviet forces are designed for offensive operations.

—The U.S. willing to work on an agreement to move away from mutual threats. SDI would never be used by U.S. to improve its offensive capability or to launch a first strike. SDI should not lead to an arms race; we can both decide to reduce and eliminate offensive weapons.

—These are things we could do to remove mistrust. Our goal is not an arms race. We can return to parity in one of two ways: either we both reduce offensive weapons, or we can build them up and use defensive systems to offset them. The U.S. does not seek superiority, but will do what is necessary to protect its freedoms.

Gorbachev then asked what they should tell their negotiators in Geneva.

The President replied that they could be given guidelines to reduce nuclear weapons, say by 50%. We could negotiate on the structure of forces, since we know the structure of our forces is different.

Gorbachev asked about the U.S. goal of SDI and how this relates to our January agreement to prevent an arms race in space.

The President said that he did not see a defensive shield as an arms race in space. He then recounted a conversation between a Chinese official and Ambassador Walters, in which Walters was asked what happens when a man with a spear that can penetrate anything meets a man with a shield that is impenetrable. Walters responded that he did not know, but that he did know what happens when a man with no shield meets that same opponent who has the spear. Neither of us wants to be in the position of having no shield.

Gorbachev then asked whether the President considered developing SDI weapons as the militarization of space.

The President replied that he did not. If the technology was developed, it should be shared. Neither side should deploy until the other did. It should be done in combination with lowering offensive weapons so that neither could gain a first-strike advantage.

The President then invited *Gorbachev* to take a walk for another private conversation and the two departed at 3:40 p.m.

153. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, November 19, 1985, 3:40–4:45 p.m.

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA

November, 1985

Second Private Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

United States

President Reagan

William D. Krimer, Interpreter

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

General Secretary Gorbachev

N. Uspensky,² Interpreter

During their brief walk from the villa at Fleur d'Eau to the pool house, the President and General Secretary Gorbachev did not discuss substance, confining their conversation to the President's old movies. In the course of that conversation the President suggested to Mr. Gorbachev that he inform Mr. Arbatov that he had made not only grade-B movies, but also a few good ones. Gorbachev mentioned that he had recently seen "Kings Row" and had liked it very much.

INF and SDI

Seated in front of a fireplace at the pool house *the President* handed Gorbachev some papers and suggested that they might contain the

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Reykjavik Meeting—Geneva Materials 10/12/1986–10/13/1986 (1). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Krimer. The meeting took place in the Pool House at Maison Fleur d'Eau. In his diary on November 19, Reagan wrote of this private meeting: "We walked down to a pool house on the lake shore. Eddy had a fire going & we did about 2 hours on S.D.I. He's adamant but so am I. I scored one we've worried about; —that the meetings should be on an ongoing basis. He accepted my invite to the U.S. next year & I'm invited to the U.S.S.R. in '87. That in itself could make the meeting a success." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 542)

² Nikolai Uspensky is the correct name for the Soviet interpreter. In several meetings, the notetaker used a variation in the name or mistakenly recorded the Soviet interpreter as Yuri Uspensky.

seed of something the two of them could agree upon.³ He added that he had one copy done in Russian.

Gorbachev devoted a few minutes to reading through the separate documents.

Gorbachev prefaced his reaction by saying that, of course, what he would present now was based on his first impression of what was contained in the formulations. He thought that some of the issues dealt with did contain some substance that merited serious discussion with a view to bringing the positions of the sides closer together.

With reference to space weapons he had some questions to ask and, on the basis of his first reading, some considerations and objections to state. He would first refer to something that could be left for further discussions.

The President interjected to the effect that the material set forth in these papers should be viewed as a seed for possible instructions to the arms negotiators of both sides.

Gorbachev said he understood the President's idea, but still had some objections to state.

With reference to paragraph 1 of the first paper, concerning 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms, that was acceptable and he was prepared here to discuss this matter in terms of seeking a mutually acceptable solution. However, he would have to note that during the meeting between Foreign Ministers in Geneva last January agreement had been reached that such reductions would be negotiated together with an agreement halting an arms race in space. In other words, arms reductions must be viewed in their interrelationship with space weapons. That idea had been agreed upon in Geneva in January, but he had to note that here it seems to have evaporated.

³ The papers were not found. However, in his memoir, Gorbachev wrote: "The walk, the change of scene, the crackling of burning wood—all these helped to alleviate the tension. But as soon as we sat down, Reagan rushed back to his old tactics. Seemingly anxious that I might take up SDI again—this time 'one on one'—he decided to anticipate my move by taking out a list of arms control proposals and handing them to me. As I understood it, the paper was not intended for discussion, but rather, for acceptance on a 'take it or leave it' basis. It was then to be sent to our negotiators as instructions. It was a nine-point package, written in English and in Russian. The list included many issues we had already discussed without reaching any agreement. President Reagan stressed that the American side saw these suggestions as a package deal. I read the list unhurriedly and replied that even on a first reading I noted points that were unacceptable to us. In the first place, the package deal would have allowed the United States to proceed with the SDI programme. We were going round in circles. The fire was burning and the room was warm and cosy, but the conversation had not improved the general mood. We went outside again and I suddenly felt very cold—maybe in contrast to the warmth by the fireside or to our heated discussion." (*Gorbachev, Memoirs*, pp. 407–408)

The President said that he did not see these defensive weapons as constituting a part of the arms race in view of what he had said just a few moments ago at the table, to the effect that if and when such arms were developed, they would be shared with everyone involved in nuclear weapons. Why could this matter not be set aside in order to see what could be agreed upon regarding the sharing of such things? This would enable the two sides to determine what policies were available that could help all of us to get rid of nuclear weapons.

Without reacting to the President's latter remark, *Gorbachev* said that that was his first comment. His second comment regarding the same section of the document he had just read was to note the suggestion that a separate interim agreement be concluded limiting land-based INF missiles with a view to eventual complete elimination of such missiles. This, too, required further clarification. What weapons would be covered in such an agreement, taking into account the existence of not only U.S. but also British and French missiles of that type? This had not been made clear.

Secondly, in the paper mentioning the possible interim agreement only land-based medium-range missiles were mentioned; what about medium-range cruise missiles launched from aircraft or from aircraft carriers? One had to note immediately that under the language contained in the document some nuclear weapons would clearly remain outside limitations; nevertheless, they did exist, they could be fired and naturally should also be covered by any agreement.

Moving on to paragraph 3 of the same document concerning research conducted by each side in the area of strategic ABM defense, Gorbachev wanted to ask precisely what the President had in mind when speaking of such research. He understood that basic research in laboratories was underway (he meant scientific laboratories, of course) but would also note that such research should not include the construction of prototypes or samples, or their testing. He emphasized that it was necessary to clarify the precise meaning of that research. The reason he was asking this question was that he knew that in the President's White House today two different interpretations of the ABM Treaty's provisions were in existence. One was a narrow interpretation which had been contained in a number of documents of the U.S. Congress and of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. That narrow interpretation was always limited to research not going beyond the threshold of laboratory work. Now, however, he was also aware of a broader interpretation, under which the construction of prototypes and samples would be permitted. Under that interpretation one could in no way speak about complying with the provisions of the ABM Treaty. Thus, further clarification was needed here as well.⁴

⁴ See Document 147.

The President said that we did indeed have more than one interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Under one such interpretation testing would be included in order to know that in practice we did have such a weapon. Just to have a laboratory theory would not be enough. It was his thought that all this could be covered by an agreement under which we as well as others could agree that no country would have a monopoly of such weapons. They would be shared by all. The worst thing that he could imagine was for any one country to acquire a first-strike capability.

Gorbachev noted that the Soviet Union had declared for all the world to hear, and was now declaring to the United States as well, that the Soviet Union would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Was this not sufficient if this matter were taken seriously? However, he had to note that the United States did not believe him.

The President interjected that he and *Gorbachev* might not always be here.

Gorbachev said that when he spoke of not being believed he meant that the United States did not believe the Soviet Union's statement he had just mentioned. In that case, why should the Soviet Union believe the President's statement about sharing results of the research in question, and that the United States would not take advantage of having developed a strategic defense?

The President replied that that was because the negotiators of both sides could set down in a specific agreement that both governments had agreed not to retain a monopoly of defensive weapons, an agreement that he and *Gorbachev* would sign. He would also point out that our two countries were not alone in the world. There were others, such as Qaddhafi, for example, and people of that kind, who would not at all be averse to dropping a nuclear weapon on the White House. He believed in the idea of both our governments agreeing that both conduct relevant research and that both share the results of such research; if one country produced a defensive shield before the other, it would make it available to all.

As for believing the Soviet Union's commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, the President would remind *Gorbachev* that in Stockholm we had subscribed to the doctrine that countries must not use force against each other.

With some emotion *Gorbachev* appealed to the President as follows: if the two sides were indeed searching for a way to halt the arms race and to begin to deal seriously with disarmament, then what would be the purpose of deploying a weapon that is as yet unknown and unpredictable? Where was the logic of starting an arms race in a new sphere? It must clearly be understood that verification of such weapons would be totally unreliable because of their maneuverability and mobil-

ity even if they were classified as defensive. People would not be in a position to determine what it was that would be placed into space and would surely regard it as an additional threat, thereby creating crisis situations. If the goal was to get rid of nuclear weapons, why start an arms race in another sphere?

The President asked Gorbachev to remember that these were not weapons that kill people or destroy cities, these were weapons that destroy nuclear missiles. If there were agreement that there would be no need for nuclear missiles, then one might agree that there would also be no need for defenses against them. But he would also urge Gorbachev to remember that we were talking about something that was not yet known, and that if it were known, that would still be years away. Why then should we sit here in the meanwhile with mountains of weapons on each side?

Gorbachev countered by suggesting that they announce to the world that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev had declared firmly in official statements that both countries would refrain from research, development, testing and deployment of space weapons and that such agreement would be subject to appropriate verification. Thus they could implement the idea of open laboratories and at the same time begin the process of 50-percent reductions in offensive arms.

The President asked if Gorbachev had in mind that Soviet laboratories would be open to visits by our experts and that their experts would be free to visit our laboratories.

Gorbachev replied that the Soviet Union would agree to open its laboratories provided they were used for the purpose of verifying how the agreement on banning and non-use of space weapons was being complied with.

The President said he did not know why Gorbachev kept on speaking of space weapons. We had no idea of precisely what the nature of these weapons would be; however, we certainly had no intention of putting something into space that would threaten people on Earth. Some years ago there had been some talk about putting nuclear missiles into orbit in space, weapons that could be dropped on any point on Earth. This was not what he was talking about. He would recall that in 1925 in this city of Geneva all of the countries that had participated in World War I had met and had reached agreement not to use poison gas warfare. Nevertheless, all had kept their gas masks. What he was saying now was that we should go forward to rid the world of the threat of nuclear weapons, but at the same time retain something like that gas mask, i.e., a shield that would protect our countries should there be an unforeseeable return to nuclear missiles.

Gorbachev wanted to repeat something he had said at the plenary meeting. He had pointed out that the Soviet Government had really

carefully considered everything that had been said by the President with regard to SDI, especially all his arguments in favor of SDI. To a certain extent he could understand the President on a human level; he could understand that the idea of strategic defense had captivated the President's imagination. However, as a political leader he could not possibly agree with the President with regard to this concept. He would assure the President that this was not the result of some merely capricious attitude. He was not saying this for some sort of petty reasons. On the basis of profound analysis by scientists, Soviet as well as American, he had to conclude that if the Soviet Union were to agree to proceed along the direction of SDI, and this was confirmed by almost all authoritative people, if it were dragged into this new dimension of the arms race, the other side would be bound to lose confidence and would seek to counter SDI in any possible way, including by increasing the numbers of its offensive arms. Thus, it would not make any sense at all for the Soviet Union to help the U.S. in the development of a strategic defense. In addition, he would point out that a defense against one certain level of strategic missiles was one thing, but a defense against a much larger number of such missiles would not be reliable at all. This could only lead to the conclusion that the only possible use of a strategic defense was to defend against a weakened retaliatory strike not against a first strike. It should certainly be realized by the President as well that the great majority of people throughout the world, including scientists, were extremely concerned over the development of space weapons, whatever their avowed purpose. Among such people were a number of U.S. Secretaries of Defense and such experts as Ambassadors Smith and Warnke.⁵ Gorbachev knew what they had said about it, he had read their statements and it was clear that strategic defense would only be useful after a first strike by the side deploying such defense. This was a very serious problem today and he would ask the President to reflect on it seriously. The Soviet Union had no desire to harm him as President or to harm the United States as a country. He firmly believed it necessary to do all in his power to prevent this from happening. He would urge the President jointly with him to find a way of formulating guidelines for their negotiators with a view to stopping SDI.

The President thought they had used up a considerable amount of time at this meeting. He thought the plenary meeting was about to conclude in any event, but he would say one thing. He would ask Gorbachev to consider this matter once again. He recognized that both of them had made some strong statements and that it would be difficult

⁵ Gerard C. Smith and Paul Warnke were former Directors of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. They were also members of the U.S. SALT delegation.

for either of them to reverse direction. However, it seemed to him that in his idea of ultimately sharing the results of research there was something that might be of interest to both of them. He had to tell Gorbachev that our people overwhelmingly wanted this defense. They look at the sky and think what might happen if missiles suddenly appear and blow up everything in our country. We believe that the idea of having a defense against nuclear missiles involved a great deal of faith and belief. When he said we, he meant most of mankind.

Gorbachev pointed out that missiles were not yet flying, and whether or not they would fly would depend on how he and the President conducted their respective policies. But if SDI were actually implemented, then layer after layer of offensive weapons, Soviet as well as U.S. weapons, would appear in outer space and only God himself would know what they were. In this connection he would note that God provides information only very selectively and rarely. He appealed to the President to recognize the true signal he was conveying to him as President and to the U.S. Administration as a whole that the Soviet Union did indeed wish to establish a new relationship with the United States and deliver our two nations from the increasing fear of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union had conducted a deep analysis of the entire situation and had come to the conclusion that it was necessary precisely now to proceed on the basis of the actual situation; later it would be too late. This was why the Soviet Union had tabled serious and comprehensive proposals concerning strategic weapons, medium-range weapons and others. This had been the result of a thorough assessment and profound understanding of where the two countries stood today. They now had a chance which they must not fail to take advantage of. He would ask the President not to regard this as weakness on the part of Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership.

During the walk back to the villa *Gorbachev* noted that this would not be their last meeting. *The President* expressed the hope that their next meeting would take place on U.S. soil, and said that he would be pleased to accept an invitation to visit the Soviet Union in return.⁶ *Gorbachev* agreed and suggested that dates and modalities be worked out by their respective staffs.

⁶ In his memoir, Gorbachev continued to discuss this meeting: "At that point, the President unexpectedly invited me to visit the United States and I reciprocated by inviting him to Moscow. As it seems to me now, something important happened to each of us on that day, in spite of everything. I think there had been two factors at work—responsibility and intuition. I did not have this impression after lunch, and in the evening we were still clinging to our antagonistic positions. But the 'human factor' had quietly come into action. We both sensed that we must maintain contact and try to avoid a break. Somewhere in the back of our minds a glimmer of hope emerged that we could still come to an agreement." (*Gorbachev, Memoirs*, p. 408)

154. Record of a Meeting¹

Geneva, November 19, 1985

Meeting While Leaders Walk

Shultz:

—Do you wish to talk on guidelines? No need to let the time pass. There are some points of intersection. We could try to narrow it down. President Reagan is doing that. Do you have suggestions?

Shevardnadze:

—The General Secretary has outlined our approach: a ban of space weapons, and an exploration of the gap between our two proposals.

Dobrynin:

—This would provide short, good guidelines.

Shultz:

—We will not stop our research. President Reagan is ready to talk about what we can do if progress is made—and we are ready to talk about this now.

Shevardnadze:

—I can't understand the purpose of this.

Shultz:

—Our purpose is to move the concept of deterrence into a more stable and humane posture. It will also serve to deal with unstabilization of offensive arms brought about by increasing accuracy and mobility. Those developments bring us to the need for a shield. Stability can be enhanced if it is not a race, but is a cooperative effort. Unilateral actions are not stable. A negotiated transition would be more stable.

Shevardnadze:

—What you are proposing, cooperating in unknown area, is more like science fiction. The General Secretary has said if we can agree on a ban, then on that basis, and on proposals put forth by both, there is a realistic way forward. You have said that what is destabilizing today is offensive forces, but I say it is your SDI. But for this program, we could have serious progress in Geneva. One more point, not mentioned earlier, you have been saying in the context of explaining your SDI

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chron, Geneva Summit Records, 11/19/1985–11/21/1985 (2 of 4). Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information. All brackets are in the original. This side meeting among Shultz, Shevardnadze, and their assistants took place during the Gorbachev-Reagan private meeting that started at 3:40 p.m.; see Document 153.

program that the USSR has similar research and that we are somewhere ahead of you. This is being asserted by your press and your official spokesman. If that is so, why are we now proposing a ban on a space strike?

Shultz:

—I am confident your research is parallel to ours, and I can tell you why we feel it exists.

Nitze:

—In the area of lasers, there is no doubt.

Shevardnadze:

—If you have invited us to talk to convince us of the utility of SDI, I doubt you can do it. As the General Secretary has said, our arguments are not made of thin air. We have worked this issue with our experts. As a result, we hold deep convictions that the development of space strike arms will usher in new era of the arms race. Any talk of regulating this process by treaty is not realistic. In fact it is most unrealistic. The right decision is not to allow a new cycle of the arms race.

—We may not be informed on your data, but can one say that any guarantee that defense weapons will not be used for offense is no guarantee. Any defensive weapon can be used for offense.

—Let me ask, President Reagan and others have said that after you find out if development is feasible, and before deployment, you will share the benefits of the research. But, the research to get to that point will take many years. Will President Reagan have the same policy and objectives ten to fifteen years from now? In 10–15 years, when your weapons are developed, we will have own objectives. In the process, treaties will be thrown away. How can we be assured we can trust your actions that are 10–15 years in the future?

Shultz:

—[Interrupting] That is a good question. We have proposed an “open laboratories” approach calling for visits back and forth to eliminate surprises. Our scientists could visit each others’ laboratories so they can get a sense of what is taking place.

—Secondly, it is in our interest to maintain such a policy, not a matter of goodwill or trust. It is in our interest to have a cooperative development rather than unilateral defensive deployment. Unilateral action creates instability. It creates concern in the mind of the side not deploying. It is simply not in our interest to create instability, therefore, it is not in our interest to handle the transition differently than President Reagan has proposed.

—Third, our two sides are finally discussing reductions. This has been a long time coming. Our agenda, agreed here in Geneva, put both offense and defense on the table. President Reagan and General

Secretary Gorbachev both have said they aspire to go to zero. The more you get down to zero, the more a defensive shield is an insurance policy vice a device to let offensive forces strike without risk. So if we stay on this path, and get others to join, we will change the nature of the situation.

Shevardnadze:

—If you would permit, I would like to respond and ask a question. We are now discussing deep cuts in offensive strategic weapons, cutting all by 50% as we look for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. If we are serious in following this path, and others join us in this, why do we need the shield? What is it for, since we will not only eliminate the weapons but also take measures to ensure none retain them?

Shultz:

—Good point, verification is needed.

McFarlane:

—Your question is reasonable. Treaties are broken. However, the history of actions by democrats provides a basis for judgment. Recent evidence demonstrates that, even if we have no treaties but only agreements, we have continued to observe them beyond expiration when we had no reason to do so. This should provide some basis for confidence.

—Did you intend to propose a question about the period of time while we are under ABM Treaty?

Korniyenko:

—Another point, this may seem strange but I do think it applies here.

—President Reagan began his explanation of mistrust by asserting that US pilots died because the USSR did not allow US planes to land—but this is inconsistent with the truth. The truth is that, as soon as sufficient territory was liberated to get within range for planes, a huge Soviet air base at Poltava was opened in 1944. They used this airfield as much as needed.

—I personally was a citizen defending that air base, and was injured. Many died there. I know the US general in charge. Everyone knows about that.

—Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has said that Stalin and FDR did not have misconceptions on this.

—What kind of information is being given to President Reagan? Who does this, and what do they inform him of?

Shultz:

—If President Reagan is wrong, I will tell him.

—Let us turn to different subjects.

—Three important things were said today. Two by the General Secretary, and one by Shevardnadze.

—You said we should be working on a way of expressing the results of our meeting since we found many areas of agreement. That's true.

—This afternoon, the General Secretary spoke of Afghanistan, noting that a political settlement is highly desirable. We agree.

—The way the General Secretary made his comments is new to me. Maybe something can be worked out.

—We agreed beyond so-called expert talks and that at the foreign minister level we should continue to have meetings on our agenda, and on processes that we should consider.

—I put this down as a plus. Then I added something else said this morning. The General Secretary laid out an outline for a desirable process for our two countries involving meetings at varied levels, down to citizens. We agree this is desirable.

—This brings me to the question of how to report results of our meeting to our countries and publics at large.

—I gave Dobrynin a statement that we agreed on drawn from your previous document. I added a paragraph that refers to areas of agreement as listed on the following pages:

—we already have some items agreed, like NPT language.

—If you want to work on this. Fine. I propose we use the meeting at 9 p.m. this evening for this purpose.

Dobrynin:

—But what is following page?

Shultz:

—That depends on what is agreed upon. I showed Dobrynin in Washington only one page. This is a way to prepare to add on to this as appropriate and tell the public we met—did not agree on all but made some progress—and here's what we agreed.

Shevardnadze:

—Not really clear what kind of issues would follow.

Dobrynin:

—In addition to guidelines, what should be there?

Shultz:

—What we can agree:

—NPT

—Cultural agreement

—No PAC

—Regional talks and FM impetus to them

—Arms control—not only guidelines

—Try to find things we agreed.

Shevardnadze:

—Today the General Secretary has mentioned a political mechanism that should function.

Shultz:

—We agree and have said we endorsed this.

—It is reflected in this approach.

Shevardnadze:

—We have mentioned this because the mechanism has components: the Summit; foreign minister's meetings; Geneva negotiations; political consultations on regional matters; negotiations on Civil Air, etc.

Shultz:

—Also people exchanges.

—We had all of this in mind.

Shevardnadze:

—We should record the facts of this meeting to give political impetus to this meeting.

—What we need is serious and sound documentation.

—Ridgway and Sokolov will meet tonight.

[1654 PM. At this point the President and Secretary General returned and the meeting ended.]²

² In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "While they were talking by the fire, Shevardnadze and I and all the others chatted among ourselves. The two leaders returned an hour later, having discussed inconclusively our approach to arms control. Both were obviously in a good mood. The president made an important announcement to us. They had agreed on reciprocal visits: first Gorbachev to a Washington summit, then Reagan to a Moscow summit. I was surprised and encouraged, as much by the obvious rapport between the two men as by their quick agreement without hesitation on reciprocal visits for two follow-on summit meetings. Such agreement was one of our main objectives in Geneva. The president's brand of personal diplomacy seemed to be working." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 601)

155. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, November 19, 1985, 8–10:30 p.m.

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA
November, 1985

Dinner Hosted by the Gorbachevs

PARTICIPANTS

United States

President Reagan

Mrs. Reagan

Secretary of State George Shultz

Chief of Staff Donald Regan

Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Ambassador Arthur Hartman

Mrs. E. Arensburger, Interpreter

William Hopkins, Interpreter

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

General Secretary Gorbachev

Mrs. Gorbacheva

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Korniyenko

Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin

Ambassador Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov

Mr. P. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

At the beginning of the dinner, General Secretary Gorbachev announced that he had invited President Reagan to come to the Soviet Union and President Reagan had extended an invitation to Gorbachev to come to the U.S.A. Both had accepted, but no definite time was set. At that point the ladies announced that they, too, had extended an invitation to each other to come to their respective countries. There was much joking to the effect that Mrs. Reagan could come alone if President Reagan could not make it.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US–USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Reykjavik Meeting—Geneva Materials 10/12/1986–10/13/1986 (1). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Eugenia Arensburger and William Hopkins. The dinner took place at the Villa at the Soviet Mission. On November 19, Reagan wrote in his diary: “Tonight to their place for dinner. And what a dinner—they must be influenced by the Orientals. Course after course & for half of them I thought each one had to be the entrée. Finally dessert & by this time it was time to go home & that’s what you did because the host & hostess pushed back their chairs & escorted us to the front door. When you have dinner with the Russians—dinner is the full evenings entertainment.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 542)

When the caviar was served, President Reagan spoke of sturgeon in the Sacramento River and Gorbachev told Mrs. Reagan of the building of hydroelectric dams on the Volga, which had decimated much of the beluga in the Caspian Sea. They had made some mistakes, he said, but now they were rectified and the fish were thriving.

Mrs. Reagan asked Gorbachev about tourism in the Soviet Union, and he told her at length about the Soviet tourist industry, how it was being built up and expanded, and at the end joked about the fact that tourism not only builds international understanding, but brings foreign currency into the Soviet Union.

Addressing himself to Mrs. Reagan and Mr. McFarlane, Gorbachev spoke of Russian history, about the fact that Russia had acted as a buffer zone for Europe throughout the centuries. Russia itself was invaded by the Mongols of Central Asia and therefore, he said, “Scratch a Russian and find a Tartar.” Because Russia had been Europe’s buffer, he said, it had fallen behind. It had experienced many invasions, from the Mongols to Napoleon, not to mention two world wars. Nevertheless, Russia has always been able to recuperate from her wounds and build up her strength.

During the course of the dinner, perhaps to encourage his guests’ appetite, Gorbachev quoted the Russian scientist Timiryazev, who said that food was the closest man could come to communing with nature.

Mrs. Gorbachev said that American playwrights were very popular in the Soviet Union, especially Tennessee Williams and Albee. The Gorbachevs had recently seen a Moscow production of *Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?* and argued at the table about who had given the better portrayal—Elizabeth Taylor or the Russian actress.

Mrs. Reagan asked about the Soviet film industry and was told by Gorbachev and Korniyenko about the many film studios in various parts of the country. Three of the largest are in Moscow.

Mrs. Reagan asked about drug abuse in the Soviet Union and was told that the drug problem was very small in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev then told her that his anti-alcoholism campaign was a huge success and enjoyed great grass-roots support. Coffee shops and ice cream parlors are becoming profitable ventures because people appear to be enjoying them more than hard liquor. He said that he had thought at the beginning of the campaign that moonshine production would increase, however, they found that since the beginning of the campaign the consumption of sugar has actually gone down. He explained that large amounts of sugar were used in distilling a home brew. Apparently, such activity was not being indulged in.

Mrs. Reagan and Gorbachev spoke of their respective families and Gorbachev said it was his belief that the family was the foundation of society. He felt that there was a risk now of that foundation eroding. Too many people were living together without benefit of marriage, and there were too many single-parent families, especially among European Russians. This was not the case in Central Asia, he said, where the average family had 5–6 children and two and even three generations all live together in one house. He said that he meant to speak about family values at the next Party Congress.

IMPROMPTU TOASTS

General Secretary Gorbachev's Remarks

General Secretary Gorbachev rose and remarked that he was happy to have everyone here together, and there would certainly be no speeches at this dinner. However, he said he wanted at this table this evening, where such a good atmosphere reigned, to welcome the President and Mrs. Reagan. (Mrs. Reagan remarked to the Soviet interpreter that the General Secretary had referred to her as "Nancy.") He welcomed President Reagan and his American colleagues to the Soviet Mission, on this "little bit of the Soviet Union."

He said that everyone present knew the reason why they were in Geneva. Yet, he said the fact that they had relaxed a little bit at this dinner did not mean that they would neglect the reasons why they had come here. He added that his purpose in rising to speak was not to bring up the seriousness of the reasons why they were in Geneva. He said that first, he simply wanted to greet his guests very cordially.

He said that speaking in human terms, he was happy to get acquainted with his guests and he expressed the hope that it would be possible to achieve the kind of understanding and spirit in which it would be possible to discuss "people" problems.

He noted that one day of the meetings had passed, and only one day was left. He said he wanted to recall a line from the Bible to express the Soviet side's desire as to how the meetings should go. The Biblical quotation was to the effect that there is a time to throw stones, and there is a time to gather them; now is the time to gather stones which have been cast in the past. The seven years in which there were no meetings between the Presidents of the United States and the General Secretaries of the Soviet Union were filled with considerable changes in the world. It would be possible to describe and explain what happened in the world during that time and much could be said by way of explanation. More important than that, however, is the lesson of those times, namely, that the President and the General Secretary must

meet and talk about where the two countries are, and how they view each other, and how the two countries intend to build their relations in this many-faceted world of ours. He said that the current day was waning and in a positive atmosphere at that. He noted that the participants had laid out their positions on a broad range of problems of concern to the USSR and the U.S. and to all of the nations of the world. He said he had noticed the word “responsibility” used frequently in relation to this meeting. He said both the President and he understood that the frequent use of that word in itself emphasized the responsibility they bore as world leaders.

He continued that as far as the future is concerned, it can be built, if it is built by the two countries together. That can be done despite all of the countries’ differences and the depth of those differences—that had been visible even in the discussions held today—because the process of moving toward each other through this method of meetings had begun, and it was necessary to continue the process of moving forward.

He said that it was true that one cartoonist had sent him a cartoon which showed him and President Reagan standing on the two sides of the abyss. On one side was President Reagan and on the other side was Gorbachev. Reagan calls to Gorbachev across the abyss “Gorby, I am prepared to go my part of the way,” and “Gorby” says to Reagan, “Come ahead.” Joking aside, he said, if the two leaders go their part of the way together, they will not end up in the abyss finally, but rather with a higher degree of understanding and trust that will be the basis of the long-term outlook of U.S.-Soviet relations.

He continued that there are certain questions without whose examination it would be difficult to leave Geneva, and he recalled the Nobel prize winner’s letter saying that he and the President should stay in Geneva as long as necessary to resolve the questions of war and peace. (He said he thought at that rate they would be there until Christmas.) He added that, seriously, there were problems which would require thinking and an overall approach. If those questions are not addressed, it will be difficult to go on, and there will be more accusations and recrimination. It is evident that the people of the world are sick and tired of the mutual accusations and recriminations the U.S. and the USSR addressed at each other.

He said that he could not say for sure that the sides would reach agreement in the course of the current meetings, even if they worked all night. (He jokingly suggested that all the others ought to work all night.) He suggested that, jokes aside, he and the President should nevertheless continue to work to accomplish the necessary goals.

He said he wished to raise a toast to the President, to Nancy Reagan, and to the U.S. people, whom the Soviet people regard so highly; he wished to drink to the success of the current talks, to an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, and to the resolution of outstanding problems between the sides.

President Reagan's Response

In response to General Secretary Gorbachev's remarks, President Reagan said that the American delegation was pleased to be here in Geneva on this mission.

He said that while the General Secretary was speaking, he had been thinking of various problems being discussed at the talks. He said that previous to the General Secretary's remarks, he had been telling Foreign Minister Shevardnadze (who was seated to the President's right) that if the people of the world were to find out that there was some alien life form that was going to attack the Earth approaching on Halley's Comet, then that knowledge would unite all the peoples of the world.

Further, the President observed that General Secretary Gorbachev had cited a Biblical quotation, and the President, also alluding to the Bible, pointed out that Acts 16 refers to the fact that "we are all of one blood regardless of where we live on the Earth," and we should never forget that.

The President quoted Theodore Roosevelt to the effect that the true goal of nations is peace with self respect. Theodore Roosevelt loved his people as the current U.S. President and General Secretary love theirs, and Roosevelt believed in peace and security for his people, although some of his detractors would construe that to mean that there was something militaristic in his attitude. Yet despite some such negative attitudes about him, he had been the first person to win the Nobel Prize for peace, and that was specifically for his efforts devoted to ending the Russo-Japanese War.

The President pointed out that there was something else significant about this particular time and this particular occasion. It was exactly 43 years ago on this date that the Soviet Army had begun the counterattack at Stalingrad which had actually turned the war around. The President suggested that this 43rd anniversary of that event could also be the beginning of yet another turning point for all mankind—one that would make it possible to have a world of peace and freedom.

The President raised his glass to the General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev, to the Soviet people, to peace, freedom, to our great nations, and to the peoples of the world—that they may have a world of peace and freedom.

Gorbachev Family

The Gorbachevs have been married one year longer than the Reagans. Their daughter, a doctor, wrote her thesis in medical school on the effects of alcohol on the human system. Their son-in-law is a surgeon. Their daughter, son-in-law and granddaughter live with them. Gorbachev said that he was a man of conservative values when it came to keeping the family together. Their granddaughter, who will be six in January, knows all of the world leaders, he said. She watches the news broadcasts and periodically asks where Mrs. Thatcher is going now. Mrs. Gorbachev added that the granddaughter watches two TV programs: "Good Night, Children" and "Vremya," a news broadcast.

Gorbachev said that he and Mrs. Gorbachev had taken two, apparently private, vacations to Italy and France. They toured each country by car for 21 days.

Gorbachev told Mrs. Reagan about a vacation to the Crimea that Mrs. Gorbachev had taken with her granddaughter. They visited the palace of an ancient khan, where they learned that the khan had 200 wives. Upon her return to Moscow, the granddaughter asked Gorbachev why the khan had 200 wives and he only had one. Gorbachev replied that the khan did not have a single philosopher among his wives, and he did not know what to do with the single one he had.

156. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, November 20, 1985, 10:15–11:25 a.m.

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA

November, 1985

Third Private Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

United States

President Ronald Reagan

Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Yuri D. Uspensky,² Interpreter

After the photo opportunity in an adjoining room, General Secretary Gorbachev invited President Reagan to join him in a small room next to the main meeting room while the rest of the delegation took their seats, after which he and the President could join them.

President Reagan told the General Secretary that he wanted to talk with him privately about a subject which he knew that the Soviet side considered to be interference in its internal affairs. The President stressed that he did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, but he did want to speak with Gorbachev about human rights.

The President indicated that in the U.S. system of government many of the things that we would hope to accomplish with the Soviet

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Reykjavik Meeting—Geneva Materials 10/12/1986–10/13/1986 (1). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Zarechnak. The meeting took place in the Soviet Mission. On November 20, Reagan wrote in his diary: “The last day of the summit & this time Mr. G. was host. We went to the Soviet mission & he took me into a small room with interpreters. This was my chance to have at human rights. I explained that I wasn’t telling him how to run his country—I was asking for his help; that I had a better chance of getting support at home for things we’d agreed to if he would ease some of the restrictions on emigration etc. I told him I’d never mention what he was doing out loud but he’d find that I could better meet some of his requests for trade etc. He argued back sort of indicating that he thought they treated their people better than we did ours. He quoted statements made by some of the feminist extremists to prove we were unkind to women. I fought back—only time will tell if I made any headway.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 542)

² Nikolai Uspensky is the correct name for the Soviet interpreter. In several meetings, the notetaker used a variation in the name or mistakenly recorded the Soviet interpreter as Yuri Uspensky.

Union would require the support of the Congress, which, in turn, is influenced by the people of the country. He could get such support if some things were done in the area of human rights. In the U.S., as Gorbachev knew, we have people from all over the world. Many of them retain a pride in their heritage, with regard to the countries where their parents and ancestors came from.

The President said that religious groups in the U.S. tend to influence Congress through lobby groups. An example of strong attachment to religious celebration occurred in the U.S. on St. Patrick's Day. This was a special holiday for the Irish, and Reagan's father had come from Ireland. Other groups in the U.S., such as Ukrainian Americans, Lithuanian Americans and Polish Americans have their organizations, customs and holidays.

The President said that he did not wish to raise this issue in the main meeting. He was also not asking to get Gorbachev's agreement to publicly announce actions which were being taken to deal with difficulties in this area, such as emigration. The recent release of several men and women who were allowed to join their spouses had made a big impact on the people in the U.S., but the President wished to be frank and said that the question then arose—why not the rest? An example of such an issue was the desire of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel. There was a large Jewish community in the U.S., which had an influence on Congress.

The President told Gorbachev that if he could resolve some of these issues on his own, the President would never boast that the Soviet side had given in to the U.S. We would express our appreciation for what was done, and there would be no hint that this was done as a result of U.S. efforts. But the fact that something was done would make it easier for the President to do the type of things which the two countries could do together, such as in the area of trade, for which the President needed Congressional support.

The President said that he wished to give an example of this type of approach. In 1981, during his first year in office, the Soviet government was eager to have a new long-term grain agreement with the U.S., after the imposition of the grain embargo by Reagan's predecessor. The President had sat down with the Soviet Ambassador and had spoken with him about human rights concerns, citing the specific example of the Pentecostals who had been living for five years in the basement of the Moscow Embassy. If they had left the Embassy, they would have been taken by the police. They had come to the Embassy because they had gotten into trouble after having asked for permission to emigrate. The President told the Ambassador that he would not speak publicly about this, but there would be a better chance to have a grain agreement, since there was opposition in the U.S. to such an

agreement, if something were done to free those people. Shortly after that, they left the Embassy and emigrated to the U.S.³ The President never told anyone that he had done this. Those people were gratefully received in the U.S., and they did not even know that the President had spoken on their behalf. A short time later, the long-term grain agreement was concluded without difficulties in Congress, and this agreement is in place today.

The President indicated that this was the type of thing which he was seeking here and that is why he did not wish to raise these issues in the full meeting, not to make it appear that he was trying to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. It would make it easier for us to do the type of things that we could do together if he were not constantly reminded about the restrictions imposed on Soviet people, the refusal to permit them to practice their religion, etc. The President would not tell anyone that he had raised this issue with Gorbachev.

Gorbachev replied that he considered that at some stage of U.S.-Soviet relations, the issue of human rights was being used for political purposes, not only by representatives of various political organizations which were anti-Soviet, but, and this came as a surprise, also by officials of the U.S. Administration, including the President. The Soviet side did not understand this. The President had mentioned why and how he had come to be involved in these issues. Gorbachev wished to say in all sincerity that the Soviet Union was in favor of broader contacts, exchange of people—scientists, cultural representatives, all types of people—with the U.S. The Soviet side felt that this was necessary, and Gorbachev thought that Reagan had said the same. The two countries depended on each other today and would in the future. We should get to know each other better and create a good atmosphere. The Soviet people have no enmity for the American people. The Soviet people have a positive attitude toward the people of the United States. If we work at this on the basis of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other country, the Soviet side would be ready to broaden its contacts with the U.S. It is truly interested in doing so. But what we need first is an atmosphere of good will between the countries. This was the fundamental question.

Gorbachev then went on to give specific examples. People from the U.S. travel to the Soviet Union and vice versa. People in the U.S. have relatives in the USSR, and they come visit the places of their origin, such as the Ukraine, the Baltic States, and so on. The Soviet Union welcomes this and is open to such visits. There are no difficulties in this regard. Lately, there has been an increase in contacts between

³ See footnote 2, Document 38.

representatives of religious groups. The Soviet side was in favor of this. There were marriages between U.S. and Soviet citizens. This was a very natural and understandable thing, and there were no objections to this. Since the group of U.S. Senators that had met with him before this meeting in Geneva had mentioned these issues, Gorbachev had looked into them.⁴ During the past five years more than 400 marriages had taken place, and out of these, only ten people had not been permitted to emigrate.⁵ The only obstacle to emigration is involvement of the person in question with state secrets. In this case, the state has a specific responsibility, but it tries to let time pass, to let the individual do different kind of work so that his knowledge becomes outdated. His case is then returned too, and he is released. Gorbachev repeated that within the past five years restrictions had been placed only on ten of 420 to 450 people. But these were Soviet regulations, and the Soviet side asked that they be respected. This was one example.

Gorbachev continued that the President had mentioned Jews. The fate of Jewish people was of concern to the Soviet government. There are many Jews in the Soviet Union, as there are in the U.S. (which has the greatest number) and in other countries. After what the Fascists had done to the Jews, the Soviet Union had done everything it could to give them special attention, and it had not regretted doing so. Since many Jewish families had been separated, difficulties existed because of this, and the Soviet side tried to examine such cases. But when such issues are mixed in with discussion of the situation of the Jews in the Soviet Union in general, this is not right. Then the Soviet side objects and furnishes data to back up what it says. This has been the Soviet Union's approach in all cases, including in its discussions with the U.S. The Soviet Union was willing to look at specific cases, but when these things are used for political aims, they would be rebuffed. Specific cases would be examined quietly, in a humane way.

Gorbachev said that when a U.S. Congressional delegation had visited the USSR at the invitation of the Supreme Soviet, the two bodies had agreed to establish a permanent group to examine such issues,

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 80.

⁵ Telegram 353884 to Moscow, November 19, transmitted the text of a letter from a group of U.S. Senators to Gorbachev urging him to "address the extraordinary issue of divided spouses" and provided a list of cases. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850828–0420)

and the Soviet side was in favor of this, but would not permit this issue to be used for political aims.⁶

The President said that with regard to Jews and other religious groups, there were restrictions in the Soviet Union on their ability to practice their religion, e.g., Jews were not permitted to teach Hebrew. In the U.S., in addition to attending the usual schools, Jewish families sent their children to their own schools to study their ancient language. Perhaps some people would not think of emigrating from the Soviet Union if they were allowed to practice their religion.

The President continued that with regard to other questions, the two countries had signed the Helsinki Accords which assured certain freedoms, such as family reunification and the right to emigrate. However, our two countries were big ones, with very large bureaucracies. It was not possible for Gorbachev or the President to know everything that went on at the lower levels, where people could make decisions which were contrary to the desires of the leadership.

The President said that Gorbachev had mentioned that only ten people had not been permitted to rejoin their spouses. But he had a much larger list of cases of separated families. He also wished to give Gorbachev one more example of a case in this category. He knew of a piano player, a young man in the Soviet Union, who wished to emigrate to Israel. Not only was he denied such permission, but he was also denied permission to play the piano with major orchestras, and his records could no longer be sold in stores. His career had been destroyed as a result of the fact that he had wished to emigrate. The bureaucracy could do many things of which Gorbachev was not aware. This man had a wife and a small child. Apparently, he and his wife had been told that they could emigrate, but the baby would have to remain. Since the child was only one year old, they certainly could not have left him behind, so they did not emigrate.

Gorbachev said that he would like to ask the President about the following. For the Soviet leadership and for everyone in Soviet society it was clear whose side the President was on in the area of human rights. The President always spoke of the lack of human rights in socialist countries. In other countries there was democracy and everything was okay. Since people were aware of the rights situation in the

⁶ In telegram 4621 from Moscow, April 10, the Embassy reported on Speaker O'Neill's meeting with Gorbachev in Moscow. The telegram reported that during O'Neill's meeting with members of the Supreme Soviet, "they agreed to appoint a subcommittee of two members from each side to discuss the problems of people who want to leave the Soviet Union. We are all politicians and we have many people from our home districts who have approached us with specific names." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850005-0003) See also footnote 2, Document 15.

Soviet Union and in other countries, and could compare the situations, why was the President taking this point of view. If other people said this, this might be understandable, but the President always said that there is a clear distinction, namely, that there are no rights in socialist countries, but they are in bloom in the democracies. This caused consternation.

Gorbachev continued that at the level of General Secretary and President one should be responsible and call things by their proper names, no matter where they occur. If things are painted only in black and white, this would only inflame the distrust between the countries. He thought that it would be better to take steps to improve the general atmosphere of our relationship, and then specific humanitarian issues could quickly be resolved. The Soviet Union was prepared to resolve them. But if questions of human rights were used for political purposes, the Soviet side would rebuff such attempts. He repeated that the Soviet Union was ready to examine specific cases, especially those mentioned by the President.

The President replied that he was trying to clearly indicate that if such changes occurred, he would not indicate that he was the one that had persuaded Gorbachev to do this. He realized that both of them had concerns about their political image, namely, that they did not want to have it seem that they were giving in to outside influences. He wished to assure Gorbachev that he would have no such problems with the President. What happens is that various groups in the United States have relatives and families in other countries, and they get information from these people. Then organizations deliver this to the President and demand that their grievances be resolved with regard to people in the Soviet Union. These things make their way into the press, and he could not do anything about that since the U.S. has a free press. He was trying to say that we could work better together if such issues did not appear on the front pages, but rather if he spoke with Gorbachev about these things confidentially.

Gorbachev replied that he welcomed the President's decision to have such a private meeting. He had heard him out, and the President had heard him out as well, and the two of them would bear in mind what had been said.

The President indicated that he would like to make one last point. With regard to what Gorbachev had said about issues like this in the U.S., the President wished to say that in the U.S. there are laws which prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion, national origin, sex and race.

Gorbachev interjected that he was familiar with the state of things in the U.S. The President had said that there was no discrimination on the basis of sex. This was not true. According to U.S. law a woman

could make 60 percent of the salary a man made for the same job. The President had spoken of equality. But so much time had passed since the American Revolution, and women still did not have the same rights as men. He knew this to be the case. He was informed. He had a legal education. The President should not think that he saw only the negative aspects of things in a primitive way. He saw things from a broad perspective, and he was responsible. He supported the rights of families. If there was a need, we should have exchanges and see what could be done about specific problems. But if we are referring to changing laws, with other interests in mind, this could not be done. The Soviet people set their laws. Any other approach shows a disrespect for the Soviet people. This must be the basic framework. The U.S. had its own system, and the Soviet Union had its own. The President would defend the United States, and he, Gorbachev, would defend the Soviet Union. Such a discussion could take a very long time.

The President replied that there were differences in our economic system and in our societies. Gorbachev had mentioned the question of women's rights. The President noted parenthetically that women own more than 50 percent of all the wealth in the United States. But the difference in the systems was that, yes, there were individuals, perhaps employers in factories, with personal prejudices about hiring women, blacks, and so on. But the law says that there can be no discrimination. So when various groups indicate that there are those who discriminate, the government must abide by the law and punish those individuals. No U.S. law permits discrimination—quite the contrary.

The President continued that he had spoken about the bureaucracy. He wished to recall that when he was Governor, he learned from one of his assistants that the latter had taken some young black people to the State Labor office to fill out some job applications (the President explained that there was a Department of Labor in California, which helped people to find jobs). When the applicants had subsequently been questioned about whether they had filled out the applications correctly, one said that he had not. Reagan's assistant took the man back and asked to see his application. They could not find it. Then the man to whom they had been talking slowly edged over to the wastebasket and pulled the application out of it. The Governor was not the one responsible for this. It was one prejudiced clerk who had thrown the application into the wastebasket.

Gorbachev said that people in the U.S. should live as they like. If they choose something, the Soviets would not judge them. The U.S. had many achievements, and the USSR would not interfere in its internal affairs. But the U.S. should do the same with regard to the USSR.

The President said that it would be easier for him to fulfill some of the possible agreements between the two countries if he were not beset

by people in the U.S. Congress and by organizations that hear of their relatives and friends and complain about the restraints which they consider should not be imposed upon them, such as with respect to the right to live in other places or the right to emigrate. So if Gorbachev would think about these things, the President would have more freedom to work together.

Gorbachev said that he had heard the President's thoughts, but he could not agree that the President was so dependent on the opinion of small groups. He knew what the President could do as a political leader when he wanted to. When he did not want to, he would talk about pressure groups, and so on. The Soviet side saw all of this. If had a realistic view of life, and asked the U.S. side to have a realistic view of the USSR.

The President said that he realized that it was difficult for the General Secretary, within his system, to believe the President that he, Gorbachev, was wrong about the President's power. In the U.S. system, including during the time after he had become President, one part of the Congress, i.e., the House of Representatives, was dominated by the opposition party.

Gorbachev interrupted, without listening to the translation, to say that he had understood what the President had said, and that he took all of this into account. He was familiar with the American political process, and the President should not hide behind this. (U.S. Interpreter's Note: Gorbachev's indication that he had understood what the President had said without translation was unexpected, since he had never shown any indication of understanding English in previous or subsequent conversations. After the President's following remarks, Gorbachev specifically asked for interpretation and looked like he had not understood what the President had said. I think that the first time he was simply assuming that he knew what the President was saying, and was anxious to get into the plenary meeting.)

The President indicated that there were things which he was not able to get approved at the present time because of his opposition, which based its position on what was said by lobby groups.

Gorbachev said that the President had talked about certain issues and he, Gorbachev had expressed his views.

The President interjected that with regard to some cases involving individuals Gorbachev could make it easier for him with regard to the relationship between the two countries.

Gorbachev said that he was glad that they had had a private talk and that this had let them get to know each other better, and this was important. When the two of them would communicate, especially about the larger political issues, they would know what the other one looked like, and the image of the other person would be present when decisions would be made.

157. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, November 20, 1985, 11:30 a.m.–12:40 p.m.

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA

November, 1985

Third Plenary Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

United States

President Ronald Reagan

George Shultz, Secretary of State

Donald T. Regan, Chief of Staff, White House

Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Arthur Hartman, Ambassador to the USSR

Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

Paul H. Nitze, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters

Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Mark Parris, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State
Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev

Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States

Aleksandr Yakovlev, Chief, Propaganda Department, Central Committee, CPSU

Leonid M. Zamyatin, Chief, International Information Department, Central Committee, CPSU

Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to General Secretary Gorbachev

Sergey P. Tarasenko, Assistant to Minister of Foreign Affairs

Yury D. Uspensky,² Interpreter

After the press had been ushered out of the meeting room, *Gorbachev* invited President Reagan to lead off.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Reykjavik Meeting—Geneva Materials 10/12/1986–10/13/1986 (1). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in the Soviet Mission. On November 20, Reagan wrote in his diary: “In the plenary I took off on arms control then he fired back about S.D.I. creating an arms race in space & the stuff really hit the fan. He was really belligerent & d—n it I stood firm. That took us til lunch.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 542)

² Nikolai Uspensky is the correct name for the Soviet interpreter. In several meetings, the notetaker used a variation in the name or mistakenly recorded the Soviet interpreter as Yuri Uspensky.

The President noted that he wished to address a number of items which there had not been time for the previous day. He would open with a few words on the Geneva arms control negotiations.

The President observed that our peoples were particularly concerned by nuclear missiles, which, if the button were pushed, could kill millions in a matter of minutes. It was important to show our people that we were concerned.

We had therefore shaped our proposal on strategic offensive systems so as to achieve deep reductions, focusing in particular on what we think are destabilizing weapons. Our proposals dealt with a number of delivery systems: ICBMs, SLBMs, etc. It built upon the fifty percent reduction concept contained in the Soviet counterproposal. It also incorporated reductions to 4,500 ballistic missile warheads and a limit on ALCMs of 1,500; the overall sum would be the 6,000 figure that the Soviets had proposed.

The U.S. had to insist, however, that the reductions be applied to the proper categories of systems. We could not agree to the Soviet's proposed definition of "strategic delivery systems" or any definition that included within a common limit a category of delivery systems on the US side while excluding it on the Soviet side. The two sides, of course, had a long negotiating history on this issue, so the President would not repeat the U.S. rationale, but rather restate its insistence on the definition agreed upon in past strategic offensive arms agreements as to the categories of systems to be included in limits on strategic offensive arms.

The aggregate result of the reductions and limits we proposed for strategic offensive arms would be a more stable world in which the number of these arms would be radically reduced to comparable levels on both sides, the threat to the retaliatory capabilities of each side would be significantly diminished, and the prospects of verification would be enhanced. The President stressed that verification was vital if we were to reduce suspicion between our two governments.

In the area of intermediate-range nuclear arms, the U.S. proposal built, in part, on Soviet ideas. The U.S. was prepared to cap US LRINF missiles in Europe at the level deployed as of December 31, 1985, in return for your agreement to reduce your LRINF missile launchers within range of NATO Europe to the same launcher number. The U.S. would be prepared to discuss with the USSR the exact mix of these systems. The U.S. proposal included reductions in the number of SS-20 launchers located in Asia and outside range of NATO Europe. The end result, the President stressed in conclusion, would be that both sides would be limited to an equal global LRINF missile warhead number.

Before moving onto other issues, the President offered Gorbachev a chance to respond.

Gorbachev indicated that he did, in fact, have a few comments. The Soviets had carefully assessed the U.S. NST proposal. They welcomed the U.S. agreement to accept 50 percent reductions in nuclear strategic arsenals. It was of fundamental importance to note any basis for moving ahead in the search for mutually acceptable proposals which could be components of possible agreements.

But *Gorbachev* also had some critical observations to make regarding practically all the elements of the Soviet [U.S.?] proposal. He did not wish to dramatize this. He believed that this approach coincided with the President's own in welcoming the basic thrust of Soviet proposals for radical reductions, while not welcoming other elements. Both sides now had proposals on the table. There was plenty to work with.

Reiterating that he did not want to dramatize differences in the two sides' approach, *Gorbachev* stressed that the Soviet Union truly desired a serious search for mutually acceptable proposals. He stressed that the Soviet Union was not proposing elements which would be unacceptable to the U.S., which could jeopardize U.S. security, since this would make it impossible to reach agreements in the future. But the Soviets expected the same treatment from the United States. If the U.S. advanced proposals which sought to undermine Soviet security, it would make agreement impossible and complicate future work in this area.

There were elements in the U.S. proposal, however, which clearly departed from the January 1985 U.S.-Soviet understanding on the goals and subjects of the Geneva talks. On the one hand, the President and his colleagues asserted that the U.S. had not departed from this understanding, that the U.S. was in favor of radical reductions in defensive nuclear weapons and in favor of preventing an arms race in space.

The President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was regarded by the U.S. as consistent with the January understanding. This was a "revelation" to the Soviets. No matter under what flag the U.S. chose to cover it, SDI amounted to placing weapons in space, to spreading the arms race to space. This view devalued the remaining elements of the U.S. proposals. What purpose could be served by radical reductions if the U.S. contemplated deploying weapons in space—with all the attendant consequences.

When the Soviets had proposed that the two sides agree to close the door to deployments of weapons in space, it was consistent with both the U.S. and USSR's security interests. *Gorbachev* noted that the U.S. had claimed the Soviet Union was ahead in scientific research on space questions; if so, the U.S. should want to stop the process now. As the U.S. did not, Soviet superiority in space research did not appear to be the problem.

Gorbachev felt he had to say that he did not know what lay at the bottom of the U.S. position. How the U.S. had come to its position was

not important to him, however. What was important to him was the position itself. Gorbachev was concerned that the position was fed by an illusion that the U.S. was ahead in the technology and information transfer systems on which space systems would be based, and that a possibility therefore existed to obtain military superiority over the USSR. The U.S. might even consider it possible to obtain a first-strike capability, or, under certain circumstances, to launch a first strike. The Soviet Union needed to consider worst cases in developing its policies.

Gorbachev told the President that he had recently observed to a Soviet scientist that he could see no reason why the President should be committed to SDI. Gorbachev had wondered why the President could have any interest in injecting a new element of instability into the relationship, in further exacerbating U.S.-Soviet relations. The scientist had said that she had done research into the matter and found the explanation: SDI would produce from 600 billion to a trillion dollars in new military expenditures. That was the reason.

With mounting urgency, Gorbachev said he must return again to the problem of SDI, even at the risk of injecting some tension into the discussion. He did not want to do this. But he could not ignore the importance of the problem. Gorbachev expressed regret that the U.S. appeared determined to depart from the January agreement on stopping the arms race on earth and preventing it in space. If the U.S. departed from that road, Gorbachev did not know when it would be possible for the two countries to meet on it again. Everything at the Geneva NST talks would come to a halt. For its part, the Soviet Union remained committed to the goals of the January understanding, and was prepared to do everything possible to achieve them.

The President stated that the scientist Gorbachev had referred to was dealing with a fantasy. She reminded the President of the scientists who had told President Eisenhower that ICBMs would never work.

The President underscored that SDI was not a weapons system or a plan for conducting a war in space. It was an effort to find a more civilized means of deterring war than reliance on thousands of nuclear missiles which, if used, would kill millions on both sides. Never before in history had the possibility existed of a war which would bring about the end of civilization.

Even if the two sides reduced offensive arms by 50 percent, there would still be too many weapons. The U.S. did not see in SDI a means of obtaining military advantage over the Soviet Union. The benefits of SDI research would be for the USSR as well as the U.S. If defensive systems could be found, they would be available to all. This would end the nuclear nightmare for the U.S. people, the Soviet people, all people. The Soviet Union and the United States had the capability to move beyond simply aiming weapons at each other with the risk of

ending the world as we know it. As to the argument that the U.S. sought to build an offensive arsenal, the U.S. objective was that whoever developed a feasible defensive system would share it, so that any threat to the other side would be eliminated. If there was opposition to that concept, the President speculated it might be based on the assumption that nuclear weapons might, at some point, be used. The U.S., on the other hand, was seeking a security system based on "shield," not "spears" or missiles. Under the current system of deterrence, it would be impossible to tell the winner from the loser in the event of war.

Gorbachev replied that he understood the President's arguments but found them unconvincing. They contained many emotional elements, elements which were part of one man's dream. *Gorbachev* did not wish to suggest that the President did not want peace. But the fact was that SDI would result in the appearance of weapons in space. They might be built as anti-missile weapons, but they would have the capability of striking earth. The USSR could never know for sure. The Soviets had agreed on 50 percent reductions in nuclear weapons. But the President was advocating a whole new class of weapons. Describing these weapons as a shield was only packaging. They would open a new arms race in space. The President would be held responsible.

Gorbachev said that there were dreams of peace and there were realities. He did not believe the President saw him as a blood-thirsty person who wanted to drag his country into conflict. The Soviet Union was for reducing the number of weapons. History would remember the President, as well as the Soviet leader, for having begun to eliminate nuclear weapons. But agreement had not yet been reached. And now SDI threatened to open a new arms race.

The President observed that, under the U.S. open laboratories concept, scientists from both sides could satisfy themselves that SDI research was not being directed toward the development of an offensive capability. *Gorbachev* shot back his agreement that laboratories should be opened, but only if the development of space weapons had first been banned. *The President* reiterated that Soviet scientists would be able to verify by visiting U.S. laboratories whether the U.S. was building destructive weapons or a shield. The U.S. was after a shield.

This got to the point that it was necessary for the two countries to get beyond suspicions. The President asked whether he would not be justified in suspecting that, under certain circumstances, the Soviets would use their missiles against the U.S. Words could not reduce the idea of a threat from one side to another. The Soviet interpretation was that SDI would lead to the development of new offensive weapons. The U.S. was trying simply to see if there was a way to end the world's nightmare about nuclear weapons. The President emphasized that the U.S. would share its research with the Soviet Union; attempts to develop destructive weapons would be discovered.

Gorbachev asked the President with some emotion why he would not believe him when he said the Soviet Union would never attack. Before the President could respond, *Gorbachev* repeated the question. He again interrupted the President's answer to insist on a response.

The President stated that no individual could say to the U.S. people that they should rely on his personal faith rather than on sound defense. *Gorbachev* questioned the sincerity of the President's willingness to share SDI research, pointing out that the U.S. did not share its most advanced technology even with its allies.

Gorbachev called for a more realistic discussion. The Soviet Union was prepared to compromise. But the U.S. had the impression that the USSR was weak and could be painted into a corner. That was no illusion. There would soon be a disillusionment; perhaps not in the President's time, but ultimately. The President would be held responsible. SDI would open a new sphere for the arms race. Why was this necessary?

The Soviet Union had said it would agree to a separate INF agreement, to deep cuts. These had not been easy decisions. The Soviets had their concerns. But they felt that if steps were not taken in the next year to 18 months, the consequences would be grave. The President wanted to catch the "Firebird" of SDI by using the U.S. technical advantage. There would be disillusionment, but it would come too late, as the "infernal" train would already be moving.

Gorbachev observed that perhaps his remarks had grown a bit heated. He had meant only to convey to the President the depth of Soviet concern on this issue.³

The President replied that, with all due respect, *Gorbachev's* concerns were based on a false premise. Overcoming several interruptions

³ In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "In the plenary session, we turned to strategic arms. Regan, McFarlane, Nitze, Ridgway, and Hartman joined the president and me on our side, facing our Soviet counterparts. *Gorbachev* again harangued us about SDI. President Reagan exploded. The two leaders went back and forth, interrupting each other and expressing their views with vehemence. Ronald Reagan got the floor. He spoke passionately about how much better the world would be if we were able to defend ourselves against nuclear missiles. He was intense as he expressed his abhorrence at having to rely on the ability to 'wipe each other out' as the means of keeping the peace. 'We must do better, and we can.' The depth of the president's belief in SDI was vividly apparent. Ronald Reagan was talking from the inside out. Translation was simultaneous. *Gorbachev* could connect what the president said with his facial expression and body language. When the president finished, there was total silence. After what seemed an interminable time, *Gorbachev* said, 'Mr. President, I don't agree with you, but I can see that you really mean what you say.' Ronald Reagan had made an immense impression on Mikhail *Gorbachev*, who must have realized that he could not talk, con, bully, or in any other way manipulate Ronald Reagan into dropping his SDI research program. Ronald Reagan had nailed into place an essential plank in our negotiating platform." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 603)

from Gorbachev, the President reaffirmed that the U.S. would be prepared to reduce nuclear weapons to zero and ultimately to eliminate them. The fact was, however, that they still existed. A defensive shield was therefore necessary. He compared nuclear weapons to chemical weapons. Conventions had been negotiated to ban the use of chemical weapons, but gas masks had been retained. With a defensive shield against nuclear weapons, people would have an additional guarantee against their use. The President could not see how SDI research could be interpreted as threatening to human life or targets on earth. Moreover, he repeated, the ultimate idea was to share SDI research; neither nation would be able to use it to develop a first-strike capability.

Gorbachev alleged that the U.S., under the guise of a shield, intended to introduce weapons into space. The Soviet Union must base its policies on this fact. The Soviets could not be sure what the U.S. ultimately had in mind. The fact was that to destroy weapons other weapons were necessary. The President countered that no one was sure whether SDI would work; the U.S. effort was designed only to find out if a defense was possible. *Gorbachev* said that this meant only that the U.S. was seeking to determine if space weapons were possible.

The President explained that his instructions to those responsible for SDI research had been to find out if there were a means to stop nuclear missiles. He had said that if such a means existed, the U.S. would share it with other countries so as to make nuclear weapons unnecessary. He was aware that SDI research dealt with systems such as lasers and particle beam devices which had weapons applications. These systems, however, were designed not to kill people, but to stop nuclear missiles from reaching their target. The President noted that the Soviet Union already had the world's most developed ABM system.

Gorbachev said he felt it inappropriate in their conversation to inject banalities more in keeping with press conferences. The Soviet ABM system was in compliance with the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union had chosen to place its system around its capital; the U.S. had placed its near missile fields. The USSR was scrupulous in complying with treaties dealing with nuclear weapons. It was too dangerous to engage in deceptions in this area. *The President* agreed, noting that the U.S. had raised the question of Krasnoyarsk radar and its possible battle management role. He asked *Gorbachev* whether the U.S. expression of willingness to share its SDI research did not adequately deal with Soviet suspicions.

Gorbachev indicated that the President already had the Soviet assessment of the U.S. position. *Gorbachev* wanted to emphasize it because it was the key question of their meeting. It would define the future political dialogue between the two countries, the nature of the Geneva negotiations, the outcome of important decisions on domestic policy

in both countries. It appeared that the President was very committed to the development, testing, and deployment of space weapons. The Soviets would have to consider and base their policy on this fact. The Soviets had heard similar views expressed by many of the President's advisers. But these were only advisers. The President had the ultimate responsibility. Gorbachev sometimes had felt that the President's advisers feared the President's prestige would suffer if he gave up SDI. Gorbachev was "500 percent" convinced that the President would in fact benefit from such a decision.

The President expressed concern that the discussion had gone too far and suggested a more reasonable approach. The two sides had agreed to a reduction in strategic offensive weapons of 50 percent. It was unfortunate that this was being frustrated because the Soviets objected to an attempt to determine if there was a defense against nuclear missiles. It would be years before this was known. We had made clear our willingness to share SDI research. There was no reason why such research should prevent us from going ahead with reductions in nuclear forces.

The President did not know whether or not Gorbachev believed in reincarnation. Perhaps the President in a previous life had been the inventor of the shield. In any case, the President believed that trust and prospects for peace would improve if both sides began to rely more on defense, with offensive weapons being reduced.

Gorbachev asked rhetorically what was the result of the Geneva talks thus far. There had been negotiations, with the objectives and subjects clearly determined: to stop the arms race on earth and prevent its spread to space. The Soviets had felt that the work done thus far in Geneva would enable the two leaders to give an impulse to the process in their own meeting. The leaders had now met and it seemed clear that the President felt that weapons could be introduced into space. Gorbachev feared the negotiations would go by the wayside in this case. What, he asked, was to be done.

The President replied that, where Gorbachev saw a threat, we saw an opportunity. We should both seek to reduce offensive arms by 50 percent and to determine if defense was possible. We could then sit down and decide if deployment was desirable. We would share our findings. Was that not a fair deal? The Soviet Union would be aware of our arms program. We would look at the Soviet's. We were talking about several years. Would people not, the President asked, be more confident that a defense would work if both sides reduced by 50 percent.

Gorbachev asked that the President not treat the Soviets as "simple people." *The President* replied that he did not see how he had in any way shown disrespect or charged the Soviets with naivety. He had

explored the various issues with Gorbachev as openly as possible. He could see no logical argument against going ahead with research when we have made clear that we will not have a monopoly on defense if a feasible solution is found.

Gorbachev questioned why it was necessary to conduct research when nuclear weapons were being reduced—and by 50 percent as a first step. SDI was torpedoing the possibility of steps to reduce nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union wanted to lock the door against space weapons—to bar it or even drive in nails—and then begin reductions. The Soviets did not know what weapons might be developed by researchers. If the past was any guide, they would find things they had not expected to find. The Soviets had repeatedly shown in recent months their willingness to seek reasonable solutions. The U.S. approach could only lead to an expansion of the arms race on earth and in space.

The President denied this. He stressed that the U.S. was prepared to open its laboratories to demonstrate that it was not seeking a new offensive potential. *Gorbachev* interrupted to state that the Soviets were looking for a way out. They were serious. The President countered that the way out was to reduce and not to miss the opportunity to develop a defense because of fear that it might have an offensive potential.

Gorbachev asked if the President had money to spare. *The President* replied no. *Gorbachev* said he knew that. The President had in the past expressed the view that SDI could be used to prevent “some madman” from using a nuclear weapon. The U.S. and USSR should reduce their own weapons by 50 percent and then have other countries join them. More could be done with the NPT Treaty. Ways could be found to prevent madmen. Because of one madman, should we have an arms race in space?

The President again wondered why the Soviets should object to research. At this point, we were only talking about a theory. We were also talking about safeguards. If the problem appeared to be solvable, then we could talk. But both sides would for the moment retain nuclear weapons. Reductions would make it possible to save considerable expenditures, e.g., for modernization.

Gorbachev expressed his regret that the two leaders would have so little positive to say on the Geneva talks. The President replied that the U.S. would have to tell people that the possibility of reducing nuclear arms by 50 percent had been destroyed by suspicion of ulterior motives. *Gorbachev* noted that strategic defense was the President’s idea; it was hard to dispute the notion that the Geneva negotiations were based on the January understanding, which deal with two elements: stopping the arms race on earth and preventing it in space.

After his discussion with the President, it was clear that the U.S. was determined to develop and introduce weapons into space.

The President said that the U.S. side would tell a different story. We would say that current effort to develop a system that would not kill people, but only stop missiles, was the cause of Soviet suspicions which had prevented reductions of nuclear weapons. An opportunity was thus being lost. The President felt that public opinion would find that difficult to understand.

Gorbachev said that this was the U.S. assessment. But it was important the leaders deal in substance not propaganda. The Soviet side had expected that, when the two leaders met, after months of preparation, it would be possible to reach solutions and to clarify what had been agreed to in January.

Noting that they had already run over the allotted time, *the President* urged Gorbachev to consider further the safeguards the President had mentioned. It would reassure publics in both countries if the leaders could agree on this and go forward with reductions in nuclear weapons. The President had no further elaborations other than to repeat his inability to comprehend how, in a world full of nuclear weapons, it was so horrifying to seek to develop a defense against this awful threat, how an effort to reduce nuclear weapons could break down because of such an attempt.

Gorbachev for his part, questioned how, in such a difficult situation and with the threat that the arms race would expand in the absence of restraints, one could contemplate a new arms race in space. It was not even possible to reduce armaments on earth. What could be done when weapons were orbiting the globe? How could one verify this? Gorbachev could not commit himself to developing such systems.

The President said it was necessary to give each side the freedom to look at what the other was doing. He recalled President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal in expressing disappointment at the Soviet Government's one-sided approach to verification.⁴

Gorbachev suggested that the two sides think about and analyze the thorough discussion which had taken place. It might be possible to return to the subject that afternoon. He reiterated that he saw no obstacles to movement towards a solution which might serve both sides' interests. The President urged Gorbachev to consider the verification ideas he had shared. Gorbachev indicated his willingness to do so, but stressed that what was being verified was important. The Soviets would be prepared to verify an end to nuclear testing; they would not

⁴ For an explanation of President Eisenhower's Open Skies proposal, see *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. XX, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Document 48.

be willing to verify a continuation of such tests. They would be similarly willing to verify a prohibition of space-strike weapons, but not a process by which such weapons would be developed, whether through open laboratories or other means. But in principle, they were open on the question.

The President again urged Gorbachev to consider whether he could not accept the idea of a shield.

Gorbachev did not respond, proposing that the meeting end and resume at 2:30 P.M.

158. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, November 20, 1985, 2:45–3:30 p.m.

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA

November, 1985

Fourth Plenary Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

United States

President Ronald Reagan

George Shultz, Secretary of State

Donald T. Regan, Chief of Staff, White House

Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Arthur Hartman, Ambassador to the USSR

Paul H. Nitze, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters

Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Mark Parris, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State

Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev

Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Anatoly F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States

Aleksandr Yokovlev, Chief, Propaganda Department, Central Committee, CPSU

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US–USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Reykjavik Meeting—Geneva Materials 10/12/1986–10/13/1986 (1). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in the Soviet Mission.

Leonid M. Zamyatin, Chief, International Information Department, Central Committee, CPSU

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Soviet Interpreter

Gorbachev opened the meeting by remarking that just days before the two leaders had been moving toward Geneva. They were now moving toward the completion of their meeting. Gorbachev understood that this would be their last official session. He invited the President to start the session.

The *President* began by noting that he would like to summarize his discussions with Gorbachev over the previous two days. He had a few points to make and would be interested in seeing if Gorbachev could agree.

There had been two days of candid conversation on a wide range of issues. There were clear differences on such questions as nuclear weapons, on the political philosophy of the two countries. It was important to be realistic and to have no illusions regarding our differences.

But there were some common concerns as well. Both sides had expressed their commitment to deep reductions in nuclear armaments and their hope to eliminate such weapons entirely some day. Both would like to intensify discussions on how to increase strategic stability and reduce the dangers to either side.

The President repeated his conviction of a need for a shift from deterrence based on strategic arms to a greater reliance on defensive systems. If our research was borne out it would be necessary to discuss how to introduce defensive systems. There was also a need for greater mutual trust through compliance with obligations under bilateral and multilateral agreements from arms control to the Helsinki Final Act.

In addition to creating a safer strategic environment, it was necessary to end tragic regional conflicts. The two sides differed on the causes of regional tensions, but the President believed both saw the need to intensify the consultative process on local conflicts. As he had said in his October UNGA speech, the United States was prepared to associate itself with bold initiatives to resolve conflicts which had damaged U.S.-Soviet relations and aggravated international tensions. This was behind our proposals for military disengagement and to end outside involvement in regional struggles. The people of the various regions must be able to solve their own problems.

There were a number of bilateral questions which could be resolved if the necessary political will was there. The two sides should be able to agree to a fundamental expansion of exchanges in the areas of culture, science, and athletics as a means of promoting greater mutual understanding.

The President described his discussions with Gorbachev as rich and constructive. He was pleased that the two leaders would continue the process by visiting each others' countries. He looked forward to the pleasure of Gorbachev's visit to the U.S. in 1986, and to his own visit to Moscow in 1987. The results of the Geneva meetings would be clear only in the months and years ahead.

The President then read the following statement on the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) for the Soviets' consideration as a joint statement of what might be accomplished in those discussions:

"The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on nuclear and space arms. They agreed that work on these negotiations should be accelerated with a view to accomplishing the tasks assigned in the Joint US-Soviet Agreement of January 8, 1985, specifically to prevent an arms race in outer space and to terminate it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance strategic stability. Offensive nuclear arms will be significantly reduced applying the general concept of 50% reductions to equal ceilings on specific, comparable categories. There will be a separate interim agreement resulting in reductions and limitations on land-based, intermediate-range nuclear missile systems as a step toward the total elimination of this class of missiles. To insure effective verification of compliance, meaningful measures to this end will be negotiated concurrently with limits on weaponry and incorporated in all agreements resulting from these negotiations."

After first confirming that the President was finished, *Gorbachev* indicated that he would like to sum up the meeting from the Soviet perspective.

Gorbachev felt that the very fact of the meeting should be considered a positive development, since it demonstrated a joint understanding of the significance of U.S.-Soviet relations and of the two sides' responsibilities and role in the world. He agreed with the President that the meeting had taken place in an atmosphere of frankness, which permitted the two leaders to outline in detail their positions on the full range of bilateral and international questions.

Gorbachev concurred further that the discussions had revealed deep differences in the two sides' assessments of the causes of certain bilateral and international differences. The talks had allowed both sides to understand one another better; this was of some importance, even major importance. Gorbachev felt, however, that the discussion had shown that the two sides were unable to build a joint concept for dealing with the broad range of bilateral and international questions. Nonetheless, they had agreed to continue their political dialogue. It was in this context that the two leaders had agreed on an exchange of visits at a time to be arranged.

For its part the Soviet side would have to say in describing the meeting that questions of war and peace had been at the center of the meeting in one way or another both during private discussions and in plenary sessions. He felt that the people of both countries, as well as the world as a whole, were concerned by the number of nuclear weapons and the need to stop the arms race and to proceed to disarmament. Unfortunately, it was impossible to report to our peoples and to the world that there had been a rapprochement of positions.

The Soviet side had tried in the meetings to make an extra effort to explain its views. Discussions had been held, but it would be a distortion of the truth to say that there had been progress. Such progress as had been achieved was limited to a detailed discussion and exchange of positions. Gorbachev hoped that this was not the last word. Both sides would take into account the frank discussions which had taken place. Joint efforts should be continued.

The Soviet Union was in favor of continuing negotiations on the basis of the January 1985 Joint Statement on stopping the arms race on earth and preventing it in space. Serious work lay ahead. Gorbachev felt that movement was possible. The Soviet Union was committed to the spirit of the January 1985 understandings and prepared to act in accord with them, on the clear understanding that it was against the arms race on earth. The USSR was prepared as a first step to seek to implement the idea of a 50% reduction of offensive nuclear forces on the basis of both sides' proposals. But this was based on the understanding that neither side would take steps which would open up an arms race in space. On the basis of this understanding the Soviet Union was open to further movement toward deep reductions in nuclear arms.

Gorbachev agreed that it was possible to intensify bilateral relations. This would contribute to greater trust between the two countries. The USSR would be ready to work to expand exchanges in the economic, cultural and scientific fields.

On regional problems (which he at first forgot to mention), Gorbachev acknowledged that both sides attached importance to the problem and shared a desire to seek political settlements of regional disputes to relieve tensions on the basis of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. He agreed that bilateral regional expert consultations should be continued.

Noting that the President had raised the possibility of a statement summarizing the results of their discussions, Gorbachev asked if this would be justified. The *President* indicated that we had hoped to get to the subject, and called on Secretary Shultz to outline the options as we saw them. *Gorbachev* commented that the Soviets did not insist that there be a statement. If there was nothing to report, it was better to say so. The *President* felt nonetheless that it would be useful to share

views on how to handle the question of reporting the results of their meetings.

Secretary Shultz outlined a number of options, noting that one could envision an outcome involving all, some, or none.

—First, there could be a written compilation of all items which had been agreed during the leaders' meetings or in the preparations for their meetings. There were quite a number of these, of varying importance. There was a possibility of developing joint language on certain arms control questions: e.g., on the Stockholm conference and chemical weapons proliferation. Agreed language existed on nuclear non-proliferation. The President in the statement he read had raised the possibility that NST might be treated, although that morning's conversation had shown the depth of differences on that set of issues. There could also be agreement on a range of regional and bilateral questions, and on a process for the future. In this connection the Secretary had been struck by Gorbachev's references the day before to a mechanism for regulating U.S.-Soviet relations. Thus, it might prove feasible to develop a package which would register areas of agreement reached in Geneva. Disagreements would not be registered except to acknowledge that they existed.

—A second possibility would be to sign some sort of document. The general exchanges agreement was already agreed at the technical level and could be signed if the leaders wished.

—A third element would be separate statements by leaders at a common site. While each leader would say what he wished, the U.S. felt there should be some coordination to avoid surprises. The Secretary speculated that statements could refer to differences but could also include parallel language where appropriate. For example, on NST there were issues on which U.S. and Soviet views coincided, and others where they did not. The kind of statement he had in mind would make clear both areas of agreement and disagreement.

—A fourth option would be to release a short joint report saying, essentially, that the leaders had met and agreed to meet again. Both sides could then issue statements of their own.

—Finally, the two sides could make individual statements at different sites. The Secretary speculated that both leaders would, in any case, be reporting publicly to their peoples on their meetings.

The Secretary concluded by noting that the U.S. would be willing to consider some sort of joint ceremony on the next morning, but was prepared to go in a variety of ways. He was aware of the great responsibility each leader had before their own people and the world to report on their discussions. A dignified ceremony at which areas of agreement could be reported and differences laid out in a modulated

fashion would seem to be an appropriate way to proceed. In such a context, the President's statement on NST could be either included in a joint statement or used unilaterally.

Gorbachev, noting that the issue required some thought, indicated that he was nonetheless prepared to respond. If he understood correctly, both sides wanted to continue the dialogue that was begun in preparations for the Geneva meeting, which had been expanded in Geneva, and which would be continued in the future. Even if one were subjectively against such dialogue, objectively it was necessary to continue contacts and exchanges, and to deepen the process of searching for solutions in the interests of U.S. and Soviet peoples and of the people of the whole world. The Soviet Union, therefore, welcomed Secretary Shultz's expression of willingness to continue work in the future.

On how to document the Geneva meeting, *Gorbachev* indicated that the Soviet Union would be prepared to accommodate a U.S. desire for a joint document, whether a communique or simple statement. Noting that the Soviet Union had originally advocated a communique, but had dropped the idea when it appeared the U.S. was not interested, he outlined his assessment of how to proceed. If a communique incorporated the fundamental results of the meeting, there would be no need for separate statements. If such a communique were impossible, the Geneva program should end with the present meeting.

Gorbachev felt that it would be inappropriate to seek simply to list minor agreements in a joint document. This would not be understood in our two countries or internationally. A more substantive statement would be necessary. *Gorbachev* wondered whether the two leaders should reassess the problem and perhaps deputize senior members of their staffs to propose a solution. He joked that he and the President might take a walk, leaving Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to work on the problem.

More seriously, *Gorbachev* recalled that the Soviets had always been prepared for a communique; indeed at one point they had thought the U.S. had agreed to such a document. He felt that there was still time to work out an acceptable document if both sides were willing. He repeated his suggestion that the Foreign Ministers should study the problem and present their findings to the leaders.

The *President* observed that he might have been to blame for any confusion the Soviets had felt with respect to a communique. In considering the question before the Geneva meeting, the President had been concerned about how a prearranged communique might be perceived. He had been similarly uncomfortable early in his presidency with the practice at the OECD summit meeting of having one leader read a pre-cooked document on behalf of the others. His concern for Geneva was

that a document emphasize that the meeting was part of an ongoing process. In this context, a document might be worthwhile. The President felt, however, that such a document should include bilateral issues already worked out.

Gorbachev said he shared the President's view. After seven years without a U.S.-Soviet summit, the President was probably right in being somewhat apprehensive about how the meeting would develop. Now that the meeting had taken place, it might be possible to compile "a joint approach in a fundamental way." *Gorbachev* again suggested that the Secretary and Shevardnadze consult and report to the leaders.

The Secretary commented that U.S. and Soviet representatives had been at work since 11:30 that morning to explore possibilities of developing acceptable joint language. It would be necessary to check with them before he and Shevardnadze could begin work. *Gorbachev* agreed. He proposed a break and quipped that the most important task facing the Foreign Ministers now was to find their subordinates.²

Secretary Shultz confessed jocularly that he and Shevardnadze had agreed in a September dinner conversation that they should let their leaders carry as much of the burden in Geneva as possible.³ Until *Gorbachev* had given the Foreign Ministers their current assignment, they thought they had succeeded. *Gorbachev* suggested that the Secretary was simply trying to turn his joke about a walk around on him. *The Secretary* told him not to worry, that he (the Secretary) had a thick skin.

The President and *Gorbachev* agreed to adjourn the meeting and, after a ten minute conversation in the Mission reception room, retired to a separate area for an extended private conversation.⁴

² *Gorbachev* recalled in his memoir: "during our afternoon meeting we agreed to entrust Foreign Affairs Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State George Shultz with the task of finding a way to some kind of agreement. I spent the afternoon with the American President at the Soviet mission, waiting for results. By five p.m. it was clear the remaining disagreements left little hope of a breakthrough. They parted to explore possible solutions within the delegations. Reagan and I instructed our colleagues to resume negotiations and to brief us in the evening on the progress achieved. I added, half-jokingly: 'I hope they won't ruin the evening.'" (*Gorbachev, Memoirs*, p. 409)

³ See Document 107.

⁴ On November 20, Reagan wrote in his diary: "In the P.M. session I tried out a written proposal for a joint statement. Upshot was we cut short the meeting and our teams went at the problem of a joint statement. He & I & the interpreters went into a small room & wound up telling stories. We were there 'til 5:30 then the teams came in with a number of things agreed upon & several we didn't. We broke up to leave them still at it so he & I could get ready for the reception at the Swiss Presidents home." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 542)

159. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, November 20, 1985, 8–10:30 p.m.

REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETINGS IN GENEVA

November, 1985

Dinner Hosted by President and Mrs. Reagan

PARTICIPANTS

United States

President Reagan

Mrs. Reagan

Secretary of State George Shultz

Chief of Staff Donald Regan

Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Ambassador Arthur Hartman

Mrs. E. Arensburger, Interpreter

William Hopkins, Interpreter

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

General Secretary Gorbachev

Mrs. Gorbacheva

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Korniyenko

Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin

Ambassador Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov

Mr. P. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

The conversation began by continuing a topic touched upon at last night's dinner about the fact that people are marrying and having children younger now in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev said that, on the other hand, youth is becoming less responsible, which is illustrated by a saying which the older generation now has; we must see our grandchildren through until they reach pension age.

Gorbachev again lovingly talked about his granddaughter. President Reagan told of a letter he received from a little girl who told him exactly what she wanted him to do and at the end said: "Now go into the Oval Office and get to work."

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Reykjavik Meeting—Geneva Materials 10/12/1986–10/13/1986 (1). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Arensburger and Hopkins. The dinner took place at the Maison de Saussure. On November 20, Reagan wrote in his diary: "Then they were here for dinner. It was a pleasant evening & a small informal dinner. Over coffee some of our aides (both his & mine) came over to tell us they were having trouble on the joint statement—his people were trying to withdraw some things they had already agreed to. There was some brisk language & at 5 A.M.—the statement ended up the way we'd wanted it! And I think it was because Mr. G. told his guys to quit what they were doing." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 542)

Mrs. Gorbachev then told of a letter Gorbachev received which wished him success, expressed full agreement with his anti-alcohol campaign and said that the author kept Gorbachev's picture next to her icon. The author said she was 83 years old, prayed every day, and gave her telephone number. She then said to call only early in the morning; she was busy all other times. She lived in Kostroma. President Reagan asked whether Gorbachev called. The other replied that he would report as soon as he got back from Geneva.

Secretary Shultz asked about a revival of religion in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev replied that this question should be addressed to Mrs. Gorbachev, who taught a course on the topic; however, her course was on atheism rather than theology. Gorbachev said that many find the ritual, ceremonial part of religion attractive. However, true believers are dying out with the older generation. Still, one third of the population marry and baptize their children in the church. The Islamic religion, however, seems to have deeper roots. Shevardnadze confirmed that traditions survive in the Islamic religion. Gorbachev said that he was speaking of the Russian orthodox Church, which is preparing to celebrate the 1,000th anniversary of the Christianization of Russia. The church has even petitioned the government to return to a monastery for church use. Mrs. Gorbachev said there were also many sects in Russia, including the Baptists, Pentecostalists and "Tresuny."

Secretary Shultz asked whether Khomeini had had an influence on the Islamic population of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev answered, "No." He also said that right after the revolution there were many slogans for renouncing all of the past, as if doing away with everything which took place before the revolution. This was wrong, he said. But such were the times. He remembered that at that time even wearing a tie would brand one as a member of the bourgeoisie.

As for Khomeini, President Reagan said, he felt that both countries—the U.S. and the USSR—born of revolution, ought to keep an eye on another revolution: an attempt to bring about a fundamentalist Islamic revolution, where the revolution would become the government, and which teaches that the way to heaven is to kill a non-believer.

Gorbachev said that as we end this summit, he felt that he and President Reagan had truly made a start. It would have been unrealistic to expect great progress right away. But the whole world was very concerned, and it was a good thing that they had made this start. Donald Regan said that the President had said the same thing to him.

At this point President Reagan said that in one of the U.S.'s oldest towns, Philadelphia, a toast to the living is always given sitting down. Only a toast for the dead is given standing up. So he wanted to continue in this tradition because what the two sides were dealing with here definitely concerned the living. This is a beginning, he said. No matter

what it was we failed to agree on, the important thing was that the two of them would continue to meet. Each of them had accepted an invitation to come to the other's country and continue these meetings. Even though the two of them had not agreed on many things, they had not closed the door. They would continue to meet.

One of the early leaders of the American Revolution, Thomas Paine, in those dark days when they did not know whether the revolution would succeed, said, "We have it in our power to start the world over again." Something of that is present in what we are doing today, because the problems we are trying to solve have plagued mankind for a long time.

We have started something, President Reagan said, and he felt that these meetings expressed the will and desire of both sides to find answers that would benefit not only all the people of the world now living, but also the yet unborn. His toast, therefore, and his devout prayer was that we could deliver something better than in the past. We will continue meeting, he said, and continue to work for those causes which had brought the sides together here in Geneva.

Gorbachev answered, saying that he was confident tonight that the two of them had started something. After a very long interval between summit meetings, he shared the President's view that it would be wrong to give a false signal from Geneva. He said that Soviet side would very carefully assess the results of this meeting, fully cognizant of a mutual sense of responsibility. Every beginning is difficult. If now we have laid the first few bricks, he said, we have made a new start, a new phase has begun. This in itself is very important. The major differences are ahead, he said, but he wanted to invite the U.S. side to move ahead on the appointed road together with the Soviet side, with mutual understanding and a sense of responsibility. We will do our part on that road, he said. We will not change our positions, our values, or our thinking, but we expect that with patience and wisdom we will find ways toward solutions. We have had the opportunity to speak privately, he said, and he attributed great importance to those talks. Without them it would have been difficult to arrive at this result. Let us then move toward each other with an understanding of our responsibility before all the countries of the world. Gorbachev's toast was for better dialogue and cooperation, for which the Soviet Union was prepared and hoped for reciprocity from the United States.

AFTER-DINNER CONVERSATION

Having moved into the study after dinner, Secretary Shultz said he wanted to make a suggestion to both of the leaders about each of them making individual statements at the ceremony there would be tomorrow. He said in his personal opinion, he thought the people of

the U.S. and USSR and the people of all the world really wanted to feel the presence of both of the world leaders at such a ceremony. If these leaders were simply present and went through the business of signing documents, it would not be the same thing as having them actually speak.

Gorbachev responded that in the first place he thought a joint statement or communique would represent the embodiment of the significance of such a document. Therefore, he said, he thought that a communique was of primary significance. Its presence would show that the current meetings had led to common judgments, common results and common motives in matters of principal importance. The Soviet side feels that such a document would demonstrate to the U.S. and Soviet peoples and to the world that the leaders of the two most powerful countries, despite their deep differences, are exercising their responsibility, and the document would show and convince the people of the world that the leaders were demonstrating their commitment to their principles. A joint document then would be a basis for further statements on the problems involved, both to each of the countries' allies and in the legislative bodies of both countries.

However, said Gorbachev, he thought if the leaders started to give commentaries, most especially short ones, on any document that they signed, it could very well detract from the significance of the document, because there might even be an unfortunate phrase which would detract from the weight and significance of the document. He said he hoped to save any possible document from that fate.

President Reagan responded that he begged to disagree with the General Secretary. He said that a full statement would be an honest, frank and open document about what had and had not been achieved, and about the fact that these meetings between them would be continuing. He suggested that what Secretary Shultz had been speaking about concerned the world press and the European press. He said that if he and General Secretary Gorbachev were there at a ceremony, they would not have to comment on the specifics of any document. However, hope in the world had grown as a result of this summit meeting, and people should not be disappointed in this respect.

General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to a statement of one to three minutes' duration by each of the leaders. President Reagan concurred and added that it had been his idea not to go into detail.

Gorbachev noted that one other thing bothered him, namely, that having produced a document, the sides do not believe in themselves; commenting on it, even briefly and generally, would only serve to strengthen and reaffirm the content of that document. The President responded that instead of being silent, it would be better for the people who have placed so much hope in the outcome of these meetings to

hear that he and Gorbachev are going to continue to meet despite the fact that they have not solved all of the problems connected with the communique. He said that the tone and the need here were simply not to leave this meeting and have people disappointed that there had been no progress, and thus have the hopes of so many people dashed.

Gorbachev responded that both leaders' statements ought to be in support of the document, and the statement would not last longer than two to three minutes. Moreover, the statements should not concentrate on differences, but on areas where there was agreement. He said there was no need for rose-colored glasses. Both leaders could be frank about the result reflected in the document: meanwhile, the process of their meeting would be continuing.

President Reagan said it would be necessary to decide when and where the leaders would make their statements.

When some of those present suggested it might be a good idea to have the leaders' statements at 10:30 or 11:00 AM, President Reagan explained that he preferred 10 AM, because precisely 17 hours later he would be appearing on U.S. television and giving his report about this meeting to the U.S. Congress and the American people, so the upcoming day would certainly be one of the longest working days.

Secretary Shultz said he wanted to add one thing. He had just received information about the joint understanding, and apparently the work on it was going backward. He noted that U.S. aides had been instructed to stay up all night and work to get a document out, and he expressed the hope that the Soviet leader would give his people similar instructions. Shultz said the statements would be made in the Geneva International Conference Center at 10 AM.

Korniyenko asked, "Is there anything to announce?" Shultz responded there could be—agreement had been reached about certain things; however, the Soviets were now beginning to go backward on some of what had been agreed.²

² In his memoir, Gorbachev wrote: "The dinner given by the Reagans was nearing its end and still there was no document in sight. We left the table and went to a small adjacent living-room. Reagan and I sat down. When the negotiators finally arrived, Deputy Minister Korniyenko started briefing us. George Shultz reacted heatedly and that sparked off an argument. Korniyenko was virtually leaning over me and speaking in a harsh and extremely nervous tone. Shultz, usually calm and even-tempered, suddenly burst out, 'Mr. General Secretary, you can now see for yourself how we work. How are we supposed to achieve anything in this way?' President Reagan and I were quietly watching the scene. 'Let's put our foot down,' he suggested. 'Agreed,' I replied. We separated and I went to discuss the problem with my colleagues. From Korniyenko's tone and behaviour, I assumed that there must be some fundamental disagreement or serious threat to our interests. But from what Bessmertnykh was saying it became clear that they simply could not agree on the wording, and the problem was quickly taken care of." (Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, p. 410)

Shevardnadze interjected that he had a question of principle. He said that it should be agreed not to detail differences but just make the statements in a general form.

Gorbachev said that he thought that the people involved were clever enough not to have the tail wag the fox, however, there are two foxes and two tails involved here. He said the sides ought not to come out with an empty document. Indeed, it would be better to have no document than an anemic one.

Secretary Shultz pointed out that the Soviet side was now beginning to link civil aviation and the cultural agreement. Korniyenko responded that it was Shultz who had always wanted to make those two things a package.

Shultz said that if it came to that, everything could be linked—bilateral issues and regional issues. But it would be a mistake to make everything into such a package and link everything. Korniyenko said that it would be possible to say that the sides have completed working out details on exchanges but this should not be linked to other documents.

Gorbachev said that in conclusion it can be said that the Soviet side will give its people instructions to wind up and the U.S. side can give its people instructions to wind up, and they will, even if they have to be there all night.

Shultz said yes, all night, even if they have to be there without food. He said the U.S. was glad to a civil aviation agreement with the USSR, but there had to be in it commercial terms to make the route financially attractive to PanAm, otherwise the company would simply not fly the route and there was no reason for Aeroflot to have a monopoly on that market.

Korniyenko said that yesterday the Soviet side had compromised on that issue and then the U.S. had advanced 30 points which had knocked everything out of kilter.

To Gorbachev's suggestion that everyone continue working, Shultz said that it was good and the U.S. side would work all night and that would be great if agreement could be achieved and if that were not possible, then there just would not be agreement.

Gorbachev said he thought he did not completely understand all the differences with all of the documents, but in any event he spoke to his people to the effect that he wanted everyone to get his act together and somehow iron out these last minute difficulties in regard to these issues.

President Reagan said that he and Gorbachev were meeting for the first time at this level. They had little practice, since they had never done it before. Nevertheless, having read the history of previous

summit meetings he had concluded that those earlier leaders had not done very much. Therefore, he suggested that he and Gorbachev say, “To hell with the past,” we’ll do it our way and get something done.”³

Gorbachev concurred. The conversation broke up at 10:30 P.M.

³ The following morning, November 21, both Gorbachev and Reagan made brief concluding remarks on the summit, and a Joint Statement was issued. For the text of the statement and the remarks, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 1986, pp. 7–11. In his memoir, Gorbachev recalled: “We signed the joint communique. In this truly historic document the leaders of the two superpowers declared that ‘nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.’ Admitting this and implementing it in practice made meaningless the arms race and the stockpiling and modernizing of nuclear weapons. ‘The parties will not seek military superiority.’ This fundamental statement was not just a general phrase to soothe the public. The American President and I had already committed ourselves to giving the necessary instructions to the negotiating teams at the nuclear arms talks in Geneva. Both parties declared their intention to improve bilateral relations—in particular, humanitarian exchanges and contact between our young people—and to resume air traffic between the two countries. The President and I each gave a short address. I stressed that the summit meeting was too important an event to be judged by simplistic standards. It had shed light on our differences and allowed the overcoming—‘at least I hope so’—of some biased judgments about the Soviet Union and its policies.” (Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, p. 411) See also Document 160.

November 1985–April 1986

New Political Thinking: Gorbachev's Proposal To Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

160. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, November 21, 1985

SPOT COMMENTARY: Special Follow-Up Analysis on Gorbachev's Press Conference

In his lengthy prepared remarks following the joint appearance with the President, General Secretary Gorbachev focused principally on security and arms control issues, which he characterized as the "central thread" of the meeting.² While giving a positive evaluation of the summit—stating in response to questions that he was "very optimistic" and that the world was now "more secure"—he noted that the discussions had been "frank and sharp"—at times, "extraordinarily sharp." He gave no indications that the USSR had altered its positions on arms control issues, and stressed the differences in the US and Soviet views on the origins of regional conflicts. Gorbachev spoke forcefully on the SDI issue, claiming he failed to understand how the President could endorse the concept. He said it would have been better if the meeting had resulted in solutions to the arms race, claimed the United States was not yet prepared to make the "big" decisions on this

¹ Source: Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Chron File November 1985 (2); NLR-324-12-39-2-4. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence. In a November 21 covering note to Lenczowski, [text not declassified] wrote: "John: We worked this up on the basis of the Gorbachev press conference including his q and a's. I don't believe that anyone in the Presidential party would be aware of some of the things discussed in this spot commentary, since they would have been on planes between Geneva and Brussels or Brussels and here. The White House sit room has a copy but this copy is for you to decide on whether McFarlane or Matlock should see this tonight." Lenczowski forwarded the report to McFarlane on November 21.

² On the morning of November 21, Reagan and Gorbachev took part in a joint press conference, closing the Geneva Summit. For the text of the remarks, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book II, pp. 1410–1411 and *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVII, no. 47 (December 18, 1985), pp. 10–16. On November 21, Reagan wrote in his personal diary: "This is the beginning of the longest day. At 10 A.M. in the large convention hall Mr. G. & I appeared on stage to considerable applause. Then we each made a short statement following a brief speech by Pres. Furgler. Then Geo. S. & Shevardnadze signed a couple of agreements, we said our farewells & back to the house." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 543) See also footnote 3, Document 159.

issue, and implored the Administration to carefully consider what it had heard from the Soviet side. He said the main significance of the meeting was “first and foremost” that it set the stage for the start of new efforts to normalize US-Soviet relations. Among his major themes were the following:

US and Soviet Strategic Thinking. Gorbachev said the sides shared the premise that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. In arguing for strategic parity, he stated that for the United States to have “less security” in comparison to the Soviet Union would be “disadvantageous” for both countries, because it would generate instability. He thought the United States ought to feel the same way about the USSR.

SDI. Showing no flexibility on SDI, Gorbachev said that if the arms race were extended into space the arms race would become uncontrollable. In response to questions, he said he had stressed to the President that the Soviets view space weapons as having offensive capability against satellite and ground targets. He noted that there was “some agreement” on the US side to look into the matter further. He also said Soviet scientists had assured him that if the USSR were forced to respond to SDI, it could do so in a way that was less costly, quicker, and more effective than US efforts, but he did not indicate what form the response would take. He said US deployment of SDI would “complicate the atmosphere” for the Geneva arms talks, a milder formulation than he has used in the past to imply a possible Soviet walkout.

Nuclear Arms Reductions. Gorbachev said the USSR would be prepared to radically reduce nuclear arms provided that the door to an arms race in outer space was “firmly closed.” He noted that the sides agreed on the concept of 50 percent reductions but that their views on the systems to be reduced differed. He said, however, that these differences should not be “overdramatized” and that mutually acceptable solutions would be found if there were no arms race in space. Responding to a question, he said that what the US had done in Geneva “would go a long way” toward helping to find a compromise if a space arms race could be avoided.

Verification. Gorbachev claimed that the USSR would be willing to open its laboratories to inspection, but only after it has been agreed to halt SDI. He also said if the United States would agree to halt nuclear testing, verification would not be a problem.

Nuclear Testing. Injecting a note of urgency into his voice, Gorbachev expressed hope that the US Administration had not said its last word on this issue. He said that agreement on a joint test ban would be a “tremendous” step forward and would promote the negotiating process in Geneva.

US-Soviet Relations. Gorbachev expressed optimism about the prospect for improved relations but argued that the countries must work

together. He characterized the meeting as the first step in the process of efforts to improve relations, citing in particular the agreement to hold future consultations and his remarks to the President on the political gains that would result from an expansion of economic ties.

Regional Issues. Gorbachev's remarks on regional issues were some of the sharpest and suggest that he was irritated by how they were handled during the meetings. His prepared remarks and answers to questions made it clear that he considers arms control to be the top priority and amounted to a rejection of the US regional issues initiative. Gorbachev acknowledged that the US and USSR "in principle" could work together to reduce regional tensions but rejected any suggestion that the USSR was somehow responsible for such tensions. Pointing to the LDC debt problem—and specifically Mexico—Gorbachev argued that regional problems are rooted in indigenous socio-economic conditions and not the result of East-West rivalry. Arguments to the contrary, according to Gorbachev, are "irresponsible" and "inadmissible banalities." His singling out of Mexico may have been meant as a riposte to US treatment of Afghanistan in the discussions. In his opening remarks, Gorbachev insisted that any US or Soviet actions in the Third World must respect the "sovereign right" of each nation to choose its political and economic system, methods and friends.

Comment. In keeping with past public performances, Gorbachev assumed a self-confident air while avoiding bombast or polemics. He was most animated when critiquing the US position on SDI, but otherwise sought to characterize Soviet concerns as reasonable responses to positions taken by the US during the talks. On SDI, for instance, he defended Moscow's rejection of its defensive purpose by citing an alleged remark by former President Johnson that "whoever gains power in space will rule the earth."

Gorbachev appeared acutely conscious of the image he was projecting to the Western press. In the question and answer session, he spoke at a measured and deliberate pace and when taking questions addressed some US correspondents by name. He appeared to adopt a deliberately indulgent pose toward the press corps, repeating answers to similar questions rather than brusquely dismissing them as he did during his press conference in Paris in October.

While portraying the meeting as a success, Gorbachev displayed clear but tempered disappointment on the lack of progress on arms control. He appeared most interested in portraying the meeting as offering the potential for progress in the future on arms control and bilateral and regional issues, providing that the United States does its part. He also set the stage for placing the onus on the United States, in particular the President's personal commitment to SDI, for any lack of future progress on arms control. [*portion marking not declassified*]

161. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Palmer) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

November 21, 1985

SUBJECT

Meeting with the President: Gorbachev Follow-Up

Here are some thoughts from the plane about follow-up, and a checklist/card for your meeting with the President.²

Our overall objective should be to have something meaningful under way in *all four areas* of the relationship by the time of the next summit meeting.³

Setting a *date* would help to provide a framework within which to work. Therefore, it would be useful if you could obtain the President's agreement to the general June–July period and to our working out with his schedulers and the Soviets a specific date.⁴

The key question is what process to set in motion within the USG and with the Soviets. We should sustain the momentum in both spheres achieved in Geneva.

With regard to the *interagency process*, Richard Perle and I had a long talk on the backup plane. As you know, he was constructive in the drafting exercise on the joint statement and says he wants to break through the distrust, logjams and tendency to end-run each other which has characterized State-Defense dealings on many US-Soviet issues.⁵ Obviously, this isn't just a question of process; there must be a willingness to work substance in a productive manner. We came up with two suggestions which combine process and substance and which you might want to discuss with Bud and the President.

—On the *nuclear and space talks*, we suggest that you, Cap and Bud try meeting together with SACG representatives to break the frustrating

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 Nov. 22, Mtg. w/ the Pres. Secret; Sensitive. A typed notation in the top right-hand corner reads: "Prepared 21 November on board back-up aircraft for meeting, 2:00 p.m., 22 November." Throughout the memorandum, there is underlining by an unknown hand. In his diary on November 22, Reagan wrote: "George Shultz came in after the Cabinet meeting. The meeting was for both of us to report on the Geneva trip." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 543) No substantive record of the meeting was found.

² Attached but not printed is the undated "Checklist Gorbachev Follow-up."

³ An unknown hand wrote "ok" in the right-hand margin.

⁴ An unknown hand circled the word "June," wrote "latter part" in the right-hand margin, and drew a line from it to "June."

⁵ See Document 142.

problem of already locked-in and differing positions coming from the SACG to principals. The initial substantive focus would be on an NST strategy for the first six months of 1986. This could address how to move the Soviets off the two key obstacles in START and INF respectively: including only comparable systems, and excluding British and French systems. On SDI, our thought is that we focus on ways to communicate better to the Soviets about some of their concerns. One idea is to prepare a thoughtful paper and send it to Gorbachev, and also, when he comes to the U.S., to try to get him to sit still for a briefing with charts and all. (In addition, I personally think we should try to satisfy Gorbachev's particular concern that space-based systems could strike objects on earth by offering to negotiate constraints. Fred Ikle tells me that our systems will not have this capability anyway.)

—On *human rights and trade*, Perle agrees with the general approach you offered to Shevardnadze in New York and is willing to develop some concrete incentives.⁶ We discussed removing the non-strategic, foreign policy controls on oil and gas technology. There are some other possibilities as well. My suggestion here is that you authorize Roz and me to work with Perle, Baldrige and Matlock to come up with a substantive plan for consideration by you and the President and for use in the confidential dialogue he now wants to launch with the Soviets.

These two suggestions would allow us to test whether we can enter into a more collegial and productive relationship with Defense as we prepare for the next summit.

On other arms control issues, I see the following next steps:

—On the *Risk Reduction Centers*, we need to select someone to conduct talks with the Soviets. Perle and I agree that the key qualification is “creativity” as there is nothing very definite in this Nunn-Warner concept.⁷

—We also should select someone to conduct our new dialogue on chemical weapons proliferation and get back to the Soviets to set a date. Ken Adelman is a possible candidate as he has a strong personal interest.

—On *MBFR*, we should get our initiative down on the table and try to develop some movement by the summit.

—On *CDE*, while we should try to get this wrapped up by the Summit, others seem to see this concluding just before the Vienna Review Conference in the fall.

⁶ See Documents 99 and 100.

⁷ See footnote 4, Document 135.

On *regional issues*, you mentioned a shared desire with Shevardnadze to get into more focussed and productive discussion. We could select perhaps two of the regional issues, have an early meeting between the two of you, then hold experts talks on the same issues, and possibly another session at your level, before the summit.

My personal candidates would be Southern Africa and Afghanistan: the first because it is the least sensitive and difficult for the two of us and Afghanistan because it is, in some ways, the most important. We've also had more experts-level meetings on these subjects in the past.

This raises the question of setting and timing of *your next meeting with Shevardnadze*. Having your meetings in Moscow and Washington makes sense, as this allows access to Gorbachev who clearly makes their decisions, and the two leaders should be directly involved in preparations for their next meeting. (It is Shevardnadze's turn to come to Washington next.) At the same time, there might be some advantage to using your trip to Europe next month (or a quick trip in January) generally to sustain momentum and to launch the regional discussion. One possibility would be a relaxed weekend or a day in the English countryside at Chevening at the outset of your trip. Another possibility would be for Shevardnadze to join you in Budapest (the Hungarians secretly aspire to become the "Switzerland of the East" and just hosted CSCE's Cultural Forum).

On the *bilateral agenda*, there are three items:

—The *Civil Air* talks should be wrapped up shortly.⁸

—We will need to push ahead firmly on the President's *people-to-people initiatives*. This requires that we get each side's representatives together in December if the Soviets are ready. In our joint statement, we agreed on a number of ideas and that the leaders will review "resulting programs" at their next meeting.

—The *fusion* project also requires that we get our representatives together soon or the momentum will be lost.⁹

Mark Palmer

⁸ An unknown hand wrote an asterisk at the end of the sentence and added "wrapped up today" in the margin.

⁹ An unknown hand wrote "DOE" at the end of the point.

162. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 26, 1985

SUBJECT

NST Issues

It is not too soon to begin to sort out our approach to the NST issues looking forward to a second summit meeting. I suggest the following main lines of attack:

1. That we fully develop and exploit the line you took with Mr. Gorbachev on British and French systems. Britain and France are important countries for the reasons you outlined; they are entitled to consider their nuclear systems to be their ultimate guarantee of security, as does the USSR, the US, and China; their nuclear forces today are relatively small in relation to those of the superpowers and smaller as a percentage of US and Soviet totals than they were some years ago.

We must recognize, however, that British and French forces will not only grow in numbers as they catch up in MIRVing but also increase in significance as US and USSR forces decline pursuant to an appropriate 50% reduction agreement. Therefore, we should support the participation of the British, French and Chinese in future negotiations toward reductions below 4500. Each of these countries has expressed such an interest, in one way or the other; and, most importantly, it would be imprudent for us to go below our proposed force level without participation of the other nuclear powers.

2. If British and French SLBMs are thus put into the category of "START-type systems", they should be logically excluded from consideration in the category of INF or "medium range" systems. This would remove the principal boulder which has stood in the way of negotiating an INF deal. There are many other important issues in the INF field, but the major and most difficult element in the Soviet INF position has been compensation for British and French SLBMs.

3. With "medium-range" and "FBS" systems having been dealt with in the INF negotiations, the START negotiations would be purged of them and the major boulder blocking progress in START would

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, November–December 1985. Secret; Sensitive. "Treat as original" is stamped at the top of the memorandum. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. An unknown hand wrote "See GPS comment p. 3" next to Shultz's stamped initials.

have been removed. Numerous and difficult issues regarding START will remain, however. Among these would be the problem of convincing the Soviets to defer inclusion of British and French systems. Also, we should review the ban on all mobile ICBMs and reconsider banning only MIRVed mobile ICBMs. There may be other such issues where we might wish to come up with new approaches where pertinent, e.g., revisit the SLCM issue.

4. No overall progress is possible unless we're prepared to deal in some intelligible way with the defense and space issues. In this regard, I see no way of making progress on defense and space unless we are prepared to get into a discussion aimed at agreement on what is permitted and not permitted in the field of research, development and testing. The problem is not merely one of defining research. One must also define the cutoff between permitted and nonpermitted development and testing. When we negotiated the ABM Treaty it was not intended that the parties limit the development and testing of subcomponents such as chips, sensors, propulsion units, etc; precise distinctions are essential in sorting out this area. Some in DoD do not wish us to get into any discussion of such precise distinctions. They say they are afraid our negotiators will negotiate improvidently. This battle must be won if we are to achieve overall progress in Geneva.

A second issue is that we must find a concrete way to deal with Gorbachev's concern that space-based systems designed for boost phase, or post-boost phase, intercept could lead to systems able to penetrate, or re-enter through, the atmosphere to attack objects on earth. We should work hard to come up with measures which would support a verifiable ban on space-based systems able to attack objects on earth while not foreclosing boost and post-boost phase intercept systems.

A third issue is what specifically we have in mind when we speak of a cooperative, phased transition. I drafted a paper on this subject during the spring, but it was bottled up in the NSC and has not been exposed to interdepartmental review.² The Defense and Space IG developed a paper on what should be said about transition to effective defenses, but that paper did not really address the substantive issues and was never acted upon by the IG.³

A fourth SDI issue relates to what happens in the event the "research" comes up with a positive result and the Soviets refuse to join in a cooperative program. The President rightly insists that we should not give the Soviets a veto. But the Soviets are understandably

² Not found.

³ Not found.

unwilling to hazard their basic security on some statement on or agreement calling for good intent on our part. The formula that we had in the "Monday Package," making continuation of the program of offensive reductions contingent, at each step, on continued adherence to agreed limits on strategic defenses, was an attempt to meet that problem. We should give alternative solutions to this issue our concentrated attention.

6. We should also insist that the issues involved in the verification annex which has been hung up in the interdepartmental process for several years be promptly resolved. Perle, Ikle and Adelman would like to make verification the centerpiece of our post-Geneva NST program. I believe this is wrong and would be viewed as a transparent attempt to block progress towards an NST agreement. However, as one of five avenues of approach, I think it is necessary and appropriate that we get at sorting out the decisions required to achieve an approved draft verification annex.

7. After having sorted out the line we wish to follow on substance, there should be another, perhaps separate, exercise on the tactics, including meetings with the Soviets and their timing, and the Public Affairs, Congressional and allied consultation programs best designed to get on with the job.

8. If you agree with the thrust of these ideas, we will put them in a form appropriate for a memo from you to the President.⁴

⁴ An unknown hand drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin and wrote: "GPS: I agree. Do a memo."

163. Handwritten Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev¹

Washington, November 28, 1985

Dear Secretary General Gorbachev,²

Now that we are both home & facing the task of leading our countries into a more constructive relationship with each other, I wanted to waste no time in giving you some of my initial thoughts on our meetings. Though I will be sending shortly, in a more formal & official manner, a more detailed commentary on our discussions, there are some things I would like to convey very personally & privately.

First, I want you to know that I found our meetings of great value. We had agreed to speak frankly, and we did. As a result, I came away from the meeting with a better understanding of your attitudes. I hope

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8591143, 8591239). No classification marking. The editor transcribed the text from Reagan's handwritten letter. An image of the letter is Appendix B. In his book, Matlock recalled: "After the meetings in Geneva, Reagan flew out to his ranch near Santa Barbara for Thanksgiving. He was still there when I was asked to draft a letter to Gorbachev following up on the discussions in Geneva. Eager to avoid the delays of interagency consideration and bickering between Shultz and Weinberger, Reagan intended to copy my draft in his own handwriting. He felt that his cabinet officers were less likely to pick it apart if he presented it that way. I sat down at my word processor and had a text ready in a few hours. Poindexter read it, approved it, and sent it to McFarlane, who was with the president in Santa Barbara. The president liked it, copied it out in his own handwriting, and sent it back to Washington to show to Shultz and Weinberger. They read it hurriedly and made no objections. On November 28, just a week after we returned from Geneva, the letter went out to Ambassador Hartman for delivery in Moscow. If we had followed normal procedures, with a draft by the State Department, clearance by an interagency group, then checking and revision at the NSC, the process would have taken weeks if not months, Reagan would have rejected the cautious, prolix product, and I would have ended up drafting the same letter before he would have agreed to send it." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, pp. 169–170) Matlock's typed draft, including Reagan's initials in the margin and some minor handwritten changes, is in the Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8591143, 8591239)

In a November 29 covering note to Shultz and Weinberger, McFarlane explained: "On Thanksgiving Day at the Ranch the President wrote the attached private letter to Gorbachev. He wanted you to see it before it is pouched to Moscow. We think it should be delivered by Ambassador Hartman in a sealed envelope with a courtesy Russian translation so that he will know what it says before giving it to anybody else. Jack Matlock will have the senior Russian translator from State come to his office on Saturday to do the translation." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 Soviet Union Nov) In telegram 17607 from Moscow, December 9, the Embassy confirmed that Reagan's letter was "hand-delivered in sealed envelope to the MFA morning of December 9." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

² In a handwritten note on the November 29 covering memorandum to Shultz, Poindexter wrote: "Mr. Secretary, We note the President got his title reversed, but don't think that is critical. The translation can put the title in proper order. John." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1985 Soviet Union Nov)

you also understand mine a little better. Obviously there are many things on which we disagree, and disagree very fundamentally. But if I understand you correctly, you too are determined to take steps to see that our nations manage their relations in a peaceful fashion. If this is the case, then this is one point on which we are in total agreement—and it is after all the most fundamental one of all.

As for our substantive differences, let me offer some thoughts on two of the key ones.

Regarding strategic defense and its relation to the reduction of offensive nuclear weapons, I was struck by your conviction that the American program is somehow designed to secure a strategic advantage—even to permit a first strike capability. I also noted your concern that research & testing in this area could be a cover for developing & placing offensive weapons in space.

As I told you, neither of these concerns is warranted. But I can understand, as you explained so eloquently, that these are matters which cannot be taken on faith. Both of us must cope with what the other side is doing, & judge the implications for the security of his own country. I do not ask you to take my assurances on faith.

However the truth is that the United States has no intention of using its strategic defense program to gain any advantage, & there is no development underway to create space-based offensive weapons. Our goal is to eliminate any possibility of a first strike from either side. This being the case, we should be able to find a way, in practical terms, to relieve the concerns you have expressed.

For example, could our negotiators, when they resume work in January, discuss frankly & specifically what sort of future developments each of us would find threatening? Neither of us, it seems, wants to see offensive weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction, deployed in space. Should we not attempt to define what sort of systems have that potential and then try to find verifiable ways to prevent their development?

And can't our negotiators deal more frankly & openly with the question of how to eliminate a first-strike potential on both sides? Your military now has an advantage in this area—a three to one advantage in warheads that can destroy hardened targets with little warning. That is obviously alarming to us, & explains many of the efforts we are making in our modernization program. You may feel perhaps that the U.S. has some advantages in other categories. If so, let's insist that our negotiators face up to these issues & find a way to improve the security of both countries by agreeing on appropriately balanced reductions. If you are as sincere as I am in not seeking to secure or preserve one-sided advantages, we will find a solution to these problems.

Regarding another key issue we discussed, that of regional conflicts, I can assure you that the United States does not believe that the Soviet Union is the cause of all the world's ills. We do believe, however, that your country has exploited and worsened local tensions & conflict by militarizing them and, indeed, intervening directly & indirectly in struggles arising out of local causes. While we both will doubtless continue to support our friends, we must find a way to do so without use of armed force. This is the crux of the point I tried to make.

One of the most significant steps in lowering tension in the world—and tension in U.S.-Soviet relations—would be a decision on your part to withdraw your forces from Afghanistan. I gave careful attention to your comments on this issue at Geneva, and am encouraged by your statement that you feel political reconciliation is possible. I want you to know that I am prepared to cooperate in any reasonable way to facilitate such a withdrawal, & that I understand that it must be done in a manner which does not damage Soviet security interests. During our meetings I mentioned one idea which I thought might be helpful & I will welcome any further suggestions you may have.

These are only two of the key issues on our current agenda. I will soon send some thoughts on others. I believe that we should act promptly to build the momentum our meetings initiated.

In Geneva I found our private sessions particularly useful. Both of us have advisors & assistants, but, you know, in the final analysis, the responsibility to preserve peace & increase cooperation is ours. Our people look to us for leadership, and nobody can provide it if we don't. But we won't be very effective leaders unless we can rise above the specific but secondary concerns that preoccupy our respective bureaucracies & give our governments a strong push in the right direction.

So, what I want to say finally is that we should make the most of the time before we meet again to find some specific & significant steps that should give meaning to our commitment to peace & arms reduction. Why not set a goal—privately, just between the two of us—to find a practical way to solve critical issues—the two I have mentioned—by the time we meet in Washington?

Please convey regards from Nancy & me to Mrs. Gorbacheva. We genuinely enjoyed meeting you in Geneva & are already looking forward to showing you something of our country next year.

Sincerely Yours,

Ronald Reagan

164. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, December 3, 1985

SUBJECT

NST Issues—Follow-on after Geneva

I read Paul Nitze's memo on next steps with great interest and am comfortable with most of his recommendations. It is not too soon to begin tackling some of the difficult issues.²

However, I have serious reservations about his proposals for dealing with the issue of French and British forces. As we all know, there is enormous potential for intra-Alliance tension on this issue and we should consider the risks very carefully before proceeding. Specifically my concerns are that Paul's approach would not work, that even raising it with the French and British at this point would needlessly create suspicion and tension, and that we do not need to propose a solution to this issue *now*:

—I see no reason for the U.S. to take the lead on this issue. It is a Soviet demand. The arguments put forward by you at Geneva as summarized in paragraph 1 of Paul's memo are valid ones. We should simply refuse to deal with this issue *until and unless* it is clear that an agreement so advantageous to U.S. security would be forgone by not dealing with this issue. We are not yet at that point and the prospect of a separate INF agreement is not inducement enough.

—We would obviously not want to express our support for the participation of the French, British, and Chinese in future negotiations without prior consultation with them. We are, however, almost certain to get a flat no from the French and Chinese and possibly the British as well.

During the INF debate, the French stated that they would be willing to participate in strategic arms limitation discussions once there had been significant strategic reductions by the superpowers *but also provided a number of other conditions were met*: an improvement in the conventional imbalance in Europe, no improvement in the strategic defenses that French forces would have to overcome, and finally, elimination of the CW threat in Europe. While this last condition is somewhat spurious, the first two are obviously relevant to France's security. In

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, November–December 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bohlen.

² See Document 162.

sum, the French want to undertake no commitment at this point but to maintain their freedom of action. Moreover, even in the unlikely event that Mitterrand wanted to adopt a more flexible attitude, his precarious political situation between now and 1988—the challenge from his right—would preclude this.

The British also have made their participation in future talks dependent on no improvement in strategic defenses as well as on substantial superpower reductions. It is possible they would be more flexible than the French at the end of the day, but they too would probably want more to show for it than the Soviets have offered us at present.

In addition, there could be considerable cost to even raising this issue with Paris and London, where there has long been the suspicion that the U.S., its protestations notwithstanding, would one day raise the issue. The French and British are extremely apprehensive of being put in the position of being obstacles to an agreement, which not only opens them up to pressures from other Allies but also plays into the hands of their domestic left. In the long run, it is simply not in our interest to weaken these countries' independent commitment to nuclear defense, strengthening the already-considerable anti-defense forces in Western Europe.

Finally, the Chinese would be a no less difficult if somewhat different problem. We would not need their consent to raise the issue, but neither could we commit them to future participation. This raises the immediate question of whether Paul's approach will satisfy the Soviets. It also raises the deeper question of what conclusion the Chinese will draw about our relationship if we seem to be colluding with the Soviets to limit Chinese military strength.

In sum, while I think Paul's formula of deferral to a future negotiation (and possibly indefinitely) is probably the best we could come up with if we had to, it will not be cost-free and we should make sure that what we are getting in return is worth it. In any event, I do not think there is any need to raise it now.

165. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, December 4, 1985, 1017Z

17327. Subject: December 3 Meeting With Shevardnadze. Ref: State 364561.²

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary. I met with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on December 3 to deliver the official invitation for Gorbachev to visit the United States. Shevardnadze said he would convey it to Gorbachev and then contact us about further steps.

3. Shevardnadze made these general comments:

—Geneva was the start of a long, difficult road.

—The experience of preparing for that meeting was “rather good,” and we should begin now to prepare further steps forward.

—The Soviet Union has “high expectations” for the nuclear and space talks.

—Recent Soviet messages to Egypt and Libya exemplify the type of efforts which should be made to prevent regional military conflicts.³

—The Soviet Union considers the upcoming visit of Secretary Baldrige and the meeting of the Trade and Economic Council important and is making suitable arrangements.⁴

—Gorbachev has asked to be kept informed of implementation of the agreements reached in Geneva, and the MFA furnishes him with periodic status reports.

4. I raised the possibility of televised New Year messages from the President and General Secretary. Shevardnadze termed the idea “attractive,” but said he must consult with Gorbachev before giving a definitive reaction.

5. USA Department Chief Bessmertnykh called attention to the lack of a reply from State to a request from the Soviet Embassy for a list

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² In Tosec 270176/364561 to Shultz's delegation, November 29, the Department repeated the text of telegram 364561 to Moscow, November 28, which provided instructions for Hartman to meet with Shevardnadze and present Gorbachev a formal invitation to visit the United States. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850012–0475)

³ Documentation on this is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

⁴ See Document 169.

of institutional counterparts with which the Soviet Union should deal in connection with exchange agreements. See paragraph 18 for action request. End summary.

6. Shevardnadze was accompanied by Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, the Chief of the MFA USA Department. An officer in that department, Vassiliy Kochetkov, interpreted. Embassy Political Officer Martin McLean took notes.

7. I first conveyed the invitation to Shevardnadze. I also alerted him to the possibility that when Secretary of Commerce Baldrige is in Moscow next week he might deliver a letter from the President which refers to the invitation. I told Shevardnadze that our negotiators and everyone else were working seriously to implement the understandings reached in Geneva and asked for his assessment of the meeting. Noting that we share one common holiday, I also asked for his reaction to the idea of televised New Year's messages from President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev to the people of our respective countries. I said this was a personal idea which I could pursue further, depending on the Soviet reaction.

Invitation to Gorbachev

8. Shevardnadze said that the US visit had already been "agreed in principle," but he was still pleased to receive the formal invitation. He said he would convey it to the General Secretary and would then tell us what practical steps need to be taken.

Assessment of Geneva

9. He evaluated the Geneva meeting at some length. He first stressed that much advance work had been done to prepare the agenda and other documents. In the end, they had "come in handy." Bessmertnykh interjected with a smile that they had only been partially useful. Also smiling, Shevardnadze replied that the negotiators of the joint statement had been able to sleep for two hours after agreeing on the text. Without the preparatory work, they would not have slept at all.⁵

10. Shevardnadze termed the Geneva meeting "useful and very necessary." He referred me to Gorbachev's Geneva press conference and his "more comprehensive and fundamental" report to the Supreme Soviet for the Soviet assessment of the results.⁶ "We realistically say what was achieved and what was not achieved, as well as the reasons why more was not accomplished." Shevardnadze said he personally considered the meeting as the start of a "long and difficult road." He

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 159.

⁶ See Document 160. Excerpts of Gorbachev's report to the Supreme Soviet on November 27 were printed in the *New York Times*, November 28, p. A4.

said the Soviet Union is “far from having an oversimplified attitude to the next steps.”

11. On the other side of the ledger, he said that the experience of preparing for the meeting had been “rather good.” We should use that experience to begin without delay to prepare seriously for further steps. He underlined the importance of “mutual desire” to deal with all aspects of the Geneva document, such as the nuclear and space negotiations, security problems, bilateral relations and other issues. Recalling my remark that our negotiators in the nuclear and space talks were preparing seriously to achieve positive results, Shevardnadze said Soviet negotiators had taken that approach from the start. He doubted that “third parties” would interfere if both the U.S. and USSR shared this objective. He noted the Soviet Union’s “high expectations” for the nuclear and space talks.

Regional Issues: Egypt and Libya

12. Turning to regional issues, Shevardnadze said we should not wait for a “global solution.” We are now witnessing an event which exacerbates tensions. He observed that two days ago (December 1) the Soviet Union had sent messages to the leaders of Egypt and Libya urging restraint. The Secretary of State had been informed of this step and urged to help calm the situation. Shevardnadze said this was the kind of problem where, “without fanfare,” the U.S. and USSR should try to avoid a military clash in a flammable region. If a military conflict began, the problem would be harder to deal with.⁷

Baldrige Visit

13. Concerning bilateral matters, Shevardnadze said the Soviet Union considers the upcoming Baldrige visit and meeting of the Trade and Economic Council important. He assured me that the level at which they are received and the organization will be good.

Exchanges and Other Bilateral Issues

14. He then asked Bessmertnykh to review other bilateral matters. Bessmertnykh said that the Soviet side is active on all issues “which were discussed” in Geneva. Agreements had already been reached on ecological questions and cancer research. Both sides were working on the fusion reactor issue, and maritime negotiations had been renewed. Other negotiations, such as the maritime boundary talks, were suspended because of the U.S. desire to study Soviet proposals.

15. Bessmertnykh said he wanted to “call attention” to the lack of a reply from the State Department to a request from the Soviet Embassy

⁷ See footnote 6, Document 167.

for a list of the agencies and departments with which the Soviet Union should work concerning the issues discussed at Geneva. In response to my request for clarification, he said the request concerned counterparts for bilateral agreements and new exchanges under discussion. Summing up, Bessmertnykh said the Soviet side is ready to move ahead and it hopes the U.S. is also.

Gorbachev Monitoring Progress

16. Shevardnadze said Gorbachev had issued “categorical instructions” to monitor implementation of the understandings in Geneva. As a result, the MFA provides him with periodic progress reports. He said he expected that President Reagan had a similar attitude.

New Year Messages

17. Concerning the possible New Year messages, Shevardnadze said he would have to consult with Gorbachev. He said he personally found the idea “attractive.”

18. Action request: We would appreciate information about Soviet Embassy demarche regarding Egypt and Libya, as well as Soviet Embassy request for USG counterpart agencies to follow up Geneva issues. To date we have received nothing from Washington on either matter.

Hartman

166. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan¹

Moscow, December 5, 1985

Dear Mr. President,

In this message of mine I would like to express some considerations and proposals as a follow-up to our exchange of views.

After the Geneva meeting we have a common task—to do all that is necessary and possible so that its results which were met with satisfaction everywhere, be reinforced by practical agreements and measures leading to the termination of the arms race, strengthening of the security of all states and revitalization of the situation in the world. This is precisely what is expected of us as leaders of the two major powers.

The Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons are, of course, of special importance. We favor achieving real progress at these talks, as well as at the conference in Stockholm, at the negotiations in Vienna and in other fora.

But there is an issue where concrete and rather weighty and tangible results can be achieved already now. This is the issue of stopping nuclear tests.

The Soviet Union unilaterally introduced since August 6 and has been observing a moratorium on all nuclear explosions.² There is no need to dwell upon the seriousness of this step. To take such a decision was not a simple matter for us. The Soviet side has its own programs, concrete practical needs. For that reason a time period through which the moratorium would remain in effect was set—until January 1, 1986. As we have stated, the USSR is ready to refrain from conducting nuclear explosions even further, though, naturally, on the basis of reciprocity. I wish to reaffirm that again. If, however, no positive response to this

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8591245). No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian was provided by the Soviet Embassy. Reagan initialed the top right-hand corner of the letter, indicating he saw it. Platt sent McFarlane the letter under a December 5 covering memorandum, writing: "Soviet Ambassador today delivered to the Secretary a letter to the President from Gorbachev with a proposal on nuclear testing. The letter, which is attached, reiterates the Soviet moratorium proposal but adds some new twists; the moratorium would extend to peaceful nuclear explosions; and both sides would agree to allow visits by observers to sites of ambiguous activities. We will provide separately our views on a response." In a handwritten covering note on December 9 to the President, Poindexter informed him: "We will review this with the arms control community and have a proposed response for you."

² See Document 68.

goodwill gesture of ours comes from the US, the unilateral commitments of the USSR will be void after the announced date.

We would not like it to happen. Although we do not have much time at our disposal, there is still enough time for the American side to carefully analyze this question again and to review it in broad political terms. I wish to reiterate the thought which I have already expressed to you: if there is a genuine intention to work towards stopping the nuclear arms race, a mutual moratorium cannot be objected to, while it would bring great benefits.

Indeed—what can be the objective obstacles to our joint suspension of nuclear weapon tests? I am convinced that there are no such obstacles. For in that case our countries would, in fact, be in an equal position.

Sometimes, of course, they refer to the difficulties of verification. But there is no basis whatsoever to dramatize this problem, either. We both know that the USSR and the US possess very sophisticated national technical means making it possible to verify reliably the fact of the absence of nuclear explosions. An additional guarantee of ensuring the confidence of the sides that the moratorium is being observed would be renouncing—as the Soviet Union has done now—any nuclear explosions—for peaceful, as well as military purposes.

If, however, some doubts regarding verification remain, this, given agreement on the main point, is a problem which, in our view, can be solved. One can take up, for example, the proposal of the Delhi “six”—Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania and Sweden—regarding the creation of verification mechanisms on the territories of these countries.³ We have already expressed a positive attitude to that.

Moreover. If a mutual moratorium on nuclear explosions is going to be introduced now, we are prepared—and this is what we propose—to agree at the same time on the following: on a reciprocal basis to give on appropriate requests the opportunity to the observers of both sides to visit the locations of ambiguous phenomena in order to remove possible doubts that such phenomena can be related to nuclear explosions.

In other words, the issue of a mutual moratorium on nuclear explosions is ripe and can be resolved as a practical matter. And if one is to speak of the political significance of such a joint step, then, certainly, it would give quite a definite signal to other nuclear powers, too, would create a qualitatively new situation, much more favorable for a positive

³ On January 28, 1985, a six-nation (Argentina, Mexico, Tanzania, Greece, Sweden, and India) summit held in New Delhi adopted a joint declaration urging the nuclear-weapon states to halt the nuclear arms race. For the text of the Delhi Declaration, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1985, pp. 35–37. See also footnote 9, Document 138.

development of the process started in Geneva, for taking effective practical steps to curb the nuclear arms race.

The resumption of the trilateral negotiations on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests would also be a tangible step in that direction. The overwhelming majority of states quite definitely speaks in favor of that, as was clearly stated in the U.N., at the recent NPT review conference, in other prestigious international organizations.

I would like to reaffirm our readiness for such negotiations and I specifically propose that they be resumed next January, for example, in Geneva. I believe that, should you accept, we could jointly come to terms on this matter with the British, too.

Mr. President, I found it necessary to address in this message a very important, serious question in the spirit of frankness which permeated our meetings and conversations in Geneva.

On behalf of the Soviet leadership I would like to reaffirm that we favor the implementation of those understandings of principle, which were reached between us. It is precisely in this vein that I address you.

We do not see any genuinely convincing reasons, why the USSR and US could not make a joint step—to mutually discontinue nuclear explosions. A political decision is required in this case. And we would like to hope that such a decision will be taken by the US Administration.

Sincerely,

M. Gorbachev

167. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, December 6, 1985

SUBJECT

12/5/85 Dobrynin Meeting

Dobrynin came in for a little over an hour Thursday evening.² He handed over the Gorbachev letter on testing which I have sent you separately through John Poindexter.³

We discussed in general terms the modalities of your next meeting with Gorbachev. We also considered the timing of additional meetings between Shevardnadze and myself. Dobrynin seemed comfortable but non-committal with my suggestion of late January and late May sessions, perhaps outside of Washington and Moscow. As to the late June timing of your next meeting with Gorbachev, he questioned whether it allowed enough time to work out something substantial in Geneva and suggested September. I responded that this would be too close to our elections. My guess is that they will in the end accept the June or perhaps the July date.

In addition to walking Dobrynin through the post-Geneva agenda along the lines I discussed with you on Wednesday,⁴ I took advantage of the meeting to tell him about the human rights letter Mac Baldrige will be carrying to Moscow.⁵ Dobrynin seemed to take my point that it would be valuable for Mac to meet with Gorbachev, and said he would send a telegram recommending a meeting.

I also put down a marker on the SA–5 missiles the Soviets appear to have delivered recently to Libya, and which could threaten our aircraft over the Gulf of Sidra. I told Dobrynin we had proof positive of Qadaffi's involvement in terrorist operations and other irresponsible activities and strongly urged that Moscow reconsider the wisdom of its military supply relationship with Tripoli.⁶

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Meetings: Shultz-Dobrynin 1986. Secret; Sensitive.

² December 5.

³ See Document 166.

⁴ December 4.

⁵ See Document 168.

⁶ In telegram 379815 to Cairo, also sent to Moscow for information, December 13, the Department noted: "We have raised the issue of Soviet supply of SA–5 air defense missiles to Libya both in Washington and Moscow. The Secretary raised this question with Dobrynin on December 5 and Ambassador Hartman took it up with Deputy Foreign Minister Komplektov on December 6." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850013–0230) Documentation is also scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVIII, Libya; Chad.

We agreed to meet again after my return from Europe in mid-December.

168. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev¹

Washington, December 7, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

The visit of Secretary Baldrige to the USSR provides an excellent opportunity for me to give you confidentially some of my further thinking on the issue of human rights. I was encouraged by our discussions on this topic in Geneva. Neither of us, I am sure, expected to convince the other of the correctness of all our positions during those sessions. However, I was pleased by your apparent agreement that this is a subject on which, working quietly, we can resolve outstanding problems.

You noted your support for contacts between our two peoples, the importance of visits by relatives, and your understanding of the need for increased contacts by religious groups. You agreed that it is natural that our citizens should marry. I hope steps will be taken that eliminate artificial barriers in these and similar areas. We agreed that the time has come for boldness in our relationship. I can assure you that some bold steps in the human rights area would be reciprocated by us in other areas.

At Geneva, I noted our pleasure that our embassy had been informed that a number of separated spouses would be allowed to leave the Soviet Union to join their husbands or wives. Some unfortu-

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8591241, 8591243). No classification marking. In a December 6 covering memorandum to Reagan, Poindexter recommended that he sign the letter: "You have said you want to follow up your exchange with Gorbachev in Geneva to emphasize the possibilities that would open up in areas of interest to the Soviets, *if* we see progress. The attached letter makes this point and sets out some of the specific cases where progress is needed. These cases (involving divided spouses and families, and dual citizenship) are important, although a real change in our approach to East-West trade requires Soviet resolution of the major human rights cases and a major increase in emigration. So that Gorbachev will know what you're looking for, the letter also makes this clear." An undated memorandum from Shultz to Reagan, along with a draft letter to Gorbachev, is *ibid.*, indicating the letter was drafted in the Department of State. Minimal changes were made in the final text of the letter.

nately have yet to hear this officially. Moreover, we have difficulty reconciling your number of ten spouses being held for a limited time because of security concerns with the longer list of such people who we know seek to be united with their loved ones. One of these cases involves a blind Soviet woman in her sixties who has been separated from her husband for almost thirty years. Another longtime case involves a Soviet man driven by desperation into two life-threatening hunger strikes in an effort to join his wife and small children in the United States. Several other cases have remained unresolved for many years.

We have provided your government with a list of 17 names in addition to those we have already been informed will be released; they all deserve special concern, and their resolution would have a positive impact on the relationship. I fervently hope these cases can be resolved quickly. It would be a joyous occasion if all of them could join their spouses for the Christmas and New Year's holidays.

I also hope we can overcome whatever obstacles stand in the way of eliminating the problem of people with dual US-Soviet citizenship. There are 23 of these cases. Several of these people are now very old. One 77-year old U.S. citizen, who came to the Soviet Union in 1932 on a school break and somehow ended up with a Soviet internal passport, has been trying unsuccessfully to return to the United States for over 50 years. None of the people involved raise security issues in any way whatsoever; it should be easy to wipe the slate clean in this area by allowing those who wish to depart to do so—quickly.

There are an additional one-hundred twenty-nine families in the Soviet Union who want to join close relatives in the United States, but have not been allowed to do so. Each one of these cases involves a human tragedy of separation. One involves a 16-year old child from Leningrad whose father was killed in an automobile accident last fall, leaving him all alone. In many other cases, parents and children have been separated for many years. Our embassy has in the past and will again provide all necessary details on these cases.

Beyond these cases, let me touch on areas in which, as I mentioned in Geneva, there are quite substantial political incentives for progress. I refer here to the broad question of emigration, whether of members of such groups as Jews, Armenians, and others, or of some internationally-known individuals. In both categories, we are talking about quite poignant cases. The young pianist I mentioned to you falls into the category of someone whose requests to emigrate have been refused. The political importance of resolving such well known cases as the Sakharovs, Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, and Yuri Orlov cannot be overestimated. We are not interested in exploiting these cases. Their resolution will permit greater prominence for other issues in relationship.

I mentioned the need for boldness in dealing with these issues. We are prepared to take some bold steps ourselves in areas that Secretary Baldrige will be willing to discuss. The emigration and trade areas offer some real scope for parallel movement that could benefit both our countries. I hope you and your representatives will discuss these areas candidly with Secretary Baldrige.

I trust that after our discussions in Geneva you have no doubt about my desire to move the relationship between our two countries onto a more constructive path. The issues I have laid out in this letter are serious ones. Progress here would provide an enormous impetus to the resolution of other outstanding problems; lack of progress will only hold us back.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

169. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, December 10, 1985, 2236Z

17758. Department Please Pass Secretary, Admiral Poindexter NSC; and Clarence Brown Dept. of Commerce Only. Subject: Secretary Baldrige's December 10, 1985 Meeting With General Secretary Gorbachev.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Introduction: The following is a memorandum of the December 10 conversation between Secretary Baldrige and General Secretary Gorbachev. The meeting took place in the usual Kremlin meeting room. It commenced at 5:30 p.m. and concluded at 7:05 p.m. The General Secretary was accompanied by his foreign policy assistant, Ambassador Aleksandrov-Agentov. Foreign Trade Minister Aristov joined the Soviet side some ten minutes after the meeting began. Secretary Baldrige was accompanied by Under Secretary Smart, Ambassador Hart-

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. In his diary on December 23, Reagan wrote: "Mac Baldrige came by with his report on the meeting with Gorbachev. It was somewhat similar to mine. G. on human rights gave him the same pitch I got that basic human right was everyones right to a job & in the Soviet U. everyone is given a job. Of course he doesn't also add that they cant choose a job—they take the one the govt. tells them to." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 555)

man and DCM Combs (notetaker). Gorbachev's overall approach was moderate and relaxed throughout the 95 minute meeting. End introduction.

3. The meeting opened with a five-minute photo opportunity. Gorbachev jokingly noted that Mr. Baldrige had arrived with a large team, a large landing force, but this was all right. The Secretary said that some 400 U.S. businessmen were in town for the USTEC meeting and this was the largest number ever to have taken part.² Gorbachev quipped that if this is a sign something good would take place after the Geneva Summit, that would be fine with him. The Secretary said he was here without question because of the progress the President and the General Secretary had made at Geneva. I'll take the blame, Baldrige added, for whatever trouble we have in our discussions here. Gorbachev said that the Secretary's blame was less than that of his and of President Reagan's but he would talk of that later once the newsmen left the room.

4. As the newsmen prepared to leave, Baldrige said he was sorry to hear that former Minister of Trade Patolichev was ill. Gorbachev acknowledged that Patolichev was seriously ill and could not work as before. But Patolichev was a man with a deservedly solid reputation; he had written one book and was now putting together his memoirs. Baldrige recalled that Patolichev had told him interesting stories about his wartime experiences constructing Soviet tanks. Gorbachev agreed that Patolichev had gone through a great deal in his life.

5. Gorbachev said he knew this was Secretary Baldrige's second visit within one year.³ This should have some meaning and Gorbachev hoped it was a good omen. If the U.S. side is prepared to take positive, practical steps this will be welcomed and met with understanding by the Soviet side. We look forward to hearing Secretary Baldrige's assessment of the current situation. Perhaps we will go no further than during the Secretary's May visit when there was considerable talk about trade, but trade did not grow. Directing his attention to Ambassador Hartman, Gorbachev said with a smile that the U.S. Embassy tended to monopolize the relationship but this amounted to little other than political dialogue. So we hope the Secretary's second visit will bring some concrete progress.

6. Ambassador Hartman can confirm, Gorbachev continued, that in Geneva Gorbachev and the President agreed an atmosphere of trust and confidence was needed in our relationship. If we adopted a practical approach, we could make progress in our bilateral trade. This indeed

² The U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council met in Moscow December 9–11.

³ See Document 32.

would contribute to an improved atmosphere and increased mutual trust as we got to know each other more fully. The arrival of Secretary Baldrige and the large group of U.S. businessmen fit quite well into this scheme.

7. Referring to typewritten talking points, Gorbachev said that before discussing trade questions he would like to say several words about the Geneva Summit. You certainly know our general evaluation of that meeting. In short, I would say that while we took only initial steps in Geneva, an important start was made there, despite differences on many issues particularly in the field of national security. This was also President Reagan's view. We in Moscow assess the meeting as generally positive on the whole. Most important, I think, Geneva showed that we can discuss and seek solutions to the most difficult questions. It is my view, and I think that of the President as well, that this by itself is important in guiding our relations now and in their subsequent stages of development. Of course, I did not expect the President to become a Communist comrade and I'm sure he had no illusions about changing my convictions. But we showed in Geneva that we could exchange views frankly and without preconditions.

8. I mentioned this, Gorbachev continued, because our relationship should be free of delusions. We need realistic evaluations of each other's policies and positions. We need to seek paths to wider cooperation and mutual efforts wherever possible in our bilateral relations and in the international arena generally, no matter how difficult this may be. Any other approach would be fraught with unpredictable consequences. In short, the main result of the Geneva meeting was that it showed how we could go forward in a mutual search for improved relations.

9. But this approach needs to be validated by practical deeds, Gorbachev said. It was not easy to reach Geneva: A great deal of debate—some public, some behind closed doors—preceded that meeting. More than six and one-half years had elapsed since the last U.S.-Soviet summit and so we were faced at Geneva with a review of all aspects of our relations. The next step, building upon the Geneva experience with practical measures, will be even more difficult. We need to move in various directions including not only our bilateral relations but such world developments as regional hot spots and north-south relations. I would therefore repeat that we are now beginning a period in which the results of Geneva are put to the practical test.

10. Gorbachev noted that Ambassador Hartman had conveyed the President's letter of November 28, 1985 and that Gorbachev would consider it most seriously and would provide a reply.⁴ Gorbachev said

⁴ See Document 163.

he would like to conclude this part of the discussion, regarding Geneva, with a request that the Secretary convey to the President that the achievements of Geneva are regarded very seriously in Moscow. We will try to improve the atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet relations as well as the substantive content of this relationship. As I told the President, this is not only our sincere desire; the objective character of our relations as well as the overall situation in the world make this necessary. This is an objective process and we cannot escape the responsibility we both bear because of the very nature of our two countries. I will repeat what I said in Geneva. We must proceed on the basis of equality and mutual advantage. We have no desire to damage the interests of the United States. It is excluded that we could reach an agreement whereby one side would capitulate and the other claim victory. This is impossible. We must proceed together on the basis of mutual advantage. We must share the bruises and bright spots equally. There must be no discrimination and we must be candid with each other. This holds true for our trading relationship. The U.S. administration must clearly understand that the Soviet Union will not succumb to pressure. We cannot build a political relationship upon such false premises. But in a healthy atmosphere all aspects of our relations—in cultural exchanges and other areas—can improve.

11. Gorbachev said he wished to emphasize a particularly important question concerning the arms race and the militarization of space. He had noted Secretary of Defense Weinberger's comments in London accusing the Soviet Union of evil designs and deployment of new rockets against the United States.⁵ These were not the words of an ordinary person or a journalist, but those of a senior representative of the U.S. administration. This was a serious matter (Gorbachev here began to warm to his subject). If Mr. Weinberger needs to make such charges against us in order to obtain more money from Congress, that is one thing. Does he really think that there are such politicians, such irresponsible gamblers, in the Kremlin? Such allegations are irresponsible and inadmissible. The element of responsibility in our relationship

⁵ According to the *Washington Post*: "Weinberger said today [December 6] that the Soviet Union has deployed 27 mobile, intercontinental SS25 ballistic missiles in what is a 'clear violation of the SALT II agreement.' Weinberger's statement, made in a speech to U.S. and British reporters, marked the first time that the Reagan administration has made public a specific number on Soviet deployments of a new missile system it has charged violates existing arms control agreements." ("Weinberger Says Soviets Deploy 27 SS25 Missiles," *Washington Post*, December 7, 1985, p. A19) in telegram 17801 from Moscow, December 11, the Embassy reported on a *Pravda* article that accused "Defense Secretary Weinberger of trying to sabotage the achievements of Geneva." The article also maintained the deployment of the SS-25 missiles was a "permissible modernization of the SS-13." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850888-0107)

needs to be strengthened, particularly after Geneva. If it is present, the results of Geneva will be enhanced.

12. Gorbachev concluded that he would now appreciate hearing Secretary Baldrige's assessment of the U.S. political scene after Geneva. We in Moscow see the current situation as far from simple. Certain people are dissatisfied with the modest results achieved in Geneva. I do not think it an exaggeration to say that some circles are seeking revenge for what was accomplished in Geneva. I make this evaluation knowing how the U.S. political system works. I see that Ambassador Hartman does not agree with me, but I think attempts have been made to strike blows at Geneva. At least this is food for thought and discussion. I return to what I said at the outset. Geneva was a first step; we now must make the entire journey to reach better relations. We have agreed to further meetings with the President and at other levels. We must ensure that these meetings are fruitful and bring about further normalization. So for the first time after Geneva I wanted to share my views with the U.S. side. I am most interested to hear your report of the evaluation in Washington.

13. Secretary Baldrige said he would let Ambassador Hartman handle Secretary Weinberger's statement (Gorbachev smiled and said that's right, that's right). The Secretary said he had given ten or twelve speeches in various parts of the United States since the Geneva meeting. These had dealt mostly with economic and trade matters but everywhere he had appeared his audiences had shown very great interest in Geneva. The common reaction was that Geneva marked a good beginning, as the General Secretary had himself noted. The American people did not expect all problems to disappear overnight, but their overall attitude regarding Geneva was very good. It was not surprising that some in the United States, particularly some journalists, downplayed Geneva's significance. But this was very much a minority view. Most press commentary was similar to the popular response that Baldrige had described. It was indeed typical that over 400 U.S. businessmen had decided to come to Moscow for the USTEC meeting. Above all, Baldrige could tell the General Secretary that President Reagan was very satisfied with the spirit of Geneva, with the frank talks held there. The President considers that we can move forward, and, most importantly, he has a genuine desire to do so.

14. The Secretary said there was no question that the President very much appreciated the opportunity to discuss all aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations with the General Secretary in Geneva. We were prepared for a fresh start and some bold steps, and this was the reason Baldrige had come to Moscow for a second time. We wanted to discuss the potential for improving our trade relations, Baldrige continued. We recognize very well the truth of your opening statement to the

effect that talk alone was insufficient. There was a time for talk and there was a time for action, particularly regarding trade.

15. The United States had taken some steps in this area. Perhaps the General Secretary did not think them important; perhaps he was not aware of them. For example, the recently enacted Export Administration Act contained considerably stronger provisions regarding contract sanctity than had the earlier act. Regulations had been eased regarding the sale of various types of equipment including imbedded microprocessors. We were issuing more licenses and working hard on trade promotion. So we had done more than just talk about improving mutual trade (Gorbachev interjected that this was a good development because nobody wanted equipment without microprocessors). The Secretary said he had been pleased to meet Foreign Trade Minister Aristov, with whom he could do business since he was an engineer who knew something more than just theory (Gorbachev commented that Aristov was an old industrialist from Leningrad who had perhaps been inflicted by a bit of diplomatic fog but would probably recover from that experience. Noting a reaction to these words by the two diplomats on the American side of the table, Gorbachev laughed that diplomats tended to protect each other without regard to conflicting ideologies.).

16. Gorbachev interrupted at this point to note that to a certain degree the Soviet Union had to thank the United States for its hard line on technology transfers. This had stimulated Soviet thinking and had led to basic decisions regarding the development of Soviet computers. Prompted by Aleksandrov, Gorbachev said this was like Peter the Great's initial defeat at the hands of the Swedes. He learned from that experience, defeated Sweden at Poltava and thanked the Swedes for teaching him how to win. Or take the example of grain. You wanted to teach us a lesson, but following your grain embargo we found new suppliers which we will not abandon. The U.S. lost from that episode, both economically and politically. He said with a smile that he was giving free advice on how to conduct U.S.-Soviet relations, while Henry Kissinger charged a fortune for doing the same thing.

17. Secretary Baldrige said he had never paid Kissinger and was glad to have free advice.

18. Gorbachev continued that even more important than trade and economics was the need to live together in peace. In this sense the various elements of the relationship that bring us together act as constraints against temporary emotions. This is important because we cannot base policy on reactions to one or another development. All perspective would be lost if policy is built on reaction rather than long-term goals. The result would be an absence of policy. Even when the atmosphere is tense we need to meet and discuss. We can deal with hot-spots in this way. This is not duplicity. This is reality. This is a

political conclusion we have made on the basis of a careful analysis of the world situation. There is no other way to go. We are two different societies; let us try to justify our respective systems and ways of life. But the long term political line of the Soviet Union which is based on political realities is to seek ways to resolve the unnecessary complications that exist between us.

19. Secretary Baldrige said the President had asked him to present a matter for the General Secretary's consideration in an area where our views differ. There are possibilities for improving bilateral trade in the field of equipment and technologies to assist exploitation of oil and gas. The United States leads the world in some aspects of this field. We think that would make sense for the Soviet side particularly regarding oil drilling and oil recovery. But our ability to conduct trade in this area was limited in 1978 because of concern over human rights, as I am sure you know. I am aware of your one-on-one discussion of human rights with President Reagan. As he made clear, we do not ask for public statements in which you state that you are changing your human rights policies. I am sure you know, however, the great importance of this issue for the President personally as well as for the Congress and the American people.

20. The President suggests that as a first step we remove unilateral controls on oil and gas equipment and technology. In most cases this would eliminate the licensing requirement. The President feels we can do this commensurate with progress in the human rights area, particularly given a substantial increase in emigration. We regard this as a practical, businesslike step which would be taken privately, not publicly, on both sides. The President is prepared to approach this in a cooperative spirit. We would like to see quiet progress without politics and with no public claims regarding linkage. It is in this spirit that the President asked me to deliver a letter to you on the topic of human rights that you discussed with him in Geneva. We look forward to hearing from you on this once you have had a chance to think over the matter.

21. Gorbachev said that indeed he and the President had discussed human rights. President Reagan thought his system was better, and the Soviet side was convinced of the opposite. Gorbachev could not agree with the President when the President said his job was complicated by political pressure from various groups such as the Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians. I told the President, Gorbachev said, this was his problem, that the Soviet Union had its constitution, its laws and its regulations regarding its internal affairs.

22. At the same time, Gorbachev continued, the Soviet side is prepared to take practical steps to resolve human rights problems. The Soviet side will not refrain from this if due respect is given to its

sovereignty. Our laws must be adhered to, but if a truly humanitarian matter arises, we will consider it. It is in this spirit that we accept the letter from President Reagan and will consider the practical questions it raises. You say you do not proceed on the basis of linkage, but there is a certain degree of linkage in what you have just said. You seem to be trying to force your views on us. You must understand that we do not try to dictate changes in your internal affairs, but I can assure you we have many things to say about human rights in the United States. I did not go into this in Geneva and I do not propose to do so now. Your government has great power; it can for example install listening devices. Millions of blacks and other non-whites enjoy only semi-rights. But I will not pursue this path. We have our own political process which we consider to be democratic and I know that both of us use such words as democracy, although the respective meanings are not the same. Let us respect each other. Your people have taken their decision about their way of life. We took ours in 1917, we lost 20 million lives defending it during World War II, and we are not going to renounce it today. So it is hard for us to accept any U.S. pressure regarding our internal order. But with respect to the practical matters raised in the President's letter, we will give these due consideration.

23. Why do you raise this question of emigration, said Gorbachev with emotion. You imply that vast numbers of Soviet citizens wish to leave. This is nonsense. We are not going to force people to leave when they do not wish to do so. When we check the lists you give us people are indignant at the suggestion that they want to leave this country. You have your laws regarding emigration and immigration; we have ours. So our systems are different and we should show respect for these differences.

24. Gorbachev said it was now time to join the others for dinner although the conversation could be continued during the meal. He was glad to receive Secretary Baldrige and to participate in a good discussion with him. The Secretary was recognized as a realistic leader interested in improving U.S.-Soviet relations in a wise fashion. Secretary Baldrige was welcome to come to the Soviet Union again, particularly if more barriers to U.S.-Soviet trade could be removed. Meanwhile, said Gorbachev with a smile, Ambassador Hartman needed to do more here in Moscow. But the Ambassador was within geographic reach and perhaps we would be able to influence him while he is here. Gorbachev said he would save the rest of his remarks for his dinner speech.

25. Gorbachev said he would sum up by noting that the Soviet Union favored development of trade with the United States and indeed had a great interest in doing so. We have large plans as you know, we are now considering and comparing various offers in the field of

international trade so the time is right, it is possible to move off dead center and we therefore welcome Secretary Baldrige's visit. But one thing must be clear, the U.S. must not think that trade with the Soviet Union is a reward that can be given or taken away, that can be used to force behavior that the United States desires. This would be a serious misconception. The Soviet Union can live without the United States and of course the United States does not require economic relations with the Soviet Union. From a political viewpoint, however, the situation is quite different. Our overall policies must develop further. Improved political relations should make possible enhanced trade relations. Please convey my warm regards to President Reagan and his wife Nancy. We, said Gorbachev, with a smile, hope for the best.

26. Secretary Baldrige thanked Gorbachev for his positive statements and said he only wished to emphasize that the President wished to remove the sensitive issue that Secretary Baldrige had raised from the public arena. Gorbachev said he took note of that.

27. As the meeting concluded, Secretary Baldrige presented Gorbachev with a book of photographs of the United States capital, noting that since Soviet briefing books probably did not have pictures he hoped the General Secretary would find the book of interest in connection with his coming visit to Washington. Gorbachev accepted the gift with thanks.

Hartman

170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to NATO¹

Washington, December 13, 1985, 0412Z

Tosec 280182/379810. Roz Ridgway and Allen Holmes From James P. Timbie. Subject: Support Group Meeting on Nuclear Testing.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. The NSC is worried about what our response should be to the recent Gorbachev letter on nuclear testing.² They are afraid that our

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to Shultz's delegation in Brussels where he was attending the NATO Ministerial December 11–13. Drafted by Timbie; cleared by Bova and in S/S–O; approved by Timbie.

² See Document 166.

track record of opposing an uninspected moratorium has left us vulnerable now that the Soviets have proposed an inspected one.

3. They called a Support Group meeting today to talk about this. In my view (which I laid out at the meeting) there are two basic ways to go:

—Stick to our current posture, but elaborate it in a clever way, emphasizing that we support a CTB as an eventual goal when certain conditions are met, pointing out that we are actively working to bring about some of these conditions (e.g., deep reductions), but we need to get work underway in one area—verification—and propose a meeting of experts to address both their verification idea (on-site inspection of anomolous situations) and our idea (measurement of yields at test sites).

—Extend the 50 percent reduction concept to testing, reducing the number of tests to 10 per year (about half the recent average) and implement both sides' verification proposals (on-site inspections of suspect events, measurement of yields at test site). The sides could agree to conduct no more than 10 tests in 1986 while an agreement was worked out.

4. A limit on the number of tests has some advantages (would permit us to be for something, rather than simply against the Soviet proposals, would require both sides' verification ideas, and would permit high priority testing to continue for SDI, D-5, etc.). It also has technical problems (how to handle multiple simultaneous shots) and political problems (if we change our position, are we on a slippery slope to a CTB). Also, what we would give up in 1986 would be clear, but what the Soviets would give up would be hard to judge.

5. At the meeting, just about everyone liked the elaboration of our current policy, and hardly anyone liked the quota concept. It is probably unlikely that we will make any major shift in our position over the next few weeks (everyone assumes that the Soviets will go public with their inspection proposal by the end of the year when their moratorium expires, and we fear a leak even sooner). An EUR/PM draft letter back to Gorbachev elaborating the current policy is being sent to the Secretary today,³ and it would be a good idea to turn it around quickly so the NSC can have it, even though it probably won't be sent until late next week at the earliest.

³ Not found.

6. A SACG meeting is scheduled for next Tuesday or Wednesday, primarily on this issue.⁴ Over the weekend the Support Group will write a little paper for the SACG, and it will have the two options outlined above, and perhaps others. If you have any ideas, let me know.⁵ Judging from the emotional reaction of OSD and JCS, I doubt the test quota will be picked in the near term, although we might get a serious look underway that could help us in the future. The White House is slightly receptive to a clever idea on this subject, and if you have one, send it along.

7. You might brief the Secretary along these lines.

Whitehead

⁴ December 17 or 18.

⁵ In a December 17 memorandum to Senior Arms Control Group Participants, Linhard wrote that the next SACG meeting would be on Wednesday, December 18, from 3:00–4:00 pm in the White House Situation Room. We currently anticipate that the agenda will include; —a discussion of developments in the area of nuclear testing (including both the potential end of the Soviet testing moratorium on December 31 and recent Soviet nuclear testing proposals made by Gorbachev); —the U.S. strategy for handling the expiration, also on December 31, of the unratified SALT II accord on December 31; —and, the status of preparations for the next round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (including the ‘strategy and themes’ papers for this round which have been developed and the status of the delegation instructions due on January 3).” (Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, December 1985) Listed in this memorandum were three attached papers (not found): “Nuclear Testing Paper;” “Consultation Gameplan;” and “Strategy & Themes Papers.”

171. National Security Decision Directive 203¹

Washington, December 23, 1985

*Nuclear Testing Limitation:
Responding to the Soviet Proposal of December 5 (U)*

I have reviewed the paper on Nuclear Testing Limitations prepared under the auspices of the Senior Arms Control Group and the agency

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD), NSDD 203 [Nuclear Testing Limitation: Responding to the Soviet Proposal of December 5]. Secret.

views provided on that paper.² Based on my review, I have decided to respond to the proposals made on this subject by Secretary General Gorbachev in his letter of December 5, 1985,³ using the first alternative approach outlined in the paper. (S)

The fundamental U.S. policy with respect to nuclear testing limitations initially outlined in NSDD-51 remains valid.⁴ For as long as the United States and its allies must rely upon the vital contributions of nuclear weapons to underwrite security and deter aggression, we will have to conduct nuclear tests. (S)

The U.S. response to Secretary General Gorbachev should build upon the principled U.S. long-standing positions in this area which are based upon that policy. In addition, our response should reiterate the U.S. offer to the Soviet Union to send experts to visit the United States' nuclear test site to measure the yield of a test and to have U.S. and Soviet experts meet to discuss how best to make progress on verification based upon the common ground that may exist between the most recent U.S. and Soviet proposals in this area. (S)

At such a meeting, the U.S. group would be prepared to discuss both the U.S. and Soviet proposals. However, the U.S. objective would be to seek Soviet agreement to begin the process of developing effective verification measures for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). (S)

Ronald Reagan

² Not found. See footnote 5, Document 170.

³ See Document 166.

⁴ NSDD 51, "U.S. Nuclear Testing Limitations Policy," August 10, 1982, is in the Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD), NSDD 51. It is also scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XL, Global Issues I.

172. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan¹

Moscow, December 24, 1985

Dear Mr. President:

I consider your letter and value the spirit in which it was [written] addressed to me.²

I am speaking to you because I see a desire to continue and to that which we achieved in Geneva. I am gladdened that we have begun—both in fact and in spirit—a direct and frank discussion. I attach special significance to the fact that we have been able to overcome the serious psychological barrier which for a long time has hindered the dialogue achieved by the leaders of the USSR and USA.

I also have the feeling that now we together can set aside our differences and get down to the heart of the matter—we can set a specific agenda for discussing in the upcoming years how to set straight Soviet-American relations.

This much is perfectly obvious: we must expand areas of agreement and must increase painstaking responsibilities in our policies and must adopt the appropriate specific resolutions.

In my opinion, such a position would be ideal in which we together make steady progress. I agree with what you said: no one except us, in the final analysis, can achieve this. And especially we should assume

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) December 1985 (2/3). Secret; Sensitive. Brackets are in the original translation. In an undated memorandum to Poindexter summarizing the letter, Platt explained that Gorbachev “sent a lengthy, handwritten response to the letter sent by the President after the Geneva summit. The fact that the President wrote his letter in longhand obviously made an impression. Gorbachev not only answered in kind, but with an unusual lack of formality.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8591293)) Gorbachev’s handwritten letter, in addition to a typed copy noting “Final translation done by WH translators,” is *ibid*.

² On January 13, 1986, Ridgway sent a memorandum to Shultz, “Handling of Gorbachev’s December 24 letter,” explaining that “the original translation was done by White House personnel from the handwritten script that had been delivered by the Soviet Embassy to Don Regan. We received this preliminary version, plus a copy of the handwritten text, late on the evening of December 26.” State Department personnel from the Soviet Desk, she continued, “including two who have served in the Soviet Union and speak Russian, worked that night to provide an analysis and talking points (Tab 3) for the NSC to brief the President the following day. They were in touch directly with the White House translators to clarify points in the text. On December 27, State’s Language Services Division did its own translation. The analysis based on the White House translation notes that the tone of the Gorbachev letter was informal and upbeat; this characterization is accurate for the State translation. There are no significant differences between the two translations on substantive points.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Super Sensitive 01/07/1986–01/16/1986) See Document 163.

the duty to untie the knot surrounding nuclear and space weapons. It has struck me that you, Mr. President, also consider that this is of critical importance to us.

From what we said in Geneva, you, I think, have understood that our decisive opposition to the creation of nuclear space weapons is rooted in the fact that weapons of this class, possessing in their very nature the ability to be used both for defensive and offensive aims. In the final analysis they present the extreme danger of broadening the offensive potential with all the inevitable consequences entailed in this in the sense you have said, Mr. President, that the US has no intention of using the SDI program for achieving military superiority.

I am sure that you personally could not have any such intention. But we agree that it is the duty of the leaders on both sides to evaluate the actions of the other in the area of the creation of new types of weapons not in terms of intentions but rather in terms of the potential capabilities which might be achieved due to the creation of a new weapon.

Viewing the SDI from such a position, the Soviet leadership inevitably arrives at one conclusion: in the current actual conditions “the space shield” is needed only by that side which is preparing a first (preemptive) strike. For the side which does not proceed from this notion, the need for such a weapons system need not arise.

Indeed, space strike weapons are global weapons. The space strike weapons being developed in the US are long-range directed-energy and kinetic weapons (which have a range of several thousand miles and are highly destructive). They are capable—and here your [scientists] specialists and ours are in agreement—in a short period of time, in mass quantities of (1g) destroying targets thousands of miles away both in space and from space. And I emphasize, thousands of miles. How, for example, should one consider the space weapons of one side, which have the capability in a short period, (2g), of destroying the other side’s monitoring, navigation, communications and other space systems by strikes from guided space weapons. In essence, the use of this weapon can only be considered as a means to “blind” and take the other side by surprise, and to interfere with its capability to respond to a nuclear attack. Moreover, once this weapon is created the process of improving it will begin, giving it ever increasing combat characteristics. Such is the law of the development of any weapon. How, Mr. President, should the Soviet Union respond in this situation? I would like to repeat what I said in Geneva. The USSR simply can not and will accept the situation of the U.S. realization of the SDI program to reduce nuclear weapons to provide for its security. Come what may, we will be forced to develop and perfect strategic nuclear forces, to increase their ability to neutralize the American “space shield.” At the same time we would

be force to develop our own space weapons, including those for national ballistic missile defence. Apparently, the U.S., for its part, would adopt other kind of measures. As a result we would not be able to break out of this vicious circle and in the final analysis, from the whirlpool of the ever-spiraling arms race. The end results of such actions inimical to our people and all of mankind would be unspeakable.

I am convinced that the only rational way out is not to do this. From all points of view the right path for our countries is to prevent an arms race in space and halt it on earth. Moreover, it is necessary to negotiate under equal and mutually acceptable conditions. Together we are committed to speeding up the negotiations. I was pleased to hear your words to the effect that the U.S. will not “create offensive space-based weapons.”

As I understand it, we now have a common ground on a very essential part of the problem of preventing an arms race in space. Let us do what needs to be done so that our representatives at the talks will begin to develop specific measures on this basis aimed at preventing the development of offensive space weapons; that is, all such space-based weapons which are capable of destroying targets in space and from space.

In the spirit of that frankness, with which we conducted our talks, I tell you that this questions is now acute; either future events will determine policy or they will be determined by us. In order not to be caught up in events, it is again especially important to look into all aspects of the objectively existing interrelationships between offensive and defensive weapons and to listen to each other on this question. I think, however, that there is little sense in such discussions if at the same time from the doors of our laboratories begin to appear weapons of war, whose effects on strategic stability cannot be calculated. Common sense tells us that until we jointly clarify these consequences, it is impossible [should not] to produce anything behind the walls of the laboratories. We are also ready to discuss this question.

It seems to me that this is the primary course toward the realization of joint talks, which we considered in Geneva on the unacceptability of an arms race in space and, in the final analysis, on the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Such an approach makes sense at the discussion in the Geneva negotiations on eliminating the danger first strike (preemptive) nuclear weapons. I would like to again tell you definitely that we are not gambling on a nuclear first strike nor are we preparing our nuclear arsenal for this purpose.

I cannot agree with the way in which you consider the question of first strike nuclear weapons. This, of course, is not simply a matter

of ICBM warheads. There is no comparison of the destructive capability between, for example, “Trident” submarine ballistic missile warheads and warheads on current Soviet land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles; that is, in such indicators as accuracy, (1g) and range. If it is a question of warning time, then there cannot be less time than for a significant part of submarine missiles, in which warheads the U.S. has a great superiority. [And] can we view in any other way than as a first strike weapon the “Pershing–2” missiles deployed in Europe with high accuracy and short flight time to targets in the USSR?

Please forgive me for being concerned with technical details in a personal letter of this kind. But, really, this is a vitally important situation and it cannot be avoided.

Believe me, Mr. President, we have real and extremely serious concern over U.S. nuclear weapons. You speak of mutual concerns. The solution of this problem is only possible through consideration and calculation of sum total of the corresponding nuclear weapons on both sides. Let our negotiators discuss this, too.

Mr. President, in short, I would like to respond to your reference to regional concerns. I already emphasized, when we spoke on these matters in Geneva, that the most important thing here is that we look at things as they are. If we acknowledge that in the international arena independent states are speaking and acting and that we must recognize their sovereign right to maintain relations with anyone they wish and to seek assistance, including military.

Both of us are providing this kind of assistance. Why apply a double standard here and assert that Soviet aid is a source of tension and American aid is goodwill? Better to be guided in this matter by objective criteria. The Soviet Union will help lawful governments which ask us for aid because they have been and are being subjected to external armed intervention.

But the U.S., and such are the facts, inspires action against governments and supports and arms antisocial and, in essence, terrorist groups. Objectively looking at the matter, it is specifically such actions and external interference which creates regional tensions and conflict situations. Were there no such activities, I am sure that tensions would be reduced and the prospects for political control would be much better and more realistic. Unfortunately, developments are proceeding in another direction. Take, for example, the unprecedented pressure and terror to which the government of Nicaragua which has been lawfully elected by the people in free elections has been subjected.

I will be frank—the things which the United States has done lately make us wary. It seems that just now a shift is being made in the direction of further exacerbation of regional problems. Such an

approach does not facilitate finding a common language and complicates the search for political solutions.

As far as Afghanistan is concerned, the impression is being formed that the American side is intentionally overlooking the “open door” leading to a political settlement. Now there is a working formula for such a settlement. It is important not to interfere with the ongoing negotiations but to assist them. Then a just settlement will definitely be found.

Mr. President, I would like for you to view my letter as another of our “fireside chats.” I sincerely would like not only to keep the warmth of our Geneva meetings but also move further in the development of our dialogue. I look at correspondence with you as the most important channel in preparing for our meeting in Washington.

There are only a few days until the New Year and I would like to convey to you and your spouse our warmest wishes.

Respectfully,

M. Gorbachev

173. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev¹

Washington, December 26, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I have already written to you informally to express some of my thoughts on the issues facing us in the wake of our meeting in Geneva.² I would like in this letter to deal with some of the particularly pressing regional issues which I believe we must address in the months ahead.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8591241, 8591243). No classification marking. This letter is in response to Gorbachev’s December 5 letter, not the handwritten letter of December 24. In a December 18 covering memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock explained: “A letter from the President to Gorbachev on regional issues is at Tab A. It would follow up, in greater detail and on a more formal basis, some of the suggestions he made in his handwritten letter.” A December 13 covering memorandum from Platt to McFarlane indicates the letter was drafted and revised in the Department of State then sent to the White House. Gorbachev’s December 5 letter is Document 166.

² See Document 163.

I mentioned Afghanistan in my earlier letter, but I would like to share with you some further thoughts. Afghanistan was, after all, the regional question on which we spent the most time in Geneva. You expressed Soviet readiness to see an agreement emerge from the United Nations negotiating process which would entail a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops, return of the refugees and international guarantees. The discussion recalled the suggestion in your June 10 letter that my government had “opportunities to confirm by its actions” our readiness to reach a political settlement in Afghanistan.³ As I explained in my October speech to the UNGA, we are prepared to cooperate with others on practical steps. Three elements could form the basis for a lasting solution: A process of negotiations among the warring parties including the Soviet Union; verified elimination of the foreign military presence and restraint on the flow of outside arms; and movement toward political self-determination and economic reconstruction.

As you know, we have been disappointed with the results of the proximity talks conducted by the U.N. Secretary General’s Special Representative. Five rounds in Geneva have not addressed the real issue on which a resolution of this problem depends—withdrawal of your forces. No other element of the problem presents real difficulty.

To underscore this, we have formally notified the Secretary General that we accept the agreed formulation on guarantees. For your part, I believe that the talks would gain a real impetus from Soviet action to permit discussion of a timetable for withdrawal at Geneva and a public announcement to that effect. Were such action taken by the time of our Ministers’ next meeting, it would enable them to have a more focussed and productive discussion.

Another area where I believe movement is possible is Southern Africa. Because we have covered this ground often in the past, the point I need to make is a simple one.

As I am sure you are aware, I am reviewing our policy in Southern Africa, specifically with respect to the war in Angola. This review might not be necessary if there were real evidence that the outside forces in that country could be reduced, and then withdrawn, making possible the reconciliation of the indigenous parties to the war. Such an outcome, of course, would dramatically improve prospects for the establishment of an independent Namibia in accordance with UNSC Resolution 435—an objective we share with the U.S.S.R.⁴ Unfortunately, the evidence is clear that your own involvement in Angola is deepening.

³ See Document 41.

⁴ See footnote 17, Document 28.

As I said at the UN in October, our aim is to reduce, not increase, military involvement by the superpowers in local disputes like that in Angola.

I was pleased to learn from Secretary Shultz that the Soviet Union had expressed an interest in calming tensions between Libya and Egypt. At the same time, it appears that Libya is preparing at least two sites for the emplacement of SA-5 Air Defense Missiles to be supplied by the Soviet Union.⁵ It is hard to reconcile Soviet interest in restraint in this region with the provision of advanced weapons to a leader whose reckless behavior is a major danger to regional stability. Because we view this development with utmost seriousness, I was disappointed to see that the Soviet response to our presentation failed to address the transfer of these weapons to Libya. Our Ministers and experts should address this vital matter, since it raises the prospect of dangerous incidents that I hope you want to avoid as much as we do.

If you agree, both Angola and Libya are additional subjects which Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze might take up in their next meeting.

In closing, let me underline my satisfaction with our agreement in Geneva to put our regional experts' talks on a regular basis. When we met in Geneva we agreed that it was important for both of us to avoid a U.S.-Soviet clash over regional conflicts and to work for solutions. I believe that we must move forward on some of these issues before we meet again. In that regard, I was pleased to note that in your remarks to Secretary Baldrige you referred to the importance of dealing with regional trouble spots.⁶

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

⁵ See footnote 6, Document 167.

⁶ See Document 169.

174. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 9, 1986

SUBJECT

January 8 Dobrynin Meeting

I used the meeting primarily to share with Dobrynin your thinking on the timing of Gorbachev's visit. Dobrynin said he had no answer from Moscow on our initial proposal,² a silence he attributed to Gorbachev's heavy involvement in preparations for the February Party Congress. Dobrynin felt it was useful to have the benefit of your own thinking, understood the considerations on which it was based, and promised to report fully to Gorbachev.

Dobrynin did have an answer to my suggestion that Shevardnadze come here in late January. The Foreign Minister will be busy in his capacity as Politburo member in the run-up to the Congress and is unable to meet in January or February. Dobrynin hinted that it might be possible to schedule a visit in early March. He handed over a schedule for proposed expert-level meetings on various arms control, regional and bilateral questions between now and June—a good indication that the Soviets do not want to lose momentum on the agenda we agreed to in Geneva.³

I took advantage of the meeting to put into perspective your decision to impose sanctions against Libya, going into some detail to impress upon him our certainty of Qaddafi's links to terrorism. His response, that the roots of terrorism lie in the unresolved Palestinian problem, was disappointing boilerplate. It was made without conviction, and he ultimately agreed with me that there was no justification for actions like the Rome/Vienna attacks.⁴

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Summit 1986 (1/2). Secret; Sensitive.

² See Document 167.

³ Not found attached; however, a copy is attached to a January 21 memorandum from Ridgway to Shultz in preparation for his January 22 meeting with Dobrynin. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1986 Soviet Union Jan.) See Document 184.

⁴ On December 27, 1985, terrorists attacked the El Al check-in counters at the Vienna and Rome airports.

175. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 14, 1986

SUBJECT

Gorbachev Response to Your Human Rights Letter

Dobrynin came by Monday evening to deliver Gorbachev's response to the letter on human rights which Mac Baldridge delivered when he was in Moscow.² It smacked of having been drafted by bureaucrats.

The letter is non-polemical in tone, and reiterates the assurance Gorbachev gave you directly that individual cases of divided spouses can be resolved "on the basis of humanism and taking into account the interests of the people concerned." But it holds out little hope of broad-based progress on human rights issues.

As in Geneva, Gorbachev affirms that Soviet law is not a barrier to the emigration of Soviet citizens who meet its criteria, and rejects bending the rules to resolve specific cases. He reiterates that Moscow will not be swayed in this respect by U.S. pressure, and suggests that human rights cases continue to be "blown out of proportion" in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Finally, he warns "in passing" against attempts to link trade and economic issues to "questions of a different nature."

The letter did not address the three specific cases raised in your letter (Sakharov, Shcharanskiy and Orlov) or those I mentioned in my earlier letter to Shevardnadze.³ Dobrynin indicated, however, that we could take up specific cases tomorrow with the Soviet Embassy here. We will, of course, do so.

It is not surprising that Gorbachev has formally stayed with the party line on an issue as touchy as this one is for the Soviets. As we have understood from the beginning, the important thing is not what they say, but what they do. The resolution late last week of the case of Irina McClellan's daughter is a sign that the positive steps which began before the Geneva meeting are continuing for the moment.⁴

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8690024, 8690124). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed at the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² See Document 168.

³ See footnote 3, Document 136.

⁴ According to telegram 1935 from Moscow, February 5, reporting on divided spouses, McClellan and her daughter, Elena Kochetkova, received visas on January 6. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860091–0861) Immigration visas to the United States were then granted on January 16. (Telegram 886 from Moscow, January 17; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860044–0020)

So is the fact that Gorbachev is prepared to continue the dialogue. Disappointing as the substance of Gorbachev's response is, it only underscores the need to consider how we can best encourage and broaden the fragile process underway.

I've attached the Soviets' unofficial translation of Gorbachev's letter.

Attachment

Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan⁵

Moscow, January 11, 1986

Dear Mr. President,

Your letter of December 7, transmitted through Secretary Baldrige, addressed the questions on which we had a rather thorough discussion in Geneva. At that time I outlined in detail our approach to these questions, and, it seemed to me, you took in what was said with certain understanding.

It is hardly necessary to repeat, that the questions involved pertain to the internal competence of our state and that they are resolved in strict conformity with the laws. I would like only to point out, that the Soviet laws do not create impediments when decisions are taken on the questions regarding departure from the USSR by Soviet citizens who have legal grounds for that. This is attested to also by the fact that as a practical matter the overwhelming majority of such questions is resolved positively.

The existing laws are obligatory to everybody—both to those who apply to leave and those who consider exit applications. Such is the essence of our law and order and nobody is entitled to violate it—whether under any pressure or without it. I would think this should be understood in the the U.S.

We, of course, take into account, that due to various circumstances, divided families appear, which live partially in the USSR and partially—in the USA. Only in the past 5 years there have been over 400 marriages between Soviet and American citizens. And the overwhelming majority of those marriages—to be precise, more than 95 percent—encountered no problems with regard to the reunification of the spouses

⁵ No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Embassy.

and to living together. Yes, there are exceptions, and we have frankly and repeatedly told you what they are about. But generally, and I want to stress it once again, questions of this kind are resolved by us on the basis of humanism and taking into account the interests of the people concerned.

I share your desire to channel the relationship between our countries to a more constructive course. And the breaks are being put on this process in no way due to the existence of the cases of such sort—though I do not tend to belittle their importance from the point of view of the lives of individual persons—but because of the attempts to blow them out of proportion in the general balance of Soviet-American relations. The key issues in this area are awaiting their resolution.

I would like to note in passing: as it can be seen, the continued attempts by the American side to tie up trade and economic relations with questions of a different nature will bring no benefit. It is high time to take a realistic look at this whole issue from the position of today, rather than yesterday.

It would seem that much will now depend on how accurately we are going to follow jointly the real priorities in our relations, if we wish to bring about their tangible normalization already in the near future. I think, the chances are not bad here.

Sincerely,

M. Gorbachev

176. National Security Decision Directive 206¹

Washington, January 14, 1986

*INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE FOURTH ROUND OF THE
US/SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA (U)*

This negotiating round will be unique compared to past rounds in that it follows the summit meeting during which General Secretary Gorbachev and I called for early progress in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the nuclear arms of the U.S. and the USSR appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement. (U)

The Soviets have not yet provided a formal response to our November 1, 1985, proposals.² Since those proposals, in part, reflect elements of Soviet proposals, the U.S. Delegation should emphasize my personal hope that the Soviet Delegation will be prepared to react constructively with an early, positive response to the U.S. proposals tabled at the end of the last round. (U)

In seeking to move the negotiations forward, the U.S. delegation should take the position that the Joint Statement of November 21, 1985, reflects the agreement of both sides that the negotiations should give priority to areas of convergence, and that progress in one area should not be held hostage to a resolution of issues in other areas.³ In this regard, the delegation should take special care to resist Soviet attempts to link progress in the three negotiating groups, in order to permit each group to make progress on its own subject matter as rapidly as possible. In addition, the delegation should also resist any Soviet

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 206 [Instructions for the Fourth Round of the US/Soviet Negotiations in Geneva]. Secret. In a January 13 memorandum to Reagan, Poindexter explained: "Our negotiators will be returning to Geneva this weekend to begin Round IV of the talks on January 16 covering START, INF and Defense and Space. Recall that just before your summit and at the end of Round III, the U.S. provided a detailed counter-proposal involving the principle of 50 percent reductions. The Soviet delegation has not had the chance to really address our proposals yet. Our task during this upcoming round will be to focus on the areas where we have the most common ground (START and INF reductions) and press the Soviets for an early, constructive response to our new proposals." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 206 [Instructions for the Fourth Round of the US/Soviet Negotiations in Geneva]; NLR-751-9-40-2-2)

² See NSDD 195, Document 124. On October 31, 1985, in telegram 334148 to the NST delegation in Geneva, the Department sent the instructions and proposal reflective of the content of NSDD 195. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850777-0053)

³ See footnote 3, Document 159.

attempt to erode the separate status and roles of the three negotiating groups, making clear that each group is fully competent both to explore policy issues and to commit governments on subjects within its responsibility. (S)

Specifically, the U.S. Delegation should explain, reinforce and elaborate on our November 1 initiatives, seeking to engage the Soviets in a discussion of those proposals with the aim of looking for areas of flexibility on the Soviet side; reducing the barriers to progress on the key issues; and finding additional, or widening existing, areas of potential convergence. (S)

While noting the agreement in the Joint Statement that, “during the negotiation of these agreements, effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed will be agreed upon”, the U.S. Delegation should continue to emphasize the importance to the future of arms control of compliance with existing arms control agreements and the corresponding need for Soviets to correct non-compliant behavior.⁴ (C)

With regard to the issue of regional reductions and limitations in the INF negotiating group, given the range capability of the SS–20, systems deployed at all Asian bases must be judged to be within range of portions of NATO European territory. The missiles stationed east of the Urals at Novosibirsk and Barnaul are of special concern because they can strike a significant portion of NATO territory from the bases themselves. However, in the interest of movement toward an agreement, I am prepared not to count the SS–20s deployed at existing bases east of the Urals, including the bases at Novosibirsk and Barnaul, toward the European 140 launcher limit. The INF negotiating group should state, however, that the U.S. is prepared to take this step only in the context of a Soviet agreement to reduce remaining overall deployed Soviet LRINF missile systems in proportion to the reductions in such systems taken in arriving at the 140 launcher limit. The specific numerical reductions and limitations inherent in the U.S. proposal have been calculated on the basis of this step. (S)

In order to give concrete form to our new positions in START and INF we should be prepared to table draft treaties reflecting the November 1 proposals, as appropriate, before the end of the round. Accordingly, work on these draft texts should be completed no later than February 15, for the SACG consideration. (C)

⁴ On December 23, 1985, Reagan transmitted to Congress an unclassified report on Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements, which found: “The Administration’s most recent studies support its conclusion that there is a pattern of noncompliance.” For text of the transmittal letter and report, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, January 1986, pp. 65–72.

Within the Defense and Space area little convergence emerged at the summit meetings. The Defense and Space negotiating group has been provided the points I made personally to General Secretary Gorbachev regarding SDI in order that our constancy of approach will yield some positive elements in this area also. (S)

I have approved the cables of instruction, recommended by the SACG, for the conduct of the fourth round of the Nuclear and Space Talks by the U.S. Delegations which expand upon the specific direction above.⁵ (U)

Ronald Reagan

⁵ In telegram 12556 to the NST delegation in Geneva, January 15, the Department sent instructions to the delegation, reflecting the instructions in this NSDD. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860165–0344) The Department evidently sent to Geneva three telegrams with instructions for each NST group on January 15; the electronic text of telegrams 12554, 12553, and 12552 was corrupted.

177. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 15, 1986

SUBJECT

New Gorbachev Proposal

General Secretary Gorbachev has sent you today a letter containing a major new proposal. It sets forth a sequence of reductions leading to the total worldwide elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

The Soviet proposal would be implemented in three stages:

First Stage (5–8 years)

—Reduce by 50 percent (to 6000) nuclear warheads capable of reaching the territory of the other side (i.e., the current Soviet START position).

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, January 1986. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from an uninitialed copy. A typed notation in the top margin reads: "Original memo given directly to the President by the Secretary 1/15."

—Ban on development, testing, and deployment of “attack space weapons.” (No mention of research.)

—Elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe.

—No build-up of British and French nuclear forces, and no transfer of U.S. missiles to other countries.

—Cease all nuclear test explosions.

Second Stage (begins by 1990, 5–7 years)

—Britain, France, China freeze their nuclear forces.

—All nuclear powers eliminate tactical nuclear weapons.

—All nuclear powers cease testing.

Third Stage (begins by 1995)

—All powers eliminate remaining nuclear weapons by 1999.

Verification procedures for dismantling and destruction would be worked out, including on-site inspection.

Portions of this proposal reflect long-held Soviet positions, such as their traditional definition of strategic, the ban on space weapons, and the test ban. But there are new elements as well:

—The concrete plan for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

—Elimination of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles in Europe, with the British and French forces frozen.

—The participation of other nuclear powers in the later stages.

Gorbachev apparently plans to make a public statement on Soviet TV today. While this proposal contains many serious problems, it will be universally considered to be a major step and will raise hopes that your vision of the elimination of nuclear weapons may be realizable.

Attachment

Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan²

Moscow, January 14, 1986

Dear Mr. President,

After our meeting in Geneva where we agreed that the questions of security are central for our relations, I have carefully thought through the ways to implement the decisions of principle, which were taken as a result of our meeting.

I am convinced that we should work for packing the period till the next planned Soviet-American summit with constructive efforts of both sides aimed at achieving concrete agreements, first of all, on the urgent problems of arms limitation and reduction. I am, certainly far from being forgetful about the major differences which remain between our approaches to the resolution of these problems. But all these things notwithstanding, it is also impossible to deny that there exist now serious prerequisites to overcome the difficulties we face and, without wasting time, to arrive at mutually acceptable agreements in the interests of enhancing the security of all the peoples. A foundation for that is the joint document in which we clearly expressed ourselves in favor of preventing nuclear as well as conventional war between our countries, reaffirmed our mutual willingness to follow the path of policy ruling out the seeking of military superiority.

² Secret. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "On Wednesday morning, January 15, I talked with Ambassador Dobrynin, who was sending me an urgent message from Gorbachev. I looked it over quickly and phoned NSC adviser John Poindexter. 'I have just received an extremely important letter to the president from Gorbachev,' I said. 'Dobrynin says that Gorbachev will go public with the content in Moscow in a few hours. This is very different from anything we have seen before and is a matter of high priority. I will have a restricted group take a look at it. A messenger will hand-deliver it to you for the president in five minutes.'" (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 699) Gorbachev's January 15 public statement outlining the Soviet proposal is printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1986*, pp. 10–19. Reagan wrote in his personal diary on January 15: "Then a long meeting with Geo. S. & John Poindexter on our Khadafi problem, also our response to a letter from Gorbachev who surprisingly is calling for an arms reduction plan which will rid the world of nuclear weapons by yr. 2000. Of course he has a couple of zingers in there which we'll have to work around. But at the very least it is a h—l of a propaganda move. We'd be hard put to explain how we could turn it down." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 562)

Now this declaration has to be substantiated by concrete actions. A whole series of opportunities exists in this regard. The task is to make use of them in practice. We are for casting aside the stereotypes and outdated modes of thinking, hindering the advance movement, and for tackling in a bold and new manner the resolution of issues which you and I simply do not have the right to postpone.

In your New Year address to the people of the Soviet Union you said that it was your dream to one day free mankind from the threat of nuclear destruction.³ But why make the realization of this dream conditional on the development of new types of weapons—space weapons in this case? Why take this extremely dangerous path—which does not hold a promise for disarmament, when it is possible already now to get down to freeing the world from the existing arsenals?

We propose a different path, which will really enable us to enter the third millennium without nuclear weapons. Instead of spending the next 10–15 years developing new sophisticated weapons in space, which are allegedly intended to make nuclear weapons “obsolete” and “impotent”, wouldn’t it be better to address those weapons themselves and take that time to reduce them to zero? Let us agree on a stage-by-stage program which would lead to a complete nuclear disarmament everywhere already by the turn of the next century.⁴

The Soviet Union envisages the following procedure of the reduction of nuclear weapons—both delivery vehicles and warheads—down to their complete liquidation.

The first stage. It would last approximately 5–8 years. During this period the USSR and US would reduce by half their nuclear weapons reaching the territories of each other. There would remain no more than 6000 warheads on the delivery vehicles still in their possession.

It goes without saying that such reductions take place on the basis of the mutual renunciation by the USSR and US of the development, testing and deployment of attack space weapons. As the Soviet Union has repeatedly warned, the development of space weapons will dash the hopes for reductions of nuclear weapons on Earth.

The Soviet Union, as is known, has long been proposing that Europe be freed from nuclear weapons, both medium range and tactical. We are in favor of reaching and implementing already at the first stage a decision to eliminate completely the medium range missiles of the USSR and US in the European zone—both ballistic and cruise missiles—as the first step towards freeing the European continent from nuclear

³ For the full text of the New Year’s messages of both Reagan and Gorbachev, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book I, pp. 1–3.

⁴ An unknown hand wrote “yes” in the left-hand margin.

weapons. In this context, naturally, the US would have to assume the obligation not to transfer its strategic and medium range missiles to other countries, and Britain and France—not to build up their corresponding nuclear weapons.

From the outset, in our view, it is necessary for the USSR and US to agree to cease all nuclear explosions and to call upon other states to join such moratorium as soon as possible. I shall return to this issue later.

The second stage. It has to start no later than 1990 and last 5–7 years. Britain, France and China start to join nuclear disarmament. To begin with they could assume the obligation to freeze all their nuclear armaments and not to have them on the territories of other countries.

The USSR and US continue the reduction on which they agreed at the first stage and carry out further measures to liquidate their medium range nuclear weapons, and freeze their tactical nuclear systems. After the USSR and US complete the reduction by 50 percent of their relevant armaments, another radical step is taken—all nuclear powers liquidate their tactical nuclear weapons, that is, systems with ranges (radius of action) of up to 1000 kilometers.

At this stage the Soviet-American agreement to ban attack space weapons must become multilateral, necessarily involving all leading industrial powers.

All nuclear powers would cease nuclear testing.

A prohibition would be introduced on the development of non-nuclear weapons based on new physical principles, which by their destructive capabilities come close to nuclear or other systems of mass destruction.

No later than 1995 *the third stage* will start. During this stage the liquidation of all still remaining nuclear weapons is completed. By the end of 1999 no more nuclear weapons remain on Earth. A universal agreement is worked out that these weapons shall never be resurrected again.

It is envisaged that special procedures will be worked out for the destruction of nuclear weapons as well as for the dismantling, conversion or destruction of their delivery vehicles. In this context agreement will be reached on the quantities of weapons to be destroyed at each stage, the places where they will be destroyed, etc.

The verification of the weapons destroyed or limited would be carried out both by national technical means and by on-site inspection. The USSR is prepared to come to terms on any other additional verification measures.

All this'll become possible if we close the way for the arms race in outer space. I would like to hope, that you, Mr. President, will consider this question with all the attention it deserves.

In connection with the problem of nuclear arms, I would like to address once again the question of the cessation of nuclear explosions. We have already discussed it with you at length, in particular in our correspondence. In your letter of December 24 you say that nuclear tests are "important to ensure the safety, reliability and effectiveness of nuclear weapons".⁵ Such is your argument. It appears to us, however, that a different approach is required. It should be considered: what would provide greater security—the cessation or the continuation of nuclear explosions? Our conclusion is that it is the cessation of explosions, which would bring enormous, really tangible benefits both for enhancing the security of the USSR and USA and for strengthening strategic stability.

Guided by the objective of facilitating the termination of the nuclear arms race, the Soviet Union has taken the decision to prolong its unilateral moratorium on any nuclear explosions for three more months. I think, there is no need to prove the significance of this action. Moreover, this is a practical demonstration of the restraint on the need to exercise which we agreed with you in Geneva. I will be frank, we made this step intending to give to the American side additional time for taking a decision, which is expected from Washington by world public, a decision that the American side, too, will stop its nuclear tests.

Should the moratorium become mutual, it would give a powerful impetus to reaching agreements on the limitation and reduction of nuclear armaments, to strengthening and broadening the mutual trust. The questions of verification do not represent an obstacle. Here we could go far—up to, if necessary, mutual on-site inspections for verifying the non-conducting of the explosions. The Soviet side is ready in principle to discuss the questions of verification on the level of experts, but of verification precisely of the non-conducting of nuclear explosions, and not of anything else.

⁵ Reagan's December 24 letter to Gorbachev was not found. However, in a December 25 article, Michael R. Gordon wrote: "President Reagan has written to Mikhail S. Gorbachev proposing that experts meet to discuss improving the verification of agreements on underground nuclear tests, a senior Administration official said today. Officials said Mr. Reagan's letter reiterated the longstanding position that improved verification would allow the United States to ratify two treaties signed in the 1970's that would limit the size of the underground tests. Mr. Reagan also affirmed the United States' refusal to join the Soviet Union in its current halt on underground testing, officials said. Moscow has said that its moratorium will lapse at the end of the year unless the United States joins in." ("Reagan, in a letter to Gorbachev, Asks Technical Talks on A-Tests," *New York Times*, December 25, 1985, p. 1)

As to the question you raised of centers to reduce nuclear risk, it could become a subject for discussion at the upcoming round of the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space weapons.

We are convinced that there exist good opportunities for moving forward as regards the banning and non-proliferation of chemical weapons, the resolution of the issues discussed in Vienna and Stockholm. The Soviet delegations to the relevant fora have clear-cut instructions to work towards successful accomplishments there through joint efforts of all the participants in the talks. We proceed from the assumption that the American side, too, will act in the same direction.

I hope that the new major initiatives I outlined will be considered by you, Mr. President, with all the seriousness and favorably and that a positive response to them will follow.

I also would like to hope that agreements on the range of problems I addressed would become a weighty asset of our upcoming meeting with you. We are ready—at various levels—to work together for the sake of ensuring its success. Such a success, of course, will be possible if the striving for it is shown by practical deeds on both sides.

Sincerely,

M. Gorbachev

178. Memorandum for the Record by the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze)¹

Washington, January 15, 1986

SUBJECT

Events Concerning Secretary General Gorbachev's Letter

At 10:30 a.m. today I received a call to join the Secretary, Ambassador Ridgway, Jim Timbie, Charlie Hill and Nick Platt in the Secretary's office. The Secretary said that Dobrynin had just been in and had handed him a letter to the President from Secretary General Gorbachev.² The translation of the letter had just been passed out and we began reading it. After everyone had read the letter, there ensued a general discussion of both the letter and what we should do about it.³ The Secretary said that he had to leave shortly for a meeting on another subject and was scheduled to speak at a luncheon at Ft McNair. The luncheon would be over at 1:30 and he was scheduled to meet with the President at 2:00.

I suggested that I be authorized to ask Richard Perle to come over so that we could coordinate a plan of action. The Secretary thereupon telephoned Secretary Weinberger, told him we had received an important communication from the Soviets which required a plan of action, and suggested that he get Perle to meet me in my office as soon as possible. I temporarily left the meeting to call my office to get them to follow up with a direct call to Perle. The Secretary then called William Casey, giving him the same summary of the situation and suggested

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, January 1986. Secret; Sensitive.

² See the attachment to Document 177.

³ In his memoir, Shultz wrote: "I called in Paul Nitze, Roz Ridgway, and Jim Timbie. The essence of Gorbachev's message was: let's go to zero in nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, by the year 2000. The particulars were booby traps, but he made that goal look operational and more serious by proposing a three-stage process to get there. And he announced the extension of the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing. I passed around the letter for the others to read. Nitze was fascinated. 'I wonder whose work of art on the Soviet side this is.' While accepting the president's general concept of massive reductions in nuclear weapons, even to zero, the Gorbachev letter was also packed with all the old obstacles: defining our intermediate-range missiles as strategic, but not theirs; including the British and French nuclear systems in their proposal, although they altered the form of inclusion in a way that moved toward our position; conditioning all reductions on our agreement to give up SDI. The proposal was a blockbuster that Gorbachev clearly intended, by going public within hours of providing it to us, to use for propaganda purposes." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 699)

Doug George come to my office.⁴ He then called John Poindexter and told him what he had done.

He then turned to the group of us and said that he would like a properly prepared Secretary/President memorandum describing in 1-1/2 pages the Gorbachev letter.⁵ He said he'd also like to have talking points which he could use in commenting to the President on the letter. He suggested picking out the interesting points in Gorbachev's proposal, in a manner similar to that which I had used in my statement to the North Atlantic Council describing the Soviet counterproposal of August 25. The Secretary also said he wanted a draft press statement commenting on the Soviet proposal for the President's consideration. He suggested that the group go to my office and prepare the documents which he described and get them to him at Ft McNair prior to the time he was scheduled to leave there to go to the White House. We then left the Secretary's office and went to my office. Roz Ridgway had other work to do and sent Mark Parris to represent EUR. I asked Jim Timbie to put his hand to writing the Secretary/President memo describing the Gorbachev letter and asked Mark Parris to put his hand to a draft of the press statement. I undertook to do the draft of the talking points the Secretary might use in commenting to the President on the Gorbachev proposal.

Richard Perle and Doug George arrived while this work was in process. George reported that *Izvestiya* had published a 5,000-word article accurately describing the proposal in Gorbachev's letter and Gorbachev himself would in the next hour or two appear on TV. George had to return to the agency before the various papers were finished. The principal discussion of the papers was with Perle.

Perle raised the question of how the Gorbachev proposal is to be viewed, as propaganda or as the initial step toward a serious negotiation. I said I thought it might be a combination of both and that we could not expect the Soviets to put forward their final position in their initial presentation. Therefore, the fact the proposal had serious bugs in it did not necessarily mean they might not be serious about wanting

⁴ Shultz wrote: "I telephoned Cap Weinberger. 'I'd like Paul Nitze to talk to Richard Perle about the letter right away.' We had to produce our public position quickly to counter Gorbachev's attempt to gain a propaganda advantage. I felt that we should welcome the fact that Gorbachev proposed large-scale reductions; we should *not* put out the word that this was just another warmed-over Soviet propaganda ploy. I telephoned Bill Casey. 'Bill, something of considerable significance has come in from Gorbachev. We need to make a decision about a fast public response. I'd like Doug George [CIA arms control expert] to come over here right away. Have him come to Paul Nitze's office. Richard Perle is coming. I want a representative from every interested agency.'" (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 699–700; brackets are in the original)

⁵ See Document 177.

to proceed down some line which could be acceptable to us; we'd not know the final answer until we had the chance to negotiate seriously with them. Perle felt the original draft of the press statement was too optimistic. We reorganized the next to the last paragraph and finally accepted a final paragraph drafted by Perle.

We tried to get Ken Adelman but could not; and in his absence Mike Guhin was briefed. The documents had been typed in final by one o'clock. We took them to Brunson McKinley and Nick Platt. They finally authorized us to go forward with them. They also authorized Norm Clyne to give a copy of the Gorbachev letter to Perle so he could take that and copies of the other two documents with him to brief Secretary Weinberger in full detail on the subject.

Jim Timbie and I then went off to Fort McNair and intercepted the Secretary's car just as he was leaving and rode with him back to the White House. We got there at approximately 1:45. The Secretary suggested that both of us join him in John Poindexter's office. We found Poindexter meeting with Linhard, Lehman, and Matlock, discussing the same issues which we had already gone through. Poindexter emphasized the need to notify Congressional leaders and our allies and provide some statement to the press. He said they had concluded that the press statement should include the following items; we welcome the Soviet interest, it could be serious, we needed to consult closely with our allies, some elements were interesting and others presented real problems. The Secretary of Defense had called and suggested we say some elements were unacceptable. Weinberger also had noted that the Gorbachev letter continued to refer to SDI as space attack weapons. Poindexter thought it might be worth making the point that Gorbachev's making his proposal public without first allowing time for a serious discussion with us made it look more like a propaganda exercise than a serious proposal.

The Secretary described the papers which he had brought with him for his meeting with the President. These included not only the papers our group had prepared but also a paper containing a quote from the record of the President's fireside chat with Gorbachev which said in substance that "of course in the absence of offensive nuclear weapons, defensive weapons would be much less necessary."⁶ He suggested the need for more time with the President than had been scheduled. He wished to discuss not only the Gorbachev matter but also the originally scheduled subject; i.e., policy in the mid-east. This was arranged.

⁶ See Document 153.

Shortly after 2:00 word came that the President was ready to see the Secretary and Poindexter. The Secretary suggested I go with them.⁷

After we had joined the President, the Secretary began by giving the President Gorbachev's letter, a translation thereof, and the summary indicating its major points. The President read the summary and noted that Gorbachev's plan was indeed comprehensive. The Secretary then went through the various points in his talking point paper elaborating on each one of them as he went along. He emphasized that there was a tremendous amount to be negotiated; there were numerous jokers in the proposal, including its treatment of space.

The President recalled his statements offering to share our technology with the Soviets and referred to a suggestion of Keyworth's. Keyworth had suggested that a space defense system could be so designed that any nation could trigger the defensive weapons contained in it in the event it believed a real threat to it had been launched. The Secretary commented that he thought the negotiators in Geneva should deal with the details, however, they were not going to get very far with the details unless he and Gorbachev had set some joint objectives. The Secretary then dealt with the further issues outlined in his talking point paper.

With respect to whether we could agree to the abolition of nuclear weapons in the absence of non-nuclear defenses, he referred to the

⁷ Shultz wrote in his memoir: "At 2:00 P.M., I went over to see President Reagan, having in hand a careful summary and preliminary analysis of Gorbachev's proposal. The Soviets had moved conceptually in the president's direction by advocating big reductions. But we faced a real dilemma. At the Geneva summit, President Reagan had made a comment to Gorbachev, which I had later called to his and McFarlane's attention. Although I had not been present, I had read the interpreter's notes of the president's one-on-one conversation with Gorbachev in front of the fire in the pool house at Fleur d'Eau: if there was agreement that there would be no need for nuclear missiles, then one might agree that there would also be no need for defenses against them. The president said at first that he had never made the statement. But here was Gorbachev, in this letter, calling for the elimination of nuclear missiles and a related end to SDI. Gorbachev knew that we could not agree to his formulations, but in setting them out, he had accepted the fundamental concept of massive reductions in nuclear arms that was central to the president's agenda. I said to President Reagan, 'This is our first indication that the Soviets are interested in a staged program toward zero. We should not simply reject their proposal, since it contains certain steps which we earlier set forth.' The president agreed. 'Why wait until the end of the century for a world without nuclear weapons?' he asked. He recalled that he *had*, in fact, made that statement to Gorbachev in the pool house at Fleur d'Eau. I wanted to get the president's initial reaction out to the public immediately. Otherwise, we would leave the stage entirely to Gorbachev. Again, he agreed. He put out word that he welcomed the Soviet proposal and would study it carefully. And the next day he said in response to questions, 'We're grateful for the offer. . . . It's just about the first time that anyone has ever proposed actually eliminating nuclear weapons.' He smiled when I later reminded him of the many times he had publicly and privately said that his dream was to see a world free of nuclear weapons." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 700)

greater difficulty a Qaddafi would have in building ballistic missiles than in building nuclear weapons which could be delivered in a suitcase. With respect to conventional weapons he gave various reasons why he thought one could deal with conventional weapons problems and the world would be a better place if one could in fact eliminate nuclear weapons. With respect to radar research, he noted the word “research” is not used in Gorbachev’s letter and that a vigorous SDI research program would be the best insurance and its failure in a staged reduction scheme to eliminating nuclear weapons. He then discussed problems with our allies, Britain, France, and China, in the context of a Soviet proposal and stressing the importance of our maintaining a correct position with them. He then dealt with the implications of negotiating the staging so we could maintain a reliable deterrent throughout the entire process.

The Secretary then handed the President the draft press statement saying that everybody was on board generally, even though Cap had certain suggestions.⁸ Poindexter then described Cap’s specific problems. He said that he would talk to Weinberger and attempt to deal with his points. The President agreed that we should inform our allies, alert the Congress and issue a press statement along the lines of the one the Secretary had given him.

Paul H. Nitze⁹

⁸ On January 15, the White House released the following statement: “In 1983 at the Japanese Diet, I called for the total abolition of nuclear weapons. Since that time the United States has put forward a series of proposals to achieve this goal through radical reductions in strategic weapons. As early as 1981, I set forth a specific proposal for the elimination of all long-range intermediate nuclear missiles. At the Geneva arms control talks in November, we made yet another proposal designed to bring us closer to the goal of zero nuclear weapons. Now the Soviet Union has responded with a proposal which builds on some of the elements we had previously set forth. I welcome the Soviets’ latest response and hope that it represents a helpful further step in the process. We, together with our allies, will give careful study to General Secretary Gorbachev’s suggestions. Many elements contained in the response are unchanged from previous Soviet positions and continue to cause us serious concern. There are others that at first glance may be constructive. The American delegation in Geneva has instructions to implement the agreement reached at the Geneva summit to seek early progress in achieving radical reductions in offensive nuclear weapons, including an interim agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces. If the position outlined by General Secretary Gorbachev advances this objective, it would prove to be a constructive step.” (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1986, Book I, p. 58)

⁹ Printed from a copy with this typed signature.

179. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Rowny) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 16, 1986

Mr. Secretary,

In a memo last August, I described Gorbachev as an example of the “‘New Soviet Man’: young, articulate, and relatively unencumbered by dogmatic adherence to the status quo.”² At the time, I had expected it would take longer for Gorbachev to solidify his power base. The swiftness with which he has managed to change the complexion of the Politburo and the Central Committee is remarkable.

Although Gorbachev is a product of the nomenklatura, and has been put in by them to protect their interests, it appears now that Gorbachev feels secure in his position. He has gotten his own people behind him and believes he can break the mold of past arms control proposals.

I would feel better about this proposal if Gorbachev’s letter to the President had not been accompanied by the separate news release.³ He has taken this page directly from our own Public Diplomacy manuals. I recommend that we low-key our official response, and try to get things back into quiet channels.

This reinforces my strong belief that we need a public diplomacy czar like the Dailey-run operation in 1982.⁴ We need to nip in the bud the notion that the Soviets have responded to the CCP.

Gorbachev has given us his own version of a “no lose” situation. If we reject the proposal, he is seen as the great visionary and we the villains.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (01/16/1986–01/17/1986); NLR-775-15-7-4-4. Secret; Sensitive.

² Not found.

³ See the attachment to Document 177.

⁴ Reference is to the Ambassador to Ireland Peter Dailey, whom Reagan appointed as Chairman of the European Security and Arms Control Public Diplomacy Committee, but in 1983, not 1982. In his memoir, Shultz wrote: “Peter Dailey, our ambassador to Ireland and a man skilled in what we called public diplomacy, had been asked by the president to help out in the year of the missile, 1983. The Soviets were proceeding with a heavy hand, I told Dailey on January 18, ‘but they may have stepped in a hole by using threats,’ causing resentment by their overbearing approach. Dailey urged us to speak about the outcome we sought rather than the process. ‘The process, arms control, means weapons. What we want to talk about is peace,’ he said.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 162–163)

We must take this proposal, therefore, and attempt to turn it to our own advantage.

Our normal knee-jerk response to Soviet initiatives has been to say, "It contains significant pitfalls, but we will study it." Of course it has great propaganda appeal. Of course it has the unacceptable condition that we give up SDI. Of course it will have great appeal to our European Allies and act to split us from them. Of course it is lacking in essential specifics regarding verification. However, now is not the time to be negative toward this proposal.

Rather, we should acknowledge the unique, unprecedented sweep of this proposal and adopt the attitude that Gorbachev has recognized the appeal of the President's message and has concluded that he must respond.

The President has said that it is his goal ultimately to rid the world of nuclear weapons. With that in mind, let us respond to Mr. Gorbachev by telling him we welcome his proposal, are interested in it, and challenge him to come up with details in Geneva.

Such a broad-gauged, upbeat, positive response should be all that we say at this time. I will provide you my detailed comments on the proposal separately.⁵

Ed Rowny⁶

⁵ In a separate memorandum, January 16, Rowny provided Shultz with a three-page overview of the proposal. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (01/16/1986–01/17/1986); NLR-775-15-7-3-5)

⁶ Rowny signed "Ed" above his typed signature.

180. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Holmes) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 16, 1986

Mr. Secretary,

Gorbachev's "comprehensive" proposal is both good propaganda and aggressive substance.² By challenging the President head-on on the abolition of nuclear weapons, and by shifting a number of long-standing Soviet positions on other questions, he has positioned himself more strongly, either for potential serious negotiations or for a continued political attack on the US position, particularly SDI. At the same time, the framework he has presented, and the substantive moves it contains, offer us an opportunity to shape the arms control agenda in accordance with US and allied interests, if we move forcefully ourselves.

I like the basic structure of Paul Nitze's suggested approach. I would, however, propose a slightly different treatment of some of the elements.³

The details of first-stage reductions are crucial, since it is the part of the package with the greatest chance of implementation. Gorbachev's suggestions for first-stage reductions are highly one-sided and, except for INF, are along the lines of current Soviet NST proposals.

As Paul, I believe we should base our first phase proposals on our NST position. In INF, however, I believe we might introduce a nuance, which we will want politically to demonstrate movement equivalent to the Soviet dropping of their long-standing demand for numerical compensation for UK and French forces. Simply restating our demand for global elimination of LRINF in phase one is likely to be a non-starter. However, we might indicate that, within the context of an agreement to eliminate all LRINF globally, we would be prepared to see reductions taken disproportionately in Europe in the early years. Thus, for example, in the first three years of the period, LRINF might

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (01/16/1986-01/17/1986); NLR-775-15-7-5-3. Secret; Sensitive.

² See the attachment to Document 177.

³ Nitze sent Shultz a draft letter, under a January 16 covering memorandum, writing: "Attached is a draft Presidential letter (with synopsis) responding to yesterday's initiative from the Soviets. I worked with Roz Ridgway's people to produce this initial draft and have provided copies to Jim Timbie and Allen Holmes." Nitze's synopsis of the response to Gorbachev proposed accepting the "concept of three-stage program and goal of completion by 1999" and then outlined steps for each of the three stages. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1986 Arms Control Mtg)

be eliminated in Europe, but only cut 50 per cent in Asia. It would then be eliminated in Asia in the remaining years of phase one.

Gorbachev's proposal fails to deal with SRINF in phase one. I believe we should call for a global limit on SRINF missiles at the level of Soviet SRINF on Jan. 1, 1986, which would cap Soviet forces and allow the U.S. to retain the right to deploy P-Ib during the first stage.

With regard to SDI, I do not believe we should agree at the outset to an open-ended commitment to refrain from developing, testing, or deploying strategic defense systems so long as offensive reductions are being made. Rather, I believe we should enter into such a commitment limited to phase one. I would leave open the possibility that both sides could agree *in subsequent stages* to develop, test, or deploy strategic defenses. Paul's blanket ban on development, testing, or deployment as long as reductions in offensive forces continue runs counter to our claim that strategic defenses could have positive benefits to both sides even with reductions in offensive forces. The leverage which SDI has given us in bringing the Soviets to negotiate could be undermined, and it could become more difficult to sustain the SDI program on the Hill. We will want to preserve our long-term options until the results of our SDI research and the Soviet reduction commitment are known.

We face a very serious problem with regard to conventional weapons. The Germans have already awoken to the fact that the Soviet proposal poses the same putative threat to nuclear deterrence that they feared from SDI, and thus the same requirements for redressal of the conventional balance. No conceivable MBFR or CDE agreement will improve European security sufficiently to offset the political, psychological, and military loss of the nuclear deterrent threat. Thus, if we are to pursue the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons, as I believe we must, we must simultaneously speak frankly with the allies about their conventional defense requirements.

Specifically, I would propose the following response to the Gorbachev proposal:

- US welcomes Soviet acceptance of goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, and accepts concept of three-stage program to be completed by 1999.

- *First stage* (5–8 years)

- START: US reiterates U.S. November 1 proposal

- INF: US welcomes Soviet move toward US proposal of zero-zero for LRINF missiles, but emphasizes need to complete reductions on a global basis in phase one. In scheduling reductions, priority could be given to reductions in Europe (e.g., 100%, then 50% in Asia during first three years) as long as all LRINF missiles were eliminated on a global basis by the end of the first stage.

- SRINF: Cap forces at level of Soviet SRINF on Jan. 1, 1986. US retains option in this stage to deploy P-Ib.

—Defense and Space: US agrees for duration of phase one to observe ABM Treaty limits on development, testing, and deployment in conformity with present US policy, i.e. restricted interpretation; US opposes any limits on research.

—Nuclear testing: US proposes that an annual limit would be placed on the number of nuclear tests conducted by each side, and indicates that the limit would be decreased in stages in proportion to the reduction in nuclear arsenals. (NB: Currently 25–30 percent of our nuclear tests are SDI related. In the course of negotiating the particulars of nuclear test reductions, we may want to consider eliminating Excalibur in return for the Soviets' giving up nuclear ABM systems such as Golosh. In a context of radical reductions in nuclear weapons, nuclear-driven defensive systems would be politically difficult to defend. I do not, however, believe we should focus attention on this or any subgroup of nuclear tests at this time.)

—MBFR: US welcomes Soviet move toward Western December 5 proposal.

—CDE: US welcomes Soviet willingness to drop insistence on covering independent naval activities and urges progress on concrete CBMs, projecting conclusion of agreement by summer 1986.

—Chemical weapons: US welcomes Soviet acceptance of on site inspection of CW production facilities, and reaffirms urgent importance of negotiations on comprehensive ban.

—Other nuclear powers: US makes clear it cannot negotiate for others, nor will it accept interference with its security relationships with its allies (e.g. the US-UK Trident program, which is an obvious target of the Gorbachev proposal for a UK-French freeze commitment and tight non-transfer provisions.)

—US agrees to Gorbachev points on need for working out D&D procedures, schedules, etc.

—US pockets Gorbachev commitment to OSI and other (unspecified) cooperative measures.

Subsequent stages: One of the most difficult questions for us in agreeing to a specific timeframe for the global elimination of nuclear weapons is the requirement it creates for us to take a position *now* that the UK, France, and the Chinese, would have to join the process *at a later stage*. It would clearly be much easier if we could continue to defer the issue and rely on the general policy statements by the concerned countries. We will therefore want to be particularly careful at this point in addressing the question of the second and third stages. We will have to acknowledge the necessity for other nuclear powers to participate in future phases of reductions if the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons is to be reached. But we will not want to give this point any more salience than absolutely necessary, and we will want to underscore the total independence of other sovereign actors.

The annual number of nuclear tests would continue to decline in parallel with the continued reductions in offensive arms; and, as indicated above, the sides would discuss whether or how strategic defenses could be employed to mutual benefit. As the US phased out its nuclear

weapons in Europe, Soviet agreement to redress the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe would be of overriding importance.

H. Allen Holmes⁴

⁴ Holmes signed "Allen" above his typed signature.

181. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 16, 1986

SUBJECT

Further Soviet Response to Your Human Rights Letter

When Dobrynin delivered Gorbachev's response to your letter on human rights Monday, he told me we could take up specific cases with the Soviet Embassy here.² To follow up, Mark Palmer asked Soviet Embassy Counselor Isakov to meet with him today.

Isakov came in with a list of individuals who will be allowed to leave the Soviet Union and stated that this gesture was specifically connected to your letter to Gorbachev.³ We knew of most of the cases, but a number were new, including two cases that you had mentioned in your letter.

In your letter you raised the case of a 77-year-old U.S. citizen who had traveled to the Soviet Union during a school break in 1932 and had not been permitted to leave since that time; Isakov told us he

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8960024, 8690124). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² January 13. See Document 175. Reagan's letter is Document 168.

³ In telegram 16061 to Moscow, January 17, the Department reported that in the meeting, Isakov "handed over a list of Soviet citizens on our representation lists who had received exit permission (complete list in paragraph 11). There were seven newly resolved cases on the list, including those of two longstanding American citizen cases." The telegram continued: "Palmer told Isakov we were encouraged by the Soviet response in these cases, which he saw as part of an ongoing process of improvement in our relations." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860043-0786)

would be given exit permission. You also raised the case of a 16-year-old boy whose father was killed in a car accident last fall, leaving him alone in Leningrad; we were told he will be permitted to join his mother in the U.S.

In addition, the Soviets told us they would resolve a longstanding U.S. citizen case I had raised in a letter to Shevardnadze, as well as four other cases we had raised earlier.

On the negative side, Isakov stated that the Soviets could not resolve two cases you raised: a blind Soviet woman in her sixties who has been separated from her husband for almost thirty years; and the Soviet husband of an American wife and father of two small children in the U.S. The first they could not resolve because her husband had “violated Soviet law” (he defected in 1956); the second, because of “state security”.

In addition, they made no response on the Soviet Jewish pianist Vladimir Feltsman; on the general question of increased emigration; or on Sakharov, Shcharansky, and Orlov, all of whom you raised in your letter.

It is encouraging that the Soviets have been prepared to respond to your interest. Isakov left the door open for the resolution of more such cases, but stressed that any overt attempts to “pressure” Moscow would abort the process. His remarks underscore the importance of proceeding with sensitivity as we seek to encourage further progress.

182. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 18, 1986

SUBJECT

Responding to the Gorbachev Proposal: Possible Pitfalls Ahead

SUMMARY: On Friday, I expressed various reservations about accepting the basic framework of the new Soviet proposal.² I will not repeat what I said then, and I acknowledge that the approach outlined by Paul Nitze and Allen Holmes in their respective memos deflects some of the more objectionable elements in the Gorbachev proposal by frontloading *our* objectives into Phase I and making subsequent phases as fuzzy as possible.³ Nevertheless I still see some serious problems—particularly of Alliance management—coming down the road, sooner than some may think. The new Gorbachev proposal is a regression from where we stood after the Geneva Summit in the sense that it shifts the focus from the areas of common ground to a number of propagandistic themes; by engaging a negotiation in this new framework, we are committing ourselves to further battles on a more slippery terrain. In this memorandum, I will try to point out some of the larger pitfalls I see ahead. *END SUMMARY.*

Of the specific issues raised by the new Gorbachev proposal, the two most important are Alliance issues: the question of British and French forces presented in a new form, and European perceptions about the role of nuclear weapons in their security—a particular concern in West Germany. Thus we may be touching some raw nerves very broadly in Europe.

British and French systems: The new Soviet proposal drops the long-standing Soviet demand for numerical compensation for French and British forces—a potentially important concession which we will want to pocket quickly—but is guaranteed to remain divisive. Because reduced, the new Soviet demands—a ban on UK and French modernization in Phase I, a commitment to participate in negotiations and

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (01/18/1986–01/21/1986). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bohlen and Ledsky. Ledsky initialed the memorandum for Rodman.

² January 17. In his memoir, Shultz wrote: “How should we proceed diplomatically? The naysayers were hard at work, even in my own building. Peter Rodman said that the elimination of nuclear weapons meant a neutralist Europe, the end of our NATO strategy, a disaster for the West. No one could accept the thought of a world moving toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 701)

³ See Document 180 and footnote 3 thereto.

reductions at a future stage—will appear more reasonable to some publics in Europe. Moreover, the Soviet proposal purports to address all the French and British preconditions for participating in reductions: deep US and Soviet cuts, conventional balance through MBFR, ban on CW and no upgrading of strategic defenses.

More seriously, if we sign on to a formal scheme to eliminate all nuclear weapons, we must now acknowledge the logic of including British and French forces and their participation in multilateral negotiations at some stage—as we have never had to do for any arms control or reduction proposal before. Buying onto this framework in a U.S.-Soviet context will thus put us inescapably in the position of implicitly pressuring the French and British to agree to this—or of being at odds publicly with their position, which is likely to be negative. This plays into the hands of the antinuclear movement just when both countries are undertaking major (and controversial) modernization programs. I agree with Allen Holmes that we should avoid emphasizing this issue or giving the appearance that we are speaking for the French and British. But I'm not sure we will get off so lightly: We cannot, for example, avoid telling the Soviets something of what we have in mind for Phase 2 and 3.

Nuclear weapons and the conventional balance in Europe: As you know, the Europeans are uncomfortable with our antinuclear rhetoric and will be extremely reserved about a US commitment to abolish nuclear weapons in fifteen years. This is already evident from the cautious reaction to the Gorbachev proposal in London, Paris, and Bonn.

I take only momentary pleasure from the fact that the Europeans will have been hoist on their own petard and will now act as a brake on our negotiations instead of constantly badgering us to do more. European nervousness about nuclear issues is deep-seated and reflects the precariousness of European opinion on the whole question of being “caught in the middle” between East and West. The belief that a Western nuclear deterrent is essential to maintain the balance in Europe is deeply held by all European governments and large sectors of the public—and they have defended this doctrine courageously against decades of Soviet and neutralist pressures.

Moreover, what they mean by maintaining the balance is not merely offsetting the huge Soviet conventional superiority in Europe but in effect protecting Western Europe against the inherent and *uncorrectable* weakness that flows from its lesser size and military power, its geographic location under the shadow of the Soviet Union, and its long distance from its main protector, the United States, with its isolationist history and volatile domestic politics. Any US action which tends to deemphasize the US nuclear element is therefore seen as decoupling—i.e., as a form of U.S. withdrawal. This is especially true

in West Germany. Conceivably this prospect could have the healthy effect of stimulating more intra-European defense cooperation, but it could also stimulate resignation and a drift toward accommodation with the Soviet Union. Unlike Central America or certain other arms control issues, the issue of our nuclear presence in Europe is central to the European perception of their own security.

Accordingly, two recommendations seem to me to be in order:

We should avoid defining at this stage our requirements for the conventional balance—that is, under what conditions we would be prepared to give up nuclear weapons altogether. In particular, we should avoid encouraging the notion that an MBFR agreement even on our terms will create a conventional balance or that the conventional imbalance can be “fixed” through arms control agreements. I agree with Allen on this point but would go further and argue that even MBFR/CDE plus conventional defense improvements are probably not enough. In any event, we should remain vague on this point for now.

Because our nuclear weapons in Europe are central to our European strategy and to the Gorbachev proposal, our consultations with key Allies on a response to Gorbachev must be more than perfunctory. Before the President responds to Gorbachev, we should be prepared to meet with them—at the Foreign Minister level if necessary—and discuss the problems posed by the Gorbachev proposal frankly, while both listening to their views and making clear in which direction we want to go. This makes sense on the merits and would be good public diplomacy in Europe. Some profound issues are being raised here and should not be treated casually.

183. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Ridgway) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 21, 1986

SUBJECT

Gorbachev's Arms Control Proposal: A Reflection of Assertive Leadership

The NST elements of Gorbachev's January 15 initiative have grabbed the headlines, and, as we have noted elsewhere, may well represent an important evolution in Moscow's positions in some areas (e.g. INF). There are other aspects of the proposals, however, which are also worth noting. One involves moves in non-NST arms control negotiations; another, perhaps even more important, is what the initiative tells us about Gorbachev's domestic position.

Other Arms Control Moves

Gorbachev also announced moves on nuclear testing, MBFR, CDE, and CW. The moves were not major concessions, but they did make unreasonable Soviet positions a bit less unreasonable. They included:

—*Nuclear Testing*: A three-month extension on the unilateral Soviet moratorium (the Soviets traditionally do not schedule many tests during the winter).

—*CDE*: Readiness to defer notification of naval exercises until the second phase of CDE. They are still pushing for notification of air exercises. Independent air and naval activities are both explicitly excluded from the CDE mandate.

—*MBFR*: Acceptance of permanent manned entry points for verifying forces entering the MBFR reductions area—something we have insisted upon for years as a necessary element of any meaningful verification regime. They did not respond to the verification proposals made in the latest Western proposal, including up to 30 challenge inspections annually.

—*CW*: Support for prompt declaration and eventual destruction of CW production facilities, as well as destruction of CW stockpiles, to take place under "international on-site verification;" and a ban on transfer of CW to third countries. While the Soviets have, of course,

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (01/18/1986-01/21/1986); NLR-775-15-8-10-6. Secret; Sensitive. Sent through Armacost, who did not initial the memorandum. Drafted by Fried and Schoettle on January 17; cleared by Parris, Palmer, Burton, Caldwell, and Thielmann. Fried initialed for all the clearing officials.

been violators of past CW agreements, there has been less evidence of such violations under Gorbachev. Combined with Gorbachev's Geneva non-proliferation statement, this latest move may foreshadow a more forthcoming Soviet stance on some CW issues than in the past.

Implications for Gorbachev's Domestic Position

These steps in non-NST arms control fora, while by no means adequate, are moves in our direction. Like Gorbachev's decision to put off compensation for British and French systems in INF, they cannot have been popular with the Soviet military.² Indeed, they come in the wake of evidence of strains between Gorbachev and his top military brass. That Gorbachev was able to force these decisions through in the face of probable military opposition, at a time when preparations for the February Party Congress and the far-reaching personnel and programmatic changes which will accompany it are reaching a critical stage, suggests that his position is extremely strong. A leader so clearly able to have his way on controversial issues at such a time is—in contrast to his predecessors—one with whom a serious give-and-take, and ultimately a balanced agreement on arms control should be possible.³

² In a January 27 information memorandum to Shultz, Rodman wrote in the summary: "Our knowledge of Gorbachev's relations with the Soviet military is very sketchy, and we cannot be sure that Soviet Generals are uniformly opposed to his present posture on arms control. There may well be a diversity of views in the Soviet military. Under these circumstances, we should be cautious in allowing speculation about civil-military strains in the USSR to influence our policy." (Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons January 1986)

³ In his memorandum to Shultz (see footnote 2, above), Rodman continued: "I read with interest Ambassador Ridgway's January 21 memorandum to you, in which she stressed that Gorbachev's arms control proposal is a reflection of his assertive leadership and his strong position in the Kremlin. Although I concur with Ambassador Ridgway's view that Gorbachev is an assertive, politically secure leader, I would be more cautious in concluding that Gorbachev pushed through his proposal against the opposition of the Soviet military. We know far too little about internal Soviet debates to support conclusions of this kind."

184. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, January 23, 1986

SUBJECT

Shultz-Dobrynin Meeting of January 22, 1986

Secretary Shultz has sent the Memorandum at Tab A to the President reporting on his meeting with Dobrynin on January 22.² Dobrynin had no word from Moscow regarding the timing of Gorbachev's trip to the United States or of when Shevardnadze would be prepared to arrange his next meeting with Shultz. The Secretary responded to the previous Soviet suggestion regarding times for meetings of regional experts, offering dates for all except the talks on the Middle East, which he said would have to be communicated later because of Murphy's crowded calendar.

Comment:

It is becoming increasingly clear that the Soviets may be playing games with the Summit date, holding off a reply in the hope that it will give us incentive to pay some substantive price. Otherwise, their behavior in failing to reply in any fashion to our suggestion, made over six weeks ago, is a breach of etiquette bordering on impertinence.

Larry Horowitz told me this afternoon that, during a luncheon meeting with Senator Kennedy today, Dobrynin asked more than a dozen times why a Summit in November would not be a good idea.³ He prefaced this by saying that no decision had been made in Moscow, but that they were disturbed by the lack of movement on substantive issues. When Kennedy asked if it was definite that a meeting would take place this year, Dobrynin said that depended on what could be accomplished. (Horowitz said Kennedy refused to be drawn out on the question of timing and simply observed that meetings should take place when it was in the national interest of both sides.)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Meetings Shultz-Dobrynin 1986. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum was erroneously dated 1985.

² Attached but not printed is the memorandum dated January 23.

³ A congressional delegation, led by Kennedy, was scheduled to visit Moscow in February. (Telegram 30782 to Paris, Moscow, London, January 31; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860079–0790)

What strikes me about this is the not-so-subtle attempt by Dobrynin to suggest that *we* must be forthcoming substantively if a meeting is to be possible. I don't believe for a minute that this is really Gorbachev's position: it would be a major blow to his policy to pull out. Dobrynin's antics are more likely a crude form of "testing the water" here to see how these various arguments go down. Though he doubtless has Moscow's encouragement to do this, there could also be an element of free-lancing. There were many reports last fall (some more substantial than mere rumor) that Dobrynin would be transferred early this year. He probably got a reprieve until the Washington summit and may be trying to maneuver to postpone it as long as possible.

I attach a brief Memorandum to the President to transmit the Shultz Memorandum. You may prefer, however, just to cover the matter in an oral briefing.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached Memorandum to the President unless he has already been briefed on the Shultz Memorandum.⁴

⁴ Poindexter initialed the Disapprove option and wrote in the margin: "I'll cover your points orally."

185. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 25, 1986

SUBJECT

Background Material on Responding to Gorbachev

General Secretary Gorbachev wrote you on January 14 about a plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons through a three phase schedule by the year 2000.² He also went public with this plan shortly thereafter and, although the publicity to date has been relatively mild,

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Donald Fortier Files, Subject File, Gorbachev/Soviet Policy/etc. 01/25/1986–01/31/1986; NLR–195–5–2–1–7. Top Secret; Sensitive; Owl. Sent for information. Prepared by Wright and Linhard.

² See Document 177.

we face a significant challenge in formulating an appropriate response. The Soviet plan has a large measure of propaganda, but its broad nature and defined timelines have optical appeal which must be handled carefully in formulating our response.

The Arms Control Support Group prepared a lengthy paper on optional approaches which served as the agenda for a Senior Arms Control Group meeting on the subject last Thursday.³ Since that meeting three general approaches have emerged. OSD favors not altering our current positions while discrediting the Soviet plan. The State Department would be far more forthcoming in adapting to parts of the Soviet plan and putting forth new US positions in Geneva this round. Others are between these two approaches. Since this subject will be addressed at an NSC meeting next week, I am forwarding for your background an Executive Summary of the longer paper at *Tab A*.

Tab A

Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group⁴

Washington, January 25, 1986

OWL 21: Responding to Gorbachev's January Proposals (S)

Purpose: This executive summary has been generated from the Arms Control Support Group OWL 20 paper on the subject in order to familiarize the reader with the decisions involved with choosing a US response to the January 14, Soviet initiative. At the heart of the Soviet proposal (summarized at *Annex A*) is the proposed “plan” for achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of the century.⁵ The overriding decision will involve our basic reaction to the concept and details associated with this “plan” within which the Soviet proposals are embedded. In this regard, the most charged internal USG discussion will focus on the extent to which we can join in a call for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the relatively near-term date of

³ January 23. In a January 22 memorandum to Poindexter, Wright, Linhard, and Kraemer provided a detailed outline for the January 23 meeting, with attached papers and talking points. (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, NST—Gorbachev Disarmament Plan: 01/20/86–01/22/86) No formal minutes of the meeting were found; however, the handwritten notes of Linhard are in the Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chron, ACSG (Arms Control Support Group)—01/15/1986, Soviet Proposal (2).

⁴ Top Secret; Sensitive; Owl.

⁵ Attached but not printed is the undated “Summary of the Nuclear Aspects of the Soviet Proposal.”

1999 or accept that goal without caveat. Three alternative approaches are under consideration: (S/O)

Approach 1. Express reservations about the Soviet “plan”. Explore new elements of the Soviet proposal in the appropriate negotiating fora. (S)

Approach 2. Protect our option to advance, at the appropriate time, a US proposal which reframes the core of the Soviet plan accepting some basic elements, (e.g., a commitment to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons but with no specific timeline and agreement that the initial step should be US/USSR reductions), but rejecting any discussion of subsequent phases or the details associated with such out-year phases. (S)

Approach 3. Go beyond approach 2 and propose substantive changes to all three US NST positions (START, INF and DST) during the current round. (S)

Each approach would immediately criticize elements of the Soviet proposal that have previously been offered and rejected by the US and the unrealistic details and linkages proposed in Soviet phases 2 and 3. Each would also attempt to maintain the focus on keeping priority on executing the mandate given at the last summit to pursue areas of common ground—50% reduction in nuclear arms appropriately applied, and an interim INF agreement. (S/O)

Discussion: Certain elements of the Soviet “plan” reflect positions offered by the US to the Soviets over the past 5 years. For example, the US is on record as calling ultimately for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Further, in response to questions about how the US would propose handling the issue of British and French forces, we suggested to the Soviets that we should take the first important steps bilaterally in moving to 50% reductions (as we define them) and then involve not only the British and French but the PRC as well. We have also repeatedly stressed the need to go beyond National Technical Means (NTM) as required for effective verification. (S/O)

On the other hand, the US has always made it clear that the elimination of nuclear weapons must be accompanied by certain criteria that allow us to move safely to a world where we can maintain our security and commitments without nuclear weapons. For example, either the causes of conflict must be reduced (e.g., regional and ideological differences resolved), or alternative means of protecting US and allied vital interest must be found (e.g., SDI, improved conventional forces, or a reduction in Soviet conventional force advantages). (S/O)

The Soviet “plan” narrows the focus on the total elimination of all nuclear weapons by 1999, making that a goal in itself. It does not address the corresponding deterrence and stability rationale for weap-

ons or the associated mechanisms including equitable reductions, compliance and SDI, that will be needed either to eliminate these underlying security requirements or replace the contribution now made by the nuclear weapons. It offers no schedule for the resolution of existing regional conflicts and differences and, in the process, sets up a situation in which, if the elimination of nuclear weapons by that date were taken as a serious possibility, it undercuts US and allied nuclear modernization. (S/O)

In short, as the Soviets have often tried to do, this attempts to set an unfair public focus and agenda. It's a heads-they-win, tails-we-lose situation. If we simply eliminate all nuclear weapons by 1999, without taking actions by the same date, the Soviets gain a real advantage. If we reject their offer as framed, we look bad. Without a balanced and more comprehensive focus (which includes both a plan/schedule for the elimination of nuclear weapons *and* a plan/schedule for either eliminating or handling in some other way the security requirements for these weapons), it is questionable whether the US and NATO could go much beyond agreeing to the general overall goal. In evaluating the concept that the Soviet Union has proposed, we must keep in mind certain key national security considerations, which are summarized at *Annex B*. (TS/O)

The Soviet "plan" also calls for us to accept many unacceptable elements of the Soviet approach to reductions during the first phase, front-loading the deal in order to get certain alleged benefits in subsequent phases. Even then, however, many of the "benefits" (e.g., the early total elimination of tactical weapons) promised in subsequent Soviet phases play largely to public opinion. (S)

We face a serious problem in reconciling planned national security and defense spending (in the DoD, DoE and State budgets) with the realities of deficit reduction and Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.⁶ We must consider how our response to the Soviet "plan" will affect the debate in this area. (TS/O)

We must also consider the potential relationship to the upcoming summit. Some believe that we could use this Soviet proposal to reach some limited general agreement about the elimination of nuclear weapons, and if this agreement were framed in a manner so that it could be finally decided at the summit and protect our positions and interest in focusing on offensive reductions, that this could be useful to the United States. Others believe that if we pursue this approach, it will cause the summit to become, in effect, a deadline for reaching some

⁶ P.L. 99-177, Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, or Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, was signed by Reagan on December 12, 1985.

agreement with the Soviets, and, therefore, it will be much more difficult to deal with the Soviet proposal, protect our interests, and pursue our agenda. (TS/O)

If *Approaches 2 or 3* were chosen, the substantive steps in implementation are as outlined in *Annex C*.⁷ Beyond the central issue of framework, there are specific elements of the Soviet proposal which some believe may represent opportunities for the US; these are summarized below and contained in the matrix of options at *Annex D*.⁸

SPECIFIC ISSUES

A. START (U)

In Geneva, the Soviet delegation has said that the Gorbachev proposal does not involve any changes in their previous START position. We should challenge the Soviets to show their good faith and demonstrate we can get on schedule for a 1999 date by dropping their onesided preconditions and getting down to serious negotiations on reducing ballistic missiles and heavy bombers. (S)

Others believe (*Approach 3*) that we should go further to adjust the period of dismantlement to coincide with the 8 year period cited in the Soviet proposal and revisit the issue of whether to ban single RV mobile ICBMs. (S/O)

B. INF (U)

The Gorbachev package combines an important shift in INF that is both potentially encouraging and potentially troublesome with some familiar and unacceptable elements. (Their “interim” proposal—allowing 100–120 US GLCMs to remain in Europe—is apparently still on the table, according to the Soviet NST Delegation). Some believe (*Approaches 2 and 3*) a prompt US response should be considered. Its key elements as part of a *first step* package could be as follows: (S)

—Elimination of US and Soviet LRINF in Europe west of Novosibirsk (and therefore, Barnaul); (S)

—“Significant” reduction in SS–20s in central and eastern Asia; at least 50 percent cuts (though the US would restate its “zero-zero” preference for their total elimination); (S)

—A global LRINF missile warhead ceiling. The US would have a legal right to global equality, i.e., to match any Soviet SS–20 warheads remaining outside Europe with US systems in CONUS or elsewhere outside of Europe; (S)

⁷ Annex C is not attached.

⁸ Annex D is not attached.

—Soviet LRINF systems which are reduced would be destroyed. US systems based in Europe could be withdrawn to the US unless, or until, they were in excess of the equal global ceiling, in which case they would be destroyed (while protecting a right to convert the PIIs to PIBs). (S)

—Equal SRINF ceiling at current Soviet level or freeze SRINF at both sides December 31, 1982, levels. (S)

—The reductions and limits would involve US and Soviet systems only; there would be no agreed constraints on UK and French systems. (S)

—Introduce key elements of verification regime as an integral part of this proposal. (S)

—Reaffirm November (summit) joint statement to move ahead on INF agreement without linkage to Defense and Space issues. (S)

In the *second step* of an overall program we could envision the completion of LRINF reductions to zero-zero. (S)

C. DST (U)

The parts of the new Soviet proposal that address matters in Defense and Space neither advance the negotiations nor offer anything positive to which we could respond. The Defense and Space Negotiating Group should continue to follow the agenda defined in the DST instructions for Round IV,⁹ and should indicate to the Soviets that, if anything, their new proposal is a demonstration of lack of seriousness on their part to pursue a businesslike dialogue. (S/O)

Some believe (*Approach 3*) that the U.S. delegation should propose that neither side seek amendment of the ABM Treaty during the first phase and that we seek to resolve compliance issues associated with that Treaty and agree to do nothing further to erode confidence in it. (S/O)

D. Other Areas

With regard to verification, risk reduction centers, chemical weapons, CDE, nuclear testing and MBFR, the Soviet proposals are, on balance, not sufficiently forthcoming, and do not require a change in the current US position.

⁹ See Document 176.

Annex B**Paper Prepared by the Arms Control Support Group¹⁰**

Washington, undated

*Annex B—National Security Implications
of Eliminating Nuclear Weapons by 1999*

Our current national strategy depends, to a great extent, on the contribution of offensive nuclear weapons (both strategic and non-strategic). While we are committed to the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, we have always noted that translating this into reality will take a long time since we will either have to change the international situation to the point that the contribution of nuclear weapons is no longer needed (e.g., ideological and regional tensions resolved) or alternative means of maintaining security are in place. Any commitment we make to a detailed plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons must be viewed as an extremely serious step which we must be sure we can execute and safely live with because, once made, it may generate pressures (budgetary, arms control, political) which could force the US unilaterally toward such a course. (TS/O)

We are equally committed to NATO strategy (14/3) which also depends heavily on the contribution of both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons.¹¹ NATO 14/3 is, in many respects, a somewhat fragile, political strategy—but absolutely essential to maintaining alliance cohesion. In the context of the SDI debate, for example, the FRG offered the principle (which we endorsed) that unless and until an alternative to current strategy is found and agreed upon, it is essential that full support be provided to 14/3. Any commitment to a schedule such as that proposed by the Soviets would immediately call into question the future of 14/3. Once again, this would be a most serious step, and one that would require extensive Allied consultation. (TS/O)

If the current regional imbalances in conventional forces are not resolved, there would be little to deter hostile powers from pursuing their interests to the potential detriment of US interests. Significant political, economic, and military commitment would be required to equal the deterrent potential of relatively inexpensive nuclear weapons. Furthermore, elimination of nuclear weapons by the current nuclear

¹⁰ Top Secret; Sensitive; Owl.

¹¹ NATO adopted MC 14/3 on December 12, 1967. It provided “an overall strategic concept for the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Area.” The report is available on the NATO website.

powers could place them at risk from those that have not acknowledged possession, but may in fact possess, or gain access to, such weapons. (S/O)

The direct impact of the Soviet plan would be to derail Western modernization. Some of the provisions, by simply being given the status of real “possibilities”, could achieve the same result. For example, if the elimination of British and French systems is roughly 8 years away, why should the UK invest its limited resources on the Trident D–5 missile? Similarly, if tactical systems are also going to be gone in the same time frame, why should NATO pay the fiscal and political costs of modernizing these systems? Why should the US (or the US and its allies) waste precious funds and take the political heat of continuing with SDI? And why pay for systems like MX, MIDGETMAN and the TRIDENT D–5? (TS/O)

The President has committed the US ultimately to eliminating nuclear weapons. These observations are not intended to undercut this goal. But, to point out the dangers we face if this goal is pursued in isolation as proposed by the Soviet “plan”. Total elimination of nuclear weapons must be accompanied by actions which obviate the requirements for those weapons, including resolution of regional differences, the correction of military asymmetries, and a fundamental change in orientation and ambitions of the Soviet leadership. (S/O)

186. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, January 29, 1986

SUBJECT

Engaging the Soviets on Regional Issues

Summary. While fresh thinking is always useful, EUR’s memo on engaging the Soviets on regional issues—which I first saw Monday morning—strikes me as just the wrong way to go.² I have serious reservations about each EUR proposal. I also question some of EUR’s

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1986 Arms Control Meeting. Secret; Sensitive; Summit II. Drafted by Bohlen, Khalilzad, Kontos, Hewitt, and Paal; cleared by Ledsky.

² January 27. Not found.

underlying assumptions about the purpose of the exercise, and am not persuaded that our interests and objectives have been rigorously thought through. *End Summary.*

The EUR memo proposes to move beyond the current phase of our regional discussions with the Soviets—in essence an exchange of views—to a second more active phase, that would engage us or at least move us toward a negotiating process with the Soviets. The current phase of exchanging views has been useful in providing regional content to the US-Soviet relationship and to some extent in clarifying Soviet views. Despite some anxieties beforehand, it has neither impeded nor hindered the pursuit of our regional objectives and could be safely continued for a round or two more.

However, moving to a negotiating phase is a major step with more wide-ranging substantive implications. We must be certain that the potential gains outweigh the potential costs. The potential gains are presumably twofold: first, the advancement of our regional objectives and second, the construction of a more realistic and solid US-Soviet relationship. EUR is understandably more concerned with the latter objective. I am not persuaded that even this requires the kind of negotiation EUR advocates; but in any case, improving US-Soviet relations should not necessarily take precedence over our regional relationships and posture.

While each region has its own specificity, certain conditions must be met before we engage substantively with the Soviets:

—There must be a chance that diplomacy will succeed. This requires that the Soviets themselves have an incentive to negotiate. The costs of a given policy must exceed the prospective gains or outweigh the Soviet interests at stake.³ I see no region at present where we can realistically state this to be the case. Moreover, the present state of US-Soviet relations offers no bilateral incentives to Soviet cooperation; the potentially harmful effect of Soviet regional policy on the overall US-Soviet relationship is not the powerful argument it has been at other times in the past.

—As a corollary to the above, the cards we hold must be roughly equivalent to the Soviets'.⁴ Again, this situation obtains in none of the regions discussed except Central America, where there are other arguments against involving the Soviets.⁵

³ An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

⁴ An unknown hand underlined "cards we hold" and wrote "+ time" in the right margin.

⁵ An unknown hand underlined "Central America."

—There must be clear advantages to us in taking the lead, as well as compelling reasons for a US-Soviet negotiation other than the fact of our presence in a given region. Conversely, we should weigh carefully the risks of being out front in certain areas (for example, on Cambodia where we have been content to let the ASEAN countries take the lead, or on Afghanistan where any US initiative always risks unnerving the Paks) as well as of increasing the Soviet role in a region where they have not been active (e.g. Central America).

Under certain circumstances, US-Soviet negotiations on regional issues can succeed. Opportunities have existed in the past and may well ripen in the future. But at the present moment, a US-Soviet negotiation strikes me as either premature or inappropriate for each of regions discussed in the EUR memo.

Finally, I would argue that improving the US-Soviet relationship and preparing for the next summit do not require us to move beyond the present phase of our regional discussions with the Soviets. It is unquestionably important that the relationship have a regional dimension (as well as arms control, bilateral and human rights components). It is less clear—absent a real hope that diplomacy can produce results—that the regional dimension need be dynamic or continuously forward moving. In sum, I am not persuaded that we need at this stage to move beyond a periodic exchange of views.

As an alternative to the regional initiatives proposed by EUR, I would recommend that we pursue our efforts with the Soviets in areas of importance where a bilateral effort is both appropriate and needed, such as the Berlin air corridors and Soviet and GDR behavior toward Allied Military Liaison Missions in East Germany, issues which have festered for months without real progress.⁶ (Why should Europe be excluded from the regional dialogue?!) Some fresh input from us, perhaps at a higher political level than heretofore, might produce results.

AFGHANISTAN

EUR's suggestions on Afghanistan pose a number of problems. On the military side, EUR suggests confidence-building measures that would create many more difficulties for our side than for the Soviets. We would be opening ourselves to Soviet requests to reduce our military supplies to the Mujahedin and to curb the resistance in some areas of the country—something neither we nor the Afghan resistance movement itself can accomplish.

⁶ An unknown hand underlined "Berlin air corridors" and "Allied Military Liaison Missions in East Germany."

Different resistance groups are strong in different areas; in some regions there is an overlapping military presence. Designating regions for possible ceasefire arrangements could evoke havoc within the fragile Mujahedin alliance.

As for political measures, it will simply not work to encourage the Soviets to bring representatives of the Mujahedin into a government headed not by Karmal but someone “less tainted but still enjoying the Soviets’ confidence.” First, none of the principal Mujahedin leaders appears willing to participate in a government headed and dominated by Marxist-Leninists, especially while Soviet troops are still in Afghanistan. Secondly, even if a few resistance leaders agree to participate in such a coalition government dominated by Soviet-oriented communists, the result will almost certainly be serious conflicts within the resistance movement. Those who stay out of the coalition will be characterized as opposing a “political settlement.” None of this would serve our interests. There is a danger that we might fall in the same “coalition” trap which Moscow used with success in Eastern Europe after WWII.

In our discussions with Soviets, we should make suggestions that test Moscow’s seriousness and will not unravel the alliance between the Afghan partisans and Pakistan.⁷ For example:

—We should stress to the Soviets the importance of engaging the Mujahedin Alliance in the negotiating process. We should argue that without this development a lasting political settlement will be unlikely. This is important in order, among other things, to avoid widespread bloodshed in Afghanistan after the Soviets withdraw.

—We should convey to the Soviets that their insistence on direct negotiation between Pakistan and the Kabul regime is impractical and indicates to us that Moscow is not serious about a political settlement.

—We should emphasize to the Soviets that their agreement to the Cordovez-proposed draft on guarantees and provision of a short timetable for withdrawal would be important steps in enhancing the prospects for a settlement.

—We should express a willingness to discuss mechanisms for monitoring a possible political settlement.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

An adroit US policy might succeed in reducing Soviet influence in Southern Africa. Unfortunately, this is not the right moment for direct US-Soviet talks to this end.

The Soviets now enjoy a relatively advantageous position, particularly in Angola. They have in place 35,000 Cuban proxies and have massively escalated their military support and even direct military involvement in the Angolan civil war. It is true that Dos Santos has

⁷ An unknown hand underlined from “test” to “Pakistan.”

recently cut off some of his more pro-Soviet colleagues, but it is still a Marxist government very much in Moscow's camp.

The Soviets' support of a military solution in Angola is not a high-risk strategy for them at present. The only way to make them "reassess the dangers of a war-winning strategy" is to tip the balance of forces on the ground and raise the risks that the Soviets run. Thus, strengthening UNITA should be our first order of business⁸—on an urgent basis, before the next offensive against Savimbi. An initiative with the Soviets will be fruitful only after the inevitable next test of military strength between the two sides in Angola—and, frankly, only if Savimbi does well.

The stronger Savimbi is, the more our diplomatic leverage.⁹ If Savimbi begins to look like a loser, all of Chet's valiant diplomacy goes down the drain. The Soviets will have nothing but contempt for us, and it would probably be advisable for us *not* to engage with them in those circumstances.

CAMBODIA

In Southeast Asia, our strategic interest is to limit the growth of Soviet influence and promote regional unity against Moscow. Since our departure from Indochina, this has been an uphill fight and the terrain remains unfavorable. Raising the possibility of Soviet participation in a Cambodian settlement would unduly promote a Soviet role in the region.

We have built our policy on a foundation of unity with ASEAN and of cooperation with China.¹⁰ This achievement sends a message of reliability and responsibility to our partners around the world. China, in particular, has kept pressure on Vietnam while making the occupation of Cambodia one of its "three obstacles" to improving political ties with Moscow. Should Beijing come to suspect the US is working toward a condominium with the USSR on its southern borders, it would cause the Chinese to have profound doubts about our reliability as well as our judgment. We have nothing to gain and a lot to lose by launching such gratuitous experiments on an issue so vitally sensitive to the Chinese. Staying in step with the Chinese on the "three obstacles" is fundamental to the solidity of the US-Chinese relationship.¹¹

⁸ An unknown hand underlined "strengthening UNITA should be our first order of business."

⁹ An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

¹⁰ An unknown hand underlined this sentence and wrote in the right margin: "& isolation of an economically stagnant Vietnam."

¹¹ An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

Ironically, we believe that EUR's proposal would not help divide Moscow from Hanoi, but would have the contrary effect of strengthening the Soviet position in Vietnam. By posing as a broker to a settlement with the US and ASEAN, the Soviets can improve their grip on Cam Ranh Bay and otherwise enhance their strategic and regional objectives.

Tactically, we would be handing the Soviet side an advantage by proposing talks at a time when our side is at a low point.¹² Last year's dry season offensive and disputes within the non-communist resistance have forced the Thai and the guerrillas to regroup. The Soviets could quite reasonably interpret this proposal as a US search for a face-saving way out of a bad situation. It would confirm their smug assertions of inevitable Vietnamese victory and prompt them to start thinking about intimidating Thailand into opening some distance from the United States.

Elements within ASEAN who favor accommodation to Vietnam's aggression would use the notion of a reconvened International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) to reopen fundamental issues. As local leaders jockey for advantage, Soviet and Vietnamese officials could find themselves more welcome in the region's capitals, despite our comparatively successful efforts in recent years to keep them out.

Our best course is to continue to show firmness regarding Cambodia by backing ASEAN's policy. ASEAN leaders have wanted us to carry their message to the Soviets for some time to demonstrate that the weight of the US is behind them, not to open yet another channel for talks.

In positive terms, we should stage a display of unity with ASEAN at Bali before the next Soviet-US summit,¹³ perhaps in conjunction with renewed commitments to support the non-communist resistance. Our aim should be to show that despite our problems, the US and ASEAN believe that time, justice and world opinion are on our side.¹⁴ We should also be trying to show that Soviet and Vietnamese efforts to divide the Chinese from the US and ASEAN will not work.

NICARAGUA

Our policy in Central America has been based on strong support for a regionally negotiated solution emphasizing the importance of internal reconciliation to any stable, long-term solution. Central to our position has also been insistence that the Nicaraguans come to terms

¹² An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

¹³ An unknown hand underlined from "stage" to "Bali," and then from "renewed" to "resistance." The ASEAN Ministerial meeting at Bali was scheduled to be held April 29.

¹⁴ An unknown hand underlined "US and ASEAN believe that time, justice and world opinion" and wrote a mark in the right margin.

with their neighbors. We have accordingly steadfastly refused to “deal over the heads” of our friends and allies in the region, especially El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica.

The Contadora process was torpedoed by Nicaragua last Fall because the pressure to sign an agreement that would be unacceptable to the GON was becoming intense. The so-called Caraballeda declaration was an effort by the Contadora and Contadora support countries, in part well-meaning, to revive the effort. However, its terms are extremely vague and open to wide interpretation. For example, Nicaragua and Mexico are taking the view that the call for renewed dialogue and reconciliation leaves entirely up to governments how such a dialogue should be managed and with whom it should take place.¹⁵ Nicaragua and some others may take the view that Caraballeda is an entirely new negotiating process separate from Contadora, which could lend itself to being spun out indefinitely. It is clear that the only reason the GON agreed to sign the Caraballeda declaration at all was fear that the Administration may secure military assistance for the Contras from the Congress.

The EUR proposal would accomplish at a stroke what we have strongly resisted since the beginning of the Administration—admitting a legitimate role in Central America for extra-regional powers, especially the Soviets and the Cubans.¹⁶ The Soviets would be delighted to be invited in, the only price of admission being to pay lip service to vague concepts of dialogue and internal reconciliation.

Once they got their nose into the tent we would never get it out, and they would be in a position to provide direct diplomatic support to their clients. Similarly, resuming direct negotiations with the Nicaraguans would play into their hands, contrary to our present position of stressing the internal dialogue.

One can argue that our regional strategy seeks concessions from the Sandinistas they can hardly be expected to accept. However we should not back into the major revision of a strategy that has served us reasonably well as a holding action, and which has had some positive results. We should certainly not do so for the sake of a marginal and probably transient tactical advantage in our dialogue with the Soviets.

At the present moment, we should limit our discussions with the Soviets over Central America to (a) exchanges about our respective positions, (b) calls for the Soviets to stop supplying guns and other

¹⁵ An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

¹⁶ An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

military equipment to the Sandinistas and (c) pledges of non-interference in the affairs of Nicaraguans and its neighbors.¹⁷

THE MIDDLE EAST

I note there is nothing in the EUR paper on the Middle East, though, as far as I know, talks on the Middle East will be included in the series.

These may be the trickiest of all. So far, the Soviets have been rather clumsy, e.g., in not even raising the issue at the Summit. They were criticized for this in the Arab world. I would expect that they will be cleverer next time. As discussions of an international conference progress, as Hussein goes further in sealing his Faustian bargain with Asad, and as the Soviets get their Party Congress out of the way, we could see some aggressive Soviet maneuvering to get into the game.

Usually the Soviets act as the champion of the maximum Arab position, rather than as a moderating force. (This is one reason we don't want them in the game.) But in the current fluid diplomatic environment, they could well stake out a claim for a role that puts us on the spot. We will have to be well prepared to do some defensive maneuvering of our own.¹⁸ The next US-Soviet bilateral talks on the Middle East may be rather exciting—and also of crucial importance for the fate of our Middle East strategy.

¹⁷ An unknown hand underlined points a, b, and c.

¹⁸ An unknown hand drew two vertical lines in the right margin.

187. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, January 29, 1986

SUBJECT

Responding to Gorbachev's Arms Control Proposal

Gorbachev's proposal goes directly to the fundamental issue you raised with him in Geneva—whether our two nations can agree on a plan that will let us break the 40-year cycle of steadily growing nuclear arsenals. We should see this as an opportunity to transform Gorbachev's concept so that it matches your own vision for achieving a non-nuclear world. Our response should elaborate our own concept for a process leading to the elimination of nuclear arms, concentrating on the bilateral reductions necessary in the first stage of that process, and positing the conditions that must be met to go further, including intrusive verification, redress of conventional imbalances, a chemical weapons ban, and the need for bold steps towards resolving regional tensions.

Your response should encompass each of the three Geneva negotiating groups, in order to keep the focus on *our* arms control objectives, not the Soviet agenda. It should provide a framework for deep reductions in offensive nuclear arms, while easing the way to Soviet acquiescence to our SDI program. At the same time, it should position you to best capitalize on whatever answer Gorbachev gives—either to move forward in negotiations if he is interested in a constructive process, or to counter Soviet efforts to manipulate public opinion if he is not. I believe Option 3 best serves your purposes in a way the others do not.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1986 Soviet Union Jan. Secret; Sensitive. In a covering memorandum to Shultz, drafted by Tefft, Burton, Dunkerley, and Stafford on January 29, Ridgway wrote: "At Tuesday's [January 28] SACG meeting John Poindexter asked each agency to provide by COB Wednesday a brief memorandum recommending the appropriate response to Gorbachev's January 15 arms control initiative. The memoranda will serve to brief the President in advance of an NSC or NSPG meeting scheduled for Friday, January 31." The NSPG took place on February 3; see Document 188. Ridgway continued: "We have prepared with Paul Nitze's staff the attached memorandum from you to the President explaining the rationale for the State Department proposal (option 3). We have written the memo to take into account the arguments made against option 3 by Fred Ikle, Richard Perle and others at yesterday's SACG. Paul Nitze, Allen Holmes and Jim Timbie all approve of the memo." Ridgway recommended that Shultz sign the memorandum. A typed notation at the top of the covering memorandum indicates that it was sent to the White House by special courier at 4:30 p.m. on January 29.

Option 3 is front-loaded in our favor. It contains constructive moves on START and INF, within the context of our current position, which would fulfill U.S. and Allied objectives. It would represent a demonstrable step on your part to meet Gorbachev's stated concerns about your near-term intentions for SDI and the ABM Treaty, but it would also enable the SDI program to continue as now planned and it would protect the option of a cooperative transition to greater defense reliance. The first stage is designed to be fail-safe. The continuation of SDI would provide us leverage to ensure Soviet implementation of offensive reductions. Likewise, the British and French would be excluded; their systems would also give us a kind of insurance—the only way for the Soviets to enter negotiations on them would be to carry out the first stage reductions. Our proposal would not be an open-ended commitment that would delegitimize nuclear weapons. Rather, it envisions a continued role for an effective deterrent until the conditions exist where we could contemplate the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Some will argue that Gorbachev's initiative is cynical propaganda and that any substantive response on your part would somehow be "rewarding his intransigence."² Who knows. While Gorbachev is, of course, out to protect his own interests, he has at the same time made concrete proposals to advance the personal dialogue the two of you began in Geneva. A response based on our option would enable you to build upon that dialogue, take the initiative in setting the agenda for Gorbachev's next meeting with you, and challenge him to seize this potentially historic opportunity.

² In his memoir, Shultz wrote that on January 18 "I talked with Paul Nitze and Richard Perle. Perle insisted that Gorbachev's letter was not serious, just propaganda. 'We must not discuss it as though it was serious,' he said. The worst thing in the world would be to eliminate nuclear weapons. 'You've got a problem,' I said with a laugh. 'The president thinks it is a *good* idea. Don't worry, we can say "fine" to the three-stage approach and then front-end load our program in the first stage. Gorbachev's language makes the INF zero option operational; all else is a transition to it.' We could, I felt, design a first stage that would convert Gorbachev's language into our own proposal to eliminate INF missiles and achieve deep reductions in strategic arms." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 701)

188. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, February 3, 1986, 11:15 a.m.–noon

SUBJECT

Arms Control—Responding to Gorbachev (S)

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

State

Secretary George P. Shultz

Ambassador Paul Nitze

Ambassador Edward Rowny

Treasury

Secretary James A. Baker, III

OSD

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

Justice

Attorney General Edwin Meese

JCS

Admiral William T. Crowe

CIA

Director William J. Casey

ACDA

Director Kenneth Adelman

White House

Mr. Donald T. Regan

Admiral John M. Poindexter

NSC

Colonel Robert E. Linhard

Captain William H. Wright

Minutes

Admiral Poindexter opened the meeting by characterizing the incoming letter from General Secretary Gorbachev. He pointed out that it was subtle and clever, making some points that would appeal to certain domestic US and Soviet audiences, some that would attempt to drive wedges between the US and Allies. The thrust of Gorbachev's letter was seen by some as a purely publicity ploy, while others viewed some areas as unique opportunities to move arms control negotiations forward. (S)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC NSPG Meeting File, NSPG 0127, 02/03/1986, [Arms Control—Responding to Gorbachev]. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Presumably drafted by Linhard, as his handwritten notes from the meeting are in the Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chron, NSPG Meeting—02/03/1986. In his diary on February 3, Reagan wrote: "Then it was N.S.P.G. time in the situation room re Gorbachev's proposal to eliminate nuclear arms. Some wanted to tag it a publicity stunt. I said no. Let's say we share their overall goals & now want to work out the details. If it is a publicity stunt this will be revealed by them. I also propose that we announce we are going forward with SDI but if research reveals a defense against missiles is possible we'll work out how it can be used to protect the whole world not just us." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 568)

He noted that, in addition to the substance of the letter and the US response, the meeting should address the timing of delivery and a public diplomacy plan to handle public information about any response. *Admiral Poindexter* then outlined the options for the President's response, all agreed that a response should maintain a priority on pursuing "common ground": 50 percent reduction in nuclear arms and an interim INF agreement. All also agreed that our negotiations should criticize those elements of the Soviet proposal that have been previously offered and rejected at Geneva. (S)

Admiral Poindexter then outlined the areas of US options that required discussions and decision at this meeting.² One option (*Option 1*) would have the US express reservations about the Soviet "plan", explore any new elements at appropriate fora, not change the US position, and essentially label the Soviet effort a "publicity stunt." Another option (*Option 2*) would be to reframe the Soviet proposal in US terms, reserving our opportunity to advance such a reframed proposal where appropriate, and *move* in the *INF area* to see whether we can use the Soviet proposal to move toward US and Allied goals. A third option (*Option 3*) would be to have the US *move* in *all three* negotiating areas, making changes in the US NST position during the current round. (TS)

Secretary Weinberger advocated keeping our present (November) positions at the Geneva negotiations.³ He pointed out that the Soviet "proposal" contained a lot of old Soviet positions. However, *Secretary Weinberger* stated that he did not favor openly labeling the Soviet action a "publicity stunt." To do so would lessen the momentum at Geneva, which the US should not allow to happen. The US should keep the focus *away* from the date for abolishing nuclear weapons. He pointed out that one of the most unfair points in the Soviet proposal, which was no change from early Soviet positions, was the way they wished to count "strategic" systems. *Secretary Weinberger* pointed out that the US response should focus on our proposals, which were still valid. He argued that *Option 2* offered major concessions. It would accept the 510 Soviet SS-20 warheads in Asia, warheads that are mobile and could still be employed against Europe. It would prohibit French and UK modernization. *Option 3*, in addition to the INF concessions, would give up our ability to amend the ABM Treaty, which would kill SDI by banning research. *Admiral Poindexter* offered the clarification that

² See Document 185. Also, on January 31, Nitze sent Shultz a memorandum in preparation for the NSPG meeting. Nitze outlined Gorbachev's proposal and the three response options included in the Owl 21 paper, and produced a chart covering how each option impacted various NST issues. (Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, Binder—NATO)

³ See Document 124.

the INF portion of both Options 1 and 2 sought an interim INF agreement, and would *not* accept the Soviet notion of “freezing” French and UK nuclear forces. (TS)

Admiral Crowe stated that the JCS had sympathy for Option 2. They agreed that the Asian SS–20 situation was particularly bad. The present basing locations allowed some of the SS–20s in Asia to strike parts of Scandinavia, Turkey, and even, at extreme range, West Germany. *Secretary Shultz* pointed out that SS–20s could be reconfigured to achieve strategic range if one of their three warheads were removed. (TS)

Director Adelman stated his belief that the Soviets had done a lot of propaganda in their proposal. He said they had, however, moved some on their “zero INF” option by omitting direct reference to UK and French force levels. He believed that the US needed to “pick up” Option 2. At the same time, the US should not change our START position, or we would be negotiating with ourselves. Any move in DST would politically hamstring us on SDI. He believed the ABM Treaty needed to remain in place. *Director Adelman* stated that US Allies in Asia wanted a 50 percent cut in Soviet Asian SS–20s as part of an INF agreement. He pointed out that the Soviet appeared to have moved a little toward accepting on-site inspections in INF, at least in some public speeches. Perhaps the way to ensure a real Soviet move would be to offer a draft INF treaty. Then if the Soviets backed away from inspections, the US could challenge them to live with their own speeches. (S)

Ambassador Rowny spoke in favor of Option 2, arguing that the US should seize the European INF reduction offer and at the same time insist on concurrent reductions in the Soviet Asian forces. He pointed out that it was most important to get agreement on verification details, and Option 2 provided a way to do so. (S)

Secretary Shultz agreed with the previous comments on Option 2. He characterized that option as one that would befit the President as a man with vision to work for a “greater peace.” Gorbachev was trying to steal that image. A phased approach was desirable, even though the US need not spell out a second phase at this time. Any first phase would only involve the US and USSR. In later phases other nuclear powers might take part—thus the US could reject Gorbachev’s comments on UK and French forces for now. The US should provide *some* details of later phases more than just “elimination of nuclear weapons.” The US, said *Secretary Shultz*, needs to make the point that verification is essential, not only for nuclear weapons agreements but also for conventional fora such as MBFR and CDE. The US should also point out that the world would be more peaceful if we had fewer regional flashpoints; there are a number of items we should raise about conventional and chemical weapons arms control. (S)

Secretary Shultz went on to say he saw no sense to be in favor of higher INF totals than the Soviets. Our proposal is already for an interim solution of 140 launchers plus proportional reductions in Asia. Our overall view is for an equal global ceiling, the lower the better. The Soviet proposal for “zero” in Europe ignores Asia. For the US to remain in favor of a global ceiling at lower numbers will be easy to sell to Japan. (S)

Turning to START, *Secretary Shultz* pointed out that the Soviets have not replied to the US proposal, so there is no need to “dress up” our position. There is, he said, an anomaly in the START positions: we call for a ban on mobile ICBMs when we are planning for MIDGETMAN and possibly MX in a mobile basing mode which would give us greater survivability. When the US Congress picks up this inconsistency, it hurts in our appropriations. *Secretary Shultz* said, we have three things we need to protect by extending the time for implementation of a first phase: The UK/French modernization program—which we can defer to a subsequent stage, which will let initial reductions take place despite such programs; the visible existence of SDI, as insurance that reductions take place because of it—although at some future stage we will need to discuss with the Soviets questions of possible deployment and the transition to greater reliance on defenses; the ability to reserve ways to identify in the future some way SDI can be integrated into the reductions process. The Soviets, claimed *Secretary Shultz*, want to eliminate SDI. There is a growing perception that the Soviets are at the negotiations to make SDI go away. As an idea, the US and USSR might both agree not to call for amendment of the ABM Treaty so long as reductions continue. Since the time period under discussion is when SDI deployments won’t occur anyway, we could propose that the ABM Treaty remain in force so long as reductions go on. (TS)

Director Casey argued that speculation now on how to incorporate SDI in the negotiations was premature. Option 2, in his opinion, offered the opportunity to “pocket” some Soviet movement while testing the seriousness of Soviet statements about verification. The US task, said *Director Casey*, was to press ahead to define “effective verification”, determining which aspects are or are not militarily significant. Generally, the concept of a 50 percent reduction still could leave the USSR with a capability for a disarming first strike. A call for an extended ABM Treaty would be self-defeating for SDI. Therefore, *Director Casey* felt we should stick to our present Geneva position on START and DST. He argued that Gorbachev was seeking to undercut the President’s broader agenda in arms control and future stability of security. The US should reemphasize the problems with Soviet compliance with agreements they had signed. In all fora, the US needs to stress verification, so the focus does not shift to the Soviet positions, allowing them to dominate the thrust of negotiations. (TS)

Secretary Weinberger argued to seize any positive elements of their INF position, to retain our own INF proposals as presently construed, and to engage in vigorous conversation about verification to “smoke them out.” *Secretary Shultz* intervened to remark that it appeared *Secretary Weinberger* was supporting the State option. *Secretary Weinberger* replied that the difference in options was narrow but profound. (S)

Attorney General Meese stated the US should keep our November proposals on the table. He further said he was concerned with the provisions of the Soviet proposal that would argue for a permanent mismatch in SS–20s: zero in Europe which effectively meant zero for the US, while the mobility of the Asian SS–20s would permit the USSR to retain an effective force against Europe. He felt the US should concentrate on verification—it was the greatest place for a breakthrough. *Mr. Meese* stated his belief that the President must define the course and the goal for SDI. SDI should become a moral imperative for future presidents. (TS)

Ambassador Nitze stated his belief that a primary reason for the letter from Gorbachev was the Soviets felt a psychological need to recapture the “high ground”—to counter the good position the President had established in November. Thus, there were a lot of elements designed to give the appearance of putting the “ball back in our court” and to curry favor with specific elements of US and Allied publics. However, *Ambassador Nitze* argued, there are some elements of potential interest in almost all negotiating areas of the letter. The most crucial US decision is to establish our position in INF. (S)

Secretary Baker pointed out that the chess game for world opinion was a central element of the present policy debate. The grandiose Soviet images of “zero weapons” could prove very enticing in the public relations battle. *Secretary Baker* then stated that he did not see how *Option 1* would help the public relations questions. *Option 2*, however, would not foreclose flexibility on our part, and might have a way to work out the Asian deployment question. He indicated that, in his view, the US could not offer a position that forfeited the Asian balance question. (S)

The President, after hearing the discussion, stated that he agreed with the general thrust of the conversation. He did not believe there was any need for US movement in all three negotiating areas (*Option 3*). He agreed that in reality “the ball is still in their court”—but there is a danger in attacking the Soviet generalization as only propaganda. Then the public perceives the issue as: Who really wants to reduce? *The President* argued that we need to *make the Soviets* expose the fact that they are not really serious about reductions negotiations. The US should go to the negotiations, point out that the Soviets have made a general, overall offer, and agree on the overall aims of the process. We

should emphasize that what the US seeks now is a *practical* way forward: a way to achieve verification in a concrete agreement, even if such involves a proposal we have already made. The US should emphasize the point that we are trying to find a practical way to move forward in implementing the agreed eventual goals. (TS)

The President further stated that the US does *not* give up SDI. We should point out that SDI is not for the US alone—we seek a mutual shift from sole reliance on offensive weapons to an offense-defense mix. We should remember the principle of sharing SDI at the deployment stage. *The President* pointed out that all speakers today agreed on the overall goal of SDI. As we continue to develop SDI we need to find a way for SDI to be a protector for all—perhaps the concept of a “common trigger” where some international group, perhaps the UN, could deploy SDI against anyone who threatened use of nuclear weapons. Every state could use this guarantee. *The President* noted that we do not have all the answers. When research reveals the practicality of SDI, then we might want to mutually decide what to do. (TS)

Secretary Weinberger stated that, in the meantime, it is vital that the research programs in SDI continue. Anything that restricts research is unacceptable. (S)

The President reiterated that there is no one who wants to curtail SDI. At the same time, he pointed out that there is no guarantee we know how to make SDI work yet. (S)

Secretary Shultz agreed that SDI was the key item. He asked how we envisioned getting from where we are now to a defensive world. He further stated to the President that the US agencies owed a better answer on how to solve the difficult transition problem. (S)

The President said that the US needed to be careful that our position was not propaganda—if it were, the Soviets would be quick to label it such and negate the value of our position. (S)

Admiral Poindexter pointed out that the discussion had clarified positions and that we now needed to consult with Allies and prepare some refined options for decision. (S)

The President concluded the meeting by stating that it was clear that we needed to work in INF for total elimination of those systems. If the Soviets tried to keep some SS-20s in Asia, perhaps we could counter by putting Pershing II and GLCM systems in Alaska, where they could reach Soviet systems in Asia. The Soviets must know that if there is not complete elimination of INF, we will not eliminate our INF. There should be verifiable measures for destroying INF under an agreement. (S)

189. Memorandum From William Wright and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, February 3, 1986

SUBJECT

Allied Consultations on the Gorbachev Arms Control Proposals (U)

In order to capture the essence of today's NSPG discussion on the Soviet January 14 proposal,² and per your comment afterward to Bob Linhard, we are forwarding a memorandum to the President (*Tab I*) recommending that he sign the appended NSDD (*Tab A*) which provides a preferred U.S. approach in responding to Gorbachev.³ The objective of the NSDD is to provide a clearly defined U.S. option for Ambassadors Nitze and Rowny to use with European and Asian Allies, respectively, in a prompt consultation trip this week.⁴ The NSDD also serves as a surrogate decision document, albeit tentative, along the lines of an "option B-minus".

The real difference remaining after today's meeting was whether we should make a move in INF, and if so, when. Since all agree that the INF portion of the Soviet package represents a change and a potential opportunity for the U.S., we are proposing that we indicate a preferred course of action, including one in INF, and seek the views of *both* our European Allies and those in Asia. We will need to consult on these key inputs before giving the Geneva negotiators the go-ahead in any event. We are prepared to send Ambassadors Paul Nitze and Ron Lehman to consult in European capitals and Ambassador Ed Rowny and Bob Linhard to Asian capitals commencing this Wednesday.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—Gorbachev Response & All Coms. (NSDD) February 1986. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

² See Document 188.

³ Tab I is attached but not printed. Tab A, NSDD 210, "Allied Consultations on the US Response to General Secretary Gorbachev's January 14, 1986, Arms Control Proposal," is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XII, INF, 1984–1988. President Reagan signed the NSDD on February 4.

⁴ In telegram 36037 to all East Asian and Pacific and all European posts, February 5, the Department indicated that Reagan requested that "two small teams of senior administration arms control experts," led by Nitze and Rowny, "visit various West European and East Asian capitals in the coming week for an exchange of views with friendly and Allied leaders. These discussions will center on the current state-of-play in the Geneva arms control process, including the Soviet January 15 arms control announcement." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860091–0634)

A draft NSDD is at *Tab A* which posits a preferred approach for use as a baseline in these Allied consultations in which we capture the positive public reaction to the general goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, but are very much aware of the need to look at the practical conditions for achieving this goal. The NSDD, which will guide the approach of our interlocutors is to serve as a sounding board for Allied views and fulfill our need to consult, in particular, on INF.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to the President at *Tab I* recommending that he sign the NSDD at *Tab A* providing a tentative U.S. decision upon which our Allies are asked to provide their views.⁵

⁵ Poindexter did not indicate his approval or disapproval of the recommendation on this copy.

190. National Security Decision Directive 209¹

Washington, February 4, 1986

IMPLEMENTING DECISIONS OF THE GENEVA SUMMIT (C)

My meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev produced a fresh start in U.S.-Soviet relations in the sense that it established a framework for bilateral negotiations of some of our outstanding differences. It is now our task to make use of this framework to move us toward the goals I have set for U.S.-Soviet relations. This will also be a key component in the substantive preparations for my meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in the United States this year. (U)

In order to ensure vigorous pursuit of a dialogue and, where appropriate, negotiations in those areas where the Joint U.S.-USSR Statement at Geneva indicated that progress is possible, I hereby designate the following agencies to take the lead in coordinating the United States

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (02/05/1986–02/06/1986); NLR-775–15–15–9–0. Confidential. Poindexter sent a copy of NSDD 209 to Bush, Shultz, Baker, Weinberger, Baldrige, Casey, Regan, Crowe, and Wick under a February 4 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)

position and pursuing it actively with representatives of the Soviet Union: (U)

1. Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms: The Senior Arms Control Group will continue to have responsibility for coordinating views of U.S. positions to be taken, which will then be reviewed by the National Security Council. (C)

2. Regional Conflicts: The Secretary of State will have responsibility for developing concrete new ways to pursue my initiative to end regional conflicts, as outlined in my speech to the United Nations General Assembly last October, and for conducting regular consultations with the Soviet Union. This issue is a major one, and the Department of State should also take the lead in ensuring that it receives an appropriate share of public attention. (C)

3. People-to-People Contacts and Information Exchange: The Director of the United States Information Agency will have the responsibility for implementing the initiatives I have made in this area. Policy matters will be considered by an Interdepartmental Group chaired by the National Security Council Staff. I would note in this connection that the areas for expansion of contacts noted in the U.S.-USSR Joint Statement are only a start toward the objective I have set for a radical expansion of contacts. Therefore, efforts should concentrate not merely on implementing those programs to which the Soviets agreed at Geneva, but to expanding their scope and size in accord with the proposals made by the United States before the Geneva Summit. (C)

4. Chemical Weapons: The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency shall, in coordination with the Interdepartmental Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons Arms Control, have primary responsibility for preparing the United States position for talks with the Soviets on verification measures to enforce a chemical weapons ban, and on measures to combat the proliferation of chemical weapons. In case of interagency disagreement, the issues should be referred to the Senior Arms Control Group. (C)

5. Risk Reduction Centers: The Staff of the National Security Council, working with the existing ad hoc interagency group on this subject, will retain primary responsibility for the development and implementation of the U.S. approach to be taken in the exploratory, expert-level discussions on the concept of risk reduction centers. (C)

6. Thermonuclear Fusion: The Secretary of Energy shall have the responsibility of coordinating the United States position for the study of the feasibility of an international effort to build a prototype fusion power plant. (C)

7. Cancer Research: The Secretary of Health and Human Services, in cooperation with the National Institutes of Health, shall be responsi-

ble for developing a cooperative program in this area, utilizing the U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Medical Science and Public Health as a framework for implementation. (U)

8. Environmental Research: The Director of the Environmental Protection Agency will have the responsibility for implementing cooperation in this area, utilizing the U.S.-USSR Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection. (U)

9. Humanitarian Issues: The Secretary of State will be responsible for conducting a vigorous effort, based primarily on private diplomacy, for achieving United States objectives in this area. (C)

In all of these areas, the normal interagency process will be utilized to ensure that steps taken are in the interest of the United States. While I wish to ensure that these issues are pursued vigorously with the Soviet Union, all should be discussed and negotiated strictly on their merits. In negotiating with the Soviet Union no artificial deadlines should be set, nor any concessions made merely because another meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev will be scheduled for this year. (C)

Ronald Reagan

191. Note From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Palmer) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, February 6, 1986

Mr. Secretary,

Mark Parris and I took Oleg Sokolov up last night on a long-standing offer to have a drink together. I think you will find his comments on Moscow's current mood of interest in interpreting the delay in scheduling a summit and related issues. They reinforce the view I have shared with you elsewhere of the need for more than a minimalist response to Gorbachev's January 15 proposals.

The message which came through loudest was that, in the run-up to the Party Congress, any actions on our part—from our response to the Gorbachev initiative to more mundane steps—may affect what is

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 4D, 1986 Soviet Union Feb. Secret; Sensitive; Summit II.

said at the Congress and thus, disproportionately, the tone and substance of what follows. Some of this is clearly self-serving. But there is probably enough truth in it that the prudent course in the weeks ahead is to avoid steps which will require the Soviets to respond strongly.

With that in mind, we intend to delay informing the Soviets they will have to reduce their U.N. mission by about one hundred until after the Party Congress, the first week in March.² Jack Matlock agrees with this approach.

Mark Palmer³

Attachment

Memorandum of Conversation⁴

Washington, February 5, 1986, 7–10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.
Mark Palmer DAS, EUR
Mark R. Parris EUR/SOV

U.S.S.R.
Oleg Sokolov, Minister Counselor,
Soviet Embassy, Washington

The meeting was set up at U.S. initiative after Sokolov had hinted to both Palmer and Parris that he would be willing to share the Soviet Embassy's assessment of the current mood in Moscow.

Sokolov was clearly concerned to drive home one basic message: that Moscow is highly displeased as the Party Congress approaches that there has been no response to Gorbachev's January 15 proposals. In seeking to put the situation into perspective, Sokolov made clear that the impetus for the proposals had come directly from Gorbachev

² The 27th Party Congress of the CPSU took place in Moscow from February 25 to March 6. The decision to reduce the number of Soviets serving at the UN Mission was called for in the November 1, 1985, NSDD 196, "Counterintelligence/Countermeasure Implementation Task Force," scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988. In telegram 286191 to Islamabad, September 18, 1985 addressed "For Under Secretary Armacost Only" from Ridgway, Abramowitz, and Sofaer they wrote "we already are considering intensively an alternative option to cut substantially (by approximately 100 employees) the size of the Soviet UN Missions in New York. This move would significantly reduce the Soviet presence in this country and make the task of the counterintelligence community easier." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]) See Document 201.

³ Palmer signed "MP" above his typed signature.

⁴ Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Watergate Hotel bar.

and stemmed from Gorbachev's desire to maintain the momentum he and the President had established in Geneva. Even allowing for the fact that the U.S. may not have expected an initiative as sweeping as that tabled, the Soviets were perplexed and increasingly frustrated by the silence out of Washington. The fact that there had been no reference to the proposals in the State of the Union speech had compounded these feelings.⁵

Sokolov warned that the signals being received in Moscow with respect to U.S. intentions—accurate or not—were of enormous importance in the period leading up to the Party Congress. It was not a question of Gorbachev's strength or weakness. His authority was unchallenged. Nor would the basic thrust of policy toward the United States rise or fall on the basis of what happened in the next three weeks. But Gorbachev and other foreign policy spokesmen at the Party Congress would not be able to ignore a U.S. failure to respond to his January proposals, or a response which did not appear serious. And whatever might be said based on the U.S. answer or other U.S. actions prior to the Congress would set the tone and direction for the period ahead.

Sokolov was concerned that these dynamics might be inadequately understood in Washington. He said that Shevardnadze's frankness with Art Hartman earlier this week and the unusual publication of a statement on Art's meeting were indicators of this concern.⁶ Sokolov

⁵ For the text of Reagan's State of the Union address on February 4, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book I, pp. 125–130. In telegram 2179 from Moscow, February 7, the Embassy reported that a February 7 *Pravda* editorial, highly critical of Reagan's speech, "contains unusually authoritative and sharp criticism of U.S. policy and President Reagan personally. This blast probably reflects both Moscow's defensiveness about the Soviet 'State of the Union,' and its continuing propaganda emphasis on arms control." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860104–0213)

⁶ In telegram 1978 from Moscow, February 5, the Embassy sent the text of a TASS statement on Hartman's February 4 meeting with Shevardnadze. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860093–0075) Hartman sent a read-out of his meeting with Shevardnadze to the Department, which was used in preparation for Shultz's February 7 meeting with Reagan. See Document 192. In this read-out, Hartman wrote: "1. You asked for ideas. I think we have now reached the point where we should go hard for an agreement with Gorbachev and his new team. We may not succeed, but we need to be perceived as trying. The President has an historic opportunity to negotiate reductions in nuclear weapons. That opportunity should not slip away. 2. Indeed, it is clear from my meeting with Shevardnadze and other soundings that the Soviets feel they have made a significant effort in our direction, not only in NST, but in other arms control negotiations and on other fronts such as the people-to-people exchanges. They are looking anxiously for a constructive response." He continued: "Our negotiating leverage is declining. We have a summit meeting on the agenda which many will see as a failure if it makes no progress in strategic arms control. On the propaganda front, Gorbachev has made an impressive gesture with his plan to eliminate nuclear weapons. We need a serious, pragmatic response to maintain U.S. credibility." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary's Meeting with the President (02/11/1986); NLR-775-18-101-1-9)

stated with feeling that he could not emphasize too strongly the importance of ensuring that the U.S. leadership got the message. Palmer indicated that Sokolov could be sure that the views he had expressed would be conveyed to the Secretary and assured Sokolov that a response to the Gorbachev initiative would be forthcoming well before the Congress opened.

While Sokolov did not dwell on the substance of Gorbachev's various proposals, he made clear that a *pro forma* U.S. reaction would be as bad as no response at all. He acknowledged that there was a healthy propaganda element to the January 15 initiative, but stressed that there were also important shifts in Soviet positions which the U.S. should not discount. He highlighted the initiative's treatment of British/French systems in INF, verification, and the three-part framework for achieving elimination of nuclear weapons as particularly significant. Such steps, he argued, could never have come from the bureaucracy; rather, they were Gorbachev's attempts to address areas President Reagan had raised in Geneva. Chances of achieving a concrete agreement by the next summit were good if the U.S. picked up on these elements.

In a subsequent discussion of prospects for movement on regional issues, Palmer asked Sokolov what might be expected from the Soviets on Afghanistan in the months ahead. Sokolov gave no hint that he was aware of any forthcoming Soviet initiatives, but rather strongly affirmed that Moscow was serious about finding a way out of the conflict. He called for tangible evidence of U.S. seriousness (a token reduction of aid to the insurgents) as a first step.

In response to Palmer's inquiry as to the best channel for conducting a dialogue on Afghanistan, Sokolov suggested that the Soviet U.N. Deputy Permrep, Safronchuk, would be the place to start. Safronchuk had been the Soviet DCM in Kabul at the time of the invasion and the head of the MFA department responsible for Afghanistan thereafter. Ultimately, however, the key figure would be First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko. In an aside, Sokolov acknowledged that Korniyenko was unpopular in some quarters here. He stressed, however, that the very quality which made Korniyenko unpopular, his willingness to speak up when he saw Soviet interests at risk, made him invaluable and highly influential in Moscow. Sokolov warned against underestimating Korniyenko's clout with Shevardnadze and in broader circles in Moscow and hinted that efforts to go around him, e.g. through the Central Committee apparatus, would fail.

Sokolov seemed genuinely surprised by Palmer's suggestion that the U.S. perceived Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev as more assertive and characterized by a greater willingness to expand its military involvement in regional disputes. Sokolov's own sense of Gorba-

chev's approach was that the new leader saw no Soviet interest in getting more deeply engaged in these areas of conflict. Sokolov claimed to reflect the view in Moscow in asserting that since Geneva the U.S. seemed to be reverting to a more belligerent stance on regional questions. In what may have been mirror-imaging, he wondered whether the Administration felt such posturing was necessary to mollify conservatives fearful of compromises on arms control.

Sokolov agreed that it could be useful to deepen U.S.–Soviet regional discussions and encouraged the U.S. to put forward any ideas it might develop. Disingenuously, he attributed Moscow's non-reply on the President's UNGA regional initiative to our failure to give the Soviets adequate advance word. Palmer reminded him that we had a similar complaint with the handling of Gorbachev's January 15 proposal.

192. Talking Points Prepared in the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs for Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, undated

RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV

—We've had several useful soundings with the Soviets this week, including an interesting meeting between Hartman and Shevardnadze.² Several messages come through:

—On arms control, the Soviets are stressing Gorbachev's personal involvement in the initiative and his movement to meet your desires on INF, UK/French forces, verification, and a staged process to abolish nuclear arms.

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, February 1986. Secret; Sensitive; Summit II. Drafted by Burton; cleared by Palmer. Burton initialed for Palmer. Although no date appears on the memorandum, a typed note in the top margin reads: "For 7 February Meeting with President." Brackets are in the original. According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan met with Shultz and Poindexter on February 7 from 2:18 to 2:55 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) A longer version of the talking points, also drafted by Burton and clearly based on Hartman's February 4 meeting with Shevardnadze, are in the Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary's Meeting with the President (02/11/1986); NLR-775-18-101-1-9.

² See footnote 6, Document 191.

—They also believe they have taken important steps on human rights, your people-to-people initiative, and other areas of arms control. [Card with details attached.]³

—They are anxious for your response to the Gorbachev initiative, which they see as a bellwether in setting the tone for the months ahead.

—They are not going to make up their minds on summit timing until they see your response to Gorbachev.

—Shevardnadze also went off the record with Art Hartman to make a strong complaint against U.S. statements that U.S. strength had “forced” the Soviets to the Geneva summit. He seemed concerned about the impact of such statements at a sensitive juncture in Soviet internal politics.

Assessment

—Soviet pressure on summit timing is partly self-serving, but it’s possible we face a period of some uncertainty about a summit date.

—On our consultations with Allies, Mrs. Thatcher is nervous about talk of eliminating nuclear arms, but she also told Paul Nitze that she thought Gorbachev would need something on SDI.⁴ She suggested you take Gorbachev up to Camp David and work out how SDI relates to the ABM Treaty so there are no surprises, as you did with her.

—Once Paul and Ed Rowny are back from their trips, we should sit down and weigh all these factors in your final decision on the tone and substance of the response to Gorbachev.⁵

³ Not found attached.

⁴ In telegram 2619 from London, February 6, the Embassy noted Nitze met with Thatcher on February 5 to provide the “United States’ cautious assessment of Gorbachev’s January 14 proposal, and outlined the President’s thinking on next steps in Geneva arms talks.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 189.

193. Telegram From the Embassy in the Federal Republic of Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, February 11, 1986, 1733Z

4638. For the President and the Secretary From Ambassador Burt.
Subject: Shcharanskiy.

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. I want to report to you my impressions of this magnificent day, when Anatoliy Shcharanskiy crossed the Glienicker Bridge in West Berlin into the free world.² Shcharanskiy is all that he was cracked up to be. He is a smart, tough, but very human individual who is thrilled to be free, excited at seeing his wife after some nine years, and deeply appreciative of your and the Secretary's direct efforts to gain his release. He has an incredible story to tell. His vitality and strength of spirit in the face of the brutality and pettiness of his former Soviet jailers are remarkable.

3. He came over into the West with no baggage at all. The KGB had stripped him of all of his possessions, with the exception of a tiny Hebrew prayer book. He told me that he had taken this prayer book,

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860370–0978. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent for information to the White House.

² Reagan wrote in his diary on February 11: "1st news of the day 'Scharansky freed by the Soviets.' After years of imprisonment he was made part of a spy swap & allowed to rejoin his wife. We flew him to our base at Frankfurt & an Israeli plane flew to Tel Aviv. Later in day I received a call from P.M. Peres & Scharansky thanking us. I told them Kohl of W. Germany played a big part in putting this together." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, pp. 571–572) Shultz also recalled Shcharansky's release in his memoir: "Reports on our negotiations for the swap for Shcharansky were coming in fairly frequently now. Shcharansky was to be released across the Glienicke Bridge into West Berlin on February 11. On Monday, February 3, a leak about the coming release appeared on the front page of the *New York Times*. When I said, 'No comment,' that was taken by the TV analysts as confirmation. As usual, a mob of people had been present in the Oval Office the previous week when the Shcharansky release was mentioned, so the leak may have come from there. But there were other possibilities. The Soviets had also leaked the story to the German press, probably deliberately, to get press credit. That was a good sign; a leak from their side usually meant that the release had approval at the top. Our people in the European bureau were now in contact with the intermediary who was arranging the release. A disturbing message came in asking us to get Avital Shcharansky to write a letter to Anatoly urging him to 'cooperate' with the arrangements. I feared that this might be used to induce Shcharansky to sign something unwise or otherwise to give in to Soviet authorities. I said no to the request. 'You don't need to worry,' said Avital. 'If Anatoly is asked to compromise, he just won't do it.' Given all the leaks and the increasing certainty that the release would take place, I had decided that Avital should know the scenario for the release so she could plan to be in Europe at the time. She should consult with Prime Minister Peres right away, we advised. Avital said she would walk over to his house (it being Shabbat) that evening, Friday, February 7." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 706)

a present from his wife, Avital, into prison concealed on his person. When it was discovered sometime later by his prison guards, it was taken away from him, and he was thrown into a punishment cell for 130 days. Three weeks ago, when he was being taken out of his prison for the trip to Moscow, he threw himself into the snow and refused to move until the KGB promised to return the prayer book to him. It was handed back to him only yesterday, after he had been stripped of his Soviet citizenship, and after his plane had crossed the Soviet border for East Berlin.

4. Six weeks ago, Shcharanskiy weighed only some 110 pounds. While the KGB then began fattening him up, he did not learn that he was to be released until Ambassador Meehan spoke with him in East Berlin yesterday and explained to him what was going to happen.

5. As he talked to me about his experiences in prison and in labor camps over the last nine years, his true physical and moral strength became apparent. He told me that he had never lost hope in prison. He always felt connected to his wife, to Israel and to people of goodwill in the West. Three years ago, he went on a prolonged hunger strike to protest the refusal of the KGB to give him letters written to him by family and friends. By the end of his hunger strike, he was on the verge of death. But as he put it to me, though he was ready to die, he was not ready to give up. I think it is no wonder that the Soviets were so worried about the threat this man posed to the Soviet system.

6. Shcharanskiy also struck me as a man of considerable strength and independence of intellect. He preserved his remarkable fluency in English, for example, by reading Soviet English-language newspapers in prison. He even began studying Arabic, so that he could communicate with Palestinians as well as Israelis when he eventually went to Israel. Throughout his prison experience, Shcharanskiy maintained a lively interest in world affairs. He mentioned to me, for example, the shooting down of the Korean airliner, and he expressed his shock over the recent tragedy of the Challenger space shuttle.³

7. You should know that Shcharanskiy is a great admirer of your policies. He told me that, in discussions with other prisoners, there was agreement that your firmness in dealing with the Soviet Union

³ On January 28, the *Challenger* space shuttle exploded not long after lift off. "A day we'll remember for the rest of our lives," Reagan wrote in his diary. "I was getting a briefing for a meeting I was to have with network anchors—an advance on the St. of the Union address scheduled for tonight. In came Poindexter & the V.P with the news the shuttle Challenger had blown up on takeoff. We all then headed for a T.V. & saw the explosion re-played. From then on there was only one subject—the death of the 6 crew & 1 passenger—Mrs. McAuliffe the teacher who had won the right to make the flight. There is no way to describe our shock & horror." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 566)

(as contrasted with the policies of some of your predecessors) could produce a real detente, and not the phony detente of the early 1970's.

8. Shcharanskiy also told me he learned that you had written a letter to Avital in 1982 only when he came across a reproduction of your letter in a book of anti-Zionist propaganda in his prison library.

9. Shcharanskiy is elated and happy at his release, and he also has a good sense of humor. He told me that, over the past nine years, he had become accustomed to living under constant pressure and to being prepared at a moments's notice to deal with "provocations." He said it was a strange and altogether unaccustomed feeling for him to be able now to relax. He also said that, although the name of the city of Berlin understandably evoked mixed feelings in a Jew, Berlin was today a synonym for him of freedom.

10. Many people deserve a share of the credit for today's achievement: Chancellor Kohl and his people; Ambassador Frank Meehan in East Berlin, Bill Woessner, Mark Palmer and Olaf Grobel of the State Department; the U.S. Minister and his staff in Berlin, and our Consul General and his staff in Frankfurt; John Martin of the Justice Department, the U.S. Marshal Service, and finally the dedicated men and women of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army.

11. Incidentally, as a memento of this important day in his life, I gave Shcharanskiy my own pair of Presidential cuff links, presented to me when I became Ambassador. I hope you don't mind.⁴

Burt

⁴ Shultz continued in his memoir: "On Tuesday, February 11, 1986, Anatoly Shcharansky crossed the Glienicke Bridge to West Berlin. The spies being held on each side were not released until he was met by our new ambassador, Rick Burt, who was so moved that he took off the special cuff links, bearing the emblem of the Great Seal of the Republic, that I presented to each American ambassador. He pressed them into Shcharansky's hands. Rick cabled me later in the day to request a new set. (Shcharansky told me later when I met him in Washington, that he was not wearing the cuff links, that he had never worn cuff links—or a necktie—in his life, and though pleased with the gift, he hoped I wouldn't be offended if he didn't wear them in the future.) Within a few hours after his release, Anatoly and his wife were in Shimon Peres's office and chatting with me on the phone. 'It's a great moment in the history of our people,' Peres told me." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 707)

194. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, February 12, 1986

SUBJECT

My Meeting Today With Ambassador Dobrynin

Ambassador Dobrynin came in anticipating his departure for the Soviet Union, where he will spend some three weeks or so and attend the Party Congress. His principal reason was to see what message he might take home with him, and he put this in terms of asking when we would be answering Gorbachev's letters.

As you and I discussed earlier this afternoon, I gave him a message labeled as one he should give personally from you to Gorbachev:²

1. The President has a strong commitment to work constructively on the problems involving the U.S. and the Soviet Union and feels there has been some progress in a few areas. Parenthetically, I noted that Shcharanskiy was part of a deal which stands on its own feet but nevertheless we were glad that he was released.³

2. Our positions and our approach to the nuclear and space talks are clear and positive. We want to see results, and we are prepared for serious give and take. We are in the process of consulting with our allies, and we expect that process to be completed shortly. Our response will follow on after that is concluded. While I am therefore not in a position to provide our response at this time, I can say that the President wishes, as before, to build as much on positive aspects of the General Secretary's initiative as he can. In that regard we consider positive the General Secretary's effort to move toward a nuclear-free world, to address the issues of verification, and to set out INF as a subject on which an interim agreement is possible independent of the other two negotiating groups. We are prepared to work energetically on the INF issues. We were disappointed that the General Secretary's initiative did not seem to address our November proposals in either START or in the space defense areas and I would hope for progress in these areas.

3. We notice from Shevardnadze's statements to Hartman and the General Secretary's statements to Senator Kennedy that you seem to

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1986 Soviet Union Feb. Secret; Sensitive. Woessner sent the memorandum to Shultz under a February 11 action memorandum. A note on the covering memorandum reads: "GPS hand delivered original to Adm. Poindexter 2/12 AM."

² No record of this discussion has been found.

³ See Document 193.

link the setting of dates for the next Summit meeting to the arms control negotiations.⁴ We do not believe this is constructive linkage and, if you feel uncomfortable with another meeting this year we should simply put it off until 1987. The President's opinion is, however, that there is ample time to work on important issues of substance and with a reasonable prospect particularly in INF.

Dobrynin responded that linkage as such was not what they had in mind but simply a statement of the importance of some significant agreement or agreements at the next meeting. I said I thought that postponing a meeting until 1987 ran the danger of allowing too much time to pass with the consequent loss of momentum. He seemed to agree with this. He said that important meetings of this kind needed to be carefully prepared so that by the time the meeting took place we could be 85–90 percent sure of what kind of outcome there could be. He noted how important it was in the November Geneva meeting that a lot of preparatory work had been done and therefore wound up reflected in the Joint Statement. I said I agreed completely that careful preparations were essential and that a concentrated effort on areas that seemed fruitful was important. I said there was a real sense in which progress on some regional issues was more important even than arms control. I noted in this connection that the times for three of the regional discussions have now been set and the other two are moving toward agreement.

I pointed out the snow on the ground and told him that this was just a mild preparation for his time in Moscow.

⁴ See footnote 6, Document 191 and Document 192. In telegram 2152 from Moscow, February 7, the Embassy summarized Senator Kennedy's 3-day visit to Moscow, which included a meeting with Gorbachev on February 6. No other record of the Kennedy-Gorbachev meeting was found. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860100–0638)

195. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, February 15, 1986

SUBJECT

Reply to Gorbachev's Handwritten Letter

Issue

Whether to reply to Gorbachev's handwritten letter of December 24, 1985

Facts

Gorbachev answered your handwritten letter with one of his own dated December 24, 1985. You have also received a more formal letter dated January 12 making proposals for a three-stage process for the elimination of nuclear weapons by 1999.²

Discussion

The handwritten letter was obviously the more personal one, particularly since Gorbachev immediately announced the content of his letter of January 12 and wrote in the same vein to several other Chiefs of State. Therefore, it would be appropriate to answer the two letters separately, keeping the handwritten exchange more personal, private and direct. I think it is important to give a specific reply to the handwritten letter both to sustain this private exchange and to reply to some of the unacceptable allegations in it. This can be done without getting into the details of his letter of January 12.

The proposed draft at Tab A attempts to achieve the following:

—It answers the principal arguments advanced by Gorbachev against SDI, implicitly reminding him that Soviet programs are such

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8690024, 869014). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Prepared by Matlock. Matlock sent Poindexter an earlier draft of the attached letter under a February 1 covering memorandum and wrote: "I have not shown this text to anyone else, since I am not certain whether you want the handwritten exchange to be subject to vetting on the staff or with other agencies." Poindexter approved the recommendation to indicate his reaction to the letter. He also approved the recommendation to consult and clear with "Ron Lehman, Bob Linhard, Steve Sestanovich. After the Pres signs, I'll show to Shultz & Weinberger before it goes." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron February 1986 (1/6)) Poindexter forwarded a copy of Reagan's handwritten letter to Shultz, Weinberger, and Casey on February 17. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 21D, 1986 Arms Control Mtg)

² Gorbachev's letter is dated January 14; see Document 177.

that his arguments can be turned against him, while still leaving the door open to concrete negotiation of legitimate issues.

—By separating the reply to his handwritten letter from that to his “public” letter of January 12, the draft indicates clearly, without saying so, that the use of “proposals” for propaganda is not helpful to the negotiating process, and that such “proposals” will not be given the status of private messages.

—By devoting special attention to regional conflicts and Afghanistan in particular, it lays the ground for a linkage of restraint in these areas to the reduction of nuclear weapons beyond the initial 50 percent. It also includes a strong statement regarding Soviet involvement with Qaddhafi, based on the danger posed to the Soviet Union by his unpredictability. (This is a factor the Soviets probably worry about, and it will not hurt to play on it a bit.)

You will note that the draft contains no mention of the Washington summit. Given the Soviet delay in suggesting a firm date—or reacting in any way officially to our proposal made in early December—I think it is desirable to avoid showing any exceptional eagerness. Also, in his letter, Gorbachev made no mention of the meeting other than to say that he considered the correspondence “a very important channel” for preparing for it.

One other small matter is that Gorbachev did not pick you up on your effort to develop a less formal salutation. (You had written “Dear General Secretary Gorbachev,” while his reply was addressed “Dear Mr. President.” You may, therefore, wish to revert to “Dear Mr. General Secretary.”

Although the draft reply is longer than I would like it to be, it is only slightly longer than Gorbachev’s letter (a translation of which is at Tab B for your reference).³ Nevertheless, I consider it important to provide answers to Gorbachev’s allegations in some detail, and this cannot be done much more briefly. Providing him with a detailed reply does indicate that you take his arguments seriously and have given them careful thought.

If you decide to write out a letter along the lines of the draft, I would recommend that we do a courtesy translation (on very close hold) and send it through Hartman in a sealed envelope, as we did with your previous handwritten letter.

Regarding the letter of January 12, we will be consulting the Allies over the next few days and should have a formal reply ready for you to consider at the end of next week.

³ Attached but not printed.

Recommendation:

That you write a reply to Gorbachev along the lines of the draft at Tab A.⁴

Tab A**Draft Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev⁵**

Washington, February 12, 1986

DRAFT REPLY TO HANDWRITTEN LETTER FROM GORBACHEV

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Your letter of December 24, 1985, was most thought-provoking and I would like to share my reactions with you. I have of course also received your letter of January 14, 1986, and will be responding to it shortly. However, since the substance of the latter is already in the public domain, I believe it is well to keep our private communications separate. Although the issues overlap, I would hope that our informal exchange can be used to clarify our attitudes on some of the fundamental questions.

I agree with you that we need to set a specific agenda for action to bring about a steady and—I would hope—radical improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. I suggested two such topics in my previous letter, and I would hope that we can identify others as ripe for immediate progress. For example, some of the obstacles to an agreement on intermediate-range missiles seem to be falling away. I would also hope that rapid progress can be made toward agreement on a verification regime that will permit a global ban on chemical weapons.

Regarding arms reduction in general, I agree with you that we must make decisions not on the basis of assurances or intentions but with regard to the capabilities on both sides. Nevertheless, I do not understand the reasoning behind your conclusion that only a country preparing a disarming first strike would be interested in defenses against ballistic missiles. If such defenses prove feasible in the future, they could facilitate further reductions of nuclear weapons by creating

⁴ Reagan approved the recommendation.

⁵ No classification marking. The text printed here is Matlock's typed draft of February 12; Reagan's handwritten letter, which matches this draft, dated February 16, is in the Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8690024, 869014).

a feeling of confidence that national security could be preserved without them.

Of course, as I have said before, I recognize that adding defensive systems to an arsenal replete with weapons with a disarming first-strike capability could under some conditions be destabilizing. That is why we are proposing that both sides concentrate first on reducing those weapons which can be used to deliver a disarming first strike. Certainly, if neither of our countries has forces suitable for a first strike, neither need fear that defenses against ballistic missiles would make a first strike strategy possible.

I also do not understand your statement that what you call "space strike weapons" are "all purpose" weapons. As I understand it, the sort of directed-energy and kinetic devices both our countries are investigating in the context of ballistic missile defense are potentially most effective against point targets moving at high velocity in space. They would be ill-suited for mass destruction on earth, and if one were planning to strike earth targets from space, it does not seem rational to resort to such expensive and exotic techniques. Their destructiveness can never approach that of the nuclear weapons in our hands today. Nuclear weapons are the real problem.

Mr. General Secretary, in the spirit of candor which is essential to effective communication, I would add another point. You speak often of "space strike weapons," and your representatives have defined these as weapons which can strike targets in space from earth and its atmosphere, and weapons in space which can strike targets in space or on earth. I must ask, "What country has such weapons?" The answer is, only one: the Soviet Union. Your ABM system deployed around Moscow can strike targets beyond the atmosphere and has been tested in that mode. Your co-orbital anti-satellite weapon is designed to destroy satellites. Furthermore, the Soviet Union began research in defenses utilizing directed energy before the United States did and seems well along in research (and—incidentally—some testing outside laboratories) of lasers and other forms of directed energy.

I do not point this out in reproach or suggest that these activities are in violation of agreements. But if we were to follow your logic to the effect that what you call "space strike weapons" would only be developed by a country planning a first strike, what would we think? We see the Soviet Union devoting enormous resources to defensive systems, in an effort which antedates by many years our own effort, and we see a Soviet Union which has built up its counterforce weapons in numbers far greater than our own. If the only reason to develop defensive weapons is to make a disarming first strike possible, then clearly we should be even more concerned than we have been.

We are concerned, and deeply so. But not because you are developing—and unlike us deploying—defensive weaponry. We are concerned

over the fact that the Soviet Union for some reason has chosen to deploy a much larger number of weapons suitable for a disarming first strike than has the United States. There may be reasons for this other than actually seeking a first-strike advantage, but we too must look at capabilities rather than intentions. And the fact is that we are certain you have an advantage in this area.

Frankly, you have been misinformed if your specialists say that the missiles on our Trident submarines have a capability to destroy hardened missile silos—a capability your SS-18 definitely has. Current Trident missiles lack the capability for such a role. They could be used only to retaliate. Nor is the Pershing II, which cannot even reach most Soviet strategic weapons, a potential first-strike weapon. Its short flight time is not substantially different from that of the more capable—and much more numerous—Soviet SS-20's aimed at our European Allies whom we are pledged to defend and most of whom have no nuclear capability of their own. Our forces currently have a very limited capability to strike Soviet silos, and we are improving this capability only because we cannot accept a situation in which the Soviet Union holds such a clear advantage in counterforce weaponry. Even if we are required to complete all planned deployments in the absence of an accord which limits them, they will not match the number of Soviet weapons with a first-strike capability.

If our defense and military specialists disagree regarding the capability of the weapons on the other side, then by all means let us arrange for them to meet and discuss their concerns. A frank discussion of their respective assessments and the reasons for them could perhaps clear up those misunderstandings which are not based on fact.

In any event, we have both agreed to the principle of a 50% reduction of nuclear arms. Implementing that agreement is surely the first task of our negotiators at Geneva. Let me stress once again that we remain willing to reduce those weapons systems which the Soviet Union finds threatening so long as the Soviet Union will reduce those which pose a special threat to the United States and its Allies. Our proposals in November included significant movement on our part in this direction and were a major step to accommodate your concerns. I hope that your negotiators will be empowered to respond to these proposals during the current round and to engage us in identifying which strategic systems are to be included in the 50% reduction.

So far as defensive systems are concerned, I would reiterate what I wrote before: if your concern is that such systems may be used to permit a first-strike strategy, or as a cover for basing weapons of mass destruction in space, then there must be practical ways to prevent such possibilities. Of course, I have in mind not general assurances but concrete, verifiable means which both sides can rely on to avoid these

contingencies, neither of which is a part of United States strategy or planning. I honestly believe that we can find a solution to this problem if we approach it in practical fashion rather than debating generalities.

I would like nothing more than to find, by our next meeting, an approach acceptable to both of us to solve this problem. But I believe that will require two things: accelerating negotiations to reach agreement on the way to reduce offensive weapons by 50%, and discussion of concrete ways to insure that any future development of defensive systems cannot be used as a cover for a first-strike strategy or for basing weapons of mass destruction in space. Aside from these broader issues, I believe that your recent proposal brings settlement of the problem of intermediate-range missiles closer and that there are improved prospects for agreeing on effective verification measures in several areas.

Regarding regional conflicts, I can see that our respective analyses of the causes are incompatible. There seems little point in continuing to debate those matters on which we are bound to disagree. Instead, I would suggest that we simply look at the current situation in pragmatic terms. Such a look would show two very important facts: that the Soviet Union is engaged in a war in another country and the United States is not. And furthermore, this war is one which is unlikely to bring any benefit to the Soviet Union. So why is it continued?

Certainly not because of the United States. Even if we wished we do not have the power to induce hundreds of thousands of people to take up arms against a well trained foreign army equipped with the most modern weapons. And neither we nor any country other than the Soviet Union has the power to stop that war. For who can tell the people of another country they should not fight for their motherland, for their independence and their national dignity?

I hope, as you say, that there is an open door to a just political settlement. Of course, we support the U.N. process and hope that it will take a practical and realistic turn. However, 1985 was marked by an intensification of conflict. I can only hope that this is not what the future holds.

As I have said before, if you really want to withdraw from Afghanistan, you will have my cooperation in every reasonable way. We have no desire or intent to exploit a Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan to the detriment of Soviet interests. But it is clear that the fighting can be ended only by the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the return of Afghan refugees to their country, and the restoration of a genuinely sovereign, non-aligned state. Such a result would have an immediate positive effect on U.S.-Soviet relations and would help clear the way to progress in many other areas.

The problem of superpower military involvement in local disputes is of course not limited to the tragic conflict in Afghanistan. And I

must say candidly that some recent actions by your government are most discouraging. What are we to make of your sharply increased military support of a local dictator who has declared a war of terrorism against much of the rest of the world, and against the United States in particular? How can one take Soviet declarations of opposition to terrorism seriously when confronted with such actions? And, more importantly, are we to conclude that the Soviet Union is so reckless in seeking to extend its influence in the world that it will place its prestige (and even the lives of some of its citizens) at the mercy of a mentally unbalanced local despot?

You have made accusations about U.S. policy which I cannot accept. My purpose here, however, is not to debate, but to search for a way out of the pattern by which one of us becomes militarily involved, directly or indirectly, in local disputes, and thus stimulates the reaction of the other. This transforms what should be of local concern into a U.S.-Soviet confrontation. As I have said, we believe it is the Soviet Union which has acted without restraint in this respect. You say it is the United States.

But agreement as to who is to blame is not necessary to find a solution. The point I would make is that we must find a way to terminate the military involvement, direct and indirect, of both our countries in these disputes, and avoid spreading such involvement to new areas. This was the goal of the proposal I made last October. Let us encourage the parties to these conflicts to begin negotiations to find political solutions, while our countries support the process by agreeing to terminate the flow of weapons and war materiel into the area of conflict.

Mr. General Secretary, there remain many points on which we still disagree, and we will probably never reach agreement on some of them. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the critical problems can be solved if we approach them in the proper manner. I have the feeling that we gradually are finding some additional points on which we can agree, and would hope that, by concentrating on practical solutions, we can give greater momentum to this process.

But we do need to speed up the negotiation process if this is to occur. Therefore, I hope you will instruct your delegations in Geneva, as I have instructed ours, to roll up their sleeves and get seriously to work.

When you announced to the public the ideas contained in your letter of January 14, I made a statement welcoming them.⁶ Our study

⁶ See footnote 8, Document 178.

of that message will shortly be completed and when it is I will be responding specifically to the points you made in it.

Nancy joins me in sending our best regards to you and your wife.
Sincerely,

196. Editorial Note

In response to Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's January 15 arms control proposal (see Document 177), the Reagan administration issued two National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 210 on February 4 and NSDD 214 on February 21. The National Security Planning Group met on February 3 to formulate a response to Gorbachev's proposal (see Document 188), culminating in NSDD 210, "Allied Consultations on the US Response to General Secretary Gorbachev's January 14, 1986, Arms Control Proposal," scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume XII, INF, 1984–1988. According to the instructions contained in NSDD 210, Ambassadors Paul Nitze and Edward Rowny were dispatched to Europe and Asia to discuss the "approach to handling the general concept of a process leading to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons and on a proposed U.S. initiative in the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) area." See Document 189. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 210)

NSDD 214, "U.S. Response to Gorbachev's January Arms Control Proposals," February 21, also scheduled to be printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume XII, INF, 1984–1988, provided updated guidance related to INF issues after the completion of Nitze and Rowny's discussions with the various Allies. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 214)

197. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev¹

Washington, February 22, 1986

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

The elimination of nuclear weapons has been an American goal for decades, from our proposals at the dawn of the nuclear age to my vision of a nuclear-free world made possible through the reliance of our countries on defense rather than on the threat of nuclear retaliation. In a 1983 speech to the Japanese Diet and on many subsequent occasions, I have advocated the abolition of nuclear weapons. I have done so because I believe this is an objective which reflects the deep yearning of people everywhere, and which provides a vision to guide our efforts in the years ahead. It was for similar reasons that I have sought to develop concepts and frameworks to guide the efforts of our governments in other aspects of our relations—whether solving the regional tensions that have damaged our relations over the years, or expanding the people-to-people contacts that can enrich both our societies.

It is in this spirit that I have studied with great care your letter of January 14, your January 15 statement to the Soviet people, and your subsequent statements on the prospects for progress in arms control. I believe they represent a significant and positive step forward.

I am encouraged that you have suggested steps leading toward a world free from nuclear weapons, even though my view regarding the steps necessary differs from yours in certain respects. However, having agreed on the objective and on the need for taking concrete steps to reach that goal, it should be easier to resolve differences in our viewpoints as to what those steps should be. Our initial moves are of course the essential ones to start this process and therefore I believe we should focus our negotiating efforts on them.

Of course, if we are to move toward a world in which the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons will be possible, there must be far greater trust and confidence between our two countries than exists at

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8690146, 8690267). No classification marking. In a February 22 covering note to Reagan transmitting the letter, Poindexter explained: "Attached is a letter to General Secretary Gorbachev which responds to his letter of January 14. As I told you on the telephone this morning, we would like to cable this response to Moscow tonight so Art could deliver it tomorrow before their Party Congress convenes on Tuesday." The letter was sent via telegram 5985 to Moscow, February 23. (Ibid.) In telegram 2948 from Moscow, February 24, the Embassy reported it was hand-delivered to the MFA on February 23. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860002-0489)

present. We cannot simply wave away the suspicion and misunderstandings which have developed over the past four decades between our two countries. The process of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons can by itself nurture greater confidence and trust. But there will be many in my country, and I believe in yours, who will question the wisdom of eliminating nuclear weapons—which both sides see as the ultimate guarantor of their security—if they see the other's conduct as threatening. This leads me to three general observations.

First, it will be vitally necessary as we move down this path to ensure the most stringent verification, with measures far more comprehensive and exacting than in any previous agreement. I welcome your recognition of this in your expressed willingness to make use of on-site inspection and to adopt other measures that may be necessary. For our part, we will be proposing verification procedures tailored to the specific weaponry limits which are contemplated. Our negotiators will, of course, work out the details of the measures, but I believe we both will have to pay close attention to this aspect and see to it that our respective governments develop and implement the necessary arrangements. At the same time, it will be essential to resolve outstanding compliance concerns and ensure that all obligations our governments have undertaken are faithfully observed.

My second point is that any sustained effort to resolve our basic security concerns must go hand-in-hand with concrete steps to move ahead in other areas of our relationship—non-nuclear military issues, regional problems, human rights, and bilateral ties. The buildup of both nuclear and conventional armaments has taken place in recent decades to address perceived threats to security, including conflicts in other regions of the world. Progress on reducing arms should be accompanied by a corresponding effort to deal with these perceptions. The process of eliminating nuclear arms is liable to prove fragile indeed unless we can deal with our competition in a peaceful and responsible way.

I welcome the statement in your January 15 message to the Soviet people, which calls for settlement of regional conflicts as soon as possible. I would urge you again to consider seriously the proposal I made at the United Nations in October for a comprehensive and flexible framework that would permit our two countries to work together, in conjunction with the peoples involved, to solve regional conflicts that have damaged East-West relations over the years and have brought great suffering to the areas affected. We should make every effort to ensure that in the dialogue on regional issues to which we agreed at Geneva, including discussions by our foreign ministers and the meetings of our senior regional experts, our governments take a fresh look

at ways to reduce tensions between us over regional matters. I continue to believe that regional conflicts can and should be resolved peacefully, in ways that allow free choice without outside interference.

Finally, as you know, the United States and its allies must rely today on nuclear weapons to deter conventional as well as nuclear conflict. This is due in large part to the significant imbalance that currently exists between the conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As a result, it would be necessary, as we reduce nuclear weapons toward zero, that we concurrently engage in a process of strengthening the stability of the overall East-West security balance, with particular emphasis on redressing existing conventional imbalances, strengthening confidence-building measures and accomplishing a verifiable, global ban on chemical weapons. In addition, our cooperative efforts to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime would become even more important.

As for the specifics of your proposal, we certainly agree on the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons as soon as we have achieved the conditions for a world which makes that goal feasible. We also agree on the need to get on with the first steps towards creating those conditions now. The pace of progress towards any target date would have to depend on our ability to arrive at mutually acceptable guarantees to ensure that the security of the United States, the Soviet Union and our respective friends and allies is in no sense diminished along the way.

I also agree that the first steps in moving toward this goal involve deep reductions in the existing arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. Also, like you, we can envision subsequent steps which could involve the United Kingdom, France and the People's Republic of China, so that all can move to zero nuclear weapons in a balanced and stable manner. Finally, I also share the view that our efforts should now focus on the first steps which the U.S. and USSR can take bilaterally to begin the process.

I can also agree with several of your ideas on how this program would proceed. There are other details, however, that would require modification before I could accept them.

For example, as our two nations reduce our nuclear weapons toward zero, it is imperative that we maintain equal limits on those weapons at each stage along the way. To this end, the United States last November proposed a detailed plan for reduction of U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive forces. I am disappointed that the Soviet Union has not yet responded to this proposal, which builds on your ideas presented to me last fall by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. As we discussed in Geneva, we agree on the principle of deep reductions, but we cannot agree that certain categories of weapons systems on the U.S. side would be included while like weapons on the Soviet side would be excluded.

Similarly, we must insist that limits be based on system capabilities, not expressed intentions. You made this point very eloquently to me in Geneva. In regard to longer-range INF missiles, this means that we cannot exclude systems from limits merely because of their deployment location, since those systems are capable of moving or being transported in a matter of days between different geographic areas.

I have, however, studied closely, your INF proposal of January 15, 1986, and believe that our negotiators at Geneva should be able to arrive at an equitable, verifiable and mutually acceptable INF agreement. In this regard, I have asked our negotiators during this round to propose a concrete plan for the elimination of LRINF missiles, not only in Europe but also in Asia, before the end of 1989.²

In the defense and space area, your proposal was ambiguous with regard to strategic defense research. I continue to believe that limits on research could be counterproductive and, in any case, could not be verified; therefore, they must not be included in an agreement. Beyond research, as I suggested in Geneva, if there were no nuclear missiles, then there might also be no need for defenses against them. But I am convinced that some non-nuclear defenses could make a vital contribution to security and stability. In any event, our negotiators in Geneva should thoroughly examine how we could make a transition to a world involving the increasing contribution of such defenses.

With respect to nuclear testing, I believe that, so long as we rely on nuclear weapons as an element of deterrence, we must continue to test in order to ensure their continued safety, security and reliability. However, as I wrote to you in December, I see no reason why we should not consider the matter of nuclear testing as we move forward on other arms control subjects.³ I suggested we establish a bilateral dialogue aimed at constructive steps in this field. I remain hopeful you will take up this offer.

Finally, although your proposal seems to recognize that the crucial first step is substantial bilateral U.S. and Soviet nuclear reductions, it also attaches certain conditions regarding the forces of the United Kingdom and France. As you know, the United States can make no commitments for other nuclear powers, nor can we agree to bilateral U.S.-Soviet arrangements which would suggest otherwise. The negotiations of limitations on third country nuclear systems is solely the responsibility and prerogative of the governments concerned.

The leaders of Britain, France and China have made known their views on this and on the progress necessary in U.S.-Soviet nuclear

² See Document 196.

³ See footnote 5, Document 177.

reductions and in other arms control areas which would establish the conditions for them to consider how their security interests would be served by participation in future negotiations. Thus, the important task now before us is to make the necessary progress. When we have done so—as I noted earlier—I can envision a process involving the other nuclear powers, so that we all can move to zero nuclear weapons in a balanced and stable manner.

With these considerations in mind, and building upon your proposal, I propose that we agree upon the elements which we hold in common, as outlined above, and that we accelerate work on the first bilateral steps. Implementing details must be worked out by our negotiators in Geneva, Vienna and Stockholm, but our guiding objective should be to reach meaningful, verifiable and balanced arms control measures, each of which can stand on its merits at every stage of the larger process.

In summary, I would propose that the process toward our agreed goal of eliminating nuclear weapons include the following elements:

Initial Steps. I believe that these steps should involve reduction in and limits on nuclear, conventional, and chemical weapons as follows:

1. The U.S. and the USSR would reduce the number of warheads on their strategic ballistic missiles to 4500 and the number of ALCMs on their heavy bombers to 1500 resulting in no more than a total number of 6000 such warheads on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. These reductions would be carried out in such a way as to enhance stability.

2. In the INF area, by 1987 both the United States and the Soviet Union would limit their LRINF missile deployments in Europe to no more than 140 launchers each, with the Soviet Union making concurrent, proportionate reductions in Asia. Within the following year, both sides would further reduce the numbers of LRINF launchers remaining in Europe and Asia by an additional 50%. Finally, both sides would move to the total elimination of this category of weapons by the end of 1989.

3. Research programs on strategic defenses would be conducted in accord with treaty obligations.

4. The U.S. and the USSR would establish an effective MBFR verification regime and carry out initial reductions in manpower levels along the lines of the recent Western proposal at the MBFR negotiations; they would then begin a process of moving on to a balance of non-nuclear capabilities in Europe.

5. Concrete and meaningful confidence-building measures designed to make the European military environment more open, predictable, and stable would be initiated.

6. An effective, comprehensive worldwide ban on the development, production, possession, and transfer of chemical weapons would be

instituted, with strict verification measures including international on-site inspection.

Subsequent steps. Subsequent steps could involve other nuclear powers and would aim at further reductions and increasingly strict limits, ultimately leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. We would embark on this process as soon as the steps encompassed in the first stage are completed. The goal would be to complete the process as soon as the conditions for a non-nuclear world had been achieved.

Obligations assumed in all steps and areas would be verified by national technical means, by on-site inspection as needed, and by such additional measures as might prove necessary.

I hope that this concept provides a mutually acceptable route to a goal that all the world shares. I look forward to your response and to working with you in the coming months in advancing this most important effort.

Let me conclude by agreeing with you that we should work constructively before your visit to the United States to prepare concrete agreements on the full range of issues we discussed at Geneva. Neither of us has illusions about the major problems which remain between our two countries, but I want to assure you that I am determined to work with you energetically in finding practical solutions to those problems. I agree with you that we should use our correspondence as a most important channel of communication in preparing for your visit.

Nancy and I would like to extend to you, Mrs. Gorbacheva and your family our best wishes. It is our hope that this year will bring significant progress toward our mutual goal of building a better relationship between our two countries, and a safer world.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

198. Notes of an Interview With Oleg Gordievskiy¹

Washington, February 24, 1986

Project “RYaN” (Raketno-yadernoye napadeniye)

Noting this subject as one of the most important and disturbing elements of OG’s reporting,² [name not declassified] asked what he thought of the hypothesis that Project “RYaN” was an “active measure” campaign intended to insinuate convincing evidence of Soviet leadership fears of a rising war danger into Western, particularly US, intelligence for the purpose of moderating the anti-Soviet policies of the US administration in the early 1980s.³

OG replied that he’d been given this question in writing [*less than 1 line not declassified*] some months before and had searched his memory very thoroughly for evidence that might validate or refute the hypothesis. He concluded that, while the proposition was faintly plausible, it was very unlikely for the following reasons:

While there was always a mixture of belief and disbelief about the whole project, particularly with respect to its assumptions on the manner in which NATO governments might go to war and the probability of a pure surprise attack, too many high-level and informed people believed in the validity of the project. These included Kryuchkov, Leonov (head of the first service [?]) and a very expert America watcher), Mityaev (deputy head [?]) of the Institute for the Study of Intelligence Problems). These people were 100% serious. In addition, some dozen very able serious analysts in a section of this Institute [?], as well as Department One, the US Department [?], worked on the project in 1981–82. There was great urgency in getting letters on requirements out to the residency.

Furthermore, if the Center *planned* to leak the project to the West, the operations would have involved an impossibly elaborate deception

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis, Job 87T01145R: Policy & Substantive Files, Box 3, Folder 39: [file name not declassified]. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared by the interviewer. All brackets except those denoting text not declassified are in the original. Copies were sent [text not declassified]. In a February 24 covering memorandum [text not declassified] wrote: “1. Attached are my notes on a [text not declassified] session with Gordievskiy which occurred 1500–1600 on [text not declassified] February 1986. Because so many had gone over related matters before, I chose, in the main, to pose questions for his judgment and opinion. Significantly, he gave both his judgments and the line of reasoning or factual basis for them in most cases. 2. My uncertainty about what exactly he said on several points is indicated by [?].”

² Throughout the notes, Oleg Gordievskiy is abbreviated as “OG.”

³ See Document 125. For information on the war scare, Able Archer, and “VRYaN” see also *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 134, 135, 221, and Appendix A.

and double book-keeping down into a great many residency. This would have been evident to OG or at least the resident.

If, on the other hand, the Center did *not* plan purposely to leak the project, then it would have to be proceeding on the assumption that it would leak anyway through Western agents in the KGB. This would be too horrifying an assumption for the KGB and political leaderships to accept as an operational premise.⁴

In view of this strong case against the “active measure” hypothesis, [name not declassified] noted that we seem to be dealing with an instance of unusual irrationality or lack of realism at the top of the Soviet system. He noted further that careful study had revealed no unusual Soviet military measures, such as stockpiling, changes in routine force readiness levels, or mobilizational steps, that would seem to have been in order had the Soviet leadership really believed that the danger of a major war, especially with very short political and strategic warning, had indeed sharply increased. [name not declassified] asked whether this atmosphere of unreality sprang from some unique political circumstances of the time, such as the condition of the Brezhnev leadership (per OG’s reporting that he and others speculated Project “RYaN” could have been inspired by Andropov’s political maneuvering). Or might it be something that could recur at the top of the leadership almost any time?

OG replied that, as Project RYaN was marked by a mixture of belief and disbelief, so, one must remember, is Soviet military management marked by a mixture of high concern, on one hand, and inaction, on the other. Moreover, according to OG, there were defense-related developments which he observed on trips home during the late 1970s and early 1980s indicating heightened regime fear of war. For example, he saw increased civil defense activity, notably in hospitals; reserve officers were called up for duty or training with increasing frequency; and there was more shelter building going on. In July 1985 OG personally saw such a shelter project in the Semyonovskaya area 80–90 kilometers from Moscow, in the neighborhood of Chebrikov’s dacha, also near one of Stalin’s dachas, the “Far (Dal’naya) Dacha.” An engineer on this project, a friend of OG’s, said there were three degrees of shelter protection, A, B, and C, with A the most protected, capable of withstanding a direct hit with a nuclear weapon. This particular project, labeled with a sign as a garage, was said by the engineer friend to be of Type A, the deepest type. Construction troops were working 24-hour shifts.

⁴ Documentation on Gordievskiy’s reporting is also scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988.

As to the sense of timing or urgency that governed Project “RYaN”, OG reiterated that it was a belief in the increasing likelihood of surprise attack at some undetermined future time, perhaps months or years away, not a sense that a surprise attack was just around the corner, that animated the project. The project came to the KGB in the summer of 1981. Originally the plan was to develop a concept of the project over the following year, producing a plan by autumn 1982. But the whole thing was speeded up, with initial requirements letters going out in September 1981. Also remember: the project originated in the Ministry of Defense with the GRU. It may have come over to the KGB out of some political motive of Andropov’s; but that is largely speculation.

[*name not declassified*] noted that this period of intense activity coincided with the beginnings of the Reagan Administration. Of several factors presumably involved, the policies and rhetoric of the new US administration, INF deployments, and Soviet internal developments, which did OG believe to be the most important in inspiring Project “RYaN”? OG replied that the Soviet perceptions of the new US administration were most important.⁵

[*name not declassified*] comment: Perhaps because of the nature of the questions posed, OG gave more emphasis to the sincerity and authenticity of the fear of war that motivated Project “RYaN” than he did in earlier reporting, which gave at least equal emphasis to the lack of realism in underlying assumptions of the project appreciated by many of its participants.]

The Political Role of the KGB

[*name not declassified*] asked what was the contemporary gossip on the death of KGB First Deputy Chairman S.K. Tsvigun in January 1982.

⁵ In a separate [*text not declassified*] Information Report, disseminated in memorandum format on January 27, “Aspects of Soviet Strategic Concerns—Priority Intelligence Requirements,” the summary explained the report provided a “KGB requirements list with a summary and introduction by Oleg ((Gordievskiy)). These requirements were sent to the London Residency in December 1984. In Gordievskiy’s opinion, this list was one of the indications that the KGB Center was reducing the emphasis in collection during the last year on the threat of a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. It encourages increased collection activities against more traditional military targets in the US, NATO, and China. The list emphasizes the following requirements: (1) reliable information regarding preparations by the US to take political decisions and adopt operational plans for a nuclear or conventional war against the Soviet Union, (2) data concerning scientific and technological breakthroughs applicable to new weapons systems that might be capable of radically shifting the balance of power, (3) general factors that could affect the ‘correlation of military forces,’ and (4) intelligence/counterintelligence capabilities of the Soviet Union’s current and potential adversaries.” (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, 1981–1986, Intelligence Reports [Pre 1980, May 1985–January 1986](2))

OG said this development was unexpected and shocking because Tsvigun was regarded to be in robust health and, as a man of the elite, well cared for. His death caused a lot of talk; but there was little hard information. It was immediately noted, of course, that Brezhnev failed to sign Tsvigun's obituary. It was known that Tsvigun was a Brezhnev man, as were the other two deputies as well, Tsinev (the old man), and even Chebrikov, who also came out of the Dnepropetrovsk "Mafia." Chebrikov shifted his allegiance to Andropov at some point. Tsvigun was, as widely reported, related to Brezhnev; their wives were sisters.

OG said he was inclined to believe the version of events which gained widest currency. As overseer of the Second Chief Directorate with responsibility for KGB operations in Moscow, Tsvigun became aware of the corrupt dealings of Brezhnev's daughter. He may have gone with this to Andropov. In any event, he took the story to Suslov. Tsvigun's report put Suslov, the last real idealist and true believer in the leadership, into a towering rage, not over the allegations of corruption, but at Tsvigun's apparent violation of the most vital of Kremlin injunctions: The KGB must never collect damaging information on Politburo members. Suslov was extremely rude and threatening to Tsvigun, who then committed suicide because he felt himself to be in an impossible situation.

[*name not declassified*] asked why Tsvigun went to Suslov instead of Brezhnev. OG and [*name not declassified*] speculated jointly that a) Brezhnev would have been very unhappy with Tsvigun's report too, and b) Brezhnev's deteriorating health was undermining his ability to protect any of his clients.

[*name not declassified*] posed the following argument and question: Andropov exploited his chairmanship of the KGB in Kremlin intrigues to become General Secretary. Through such people as Victor Louis, he even advertised his rise to power, undermining his rivals thereby.⁶ This made the KGB leadership an unusually important factor in Kremlin politics. According to some rumors and reports, Chebrikov played a role in stopping a Romanov-Grishin move against Gorbachev in March 1985. Could not this political importance of the KGB, especially its chairman, become a threat to the party and to Gorbachev at some point?

OG said the preceding assessment of the KGB's role in Andropov's rise was exaggerated. There may have been some Victor Louis stories put about. But, on the whole, Andropov was exceptionally careful not

⁶ According to his obituary in the *New York Times*, July 21, 1992, Victor Louis was a "Russian journalist who for decades purveyed information that the Soviet Communist Party and the K.G.B. wanted to appear in the Western press."

to give any hint of exploiting his KGB position in the manner implied. Of course, he used KGB information of all kinds to enhance his knowledge and his image as a supremely informed, judicious, rational leader within the inner circle. He scrupulously avoided and, indeed, suppressed any aura of self-promotion or tendency for KGB reporting to glorify its chairman. For example, he stopped [or rewrote] cables seeming to promote his image or interests if they were headed for the Central Committee or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Andropov, of all people, knew that exploitation of his position for political intrigue would be noticed immediately in the party apparatus and could lead to his demise. He was an exceptionally shrewd and careful man.

After his elevation to the General Secretaryship, however, Andropov could and did rely heavily on KGB information in his campaign against corruption and for cadre replacement. He didn't get very far because his health gave out. At that time the KGB came to regard Gorbachev as "their kind of leader". During the rule of Chernenko, whom the KGB saw as a transitional figure, the KGB was, once again, very careful about seeming to be involved in politics, although it did put forward reports and information subtly making Gorbachev and his policy line look good. When he became General Secretary, Gorbachev began using KGB information just like Andropov did in pursuing his cadre and other policies. It's OK for the General Secretary to do this. For example, in OG's view, much of Yel'tsin's indictment of Grishin at the recent reporting conference of the Moscow Gorkom probably came from the KGB. All this makes the KGB a very useful tool in the hands of the top man, but not an independent factor in Soviet politics.

[*name not declassified*] asked: What about relations between the KGB and the military, in the light of a bloody history of such relations?

OG asked what areas of friction [*name not declassified*] could point to. OG did not really see a conflict here. As to the relative power balance, we should examine the make up of the new Central Committee after the 27th CPSU Congress. OG said one should expect 4–5 KGB figures and 12–14 military figures among its members.

Leadership Appreciation of US Politics

Leaving aside the experts in the KGB, MFA, and the institutes, [*name not declassified*] asked, how sophisticated are the perceptions of Soviet political leaders of political life in the United States?

OG replied that Brezhnev and Chernenko were hopeless. Andropov was a lot better in this area. Gorbachev started out from real ignorance, but works very hard and is a fast learner. He studied very diligently prior to his trip to the UK in December 1984. But his judgment and sophistication should not be overrated. For example, when he spoke to the London embassy staff during that trip, he commented

mockingly and sarcastically about the factional strife within the US Government, and how silly Washington often appeared in its inability to reach timely, clear decisions. Gorbachev seemed smug and satisfied about the advantages this gave to Soviet propaganda and political tactics.

[[*name not declassified*] comment: OG's characterization of Gorbachev's low regard for US decisionmaking was quite vivid. At the same time he clearly implied that, in OG's view at least, Gorbachev's satisfaction with perceived US policymaking disarray was a mark of inadequate understanding.]

The Papal Case

Posing one last question on this everlasting matter, [*name not declassified*] asked: Would it be possible for some Soviet intelligence entity, KGB or GRU, to coopt Bulgarian agents or assets for use in such an operation without the approval or even knowledge of the Bulgarian security or political leadership? If that were possible, then one might imagine a plot in which only two or three people (some now dead) would really know what happened.⁷

OG replied that it might be possible for some Soviet entity to coopt a Bulgarian asset in, say, Turkey or Cyprus. It was not possible to do so without Bulgarian knowledge in Bulgaria. [*name not declassified*] comment: I'm not sure whether OG said "in Bulgaria" or "if he were a Bulgarian."]

In OG's view, *if* one accepted the "Bulgarian Connection", it could have gone this way: The KGB works with the counterpart Bulgarian service. The Soviet military intelligence, GRU, works very closely with Bulgarian military intelligence. The latter are always coming to Moscow and always getting intelligence of value, but are rarely able to give much back. This creates a sense of obligation. The Bulgarian military intelligence has, or could have had, some "hit man" (*boyevik*, member of a revolutionary fighting group, also "hit" as in "hit of the season") on the string. They could have let this be known to their counterparts in Moscow, asking whether the latter had any worthwhile targets in mind. In the period 1980–81, Moscow military intelligence might have mused, well, if there's one man we'd like to see out of the way . . . And the whole thing took off from there.

[[*name not declassified*] comment: Without prompting OG twice singled out the Soviet-Bulgarian military intelligence tie as the relationship of interest here.]

⁷ Documentation on this is in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 67, footnote 4.

199. Letter From Secretary of State Shultz to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, March 1, 1986

Dear John,

I have written to Cap Weinberger to let him know that I share his concerns about American official attendance at Soviet Armed Forces Day receptions this year.² Thus, the Department earlier this month instructed all diplomatic and consular posts that sanctions against attending Soviet Armed Forces Day receptions remain in effect, and that no civilian or military personnel should attend.³

At the same time, I want to share with you and Cap my strong belief that we should make a distinction between acceptance of invitations to highly visible events in honor of the Soviet military, and other contacts with Soviet defense officials that can increase our understanding of Soviet military doctrine, policies and practices—and give them a better understanding why we view them as the threat they are.

A hallmark of the Administration's policy towards the Soviet leadership is seeking a realistic dialogue. As a result of the Geneva summit, we are working actively to expand our contacts with the Soviets in diverse fields. Several of our Cabinet colleagues have already had beneficial exchanges with Soviet cabinet-level counterparts. With regard to defense contacts, at the UNGA in October 1984, and again in Strasbourg in May 1985, the President personally endorsed a policy of greater exchanges between American and Soviet military officials.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron March 1986 (3/8). Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to Crowe. Poindexter initialed the first page of the letter.

² Not found.

³ In telegram 45754 to all diplomatic and consular posts, February 13, the Department provided guidance that, as in past years, "there will be no attendance at Soviet Army Navy Day receptions." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860114–0108) In telegram 1982 from Moscow, February 5, Hartman had advised the opposite: "It is time to end this sanction and to allow normal attendance by military and civilian invitees. The boycott on attendance has made its point. The President has met with Gorbachev and will see him again this year in the United States. Contacts by senior officials and congressmen are increasing apace. We will look as if we do not have a coherent, united policy if we continue the boycott in the military area. I recommend that we try a different approach to moderating Soviet behavior—one which will also allow us to develop scarce information on the Soviet military. All restrictions on attendance at Armed Forces Day functions should be lifted, but attaches and others who attend should be encouraged to raise the invasion of Afghanistan, the Nicholson murder, the KAL shootdown as examples of Soviet behavior which we find unacceptable and uncivilized. Let's try talking to them as a means of influencing their outlook. The cold shoulder approach has outlived its usefulness." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860094–0917)

I believe it is in our national interest to begin working to implement this policy without further delay. Senior defense officials play a key role in the Soviet Union, just as Cap and his colleagues do here. I believe it is of great value to be talking with them every appropriate chance we get.

At our breakfast on February 12, you, Cap and I discussed the pros and cons of high-level exchanges with Soviet defense officials.⁴ I would like to revisit with you and Cap ways in which we might best implement the President's policy. Such exchanges would be an important element of our overall effort to improve our understanding of the perspectives of the top Soviet leadership, which is critical to our picture of Soviet policy-making.

An additional consideration is the delicate trilateral relationship with China. You are of course aware that the Chinese Defense Minister, Chief-of-Staff, and the heads of all their respective services have already visited the United States. Although the character of these visits differs markedly from any prospective Soviet exchanges, it is in our interest not to lose sight of the trilateral ramifications.

Thus, I would like to suggest that a meeting between Cap and Soviet Defense Minister Sokolov would be in our foreign policy interest. This could be followed up with a meeting between Admiral Crowe and his Soviet counterpart, Marshal Akhromeyev. We could begin working toward an agreement at this year's Summit to exchange visits by defense ministers and military chiefs-of-staff between the 1986 and 1987 summits. Alternatively, Cap and Admiral Crowe could invite their Soviet counterparts to Washington during this period.

My staff stands ready to work together with yours and Cap's on this matter.

Sincerely yours,

George P. Shultz⁵

⁴ No record of the discussion was found.

⁵ Shultz signed "George" above his typed signature.

200. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, March 1, 1986

SUBJECT

Gorbachev and the Summit

SUMMARY: The Soviets may already be discounting the possibility of early arms control agreements with us, and therefore are haggling over the summit date in order to place the onus of failure on us. We have little to fear from Soviet resort to this tactic. Gorbachev does not believe that calling off the summit would serve Soviet interests. We therefore should resist pressures to make concessions to the Soviets, and begin to exert counterpressure on them by warning against their renegeing on a commitment made at Geneva. *END SUMMARY.*

Thursday's *New York Times* editorial (attached)² is a good example of the kinds of pressures we will come under if the Soviets continue to hint, as Gorbachev did in his speech to the party congress, at a cancellation of the summit if no progress is made on arms control.³ I am convinced that the Soviets are aware of these pressures, and are "playing hard to get" for precisely that reason. But I am also confident that the Soviets are not genuinely contemplating calling off the summit.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, March 1986. Secret; Sensitive; Summit II. Drafted by VanOudenaren on February 28. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. On a covering note, Shultz instructed: "Dick S—let's develop careful Q&A on this—see esp p. 3. G." Dick S. refers to Richard Solomon, who replaced Rodman on March 3.

² Attached but not printed is a copy of the February 27 *New York Times* editorial, "Downhill From the Summit."

³ The 27th Party Congress met in Moscow February 25–March 6. Telegram 3121 from Moscow, February 25, reported on Gorbachev's speech, which focused on economic issues and reforms. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860142–0129) For the full text of Gorbachev's speech, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVIII, no. 8 (March 26, 1986), pp. 4–40. Excerpts are printed in *Documents on Disarmament*, 1986, pp. 80–88. In telegram 3404 from Moscow, March 15, Hartman commented: "The Party Congress, always a major festival of political theater, has assumed particular importance this time because it marks the end of the transition from the Andropov-Chernenko interregnum to the Gorbachev era. Gorbachev's main political report to the Congress provided few new indications of how he intends to make good on his promise to make the system work. Similarly there were no major new directions in foreign affairs, although Gorbachev's preoccupation with U.S.-Soviet relations was striking. In this connection, his emphasis was predictably on arms control, although the overall U.S. approach to Third World problems also came in for some tough criticism." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860156–0508)

We therefore are in a good position to resist pressures for new concessions at Geneva.

In 1984, the Soviets learned that cutting off dialogue with the United States did not serve their interests. It is unlikely that Gorbachev, who has called for an "activation" of Soviet foreign policy in all directions, would repeat the mistake of several years ago. Gorbachev wants to foster an image, at home and abroad, that the USSR has recovered its internal and external dynamism—that it is on the move after years of stagnation. It is hardly possible for Gorbachev to pursue an "active" foreign policy without also conducting a dialogue with the United States.

In his remarks to the party congress, Gorbachev did not condition the holding of the summit on U.S. movement on SDI—the main Soviet theme of late and, according to the Soviets, the chief sticking point in the arms control talks. This was no accident. At Geneva, Gorbachev had a chance to see firsthand how committed the President is to SDI, and knows that demanding concessions on SDI as a price for the summit would be tantamount to cancellation. Gorbachev clearly does not want to go that far, and was careful to link the summit to two less salient issues—nuclear testing and INF—on which he hopes there may be more give on the U.S. side. But even on these issues he did not back himself into a corner. He only said that if there is "readiness" on the U.S. side to seek agreement—not agreement itself—the summit dates could be set.

By insinuating that we are not yet ready for serious talks and by suggesting that our current proposals are nothing more than a basis for "idle conversations," Gorbachev may hope to pressure us to make concessions. However, he is probably realistic enough to know that the threat of a cancelled summit will not be enough to force us to abandon, over the span of a few months, fundamental positions on INF and CTB. He therefore must have other motives for being so difficult about setting a summit date.

In my view, the Soviets are trying to place us in the role of *demandeur*, not because they believe they can pressure us into arms control agreements on their terms, but precisely because they know the gap between the sides on most arms control issues is too wide to be bridged, and that there most likely will *not* be arms control agreements. By creating the impression that we are more eager for a summit than the Soviets and by exercising his veto power over the summit dates, Gorbachev is trying to show that he can "win" in hard bargaining with the United States. He has to show his power over us on this issue, because so far he has exercised very little power over us on matters like getting us to drop SDI or securing compensation for British and French systems.

The *Times* is right—the summit date has indeed become a bone of contention between the two sides. But the implication that it is a rather silly bone standing in the way of progress on “real” issues, namely arms control, seems to me to put the cart before the horse. Given the President’s firmness on arms control issues and the rigid Soviet adherence to “principled” stances, the Soviets probably are already discounting the possibility of arms control agreements between now and the summit—whenever it takes place. They therefore are trying to place the onus for the lack of progress on arms control entirely on us.

While the Soviets may enjoy some success in this effort, they are creating problems for themselves down the road. They will either have to back out of the summit, which is clearly not in their interests, or eventually attend a summit in the absence of major progress on arms control—which they are saying they will not do.

Our problem is rather in the longer run. As I have said to you on other occasions, I see 1986 as the year of our maximum bargaining strength. Next year, if the President loses the Senate, and as Gramm-Rudman bites deeper into our defense budget, we will be in a somewhat weaker position. The Soviets may have decided to eat up time for that very reason.⁴ Indeed, Gorbachev’s proposal of January 15, which tried to undo the gains we had made in the Geneva Joint Statement, may have been designed to throw a monkey wrench into the works to ensure no rapid progress by the time of the next summit.

As you have pointed out, this is not a reason to make hasty concessions either. Rather it is a reason to focus on maintaining Congressional funding for SDI; maintaining allied solidarity; and engaging Gorbachev aggressively in the game of maneuver he is playing. Gorbachev’s two most recent arms control blitzes have really fallen flat. We may well be able to maintain Congressional and allied support over the next three years and thereby preserve the balance of bargaining strength. As our SDI program moves ahead, time is *not* on the Soviets’ side—if we keep our cool.

The one thing we should *not* do is make new concessions and thereby appear overly eager for a meeting that Gorbachev needs as much as we do. Rather, we should begin going to our publics more aggressively to reject the Soviets’ crude blackmail tactic and to explain that the Soviets are reneging on their commitment to hold follow-on summits. By meeting this issue head on, we will preempt suggestions, such as those in the *Times* editorial, that setting a summit date is a petty matter that can easily be resolved. By acting in this way, we will

⁴ Shultz underlined this sentence and drew a bracket in the right-hand margin to highlight the paragraph.

place pressures on the Soviets and hopefully induce them to agree to a summer meeting or at least to set a date for a post-election summit.

201. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Ridgway) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, March 1, 1986

SUBJECT

Looking Ahead to Possible Soviet Retaliation Against Cuts in the Size of Their UN Missions

PROBLEM

Our decision to cut the size of the Soviet UN Missions (SMUN) will have significant counterintelligence benefits, and should also help defuse domestic pressures to cut the size of the Soviet Embassy here.² Gorbachev is likely to respond forcefully to show he can be just as tough with the Americans on this issue as he was with the British, French and Italians on the question of expulsions. The Soviets are already grumbling about what they claim is our hardening rhetoric

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary's Meetings with the President (05/14/1986); NLR-775-18-106-1-4. Secret; Sensitive. Sent through Armacost. "MR," presumably Max Robinson of EUR/SOV, initialed for Ridgway. Drafted on February 28 by Hillas; cleared by Sell, Parris, Palmer, Kovner (IO), Borek (L/UNA), Kozak (L), Williams (IO/UNP), and Nolan (M/OFP). Hillas initialed for all clearing officials except for Palmer. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it, and a typed note reads: "Roz, when are we going to let them know? GPS 3/3/86." An unknown hand wrote immediately under this note "Friday, March 7."

² See footnote 2, Document 191. In telegram 71362 to Moscow, March 11, the Department reported that Ridgway met with Sokolov on March 7 to explain the U.S. decision to reduce the size of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. In summarizing the meeting, the Department noted Ridgway delivered talking points and that Sokolov "characterized the action as an unfriendly step that was bound to have negative consequences for US-Soviet relations." The Department indicated that Ridgway "stressed that there was no reason our decision to reduce the size of the Soviet UN Missions should create difficulties in our bilateral relations. She emphasized the unreasonably large size of the Soviet UN Missions, and the extensive growth in the number of Soviet UN Mission personnel." Unfortunately, the remainder of telegram 71362 is corrupted and the text is unavailable. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860179-0704) In telegram 3990 from Moscow, March 10, the Embassy provided further reporting on Soviet reactions. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860183-0448)

and the pressures we are putting on them to implement reciprocity in the relationship. This memorandum is an effort to look at possible Soviet retaliatory actions, and is a first look at possible USG responses.

SOVIET RESPONSES

Bilateral: The Soviet reaction to the British expulsions last year and the French and Italian expulsions this year was forceful, immediate and reciprocal. Remarking that “Gorbachev is not Brezhnev,” a suspected KGB officer recently warned Embassy Moscow that any expulsion of Soviet diplomats would meet with an immediate and equally sharp response. However, the absence of a multilateral U.S. mission in the Soviet Union will make it difficult for Moscow to respond with exact equivalence. We do not believe the Soviets are likely at first to expel U.S. diplomats from the USSR or to impose a personnel ceiling on our Embassy in Moscow. The Soviets will do everything they can to obstruct or delay the reductions. They will certainly not agree with our proposal that they cooperate in identifying SMUN positions to be retained under the new ceiling. They may well refuse to remove personnel from New York voluntarily, thereby challenging us to expel them.

The following are possible Soviet reactions. We have also listed some preliminary steps we might take to respond in kind:

—*Soviet Action:* refuse to issue visas or to provide promised housing to U.S. contract personnel designated to replace Soviet nationals in Embassy Moscow. *Possible Response:* expel some Soviet support staff, and restrict housing available to Soviets in U.S.;

—*Soviet Action:* withdraw some or all of the Soviet national employees from Embassy Moscow, including those working on the housing units in the new Embassy complex. *Possible Response:* speed up to maximum extent possible arrival of new contract personnel, tighten availability of housing for Soviet personnel in U.S., limit materials for construction of new Soviet Embassy complex;

—*Soviet Action:* deny Soviet diplomatic visas for Embassy Moscow personnel for every SMUN employee denied a U.S. visa. *Possible response:* reciprocate by denying diplomatic visas to Soviets coming to their missions in the U.S.;

—*Soviet Action:* block or delay U.S. shipments of materials for our new office building. *Possible response:* similarly restrict Soviet shipments.

In informing the Soviets about the reductions, we will make it clear that our action was motivated solely by legitimate concern about the unwarranted size of the Soviet UN Missions, and that we do not believe it need have a broad impact on our bilateral relations. However, we must make it clear that we are prepared to respond to Soviet retaliation firmly and appropriately. Our goal will be to make clear our determination to stand by our decision on the SMUN reduction without unneces-

sarily accelerating the cycle of retaliation. At the same time, we will warn the Soviets that if they choose to begin retaliation, we will not accept an outcome which results in a significant imbalance in our respective bilateral presence. We have obtained White House authorization to present a number of bilateral initiatives for the 1986 summit a few days before we inform the Soviets about the SMUN reduction.

UN and Public Diplomacy: Soviet public diplomacy is likely to play on three themes: the anti-Soviet nature of our action, its negative effect on superpower relations, and the illegality of the measure and its consequences for the United Nations. At the UN, they will challenge the U.S. right to implement the reductions, and try to rally other countries against the move. They will try to convince the UNSYG that this is part of a U.S. attempt to emasculate the UN system. They are also sure to press the UNSYG for his support in the Host Country Committee and in taking the case first to arbitration and, if necessary, the International Court of Justice.

202. Memorandum From the Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks (Kampelman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, March 13, 1986

SUBJECT

Personal NST End of Round Assessment

1. The Soviet refusal to follow the November 21 joint statement by not moving forward on the START 50% reduction negotiations is a disappointment which we should highlight to the Soviets and in public diplomacy; but it should not discourage us. I believe it is a signal that even though they have dropped INF linkage to SDI, we must not be misled into believing they are dropping START's linkage to SDI. The Soviets also have to keep testing us. They will renew the negotiations.

2. Insofar as INF is concerned, it strikes me as being just what it now appears to be on its face. The Soviets will continue to work very hard to keep modernization away from the French or British; and they will try to avoid making Asian reductions without getting something

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1986. Confidential.

in return from the Chinese. Here again, we should not be too surprised if the negotiations here turn cold again at the beginning of the Fifth Round.

3. Moving to Defense and Space, Karpov explicitly stated the delay in START was due to the fact that we had resisted any forward movement in the Defense and Space negotiations. My position with both Karpov and Kvitsinskiy (no longer with us) was that we had very little, if any, “wiggle room” in Defense and Space and that I could not begin addressing it internally until I knew for certain that satisfactory radical reductions in strategic offensive weapons were in hand. I, therefore, urged them to reconsider their negotiating tactics. We will see what happens.

4. I have been continuing to receive signals that the Soviets may be prepared to settle for less than a demand for a full ban on “space-strike weapons” as part of resolving the negotiating impasse. Most recently, recognizing our opposition to a comprehensive ASAT ban, they have called for “partial” or “first” steps in the form of something less than a comprehensive ASAT ban. They may feel that growing Congressional pressure will require us to follow down that road with them. (Defense is very nervous about our exploring this area with the Soviets, but I believe I should draw them out. You may hear about this.)

5. The rest of the package they appear to be suggesting to us would include an agreement as to what the ABM Treaty means, designed to limit our SDI activities by keeping them as close as possible to research alone and to as little research as possible. They have also indicated to us that they might be prepared to limit and possibly remove their ABM system around Moscow; and that they would be willing to search for a formula on Krasnoyarsk which does not label them as treaty violators. Their package will also include a requirement, I believe, that we agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for as long a period as they can get us to accept. The suggestion has also been made that certain ground-based SDI systems could be sanctioned. (Defense is also most uneasy about these subjects coming up in informal exchanges.)

6. It is my view that the interagency process should not address itself to these Defense and Space questions at this time, but I will continue my probing and my informal discussions, just as Paul has done, with friends in the other agencies. The issue is now highly sensitive and controversial in Washington. It has been said that when a seller offers two prices, he expects the buyer to choose the lower, but before we address the question of price, we need to demonstrate we are receiving something of value. That is not yet in hand.

7. It is my view that Soviet seriousness in all areas will increase as the Summit nears. Our Fifth Round will begin on May 8 and probably last until the end of June. In the event there is no Summit until December, we will, of course, have a sixth round in the autumn and the busy action will take place then.

203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, March 14, 1986, 1934Z

79463. Subject: Presidential Letter on Nuclear Testing.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Embassy should deliver to MFA immediately following letter from President to General Secretary Gorbachev.²

Begin text

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

On December 23, 1985, I wrote to you about the important issue of nuclear testing.³ In that letter I explained why we believe that some level of nuclear testing will continue to be required for the foreseeable future, as long as nuclear weapons remain the key element of deterrence. I also emphasized that I saw no reason why our two nations could not begin a process of narrowing our differences on nuclear testing, at the same time that we sought progress in other arms control negotiating fora. I argued that if we were successful in addressing the relevant verification concerns of both sides, we could move toward ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) and lay the basis for further consideration of nuclear testing issues.

My views on the need to begin a dialogue on nuclear testing limitation have not changed. As you know, we are seriously concerned with the pattern of your testing and have determined that a number of your tests constitute likely violations of your obligation to observe the TTBT threshold. For your part, you have also raised questions about the yields of particular U.S. tests. I can assure you that all our tests have been below the 150 kiloton threshold. But you should not have to take my word for it; you should be able to verify it for yourself. And that is exactly why I have proposed that our experts meet to discuss resolution of our differences on this issue.

As I have said in previous letters, what we have in mind is a process in which we can build a basis for confidence on both sides at

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860003–0301. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted from text received from the White House; cleared by Ridgway, Timbie, and Andres; approved by Bova.

² In telegram 4408 from Moscow, March 15, the Embassy reported the Political Counselor delivered the letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 15. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860003–0320)

³ See footnote 5, Document 177.

every stage. As an indication of our readiness to build that basis I would like to propose that we agree on the following steps as a means of moving toward ratification of the TTBT.

Our scientists tell me that the best way of reducing uncertainties in verifying compliance with the 150 kiloton threshold is by using a method called CORRTEx—an on-site hydrodynamic yield measurement technique that measures the propagation of the underground shock wave from a nuclear explosion. If we could reach agreement on the use of an effective verification system incorporating such a method to verify the TTBT, I would be prepared to move forward on ratification of both the TTBT and the PNET, and you could do the same.

I believe the CORRTEx method provides a reasonable technique of measuring the yield of nuclear tests without compromising essential national security information on either side. Using the CORRTEx method, a coaxial cable is placed in a hole parallel to that containing the nuclear device being tested. When the nuclear device is detonated, a shock wave emanates through the ground crushing and shortening the cable. The rate at which the cable length changes is recorded via measurements of the rate of changing electronic pulse. This rate is a measure of the propagation of the explosive shock wave through the ground which is in turn a measure of the yield of the nuclear explosion. Our scientists believe that, on the basis of our extensive experience, CORRTEx has been shown to be accurate to within 30 percent of more direct radio-chemical yield measurements for tests of greater than 50 kilotons.

To allow you to examine the CORRTEx system more fully, I propose that you send your scientists to our test site during the third week of April, 1986. At that time they could also monitor a planned U.S. nuclear weapons test. I would hope this would provide an opportunity for our experts to discuss verification methods and thus pave the way for ratification of the TTBT and PNET.

I have tried to be as specific as possible in outlining what we have in mind for this important step in the process of limiting nuclear explosions. I look forward to hearing from you soon on our concrete proposal. We stand ready to facilitate in every way the visit of your experts to our test site. I hope this can be the start of a productive dialogue on resolving our differences on the nuclear testing issue.

In closing, I would like to return to the subject of risk reduction centers which we agreed in Geneva to explore. Our mutual efforts to have experts meet and discuss the concept have not been successful to date. Perhaps at the time your experts are involved with ours at the Nevada test site, we could have another group of experts meet at a place of your choosing to explore the contributions that centers such as these could make to our mutual security. For our part, we will be

prepared to present our ideas on possible functions for risk reduction centers and the benefits we can both derive from such activity.

Sincerely,
Ronald Reagan
End text.

Shultz

204. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Stockholm, March 15, 1986, 4:45–6:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US Side

Secretary Shultz
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Matlock
DAS Mark Palmer
Mark Parris, Notetaker
D. Zarechnak, Interpreter

Soviet Side

Premier Ryzhkov
First Deputy FM Maltsev
Ambassador to Sweden Pankin
CDE Ambassador Grinevskiy
Premier's Chef de Cabinet
Batsanov
Mr. Obukhov, Interpreter

Ryzhkov opened the meeting, which immediately followed the Palme funeral service, with the observation, "Life goes on." The Secretary agreed, "In a very profound way." The Palme funeral had been oriented to the future, and the ideas and visions celebrated there were lasting ones. The Secretary and Ryzhkov agreed that it was their task now to think about life.

Ryzhkov moved into the substance of the meeting by noting that, when informed of the U.S. desire to meet in Stockholm, Moscow had

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron March 1986 (7/8). Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information. Brackets are in the original. The meeting took place at the Soviet Ambassador's residence in Stockholm. Shultz was in Stockholm from March 14 to 16 to attend Palme's funeral. In an undated briefing memorandum to Shultz, Ridgway wrote: "Your meeting with Ryzhkov will be an opportunity to take the pulse in the Kremlin in the wake of the CPSU Party Congress and of some rough sledding in the bilateral relationship. It will also enable us to give the Soviets an authoritative U.S. view of what must be done to move the agenda forward, and of how Soviet game-playing on the scheduling of a second summit has affected the process. Finally, it can help allay any concerns among the allies and the U.S. public that the U.S.-Soviet dialogue is breaking down." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, 1983–1986, Meetings: Shultz/Ryzhkov Stockholm, March 15, 1986)

agreed it would be useful to take advantage of the opportunity. The press was already speculating on what he and the Secretary would talk about and agree upon. But it was important to talk.

The Geneva meeting had been a good start. It provided an opportunity to begin a constructive dialogue to have a good discussion. Since then several months had passed. During that period, some things had unfortunately happened which the Soviet side did not understand. To be frank, there were doubts in Moscow as to where the process was leading. The world was talking of the next summit. Some had even tried to determine its dates. But the events of the months since Geneva had brought much which the Soviets did not understand. Some of these events had put their stamp on the forthcoming meeting. Therefore the Soviet side saw the present meeting as an opportunity to clarify views. Ryzhkov believed the U.S. might be as concerned about the situation as the Soviets were. This was the first meeting at this level to take place since the Geneva summit. Ryzhkov would therefore like to hear the Secretary's views on the issues he had raised. As the guest, he invited the Secretary to speak first.

After thanking Ryzhkov for the opportunity, the Secretary recalled a Japanese saying: "The reverse side has its own reverse side." Ryzhkov had described a situation from one side. The Secretary could agree with everything the Premier had said. But, just as the Soviets were puzzled by us, we were puzzled by the Soviets.

The Secretary agreed, and, he noted President Reagan agreed that a very good start had been made in Geneva. We wanted to continue the process now. To make the most of that start, the Secretary felt the way to do that was to focus on the context of issues and to identify areas where we needed to—and might be able to—move ahead. In that spirit he proposed to touch illustratively on a number of specific issues to show the direction in which we would like to go. Ryzhkov agreed.

Starting with bilateral issues, the Secretary noted that there had been progress since Geneva in a number of areas, citing exchanges and civil aviation in particular. On the whole our interaction had been constructive. We had gone forward very much in the spirit of Geneva, even as each side had looked to its own interests. Direct air service between the two countries, for example, would resume in late April. That was good—a clear, objective fact. We needed to continue to work in that spirit.

On the "tremendously important" area of arms control, we had seen little movement, although there had been a number of promising straws in the wind. It was in this area that we had the greatest sense of disappointment that our leaders' objectives had not been fulfilled.

Starting with issues not covered in the Geneva nuclear and space talks (NST), the Secretary noted that we had recently had a relatively

good meeting on chemical weapons (CW) proliferation.² It was not clear where that dialogue would go, but we had made a start and there was substance.

On the more general question of a CW Treaty, there had been less motion. The problem there was verification. In this regard we had noted and been gladdened by some of General Secretary Gorbachev's recent statements on verification, especially his more positive treatment of the possibilities for on-site inspection. This was a "definite plus" from our standpoint. But we failed so far to see the operational context of such statements with regard to CW.

Similarly in MBFR, there had been initiatives from both sides since Geneva, but the most recent Soviet counterproposals did not go far enough to meet our verification concerns.

On CDE, everyone seemed to believe it could be done. The Secretary and Shevardnadze, and before Shevardnadze the Secretary and Gromyko, had said so to each other; the President and Gorbachev had said so to each other. We saw some progress, but we were afraid the process would stall out. Noting that Ambassador Grinevskiy had agreed to Ambassador Barry's invitation to visit Washington in April, the Secretary expressed hope for a fruitful discussion.³ Each side needed to tell its representative to push a little.

On another issue, we had agreed in principle to discuss risk reduction centers, but had not been able to agree on where to talk. The Secretary told Ryzhkov that he was prepared at this meeting to tell the Soviets to name their site. He personally believed it would be better for the two superpowers to use their own capitals for such discussions than third capitals, but it was the Soviets' call. You name it and we will be there.

The Secretary spent considerable time elaborating the U.S. position on nuclear testing. We agreed with Moscow that testing was an important issue. The U.S. did not agree that all testing should be banned as long as both sides had large numbers of nuclear weapons and the process of working on them had not been brought under an agreement to radically reduce them (which both sides favored), and until we had an operational ability of getting nuclear weapons totally under control.

The U.S. was nonetheless prepared to discuss nuclear testing seriously. We were, in fact, prepared to take deliberate, concrete steps in

² While this precise reference is unclear, the United States and Soviet Union had ongoing negotiations on chemical weapons under the umbrella of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

³ Ambassador Robert L. Barry, Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in Stockholm. Ambassador Oleg A. Grinevskiy headed the Soviet Delegation.

the field. The step we had in mind took into account General Secretary Gorbachev's recent comments on verification, as well as the potential benefit of ratification of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) and Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). We did not require amendment of those treaties. What we had in mind was an effort on verification which could be coupled with an understanding on their ratification. The Secretary handed Ryzhkov the signed original of President Reagan's proposal to this effect to Gorbachev, the text of which had been conveyed to the General Secretary March 14 in Moscow.⁴

The Secretary emphasized that the U.S. proposal opened up the prospect of a concrete step on arms control in a time frame we could calculate. It built on Gorbachev's recent remarks on verification and on-site inspection. It addressed the dilemma posed by the fact that both sides had charged the other with violating megatonnage thresholds, while stating with certainty that such charges were unfounded as far as its own program was concerned. This situation showed that we could not be confident of our ability to verify nuclear yields. Our proposal was simple, non-intrusive and could substantially improve confidence in our ability to verify the two treaties in question. What the President was saying was that, if the Soviets accepted our proposal, we could move to ratify these treaties.

Thus, in the non-NST complex of arms control issues, including nuclear non-proliferation, there had been some progress. With the necessary push from each side, more might be accomplished.

We had seen less movement in the NST area—the most important one of all—despite our leaders agreement in Geneva that there were possibilities there. The President had found Gorbachev's January 15 proposals "stimulating," but ultimately inadequate in certain respects. On START and space/defense, they did not address our previous proposals.

There seemed to be a bit more progress on INF. The Soviets had made a proposal, and we had made a counterproposal. But our negotiators in this forum had not been able to get down to real bargaining. While there were possibilities, we continued to see the problem of missiles as one which had to be resolved on a global basis because of their mobility. This was an issue which had to be addressed. Still, there were possibilities in INF and in the other fora. Both sides had made clear their discomfort with the mountains of weapons which had accumulated. We needed to roll up our sleeves in Geneva and get to it.

Briefly turning to other issues, The Secretary noted that it had been possible in most cases to set dates and places for the next round of

⁴ See Document 203.

regional experts talks. We owed the Soviets an answer on one area, there was some uncertainty on another. Thus, the regional dialogue was proceeding. We regretted, however, that in the March 6 discussions on Southern Africa, the Soviet representatives had not seemed prepared to engage.⁵ This was a volatile, dangerous area.

We would like, the Secretary continued, to see the regional talks get somewhere. That was why he and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had agreed on the margins of the Geneva meeting to take up such issues at their level in future meetings. It had not yet proved possible to schedule such a meeting. But the U.S. continued to believe, as Gorbachev himself had noted in Geneva, that regional conflicts were one of the main sources of international tension. Such tensions lead to armaments, not the reverse. Problems like Southern Africa were problems we could only solve together. The Soviets were not responsible for what was happening there. Neither were we. But we should be able to work together to get at the real issues.

Switching the focus to human rights, the Secretary reaffirmed the importance of the issue to the American people. There had been progress since the Geneva meeting and we welcomed it. But as a general proposition there were still great problems. We had noted the General Secretary's unequivocal condemnation of terrorism at the CPSU Party Congress,⁶ and had cooperated with the Soviets on this problem at the U.N. We felt there was more room for cooperation in this important area.

Concluding, the Secretary stated that the President had asked him to convey that our commitment and dedication to making progress on the various issues of the relationship was as strong as on the day we left Geneva. The Secretary had tried to review these issues from the standpoint of their content. In summary, we saw movement in some, not in others. We saw a need for energetic movement in the NST talks. And we felt progress was possible on nuclear testing. The Secretary thanked Ryzhkov for hearing him out.

Ryzhkov prefaced his own remarks by noting that the Secretary had accurately characterized the period since the Geneva summit as one of "disappointment." The Soviets agreed. Nonetheless, the Geneva

⁵ In telegram 2278 from Geneva, March 6, Crocker, who was heading the U.S. delegation to talks on Southern Africa, wrote to Shultz: "I met for more than five hours on March 6 with a Soviet delegation which had instructions to assert Soviet interest in 'activating' joint work on regional problems, but which had no mandate on how to put any flesh on the bones of those good intentions. This produced some visible discomfort, with my counterpart several times citing the ongoing CPSU Party Congress to explain his inability to be more concrete." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

⁶ See footnote 3, Document 200.

meeting had established some prerequisites for further work. It had elaborated certain common principles on issues of concern to the entire world as well as to the two leaders. People on both sides had expected an active and constructive dialogue after Geneva on the most vital issues of modern times.

The Soviet political leadership thus took a most serious approach to the results of the Geneva meeting. The first meeting of the leaders of the two superpowers in seven years could not be considered merely a protocol meeting. The Secretary strongly agreed, noting that it was a real meeting between two strong people.

The proof of the seriousness of the Soviet leadership's approach, Ryzhkov continued, was the comprehensive arms control proposals made by the General Secretary on January 15. The Soviet leadership expected that this major initiative would be seriously considered and would lead to constructive discussions and constructive results. They had no illusions that it would be possible to solve all outstanding issues "at a single stroke." But they did hope that a step-by-step process would be set in motion which would lead to concrete results.

The U.S. response had arrived on the eve of the opening of the CPSU Congress. Gorbachev had summarized the Soviet reaction in his report. Ryzhkov wanted to take the opportunity of his face-to-face meeting with the Secretary to say that Moscow was frankly disappointed with the U.S. reply. On the one hand, it appeared to support the notion that outstanding problems should be resolved. But it was so encumbered with conditions and linkages as to suggest that there was no real will to find solutions.

Similarly, the Soviets had hoped that the fourth round of the NST talks would clarify issues in such a way as to make possible constructive discussions and ultimately, solutions. Ryzhkov felt the Secretary would agree that the round had produced no forward movement. Against this backdrop, Ryzhkov observed, what he called a "global question" arose: Where are events leading? Months were passing. There was no forward movement. The Soviet leadership ever more frequently found itself asking: "What is to be done? Why is this happening?" They hear the U.S. claim it wants to solve problems. But when it comes to practical steps to answer the "global question," there is no constructive movement. The Soviets were thus asking themselves why this was happening. Noting that there was a similar saying in Russian, Ryzhkov concluded his general remarks by admitting that the Secretary could apply his Japanese "reverse" argument to what he had just said.

Returning to the Secretary's remarks on nuclear testing, Ryzhkov had some specific comments. Ryzhkov recalled that the Geneva Joint Statement had called unequivocally for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The first and necessary step toward this goal, he argued,

was to ban nuclear testing. He therefore found it puzzling that the U.S. position should be that such tests should continue. The sole purpose of such tests was to perfect nuclear weapons. Where was the logic in this? How could one eliminate nuclear weapons while at the same time perfecting new ones?

Ryzhkov said he had not seen the contents of the President's letter to Gorbachev on testing. He could not give an authoritative response to the letter to Secretary Shultz. But he and his colleagues around the table had been puzzled by Western media accounts of the letter's contents. The testing issue could only be resolved by banning testing. Verification made sense only in the context of such a ban. Yet the U.S. seemed to be proposing to perfect the verification not of a ban, but of testing. The American approach focused too much on technicalities while ignoring the central issue of banning testing.

Ryzhkov claimed that both sides had more than adequate means of determining whether nuclear tests had occurred. Rather than seek to verify the caliber of a test, efforts should be directed to banning all tests. While press accounts of the U.S. position might be distorted, the U.S. appeared to be proposing that Soviet technicians come to the U.S. in April to monitor a nuclear explosion. From this, it appeared the U.S. leadership was determined to continue testing.

As for the TTBT and PNET Treaties, it was Ryzhkov's understanding that they dealt not with banning testing, but with thresholds. These were two different things. It appeared the two sides were speaking in different languages. The Soviet position had been made clear in Gorbachev's letter to the Delhi Six.⁷ The Soviet Union was prepared to cooperate fully in verifying a ban on nuclear testing.

Ryzhkov indicated he would not address all the issues raised by the Secretary, as Soviet views had been clearly expressed in the recent CPSU Congress. He did wish to call attention to General Secretary Gorbachev's remarks on future meetings with President Reagan. However, while it might not be possible to reach agreement on all issues in advance of such a meeting, it was the Soviet view that for such a meeting to be fruitful it would be necessary to "resolve" two sets of issues: nuclear testing and INF.

Without getting into details, Ryzhkov noted that the Soviet position on INF had been made clear in the January 15 proposal. He underscored the Soviets' willingness to include Soviet territory up to 80 degrees

⁷ In a letter of March 13, Gorbachev responded to a February 28 joint message from the Delhi Six, Argentina, Mexico, Tanzania, Greece, Sweden, and India. The texts of the joint message, which was also addressed to Reagan, and Gorbachev's response are printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1986*, pp. 93–94 and 115–117. See also footnote 3, Document 166.

longitude, which goes to the Novosibirsk area in its definition of the “European” U.S.S.R. for purposes of an INF agreement. Within this zone, the Soviets would be prepared to destroy, not merely move, LRINF missiles. It was unfortunate that there had been no forward movement from the U.S. in response.

Ryzhkov noted that the Secretary had not touched on the next summit, about what should be addressed there. Both sides seemed to recognize that this meeting could not be just a protocol affair. Too many people would be disappointed by such a meeting. Rather, it would have to be a fruitful meeting.

The Secretary agreed that the next summit should be fruitful. He had tried to show in his review of the issues the varying degrees of progress achieved to date. We agreed that progress in NST was desirable and that INF was a likely candidate. But it would be a mistake to rule out other areas. There were important things on the table. Progress could be made.

Maltsev interrupted to ask if the Secretary included nuclear testing in that category. The Secretary noted that nuclear testing was not covered in the NST talks, but it appeared we could have a useful exchange on testing. He could not predict that we would agree. But when one had a goal, the way to get there was to take a step. When that had been done, there would be a basis for further progress. That was why it was important to cap megatonnage and improve verification. As for a testing ban, the Secretary wondered if the Russians had an equivalent of the expression: “putting the cart before the horse.” In response to Ryzhkov’s confirmation that they did, the Secretary observed that the problem was one of deciding what was the cart and what the horse. We believed the first task was to achieve radical reductions in nuclear weapons, and only then consider a ban on testing. But even within those parameters, we could have a useful discussion of testing issues.

Ryzhkov quipped that he thought the “cart horse” saying worked against the U.S. position. The U.S. proposal did not represent a real “step.” The Soviets, on the other hand, had made three steps: with their August 1985 moratorium, with their extension of the moratorium, and with their response to the Delhi Six to continue the moratorium so long as the U.S. conducted no nuclear tests. The U.S.S.R. had gone eight months without a test. Ryzhkov had a frank question for the Secretary: Had the U.S. decided to conduct a new test?

The Secretary replied that the U.S. would continue testing. In reviewing his earlier argumentation on the rationale for the U.S. testing proposal, he emphasized the prospects it opened for early concrete progress on testing. Capping megatonnage and improving verification means would make it possible to go on from there.

Ryzhkov indicated he would report the Secretary's answer to Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership. Both sides had to work, he added. They had to work, moreover, in ways other than they had in the months since Geneva.

The Secretary agreed. But he also felt, on a personal basis, that it was important to establish a time for the next summit meeting, as well as for his next meeting with Shevardnadze. Experience had proven that the existence of dates tended to put drive into the process on both sides. The Secretary had found this to be the case when he was in a business organization. He knew that the Premier had extensive management experience of his own, and suspected he had had similar experiences. It was important to pin the matter down. The Soviets had the U.S. proposal for dates. We would wait for a response.

Ryzhkov asked what the next meeting should address. The Secretary asked in response if he could pose a frank question of his own: "What should he report to the President. . . ?" Before he could finish the question, Ryzhkov interrupted to note that that was precisely what he, Ryzhkov, wanted to know. What could he tell the Soviet leadership when he returned to Moscow? The only firm thing he could say was that he had asked a frank question and received a frank response about testing. The Secretary observed that those of Ryzhkov's colleagues who had worked with the Secretary in the past would tell him that his answers were always frank and reliable, even if his listeners did not always like them. Ryzhkov allowed that he had heard a lot about the Secretary from his "comrades" who had dealt with him. But frankness was one thing. Substance was another.

Maltsev interrupted to say "two words." As former Ambassador to Sweden, he claimed to know the Swedes well. The U.S. could ask the Swedes, who were very good in such matters, whether or not calibration tests were necessary to detect nuclear explosions. They would tell us that they were not. The Soviets did not have to ask the Swedes. Their own capabilities were sufficient to detect even unannounced U.S. explosions. Ryzhkov stepped in to comment ruefully that his and the Secretary's task till they reported to their leaders was to figure out what to tell them.

Returning to his original question as to what he should tell the President, the Secretary asked if he should say that there should be no more discussion of summit dates until there were mutually satisfactory agreements on INF and nuclear testing. The Secretary stressed that he asked the question because what Ryzhkov had said left him uncertain.

Ryzhkov responded that he had simply repeated what Gorbachev had said at the CPSU Congress. The Secretary said he had not understood Gorbachev to be so categorical as Ryzhkov had sounded. Maltsev produced a copy of Gorbachev's report and read the text in question.

The Secretary indicated that he had posed the question not because he was angry, but because he wanted to be clear about what he should tell the President. Ryzhkov said he would not go beyond what Gorbachev had said.

The Secretary asked if he should tell the President that until he agreed to cease nuclear testing and to accept a non-global INF agreement, the Soviet leadership did not want to discuss a next meeting. Again, the Secretary stressed he was simply seeking information. It would obviously save everyone a lot of trouble if we didn't need to worry about the next summit.⁸

Amid whispered prompting on the Soviet side, Ryzhkov replied that the issue the General Secretary had sought to address in his report was an important one. The Soviets recognized that everything could not be solved in a single day. What was needed was constructive proposals, a demonstration of readiness to address the issues constructively, calling for frankness. Ryzhkov observed that the U.S. wanted a date. On the other hand, it would continue testing. This was a bad combination. [The last two sentences were not translated into English by the Soviet interpreter because of the Secretary's following interjection:]

The Secretary replied that he was not asking for a date. He only wished to clarify the Soviet position. Ryzhkov repeated that this was something to consider carefully once he and the Secretary had returned to their capitals.

Noting that the press would be interested in their discussion, the Secretary asked for Ryzhkov's reactions to some themes the Secretary proposed to use in describing the meeting. Ryzhkov concurred with one exception: in place of the Secretary's suggestion that they indicate it had not been possible to resolve the question of summit dates, Ryzhkov proposed that he say only that the issue would be discussed further. The Secretary agreed.

Prior to departing, the Secretary expressed regret that he and Ryzhkov had not had an opportunity for an in-depth discussion of economic issues as the Secretary had once had with Ryzhkov's predecessor, Kosygin. Ryzhkov replied that he was sure the two would meet again and that he would look forward to such a discussion.

As the meeting was breaking up, Ryzhkov stressed with some feeling the need for continued work on the full range of issues, includ-

⁸ In telegram Secto 4013 from the Secretary's aircraft, March 16, Shultz sent Reagan a summary of the meeting stressing these points related to the summit. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, 1983–1986, Meetings: Shultz/Ryzhkov Stockholm, March 15, 1986)

ing the question of a future meeting. The Soviet position, he said, was that no doors should be closed with respect to such a meeting.

The two superpowers had a responsibility for the future of the entire world. He hoped the meeting could conclude on that note. The Secretary agreed.

205. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, March 17, 1986

SUBJECT

Summitry and the Shultz-Ryzhkov Meeting

The following are my impressions and conclusions from Secretary Shultz's meeting with Ryzhkov Saturday.²

Summit Date

Ryzhkov made clear that he could not go beyond Gorbachev's comments to the Party congress, i.e., that the next Summit is important, that it could not be merely "protocollary," and that some "real achievements" would be necessary to justify it.³ INF and nuclear testing are clearly the Soviet targets for such "achievements," but when Shultz asked Ryzhkov if the President should be told that Gorbachev would not set a date until we reach satisfactory understandings on INF and testing, Ryzhkov refused to confirm. He said that Gorbachev's words at the Party Congress speak for themselves, and that they were still

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron1986 (6/8). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: "Nat'l Sec Advisor has seen."

² March 15; see Document 204.

³ See footnote 3, Document 200.

waiting for U.S. suggestions regarding the “content” of the Summit.⁴ (Shultz pointed out that we have many proposals on the table.) Just as we were leaving, Ryzhkov said—as if to give the meeting a more upbeat conclusion—that we should *not* “close any doors” to future meetings, and that the question of the date should be discussed further.

I infer from this that the Soviets understand that their interests would not be served if the meeting this year collapses. However, by taking the public stance they have, they seem to have painted themselves into a corner publicly. How they will wiggle out of it remains to be seen, but we doubtless face some continued pressure to define the principal “results” in advance. I suspect that the Soviets feel that we bested them at Geneva, and this feeling lies behind their recent maneuvers. They don’t want Gorbachev to come home again with empty hands in terms of Soviet positions.

Issues

Shultz went through the talking points which you saw, though in a different order. Ryzhkov picked up on only two issues: INF and nuclear testing.

Regarding *INF*, he directed his criticism at our position on systems in Asia, saying that they had made a major concession in extending the “notion of the European zone” to Novosibirsk, and agreeing to destroy, not transfer, the missiles, yet they “see no movement.” Since he did not single out our position on British and French systems for criticism, one might conclude that the treatment of the missiles in Asia is considered a more serious problem than the rejection of any linkage with the British and French.

He spent more time, however, on the *nuclear testing* issue, using the familiar Soviet arguments: that continued testing is inconsistent with a commitment to abolish nuclear weapons. As for the President’s latest proposal, he claimed to have seen only press reports (probably true, since the text was not delivered in Moscow until noon that day), but was basically negative on the idea of improving verification of

⁴ In telegram 3528 from Moscow, March 3, the Embassy reported that “four key Soviet foreign policy advisors answered questions on U.S.-Soviet relations and security and regional issues at a Moscow press conference March 3 tied to the 27th CPSU Congress.” In a section entitled “U.S.-Soviet Relations and the Summit,” the Embassy reported: “Although generally critical of the President’s defense speech, Arbatov noted that the President, like Gorbachev at the CPSU Congress, had called for concrete results at the next summit. There was, however, no sign of a U.S. desire for progress; when such a sign came, Arbatov said, one would be able to speak with more optimism.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860162–0157) Reagan’s February 26 address to the nation on national security is printed in *Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book I, pp. 272–276, and excerpts are in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 263.

threshold testing limits.⁵ He asked Shultz directly whether we intend to continue testing, and Shultz confirmed that we do.

General Tone

Ryzhkov's approach, while implicitly accusatory, was more in sorrow than in anger. He repeated several times that developments since Geneva have produced "incomprehension" in Moscow. (Shultz made clear that we also are concerned about the lack of progress since Geneva and cited Soviet stonewalling in several areas.)

Ryzhkov the Man

Self assured and superficially very "Western" in his style, Ryzhkov projects the image of a corporate executive. He looks younger than his 55 years and would blend in well in an IBM Board meeting. His style was less argumentative than Gorbachev's, but this may only reflect the fact that he does not have primary responsibility for foreign affairs. As they parted, Shultz observed that it was a pity they had not had time to discuss economic questions since they share an interest in them. Ryzhkov responded that they would doubtless have opportunities on other occasions to do this—which seemed to be a clear signal that, whatever their rhetoric at the moment, they are not thinking of ending the dialogue.

COMMENT:

We will probably have to wait until Dobrynin's return for another authoritative exchange regarding the Summit date. In the meantime, I would suggest that we say as little as possible about the date. Otherwise, we risk encouraging the Soviets to believe that we are so eager to nail it down we might yet pay a price—which would simply add to their incentive to continue their current tactics. When asked, we should simply say that there is an agreement for a meeting this year which we assume the Soviets will honor, and so far as the date is concerned, the ball is in their court. I think we should avoid being drawn out on what dates are acceptable and which ones not acceptable.

If Dobrynin does not bring with him a suggested date, the President might make the following points to him:

1. Our invitation was in good faith, as was our suggestion for a date.⁶
2. We do not understand why the Soviets seem to think that we are not as interested in results as they are.

⁵ See Document 203.

⁶ Poindexter highlighted the eight points and wrote "Good. JP" in the margin.

3. We have made a number of proposals, and are perplexed at the lack of Soviet response to some and their failure to negotiate actively on others.

4. Nevertheless, we do not call the meeting into question, since we feel that it can play a major role in solving some of the current impasses.

5. A firm date could also serve to focus the attention of bureaucracies on both sides on possible achievements.

6. However, we have no greater interest in a meeting than do the Soviets. Preconditions from either side are clearly unacceptable.

7. Practically speaking, we need a few months to prepare a proper visit.

8. For this reason, we would hope that the General Secretary will see fit to indicate his preference regarding timing as soon as possible.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That you indicate your reaction to the approach outlined above.⁷ If you concur, I will incorporate it in the Briefing Memorandum for the Dobrynin meeting.

2. That you discuss our public stance with the President, Don Regan and Secretary Shultz, and encourage them to minimize comments on the Summit timing and avoid public discussion of the pros and cons of various dates.⁸

⁷ Poindexter approved the recommendation.

⁸ Poindexter approved the recommendation and wrote "Done" below the recommendation.

206. Note From the Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Palmer and Thomas) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Ridgway)¹

Washington, March 20, 1986

Roz:

The attached is a non-paper Craig has prepared for your reading and consideration during the trip, which we believe you may wish to share with the Secretary as well.² It sets down in somewhat greater detail how our idea of a closehold exploratory effort with Gorbachev might work. We believe it tracks with the results of the Secretary's conversation with the President on Wednesday.³ We are obviously keeping this restricted to the minimum of people necessary within EUR and the building.

The paper reflects the views of Jim Timbie, who thinks it is a good piece. We are sharing it with Hawes and Clyne (in Paul's absence), but do not yet have their comments.⁴

In brief, the paper notes:

—the case for making a quiet, exploratory effort with the Soviets now, rather than holding off until 1987.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 4D, 1986 Arms V Arms Control Jan–Mar. Secret; Sensitive; Summit II. A typed note on a covering memorandum reads: "Paper given to Secretary on board aircraft 3/30." In the right-hand margin of the note, Ridgway wrote: "Mr. Secretary: If the SALT & ABM decisions go the wrong way, this scenario may be dead. But the issue is so important that we may then want to restructure it to take advantage of any Soviet fears of our moving faster than they can keep up with. It isn't much to hope for, but I don't see how we can let a bad decision be the last word from the US until 1989. Roz."

² Craig Dunkerley, EUR/RPM. Shultz traveled to Paris on March 21, to Turkey from March 22 to 25, to Athens from March 25 to 28, and to Rome and Vatican City from March 28 to 30.

³ According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan met with Shultz on March 19 from 1:25 to 2:10 pm and then spoke with him on the phone from 6:16 to 6:18 pm. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary on March 19: "A meeting with George Shultz and upstairs for the rest of the day." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 583) On March 21, from 10:03 to 10:33 a.m. Reagan met with Hartman and others in the Oval Office to discuss recent developments in U.S.-Soviet relations. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) In his diary on March 21, Reagan wrote: "Brief meeting with Amb. Hartman (Russia). He says Gorbachev hasn't tied everything down his own way—according to recent Soviet Party Congress." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 583)

⁴ John Hawes, Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, and Norman Clyne, Executive Assistant to Paul Nitze for Arms Control. A note in the margin reads: "NB: Clyne has now cleared."

—the basic substance of such a probe, in which we would indicate for the first time our willingness to consider a move on the defensive side (reaffirmation of the ABM treaty for the next decade) if matched by Soviet acceptance of our basic terms for offensive nuclear reductions.

—the especially closehold manner in which such an exchange would have to be handled, suggesting the President propose to Dobrynin that Paul and he set up special communications arrangements for a “very private, very informal dialogue.”

Next steps: Bruce has prepared for your consideration and that of the Secretary a first cut at the President’s talking points with Dobrynin at the latter’s April 7th farewell call (also attached).⁵ Over the next few days, we will prepare an initial draft of a “non-paper,” which could form the basis of Paul’s first presentation to Dobrynin.

Mark Palmer

Charles Thomas⁶

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs⁷

Washington, undated

Geneva Arms Control and the Next Summit

With some eighteen months left before the 1988 election campaign gets underway, we need to ask more precisely what we want to accomplish in East-West arms control and how we can get there in the time remaining. The Administration’s basic goal in this regard should be the achievement of a U.S.-Soviet agreement that starts the process of substantial reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arms; reduces the Soviet LRINF threat in a way that meets our Allies’ security and political concerns; and protects both our current SDI research and future options for strategic defense.

After a year of negotiation, however, we have reached a point in the Geneva NST talks where the positions of the two sides are divided by well-defined and entrenched differences over questions of equality, stability and relative advantage. Adjustments at the margin of either

⁵ Bruce Burton, EUR/SOV. The draft is attached but not printed.

⁶ Palmer signed “Mark” and Thomas signed “T” above their typed signatures.

⁷ Secret; Sensitive; Summit II. Prepared by Dunkerley.

the U.S. or Soviet positions may help, but are unlikely by themselves to generate meaningful progress. Although we may be able to deflect any pressure on us for unwarranted concessions in any continuation of the current situation, we will almost certainly be unable to achieve the President's central objectives in the negotiations.

In order to advance the Geneva talks in any significant sense, we would have to bring the Soviets to preliminary agreement on the basic elements necessary for any eventual NST treaty, and in doing so, provide guidelines for the Geneva negotiators which begin to address the longer-term issue of the offense-defense relationship. This can only be accomplished by directly engaging the President and General Secretary; the Washington Summit is the logical mechanism for achieving this objective.

Although we are in a sound tactical position at the moment, there are several factors arguing for making an exploratory effort to resolve the basic issues of contention at Geneva during this year's summit, rather than holding off until 1987. Not the least is the possibility that it could provide the President with an opportunity to reach a personal and substantive agreement with Gorbachev, that gives tangible evidence of the wisdom of his overall policy towards the Soviet Union and constitutes meaningful progress toward his arms control goals.

A further consideration is that of time. Negotiation of a full and detailed NST agreement would require considerable time (bumping up against the opening of the 1988 primary season), even if the Soviets prove to be more forthcoming after the President's next meeting with Gorbachev. In the absence of major negotiating movement during this same period, the combination of Congressional pressures, budgetary constraints and Allied anxieties could work to undercut both our strategic programs and our negotiating leverage with the Soviets.

In sum, it is in our interest to test the Soviets on what might be possible on Geneva at a 1986 summit, specifically, whether they would be prepared to work together to solve the key issues of the definition of strategic forces, the exclusion of third countries, and relaxation of their position on "space strike arms." At this point, we do not know whether or not Gorbachev would respond positively to our invitation for a closehold exploratory exchange to see if an agreement on these points might be possible. It may be worth the effort simply to determine if he is. For their own reasons, the Soviets have taken care to indicate—as Ryzhkov did to you in Stockholm—that "content" in any 1986 Summit is important for them as well.⁸ They have talked tough, but taken special care not to close any doors.

⁸ See Document 204.

Basic Elements of an Agreement

Our objective in a summit agreement would be to set out the central points that would be necessary for any acceptable final treaty to emerge out of the Geneva NST. We would want an NST treaty to enable substantial offensive nuclear reductions to take place over a measured period against the background of predictable future defenses. To that end, we would seek to build the basis for agreement between the President and Gorbachev on two elements covering the near-term developments (i.e., through the mid-90's) in the offensive and defensive fields:

- an agreement on the basics of staged and continuing reductions in US and Soviet START and INF offensive nuclear forces over the next decade; with

- an explicit commitment to maintain current ABM Treaty constraints on strategic defense developments and deployments during the period of offensive reductions, while continuing the SDI research program as presently structured.

Under a summit agreement with such an approach, the President would gain Soviet acceptance of the general scope and nature of deep offensive reductions that we are seeking in START and INF. This would essentially involve Soviet agreement to our definition of strategic forces and our position on the exclusion of third country forces. Specifically, this could take the form of language elaborating our earlier joint endorsement of 50% cuts “appropriately applied,” by specifying the types of strategic and LRINF systems to be included, the numerical levels to which they would be reduced, and the time frame (e.g., ten years) for such reductions.

In such an agreement, the President would also gain Soviet acquiescence to our continued SDI research (which we have already structured to meet restrictive ABM Treaty restraints and on which it would not be feasible to take decisions on deployment steps beyond treaty limits until at least the early 1990's). In defending our program, we would indicate our readiness to enter into discussions with the Soviets of the treaty dividing line between such permissible and prohibited activities. We would retain the right to pursue deployments at a single, fixed land-based site as permitted by the ABM treaty if we so wished.

For the Soviets, this sort of framework agreement would allow Gorbachev to return from Washington with a concrete reassurance from the President against a unilateral and abrupt near-term U.S. expansion of strategic defenses beyond the ABM Treaty, particularly regarding space-based systems.

Negotiating in a Special Channel

Given the current state of interagency stalemate and inertia, a successful agreement on basic negotiating elements for the Summit can

only be presented as a Presidential *fait accompli*. To reach that point, however, any exploratory effort with the Soviets concerning such an agreement would have to be conducted through a special channel on an extremely closehold and deniable basis. Knowledge of its existence and substantive content would have to be tightly restricted even at the White House; such a channel would have to operate on a Presidential mandate without the sort of interagency clearance that even current NODIS traffic often receives.

Therefore, we would want to structure any special channel discussion with the Soviets in such manner as to be:

- almost totally invisible not only to the public but within the USG as well, requiring the use of specially-chosen interlocutors in each capital and the absolute minimum use of “official” communications.

- authoritative yet highly informal in nature, maintaining an *ad ref* (and disownable) character to any substantive proposals and agreement until the very final stages.

- paced in such a way as to allow us to maximize our leverage while minimizing the opportunities for the Soviets to pocket any U.S. move without comparable reciprocal movement.

- staged to provide for the personal involvement of the President in bringing an agreement to conclusion with Gorbachev, once its feasibility and acceptable outlines have been worked out in the special channel.

We believe that as a start, we should seek to use Paul Nitze and Dobrynin as our basic interlocutors, drawing on the special strengths and positions of each. In particular, it is worth exploring whether Dobrynin’s new duties within the Central Committee and close to Gorbachev, when combined with his extensive Washington experience, offer us any special opportunities.⁹ As their discussions progress, we

⁹ During the 27th Congress of the CPSU, Gorbachev appointed Dobrynin to head the International Department in the Central Committee in Moscow, ending his term as Soviet Ambassador to the United States. In his memoir, Dobrynin wrote: “It came as a complete surprise. Frankly speaking, the flattering offer did not appeal to me at all, I would rather have remained abroad because I simply liked working as an ambassador. I liked the United States and still do. I liked the comparative independence and autonomy of my job and the distance from the Moscow bureaucracy. I had a rare opportunity to express my opinion and views directly to the general secretary (five of them in succession) and to the Politburo, and thus to some extent influence events and decisions in our relations with the United States from the Soviet Union’s most important diplomatic post. Worst of all, the International Department of the Central Committee, to the best of my knowledge, had in reality little to do with foreign policy and diplomacy but mostly occupied itself with promoting cooperation and ties with Communist parties and left-wing organizations in other countries. I had neither the experience nor the taste for that, and I told that to Gorbachev in just those words. Gorbachev dismissed my argument. By electing an experienced ambassador to run the International Department of the Central Committee, he said, the party leadership specifically meant to boost its prestige. Right now it was doing practically nothing in foreign policy, although that was what it was supposed to do.” (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, p. 601)

would want to give thought to your own possible involvement and that of Shevardnadze as appropriate. If successful in our initial exchanges, we would seek to reach agreement on as much as possible in this special channel, while recognizing that final agreement on the central points will doubtless have to be directly settled by the President in his personal exchanges with Gorbachev.

One possible scenario for setting up this special channel could run as follows: When Dobrynin returns to Washington in the first week of April for his farewell calls, the President could take him aside at their White House meeting to express his personal interest in a successful, substantive exchange with Gorbachev at the summit. The President would indicate that he would be interested in seeing whether a very private, very informal exploration of the arms control content of the next summit, including how we might address concrete stumbling blocks at Geneva as well the overall question of offense/defense relationship, could yield mutually acceptable results. The President would propose that Paul Nitze conduct such an exploration with Dobrynin (or any other special Gorbachev designee as necessary), setting up whatever special communications arrangements might be necessary.

This exploratory effort could initially take the form of exchanges of “non-papers” with Dobrynin, though we would make clear that, if it appeared useful, we could also envisage one or several quiet visits by Paul to Moscow. As the first substantive move in this process, we would put forward our initial ideas on a possible agreement on basic elements. In doing so, we would indicate for the first time our willingness to consider a move on the defensive side (reaffirmation of the ABM treaty for the next decade) if matched by significant Soviet movement on the terms of offensive nuclear reductions.

207. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz in Rome¹

Washington, March 29, 1986, 2204Z

Tosec 50410/98353. Subject: Gorbachev Proposal for Summit on Nuclear Testing.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Here follows an Information Memorandum for the Secretary on Gorbachev's March 29 address. Embassy Moscow will be sending an additional analysis by septel.² NSC-approved press guidance also being transmitted separately.³

3. Begin Info Memorandum:⁴

To: The Secretary

From: EUR—William Woessner, Acting

PM—H. Allen Holmes

Subject: Gorbachev Proposal for Summit on Nuclear Testing

In a 20-minute television address March 29, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would resume nuclear testing if the U.S. continues to test, but also proposed that he and President Reagan meet in Europe to discuss the issue and "issue instructions to draft an appropriate agreement."

In the address, Gorbachev reiterated familiar themes and recounted the various Soviet proposals on a testing halt. He again said the Soviet Union would not test after the March 31 deadline, provided the U.S. did not test after that date.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860243–0399. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Moscow. Drafted by Burton; cleared by Holmes, Bova, and Talcott; approved by Parris. Shultz was in Rome and Vatican City from March 28 to 30 to meet with Prime Minister Craxi, the Pope, and other officials.

² In telegram 5421 from Moscow, March 31, the Embassy reported: "Gorbachev's televised speech was presumably intended both to increase international pressure on the U.S. and to explain the failed risk of the nuclear testing moratorium to the Soviet public. The speech revealed a bitter attitude toward the Reagan administration, which Gorbachev accused of hypocrisy. Gorbachev thus sought to place the onus on the Reagan administration for the imminent resumption of Soviet nuclear testing." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860244–0470) For the full text of Gorbachev's speech, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1986*, pp. 164–168.

³ Press guidance not found. For the text of the March 29 White House statement, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book I, pp. 415–416.

⁴ The information memorandum was drafted by Burton and cleared by Parris and Holmes.

The new twist in the Soviet position was an offer to meet with the President in London, Rome, or other European capital to reach an agreement on testing.

Gorbachev said he hoped the proposal would be “correctly understood” by the President, and by other governments. Gorbachev did not rpt not call into question his commitment to come to the United States in 1986 to meet with the President, and indeed made no reference to that meeting.

Analysis

Gorbachev’s speech is an attempt to lay the groundwork for a resumption of the Soviets’ own testing program. The fact that the Soviets did not communicate the proposal to us privately beforehand,⁵ but began alerting the Western press yesterday that the speech was on the way, indicates they, too, see it as basically a propaganda exercise.

We do not interpret Gorbachev’s call for a meeting with the President in Europe as an attempt to back out of the 1986 summit in the United States. Clarification of Gorbachev’s intentions on that score can be expected when Dobrynin meets with the President April 8.

Whitehead

⁵ According to telegram 99669 to Moscow, April 1, Sokolov called on Ridgway on March 31 to deliver the text of Gorbachev’s speech, stating that “he hoped the Soviet proposals would be considered seriously.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860865–0836)

208. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 2, 1986

Dear Mr. President:

I have requested A.F. Dobrynin to transmit this letter to you personally as a follow-up to our exchange of views.

I would like to say that we value A.F. Dobrynin's long years of activity as Soviet ambassador to Washington and his vigorous efforts to develop mutual understanding between our two nations. This, of course, has been greatly facilitated by the contacts he maintained with the American leadership, including under your Administration. We hope that similar opportunities will be available to his successor who we are currently selecting and who will be named shortly.

I intend to send you a more detailed letter on a number of specific issues in our relations and also amplifying on those ideas that I have set forth before. Now, I would like to share with you some of my general observations that I have, and, surely, you must have your own, regarding the state and prospects of the relationship between our two countries. I believe, in doing so, one has to use as a point of departure our meeting in Geneva where we both assumed certain obligations.

I think our assessments of that meeting coincide: it was necessary and useful, it introduced a certain stabilizing element to the relations between the USSR and the USA and to the world situation in general. It was only natural that it also generated no small hopes for the future.

More than four months have passed since the Geneva meeting. We ask ourselves: what is the reason for things not going the way they, it would seem, should have gone? Where is the real turn for the better? We, within the Soviet leadership, regarded the Geneva meeting as a call for translating understandings of principle reached there into specific actions with a view to giving an impetus to our relations and to building up their positive dynamics. And we have been doing just that after Geneva.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Gorbachev (8690146, 8690267). No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. On an attached note evidently intended for Poindexter, Reagan wrote in the top margin: "We must talk about a reply to this. RR." According to an April 11 covering memorandum from Platt to Poindexter, transmitting copies of the letter in Russian and English, Dobrynin passed the letter to Shultz during their April 7 meeting; see footnote 4, Document 212. In a note to Matlock on an NSC routing slip attached to the letter, Poindexter wrote: "Jack, The President wants to answer this this week so Doby can take it back with him. You think that is ok? JP."

With this in mind, we have put forward a wide-ranging and concrete program of measures concerning the limitation and reduction of arms and disarmament. It is from the standpoint of new approaches to seeking mutually acceptable solutions that the Soviet delegations have acted in Geneva, Vienna and Stockholm.

What were the actions of the USA? One has to state, unfortunately, that so far the positions have not been brought closer together so that it would open up a real prospect for reaching agreements. I will not go into details or make judgements of the US positions here. But there is one point I would like to make. One gathers the impression that all too frequently attempts are being made to portray our initiatives as propaganda, as a desire to score high points in public opinion or as a wish to put the other side into an awkward position. We did not and do not harbor such designs. After all, our initiatives can be easily tested for their practicality. Our goal is to reach agreement, to find solutions to problems which concern the USSR, the USA and actually all other countries.

I have specially focused on this matter so as to ensure a correct, unbiased and business-like treatment of our proposals. I am sure that it will make it easier to reach agreement.

Now what has been taking place in the meantime outside the negotiations? Of course, each of us has his own view of the policy of the other side. But here again, has the Soviet Union done anything in foreign affairs or bilateral relations that would contribute to mounting tensions or be detrimental to the legitimate interests of the USA? I can say clearly: no, there has been nothing of that sort.

On the other hand, we hear increasingly vehement philippics addressed to the USSR and are also witnessing quite a few actions directly aimed against our interests and, to put it frankly, against our relations becoming more stable and constructive. All this builds suspicion with regard to the US policy and, surely, creates no favorable backdrop for the summit meeting. I am saying it with no ambiguity in order to avoid in this regard any uncertainties or misunderstanding that only one side should exercise restraint and display a positive attitude. Our relations take shape not in a vacuum, their general atmosphere is a wholly material concept. The calmer the atmosphere, the easier it is to solve issues which are of equal concern to both sides.

The issues have to be solved—there is no doubt about it. And above all this bears on the area of security. You are familiar with our proposals, they cover all the most important aspects. At the same time I would like specifically to draw your attention to the fact that we do not say: all or nothing at all. We are in favor of moving forward step by step and we outlined certain possibilities in this regard, particularly, at the negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

We maintained a serious and balanced approach to the problem of ending nuclear tests. One would not want to lose hope that we shall succeed in finding a practical solution to this issue in the way that the world expects us to do. It is hardly necessary to point out the importance of this matter as it is. The solution thereof carries with it also a great positive political potential. It is precisely one of the central thoughts contained in the message of the Delhi Six—countries which called for building a favorable atmosphere in the relations between the USSR and the USA and in the international situation as a whole.² We took that also into account, having reacted positively to their appeal to our countries not to conduct nuclear tests pending the next Soviet-American summit meeting.

It was the desire that we work together in the cessation of nuclear tests and set a good example to all nuclear powers that motivated my recent proposal for both of us to meet specifically on this issue at one of the European capitals. Have another look at this proposal, Mr. President, in a broad political context. I repeat, what is meant here is a specific, single-purpose meeting. Such a meeting, of course, would not be a substitute for the new major meeting that we agreed upon in Geneva.

I do very serious thinking with regard to the latter, first of all with a view to making that meeting truly meaningful and substantial, so that it should enable us to move closer to putting into practice the fundamental understandings reached in Geneva. As you know, I have mentioned some of the questions pertaining to the area of security which are worthwhile working on in preparing for our meeting. I reaffirm that we are ready to seek here solutions in a most serious way, which would be mutually acceptable and not detrimental to the security of either side. Given the mutual will it would be also possible to ascertain other possibilities for agreement in the context of the forthcoming meeting both in the area of space and nuclear arms and on the issues discussed in other fora. To be sure, we also have things to discuss as far as regional matters are concerned.

I assume that you are also working on all these questions and in the subsequent correspondence we will be able in a more specific and substantive way to compare our mutual preliminary ideas for the purpose of bringing the positions closer together. Obviously, this joint work, including the preparations for our meeting, will benefit from the exchanges of views at other levels and particularly from the forthcoming contacts between our Foreign Minister and your Secretary of State.

² See footnote 7, Document 204.

I will be looking forward with interest to hearing from you.
Sincerely,

M. Gorbachev

209. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, April 2, 1986

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations: Disarray in Moscow?

Recent Soviet behavior can be interpreted broadly in two ways. Assertive Soviet behavior in regional conflicts, the heavy ideological tone of Gorbachev's Party Congress report, the clearly propagandistic nature of Soviet arms control proposals and the apparent attempt to extract substantive concessions in exchange for agreeing to a summit date are read by some as a sign that Gorbachev is not serious in reaching any accommodation with the United States, but rather is determined to test our resolve and to play to the "peace" galleries in the West in order to strain our alliances and bring pressure to bear for unilateral concessions.

The alternate interpretation is that Gorbachev in fact sees it in his interest to lower tensions with the United States, but is constrained by internal divisions and major opposition to changes of policy and furthermore misled by faulty political advice regarding the most effective tactics in dealing with the United States. The current Soviet stance, according to this interpretation, does not signify that Gorbachev has set out to challenge the United States, but rather that he must maintain the image of standing up to U.S. pressure to change long-standing Soviet policies. Those inclined to this interpretation see signs that he may be subject to criticism for returning from Geneva empty-handed, and simply cannot risk another summit without some concrete results. This interpretation, of course, does not deny the obvious fact that Soviet

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron April 1986 (1/6). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action.

actions have been heavily influenced by propagandistic considerations, but would hold that these are not inconsistent in Soviet eyes with a genuine effort to reduce tensions.

After careful reflection on the events since the Geneva Summit, I am convinced that the second interpretation is closer to reality than the first. It would take an extended essay to describe all the reasons which led me to this conviction, but the key factors are the following:

1. Evidence of disarray at the Party Congress: no consistent line, directly contradictory elements—even in the “Central Committee report” read by Gorbachev—and striking differences in approach by some of the speakers.

2. Retention of persons Gorbachev clearly wished to remove.

3. Contradictions in the Five-Year Plan.

4. A slowdown (and in some cases a total stalling) of some of the “campaigns” and “reforms” proposed by Gorbachev.

5. Accumulating evidence that the military is not enthusiastic about accommodation with the U.S.: lukewarm treatment of Geneva summit in the military press; behavior of military representatives in the various negotiations (introducing elements which political representatives had agreed to change).

In sum, Gorbachev seems not to have his act together yet. Furthermore, he has made some mistakes which open him to criticism. For example, in espousing the nuclear testing moratorium, he can be accused of failure to achieve anything. Not only has the U.S. not gone along, but it has not had the propaganda effect anticipated. (It is probably not accidental that he made his speech last Saturday on Soviet TV.² It was in part aimed at peace movements in the West, but more importantly it was aimed at a Soviet audience, and was meant to explain his failure and to cast the U.S. as the guilty party. There was an unmistakable note of defensiveness in the Russian text.)

He also is possibly accused of agreeing too readily to a pattern of future summit meetings. The argument likely used is that the President uses the meetings to obtain backing for his policies at home, and that Gorbachev—inexperienced in national security affairs—fell into a trap. Both elements of the military and the old guard political leadership—the latter now fighting for its life—probably resorts to such arguments.

Even if this second interpretation is correct, *it does not mean that we should change any policies*. In my opinion, we are exactly on the right track. We must demonstrate firmness and continuity. However, if we are to put Gorbachev’s intentions and political clout to a valid test, we

² March 29; see Document 207.

should do two things: (1) convey clearly to him what sort of substantive outcome we consider possible at the next summit (and perhaps the one after that); and (2) avoid gratuitous public slaps.

Regarding the second point, I would observe that such moves as supplying stingers to the mujahedin can be most useful. Talking about it, however, can be counterproductive. The same goes for drawing public attention to programs like stealth. The leverage is in the action itself. Public threats (even in the form of leaked stories) simply pushes the Soviet leadership into a corner. The thing they are unable to tolerate is public humiliation. *Under such circumstances, their habit is to stand pat and become demonstrably truculent.*

It is of course a tall order to attempt to bring pressure to bear quietly, given our inability to control leaks and the need to go public on a number of issues in order to garner support. However, we need to do better on this score if we are to maximize pressure *and* the prospects for successful negotiation.

One final note regarding Soviet (and Russian) psychology: As I have pointed out in previous papers, Russians tend to proceed *deductively* in their reasoning and approach to negotiations. This is in contrast to the normal American *inductive* approach. Concretely, what this means is that they have a psychological need to be assured in advance where we are headed, before they will address the concrete steps necessary to get there. They are quite capable of proceeding step by step—but only if they are convinced that there is a real prospect of agreement at the end of the process.

Although we cannot and should not interpret recent Soviet actions as benign, it seems clear to me that *there is some measure of a genuine element* in the repeated Soviet requests to *define what we wish to achieve at future summit meetings*. In effect, they are asking: “Is the President willing to conclude major agreements at all, or is he simply diddling us with negotiations to hold domestic forces at bay?”

In sum, my judgment is that the greatest tactical risk at present is *not* that our actions can be interpreted by the Soviets as showing insufficient resolve (I think they are fully convinced on this score), but that they may draw the conclusion that concrete negotiation is futile. Therefore, I believe that some steps to provide reassurance that the President has a real desire to enter into major arms reduction agreements could be helpful. I believe this can be done without in any way damaging our substantive positions.

Recommendations:

1. That the President stress to Dobrynin his desire to conclude concrete agreements on key issues, and *sketch out a plan of what he would like to achieve*. He should make clear that optimally, he would like

to see a resolution of the key issues of the NST talks and appropriate treaties signed and ratified during his administration. (Note: he can make reference to some of the suggestions in his private correspondence.)

2. That we make another effort to *establish more private means of communication*. Dobrynin's new appointment may facilitate this, since he may now be a key player in Moscow and not just a messenger here. His appointment *could* provide the Soviets with an appropriate counterpart in Moscow for dealing with (for example) Paul Nitze in a very quiet way.³

3. That we take concrete steps to *compartmentalize very restrictively any confidential consultations*, so as to preclude any risk of leaks. (This may require cutting the staffs of some Departments out altogether.)

³ See footnote 9, Document 206.

210. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, April 4, 1986, 1635Z

5828. Subject: April 3 Meeting With Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Ref: State 98024.²

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. Summary: Ambassador conveyed to Shevardnadze President's and Secretary's concern over Soviet side's failure to maintain progress in U.S.-Soviet relations following Geneva. Ambassador noted that U.S. side wished to keep process going but had difficulty understanding such facts as total lack of Soviet response to our December 1985 proposals for Ministerial meeting and timing of next summit. Shevardnadze

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860004-0191. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis.

² In telegram 98024 to Moscow, March 29, the Department reported that "the just concluded MBFR and CDE rounds were disappointing, with progress minimal in CDE and non-existent in MBFR. Soviet stonewalling has come despite NATO's forthcoming MBFR position and a clear commitment to draft substantively in CDE. Ambassador should thus raise USG concern over lack of a positive Soviet attitude in both." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860004-0108)

claimed Soviet side had since Geneva made many significant moves in U.S. direction that had been rejected by USG. He nonetheless agreed with Ambassador that a Shevardnadze-Shultz meeting was necessary; he thought Dobrynin would be able to work out the timing directly with the Secretary. Dobrynin would also be prepared to discuss the next summit. Ambassador pointed out that current unsatisfactory state of our relationship demonstrated how fragile the process was, and underscored the utility of more frequent high-level meetings.

3. At 7:00 p.m., April 3, MFA USA Department Chief Bessmertnykh telephoned DCM to say Shevardnadze could receive Ambassador between 7:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. that evening for about 20 minutes. Informed that Ambassador would be unavailable until later that evening, Bessmertnykh said Shevardnadze would be working late and could see Ambassador any time evening of April 4 (Embassy had earlier informed MFA Ambassador wished to see Foreign Minister prior to Dobrynin's April 4 departure for Washington).

4. Meeting took place in Shevardnadze's office from 9:30 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. April 3. Shevardnadze was accompanied by Bessmertnykh; Ambassador by DCM.

5. Ambassador opened meeting by explaining he had been asked by the President and the Secretary of State to convey their view of current developments in U.S.-Soviet relations prior to Dobrynin's departure for Washington and his official farewell calls there. In particular, the President wished the Soviet side to know of his personal disappointment at the way the process he and Mr. Gorbachev had agreed upon in Geneva had subsequently been neglected by the Soviet side. The President understood that the Soviet leadership had been occupied with the 27th Party Congress but felt that could not account for Moscow's failure to set dates for important future meetings. This would have enabled the bureaucracies on both sides to make progress on substantive issues.

6. Our Geneva, Stockholm and Vienna negotiators had given the President discouraging reports about Soviet unwillingness to negotiate seriously. We thought we had agreed in Geneva to focus on INF and cuts in strategic systems, yet no serious discussion of these issues had subsequently taken place at the Geneva arms talks. Indeed, in some cases the Soviet side had moved back from earlier positions, (at this point Ambassador drew upon points made in reftel on CDE and MBFR and later handed over a non-paper based upon para. two of reftel).³

7. The President wanted the Soviet leadership to understand, the Ambassador continued, that he found these delays disappointing and

³ Not found.

unacceptable. He had many demands on his time and was beginning to wonder how much more effort he should expend attempting to move the process along. If there were no desire on the Soviet side, he would be disappointed, but so be it. The President and the Secretary felt the process itself was worthwhile as a means of keeping pressure on our bureaucracies to resolve important problems. We have seen that without momentum, the relationship quickly decays. We, therefore, hope the Soviet side has not lost interest in the process we had begun at Geneva last November.

8. Shevardnadze responded that the Soviet side had often underscored publicly the importance of the Geneva summit. Moscow favored further step-by-step cooperation on security issues and was ready to meet at any level, under any circumstances, to move ahead. But the Soviet side awaited the prospect of specific, concrete results, above all in the security area. The USSR had made numerous serious proposals—i.e., test moratorium, Gorbachev's January 15 proposals—to this end. It had, in particular, proposed negotiations on all aspects of verification and delinked the issue of European INF from the problem of space weapons. Speaking frankly, some of these decisions had an adverse impact on Soviet national security. This was also true for Soviet positions in Stockholm. Indeed, Soviet delegations at Stockholm, Vienna and Geneva were no less disappointed, to put it mildly, than their American counterparts. Shevardnadze added that he personally followed arms control negotiations very closely, and knew what had transpired.

9. Why had not dates for high-level meetings been set, Shevardnadze asked? The Soviet leadership had been busy with the Party Congress, but this was not the problem. The Soviet leadership had discussed the situation in Vienna, Stockholm and Geneva and had tried to imagine what the General Secretary and the President could, on the basis of those negotiations, discuss at a summit. There was no topic for serious high-level negotiations. So the Soviet side was disappointed and seriously concerned.

10. So what next, Shevardnadze continued. The Soviet side favored continuation of the dialogue. We should seek paths for bilateral cooperation; "we all understood this" and the Soviet side was prepared for this. At the current juncture, it made sense to arrange a Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting to clarify what each side sought and to discuss the reasons for the current situation. Probably, Dobrynin would be able to fix dates when he saw the Secretary. They could also discuss the next summit, which was "the main concern" of both sides.

11. The Ambassador said we were concerned not only with the summit question but with the fact that instead of a willingness for serious negotiation we saw little more from the Soviet side than a series

of public statements. We thought we had agreed to something more at the Geneva meeting. One could only hope that a Ministerial-level meeting would result in real negotiations as opposed to public exchanges that lead nowhere.

12. Shevardnadze, becoming a bit testy, said the Ambassador was now “speaking a different sort of language.” It was clear to the Soviet side that its record in negotiations, as opposed to that of the U.S., was entirely defensible. Shevardnadze would be prepared to discuss this in detail with the Secretary, although there was insufficient time now for such a conversation. While he had not intended to get into such matters, he could mention another aspect of U.S. behavior. If Washington really favored serious negotiations, it should avoid hostile actions such as the reduction of Soviet U.N. Missions⁴ and the provocation in the Black Sea.⁵ Such actions did not facilitate the atmosphere needed for a successful summit.

13. Shevardnadze added that he had worked well with the Secretary before the Geneva meeting. It had been a difficult but useful process. So let us eliminate all disturbing, negative elements and focus on positive, constructive elements. For his part, Shevardnadze concluded, he had no desire to discuss negative topics with the Secretary.

14. The Ambassador commented that Shevardnadze’s remarks demonstrated that it would have been useful for the two sides to have met earlier, following the Geneva summit. We needed to discuss our concerns very frankly and openly. Nothing of importance should be excluded from our agenda. The process was indeed fragile; we should not unduly delay the high-level meetings necessary to sustain it.

15. Shevardnadze said he agreed that the process was both fragile and complicated. Yet it remained true that the Soviet side had done nothing to complicate the situation, while the U.S. had done such things as restrict the Soviet Missions in New York. Moscow had not responded to this. But it was up to both sides to act with restraint. Shevardnadze also agreed on the need to meet with the Secretary and to include tough questions on the agenda. Dobrynin would be appropriately instructed to these ends during his upcoming Washington visit.

Hartman

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 191.

⁵ In telegram 3029 from Ankara, March 19, the Embassy reported that “the Soviet protest alleging territorial waters violation [into the Black Sea] by USS *Yorktown* and USS *Caron* was front-page news in Ankara on March 19.” The report continued that a spokesman for the Turkish MFA stated: “the cruiser USS *Yorktown* and destroyer USS *Caron* received permission to transit the Turkish Straits 15 days in advance in accordance with the Montreux Convention.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860212–0078)

211. Memorandum From Jack Matlock, Judyt Mandel, and John Lenczowski of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, April 4, 1986

SUBJECT

Geneva Exchanges Initiative

Attached for your approval at TAB I is a memo to the President forwarding the text of the NSDD on Implementation of the Geneva Exchanges Initiative.² The text and related policy issues have been worked out in meetings of the subcommittee on security issues, chaired by Steven Rhinesmith, the new Coordinator for the US-Soviet Exchanges Initiative, and the Interagency Group on the Geneva Exchanges Initiative (IG/GEI), chaired by Jack Matlock.³

Per your instructions, the text of the NSDD contains general language outlining our security concerns, but leaving the specifics for a separate directive from you to the concerned agencies. The subcommittee on security issues has agreed on the language for that directive, which will be forwarded to you shortly.⁴

OMB has also informally reviewed the NSDD, and has expressed some concern about the possible cost of the new programs. They suggested that we add a sentence indicating that the new programs would be funded within existing budget plans, which is true for the short run. However, we would prefer to have flexibility to request additional money should the Soviets agree to a dramatic expansion of these programs at some time in the future.

In addition, the IG has reviewed and approved a package of program proposals which Steve Rhinesmith presented to the Soviets in

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 223 [Implementing the Geneva Exchange Initiative]; NLR-751-10-10-9-6. Confidential. Sent for action. Rodman, Raymond, Major, and deGraffenreid initialed their concurrence.

² Attached but not printed. For the final text, see Document 218.

³ See footnote 1, Document 218.

⁴ Not found.

Moscow.⁵ The Soviets have indicated they want a return visit to the US in late April to work out further details. Our aim is to have Soviet agreement to at least some of the programs by May, so that the people-to-people exchanges can get underway this summer.

OSD previously concurred with the NSDD, but Cap Weinberger sent you a memo (at TAB B) suggesting the inclusion of two additional paragraphs spelling out our strategic objectives in proposing the new exchanges. He argues that the additional language is needed to distinguish this Administration's policy from that of its predecessors, and avoid giving the impression that the exchanges are an end in themselves, rather than a means of ending Moscow's monopoly on information to its citizens and about it to the outside world. Moreover, he argues that without such language, officials implementing the initiative will have no guidance on the question of our larger objectives, and the public may get the impression that the exchanges are indicative of a return to the "detente" era.

Although this language aptly defines our long-term objectives, including it in the largely unclassified NSDD could undermine our ability to achieve that objective. We believe that this language is a little too explicit to be fully consistent with the President's own approach to treating our objectives confidentially if they are to have a prospect of success. Even if the OSD language were classified, it could leak and be used by the Soviets to vilify and reject the kind of programs and contacts we are proposing.

John Lenczowski has alternative language at TAB II which deals with Secretary Weinberger's suggestion in a more nuanced manner.⁶ He believes we should not put the President in the position of having to flatly reject the Secretary's constructive suggestion, and has therefore modified the language of the introductory paragraph in a way that: 1) makes our objectives sound less "detentist"; 2) supplies guidance on the broader strategic purposes of the exchanges; and 3) is not so explicit as to risk undermining our objectives if the language of the NSDD is made public. (Most of the text is unclassified and intended

⁵ In telegram 4762 from Moscow, March 20, the Embassy reported that "Rhinesmith informed the Soviets that the 37 exchange proposals handed over to them had been selected from a total of 169 received by his office. The U.S. side also has ideas for additional exchange programs, and is prepared to offer them as formal proposals if the Soviet side expresses interest. Rhinesmith said both sides must do all they can to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the exchange initiative agreed upon by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva—an opportunity, he stressed, that is extremely fragile, depending as it does in great part on other aspects of bilateral relations." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860216–0748)

⁶ Not found attached.

for public use.) We have incorporated the two paragraphs of this language into the NSDD as a replacement for the first paragraph of the old version (which appears at Tab III).⁷

We did not have time to submit the substitute language to the other concerned agencies. However, State has informally indicated that it has no objection to the substitute language, and we believe USIA will not have any objection.

Walt Raymond feels that the Weinberger/Lenczowski modifications are unnecessary and inconsistent with the President's Geneva and post-Geneva statements, and thus he prefers the old version. Others on the staff believe the Lenczowski language is a reasonable compromise.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo forwarding the NSDD to the President.⁸

Tab B to Tab I

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)⁹

Washington, March 12, 1986

SUBJECT

Draft NSDD on Geneva Exchanges Initiative

The draft NSDD has, in my view, a serious shortcoming. It depicts the initiative as an end in itself—i.e., an exchange, like virtue, is its own reward. None of the sober and analytical realism regarding US-USSR relations that distinguishes President Reagan from his predecessors (or from his current domestic opposition) finds expression in the document. This creates two problems: Officials implementing the initiative will find in the NSDD no guidance on the question of its grander or “strategic” purposes. And if the NSDD is made public—by leak or authorized release (most of it is unclassified anyway)—the President is likely to be embarrassed by the apparent aimlessness of this exercise

⁷ Not found attached.

⁸ Poindexter initialed his approval of the recommendation.

⁹ Confidential. Weinberger wrote “John” above the addressee line.

and by the rhetoric in the NSDD that is redolent of the “detente” era and Carter Administration pronouncements.

These problems can easily be remedied through an addition to the draft of the following paragraphs:

The primary objective of the Geneva Exchanges Initiative is to mitigate, along with the other US information programs, the many international security and humanitarian problems arising from the Soviet government’s monopoly on information to Soviet citizens about the West, East-West relations, and the USSR itself, and its monopoly on information to the outside world about the USSR. Through increasing the flow of people and information in and out of the USSR—through whittling away at the monopoly—we can serve the cause of peaceful relations by inhibiting the Soviet government’s ability to gain acceptance for aggressive or anti-democratic action. We can also usefully broaden American appreciation of the realities of Soviet life in ways as little controlled by the Soviet government as possible.

These fundamental aims necessarily conflict with aims that the Soviet government will pursue through the exchanges. It can be expected to try to maximize its access to otherwise denied information and technology, enhance its ability to press its own propaganda and political lines in the United States, and insulate its own citizens as much as possible from influences beyond its control. Thus the GEI must be seen as part of our continuing contest with the Soviet system and its ideology of secretiveness and control. It is a contest of incalculable consequences, one in which we can engage confidently so as to build a basis for a secure peace.

I would hope that the foregoing paragraphs, even after inclusion in the NSDD, could remain unclassified and accompany any public release of the document or of the official rationale for the initiative.

I would greatly appreciate it if you will give this memorandum to the President, since it embodies a matter I think is very important.

Cap

212. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 8, 1986, 9:45–11 a.m.

SUBJECT

The President's Meeting with Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin of the Soviet Union (S)

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary George P. Shultz

Donald T. Regan

John M. Poindexter

Rozanne L. Ridgway

Donald R. Fortier

Jack F. Matlock

SOVIET

Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin

Deputy Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh

Soviet DCM Oleg Sokolov

The President opened the meeting by congratulating Dobrynin on his election as Secretary of the Central Committee, and pointing out that he was eager to move forward along the lines agreed at the Geneva Summit. He noted that we had made some progress, especially in bilateral areas, and said that he was particularly encouraged by the Soviet Government's receptiveness to discussing an expansion of people-to-people programs. Charlie Wick, he observed, had informed him of his good reception during his trip.² (C)

However, the President added, he was disappointed by the overall lack of progress in our relations, and was aware that much remains to be done. He then invited Dobrynin's comments. (S)

Dobrynin began by thanking the President for the cooperation he had received during his tenure in Washington, and mentioned that his new duties would involve supervision of the Central Committee's International Department, which would include in the future U.S.-Soviet relations. (C)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron April 1986 (3/6). Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Brackets are in the original. Reagan wrote in his diary: "The 15 min. meeting with Amb. (now Sec. of Politburo) Dobrynin went 45 min's. My feeling is the Summit will take place—if not in June or July—sometime after the election." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 587)

² Wick traveled to the Soviet Union in January 1986. (Telegram 433 from Moscow, January 10; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860022–0969)

He also brought personal greetings from Gorbachev, and mentioned that he had delivered a letter from Gorbachev to Secretary Shultz yesterday.³ He hoped that there would be a reply soon, and suggested that it would be nice if he could carry one back to the General Secretary. He had had a good talk with Secretary Shultz and Admiral Poindexter yesterday,⁴ and wondered if the President had any reaction to Gorbachev's letter. (S)

The President said that he would speak frankly. As he had noted, progress in our relations had not been what he had hoped after Geneva. Soviet military involvement in regional conflicts creates major problems in our relations, and furthermore is dangerous. He and Gorbachev bear a great responsibility: they hold the fate of the world in their hands, and such involvement increases dangers. (S)

Libya is a prime example, the President continued. It is hard for the U.S. to accept Soviet criticism of our maneuvers in international waters, since we both agree that the Gulf of Sidra is international. The U.S. has operated there many times, the recent maneuvers were scheduled well in advance, and were not intended to be provocative. Therefore, the Soviet stance could not be understood here. (S)

The U.S. seeks solutions to these regional problems—but as long as our friends need help, we will give it. He had studied Gorbachev's

³ See Document 208.

⁴ In his memoir, Shultz recounted this meeting: "On April 7, 1986, I had breakfast with Dobrynin, who was back in Washington only briefly. He had suddenly been appointed a top adviser on world affairs to Gorbachev in Moscow. Many people speculated that he would dominate Shevardnadze, the newcomer to foreign affairs. I didn't agree. I knew them both; it would not be Dobrynin who would prevail in such a contest. Shevardnadze was a close friend of Gorbachev and he also knew his country well. 'Gorbachev is a politician,' Dobrynin told me. 'He has to get results for his constituencies.' So what could he get out of a summit meeting in Washington? 'INF and START are the big issues to work on,' I said. 'We have put out sensible proposals for each.' 'What about SDI? Is there anything new?' Dobrynin asked. 'The president will not curtail his research program,' I responded. Dobrynin made an important declaration: 'Gorbachev thinks INF is possible.' Then he commented, 'There have been some questions in the press about whether Gorbachev is in control. Let me tell you, *he is in control!*' Yes, I thought, but he is in control of a declining power. At the end of our meeting, I took Dobrynin up to the eighth floor and to my private dining room for lunch. Out on the balcony, on this bright spring day, we could see all Washington stretched out before us, from Capitol Hill far up to the left, to the Lincoln Memorial straight ahead, to Arlington Cemetery and the Custis-Lee Mansion on the right. Dobrynin said he had seen this sight many times in his decades of service in Washington and asked whether I could give him a panoramic photograph of it all. 'Of course,' I said. Dobrynin seemed wistful and subdued, as though he hated to leave America, the country in which he had been ambassador for almost a quarter of a century. I soon found out that no such photograph existed. It took six months to get a good panoramic photograph shot and framed. Then some security people raised concerns about such a picture hanging in the Kremlin, apparently fearing it would help the Soviet air force with plans to bomb the Washington Mall. I mailed it to Dobrynin, anyway." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 709)

remarks on Afghanistan at the Party Congress, and wished to say that the U.S. has no desire to keep Afghanistan a “bleeding wound.” Soviet escalation has done that. (S)

Regarding arms control, he sees potential progress in some areas, but is frustrated by a lack of Soviet response to the U.S. proposals. For example, there has been no answer yet to our November 1 proposal on strategic arms reduction. In this respect, we may have different approaches to negotiation. Our approach is for each side to present its optimum desires, and then to narrow the differences through negotiation when the differences in approach are clear. (S)

As for nuclear testing, he regrets Soviet efforts to make propaganda on the issue. The U.S. has made numerous efforts to make progress, but it must be understood that the U.S. is behind the Soviet Union in carrying out its testing program. A moratorium when one side has completed its program and the other is still in the middle of its program is unacceptable. Our priority goal is agreement on concrete verification improvements for the two treaties which have been signed. It is important to take steps to build confidence, since there is too much distrust on both sides to agree immediately to major changes. As he had told the General Secretary in Geneva, nations don’t distrust each other because they are armed; they arm themselves because they distrust each other. We are ready to have our experts meet for bilateral talks without preconditions, and they can deal with the concerns of both sides. We see no reason why this dialogue could not produce concrete results at the next summit. (S)

Regarding the next summit, the President stressed that we want a substantive outcome. He then listed the following as optimum goals:

- Agreement on key elements of a treaty reducing strategic weapons in comparable categories by 50%.

- Agreement on key elements of an INF treaty.

- Agreement on methods which eliminate both the threat of an effective first strike by either side and the use of space for basing offensive weapons capable of mass destruction.

- Agreement on more reliable means to verify nuclear tests and commitment to create conditions which would permit the ultimate elimination of testing. If we could make progress toward reducing nuclear weapons, that would provide a basis for further limitations on testing.

- Agreement on chemical weapons ban.

- Progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict.

- Improvements in the political atmosphere to permit major expansion of trade and cooperation. (S)

The President then pointed out that agreements on key elements in 1986 would permit negotiation of treaties in time for meeting planned

for 1987—which in turn would make ratification possible before the U.S. 1988 election campaign. Such agreements would represent a blueprint for realizing the first phase of General Secretary Gorbachev's January 15 proposal. (S)

He then noted that other important issues require attention: conventional force reductions in Central Europe and more effective confidence-building measures, and said that even if they could not achieve all these optimum goals, substantial progress in some of these areas would be a worthwhile achievement. But we are ready to work constructively on all of them. (S)

The President then concluded his presentation by asking Dobrynin to tell Gorbachev that he very much is looking forward to his visit to the United States. He hopes the General Secretary can stay here for at least a week, since he would like to show him something of the United States. The visit should not be all work, although there will be plenty of time for working sessions. But he would like to hear Mr. Gorbachev's desires on this score. (S)

Dobrynin began his response by commenting that they are not trying to avoid a discussion of regional conflicts. There will be further opportunity when the foreign ministers meet. Our views, of course, differ, but we can discuss this. (S)

As for Afghanistan, U.S. involvement prolongs the war, which is what Gorbachev was referring to in his Party Congress speech. The issue of local conflicts is on their minds, however. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will be willing to take up three or four of the most important and discuss them in more detail with Secretary Shultz. The Soviets have made good proposals to Pakistan on Afghanistan, and have even set forth a schedule for troop withdrawal. The situation around Libya also bothers them very much, and that is true also of Nicaragua, but he would not take time now to discuss it. We can go into these issues more thoroughly on other occasions. (S)

Regarding the central security issues, the Soviets want something substantial to come out of the next summit. We need to find a minimum number of issues to try to solve. Diplomats must do the negotiation, but they need instructions from the top. Some recent U.S. actions have introduced uncertainty on the Soviet side. (S)

For example, they are concerned regarding the U.S. position on a nuclear test ban. They are willing to discuss verification, but why not discuss a test ban and verification simultaneously? We could either resume the tripartite talks with the UK, or just open bilateral talks on the subject. (S)

Secretary Shultz asked if he was proposing this as one of the summit announcements. (S)

Dobrynin said yes, and asked what would be wrong with an announcement that negotiation on U.S. and Soviet ideas would be resumed. (S)

The President noted that there is no agreement yet on the time for his next meeting with Gorbachev. (S)

Dobrynin said that this is precisely the point. Although there are no preconditions, they do not want our leaders going blindfolded into a meeting. History has shown that such meetings are not successful. For example, Kennedy met Khrushchev without preparation in Vienna and it was a flop. The same is true of Eisenhower's meeting with Khrushchev in Paris. On the other hand, the summits that Nixon, Ford and Carter had with Brezhnev, and that the President had with Gorbachev in Geneva were well prepared and were successful. (S)

We need to know what minimum will be achieved, he continued. We cannot risk failure at the top level. Gorbachev wants success just as he feels the President wants success, and he is setting no preconditions, but he is asking specifically what areas we can reach agreement on. (S)

Dobrynin pointed out that the Soviets are familiar with the three broad areas of our relations, security, regional conflict and bilateral, and are willing to work on all of them. We began to prepare well before the Geneva summit last year, and although we stopped for a while, these preparations permitted the staff to work out the joint statement the last night. This would not have been possible without the prior work. But the joint statement was a good one and had an impact on public opinion. (S)

Now five months have passed, and what do we have that we can announce at the next meeting? That is, if there is a meeting this year—and Gorbachev assumes there will be one. We have no clearcut minimum goal. (S)

So Gorbachev's main message is: Let's sit down and find at least the minimum. We can work on the proposals of both to define the minimum. When Nixon came to the Soviet Union in 1972 he had 80 percent of the results in his pocket. It is dangerous to go into these meetings entirely *ex promptu*. We have presented some ideas; you may have other ideas. This is not to substitute for the work at the meeting itself, but rather to insure that it is successful. (S)

The President said that we had in fact proposed a number of things, and observed that we may look at negotiations from different viewpoints. He recalled that for 25 years he had been chief negotiator for his labor union, the Screen Actors' Guild. In those negotiations, the union would make a proposal, and management would make a proposal, and that way they came to understand the differences between them which had to be negotiated. (S)

Regarding INF, we seem close to agreement. We agree that we should go down to zero. We do disagree on how to apply this globally. But we could bridge that at the next summit. (S)

As for START, we have agreed on a 50 percent reduction. We apply this to different systems. It is a complex question because of the types of weapons and the fact that each side has a different force structure. But we have come a long way in agreeing on a world without nuclear weapons. U.S. proposals have been presented in response to Soviet proposals, and if our negotiators are freed up so they can discuss the differences, we might hammer out an agreement on the remaining issues at the next summit. If we could do that, our public would clap their hands, since they fear the nuclear threat and want to have it eliminated. (S)

As for agreements at earlier summits, some of these seem to have been reached just for the sake of agreement. There have been some violations of them, which is evidence of this. Therefore the President said he is not impressed by what had been achieved at these earlier meetings. Previous agreements merely agreed on the pace of an increase, not on reductions. But he wondered what is keeping us from settling how we do the 50 percent reductions to which we have agreed. (S)

Dobrynin said that what the Soviets are trying to do is to find a way for the leaders to give instructions to our negotiators to narrow the differences. Negotiations will continue in the various fora, but our Foreign Ministers should sit down and see what goals would be realistic. We need something for our bosses to sign or announce. Then they will have some birds in hand as they go into their meeting, and can see how much more they can get during the meeting. (S)

For example, a simple announcement that they agree to begin negotiations on a [comprehensive] test ban and verification of testing is one possibility. Or, as regards SDI, an announcement that we will begin talks on how to strengthen the ABM Treaty. The point is that we need some definition of the minimum which can be achieved or announced. (S)

Dobrynin then observed that Gorbachev, like the President, is a politician, and just cannot risk coming home from the summit without some definable result. He observed that when the President meets with his Allies, he always has something in mind in advance. This is also a good rule to follow with others. That way, formal negotiations can go forward, but at the same time we can reach an understanding on what the minimum results will be. (S)

Dobrynin then pulled out a paper in Russian and translated what he characterized as an “oral message” from Gorbachev, remarking that

it had been given to him when he saw Gorbachev the day before his departure from Moscow. It contained the following points:

—Gorbachev is committed to pursuing the obligation he and the President assumed in Geneva to work toward an improvement of the international situation.

—Since Geneva, the actions of the USSR have been designed to achieve the aims agreed at the summit. These have been consistent with preparing for the next meeting, agreed to at Geneva.

—He, Gorbachev, is prepared to be guided by the mutual agreements undertaken at the Geneva Summit.

—U.S. actions, however, leave a different impression. Rhetoric has intensified. Certain U.S. steps can be interpreted as unfriendly acts, directed against the improvement of relations. And all this has happened while there was no dialogue between the US and USSR regarding plans for the next summit meeting.

—He is trying to understand what the U.S. wishes to achieve. He took note of Secretary Shultz's statement to Ryzhkov that the President is committed to an improvement in relations.⁵

—The main thing is to insure the success of the next Summit meeting. We need an understanding on what specific results can be counted on.

—He wishes to invite the President's personal attention to this problem. When matters of such importance are involved, extemporaneous actions and meetings can be dangerous. Khrushchev's meeting with Kennedy in Vienna, which proceeded on such an "extemporaneous" basis, aggravated relations.

—He is not making an attempt to impose preconditions for the summit meeting. Rather, his desire is to agree in advance on the possible content of the meeting—what we each will be bringing to the meeting and what we hope to achieve. Specifically, what agreements or understandings, as a minimum, will be the result?

—He believes that every opportunity should be taken to prepare a productive meeting so he can visit the United States this year. But he wants that meeting to be meaningful and substantial. (S)

Having read these points, Dobrynin observed that our Foreign Ministers would be meeting in May. [Secretary Shultz observed, "May 14–16."] Dobrynin then summed up his presentation by saying that his main message is that we should try together to clarify what the positive results of the next summit will be, and that Gorbachev hopes to see the President in this country this year. (S)

⁵ See Document 204.

Secretary Shultz said that he would like to repeat what the President had already said, so that it would be clearly understood. (S)

First, we want a meeting associated with progress in reaching accords. (S)

Second, we know the only way is to work on the subject matter ahead of time. We must know 80–90% of what we have in hand before the meeting. It is therefore good that his meeting with Shevardnadze has been scheduled. (S)

Third, they should look carefully at what the President has said regarding potential areas for agreement. He will go through them with Dobrynin later this week, but he wanted to emphasize their importance now. [Note: A written text of the President's "optimum goals" was given to Dobrynin's staff later, and Secretary Shultz reviewed them again with Dobrynin at his April 9 meeting.]⁶ (S)

The President observed that both sides have now made similar statements. They have made proposals, and we have answered them. We accepted some of the Soviet ideas, and made some of our own. But we have no response. (S)

However, both of us have expressed a desire to achieve the same goal. He understands the point that both he and Gorbachev are politicians, and that a political leader cannot be pushed into a corner. This holds true on both sides. (S)

If he and the General Secretary get together and come to an agreement, some elements will be from the proposals of one side and some elements from those of the other. That way each can say afterward what he obtained in terms of his own proposals. (S)

⁶ The talking points for Shultz's April 9 meeting with Dobrynin were found attached to a memorandum, drafted on April 8, in which Ridgway explained: "We have attached talking points for your meeting and lunch tomorrow with Dobrynin that key off the President's and your conversations with him yesterday and today. We had a good meeting with Bessmertnykh and Sokolov this afternoon that confirmed the Soviets are looking carefully at specifics to take back to Gorbachev and Shevardnadze on our plans for the summit and the ministerial. The atmosphere was quite positive and workmanlike." (Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, March–April 1986) Included in the talking points was the list that "President outlined following as *optimum* goals for the summit: —agreement on key elements of a treaty reducing strategic weapons in comparable categories by 50%; —agreement on key elements of a treaty on intermediate range nuclear forces; —agreement on methods which eliminate both the threat of an effective first strike by either side and the use of space for basing offensive weapons capable of mass destruction; —agreement on a more reliable means to verify nuclear tests, and a commitment to create conditions which would permit the ultimate elimination of testing; (If we could make progress toward reducing nuclear weapons, that would provide a basis for further limitations in testing.); —agreement on chemical weapons ban; —progress in bringing peace to regions now torn by conflict; —improvements in the political atmosphere to permit major expansion of trade and bilateral cooperation." (Ibid.)

The President then said that he wanted to mention another subject—human rights. He has no desire to push the General Secretary into a corner on this issue. He noted that he had discussed it previously with Dobrynin, and emphasized that he was not pushing for an agreement as such. However, this is one area where, if the Soviet Union takes some actions, it will make it possible for him, the President, to do some things that both want. (S)

The President added that one out of ten Americans has relatives or ancestors in the Soviet Union. They are emotional about what happens there. If positive action is taken, he will never open his mouth to say that we suggested it. But it will be easier for him to say that he had agreed to this or that with the Soviet Union. Therefore, he hoped that we would see more progress in this area. (S)

Regarding arms control, testing and the like, he felt that we have enough areas to work on. We use the same figures as our basis for negotiation. But if the General Secretary proposes one date as a goal for something and we propose an earlier one, that is not the sort of issue where one side “caves in” if it agrees with the other. Rather it would be a compromise. (S)

The President then wondered if we have the same understanding of the word “compromise.” We seem to look at it in different ways. (S)

Dobrynin stated that “compromise” means the same in both languages, and that Gorbachev is in favor of compromise. He knows there must be compromise on security issues. (S)

As for dates when things can be accomplished, Gorbachev had mentioned some in his January 15 proposal. If the U.S. wants to speed them up, that is all right with Gorbachev. (S)

Regarding the U.S. November 1 proposal, this was made before the Geneva summit. Gorbachev’s January 15 proposal was based on the discussion at Geneva and took the November 1 proposal and the discussions at the summit in Geneva into account. We must look at the situation now and find a way out. (S)

Regarding medium-range missiles [i.e., INF], the Soviets have made major concessions. They have agreed that there could be a separate agreement, that the SS-20’s could be eliminated in Europe, that deactivated missiles would be destroyed and not just moved, and have even compromised on the role of British and French systems in any agreement. It is natural that they would insist on a non-transfer provision, so that the agreement could not be circumvented, but the U.S. has said no to this. Secretary Shultz has said that this topic may be an area for a “minimum” achievement at the next summit, but he is not sure we are close enough. (S)

Dobrynin continued by saying that there may be other subjects which could be agreed upon. The 50 percent reductions, for example,

but we still have the critical problem of how we define the “content” of the reduction. (S)

Dobrynin then asked if he could say that the U.S. is in favor of activating the negotiating process and simultaneously thinking about what results can be anticipated from the next summit? (S)

The President agreed and *Secretary Shultz* noted that the President has gone farther than suggesting goals for 1986. He has pointed out that if we are to have a successful meeting in 1987 as well as 1986, we must begin preparations now. That means working on a solution in the strategic arms area. (S)

Dobrynin said that we should hope that the two foreign ministers can get a clearer picture of the prospects for the 1986 meeting. (S)

Secretary Shultz pointed out that Dobrynin would be here until Friday evening,⁷ and that we would be pursuing discussion of these matters with him and with Deputy Minister Bessmertnykh. He then asked if there is agreement on Shevardnadze’s visit to the United States. (S)

Dobrynin confirmed that there is, and *Secretary Shultz* suggested that by Friday they would try to sum up just where things stand at present. (S)

The President noted that we still need a date for Gorbachev’s visit. The Soviets are aware of our problem in the fall—the election campaign—and it is not desirable to have the visit at that time. (S)

Dobrynin assured the President that Gorbachev has no desire to be involved in any way in domestic U.S. politics, and understood that a visit during the Congressional campaign would not be a good idea. (S)

The meeting ended about 10:50; Dobrynin stayed for a few minutes with the President after the others had left the room.⁸ (C)

⁷ April 11.

⁸ In his memoir, Dobrynin recalled this private conversation: “After the formal conversation the president asked me to stay and talk privately with him. Reagan said it appeared that both leaders had to give an additional push to preparing the summit. One way was to intensify the negotiations in various forums and in particular to involve Shultz and Shevardnadze more personally. Another would be finally to operate a strictly confidential channel, which had proven useful in preparing for Geneva. But Reagan did not give any idea of how the new channel would work; I was going back to Moscow, and he promised to think about how to revive it, but that never happened after I left Washington. One reason was that our ambassadors were changed too often—four in the next five years of the remaining Reagan and succeeding Bush presidency.” (Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, p. 604)

213. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev¹

Washington, April 11, 1986

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Thank you for your letter of April 2, which Ambassador Dobrynin delivered.² As Ambassador Dobrynin will report to you, your letter served as the point of departure for a very useful meeting we held in my office, and for additional meetings between him and Secretary Shultz.³ It is clear that both of us are concerned about the relative lack of progress since our meeting in Geneva in moving overall relations in a positive direction. While each of us would cite quite different reasons to explain this situation, I agree with your thought that the important thing now is to focus our attention on how we can solve the concrete problems facing us.

I described to Ambassador Dobrynin a number of goals which I believe we could set for our meeting. This was of course an optimum list. I recognize that achieving these goals will be a complex and difficult process and that we may not be able to achieve them all in the immediate future. I am confident, however, that all can be achieved if we have the will to get to work on them promptly. Furthermore, they are sufficiently important that progress on even a few of them would be a worthwhile achievement.

Although I believe we should not relent in our search for ways to bridge critical differences between our countries, I agree with your

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Gorbachev (8690146, 8690267). No classification marking. Under an undated handwritten cover note, Matlock sent Poindexter a draft of the letter, writing: "Original State draft is attached. I advise strongly against approach here. (1) It does not really answer Gorbachev's letter (2) No need to put the President's goals in the letter—we gave it to the Soviets in writing. (3) There should be *no* mention of special channel in written correspondence (except *very* private). (4) No need to raise new issues at this time. I believe my draft corrects these deficiencies and strikes the right tone for this particular letter. Jack." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) April 1986 1/2) Matlock made substantial revisions to this draft. In an April 9 covering memorandum to Shultz, Nitze and Ridgway wrote: "Matlock has drafted a letter from the President to Gorbachev, for you to hand over to Dobrynin at your Friday afternoon meeting. We have revised it along the lines you suggested this afternoon and attached it for your approval. The letter does not mention the goals for the next summit which the President outlined to Dobrynin, because we gave Bessmertnykh a copy of the text during our meeting yesterday. Nor does it mention the special channel. Jack Matlock does not want to put the idea in print to avoid other members of the White house and NSC staff learning of the proposal." (Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, March–April 1986)

² See Document 208.

³ See Document 212.

observation on the desirability of moving step by step when an overall solution to a problem eludes us. I want to assure you that our proposals, like yours, are not “all or nothing at all.” We wish to negotiate, to find compromises that serve the interests of each of us, and to achieve as much progress as possible. If we can make a critical breakthrough, that of course would be best. But as we attempt to deal with the key issues, we should simultaneously try to solve as many of the smaller ones as we can in order to develop momentum for dealing successfully with the larger issues.

This applies particularly to the nuclear testing issue, which you mentioned in your letter. Since nuclear testing occurs because we both depend on nuclear weapons for our security, our ability eventually to eliminate testing is intimately connected with our ability to agree on ways to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons themselves. This is why we simply cannot enter into the moratorium you have proposed.

However, there must be practical means by which we can begin resolving our differences on this issue. Congressmen Fascell and Broomfield have reported to me your suggestion that we open a dialogue to discuss both your ideas and ours on this subject.⁴ I am prepared to agree to this idea, to have our representatives meet to discuss the principal concerns on both sides without preconditions. If we could agree on concrete verification improvements for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, we would be prepared to support ratification of those treaties and create conditions which would let us move toward our ultimate goal of banning all tests.

I have taken careful note of your suggestion that we meet in Europe to deal with this issue. While I agree that it is very important, it is hard for me to understand the basis for a meeting on our level, devoted solely to this issue, when it has been impossible to arrange for our representatives to discuss it. In any event, our calendars are such that we should be able to arrange the meeting we agreed on in Geneva as soon and as easily as we could arrange a one-purpose meeting in Europe. Wouldn't it be better to treat this issue first at a lower level, in the hope that a way could be found to produce some concrete result when we meet in the United States?

In addition to the substantive suggestions I made to Ambassador Dobrynin, I asked him to convey to you some ideas for procedures we

⁴ In telegram 5833 from Moscow, April 4, the Embassy transmitted the text of a memorandum of conversation between Gorbachev and Congressmen Dante Fascell and William Broomfield. Fascell and Broomfield were on a Codel to Moscow and Leningrad in late March/early April 1986. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D806259–0688)

might follow to speed up resolution of the issues we face. I hope you will give them serious consideration.

I am pleased that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will be meeting in May to discuss how we can accelerate the preparations for your visit to the U.S. I would hope, however, that we can begin immediately to exchange ideas regarding practical goals we can set, and therefore look forward to receiving your more detailed letter and your reaction to the ideas I presented to Ambassador Dobrynin. I would also like to suggest that you look again at our most recent arms control proposals—the comprehensive proposal of November 1 and the INF proposal of February 24. I believe there are positive elements in them on which we can build. Both of these proposals were designed to pick up on positive aspects of your proposals and bridge the previous positions of our two sides. They also would provide key elements in implementing the first phase of your proposal of January 15.

In conclusion, I want to convey to you the high regard in which Ambassador Dobrynin is held in our country. He has played a truly distinguished, historic role in relations between our countries for over two decades, and we view his departure from Washington with regret. I understand, however, that his future duties will involve relations between our countries, so that we look forward to working with him in the future as well.

I am certain that Ambassador Dobrynin's successor will be received by American officials and our public with the respect due the representative of a great nation. I agree with you that the widest possible contacts by our Ambassadors both in Washington and Moscow are important if we are to achieve a greater measure of mutual understanding.

Nancy joins me in sending our warm personal regards to you and Mrs. Gorbacheva.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

214. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 14, 1986, 2–3 p.m.

SUBJECT

Briefing with Experts on The Future of the Soviet Economy (U)

PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of the Treasury
W. Dennis Thomas, White House
Admiral John M. Poindexter, NSC
Donald R. Fortier, NSC
Stephen I. Danzansky, NSC
W. Allen Wallis, Under Secretary of State
Lucian S. Pugliaresi, NSC

Henry Rowen, Hoover
Charles Wolf, Rand
Vladimir Treml, Duke
Andrew Marshall, Department of Defense

Minutes

Poindexter began the meeting by informing the President that we were pleased to have four eminent experts on the Soviet economy. He stated that the purpose of the meeting was to give the President their views on the prospects for the Soviet economy and the implications for the West. (C)

Poindexter pointed out that this briefing was part of our preparations for the President's unstructured time at the Economic Summit and that this briefing would also prove useful for the President's upcoming meeting with Secretary Gorbachev.² (C)

Poindexter informed the President that the poor performance of the Soviet economy could be contrasted with the President's theme for his Pacific journey: The Winds of Freedom. The successes of the free economies are impressive when compared to the failing and antiquated machinery of the Soviet system. He pointed out that Allen Wallis had already briefed the President on the Tokyo Summit and that it would be looked upon as a celebration both of freedom and unparalleled

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Stephen Sestanovich Files, U.S.-Soviet Relations: 03/25/86–04/24/86. Confidential. Sent for information. Prepared by Pugliaresi. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

² Reagan and Shultz attended the G-7 economic summit in Tokyo May 2–7. Documentation on the summit is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXXVII, Trade; Monetary Policy; Industrialized Country Cooperation, 1985–1988.

cooperation in the economic, as well as, political and economic spheres. (C)

Poindexter then stated that it was premature for the President to offer the allies specific policies for addressing a failing Soviet economy, but that it is important that we take this opportunity to raise their awareness of this issue. (C)

Poindexter then went on to introduce Henry (Harry) Rowen and asked him to introduce the other experts. After introducing the other experts, *Rowen* began the discussion by pointing out that there is growing evidence that the Soviet economy is doing considerably worse than many analysts had suspected and that its outlook was poor. An outline and two charts (attached) presenting an overview of the briefing was given to the President and all attendees.³ The experts discussed the charts which showed declining growth in Soviet GNP and a likely decline in Soviet hard currency earnings for 1986. *Rowen* stated that these figures don't tell the whole story. One of the clear indicators of poor Soviet performance was that the health and welfare of the Soviet people were declining. (C)

Trem then added that infant mortality was rising and that life expectancy had declined over the last twenty years—the Soviet Union was the only industrialized country which had such a remarkable drop in health. In addition, alcoholism was now rampant in the USSR. (C)

The President suggested that increased mortality might be the only way people can escape from the Soviet system. In addition, he stated that alcoholism was probably related to the pessimistic outlook the people had of Soviet society. (C)

Baker asked if drug use was extensive in the USSR and *Trem* answered that it was largely alcoholism. The *President* commented that Gorbachev's anti-drinking program must be having some effect. At a recent meeting with the Soviets, one of the officials commented that the only place he could get a drink was in the West. (C)

Rowen then began to outline the Gorbachev modernization program and indicated that it was unlikely to work. *Rowen* suggested that future Soviet growth will probably be closer to 1½% per annum and with the Soviet population growing by about 1½% per annum, per capita income will probably not rise. In addition, future Soviet economic performance will probably continue to be poor as the result of declining oil prices. Earnings from natural gas will fall as oil prices decline and the Soviets

³ The outline, entitled "Gorbachev's Predicament," and two charts, "Soviet Economic Performance and Forecasts" and "Soviet Hard Currency Earnings", are attached but not printed.

can expect a decline in weapons sales as many oil-exporting buyers experience financial constraints from lower oil prices. (C)

Rowen went on to point out that the Soviet labor force is not growing and that productivity is likely to decline. By the year 1990 Japan will likely overtake the Soviet Union as the world's second largest economy. This means the Soviets will have less capacity to compete militarily. Harry asked Andrew Marshall to comment on the military burden. (C)

Marshall pointed out that the direct Soviet military burden is 15–17% of GNP. However, the penetration of Soviet military spending into the civilian sector is extensive. For example, 15% of merchant ships are doing military work and it is not unusual for other non-military sectors, such as fisheries, to receive higher funding to build additional ships to support the military. (C)

Marshall said it broke down as follows in terms of the military burden on Soviet GNP: 15–17% for direct military expenditures, plus 4% for civilian subsidies, plus 2% for the civilian mobilization base, plus 3% for the Empire (such as Cuba and Angola), for a total burden of 24–26%. (C)

Rowen then added it's unlikely that the Soviet society has the capability to sustain this burden over the long-term. As a result, the Soviets will probably be more reluctant to take on foreign adventures unless, of course, the risks are low and the payoffs large, e.g., Iran. *Rowen* then asked a question: Will the system change? *Rowen* stated that the Chinese have made changes, but Gorbachev may try and fail or he may not even be willing to take the risk. The betting in the short run is that he will not take the risk. (C)

Trembl pointed out that the Soviets are probably not willing to make any further cuts in consumption. *Regan* asked if they would be willing to cut the military and *Trembl* responded that they might be willing to consider it. (C)

The President then asked about the influence of the generals. He referred to Brezhnev's comments to Nixon that "you have your Congress but I have my generals." *Rowen* added that he thought the generals were under control. (C)

Marshall pointed out that the generals can get into trouble if they are too vocal, e.g., Ogarkov received a demotion when he spoke out about cuts in military spending. *Marshall* also made two more points:

(1) A large global nuclear war is not now viewed by the Soviet Union as the most likely war, but rather a conventional war with high attrition rates and requirements for large amounts of spare parts. (C)

(2) Soviets will need sophisticated technologies to fight such a war, which are not now available to them. (C)

The President then pointed out that Gorbachev had complained to him that U.S. policy was to bankrupt the Soviet Union because of our tendency to keep developing new weapons. (C)

Marshall responded that there are times when we were only thinking about a new weapons system and the Soviets go to work immediately to develop a counter weapon long before we had made a firm commitment. *The President* suggested that this might be a good strategy. (C)

Rowen now moved the discussion on to Eastern Europe. Harry pointed out that when oil prices rose in the 1970's the Soviets subsidized oil shipments to them by giving them oil at less than world prices. However, now with the collapse in oil prices the reverse is true. (C)

Wolf then stated that given the poor economic performance of the Soviet Union the burden of the Soviet Empire on the USSR is getting larger. He indicated that the Soviets are trying to reel back these costs and may not be as willing now to incur costs as in the past. However, *Wolf* didn't see the Soviets taking any major risks with Eastern Europe. (C)

Rowen agreed that Eastern Europe is an important consideration for the Soviets but that Eastern Europe is now being dragged down by the USSR. In the future the Eastern Europeans will be reluctant to be taxed by the Soviets. (C)

The President pointed out that some people listen to these discussions on the state of the Soviet economy and see the Soviets not as a sick bear, but as a wounded bear. *The President* did not view a sick bear as dangerous and stated that he had always believed that the appropriate strategy was to keep the heat on the Soviets. (C)

Rowen replied that this was exactly right and that many of our European friends believe that the more help we give the Soviets the less dangerous they will become. At this point *Regan* asked if Harry expected Soviet debt to increase.⁴ (C)

Rowen pointed out that the Soviet net debt will increase to about \$20 billion which implies a debt service of about \$2 billion a year. This is close to their capacity for debt service given minimum import requirements of food and equipment. As a result, this is the point at which the banks should exercise some caution and, in any case, government guarantees should not be permitted to ensure that the private sector appropriately evaluates the risk of doing business with the Soviets. (C)

⁴ Although *Regan* is not on the list of participants, this indicates that he was present for at least part of the meeting.

Regan asked how big the Soviet GNP was and *Rowen* responded that it was about \$2 trillion. *The President* asked how it compares to our GNP and *Regan* replied that our GNP would probably hit \$4.2 to \$4.3 trillion this year. (C)

Rowen talked about what we might do given a failing Soviet economy. For example, although we shouldn't help the Soviet economy we should not give up trying to reach the Soviet people. We need to keep looking for ways to open up their system, e.g. restore direct telephone dialing and permit parcels to be shipped directly to Soviet people. The main thing is we have to address the internal contradictions within their system. (C)

There are a number of other things we could do. For example:

(1) West Germany could be more imaginative. The FRG could try and get the Soviets to make some unilateral reductions in their forces in Eastern Europe in exchange for better relations with the FRG. (C)

(2) Japan should seek a return of the Northern Islands. *The President* mentioned that Prime Minister Nakasone complained to him about this at Camp David. *Rowen* stated that the Japanese should get in a state of mind that this must take place before any major new steps can take place in USSR-Japan relations. (C)

Baker raised concerns about sanctions which only harm U.S. interests and help competing foreign firms, as was the case with Libya. *Rowen* pointed out that the best way to solve this problem is normal trade: yes, subsidized trade no. This should take care of Secretary *Baker's* concerns *Rowen* stated and *Baker* agreed. (C)

Poindexter pointed out that we should make the Soviets realize the poor risks they are taking. He also asked *Rowen* what factors contributed to Gorbachev's success at the Party Congress. *Rowen* said that it was his view that the Party Congress was a conservative gathering and did not succeed from Gorbachev's point of view. *Treml* then pointed out that Gorbachev is not getting visionary people into the Party Congress and *Wolf* pointed out that the KGB, however, was doing well in getting high level appointments. (C)

Wallis asked about the use of computers especially personal computers, in the Soviet Union and whether it posed a serious threat to the Soviet Union. *Rowen* agreed that the use of computers was a severe problem for the USSR. First, the lack of computation power will hurt the Soviet military. Second, such items as disks, tapes, etc, present a legitimate basis of concern for a regime like the USSR. (C)

Poindexter thanked the experts for their presentation and the President expressed his appreciation. The meeting was concluded at 3 p.m. The White House photographer took several photos of the experts with the President. (U)

215. Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

SOV 86–10023

Washington, April 1986

The 27th CPSU Congress:
Gorbachev's Unfinished Business [*portion marking not declassified*]

Key Judgments

Gorbachev's initial party congress effectively drew a curtain on the Brezhnev era and gave him a stronger hand to pursue his domestic and foreign agendas, but it was not the decisive break with the past that some Soviets and Western experts had predicted.

Gorbachev emerged from the congress in an improved position to press forward in rejuvenating the Soviet leadership and revitalizing the economy:

- His control over the leadership was strengthened by the greatest turnover in the Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee at a party congress since Khrushchev. The promotion of several supporters to steppingstone positions presages further housecleaning in the top leadership.
- The repudiation of the stagnation and inertia of the Brezhnev era, along with the strong endorsement of more exacting standards for party and state managers, will allow him to maintain pressure on the bureaucracy for improved performance.
- The congress's endorsement of Gorbachev's priority for machine building and accelerated technological renovation gives him the mandate he needs to push his goal of modernizing the Soviet economy.
- Gorbachev and his allies also broadened the scope of debate on how best to achieve rapid economic progress by asserting the need for "radical reform."

The congress approved Gorbachev's foreign policy strategy designed to nurture a favorable environment for domestic rebuilding through more assertive efforts to blunt a renewed American defense buildup:

- By focusing his report squarely on arms control and the US-Soviet relationship, Gorbachev underscored that foreign policy initiatives over the coming year—from Europe to Asia and the Third World—will be

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, 1980–1986, USSR-Internal Politics. Confidential; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis of the Directorate of Intelligence. A typed note on the first page reads: "Information available as of 15 April 1986 was used in this report."

geared to the effort to change American policies. Subsequent remarks by Gorbachev and his colleagues at the congress indicate that Moscow will continue to engage the United States while sharpening its attempts to paint the administration as a recalcitrant partner.

- Advancement of two experts on the United States to the Secretariat presages a more sophisticated and vigorous effort to generate domestic pressures against administration policy.

- The truncated nature of his review of foreign policy, however, makes it difficult to predict Soviet behavior on specific regional and bilateral issues.

Although the congress gave new impetus to the main elements of Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policy line, it also raised questions about the General Secretary's will and ability to follow through on his ambitious agenda. For every issue moved forward an equally important question was sidestepped:

- In a number of areas—notably economic reform and elite privileges—it was clear that differing perspectives at the top and bureaucratic foot-dragging below still limit the pace of change.

- The congress failed to clear up how Gorbachev can keep his promises to the Soviet consumer while meeting his announced goals for investment growth.

- A core of Brezhnev holdovers remains in key positions, while Gorbachev's most outspoken proteges did not advance.

Gorbachev's avoidance of potentially divisive issues at the congress was politically prudent, but continued caution could slow the momentum he has built over the first year and undermine his image as a leader determined to overhaul the Soviet system. Whether the congress proves to be the major "turning point" in Soviet history that Gorbachev clearly wants it to be will depend on his ability to pursue the unfinished business left by the congress. To this end he needs to:

- Further shift the balance at the top by replacing old guard holdovers with allies more open to change.

- Make headway against the vast bureaucracy that historically has frustrated change by maintaining public pressure for exacting standards and perhaps authorizing further exposes of elite improprieties.

- Prepare the ground for more substantial economic change by sanctioning a wider discussion and initial experimentation with reform measures heretofore considered taboo.

- Gain a tighter grip on the foreign policy and defense establishments to match the control he has already achieved in other sectors, and begin to make changes of substance in long-held Soviet foreign policy positions.

[Omitted here are the table of contents, the preface, the text of the assessment, and the appendix.]

216. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, April 15, 1986

SUBJECT

Soviet Reaction to U.S. Actions in Libya²

Art Hartman was called to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on Tuesday afternoon by the head of their U.S.A. Department.³ The Soviets told Art that because of U.S. actions in Libya the meeting between Shevardnadze and me, scheduled for May 14–16, was “not possible at this time,” and that the U.S. was responsible for this turn of events. The Soviets will be making an announcement this evening and they suggested that they may undertake further measures. Art was also told that Soviet planes and ships have been operating, and will continue to operate in the Mediterranean. The Soviets said the U.S. should not seek to interfere with their air and naval activities.

Art Hartman believes that since the Soviets are engaging us publicly on this question, we should be prepared to respond. Art found the White House background materials very useful and believes in particular that when the Soviets raise the question of loss of life resulting from our operations that we respond with chapter and verse on our casualties from acknowledged Libyan terrorist activities. I agree.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron April 1986 (5/6). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed at the top of the memorandum. Acting Assistant Secretary Woessner sent Shultz the memorandum under an April 15 action memorandum, requesting he sign it.

² Shultz wrote in his memoir that during his April 7 meeting with Dobrynin (see footnote 4, Document 212), he informed the Ambassador “about Qaddafi’s direct involvement with the La Belle disco bombing (without disclosing why we were so sure) and about Qaddafi’s other terrorist operations against us and others. Dobrynin made no comment. As we came down from breakfast in the elevator, the deputy of our Near East bureau, Arnie Raphel, said, “So we can check off the box marked “consult with the Soviets.” I wasn’t just getting my ticket punched. It was important to have informed the Soviets, an uneasy supporter of Libya, of our strong objections to Libya’s actions.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 684). In retaliation for Libyan involvement in the April 5 terrorist bombing of the La Belle disco in West Berlin, on April 14 Reagan announced that “air and naval forces of the United States launched a series of strikes against the headquarters, terrorist facilities, and military assets that support Mu’ammar Qadhafi’s subversive activities. The attacks were concentrated and carefully targeted to minimize casualties among the Libyan people with whom we have no quarrel.” For the full statement, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book I pp. 468–469. Documentation on the La Belle disco bombing and the U.S. reaction is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Part 2, Terrorism, June 1985–January 1989.

³ April 15.

We will be working with the NSC to ensure that our response is coordinated and effective.

It is not clear at this point whether the Soviets are actually canceling, postponing, or calling into question the scheduled meeting. At this point, however, we have to assume the meeting will not occur as scheduled. This will of course make it more difficult to organize a July summit. For the Soviets, who appeared in any case to be planning on December, cancelling the meeting is a low cost means of responding not only to the Libya situation, but to such previous slights as our move against their UN mission.

217. Note From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Ridgway) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, April 21, 1986

Mr. Secretary:

Mark Palmer and Mark Parris had one of their informal sessions with the Soviet Embassy's Sokolov Friday evening. Their memcon is attached.²

Sokolov's claim that the Soviets tried to be helpful before the Berlin bombing and are trying now to prevent further incidents, while self-serving, bears following up.³ While I think it best to hold this information very closely, we will be in touch with Bob Oakley to see if we can pass data which would put the Soviets to the test.

Sokolov's message that rescheduling the Shevardnadze visit will have to await the arrival of a new Soviet Ambassador confirms our sense that a summer summit is no longer in the cards. If we are to get the process back on track at all, however, we ought to pay attention to his entreaty to keep scheduled meetings on track. In the first instance, this means meeting our commitment to send Elliot Abrams to Moscow

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 4D, 1986 Soviet Union April. Secret; Sensitive.

² On April 18, Palmer and Parris met with Sokolov in the bar at the Watergate Hotel from 6 until 8 p.m. The memorandum of conversation is attached but not printed.

³ Reference is to the April 5 bombing of the La Belle disco in West Berlin. See Document 216.

in mid-May, despite ARA's preference to cancel or send a lower-ranking representative.⁴ You have a separate decision memo on that issue.

I've also attached a report from the British Embassy in Moscow which suggests that the decision to cancel the Shevardnadze visit was not an easy one, and that Gorbachev's discomfort with Qadhafi is acute.⁵ This tracks with Sokolov's own sense that Moscow is anxious to limit damage to the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

Rozanne L. Ridgway⁶

⁴ Abrams was tentatively scheduled to attend U.S.-Soviet talks in Moscow on Central America and the Caribbean.

⁵ Attached but not printed.

⁶ Ridgway signed "RR" above her typed signature.

218. National Security Decision Directive 223¹

Washington, April 22, 1986

IMPLEMENTING THE GENEVA EXCHANGES INITIATIVE (U)

A major emphasis in my discussions with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva was to seek ways to increase and broaden direct contacts between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union. The

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 223 [Implementing the Geneva Exchange Initiative]. Confidential. A January 23 covering memorandum from the NSC Executive Secretary to the Executive Secretaries of State, Defense, Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Information Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Immigration and Naturalization Service forwarded a draft NSDD for consideration at the "first meeting of the Interagency Group on the Geneva Exchanges Initiatives on Friday, January 24." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 223 [Implementing the Geneva Exchange Initiative]; NLR-751-10-9-6-1) With the work of the interagency group completed (see Document 211), on April 21 Poindexter forwarded Reagan a revised version of the NSDD, explaining: "The NSDD translates your vision of opening Soviet society through dramatically expanded people-to-people contact into broad policy guidance, recognizing the need for reciprocity and measures to deal with the security and counterintelligence implications." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 223 [Implementing the Geneva Exchange Initiative]; NLR-751-10-10-1-4) Reagan initialed his approval of the recommendation to sign NSDD 223.

objectives underlying expansion of such contacts are: 1) to deal more constructively with the problems arising from the open and closed nature of the respective societies; 2) to reduce, in particular, the misconceptions that the people of the Soviet Union have about the United States and the world in general; 3) to promote understanding by Americans of the realities of the Soviet system; 4) to build individual bridges of cooperation in a variety of fields; and 5) to mitigate the many international security and humanitarian problems that arise from existing barriers to free movement of people, information and ideas.² (U)

While we hope we can develop real cooperation with the Soviet people through expanded exchanges, we recognize that the Soviet government's interest in these exchanges differs from ours in important respects. But the contest of ideas is a competition in which we can engage confidently so as to build a basis for a more secure peace. (U)

Prior to Geneva, the US made a number of proposals to the Soviets for contacts, exchanges, and cooperation which were to go beyond the traditional exchanges covered by the US-USSR General Exchanges Agreement. In turn, we asked the Soviets for their ideas for programs to promote better understanding, to work cooperatively on some of today's most difficult human problems, and to open up our societies to each other. (U)

In Geneva, General Secretary Gorbachev and I agreed on the utility of broadening exchanges and contacts in a wide variety of fields, and agreed to begin on a reciprocal basis, with six areas in education, medicine, and sports, with others to follow:

- cooperation in the development of educational exchanges and software for elementary and secondary school education;
- measures to promote Russian language studies in the United States and English language studies in the USSR;
- the annual exchange of professors to conduct special courses in history, culture and economics at the relevant departments of Soviet and American institutions of higher education;

² Poindexter's April 21 memorandum continued: "Cap Weinberger feels that additional language is needed (at Tab B) in the NSDD to spell out our strategic vision of using the exchanges to end the Soviets' monopoly on information to their own citizens, and thus undermine their political controls. While this reflects our 'strategic' goals, saying so as explicitly as this language does in this kind of document which could leak, could undermine our ability to achieve those objectives, and give the Soviets a pretext for stonewalling. We have, therefore, amended the old version of the NSDD to include language which addresses Secretary Weinberger's concerns, but which expresses his points more delicately and thus avoids undercutting our objectives. (The new language appears in the first two paragraphs of the NSDD at Tab A.)" (See footnote 1, above) For the original memorandum from Weinberger on this language, see the attachment to Document 211.

—mutual allocation of scholarships for the best students in the natural sciences, technology, social sciences, and humanities for the period of an academic year;

—holding regular meets in various sports and increased television coverage of sports events;

—resumption of cooperation in combatting cancer diseases. (U)

General Secretary Gorbachev and I agreed that relevant agencies in both governments would be asked to develop specific programs which could be reviewed by both sides at our next meeting. (U)

A primary objective of the Geneva Exchanges Initiative is to enhance bilateral cooperation at all levels. Given this emphasis, it is imperative that our planning be coordinated early and frequently with the corresponding designated officials in the Soviet Union. In the development of these programs, a continuing emphasis must be on mutually beneficial and fully reciprocal programs. Highest priority is to be given to programs which emphasize participation of youth between the ages of 16 and 25. We consistently must make clear to the Soviets that we are not looking for token programs, but rather those which are imaginative, bold, and hold the most promise for meeting the objectives of this undertaking. (U)

However, I view this as just the beginning of a process to expand dramatically contacts and communications between the peoples of our two countries. My objective is to stimulate a process that goes well beyond these initial programs, both in numbers and in developing new kinds of exchanges to increase cooperation and mutual understanding between our two countries. Thus, we should continue to pursue on a reciprocal basis the full range of initiatives that we outlined to the Soviets and others which appear promising. These would include:

Educational and Student Exchanges

—substantial exchanges of undergraduates;

—an ambitious youth exchange program for secondary school children;

—establishment of university positions in each other's country to teach national studies;

—nomination of distinguished American and Soviet educators or public figures to study ways of improving understanding through language studies;

People-to-People

—expansion of "sister-city" relationships;

—increased exchanges of civic, religious, and other groups;

Media and Information Exchanges

—inauguration of regular media exchanges;

—establishment of out-of-embassy cultural centers and/or libraries in each other's capital;

- facilitation of direct satellite transmissions to each other's country;
- increased publication and distribution of each other's books and publications;

Consultations

—broader consultations on a variety of topics of mutual interest, including health and social problems such as alcoholism and drug abuse and trafficking. (U)

I attach high priority to the exchanges initiative, and am requesting that all United States Government agencies which have responsibilities in the areas of agreed cooperation give high priority and render every possible assistance to their implementation. (U)

To provide overall policy guidance, a new Interagency Group on the President's Geneva Exchanges Initiatives (IG/GEI) has been established. It is chaired by the NSC's Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs, and includes representatives of all concerned U.S. Government agencies. The IG will review programs and implementation to ensure that they are in conformity with U.S. policy and objectives toward the Soviet Union. (U)

In addition, I have asked USIA Director Wick to create a new office of the Coordinator for the President's U.S.-Soviet Exchanges Initiative, established at USIA with the express purpose of working with USIA, other concerned U.S. Government agencies, and the private sector to develop concrete programs in each of the six agreed areas and others which appear promising. The Coordinator will also chair a working group to develop and coordinate proposals for new initiatives, establish guidelines and operating procedures for the programs, coordinate the response to other U.S. and Soviet proposals, and identify other innovative proposals which could form the basis of additional programs. Upon agreement of the working group, the Coordinator will pursue implementation of the programs with Soviet counterparts. (U)

Additional responsibilities of the Coordinator will be to inform the American public about the possibilities for new exchanges with the USSR, to generate support for the Initiative, either through fundraising or matching private support with potential programs, and to serve as the central point of contact with the private sector. (U)

The Coordinator will be located in the Office of the Director, and will work closely with the staff of the United States Information Agency, the Department of State and other U.S. Government agencies concerned with administrative, programmatic and security aspects of the exchanges, and with the American Embassy Moscow. The coordinator will rely principally upon the USIA staff for operational support, calling upon other U.S. Government agencies for support as needed. He should

seek the advice, guidance, involvement, support and services of academia, private agencies which are engaged in US-Soviet exchange activities, and other elements of the private sector which have an interest in this important bilateral effort. (U)

It is essential that programs established under the President's U.S.-Soviet Exchanges Initiative provide for reciprocity and the protection of U.S. national security interests. Our objective of increasing contacts and dialogue between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union should not obscure the realities of the Soviet system and the differences which exist between our open and their closed society. Accordingly, the working group will develop, with the participation of concerned agencies, procedures to ensure that U.S. participants in the exchanges are informed of these realities, including the regulations and the conditions governing foreigners in the Soviet Union, and that U.S. hosts are informed of the elements of the program and the conditions under which Soviet citizens are admitted to the United States for these exchange programs. These programs will continue to be governed by adherence to the existing Export Control guidelines and subject to U.S. Government mechanisms to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology. (C)

In implementing the Exchanges Initiative, priority will be given to programs which can be implemented expeditiously and become either self-sustaining within a period of one to two years or incorporated into an existing United States Government program. These programs are not to replace existing programs called for under the General Exchanges Agreement or other bilateral agreements, but will be in addition to them. (U)

219. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Solomon) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, April 24, 1986

SUBJECT

Keeping the USSR on the Defensive after the Libyan Operation

SUMMARY

The recent USG attack on Libya provides opportunities for the US to keep the Soviets on the defensive.² The Administration's action against Qadhafi has not only given renewed credibility to our willingness to use military force in support of Western interests (thus reinforcing the Grenada success), it has also exposed the weakness of the Soviet position in Northern Africa and the Mediterranean. This memo suggests steps we can take now to improve our position in this vital region, as well as to counter the downside costs to ourselves of the Libyan action. *END SUMMARY*

The Libyan Operation: Impact on the Soviets

The US attack on Libya has set in motion a number of forces which the Soviets may or may not be able to control. This must give them reason for concern on a number of fronts. Seen from Moscow, there is the possibility of:

(1) Further US military strikes against Libya in reaction to continuing terrorist initiatives by Qadhafi (which the Soviets are likely to discourage, with uncertain effects on the Colonel).

(2) Destabilization of the Libyan leadership, with uncertain consequences for internal stability, and the future position of the Soviet Union. The Soviets may hope for the emergence of a more docile pro-Soviet leadership, but they must also worry that any change at the top could move Libya into a more pro-Western orientation.

(3) Nervousness by other client states, (Syria, South Yemen, Ethiopia), who may interpret Moscow's hesitant support for Libya as a sign of Soviet weakness or opportunism.

In sum, the US operation against Libya has probably compounded Moscow's concerns about dealing with a United States which has demonstrated the will to forcefully defend Western interests and confront a Soviet Third World client.

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, April 1986. Secret. Drafted by Pieczenik and Ledsky on April 23.

² See footnote 2, Document 216.

Downside Costs for the U.S.

The Soviets will not be blind to their own opportunities, based on the significant downside effects of our Libyan actions. They will certainly try to exploit our vulnerabilities with some of our West European allies, and especially with those population groups in Europe (Greens, peace activists, churches) who have taken to the streets to protest our raid on Libya. They will also work in the Middle East to see if they can drive a wedge between us and the moderate Arabs, who would have welcomed the fall of Qadhafi but who now must make some kind of accommodation with him for as long as he is in power.

Operational Strategy:

How can we exploit Moscow's demonstrated vulnerabilities in the Mediterranean region, prevent a consolidation of a more docile Soviet-client government in Tripoli, and defend ourselves against the downside costs of our actions against Libya? Here are a few suggestions:

1. *Put more pressure on those East European regimes directly involved in supporting Qadhafi.* Thus far we have limited our demarches in Eastern Europe to complaints about the presence in their capitals of Qadhafi's "Peoples' Bureaus." We should expand our presentations by pointing to direct East European involvement in Libya in support of Qadhafi and the Libyan economy. (The East Germans provide Qadhafi with intelligence and security support.) Our demarches could take the following form:

"We are aware of the activities of your nationals inside Libya. We want to stress the volatile nature of the situation in that country, and warn that your nationals may get caught in the middle of the conflict. We suggest therefore that you repatriate your nationals."

We do not harbor illusions that the East European regimes will cease their activities inside Libya overnight. Yet, just as they may move quietly to restrict "Peoples' Bureaus" in their own capitals, they may also begin to balk at Soviet insistence that they work inside Libya, particularly if their nationals come to believe they are in personal danger.

2. *Seek to sever the Maltese connection with Qadhafi.* We have made demarches in the past both in Valletta and in the Department warning Malta against its close relationship with Libya. Our warnings have gone unheeded. Indeed the Maltese-Libyan relationship is today in one of its warmest phases. Our recent airstrike against Libya provides us with a useful opportunity to make another try. Our demarches should emphasize (a) that Maltese involvement with Libya makes a mockery of their professed stance of neutrality, (b) that Maltese nationals inside Libya are in physical danger, and (c) the Maltese government should stop backing a losing horse, lest it fall into our permanent black

list for providing moral and material support for Qadhafi's aggression and terrorism.

3. *Work to stabilize the situation in the Sudan.* Our air strike against Libya comes at a crucial moment in Sudanese politics, and we should use this opportunity to try to end Libyan influence, and bring the northern and southern parts of the Sudan closer together. It is worth considering in this context a new direct U.S. approach to John Garang.³ The two main Sudanese parties have already sent emissaries to Garang in Addis Ababa, and we should support their effort by going to Garang and (a) blackening the Libyans for their air attack on southern towns held by Garang forces, (b) stress the malevolent Libyan role in the Sudan and elsewhere in the area, and (c) urge reconciliation with the two main parties and the new government in Khartoum.

4. *Counter the Soviets in the Maghreb.* Soviet involvement in Libya provides an opportunity to arrest the warming trend in Tunisian and Moroccan relations with Moscow. Morocco and Tunisia have concluded agreements with Moscow on trade and economic cooperation, and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze is expected to visit both countries later in 1986.

We should launch a diplomatic effort to warn Tunisia and Morocco of the dangers of closer relations with the Soviets, emphasizing that the poor performance of Soviet weaponry and the Soviet Union's failure to assist Libya makes Moscow an unreliable ally. In addition, we should reaffirm our commitment to assist Tunisia if it is attacked by Libya, and encourage our Allies (e.g., France, Italy, Japan) to increase their support for Tunisia and Morocco. Finally, we should warn the Algerians that their effort to improve ties with Libya, given Libyan support for terrorism and Libyan dependence on the Soviet Union will seriously harm U.S.-Algerian relations.

There may be still other areas where action on our part will contribute to improving Western coordination, keeping the Soviets off-balance, and reducing the chances for renewed Libyan mischief. We are preparing a follow-on memo outlining what approach we might take with Libya's closest neighbors.

³ John Garang, Sudanese rebel leader and founder of the Sudanese Liberation Army during the civil war. Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXIV, North Africa.

April 1986–August 1986

Arms Control in the Shadow of Chernobyl

220. Intelligence Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, April 29, 1986

SPOT COMMENTARY: Soviet Nuclear Accident

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT: The Soviet nuclear accident announced by Moscow yesterday possibly occurred last Friday or at the latest early Saturday.² [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the Chernobyl Power Plant [*less than 1 line not declassified*] extensive damage, indicating a large explosion occurred in the hall of the fourth reactor building.³ The event probably was initiated by some kind of loss-of-coolant-accident, which caused fuel melting. We believe that the associated high temperatures produced hydrogen and methane which caused the explosion.

[*3½ lines not declassified*] The continuing graphite fire will be a major problem for rescuers and plant personnel trying to contain radioactive release. The fire will continue to spread radioactive fallout as long as it burns. Firefighting efforts will be extremely difficult, however, since the radiation level in the reactor hall certainly is above lethal levels. A further concern is the possibility that water used to extinguish the fire could cause another nuclear reaction.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, 1981–1986, USSR: Nuclear Accident: Chernobyl April 29, 1986. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence. A note in an unknown hand attached to the report indicates that it was sent to Thompson for Poindexter, Pearson, and Bush. Shultz was traveling with the President to the ASEAN meeting in Indonesia, the G-7 Economic Summit in Tokyo, and meetings in South Korea and the Philippines from April 29 to May 9. Shultz wrote in his memoir: “The president and the first lady left Washington on April 25, 1986, for a thirteen-day trip to Indonesia and Japan. We made our way slowly westward. As we were leaving Honolulu for Bali, Indonesia, on April 28, distressing news reached *Air Force One*. Abnormally high levels of radioactivity had been reported by Sweden, Finland, and Denmark, all downwind from the Soviet Union. Experts in these Scandinavian countries first checked their own reactors and found no problems. Sweden demanded information from the Soviets.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 714)

² Friday, April 25.

³ The USSR Council of Ministers released the following brief statement on April 28: “An accident has occurred at the Chernobyl Atomic Power Station; one of the nuclear reactors has been damaged. Measures are being taken to eliminate the consequences of the accident. Aid is being given to the victims. A government commission has been established.” (*Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVIII, no. 16 (May 21, 1986), p. 1)

Principal damage from the releases will be caused by radioactive iodine, which concentrates in the thyroid. The Soviets could be expected to divert milk supplies, since radioiodine concentrates heavily in dairy products. Other major health threats are direct damage to lungs and contamination of water supplies, especially since the reactor is located near the main reservoir for the city of Kiev. The Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute reports that the region where the accident occurred is experiencing only light winds, exposing the population there to greater radioactivity.

SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN REACTION: The Soviets delayed admission of the disaster and continue to minimize domestic media coverage, with no local announcement that the government has established a commission to investigate the disaster. Media management of the accident appears to be a critical test of Gorbachev's year-long push for openness and publicity.

The enormity of the accident is reflected in Moscow's request for assistance from Sweden and West Germany and the Soviet Foreign Ministry's warning against travel to Kiev.

[1 paragraph (2½ lines) not declassified]

So far we have heard only from Poland and Hungary of Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies. Polish radio has admitted that a radioactive cloud passed over Poland "at a great height," but Warsaw apparently is seeking to minimize any possible health concerns. Nevertheless, the government has established a special commission to track the effects and has set up two hundred additional monitoring stations. Hungarian radio has indicated only that there were injuries during the disaster and has admitted that Kiev's water supply possibly was affected.

The Chernobyl disaster already has put Moscow on the defensive regarding its advocacy of civilian nuclear power programs, and Moscow is seeking to deflect criticism of its reactor program by unfavorable comparisons to nuclear accidents in the West. The Soviets are also trying to gain a propaganda advantage by stressing the "terrible consequences" of accidents involving military weapons or weapons production, whose abolition Gorbachev demanded early this year. Meanwhile, the disaster represents a significant setback to Moscow's efforts to increase its reliance on nuclear power, may affect Soviet electricity deliveries to Eastern Europe, and probably has impacted on agricultural production in one of the country's major grain-producing areas.

WESTERN EUROPE: Scandinavian countries have expressed considerable anger with the Soviets. Sweden in particular has protested Moscow's failure to notify its neighbors. Stockholm claims its original

inquiries in the USSR received no response.⁴ Only after high radiation levels were detected in Scandinavia and inquiries were made at the IAEA in Vienna did Moscow admit to the accident, [*less than 1 line not declassified*]. Stockholm has directed its Ambassador in Moscow to protest the incident. Denmark and Norway have also expressed concern over Soviet hesitancy to inform neighboring countries.

Meanwhile, the West Germans have detected two to three times the normal radiation levels in their northernmost state, Schleswig-Holstein. This still remains below those levels being measured in Scandinavia—four to five times above normal in Sweden, and 60 above normal in Norway. Bonn has offered to assist the Soviets.

Over the long term, we do not see the accident changing West European views on security issues such as a nuclear weapons-free zone, largely because both sides will use the accident to support their own arguments. Proponents will argue that such steps are now more necessary than ever, while opponents will point out that the radiation came from outside any zone currently being proposed. Opponents are also likely to use Moscow's slow reaction to raise new questions about Soviet credibility. Western Europe's nuclear industry is likely to suffer a blow, at least initially as ecologists use this accident to highlight the dangers accompanying nuclear energy. Political groups, like the West German Greens, may benefit from a heightened public sensitivity to the issue.

⁴ In telegram 3296 from Stockholm, April 29, the Embassy reported: "The Swedish Ambassador in Moscow will be using a pre-scheduled meeting at the Soviet Foreign Ministry on April 27 to demand clarification and details on the nuclear accident at the Chernobyl reactor in the Ukraine and to complain over the Soviet delay in notifying Sweden of the accident. Airborne nuclear debris from the accident was first registered by 'automatic' measuring stations in Sweden on April 26 but not read until opening of business the following day. A cloud of nuclear materials is now over most of the Scandinavian peninsula but poses no serious radiation threat and is expected to disperse shortly. Swedish authorities now speculate that the Chernobyl accident could have occurred early on Saturday, April 25, and that it has resulted in serious damage to the reactor's core and possibly a core melt." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860328-0229)

221. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, April 29, 1986, 1554Z

Tosec 80138/133191. Subject: Presidential Message on Reactor Accident.

1. Secret entire text.

2. Asst. Sec Ridgway will deliver points at para 3 below to Soviet Chargé Sokolov Tuesday morning.² Embassy should seek urgent appointment at highest available level of MFA to deliver parallel démarche using same points. Points should be delivered as an oral message from the President to Gorbachev. You should leave paper incorporating points for the record. You should make the two points at para 4 separately from the President's message.

3. Begin text of President's oral message:

—We wish to express our deep regret over the accident at the Chernobyl atomic energy station. We hope casualties and material damage are minimal.

—The President has directed me to assure you that the United States is prepared to make available to the Soviet Union humanitarian and technical assistance in dealing with this tragedy.

—We could send immediately a party of scientists from our Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) who can assist in determining and subsequently coordinating the best use of the resources from the United States nuclear safety and environmental protection programs.

—These resources can also be made available and include the following capabilities:

1. Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) which can predict radioactive material dispersion based on geography, weather, and the radioactive materials released.

2. Aerial Measuring System (AMS), a helicopter-borne radiological measurement system which can map the actual spread of radioactive contamination.

3. Radiological assistance teams including health physicists and equipment to measure radioactive contamination in water, air, and

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860328–0820. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Parris; cleared by Negroponte, McDaniel, and Devine; approved by Ridgway. Sent for information Immediate to Shultz; see footnote 1, Document 220.

² April 29.

soil. Also, technical assistance in assessing the environmental effects of the radioactive materials released.

4. Medical personnel experienced in the diagnosis and treatment of radiation exposure in people.

5. Technical expertise and assistance in radiological decontamination, recovery from a nuclear reactor accident, and minimizing environmental effects.

End text.

6. Begin text of additional points.

—We are of course concerned about the levels of radiation released as a result of the accident. Press reports indicate higher than normal radiation levels as far north as Finland.

—Since radiological damage or accident assessment issues with international implications may result, we would appreciate any additional details you can provide on the Chernobyl accident.

Whitehead

222. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz in Bali¹

Washington, April 29, 1986, 2350Z

Tosec 80165/133853. Subject: Information Memo: Soviet Nuclear Disaster (S/S 8613554).²

(Secret entire text)

To: The Secretary

From: EUR—Rozanne L. Ridgway

Subject: Update on Soviet Nuclear Disaster

Chargé Combs presented our offer of assistance to Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmyrtnykh today. The Soviets expressed appreciation for our offer of help and promised to get back to us.³ Bessmyrtnykh said

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Robinson; cleared by Parris, Negro-ponte, Stratford, Bova, Wilkinson, and Pace; approved by Ridgway.

² The information memorandum was drafted by Robinson and cleared by Parris, Stratford, and Negro-ponte.

³ See Document 221.

the government's technical commission is hard at work to find answers. The Embassy reports that Soviet media now characterizes the accident as a "disaster", but is providing few details.

- In Washington, Soviet Chargé Sokolov reacted similarly to Ridgway's offer of assistance. He said that regardless of whether or not the Soviets take advantage of our offer of assistance, they will view it as a positive gesture.⁴

- The Swedes confirm that the Soviets have officially approached them for assistance in fighting the reactor fire. The FRG Science Attaché reported that the Soviets have contacted private West German firms for assistance in handling the fire. Both the Swedes and the Finns have asked us for any information we have on the status of the reactor accident, since they have been unable to get any from the Soviets. We will provide what information we can.

- The Embassy is hearing rumours of hundreds of fatalities, but the only official word so far is from a Moscow TV broadcast Tuesday evening reporting that 2 people have died, the radiation situation has stabilized, and three populated areas around the nuclear station have been evacuated. A USG traveller leaving Kiev Monday reported observing no unusual activity in that city.

- Based on a Soviet MFA statement that no travel is being permitted to the Kiev and Chernobyl areas, we are issuing a travel advisory. We're incorporating these elements into an evening reading item.

- The following points were used in the noon press briefing today in response to press inquiries:

—Assistant Secretary Ridgway met with Soviet Chargé Sokolov this morning and expressed, on behalf of the President, the United States' deep regret over the accident at the Chernobyl atomic energy station. We hope casualties and material damage are minimal. The

⁴ In telegram Tosec 80173/134124 to Moscow and repeated to Shultz, April 30, the Department reported that Isakov delivered the following message from Gorbachev to Reagan on the nuclear accident at 6 p.m. on April 29: "1. As it has already been reported in the Soviet press, an accident took place on April 26 in one of the power block rooms of the Chernobyl atomic power station, 130 kilometers to the north of Kiev. The accident has resulted in the destruction of a part of the reactor building structure, caused damage to the reactor and some leak of radioactive substance. Three remaining power blocks have been stopped, they are in order and are in operation reserve. 2. According to the measurements which are continuously being taken by Soviet services, the radiation situation in the regions immediately adjacent to the place of the accident has required partial evacuation of the population. Due to the measures taken the radiation situation has been stabilized. Additional measures to eliminate the consequences of the accident are being taken. 3. According to the data of the Soviet competent authorities, dissemination of radioactive contamination in the western, northern, and southern directions has been detected. The levels of contamination are somewhat above permissible norms, but not to an extent that would require special measures to protect the population." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860330-0576)

United States is prepared to make available to the Soviet Union humanitarian and technical assistance in dealing with this accident.

—We learned of the nuclear accident at Chernobyl from the TASS announcement on Monday afternoon. The Soviet Government has not contacted us through diplomatic channels.

—We do not have an accurate estimate of the number of Americans who may be in the area affected by the accident and are in contact with Intourist, the Soviet travel agency, about American tourists who may be affected.

—Our Embassy in Moscow is in contact with registered American citizens known to be in the affected area. The primary responsibility for notifying residents of potential danger and for taking steps to safeguard the public obviously lies with the Soviet authorities. We are in contact with the Soviets on the safety of our citizens.

Whitehead

223. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, April 29, 1986

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER

This is a very preliminary and tentative effort to scope out the implications of this disaster and related intelligence tasks.

Although it is by far the largest nuclear power plant accident in world history, the immediate effects are still far from clear.

If we accept Soviet official claims that two people died in the immediate event at the plant and the other three reactors were shut down, then the Soviets did use forewarning of a meltdown (possibly up to 24 hours) to evacuate the plant. But this is still very uncertain.

We have reports that evacuations in a 30 km radius are taking place. If these started well before the actual meltdown, immediate loss of life in the neighborhood may be quite small. But we also have rumors

¹ Source: Reagan Library, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC: Records, 1983–1989, Chernobyl; NLR-170-8-27-2-3. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]; Sensitive. Prepared by the NIO/USSR and others.

of hundreds, even thousands, of dead already, and of hospitals being heavily taxed. This suggests that only the plant took advantage of early warning. Again, very uncertain.

Long-term effects, resulting from radiation and associated ecological impact, are very difficult to predict on the basis of our sparse current data, and will be influenced by variables such as weather and winds in the immediate future and Soviet protective measures.

Apparently the fire in the graphite of the reactor continues to inject new radioactive contaminants into the atmosphere.

Some Implications

The direct impact of the facility loss on the Soviet power economy is likely to be small. If the Soviets are obliged for safety reasons to shut down other reactors, it could have a noticeable impact.

Large economic impacts could well arise from:

The disruption of large areas downwind of the radiation source due to evacuations, shutdown of plants and facilities, and decontamination activities.

The impact of radiation on agriculture, especially the dairy industry.

Pollution of water supplies, especially downstream on the Dniepr toward Kiev.

The social impact of the accident will depend upon the number of casualties already suffered and expected over the longer term. Even if the number of people physically affected in the short run is small, the lingering public health effects of this kind of radiological event could magnify social impact.

A major concern of Soviet citizens will be how well their system looked out for their safety. And it will be of great importance to the regime to influence the way this is perceived, either by effective action or, as is the usual Soviet practice, by manipulating information.

The disaster could exacerbate ethnic and class resentments because, on present evidence, it seems likely that lower classes and Baltic and Ukrainian populations will suffer disproportionately.

If there is widespread death, illness, and dislocation, this event will be a severe psychological blow to the Gorbachev regime and its gospel of optimism, even if the economic effects are limited.

No matter what the regime does or says, many Soviets will blame their suffering on a negligent system which only looks out for the nomenklatura.

In a population where ancient superstitions still play a role, Chernobyl will be an evil omen.

In any case, the system under Gorbachev's new leadership will be put to a politically and psychologically important test:

Did it react with the honesty, efficiency, promptness, and public-mindedness he calls for?

Or did it manifest the usual sloth, carelessness, evasions, and outright lies?

Moscow will show a strong inclination to find prominent people to blame and punish. Shcherbitskiy, the Ukrainian party boss, is likely to come under renewed fire.

Although East European customers for Soviet electric power may face some disruptions and Soviet nuclear power plants are likely to lose their market for a while, the principal international effects of this event are likely to be political and psychological:

Governments and publics in both East and West Europe could be alienated in lasting ways by Soviet failure to provide any early warning, when something like three days were available. This will noticeably dull Soviet persuasiveness on all manner of negotiations, from arms control to trade, and their related propaganda efforts.

The accident will undoubtedly inspire the Green and other environmentally oriented political movements to new efforts directed against nuclear power.

If there are tangible environmental impacts in West Europe, such a rise in the rate of cancer deaths, these could linger as problems for Soviet diplomacy in the years ahead.

Some Intelligence Tasks

Our main tasks will be to assess the magnitude of this accident and to track the implications noted above and others that will surely develop, technical, economic, social, and political. In addition, we can already identify some other intelligence concerns.

The causes and phenomenology of this accident are of great interest simply because of the insight they will provide into nuclear safety and protective measures, a world-wide concern.

If we target appropriately *now*, we ought to get some insight into the effectiveness of the Soviet civil defense organization in the nearest thing to its "design task" short of nuclear war itself.

We are disturbed by the lack of intelligence evidence, prior to the Swedish disclosures and the near simultaneous official Soviet announcement, that this disaster was unfolding over some three days. We are especially disturbed because it occurred right in the heart of NATO's "warning of war" domain. We need to find out why.

We may be asked to judge whether it is safe for official and unofficial US travelers to be in affected parts of the USSR. This may get us into the business of—or give us a case for—overt radiation monitoring within the USSR.

We shall want to derive intelligence from any Western organizations who become involved in containing the accident (e.g., fighting the fire), cleaning up, or contributing to medical needs.

Unless the Soviet government is uncharacteristically prompt and candid in disclosing information about this accident, US intelligence will be a principal source of data and analysis on it, to inform everything from US policy to world opinion. This is likely to impose some new kinds of pressure for declassifying otherwise sensitive information or for sharing it with foreign governments. This is something the world believes it has a need to know about in detail. The protection of sources and methods will not be recognized as a comparably important concern.

224. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz in Bali¹

Washington, April 30, 1986, 0233Z

Tosec 80174/134125. Subject: Information Memo: Soviet Nuclear Accident as of 1800 GMT 29 Apr 86 S/S 8613570.

To: The Secretary

From: INR—Morton I. Abramowitz

Subject: Information Memo: Soviet Nuclear Accident as of 1800 GMT 29 Apr 86.

1. Damage Assessment:

An accident occurred at reactor #4 of the Chernobyl nuclear power station probably last Friday or at the latest early Saturday morning.² The Chernobyl nuclear power station consists of four operating reactors conjoined with generator halls in a single building. Reactor #4 is a 1000 MW RBMK type reactor. It is graphite-moderated, light-water cooled, and low enriched uranium fueled (the fuel is not contained in a steel

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860330–0613. Secret; Immediate; Noform; Wnintel. Drafted by Siegel (INR/SFA); approved by Lowenthal (INR/SFA).

² On April 30, White House Press Secretary Speakes issued an official statement on the Chernobyl accident from the Bali Sol Hotel in Bali, Indonesia, announcing that Reagan had “ordered the establishment of an interagency task force” to “coordinate the government’s response to the nuclear reactor accident at Chernobyl.” The statement provided information on the accident and on U.S. diplomatic contacts with the Soviets to offer “humanitarian and technical assistance.” For the full text of the statement, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book I, pp. 536–537. Reagan, who was in Bali, wrote in his personal diary: “This was to be a day off like in Hawaii. It was interrupted by a briefing on the nuclear plant emergency in Chernobyl Russia. As usual the Russians wont put out any facts but it is evident that a radioactive cloud is spreading beyond the Soviet border.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 594)

vessel as is used in US reactors); it went into operation in 1983 and has a number of safety systems including a “containment building.”

Preliminary analysis of imagery of April 29 shows that:

—Reactor building #4 and the adjacent generator halls have sustained extensive damage, probably the result of an explosion. There is a large hole in the roof of the reactor building; severely distorted roof support members; debris along the north side of the reactor building; numerous missing roof panels on the adjacent generator hall and smoke/vapor emitting from the reactor building all of which attest to the severity of the accident. Additionally, all cooling-water pumping activity has ceased and some reactor cooling water may have been diverted to adjacent overflow basins. Reactors 1, 2 and 3 all do not appear to be operating.

—In related activity, command and control and damage assessment operations are in progress. Numerous pieces of emergency equipment are in the area, including fire trucks, armored vehicles and mobile satellite communications vehicles. A Halo heavy-lift helicopter is in flight over the destroyed reactor building.

[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

2. Cause of the Accident:

[7½ lines not declassified] The fire will continue to spread radioactive fallout as long as it burns. Firefighting efforts will be extremely difficult because the radiation level in the reactor hall is well above lethal levels. A further concern is the possibility that water used to extinguish the fire could cause another nuclear reaction.

A DOE analyst commented that only the British have the experience to cope with this problem. The accident can only be brought under control by smothering the fire—such as covering with sand or earth—and taking measures to “poison” the nuclear reaction by using material containing boron. This entire process still presents a tremendous problem in terms of actually getting equipment and personnel close enough to the reactor.

Soviet State radio has characterized the accident as a “disaster.” TASS admitted today that two people had died in the accident. However, there is an unconfirmed press report (CNN cable news) that 2,000 people were killed.

3. Evacuation of Population:

The reactors are located in the town of Pripjat, which was built near Chernobyl in the 1970s specifically to house the reactor complex. Although April 29 press reports claim the Pripjat population is between 25,000 and 30,000, [2 lines not declassified].

[3½ lines not declassified] Press reports have said that buses have been commandeered from Kiev for the evacuation at the site. [1½ lines

not declassified] there are logistical problems, as Kiev is 133 km south of the accident. [*1½ lines not declassified*]

5. Outlook:

[*1 paragraph (7½ lines) not declassified*]

AFTAC will fly an air sampling mission against the contaminated air mass off the Norway coast today. Results are expected in two days. In addition, stationary samplers on the periphery of the USSR will be looking for increased concentrations of radioactive gases such as tritium and xenon. Huge concentrations of radioactive xenon are expected to be detected in Stockholm and eventually in Japan. Finnish atomic energy experts have said that the radioactivity in their region was diminishing because of wind shifts. The winds are fairly light at present, increasing the hazard to the local population.

Whitehead

225. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz in Tokyo¹

Washington, May 3, 1986, 2003Z

Tosec 80421/140146. Subject: Soviet Nuclear Accident.

To: The Secretary

From: S/P—Richard H. Solomon

Subject: Information Memorandum: Soviet Nuclear Accident: A Strategy for U.S. Response—S/S 8614022²

1. Summary: The nuclear accident at Chernobyl has left the Soviet Union in a weakened position—at home and abroad. We can benefit from these Soviet difficulties, but we must proceed with some caution, lest we open ourselves to charges of self-righteousness when current European anger at the Soviets cools. The memorandum that follows outlines the strategy to guide our reaction to the Chernobyl disaster in a way which maximizes Western interest. End summary

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860343–0808. Secret; Immediate; Stadis; Exdis. Drafted by Khalilzad; cleared by McKinley, Talcott, and Bleakley; approved by Solomon.

² The information memorandum was drafted by Khalilzad, cleared by Parris and Negroponte, and approved by Solomon.

2. Soviet and U.S. Vulnerabilities

3. Thus far we have responded to the Chernobyl accident with the right mixture of concern, sympathy and generosity.³ We have offered our assistance to the victims and shown reserve in pointing the finger of blame at Soviet behavior, leaving the Europeans most directly affected to carry the main burden of complaining about Soviet failure to provide adequate information.

4. Analyses by INR and other sources indicate that the physical impact of the Soviet nuclear accident is considerably less than that originally assumed in the West. At the same time, it is considerably more than the Soviets would lead the world to believe. This would seem to leave the Soviets and us vulnerable in the following areas:

A) Gorbachev's leadership style and credibility domestically, in the Warsaw Pact, and in the West is further undermined.

B) The combined impact on Soviet agriculture, energy production and exports is likely to slow the Soviet economy, but to a degree difficult to estimate at this time.

C) Soviet mastery of and reliance on nuclear technology will be under intense scrutiny throughout the world.

D) From the U.S. perspective, we are vulnerable to being accused of exaggerating and exploiting the Soviet disaster for our own purposes. Our democratic society may actually cause us to take even more severe steps to limit nuclear technology than the Soviets take. Public opinion may also put even heavier pressure on us to make concessions on limiting nuclear arms than it does on the Soviets.

E) The environmentalists and Greens in England and West Germany and perhaps other parts of Western Europe will be greatly strengthened. This could be bad news for conservatives like Helmut Kohl (facing elections next January) and Margaret Thatcher.

5. What Should We Do?

A) Rebuild confidence in the West's peaceful uses of atomic energy and emphasize Soviet shortcomings and the differences between our nuclear programs.

—We should prepare a series of concrete proposals for strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency to institutionalize safety standards for nuclear plants and to strengthen provisions for disclosure of information on nuclear accidents. We should call on the Soviets and others to enter international arrangements calling for the obligatory

³ On May 1, the White House issued a second statement on the Chernobyl accident. For the full text of the statement, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book I, pp. 539–540. See also Document 221.

reporting of nuclear incidents. Our goal should be a much strengthened agreement on these and related issues to which all nations would be asked to subscribe. While the Soviets may be reluctant to join such an international arrangement they would suffer costs in failure to subscribe to international standards including a probable substantial decline in their export market for nuclear-related technology.

B) Be forthcoming in offering our assistance to the Soviets and East Europeans in treating both the short-term and the long-term effects of the disaster.

—This includes offers of medical assistance, and help in assessing the safety of their nuclear plants as well as food sales where appropriate.

C) In arms control talks, we should press harder now on the issue of verifiability.

—The accident is also likely to fuel European and American public support for controlling and reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons, as well as banning or limiting nuclear tests. This mood will present an opportune time for U.S. NST negotiators to demonstrate our willingness to move forward and to press the Soviets to adopt more realistic positions.

D) In the area of regional conflicts, we may be able to make some headway by looking for means to increase the costs to the Soviets of supporting their clients in a time of economic vulnerability.

E) On the propaganda front we need to proceed with great care.

—The concerns of Eastern and Western Europeans are already high. The impact of the accident on their relations with the USSR may be greater by letting them reach their own conclusions without making this an East-West issue and a loyalty test to the Soviet Union. We need to take positive measures such as the IAEA and aid initiatives mentioned above. We need to demonstrate by contrast how we and the Soviets deal with nuclear accidents, particularly with respect to timely disclosure. Then let the record speak for itself.

—We must be careful not to “rub the Soviets’ noses in the dirt” and instead continue to encourage the small but significant changes in their behavior, such as permitting an Embassy officer to testify at a congressional office.

Whitehead

226. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 5, 1986, 1428Z

7552. Subject: Chernobyl: Domestic Fallout.

1. C—Entire text.

Summary

2. The domestic political consequences of the Chernobyl accident are likely to be less severe than either the foreign political or ecological consequences. However, they cannot be excluded. Ligachev's visit to Chernobyl underscored the Party's political concern, and may hint at personnel moves against those held responsible. Gorbachev's new spirit of "openness" has been proved somewhat hollow. The disaster could be used as a wedge to drive Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitskiy out of office if Gorbachev wants him moved aside. Moscow party chief Yel'tsin's remarks to journalists in West Germany go farther than the apparent official line, and raise the question of whether he has overstepped his bounds. End summary.

3. The domestic political consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear power station disaster are—by Western standards—almost inconsequential. Tight control of the media, and the instinctive reaction of the Soviet population to swallow the party line combine to limit the damage an event such as Chernobyl might otherwise cause. However, there are some significant domestic considerations.

The Site Visit

4. CPSU Secretary and Politburo member Ligachev, Premier Ryzhkov and Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy visited the disaster "area" May 2. Gorbachev pointedly did not participate in the tour, probably because this would have underscored the seriousness of the situation more than the Soviets would like, and because he undoubtedly wants as little personal involvement as possible. Ryzhkov, as head of the government, and Shcherbitskiy, as Ukrainian Party boss, were understandable inclusions in the party. The choice of Ligachev, rather than Zaykov as ranking central Party representative was a vivid demonstration that the Party's concern with the disaster is more political than technical. Also, as cadre supervisor, Ligachev's presence may

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860346–0183. Confidential; Priority. Sent for information to the Moscow Political Collective.

foreshadow the axe that may soon fall on those held “responsible” for the incident.

Glasnost

5. Gorbachev’s concept of Glasnost has been dealt a blow by the knee-jerk cover up reaction of the authorities to the disaster. January 5, “Sovetskaya Rossiya” printed a letter decrying the practice of hushing up domestic disasters, while covering foreign ones. This view obviously did not prevail this time around, and the news that has come out has been slow and not very convincing.

Shcherbitskiy

6. Shcherbitskiy may bear little responsibility for operation of the plant and the disaster itself. However, the next few months will provide many opportunities for things to go wrong as the local authorities deal with the consequences of the accident. The high-level site visit stressed (according to press accounts) aid for the victims, provision of services to evacuated populations, and arrangements to put them to work. If Gorbachev wants to get rid of Shcherbitskiy (and that is a major if), the accident and its consequences may very well provide a perfect opportunity.

Yel'tsin

7. Boris Yel'tsin, in Hamburg for the German Communist Party Congress, has provided far more details about the disaster than any other public Soviet source. Only time will tell whether this is a course that Gorbachev will applaud, or whether Yel'tsin has overstepped his leash. We suspect the former, but cannot exclude the latter.

Hartman

227. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz in Tokyo¹

Washington, May 6, 1986, 0004Z

Tosec 80491/141349. Eyes Only for Hill From Timbie. Subject: Arms Reductions, SDI and Containing Soviet Power.

1. Text follows of a Nitze-Timbie revision of your paper.² Begin text: Arms Reductions, SDI, and Containing Soviet Power

—Stripped of its superior military capabilities, the Soviet Union would be an unimpressive power.

- Its political and socio-economic systems are relics of the past.
- A heavy industry nation in an “information age.”
- Its vast conventional forces have been of limited effectiveness in Afghanistan.
- Losing ground to a modernizing China.
- Despised in Eastern Europe.
- No longer a model for all but small groups of conspiratorial leadership groups in the Third World. Much of the Third World is turning or would like to turn to the West.

—But Moscow has one big area of comparative advantage: The ability to build and deploy big land-based strategic nuclear weapons systems. Because of our congressional, environmental, budgetary, etc.,

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Eggplant II, Eggplant Travel Kit 1985–1986. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Timbie; cleared by McKinley and Talcott; approved by Timbie. In a meeting with Reagan on May 14, Shultz reiterated the points addressed in this paper. As Shultz recalled in his memoir: “I talked to the president at some length the next day. ‘The Soviets,’ I said, ‘contrary to the Defense Department and the CIA line, are not an omnipotent, omnipresent power gaining ground and threatening to wipe us out. On the contrary, we are winning. In fact, we are miles ahead. Their ideology is a loser. ‘They have one thing going for them: military power,’ I said. ‘But even there they have only one area of genuine comparative advantage—the capacity to develop, produce, and deploy accurate, powerful, mobile land-based ballistic missiles.’ I elaborated on this point, which I had made to President Reagan many times: ‘There’s only one thing the Soviet Union does better than we do: that is to produce and deploy ballistic missiles. And that’s not because they are better at engineering. They’re not. Our political system resists basing ballistic missiles on our own territory. But their ballistic missiles threaten our security directly. Not since we beat the British at the time of our revolution has anything threatened our country like the ballistic missile does. ‘So we must focus on reductions in ballistic missiles,’ I said. ‘Reductions are the name of the game. The only way to achieve reductions is through negotiations. The negotiation of large reductions in strategic missiles is the most important objective for the security of the United States. We have a tremendous amount to gain by bringing the number of strategic missiles down. We must start in 1986.’” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 716)

² Reference is unclear.

constraints. The Soviets will continue to be much better at this than we ever will be.

—So it is in our interest to get a handle on this. An unconstrained world would not favor U.S. interests.

—President Reagan's initial arms reduction proposals were said to be not serious—because he called for radical reductions aimed at eliminating nuclear weapons altogether.

—But today the Soviet Union is talking along the lines of the President's agenda.

—Given the reality of the situation, it is unwise to denounce in sweeping terms past treaties and agreements, even though expired or unratified, and it is equally unwise to argue that we should not seek further agreements. The right kind of treaty constraints with reasonable means of compliance and verification are to our advantage.

—Therefore we should resist domestic pressures to break out of SALT II by exceeding numerical limits at least through 1986. The cost of trading in older systems is low and the Soviets are better positioned to expand their forces than we are.

—And we should devote ourselves for the rest of this year to getting a deal that furthers American interests.

—The deal: In order to get useful offensive strategic reductions along the lines of our START proposal we will have to agree to some kind of a handle on SDI deployment. One approach might be to seek new understandings under the ABM Treaty, clarifying the status of permitted testing and including some near-term understandings on non-deployment. (Perhaps a policy statement that we would not contemplate withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in less than three years from prior notice of intent, or an agreement that the process of reductions would be contingent on continued commitment to the ABM Treaty.) We would also seek INF and nuclear testing components in the deal if possible.

—SDI therefore would:

1. Be recognized formally as a continuing research program. This would lock it in as a legacy to the next President, ensuring that he will have the information needed in the 1990's to make an informed decision whether to proceed with such large-scale defenses.

2. Serve in the meantime—because of its potential deployability—as continuing leverage on the Soviets to remain in compliance and keep strategically significant reductions coming.

—In working out this agreement, we would test the Soviet professions of a new attitude toward verification.

—Our defense modernization and arms control programs work hand in hand. The success to date of our defense program puts us in

a stronger position to negotiate our efforts to reach agreement on reductions and continuation of our interim restraint policy enhance public, congressional, and allied support for continuing our defense program in a difficult budgetary environment.

—If by early next year our effort to work out the basic elements of a new agreement for Summit II produces no progress. Then the cost of continued adherence to the current regime could outweigh the benefits. This should be handled so as to maximize our changes for getting things done in a positive way.

End text.

Whitehead

228. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 8, 1986, 2033Z

7851. Subject: May 8 Meeting With Shevardnadze. Ref: State 133017.²

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Introduction and summary: Ambassador received appointment with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze late afternoon May 8 in connection with demarche on bilateral matters (reftel) and Ambassador's May 10 departure for consultations. Demarche was requested on April 29. Shevardnadze was joined by Acting Chief USA Department Mikolchak; DCM accompanied Ambassador. Meeting lasted about 90 minutes.

3. Ambassador first raised Chernobyl accident, reiterating President's sympathy and offer of assistance, and forcefully rebutting assertions of "orchestrated campaign" against USSR.³ Shevardnadze made the obligatory effort to defend Soviet public handling of incident and

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860005–0359. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis.

² In telegram 133017 to Moscow, April 29, the Department forwarded the text of a demarche on bilateral issues. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860005–0176)

³ See Documents 221 and 222.

claimed criticism of Soviet Union, including that voiced by President Reagan, was difficult to comprehend.⁴

4. On bilateral relations, Ambassador drew upon talking points in reftel, emphasizing that restoration of the process of high-level dialogue was needed to stimulate resolution of key problems. Progress in at least one arms control area was most important, but required focus on something specific, as opposed to sweeping conceptions. Shevardnadze said Soviet Union was prepared for reasonable compromise and favored continuation of the dialogue at all levels. However, the current situation did not allow placing the question of a Foreign Ministers' meeting on the agenda. This would take "a certain period of time." End introduction and summary.

5. The Ambassador opened the meeting by reiterating the President's expression of sympathy and offer of assistance regarding the Chernobyl accident. As a country that had experienced a recent nuclear accident, and believed in nuclear power, we knew the difficulty of bringing people to understand what had happened. We also knew the importance of providing as much information as possible about the present situation and measures to avert future accidents. The U.S. was prepared to play its full part in rendering assistance, both bilaterally and in appropriate international organizations.

6. The Ambassador wished to assure Shevardnadze there was no "orchestrated campaign" against the Soviet Union, as some Soviet commentators were claiming. This amounted to a most uninformed misreading of opinion beyond Soviet borders. If the Soviet leadership had been told this, it should find advisors who knew the actual situation in the external world. There existed great concern over atomic energy in the United States and other countries; the USG faced this problem every day, particularly in reaching agreement over the location of nuclear power facilities. We therefore were as interested as the Soviet Union in persuading people that accidents like the present one could be reasonably handled and that future accidents could be averted.

7. Shevardnadze responded that General Secretary Gorbachev had received the President's message and had expressed gratitude for its contents. Many letters were being received, including from American scientists, public figures and others, and Shevardnadze wished to

⁴ During his May 4 radio address, Reagan addressed the Chernobyl accident and stated: "The Soviets' handling of this incident manifests a disregard for the legitimate concerns of people everywhere. A nuclear accident that results in contaminating a number of countries with radioactive material is not simply an internal matter. The Soviets owe the world an explanation." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book I, pp. 554–555) The issue of Chernobyl was raised again during his May 7 news conference in Tokyo. (*Ibid.*, pp. 564–565)

express thanks on behalf of the Soviet people. An American medical specialist and his colleagues were doing major work in saving lives; this was appreciated.

8. A tragedy of this sort could happen in any nuclear power station, in any country, Shevardnadze continued. Concern over the incident was completely understandable. But other aspects were difficult to explain. "Some" were attempting to make political capital and blacken the Soviet Union—whether organized or not, well, this was another matter. This effort was simply inhumane and immoral. The U.S. President's public rebuke of the Soviet Government—that insufficient information was provided—was difficult to comprehend. Information was in fact given on a timely basis, but only when the special commission had developed the essential facts. Any attempt to hide the accident would have been impossible. So the President's criticisms were not understood.

9. Shevardnadze added he had just come from a meeting (probably the Thursday Politburo meeting) with Gorbachev,⁵ who had asked Shevardnadze to once again thank the U.S. for its sympathy and offer of assistance.

10. The Ambassador said there had been really only one problem: The first announcement of the accident was made by the Swedish Government, not the Soviet Government. If the USSR had made the initial statement, and followed up with daily bulletins, people would have understood.

11. Shevardnadze replied that "serious people" knew such accidents were difficult to sort out. The USSR approached this question seriously and responsibly. Secondly, the Chernobyl accident was a very bitter practical, scientific and historical lesson. The cause was still not established. When the investigation is complete, the results will be made available to all governments so that such accidents can be prevented. Meanwhile, all attempts to blacken Soviet policy are doomed to fail.

12. A final lesson of Chernobyl, Shevardnadze said, was the "terrible" nature of atomic energy. If, under peaceful conditions, a great scientific and technical power like the USSR could not at first control the Chernobyl situation, a nuclear military exchange would surely be a grave catastrophe threatening the end of all mankind. The Soviet Union therefore was resolved to redouble its efforts to eliminate all nuclear weapons, and to commence the process by a total ban on nuclear testing, peaceful as well as military.

⁵ May 8.

13. The Ambassador agreed that a tragedy like this provided impetus to do all possible to create more stability and avoid conflicts. Our leaders, on each side, were agreed on the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. Our immediate problem, which would be discussed when the Ambassador returned to Washington, was how to continue the dialogue unfortunately called off by the Soviet side.

14. At the November meeting in Geneva we had agreed to work on specific goals: a 50 percent cut in strategic systems, an interim INF agreement, and analysis of the problems of space defense. Negotiations were continuing, but political impetus was needed. Thus we were interested in high-level meetings leading to a 1986 summit in the United States. It was in our view also important for the ministers to review other aspects of the relationship. We would provide the Soviet side with a paper giving our detailed views on where the bilateral relationship stood and underscoring the importance of human rights. It was important that we make progress in our arms control field, and in the Ambassador's view this was possible if we focused on something very specific; as opposed to sweeping but ill-defined goals.

14A. Meanwhile, we were disappointed that the Ministerial meeting had been put off. We at no time felt our actions in Libya had anything to do with the Soviet Union. Our actions stemmed from a very specific quarrel with Qadhafi.

15. Shevardnadze said it had not been easy to decide to call off his Washington trip. The Soviet side had prepared seriously and developed good, constructive proposals. Unfortunately, the actions of the administration did not allow the Soviet side to realize its plans.⁶

16. Shevardnadze asked that his words be understood correctly. He could not characterize U.S. action against Libya as other than unveiled aggression, a barbarous attack against a sovereign government with which the USSR had relations, friendly relations (Shevardnadze paused before adding "friendly"). So the first point was that the very fact of U.S. "punishment" against Libya for moral and political reasons prohibited his meeting with Secretary Shultz.

17. Secondly, U.S. actions of this sort were fraught with serious and even catastrophic consequences. The USSR had "hundreds" of specialists in Libya, including military specialists. Soviet ships and aircraft were in the Mediterranean and surrounding areas. Hence such actions could lead to uncontrolled situations having most catastrophic results. The U.S. side should keep these two aspects in mind, because they compelled the Soviet side to cancel the Ministerial meeting.

⁶ See Document 216.

18. The Soviet side favors continuing the dialogue, Shevardnadze went on. Our delegation just arrived in Geneva with instructions to reach agreement faithful to the “spirit of Geneva.” The Soviet side was ready for reasonable compromise even where none seemed possible. But the current situation did not allow us to place a Ministerial or summit meeting on the agenda. This would evidently require more time. The Soviet side would judge if USG expressions were followed by corresponding actions. A certain amount of time (“kakoye-to vremya”) was needed. “Today’s situation was unsuitable.” It was unfortunate that events had gone this way, but the Soviet side was in no way at fault.

19. The Ambassador noted that we would be patient. Regarding Libya, he did not think the Soviet Union would have acted differently if it possessed proof another government was planning violence against its citizens. We had shared our proof with our allies, and surely the Soviet side had noticed the actions recently taken in Western Europe against Libyan Missions there. Shevardnadze commented that the Soviet side knew of no such proof, but could not accept the use of U.S. military might against the Libyan people even if such proof existed.

20. The Ambassador said he would report the Foreign Minister’s remarks to the President and the Secretary, and hoped the time would soon come when the vital process of high-level dialogue could be resumed.

21. As the meeting concluded, Shevardnadze asked that his personal regards be conveyed to President and Mrs. Reagan as well as to Secretary and Mrs. Shultz.

Hartman

229. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz in Manila¹

Washington, May 10, 1986, 0009Z

Tosec 80699/148244. For the Secretary From Amb Richard Kennedy. Subject: Blix Readout on Chernobyl Incident.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860362–0646. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Moscow and UN Mission in Vienna. Drafted by Bisdee; cleared by Negroponte, Pascoe, Harty, and Collins; approved by Kennedy.

1. At 3:00 pm 5/9/86, I received a call from IAEA Director General Hans Blix, who had just returned to Vienna, to give me a readout on his discussions and observations in Moscow, including a flight over the Chernobyl reactor.² Morris Rosen, a U.S.-national safety expert at the IAEA, who accompanied Blix to the Soviet Union, also participated in the call.

2. Blix noted that he and Rosen, accompanied by A.M. Petrosyants, Chairman of the State Committee on Atomic Energy, actually flew over the reactor site (400 meters in elevation to within 800 meters of the plant itself). Radiation detection equipment on board registered very low radiation levels—nothing in the dangerous range. According to Rosen, the plant is essentially sealed from the top. The Soviets are putting concrete underneath reactor 4 which in essence will create a floor under the reactor. The entire building will be entombed in concrete. They also are pumping gaseous nitrogen in pipes under the reactor for cooling purposes and to assist in the inerting process. The Soviets have infra-red measurements and they say the temperature in reactor 4 is going down, although it is still hot.

Rosen reported the Soviets said that the safety systems at reactor 3 are intact and functioning, and that cooling water is available. The Soviets claim the original accident did not damage reactor 3 operationally. Blix and Rosen reported they saw no activity associated with reactor 3 when they flew over the reactor site.

The Soviets claimed that all units at the reactor site are manned. Whereas normally there would be 150 people on site, now there are 30, enough for shutdown conditions. The Soviets say it is possible for people to be on the site despite radiation levels because there is a “safe room” inside the control room in which properly suited up personnel can function.

Rosen and Blix said the Soviets admit they are dealing with the unknown. Rosen reported one of the Soviets as saying “this is something we have never dealt with or seen before. We don’t really know everything that is going on.” The Soviets cannot describe the present state of the core of the reactor. Rosen said they are taking “heroic measures” at the site.

Blix reported that the Soviets have agreed to give daily radiation readings to the IAEA, and in fact the IAEA has already received the

² Hans Blix, Director General of the IAEA, went to the Soviet Union from May 5 to 9 at the invitation of the Soviet Government to discuss the accident at Chernobyl. Telegram 7868 from Moscow, May 9, reported on Blix’s May 9 press conference at the close of his visit. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860361–0576) For a summary of post-accident IAEA reviews and reports, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1986, pp. 584–586.

first readings (the readings are apparently taken at 1:00 am each morning Soviet time). There is a monitoring checkpoint 1.68 kilometers from the plant and five points on the Soviet's western border.

Blix said that in addition to regular readouts of data, the Soviets also agreed to a proposal on a program for early warning systems, to a post-accident analysis, and that there should be developed and proposed increased technical means for safety systems in these reactors. Rosen said his impression is that the "Soviets will agree to almost anything." Rosen emphasized his impression that the accident was and continues to be an intensely humbling experience for the Soviets.

[Omitted here is material transmitted in error which includes parts of the paragraphs above and below.]

I asked Blix within what time frame he thought the post-accident analysis might take place. He said soon, and that the Soviets have in mind the TMI experience "which they are going to beat."³ I asked Blix if that suggested the Soviets will be prepared for a post-accident analysis by the June IAEA Board of Governors meeting. He replied he did not know about that, but it should be not long after.

Blix and Rosen reported that life in Kiev seemed reasonably normal for the majority of the population. People are in the streets going about their business. Although some sort of an alert or advisory had been given for people to stay indoors, there seemed to be a lot of vehicles and pedestrians in the streets.

Rosen also said it seems clear that the Soviets are assessing this accident as human error, although they are not going to state this publicly at this time. When they are ready, the Soviets will describe the accident. They are quite confident they know what caused the accident, but want to be absolutely sure before they say it publicly. They do not want to allege failure on anyone's part until they are absolutely convinced. FYI: Rosen at this point said he had just heard that the Germans were calling for an emergency meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors. We subsequently learned that Kohl had proposed this. End FYI.

Armacost

³ Reference is to the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear generating station near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in March 1979.

230. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Platt) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, May 14, 1986

SUBJECT

Gorbachev Speech on Chernobyl

In his first public remarks on Chernobyl Gorbachev blasted U.S. and Western leaders for exploiting the accident to divert attention from Soviet arms control initiatives.² He thanked American doctors for their assistance (the U.S. was the only nation explicitly singled out for thanks) but said that leading circles in the U.S. and its allies, especially the FRG, were using Chernobyl to put barriers in the way of dialogue and peaceful coexistence. Gorbachev reaffirmed the Soviet nuclear testing moratorium. He talked again about meeting the President in a European capital but did not mention a U.S. summit in 1986. In a particularly gratuitous comment, Gorbachev also said that he would be willing to meet the President at Hiroshima. Implicitly seeking to defend the Soviet record on providing information, Gorbachev (falsely) stated that the U.S. had taken 10 days to inform Congress and over a month to inform the IAEA about the accident at Three Mile Island.

In a more positive vein, Gorbachev proposed a number of steps to increase nuclear reactor safety under the IAEA. Many of these proposals are quite similar to those included in the Tokyo summit communiqué.³ Specifically, Gorbachev proposed:

- International cooperation on reactor safety to develop systems for providing quick information on nuclear accidents;
- International mechanisms for multilateral and bilateral aid in case of such disasters;
- Upgrade the staff and resources of the IAEA;
- Work through specialized agencies such as the WHO.

Gorbachev added little new information on the accident itself. Claiming that the worst was over, he said that the fire in reactor four was out and the other three reactors at the site had been shut down. He reaffirmed that two people had died during the initial explosion

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron May 1986 (2/4). Confidential.

² See *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVIII, no. 20 (Jun 18, 1986), pp. 18–20. Excerpts of the May 14 address are printed in *Documents on Disarmament*, 1986, pp. 244–246.

³ For the text of the communiqué, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book I, p. 558.

and said that seven of 299 hospitalized with radiation sickness had subsequently died. Gorbachev said that the Politburo had taken the incident under its direct control as soon as it received complete information. For the first time he said that the special commission on the accident is headed by Premier Ryzhkov, a Gorbachev appointee.⁴ Gorbachev went out of his way to praise Ukrainian officials, perhaps to dampen speculation that he would use the accident to remove Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitskiy.

Gorbachev's tone throughout the speech was bitter toward the West. He offered not a word of self-criticism or apology to the Western European nations exposed to radiation from the accident. His remarks on testing were a lame effort to divert Western attention from the Soviet performance during the accident.

Nicholas Platt⁵
Executive Secretary

⁴ In his memoir, Gorbachev described in detail the Soviet response to Chernobyl. He wrote: "The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station was graphic evidence, not only of how obsolete our technology was, but also of the failure of the old system. At the same time, and such is the irony of history, it severely affected our reforms by literally knocking the country off its tracks." He continued: "Because of the extraordinary nature of the accident, we immediately set up a Politburo Operations Group, headed by Ryzhkov. Beginning on April 29, it operated around the clock. The minutes of its work and its reports have been published." (Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, pp. 189–190)

⁵ Kenneth Quinn signed for Platt.

231. Note From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Ridgway) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, May 15, 1986

Mr. Secretary,

Gorbachev's speech yesterday was the latest and most pronounced sign of a Soviet leadership that is feeling beleaguered and inclined to

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, May 1986. Secret; Sensitive; Summit II.

draw inward.² The formula of the speech was that used by Soviet leaders many times before—an appeal to the Soviet people to pull together in the face of a campaign by their external adversaries to exploit Soviet difficulties. The symptoms are reminiscent of the Soviet mind-set after the KAL shootdown and INF deployments of 1983.

The trend toward defensiveness was evident even before Chernobyl—in their reluctance to engage us at the political level, their implicit attempt to find an alternative to a summit here, their propagandistic arms control schemes, and their complaints about other U.S. actions since Geneva. The result is that the Soviets are rapidly becoming immobilized and unable to climb out of the trap they have built for themselves.

It won't be easy for us to help them out of this fix, but I think we should try.³ A Soviet Union retreating to its bunkers does not help our interests, either in moving ahead with the agenda set at the Geneva summit, or in dealing over the long haul with our European and Asian allies.

In my view, the situation is ripe for the President to take the initiative and encourage the Soviet Union to reengage. The Soviets have stressed the importance of atmospherics as well substantive results. A statesmanlike speech which recounted the value of last year's summit and spelled out what could be accomplished at the 1986 and 1987 summits could go far to get the process moving again, on our terms. A Presidential letter to Gorbachev could set the stage for the address. Jack Matlock is on board for this kind of approach.

I have asked my staff to look at the content and tactics of an effort to get things off dead center. I will send you some specific ideas in the next few days.

Roz Ridgway⁴

² See Document 230. In telegram 8240 from Moscow, May 15, the Embassy reported on Gorbachev's address on Chernobyl, noting: "Gorbachev praised the heroism of those coping with the problem, fuzzed the timing issue, and thus far at least found no domestic culpability. He kept options open, however, by noting the investigation was incomplete." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860377-0785)

³ A handwritten note in the right-hand margin, possibly by Nitze, reads: "Why? If we help them they will just stick it to us later—or at least try!"

⁴ Ridgway signed "Roz" above her typed signature.

232. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Mission to NATO, and the Defense Intelligence Agency¹

Moscow, May 19, 1986, 1550Z

8456. Subject: Weinberger Invitation to Soviet Defense Minister.²
Ref: State 150126.³

1. Confidential entire text.

2. Summary. Chargé Combs and DATT RADM Kurth met with Soviet MOD, Marshal Sokolov, on 19 May. Before handing over the letter of invitation from Secretary Weinberger, Chargé expressed regret and sympathy over the Chernobyl catastrophe. Referring to the Incidents at Sea Agreement and other ongoing discussions involving military contacts between the two countries, the Chargé described Secretary Weinberger's invitation as a means to widen helpful contacts. Sokolov said that he would take the invitation under advisement. However, he complained about Secretary Weinberger's public characterization of the Soviet Union. He added his view that current difficulties in U.S.-Soviet relations were caused by U.S. actions such as the attack on Libya.⁴ Countering with the U.S. perception of Soviet actions such as those in Afghanistan, the Chargé argued that wider military contacts could lower the level of misunderstanding.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860387-0267. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.

² On March 1, Shultz had written Poindexter about attendance of U.S. officials at Soviet Armed Forces Day events. See Document 199. In telegram Tosec 80182/134151 to Shultz in Bali, April 30, the Department transmitted the text of a memorandum from Ridgway regarding a Weinberger-Sokolov meeting. The text of the telegram also contained Tab 3 from the Ridgway memorandum, a March 3 letter from Shultz to Weinberger, noting that an idea for the meeting had emerged from discussions among Shultz, Weinberger, and Poindexter at a February 12 breakfast. In the March 3 letter, Shultz noted that he saw a "distinction between acceptance of invitations to highly visible events in honor of the Soviet military, and other contacts with Soviet defense officials that can increase our understanding of Soviet military doctrine, policies and practices—and give them a better understanding why we view them as the threat they are." The Department also enclosed in telegram Tosec 80182/134151 the text of Weinberger's response to Shultz: "At NSC request, I again have considered the possible merits of inviting Soviet Defense Minister Sokolov to visit the United States this year. I concur with the suggestion that extending such an invitation at this time would be beneficial." Weinberger attached a letter to Sokolov and requested it be sent to Hartman for delivery. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860330-0666)

³ In telegram 150126 to Moscow, May 13, the Department instructed the Embassy to deliver to Sokolov, "at the earliest appropriate time during the week of May 12," the invitation from Weinberger. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860367-0808)

⁴ See Document 216.

3. Background.

—In response to the instructions in reference, Embassy made parallel approaches in pursuit of appointment with Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L. Sokolov. Embassy Protocol Officer requested the call through the MFA protocol section, and DATT made a personal call at the Foreign Relations Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, MOD(UVS). At 1130 on Saturday, 17 May, Soviet Navy Captain Kharchenko, U.S. Regional Affairs Officer at MOD (UVS), called DATT to announce that the appointment with Sokolov had been set for 1000 Monday morning, 19 May 1986. Kharchenko said he would call early Monday to confirm arrangements, which he did. Chargé and DATT were received at MOD (UVS) by Colonel Tikhomirov at 0950 and then escorted to the call by Captain Kharchenko and a Soviet Army interpreter, Major M.T. Globenko.

4. The Discussion.

—A. The Chargé opened the discussion and proceeded without use of the interpreter. Chargé said that he was carrying a letter of invitation from Secretary Weinberger for Marshal Sokolov. However, he wanted at the outset to express his regret and sympathy over the ordeal which had befallen the Soviet people at Chernobyl. He knew that the Soviet military had played a major role in containing the disaster. The role of the Soviet helicopter pilots in the first hours after the accident was noticeably heroic, and he wanted to express his respect for them.

—B. Sokolov simply answered with a “thank you.”

—C. The Chargé turned to Secretary Weinberger’s letter. He had the letter in English, he said, but would give the Marshal his own translation of its contents, which he did. After handing the letter to Sokolov, Chargé continued on to the talking points in the reference telegram. He added that the two sides would soon meet for the annual review of the Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), a most successful example of military contact between the two sides. On behalf of the Ambassador, Mr Combs invited Sokolov to the reception for the INCSEA delegations to be held at Spaso House on 11 June. The Chargé then referred to U.S. proposals for bilateral cooperation on search and rescue as well as radio navigation, involving the military of both sides, as additional examples of potentially fruitful cooperation. However, he said, the invitation from Secretary Weinberger could set an example from which even more helpful contacts could grow.

—D. Sokolov thanked the Chargé for delivery of the invitation. He went on to say that relationships must be proper for military contacts to prosper. The meeting last November at Geneva was promising, and the Soviet side wanted the dialogue to continue and to develop. However, the development of the dialogue got off track, mostly because

of zigzags in American policy. Mr Weinberger speaks against the Soviet Union, describing it as threatening and as the enemy of all peaceful people, alleged Sokolov. If Mr Weinberger now wants to befriend the Soviet side with this invitation, then that is hard to understand. If he were interested in befriending Mr. Weinberger, continued Sokolov, he would lay a better base for it with his actions.

—E. The Marshal now warmed to the topic of U.S. action as he saw it. The United States, he claimed, acts as though it has the right to take any step it may choose. Rather, the two sides need to develop more cooperative steps and to lay properly the base for this step (the invitation), and for the future development of wider contacts.

—F. Chargé broke into the Marshal's presentation to say that current circumstances were exactly the reason for seeking ways to improve mutual understanding. This invitation is a businesslike step to help that process and to diminish misunderstandings which only seem to one side to be zigzags, the Chargé argued. Secretary Weinberger is offering this invitation as a constructive step with this goal in mind, he suggested.

—G. The Marshal resumed his tack. The U.S. and Soviet Foreign Ministers were to meet but that meeting was adversely affected by U.S. actions, he alleged. American ships and aircraft performed an act of war (against Libya) in the name of counterterrorism. What is terrorism?, the Marshal asked rhetorically. Was not Grenada terrorism? Was not the American attack on Libya state terrorism?, he continued. With inadequate evidence, having failed to convince world opinion, the United States sacrificed the lives of innocent people in the name of counterterrorism. Because of that action, the meeting of our Foreign Ministers could not occur. The American side bombs whom they want, killing peaceful people. The U.S. cannot do that, he argued, and certainly some time must pass before we can get our relationship back on track.

—H. The Soviet side's misunderstanding of our necessary action is exactly the reason why the Soviet Defense Minister should discuss such issues directly with Secretary Weinberger, interjected the Chargé. The Marshal needed to know our view. The U.S. took the action in Libya clearly out of self defense against a blatant source of terrorism against U.S. citizens. Innocent Americans were being murdered and wounded. It was not an action directed against the Soviet Union. If the Minister did not understand that fact, there was all the more need to develop the process of high-level discussion, especially when views differed as widely as they appeared to.

—I. The Soviet side is for such meetings and such discussions, claimed Sokolov, but when the American side allows itself the right to take such steps, the Soviet Union must react as it did. The Soviet Union does not allow itself claim of the right to take such steps.

—J. From the American point of view, said the Chargé, the Soviet side claimed the right to impose military action against Afghanistan, which action we think is indefensible.

—K. With mention of Afghanistan, Sokolov moved to close the discussion. The Soviet side would study the proposal in Mr Weinberger's letter, he offered. Whatever it would decide to do, he assured the Chargé, he would inform him directly. Sokolov rose to close the meeting amicably and shook hands with the Chargé and DATT who exited. The call had lasted fifteen minutes.

5. Venue and Atmosphere.

—A. Chargé and DATT were led to the front entrance of the new MOD building, across the street from the older MOD headquarters. Major Globenko said the new building had been open for use for about one and one-half years. The Americans entered the building to be met in the foyer at the right of the door by a Soviet Army Captain, and on the left by a Soviet Army praporshchik wearing red tab, motorized rifle insignia. Both smartly saluted, and then the Captain led the party to a waiting elevator.

—B. The ground level foyer had pillars, walls and floor of various combinations of marble. The cloak room (garderobe) was on the left, attended by a well-dressed but typical Soviet babushka. The party climbed a wide, five-step marble stairway to a second foyer with elevators on the left and a staircase to the right. A young lady was operating the waiting elevator which took the party to the fifth and top floor.

—C. The party exited on the fifth floor to a similar foyer where they were met by General Lieutenant G.A. Borisov, Director of MOD (UVS). (This was DATT's first meeting with Borisov whom he knew from his last tour in Moscow, 1975–77. Borisov's deputy, RADM V.Z. Khuzhokov, is now much more in evidence in the day-to-day operations of MOD (UVS).) The party was led across a long hall to an immediate door opening into a large conference room. At the right extremity of the carpeted hall, which ran the width of the building, was a large bust of Lenin on a tall pedestal. The wall at the left end of the hall contained a marble mosaic of the Soviet military insignia. The conference room contained a large table with about fifteen chairs on each side. The room was rectangular, about 60 by 20 feet, with the long dimension perpendicular to the hallway. At each end of the conference room were large bronze castings of an elaborate military nature, while the long walls were panelled in wood.

—D. Borisov went out of the conference room to get Sokolov and then escorted the Marshal to his visitors. Sokolov looked well rested, fuller in the face than his popular picture, bald with some hair on the side, ruddy complexion, but tanned. He appeared reasonably trim,

absent the common portliness of senior Soviet officers. He is about 66 inches tall. The groups took up seats on opposite sides of the long table.

—E. Sokolov remained controlled and reserved throughout the discussion, showing only a very limited amount of emotion in delivering the standard line on his allegations of state terrorism. He was lucid and focused, speaking extemporaneously and carefully articulating his thoughts. He did not say he could not accept the invitation and certainly did not close the door on the possibility.

Combs

233. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, May 19, 1986

SUBJECT

Letter to General Secretary Gorbachev

I noted in my recent discussions with you that, as a result of Chernobyl and other events since last year's summit, the Soviets are becoming increasingly defensive and withdrawn.² Much of this problem is of their own making, and you are under no obligation to make a special effort to bring them back to a more active negotiating posture. Nevertheless, the current Soviet mood undermines the prospects for significant progress in our own agenda. A prolonged deadlock in U.S.-Soviet relations also may increase the electoral difficulties facing such strong supporters of yours as Mrs. Thatcher and Helmut Kohl. An American act of statesmanship now could go a long way to helping us on both these scores in the months ahead.

As I mentioned to you last week, I think the time is right for a forward-looking personal letter to Gorbachev which notes your dissatisfaction with results since the summit, tells him the time for recrimination is over, picks up his suggestions for cooperation on nuclear reactor

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Gorbachev (8690389, 8690420). Secret; Sensitive.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan met with Shultz on May 14, 1–1:52 p.m., and on May 16, 1:31–2:10 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) See also footnote 1, Document 227.

safety, reminds him of the ideas you gave Dobrynin in April,³ and urges him to get down to business. The letter also notes that, given Gorbachev's stress on atmospherics, you will make a speech in the near future on U.S.-Soviet relations. A draft letter is attached.⁴ We will provide a draft speech text in the next few days.

In addition, I strongly recommend that you receive Armand Hammer and Dr. Robert Gale (the physician who treated many of the Chernobyl victims) on Thursday.⁵ Both met recently with Gorbachev and may be able to provide fresh insights on his current thinking. In addition, the meeting would provide an excellent opportunity to underscore your support for greater cooperation between the U.S. and Soviet peoples despite recent tensions in the relationship.⁶

³ See Document 212.

⁴ Not attached. In his memoir, Shultz wrote: "I sent the president a draft of a letter for him to send to Gorbachev, just as a way of making these ideas operational. Let's get started on our mutual objective of eliminating nuclear weapons by working first on major reductions in strategic systems, the draft said. While pressing in this way for START, I remembered that Dobrynin had told me that Gorbachev felt INF was possible. I thought so, too. A verifiable treaty on significant reductions of such weapons would be a far-reaching step. And the political impact of removing all of those missiles—the zero-zero outcome—would be historic." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 717) See also Document 231.

⁵ Thursday was May 22. In telegram 8356, May 16, the Embassy in Moscow reported on the May 15 meeting of Gale and Hammer with Gorbachev before they left Moscow. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860381–0748) There is no record of a meeting between Reagan and Gale and Hammer, but see footnote 2, Document 235.

⁶ Poindexter wrote in the left-hand margin: "George no longer recommends this. I did not recommend. John."

234. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Solomon) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, May 22, 1986

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations After Chernobyl

SUMMARY: The Soviets may genuinely believe that the United States is exploiting Chernobyl in a way that is inconsistent with the “spirit of Geneva.” The Soviets tend to think that U.S. Administrations which want to improve Soviet-American relations are obliged to discourage “anti-Soviet” sentiments in the West, even if doing so in effect means protecting the USSR from the consequences of its own blunders. We need to encourage change in this Soviet way of thinking by rebuffing Moscow’s efforts to wrangle new concessions from us before agreeing to the next summit. *END SUMMARY.*

What Gorbachev Wants from Us

While the United States officially offered sympathy and help to the USSR after Chernobyl and was restrained in its public criticisms of Soviet secrecy, many Soviet officials probably genuinely believe that the United States is trying to exploit this Soviet misfortune for political gain. In the Soviet view, the U.S. response to the disaster fits a pattern of other U.S. actions that are inconsistent with the “spirit of Geneva.” These include rejection of Gorbachev’s proposed moratorium on nuclear testing, the Black Sea incident, the forced reduction in the size of the Soviet UN mission, and our clashes with Libya.

Soviet complaints about these U.S. actions are in some measure propagandistic and are being made for tactical purposes. The Soviets often try to impose unilateral interpretations on international agreements and then accuse the other side of violating the letter or spirit of these agreements. Soviet charges that the United States is violating the “Geneva mandate” are thus predictable and not entirely sincere.

Nonetheless, there probably is an element of genuine bitterness in Soviet reactions to how the United States handled Chernobyl—both officially and in the private sector. Soviet assessments of the U.S. in this instance are conditioned by what the Soviets think *should* be appropriate U.S. behavior toward the USSR. Like other Soviet leaders, Gorbachev

¹ Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, 1986 May. Secret; Sensitive; Summit II. Drafted by VanOudenaren; cleared by Ledsky. A stamped notation reading “GPS” appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

wants a relationship in which the United States treats the Soviet Union as a fully “equal” superpower, and demonstrates its commitment to equality by exercising a degree of deference toward Soviet interests and toward Gorbachev personally.

The General Secretary may not believe that the United States is conspiratorially undermining the “spirit of Geneva,” but he probably does believe that President Reagan has an obligation to shape American policy in such a way as to make the USSR—and Gorbachev personally—“look good” in the eyes of the world. This not only means refraining from actions such as the strike on Libya, but even protecting the USSR from the consequences of its own blunders such as Chernobyl.

Implications for U.S.-Soviet Relations

The curious side of Gorbachev’s behavior is not that he *wants* such a relationship, but that he persists in believing that by finding the right public relations formula, he can get it—without making real concessions or changing Soviet international behavior in any way. Instead, Gorbachev appears to have settled on an ambiguous strategy for dealing with the United States. On the one hand, he wants an ongoing process of dialogue and summitry with the United States, which he sees as essential to underlining the Soviet Union’s status as a superpower and stressing its essential role in solving world problems. For this reason, Gorbachev is reluctant to call off the next summit.

On the other hand, Gorbachev is extremely wary of heightening interactions with the United States in a way which would make the USSR appear to be the “junior” superpower, or at a time when he is vulnerable because of Soviet difficulties. For this reason, he wants to come to Washington only after he has convinced the world that the USSR is again on the move and that it can meet American political, economic and technological challenges.

To minimize prospects of being perceived as “number two” at the next summit, Gorbachev needs to chalk up domestic economic gains, reinforce the image of a cohesive Eastern bloc, and place the United States on the defensive with his testing moratorium and his overall disarmament campaign. Because Chernobyl undercuts all these objectives, it has probably made Gorbachev less willing to accelerate progress toward a second summit or to make arms control concessions that could be seen as evidence of weakness.

Soviet Tactics and Appropriate U.S. Responses

Gorbachev no doubt sees the Chernobyl setback as temporary; and the Soviets have already begun a campaign to recover lost ground and to place us on the defensive. By proposing cooperative measures to cope with Chernobyl-type disasters, such as strengthening the IAEA,

they hope to portray themselves as part of the solution to a common problem and dilute Western charges that Soviet behavior *is* the problem. They will try to soften Western complaints about Soviet secrecy by hammering away on the incorrectness of some initial reports in the Western press. Above all, they will accuse the United States of having tried to exploit the crisis, while trying to drive wedges between us and our allies by downplaying equally strong European reactions to Chernobyl.

In responding to the Soviet counteroffensive, it is important for us to recognize that *nothing* we do will convince the Soviets of our good faith and dissuade them from attacking us. Soviet bitterness toward the United States is not the result of individual American acts, but is a byproduct of the Soviet leaders' own inflated view of their power and importance. It also reflects their deep frustration with the fact that the world does not accord them the respect that they feel they deserve by virtue of their status as a nuclear superpower and their stewardship of the Marxist-Leninist faith. In Gorbachev's case, the effects of ideology and tradition are reinforced by personality. Congressman Fascell and others who have met with him have been impressed by his self-confidence—some would say arrogance—and his total lack of doubt in the rightness of Soviet ideology or the superiority of the Soviet system.

We will likely have to deal with Gorbachev for many years to come, and our policy should be geared to disabusing him of the idea that he can pressure us into reconstructing U.S.-Soviet relations on his terms. To convey this message, we should respond very forcefully to Soviet efforts to co-opt the IAEA process and turn what should be an international review of Soviet actions into a Soviet-sponsored exercise designed to whitewash Soviet errors.

More importantly, we should rebuff Soviet attempts to use the Chernobyl disaster to extract concessions from us in advance of the summit. In his Chernobyl speech, Gorbachev again raised the prospect of a "testing summit" in a European capital or at Hiroshima. This suggests that he intends to continue wrangling with us over the timing of the next summit. The Soviets may even put out feelers about moving the Washington summit to a third capital, and may expect that we would be sympathetic to such a request in hopes of smoothing over the bad feelings generated by Libya and Chernobyl.

We need to resist Soviet feelers for this or other "positive" gestures. Chernobyl can play a useful role if it encourages Gorbachev to focus on the USSR's internal weaknesses and to begin to perceive the incompatibility between them and the USSR's external ambitions. But if we try to placate Gorbachev at a time when he is attacking us, we will send precisely the wrong signals. We will encourage him to believe that he can have a relationship with the United States largely on his

terms and thereby undercut the prospects for change in Gorbachev's attitude that would serve our interests and that we ought to be promoting.

To send Gorbachev the right signals, we should:

- Take a positive attitude toward improved cooperation on nuclear safety in the IAEA, but not allow our interest in cooperation to override the political aspects of Chernobyl. After all, it is the *Soviets* who are politicizing Chernobyl by attacking us.

- Strongly reiterate to the Soviets, in private, our expectation that a summit will take place in Washington in 1986. Faced with a stark choice between no summit and the one agreed to in Geneva, Gorbachev is more likely to opt for the latter.

- Make clear to our allies that we are not contemplating positive gestures toward the Soviets, which we believe would send the wrong signals at this time. If we fail to convey to the allies that we have a conscious game plan for dealing with Gorbachev, we will come under pressure from them to make such gestures.

235. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev¹

Washington, May 23, 1986

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Since my last letter, a number of events have occurred which neither of us could have predicted. Therefore, it may be useful for you to have my personal thoughts on how we might set relations between our countries in a more positive direction.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Gorbachev (8690389, 8690420). No classification marking. Under a May 23 covering memorandum to Reagan, Poindexter sent the letter for Reagan's signature, writing: "Shultz has recommended that you send him [Gorbachev] a letter to clear the air following the Chernobyl disaster and encourage him to reply to the suggestions you have made. [See Document 233.] I agree with George that a letter could be helpful at this time. You can express your sympathy for the victims of Chernobyl, reiterate your readiness to be of assistance, endorse his call for more international cooperation regarding nuclear safety, remind him that he owes you replies to the suggestions you gave Dobrynin, and suggest a Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting, in Europe if they prefer." He wrote in the margin: "I think you should give a speech on US-Soviet relations, but I do not think you should mention in the letter as George suggests. John." Reagan initialed the recommendation and signed the letter. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) May 1986)

Let me begin by expressing my admiration for the courage with which the Soviet people have responded to the recent tragedy at Chernobyl. Dr. Gale has described to us in stirring detail the sacrifices and skill with which your experts are dealing with the human and physical consequences of the disaster.² We wish you success in your efforts. Our hearts go out to those Soviet citizens who have been affected by this tragedy. We offer our condolences to the families of those who perished and our good wishes for the recovery and well-being of others affected. We remain ready to help in dealing with the consequences of the tragedy if this is desired.

In your address of May 14, 1986, you made some constructive suggestions for international cooperation in dealing with the safety of nuclear power plants. I agree with you that such action is highly desirable. You will have the full cooperation of the United States in working for effective international arrangements in this area. I would propose that Ambassador Kennedy and Chairman Petrosyants be prepared to discuss in detail what form such cooperation might take when they next meet.³

Mr. General Secretary, it is time to put behind us any misunderstandings arising out of the accident at Chernobyl. I regret that you misinterpreted the motives behind our offers of assistance. Unfortunately, this misunderstanding is all too characteristic of the recent dynamics of our relationship. Following our meeting last fall, I wanted to build on the momentum I felt we had established. I thought we had agreed to accelerate progress in achieving the very specific goals we had set for ourselves. That was why I instructed Secretary Shultz to propose early dates for our next meeting.

In the absence of a response to our proposal, I have sought to communicate to you in our private correspondence, during Secretary Dobrynin's recent visit, and through diplomatic channels specific ideas on what the outcome of a 1986 meeting might be. I described to Secretary Dobrynin, for example, our readiness to reach agreement by the next summit on the key elements of treaties to reduce strategic nuclear forces and eliminate intermediate range nuclear missiles, as well as on methods to remove both the threat of an effective first strike from either side and the use of space for basing weapons of mass destruction. I also indicated that I was prepared for our experts to meet to discuss

² See footnote 5, Document 233. In telegram 164597 to Moscow, May 23, the Department reported that Shultz met with Gale on May 22 and provided information to Reagan. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860403–0513) There is no indication that Reagan met with Gale.

³ Kennedy and Petrosyants were the lead negotiators at the Nuclear Testing Experts Meetings, ongoing bilateral talks in Geneva on non-proliferation and nuclear testing.

the important issue of nuclear testing. As you know, we feel that effective verification is the key to further progress in this area, but we are prepared, of course, to give careful consideration to any proposals you wish to advance.

We have, in short, made a good faith effort to set in motion the serious, high-level discussions necessary to prepare for a meeting between us. I regret that it has not been possible to begin them. While there have been positive steps in some areas, we have lost a full six months in dealing with the issues which most merit our personal attention. I hope you will agree that it is time to concentrate on the agenda we set forth in Geneva last November.

I am prepared to do my part. As I have said, I am eager to achieve tangible practical results at our next meeting. I agree with you that an atmosphere conducive to progress is important. The suggestions I have made, which took careful account of your comments to me on the issues, sought to find a mutually acceptable approach to some of the key issues.

The atmosphere of our relationship is also affected, of course, by what the two of us say publicly. The approach I intend to take in my public statements is to reaffirm my strong personal commitment to achieve concrete progress in all the areas of our relationship during the remaining years of my administration. I hope that in our correspondence we can begin to make such progress.

I would also propose that we arrange for our Foreign Ministers to meet to review these critical matters as soon as possible. If it is more convenient for Minister Shevardnadze to have the meeting in Europe than in Washington, that would be acceptable to us.

Mr. General Secretary, our recent history provides ample evidence that, if we wait for an ideal moment to try to resolve our differences, we are unlikely to resolve anything. This is the moment which has been given us. We should take advantage of it since it is a time of historic and possibly unique potential. Let us not lose it for lack of effort.

Sincerely yours,

Ronald Reagan

236. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 3, 1986

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations

I am convinced that we are approaching a fork in the road for your Presidency and for American security over the next decade, and perhaps beyond. You have a choice to make. So does Gorbachev. You should take the initiative to lead him in the right direction.

We have seen enough of Soviet behavior since the summit to make an educated guess that Gorbachev's strategy in the months ahead will be a sophisticated mixture of two elements: playing a propaganda game to influence trends in the U.S. and Europe; and probing for opportunities to reach agreements.

Gorbachev almost certainly is being counseled by some to play for time. He and his advisors follow us closely and are aware of the elements working against us—reduced budgets, Congressional pressure on security issues from chemical weapons to critical R&D such as SDI, Allied divisions over your strong medicine on Libya and the SALT treaties. These trends will tempt him to wait out your Presidency and hope that your successor will be less resolute or less popular, and thus be less able to drive a tough bargain. All the Soviets need to do to carry off this strategy is appear as reasonable as they can and advance proposals designed to erode Western unity and public support for our foreign policy and defense objectives.

At the same time, such a course poses tough problems for Gorbachev. He clearly places top priority on invigorating the Soviet economy, and military spending stands in his way. Politically, he knows that you are a President who can deliver. Thus, if a reasonable deal is available, it makes sense for him to strike it with you. Finally, there

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 4D, 1986 Soviet Union June. Secret; Sensitive. According to another copy, the memorandum was drafted by Burton and Stafford on June 2 and cleared by Nitze and Palmer. (Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, June 1986) A typed notation in the top margin reads: "Hand delivered by the Secretary June 3." According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan met with Shultz on June 3 from 2 to 3:15 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No substantive record of the conversation has been found.

are suggestions that he may in fact be the first Soviet leader to recognize that increasing quantities of nuclear weapons may yield less rather than more security—a thought you planted at Geneva, now reinforced by the Chernobyl accident.

I have reviewed Soviet moves in arms control and other areas of our agenda since the summit. Many are self-serving and propagandistic. Yet taken as a whole, they form a package that is comprehensive and at times dramatic, with elements that seem to involve real efforts to address our concerns. Admittedly, many of these moves might look the same if Gorbachev was simply playing for time. But some—particularly Soviet efforts over the last few weeks to clear up about half of our human rights cases, and the move last week on strategic defenses—have been impressive. The only way to find out if Gorbachev is serious is to put him to the test.

To do so, we need to take care of three pieces of business.

First, we cannot tolerate what is happening to the defense and foreign affairs budgets. We are facing murderous cuts in both. If these occur, it will confirm to Gorbachev that if he stalls, he will get a weaker American defense and foreign policy without paying any price. We have to find a way to restore funding in these areas. This is imperative.

Second, we have to work on the Alliance connection. The Allies are deeply disturbed. Every single minister at Halifax opposed our interim restraint decision. This is not to say that our decision was a mistake, but rather that we have a problem that needs tending.² Western unity has always been a fundamental advantage in driving forward our agenda with the Soviets. Moreover, friends like Kohl and Mrs. Thatcher have cast their political fate with us, and what we do has a

² The 77th NATO Ministerial meeting took place in Halifax from May 28 to May 30. On May 27, the White House issued a statement announcing the U.S. decision to end its observance of the unratified SALT II Treaty. For the text, see *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1986, Book I, pp. 678–681. In his memoir, Shultz wrote that: “In 1985, the president had debated whether he should continue to abide by the limits set out in the unratified SALT II Treaty. The outcome of the debate then was to maintain the policy of staying within the SALT II limits. Practically speaking, we had no operational need to exceed them.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 717) Documentation on the decision is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988.

In telegram Secto 10023 from Shultz in Halifax to the White House, May 30, Shultz reported to Reagan: “Predictably the U.S. approach to SALT II was the primary topic in the minds of my colleagues. They regard Cap’s statement that we would violate the SALT II limits by August rather than the end of the year, as a vigorous assault on arms control.” Shultz continued “It is clear, however, that they were uniformly opposed to our decision, with the opposition most vociferous from the British, Canadians and Dutch. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860006–0097) Weinberger’s statement was presumably made in remarks to reporters before his commencement address at West Point on May 28. (Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. Is ‘No Longer Bound’ by SALT II, Weinberger Says,” *Washington Post*, May 29, 1986, p. A1)

direct bearing on their future. Both are in political trouble; both have told us that reasonable Western positions on arms control are key to their survival. If they go, their successors are unlikely to have the inclination or the steel to carry off, say, an INF deployment. In the 1990s, our key allies would be ruled by weak and recalcitrant governments. The Soviet Union would have an open field.

Third, we have to advance positions that can bring about good agreements, if the Soviets are willing to make realistic bargains.

To strengthen support for our budget, to revitalize Western unity, and to see if good agreements are possible, we need to get back in charge. That means advancing proposals of our own across a broad front, above all at Geneva. It also means that when the Soviets show readiness to deal on our terms, we have to be ready to take yes for an answer.

The recent Soviet move on strategic defenses is just such a moment of truth. For the first time, the Soviets are showing willingness to get to the center of the NST puzzle—the strategic offense/defense relationship.³ We have waited long for such a moment; you worked hard on Gorbachev at Geneva to make him understand this point, telling him that the less offense there is, the less defense might be necessary. By proposing to negotiate deep reductions in offensive arms conditioned on extension of the withdrawal period for the ABM Treaty, Gorbachev is, in effect, calling our bluff on our assurances to him, our Allies, the Congress and the public that we will conduct our SDI research program within the limits of the Treaty. Although the 15–20 year withdrawal period he proposes is too long, the concept of giving substance to our assurances is not unreasonable and, properly applied, one we can accept with no cost to the SDI program. Moreover, because of the strong support in almost all quarters for the ABM Treaty and because of the inducement of possible deep reductions in offensive arms if we will agree to reaffirm the Treaty, our rejection of his proposal would seriously undermine our credibility. It could be especially harmful in Congress, where our commitment to observe the ABM Treaty while research proceeds is crucial to achieving adequate funding for SDI.

³ According to a May 29 memorandum for the files: “Greg Suchan reported this morning that the Soviets made a ‘major’ proposal in the Defense and Space Group Plenary by calling for a 15–20 year commitment to ‘no-withdrawal’ from the ABM Treaty. In two post-plenary conversations—including Karpov-Kampelman—the Soviets stated that the acceptance of this commitment would be sufficient *by itself* for a 50% reduction in strategic systems.” (Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, May 1986) See Document 238.

We should take the initiative and propose our own comprehensive solution to the strategic offense/defense problem. This should entail some form of reaffirmation of the Treaty (designed so that future decisions to develop and deploy strategic defenses would not be precluded) and clarification of its provisions, conditioned on Soviet agreement to deep, equitable, and stabilizing cuts in offensive arms. Not only is this essential for getting deep cuts, it strengthens SDI. If the Soviets refuse the proposal, our demonstrated good faith effort to negotiate will bolster support for the program; if the Soviets accept, it will legitimize SDI and make a robust research program the essential guarantee of Soviet compliance with the agreed offensive arms cuts. Either way, this move could be critical to keeping SDI on track in the next Administration.⁴

⁴ In his memoir, Shultz wrote that during a June 3 meeting with Reagan, it became clear that Reagan “was afraid that *any* discussion with the Soviets about strategic defense would be used as a way to scuttle SDI. I tried to convince him that we could give up those deployment rights that we could not exercise anyway—we lacked the technical capability—and hold the line there. That would be giving the Soviets the sleeves from our vest! But he remained apprehensive, and we reached no agreement. That evening I called in Paul Nitze. ‘I keep trying to explain to the president that this approach, which you and I have advocated, is the best insurance policy for the continuation of SDI and the best way to make SDI valuable to his successor,’ I told Paul. ‘The question is, are we willing to discuss what the ABM Treaty means? The Soviets have come toward our position. They have moved from saying the ABM Treaty bans any work on SDI, a ridiculous position, to asking us how we might agree that the treaty limits SDI, particularly on deployment rights, in return for an agreement on offensive reductions.’” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 718–719)

237. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, June 6, 1986, 1528Z

9629. Subject: Oral Response to Gorbachev's Message on Nuclear Safety. Ref: (A) State 177227.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. In a meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh, June 6, Ambassador Hartman conveyed the President's initial response to Gorbachev's June 1 oral statement on nuclear power plant safety³ (reftel). The Ambassador said that the President considered Gorbachev's proposals on nuclear plant safety constructive and that the recent accident at Chernobyl had intensified public pressure on all governments to ensure that nuclear power was safe. He noted that we were the same day conveying a DOE offer to provide the Soviet Union with a database on possible health effects of nuclear accidents. We understood also that Dr. Gale was very interested in conducting a long-term study of the public health impact of the Chernobyl accident. All of these efforts would be important in generating scientific data rather than uninformed speculation. The Ambassador also noted that Ambassador Kennedy and Chairman Petrosyants would be meeting at the end of July to resume their discussion of nuclear non-proliferation. As a former member of the NRC, Ambassador Kennedy would be interested in a thorough exchange of views on a wide range of nuclear safety issues.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860006-0233. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² In telegram 177227 to Moscow, June 5, the Department sent the President's message. It reads: "The President has received the General Secretary's oral statement which was delivered June 1 and welcomes the proposals for international cooperation in dealing with nuclear power plant safety. He has directed that United States Government officials include these constructive proposals in their ongoing study of the possible international efforts to improve nuclear power plant safety. He hopes to communicate his detailed views to the General Secretary in the near future. The President also shares the General Secretary's expressed desire to reduce the size of nuclear arsenals and to find ways to move ultimately to a cessation of nuclear testing and the elimination of nuclear weapons. He hopes, therefore, that the Soviet Union will join the United States in serious negotiations to implement the understandings reached in Geneva last November and to explore ways to verify progressive limitations on nuclear testing, which would move us toward these goals." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860006-0210)

³ In telegram 174582 to all OECD capitals, June 3, the Department sent the text of Gorbachev's oral message "to the President and other world leaders" on strengthening cooperation on nuclear safety. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860429-0950)

3. Bessmertnykh said that he was glad to hear that the U.S. would look carefully at the Soviet proposals. He added that the Soviet side had made a “good effort” to come up with positive proposals and looked forward to a detailed U.S. response. Bessmertnykh briefly took issue with the language in the President’s oral statement calling on the USSR to “join the U.S. in serious arms control negotiations.” He asserted that the Soviet Union had always taken a serious approach and wanted progress in arms control.

Hartman

238. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks to the Department of State¹

Geneva, June 6, 1986, 0932Z

5248. Eyes Only for S/S Nick Platt. Subject: Kampelman June 5 Message to Poindexter.

I am sending you for the Secretary a copy of the message I have sent to Poindexter at the NSC (with a copy to Linhart). Please share also with Paul Nitze, Allen Holmes and Roz Ridgway.

Begin text:

Dear John:

You will recall that during the first two rounds of our negotiations, Bud or you telephoned me weekly to get my judgments on where the Soviets were heading. This pattern stopped as we both realized that the process here would be a long one. Instead, I occasionally met with Bud or gave him a memorandum of my personal observations, and you and I recently had one such lengthy exchange in your office.

In that spirit, I am sending you the following memorandum of my reactions to the most recent developments in Geneva. The newspaper leak was regrettable and has created, in some cases, erroneous impressions. I hope the following summary of my analysis, which I am back-channeling to you, will be helpful. I am sending a copy to Bob Linhart. I will also share this with George Shultz.

Begin text.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860006–0230. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

1. On May 29 the Soviets formally presented us with what appeared to be the first substantive change in their position in the Defense and Space negotiating group since the talks began.² There had been informal soundings in a similar vein since early in the negotiation. Their most recent plenary statement of June 3 has cast some doubt on the significance of their move. But on balance, I continue to believe the move is important. We are still analyzing these recent developments, but I wanted to let you know my own thinking and my thoughts on how we should proceed.

2. There were two parts to the formal Soviet proposal of May 29. First, they called for a commitment—to be embodied in a protocol to the ABM Treaty—not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period of time (i.e., 15–20 years, with indications of some flexibility). Secondly, they proposed that we reach agreement on definitions of terms related to the treaty's prohibition (in Article V) on the development of space-based ABM systems and components.

3. In return it was suggested, with varying degrees of specificity, that U.S. agreement would open the way to radical reductions. The plenary statement used such a formulation. Two Soviets (one in response to a direct question) said explicitly that acceptance of this new Soviet proposal would make possible fifty percent reductions in strategic offensive forces. You will recall that Karpov had told me much the same thing at lunch the previous week.

4. In our post-plenary discussions the following week, the Soviets were much more evasive about what would be required for radical reductions. While some denied they had ever said strengthening the ABM Treaty would be sufficient to bring these about, Karpov privately reaffirmed it to me.

5. As it stands, the Soviet proposal of May 29 is far from the answer to our dreams. The net effect of the new Soviet-proposed definitions would be to constrain SDI activities even more closely than the "restrictive" interpretation of the ABM Treaty. They differ significantly from those discussed in the ABM Treaty negotiations. In effect, they amount to amendments to the treaty. In addition, the Soviet non-withdrawal proposal would preclude us from going beyond the treaty for that period, even if SDI research demonstrates that effective defenses are feasible.

6. The potential significance of the proposal lay in the implicit hint that a "strengthening" of the ABM Treaty might replace a comprehensive ban on "space-strike" arms as a prerequisite for substantial reductions in offensive arms. This was the implicit indication, too, from

² See footnote 3, Document 236.

my earlier conversation with Karpov. However, the June 3 plenary withdrew whatever hint had been dropped the previous week. The Soviet statement of that date decomposed its longstanding ban on space-strike arms into two components: a ban on space-to-earth weapons and a ban on ASATs. These were lumped together with the May 29 proposal for strengthening the ABM Treaty as the steps necessary to prevent an arms race in space, with only the most desultory reference to reductions.

7. In short, the Soviets have pulled back at least for the formal negotiating record. Several explanations are possible:

—There never was a change in the Soviet position. The May 29 proposal was merely a cleverly packaged feint to reflect Karpov's May 19 luncheon conversation with me but primarily aimed at the Senate observers group who were here at the time and who quickly seized on it as significant.³ I do not accept this.

—The move was real, but for tactical negotiating reasons the Soviets are trying to shroud it in ambiguity (to prevent our pocketing the move, to oblige us to show interest before they proceed further, to cover their tracks if the move leads nowhere).

—The initial move was real, but Moscow had a change of heart and ordered the pull-back (possibly reflecting broader policy considerations or as a response to the President's interim restraint decision).⁴

Only time will tell. Nonetheless, I am inclined to think that the May 29 proposal was significant and that the Soviets have shown us the shape of what they would be willing to accept at an "end game" as the price for substantial reductions. (We should note they did not publicize the May 29 proposals.) There is, of course, a long road still to travel.

8. Leaving aside the larger question of whether the approach outlined by the Soviets could be reconciled with our broader strategic objectives, there is no question that the Soviet proposal as it now stands is not acceptable. The new definitions proposed by the Soviets in their May 29 statement are intolerably restrictive. However, the Soviets, in my opinion, will be flexible on this point at the end game. They do not put down their final positions at this stage of a negotiation. Ten days before tabling this proposal, Karpov told me at lunch that he personally did not disagree with the 1971 Brown statement, which established the distinction between "research" and "development" and

³ Telegram 5105 from the NST Delegation, June 3, sent a summary report of a congressional delegation, led by Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), from May 28 to 31. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860428–0532)

⁴ See footnotes 2 and 4, Document 236.

which forms the basis for the “restrictive” interpretation of the treaty.⁵ Similarly, the 15–20 year time-frame is clearly outlandish, contrasts with Kvitsinskiy’s statement to me in the second round of “at least 10 years,” and is not the Soviets’ last word.

9. If the Soviets follow up this ABM Treaty initiative with a more serious approach in START which meets our requirements—and only under this condition—we might in the end be able to find an accommodation, especially if—as my conversations with Senate observers strongly suggested—SDI funding will be significantly below administration requests for some time to come, with an inevitable impact on the pace of the program’s progress.

10. Moreover, as the President has indicated, the United States has a national security interest in hanging on to the ABM Treaty for the near term, provided the Soviets bring their activities into compliance, negotiate seriously toward a 50 percent reduction, and our SDI exploratory activities are allowed to continue. The Soviets have near-term advantages in deployable land-based ABM systems, which, while presumably less effective than the systems under consideration in SDI, could be available much sooner. Also, if an accommodation results in significant START reductions in our interest, the job of defending against nuclear weapons in the future might well be made easier and safer.

11. These are long-term considerations which would come into play only in a situation which does not yet exist, that is, if the Soviets make us a START offer which it is in our interest to accept. We are not there yet, and in my view our task over the short term must be to make clear to the Soviets that we could consider their approach in D&S (not its substance) only if the inducement in START were sufficiently great—and even then not in the specific terms which they have proposed. We also, of course, cannot forget that Krasnoyarsk must be dealt with. In the meantime, however, it is very important not to close the door.

12. My specific thoughts for now are the following:

—We should not reject the Soviet proposal, either publicly or privately. Publicly, we should stick to the line that we are studying the Soviet proposal and avoid characterizing it. Avoiding the presumption of a negative U.S. response—particularly to a reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty—will be especially important to the Congress and in Europe, coming on the heels of the U.S. decision on interim restraint.

⁵ Reference is to former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. His 1971 statement has not been identified, but see footnote 2, Document 147.

—Privately, we in Geneva should, at least for the remainder of this round, confine ourselves to asking questions and seeking clarification. We should focus on the May 29 proposal, while remaining critically noncommittal on its merits. My existing instructions are adequate for this purpose. I neither need nor want new instructions for now.

—We should continue to press the Soviets on START, as Ron and the START group have been energetically doing. With respect to the proposed strengthening of the ABM Treaty, we should state that the dismantling of Krasnoyarsk and other steps to bring Soviet activities into compliance would do that. A no-withdrawal commitment and new definitions (which we should not hesitate to call amendments) are something which the Soviets want but for which we do not see a need. We should contrast our own treaty-compliant activities with Soviet violations. We should also make clear that it is up to them to demonstrate why the Soviet approach should be in our interest—and to make it worth our while.

—Once again, it will be important to make the START point to our allies and the Congress that there has been no change in the Soviet START position. (The Senate observers were in Geneva when the proposal was made.) The Soviet proposal may well generate the usual pressures on us to show flexibility in response. We need to stress that the Soviets have shown no flexibility on the central issue of fifty-percent reductions and that, even if the May 29 proposal is reaffirmed, unless the Soviets tell us more clearly what they are prepared to offer in START, we would be buying a pig in a poke (and an expensive pig at that).

—Finally, the President may wish to think about an early private communication to Gorbachev designed to keep some momentum going. In addition, some public statement which, in effect, makes points for us with the Congress and allies might also be considered.

Warm regards.

Kampelman

239. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting of the National Security Planning Group¹

Washington, June 6, 1986

SUBJECT

NSPG—6 June 1986

1. Poindexter opened up with the strong position of Soviets seeming to be in disarray. We need to maintain funding levels to keep our strong position.² The Soviet proposals plus our strong options may provide an unusual opportunity. We should sort out what we can do in six areas of arms control: defense, space, conventional forces, INF, nuclear tests, chemical warfare. Gorbachev will have to have any positions pretty quickly if we are going to get a reaction and understand in time for the Soviets to prepare for a late-November, early-December meeting here.

2. Shultz wants rather to extend strengthening to the start of our proposals. The needs for us to exploit it.³ We have a chance to look at things desirable—reduce and _____ weapons.⁴ There is real negotiating going on at Geneva. He perceives both U.S. and the Soviets struggling to find the next direction. Again held forth on the victory of

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980–1986), Box 19, DCI Memo Chron (1–30 Jun '86). No classification marking. The June 6 NSPG meeting took place in the Situation Room from 10:58 to 11:51 a.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) A copy of the official NSPG minutes are in the Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Planning Group (NSPG), NSPG 134 06/06/1986 [US-Soviet Relations]; excerpts are provided in the annotation below. Weinberger's memorandum for the record is in the Reagan Library, Fred Ikle Files, Arms Control (President Gorbachev) 1986–88. Gates' memorandum for the record is in Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 89B00224R: Committees, Task Forces, Boards, and Councils Files, Memos for the Record of Mtgs w/Nat'l Security Advisor (1986).

² According to the minutes: "*Admiral Poindexter* introduced the meeting by noting that the approaching summer break in the Geneva arms control negotiations provided an opportunity for fresh thinking aimed at developing new proposals for the fall. The Soviets clearly wanted to lock us into a period of ABM treaty adherence, and this presented opportunities and challenges." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Planning Group (NSPG), NSPG 134 06/06/1986 [US-Soviet Relations])

³ According to the minutes: "*Secretary Shultz* then outlined the overall state of the relationship, concluding that the Soviets are at a fork in the road where they can either choose to wait out the President—gambling that Congress will cut the defense budget—or go for an agreement that will allow them to reduce their military spending on the premise that Ronald Reagan is their best hope for selling an agreement to the American public. He argued that USG priorities for the year should be: restore the budget cuts to defense and international functions, work on alliance relationships, and go for a good arms control agreement." (Ibid.)

⁴ This and all other omissions are in the original.

freedom. The value of free and open markets, negotiating with entrepreneurs. He cited China, the recent meeting of the African nations—Soviets have lost ideological battle. Their position is based only on military strength. He thinks we have greater military and doubts that they could have pulled off the Libya raid. They have two bases outside Libya. We have lots of bases. Only Soviet advantage is in Lenin based strength. U.S. not as good as Soviets particularly because we are not good at _____. It would be to our advantage to reduce this advantage of the Soviets. Soviets are floundering.

3. He then went into historical deductions. In the Nixon years of linkage, linkage did not work. The Soviets took advantage of opportunity—Afghanistan and Angola.

4. There was a shift in the Reagan years from linkage to pursuit of our own interests. Shultz cited the furor over the KAL shootdown. The tension separated the two countries at the Geneva negotiations. They were sent back with the message that arms control is important in itself. The allies liked this. They did not recognize _____, namely, that we are pursuing our own interests independent of the Soviets. Shultz mentioned his Rand speech.⁵ Shultz says that all the Soviets have been able to do is to cite violation in the spirit of Geneva. There is no spirit in Geneva. The two have different concepts of the relation—ours for interest for each and theirs for linkage: for the spirit of Geneva. He then pointed out Geneva and that there had been a great deal of movement on their part to the British and French capabilities; their zero-to-zero offer, the 50% reduction to freeze of SS-20s in Asia, to nuclear testing moratorium now going over a year, their response to chemical warfare initiatives and conventional arms proposals. In their conventional arms proposals they bought the concept of applying it from the Atlantic to the Urals for the first time. Shultz went on to say that on verification they had not done much but their rhetoric had opened up on divided families. They have done more than they have ever done. They allowed Sacharov (sp?) out and Bonner to travel, the bilateral exchange—people to consulates—moved forward. They have gone forward in the program and have been friendly in bringing out the red carpet.

5. Shultz mentioned the question of how the Soviets would deal with Reagan, the strong and tough. Why not wait it out, but on the other hand if an agreement could be struck with Reagan, he will be able to make it stick better than the next President may be likely to do. Finally, the next President will take time to sort out a _____ and figure out his strategy and he would not be ready for dealing until

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 2.

sometime in 1990. Meanwhile, military and economic pressures on Gorbachev are great. A lot going on in defense area. This is the first time we have them talking about these reductions.

6. In addition to trying to capitalize on the deep reduction, we need to build SDI into the system to assure its momentum into the 1990s. We need to work on four lines:

1. Get started this year;
2. To restore the funding necessary to preserve the level we have and the strength it provides with the forward thrust which has put us ahead
3. Work on our alliances
4. Keep advancing proposals that have a chance to result in a good agreement

Shultz concluded his discussions whereupon Poindexter resumed the floor saying that arms control was the prime area for progress.⁶ For these reasons: (1) compelling public interest in arms control; (2) Soviets will continue to make proposals and advances. They will have an impact on the allies, the public and the Congress. We must put forward counter arms proposals before the summer break; (3) Study a comprehensive space and defense in the areas of space and defense including ABM, nuclear tests, conventional forces; (4) Study whether this can be a repackage of what we have out there or key developments options; and (5) President Reagan should work to develop a comprehensive initiative on defense and space. We should consider what could be done with the Soviet ABM proposal to defense research and extend ABA [ABM]. They have started a 15–20 years extension. In regard to defining research, Poindexter said this is unacceptable but we should consider what we should do to assure near time support of SDI and institutionability while avoiding restraints on the program itself. He expressed fear of the accusation the Soviets would make that we tried to advance ABM. Soviets have fear of competition, fear of xray laser to technology and economy. He pointed out that the Soviets have SDI programs going on. Our SDI could not survive the abrogation of the ABM Treaty. He said we should consider some

⁶ The official NSPG minutes read: “Admiral Poindexter opened a general discussion with the observation that an arms control agreement represented both the greatest opportunity and the greatest challenge to the Administration. In re-examining our current position, the main issue was the ABM treaty versus SDI—how to position ourselves so as to bring Congress along in funding SDI, while working the treaty issue, developing a concept for transition to a defense-based deterrence, and coming up with a viable concept for sharing. In addition, the other arms control areas must also be addressed. He proposed that the interagency group be tasked to develop proposals for consideration by the NSPG. The output of these deliberations should be a private initiative and/or a public speech.” (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Planning Group (NSPG), NSPG 134 06/06/1986 [US-Soviet Relations])

extension of the ABM Treaty in exchange for a definition of research which will permit testing. Soviets would also want to test no later than we and we should attempt to establish an understanding that will permit full scale testing and evaluation within the Treaty sufficient to permit a scale engineering decision that SDI is feasible. We might also consider a modification that would permit deployment only after a specified fixed negotiation period, after feasibility. He then turned to nuclear testing of CTB for a long-term resolution for verification issues, limits on lowering of threshold perhaps to progress in reducing offensive forces. Now a decision on public position of the U.S.—whether in Geneva, whether in a letter to Gorbachev, whether a Presidential speech, the objective would be to take the high ground to improve position in Congress to institute SDI and shift the blame to the Soviets if all this fails.

Then the President spent about 5 or 6 minutes of additional time to express his general attitude.⁷ He said that he thought that Gorbachev is confused and that Gorbachev and the hardliners are increasingly at odds. He believes that Gorbachev is groping for a line and said it might be that their action on divided families and other human rights type things is his way of testing what Ronald Reagan said to him in Geneva, namely that the U.S. represents no threat to the Soviets and had no desire to harm them. He indicated the desire to give Gorbachev some ammunition to use with hardliners by Reagan expressing appreciation of those gestures, press for more collaborated activities, like the creation of an international consultation group on nuclear power, like exchanging experience and safety hints, etc., the kind of thing which would be something for Gorbachev to point to. At the same time, press for definite steps to reduce weapons as a first step to eliminate mistrust. We can't give SDI away as long as nuclear weapons exist. He would be interested in a provision that would assure that we not take advantage in developing SDI. He would like to continue on research and necessary testing and would be willing to consider an agreement in advance that if the testing was successful, the Soviets would be invited to observe the tests, with the understanding that the _____ will go forward in the absence of an agreement which would lead toward the

⁷ The official NSPG minutes read: "The *President* observed that Gorbachev has an internal dilemma, heightened by Chernobyl—we need to reach an agreement which does not make him look like he gave up everything. We cannot give away SDI, but we can make clear we do not seek a first-strike capability. He was thinking of something like an agreement now that, if SDI research proves out, and recognizing that both sides are now free to conduct research under the ABM treaty, we would when we got to the point of needing to test, invite the Soviets to observe our tests, but then actual deployment by either side would depend on the movement towards total elimination of strategic nuclear missiles—in this way, both sides would see SDI not as a threat, but as a defense against a madman." (Ibid.)

deployment elimination of defense and would also agree to make defense available to all contributors beginning with the Soviets. He used the saying “Keep the gas mask to protect against mad men.” The bottom line was we should recognize and appreciate what the Soviets have put forward.

William J. Casey⁸

⁸ Printed from a copy that bears his typed signature.

240. Mock Memorandum From Soviet Foreign Policy Assistant Chernyayev to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev¹

Moscow, June 9, 1986

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy and Our Dilemma

You asked me to convene a small group to discuss prospects for dealing with the United States for the remainder of the Reagan term, with particular reference to our options in managing your commitment to meet with Reagan in the United States this year. I can assure you that we conducted our work with the utmost discretion. By meeting here at the Central Committee we stayed out of the way of Chebrikov’s KGB snoops, and we never met before 6:00 because we know that by then all of Dobrynin’s crew would be long gone. (As you know, they clear out right after 5:00 so they can get soused at Igor’s before going home. I know you’ve been thinking of cracking down on this, but I would suggest you wait a while because it’s useful to have them out

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron June 1986 (4/6). Top Secret; Eyes Only for the General Secretary. The date and classification marking are in Russian. Reagan initialed at the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Matlock wrote this fictitious memorandum to provide his assessment of possible thinking within the Soviet leadership. In a June 16 handwritten covering note to Reagan, Poindexter explained: “Mr. President, This is a translation of a *fictitious* memo by Jack Matlock that represents his best analysis as to what is going on in the minds of the Kremlin leaders. This style paper makes very interesting reading. I agree with Jack’s analysis. John.” Reagan responded: “Tell Jack—thanks. Can I have a copy of this for my own pleasure? RR.”

of the way at times.) And, by the way, we also didn't forget the building guards. We picked the three most luscious secretaries in the Central Committee and had them come up and sit in the outer office. That way they could not only keep watch on the door, but when we all waltzed out around midnight, the guards naturally assumed that we had hung around for fun and games and thus will not go around gossiping about folks working late on some secret project. (Bear this in mind if some snitch tells you we were playing around.)

Anyway, we hammered out a consensus on most issues. I'll summarize them, and note the areas where there was some disagreement.

Background: The Situation

For six years now, the correlation of forces has been shifting against us. The Brezhnev crowd was guilty of the most egregious error of judgment in the 1970's. They let our economy stagnate and fall even farther behind our enemies in a technological sense. At the same time, they threw down the gauntlet and started pushing our weight around. That would have been fine if the United States had continued to decline and if we had had a fully developed socialist base at home. But neither of these conditions were fulfilled, and Brezhnev's failure to understand this was truly a case of an "infantile disease of leftism," to use Lenin's trenchant phrase. The old boys just never understood Lenin's teaching to calculate the correlation forces accurately before acting. Their policy was clearly premature. We should not have taken on the U.S. until we were certain we had a firm base of strength at home. As it is, we just galvanized the Americans to revive their strength—and this happened just when we started paying the price of Brezhnev's cronyism and "do nothing and it may go away" policies.

As you have said many times to us in private, you really inherited a mess! We've been in now for over a year, and have found out just how bad it is. That would be true even if Ronald Reagan did not exist, but he does, and that makes matters even worse. For a while our pollyannas thought he would overreach himself and stumble. And those foolish enough to pay attention to the idiots in the left-wing press in the West clung to the thought that he couldn't get his programs through. (Lenin said we should exploit useful idiots, not listen to them!) But what do we see: the lucky so-and-so wins every one of the important ones regardless of what we do to encourage opposition to him, and he's riding a wave of popularity that Franklin Roosevelt would envy. Anybody who predicts that we can outflank him in Congress has a half liter of vodka in his belly.

One more factor I need not mention, but since you charged us with looking clinically at *all* factors, I will for the sake of completeness. That is, our problems in getting control of the *nomenklatura* here. The old

guys are putting up a lot more fight than we expected. The Party Congress came before you got your ducks in a row, and we still have to put up with empty heads like Kunayev and blockheads like Shcherbitsky (maybe you can use Chernobyl to take care of that one!), not to speak of stonehead Gromyko and his constant grouching. We simply cannot forget that a lot of long knives are out and if you change things too fast they might be used. The very fact that this is the crowd that led us into this mess means that they will fight anything that reflects on their stewardship, and will not shy away from accusing you of treason to the cause if you seem to be retreating from the morass they stumbled into.

The Dilemma

This means we have a real dilemma. If we have any chance to get things on the right track at home, we've got to get the Americans off our backs. But they are just not buying soft soap any more. This time, we're going to have to pay. If we had gotten our people in all the key positions, we could pull it off by explaining very quietly that we have to take a step back so we can take two or three forward in 15 or 20 years. But your opponents here won't buy that. After all, if they admit they were wrong, they will be signing their own political death certificates.

Arbatov keeps advising you to just wait out Reagan. Come January, 1989, he won't be there to kick us around any more. Of course, that's what Arbatov always advises: just wait them out. That's what he said in 1976 (you were still in Stavropol then, but I was in the CC *apparat* and remember it well): don't make a deal with Ford, he said, the next guy may be easier. And what did we get? Carter. Couldn't get a treaty out of the Senate even if it was to ratify a gift of Kamchatka. So old Georgy says, "Don't worry, I see Nixon II just over the 1980 horizon." And what do we get? Ronald Reagan. Frankly, this waiting game is for the birds. If his successor is easier for us to deal with, he won't be able to deliver. And anyway, it will take him a couple of years to organize his Administration, so we are not talking about two and a half years, we are talking five at least.

You are a better judge than I as to whether we have five years to play with. But I doubt it. If we don't get things moving before then, you may go down in our history as Khrushchev II. Managing a *sovkhoz* in the Urals is not the way I believe you want to pass your golden years, but the thought does concentrate the mind.

Actually, there is one strong argument in favor of dealing with Reagan, even if we could afford to wait for his successor. And that is: if we make a deal, he can deliver. The question our group addressed most intensively, therefore, is can we deal with Reagan, or is it futile to try?

American Objectives

All in our group agree that the Americans understand our problems pretty well, and are out to exploit them to their advantage. They are feeling their oats and are pressing us everywhere. They finally seem to understand the importance of ideology and are fighting back just when most of the world is turned off on ours. They clearly want to gain military superiority if they can. They know that we can't compete in trade or economic aid, and therefore are trying to deprive us of our superpower status by blocking our use of military force.

We also agree that Reagan has really stuck it to you this year. Support for counterrevolutionary forces in Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua is up. They hit Libya to our great embarrassment—not that we give a fig for Qaddafi, but it really made us look bad with our Arab friends. Makes it look like our weapons are no good—and if our weapons won't work, what do they need us for? They also kicked a lot of our people out of the UN Mission, sent Naval ships through our territorial waters near Sevastopol, and refused to sign the concluding document at the Bern Conference, even though all their European friends wanted it. And now we have the insulting interim restraint decision.

What is puzzling about these actions is not that they were taken (we have to expect this sort of thing from the Americans), but the *way* they were taken. A lot of trumpeting and fanfare, as if they really wanted to rub it in. After all, if they want to give the bandits in Afghanistan stingers, that's no more than what we would do if we were in their place, but why do they talk about it? They must realize that when they do this, it makes you look like you are knuckling under to them if you carry on with business as usual. Yuri, who spent several years bar hopping in Georgetown, says that sometimes these things happen by accident and that American officials are really pretty undisciplined, but the rest of us think that is absurd. Even two-kopek banana republics do better, and besides, there is a consistent pattern here. (By the way, you might ask Chebrikov to run an audit on what Yuri really did with all that hard currency the KGB gave him for recruitment when he was in Washington; you've got to wonder what sort of trash he was buying drinks for—that is, if he didn't spend it all on himself!)

In short, all of us except Yuri agree that Reagan has put the squeeze on you, not only privately—which is understandable—but publicly—the reasons for which are harder to interpret. And this is the point on which we could not reach a consensus. Two broad theories emerged, which I will call A and B.

Theory A: Reagan has no intention of reaching any deals on important subjects. He wants you to come to the U.S. to give the appearance of negotiation to keep Congress and his Allies quiet, and to legitimize

his aggressive policies toward us. His ultimate aim is to make it impossible for us to get the country moving again, and would not mind at all if Gromyko-style knuckleheads take over, since he calculates that this would doom us to stagnation or worse, and by the Year 2000 we couldn't even maintain a first-rate military establishment.

Theory B: Reagan might be prepared to reach deals if the price is right. Americans are a riddle and it is dangerous to read logic as we see it into their actions. His messages to you sound like he wants to deal, and he certainly came across as an honest, straightforward man at Geneva. He has to think about history too, and probably does not want to be seen by posterity as one who forced an arms race on the world. His anti-communism need not be a barrier—Nixon was an anti-communist and we dealt with him—and could even help him get treaties ratified. (Besides, we've got to admit that those bungling predecessors of yours didn't do much to make communism look good!)

A Strategy

Since we cannot be certain at this point which of the hypotheses about American intentions is correct, we must devise a strategy which takes both into account. Our recommendation is that it should have the following elements:

1. Although you need the meeting with Reagan, a firm commitment to a date is just about the only real lever we have left, so you should not rush to agree to a date. It is unlikely he will make substantive concessions for a date, but holding off until, say, September may concentrate American minds a bit. Actually, since the meeting cannot take place until November because of the American elections, nothing is lost by waiting until September to lock us in. We must not forget that he also needs the meeting with you, and is most unlikely to take the blame for scuttling it.

2. There is no way to find out which of the hypotheses about American intentions is correct without testing them. The Americans have made much of our failure to get particulars to the negotiating table. (They expect us to understand delays in their interagency process but never understand the problems we have here.) Anyway, things are beginning to jell a bit, and we should start putting some things down on the table. Our strategy should be to put in just enough in the way of concessions to see whether the Americans will answer with some of their own. Above all, we must not make the 1983 mistake and walk away from any negotiating tables.

3. We should keep up our public campaign on "peace" issues. This has been selling pretty well, particularly to naive publics in Europe, though we shouldn't expect it to persuade anybody intelligent enough to run a government. Even with the Chernobyl setback, we have to

keep plugging, and maybe eventually we can even get some advantage out of the fear of everything nuclear that the Chernobyl incident unleashed. Our peace propaganda will continue to be necessary as a hedge, in case Theory A is correct, and as an instrument of pressure if Theory B turns out to be correct. However, we must beware of raising expectations too high here, or else you will seem a failure even if you make some progress.

4. We have already made some progress in setting out an ideological framework which will give you more wiggle room. In developing the theme of “interdependence” we have a framework which will explain making some real concessions if they seem necessary, without really committing us to anything specific. Nevertheless, this will give you much more flexibility to deal than the old Gromyko formulas would have.

5. On nuclear testing, the marshals are already howling that you have stopped testing too long. (Who could have predicted that Chernobyl would require us to extend the moratorium a few more months?) However, when we resume in August, we should be able to get 20-odd shots off in a few weeks, and that will put us back on schedule. On this one, we clearly miscalculated, since we thought it would at least force Reagan to talk about a CTB. We should consider letting our experts talk about the issue as he has suggested, since we still want to find a way to stop the X-ray laser research. And maybe if things move a little in START, he will give you a fig leaf by agreeing to talk about a CTB at some point down the road. That wouldn’t be worth much, but you could at least claim that the whole moratorium caper had brought a useful result.

6. Whenever we manage to knock enough heads to get a negotiable position on START, it will probably be time to ease off some of Gromyko’s stupid positions on Star Wars. To be sure, they have been a useful propaganda ploy to cover our problems in getting our act together, but objectively speaking, it is not an immediate military problem, and Gromyko really put us in a box politically. The fact is that we need SDI as much as the Americans, and if we can play for time, the KGB should be able to steal the blueprints before Congress finishes debating whether to fund deployment or not. What we really must have is some face saving at this point. We’ve made so much of SDI, that you really are going to have to claim that you’ve gotten something from Reagan, or else there might be mutiny in the ranks here. Some of the fellows are toying with the idea of settling for a commitment not to break out of the ABM Treaty for a few years, and that might do the trick. Not that it really means anything, since the Americans will continue their research no matter what, but just might sell in a pinch, since most of our people really don’t understand the first thing about SDI—or any other military issue, for that matter.

In sum, we are in a box. The Americans have us where they have wanted us for a long time, and seem to have learned quite a bit from the stupid mistakes dunderheads like Khrushchev and Brezhnev made. It was doubtless a mistake ever to think that they never would wake up and see what was going on. But the bottom line is that all this is coming to a head on your watch, and you don't have an easy out. You can't live without Reagan, and we can't be sure you can live with him. But we really don't see any alternative to giving it a try. One thing is sure: any way you cut it, the price we're going to have to pay for a little breathing space is steep. Your biggest problem may turn out to be how to keep the long knives out of your back in the process.

P.S.: That analysis you requested of specific issues will follow in a couple of days.

241. Action Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Woessner) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, June 10, 1986

SUBJECT

Treatment Of New Soviet Ambassador

ISSUE FOR DECISION

How to introduce a greater measure of reciprocity into the access we give the new Soviet ambassador.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

The arrival of the new Soviet ambassador, Yuriy Dubinin, gives us a unique opportunity to redress a long-standing imbalance between the access granted the Soviet ambassador in Washington and that given our ambassador in Moscow.² We believe we can do so without sending

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (06/10/1986); NLR-775-16-4-3-7. Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum was sent through Armacost. Drafted by Murphy on June 2; cleared by Sell, Parris, and Palmer.

² In an April 3 memorandum to Shultz, Ridgway had previously raised the reciprocity issue regarding Soviet requests for appointments, related to Dobrynin's retirement as Ambassador to the United States. Ridgway explained: "Art has come in with a strongly worded cable about this problem and recommends that we use the Dobrynin visit as an entrée to redress the imbalance in access and requests that Dobrynin not be permitted to call upon you, other Cabinet-level officials, or the President until he has been received by Shevardnadze." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1986 Soviet Union April) Hartman met with Shevardnadze on April 3; see Document 210.

the wrong signals to the Soviet leadership about our desire to return to the Geneva agenda and to continue our dialogue on issues of concern.

For decades, US ambassadors have had difficulties in obtaining appointments with the Soviet leadership, even in circumstances which make it clear the appointment request is urgent. Prior to 1980, Dobrynin had extensive access in official Washington, including the White House and the NSC. The situation has been better under this Administration, with your serving as Dobrynin's only authoritative interlocutor. Art Hartman's access in Moscow, however, has remained severely restricted. In five years, Art has never once had an appointment in the Central Committee. The Soviets have sought to conduct as much business as possible through their ambassador here, which enables them to put their unscrutinized views directly to senior USG decision-makers.

Our tolerance of such an arrangement has denied us opportunities and influence in Moscow. The problem has intensified since Shevardnadze became Foreign Minister, with Art sometimes waiting a week or more for an appointment. Dobrynin's presence in Moscow and his apparent determination to play a central role in US-Soviet relations should help shift the balance in access back to Moscow. But there are steps we can take at this end to encourage greater reciprocity.

Specifically, I recommend that:

—We change the way we handle requests by the Soviet Embassy for appointments with you and other Seventh Floor principals to give us better control over the problem. Soviet Embassy requests for appointments with you or any other Department principal should first be referred to EUR/SOV, just as in Moscow all requests by Art for any appointment go through the USA Desk. SOV would review these requests on the basis of reciprocity and the type of business Dubinin wanted to conduct, and then recommend whom he should see and how soon. On some occasions, we might want to alert Art to the Soviet request and recommend that he make a request for a similar appointment.

—To ensure that the progress we have made since 1981 in keeping State as the sole communications channel with the Soviet Ambassador does not unravel, you may wish to remind John Poindexter of the need to continue to refuse to meet with Dubinin. You could cover this point in briefing John and the President on your initial meeting with Dubinin.

—We be a bit more audacious in using Art. We might, for example, instruct him to deliver letters from the President directly to Gorbachev. While there have been efforts to keep Art out of meetings with the top Soviet leaders, on those occasions when Art has accompanied high-level US visitors Gorbachev has gone out of his way to recognize Art's role. He might be prepared to permit a relationship which could be a

major asset as we seek to deepen our dialogue in the months ahead. As such a channel would inevitably involve Dobrynin, he might well encourage Gorbachev to receive Art.

*RECOMMENDATION*³

1. That Seventh Floor offices refer requests for appointments with Dubinin to SOV.
2. That you speak to Poindexter about keeping State as the Soviet Embassy's only official channel to the Executive Branch.
3. That we seek to use Art more imaginatively to develop channels to the Soviet leadership outside the MFA.

³ Shultz did not indicate his approval or disapproval of the recommendations.

242. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, June 11, 1986, 1154Z

9885. Subject: Gorbachev's Foreign Policy Views: How Much Change?

1. Confidential—Entire text.

Summary: We are reading and hearing these days about a new Gorbachevian approach to foreign policy that moves away from Khrushchev-Brezhnev stereotypes of international affairs toward a more realistic assessment of global interdependence and global problems. We saw some evidence of this in the materials of the 27th Party Congress and in subsequent media commentary about the Congress. We have heard from various Soviet sources that Gorbachev's May 23 speech at the Foreign Ministry featured this theme.² Dobrynin's May 27 speech, judging from *Pravda's* account of it, highlighted "new thinking"

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860451–0230. Confidential. Sent for information to USIA, the Moscow Political Collective, CDE Stockholm, and USCD Geneva.

² Gorbachev's May 23 Foreign Ministry speech was not made public. A few weeks later, the CIA received reporting on the speech. On July 18, Ermarth sent Casey a memorandum summarizing the main points, with the report attached; see Document 253.

about foreign affairs and omitted much of the pre-27th Congress dogma.³ An April article in *Pravda* was particularly insistent about fundamental changes in Soviet foreign policy doctrine; we recently met with the author, who argued that such changes were indeed underway and indicated they were controversial. We think there is something to these developments, although as yet their practical significance is unclear. End summary.

The 27th Congress and Media Commentary

3. As previously reported, there was an intriguing difference between the revised Party program ratified at the 27th Party Congress and Gorbachev's report to the Congress.⁴ The new version of the program characterized international affairs in standard terms, emphasizing the "contradiction" between "imperialism" and "socialism." Gorbachev's report added to this a new formulation regarding international affairs: "a growing tendency toward interdependence" leading toward a largely "integral world." Gorbachev's formulation—that contemporary foreign affairs are determined by interdependence as well as by the struggle between imperialism and socialism—was repeated in the official resolution of the Congress and in the authoritative *Pravda* editorial on the Congress.

4. Major media commentaries on the 27th Congress approvingly elaborated upon Gorbachev's approach. For example:

—First Deputy Chief of the Central Committee's International Department Vadim Zagladin published a lead article on "Global Contradictions" in the February 1986 issue of philosophical journal *Voprosy Filosofii*. Zagladin later told us we would be hearing a lot more on the subject.

—An editorial in the Central Committee journal *Kommunist* of March 1986 called for a "new system of coordinates" for analyzing international affairs and spoke of an "innovative conception of world interdependence."

³ The Embassy reported on Dobrynin's May 27 speech in telegram 9483 from Moscow, June 4, listing the main topics: "—'new thinking' in the nuclear age; —international cooperation to solve global problems; —flexibility and compromise in foreign policy; —the mutual nature of Soviet and American security." The Embassy commented that Dobrynin used this speech to "accentuate the positive, modern side of Gorbachev's rhetoric. At least in theory, the concepts for dealing with the West which Dobrynin outlined provide an alternative to the now passé notions of peaceful coexistence and détente." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860433–0420)

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 207.

—A major *Kommunist* editorial in April spoke of new thinking and action, new psychology and a new overall orientation in foreign policy. The editorial noted that one should not be bound by “yesterday’s formulas,” that the relationship between theory and practice should be reexamined in the light of the innovative ideas of the Congress.

—A lead article in the May issue of *Voprosy Filosofii* spoke of “the essential unity of contemporary mankind,” in addition to the struggle of the two world systems, and quoted at length that part of Gorbachev’s report to the 27th Congress which dealt with interdependence and global unity.

Speeches by Gorbachev and Dobrynin

5. We have heard from various Soviet sources that Gorbachev’s May 23 address at the Foreign Ministry featured the interdependence theme. The concept has also been emphasized by numerous party and government interlocutors with whom private U.S. foreign policy specialists have spoken in Moscow since the May 23–24 MFA meeting.

The foreign policy part of CC International Department Chief Dobrynin’s May 27 speech (see Moscow 9483) probably echoed Gorbachev’s May 23 MFA speech.⁵ As reported, Dobrynin emphasized interdependence, which in turn (he said) required “a qualitatively new approach to the problems of national security.” He spoke of “new political thinking that involved a new, qualitatively higher level of flexibility in foreign policy.”

Views of Mshvenieradze

7. The most dramatic article on these themes that has come to our attention appeared in *Pravda* April 11, 1986, under the title “New Political Thinking.” Written by Deputy Director of the Institute of Philosophy Vladimir Mshvenieradze, the article asserts that:

—Old political thinking has become “extremely dangerous.” For example, the Roman slogan “if you want peace, prepare for war” has become a direct threat to mankind.

—“There is no political, economic, social, ideological or any other problem that can be positively resolved by the application or threat of force.” Emphasis on military force is a sign of political impotence.

—“In this context, international contacts of all sorts, including the perfecting of a mechanism for negotiations at various levels . . . are extremely important.”

⁵ See footnote 3, above.

—It is necessary today to reject stereotypes and see new political realities, to renounce the competitive approach to political thinking about international affairs.

8. It is possible, of course, that Mshvenieradze and others have in mind a change primarily in U.S. political thinking, not Soviet. When we finally succeeded in meeting with Mshvenieradze June 3, he left no doubt that in his view Soviet as well as American foreign policy doctrine required revision. The formulas of Khrushchev (and Brezhnev) were no longer valid, he said. When we pointed out that the orthodox view of international relations formulated during the Khrushchev years could still be found in Soviet writings, Mshvenieradze said that “we” (i.e., he and unspecified colleagues) would have to be more active, “we have to be clearer about the new approach.”

9. In discussing the “contradictions” that shape contemporary international relations, Mshvenieradze said that the contradiction between “imperialism” and “socialism” had faded in significance because of the emergence of global contradictions that threatened both imperialism and socialism. This, he indicated, was what Gorbachev had in mind when at the 27th Congress he said international relations were determined primarily by the competition and confrontation of the two systems, plus a growing tendency toward global interdependence.

10. When we pointed out that this formulation did not appear in the revised party program, Mshvenieradze smiled and said it was no secret that various people were involved in drafting the program and the General Secretary’s report. One should focus on the report, not the program, he added. The essential thing was that present-day realities required assessing old thinking about foreign affairs in a new, larger, more realistic context.

What Does it Mean?

11. The way that this issue has unfolded before, during and after the 27th Congress leads us to doubt that Soviet statements about interdependence and a new approach to foreign affairs amount to a massive disinformation effort. We recall, for instance, Gorbachev’s evidently impromptu speech on interdependence when he arrived at the Soviet Mission in Geneva last November. We also recall the British Embassy’s telling us that Gorbachev delivered a lengthy monologue on interdependence to the British parliamentary delegation that recently visited Moscow (although we understand the parliamentarians could not make much sense out of what Gorbachev said).

12. We also gather that this new approach to thinking about international relations is controversial, although we cannot assess the degree

of controversy it has engendered. Dobrynin and Zagladin seem to be on board. Shevardnadze would be an unlikely opponent. Perhaps Gromyko and other warhorses like Boris Ponomarev are uncomfortable with this revision of longstanding foreign policy orthodoxy. Some in the military establishment may be particularly uneasy about the new approach's deemphasis of militarism.

13. At this point, however, we have more questions than answers. Is Gorbachev's conception of international relations still taking shape, as seems to be the case with his foreign policy apparatus? Do the many changes in the foreign policy apparatus reflect Gorbachev's desire to shake things up and clear the way for a new substantive approach? Did Gorbachev and colleagues arrange the unprecedented meeting at the Foreign Ministry last month to promote his new conception of foreign policy? Is the new emphasis on interdependence a tactical change, calculated to maintain the status quo while the Gorbachev regime turns inward to recover its domestic strength? Or does the new line represent a more fundamental change in Soviet political doctrine? What are the operational implications of this development for Soviet foreign policy behavior, and when will they emerge (few, if any, seem to have appeared to date)? Finally, what are the implications of this overall development for our approach to U.S.-Soviet relations? We will be looking for answers here, and hope our colleagues in Eastern Europe and other suitable venues will give us a hand.

Hartman

243. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, June 12, 1986, 2–2:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

State:

Secretary George P. Shultz

Treasury:

Secretary James A. Baker, III

OSD:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

Justice:

Attorney General Edwin Meese, III

OMB:

Director James C. Miller

CIA:

Director William J. Casey

JCS:

General John A. Wickham, Jr.

White House

Mr. Donald T. Regan

Admiral John M. Poindexter

NSC

Mr. Rodney B. McDaniel

Minutes

After a brief introduction by *Admiral Poindexter* summarizing the discussion on June 6,² general discussion of a new arms control position followed.

Secretary Weinberger made the point that the Soviets wanted an agreement to cut their defense budget. We should not bargain SDI away, that Congress would not fund SDI if we agreed not to deploy it, and that he sensed no enormous public pressure for a new agreement. If new proposals were needed, he agreed that we should say we are not designing SDI to destroy targets on earth, that there should be no restraints on SDI research, and that we should go for reduction to zero ballistic missiles to be phased in with SDI deployments.³ He also noted

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Planning Group (NSPG), NSPG 135 06/12/1986 [US-Soviet Relations]. Secret. The meeting took place in the Situation Room.

² See Document 239.

³ A paper entitled "Reducing Ballistic Offensive Missiles to Zero," June 16, with an explanatory cover page reading: "Tkle paper describing Weinberger position on elimination of nuclear weapons," is in Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, June 1986.

that verification is a major problem and should be discussed first, not last in any serious negotiations.

Director Casey felt the Soviet proposals were clearly aimed at gutting SDI which was not in our interest. We should stick to our goal, cuts in offensive forces and transition to defense. At some point, we will need to change the ABM treaty, and should not accept the Soviet proposal to bless it. More work needs to be done on transition and sharing, perhaps along the lines of the open labs proposal. We can possibly accept restrictions on the pace of our transition to defense, and should link this to reductions in offensive forces.

General Wickham thought the Soviets were timing their proposals to influence Congress on SDI funding. Their numbers were attractive, but there were hooks—especially in INF and SLCM. We should not undercut SDI, and new proposals were not necessary.

Secretary Shultz disagreed, saying we need to be seen as joining the process. He liked Secretary Weinberger's repackaging of the zero option.⁴ As long as the agreement permits SDI, we have not given away anything. He agreed we needed to focus on compliance, and that SDI could be seen as insurance against Soviet noncompliance. The stage was set for something dramatic, but the current US proposals were too complicated—the zero option linked to SDI sound good to him.

Don Regan agreed we should work now to develop a new proposal or a repackaging of the current one. If we do not take this seriously now, the Soviets will wait us out. The right agreement would give the Soviets what they want—reduced costs—and would be good for the allies and good domestic politics too.

The *President* said we do not want a first-strike capability, but the Soviets probably will not believe us. The Soviets have economic problems, and Gorbachev has his own internal problems with the hardliners. Further, Chernobyl has altered Gorbachev's outlook on the

⁴ In his memoir, Shultz provided his account of Weinberger's statement during this meeting: "The president convened an intimate and restricted group in the Situation Room on June 12 to consider the Soviet proposals. Cap Weinberger surprised the president and me with a dramatic and radical proposal. When Gorbachev had proposed at the beginning of the year a phased program to eliminate nuclear weapons, the president was enthusiastic, but no one else in his administration was. I had tried to convert the idea into an asset on which we could build a solid first phase of reductions. Now came Weinberger with a proposal to eliminate all ballistic missiles. Everyone was astonished. The president looked at me. I smiled. 'I compliment Cap on having the imagination to present such a bold idea,' I said. I recalled to the president my sentiments about the Soviet comparative advantage in ballistic missiles. The president was intrigued. We left the meeting on the note that Cap's idea should be studied carefully but quietly to see how we might make it part of our reply to the latest Soviet offer." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 720–721) No record of Weinberger's proposal was found.

dangers of nuclear war. The time is right for something dramatic. We should go for zero ballistic missiles, agree to go forward with research permitted by the ABM treaty, invite the other side to witness testing when we come to that. No deployment of SDI until we eliminate ballistic missiles. Agree to share SDI with the world.

Secretary Baker agreed we needed something new, but asked whether we would agree to share before giving up ballistic missiles.

Secretary Weinberger thought there was a timing problem also with respect to the linkage of deployments to ballistic missile elimination. He agreed we should develop a new proposal for after the break, but we need to be careful with any discussion of ABM or we risk being dragged into an agreement.

The *President* said the ABM treaty issue was okay, since research was permitted—we need an agreement to cover what we do when we are ready to test, providing for joint observers or something like that. The issue of the timing of the period of deployment and how deployment was linked to elimination of ballistic missiles needed to be negotiated.

Admiral Poindexter concluded by saying we would summarize the President's views and circulate them to NSPG principals, and then energize the interagency process (at Tab I is a summary of the President's position).

Tab I

Summary of President Reagan's Position⁵

Washington, undated

The President has provided the following guidance with respect to our arms control process:

1. The USG should act positively towards Soviet proposals put on the table at Geneva during this round. We should take their proposals seriously and develop appropriate counter-proposals within existing policy guidelines. Our public posture should project this positive/serious stance.

2. I believe that the Soviets oppose our development of SDI because they genuinely believe that we seek a first-strike advantage. Accordingly, I propose the development of a new initiative designed to counter this fear and to lead as rapidly as possible to a system of mutual

⁵ Secret.

deterrence based on defense. Development of this dramatic new proposal should commence now and be introduced at the next Geneva round in September. The basic elements of this initiative should include:

—Continue our SDI research at our current pace. Acknowledge that the Soviets are free to continue their ABM research.

—Agree that, when either side reaches the point in their ABM research that testing is required, then the other side will be invited to observe the testing.

—Agree that there will be no deployment of an ABM system by either side until agreement is reached on reductions of ballistic missiles by both sides. Actual deployments of ABM systems would be linked and phased to actual ballistic missile reductions by both sides.

—Agree that either side will share its ABM system with the other side, after the mutually witnessed testing has demonstrated that the system works. Eventually, our goal would be sharing the ABM systems with all responsible nations of the world.

244. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, June 12, 1986

SUBJECT

June 11 Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dubinin

The arms control initiative Dubinin wanted to convey was a copy of a proposal being made to UN Secretary General de Cuellar for

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron June 1986 (3/6). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed in the top right-hand margin of the memorandum. In telegram 179564 to USUN and Moscow, June 6, the Department reported that Yuriy Vladimirovich Dubinin was “named the Soviet Ambassador to the United States on May 20, 1986. He has no direct experience with U.S. affairs, although he dealt with U.S. officials frequently in Geneva” as deputy head of the Soviet CSCE delegation from 1973 to 1975, and then as Ambassador to Spain from 1978 to 1986 when he was appointed Soviet Permanent Representative to the UN. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860441–0133) A read-out of Shultz’s meeting with Dubinin was transmitted in a message via the NODIS//ADAM Channel to Moscow on June 12. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron June 1986 (3/6))

multilateral cooperation in the peaceful uses of space.² I reminded Dubinin that Moscow had been unresponsive to our own earlier proposals for space cooperation, but said we welcomed in principle the opportunity to work together in this area. I am sending John Poindexter the text and our analysis of the document.

As we discussed, I took the occasion to make three points which I asked Dubinin to convey on your behalf to Gorbachev:

—That we viewed the Soviets' recent proposals in Geneva as serious ones, and that they would receive careful study and a reply;

—That you had noted what has been done in resolving some humanitarian cases, and viewed recent steps as positive and welcome;

—And that, if Gorbachev wanted to suggest a date in mid-November for the 1986 summit, you would be prepared to accept.

Dubinin undertook to convey your message to Gorbachev personally. He then asked—on a “personal” basis—what we intended to do about SALT II. I outlined the rationale for your decision, emphasizing our desire to achieve a reliable regime of mutual restraint, and pointing to the first element of your message to Gorbachev as evidence of your desire to achieve real reductions in strategic weapons.³ Dubinin noted in response only that the timing of a decision to exceed SALT restraints was “an important element.” He seemed to be suggesting that it might be difficult for Gorbachev to come here with such a decision hanging over him or having just been made.

Dubinin confirmed he would be returning from Moscow in time to present his credentials to you June 23 as we had proposed.

² In telegram 187071 to Moscow, June 13, the Department sent the information provided by Dubinin, which consisted of a “letter from Premier Ryzhkov to UN SecGen Pérez de Cuéllar proposing creation of new ‘world space organization’ to oversee ambitious program of cooperation in peaceful exploitation of space;” as well as talking points elaborating the proposal. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860457–0867)

³ See footnote 2, Document 237.

245. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, June 20, 1986

SUBJECT

Soviet Backchannel Message to Sen. Kennedy: President Playing Politics, but Summit is On

I met Larry Horowitz at noon today, and he briefed me on his meetings with his Soviet interlocutor, Pavlov, earlier this week.² He asked that I inform *only* you, Secretary Shultz—and, of course, the President.

Background:

The Soviets proposed and indeed insisted on the meeting. They invited Horowitz to come to Moscow, and when he said he couldn't (he is moving to California this weekend), they proposed another site and settled for Paris, since Horowitz was planning to be in London over the weekend. The meetings with Pavlov took place in Paris between Monday evening and Wednesday morning this week.

At first, Pavlov read from a prepared text, which he stressed comprised his "official instructions." His "instructions" were typed in Russian, and Pavlov translated as he went along. Horowitz took notes and read them to me from his notes. The following is a close to verbatim version of Horowitz's account.

The "Message" to Kennedy:

The situation in U.S.-Soviet relations has deteriorated, but its essence is clear to the Soviet leadership. It has become more complicated. What appears in public is like the tip of an iceberg. One sees only propaganda, but much is invisible below the surface.

President Reagan has shown a greatly increased interest in a Summit meeting this year. This is part of his political strategy for 1986 and 1988. He wants to keep the Republicans in control of the Senate and of the White House. It is rare that we can see through American political

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File 1980–1986, Matlock Chron June 1986 (5/16). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Brackets are in the original. Reagan initialed the memorandum in the top right-hand corner, indicating he saw it.

² Horowitz, assistant to Senator Edward Kennedy; see Documents 65 and 66 and *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 163 and 180.

manipulations so clearly, and we can only be amazed that the Administration is so obvious in its tactics. Reagan has no interest in arms control questions as such and is thinking only of politics. We realize that whatever we do has a bearing on politics in the United States. We regret this, but cannot avoid it, for it is a fact of life.

In official communications and in private messages, the Administration has been planning for the development of U.S.-Soviet relations to include a visit by Reagan to the USSR late in 1987 or even in 1988. In preparing to schedule the summit meetings in the United States and the USSR, he seems prepared to reach more practical agreements than any previous American President. We believe he in fact wants agreements.

On nuclear testing, the President is ready to ratify the 1974 and 1976 treaties—if there is improved verification of testing. Not a treaty, but an understanding on the process. Communications from the Administration have offered a statement on testing at the Summit, along these lines. Then our experts would meet to discuss their proposals for “rules of the road,” but they would listen to our views. Note: these proposals are for discussions, promises for progress in the future, but not a concrete agreement.

On medium-range missiles, Shultz told Dobrynin that it was the “best prospect” for an understanding at the Summit. The President took Dobrynin aside at the end of their conversation in April and said it could be done, but it must be on a global basis. Our position on this is well known.

On space strike weapons, both Reagan and Shultz, at different times, as well as other officials, have raised with us proposals for cooperation. They suggest we do this by discussing methods and means to prevent a first-strike capability and the stationing of offensive weapons in space. This is just a way to avoid discussing the ABM Treaty. The Administration wants verbiage promising not to deploy weapons in space, but a free hand to pursue its research. We believe they want to develop a nationwide territorial ABM capability. This is unacceptable. They will never get anywhere with this approach.

On strategic weapons, the President expressed a willingness to reduce by 50%. But for the 1986 summit he wants only to pave the road for signing the agreement when the President visits Moscow—in late 1987 or 1988. That is, he wants good feelings and the appearance of progress this year, but no agreement until the eve of his departure from office.

Regarding other matters, the President’s people have made clear that they would like progress on a chemical weapons ban and are prepared to negotiate agreements on Afghanistan and a range of bilat-

eral matters. We now believe that there is a real possibility of progress in Vienna and on taking some confidence-building measures.

We think there are possibilities in all five of these areas. The President and Shultz have persistently pushed the idea that in 1986 we need agreements on the key elements, but no agreements need be finished. These can be ready for signature in Moscow in 1987 and ratified by the Senate, maybe just before the 1988 election. As Shultz put it, "We need to identify elements *now* to have agreements ready next year." When Dobrynin had his final meeting with the President, the President said, "What would you think about identifying the elements of an INF agreement at the 1986 Summit? If we could, we would have almost a year to build an agreement and sign it in 1987."

Therefore, we believe that the President is proposing a two-stage process. It is a cynical and politically motivated attitude. Preliminary agreements in 1986 and complete agreements in 1987. American officials make it very clear. For example, Matlock told one of our people that we need to settle on the types of weapons to be covered and the numbers, and to talk in precise terms. These are just words. They have nothing practical in mind, just words. [Horowitz commented that he thought the words attributed to me demonstrated the opposite of what the Soviets were trying to prove. I agreed, and explained that I was merely pressing them to get down to business in Geneva.]

What is President Reagan's intention? First, to avoid agreements in 1986. Second, to pave the way for a Summit in 1987 or 1988. Third, all this is politically motivated. The White House would be satisfied with smiles when Gorbachev comes to the U.S., and a document of words but no substance. Things like rules of behavior and mutual understandings. That is worthless.

We are deeply concerned that international affairs are now so deeply tied to Republican Party politics. We can see that the President needs to employ harsh rhetoric to placate his right wing. We also know why he announced the decision on SALT-II the way he did. It was to play to the right wing. We do not take it seriously because it has no practical significance.

END OF "MESSAGE"

Other Matters:

In addition to his "official message," Pavlov made a number of comments on other questions, some of which he represented as only his personal view. The ones Horowitz mentioned to me are the following:

Summitry: Shultz and Shevardnadze will meet, Pavlov said. (He did not say when.) The Summit will be held in the U.S. this year. (When Horowitz asked whether this was Pavlov's opinion, the latter said, "It is fact, not opinion.") And, finally, Pavlov repeated that it was the

Soviet assessment that agreements would be reached with the President before the end of his term.

Human Rights: The Soviets are releasing 10 more families, as the “second wave” of visas promised Kennedy. One of the persons included, a physicist named Azernoy, could have more than routine significance since he worked in Sakharov’s laboratory and is the first scientist who worked with Sakharov who has been permitted to leave. Pavlov said that this might set a “useful” precedent for dealing with Sakharov, but that he had “no word” whether anything would be done to alleviate Sakharov’s status. (He observed that Sakharov’s Moscow home “was being maintained” so the practical possibility exists for him to return there, but that he was unaware of any decision to allow this to happen.)

American Politics: The Kremlin, Pavlov said, had reached the conclusion that the Democrats could not gain control of the Senate in 1986 or 1988, and could not win the Presidency in 1988, therefore they would have to deal with the Republicans. (Pavlov claimed that he personally did not agree with this analysis, but stated that it was the Kremlin assessment.)

Pavlov added that, of the potential Republican candidates in 1988, they liked Bush the most and Laxalt the least. He explained that they knew Bush and thought they could deal with him. But they considered Laxalt an ideologue who would be most difficult. They thought they might have the best chances of all with Dole, he continued, since they “liked his approach,” but felt that he didn’t have a chance. After reviewing these names Pavlov observed that of course they would prefer to deal with any Democrat rather than a Republican, but they just didn’t see this as a real possibility and assumed that they would be dealing with Republicans beyond 1988.

Soviet Bureaucracy: Pavlov is a close friend of Gorbachev’s foreign affairs assistant Chernyayev. When Horowitz asked him what had happened to Zagladin (also a friend), Pavlov claimed that Zagladin is still in charge of “parliamentary contacts” in the Central Committee, including with the U.S., and stated that Dobrynin does not have the field totally to himself. He stated that his meeting with Horowitz had been approved personally by Gorbachev, that his written “instructions” had been approved personally by Shevardnadze, and that Bessmertnykh had participated in the drafting.

Matlock Comment: The *chutzpah* in the Soviet effort to play both sides of the street on the American political scene is rather breathtaking. Not surprising, but it is so blatant that it is more likely to backfire than to achieve whatever purpose they have in mind. (They probably assume that Kennedy is their pipeline into the entire Democratic Party—which would be typical of the sort of assumptions they make. Actually, I doubt that he tells any of his colleagues about this in any concrete fashion.)

Horowitz started our conversation by observing that he had “good news” for us. “They’re telling us they plan to deal with the President,” he added. I think that is exactly right. They have concluded that they have no real alternative but to deal, and are attempting to give the Democrats “fair warning” not to expect “assistance” in the form of stonewalling agreements and such to “help” them in coming election campaigns. I don’t know whether they really believe all the claptrap about the President’s political motivations—they possibly may—but the analysis they offered was obviously tailored for Kennedy’s ear. Even if they believe it, it may not be too damaging, unless they assume that political motivations will make the President “soft” in the end game. If they should make that mistake, they will probably find they are wrong too late to do much about it.

It occurs to me that, in this caper, the Soviets may have been too clever by half. If the message they were peddling gets out to the Democrats, it could be most helpful, since the only logical conclusion to draw from it is that it is most dangerous to make a campaign issue out of the President’s alleged inability to deal with the Soviets. By the Soviets’ own admission, he *is* dealing effectively, and is likely to have something to show for it before the votes are cast in November, 1988. On the interim restraint decision, the implication seems pretty clear: “Save your breath; it isn’t going to make any difference!”

Horowitz’s Plans

Larry is moving to California this weekend, to take up a job with an investment banker. (Says a couple of years there should take care of his kids’ education!) However, he will continue to be Kennedy’s contact with the Soviets. (They like to deal with people they know.) He offered to be of service to us if we have anything for him to do, and said he would keep us informed if there are any further substantive contacts. He repeated again that he is not sure his Soviet contacts know that he passes this on to us, so that we should not play any back to Soviet officials.

246. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 23, 1986, 4:55–5:35 p.m.

President Reagan and Ambassador Dubinin

US Participants:

President Reagan
Chief of Staff Regan
VADM Poindexter
Ambassador Matlock
Deputy Assistant Secretary Simons
D. Zarechnak, Interpreter

Soviet Participants:

Ambassador Dubinin

After initial greetings, Ambassador Dubinin began to read prepared notes. He said that when he was in Moscow he spoke with General Secretary Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders, and Gorbachev asked him to convey his greetings and best wishes to the President.

The President thanked the Ambassador, and asked him to transmit his greetings and best wishes in return.

Dubinin indicated that Gorbachev, speaking to him as Ambassador of the USSR, had given him his evaluation of the state of Soviet-American relations and the prospect for their improvement. He had also noted the positive elements in Reagan's Glassboro speech, and its tone.² Of course, the most decisive thing was practical policy and actions. The sooner the United States stops thinking that it can put the Soviet Union in a difficult situation with respect to arms, technology, economics, etc., the sooner there will be fruitful results and improvement of relations between the two countries. Such an approach is no basis for

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1986 (4/4). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Zarechnak; cleared by Simons. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Shultz did not attend this meeting, as he was traveling in Asia. In telegram Tosec 110162/199602 to the Secretary's Delegation, June 24, the Department sent this memorandum of conversation, as well as the text of Gorbachev's letter to Reagan; see Document 247. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860006–0461)

² On June 19, Reagan gave the commencement address at a high school in Glassboro, New Jersey. He spoke at length on U.S.-Soviet relations, explaining that "in recent weeks, there have been fresh developments. The Soviets have made suggestions on a range of issues, from nuclear power plant safety to conventional force reductions in Europe. Perhaps most important, the Soviet negotiators in Geneva have placed on the table new proposals to reduce nuclear weapons. Now, we cannot accept these particular proposals without some change, but it appears that the Soviets have begun to make a serious effort. If both sides genuinely want progress, then this could represent a turning point in the effort to make ours a safer and more peaceful world. We believe that possibly an atmosphere does exist that will allow for serious discussion." For the text of the address, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book I, pp. 806–811.

a bilateral relationship. A good basis for this relationship is to act in accordance with the long-term interests of both countries.

Dubinina continued that Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union is not trying to defeat the United States, but it will also not permit itself to be defeated. Its approach is that relations with the U.S. must be based on equality and equal security. The Soviet Union wishes to improve relations with the United States. It would be dangerous to put these relations to the test.

Dubinina indicated that Gorbachev had asked him to tell the President that he was ready to look at regional issues, but that such discussions must be based on realism. The Soviet Union considers that each country has the right to chart its own course and to decide whether its economic system should be a market system or a socialist system. He is prepared to discuss regional issues on a realistic basis. The Soviet Union is for democratization of international relations.

Dubinina said that Gorbachev noted the constructive approach of the Soviet leadership with respect to dialogue with the U.S., including dialogue at the highest level, but stressed the great significance of a possible summit. The possibility of such a meeting has attracted so much attention in the world that preparations for it and its successful conclusion are more important than they were for the Geneva summit.

Dubinina indicated that Gorbachev had asked him to transmit a letter which he signed on June 19.³ The main idea of the letter was that the Soviet Union approaches things constructively and is seeking to find solutions to problems between us. Gorbachev was impressed by the idea the President conveyed to Dobrynin in May, namely that practical possible agreements lay between the optimum requirements of one side or the other.⁴ Therefore, this search was something which both sides had in common. In light of this common understanding, Gorbachev proposed that concrete areas be found for practical agreements in time for the summit.

Dubinina continued that the Soviet Union has moved, and is ready for a reduction in arms. In the area of space the Soviets had taken some steps and are ready for practical work. His purpose was not to identify specific elements at this time, but areas where we should concentrate our efforts. Gorbachev positively noted the President's assessment of the latest Soviet proposal on strategic offensive nuclear arms, which was conveyed through Secretary Shultz and Dubinina. The Soviet delegation in Geneva is awaiting a concrete reply and a discussion of the Soviet proposal with the U.S. delegation.

³ See Document 247.

⁴ Dubinina likely meant Dobrynin's April 8 meeting with Reagan; see Document 212.

Dubinina indicated that with regard to medium-range missiles, Gorbachev was ready to consider a partial solution. The Soviet side may have some specific thoughts on this score, and if the U.S. side has some as well, the Soviet side is ready for serious work on this. Gorbachev is convinced that a mutually satisfactory solution can be found.

Dubinina then touched upon the issue of nuclear testing. Gorbachev understood the reasons behind the fact that President Reagan was not ready to cease nuclear tests. He, therefore, had weighed carefully what the President had conveyed through Ambassador Dobrynin. In his letter, Gorbachev states that he, too, thinks that there should be talks between experts on all aspects of this issue. Such talks could touch upon questions of verification and the obligation to determine the conditions and ways of attaining a complete prohibition of nuclear tests. Such a meeting which the President had also spoken of, should take place as soon as possible, perhaps at the beginning of July.

Dubinina continued that Gorbachev thinks that the U.S. and USSR have certain common elements of an approach to the important issues, and that it would be possible to cooperate, including at the Summit, on such issues as improvement of nuclear power plant safety, peaceful uses of space, and other bilateral issues. Gorbachev has some thoughts on how to proceed in preparing this work. The Soviet side is proposing to work together without wasting time and using the fora and channels which already exist, such as the respective embassies. The foreign ministers of the two countries could then analyze the results of this work, and make final decisions with regard to the Summit.

Dubinina said that in his letter, Gorbachev indicated that he was for movement, for active preparations, and for a drastic turn in U.S.-Soviet relations.

At this point Dubinina handed Gorbachev's letter to the President, together with an unofficial Soviet translation.

President Reagan thanked the Ambassador and indicated that he was glad to hear that the General Secretary was looking forward to the Summit. The President had never given up belief in a Summit in the US, as was agreed in Geneva. He recalled that when he had talked with the General Secretary in Geneva, the President had indicated that before we could talk about weapons, and what was fair, we needed to remove the distrust which existed between the two countries. This needed to be done more than in words, it needed to be done with deeds. He had indicated that the US did not seek to acquire an advantage over the USSR, but that the record showed that there were reasons for US mistrust. After the Second World War, in which the US and the USSR were allies, the US disarmed. During that war, the US did not acquire one foot of foreign territory. At the same time, after the end of the war, the US was the only country in the world with nuclear

weapons. It could have dictated its will to the world, but it did not do so. Instead, it proposed that all weapons be turned over to an international board, so that no country could threaten any other one. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, embarked on a program of massive rearmament which was offensive in nature, and which could not be justified by the need for defense.

President Reagan continued that General Secretary Gorbachev had not said this, but previous Soviet leaders had reiterated many times that the goal of Marxism and Leninism was the achievement of a one-world Communist state. Could the US ignore this and think that it was not a possible target? General Secretary Gorbachev had not made such a statement and was the first Soviet leader to Reagan's knowledge who proposed to decrease the number of nuclear weapons and to completely eliminate them. The President welcomed this and was willing to join in this effort, since he had had this same goal for many years, but not through something like the SALT Treaty, which simply regulated an arms increase, but real negotiations to reduce the number of such weapons.

The President said that in order to achieve these aims there would need to be deeds to show that both sides wished to eliminate the distrust which exists between them, and which makes each feel on guard against the other.

The President emphasized that the US side was very grateful for the steps taken by the Soviet government to allow reunification of families through emigration. The Soviets had not seen the US give this a lot of publicity, or make public demands or take credit for it. It very much appreciates the Soviet actions.

The President indicated that he wished to conclude the meeting with the following thought, since he had already taken up a great deal of the Ambassador's time. He realized that with the new Soviet administration, June had been too early a date to have set for the Summit. Now the US side was faced with a difficulty due to elections in which members of the U.S. side would be involved. The US would very much appreciate it if the General Secretary or the Ambassador would propose a date after the early November elections for the Summit. Then the two sides could get together to work on issues to decrease the mistrust between the two sides.

Dubin in thanked the President for his frank and candid remarks, especially for discussing those things which he had discussed in private with Gorbachev. The President was aware of the position of the Soviet Union on these issues, since Gorbachev had indicated them, so Dubin in did not wish to dwell on this. He did wish to stress and stress again that the Soviet Union wants to live in peace with the US, and that it had no intentions with regard to the United States or other countries

or regions except those of peaceful coexistence, peace and cooperation. The two countries fully shared a common goal of reducing arms. The President would see from Gorbachev's letter that the two sides are close to very significant agreements, and such agreements could be realized in time for a possible Summit. The Soviet side was proposing to begin preparatory work immediately. Then the foreign ministers might meet in September to evaluate the results of the work. This could take place immediately preceding the UN General Assembly. It was very important to prepare thoroughly for the Summit, and the US and USSR could really set an example and start the work of real disarmament.

Dubinina concluded by saying that the USSR was approaching this in a constructive and optimistic fashion, and that it was ready to get down to work.

247. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz in Singapore¹

Washington, June 24, 1986, 2346Z

Tosec 110162/199602. Subject: Soviet Ambassador Dubinina's Call on the President; Gorbachev's Letter.

[Omitted here is the text of the June 23 memorandum of conversation; see Document 246.]

4. Begin text of Gorbachev letter, in informal Soviet translation:²

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N8600006-0461. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent to Moscow for information.

² The letter was presented to Reagan by Dubinina during their June 23 meeting. Although it was undated, Dubinina told Reagan that Gorbachev signed the letter on June 19; see Document 246. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "While I was in Singapore, a flash cable from Washington arrived with the news that Ambassador Dubinina had brought a letter from Gorbachev. Many Sovietologists in the U.S. government had worried that Gorbachev might not want to expose his arms control ideas to his 'interagency process,' and so, with urging, especially from the NSC staff, a private channel or set of special emissaries to carry on the work between us had been proposed. No, Gorbachev indicated that he wanted the work done through 'existing channels,' our respective embassies, with the foreign ministers, Shevardnadze and me, taking the lead. This was helpful to me, in the face of the NSC staff's constant efforts to become the U.S. special channel or emissary." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 722–723)

Dear Mr. President,

In your letter of May 23, 1986 you note that a full six months have been lost, which could have been used for resolving important problems in the relations between the USSR and U.S.³ In principle it is difficult not to agree with that. Indeed, the months which have passed since our meeting have turned out to be a kind of a period of missed opportunities.

Speaking frankly, without diplomatic contrivances we are disappointed by the developments after Geneva, and we have serious grounds for that. Last November it was our assumption that through the efforts of both sides—joint or, if you will, simultaneous—the shift of our relations to a more stable, solid basis would be practically implemented. In other words the period after Geneva was supposed to become a time for intensive work to prepare the next, higher stage of Soviet-American relations.

This, however, did not happen. The reason is not that the real opportunities for such a shift were lacking. It is that the American side did not join the constructive efforts made by the Soviet Union, and even resisted them.

I am saying this not for the sake of polemics which would substitute a businesslike discussion, but in order to set the record straight. The fact remains that it is precisely the Soviet Union who, following the joint commitments undertaken at the Geneva meeting, has prepared and introduced the proposals which, should they be taken up by the other side, would ensure a weighty material content of agreements on the main directions which you and I, Mr. President, have chartered. They constitute a sufficiently comprehensive system of possible solutions on the main aspects of the problem of security. I am speaking about space, strategic offensive, nuclear medium-range, nuclear operational—tactical, chemical and conventional weapons. At the same time we have worked out anew a broad spectrum of measures to strengthen verification and enhance confidence-building measures.

Unfortunately, so far our initiatives have not generated a real reciprocal movement on the part of the U.S. Yet, in fact, each of those proposals contains as an integral element an opening for cooperation with the United States.

The American side has responded by unwillingness to give thought to the essence of our ideas, unpreparedness to get down to their specific discussion or, at best, by calls to return to its proposals introduced even before the November summit. The latter looks strange, to say the least, if one is to take into account that you and I agreed in Geneva

³ See Document 235.

to accelerate the process of negotiations, that is, to move forward, not backward.

Judging by your latest letters, you, too, recognize the importance of the atmosphere shaping up around Soviet-American relations. Understandably, the political climate is determined not only by the public utterances on either side, though this factor cannot be discounted completely, but, mainly, by the practical actions. In this connection it must be stated outright that many American actions, for example, the attack against Libya, renunciation of compliance with the 1972 interim agreement and the SALT II Treaty, were of an extremely negative, dangerous nature. This, naturally, has a direct bearing on the evaluation of the intentions of the U.S. in the international arena and cannot but affect our perception of the attitude of the American leadership to the conduct of affairs with the Soviet Union. Clearly, such a line of action of the U.S. does not make things more definite also in so far as a new summit meeting is concerned, our attitude to which, as I have already told you, is in principle positive.

Nothing should be left unsaid on this subject, however. We are deeply convinced—and we sincerely say that—that with no confidence that actual agreements will be reached there would be no point in holding such a meeting. A sterile meeting would only mislead the public opinion, would have the opposite effect.

Preparing and holding a productive meeting between the leaders of two countries is, naturally, a mutual endeavor. You and I should be equally interested in a positive outcome. Accordingly, an equal degree of readiness to make a tangible contribution to ensuring a positive outcome should also be manifested. In the language of the political practice, that means the willingness and ability to reach mutually beneficial compromises.

I admit, the thought appeals to me, which you expressed in the conversation with Anatoly F. Dobrynin to the effect that the practical possibilities of agreements can lie somewhere between the optimum requirements of both sides. Certainly, it would be, nevertheless, good to resolve the vital problems at one stroke, radically. The critical moment we are going through requires that. But since so far in practice it doesn't work out that way, let us begin by taking the path of searching for solutions leading to that.

Should the search show that pragmatic agreements are within the realm of our possibilities, then the necessary efforts could be exerted to make them a positive core of our meeting.

In our view, there are several areas where, given mutual willingness, forward movement could be achieved, which could take the shape of agreements at the summit. Given the work which we continue to

conduct to create a basis for such agreements, I would like to suggest that now attention be focused on the following:

First: Space and strategic offensive weapons. The Soviet side, as you know, introduced in Geneva the other day a compromise version of a possible agreement on this subject.⁴ As a key element we propose to come to agreement on strengthening the regime of the ABM Treaty, among other things, by adopting the obligation not to use for a certain agreed period of time the right to withdraw from the treaty. A more solid degree of strategic stability and confidence resulting from such a step could be enhanced by agreement to ban “offensive weapons” in space, that is, weapons capable of striking targets in the Earth’s atmosphere or on the surface of the Earth, and to prohibit anti-satellite systems, including the liquidation of the existing ones. We would be also prepared to clarify on a mutual basis the boundaries of the activities in the ABM field permitted and prohibited under the treaty.

A forward movement on these problems would undoubtedly permit to resolve as a practical matter the problem of a substantial reduction in strategic offensive arms. On this subject we have outlined two versions of agreements, so to speak, for the American side to pick and choose. One—involving the inclusion of the American medium-range nuclear systems capable of reaching the territory of the USSR among the weapons to be reduced, the other—without the inclusion of such systems.

I have noted with satisfaction your assessment of the new Soviet proposals as “undoubtedly serious”, which will be “intensively and carefully studied” in Washington, which was transmitted to me by Secretary George Shultz through Ambassador Yuriy Dubinin. I see in that an encouraging sign and expect that you will instruct your delegation in Geneva to get down to a businesslike and specific discussion. Our representatives have all the necessary instructions for that.

Second: Medium-range missiles in Europe. Though we have agreed in Geneva, among other things, to conduct a search around the idea of an interim agreement, the American side has never departed from its old “zero option”, the lopsidedness of which is obvious to everybody. Some later procedural additions to that American position do not change things, of course. Nevertheless, I am convinced that we are able to find a mutually acceptable version. The best of them would certainly be agreement on the complete elimination of the medium-range missiles of the USSR and U.S. in the European zone, reinforced by the appropriate obligations not to circumvent it, both on your and on our part. But, I repeat, we are also prepared for partial measures.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 236 and Document 238.

I think, there is merit in starting exploring them without delay. If the American side, too, has concrete considerations on this score, it would be good for our representatives to exchange ideas on this subject.

Third: Cessation of nuclear tests. You, Mr. President, have spoken frankly enough about the motives the American side is guided by in continuing to conduct underground nuclear explosions. And yet, I place the question of restraint in that area in the category of political rather than military decisions.

This issue attracts universal attention in the world. Taking unilateral actions in this area and inviting the United States to come along, we by no means are seeking “to drive the other side into the corner”. We would like Washington to have a correct perception of this policy of ours.

I have carefully thought over again the considerations outlined by both sides, including the recent ones, concerning the talks of experts in the field of nuclear explosions. I am also inclined to think that such discussions, conducted without any preconditions, should touch upon the entire range of questions—both the questions of verification and the obligation to define the conditions and ways leading to complete renunciation of nuclear weapon tests.

Taking into account a certain convergence of attitudes we suggest that such talks, which you also spoke about, start in the nearest future, say, in early July. The level and place for these bilateral discussions, I presume, could be worked out soon through diplomatic channels.

All in all, it would certainly make sense for both of our sides to show a realistic approach to this set of questions, which touch upon the nerve centers of security of both the USSR and U.S.

There are, we think, possibilities for joint work, including in the context of the summit, also on such problems as the strengthening of the safety regime for nuclear power plants, cooperation in the peaceful use and exploration of outer space as well as in a number of areas of concrete bilateral contacts. It is our understanding that the American side is also interested in such cooperation.

Thus, Mr. President, the Soviet side does not slacken its efforts directed not only at the normalization of our relations and strengthening of international security, but also at a practical preparation, by deeds, of the summit meeting. I hope that you will view in this light also the considerations about the substance of the issues stated in this letter.

Now, a few words about how our further work could be organized. First of all the already existing fora and channels, including the contacts of our embassies in Washington and Moscow, should be made more active. We attach, as I already have said, great significance to the

intensification of efforts of the Soviet and American delegations at the Geneva negotiations on space and nuclear weapons.

Along with those traditional fora it would be useful as a practical matter to conduct several working meetings at the level of experts, who could consider in a purely businesslike manner a number of problems of importance for the development of our bilateral dialogue. For example, in this format the possibilities could be discussed of bringing closer together the positions of the USSR and U.S. on conventional forces and armaments, on confidence-building measures in Europe, some points of contact could be additionally explored in the positions of the sides on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. We think it is necessary to have a comprehensive exchange of views—in conceptual as well as practical terms—on the whole on the issues of a peaceful settlement in the regions torn by conflicts. Soviet-American bilateral relations could be the subject of special consideration at a similar level.

Such a blueprint of the preparatory work, if it suits you in principle, could be set in motion already in the near future (if necessary its details could be discussed at the ambassadorial or deputy minister level.) The results of such work could be then jointly analyzed by our Foreign Ministers, who could at the same time pick out several questions for a more in-depth consideration at their level. As a result, it could be finally determined how things are shaping up as far as the summit is concerned.

In conclusion, I would like to say: In the complex dynamics of the contemporary international life, ideal moments, indeed, as you write, are hard to find. But to create moments enriched by our mutual constructive efforts, leading up to important results is well in our power. In fact, this is the key to the implementation of that decisive turn in the relations between the USSR and U.S., about which I spoke to you at the beginning of my letter.

End text of letter

Whitehead

248. Mock Memorandum From Soviet Foreign Policy Assistant Chernyayev to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev¹

Moscow, June 26, 1986

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy and Our Dilemma: The SDI Issue

You will recall that I promised in my memorandum of June 9 to follow up the general assessment by our group with a more detailed discussion of the particular issues.² We started with SDI, and frankly, I wish we hadn't. I apologize that it took more than the two days I initially thought. The truth is that, when we went from the general to the particular, most of our consensus vanished. The decibel level of our deliberations rose at times to alarming magnitudes, and unfortunately Svyatoslav is going to be out of action for a while. The doctors in the Kremlin hospital managed to set his broken jaw, but what with the bruises on his face and his dislocated shoulder, we thought it better that he not show up for a while. The bright side is that when he can talk again he probably won't be making cracks like "The only thing wrong with the American strike on Libya is that they didn't get Qad-dafi." Candor is candor, but there are limits. (And don't worry about the security aspects. As always, they are uppermost in our minds and we're spreading the story that his wife caught him with Ludmila. Anyone who knows his wife and knows Ludmila is bound to believe it!)

What follows is a summary of the conflicting opinions that were voiced. Since we couldn't get agreement, all we can do is throw the problems in your lap—and recommend a course of action that may give us further clues as to what the Americans are really after.

American Objectives in SDI

The attempt to stop the American SDI program has been such a prominent part of our propaganda that we need to take a hard look to see if your predecessors were right in saddling you with that stance.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron June 1986 (6/6). Top Secret; Eyes Only General Secretary. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. Matlock wrote this fictitious memorandum to reflect his assessment of possible thinking within the Soviet leadership. In a covering note to Reagan, Poindexter explained: "Mr. President, Here is Jack Matlock's latest assessment of Soviet thinking on SDI. John." Reagan replied: "He [Matlock] should run for General Sec. RR."

² See Document 240.

If we look back to the fall of 1983 when the decision was made to do this, the reason was that Reagan's speech that spring scared the pants off some of our marshals. They said, "We don't know what he's up to, but if he pulls it off, there go down the drain two decades of sacrifice to build the greatest ICBM force in the world. We won't even be a second rate power."

Of course, this was at the same time the Americans were getting ready to put their Pershings in Europe—weapons which could be landing in your office three or four minutes after our radar sees them coming. (Given the way communications work around here, that would probably be about a half hour before it occurred to the guys who watch the radar screens to let you know what was coming—they would assume their equipment was faulty.) And it was just a few months after the "Evil Empire" speech, when Reagan openly set the goal to wipe us out. It was not unreasonable to suppose that this was part of a master plan: put Pershing II's in Europe to wipe out our national command authority, deploy the MX and D-5 to take care of our silos, then put up an impregnable defense. Zippo: end of the "Evil Empire."

We've had three years now to look at things more carefully, and though some of us are still convinced that this scenario is the correct one, it really has a lot of holes in it. None of us really know what Reagan's *intentions* are, so we must look at the objective facts. Some of the relevant ones are as follows:

—None of our scientists think the Americans have a hope of deploying an impregnable defense in the foreseeable future. Even if they develop parts of a system to provide some defense, they couldn't test the full system under realistic conditions, which means that they couldn't rely on it for immunity if they were to launch a first strike.

—Our military agree that an impregnable defense is not possible, but worry that the Americans are up to something else. If they could protect their missiles better, they could get the edge on us with all the new systems they have coming. Also, the whole program could be a cover for developing exotic space-based offensive weapons.

For example, some projects could produce very dangerous offensive technologies. The Americans have been working on an X-ray laser just as we have, and although our scientists are not making much progress, we cannot be sure the Americans won't solve the problem if they keep trying. Some of our people think the whole SDI program is an elaborate cover for this research. They point out that although Reagan talks about abolishing nuclear weapons, this project has to use a nuclear device. And if it ever works, they would orbit that device in space. So this makes clear that whatever Reagan tells you about the defensive character of SDI, he is not really sincere. (By the way, our

people also think that the research on the X-ray laser is the real reason the Americans won't join us in a nuclear testing moratorium.)

—There are also puzzles in the way SDI has been handled in the U.S. If the Americans are really serious about the program as they have described it, why would they talk about it so much? They didn't tell the world they were developing the atomic bomb. They built it in complete secrecy, then dropped it on the Japanese. We do the same with serious weapons systems, as does every other responsible power.

Yuri, the fellow who just came back from our Embassy in Washington, tried to persuade us that the Americans talk a lot about their military programs because the President has to get funds out of Congress. Of course, he didn't convince the rest of us, because we know that the President can get what he wants when he really wants it. He runs it as a "black" program, like he's doing with "Stealth." (I'd suggest we take a closer look at the people we send to Washington—some of them come back with the most absurd ideas. Is Chebrikov sure that the CIA didn't set up a Swiss bank account for Yuri, to pay him for the disinformation he spreads here?)

—In fact, Congress is just a cover for conducting propaganda campaigns for other purposes. For example, who in his right mind would believe an American President has to mount a public campaign to get a measly hundred mil for the *contras*? That's not enough to buy a year's supply of toilet paper for the Pentagon. (It may surprise you that Americans spend real money on such non-essentials. They could save by giving everyone a subscription to *Pravda* and letting them use it the way we do, but, no—they're too soft for that!) Anyway, if the point were to help the *contras*, the President would just give them a couple of billion and shut up about it. Instead, we get this public campaign, which is clearly designed just to make us look bad, and to put you on the spot with the old-timers here. The object in all the SDI propaganda may be the same, but we can't be sure.

—Part of the answer may be the U.S. military-industrial complex. A lot of scientists, technicians and business firms are feeding at the SDI trough. The more funds, the more jobs and the more profits. You understand all this very well, and I thought you were very clever to let Reagan know you are on to this game when you met him in Geneva. It caught him so much by surprise that he forgot to point out that the whole Soviet Union is a military-industrial complex! Still, I don't suppose he thinks we are an agricultural-industrial complex, so maybe you better not try this line again. Just as well to stop while you are ahead.

As you can see, these considerations pull in a lot of different directions, and there are at least four ways they can be explained.

American Motivations: Four Theories in Search of Reality

Theory A: The American SDI program is just a propaganda effort, with no likely military impact.

Evidence in favor:

(1) The high-profile political campaign, which implies a lack of seriousness in building a working system.

(2) The fact that this propaganda enables Reagan to pose as a champion of eliminating nuclear weapons, while still building up his nuclear forces.

(3) Many U.S. military officers are dubious about SDI and give it little support.

(4) Reagan's offer to "share" the system—which no one can take seriously—is consistent with a purely propaganda approach.

(5) Pressure on American Allies to participate in the research implies at least two things: (a) that the U.S. is not about to develop a workable system (if they were, they would not tell anyone), and (b) they are using it as a tool to control technology developments in Allied countries—i.e., their objectives are political and economic, not military.

Evidence against:

(1) The U.S. research effort seems to be making some progress. Their ten-year lead in computers gives them a great advantage.

(2) They usually accomplish what they set out to do, even if it seems impossible at the start (take the goal of putting a man on the moon!). It would be foolhardy to discount American technology.

(3) Even a partially effective system used to protect American nuclear installations could give the Americans an edge if they get it first.

Theory B: SDI is a cover for development of some other military system.

Evidence in favor:

(1) All the evidence in favor of Theory A would support this one as well.

(2) Public attention to SDI distracts attention from other programs which could be more immediately threatening to us (Stealth, for example, and Lenin only knows what else.)

(3) Much research carried out under the SDI rubric could be applied to offensive systems.

Evidence against:

(1) The program seems to be structured to achieve its declared purpose.

(2) If it were merely a cover for something else, the American negotiating position would not be so rigid, since they could distract attention from other programs for a long time just by negotiating on SDI.

(3) President Reagan is totally dedicated to the program in its most extreme form (a "space shield").

Theory C: The whole purpose of the program is to force us to ruin our economy to gear up to match them. When we have committed

billions to the effort, they will just drop the whole thing like they did the supersonic passenger plane and leave us holding the bag.

Evidence for:

Consistent with propagandistic approach.

Evidence against:

Program looks serious, as noted.

Theory D: The program is exactly what the Americans say it is, but while the President genuinely views it as defensive, others intend to use it as part of an offensive strategy, and if successful it would provide that capability.

Comment:

Impossible to prove either way, but this is potentially the most threatening of the scenarios.

Policy Implications

It is impossible to devise a policy which deals simultaneously with all these contingencies. If this is just an effort to take us in, we would be foolish to over-react—but then we have probably already done this. If it is a serious military challenge, then we have to find ways to counter it militarily, but it is not immediately obvious what these ways could be. The things we have talked about—just building more ICBMs and going flat out to develop our own system might be the worst option of all since it would strain our economy and probably make it impossible to turn it around as you have recognized is necessary. If we do this, we may well be falling into a clever and well laid American trap.

Your task is to find a way to handle the issue in order to achieve the following objectives:

(a) Get the marshals off your back with their demands for increasing their funding by an *additional* ten percent. (We are going to have trouble over this five-year-plan scraping up their usual 4% annual increment without further ruining the economy.)

(b) Preserve the political clout that our huge ICBM force gives us. (If people believe that SDI will work, they may stop taking us seriously as a superpower.)

This is a tall order, and the way to do it does not come readily to mind. We may have to just play for time, and hope that Reagan's successors will kill the program. Settling for an extension of the ABM Treaty probably would not affect the American program, but would give us an argument to use with our tin hats, particularly if we could put tight restrictions on the U.S. program. Actually, as we negotiate, we might get some further insight into which of the various theories I have mentioned is the right one.

Regarding the American negotiating objective, they clearly want us to agree to revising the ABM Treaty to legitimize SDI and give them

a totally free hand. It would be most dangerous for us to go along with this; we would end up at a disadvantage no matter how you look at it. In this connection, I am sure that you will not be deluded by Reagan's offers to "share" the American system. For all I know, he may be sincere, but this is irrelevant. He won't be President when the question arises, and even if the U.S. were bound by a treaty to share it, you know very well that our clowns couldn't make it work. And besides, are we expected to depend on the Americans for spare parts?

So, finally, in my judgment, the least we can settle for and protect our minimal requirements is an extension of the ABM Treaty until Reagan is no longer in office. I doubt that we can get much more out of the Americans, and we shouldn't cut our ICBMs very much for that. But at least it would kick this SDI can down the road and give us time to assess whether it is a real threat or not, and maybe come up with some ideas as to how to deal with it.

If this doesn't work, we may have no option except to build a few hundred more ICBMs. We don't really need them, but that would certainly panic the U.S. Allies, and could eventually bring fatal pressure to bear on SDI in the U.S. Congress.

249. Memorandum From the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters (Nitze) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, June 27, 1986

SUBJECT

Assortment of Meetings

1. Yesterday Bob Linhard from the NSC Staff came to see me. He had a draft of the letter from the President to Gorbachev as it had emerged from a meeting on Wednesday between the President, Cap

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, June 1986. Secret; Sensitive.

Weinberger, and John Poindexter.² He asked me to read it and write my comments on it, but said he was instructed not to leave it with me.

I questioned the wisdom of permitting SDI testing during the first five years without setting any standard governing the nature of testing and without making it clear whether such testing would be within the limitations of the ABM Treaty or not. I questioned the wisdom of permitting each side to observe the others' testing without clarifying the purpose and nature of such observance. I doubted whether we wished to give the Soviets an unlimited right to observe what's going on in our labs, even prior to an agreement concerning reductions, and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. I questioned the advisability of setting what appeared to be an ultimatum that suggests we would denounce the ABM Treaty in seven years in the event the Soviets had been unwilling to agree to the total abolition of all ballistic missiles. I asked how one could avoid immense problems with our Allies if we made any proposal for total elimination of ballistic missiles without the prior agreement of the British, French, Chinese and our other Allies and friends.

Linhard then showed me the draft of the paper which he had prepared, which had been the subject of the Wednesday meeting, and the modifications of that paper which had emerged from the Wednesday meeting.³ He indicated that the modifications had come more from the President than from Cap. Linhard's primary objective was to obtain reasonable working instructions for the SACG and its support group so the difficulties in the proposal would emerge from their analysis. After that had happened he hoped serious work on a revised draft of the letter could be initiated in time for a revised and more sensible letter to be sent, hopefully as early as July 15th.

2. Yesterday afternoon I had a one-hour meeting with Admiral Crowe. His mind was particularly focused on the Packard Defense Reorganization legislation. After we got through that subject, I went over with him the main elements of the State Department's proposed comprehensive counter-proposal and the difficulties I saw in the approach Linhard was about to explain to him in a meeting scheduled to begin immediately after my meeting with him. He commented that

² Wednesday was June 25. In a June 21 memorandum to Reagan, prepared by Linhard, Matlock, and Kraemer, Poindexter forwarded a packet of material, "Guidance for the Arms Control Support Group," which included a rough draft letter to Gorbachev and a paper, "Guidance on the Evolution of the U.S. Arms Control Policy." Reagan initialed the recommendations to review both documents. This letter and paper were discussed during the June 25 ACSG meeting. (Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Compartment File, SAGE 01-02-Overview (1); NLR-334-45-10-4-6) A heavily revised version of the letter was sent on July 25; see Document 254.

³ See footnote 2, above.

it was difficult to change Cap's view on any matter, although it is sometimes possible; on matters concerning SDI, however, he did not believe it possible at all.

3. This afternoon I had a one-hour discussion with Ed Teller.⁴ He is persuaded that the project for a pure fusion reactor is bound to be unsuccessful because the cost of making such reactor safe would be impossibly high. He explained why he thought a different approach involving a hybrid fission/fusion reactor would be inherently safe and would not be excessively expensive. He said that the Soviets had given much thought to a hybrid approach including some ideas of Sakharov of some 20 years ago.

4. I had lunch today with Jim Wade who is Assistant Secretary of Defense for Procurement. Among other things he said was that at current yield rates of 1%, the mercury/cadmium/tellurium crystals used for infrared sensors in the SDI program would cost \$35 billion over five years. They need a \$500 plus million program to develop the technology to increase the yield to 20 to 30 percent and thus reduce costs to a tolerable level. They have not yet found a way of getting this into the SDI budget.

⁴ Teller, an American physicist who helped develop the hydrogen bomb, was a major proponent of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Documents on the evolution of SDI and Teller's role are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984.

250. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Ridgway) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 10, 1986

SUBJECT

Next Steps With Moscow

You asked for my views on how we should handle the Soviets' offer to send a Deputy Foreign Minister here to organize preparations for your meeting with Shevardnadze and the next summit. I believe we should take them up on the offer.

What the Soviets Have Done

For all the obscurity in which it has been couched, the Soviet offer appears to be an attempt to create the basis for a summit meeting this year. Gorbachev faces a difficult set of choices. He does not want to walk away from his commitment to see the President in 1986, since that would raise questions abroad about his reliability and at home about his judgement in agreeing to a meeting in the first place. But he also can not afford to come here immediately after or before we exceed SALT II numerical limitations.

Moscow's 11th hour NST initiatives appear in retrospect to have been aimed at establishing the basis for enough movement by a year-end summit to either avoid a U.S. SALT II breakout or make it irrelevant. Realizing that a go/no-go decision on a summit will have to be made by the time you meet Shevardnadze, Gorbachev is now pressing his people to find out what might be possible if summit dates are set. To do that, there has to be a dialogue. And with Geneva in recess, and the negotiations having in any case been relatively fruitless thus far, Moscow is searching for other modalities. Thus the idea of a visit.

The Soviets have, in effect, come close to buying our idea of a special channel. They are not calling it that, for reasons which probably have to do with rivalries in Moscow. But in sending someone like Bessmertnykh here, the Soviets are signaling as clearly as they ever do in these things that they want to set about seeing what can be done on NST for the next summit—and don't want to waste any time doing so. Dubinin made it clear to Mark Parris that, while whomever the

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (07/10/1986-07/13/1986); NLR-775-16-20-4-8. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris; cleared by Simons.

Soviets send would be prepared to address other issues (e.g., CDE, CW), his main interest would be NST.

At the same time, Bessmertnykh or even Vorontsov would be equipped to work through the rest of the agenda and to pick and move issues further toward decision. The fact that the Soviets do not appear to want radically to change or duplicate existing channels would thus work to our advantage. Billing the visit as a review of the whole agenda preparatory to your next meeting with Shevardnadze would also reduce exposure on NST—or indeed on any single topic.

What We Should Do

Our point of departure is that if we want a summit this year that produces results on arms control and other issues which serve our interests, we must soon engage the Soviets meaningfully. I am convinced that, unless we get into a serious discussion with Moscow on NST over the next month or so, Gorbachev will come to the conclusion that he can not afford to take the risk of setting dates. We could soon lose 1986—and perhaps the whole process. As our objective since last spring has been to get the Soviets into precisely the kind of discussion Moscow now seems to be proposing, I see no reason to play coy.

I recommend that:

—We advise the Soviets we accept the overall approach set out in Gorbachev's letter (which is based on our four-part agenda and the Geneva concluding document and is consistent in terms of modalities with our views on how to prepare for the next summit);²

—We confirm to the Soviets our willingness to receive their Deputy Foreign Minister to discuss preparations for your next meeting with Shevardnadze, which we consider to be agreed in principle for September 19–20;

—We schedule the Deputy Foreign Minister visit to follow immediately the President's decision on our response to the Soviet NST initiatives. We will, of course, need your guidance on this. If you believe we can predict a date, I recommend we tell the Soviets generally when we would be prepared to receive their Deputy Minister. We could then follow up with a specific date when we have one.

—We wait until their envoy arrives here to transmit the President's reply. Art Hartman could formally deliver the reply in Moscow, perhaps to Gorbachev himself. We would provide Dubinin and their emissary a copy at the same time. Waiting until their man was already here would deny the Soviets the opportunity to delay the trip if they found elements of our response objectionable.

² For Gorbachev's letter, see Document 247.

—We plan a program covering the full range of issues on the agenda. There is useful work that can be done now in areas other than arms control. Human rights is one where we would want to make a special effort. NST would have its place on the agenda, but the Soviet envoy would be available for off-the-record discussions as well.

—We consider how to respond to a likely Soviet suggestion for follow-up discussions on NST issues during the month of August. This is heart of the “mechanism” the Soviets say they want, although it is unclear precisely what they have in mind. It is possible that whomever they send would simply stay on here for extended discussions with whomever we designate. Or they may favor bringing NST negotiators back early from vacation. Paul, Allen and I will give you our recommendations on this.

If you agree to this general approach, we can provide appropriate talking points for your use with the President and John Poindexter on Friday, with a view toward getting back to the Soviets that afternoon.³

³ Friday was July 11. Shultz’s regular Friday meeting with Reagan took place in the Oval Office 1:30–2:11 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Shultz’s briefing packet, prepared in advance of the meeting, included talking points entitled “Next Steps with the Soviets.” The main points read, in part: “Based on further talks with Soviets (both their Embassy here and Art with Dep. Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh), it’s now a little clearer what Dubinin was trying to say Wednesday [July 9]. Their main concern is to be able to discuss strategic/defense issues between now and September.” The last round of the NST in Geneva had concluded on June 26 and was not scheduled to resume until mid-September. The points continued: “It looks, therefore, like the Soviets are trying, however indirectly, to get the process back on track. It’s in our interest to respond positively.” (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary’s Meetings with the President (07/11/1986 & 07/25/1986); NLR-775-19-4-1-6) In his diary on July 11, Reagan wrote: “A meeting with Sec. Shultz—mainly on the game playing going on about a summit. I think he’ll have a ministerial level meeting to work on this—but they are being coy.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 617)

251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, July 12, 1986, 1857Z

219318. Subject: President's Oral Response to Gorbachev on Nuclear Safety. Ref: State 177227.²

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Ambassador should seek earliest opportunity for meeting with Shevardnadze or other appropriate senior official to deliver President's oral response to Gorbachev on nuclear safety.³ Text follows para 3 below. The message responds to Gorbachev's oral statement delivered to the Department on June 1.⁴ Embassy should note that the President's oral message contained in this cable constitutes the President's more detailed views on the subject, as mentioned in the President's initial response to Gorbachev (reftel).

3. Begin text:

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

As I noted previously, I read with great interest your message delivered by the Soviet Embassy on June 1 on conclusions on nuclear safety which follow from the Chernobyl accident. I appreciate your proposals on nuclear safety and welcome their positive spirit.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860007-0182. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Sell; cleared by Collins, Talcott, and McDaniel; approved by Parris. In a July 11 memorandum to Platt, McDaniel explained: "The attached oral statement has been cleared through the interagency process and represents the President's full reply to General Secretary Gorbachev's statement of June 1 on nuclear safety." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Gorbachev (8690433)) In a June 25 NSC covering note, Rodman wrote: "1. I think it should be an oral message, since the incoming was. 2. The language on testing, I think, is a bit abrupt in view of what we are thinking of saying in our proposed letter on arms control issues. Perhaps trim it way back here with a hint that we will have some thoughts to suggest in response to his letter of June 19." Jack Matlock agreed. The issue of nuclear testing was addressed in Reagan's July 25 letter to Gorbachev; see Document 254.

² See footnote 2, Document 237.

³ In telegram 12537 from Moscow, July 22, the Embassy reported: "Acting DCM met with Deputy Chief of MFA USA Department Mikol'chak July 22 to hand over the text of the Presidential message." The Embassy continued: "Acting DCM drew on Ref B talking points," contained in telegram 225208 to Moscow, July 17, "noting that the President's message was a positive response and encouraging full disclosure on Chernobyl. He continued, however, that the U.S. did not accept the Soviet formulation of the August IAEA meeting as a multilateral presentation on nuclear accidents; in particular, the U.S. had already briefed the IAEA on Three Mile Island two months after that accident." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860007-0310 and N860007-0249, respectively)

⁴ See Document 237.

As you know, the leaders of seven Western industrialized nations met in Tokyo the first week of May and called for the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency to improve international cooperation on ensuring safe nuclear installations, handling nuclear accidents and providing mutual emergency assistance.⁵

The seven leaders at Tokyo also called for the early elaboration of an international convention committing the parties to report and exchange information in the event of nuclear emergencies or accidents. I welcome your proposals suggesting a mechanism for speedy notification in case of nuclear power plant accidents and the provision of radiological data in connection with such accidents. So too, I believe it possible to develop mechanisms ensuring the availability of assistance in dangerous situations.

I note with satisfaction that the IAEA has already taken a number of important steps to begin to address these problems at the special session of the Board of Governors on May 21. Among those steps was a decision to draft on an urgent basis conventions on notification and mutual emergency assistance, which carries forward both the statement of the leaders in Tokyo as well as your own proposals.

Regarding your concern that we act as expeditiously as possible on a system of notification, I am informed that all members of the IAEA Board of Governors undertook to provide prompt notification and information in the event of a nuclear accident with potential trans-boundary effects and urged all countries to do likewise. We welcome the prompt and cooperative spirit with which the IAEA has acted. This only reinforces our mutual belief that this international technical organization should continue to be strengthened and be a principal forum for continuing international collaboration in this area.

In addition I welcome your plans to expand the links between your nuclear safety specialists and those in other nations and international organizations. We wish to cooperate with you in this regard. A number of your other proposals are of potential interest and deserve further study.

I share your expressed concern about nuclear terrorism and believe that nuclear facilities of all countries must be protected against this threat. We must take all necessary steps to combat terrorism in whatever form it appears. With respect to nuclear terrorism, the United States proposed the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 230.

Material, which was opened for signature in 1980.⁶ Our two countries have ratified the convention, and we have welcomed your continued cooperation in working to urge all other states to become parties to this convention without delay. And last June, as a result of a U.S. initiative, our two countries signed a common understanding to the 1971 “Accidents Measures” Agreement that clarifies our obligations to consult in the event of a nuclear incident involving unknown or unauthorized groups or individuals, including terrorists.⁷

With regard to the testing of nuclear weapons, I have read your recent letter, delivered by Ambassador Dubinin, with much interest and am responding to you separately on that subject.⁸

If nuclear energy is to continue as a growing source of electric power, each country must continue to make its existing and future nuclear power plants as safe as they can possibly be. The nations at the Tokyo summit recognized that safety and security at nuclear power plants were crucial. While each country is fully responsible for its own nuclear program, each country bears full responsibility for the safety of the design, manufacture, operation, and maintenance of its installations. Cooperation among countries can help each country to meet its responsibilities on nuclear safety. It is our job to foster and support the fullest possible international cooperation in nuclear safety.

Mr. General Secretary, we in the U.S. are encouraged by Soviet efforts to learn from the tragic accident at Chernobyl. Those Soviet citizens directly affected, and their families, have our deepest sympathy and best wishes for a rapid return to a normal life. We welcome your offer to share your knowledge with other nations. You have our commitment to work closely with you, your experts, and the appropriate international organizations to improve and expand new international nuclear safety measures to ensure the safety of all nations.

Sincerely,

His Excellency

Mikhail Gorbachev

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

The Kremlin

Moscow.

End text.

Shultz

⁶ The text of this agreement, INFCIRC/274, is available on the IAEA website.

⁷ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971, Document 320.

⁸ See Document 247.

252. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, July 14, 1986

SUBJECT

Hartman Conversation with Dobrynin

Art Hartman had a lengthy conversation with Dobrynin on July 8, at which time Dobrynin made the following points regarding Gorbachev's current position on U.S.-Soviet relations:

—Time is moving quickly and there is a need to move rapidly to seize the opportunity of improving U.S.-Soviet relations.

—Gorbachev wants a summit this year, but could not afford domestically or internationally to meet with you and settle nothing in the arms control area.

—Gorbachev has laid out a specific "road map" on how to get there, with specialist meetings, followed by a Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting to prepare the summit agenda.

—Your remarks at Glassboro did much to meet their concern regarding atmosphere.² However, Gorbachev wonders why all members of the Administration do not take the same line.

—In this connection, the Soviets have "real doubts" whether you want to "discipline your ranks" to achieve agreement. They feel that there are those in the Administration who want no agreement.

Comment: This pretty well summarizes the line we are getting from all Soviet officials of late. It is consistent with our presumption that Gorbachev has in fact decided to come to Washington later this year, but is trying to keep the pressure on for at least one substantive agreement in the arms control area so that he will not risk returning home empty handed. His concern over "atmosphere" probably reflects his sensitivity to the prospect of appearing to come to Washington while under attack.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1986 (3/4). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

² See footnote 2, Document 246.

³ Telegram 11617 from Moscow, July 9, is attached but not printed at Tab A.

253. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for USSR (Ermarth) to Director of Central Intelligence Casey and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Gates)¹

Washington, July 18, 1986

SUBJECT

[1 line not declassified] Gorbachev's New Line Toward Diplomats

1. *[less than 1 line not declassified]* in late May, Gorbachev hammered on his diplomats to get out of their offices, to develop real local contacts, to quit sending him commonplaces from the local press, and to cease recycling misleading canned applause claimed to represent local reactions to Soviet initiatives.² *[less than 1 line not declassified]* One of these reports reflects the understandable skepticism and anxiety of the recipients of these instructions.³

Most of them are not trained or experienced in close interactions with their host environments.

They are worried about what their superiors and security overseers will say. No one wants to be first to try the "new style" and fall victim to a flap.

We see here the exact analog to what is now going on all over the Soviet internal bureaucracy.

2. If the Soviet diplomats and overseas intelligence officers succeed in implementing a more aggressive contact style, it will improve Soviet intelligence and diplomacy *[1 line not declassified]*.

3. *[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]*

4. Jack Matlock brought this matter up in a conversation with me yesterday. *[2½ lines not declassified]* He plans to send a memo on this to Admiral Poindexter, who may raise it with you.⁴

5. Jack has a lot of experience dealing with Soviets here and elsewhere. He believes that a great many harbor anxieties, resentments, and longings. *[3 lines not declassified]* I have little basis for an independent

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980–1986), Box 19, DCI Memo Chron (1–30 Jun '86). Secret; *[handling restriction not declassified]*. Sent through the Acting Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.

² See footnote 2, Document 242.

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Not found.

judgment, but it's hard not to see here both a challenge and an opportunity demanding an extra effort on our part.

Fritz W. Ermarth

254. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev¹

Washington, July 25, 1986

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I have taken careful note of the proposals your negotiators made during the recent round in Geneva.² I have also continued to ponder our discussion in Geneva last November and our subsequent correspondence, including your June 19th letter. As you may have guessed from our earlier exchanges, I heartily agree with the statement you made in your address to the last plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee about the need to “search for new approaches to make it

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Gorbachev (8690529). No classification marking. Under a July 18 covering memorandum to Reagan, Poindexter forwarded an NSDD that outlined the consultations regarding the response to Gorbachev. Poindexter noted the text of the letter, included in NSDD 233 and available on the Reagan Library website, was the text that had been “discussed and approved on Friday morning.” According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan met with Poindexter, Regan, and Linhard, who likely drafted the letter, from 11:01 to 11:35 a.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) On July 18, Reagan wrote in his diary: “Well we finally came up with a letter to Gorbachev that I can sign. In fact it’s a good one & should open the door to some real arms negotiations if he is really interested.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 619)

² In his memoir, Shultz recalled the drafting of this letter: “Poindexter sent me a draft presidential letter to Gorbachev that he had worked out with Weinberger. They made use of the ideas of nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty and elimination of ballistic missiles, but in what I regarded as a peculiar way. I sent their draft privately to Nitze for comment. He pointed up problems, particularly with our allies. [See Document 249.] When I returned to Washington, I focused my work on a response to Gorbachev’s May 31 proposals. The debate within the administration over our response to Gorbachev soon leaked. On July 10, the front page of the *Washington Post* carried a Walter Pincus-Lou Cannon article, headlined “‘Star Wars’ Compromise Discussed: If Soviets Slash Weapons, Reagan Might Delay Deployment.’ Sourced to ‘administration officials,’ the story said that Weinberger and Shultz ‘disagree so sharply over whether the United States should consider such a swap that the schism ultimately will have to be resolved by President Reagan,’ adding, ‘Reagan has reached no decision.’ That was wrong. The president had been working over ideas and a draft response with a small ad hoc group of key advisers, which included Weinberger, Casey, Poindexter, and me.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 723)

possible to clear the road to a reduction of nuclear arms.”³ That is certainly the most urgent task before us.

In Geneva, you expressed to me your concern that one side might acquire the capability to deliver a disarming first strike against the other by adding advanced strategic defenses to a large arsenal of offensive nuclear weapons. The United States does not possess the numbers of weapons needed to carry out an effective first strike; nor do we have any intention of acquiring such a capability. Quite the contrary, you well know my strong view that we both should immediately and significantly reduce the size of our nuclear arsenals. Nevertheless, since this remains a particular concern from your point of view, I agree that the “new approach” you have called for should address this concern directly. Neither side should have a first strike capability.

We have both focused on the issue of advanced systems of strategic defense in connection with a “new approach.” Research and exploration on the feasibility of such advanced strategic defenses is a subject we have discussed together. I want to address it now, at the very outset of this letter, because I am aware that this is a matter of great concern to both of us. We both agree that neither side should deploy systems of strategic defense simply to augment and enhance its offensive capability. I have assured you that the United States has no interest in seeking unilateral advantage in this area. To ensure that neither of us is in a position to do so, we would be prepared immediately to conclude an agreement incorporating the following limits:

(a) While it may take longer to complete such research, both sides would confine themselves for five years, through 1991, to a program of research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, to determine whether, in principle, advanced reliable systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Such research and development could include testing necessary to establish feasibility. In the event either side wishes to conduct such testing, the other side shall have the right to observe the tests, in accord with mutually agreed procedures.

(b) Following this five year period, or at some later future time, either the United States or the Soviet Union may determine that advanced systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Either party may then desire to proceed beyond research, development, and testing to deployment of an advanced strategic defense system. In anticipation that this may occur, we would be prepared to sign a treaty now which would require the party that decides to proceed to deploy an advanced strategic defense system to share the benefits of such a

³ See footnote 3, Document 200.

system with the other providing there is mutual agreement to eliminate the offensive ballistic missiles of *both* sides. Once a plan is offered to this end, the details of the sharing arrangement and the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles would be the subject of negotiations for a period of no more than two years.

(c) If, following the initial five year period and subsequent to two years after either side has offered a plan for such sharing and the associated mutual elimination of ballistic missiles, the United States and Soviet Union have not agreed on such a plan, either side will be free to deploy unilaterally after six months notice of such intention is given to the other side.⁴

You also continue to express concern that research on advanced defensive systems could lead to the deployment of spaceborne systems designed to inflict mass destruction on earth. This is certainly not our intention, and I do not agree that such an outcome is a necessary result of such research. We already are both party to agreements in force that address this subject. And, quite the contrary to your concern, U.S. research into advanced defenses is focused on finding ways to defend directly against offensive ballistic missiles that transit through space and are specifically designed to produce such mass destruction. However, in the context of the approach outlined above, I would also be prepared to have our representatives discuss additional assurances that would further ban deployment in space of advanced weapons capable of inflicting mass destruction on the surface of the earth.

I believe you would agree that significant commitments of this type with respect to strategic defenses would make sense only if made in conjunction with the implementation of immediate actions on both sides to begin moving toward our common goal of the total elimination

⁴ In his memoir, Shultz explained the new aspects of Reagan's proposal on ABMs: "A letter finally emerged that covered much familiar ground, including reductions by 50 percent in strategic weapons. But, at the end, the letter contained a new proposal. For seven and a half years, both sides would consent not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. For five years, each side would confine itself to research, development, and testing consistent with the ABM Treaty. If either side then decided to deploy strategic defenses, then that side would be obligated to offer and negotiate a plan for sharing 'the benefits of strategic defense' and *for eliminating offensive ballistic missiles*. If no agreement was reached on this plan by the end of the seven and a half years, either side would be free to deploy after six months' notice. This was a different version of the approach Nitze and I had advocated: a restriction on SDI that did not really restrict us and the reductions we sought in strategic weapons. And it now included Cap's idea of eliminating ballistic missiles. The letter was made known to our allies and then was sent to Gorbachev on July 25, 1986. The compromise on the ABM Treaty was promptly leaked. But the proposal to eliminate ballistic missiles was not revealed publicly until an August 25 article in the *Wall Street Journal*. There was little comment on what I had regarded as a radical idea, perhaps because no one took the idea seriously." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 723–724)

of nuclear weapons. Toward this goal, I believe we also share the view that the process must begin with radical and stabilizing reductions in the offensive nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

In the area of strategic offensive nuclear forces, we remain concerned about what we perceive as a first-strike capability against at least a portion of our retaliatory forces. This is a condition that I cannot ignore. I continue to hope that our efforts in pursuit of significant reductions in existing nuclear arsenals will help resolve this problem. I remain firmly committed to our agreement to seek the immediate implementation of the principle of a fifty percent reduction, on an equitable and verifiable basis, of existing strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. The central provision should be reduction of strategic ballistic missile warheads.

However, if necessary, I am prepared to consider initial reductions of a less sweeping nature as an interim measure. In this context, along with specific limits on ballistic missile warheads, we are prepared to limit long-range air-launched cruise missiles to below our current plan, and to limit the total number of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers to a level in the range suggested by the Soviet side. Such reductions should take into account differences among systems in a manner which enhances stability. These reductions should begin as soon as possible and be completed within an agreed period of time.

At the same time, we could deal with the question of intermediate-range nuclear missiles by agreeing on the goal of eliminating this entire class of land-based, LRINF missiles world-wide, which is consistent with the total elimination of all nuclear weapons, and by agreeing on immediate steps that would lead toward this goal in either one step, or, if you prefer, in a series of steps. Your comments regarding intermediate range nuclear missile systems suggest to me that we were heading in the right direction last November when we endorsed the idea of an interim INF agreement. While an immediate agreement leading to the elimination of long range INF missile systems throughout the world would be the best outcome, an interim approach, on a global basis, may prove the most promising way to achieve early reductions.

Both sides have now put forward proposals whose ultimate result would be equality at zero for our two countries in long range INF missile warheads. If we can also agree that such equality is possible at a level above zero, we would take a major step towards the achievement of an INF agreement.

We should seek such an interim agreement without delay. I would be interested in any specific suggestions that you may wish to offer towards this end. It is important that reductions begin immediately and that significant progress be achieved within an agreed period of time.

Of course, I hope that we can also agree now that once we have achieved a fifty percent reduction in the U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals and make progress in eliminating long-range INF missiles, we would continue to pursue negotiations for further stabilizing reductions. The overall aim should be the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

I will be instructing our negotiators to present these proposals, along with appropriate implementing details, when the next round of negotiations begins in Geneva in September. I hope that your negotiators will be prepared to respond in a positive and constructive fashion so that we can proceed promptly to agreement.

Mr. General Secretary, I hope that you will notice that I have tried explicitly to take into account the concerns you expressed to me in Geneva and in our correspondence, as well as key elements of your recent proposals. I believe you will see that this approach provides assurance that neither country would be able to exploit research on strategic defense to acquire a disarming first-strike capability, or to deploy weapons of mass destruction in space. The framework I propose should permit us to proceed immediately to reduce existing nuclear arsenals as we have agreed is desirable, and to establish the conditions for proceeding to further reductions toward the goal of total elimination.

With respect to nuclear testing, as you know, we believe a safe, reliable and effective nuclear deterrent requires testing. Thus, while a ban on such testing remains a long-term U.S. objective, I cannot see how we could move immediately to a complete ban on such testing under present circumstances. We are, however, hopeful that with the initiation of discussions between our respective experts, we can make progress toward eliminating the verification uncertainties which currently preclude ratification of the treaties signed in 1974 and 1976.

Upon ratification of these treaties, and in association with a program to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons, we would be prepared to discuss ways to implement a parallel program to achieve progress in effectively limiting and ultimately eliminating nuclear testing in a step-by-step fashion. The immediate next step needed is our agreement on verification procedures which would permit ratification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties. I would hope that the exchanges between our experts will permit us to take this step promptly.

With regard to conventional and chemical forces, I fully agree that the existing fora and channels should be used more actively. As you know, it is our view that the correction of conventional and other force imbalances is one of the vital requirements for achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Confidential exchanges between our negotiators and experts, away from the glare of publicity, might be useful. I would suggest that such discussions could first profit by

preliminary exchanges to clarify and focus the agenda of such meetings. When we have been able to make some preliminary progress on this point, we may wish to consider having our respective ambassadors to the negotiations in Vienna and Stockholm, and at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, get together in capitals for bilateral exchanges.

It will be particularly important to ensure a successful conclusion of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe before the CSCE review conference convenes in Vienna. We are seriously considering your recent proposals for limiting conventional weapons in Europe. A more forthcoming response by the Warsaw Pact to the NATO proposal of last December in the MBFR negotiations in Vienna would be helpful.

Regarding other issues, I agree with you that a number of possibilities exist for joint action. You have my earlier message regarding nuclear power plant safety,⁵ and I am pleased that our representatives are working actively in the International Atomic Energy Agency to develop more effective means of international cooperation. The exploration of space is also a potentially fruitful area for U.S.-Soviet cooperation, and I would propose that our specialists meet soon to discuss the possibilities of an agreement in this area.

Your proposal for organizing our work in the coming weeks seems sound to me. We have already agreed on several meetings by specialists, and we look forward to consultations with one of your Deputy Foreign Ministers shortly. Should either of us consider other meetings by specialists desirable, we should be able to arrange these, as needed, through normal diplomatic channels. Thus, it would appear that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will have a well prepared agenda when they meet in September.

There are, of course, a number of important questions in addition to those I have mentioned in this letter which we must continue to address if we are to create the most propitious conditions for your visit to the United States. I believe we have now established a framework to deal with them, and I hope that we can move rapidly toward that "decisive turn" in relations between our countries which we both agree is overdue.

Sincerely yours,

Ronald Reagan

⁵ See Document 237.

255. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 25, 1986, 3:40 p.m.

Visit of Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh
July 25, 1986*U.S. PARTICIPANTS*

EUR/DAS Thomas Simons

Ambassador Paul Nitze

COL Robert Linhard (NSC)

SOV Director Mark Parris

SOV Dep Dir Bruce Burton
(notetaker)*SOVIET PARTICIPANTS*

Deputy ForMin Bessmertnykh

DCM Oleg Sokolov

Minister-Counselor Victor Isakov

Counselor Vadim Kuznetsov

Simons opened by welcoming Bessmertnykh to Washington and congratulating him on his appointment as deputy foreign minister. Simons then handed him the signed original of the President's letter and said it was being delivered nearly simultaneously in Moscow.² Bessmertnykh and company took about 15 minutes to read the letter. After doing so, Bessmertnykh said he had an "urge to say something but I think I won't". He commented that this was a crucial time in U.S.-Soviet relations and we would discuss the letter later, but he thought the main point of the President's proposal seemed to be to allow testing of space-based systems without limitations.

Nitze answered that this interpretation was incorrect. The President is saying that testing and development, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, will continue. Nitze continued that some testing and development is permitted by the treaty, and some is not; both sides can do what is permitted. Bessmertnykh asked if that meant we could "test and develop only what is permitted," and Nitze answered that was correct. Bessmertnykh then commented that "it comes again to the question of defining what is permitted by the treaty."

Nitze emphasized that the President intends to advance the process of discussions and believes that it is important to make a move forward. He said the President had tried to take into account the concerns of both sides. The proposal itself demonstrates the President's desire to address the issues broadly. Nitze added that it also our intent to move forward on the purpose of Bessmertnykh's visit, i.e., to organize the

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, July–August 1986. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burton. The meeting took place in the EUR Conference Room at the Department of State. Brackets are in the original.

² See Document 254.

work ahead. Simons added that we want a thorough discussion of all areas in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Bessmertnykh, referring to the passage in the President's letter which said the U.S. would present the new proposal at the NST negotiations, then asked if there was any chance for a "working" meeting on NST before the round formally opens on September 18. He suggested a meeting of a small group of three or four experts on each side, not necessarily at the Karpov-Kampelman level, since that would give the appearance of formal talks. Bessmertnykh said he realized that we were not going to develop a treaty in the next few months but we need to examine the issues closely. Simons, referring to the President's conversation with former Ambassador Dobrynin in April, said Bessmertnykh's suggestion made sense and that we saw Bessmertnykh's visit as a chance to initiate such discussions.

Bessmertnykh, turning to Linhard, asked the origin of the references in the President's letter to banning space-based weapons of mass destruction. Linhard started to answer that this was a subject raised at the summit and in the Geneva talks, but Bessmertnykh broke in to quip that since the U.S. and Soviet Union already had a treaty [i.e., the Outer Space Treaty] on this, the presence of so many references in the President's letter to space-based weapons of mass destruction began to make him nervous.

Simons then said that the American press was aware that Bessmertnykh was here. We intended to answer queries by noting that Bessmertnykh was in Washington for a review of U.S.-Soviet relations and that we hoped the visit would provide new energy to our discussions. If the media sought to portray the visit as a special event, we would say it was special only because it was being held at the deputy foreign minister level, but that it was a part of a process of exchanges the two sides had agreed to and had been conducting for some time.

Bessmertnykh, laughing, then said he had something to bring up. At the May talks on nuclear risk reduction centers [NRCC], the U.S. had proposed that a second round be held at the end of July.³ The Soviets, he said, would like to propose that the NRCC experts meet in Geneva on July 29–30—and the Soviets needed an answer that evening. Linhard answered that, at the May meeting, the two sides seemed to agree that the experts talks were intended to explore the concept of risk reduction centers and that we would not rush the issue. In any case, the U.S. had offered to host the next meeting in Washington,

³ In telegram 166678 to Moscow, May 28, the Department provided a summary of the May 5–6 U.S.-Soviet meetings on the development of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860410–0575)

although we were flexible on venue. It was pointed out that a meeting next week would pose difficulties but that we would get back to the Soviets as soon as possible. Bessmertnykh seemed to indicate that one factor in the Soviet suggestion was that Ambassador Obukhov will be in Geneva next week.

256. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 26, 1986, 11 a.m.–1 p.m.

Visit of Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh July 26, 1986

U.S. PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Ridgway
DAS Simons
Ambassador Matlock (NSC)
Mark Parris (SOV)
Bruce Burton (SOV) (notetaker)

SOVIET PARTICIPANTS

Deputy ForMin Bessmertnykh
DCM Sokolov
Second Secretary Vitaly Churkin

Ambassador Ridgway welcomed Bessmertnykh to Washington. She recalled the all-night negotiating session with Bessmertnykh at the summit and hoped we wouldn't have to go through that again.² The purpose of the meetings in Washington was to organize our work and set the stage for a meeting between ministers and ultimately by our leaders at the summit. The Soviet side has said it wants a summit with concrete results. So do we. We understand the Soviet side has some detailed ideas on how to organize efforts in the weeks ahead. We're eager to hear them and have some ideas of our own.

Bessmertnykh said he was glad the two sides had come to the same conclusion on preparations for a good meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Gorbachev's June 19 letter had suggested steps for moving ahead, and the Soviet side very much appreciated U.S. acceptance of these ideas for arranging meetings. It

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, July–August 1986. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burton. The meeting took place in the EUR Conference Room at the Department of State. Brackets are in the original.

² During the Geneva Summit in November 1985, the U.S. and Soviet delegations worked through the night to formulate an acceptable joint statement. See footnote 1, Document 159.

was good to have talked with Ambassador Hartman and to have come to agreement on this point.

Bessmertnykh continued that it was important to arrange meetings over the next few weeks so that time is not wasted. There can be a number of meetings in Washington and Moscow on a number of subjects. The Soviets are quite open to U.S. suggestions. "We want to finish the job with you here so we have a complete program."

[NOTE: At this point, the two sides then covered, in order, Security and Arms Control, Regional Issues, and Bilateral Affairs.]

SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL

Nuclear and Space Talks

Bessmertnykh said this subject was paramount and we should not wait until the opening of the next NST round to discuss it. Thus, the Soviets want a "working-type meeting" between representatives of the two sides. This should not simply be a repetition of Geneva plenaries; there is no time for that. The idea is to get together in small groups, not delegations. One person should be in charge, and have two or three others with him. These representatives would, in effect, say: We know each other's principled positions. Do we have any common ground? Are there grounds for a summit? Their slogan should be: "Let's be practical". If they find there is no common ground, they can say, well all right, let's not trouble with it at a ministerial meeting. If they agree that ministers "should dwell on it," they would recommend more formal treatment.

Saying she wanted to make sure we were clear about the Soviet proposal, it was her understanding that this small group would get together and make recommendations to foreign ministers. Would the group recommend further work?

Bessmertnykh replied, "Yes." The group could look at possible communique language, or foreign ministers could declare they would like the subject worked out in the negotiations, through diplomatic channels or through other means.

Ridgway said that, on the matter of a communique, we would be under "the same injunction as of last fall." The Secretary had told Dubinin that one thing the Secretary and Shevardnadze should take up is how to record the results of a summit.

Ambassador Matlock said that, speaking ad referendum, there would probably be no particular problem if we were at the point of exchanging language, so long as we don't call it a communique. The President has indicated that he doesn't want staffs pre-negotiating an outcome, which he wants to determine. But this may be a matter of semantics or form. We can work at recording what both sides are discussing.

Bessmertnykh agreed that it might just be a matter of form. We could try to develop a joint statement or perhaps separate language on individual issues. This is a matter for consideration after September.

Ridgway and Matlock agreed.

DAS Simons said there was a third possibility: having a piece of paper that is something between a communique or individual elements. Ridgway commented that the President knows perfectly well that the language of the Geneva joint statement wasn't done in one night.

Bessmertnykh said the working meetings should be confidential. Matlock asked if that applied just to the NST working meeting; Bessmertnykh answered, all working meetings.

Parris asked if Bessmertnykh meant the existence of the working meetings was to be confidential, or their content? Bessmertnykh said he recognized that the existence of the meetings was likely to become known, so he was referring to their content.

Bessmertnykh continued that the representatives should have a mandate to explore ideas, "not be frozen into known positions." If the U.S. is prepared, the Soviets would like to give them freedom to explore—"How about this? How about that?" He said the meetings should not be prolonged. The groups would meet for two or three days, go back to Ministers, then meet again. If they go too long at one sitting, such as two weeks or so, they would become like negotiations, with the representatives requesting instructions from capitals. The working meetings should decide how to handle further meetings. "This will create a flow of business."

Ridgway asked where the meeting might take place. Bessmertnykh said he would go through that.

Bessmertnykh said the Soviets envision one person in the chair, with perhaps one expert for each of the broad NST subjects, space, strategic arms, medium-range arms.

Matlock asked if Karpov would head the Soviet team. Bessmertnykh said this was possible, but he personally had in mind someone else.

Simons asked if the groups would be of equal size on both sides. Bessmertnykh said they should not be terribly asymmetrical, with three or four on one team, and a dozen on the other.

Ridgway said she could not say much today about the Soviet suggestion, since we are looking over ideas. To recap, the Soviets have in mind a small group, with one person in charge, but not necessarily "experts" in the technical sense.

Bessmertnykh said that's right. Four representatives would be the maximum. He said the Soviets do not exclude having heads-of-delegation, but Bessmertnykh personally believes that is not a good idea. We shouldn't close the door to other arrangements.

On time and venue, Bessmertnykh said the talks should be held in Moscow or Washington between August 10–15. The Soviets are prepared to host the U.S. group in Moscow; the second round would be in Washington.

In answer to a question from Simons, Bessmertnykh said they want to hold the sessions in Moscow or Washington, and not in Geneva or some other capital, because they do not want cable traffic on the discussions.

Matlock said we will try to have an answer to Bessmertnykh on Monday or before he departs Washington.³

Nuclear Testing

Bessmertnykh said that since our experts are already meeting in Geneva, he did not believe there was a need for a special group.

Ridgway said we can confirm the Barker-Petrosyants channel as the appropriate place to discuss nuclear testing.

Bessmertnykh said that if the talks need additional impetus, we can give it. But we should not tie them too closely to the Foreign Ministers' meetings. There is not much time for progress, and the destiny of the talks should not be tied to ministerial meetings or a summit. Of course, if they do make progress, that would be good.

Simons told Bessmertnykh not to be pessimistic. Bessmertnykh quipped, "I'm not pessimistic, I'm just not a short-term optimist."

Conventional Force Reductions in Europe

Bessmertnykh said he believed we can work together on a bilateral basis and can approach this subject as we do chemical weapons, where bilateral Soviet-American talks support the multilateral negotiations. He had two specific suggestions:

—MBFR Ambassador Mikhailov would meet with an American representative in Moscow during the last 10 days of August;

—CDE Ambassador Grinevsky would meet in Washington during the same time frame.

Ridgway said she understood that the CDE delegations were departing Stockholm in the next few days but would all return there on August 12. Would Grinevsky come to Washington before August 12?

Bessmertnykh answered that, in light of this, we should keep open the possibility of meeting in Stockholm at the beginning of August. He suggested we check with Ambassadors Grinevsky and Barry about this.

³ July 28.

Ridgway said the Soviet suggestion seemed acceptable since it was in the direction of our own thinking, and we could have our ambassadors hold their meetings in those places. Her sense is that both MBFR and CDE are down to the essentials, such as verification.

Bessmertnykh said that the teams would meet in Vienna and Stockholm. The same rules would apply as to the NST teams. There would be three or four representatives on each side. They would look at the possibilities—not appraise the status of the negotiations, but look at common points for Foreign Ministers to discuss or for the President and General Secretary to say. He added that by helping “Stockholm I”, we will be paving the way for “Stockholm II”.

Ridgway said discussion of conventional force reductions will be difficult for us, since the NATO study will not be completed until December.⁴ A search for common ground will be complicated by this timing.

Bessmertnykh said he understood that the Halifax study wouldn’t be done until December. One issue is crucial: Where do we discuss conventional force reductions from the Atlantic-to-the-Urals? Vienna? Stockholm? He said his personal preference was “Stockholm II”, but perhaps we can focus on that one element and reach agreement before December.

Ridgway said, “I think not.”

Chemical Weapons

Bessmertnykh said there are two groups in Geneva.

Ridgway said, yes. Hawes and Issraelyan discuss CW proliferation. The CD ambassadors meet on a CW treaty. Both channels are acceptable to us. There will be an early September meeting, and Foreign Ministers can discuss the results.

Bessmertnykh said they would like a meeting in early August which pays more attention to bilateral measures on a CW ban. This could be a basis for discussion by Foreign Ministers—the effort to solve the global CW problem.

Ridgway pointed out that the CD adjourns in the near future until January. To be clear, she understood that Bessmertnykh was suggesting that our CD ambassadors get together in August and identify areas for further work.

Bessmertnykh said that was correct. The Soviet CD ambassador will be ready to go to Geneva whether the CD is in session or not.

⁴ A statement issued at the end of the NAC Ministerial meeting in Halifax on May 30 established a task force to conduct a study on conventional arms control. See the Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1986, pp. 53–54.

There was then some discussion about the impact of this work program on summer vacations. Ambassador Ridgway emphasized that she was taking the last two weeks in August. Bessmertnykh said, "Good. I will tell Shevardnadze that Roz Ridgway is taking the last two weeks, and that I'll get *my* vacation."

Parris then asked whether Bessmertnykh was thinking of working on a CW treaty or was looking for areas of agreement. Bessmertnykh said he personally believed there were possibilities for working out the CW question. Perhaps not a treaty, but an understanding or commitments which both sides might take bilaterally. He said the U.S. has suggested three or four areas, and the Soviets have ideas.

Ridgway said there might be a parallel to preparations for last year's summit, where we both examined our positions and found it possible to come up with some areas of common ground to put into a statement.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

In answer to the Soviet proposal in the July 25 meeting, Matlock said Bessmertnykh could inform his people that a meeting on NRRCs the week of July 28 in Geneva was impossible for us. Colonel Linhard of the NSC staff thought the earliest a meeting might be possible would be August 15, but from our point of view, September would be acceptable.

Bessmertnykh said Obukhov might be involved in the other (i.e., NST) working group. If that were the case, and the group came to Washington in late August, perhaps he could also hold the meeting on NRRCs at that time.

Other Issues

(Note: the following items were actually brought up after the discussion on regional affairs.)

Ridgway said the SCC was meeting in Geneva now.

She said we would have technical talks in early September on the hotline upgrade.

REGIONAL ISSUES

Regional Experts Meeting

Bessmertnykh said we have held experts meetings on five regions separately and do not need to start again on these five groups. He suggested that we have a four- or five-man team discuss regional affairs "as a general subject". The regional question is a problem in U.S.-Soviet relations and world stability. These talks could look at the situation, perhaps find areas of common interests. The talks could become too academic or focus too much on particular issues, "but we should give

them a chance to talk about regional affairs differently—what approaches are there to solve existing problems or to prevent new ones?” Iran-Iraq was one possibility. Polyakov would participate, not as an expert on the Middle East, but as a specialist on regional affairs.

Ridgway said continuation of the regional experts talks on an annual cycle has been good. We had hoped to have a general discussion of regional affairs during the Foreign Ministers meetings, but this of course had now been put off for nine months. In any case, as we prepare ideas for dialogue, it is good to keep the regional experts meetings going. This doesn’t require great preparation for the summit, just confirmation that it is a good thing. Ridgway continued that, if she understood Bessmertnykh correctly, there would be a single group called “regional” which would get together to look at the broader question of the role of regional issues in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Bessmertnykh said he had talked to Ambassador Hartman about this. The experts meeting the Soviets envision would not “interrupt the flow” of the regional experts talks, which should begin again next January. The meeting would not prevent a discussion by Foreign Ministers. The Foreign Ministers will discuss regional affairs. The experts meeting rather would focus on issues for Foreign Ministers to discuss. It would not prevent or supplant the existing regional experts talks or Foreign Minister discussions.

Simons asked if the Soviets accept our dates for the Afghanistan experts talks (September 3–4). Bessmertnykh said they would.

Matlock said the U.S. would think about the Soviet idea. He had no immediate negative reaction.

Ridgway commented that the proposal posed some difficult questions. We don’t really have an official at Polyakov’s level who is charged with general regional matters—that would be handled by Under Secretary Armacost. But this raised problems of level and visibility.

Bessmertnykh suggested that we find a Polyakov and make him a generalist. He proposed that the talks be held in Moscow or some European capital such as Paris, Madrid, or perhaps Stockholm, and that they be held in mid-August.

Simons remarked that this subject was tricky. Bessmertnykh rejoined, “It’s a minefield.”

Terrorism

Ridgway said Polyakov and Murphy had discussed experts talks on terrorism. This was a good idea. We envisioned a discussion that was broader than just the Middle East. Ambassador Oakley and DAS Simons had talked with people here. They thought we could look at terrorism as a functional, not regional issue, and could look at such areas as civil aviation or hostage-taking. Thus, she would propose to

add terrorism to the meetings calendar. We would take a very practical approach. Simons and Oakley would be our representatives.

Simons added that perhaps Sokolov or (Embassy Minister Counselor) Isakov could represent the Soviets.

Ridgway repeated that we should get a place on the program for terrorism talks.

Bessmertnykh said he accepted the subject on the program and would be back to us through Sokolov.

BILATERAL AFFAIRS

Bessmertnykh said the Soviets would like to use the same approach on this set of issues as on the others. One group would meet in August to see what could be done or improved.

Ridgway said, that's going to be me, so don't pick a date (i.e., in the last half of August). Bessmertnykh replied, that would wreck my vacation, so let's pick someone else. Mikol'chak? (NOTE: Mikol'chak is senior deputy in the USA and Canada Department).

Matlock said Kashlev is coming to Washington. (NOTE: Kashlev is head of Soviet MFA's humanitarian/cultural department.)

Bessmertnykh said he only deals with cultural affairs.

Ridgway said there is lots of work going on and she would hate to postpone the work already under way. Wherever there is a group, they should keep going.

Bessmertnykh agreed. The new groups should not interrupt the flow of other groups.

Simons and Bessmertnykh agreed that the bilateral group could meet in August, in Washington and Moscow.

Simons said his last day before vacation was August 23, so let's start in Moscow.

Ridgway said let's start as early as possible. The group should lay out some ideas where progress could be made. For instance, on space cooperation, our experts could meet in September to renegotiate our Space Cooperation Agreement.

Bessmertnykh said we could discuss peaceful uses of space, and nuclear reactor safety.

Ridgway said there were other subjects as well—a transportation agreement, health, environmental protection, maritime boundary, Search and Rescue, Coast Guard cooperation. A lot of issues fall under this umbrella.

Simons said we had also suggested, in the Bilateral Review Commission talks now under way in Moscow, an agreement covering dual nationals. We know the Soviets don't recognize dual citizenship, but we should find a way to deal with these cases.

Ridgway said Simons would go to Moscow in early August, and Mikol'chak would come to Washington later.

Bessmertnykh agreed that Simons would go to Moscow; the outside date would be August 23. (At lunch after the meeting, it was agreed that because of coverage considerations on the U.S. side, it would make more sense for Mikol'chak to come to the U.S. in early August, with Simons to pay a return visit in early September).

Matlock said he saw no problem with comparing notes on where we stand on bilateral issues. Simons added we should also identify areas where movement is possible. Matlock continued that some things, like fusion research, may take longer.

Ridgway asked when the Soviets would be in a position to announce dates for the September ministerial. She added that a meeting was becoming common knowledge in any case.

Bessmertnykh answered, probably in a few days.

Simons asked can you confirm that there will be a meeting on humanitarian affairs with Kashlev when he comes to the U.S.?

Bessmertnykh asked, do you want to deal with it as a separate subject?

Simons said we could raise it informally, perhaps at lunch.

Bessmertnykh said that if you raise it, Kashlev will be prepared to talk.

Simons said we're ready to consider a separate meeting.

Sokolov said Kashlev's schedule with USIA was very tight.

Simons said Kashlev's discussions on cultural matters were the main part of Kashlev's visit. If there isn't time, we could discuss humanitarian matters during Simons' visit to Moscow. To clarify, such matters as space cooperation could go forward without prejudice to other meetings; we're thinking of an early September meeting on this.

Parris asked whether the Soviets envisioned a philosophical review or more concrete discussions for the bilateral experts meetings.

Bessmertnykh said, They're the experts. They should have one practical goal in mind; to say something to Foreign Ministers.

Ridgway said, to pursue that point, do you see Foreign Ministers reporting to leaders what are areas of possible progress?

Bessmertnykh said, yes. We have to help them make up their minds on possibilities of progress, to see if a summit is justified.

Ridgway said, "Let's be frank. We're talking about convincing *your* leader."

Bessmertnykh answered that both sides agree that a summit should be well prepared.

Ridgway then previewed the schedule for Monday—a 9:30 A.M. meeting with the Secretary, followed by discussions on nuclear arms

control, lunch, and discussion of non-nuclear arms control. Ridgway said the U.S. would want to talk about the substance of these issues.

Bessmertnykh said he is not in a position to discuss the President's letter now. However, he could give some hints about Soviet thinking about directions we should be heading, so the working meetings don't get off the track. This is no time to get propagandistic. There is a time and a forum for that. Now, the two sides have to listen to each other.

The group then adjourned for lunch at the Soviet Embassy.

257. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 28, 1986, 9:30–10:40 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Side

The Secretary
Deputy Secretary Whitehead
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
S/P Director Solomon
DAS Simons
D. Zarechnak, Interpreter

Soviet Side

Deputy FM Bessmertnykh
Ambassador Dubinin
DCM Sokolov
First Secretary Churkin

After some informal banter, Bessmertnykh thanked the Secretary for the opportunity to see him, and he conveyed greetings from Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. He also hoped that Foreign Ministers Genscher and Howe had transmitted messages from the Soviet side.²

Secretary Shultz replied that they had indeed. He then indicated that he had received reports of Bessmertnykh's meetings thus far and

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 4D, 1986 Soviet Union July. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Zarechnak; cleared by Davies and Pascoe. The meeting took place in Shultz's office.

² In telegram 227380 to London, Moscow, and Oslo, July 19, the Department reported on Howe's July 18 meeting with Shultz, noting: "Howe briefed Secretary Shultz on the July 14–15 Shevardnadze visit to London. The British had been impressed by Shevardnadze's emphasis on substance rather than style on East-West security issues, and by his refreshing professionalism." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860007–0272) In telegram 236354 to Bonn, Moscow, and Berlin, July 29, the Department reported on a July 23 meeting between Shultz and Genscher in Washington, during which Genscher "briefed the Secretary on his July 20–22 visit to Moscow" and meetings with various Soviet officials, including Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860577–0172)

about the general approach which was being taken. The U.S. side had no objection to this, but it puzzled the U.S. side, and him personally.

Bessmertnykh asked why this was so.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. side was curious about what the Soviet side was driving at. It would like to see a more constructive and easier relationship with the Soviet Union, and the President and he were working at that. We believe high-level meetings make a contribution to the relationship, but these meetings need to be prepared and they need to produce something. So we need to work at it. The Soviet side says the same things, but it has not been willing to work at this. For this reason, the U.S. side has been puzzled about Soviet thinking in this regard. For example, there is agreement that the NST talks are of fundamental importance, and yet the Soviet side waited until almost the end of the last round to give its counterproposal to the U.S. proposal which has been on the table for six months. The next round of these talks will begin only in mid-September. So what should be done? We would not want to sit until mid-September if we are thinking of a summit. The fact that the Soviet side waited so long has put us in a jam.

The Secretary continued that the U.S. side acknowledges the positive steps taken by the Soviet side with regard to family reunification, although they are proceeding slowly, as these things tend to go. But emigration from the USSR has practically stopped. Bessmertnykh, who had been here a long time, understood full well the importance of that subject in the U.S. and the impact which a lack of willingness to permit Jewish emigration would have on the reception of General Secretary Gorbachev or, for that matter, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. The U.S. would, of course, try to control these things, but there would be a bad atmosphere. Bessmertnykh would understand this, and, in addition to the timing of the Soviet counterproposals, these things form the basis of why Shultz was puzzled by the Soviet approach.

The Secretary repeated that he was very glad to see Bessmertnykh since Bessmertnykh understood and cared about the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and since Shultz could talk in an open and candid way with him. Shultz indicated that the U.S. would like to get an understanding during Bessmertnykh's visit of where the relationship is and where we want it to go. Our own view is that we want to get meetings set up and use them as pressure points to get things done. This should be done today, and not five years from now. In many areas, such as space, there was a lot to learn. But areas such as INF, nuclear testing and START are quite well known by now, and even on space we can see the general outlines. This is the reason that the U.S. side is puzzled.

The Secretary continued that there are those who look at these things and tell him he is not getting the message the Soviets are sending. Shultz then asks these people—what is the message? They say the

Soviet message is that they want various fora, but no summit or other high-level meetings. These people suggest, for example, that the Soviets want the negotiators in Geneva just to go along, and, if they reach an agreement, simply announce it. In other words, they feel Moscow just wants to put the whole thing on a low level.

The Secretary continued that he did not think one could take the U.S.-Soviet relationship and treat it like the relationship between two small countries, which could be mad at or happy with each other, without troubling the world. This was not the case with our relationship.

The Secretary indicated that he assumed that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze would be coming to the UNGA. Was this true?

Bessmertnykh replied that it was.

The Secretary said that he assumed that if Shevardnadze came, he would not think it inappropriate to meet with the U.S. Secretary of State. Even in the tensest times, for example in Madrid at the height of strain over the Korean airliner, the Secretary had met with Gromyko. The meeting had been a tempestuous one, but it had been good to meet.³ Yet it did not seem to be possible to establish a date for the meeting with Shevardnadze. Shultz liked Shevardnadze a lot, thought that he was a good person to deal with, and that they had a good personal relationship. The Soviet side had indicated that Shevardnadze thought it would be good to meet in the U.S. before the UNGA, and the U.S. side had agreed. Shultz went to the White House and got a date for the President to meet with Shevardnadze, since he is the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. The President did not see many Foreign Ministers, and left most of such meetings to the Secretary. But this was a different situation. He brought that back, but the Soviet reply was that they were not sure about such a meeting. Perhaps this did not puzzle Shultz' colleagues, but it did puzzle Shultz.

The Secretary indicated that he had seen the latest Soviet proposals. The Soviet side had proposed to put together a strong team on NST and to deal with those subjects at a level of less detail than that of the negotiators in an effort to move things along. The U.S. thought this a good idea and was ready to put together a team to do that.

Going down the list of topics in our relationship, the issue of nuclear testing was now being discussed in Geneva and reflected what was covered broadly with Ambassador Dobrynin during his last meeting in the U.S. Discussions to review the bidding are proceeding in

³ See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 104–106.

Vienna and Stockholm and in the area of chemical warfare, and that was fine.

The Secretary was not quite clear about the Soviet proposal with regard to regional conflicts. When he and Shevardnadze talked about this in Geneva, Shevardnadze had taken a special interest in this. They had agreed the experts meetings were useful. They had gone better, in his appraisal, than the previous year, at least in the sense that they had been easier and the groups had developed a greater rapport. So, perhaps, they might be more fruitful as they go along. But Shevardnadze had indicated that these discussions would benefit if the Foreign Ministers interjected more political life into them. Shultz recalled Gorbachev's intervention in Geneva during his discussions with the President about how the Foreign Ministers should meet more frequently. Shevardnadze had also felt this would provide more instruction to experts. He had proposed that one or two specific regions be selected prior to their meeting in an attempt to see what could be done to resolve those issues, rather than to discuss all of them. Perhaps the Soviet side might name a region, and then the U.S. side would name one, and the two sides would try to come to grips with finding common ground. The U.S. had said this would be fine.

The Secretary suggested that the U.S. Undersecretary for Political Affairs could handle the Soviet proposal on regional conflicts. This would be a level in between the current experts' talks and the meeting of Ministers. However, the U.S. side was not too clear on the Soviet purpose, and was not in favor of a large number of talks without a clear aim. The U.S. side was willing to take a chance, to try and see, but the aim should be to make it a vehicle through which he and Shevardnadze could better discuss specific regional issues; in this case, such talks would be fruitful. Some regions are explosive. Southern Africa, for example, is in a state of tremendous turmoil. Afghanistan is puzzling, but may also be a worthwhile area of possibly fruitful discussion. And there may be other such areas.

The Secretary continued that he wished to make clear to Bessmertnykh,—and the Soviet Ambassador, as well as Dobrynin and Shevardnadze, had already heard this—that it is of great importance to the U.S., but also to the world at large, that our two countries, which have so much to offer and which can rain down such great destruction, should make progress in the area of nuclear arms, and above all on reducing their levels. Someone calculated that the fallout from the Chernobyl incident was such that one to three Chernobyls would equal the fallout of one Soviet or U.S. nuclear warhead—and we each have thousands of these warheads. People talked about “game plans” for nuclear war. This was ridiculous. There was no such thing as a first strike. The side making such a strike would itself perish from the

fallout. So we need to make progress, but we are spinning our wheels, and need to get some traction. For this reason The Secretary had expressed his concern. He realized that Bessmertnykh was here on a constructive mission, and he had read the reports, but he was still puzzled about how we would proceed.

Bessmertnykh replied that he much appreciated the Secretary's candid and frank remarks, and in the same spirit, he wished to say that he was puzzled by the Secretary's puzzlement. The Soviet side felt that it was doing all it could to move in Geneva and in other fora. It never tried to reduce the importance of political contacts, especially with regard to meetings of Ministers and of top leaders. Such meetings were "movers and pushers," definitely one of the central parts of our relationship. Shevardnadze was very much in favor of this meeting, but, unfortunately, it could not take place due to certain circumstances. The Soviet side had been ready for such a meeting in May, had prepared thoroughly for it, but it had been postponed.

Bessmertnykh said that he would now like to confirm that the dates for Shevardnadze to come to Washington discussed by Shultz and the Soviet Ambassador were acceptable, i.e. September 19 and 20, including a meeting with the President as the U.S. side had suggested. This was now clear. The problem had not been the lack of willingness for such a meeting on the Soviet side, but rather scheduling difficulties, as Bessmertnykh had explained to Ambassador Hartman. Compared to previous such meetings, this would be one of the most critical, since it would discuss the summit situation, and the Ministers would report to their leaders, who would then decide what to do next. The series of working proposals which Bessmertnykh had brought were aimed at making Shultz' meeting with Shevardnadze as productive as possible. Bessmertnykh agreed that if the meeting had taken place in May, perhaps the situation would have been different now. But we should not waste further time, but rather concentrate on things we have in common, as the basis for agreements and understandings. Presenting a list of things on which the sides did not agree would not be helpful.

The Secretary indicated agreement with this last statement and recalled that, in his first meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko in 1982, they had agreed to look for areas of agreement between meetings.⁴ Two such areas had been nuclear non-proliferation and Southern Africa. With regard to the latter, the two sides had not gotten anywhere, but the area of non-proliferation had proved to be a fruitful one.

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 217.

Bessmertnykh said that proved this was the right approach and the Soviet side was in favor of it. He was glad that even before the President's reply to Gorbachev's last letter the U.S. agreed to this approach, so that he could come to Washington. This was a good indicator, although not everything had been cleared up.

Bessmertnykh said the Soviet side was ready for a good meeting, and hoped the next summit would be even better than the previous one. But both sides needed to prepare for it.

Bessmertnykh indicated that, with regard to NST, he did not understand why such a message was addressed to the Soviet side, since the picture from the Soviet's point of view was different. The Soviet side considered that one side was trying to move and the other side was going back to what existed before November. At the summit, the leaders of the two countries had agreed to speed up negotiations, and a reference to previous proposals was not a way of speeding them up. The Soviet side accepted the ideas about the space talks expressed by President Reagan during the last visit of Ambassador Dobrynin, namely, to seek something between the extreme positions of the two sides. Gorbachev had liked this idea, and the question now was whether the U.S. side was prepared to join in seeking partial solutions between the positions of the two sides in Geneva, even in the area of space. The Soviet side was prepared to discuss partial solutions as well. This was the gist of Soviet thinking.

Bessmertnykh realized that some parts of the sides' positions would remain but we should look at the meeting between the Secretary and Shevardnadze to see if Gorbachev and the President could do something, not a treaty, but something practical to show the world we are moving.

The Secretary interjected that he wished to refer back to Dobrynin's meeting with the President, where two points had been made: (1) it should be possible to work out something in INF; and (2) it should be possible to find something where progress would be possible in the area of nuclear testing, especially since Gorbachev has stressed that so much. Since Gorbachev does care so much about nuclear testing, the President agreed to a meeting which began on July 25. Useful moves on verification could lead us to ratification of the two treaties, and into a mode of looking at additional possibilities. This is what Dobrynin had said. He, Shultz, had said he thought this was not ambitious enough and that the two sides should aspire, perhaps taking the Soviet proposal on experts' talks into account, as well as the next round of negotiations in September, to make the next round a hard-driving round, which could lay the basic structure of the summit, if there is to be one in 1986. The negotiators should be ready to get down to work. But START and the space talks are too complicated for reaching

full agreement, so we should try to do enough to create outlines which could then be discussed at the negotiations in 1987 to get something which would be an achievement as part of the Moscow summit that year. With all due respect to other important areas, we must not lose sight of START and space, which are of the greatest importance—are the big deal—at present.

As the Secretary began to discuss regional issues, Bessmertnykh indicated that he would like to speak on what the Secretary had just said. He recalled the Secretary's conversation with Dobrynin during the latter's meeting with the President. That conversation was reflected in Gorbachev's letter. The Secretary said we had noticed. Therefore, Bessmertnykh went on, the Soviet side thought INF was an area where we should try an interim approach, although an agreement on radical cuts, i.e. no U.S. and Soviet missiles in Europe, was their preference.

The Secretary interjected that it would be better not to have any of these missiles anywhere in the world.

Bessmertnykh continued that the sides should try to arrive at a situation which was more fruitful with possibilities. In the area of nuclear testing, it was good that the two sides had found a formula to discuss both verification and a test ban. Each side was abiding by its interests and also was willing to talk about the things that interested the other side. This showed a desire to work, and the Soviet side appreciated that. Perhaps some result would come of it. He had heard what Shultz had said of possibilities with regard to the 1974 and 1976 Treaties. Of course, the world would look for the results with regard to space and START when Shultz would meet with Shevardnadze.

Bessmertnykh continued that, of course, the U.S. side was aware of the basic Soviet position with regard to prohibition of space strike weapons, but it was trying to find more practical solutions, such as strengthening the ABM Treaty. Since the U.S. had said its SDI work was being conducted within the framework of the ABM Treaty, it would seem the Treaty was something that the sides wished to keep. Hence, the proposal to strengthen the regime of that Treaty with regard to the time period within which it would be in force, i.e. the time-frame within which neither side could withdraw from it. As presently envisioned, each side could withdraw under extreme circumstances, where it felt that its national security interests were threatened. It seemed to him that neither side foresaw such an extreme situation. So the two sides should think about this. The second point was to define what was permitted and not permitted under the ABM Treaty. Appropriate proposals on this score had been made in Geneva. These could form the basis for political solutions.

The Secretary indicated that other possibilities which existed were agreement on ASAT and offensive space weapons, in which the Soviet

side had shown interest. The U.S. had tried hard to answer Gorbachev's concern about "space-strike weapons" hitting targets on earth, and the President said that he would try to deal with this issue.

Bessmertnykh interjected that this was not the same thing as weapons of mass destruction. He continued that the question of regional conflicts had apparently caused some confusion. Secretary Shultz indicated that the U.S. side had tried to figure out what the Soviet side was striving for.

Bessmertnykh said the Soviet side did not depart from the understanding reached between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to the effect that the Foreign Ministers would discuss regional situations. They might have even more to do after the talks the Soviets are proposing. Shevardnadze was ready to talk about one, two, three or four situations. Similarly, the group experts discussions should continue.

The Secretary quipped that perhaps the Ministers should straighten out what the regional talks had done.

Bessmertnykh continued that the two sides had looked at various aspects of regional conflicts, and both sides had said a great deal about them. The thing was to see if common positions could be found in this area, perhaps small ones. One such common position might be based on the fact that neither side would want to see an exacerbation of regional conflicts, or an increase in their number. The working group, therefore, should not be a substitute for the Ministerial meeting, but should try to prepare the meeting better.

The Secretary indicated that the U.S. delegation would be prepared to discuss the full range of areas of conflict to see what could be said, and would sort out the topics for discussion at the Ministerial meeting that would be the most fruitful. He asked if this was how the Soviets saw the main task.

Bessmertnykh indicated that this was an important point, but not the only one. If they simply reviewed areas of conflict, they would probably be repeating previous positions. The idea would be, without forgetting that problems exist, to find common points in a general way, perhaps some mechanisms which the sides would share. Perhaps they would not come up with anything, but at the summit there should be a passage about regional affairs.

The Secretary asked whether an example of such a common point might be the question of the use of chemical weapons in the Iran/Iraq war. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union are against the proliferation of chemical weapons, and know they are being used in that war.

Bessmertnykh agreed that this was an example of more practical discussions, and the Soviet side could consider this and be prepared to work on it together. Perhaps something could be found here.

The Secretary indicated that since this group was envisioned to be something between an expert group and a Ministerial meeting, the U.S. side would nominate Undersecretary Armacost to head it, and it would have others from other parts of the U.S. Government, people who are representative and thoughtful.

Bessmertnykh replied that the Soviet side would then need to think of who would head up its delegation. They had thought it would be headed up by someone at a lower level, but would think about it.

Bessmertnykh noted the Secretary's interest in Chernobyl, and said the Soviet side also feels that we should not play games.

The Secretary asked Bessmertnykh what he thought about how this preparatory meeting and its structure should become known. Should the two sides describe it, or should it ooze out to the press? Shultz would tell the President that the proposed dates had been accepted. This should be announced, or it would leak out anyway, and he would prefer to say it in the way in which the U.S. side wanted to. How should the sides plan to do this? If an important group went to Moscow, people would figure out what the trip was about.

Bessmertnykh said the substance of the talks should not be described.

The Secretary agreed absolutely. The delegation members should be taken "by the scruff of the neck" and told they could talk to no one about the substance of the talks except among themselves, to Shultz and to the President. But it would not be possible to conceal the fact that the talks were taking place.

Bessmertnykh said perhaps it would be better to announce the concept of a variety of meetings of experts taking place between the two sides in order to put into motion the Ministerial meeting.

The Secretary replied that perhaps Bessmertnykh and Ridgway could discuss the wording of such a statement, but it should be done carefully. We should be matter-of-fact about it, not to overstate its importance, and not to understate it.

Bessmertnykh said that perhaps we should mention only the dates and place of the next meeting.

The Secretary said he could see a brief statement to the effect that the Foreign Ministers would be meeting September 19 and 20 and that in preparing for that meeting, certain subjects would be discussed, to show that this would take place between now and mid-September without indicating when, where and by whom.

Bessmertnykh thought this was a good proposal and agreed to work on it, but repeated that perhaps the statement should only indicate the meeting of Ministers. He would have to get Shevardnadze's approval for any statement.

The Secretary indicated that perhaps Bessmertnykh and Ridgway could try to work something out.

Bessmertnykh repeated that the major agreement was that the dates of the Ministerial meeting had been set.

Bessmertnykh then asked if Ambassador Dubinin wished to add anything.

Dubinin replied that he had just come from Moscow the day before, and had noticed a difference between temperatures in Moscow and Washington. In Moscow it was summer, but a few degrees less.

The Secretary interjected that he would be glad to loan Moscow some of our degrees.

Dubinin added that he did feel, however, that there was much in common with regard to the political temperature with respect to the meeting between Shultz and Shevardnadze. He had talked with Shevardnadze and other high Soviet officials. The Soviet Union and the U.S. share the viewpoint that they must work quickly to prepare for the Ministerial meeting. There is pressure not only from the point of view of the substance of the issues, but also from the point of view of time. Minister Shevardnadze sends Shultz his warmest regards and his wish to stress the urgency of the preparatory work. Dubinin also noted that Gorbachev was not in Moscow at the time of his visit, since the Soviet leader was traveling in the Soviet Far East at the time.

The Secretary remarked that the U.S. side had read the speech which Gorbachev had made there.⁵

Dubinin replied that Gorbachev was practically on the U.S. border, and had noted that there were only about seven kilometers between the U.S. and the USSR. It was also there that Gorbachev had given the first reaction of the Soviet side to President Reagan's letter in response to Gorbachev's letter of June 19. Dubinin indicated that the Soviet side had the full text of Gorbachev's statement and could give it to the U.S.. The text calls for what Shultz had mentioned, i.e. activating serious preparatory work in order that the meeting between Shultz and Shevardnadze might be productive. The statement looks optimistically towards the future. This is what he wished to say on the basis of his last contacts with the Soviet leadership.

The Secretary replied that he appreciated this, and appreciated his relationship with Minister Shevardnadze. Turning to Bessmertnykh,

⁵ Three telegrams from Moscow reported on Gorbachev's long July 28 address in Vladivostok: telegrams 12861, 12873, and 12835, all dated July 28. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860575–0668, D860575–0785, and D860575–0153, respectively) Excerpts of the speech are printed in *Documents on Disarmament*, 1986, pp. 426–432.

he indicated that the U.S. side would like to have a fruitful meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister. Shultz' definition of "fruitful" was not simply to announce a long list of things for the press. "Fruitful" meant that he could tell the President and Shevardnadze could tell Gorbachev that there was progress in view and that there could be useful work done beginning in September to produce a fruitful summit, that Shevardnadze would do certain things and that Shultz would do certain things, including having more meetings, perhaps also in Moscow. The main thing would not be to list five or ten areas of agreement for the press. Would Bessmertnykh agree?

Bessmertnykh indicated that he would, and that the best result would be to report to the leaders that there are possibilities, that they will not be wasted, that they will be used to improve the relationship.

The Secretary indicated that this was good.

Bessmertnykh said that Gorbachev had noted that months had been wasted. Maybe now we should try to find opportunities to improve our relationship. The Soviet side had had discussions with U.S. allies (France, Britain, West Germany) as well as with neutral nations and various leaders. The impression Gorbachev and Shevardnadze were left with was that everyone would like U.S.-Soviet relations to stabilize and to improve, and expect such a result to come out of the meeting.

The Secretary concluded by saying that he now felt better than at the beginning of the meeting. He felt better about what the Soviet side was thinking about, and thought that we should proceed as had been agreed. He did not wish to see his boss in a summit which was not well prepared. This was a formula for catastrophe.

258. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 28, 1986, 10:30 a.m.–12:05 p.m.

Visit of Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh
July 28, 1986

U.S. PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Kampelman
Ambassador Nitze
ASD Richard Perle
DAS Thomas Simons
COL Robert Linhard (NSC)
SOV Director Parris
SOV Dep Dir Burton (notetaker)

SOVIET PARTICIPANTS

Dep FonMin Bessmertnykh
Ambassador Dubinin
Minister-Counselor Sokolov
Second Secretary Churkin

The discussions began after Bessmertnykh's meeting with Secretary Shultz. Referring to the all-night negotiating session on the joint statement at the Geneva summit, Bessmertnykh remarked, "When I see Richard Perle in the room, I have the feeling we'll have a joint statement." Perle rejoined, "Well, at least it's a decent hour."

Ambassador Ridgway opened by noting that the discussions this morning would focus on the Nuclear and Space Talks. She said the Soviets had received a copy of the President's letter.² The USG's review of Soviet proposals was thorough and careful. We realized the Soviets had had only a short time to study the President's proposal, and we had seen the general reaction of General Secretary Gorbachev in his speech, but we would be interested in any further comments reaction.³ At this point, she would turn to Ambassadors Nitze and Kampelman to discuss the President's proposal.

Bessmertnykh said that the U.S. side was assured from the General Secretary's speech that the Soviets are going to study the President's ideas very carefully. He saw the General Secretary's statement as a good reaction. Soviet experts will look it over closely and this process will take some time. He said he didn't want to comment beyond that, but would appreciate hearing anything the U.S. side wanted to say which would help the Soviets understand better.

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, July–August 1986. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burton. The meeting took place in the EUR Conference Room at the Department of State.

² See Document 254.

³ See footnote 5, Document 257.

With regard to INF, he continued, the letter from Gorbachev and the letter from President Reagan each expressed interest in a search for an interim agreement. This is an area of great importance. The President's letter also referred to the talks on nuclear testing about verification and about a test ban. Of course, the crucial area involves the Nuclear and Space Talks.

Ambassador Nitze said he could not add much to the President's letter, since the President had tried to make it as clear as possible, but he did want to review the main parts. First, the President had tried to take into account Gorbachev's concerns as the President understands them. One such area was the right the U.S. has, under the supreme interest clause in the ABM Treaty, to withdraw from the treaty on six months' notice. The principal part of the proposal is that both sides would confine themselves to research, testing and development, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. The purpose of this research is to determine the feasibility of advanced defenses against ballistic missiles. That is the intent of the proposal.

Bessmertnykh said the intent is understood but he had some questions on the interpretation. The basic question is whether one of the most important provisions of the treaty will be respected, and that is the provision against establishment of a space-based ABM system.

Nitze answered that both sides recognized in the past—as the U.S. does now—that there are two important provisions of the treaty. Article V relates to the definition of ABM systems and components, based on the technology that was understood when the treaty was negotiated in 1972. Agreed Statement D is directed at systems based on new technologies which were not well understood at that time. Nitze continued that we worked hard in the negotiations to define a "component" in light of technology at the time and eventually agreed on a definition of components as ABM launchers, radars and interceptors. Concerning future technology, there was much discussion about a definition of "components"; the Soviet side took the position that it could not be defined what these components might be. As a result of lengthy negotiations—from September to February, as he recalled—the two sides worked out Agreed Statement D. (Nitze then asked if Perle wanted to add anything; Perle shook his head).

Bessmertnykh said there are provisions of the treaty which have to endure. One is not to violate the prohibition against a space-based ABM system.

Nitze asked: "Where does that appear? Article V?"

Bessmertnykh said yes. The thrust of the Soviet position is to preserve the ABM Treaty. Bessmertnykh did not want to get into details but wanted to ask whether the two sides now could agree not to take measures against the thrust of the Treaty. Nitze agreed that we could

but the question is, what are the measures? Article V and Agreed Statement D are relevant.

Nitze continued that the President has proposed a five-year period of research, and after that, a two-year negotiating period. Both sides would sit down and try to work out the details. If either party decided to go beyond research, development and testing in the sense of Article V, they would enter into negotiations to share the benefits of such a system provided there was agreement on the elimination of ballistic missiles. This means that we would sit down now to negotiate a treaty about what we would do at the end of the five-year research period. In those negotiations (i.e., after the research period), the Soviets might say that their research had been successful, or we might say ours had succeeded, and we would talk about sharing the benefits of those efforts.

Bessmertnykh asked what “sharing the benefits” means?

Nitze said that was something we would have to sit down and discuss. The sense is that both sides would share the results of that research. What the President wants is to agree that we would sit down and discuss this question—it would be the substance of a negotiation.

Perle said the logic of the President’s proposal is that there could be a kind of instability if we both gave up our ballistic missiles. Each side would leave itself vulnerable under such an outcome to ballistic missiles held by third countries, or to cheating by the other. Sharing the benefits of a defense against ballistic missiles would give both sides assurances about the significant change in the strategic situation that would be brought about by the elimination of their ballistic missiles.

Nitze continued that the President made clear in his letter that his proposal makes sense only in the context of deep, stabilizing reductions in offensive nuclear weapons. This presupposed progress in START and INF. Nitze did not want to get into the details of these negotiations other than to note the President’s strong affirmation of 50% reductions, that we should go down to that level. Nitze recognized that the Soviet position is different, in part on definitions.

Bessmertnykh asked Nitze to clarify which definitions.

Nitze answered, the definition of a strategic offensive system. The Soviets have one view. We think the definition should be that used in SALT II regarding limitations on strategic offensive systems.

Bessmertnykh said the Soviets have decided to go a different way, that is, towards smaller reductions. There is a question, however, on systems to be covered. For instance, the Soviets had proposed limits on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). The President’s letter mentioned nothing about this.

Nitze said the U.S. would be interested in any ideas the Soviets have on verifying such limits.

Bessmertnykh answered that the Soviets had presented some ideas in Geneva on this. There was no mention in the President's letter about this. The U.S. side wanted to ban land-based mobile missiles because they were "uncontrollable". They did not want to deal with SLCMs because they were "uncontrollable." This led the Soviets to conclude that if there are American systems that are "uncontrollable", they are not to be discussed. If there are Soviet systems that are "uncontrollable", they are to be limited. But today, the two sides are not discussing the President's letter. Perhaps Ambassador Kampelman would care to comment.

Kampelman said he thought Ambassador Nitze's comment about verification was quite appropriate. The U.S. is not questioning the good faith of the Soviet proposals at Geneva, but we do feel they are far from adequate.

Bessmertnykh asked whether the two sides should abandon the SLCM question or continue discussing it.

Kampelman said that we have repeatedly made clear at Geneva that if there is an issue of concern to the Soviets "The U.S. is not going to tell you we won't discuss it. We want you to explain your concerns to us, and we hope you'll listen to ours."

Bessmertnykh said this not an issue of academic concern to the Soviets.

Kampelman answered that, again, as Ambassador Nitze said, and in light of the President's letter, there is a great deal more work that needs to be done on offensive reductions. General Secretary Gorbachev is concerned about this, too. "We should do more to stimulate that side of the discussion."

Bessmertnykh said the Soviets see their proposal on SLCM as an important compromise on their part. They didn't insist on a ban, as before, and thought this should have been appreciated by the U.S. side. There are long-range issues that may take years to discuss, but there are things that can be done before then. The President had said in the past that both sides have staked out ideal positions but there may be something in between. Gorbachev had said "I like that idea, we should try to find that." That is the thrust of the Soviet approach—to find something that perhaps is not ideal for either side, but acceptable to both.

Kampelman said that is the President's idea, as well. He continued that he had a question regarding the INF aspect. The negotiators in Geneva are quite unclear about Soviet thinking in the INF area, and efforts to explore this had not provided answers—perhaps because the Soviets themselves were uncertain about how to proceed. After the summit, we expected a discussion at Geneva of an interim agreement.

In January, however, we saw something quite different, so we moved in that direction in our own thinking. The U.S. was ready to work on either approach. After reading Gorbachev's letter, it appears that the Soviet side has reached the conclusion it would be more fruitful to go back to discussing an interim agreement.

Bessmertnykh said he could confirm today that the Soviets are interested in trying to find an interim agreement. Both sides have basic positions. The Soviets are not demanding theirs. The Soviet side realizes that an interim agreement means some level of U.S. medium-range missiles would stay in Europe. If there is interest on your part, we want to share ideas the two sides can develop together. Perhaps we can discuss this in the next several weeks. We do not want to table old proposals. The Soviets want "fresh" ideas to refer to Ministers and then the leaders at the summit.

Kampelman then referred to the idea of eliminating ballistic missiles, and asked for Soviet reactions.

Bessmertnykh said the Soviets would have to look at the concept—what are the conditions, the terms of agreement. The General Secretary has said the Soviets want to eliminate all nuclear weapons, and so has the President, so there is a general framework. But we have to study which way it is put. It would be helpful if the U.S. could give more information.

Perle said the logic of the proposal is a powerful point, apart from the question of developing practical ways of getting there. A central part of the question of strategic defenses is the proper relationship between offensive and defensive forces. In the defense area, we are talking about a defense against ballistic missiles that would render ballistic missiles "irrelevant" as an element of power. Neither of us would want to be vulnerable to a country that could obtain ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. There are lots of countries that have space programs. There is not much difference between a missile used for civilian purposes and a missile that can carry a nuclear weapon. After eliminating our own ballistic missiles, neither of us should feel exposed to the first country that develops a ballistic missile of its own. That is the logic. It is difficult to get there. But it is such an appealing notion that we think it is worth looking at.

Bessmertnykh asked about the threat from airplanes and cruise missiles.

Perle answered that there is no practical way to eliminate all nuclear weapons at one time. The U.S. has always emphasized ballistic missiles. These are more dangerous compared to aircraft, which move slowly. Both sides have many ballistic missiles and they cost lots of money.

Bessmertnykh said that when the U.S. says cruise missiles are less destabilizing, that is relative to ballistic missiles. If we eliminated

ballistic missiles, aircraft and cruise missiles would be what's left, and they would become the most dangerous in their own right.

Perle assured him it was not the U.S. intention to leave other systems such as cruise missiles outside of a reductions regime. No one is interested in seeing ballistic missiles eliminated and other systems increased. Kampelman joined Perle in emphasizing that this was why the President called for reducing nuclear weapons significantly in a way that is stabilizing for both sides.

Nitze added that we have to consider other arms control areas as well. There is a whole panoply of interests which will become of greater concern as we reduced nuclear weapons—conventional forces, chemical weapons. As Perle had said, if you can deal with the most dangerous systems, then it makes it easier to deal with the others as you go along. The two sides need to work out a road map, since if you can work out some problems, you have a much better chance of getting at the others.

Bessmertnykh said that is why we have the various groups at work in these areas. We had spent a good deal of time during his visit to go over these groups. The concept is the same—to work on all areas. All nuclear weapons should be slowly eliminated, we can't just deal with one part. One side is liable to feel insecure.

Kampleman said we are not replacing talks already under way, we are supplementing them. We can focus on the central issues now and, as we go along, in other areas.

Perle said we constantly hear from our Allies and others that we cannot just work in one area. It is clear that we have to deal in other areas. But ballistic missiles are different in important respects. For one thing, there is no defense against them; this means both sides can calculate with considerable precision the effects of an attack with them. Regarding aircraft, the Soviets are better off—they have an elaborate defense against aircraft, we have virtually none. In a world without ballistic missiles, where deterrence depended on aircraft and cruise missiles, the U.S. would be required to make significant changes, and we cannot do it overnight. In his view, a world free of ballistic missiles, and where, accordingly, decisions did not have to be made in 20 minutes, would be safer for all parties.

Perle continued that strategic defenses would protect against third countries; it could even deter third countries from acquiring ballistic missiles. As it stands now, the U.S. has no defense against ballistic missiles, and the Soviet Union only has an ABM system around Moscow. Thus, both the U.S. and Soviet Union, with the exception of the Moscow area, are vulnerable to third countries. This is not a very desirable situation for either of our countries.

DAS Simons said he wanted to make one point to Bessmertnykh. It was important to study the President's letter carefully, not from the

standpoint of intentions, but for its implications. The President's letter is constructive. The U.S. knows that the Soviets are very thorough in their analysis, but he hoped they would not get enmeshed in an effort to speculate about the intent of every word—in other words, don't carry things too far. Any conclusions on the President's intentions probably would wind up overdrawn.

Bessmertnykh referred again to Gorbachev's speech and said the Soviets believe the President's letter deserves intensive consideration. The Soviets do not want to rush into reactions. Fortunately, both sides recently have been more careful in this respect. Sometimes there has been a practice of launching a proposal and then "running around trying to score propaganda points." However, he can assure the U.S. that the Soviet proposals were worked out very carefully with the Minister of Defense and the Soviet military.

Simons interjected "In other words, you can live with them."

Bessmertnykh said yes. They are very serious. They are attempts to move things along. The Soviets were dissatisfied with the progress at Geneva, as in other aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations. He had the sense both sides are trying to work seriously with each other, and the President's letter will be examined in that light.

Nitze, referring to Bessmertnykh's comments on Friday about references to space-based systems of mass destruction,⁴ said there were some who argued in the USG that it wasn't a serious Soviet concern, but the President determined that we should address it.

Bessmertnykh said it is a Soviet concern and they want to find a more practical way to address it.

Perle quipped that it is always easier to deal with something when you don't have to take it away (i.e., from existing forces).

Bessmertnykh agreed. He said that in some cases in the past, we failed to deal with certain things because they did not exist—for instance, MIRVing on the American side, and perhaps some things on the Soviet side as well—and they got away from us, and both sides learned to regret it.

Perle said that, over time, some things have gotten relatively better. For example, our weapons now are a lot safer than they were. Both sides should be grateful that we have avoided any serious accidents. Smaller forces on both sides would make forces more manageable and thus reduce the possibilities of unintended incidents. We should look at ways to make the situation safer and more stable.

⁴ July 25. See Document 255.

Bessmertnykh said modernization questions were important. The Soviet side would like to constrain this. However, on defensive arms, there should be no illusions, at least within some circles, that the Soviet Union is not up to the challenge. The Soviets want to explore ideas with the U.S. in order to give our leaders the chance to have some new thinking.

Perle said that if he understands the President's thinking when he first raised SDI in March 1983, the President did not see it as a "menacing development". The President's instinct then, and in everything he has said since, is that SDI is an attempt to deal with an undesirable situation, to see if there is a better way than destroying each other's societies. The President is trying to find a way to do this and to deal with the General Secretary's concerns. He is searching for the right relationship between offenses and defenses. He has *never* envisioned SDI as a way to gain unilateral advantage.

Bessmertnykh said he believed that. The General Secretary has talked to President Reagan. There is no doubt that the President wants to protect his nation—"there is not a single doubt about the integrity of the President's thinking." But for the rest of us, Bessmertnykh continued, we must see how it is translated into reality. If we do not define the steps, there could be a very different result, no matter how unintentional on the President's part. Before now, there had never been a time when the leaders of both sides wanted such dramatic reductions; whether 50% or something less, both sides were saying let's try to do it. We should try to avoid a new arms race, and with leaders like President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, the chances are good. Under Gorbachev, you may have noticed, "we're more open, more mobile." Now is a good time to try to do something.

Kampelman, referring to Bessmertnykh's earlier comment about being up to the challenge, said he did not know of a single responsible American official who did not believe that the Soviets can do whatever they want in the military field, regardless of the economic consequences. There is no responsible American official who does not believe that the Soviet leadership will do whatever it feels it must to ensure Soviet security.

Bessmertnykh said if that is, that is good, because we are both in a better position to negotiate. He had the strong feeling that there might be misconceptions on this. What Kampelman had said is a very important starting point. If each side believes that the other can compete in a space arms race, then it creates a basis for negotiation. If one side believes that it could gain unilateral advantage, then there it makes a different situation.

Ambassador Ridgway then recommended that we conclude the discussion of NST. We would discuss non-nuclear arms control subjects in the afternoon.

Bessmertnykh thought we had already covered those issues sufficiently. As for CDE, his sense was that the negotiations are going into a much more active phase and were on the move.

Ridgway and Bessmertnykh then decided to take a coffee break, after which the group would discuss other arms control subjects.

NOTE: During the break, it was decided not to resume the meeting, and the group broke up for the 1 p.m. lunch in the Department.

259. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, July 28, 1986

SUBJECT

Bessmertnykh Proposal for Schedule of Meetings

In the meeting with Ridgway Saturday, Bessmertnykh proposed an elaborate series of meetings, most in August, to prepare for the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in September.² Clearly the two most important are the ones proposed on NST issues and regional issues.

Consultations on NST

During the Saturday morning session, Bessmertnykh proposed that a small group meet on NST in either Moscow or Washington in the August 10–15 time frame. Since Bob had gotten the impression the day before that they were asking for someone other than the negotiators plus “experts,” I questioned him on these points. In reply, he said that they had in mind three or four people, not necessarily the negotiators, but they would be acceptable if we wished. He said they were not proposing to include “technical experts,” since these consultations would be broader and there would be no need for “narrow specialists.” However, the chairman might wish to have a person at hand who was familiar with each of the three negotiating areas.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, 1983–1986, Bessmertnykh Visit July 1986 (2/2). Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Linhard and Rodman.

² Saturday was July 26. See Document 256.

The important thing, he said, was for the session not to be a repeat of the sort of negotiations conducted during the formal sessions—i.e., that they be directed not to an explanation of current positions, but at trying out new ideas to resolve problems, strictly *ad referendum*. He also proposed that the meetings be for only a couple of days, after which the group would break, consult in capitals, and perhaps convene again in a week or so.

When I asked Bessmertnykh directly whether the negotiators would be acceptable as our team, he replied, “In my personal view it would be better to name someone else, but the negotiators will be all right if that is what you want.” He then implied that if Max led our team, Karpov would probably lead theirs.

Regional Issues

Bessmertnykh proposed that we have a general meeting on regional issues around mid-August, involving four or five persons on each side.

I think we should accept, and use the President’s UNGA proposal for the basis of our pitch. I believe that Peter Rodman is ideally placed to head our group. However, Simons tells me that Armacost has expressed a personal interest in doing this. Although I have no doubt Mike could do it well, he is too high ranking for his Soviet counterpart. (They have named Polyakov, a division chief in MFA.) I think it ought to be Rodman, Sestanovich, plus office directors from State who cover Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua.

Other Meetings

The other meetings suggested by Bessmertnykh are as follows:

Nuclear Testing: Continue meetings between Barker and Petrosyants which have already started.

Conventional Arms in Europe: Mikhailov (Soviet MBFR negotiator) prepared to meet with our representative in Moscow during the first ten days of August. (Presumably if we accept, we would send Blackwill; this would give us the opportunity to press the Soviets on a more forthcoming reply to the last Western proposal in MBFR, as the Germans strongly desire.)

CDE: Soviets are prepared to have Barry and Grinevsky meet in Washington during the first ten days of August, unless they prefer to meet in Stockholm. The Soviets are interested in discussing where to take up their proposal for Atlantic to Urals conventional arms reduction: CDE-II, enlarged MBFR or something else. (It may be premature for us to get into these things now, although it is clear that the Soviets are angling for something to announce during the summit. If we agree to the meeting, I believe we should use it to stress that we must conclude the CDE satisfactorily, get some progress in MBFR, and also get some

progress in Basket III of the CSCE before we set up mechanisms for the recent Soviet proposals on conventional arms.)

Chemical Weapons: Soviets propose that our CD negotiators meet in Geneva in August to discuss verification of a CW ban. They also agree to talks on proliferation in Moscow in September (Hawes has been designated to do this on our side.)

Risk Reduction Centers: As you know, they proposed this week in Geneva; we have told them this is impossible, but we will propose a date.

Terrorism: Ridgway proposed consultations between Oakley and representatives of the Soviet Embassy here. Bessmertnykh accepted.

Bilateral issues: Bessmertnykh proposed that a group be designated to discuss these various issues, either in Moscow or Washington, in August. He seems willing to include “humanitarian” issues. EUR is interested in putting together a team, probably headed by Simons, to do it.

General Comments

It seems absolutely clear that Bessmertnykh is under instructions to get things moving rapidly across the board. He strongly implied that, if the preparations before the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting are “satisfactory,” we will receive agreement to a summit date from Shevardnadze, or very shortly thereafter. I would infer that the Soviets have decided that they want the meeting this year, and therefore will be inclined, during August, to compromise at least enough to provide enough “meat” to match whatever criteria they have sent for a “minimal result.”

These vibes were all present a day after Bessmertnykh had read the President’s letter.³ Although it was probably too early for him to have received any specific guidance from Moscow, I would conclude that he personally did not react to the proposals in the letter as if they were so tough as to get in the way of summit preparations. Since he is presumably familiar with the bureaucratic scene in Moscow, this may be significant. (Throughout the meetings, both formal and informal, he refrained from any comment on the letter, simply observing that while he might have a personal reaction, he knew that was not of interest to us, and that he would await Gorbachev’s reaction before discussing it.)

I was also struck by the fact that Bessmertnykh’s presentations were totally devoid of propaganda in any form. He was utterly businesslike, and directed his attention on getting the process moving.

³ See Document 254.

Once, when he commented on the meetings proposed, he said that the Soviets wanted to use them to find solutions, and did not intend “long speeches and propaganda.” He added that “there are plenty of fora for that,” as if to distinguish the process they propose from their normal behavior—and from the public comments of both sides.

Finally, I would note that during the informal dinner Saturday night the Soviets present spoke spontaneously, at length, and with uncharacteristic candor about Soviet internal difficulties. (Sokolov and Political Counselor Kuznetsov were with Bessmertnykh; Ridgway, her husband, Simons, Parris and myself were there from our side.) They made a number of comments about the dire effects of the “stagnation” brought on by Brezhnev’s last years and Chernenko, asserted that this affected morale and productivity not just among the elite but throughout the population as a whole, and described in some detail the difficulty of changing anything given the fierce resistance of the entrenched bureaucracy. They also observed that the current leadership has maybe a year or at most 18 months to show some palpable changes, or else the entire society will relapse into the torpor of the early eighties.

260. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Solomon) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, July 29, 1986

SUBJECT

Gorbachev Plays Triangular Politics: Some Observations on your Meeting with Bessmertnykh

Gorbachev is now actively searching for leverage points on issues that would give him a positive Summit outcome. In this regard, there were several dimensions of your discussion yesterday with Bessmert-

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 4D, 1986 Soviet Union July. Secret; Sensitive. In a July 29 handwritten covering note attached to another copy of this memorandum, Solomon wrote: “Nick Platt: This is the memo I mentioned at the morning staff meeting interpreting the Secretary’s meeting yesterday with Bessmertnykh. Given its subject, I assume you will want to restrict its circulation. I suggest that it go to Charlie Hill, Mike Armacost and John Whitehead—apart from whomever else you think should see it. Bernie Kalb and Mort Abramowitz also asked to see it. You decide. Thanks, Dick.” (Department of State, S/P Records, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, 1986 July) No record of the morning staff meeting has been found.

nykh that seem particularly significant, more for what was implied rather than directly stated.²

Gorbachev Tries "Triangular" Politics: Ambassador Dubinin noted at the end of the meeting that Gorbachev had just given a major speech during his travels in the Soviet Far East.³ Dubinin said that the Secretary General had commented in his speech that U.S. and Soviet territory are only seven kilometers apart. What he did *not* say is that Gorbachev had given the speech in Vladivostok, and that it contained a major initiative designed to break the decades-long deadlock in Sino-Soviet relations. In his speech Gorbachev expressed a positive attitude toward China's modernization reforms; he revealed that efforts are underway to resolve long-standing border disputes; and he suggested significant new proposals designed to break the so-called "obstacles" in the way of Sino-Soviet normalization—the reduction of Soviet troops in Mongolia and Afghanistan.

Gorbachev's speech—perhaps timed for Bessmertnykh's meeting with you—comes in the context of other Soviet initiatives to both entice and pressure the Chinese into a new relationship, and to broaden Moscow's dealings with Japan and other Asian states. The Soviets recently sent arms negotiator Karpov to Beijing (although he was identified by the Chinese only as a guest of the Soviet Ambassador) to brief PRC officials on the state of the Geneva negotiations. (In this regard, it is unfortunate, in my view, that we did not send Ambassador Rowny to Beijing on his current round of consultations.⁴ We now face the problem of appearing to play "catch up" with the Soviets in any initiatives we might take in the China relationship.) At the same time, the Soviets have conducted at least ten intelligence overflights in the North Korea-Manchuria area that led to a Chinese interception of Soviet aircraft. There are also rumors circulating in Beijing of a small scale Sino-Soviet border clash. Thus, Moscow is using pressures as well as incentives with Beijing.

While China, unquestionably, will continue to try to "balance" between the Soviets and ourselves, the significant point for our dealings with Moscow is that Gorbachev is now making a major effort to reactivate the Sino-Soviet relationship, in part as a way of putting additional pressure on us in advance of a Summit meeting. We thus face a more

² See Document 257.

³ See footnote 5, Document 257.

⁴ In an undated memorandum to Poindexter, Platt noted: "In accordance with their July 18 instructions, Ambassadors Nitze, Rowny and Holmes are consulting with key allies on the President's proposed reply to Gorbachev." (Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1986 July–August). See footnote 1, Document 254.

complex political environment as we consider putting more activity into our dealings with Beijing.

In this regard, it is probably no accident that I received a call yesterday from a long-known Chinese Embassy official with special responsibilities for monitoring Soviet affairs inviting me to dinner next week. I should receive your guidance on any impressions or messages you want passed on through this channel.

Moscow's "Indecisiveness" on the Ministerial Meeting and Summit Dates. Soviet waffling on the setting of a final date for your meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and on the Summit, can, of course, be seen as a negotiating ploy to hold these meetings out as bait and to force us into the *demandeur* position in order to test our firmness on various substantive issues. Moscow, no doubt, hopes to jam us up against time deadlines that will force hasty and (from our point of view) ill-considered decisions.

At the same time, my political viscera tell me that there may be more than just a negotiating strategem at work here. Bessmertnykh's disingenuous reference to the now long-passed "circumstances" (i.e., Libya) that led to the cancelling of the May ministerial meeting, seems to me to reflect not just circumstances of the moment but real political defensiveness and uncertainty in Moscow as Gorbachev positions himself for the next Summit. While our Soviet specialists seem to feel that Gorbachev is in a relatively secure position, I would not be at all surprised if, in fact, he is having significant problems building a coalition and a negotiating position that will carry him politically through a second Summit. Hence his current maneuvering for various forms of leverage on us—the added activism with the Chinese, the effort to build time pressures, etc.

"The Hug of the Bear" on Regional Issues. I also find notable—and a matter of concern—the new Soviet proposal for a special working group on regional issues, and Bessmertnykh's emphasis that such discussions should concentrate on "positive things." The Soviets, as ever, are trying to create the impression of U.S.-Soviet collusion on various regional issues as a way of compensating for their own weak or exposed positions and of neutralizing our pressures on them. They hope, no doubt, that our interest in a productive Summit will enable them to maneuver us into positions on Afghanistan, Angola, the Middle East, etc., which will compromise our independent standing and room for maneuver on these areas of conflict. They will attempt to worry our allies and friends—including the Chinese—that we are actively working with Moscow to "resolve" these issues rather than to sustain support for their interests.

Our management of these regional talks, if we are to successfully bridge the distance between Soviet purposes and our own objectives

in eroding Moscow's exposed positions, will take some skillful footwork as we maneuver through the next two Summits (assuming they are held).

261. Talking Points Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, August 11, 1986

TALKING POINTS: Press Accounts of Soviet War Scare

On August 8, the *Washington Post* carried a front page account of a Soviet "war scare" in the early 1980's derived from the debriefing of Oleg Gordievsky, KGB acting "rezident" in London prior to his defection to the UK in June 1985.² That account may raise questions in Congress and other forums about the accuracy of the *Post* report, and what the US Intelligence Community knew at the time. [*portion marking not declassified*]

[10 paragraphs (55 lines) not declassified]

The essential point is that the war scare was not a military alert, nor did it ever result in specific Soviet military actions that threatened the national security interests of the US or its allies. The war scare is, however, an analytic issue that has prompted numerous memoranda, a SNIE, and on-going research in several components of the US Intelligence Community.³ Contrary to an aside in the *Post*'s report, we do judge that these Soviet actions suggest a great deal about their perceptions of the US, their intelligence apparatus and analysis, and the divisions of responsibilities within the Soviet security system. [*portion marking not declassified*]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Job 91B00874R: O/DDI Files (1980–1988), Box 1, Folder 24: HPSCI Current Intell Briefing 12 Aug 86. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

² See Murrey Marder, "Defector Told of Soviet Alert," *Washington Post*, August 8, 1986, p. A1. Documentation on Able Archer and the war scare is in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 134, 135, 221, and Appendix A.

³ For SNIE 11–10–84/JX, May 18, 1984, see *ibid.*, Document 221.

262. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Ridgway) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, August 13, 1986

SUBJECT

U.S.-Soviet Relations: Status and Prospects

I. Summary

The “work program” agreed to during Bessmertnykh’s visit is well underway, although we are still nailing down dates for the last individual pieces.² Both sides have the same idea of what is involved: a review of relations across the board, focussed on the most promising elements, for you and Shevardnadze to sift through in September, with a view to identifying and giving a further push to items suitable for the Summit. The Soviets have made clear that their agreement to go to the Summit depends on the results of your meeting with Shevardnadze.

At the same time, just having the work program underway has already energized the machinery on individual issues on both sides, and we want it to keep doing so. The work program is not the only arena where important things are happening for U.S.-Soviet relations—we are engaged in our defense budget debate, and the Soviets are invigorating their Asian diplomacy—but it is more than ever the main ring. I wanted to take advantage of your presence in Washington to give you a snapshot of where we are, a sense of the more promising issues that are beginning to emerge, and a preview of some of the topics on which you will probably need to be personally involved over the coming weeks and months.

An update of the familiar U.S.-Soviet checklist is attached at Tab A.³ This memo concentrates on the highlights. (End summary)

II. Status of the Work Program

Exchanges are underway in every area of our agenda.

1. Arms Control

On *NST*, the Soviets were waiting for the Moscow exchanges before proceeding further on Gorbachev’s response to the President’s propos-

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 4D, 1986 Soviet Union, July–August. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on August 11. An unknown hand initialed for Ridgway.

² See Documents 255, 256, 257, and 258.

³ Attached but not printed.

als, and at least some of them were disappointed that the delegations (both) turned out as they did, since the final composition made frank exchanges less likely than they had hoped.⁴ The work program format calls for two meetings on each topic, and the idea of choosing a smaller group for the second NST session is in the air. We should keep it in mind as we consider the delegation's report.

On *nuclear testing*, the Soviets have held off ending their unilateral moratorium as we discuss another session. I believe the makings of a feasible and useful deal are there to be had for the Summit, and will discuss it in the next section on promising topics. But the Soviets have made clear that they want the delegates to have a negotiating mandate, and there is fierce resistance to the idea here. Our man may be able to get through the next session with his current mandate for technical exchanges, but by September he will need authorization to "negotiate."

Turning to the *three multilateral negotiations* (CDE, MBFR and CW), contacts between negotiators have already begun.

In Moscow the Soviets made clear to Blackwill they want to end MBFR with a "graceful gesture," before folding it into a CDE II. They proposed token U.S.-Soviet withdrawals of 6,500 and 11,500 respectively, with a no-increase pledge but no verification beyond the reductions phase. Conceivably, Soviet interest in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals concept could give us new leverage in MBFR, just as it has in CDE, but at this point they seem to be going the other way, to escape from the negotiation entirely.

In *CDE* itself, the Soviets are on the move, Bob Barry managed to leave town without being saddled with instructions and will be seeing Grinevskiy in Stockholm this week. We will probably get a modest but significant agreement by the time CDE ends September 19, the day Shevardnadze starts in Washington.

On *CW*, Lowitz is in touch with his counterpart, and we will just have to see whether Bessmertnykh's hints of interest in working concretely on some of our suggestions are borne out in the actual exchange.

On the specific topic of *CW non-proliferation*, we have a second bilateral session scheduled for September 4–5.

On *risk reduction centers*, we are awaiting the Soviet reply to our proposal for a second round between Perle and Linhart on our side and Obukhov on theirs in Geneva August 25.

⁴ See Document 263.

2. *Regional Issues*

It is still unclear what the Soviets have in mind for Mike Armacost's "super-regional" talks. We suspect they would like to use these talks to inch back toward agreement on some "principles of conduct." We have no interest in that, and will be looking for things that tend to fit into the matrix of ideas which the President put forward last October 24. This may well be one set of talks that turns up nothing promising for you and Shevardnadze to review.

On *Afghanistan*, however, the Soviets may have moved in the latest Cordovez round, offering a three-year timetable for withdrawal with half their troops out in the first year, and agreeing in principle to a UN monitoring role. This followed directly on Gorbachev's Vladivostok offer, which was generally not considered worth much, to pull out 6–8,000 troops in units unilaterally.

There may be less to this than meets the eye. The Cordovez round is adjourned with all the right noises about the inadequacy of Soviet offers being made. We are getting together with the Pakistanis to make sure we know what the factual situation is, and over the next days will be engaged in a very serious review of the bidding. At the very least these moves are timed to make it harder to get another good Afghanistan resolution in the UNGA. At worst they could lead to splits among us, the Pakistanis and the resistance which leave the Soviets in the driver's seat on Afghanistan. At best they could mean genuine Soviet willingness to risk substantial troop withdrawals in Afghanistan on terms our side finds acceptable, which would be a major victory for U.S. policy.

One of the issues that needs rethinking is the neutrality proposal. Prior to these Soviet moves we thought of it as a way of keeping talks going if this Cordovez round stalemated; now it may be a vehicle for controlling the pace and—since it involves non-reintroduction of troops—content of forward movement.

Meanwhile, the Soviets have confirmed acceptance of Afghanistan talks with us in Moscow September 3–4, but we have held off announcing it while we sort out where we stand.

On Iran-Iraq, our analysts are somewhat less pessimistic about Iraqi conduct of the war than they were some weeks ago, so we are letting our proposal for a U.S.-Soviet joint statement percolate in the Soviet bureaucracy, without special reminders. One spinoff of Murphy's talks, exchanges on terrorism, is discussed below under the bilateral rubric.

3. *Human Rights*

We have continued to press home privately that poor Soviet performance, especially on Jewish issues, casts a cloud over the Summit

and puts our policy of quiet diplomacy under strain. Recent events show the same picture, mixed but basically lamentable: Shcharanskiy's family finally allowed out, but the lowest Jewish monthly total, 31 in July, since 1970.

The CSCE follow-up meeting, opening November 4 in Vienna, will provide a high-level, more public forum for addressing the Soviet human rights record. Warren Zimmermann is seeking to arrange consultations with his Soviet counterpart next month. Even earlier, the National Conference on Soviet Jewry wants to present us a paper by respected analyst Bill Korey, and it would be appropriate to respond to it, as a way of making our unhappiness public at a level below the President and you. In the meantime, we have been pressing the Soviets privately for a mechanism which would permit us to compare notes on representation lists and other cases. Tom Simons will be raising this again with Mikol'chak, and proposing to take SOV Bilateral chief Louis Sell with him to Moscow for just this purpose when he goes for the return round with Mikol'chak in early September. We have been giving the Soviets status reports on our handling of oil-and-gas license cases, and pushing the process along, but it is vastly premature to consider lifting foreign policy controls on the whole category.

4. Bilateral Issues

Tom and Mikol'chak will be conducting the review of this agenda area, and it is one where the prospects are relatively good. After initial hesitation, the Soviet inter-ministerial delegation which came here the week before last to discuss "private" exchanges with Rhinesmith ended up signing 13 agreements. Dubinin helped out on this. He is looking for a role in the bilateral area, and it was useful to have the "work program" context. In general, the Soviets appear to be ready to move on individual items, and there are fewer obstacles here, too.

To set the stage for Mikol'chak, Tom told Sokolov last week he saw genuine prospects for agreements before the end of the year on space cooperation, transportation, treatment of dual nationals, three kinds of coast guard cooperation and perhaps even the maritime boundary.⁵ I am somewhat skeptical on the maritime boundary, since it is very complicated and involves the highly politicized issue of Wrangel Island. But this week's incident of Soviets chasing American crabbers in the area of the disputed zone certainly points up the virtue of settling the boundary in the run-up to the Summit if we can, and I think it is worth a try.

⁵ Simons provided a read-out of his August 8 lunch meeting with Sokolov in a memorandum for the record. (Department of State, EUR Files, Records of Ambassador Thomas W. Simons, Jr. 1964–1995, Lot 03D256, Chron Files 1984–1987, August 1986)

On *terrorism*, the Soviets appear ready for informal private exchanges here between Sokolov and Oakley/Simons, and they also broached the idea of similar talks with the French and British. At Sokolov's request Tom gave Sokolov an NSC-cleared list of possible topics for discussion, and offered to begin next week. We have told them and our list makes clear that we are interested in practical cooperation. If anything emerges worthy of Summit attention, it will be icing.

Three Promising Topics

Among the issues which have a realistic chance of ripening to maturity at the Summit, there are three where we may need help from you in the coming weeks (aside from the larger topic of how to conduct NST exchanges).

To start with the easiest, it should be possible to negotiate a new *agreement on space cooperation*. All the evidence suggests that the Soviets have delinked the topic from SDI. Scientists on both sides have been discussing possible areas of cooperation, and are enthusiastic about the project. The President is on board and has told Gorbachev so. Tom Simons *should* be in a position to give Mikol'chak a cleared illustrative list of the kinds of cooperation which could be registered in an agreement, and to reiterate our proposal that a group of experts go to Moscow to pursue discussion in early September. If he is not, it will be because DoD continued its blocking stance on the topic in general, and that stance will have to be overcome. Once it is, and provided the Soviets are as willing as they look, the only remaining task will be to get Circular 175 authority and proceed to negotiate and conclude an agreement.

Nuclear testing is the next hardest. I think it is perfectly plausible to envisage language at the Summit which registers agreement on an improved verification regime and ratification of the two treaties, followed by the further discussions already provided for in the TTBT, in a context of reductions in offensive weapons. Although one more technical round may be feasible, we cannot even begin the process that will get us toward this Summit outcome without a mandate for our delegation leader, Dr. Barker of ACDA, to "negotiate" with Petrosyants thereafter. This is a formal Soviet requirement without much substantive content, since he will be "negotiating" our demand that they accept better verification in return for ratification, but this is likely to be fought hard by DoD and others. There seems to be no way around it, as the NSC isn't willing to make the leap from our public position that we seek an improved verification system to letting Barker get one. We will try to get such a mandate ourselves, but will probably need your support.

Finally, I think we should also shoot for a separate, *interim agreement on INF*. Both leaders have now agreed to the concept, but we have

barely begun to think through the complexities of actually negotiating and concluding such an agreement. Consultations with the European Allies and the key Asians will be an integral part of the process. So far the main sticking point for the Soviets appears to be proportional SS–20 reductions in Asia, but Gorbachev's new Asian activism may make that easier for them to swallow. I will work with Allen Holmes to develop an informal negotiating mandate for a timeframe that could get us from here to there before the end of the year.

263. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to NATO, the Embassy in Japan, and the Embassy in Australia¹

Washington, August 15, 1986, 0235Z

256573. Military Addressees Handle as Specat Exclusive. Subject: Moscow Arms Control Experts Meeting: Briefing the Allies.

1. Secret—Entire text (except paragraph 14 Unclassified)

2. Summary and Action Requested: Ambassador Abshire should inform PermReps at earliest opportunity of the results of the U.S.-Soviet arms control experts meeting held in Moscow August 11–12, drawing on the points contained in paras 3–13, and stressing the confidentiality of the information.² For Tokyo and Canberra: Ambassador should do the same at appropriately high level in MFA. Action addressees should also pass on the USG public guidance provided in para 14. End summary.

3. U.S. and Soviet arms control experts met for eight hours on August 11 and four hours on August 12.

4. U.S. participants were Ambassadors Nitze, Rowny, Kampelman, Glitman, and Lehman, ASD Perle, and Special Assistant to the President Col. Robert Linhard. Karpov, Obukhov, Chervov, Detinov, and Tara-

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to SecDef, Moscow, all NATO capitals, Seoul, and Beijing. Drafted by Tulenko and Burton; cleared by Thomas, Nosenzo, Nitze, Hawes, Rowny, Deming, Kampelman, Smith, Lehman, Wheeler (JCS), Glitman, Michael (OSD/IS), Pascoe, Timbie, Linhard, and Pearson; approved by Ridgway.

² Memoranda of conversation of the August 11–12 NST meetings in Moscow are in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, Documents 143 and 144.

senko (Special Assistant to Shevardnadze) participated both days on the Soviet side.³

5. The meetings were serious, substantive, and businesslike. Each side was able to hear the other out in detail, and to express its own views. The sides explored ideas and had a good exchange.

6. Karpov opened the first day's session by stating that the purpose of the talks was to work out substantive solutions which could facilitate a productive Foreign Ministers' meeting. He added that this was a free exchange, with discussions on an ad ref basis. Nitze answered that there were two purposes: to prepare for the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting and to support the NST negotiations.

7. During the first day the Soviets did not follow through on Bessmertnykh's call for fresh thinking, but instead reiterated past positions without offering any new ideas. They showed little interest in engaging in discussion of the offense-defense relationship.

8. The Soviets raised some questions on U.S. position regarding defense and space arms—in particular continued observance of ABM Treaty—but did not pursue those questions. They offered nothing new on START and resisted the notion of differentiation between types of strategic systems.

9. They did express some interest in a separate INF interim agreement involving retention by both sides of some LRINF missiles in Europe, but were not forthcoming on Asia or SRINF and persisted in raising the issue of non-transfer to third parties.

10. The second day was more productive. Substantive discussion began with the U.S. posing questions intended to frame central issues in each of the three NST areas. The subsequent exchanges were, with one exception, non-polemical and constructive. Karpov said he would

³ In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "Paul Nitze headed a team of experts that went to Moscow in mid-August and returned to say that the atmosphere was good. There were seven on the U.S. team: Paul Nitze, Ed Rowley, Max Kampelman, Mike Glitman, Ron Lehman, Bob Linhard, and Richard Perle. Ken Adelman asked to be included, and I agreed. Adelman said that I regarded him as 'the eighth dwarf.' 'Do I look like Snow White?' I asked. 'I felt the Soviets were instructed to be serious about narrowing differences,' Paul said, 'but the people they selected for their team find it hard to deal with such instructions.' The Soviet delegation was composed of the same people who had been negative all through the negotiations in Geneva. Bessmertnykh had remarked privately about his own delegation, saying, 'We perhaps made a mistake in the composition.' The Soviets were fascinated by SDI but showed no signs of interest in our July 25 approach. The least progress of all was on START. With INF, Nitze felt we were getting somewhere. He asked me a crucial question, 'Do we put the brakes on an emerging INF agreement until we see Soviet movement toward radical reductions in strategic arms?' 'No,' I said without a moment's hesitation. 'Wherever we see the possibility of progress, we should be ready to go forward.'" (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 726–727)

take U.S. side's questions as "homework" in preparation for next round of talks in Washington.

11. The exception involved Chervov. After U.S. review of our approach on the ABM Treaty and possible deployment of advanced strategic defense outlined in the President's July 25 letter,⁴ Chervov launched into a lengthy, intense attack on SDI and U.S. motivations.

12. The Soviets asked about our post-May 27 ideas on mutual restraint. Linhard explained that U.S. would not exceed Soviet levels of ballistic missile warheads or strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. U.S. was ready to discuss other elements of mutual restraint, but sides must focus on need for negotiated reductions. The Soviets mentioned a nuclear test moratorium as a possible element of a mutual restraint regime. Nitze made clear that our position on a test moratorium had not changed.

13. We have invited the Soviets to come to Washington in early September and will be working through diplomatic channels on exact dates.

14. Following is text of USG press guidance on Moscow arms control experts meeting:

Q. What comments can you make on the just-completed meeting in Moscow of U.S. and Soviet arms experts? Did they make any substantive progress?

—The two days of meetings were serious, substantive and business-like. Each side was able to hear the other out in detail, and to express its own views. We explored ideas and had a good exchange.

—As we said earlier, this dialogue is intended to support the Geneva NST negotiations and the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting set for September. It is also part of the overall U.S.-Soviet diplomatic process in arms control and the other key areas of the U.S.-Soviet agenda, including human rights, regional issues, and bilateral matters.

—The dialogue on NST issues will be continued. We anticipate that these experts will meet again in the near future, with a date to be set in diplomatic channels.

Shultz

⁴ See Document 254.

264. National Security Decision Directive 232¹

Washington, August 16, 1986

PREPARATIONS FOR THE NEXT NST NEGOTIATING ROUND (S)

The next round of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) are scheduled to begin on September 18, 1986, in Geneva. This National Security Decision Directive provides guidance to assist in completing preparations for this upcoming negotiating session. (U)

START

In the area of strategic offensive nuclear forces, I remain firmly committed to seek the immediate implementation of the principle of a fifty percent reduction, on an equitable and verifiable basis, of existing strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union. The central provision should be reduction of strategic ballistic missile warheads. However, if necessary, I am prepared to consider initial reductions of a less sweeping nature as an interim measure. (S)

In this context, along with specific limits on ballistic missile warheads, we should be prepared to limit long-range air-launched cruise missiles to below our current plan, and to limit the total number of ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers to a level in the range suggested by the Soviet side in June 1986. Such reductions should take into account differences among systems in a manner which enhances stability. These reductions should begin as soon as possible and be completed within an agreed period of time. (S)

INF

We should seek to deal with the question of intermediate-range nuclear missiles by agreeing on the goal of eliminating this entire class of land-based, LRINF missiles world-wide and by agreeing on immediate actions that would lead toward this goal in either one step, or, if the Soviets prefer, in a series of steps. Soviet reactions regarding intermediate range nuclear missile systems suggest to me that General Secretary Gorbachev and I were heading in the right direction last November when we endorsed the idea of an interim INF agreement. While an immediate agreement leading to the elimination of long range INF missile systems throughout the world would be the best outcome, an interim approach, on a global basis, may prove the most promising way to achieve early reductions. (S)

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 232 [Preparations for the Next NST Negotiating Round]. Secret.

Both sides have now put forward proposals whose ultimate result would be equality at zero for our two countries in long range INF missile warheads. If we can also reach agreement that such equality is possible at a level above zero, we would take a major step towards the achievement of an INF agreement. We should seek such an interim agreement without delay. It is important that reductions begin immediately and that significant progress be achieved within an agreed period of time. (S)

DEFENSE AND SPACE

The United States has no interest in seeking unilateral advantage from its program of research into the feasibility of advanced strategic defenses. To ensure that neither the United States or the Soviet Union is in a position to do so, I would like to be prepared to conclude an agreement incorporating the following limits:

(a) While it may take longer to complete such research, both sides would confine themselves, through 1991, to a program of research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, to determine whether, in principle, advanced reliable systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Such research and development could include testing necessary to establish feasibility. In the event either side wishes to conduct such testing, the other side shall have the right to observe the tests, in accord with mutually agreed procedures. (S)

(b) Following this period, or at some later future time, either the United States or the Soviet Union may determine that advanced systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Either party may then desire to proceed beyond research, development, and testing to deployment of an advanced strategic defense system. In anticipation that this may occur, we would be prepared to sign a treaty now which would require the party that decides to proceed to deploy an advanced strategic defense system to share the benefits of such a system with the other providing there is mutual agreement to eliminate the offensive ballistic missiles of *both* sides. Once a plan is offered to this end, the details of the sharing arrangement and the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles would be the subject of negotiations for a period of no more than two years. (S)

(c) If, following the initial period and subsequent to two years after either side has offered a plan for such sharing and the associated mutual elimination of ballistic missiles, the United States and Soviet Union have not agreed on such a plan, either side will be free to deploy unilaterally after six months notice of such intention is given to the other side. (S)

The Soviets continue to express concern that research on advanced defensive systems could lead to the deployment of spaceborne systems

designed to inflict mass destruction on earth. This is not our intention, nor is such an outcome a necessary result of such research. Although both nations are already party to agreements in force that address this subject, to further allay Soviet concerns I wish to be prepared, in the context of the approach outlined above, to have our representatives discuss additional assurances that would further ban deployment in space of advanced weapons capable of inflicting mass destruction on the surface of the earth. (S)

Significant commitments of this type with respect to strategic defenses make sense only in conjunction with the implementation of immediate actions on both sides to begin moving toward our common goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The process must begin with radical and stabilizing reductions in the offensive nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union. (S)

ACTION

Instructions for the next round of NST negotiations shall be prepared based on the foregoing guidance. In addition, it is important that we ensure our progress in related areas is consistent. The following additional guidance is therefore provided: (C)

Nuclear Testing

In the area of nuclear testing, it is the long-standing U.S. position that a safe, reliable and effective nuclear deterrent requires testing. Thus, while a ban on such testing remains a long-term U.S. objective, I cannot see how we could move to a complete ban under present circumstances. Our immediate objective remains prompt agreement on verification procedures to permit moving forward on ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. I believe, however, that following ratification of these treaties, we should be prepared to consider further limitations on nuclear testing in parallel with actual reductions in strategic nuclear arms. (S)

In order to be prepared for such consideration, I request the Department of Energy, assisted by the Department of Defense and other agencies as appropriate, to conduct a technical review, based on the work recently completed by the Arms Control Support Group (ACSG), of how a scheme involving a decreasing numerical quota of nuclear tests could be structured to preserve flexibility to conduct essential U.S. testing and provide for an acceptable level of verification. At the same time, I request the Department of Defense, assisted by the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, to resolve the policy issues associated with this scheme, as identified in the ACSG work, and to assess its potential impact upon the ability of the United States to meet its national security requirements. Both studies should be conducted on a close-hold basis

and completed by September 8, 1986. Guidance on this point supercedes the suspense directed for such studies in NSDD 233 (distributed on a limited basis only). (S)

SALT II Numerical Limits

I remain fully committed to my May 27 decision that, in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure which has been undermined by Soviet noncompliance.² SALT II was a flawed agreement which was never ratified, which would have expired if it had been ratified, and which continues to be seriously violated by the Soviet Union. The SALT I interim offensive agreement was unequal, has expired and is also being violated by the Soviet Union. (U)

I indicated on May 27 that I intended to continue deployment of U.S. heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft as an appropriate response, without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Treaty. Since the United States is retiring two Poseidon submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty until that event near the end of this year. (U)

The Secretary of Defense is requested to inform me in advance of the exact timing of any action which would result in exceeding SALT II limits. (S)

SCHEDULE

In order to permit time for review and allied consultation as appropriate, specific proposals for instructions to the NST delegation, based on the foregoing guidance, should be submitted for my approval not later than September 9, 1986. (C)

Ronald Reagan

² See footnote 2, Document 236.

265. Note From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, August 18, 1986

SUBJECT

Gorbachev Speech

The Gorbachev speech is an attempt to bring increased pressure on us in the nuclear testing area by tying the moratorium extension to a claimed policy of turning the world toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.² It is probably based on an assessment that the Soviet moratorium is beginning to bring some dividends in Congress and with the Allies, and therefore should continue as a centerpiece of the Soviet propaganda offensive.

He has worked this in to the relatively new Soviet “principle” of interdependence—which for many in the world, places Soviet rhetoric on the side of the angels.

The fact that Gorbachev made an agreement on a testing moratorium an explicit goal for the Washington Summit is clever, but may be too clever by half. If it is clear that he cannot achieve it, it makes it more difficult for him to come. However, it also means that if there is any progress on the testing issues, he can claim that this was only because of Soviet pressure on the U.S.

His comments toward the end that agreement on a moratorium “would be a kind of prologue to further progress on nuclear arms” tends to imply that a moratorium is a prerequisite to arms reduction, but does not actually say so.

Most other issues are mentioned almost in passing, but all in the context of the claim that the Soviets have put forward a comprehensive program to ensure peace and move toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It is striking to me that he had so little to say about SDI (his comments are nothing new, and seem to be largely a reassurance to the Soviet public that he will protect Soviet interests). This suggests that the speech may herald a lessening of emphasis on SDI as a stumbling block, along with increased emphasis on the testing issue. In

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron August 1986. No classification marking.

² In telegram 14311 from Moscow, August 20, the Embassy reported on Gorbachev’s speech on Soviet television the evening of August 18, which “announced Soviet decision to extend unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing until January 1, 1987.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860637–0492) For the full text of the speech, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1986, pp. 494–500.

propaganda terms, this has some advantages for the Soviets, since they cannot deny that they have an SDI program of their own, but can point to their self-imposed moratorium as evidence of Soviet restraint and good faith.

There is nothing new on verification: the same general statements made before, along with the reference to the instrumentation installed by the private group. In sum, I believe we face an increased push from the Soviets on the testing issue. It could conceivably be designed to provide a pretext to delay the summit if our position does not change, but I doubt that this is the main motivation. What is most likely, in my view, is that Gorbachev went out on the limb a bit when he proposed it in the first place, and seeing that it is making inroads in world opinion, has decided to step up the pressure on us rather than climbing back off the limb at this time.

At this time, I believe our comments should be relatively brief and should concentrate on the following elements:³

1. The best way to move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons is to start reducing them. It is unfortunate that G did not have more to say about how we can do this.

2. If he means what he says about verification, then the way to show it is by accepting U.S. proposals to improve verification, ratify the TTBT and PNET, and negotiate further limits on testing on this basis.

3. Soviet claims to support movement to a more peaceful world ring hollow so long as they continue to pursue a brutal, unjust war of conquest in Afghanistan.

4. In sum, if the USSR is genuinely interested in peace, it will stop waging war; if it is interested in eliminating nuclear weapons, it will start reducing them, and if it is interested in ending nuclear testing, it will work with us to improve verification procedures.⁴

³ Poindexter initialed above this sentence.

⁴ Poindexter handwrote an additional point: "5. Moratorium on unrealistic proposals."

266. Memorandum From the Chief of the Arms Control Intelligence Staff, Central Intelligence Agency (George) to Director of Central Intelligence Casey¹

Washington, August 19, 1986

SUBJECT

Background Information (U)

1. This “fast-track” memorandum is for your information and such subsequent action at the Cabinet level as you see fit. (U)

2. Attached is a set of the draft Memoranda of Conversation resulting from the meeting of US and Soviet NST experts in Moscow on 11/12 August.² *These papers show that the NODIS messages from Moscow were incomplete.* I know NIO/USSR wrote to you on this general subject already. I think he and I agree that the US did not do a very good job in Moscow. [*portion marking not declassified*]

3. [1 paragraph (2½ lines) not declassified]

4. I read this material Saturday and gave up in disgust. I know the Administration did not want to be in the position of working any text in Moscow (for security reasons), but I think it is clear that the US Delegation:

—Did not use the correct (and may have used the “wrong”) terminology to describe the US position about SDI and the ABM Treaty (e.g., as cited in the President’s letter).

—Had essentially nothing to say of substantive content, in response to Soviet questions (e.g., when Karpov asked what the US had in mind, beyond ballistic missile warheads, in a regime of mutual restraint).

I think it is obvious that the US Delegation, in effect:

—Gave minimal, if any, thought to what it wanted to do in Moscow.

—Did minimal, if any, preparatory work for responding to the obvious, upcoming Soviet questions. [*portion marking not declassified*]

5. I think the root causes of this situation are: insufficient policy direction, little policy discipline, and personality conflicts. Colonel Linhard of the NSC Staff cannot enforce these points; he is outstanding in substance and procedure, but he does not have the necessary political muscle. [*portion marking not declassified*]

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Arms Control Intelligence Staff (DCI/ACIS), Job 91B00805R, Policy Files (1972–1986), Box 2, Folder 15: Douglas George: NSC/START Policies. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. [*text not declassified*].

² Not found attached. For information concerning the talks, see Document 263.

6. Of relatively greatest annoyance to me is that US intelligence went far out of its way to ensure the delegation had our papers on the Air Force plane from London to Moscow about what to expect from the Soviets.³ Both Ambassadors Kampelman and Rowny told me privately upon their return that they thought our background papers had been extremely helpful. Clearly, good intelligence is not a substitute for preparations or policy. [*portion marking not declassified*]

7. Whatever one may think about the wisdom or value in the Administration's arms control positions, it is sad to see a senior US delegation "fumble the ball" as was done in Moscow. In my view, certain arms control experts in Washington—upon hearing about the substance of what happened in Moscow—would be seeking to remove delegation members from office; Richard Perle's treatment of SDI and the ABM Treaty is a prime example. [*portion marking not declassified*]

8. It may be that the Administration wanted to appear confused and shallow to the Soviets, but I suspect not. The Soviets no doubt noticed the US performance. One of the "secrets" of Gorbachev's arms control effort is that he knows US positions are relatively shallow and their presentation relatively weak. Generally (and Ambassador Nitze usually is a key exception), once US personnel exhaust their inventory of policy statements and questions, there is essentially nothing left and little capacity to invent anything else. One reason is that almost every issue has to go to the NSC Staff; generally this is on purpose, because one or more "players" thinks the President will agree with him—if only he knew the true story. In my view, the President ought to be "mad as hops" about the chaos in and around the Moscow meeting. This nation's arms control policies are hard enough to implement, and to explain, without such mindless foolishness. I think the US is losing the battle on arms control and the summit. [*portion marking not declassified*]

9. If I were king, I would do my best to get Secretary Shultz's attention (as well as that of Admiral Poindexter) to ensure that when these NST experts get together again in early-September in Washington, the US is prepared (especially on substance), and the senior White

³ Under an August 6 memorandum to Linhard and Kampelman, DCI Representative to the Arms Control Support Group [*name not declassified*] forwarded a paper "intended to complement the memorandum being prepared by CIA in support of your trip to Moscow, which focuses on the substantive issues involved. My paper presents some personal views on possible Soviet objectives and expectations that might help you in preparing for certain contingencies." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Ambassadors Henry F. Cooper and Max Kampelman, Program Files for the Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms (S/DEL), Lot 93D592, Experts Group)

House Staff know we are—from its own reviews with the key people.
[portion marking not declassified]

10. If ACIS may do more to assist you here, please call. (U)

Douglas George⁴

⁴ George signed “Doug” above his typed signature.

August 1986–October 1986

“The Iceland Cometh”: The Arrest of Daniloff; SDI and the Reykjavik Summit

267. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, August 30, 1986, 1719Z

15038. Subject: Detention of U.S. Correspondent Nicholas Daniloff. Ref: Combs-Parris Telecon of August 30, 1986.²

1. Summary. Confirming referenced telecon, *U.S. News and World Report* Bureau Chief Nick Daniloff was detained by Soviet authorities midday August 30 in Moscow, ostensibly for possessing classified Soviet documents. Daniloff’s detention clearly was a KGB set-up. Embassy has registered a stiff oral protest with the Foreign Ministry and is pressing for immediate consular access. End summary.

2. Daniloff telephoned his successor, Jeff Trimble, around 5:30 pm August 30 at the *U.S. News and World Report* Bureau in Moscow to report the following:

—Morning of August 30 Daniloff met a long-time Soviet contact, “Misha,” in Moscow to say goodbye (Daniloff is scheduled to depart the USSR in October). Daniloff had met Misha in Frunze several years ago.

—Daniloff gave Misha two Steven King novels as a goodbye gift. Misha gave Daniloff a package, which Daniloff did not open. Misha said it contained clippings from Frunze newspapers.

—Shortly after leaving Misha, Daniloff was apprehended by some eight plainclothesmen, who seized and opened the package. It contained two Soviet maps marked “Secret.”

—Daniloff was then taken to an office at Ulitsa Energeticheskaya 3A. After being questioned, and denying all allegations, Daniloff was allowed to call his Moscow office.

—Daniloff told Trimble Daniloff had been treated correctly.

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860663–0226. Limited Official Use; Niact Immediate.

² Not found.

—Daniloff also told Trimble Daniloff felt his apprehension was in retaliation for the Zakharov arrest in New York.³

—Daniloff said that as of the time of his call no formal charges had been brought against him.

3. Embassy registered stiff oral protest of the incident with MFA duty officer at about 6:30 pm August 30, terming Daniloff's detention a crude provocation, and requesting immediate consular access (noting, in this regard, prompt access granted Soviet Embassy in Zakharov case).

4. Embassy dispatched consular officer to the address given by Daniloff. Consular officer was denied access to the building and told to deal directly with KGB headquarters.

5. In addition, we have informed MFA duty officer that Chargé wishes to speak urgently with Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh. As of 8:00 pm, we have been unable to contact anyone at Foreign Ministry other than the duty officer.

6. That Daniloff's detention was a KGB set-up was corroborated by tip-off given to *New York Times* bureau mid-afternoon August 30. A non-Soviet contact called NYT bureau to say he had heard from a Soviet source connected to TASS that an American had been arrested, would be charged with espionage, and a TASS announcement to that effect would be released later August 30.

Combs

³ In his book, Matlock recounted the reasons for the arrest of Gennady Zakharov in great detail, explaining that he was a Soviet official with the UN Secretariat, and therefore did not have diplomatic immunity. Zakharov recruited a defense contractor, who was actually working for the FBI, to pass information to him. Matlock wrote: "On August 23 the FBI arrested Gennady Zakharov as he paid the FBI's double agent a substantial sum of money for a package of classified material. Zakharov was arraigned in the Federal District Court of Brooklyn and held without bail for subsequent indictment and trial." Matlock noted that the Department of State and CIA had approved the FBI plan to arrest Zakharov, and when it reached the NSC for approval, Matlock "commented to John Poindexter that I thought he should not oppose the arrest since no agency objected, but we could expect the KGB to arrest an American without diplomatic immunity in the hope of forcing a trade." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, pp. 197–199)

268. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, August 31, 1986, 0112Z

Tosec 170237/274937. Subject: Information Memo: Soviets Arrest U.S. News Reporter (S/S 8626863).²

To: The Secretary

From: EUR—Charles H. Thomas, Acting

1. (Secret—Entire text).

2. The Soviets detained U.S. news reporter Nick Daniloff today in Moscow on clearly trumped-up charges of espionage. Soviet contact of Daniloff's handed him a packet of materials which turned out to be maps stamped Secret. Agents jumped Daniloff before he could determine what he was carrying.³ He remains in KGB custody, and the Embassy is trying to make contact with him.

3. Mike Armacost delivered a strong protest to Soviet Minister-Counselor Sokolov early this afternoon, demanding that the Soviets release Daniloff immediately.⁴ The Soviets clearly have nabbed Daniloff in response to our arrest last week in New York of a Soviet agent, Gennadiy Zakharov, who was caught in the possession of classified documents. Zakharov, a UN Secretariat employee with only limited immunity, is under detention and subject to prosecution.

4. The last time we arrested Soviet agents without diplomatic immunity was in 1978. Just as they have done now, the Soviets then arrested an American in Moscow without immunity. Ambassador Dobrynin formally requested the release into his custody of the Soviet defendants, and guaranteed they would obey all orders of the court while in his hands. Once we agreed to this arrangement, the Soviets released the American into Ambassador Toon's custody. Dobrynin

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860663–0267. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Purnell; cleared by Parris, by telephone by A. Surena (L), Coffey, Pascoe, and Smith; approved by Simons.

² The information memorandum was drafted by Purnell and cleared by Parris and Coffey.

³ See Document 267. In telegram 15039 from Moscow, August 31, the Embassy reported that Mikol'chak met that day with the Political Counselor and delivered a formal oral protest against Daniloff. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860663–0351)

⁴ In telegram 274953 to Moscow, August 31 1515Z, the Department provided a copy of Armacost's talking points for the Chargé's use in a possible meeting with Bessmertnykh. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860663–0411)

kept his word and the Soviets were tried and convicted. They were ultimately exchanged for a group of dissidents.

5. Prior to the Daniloﬀ arrest, Zakharov’s defense attorney had submitted to the magistrate handling the case a letter from Dubinin seeking Zakharov’s release in lieu of bail into Dubinin’s custody, as in the 1978 case. The U.S. attorney handling the case—apparently without consulting main Justice—opposed the Soviet gambit, which was rejected by the magistrate. Dubinin then raised the case with Mike Armacost on the margins of this week’s regional talks. Mike promised to look into the matter, but had not had an opportunity to respond by the time of Daniloﬀ’s arrest.

6. After consulting with Abe Sofaer, Mike has since asked Justice to look into the advisability of requesting the U.S. Attorney to endorse the Soviet proposal that Zakharov be released into Dubinin’s custody. We do not yet have a response from Justice. If there is resistance there—and the Soviet move against Daniloﬀ makes this more likely—the most probable outcome will be a stalemate with Daniloﬀ and Zakharov both facing indefinite incarceration. In such an environment, pressure to take further steps against Soviets in this country will grow both inside and outside the administration—raising the possibility of an escalatory cycle which would have a profound negative impact on other elements of our relationship.

7. The next step is to await Justice’s response to Mike Armacost’s call. Even in the event the Executive Branch endorses efforts to release Zakharov into Dubinin’s custody—and this it is far from certain Justice will go along willingly—the final decision rests with the magistrate.

8. In short, unless carefully handled, the Zakharov/Daniloﬀ case has serious potential for upsetting our plans for this fall. We will keep you informed as we work with Justice and the Soviets.

Whitehead

269. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, August 31, 1986

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Policy Files (1980–1986), Box 20, DCI Memo Chron (1–30 Sept '86). Secret. 2 pages not declassified.]

270. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, September 3, 1986, 0232Z

Tosec 170274/275834. Subject: Information Memorandum (S/S 8626930) Update on Daniloff Case.²

1. (C Entire text)

2. Information Memorandum

To: The Secretary

Through: P—Michael H. Armacost

From: EUR: Rozanne L. Ridgway

SUBJECT: Update on Daniloff Case

We have reached interagency agreement on a game plan for handling the Daniloff case over the next few days. At a Tuesday morning meeting chaired by Peter Rodman and attended by Mike Armacost,³ State was given authority to approach the Soviets in an attempt to work out an agreement on the following basis:

—that we continue to reject any overt linkage between the cases of Daniloff and Soviet U.N. Secretariat staffer Zakharov;

¹ Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no film number]. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to Moscow. Drafted by Parris; cleared by Thomas, Sofaer, S. Coffey, Pascoe, and Boucher; approved by Armacost. Reagan wrote in his September 3 diary entry: "The Soviets are holding American journalist (U.S. News & World Report) charging him with being a spy. It is of course a frame up & the 4th time they've done it. Each time we have arrested one of their K.G.B. agents they have done this. The last time before was in '78. Each time before they grabbed an American businessman. Then they try to arrange a prisoner exchange." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 634)

² The information memorandum was drafted by Parris and cleared by Sofaer and Coffey.

³ September 2. No record of this meeting has been found.

—that we nonetheless have no objection in principle to considering the Soviet Embassy's petition that Zakharov be released into Ambassador Dubinin's custody, pending his trial for espionage;

—that, ultimately, the determination of such a matter is in the hands of a judge, but the arrangement is consistent with practice in the U.S. system of justice.

—that, however, we will not consider or endorse the Soviet petition unless the Soviets drop their investigation of Daniloff and allow him to leave the country.

We conveyed this message Tuesday afternoon to a Soviet Embassy official, who listened carefully and was non-committal, but undertook to report our position to Moscow.⁴ While by no means certain, we think there is a chance the Soviets will accept our package. They are taking a beating in the press for framing Daniloff at a time when they had hoped to have the propaganda high ground in the run-up to your meeting. They have not as yet formally pressed charges against Daniloff, and have said they do not intend to do so until mid next week. This suggests they are leaving themselves an exit if they can secure Zakharov's release from jail. While their long-term objective may be to secure Zakharov's return to the U.S.S.R., thus far all they have asked for is that he be released pending trial.

As we expected, there was strong sentiment at the meeting for taking punitive steps to show our displeasure with the Soviet's seizure of an innocent American to gain leverage on the Zakharov case. We were able to convince other agencies that front-loading our approach with overt countermeasures would kill chances for Daniloff's quick release. There is still strong interest in striking back at the Soviets in some way even if we can get Daniloff out, however, and State has been tasked with producing a list of options. All carry serious risk either of precipitating a PNG war or otherwise destroying the atmosphere for constructive discussions this fall. We will insist that no decision be made to act without full vetting at the highest levels.

The most serious problem we are facing in interagency consultations is a perception that agreeing to consider the Soviet petition that Zakharov be remanded to Dubinin's custody is a concession wrung from us by their seizure of Daniloff. We have made clear that we would have considered and perhaps supported the Soviet proposal on its merits had we known about it in advance of the initial magistrate's decision against. We are insisting that our primary objective be to get

⁴ In telegram 276791 to Moscow, September 3, the Department reported that Parris met with Kuznetsov on the afternoon of September 2 and provided the text of Parris' talking points on Daniloff. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860008-0471)

Daniloff out of the Soviet Union, and that if we can do so without calling into question the necessity of Zakharov's standing trial we will have achieved our objective. If the Soviets prove unwilling to take up our suggestions for a way out, however, we will have to consider more dramatic steps, recognizing that ultimately some sort of deal may be necessary to spring Daniloff once the Soviets have made a decision to tough it out.

Whitehead

271. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev¹

Washington, September 4, 1986

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I am sure that you have been monitoring, as I have, developments relating to the detention by Soviet authorities of the *U.S. News and World Report* Moscow correspondent, Nicholas Daniloff. I would like you to have in mind two points as you consider how to handle this case.

First, I can give you my personal assurance that Mr. Daniloff has no connection whatever with the U.S. Government. If you have been informed otherwise, you have been misinformed.

Second, there are no grounds for Mr. Daniloff's detention, nor for any attempt to link him to any other case. If he is not freed promptly, it can only have the most serious and far-reaching consequences for the relationship between our two countries. That would be an extremely

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State Files, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8690616, 8690659). No classification marking. A typed notation in the bottom margin of the letter reads: "Memo for the Record: no original letter sent." A handwritten note on a September 4 covering memorandum from Matlock to Poindexter, forwarding the letter for Reagan's signature, reads: "dacom to mil aide to the President at the ranch, to be delivered immediately to the President for signature. Mil Aide should notify us upon signature. Copy to Rod McDaniel." A handwritten note on a routing slip stated: "Dx'ed to the President last night. He signed copy & sent to State for transmission to Emb. Moscow." Reagan was at his ranch in California August 29–September 8. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) On September 4, Reagan wrote in his diary: "Had our ride, but 1st I called Geo. S. re our man Daniloff in the Soviet U. I asked his opinion of my thought that perhaps I should communicate directly with Gorbachev & tell him Daniloff was not working for our gov't. At about 5 P.M. I signed such a message." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 634)

unfortunate outcome, and I therefore thought it important to emphasize personally the gravity with which this situation is viewed by the United States.

Therefore, I hope sincerely you will take the necessary actions to allow us to put this matter behind us in the nearest future.²

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

² In telegram 15355 from Moscow, September 5, 1212Z, the Embassy reported that the "Chargé met again with Deputy Minister Bessmertnykh on September 5 to deliver Presidential letter to Gorbachev (Ref C). Bessmertnykh promised to pass the letter immediately to the General Secretary and said he was not in a position to offer any official comment. Unofficially and personally, however, he said the President's letter appeared to take into account only one side of the story and, by asserting Daniloff's innocence, to prejudge the Soviet legal process. Chargé responded that the USG was indeed convinced of Daniloff's innocence of the charge of espionage and believe on the basis of past patterns, that he had been framed by the KGB in retaliation for Zakharov's arrest." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N860009–0009)

272. Note From the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Pascoe) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost)¹

Washington, undated

An Alternative to the Huff-Puff Strategy on Daniloff

Mike:

I know you will be distracted today by the Pan Am hijacking today but wanted to give you alternative views on how to handle Daniloff to what you seemed to hear yesterday.²

¹ Source: Department of State Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Daniloff Detention in the USSR September 1986 (Yogurt). Secret; Sensitive. Although the note is undated, a handwritten notation under Pascoe's signature reads: "9/5/86 (0730)."

² In telegram 18820 from Islamabad, September 5, the Embassy reported: "Pan Am Boeing 747 Flight 73 (Bombay/Karachi/Frankfurt) was seized on ground at Karachi International Airport at 0610 local (2110 Sept 4 Washington time) on September 5, when four men fired weapons outside the aircraft and charged up boarding stairs to take over plane." The hijackers demanded to be taken to Cyprus. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860674–0421)

State's major accomplishment in the KAL shootdown aftermath was to ensure that the Soviets got the public pasting they deserved for that heinous action without destroying the basis for a productive US-Soviet relationship. People everywhere were crying "sanctions" but the Secretary and President held firm against them. (We avoided major economic sanctions by only a few votes in the Senate.) That was obviously a far more serious incident, with 269 innocent dead. The Daniloff case is basically an argument over who broke the arcane rules of spying. No one has been hurt or is likely to be if we are half smart.

The "huff and puff sanction" strategy Matlock apparently advocated yesterday is a bad approach. Jack is naturally confrontational with the Soviets (he spent his chargeship in 1981 debating Korniyenko, resulting in amusing cables and an NSC job but little else). Peter tried throughout his time in S/P to scuttle our approach toward the Soviets of working for a gradual improvement in ties. He would undoubtedly like to see the Afghanistan sanctions re-established that we worked patiently for four years to get out from under. Others tend to be CI purists or look for any handle to do in State's "soft" policy toward the Soviets.

Let me suggest as an alternative a "traditional, but front-loaded" approach.³ We should wait for the Soviets to respond to the President's letter. If they do not buy our "unbalanced" deal, we could then offer the next step that foreshadows Zakharov's eventual release. We would tell the Soviets that they must release Daniloff immediately and allow him to leave the USSR without a trial. We would then remand Zakharov to Dubinin's custody and promise a trial within three months. If Zakharov is found guilty, we would expel him to the Soviet Union as part of a traditional "spies for dissidents" trade. We would name our (reasonable) price up-front (probably Orlov and Begun, but SOV might have better ideas) as part of the deal.

This approach has the virtue of pointing to where we will probably end up anyway. It avoids a downward spiral that seems headed toward scuttling any hope of progress in the relationship and the high-level meetings. It gets Daniloff out immediately. We save face and the Soviets

³ In a September 5 memorandum to Poindexter, forwarding a "draft demarche to Soviet Embassy" and "Statement by the President," Platt outlined the Department's recommendations. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Daniloff Detention in the USSR September 1986 (Yogurt)) In an undated, unsigned memorandum to Reagan, likely prepared on September 6, Poindexter explained the fundamental difference in the Department and NSC proposals in dealing with Daniloff's arrest: the NSC option "would set in motion a series of automatic escalating pressures as long as Daniloff remains in jail or is prevented from leaving the Soviet Union;" the State proposal would "give the Soviets a few more days to respond to our demarches, including your message to Gorbachev, before even threatening specific steps." (Ibid.)

get their man back. We can still huff and puff a bit, but it will be in a controlled environment. Our overall policy would be spared and we would show once again that we know how to handle our peculiar relationship with the Soviet Union.

Lynn

273. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 6, 1986

SUBJECT

Soviet Response to President's Message on Daniloff

Ambassador Dubinin came by this evening to deliver Gorbachev's reply (enclosed) to your message on Daniloff.² The reply makes two main points, keyed to those in your own letter:

—That, although their investigation has not yet reached any conclusions, the Soviets have evidence that Daniloff has been engaged in activities which are against Soviet law;

—And that the case should not be allowed to damage our broader relationship.

Dubinin's only gloss was to point out the quick turn-around on your message as a sign of the seriousness with which it was read in Moscow.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State Files, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8690616, 8690659). Secret. A typewritten notation on another copy of the memorandum reads: "9/6 sent via special S/S-I courier to the WH at 9:00 PM. ABA." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Daniloff Detention in the USSR September 1986 (Yogurt))

² In a September 6 memorandum to Shultz, Parris informed him that Dubinin had requested an urgent meeting with Shultz to deliver a "response from Gorbachev to the President's letter of September 4 on the Daniloff matter." Parris continued: "Late yesterday our Charge in Moscow made the same points to Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh that Mike Armacost made Thursday [September 4] to Dubinin. In the course of the conversation, it became clear that Dubinin's reporting to Moscow on the matter has been incomplete or distorted. Bessmertnykh admitted that certain elements of Combs's presentation were new to him, for example, the fact that the Soviet Embassy had not alerted us to their letter to the court requesting custody of Zakharov." (Ibid.) For Reagan's September 5 letter, see Document 271.

I told Dubinin that we continued to believe Daniloff was being held without justification and that he should be immediately released. The circumstances in which he had been seized, I noted, made it clear he had been trapped. I acknowledged Gorbachev's expression of concern that the case not damage our relations, but made clear that the Soviets' continued detention of Daniloff would *inevitably* affect our relations. Dubinin's only response was to stress that Gorbachev's letter had been written with the "most constructive" of motives and was "objective" in its presentation of the Soviet viewpoint.

I think it is significant that Gorbachev's letter does not challenge your assertion that Daniloff has had no association with the U.S. government. It seems to suggest that the Soviets feel they have sufficient evidence of wrong-doing by Daniloff to try him without directly asserting he was spying for the U.S. government. While we don't know precisely what they may have on him, Daniloff's editors have confirmed to us that he sent them photos and other materials on the basis of which a Soviet court would have no difficulty convicting him.

I am also struck by the fact that your message seems to have put the shoe on the other foot with respect to which side seems most concerned about where the Daniloff case may lead. They are now the ones saying that the case shouldn't hurt our relations. We are the ones saying it is bound to if it isn't resolved. They may, in short, be beginning to realize how serious we are about this.

Finally, I think it is important to note Gorbachev's indication that they have yet to draw any conclusions in Daniloff's case. That suggests they may want, at least for the moment, to retain some room for maneuver, even though they have not yet shown their hand.³

Attachment

Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan⁴

Moscow, September 6, 1986

Dear Mr. President,

Your letter of September 5 prompted me to ask for information regarding the question you raised. As was reported to me by the

³ Shultz wrote in the margin below this paragraph: "I hope we can discuss next steps on this very sensitive matter as soon as you return to Washington."

⁴ No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy.

competent authorities, Daniloff, the Moscow correspondent of the U.S. News and World Report magazine had for a long time been engaged in impermissible activities damaging to the state interests of the USSR. Now an investigation is being conducted by the results of which we shall be able to make a conclusive judgement about this entire case.

I think that we both should not permit the use of questions of such kind to the detriment of the Soviet-American relations whose improvement and development are extremely important.⁵

Sincerely,

M. Gorbachev

⁵ On September 7, Reagan wrote in his diary: "Word came the Soviets were going to officially charge Daniloff with espionage. Gorbachev response to my letter was arrogant & rejected my statement that Daniloff was no spy. I'm mad as h—l. Had a conf. call with Geo. S., John P., Don Regan. Decision was to wait until Tues. [September 9] in Wash. where we could explore our course of action. This whole thing follows the pattern. We catch a spy as we have this time & the Soviets grab an American—any American & frame him so they can then demand a trade of prisoners." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 635)

274. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 8, 1986

SUBJECT

Daniloff Case

As you prepare for your meeting with George Shultz and me, a number of issues seem to me to be crucial.²

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Stephen Sestanovich Files, Daniloff: 1985–1986. Secret. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Regan.

² According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan returned to the White House from California on September 8. He met with Shultz, Meese, Regan, William Ball, and Poindexter on September 9 from 9:01 until 9:40 a.m. (Reagan Library) No formal record of the conversation has been found. On September 9, Reagan wrote in his personal diary: "A meeting—Geo. S. John P., Don R. & myself re the Daniloff case. We are going to try to get him released to our Ambas. pending trial. We'll offer the same here with their spy. If its possible we'll do something of an exchange but only if they'll release some dissidents like Sakharov etc. Once we have him back I propose we kick a half hundred of their U.N. KGB agents out of the country so there can't be a repeat of this hostage taking." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 635)

Daniloff's Conduct: George has wanted to collect all the facts with respect to Daniloff's own past activity so that we can gauge Soviet perceptions of his alleged links with the CIA.³ I agree it is important to understand how the Soviets may view the legalities of the case; but that should not affect our position, which is soundly based on the real facts of the case and on some basic issues of principle. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Daniloff's behavior was that of a scrupulously independent reporter. It's fruitless to speculate what the Soviets really believe; we can never know conclusively. But we *do* know that Daniloff is *not* a U.S. intelligence agent; we *do* know the Soviets framed him in this instance; and we also know that Soviet laws contain so many traps and such severe restrictions that they arrest people freely for what anywhere else would be permissible activity. *This cannot possibly be a mitigating factor excusing Soviet behavior.*

Previous "Hostage" Cases and Their Implications: Since 1960, we have arrested five Soviet officials who did not have diplomatic immunity (all worked at the UN Secretariat) in four different incidents. In three of the four incidents, Justice pressed espionage charges, and each time the Soviets responded by arresting an American (or Americans) in Moscow on trumped-up charges. This is the second time the Soviets have arrested a journalist. In 1978 they arrested and briefly detained a Baltimore Sun and a New York Times reporter, after they arrested businessman Crawford. (In response, we expelled two Soviet journalists; they then released our journalists.) The only time an American was *not* arrested was in 1970, when a KGB officer employed in the UN Secretariat was expelled, in lieu of being charged with espionage, at State's request.

Thus, Soviet behavior has been consistent over the years. Until this case, our reaction to their hostage-taking has been similarly consistent and predictable, and this pattern probably misled the Soviets into

³ In his memoir, Shultz went into great detail about trying to piece together this information on Daniloff. See Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 733–735. In a September 8 note to Shultz, presumably forwarding a memorandum by Sofaer on Daniloff, Armacost wrote: "Abe's memo to you indicates that there is more to the Daniloff-Agency issue than we had been led to believe. Mort has confirmed the essential facts directly with the Agency. It begins to look as if the Agency has done Daniloff a real disservice [*text not declassified*]." Sofaer's September 8 memorandum to Shultz, included in a packet of material prepared for Shultz's meeting with Reagan, explained: "Daniloff could credibly be convicted of espionage under Soviet law. Daniloff has admitted collecting information, some of which was classified Secret. Other evidence provides a reasonable basis for the Soviets to prove the remaining element—that Daniloff collected information for the U.S., and the CIA in particular. The conduct in which Daniloff engaged would also justify, at least theoretically, the prosecution under U.S. law of a Soviet journalist if he engaged in those activities here." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Daniloff Detention in the USSR September 1986 (Yogurt))

expecting a milder response than they received on this occasion. *This history underlines the importance of breaking the precedent now*, and making absolutely clear to the Soviets that in this *and future* cases we will not tolerate the seizure of innocent Americans as hostages to be traded for Soviets guilty of espionage against the United States.

Unfortunately, the relative mildness of our initial response to Daniloff's seizure may have reinforced Soviet expectations of a generally benign U.S. reaction. Your letters to Gorbachev have set the written record straight; but they must now be backed by specific actions to give them credibility and convince the Soviets that hostage-taking will not achieve their goals, and that it in fact works to their net detriment in this situation.

Asymmetries in U.S./Soviet Positions: There are wide disparities in the permanent U.S. and Soviet presences in each other's country. You know the figures: 200 U.S. personnel in Moscow and Leningrad versus 320 Soviets in Washington and San Francisco; plus *another* 284 Soviets at their UN Mission and 310 in the UN Secretariat for which there are no U.S. counterparts in the Soviet Union. Thus, the total is 200 Americans versus 914 Russians, giving the Soviets the basis for a massive espionage establishment on U.S. territory, roughly two-thirds of it diplomatically protected. [4½ lines not declassified]

[4 lines not declassified] In this sense, Zakharov's activity was unusual, and effective prosecution is essential to make clear to the Soviets that they are not free to use UN Secretariat personnel to commit espionage with impunity. Otherwise, such personnel acquire *de facto* diplomatic immunity, and the pool from which the Soviets can draw to support their espionage in the U.S. would be significantly expanded. This would dramatically add to the FBI's already heavy burden of neutralizing Soviet espionage, and could undo a substantial amount of the benefit which will otherwise be achieved by the programmed drawdown of 105 diplomatically protected personnel at the Soviets' UN Mission.

Journalist vs. Businessman: The fact that the hostage this time is a journalist rather than a businessman has certain interesting implications. Among other things, it is undoubtedly designed to discourage all other Western journalists in the U.S.S.R. from being too enterprising in cultivating sources and searching out information. (Perhaps the Soviets spared the businessmen because they are now seeking to attract more Western trade.) If we fail to punish the Soviet misbehavior toward Daniloff, we potentially jeopardize *all* U.S. journalists working in Moscow by increasing the likelihood that the Soviets will again resort to this type of behavior whenever it suits their purposes. At the same time, the uproar in the American media at the arrest of a newsman is so intense that we will now have even stronger bipartisan support for

a tough response. Indeed, we are likely to run into intense and broad-based criticism if we are seen as too soft.

Costs of Delay: I agree with George that we don't want to derail other important negotiations with the Soviets or preparations for a summit. Paradoxically, a weaker response by us is really the most dangerous: It lets the crisis drag on until damage to other negotiations becomes inevitable. George is to see Shevardnadze on September 19–20; that meeting is bound to be disrupted or clouded by the Daniloff case if the case isn't resolved by then. *Bringing the matter to a head quickly by a dramatically tough U.S. response may be the only way to avoid a long-term festering crisis.* I am convinced that Soviet stonewalling up to now is due in large part to the fact that our verbal protests have lacked credibility. They have contemptuously rejected two personal messages from you. Our lack of concrete action has only led them to conclude you are not entirely serious: With every passing day they are dug in deeper and it will be harder for them to extricate themselves.

The tougher scenario that the NSC proposes in fact offers the best prospect for insulating the case from broader political issues in U.S.-Soviet relations. It directs the brunt of the cost onto the KGB, which originated the incident. It provides forceful measures other than canceling meetings and toughening our negotiating positions on other issues.⁴

If we do not react with measures which are manifestly proportionate but effective, public and Congressional pressures may well push us into a situation where rational negotiation, and even meetings themselves, will become impossible. We can only manage these pressures by demonstrating that we are moving forcefully and appropriately.

How Far Are We Willing to Go? Can We Sustain Our Course? The tougher option is indeed sustainable if we have the will to stay the course. The measures are carefully limited and discrete and are directed at the source of the problem: the use of Soviet intelligence agents attached to international organizations. There is a simple and basic equity in our position: if the Soviet Union, contrary to its international obligations and basic morality, uses employees of international organizations for espionage, they will be punished. If the Soviet authorities react by compounding the offense by taking innocent Americans hostage, we are obligated to protect our citizens.

I have no doubt there will be strong bipartisan and public support for such a stance; the measures proposed are reasonable, appropriately targeted, and will indeed seem even mild to some, on both sides of the political spectrum. Media support will continue strong so long as

⁴ See also footnote 3, Document 272.

our position is seen to be resolute, and aimed at the dual purposes of freeing Daniloff *and* deterring similar Soviet actions in the future.

The main potential threat to U.S. interests is the possibility of retaliation against U.S. installations in Moscow. This is why an essential part of the demarche is a warning that we are prepared to more-than-match the Soviets if they try to raise the stakes. If the Soviets are convinced that we will indeed bring their Embassy and consular personnel down to parity before counter-retaliating, they are very unlikely to embark on this course. If, however, they do, the consequences for us should be manageable, though admittedly unpleasant. But *the Soviets would have to absorb considerably greater and more disruptive cuts.*

Is this the way to deal with the Soviets? It is a constant Soviet claim that “you can’t deal with us by threats.” It is true that threats made public can push the Soviets into a corner and make it harder for them to get themselves out. That is why we should make the demarche as quietly and confidentially as possible, and announce the measures only as they are taken. It is important to leave the Soviets a graceful escape route, if feasible—or, at least, a way out which avoids gross humiliation.

At the same time, long experience has shown that the *only* way to deal with the Soviets is to make clear in advance that the cost to their interests will be high, so they can assess the impact of their actions. When they are convinced that they stand the most to lose, they typically find a way to shift course. Examples abound. They said they would never negotiate on INF if we deployed our missiles in Europe; they found a way out when it was clear that their interests were being damaged. Time and time again, on matters from the trivial to the apocalyptic, they have caved under real pressure, complaining all the time that “this is not the way to deal with us,” while proving precisely the opposite.

Your Credibility: You are now on the record publicly that Daniloff must be released and that there will be no trade.⁵ If we do not do something practical to bring this about, your public credibility—as well as your private credibility with Gorbachev—will be seriously eroded.

⁵ Reagan, in his remarks made at a Senate campaign fundraiser in Denver on September 8, stated: “Before I begin my formal remarks today, let me first speak to a subject of great importance: The continuing Soviet detention of an innocent American is an outrage. Whatever the Soviet motive, whether it’s to intimidate enterprising journalists or to trade him for one of their spies that we have caught redhanded, this action violates the standards of civilized international behavior. There will be no trade. Through several channels, we’ve made our position clear. The Soviet Union is aware of how serious the consequences will be for our relations if Nick Daniloff is not set free. I call upon the Soviet authorities to act responsibly and quickly so that our two countries can make progress on the many other issues on our agenda, solving existing problems instead of creating new ones. Otherwise, there will be no way to prevent this incident from becoming a major obstacle in our relations.” (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book II, p. 1147)

That could affect your effectiveness in dealings with the Soviets across the board; foster unrealistic Soviet expectations of what might be achievable at the summit, if it occurs; and generally complicate our dealings with the Soviets in a variety of areas.

275. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 9, 1986

SUBJECT

NST Experts Meetings, September 5–6

U.S. and Soviet arms control experts met for approximately eight hours on September 5, and again for approximately eight hours on September 6.² The U.S. team, headed by Paul Nitze, included Max Kampelman, Ed Rowny, Richard Perle, Ron Lehman, Mike Glitman and Bob Linhard. Ambassador Victor Karpov (the head of their NST delegation) headed the Soviet team which also included Ambassador Obukov (their START negotiator) and Generals Chervov and Detinov. Soviet Ambassador Dubinin attended all of the meetings.

George Shultz met briefly with the group on the second day to welcome the Soviet team, stress the importance of the discussions, and underscore the need for the Soviet government to find ways of resolving the Daniloff case and the problem we are now having with Soviet emigration.

The discussions were all held as ad referendum talks. The following points summarize the results of these discussions.

INF. In discussing the idea of an interim agreement on LRINF missiles, the Soviet side proposed a ceiling of 100 warheads on LRINF missiles in Europe, specifically on 25 GLCM launchers for the U.S. side (but no Pershing II ballistic missiles) and 33 SS–20 launchers for the Soviet side. The Soviets currently have 810 warheads on 270 SS–20s in

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Tyrus Cobb Files, Country File, USSR 1986 (3); NLR–98–5–23–12–0. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. This memorandum is Tab I of a September 8 memorandum from Linhard to Poindexter, forwarding NST information to Reagan. Reagan's initials are at the top of the memorandum but are struck through by an unknown hand.

² For a summary of the first round of meetings in Moscow, which began on August 11, see Document 263.

Europe. The Soviets refused to discuss any reductions on SS-20s in Asia. They said that they would continue their freeze on deployments of SS-20s in Asia (by our count, 513 warheads on 171 SS-20s) and that the U.S. could retain in the U.S. warheads to match them on a global basis. Under this Soviet scheme, the Soviets would retain 613 warheads on SS-20 ballistic missiles in range of U.S. forces and allies in either Europe or Asia while the U.S. would have only 100 warheads on cruise missiles in range of their targets.

The U.S. side suggested that the Soviet proposal of a 100 warhead level in Europe might be acceptable if the Soviets reduced their corresponding SS-20 forces in Asia to 100 warheads or less. This would result in a global ceiling of 200 LRINF warheads, an 88% reduction from current Soviet levels. Under such a reduction, the U.S. side indicated that it could accept constraining all U.S. LRINF missiles beyond those providing our 100 warheads in Europe to the United States. However, Pershing II ballistic missiles must constitute a part of the U.S. force mix.

START. While the Soviet position on START remained basically unchanged, the Soviet side did introduce two new elements at this session.

Limit on Ballistic Missile Warheads. The first new element was that the Soviet side suggested, under the current Soviet proposed limit of 8,000 nuclear devices, no more than 80–85% of the total number of nuclear devices permitted to either side could be on ballistic missiles. This would still allow them to have between 6,400 to 6,800 ballistic missile warheads—too high a number. On the other hand, this is the first time that they have proposed a ballistic missile warhead limit, and our side moved immediately to pocket this new element.

Treatment of Nuclear SLCM. The second new element was a Soviet proposal that nuclear SLCMs be limited, but not under the Soviet 8,000 limit. Instead, they would be controlled separately. We pointed out that we saw no way to limit the relatively small number of nuclear SLCMs that we have planned without unacceptable consequences for non-nuclear weapons needed by our fleet which are launched by the same launchers used for nuclear SLCM. We challenged the Soviets to provide their ideas as to how we could resolve this problem.

Defense and Space. Compared to the treatment of INF and START, the discussion of the Defense and Space area was limited. The Soviets reiterated their proposal for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for 15–20 years and for negotiations to clarify the meaning of the ABM Treaty. The U.S. side pressed the Soviets on when we could expect a response to your July 25th letter to General Secretary Gorbachev. The Soviet side replied that it would come after the Foreign Ministers'

meeting. The U.S. side explained that the absence of a Soviet response to this letter made it impractical to discuss defense and space beyond the conceptual exchanges which were held in Moscow when the experts group last met.

Summary for Allies. Attached is a cable which summarizes the meetings for our allies. We have attached this cable for your information should you wish a bit more detail.³

³ Telegram 282182 to all NATO capitals, Tokyo and Canberra, September 9, is attached but not printed. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number].)

276. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, September 10, 1986, 2322Z

284764. Special Encryption—Treat as Special Caption. Subject: 9/10 Secretary-Dubinín Meeting.

1. (S—Entire text)

2. Summary: Soviet Ambassador Dubinín conveyed to Secretary Shultz September 10 Soviet proposal for “first step” in resolving Daniloff/Zakharov cases. Without saying so directly, Dubinín sought to suggest that proposal responded to September 9 *démarche* by Asst. Sec. Ridgway on same subject.² Secretary made clear he did not consider Dubinín’s proposal a response to Ridgway initiative and that USG awaited more considered Soviet views. See action requested para 14 below. End summary.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, 1981–1986, Daniloff (1). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Parris; cleared by Simons, Ridgway, Pascoe, and Boucher; approved by Shultz.

² The *démarche* was not found. In his memoir, however, Shultz explained that he received instructions from Reagan during the September 9 meeting: “I gave the president my recommendations: under the law, we had to try Zakharov, but we would ask the court to remand him to the Soviet embassy pending that trial; Daniloff would go to the American embassy residence; the Soviets would then expel Daniloff from the USSR; Zakharov would be tried quickly; if he was convicted, we would seek to trade him for Soviet refuseniks; if acquitted, we would expel him. The president seemed relieved to hear my proposal and was happy to authorize me to try to make it work.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 735) See also Document 274.

3. Dubinin had sought a meeting with the Secretary throughout the previous day. He ultimately agreed to see Under Secretary Armacost late the evening of September 9, handing over a formal notice of Daniloff's indictment and information on which the indictment was allegedly based (septel).³ Dubinin's office sought morning of September 10 to renew his request for an appointment with the Secretary, claiming to have new instructions from Moscow. During his fifteen minute meeting with the Secretary, Dubinin was accompanied by Embassy Counselor Kuznetsov; the Secretary by Asst. Sec. Ridgway and EUR/SOV Director Parris.

4. Dubinin opened by indicating he had been instructed to convey to the Secretary a proposal on the Daniloff and Zakharov cases. He then proceeded to read (in English) and hand over non-paper, text of which follows:

Begin text.

—As we understand, both sides proceed from the necessity to take measures which would facilitate a mutually acceptable solution regarding G.F. Zakharov and N. Daniloff.

—Specifically, as a first step, we propose that the above persons be released into the custody of the respective Ambassadors on a parallel basis.

—It is in the interests of both sides that the measures we propose should be effected as soon as possible.

End text.

5. The Secretary noted in response that we had made a proposal to the Soviets the day before on the two cases covered in the Soviet paper. The difference between the two proposals was that the Soviet approach did not resolve the problem; it only postponed it. We hoped that we would soon have a reaction to the proposal we had made. We felt that this could best be done at the staff level.

6. Dubinin acknowledged that his Embassy had received a proposal from the U.S. the day before. It had been transmitted the same day. Dubinin was also aware that we had double-tracked our approach in Moscow. The message he had just conveyed had been received "today" (Wednesday). Dubinin "considered that significant." He had had different instructions yesterday; he had new instructions today.

7. Dubinin emphasized that the proposal he had just made should be seen as a "first step." Moscow believed that it should be taken as

³ Septel not found. Shultz forwarded a paper reporting the indictment to Reagan under a September 10 memorandum. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Daniloff Detention in the USSR September 1986 (Yogurt))

soon as possible, both from a humanitarian standpoint and as a means of calming public opinion in both countries. The Soviets wanted a final solution to both cases and were looking for one, but that should not keep us from taking a first step.

8. The Secretary asked Dubinin to report to Moscow that we had received the Soviet proposal and that it would be conveyed to the President. At the same time, we wanted to resolve the problem, not simply put it off. Thus, while the Secretary would not respond directly to the proposal Dubinin had just made, the Ambassador could advise Moscow that we looked forward to a response to the proposal that Asst. Sec. Ridgway had presented to Sokolov. The Secretary explained that he would prefer that Asst. Sec. Ridgway work directly with the Soviets as the Secretary's own schedule was extremely full. It was important that any developments in the cases at hand be dealt with promptly.

9. Dubinin expressed satisfaction that he had understood from the Secretary's remarks that his was not a final reaction to the Soviet proposal. What the Secretary had said would be reported to Moscow. Dubinin speculated that Moscow had instructed him to deliver his proposal directly to the Secretary as an indication of the importance it attached to calming public opinion in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The Embassy had nothing, Dubinin assured the Secretary, against working with Asst. Sec. Ridgway.

10. The Secretary again asked Dubinin to inform Moscow that we looked forward to a response to our proposal. We did not consider the message Dubinin had just delivered to be such a response. We considered it an additional point which does not interrupt discussion of a more general conclusion.

11. Dubinin asked that the Secretary nonetheless consider the Soviet proposal, taking especially into account the humanitarian aspects of the problem. Dubinin had, he stressed, received his instructions that morning. The Soviet proposal envisioned only a first—but an important—step. It need not interfere with other negotiations; both sides could maintain their positions in such negotiations. The Soviets were prepared to look for final settlements. But implementation of their proposal would be an important first step.

12. The Secretary thanked Dubinin for his presentation, and the meeting ended.

13. Action requested: Dubinin studiously avoided characterizing his proposal as a "response" to the September 9 Ridgway proposal. Especially in view of Bessmertnykh's indication to Chargé that Dubinin would not, in fact, have such a response (Moscow 15633),⁴ we strongly

⁴ Telegram not found.

suspect Dubinin is exaggerating the currency of the pitch he made today. (We also note that he appears to have advised Moscow he had a firm September 10 appointment with the Secretary when none was in fact scheduled until well after Combs-Bessmertnykh discussion).⁵

14. Given Dubinin's handling of this case so far, Chargé should seek appointment with Bessmertnykh for opening of business September 11 to reiterate points made by Secretary to Dubinin.⁶ You should stress that:

—We do not consider Dubinin's approach of September 10 to be a reply to Asst. Sec. Ridgway's proposal to Sokolov of September 9;

—We strongly believe it is in the interest of both sides that there be an early, definitive resolution of the Daniloff/Zakharov cases;

—The proposal outlined by Dubinin would simply prolong the problem, and ensure that it would continue to adversely affect our relationship during a particularly important period;

—We urge the Soviet side to accept our September 9 proposal, which would enable us to put this issue definitively behind us and create a positive climate for work in the weeks ahead.

Shultz

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 271. Telegram 15405 from Moscow, September 5, also reported on Combs's September 5 meeting with Bessmertnykh on the Daniloff situation. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N8600009-0017)

⁶ In telegram 284982 to Moscow, September 11, the Department provided the text of an oral message for Combs to deliver to Bessmertnykh. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, 1981-1986, Daniloff (1))

277. Memorandum From Stephen Sestanovich of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, September 12, 1986

SUBJECT

Daniloff and the Summit

At the outset of a new phase in the Daniloff case, it is important to re-examine its connection to other issues of US-Soviet relations, especially the prospects for a summit.² We have heard the argument that because of our interest in these issues, the Administration should pull back from punitive retaliation. I believe this is exactly the wrong lesson to draw, for two reasons—one hard-line argument, the other soft.³

The first has to do with “linkage.” People have disagreed about whether it works and how, but almost everyone (in this Administration at least) has agreed that the worst policy is what might be called “reverse linkage”—in which we sacrifice a concrete national interest in the hope of keeping the arms control “dialogue” alive. This is precisely what the President himself accused Carter of doing. If the Soviets also have an interest in arms control, then such a policy is plainly unnecessary, but it’s also unwise: the Soviets will read our flexibility on Daniloff as a sign of great eagerness for a summit, which will lead

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Stephen Sestanovich Files, Daniloff: 1985–1986. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Cockell, Matlock, and Major. A stamp in the upper right-hand margin reads: “Natl Sec Advisor has seen.” Poindexter also wrote: “Steve, Good points. Thanks, JP.”

² In a September 10 memorandum to Reagan, Shultz wrote: “Our Embassy in Moscow has passed us a message to you from Nick Daniloff. Daniloff asked our consul in Moscow yesterday to convey his deep appreciation for your support. Daniloff said he wished to emphasize that he greatly values the concern you have expressed publicly and privately in your letter to Gorbachev. Daniloff relayed his hope that a diplomatic means would soon be found to resolve his case so that ‘very important’ U.S.-Soviet talks could take place in an atmosphere unimpaired by his continued detention.” (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Daniloff Detention in the USSR September 1986 (Yogurt))

³ In a September 10 memorandum to Shultz, Solomon concurred with this analysis: “In arresting US journalist Nicholas Daniloff, the Soviet leadership has created an important opportunity for us to strengthen further our position in managing the US-Soviet relationship and to weaken Gorbachev’s efforts to play public pressures against the US and Allied governments. If we handle this case effectively, we can not only undermine Gorbachev’s efforts to capture the initiative in the relationship—as through his Vladivostok speech, public proposals for a nuclear test ban, etc.—but we can also strengthen our ‘two-track’ approach to pressures combined with dialogue in dealing with the Soviet Union.” (Ibid.)

them to raise the price on other issues. As a result our bargaining position on these issues will be weakened. And if our allies see that we pull our punches so as to keep a good East-West atmosphere, they will feel obliged to trim their own positions too. Only Moscow wins if we start such a process.

The second reason is different, but equally important. To hold a summit in which there is real movement (and perhaps even to hold one at all), the President will need a great deal of negotiating flexibility and domestic maneuvering room. Only then will he be able to explore seriously a package of arms control formulas that would be acceptable to both sides. No bargaining process of this sort occurs without compromises and concessions; these are justifiable as long as they produce an agreement that is in our interest, but it is never easy to gain bureaucratic consensus about which specific concessions to make, and when. If the Daniloff affair sparks recriminations and charges that a desire for a summit led the Administration to step back from a tough, previously-chosen policy option, I believe the President's flexibility will be less, not greater. By contrast, if he carries through a swift, sure strategy on Daniloff that makes sense, he will strengthen his hand domestically, make clear who decides policy within the Administration, and show the Soviets that his tolerance is limited. It is very possible that some delay in movement toward a summit will result, but our true strategic position vis-a-vis the Soviets will be stronger. A summit in conditions of weakness will be no great triumph.

These considerations suggest three guidelines for handling the Daniloff aftermath in the next several days.

First, our interest is best served by a quick, clean resolution that frees us for retaliatory measures. To force the pace, and avoid prolonged ambassadorial custody, we could go back quickly to the Soviets, saying that we intend to seek Zakharov's early expulsion, and asking whether Daniloff will be freed while we are seeking to get their man's charges dropped. With Daniloff out, we can then include Zakharov in the much larger list of expellees.

Second, it is important to keep elements of the US-Soviet relationship balanced, not linked. This means we should consider putting forward some new negotiating positions (either publicly or privately), while the personnel decisions are unfolding. The President's UNGA speech would be a good forum for this.

Third, as long as we have a firm policy, there is no need to humiliate the Soviets or fill the air with a lot of rhetoric. Rushing the expulsion order before Shultz meets Shevardnadze may be ill-advised. The irreversible decision to go forward should be made beforehand, however, and kept separate from whatever comes out of the meeting.

In sum: It is impossible to be sure when a summit can be held and what its outcome will be. But the most important decision the President

must make is not the timing of the summit, but how to keep his position strong both before and at the meetings that eventually take place.

Peter Rodman concurs.

278. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 11–9–86

Washington, September 12, 1986

GORBACHEV'S POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES, 1986–1988

[Omitted here are the Table of Contents and the Scope Note.]

KEY JUDGMENTS

The Gorbachev regime aims to re-create some sort of detente relationship with the United States to ease the burden of arms competition and, accordingly, the task of domestic economic revival. Because the detente they seek reduces US challenges to Soviet interests, Soviet leaders believe such a relationship can help preserve and advance the USSR's international influence and its relative military power. Gorbachev seeks to relax East-West hostility for a protracted period—he is looking ahead through the 1990s—not to suspend the competition but to put the USSR in an improved long-term position as a globally influential superpower.

These aims have persuaded the Soviets to pursue an active, engaged policy toward the United States. It is focused on arms control (supported by a vigorous worldwide propaganda offensive) and on the prospect of US-Soviet summits (exploited for leverage to moderate US policies and encourage concessions on arms control). The Soviets strive to deflect the Reagan administration away from security policies that, despite some moderation in the last two years, the Soviets see as

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Ambassadors Henry F. Cooper and Max Kampelman, Program Files for the Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms (S/DEL), Lot 93D592, USSR 1986–1987. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. A note on the cover page reads: "Information available as of September 12 was used in the preparation of this estimate, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on that date." In a handwritten note to Reagan, attached to another copy of this SNIE, Poindexter wrote: "Mr. President, Note this was prepared before the Iceland announcement. John." Reagan initialed this copy of the SNIE. (CIA Electronic Reading Room)

severely challenging to them and to discourage such hostile US policies from being carried forward into the next US administration.

The Soviets realize, however, that their engaged policy toward the United States risks legitimizing hostile policies of the current administration by muting Western anxieties about them and seeming to show that they are a sound basis for dealing with Moscow. Managing this risk is a delicate problem for the new Soviet leadership. There are differing points of view in Moscow about how to craft a diplomacy sufficiently forthcoming to encourage US concessions while minimizing this risk. Despite such controversies, we believe Gorbachev has the political strength to forge Politburo consensus behind the initiatives and decisions he favors in dealing with the United States.

The central Soviet objective in bilateral dealings with the United States and in the surrounding Soviet diplomacy and propaganda toward US Allies and Western publics is revival of the arms control framework of the 1970s or creation of a similar successor system. The Soviets see such a framework as serving their political, military, and economic interests. It would provide an important element of predictability that would ease the balancing of military requirements and economic revitalization in the 1990s. And, should its political side effects include a flagging of overall US defense efforts such as occurred in the mid-1970s, so much the better. Gorbachev is more prepared than his predecessors to consider substantial reductions of offensive nuclear forces in such a framework for reasons that include cost avoidance, increasing interest in enhancing the quality of Soviet nonnuclear forces, and a desire to undermine the credibility of US nuclear strategies. The main Soviet motive for considering and negotiating about large nuclear force reductions at present is to undermine the US strategic defense initiative (SDI).

To be acceptable to the Soviets, a comprehensive strategic arms control framework that includes substantial reductions of offensive nuclear forces must provide effective constraints on the US SDI, through formal agreement that limits the program and political effects that they calculate would kill it eventually. Despite its uncertain future, the Soviets are deeply concerned about SDI because it might produce a military and technological revolution and could undermine the war-fighting strategies of Soviet nuclear forces. In the extreme, the Soviets genuinely fear that SDI could give the US confidence it had a damage-limiting first-strike capability. To be in a position to counter SDI, the Soviets believe they must preserve large ballistic missile forces and the option to expand them. For both economic and military reasons, they wish to avoid the costs of a competition to develop and counter advanced ballistic missile defenses in which the United States has the technological initiative. Their campaign against SDI aims to deny the

United States that initiative; but they will proceed to develop advanced defense technologies in any event, as they did following the ABM Treaty of 1972.

Despite the seriousness of Soviet economic difficulties and the longer term importance to Moscow of easing East-West tensions to help address them, we believe that these difficulties do not place Gorbachev under so much pressure that he must make fundamental concessions to the United States on major security issues during the next two years. Gorbachev believes he can hold out for an arms control framework and a larger US-Soviet security relationship generally on his terms, while putting political pressures on Washington to make key concessions, particularly on SDI.²

Gorbachev believes that only a diplomacy appearing flexible to American and European audiences, especially on arms control, can put pressure on Washington and test the possibilities that may exist for real US concessions. More innovations in Soviet arms control positions of the sort Gorbachev has already introduced are likely if he believes they can help him achieve constraints on SDI and other US defense programs. New unilateral gestures, such as modest cuts in military manpower or in the officially stated defense budget, are possible.

At the same time, Gorbachev sees himself able to defend Soviet interests in the Third World, particularly with regard to embattled Marxist-Leninist client states. He expects a more active Soviet foreign policy overall to open up new opportunities in the Third World and among US Allies.

Soviet policy toward the United States involves two principal tactics: first, holding open the promise of nuclear force reductions if the United States accommodates on SDI; second, holding open the prospect of a series of additional summits if the United States gives ground on arms control. If the United States makes the concessions necessary for this process to proceed, Gorbachev believes that it will serve the political goals of weakening anti-Soviet policies in Washington or encouraging more congenial behavior from the next US administration. Gorbachev sees the popularity of arms control in the United States and Europe and domestic disquiet over the administration's foreign and defense policies as his main source of influence over Washington and Washington's eagerness for summits as his principal point of tactical leverage.

² The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, holds that the opening clause of this paragraph overstates the role of Soviet economic conditions in causing the Soviets to pursue detente in any time frame, and that strategic and political considerations are overriding. See paragraph 4 of "Discussion" for a fuller statement of this view. [Footnote is in the original.]

To maximize his leverage, Gorbachev will delay his decision on scheduling another summit as long as possible. All things being equal, Gorbachev would profit politically from additional summits. But we believe he will hold out for terms that advance Soviet political and strategic interests; he does not need a summit for its own sake. Some US movement on SDI, particularly acceptance of the principle that control of space-based strategic defenses should be dealt with by reaffirming the ABM Treaty and modifying its withdrawal clause, plus US delay in actually breaching the SALT limits and convergence on another arms control issue, such as nuclear testing or INF, would be enough to bring Gorbachev to another summit. We are simply uncertain whether Gorbachev will come short of these conditions.

Meeting these conditions and holding another US-Soviet summit would not, however, produce Soviet agreement to a comprehensive arms control package on nuclear force reductions. For such an agreement, we believe the Soviets will demand codification in some form of the principle that offensive strategic force reductions must go hand in hand with tight constraints on SDI. By the same token, we believe the Soviets will strongly resist principles and agreement terms that seem to license SDI by reconciling its development and deployment with nuclear force reductions.

Failing agreement along Soviet-preferred lines or publicly visible progress toward it, we believe that Gorbachev is likely at some point to shift his priorities and tactics toward a more concerted effort to discredit the policies of the current US administration, to inject East-West issues into the 1988 Presidential election, and to encourage more flexibility from the next US administration. Such a shift would involve harsher propaganda attacks on the administration and the President and stand-pat negotiating tactics, although not a Soviet withdrawal from arms control negotiations or other fundamental changes of behavior. Moscow would continue to position itself to appear the party eager for improved US-Soviet relations, while trying even harder to portray the administration as the recalcitrant side. There is some basis for arguing that this shift has already taken place, but we think this is unlikely and would look for it sometime in late 1987 or early 1988.

[Omitted here are the Discussion section and annexes.]

279. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Daniloff Case: Soviet Rejection of U.S. September 9 Proposal

In Ambassador Ridgway's absence in another meeting, Soviet Minister-Counselor Sokolov urgently requested a private meeting with EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Tom Simons at 5:00 p.m. September 15. Reading from notes, Sokolov gave the Soviet response to our proposal to release Daniloff and trade Zakharov for dissidents, which Ridgway presented to Sokolov with your authorization on September 9.²

The Soviet response is as follows:

—First, we believe the Soviet proposal made to Secretary Shultz on September 10 (i.e. to remand both Daniloff and Zakharov to the custody of resident diplomats) has already brought about a positive outcome at this point.³ We proceed from the assumption that given a desire to solve problems rather than seek complications, mutually acceptable solutions can be searched for further on.

—Second, the U.S. proposal of September 9 is not acceptable to us. We feel that rather than alleviating it makes solutions more complicated. If the U.S. does not wish to search for solutions acceptable to both sides, then it should understand that it will take upon itself the responsibility for the possible consequences.

—Third, we stand for a responsible approach to Soviet-U.S. relations. The United States Government, we believe, is well aware of that. Literally every line of the letters of General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan proves that. Thus, in the existing situation as well, which is not of our making, we are prepared as before to seek jointly a mutually acceptable solution.

Simons said that he would transmit the message immediately to his authorities, but that he had the following preliminary reaction:

—He regretted this response.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Daniloff Detention in the USSR September 1986 (Yogurt). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on September 15; cleared by Ridgway. Parris initialed for Ridgway.

² See footnote 2, Document 276.

³ See Document 276.

—It would have harmful consequences, for which the Soviet side would be responsible.

—Our proposal of September 9 was based precisely on the desire to find mutually acceptable solutions referred to in the Soviet response.

—Our proposal, moreover, had precedent in U.S.-Soviet relations (Sokolov nodded), and it will not be understood why that precedent did not apply in present circumstances as well.

—The Soviet rejection of this proposal was inconsistent with the responsible approach to our relations mentioned in the response.

Sokolov said the Soviets remain ready to work with the U.S. for mutually acceptable solutions. Simons asked if he had any suggestions, since the U.S. had made a suggestion which the Soviets have now rejected. Sokolov said he did not.

280. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan¹

Moscow, September 15, 1986

Dear Mr. President,

I chose to send this letter with E.A. Shevardnadze, who is leaving for the United States to attend the session of the United Nations General Assembly. He is also planning, as has been agreed, to visit Washington and to discuss thoroughly the questions of interest to both sides.

After we received your letter of July 25, 1986, which has been given careful consideration, certain developments and incidents of a negative nature have taken place. This is yet another indication of how sensitive relations between the USSR and the United States are and how important it is for the top leaders of the two countries to keep them constantly within view and exert a stabilizing influence whenever the amplitude of their fluctuations becomes threatening.

Among such incidents—of the kind that have happened before and that, presumably, no one can be guaranteed against in the future—is the case of Zakharov and Daniloff. It requires a calm examination, investigation, and a search for mutually acceptable solutions. However, the US side has unduly dramatized that incident. A massive hostile campaign has been launched against our country, which has been

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State Files, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8690529). No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. Reagan wrote in the top margin: "The blue ink scratches are mine. RR." Shevardnadze presented this letter to Reagan during a September 19 meeting in the Oval Office; see Document 283. In his memoir, Gorbachev wrote: "I received a letter from Reagan during my holiday in the Crimea in the summer of 1986 [see Document 254]. It looked to me like an attempt to uphold the pretense of a continuing dialogue, another tactical move in the 'double game' played by the Americans. Eduard Shevardnadze telephoned me to say that he had already sent a draft reply for approval, adding that we did not need to give a detailed reply since there were no significant proposals in Reagan's message. Still, we could not leave it unanswered. On the next day, Anatoly Chernyaev (who had accompanied me to the Crimea) made his daily report and showed me Shevardnadze's draft reply to President Reagan's message. It was a short, routine statement, and as I was reading it, I suddenly realized that I was gradually being forced into accepting a logic that was alien to me—a logic that was in open contradiction to our new attitude, to the process we had started in Geneva and—most important—to the hopes of ordinary people. I said that I could not sign such a letter, and told Anatoly about the thoughts that had been haunting me for days. In the end, I decided to take a strong stand, suggesting an immediate summit meeting with President Reagan to unblock the strategic talks in Geneva, which were in danger of becoming an empty rite. A meeting was needed to discuss the situation and to give new impetus to the peace process. It could take place in England or Iceland. I immediately telephoned Shevardnadze, Gromyko, Ryzhkov and Ligachev. They all agreed to my idea. We sent an urgent message to the American President." (Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, p. 414)

taken up at the higher levels of the United States administration and Congress. It is as if a pretext was deliberately sought to aggravate Soviet-American relations and to increase tension.²

A question then arises: what about the atmosphere so needed for the normal course of negotiations and certainly for preparing and holding the summit meeting?

Since the Geneva meeting, the Soviet Union has been doing a great deal to ensure that the atmosphere is favorable and that negotiations make possible practical preparations for our new meeting.

On the major issues of limiting and reducing arms—nuclear, chemical and conventional—we have undertaken intensive efforts in a search for concrete solutions aimed at radically reducing the level of military confrontation in a context of equivalent security.

However, Mr. President, in the spirit of candidness which is coming to characterize our dialogue, I have to tell you that the overall character of US actions in international affairs, the positions on which its representatives insist at negotiations and consultations, and the content of your letter, all give rise to grave and disturbing thoughts. One has to conclude that in effect no start has been made in implementing the agreements we reached in Geneva on improving Soviet-American relations, accelerating the negotiations on nuclear and space arms, and renouncing attempts to secure military superiority.³ Both in letters and publicly we have made known our views as to the causes of such development, and for my part I do not want to repeat here our assessment of the situation.

First of all, a conclusion comes to mind: is the U.S. leadership at all prepared and really willing to seek agreements which would lead to the termination of the arms race and to genuine disarmament? It is a fact, after all, that despite vigorous efforts by the Soviet side we have still not moved an inch closer to an agreement on arms reduction.⁴

Having studied your letter and the proposals contained therein, I began to think where they would lead in terms of seeking solutions.

First. You are proposing that we should agree that the ABM Treaty continue to exist for another 5 to 7 years, while activities to destroy it would go ahead. Thus, instead of making headway, there would be something that complicates even what has been achieved.

We have proposed that any work on anti-missile systems be confined to laboratories. In response, we witness attempts to justify the

² Reagan underlined this sentence.

³ Reagan underlined most of this sentence.

⁴ Reagan highlighted this paragraph in the left-hand margin.

development of space weapons and their testing at test sites, and declarations, made in advance, of the intention to start in five to seven years deploying large-scale ABM systems and thus to nullify the Treaty. It is, of course, fully understood that we will not agree to that. We see here a bypass route to securing military superiority.

I trust, Mr. President, you recall our discussion of this subject in Geneva. At that time I said that should the United States rush with weapons into space, we would not help it. We would do our utmost to devalue such efforts and make them futile. You may rest assured that we have every means to achieve this and, should the need arise, we shall use those means.

We favor the strengthening of the ABM Treaty regime. This is precisely the reason for our position that work should be confined to laboratories and that the Treaty should be strictly observed for a period of up to 15 years. Should this be the case, it would be possible—and this is our proposal—to agree on significant reductions in strategic offensive arms. We are prepared to do this without delay, and it would thereby be demonstrated in practice that neither side seeks military superiority.

Second. As far as medium-range missiles are concerned the Soviet Union has proposed an optimum solution—complete elimination of U.S. and Soviet missiles in Europe. We have also agreed to an interim option—and that, without taking into account the modernization of British and French nuclear systems.

Following our well-known steps towards accommodation, the issue of verification would seem no longer to be an obstacle. Yet, the U.S. side has now “discovered” another obstacle, namely, Soviet medium-range missiles in Asia. Nevertheless, I believe that here, as well, a mutually acceptable formula can be found and I am ready to propose one, provided there is certainty that a willingness to resolve the issue of medium-range missiles in Europe does exist.

Third. The attitude of the United States to the moratorium on nuclear testing is a matter of deep disappointment—and not only in the Soviet Union. The United States administration is making every effort to avoid this key problem, to subsume it in talk of other issues.

You are aware of my views in this regard: the attitude of a country to the cessation of nuclear testing is the touchstone of its policy in the field of disarmament and international security—and, indeed, in safeguarding peace in general.

Arguments to the effect that nuclear testing is needed to ensure reliability of nuclear arsenals are untenable. Today there are other methods to ensure this, without nuclear explosions. After all, the United States does not test devices with yields in excess of 150–200 kilotons,

although 70 per cent of the U.S. nuclear arsenal—and in our case the percentage is not smaller—consists of weapons with yields exceeding that threshold.

Modern science combined with a political willingness to agree to any adequate verification measures, including on-site inspections, ensure effective verification of the absence of nuclear explosions. So here too there is room for mutually acceptable solutions.

I have addressed specifically three questions which, in my opinion are of greatest importance. They are the ones to which positive solutions are expected from the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. They are a matter of concern to the whole world, they are being discussed everywhere. Naturally, we are in favor of productive discussions of other major issues as well, such as reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments, a chemical weapons ban, regional problems, and humanitarian questions. Here too, common approaches and cooperation should be sought. Yet, the three questions mentioned above remain the key ones.

But in almost a year since Geneva there has been no movement on these issues. Upon reflection and after having given thought to your last letter I have come to the conclusion that the negotiations need a major impetus; otherwise they would continue to mark time while creating only the appearance of preparations for our meeting on American soil.

They will lead nowhere unless you and I intervene personally. I am convinced that we shall be able to find solutions, and I am prepared to discuss with you in a substantive way all possible approaches to them and identify such steps as would make it possible—after prompt follow-up by appropriate government agencies—to make my visit to the United States a really productive and fruitful one. This is exactly what the entire world is expecting from a second meeting between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States.

That is why an idea has come to my mind to suggest to you, Mr. President, that, in the very near future and setting aside all other matters, we have a quick one-on-one meeting, let us say in Iceland or in London, maybe just for one day, to engage in a strictly confidential, private and frank discussion (possibly with only our foreign ministers present). The discussion—which would not be a detailed one, for its purpose and significance would be to demonstrate political will—would result in instructions to our respective agencies to draft agreements on two or three very specific questions, which you and I could sign during my visit to the United States.

I look forward to your early reply.

Respectfully,

M. Gorbachev

281. Memorandum From Tyrus Cobb and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter)¹

Washington, September 16, 1986

SUBJECT

Senior Advisors Meeting on Shevardnadze Visit

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President providing background material and an agenda for tomorrow's "Senior Advisors" meeting in preparation for the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.² The purpose of the meeting is to provide an opportunity for the President to review Secretary Shultz' game plan for the FM's visit and to discuss the major issues likely to arise.

The actions we are taking today against the SMUN³ and the Soviet refusal to respond to our initiatives to resolve the Daniloff case cast some uncertainty regarding whether Shevardnadze will still come to Washington. In any event we anticipate that Secretary Shultz will meet with Shevardnadze, if not here then in New York. This meeting thus provides an opportunity for the President to provide guidance to the Secretary for his meetings with the FM.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Tyrus Cobb Files, Country File, USSR 1986 (4); NLR-98-5-24-8-4. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Cobb initialed for Linhard.

² Attached but not printed. Although no formal record of a September 17 "Senior Advisors Meeting" has been found, Reagan wrote in his diary on September 17: "Then an N.S.C. meeting getting ready for the Soviet Foreign Ministers visit & how we treat the Daniloff problem with him. We've notified the Soviet U. we're sending 25 of their U.N. staff home—all are KGB agents." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 639) In his memoir, Shultz wrote of this meeting: "At a meeting earlier in the day to discuss Shevardnadze's arrival, Weinberger had argued again that we should cancel all contact with the Soviets until they unconditionally released Daniloff and gave us full satisfaction for the death of Major Nicholson. At that meeting, President Reagan had decided that I would deal with Shevardnadze on Daniloff as well as on the long-term issues but that he, the president, would not talk to Shevardnadze about anything but Daniloff and Nicholson. I knew that Shevardnadze did not want to get into a public standoff with the president and, perhaps, hoped even to avoid meeting him at all." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 740–741)

³ Reference is to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. Shultz wrote in his memoir: "On September 17, the president, with the support of his advisers, ordered twenty-five Soviet KGB officials to leave the Soviet mission at the United Nations by October 1, 1986, or face expulsion. This order stood by itself and was not linked to Daniloff. We had informed the Soviets the previous March that they must reduce the overblown size of their mission from the current 275 to 170 in steps of 25. By October 1, they were to be down to no more than 218. Now we were also telling them *who* must leave. The original issue was the number of people and their intelligence-gathering practices. But the order would be taken, without any doubt, as linked to Daniloff's detention in Moscow." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 739)

As Ty indicated in his memo to you yesterday,⁴ there is little interagency disagreement with respect to human rights, bilateral and regional issues. Although the President will wish to stress our positions on these issues should he meet with Shevardnadze, we see little if any prospect for substantial progress in these areas. We anticipate that tomorrow's Senior Advisors meeting thus will focus primarily on the Daniloff case, SMUN reductions and arms control issues.

It seems unlikely that Shevardnadze will have a Gorbachev commitment on a summit date in his pocket when he arrives. However, we anticipate that he may have a response from the General Secretary to the President's July letter.

On arms control we expect Secretary Shultz to outline his plan to provide Shevardnadze with a summary of our current position. Although we have not *formally* seen the talking points (which may pose a process problem for other agencies), our informal look reveals no problems. Secretary Shultz also plans to give Shevardnadze a 5–6 page draft paper entitled "Basic Elements of an Agreement," a straightforward outline of our position on NST issues.

Two additional arms control issues may come up:

—On nuclear testing, Secretary Shultz plans to suggest that the Geneva discussions move to actual negotiation of new verification protocols to the TTBT and PNET. We agree, but anticipate interagency disagreement over who should lead those negotiations. In addition, however, Secretary Shultz plans to note that ratification of the TTBT commits the sides to further discussions. Since the treaty speaks of negotiations relating to "cessation of all underground nuclear weapons tests," we think it unwise to stress this with the Soviets. They may incorrectly interpret it as a softening of the U.S. position on a CTB.

—Secretary Shultz will suggest negotiations to establish risk reduction centers. We agree. There is, however, interagency disagreement on who should lead such negotiations and on whether to attempt to sign some formal agreement at this summit. This issue should be forwarded to the NSC for resolution by tomorrow.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to send the memorandum to his counterparts at Tab II notifying DOD, State and the VP's office of tomorrow's meeting and agenda.⁵

Bill Cockell, Peter Rodman, Frank Lavin concur.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ Poindexter approved both recommendations. Tab II is attached but not printed.

282. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, September 18, 1986

SUBJECT

Draft NSDD Providing Instructions for Round VI of the Nuclear and Space Talks

Issue

Should you sign the National Security Decision Directive at *Tab A*, formalizing the instructions you have already approved for the NST Delegation?²

Facts

The directive instructs the delegation to follow instructions developed on an interagency basis for presenting your July proposals to Gorbachev and other issues.

Discussion

You have already reviewed and approved these instructions, and based on your previous approval, they have been released to the US delegation.³ This NSDD simply records your decision for the historical record.

As you will remember, Secretary Weinberger has, once again, raised the idea of changing our approach in the INF area from one of being prepared to negotiate an interim agreement to one of negotiating an agreement which commits both sides to the total elimination of LRINF missiles and reaches that goal in a series of intermediate stages or steps to be completed by a date certain. We have studied this idea a number of times during the past two weeks. We have also considered the tactic of initially pursuing the type of agreement that Secretary Weinberger suggests and then falling back to an interim agreement if and when needed. However, we have tried *both* these approaches

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 240 [Instructions for NST Round VI]; NLR-751-10-23-12-8. Secret. Sent for action. Drafted by Tobey and Linhard. Reagan initialed the memorandum in the top right-hand margin.

² Tab A was not attached; NSDD 240 is declassified and available on the Reagan Library Archives website. The instructions were sent in telegram 291634 to the NST Delegation, September 17. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860704-0990)

³ Reagan approved the proposed instructions to the NST delegation in a memorandum from Poindexter on September 17. (Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, NST Experts Preparation Meeting 09/10/1986 (3)).

before. In our February 1986 position, which called for the total elimination of all LRINF missiles in 3 years (with intermediate levels each year), we attempted exactly the approach that Secretary Weinberger proposes. In your private correspondence with General Secretary Gorbachev, we have moved beyond this position. To move back to this approach now would be viewed as a conscious step away from “common ground” by both the Soviets and our allies.

In addition, Secretary Weinberger argues that any missiles retained in the US to offset Soviet residual missiles in Asia would have no purpose. However, we would suggest that a moderate number of such missiles could be retained in the US to deal with contingencies currently covered by other US forces and to complicate Soviet military planning. As one example, in Cuba there are a number of runways that could support the recovery of Soviet bombers. There is also at least one major Soviet intelligence facility which could pose problems should hostilities erupt. Certainly a useful military mission can be given to a reasonable number of US Pershing II or GLCM retained in the US, and the Soviet Union no doubt considers this fact of some importance.

Recommendation

That you sign the NSDD at *Tab A*.⁴

⁴ Reagan initialed his approval of the recommendation. He signed NSDD 240, “Instructions for NST Round VI,” on September 18.

283. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 19, 1986

*EXTRACTS CONCERNING GORBACHEV'S
PROPOSAL TO MEET WITH
THE PRESIDENT AND THE DANILOFF CASE*

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Side

Secretary Shultz

D. Zarechnak, Interpreter

Soviet Side

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

P. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

TIME: 9:00–11:45

After a lengthy introductory discussion of the work being done in preparation for the Summit, Shevardnadze mentioned that he wished to say frankly that the current situation has led to difficult times in the US-USSR relationship.² These events were not initiated through the fault of the Soviet side. The Soviet side considers that the present moment is one when consultations and meetings on the usual levels will not help to achieve significant progress in Soviet-American relations. A strong political impulse and a strong political will is needed to overcome the present difficulties and to move ahead. Shevardnadze indicated that the reason he had asked for a one-on-one meeting with the Secretary was that if a meeting with the President would take place, he had a very important letter to transmit to the President from Gorbachev.³ In that letter Gorbachev indicates that a meeting between

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Daniloff File (09/20/1986); NLR–775–22–33–2–9. Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information. This memorandum of conversation contains the records of three separate meetings on September 19: the meeting between Shultz and Shevardnadze in the Secretary's office from 9 until 11:45 a.m.; a brief record of Shevardnadze's meeting with Reagan in the Oval Office from 12:15 until 1 p.m.; and the private meeting between Shultz and Shevardnadze from 5:30 until 6 p.m.

² In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "I had long since learned in negotiations that personal confidence and a personal touch can be helpful. I decided to break with precedent. I went to the Treaty Room, near my office, to meet Shevardnadze as he arrived. I watched him get off the elevator and walk through the series of stately rooms on his way to the central area used for signing ceremonies and other special events. The last time we met, he had been pink cheeked and confident; now he seemed peaked, thin, and nervous. I peeled him off from his entourage and took him to my private office. "We have a lot of sensitive matters to talk about," I said, "and we will just have to try to work our way through them as human beings. I want you to know that I value our personal relationship and that while you are here, you will be treated with courtesy and respect, whatever the strains of U.S.-Soviet relations." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 742)

³ See Document 280.

the President and the General Secretary is necessary in order to make progress in Soviet-American relations. If there is no strong push from the very top leadership of our countries, Shevardnadze did not exclude that relations between the two countries would deteriorate. At any rate, the latest events were a very bad sign.

The Secretary asked Shevardnadze if Gorbachev meant that a meeting should take place between the heads of state outside the US.

Shevardnadze replied that there was a corresponding proposal in the letter. He asked that if he were to meet with the President, it be a private meeting, without the rest of the group, in order that he could explain the contents of Gorbachev's letter to The President.

The Secretary indicated that he thought the best place to have a Summit, as he had told Shevardnadze's predecessor and Ambassador Dobrynin, was in the US and USSR, and not in third countries.

Turning to the issue of the present difficult situation, the Secretary wished to explain how the situation appeared to those in the US to see if a sense could be gotten of where we could go on this issue. Everything centered on the US perception of the way various individuals, human beings, are being treated. This causes the Secretary, the President and the American people anguish and dark clouds continue to hover over the US-USSR relationship. The Secretary mentioned the still unresolved situation of Major Nicholson, the very low level of Soviet Jewish immigration, religious persecution in the USSR, and Soviet citizens requiring special medical treatment. The Secretary listed the following names in the above categories: Sakharov and Bonner, Nudel, Orlov, Koryagin, Marchenko, Ratushinskaya, Validimir Brodskiy, Yu. and O. Medkov.

The Secretary then said that there was also the case of Daniloff, who was being held in the Soviet Union on charges of spying. The Secretary said that he did not know what materials the Soviet side had in hand, but he could say, as the President had indicated to the General Secretary, that Daniloff was not an employee of the US and was not operating on the instructions of the US.⁴ Therefore, he was not guilty of the charges brought against him. The Secretary stressed that this case, as well as the other humanitarian cases, increase the distrust between our countries, rather than increasing the trust between them, which was badly needed.

The Secretary continued that something needed to be done. He did not know if Shevardnadze had any thoughts about the Daniloff question or not. The US side had made a proposal to the Soviet side, which the Secretary would be glad to discuss further, but he was

⁴ See Document 271.

interested in any reaction which Shevardnadze might have to what he had said.

Shevardnadze replied that since his arrival in the United States the day before yesterday he had been trying to assess the general atmosphere on the basis of the press and the normal information which they obtained. He felt that a great propaganda machine had been set in motion, which was working to the detriment of Soviet-American relations. He had no doubt that there were strong forces in the US which did not wish for an improvement of Soviet-American relations. If the cases of Daniloff and Zakharov did not exist, he was sure that other pretexts could be found to poison the atmosphere and undermine the basis for a Summit. Shevardnadze had become even more convinced of this yesterday and today because of the action of expelling 25 Soviet UN employees.⁵ This was an action which will not help to resolve the issue of Daniloff and Zakharov. On the contrary, it has created a new situation which would make it more difficult to resolve things.

Shevardnadze continued that the Secretary had not known what Shevardnadze was coming with. Perhaps he had an interesting proposal about Daniloff and Zakharov which would have been acceptable to both sides. He was greatly surprised that without knowing the history or the basis of the Daniloff case everyone in the US had become involved in the propaganda machine, which was now difficult to stop. This included the President, the Secretary of State, the Congress—no one was left out. But no one had asked whether Daniloff should be answerable to Soviet law. It was not important whether or not he was an agent of the CIA. The main thing was whether or not he should be answerable to Soviet law.

The Secretary interjected that there was no argument that any person in any other country must be subject to the laws of that country. But a charge of espionage carries the assertion that a person is connected in his actions with a foreign government—is employed by that government, paid by it, or acting on its instructions. The US knows that Daniloff was not acting in that capacity vis-a-vis the US government.

Shevardnadze asked if the US would believe the Soviet side when it said that Zakharov was also not working on the instructions of the Soviet government.

The Secretary replied that the US had definite evidence to the contrary.

Shevardnadze indicated that the Soviet side also had documents.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 281.

Shultz stated that it was not possible to have documented evidence about something that was not so. The Soviet side might think that this was so, but it was not.

Shevardnadze asked if the US could rule out the possibility of Daniloff's working for English or French intelligence, or some other country if he were not employed by the CIA.

The Secretary replied that the US did not know what British and French intelligence might be doing, it only knew about what its people were doing. But on the basis of what he knew about Daniloff, he would be surprised if Daniloff had any connections with any intelligence agencies of other countries.

Shevardnadze asked if the Secretary believed that anyone could be charged in the Soviet Union with a criminal offense without sufficient probability of guilt. The Soviet Union would not risk doing this, since the fact that its allegations were unfounded would come out into the open at the trial. During the very first days, the Soviet side sent some materials to the US which were part of the evidence gathered. This was done in order to keep the situation from getting out of hand.

The Secretary replied that the US side did not consider this material to be very convincing.

Shevardnadze replied that there were doubts on the Soviet side about sending this material, since it was a part of the investigation, but Gorbachev himself said that this should be done in order that the President be informed that Daniloff should be answerable under Soviet law, and that there was a sufficient basis for this. Shevardnadze said that he was not saying that there was one hundred percent certainty, but that there were enough materials to know that the decision had a fair basis, and that Daniloff's case had nothing in common with Zakharov's.

The Secretary indicated that this was one proposition with which the US could agree.

Shevardnadze then discussed at length the detrimental effect which the action to expel 25 US diplomats would have if it were not resolved. This was a new stage of Soviet-US confrontation, and the USSR would have to reply in kind. If it had not been for this last action, Shevardnadze had thought that the best way out would be to make some fast decisions. Both Daniloff and Zakharov could be freed without a trial within a matter of days. Or if the US side thought that a trial was necessary, the Soviet side did not object. Both Daniloff and Zakharov could be tried, and the process could be accelerated to take one week or ten days—the earlier, the better. Subsequently, further similar actions could be taken between the governments. From the point of view of propaganda, these could appear to be separate issues, and would be such.

Shevardnadze stressed that a basic decision needed to be made. He said that it had been wise to free the people involved into the custody of the Ambassadors. Further actions should also be taken without unnecessary dramatization.

Shevardnadze indicated that if agreement could be reached in principle about a Summit meeting, this would resolve much, and would permit the adoption of action decisions on all issues which could otherwise hinder a Summit.

Shevardnadze again stressed the very detrimental effect of the action to expel the UN diplomats.

The Secretary then said that he would try to outline where he thought the two sides stood on the Daniloff case. Both sides had said that the Daniloff and Zakharov cases were different, and should be treated differently. The Secretary did not know what thoughts Shevardnadze had on this score, but the US had made a proposal he wished to repeat, since a similar situation had arisen before. The proposal was that certain individuals (a list of names had been given, but there could be others) would be allowed to leave the Soviet Union. The sequencing and description of these things would need to be discussed, but it would follow along the lines of past patterns. These would be people who the US felt should emigrate and they could be released as a humanitarian gesture.

Shevardnadze indicated that the question of emigration was a separate issue, and that the Secretary should not have brought it up at this meeting. There should be no connection between this issue and the Daniloff and Zakharov cases.

The Secretary continued that he wished to follow up on Shevardnadze's remark that the Daniloff and Zakharov cases were not related. Suppose that Shevardnadze and the Secretary agreed that within a short time three unrelated events (as they would be described) would take place. The first would be that Daniloff would leave the USSR. The second would be that Zakharov would leave the US. The third would be (and this could take place simultaneously) that a group of people of the type that he had described (the Secretary said that Shevardnadze had mentioned Sakharov and Bonner, and Orlov) could leave the USSR. Shevardnadze replied that with regard to the first two cases, i.e. Daniloff and Zakharov, he had indicated that the sooner these were resolved, the better.

Shevardnadze continued that he considered the third question to be a separate one. There had been a certain practice in this area. Lists had been presented by the Secretary, Ambassador Hartman and The President. Shevardnadze did not exclude the continuation of this prac-

tice. These lists would be carefully examined, as had been previously done. If Soviet law permitted, appropriate decisions would be taken.

The Secretary indicated that if progress were to be made in defusing the situation, an understanding would need to be reached about this before matters could proceed further.

Shevardnadze emphasized that letting Sakharov out of the country was out of the question. Sakharov understood this and did not insist on it. He understood that he knew many things, and American scientists were also aware of the things which he knew. This was a useless endeavor.

The Secretary interjected that Sakharov could be allowed to live in Moscow.

Shevardnadze replied that this was a question for the Soviet side to decide.

The Secretary gave some other names: Orlov, Nudel, the Meimans, Begun and Goldfarb, an acquaintance of Daniloff. The Secretary indicated that he was not trying to argue, but was trying to explore ways of getting a clear understanding of where the two sides were, which he could then report to the President, and which could help defuse the situation, but he did not yet understand if this third basket, which was not related to the other issues, could become a part of the private discussion.

Shevardnadze indicated that he did not know the names mentioned very well, but that was not the main thing. He could not give an immediate reply. Perhaps present practice would continue, whereby the Secretary would present a list, and the Soviet side would examine it to see if a solution were possible. As the President had said, these issues needed to be resolved confidentially, without a lot of noise.

The Secretary said that the President still respected this approach.

Shevardnadze indicated that the Soviet side took this into consideration in making many of its decisions.

The Secretary asked Shevardnadze if he would be prepared to work at this issue, thinking of three events which would be described as unrelated, but which would take place approximately at the same time in accordance with an agreement between the sides. The three events would be the release of Daniloff, the release of Zakharov, and the release of a group of Soviets of the type the Secretary had described. If that structure were agreed upon, there could be a decision on specific names, and an agreement could be reached on this as quickly as possible. But the Secretary did not know if this approach was acceptable to Shevardnadze.

Shevardnadze indicated that there was no connection between the first two issues and emigration. The two main issues to be resolved were Daniloff and Zakharov. He had made two proposals: The first was to free both of them immediately. The second was to have a quick trial, followed by an exchange in a relatively short time. With regard to the third question, after US-Soviet meetings in the past, the Soviet side had been given lists by the US side. The same could be done now, and the Soviet side would make appropriate decisions. Shevardnadze did not think that he could be any more specific, since these were unrelated areas.

The Secretary indicated that the US side could give the Soviet side a list this afternoon, and if the Soviet side could agree to specific names the following day, together with a time frame, this could be a basis for proceeding. But the Secretary considered that there would need to be agreement in private about this before anything else could happen, and he believed that this was the President's view as well.

Shevardnadze said that the most he could do would be to have the US present such a list and that he would promise to examine it and resolve it on the basis of Soviet law. The US side could not present other preconditions.

The Secretary thought that the present situation could be described as follows: the Soviet side has proposed the release of two individuals, whose cases are not related. The US would study this proposal. The US would present a list of Soviet citizens for emigration from the Soviet union in accordance with Soviet law, and the Soviet side would study this list. Then perhaps the Soviet side would inform the US of its decision with regard to the list and the US would inform the Soviet side of its decision with regard to the Soviet side's proposal.

Shevardnadze replied that on the first two issues there was no difference between the two sides' approach. On the third one a list would be transmitted and the Soviet side would study it with the aim of possibly resolving these issues without an indication of a time frame, since these questions demand time for study, as the Secretary realized.

The Secretary then indicated that he would call the President to arrange a meeting.

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

12:15–1:00

In his meeting with the President, Shevardnadze described the contents of Gorbachev's letter, and indicated that Gorbachev thought that a meeting of the leaders of the two countries was necessary in the

current crisis situation between them.⁶ It could be a brief, one-day meeting, perhaps in Iceland or London or some other place, of very limited composition, perhaps one-on-one or with a participation of the Foreign Ministers, in order to give instructions to the appropriate agencies to prepare agreements in the areas which Shevardnadze had mentioned, i.e. the ABM treaty, INF, etc.⁷ Dates could be set and a time-table laid out for working out agreements to be signed during a Summit in the US.

The President replied that he understood the importance of a meeting, but felt that there should be a normal Summit. He then spoke at length and very emotionally about the Daniloff case, indicating that he and all of the people of the US considered Daniloff to be a hostage, and that the situation had to be resolved before anything else could happen.⁸

⁶ In his personal diary on September 19, Reagan wrote: "George S. brought F.M. Shevardnadze (Sov. U.) over to the Oval office to deliver Gorbachev's letter to me. Then he discovered he'd left the letter with his own team. But he had a good set of notes on what it contains so he did a 20 min. speech on it. The Gen. Sec. wants a meeting between him and me in London or Iceland—I opt for Iceland. This would be preparatory to a Summit. I'm agreeable to that but made it plain we want Daniloff returned to us before anything took place. I let the F.M. know I was angry & that I resented their charges that Daniloff was a spy after I had personally given my word that he wasn't. I gave him a little run down on the difference between our 2 systems & told him they couldn't understand the importance we place on the individual because they don't have such a feeling. I enjoyed being angry." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 640)

⁷ In his memoir, Shultz wrote: "Shevardnadze told me he had a letter from Gorbachev to the president. I had arranged with the president that I would call him to bring Shevardnadze over at the moment I thought was appropriate. I picked up the phone in Shevardnadze's presence and asked the president whether we could come to the White House. I told the driver to take us in through the southeast gate to avoid the reporters and staff that hang around the West Wing. I walked Shevardnadze up behind the Rose Garden and into the Cabinet Room. The president was ready, but Shevardnadze now became agitated. He had not expected to see the president this morning, and he suddenly realized that he did not have with him the letter from Gorbachev. He dispatched an aide to fetch it. Shevardnadze met with President Reagan for an hour and could not conceivably have emerged without knowing that the president was truly angry. Ronald Reagan usually cannot help smiling, but he was not smiling that day. Near the end of the session, Gorbachev's letter was brought in to Shevardnadze, who belatedly handed it to the president. The president did nothing to relieve the tension. He made it obvious to Shevardnadze that no progress could come in the U.S.-Soviet relationship without Daniloff's release. I knew Ronald Reagan was an accomplished actor, but this was no act." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 742–743)

⁸ Soviet interpreter for these meetings, Pavel Palazhchenko, recalled in his memoir: "As we were riding in the Soviet ambassador's car to the White House, Shevardnadze was silent. I had seen many of his silences, which can mean different things to the careful observer. This silence did not seem to bode well. The meeting with Reagan was a real one-on-one, with only the interpreters present. As we were driving back to the embassy about an hour later, the minister's silence was the same as before. He went right to the second floor of the embassy building, where the ambassador's office was located. Ambassador Yury Dubinin, Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh, Sergey

SECRETARY SHULTZ—SHEVARDNADZE
private meeting—5:30–6:00pm⁹

The Secretary used this occasion to pass the promised list to Shevardnadze.¹⁰ He repeated that he regarded the Soviet proposal in itself to be unsatisfactory, but that he would regard it as being on the table, and the US side would think about it, just as the Soviet side would think about the US proposal.

Shevardnadze said that he did not think that the approach should be thus divided. The division should be that the Soviet side would consider the fate of Daniloff and the US side would consider the fate of Zakharov. This would be an equal approach. The third issue was an independent one which he saw as a routine matter raised by the Secretary of State, which the Soviet side would examine with all seriousness.

Shevardnadze then repeated the significance of the issue of the expulsion of Soviet UN personnel, and that if it were not resolved, a reply might be coming from the Soviet side tomorrow or the day after. Then all of the efforts to resolve the above two issues would come to naught. A decision needed to be made before it was too late. If the Soviet side would also reply in kind, there would be no stopping.

The Secretary gave a detailed explanation of the decision to expel the diplomats.

Tarasenko, and Teimuraz Stepanov were waiting there. Shevardnadze indicated that I should enter too. For a couple of minutes everyone sat in silence waiting for someone to utter the first word. Then Dubinin said, 'Eduard Amvrosiyevich, how does it look?' 'How does it look? Not very good,' Shevardnadze answered. He then looked at me and said softly, 'What would you say?' I was surprised that he had asked my opinion. It was unusual. So, maybe out of surprise, I stood up and was silent for a moment. The natural and expected thing would be to echo the minister's words. But I heard myself saying, 'Well, Eduard Amvrosiyevich, it did not look that bad to me. Of course, Reagan repeated the American position on the espionage matter, and that's quite natural. But he did not put it very harshly. His other remarks seemed more constructive than I had expected. And he did not reject the idea of a meeting with Gorbachev.' The foreign minister listened and did not object, although my assessment probably seemed too rosy for him." (Palazchenko, *My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze*, pp. 52–53)

⁹ Prior to this 5:30 p.m. meeting, Shultz and Shevardnadze met from 3 to 5:25 p.m. For the record of the meeting, see Document 284.

¹⁰ In his memoir, Shultz wrote: "I gave Shevardnadze in our private meeting two lists with names of people who wanted to emigrate from the Soviet Union and who, we felt, should be allowed to do so: one was a list of Soviet Jews given me by Morris Abram, chairman of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry; the other was a list of Soviet dissidents." Shultz recalled that the "Soviets were getting tough: they were going to fight us tooth and nail on the UN ouster. Zakharov was merely a poor, innocent student, they said; they could try, convict, and keep Daniloff in the Soviet Union forever. In our private talks, I stressed Daniloff; Shevardnadze stressed a summit." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 743–744)

Shevardnadze repeated that he would like to ask the Secretary to give a concrete reply about this the following day, since he needed to inform Moscow about this tomorrow. Actions might be taken whose consequences might be difficult to predict. As far as the Daniloff and Zakharov cases were concerned, the faster these were resolved, the better. The Soviet side would seriously examine the US list.

Shevardnadze continued that he did not doubt that it would be useful for the President and the General Secretary to meet (before the Summit in the US). Much could be done in one day. Solutions could be found to many issues on the basis of decisions taken by the leaders of the two countries.

The Secretary indicated that he was inclined to agree.

Shevardnadze said that Gorbachev had not taken this decision immediately, but had considered it in the light of internal affairs, international affairs, and the opinion of world leaders. He had also thought about how it would look domestically for the President, and had concluded that it would not be against his domestic interests. If such a meeting were to take place, then all other smaller issues would be resolved before the main Summit meeting.

The Secretary indicated that he would speak about the UN situation tomorrow. He did not have anything in mind, but he would consult with the President. The US would think about Zakharov and the Soviet side would think about Daniloff. He felt sure that we would not want to end our thinking until the Soviet side gave its reply to the US list (all of these issues being regarded as independent).

The Secretary told Shevardnadze that the President wished to ask him if Gorbachev had any specific dates in mind for the Summit.

Shevardnadze replied that Gorbachev felt that the sooner it would take place, the better, but this would depend on the possibilities of the President, and the Soviet side would consider dates proposed by the US side.

The Secretary repeated that the Soviet side had indicated that the sooner the Summit took place, the better, and that the Soviet side was asking the US side to make a proposal about the dates.

Shevardnadze replied that perhaps the US could at least indicate which dates would be convenient.

284. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 19, 1986, 3–5:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

Shultz-Shevardnadze Plenary on Arms Control

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Secretary Shultz
Ambassador Nitze
Ambassador Ridgway
Ambassador Hartman
Ambassador Matlock
ASD Richard Perle
DAS Tom Simons
Robert Linhard, NSC
Mark Parris, Director, EUR/SOV
Dimitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)

U.S.S.R.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Deputy FM Bessmertnykh
Ambassador Dubinin
Ambassador Karpov
Minister-Counselor Sokolov
T.G. Stepanov (Soviet MFA)
S.P. Tarasenko (Soviet MFA)
V.A. Mikol'chak, Deputy Chief,
USA and Canada Division,
MFA
P.R. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

The *Secretary* started by noting that the purpose of the meeting, as he understood it, was to take stock of where the two sides stood in the various areas of the relationship. We should record agreement where it exists and identify differences where it does not. We should discuss those differences, and possibly give our negotiators in whatever forum some help to move forward.

In planning for the meeting, it was the *Secretary's* understanding that agreement had been reached to start with arms control. We could then discuss regional issues, humanitarian problems, and bilateral questions, winding up with a Saturday afternoon summation of the discussions.² If that approach corresponded to the Foreign Minister's understanding, we might begin the arms control discussion directly.

Shevardnadze accepted the scenario outlined by the *Secretary*, and agreed that the *Secretary* should make the initial presentation.

CDE

As he and *Shevardnadze* were meeting on September 19, the final day of the Stockholm CDE conference, the *Secretary* felt it would be

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 4D, 1986 Soviet Union September. Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information. Cleared by Davies and Pascoe. An unknown hand initialed for Pascoe. The meeting took place at the Department of State. For the records of the morning and afternoon meetings of Shultz and *Shevardnadze*, and the Reagan-Shevardnadze meeting, see Document 283.

² September 20.

appropriate to begin there. We understood from our delegation that progress was being made—albeit slowly—in the final hours of the conference. The U.S. believed that a successful conclusion was important. We were working in that spirit, had told our negotiators so, and assumed the Soviets had done the same. It seemed likely that, by the time the present meeting broke up, our negotiators in Stockholm would still be working. So we should keep track of their progress, and be in a position to give them an impulse as necessary.

Shevardnadze felt it was “proper” to begin the conversation with a negotiation where positive results seemed about to emerge. The Stockholm conference was an example of both sides wanting to make progress and cooperating in a manner to make it possible. This was true not just for the Soviet and American delegations, but between the countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in general. While *Shevardnadze*’s information was probably not as “fresh” as the Secretary’s, as of the day before *Shevardnadze* had felt there was reason for hope that the conference could end with positive results. If so, it would be because our two delegations had played some role. The two heads of delegation had maintained businesslike relations; this had been important, especially in the concluding stages of the conference.

On a more general plane, *Shevardnadze* continued, the negotiation was a complex one of fundamental importance. It could end with a positive result, opening up possibilities for expanded cooperation in European security and for the development of the CSCE process. Stockholm could lay a good groundwork for the Vienna Review Conference, and for success in that subsequent meeting. The Soviet Union attached importance to the Vienna meeting; of that there should be no mistake.

As for the Stockholm meeting, it had proven that countries from different political/military organizations could find sufficient common ground to enhance European security. The complexity of the areas under discussion, whether having to do with arms control, inspections, or other issues, had not prevented this. Thus, one could be optimistic with respect to the ultimate result, if all went according to plan. A successful outcome was possible “if nothing snaps today or tomorrow.”

The *Secretary* ran through the outstanding issues, as he understood them, recognizing that it was not up to him and the Foreign Minister to act as negotiators.

On verification, we felt strongly that the levels the Soviet side was insisting upon were too high. They would exclude important exercises. A level of 14,000 for notification and 18,000 for observation was too high. We believed that a 10,000 man level for notification, and a 15,000 level for observers would make agreement meaningful.

On inspection, we had been forthcoming on the nationality of aircraft. For observer missions to be meaningful, however, the observ-

ing side needed to have its own cameras and navigation equipment. The observing side needed to have someone on the flight deck with communications with inspectors on the ground. There needed to be communications with people on the ground. There had to be a choice between various modes of inspection: helicopters, fixed wing aircraft. And there had to be a provision for inspection within thirty-six hours of a challenge. Acceptance of these modalities would give the concept of inspection meaning. We also wanted the inspected state to have the choice of being inspected by either its own equipment or by equipment of a third, neutral state.

In short, the Secretary concluded, we felt we had taken some significant steps. We hoped it would be possible to come to grips with the remaining, important details and finish the matter in Stockholm.

Shevardnadze commented in responding that the situation the Secretary had described struck him as having already been overtaken by events. Verification thresholds, for example, had been discussed the day before (September 18). The Soviet position had been accepted, *Shevardnadze* believed, by most countries in the conference, especially the neutrals and non-aligned. With respect to inspections, the discussion had similarly concluded, or was about to conclude—at least on the main issues. The question of third-country aircraft was an “artificial” complication. Most countries at the conference shared the Soviet view that use of inspected countries’ aircraft was the most practical approach to the problem. Any other created thousands of technical complications. As to the question of ground inspections, *Shevardnadze* did not think the problems involved could not be resolved.

Thus, the Foreign Minister was encouraged by the information available to him. As to the question of which side had been most forthcoming in presenting compromise proposals, it would be better not to begin a debate. *Shevardnadze* would only note that there was not a single issue on which the Soviets had not introduced new proposals—compromise proposals. This had been particularly difficult for Moscow on the question of opening up its territory for inspection. This was easy for the United States, whose territory would be excluded. *Shevardnadze* acknowledged the Secretary’s interjection that the U.S. could not be indifferent to inspection of the territory of its allies, on some of which U.S. forces were based. *Shevardnadze* insisted, however, that this was “not the same thing” as opening up one’s own territory for inspection. This had been a significant decision for Moscow.

Overall, therefore, while it was still impossible to tell what would happen during the day in Stockholm, *Shevardnadze* said he believed the conference there had resulted in businesslike treatment of some complex questions. There was a chance to end with positive results. He emphasized that our two delegations had cooperated well in pursuit of this end.

The *Secretary* suggested that he and the Foreign Minister get an update on progress in Stockholm after the current session. They might want to give their respective delegations a push to help get things settled.

Shevardnadze noted the *Secretary's* earlier remark that the U.S. was giving its delegation instructions to work for a constructive outcome in Stockholm. The Soviets, for their part, were doing so several times a day. The two sides should work for the logical completion of some very substantial, very important work. Unfortunately, there were too few fora of which this could be said. Surveying the reactions on the U.S. side of the table, *Shevardnadze* remarked jocularly that Amb. Nitze did not seem to agree.

NST

Turning from the Stockholm conference, the *Secretary* indicated he would like to start an expanded discussion of arms control issues with START. This was a logical departure point since both sides had agreed in Geneva and in subsequent exchanges on the importance of radical reductions in offensive strategic arms. This was a field, moreover, in which the two sides had many years of experience. We understood the issues well. Now was the time to take practical steps.

The *Secretary* said the U.S. had noted the steps suggested by the Soviet experts two weeks earlier, and said he was certain the Soviet side had a report of the new proposal Ambassador Lehman had made in Geneva yesterday. The *Secretary* said his remarks would be based on the summer discussions, because from what was being said by the Soviets in Geneva, it seemed as if the summer discussions had never taken place.

The *Secretary* recalled that 18 months ago when the Nuclear and Space Talks had begun, the Soviet side had been talking about strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) and "charges," whereas the U.S. had been talking about warheads and throwweight, and there was very little common ground. We had come a long way, to the point where we are closing in on a substantial START agreement. He noted that this was no small achievement, to which both sides have contributed. Our job was to accelerate this process.

The heart of the matter, the *Secretary* continued, was the constraint on ballistic missile warheads. These represented the majority of strategic weapons on both sides, the primary threat to stability. If we are to reduce substantially, and do so in a manner which enhances stability, we must focus on missile warheads.

The *Secretary* recalled that, at the Geneva summit, our leaders had agreed to the concept of 50% reductions. The U.S. had proposed a level of 4500 ballistic missile warheads, roughly half the current number on both sides.

The Secretary noted that the Soviet experts had made a suggestion that would in effect place a ceiling of 6400–6800 on ballistic missile warheads. He acknowledged that Soviet recognition of the need for constraints on this category of weapons was a constructive step, but, he said, 6400 was too high.

In response to the proposal the Soviet side had made at the last round in Geneva, the President made clear in his letter to Gorbachev that he is prepared to consider reductions less sweeping than 50%, as a step toward 50% and below. In particular, the U.S. can accept in this context a limit of 5500 ballistic missile warheads.

The Secretary said that if the two sides could agree on this ceiling on ballistic missile warheads, we could then build the basic elements of an agreement around this core. There should be sublimits to deal with special concerns, such as warheads on heavy ICBMs and heavily MIRVed ICBMs because they pose the greatest threat to stability.

The Secretary said missile throwweight should also be reduced; 50% is a figure that both sides have used. Throwweight in a sense measures the potential number of warheads, so it makes sense to reduce throwweight in a predictable way as we reduce warheads.

The Secretary noted that the Soviets had for some time made a major issue of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). He went on to say that the U.S. did not accept the Soviet contention that these missiles are particularly troublesome. They take hours to reach their targets, and are good primarily for retaliation and deterrence. The U.S. deploys them only because Soviet air defenses threaten the ability of our bombers to reach their targets. The U.S. is not impressed with the Soviet arguments.

But, as part of a package sharply reducing ballistic missile warheads, the Secretary said, we are prepared to constrain ALCMs.

So in the context of agreement on 5500 ballistic missile warheads and the sublimits Amb. Lehman proposed yesterday in Geneva, the Secretary said we had suggested an aggregate ceiling of 7500 ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs. This is a major step the U.S. was prepared to take to meet Soviet concerns.

Secretary Shultz recalled that past Soviet proposals had dealt with “nuclear charges”, which introduces two additional elements, bomber weapons and SLCMs. Again, bombers take hours to reach their targets, so they do not pose the counter-force first-strike threat of ballistic missile warheads, and they face vast, unconstrained air defenses, which are being modernized. It makes no sense to equate bomber weapons with ballistic missile warheads. But, he said, in the context of reductions along the lines discussed here, the U.S. could consider a limit on the number of bombers. As a practical matter, this would bound the number of bomber weapons which can usefully be carried.

So, the Secretary observed, we are putting together the structure of an agreement that meets both sides' concerns. In the context of the limits and sublimits the U.S. proposes on warheads, we could accept the Soviet-proposed aggregate ceiling of 1600 on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. This could be the basis of a significant agreement to reduce offensive forces and enhance the stability of the strategic balance.

The Secretary said that if the two sides could work out such a tremendous achievement, it should not be held hostage to progress in other areas.

The U.S. side was prepared for intensive work in the coming weeks to produce an agreed package along lines of those basic elements. We would still have much to do. But an agreement along these lines would be major step forward. The Soviet side could also contribute with a prompt and positive response to the U.S. proposal in Geneva.

Summarizing, the Secretary said these were our ideas and suggestions on how to resolve the difficulties. He said he would be interested in the Soviet side's reactions.

Shevardnadze prefaced his response by observing that he would start "from the other end of the question." The proper point of departure, he thought, was the "well-known statement" the Secretary and former Foreign Minister Gromyko had agreed to in January, 1985, and the joint statement issued by the President and General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. These important documents had emphasized the idea that the various components—space, strategic offensive arms, and medium-range nuclear weapons—constituted a single "complex," a whole. The current task was to prevent an arms race in space and to end unrestrained competition in nuclear arms on earth. The two concepts could not be separated.

It was the Soviet impression that the U.S. sought to pull out individual elements from the complex. The U.S. claimed, for example, that Soviet ICBMs were the most destabilizing factor in the equation. In fact, the most destabilizing factor was the U.S. program to develop "space-strike weapons"—the so-called SDI.

But the Secretary, *Shevardnadze* continued, was an experienced man. He knew the record. If one looked back to the seventies, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had been moving toward agreement on arms limitation. There had been many differences, many complaints, but many questions had been resolved. There had been concrete agreements: the SALT I interim agreement; the ABM Treaty; the SALT II accord; agreement to ban nuclear testing in three spheres. Thus there was progress not only toward limiting nuclear armaments, but toward their reduction.

A problem arose, however, with the decision of the U.S. to implement a system of ballistic missile defense. This had become the most

destabilizing factor in the relationship. Admitting that he might be wrong, Shevardnadze opined that the most important task for the moment seemed to him to be how to deal with the ABM Treaty. Gorbachev's letter to the President (NOTE: he did not specify which one) mentioned this problem. It had been raised before by the General Secretary in Geneva and in subsequent correspondence with the President. Strengthening the ABM regime was the most important question facing us.

Shevardnadze did not mean to say that there were no glimmers of light. The President's most recent letter had spoken of a certain timetable with respect to an obligation not to withdraw from the Treaty. Moscow saw the context of such an obligation differently from Washington. The U.S. seemed to want a timetable to weaken gradually that obligation; the Soviets wanted to strengthen it.

The President's inclusion of a timetable was nonetheless a positive element. The President had spoken in terms of seven and a half years; Karpov had presented in Geneva a Soviet proposal for fifteen to twenty years. The letter Shevardnadze had given the President earlier in the day had referred to a pledge not to withdraw from the Treaty for "up to fifteen years."³ This should provide a basis for the two delegations to look for a mutually acceptable solution.

If it were possible to agree on measures to strengthen the ABM Treaty, Shevardnadze continued, it would be possible to deal with the question of reducing and moving toward elimination of offensive weapons, including ballistic missiles. To a degree, the Soviet side saw this as a "precondition"—a "demand." In the absence of measures to strengthen the Treaty, any discussion of limiting offensive armaments such as ballistic missiles was simply not realistic. This was not caprice on the Soviets' part; their security demands it. They would not allow the U.S. to implement its "star wars plan." That was the first general point Shevardnadze wanted to make.

The second would be no surprise: the Soviet Union was categorically against the testing and deployment of space strike weapons. One could use different terminology to describe such systems: space strike weapons; weapons of mass destruction in space, etc. They amounted to the same thing.

The Soviets had made serious compromise proposals in Geneva in this regard, Shevardnadze said. Within the confines of laboratories, work on all aspects of ballistic missile defense—including space-based systems—might proceed. Laboratory work would not be limited. The

³ See Documents 280 and 283.

U.S. used to complain that the Russians wanted to stop basic research. This argument could no longer be used.

The Soviets had noted what might be an important formulation in the President's July 25 letter: that the U.S. would be prepared to examine the question of banning—non-development and non-deployment—in space of weapons of mass destruction for use against targets on earth. Soviet experts had sought in discussions over the summer with their American counterparts to determine the significance of this language, to see if there was anything in common between the language of the President's letter and Soviet proposals. There had been no definitive answer. If, however, there were something in common between the President's formulation and the Soviet view of space strike weapons, it would create favorable conditions to move forward, Shevardnadze said.

Soviet experts during the two summer sessions had also proposed an effort to define the line between permitted and prohibited activities under the ABM Treaty with respect to ballistic missile defense components. There appeared to be fundamental differences in the two sides' positions on this issue. The Soviets would therefore like to have special groups work on this question: what is permitted; what is banned?

The *Secretary* asked Shevardnadze to repeat precisely what the Soviet side was proposing be examined.

Shevardnadze said the subject would be "work on components of ballistic missile defense: what would be permitted; what would be banned in the framework of the ABM Treaty." The *Secretary* thanked Shevardnadze for the clarification.

Shevardnadze continued that this was a complex but fundamental question. But without solving it, we could not talk about limiting offensive nuclear weapons. The important thing, he emphasized, was to strengthen the ABM Treaty regime.

With respect to the proposals the U.S. had just made in Geneva on START, it would be relatively easy for our delegations to find common ground—even on the problem of ballistic missiles—if it were possible to clarify the main questions he had just mentioned. There were, of course, differences in a number of areas on the offensive side: SLCMs were a problem; the percentage by which nuclear weapons would be reduced was another. Shevardnadze did not rule out that the new U.S. proposals contained positive elements (although he had not detected any particular enthusiasm from Karpov upon being briefed about them). They certainly deserved careful study. But the main task was to clarify the fundamental issues Shevardnadze had addressed. Outer space and the ABM Treaty is the cornerstone, and we need it first. He did not think that fifty or a hundred warheads one way or the other was so important. These kinds of questions could be

dealt with by our negotiators if they had straightforward instructions. We had proved this in Geneva, when, although work had gone on past 1:00, problems which appeared no less difficult had been dealt with once our representatives received instructions to produce results. Shevardnadze invited Karpov to elaborate on his remarks.

The *Secretary* remarked that it was easier for the Foreign Minister than for Karpov to be flexible. Karpov was very tough.

Shevardnadze cracked that this may be the first time the *Secretary* had been exposed to Karpov in the flesh. *Shevardnadze* was seeing Nitze for the fourth time. Nitze also didn't give ground easily.

The *Secretary* pointed out that he had met Karpov in Geneva. This was the first time, however, he had seen him smile.

Shevardnadze admitted that Karpov might have his "sins," but felt they were no more than Nitze's.

The *Secretary* asked to comment on *Shevardnadze's* remarks, which he welcomed. He hoped that *Shevardnadze's* reference to "fifty or a hundred missiles" meant that, under the right circumstances, Moscow might be able to accept the new situation outlined in the START proposal we had just made. Whether one linked something with something else or not, it was important to see what progress might be made. Karpov would recall that, in January 1985, the *Secretary* and Gromyko had left the linkage question to be dealt with when there was agreement on something. We were proceeding in this spirit. What the *Secretary* wanted to do for the moment, however, was to step back from the details and make a more general statement. The *Secretary* hoped to give *Shevardnadze* some sense of the President's thinking in his July 25 letter on how to integrate reductions in offensive ballistic missiles with strategic defense.

The *Secretary* said the President had listened to the concerns the Soviets had expressed about the U.S. SDI program and had sought to take them into account in his proposal of July 25 to General Secretary Gorbachev. The *Secretary* wanted to explain the underlying concept behind the President's proposal and why he believes it offers a constructive way forward that would enhance the stability of our strategic relationship in a manner that would leave both sides more secure at every stage, while diminishing the burden we are both assuming in the continuous modernization and expansion of strategic offensive missile forces.

The *Secretary* went on to say that the President's proposal entails careful management of a transition to force structures in which there is a stabilizing balance between offensive and defensive weapons. It would in fact lead to the total elimination of offensive ballistic missiles. It would accommodate Soviet concerns, as expressed. It would carry

forward a process in which each new stage would be safer and more stable than the one that preceded it, beginning now.

The Secretary noted that Soviet concerns appeared to fall into two categories.

First, the Soviet side had suggested that our defenses might be used offensively to attack targets on Soviet territory. The Secretary assured Shevardnadze that they are not being developed for that purpose. If our program were aimed at the development of space weapons of an offensive nature we would be foolish to divert considerable technical and financial resources away from such a development to work in defensive systems. Nothing now limits our freedom to develop offensive weapons in space except the Outer Space Treaty; and that only applies to weapons of mass destruction. So why would we develop sensing, tracking, battle-management, computer and lethal devices competent for defensive purposes if our requirement were for offensive purposes? Such an approach would be so inefficient that the U.S. was puzzled as to what offensive systems the Soviet side had in mind when it expressed the concern that SDI could be used for offensive purposes. The Secretary said he had heard the argument that the SDI program would inevitably lead to the development of broad areas of technology that will be found to have offensive applications. But the quickest, surest and most effective way to develop offensive technology is to do so directly. Counting on offensive spin-offs from a defensive program makes no sense.

Second, the Secretary recalled the Soviet suggestion that the U.S. might launch a first strike against the Soviet Union and use its defenses to defeat a Soviet retaliatory strike. Mr. Gorbachev had also said this in Geneva. This is just another way of saying that certain force configurations made up of both offensive and defensive systems could be used in combination to defeat an opposing deterrent force. That is not the U.S. objective. The Secretary noted, however, that Soviet concern on this point had led the President to propose that we sign a treaty now that would lead to the elimination of *all* offensive ballistic missiles. If neither side had offensive ballistic missiles then defensive weapons would have no targets. They would add nothing to our ability to defeat the Soviet deterrent, or the Soviet ability to defeat ours, both of which would be made up of other, more stable weapons. The defenses the U.S. would possess under the President's proposal would reinforce the stability that we would have achieved by the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles. And they would protect both sides against cheating or the ballistic missiles of third countries.

This, the Secretary said, was the strategic logic of the President's proposal: eliminate the offensive missiles and render the defensive ones irrelevant to the strategic balance between us. The issue of a

combination of offensive and defensive forces giving one side or the other an advantage would not arise. We would both have eliminated those weapons which can strike in a matter of minutes and which cannot be recalled. We would have ended once and for all the instability that results from fears of a disarming missile strike. And we will have relieved both sides of the need constantly to improve and enlarge its missile forces to keep pace with developments on the other side. At present the U.S. is driven to respond to each improvement in the Soviet missile forces with new and improved offensive systems on our side. And perhaps the Soviet side is driven similarly.

What the U.S. is seeking, the Secretary said, is the replacement of offensive ballistic missiles with defensive ones in a phased manner that provides greater stability at each stage in the disarmament process. And we are prepared to go so far as sharing the fruits of our defensive research in conjunction with the elimination of ballistic missiles by agreeing now to a Treaty that would provide for both sides of the equation: elimination of offensive ballistic missiles and their substitution with defensive weapons. When we started discussions of this within the U.S. Government, the implications for substance were seen as of such importance that those present took their breath in a couple of times. This is a bold initiative, quite parallel to the General Secretary's January 15 program for the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

The Secretary pointed out that, obviously, if the two sides agreed to the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles, the level of defenses required to sustain the stability of the greatly altered strategic relationship that would then exist would be relatively modest. As the third country threat would likely be small—perhaps it too, could be negotiated away—and the insurance needed to give both sides security against it, or against cheating, would also be small, we would not need massive strategic defenses. Thus, the nature and scope of the defenses would look very different than if we are deploying defenses in the face of massive missile forces of the sort that exist today.

Equally obvious, the Secretary said, would be the need to curtail significantly those other strategic weapons, bombers and cruise missiles, on which we would rely for deterrence. In a sense we would be returning to the situation that existed before the rise of ballistic missiles, in large numbers, as the central elements of our strategic forces.

The Secretary pointed out that neither bombers nor cruise missiles are suitable for surprise attack. Deterrent forces based on these weapons would be far more stable than the current situation in which the technical possibility of instantaneous launching of ballistic missiles causes such understandable concern.

The Secretary said he was reminded of Gorbachev's declaring to the President that there was a great pile of strategic missiles that needed to be eliminated. The President had now responded.

The Secretary noted that important issues of timing and phasing needed to be considered. The Foreign Minister had mentioned them in his presentation. The Secretary assured Shevardnadze that the principle on which we would engage on those issues would be an equitable search for stability at every stage.

In conclusion, the Secretary said he realized this was a bold step that would require much new thinking and serious negotiation.

The Secretary apologized for speaking at such length, but the problems he had been discussing were central. He had sought to give some sense of how the President's proposal in a single breath incorporated Soviet suggestions for elimination of nuclear weapons, as well as the linkage between offense and defense. We would reflect on the concrete statements the Foreign Minister had made. Finally, we would welcome any comments he might have on the new ideas we had outlined for the START negotiations, although, from what Shevardnadze had said earlier, there may be none.

Shevardnadze responded that the Soviets would have to think over the new American Geneva proposals before giving any evaluation. He appreciated the detailed explanation the Secretary had provided of U.S. positions. All the material on our most recent proposals would be carefully studied, especially that which had emerged from the Moscow and Washington meetings of U.S.-Soviet arms control experts over the summer. Shevardnadze had read the statements made by all the U.S. representatives—and especially those by Mr. Perle—with great attention.⁴

The *Secretary* speculated that the reason for that was that, if Perle agreed, anyone would agree. *Shevardnadze* replied that Perle was well known to be an expert in his field. He had also spoken in Moscow in conceptual terms, which the Foreign Minister had found interesting. The Secretary said that he had asked Perle to participate in today's meeting as a means of illustrating that, despite so many reports of arguments within the Administration, we had assembled a unified delegation. And besides, if Perle disagrees with anything the Secretary said, the Secretary would knock his head off.

Shevardnadze said his own reference to Perle did not mean that he found the remarks of any of the other members of the U.S. team which had visited Moscow—Amb. Nitze, for instance—less interesting. But he had asked his experts to comment on what Perle had said there. Karpov had confirmed that Perle's remarks were not something that had been said before. The Foreign Minister at the time had suggested in reply that perhaps the Soviets had fallen a little behind. Maybe there

⁴ See Documents 263 and 275.

was something reasonable here. It would be important to retain a positive attitude. After all, in such matters, we were responsible not just to our own generation, but to the next, to the generations of the next century. This was a crucial time.

Shevardnadze continued that he did not rule out that the President believes that SDI can save the U.S., perhaps even the world. But, on the other hand, one had to look at the facts. These inescapably led to the conclusion that SDI had become the most destabilizing factor in the strategic equation.

Thus, when the U.S. spoke of developing a “modest” ballistic missile defense system, the scope of the effort, the resources being invested, one had to conclude that, no matter how one might try to see the program as innocent, it meant the right to strike first with impunity. The debate on SDI among America’s allies and among its own scientists testified to this. The problem came down to this: it was impossible to predict the future; the development of a system such as SDI could ultimately not be controlled. This could lead to a catastrophe.

Shevardnadze noted that the Secretary had said the President’s letter had responded to some of Gorbachev’s concerns. But what did the President’s letter say? Over a five-year period the two sides would do research, development and “testing.” Then they would test. Then there would be negotiation. Then either of the two sides would be free to deploy. That was all. These facts nullified the assurances the Secretary had given about the innocent nature of SDI.

The *Secretary* interjected that it was hard to see how defensive systems could be used for a first strike if ballistic missiles had been eliminated, as the President had called for. What would be left was the need for an insurance policy to deal with slow systems. But if one could get rid of ballistic missiles, the world would be a safer place. It frankly took the Secretary’s breath away to consider giving up, for example, our SLBMs, which we had always considered essential to our defense. Yet that is what the President had proposed.

Shevardnadze, allowing that he might be looking at the problem from too simple a vantage point, said he still did not understand why defensive systems were necessary. It seemed to him that, if one were serious, one would abandon any attempt to develop such systems. Instead, one could eliminate all offensive nuclear weapons—long and medium range—as the Soviets had proposed in January. There would be no need for defensive systems if there were no offensive systems. If one did not believe it was realistic to eliminate offensive systems, that was a different matter. But the Soviets had put forward a program for the abolition of offensive systems, taking fully into account the interests of both countries. Shevardnadze doubted the seriousness of alternative approaches.

On a broader scale, Shevardnadze continued, the U.S. appeared to be trying to eliminate any constraints on armaments. It was not important whether constraints were good or bad; the U.S. wanted to remove them, building both offensive and defensive weapons.

Shevardnadze did not question the Secretary's sincerity, but things sometimes changed. George Shultz was meeting with the Soviet Foreign Minister today; but George Shultz could be replaced. Someone with different views, different ideas might take his place. It was not enough just to have someone's word. The President's letter, for example, had indicated that in seven and a half years a decision to deploy would be made. But even if the Soviets agreed to scrap all offensive weapons during that time frame, it would be physically impossible.

The *Secretary* observed that, with all due respect for both the Foreign Minister and himself, matters such as these could not be handled on the basis of sincerity. As for restraints, the Secretary read from the President's May 27 statement to make clear what the U.S. had in mind:

"As we modernize we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. I do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic forces. Assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the strategic modernization program, the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than does the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the United States will not deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union."⁵

In short, we were prepared to be constrained by whatever the Soviet Union did.

Shevardnadze might have a more legitimate concern with respect to the possibility of a turnover of personnel in this country in the next five years. That was why the President was willing to negotiate a treaty now, while he was in office, to commit us in the future to eliminate ballistic missiles.

With respect to the Foreign Minister's comments on achieving the goal of total elimination of offensive nuclear weapons, all the Secretary could say was, "let's go." We had called for the elimination of a whole class of such weaponry—LRINF. The Soviets had since proposed similar steps. We had proposed more radical reductions in START. If the Soviets wanted to move even faster, we were ready. But there was no doubt that ballistic missiles were destabilizing and had to be dealt with.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 236.

The Secretary recalled how he had said to Bessmertnykh, during the latter's July visit, that we should be sobered by the Chernobyl accident.⁶ Leaving aside blast effects, the secondary effects of a single nuclear warhead would at least be comparable to those of Chernobyl, and perhaps more significant by one or two orders of magnitude. So the President's idea of eliminating ballistic missiles should be taken seriously. As the Secretary looked at the levels which the two sides had proposed for reductions of strategic offensive weapons, of LRINF, of SRINF, the U.S. figures were lower. We would be delighted if Moscow wanted to leap-frog our proposals and suggest even lower levels.

In the meantime, an insurance policy would be needed: both for an end game if we were successful in drastically reducing offensive forces; and because of the formidable size and capabilities of the current Soviet missile force. The more the Soviets were ready to talk about drastic reductions of missile forces, the more they would find us ready.

Shevardnadze noted that the U.S. was very concerned about Soviet ICBMs. For their part, they did not distinguish between our ICBMs and U.S. LRINF in Europe, which could strike the Soviet Union. All were strategic as seen from Moscow.

But the President's letter had said that defensive systems were necessary to deal with third countries which might launch a nuclear attack. The Soviets agreed there should be an insurance policy, but if we were serious about having no nuclear arms, we need an international control regime, as with chemical or biological weapons. The Soviets took this problem seriously. Some means of verification would be necessary to ensure that no state was capable of launching such an attack.

The *Secretary* said we agreed. This was a consideration in our common interest in NPT and ability over the years to work effectively in this field, despite our differences. Implementation of a program such as the President had proposed would strengthen our common position vis-a-vis countries which had resisted accepting the NPT regime on grounds that it deprived them of a sovereign right. It would also help to make possible implementation of the Soviet January proposal to abolish nuclear weapons once and for all. We were in complete accord that we needed to set up an assured regime with strong verification.

Shevardnadze, noting that the conversation was a free-wheeling, conceptual one, speculated that it would be possible to: (a) forswear a ballistic missile defense; (b) eliminate nuclear weapons; and (c) develop a cooperative system which would rule out the emergence of any threat from third countries. This was a realistic approach. *Shevard-*

⁶ See Document 257.

nadze agreed that some countries had not adhered to the NPT due to the possession by other countries of nuclear weapons. If nuclear weapons were abolished, it would strengthen the NPT regime.

Shevardnadze emphasized Moscow was not calling for an end to research. Laboratory work, even the development of mock-ups, could go on as insurance against the contingency that a madman might some day appear. The potential to deal with such an eventuality would remain. Like the U.S., the Soviets were thinking in terms of the end of this century.

So what did the Soviets propose? They felt it would be possible for our delegations in Geneva to move in a number of areas.

—First, they should seek to bring our positions closer together on the obligation not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

—Second, with respect to space-based weapons. Shevardnadze noted that the Soviet term was “space-strike weapons”; the President’s letter had referred to “weapons of mass destruction in space which might be used against targets on earth.” Would the U.S. sign an agreement to ban offensive weapons from space? If so, we might look at the possibility.

—Third, with respect to strategic offensive arms, a compromise approach seemed to be emerging. The Soviets would like to see more ideas from the U.S. It looked to Shevardnadze as if 30% was the most realistic figure for the moment in terms of reductions, although 50% could be considered.

Shevardnadze felt that, if our delegations were given clear instructions, they could search for agreements in these areas. He was not for the moment referring to INF, but he was prepared to. Or perhaps the Secretary would prefer to go first.

The *Secretary* said he would be glad to, but wanted first to make a few points. With respect to space-based systems which could inflict mass destruction upon earth targets, both sides were party to an agreement in this area. We would be prepared to explore further the questions posed by such weapons.

Shevardnadze interrupted to note that the most important thing was an agreement on all aspects of the ABM Treaty.

The *Secretary* called Shevardnadze’s attention to that portion of the President’s letter in which he called for an initial five-year period in which research, development and “testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty.” We had noted Shevardnadze’s comment that the Treaty might be extended for “up to” fifteen years and would think about it. For our part, we hoped the Soviets would consider the deep meaning of the President’s proposals, and especially how closely they relate to the objectives Shevardnadze and the General Secretary had stated.

Shevardnadze recalled that the Secretary had referred to the President's May 27 statement. Shevardnadze had read that statement carefully and with respect. Shevardnadze believed that the President had spoken with authority and for the whole Administration. But no statement could substitute for an agreement. For this reason, the May decision had been a severe and—especially after the Geneva summit—an unexpected blow, a powerful and unjustified blow. Regardless of how it might be described, regardless of what one might say about abiding by it in the future, the President's statement was only a statement. It could not be compared to a treaty, which has the force of law. It affects U.S. statements about the ABM Treaty.

The *Secretary* observed that, from the U.S. vantage point, the Soviets were currently in violation of SALT II, while we were in conformity. It was not possible to observe treaties which the other side was not observing, no matter how much we might like to. The Secretary did not want to get onto a side track in making the point, but he wanted Shevardnadze to understand our thinking on the matter. The Secretary invited some of his arms control advisors to comment, as time was running short.

Shevardnadze interrupted Amb. Nitze's attempt to speak by indicating he would like to address the violation question. Shevardnadze could understand why those who wanted to continue to build weapons, or propagandists, would speak of Soviet violations of arms control agreements. He did not believe it was justified for the Secretary to do so. The Secretary knew there was a specialized body of experts (the SCC) capable of addressing possible violations and establishing where the truth lay.

But even if it were determined that one side had committed a violation, the important thing was for that violation to be corrected. In this regard, the U.S. had claimed that the radar being constructed in Krasnoyarsk—which the Soviets had said was for space-tracking purposes—was a violation. The Soviets had said that, if the U.S. really believed this, the Soviets cared most about their relations with the U.S., about the confidence and trust necessary to the relationship. In this context, the Soviets had expressed a willingness to halt construction on the Krasnoyarsk radar, and put it in mothballs, if the U.S. were prepared to do the same with the radar it was building in Thule, Greenland. The Soviets had made this proposal several times, and were prepared to renew their offer today, if it would remove suspicion on the U.S. side. It would be good if the President and General Secretary could agree to remove areas of concern.

The *Secretary* remarked that he was glad to hear this, and could accept half of the Soviet offer. The problem, he continued, was that the Krasnoyarsk radar was a new installation. We could not judge its

use until it began operation. It was identical to radars used for ABM purposes elsewhere in the U.S.S.R. And the ABM Treaty explicitly required that radars used for ABM be on the periphery of the parties' territory. Thus, Krasnoyarsk was a clear violation of the Treaty.

Thule, on the other hand, was operational when the ABM Treaty was signed. The Treaty explicitly allowed modernization of such facilities. That was what we were doing at Thule. So there was no violation.

But the Secretary was glad that Shevardnadze had responded. As we discussed new things in the arms control field, we could not lose sight of the importance of the need to verify any commitments, or what it might mean if compliance was not honored. Nothing threatened prospects for arms control more than the sense that agreements signed in the past had failed to work as envisaged. We need to build in a very strong verification regime.

Shevardnadze observed that, during his first meetings with the Secretary, when the Secretary had made a point, *Shevardnadze* had not been able to argue. That was no longer the case.

What the U.S. had had in Thule when the ABM Treaty was signed was different from what it had there now. It was not the foundations of the site, but its function and capabilities which were important. Thule's current function and capabilities were incompatible with the ABM Treaty.

But the more important point was that, where suspicions exist, they should be removed. It had not been an easy thing for the Soviets to decide to offer up the Krasnoyarsk radar. A substantial investment had been made there. Karpov could attest to the vigor of the debate. But, *Shevardnadze* emphasized, mutual trust had to be assured on these matters.

The *Secretary* recalled a sign he had often seen in small business establishments throughout the U.S.: "In God we trust. For all others, cash." We want trust but need cash with respect to arms control verification. Noting that time was running out, the Secretary asked Amb. Nitze if he had any comments.

Amb. *Nitze* disputed *Shevardnadze's* characterization of the SCC. The body had never been conceived as an impartial board. Its members reflected the views of their governments. Moreover, we had repeatedly raised the Krasnoyarsk radar in the SCC. We had never been given a satisfactory answer to the questions we posed. Thus it was incorrect to suggest that the SCC could serve as a mechanism for resolving questions of this type. Nitze's second point addressed the function of the Thule radar. At the time the ABM Treaty was negotiated, he pointed out, Thule's function was recognized to be early warning. That had not changed. Thule's capabilities had certainly been improved, but

such improvements were provided for by the modernization permitted by the Treaty.

Asst. Sec. *Perle* added that the main problem with the Krasnoyarsk radar was that it was identical to radars the Soviets admit are being used for ballistic missile defense under the ABM Treaty. A second problem was that Krasnoyarsk's technical characteristics, its angle of inclination, for example, were not only incompatible with a tracking mission, but were different from radars the Soviets used for tracking. Moreover, there had been no Soviet objection to Thule until after we raised the Krasnoyarsk radar. Our efforts in the SCC and elsewhere to get satisfactory answers on these points had proved futile. *Perle* noted that there was no disagreement on the points he had made among scientific opinion in the West.

With respect to the Soviet proposal for a trade-off of Krasnoyarsk for Thule, *Perle* noted that work to improve Thule was only beginning. Krasnoyarsk, on the other hand, had been under construction for some time; so far as mothballing was concerned, Krasnoyarsk was externally complete and could be turned on at anytime. We had examined the installation from the standpoint of every possible explanation of its role and location. The only argument that made any sense was that it was designed for ballistic missile defense.

Shevardnadze interrupted to note that the Soviets had made their proposal in order to enhance trust. If the U.S. was not willing to accept a trade, they could wait until Krasnoyarsk became operational. Then it would be clear that the radar was not for ABM purposes. What *Perle* wanted was for the issue not to be resolved.

Perle replied that that was incorrect. He pointed out that the Soviets could help resolve our questions on such issues as Krasnoyarsk's angle of inclination if it were prepared to provide sufficient information. We would welcome a fuller description and not having to wait to see the radar on the air. We had not, however, obtained the quality of information we needed through the SCC. We certainly would like to have a more useful conversation on these kinds of issues. Perhaps special technical groups could be created for this purpose.

Shevardnadze replied that the U.S., for its part, could not prove that Krasnoyarsk could not be used for space tracking. But if the U.S. was not getting sufficiently authoritative responses in the SCC, why not raise the level of discussion. There was a need for some kind of body to remove sources of suspicion. Maybe it would be profitable to find a way to improve the SCC.

Nitze observed that the question was one of intent versus externally visible characteristics. It had been a cardinal principle of arms control since its inception that only externally visible characteristics were a valid basis for judgments as to the function of specific systems.

Karpov acknowledged that the Thule radar site existed prior to the signing of the ABM Treaty. But it was neither a phased-array radar at the time nor was it as powerful as at present. When the Treaty was signed, these kinds of radars existed only in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. But there was an understanding at the time that neither country should deploy additional early warning radars except on the periphery of its own territory. Now, instead of the old radar, the Soviets faced a new, phased-array complex inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. This could not be considered simple modernization of an old complex; the foundations were the same, but the station was new. Thus, Thule was a violation.

As for Krasnoyarsk, the U.S. had no means of determining the radar's characteristics, as it had not been put into operation. Once this had occurred, it would be clear that the radar served no early warning function. Its technical characteristics were totally different. Its inclination angle is different. It will work in the meter, not decimeter range. This would be clear. To eliminate any misunderstanding, the Soviets were willing to dismantle Krasnoyarsk. But the U.S. was in violation of the ABM Treaty in Thule and Fylingdales as well.

Nitze replied that what *Karpov* had said did not change the fact that the enhancement of Thule's capabilities was a modernization as permitted by the Treaty. As for Krasnoyarsk, *Karpov* had not explained why the Soviets refused to answer the questions we had put to them in the SCC.

In response to *Shevardnadze's* question as to what questions the U.S. felt had not been answered, *Perle* noted that a review of the SCC proceedings would show that the U.S. had repeatedly sought a plausible explanation for a variety of anomalies between Krasnoyarsk's location and configuration and its avowed purpose. There was a lot of concrete at Krasnoyarsk—why a protected radar if there was no military purpose? We had never received satisfactory answers. We would be pleased to get them. *Perle* suggested that it might be possible for the Soviets to assuage our concerns on this matter. A good technical discussion could be useful. He urged *Shevardnadze* to put us to the test by answering the questions we had asked.

Shevardnadze said that the Soviets had proposed a simple, reasonable solution to the Krasnoyarsk problem: both sides should stop construction on their radars. There was thus a way out, if the U.S. was interested.

The *Secretary* indicated that the U.S. wanted an equitable way out. He nonetheless believed that the present discussion had gone farther than in the past in addressing this issue.

Beyond that, he had nothing to add, except that he would expect the Foreign Minister and his party for dinner at 7:00. Given the length

of the remaining agenda, the Secretary suggested that they allow plenty of time in their discussions the next day.⁷ If they found by late Saturday that there was still important work to do, they could just keep going.

Shevardnadze indicated that this was acceptable, and the meeting concluded.

⁷ See Documents 286 and 287.

285. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 20, 1986, 10–11 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US Side

Secretary Shultz

D. Zarechnak, Interpreter

Soviet Side

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

P. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

The Secretary thanked Foreign Minister Shevardnadze for agreeing to meet with him privately before the plenary. He said that he wished to touch upon two things. The first was the question of the expulsion of the 25 Soviet diplomats from the United Nations. The Secretary indicated that he had listened to what Shevardnadze had said about the US decision, and had noted Shevardnadze's statement that there were fewer than 218 Soviet UN employees at present. To the extent that this has brought the number of personnel at the Soviet Mission more in line with the numbers at other missions, it was welcome. The Secretary indicated that he did realize that Shevardnadze had said that this had been done by the Soviet side for reasons of economy and efficiency.

The Secretary continued that, as the US had indicated to the Soviet Ambassador to the UN, Belonogov, the Soviet side had not been willing to indicate which of the UN mission people had departed, and this made it difficult to determine accurately the total number of personnel at the Mission. For example, if an individual had a visa and had gone

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memorandum of Conversations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, September 19 & 23, 1986, Shultz/Shevardnadze in Washington (Daniloff case). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Zarechnak; cleared by Hill. The meeting took place in the Secretary's office.

on vacation to the USSR, the US could think that he would return. Perhaps the Soviet side knew that the person would not return. This was one reason why there were different ideas about the size of the Soviet Mission. An additional reason was the difference in counting people such as chauffeurs and communicators. The US counted such people, and perhaps the USSR did not. As a result, some differences in numbers occurred. Therefore, if the Soviet side could establish that the 25 people whom the US was expelling would bring the total below 218, the Soviet side could replace its personnel up to that number. The US would expect that any new people would have legitimate UN functions. And the US would be sensitive to anyone who had a suspicious background. The US would also expect continued work with regard to future requirements, e.g. bringing down the level to 170 by April of 1988. But the US was not interested in complicating the legitimate functioning of the Mission, and this could be resolved given a constructive approach by the Soviet side.

The other subject which the Secretary wished to raise was a reply to the proposal made in the General Secretary's letter. The US side welcomed Gorbachev's proposal for a meeting, and of the two places mentioned by Shevardnadze, would prefer Reykjavik.² This proposal of the General Secretary had merit and was a serious one. The US side would prefer to reply positively to this proposal and to subsequently schedule a time for the meeting, but the present atmosphere made it difficult to put a positive reply into effect, which emphasizes the importance of rapid resolution of the current problems. There would be no point in having the President and the General Secretary spend all their time talking about Daniloff and Zakharov. This issue must be out of the way so that they could focus their attention on the type of substantive issues which were discussed at the plenary between the Secretary and the Foreign Minister the day before. These were the two basic things that the Secretary wished to mention.

The Secretary indicated that he could note that the content of the General Secretary's letter with regard to arms control and similar issues would be studied by the experts and by the principals. However, the number of people who know about the proposal for a short meeting

² See Document 280. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "I told Shevardnadze that we reacted favorably to Gorbachev's proposal for a meeting soon in Reykjavik, but that in the present atmosphere, "we cannot put such a positive response into effect. The Daniloff problem must be resolved as soon as possible. No summit meeting can be held until Daniloff is out of the Soviet Union." On the Soviet mission to the UN issue, I also told him that we wanted the Soviet mission to be reduced to no more than 218 people by October 1, 1986. If the twenty-five people we had declared persona non grata brought their overall number below 218, they could fill those slots, but not with intelligence agents. By a year later, we wanted the number down to 170 people." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 744)

between the President and the General Secretary is small, and any references to the letter in the plenary ought not to include references to the special meeting, since some of those present would not know about it.

Shevardnadze replied that he would like to ask for clarification of the answer to the first question. He had already indicated that the present size of the Soviet UN Mission was under 212. If additional confirmation was needed, this could be obtained through the UN Secretariat or the Soviet Mission, and this would not be difficult. With regard to chauffeurs, technicians, etc., there were general rules governing these things for the member countries of the UN, and these procedures ought not to be changed. Shevardnadze understood the Secretary to say that if the US side was convinced that the size of the Soviet Mission was equal to 212, then the indicated personnel would not be expelled.

The Secretary replied that this was not so. Those names would remain, but if the US established (and this ought not be difficult in accordance with what Shevardnadze had said) that the expulsion of the 25 would bring the number below 218, then the US would not object to having the USSR bring in additional people to perform UN tasks. But the 25 would remain on the expulsion list.

Shevardnadze asked what these people were guilty of.

The Secretary replied that they had been identified as being connected with espionage and intelligence activities. The US had a special problem because of the location of the UN. Every country could decide what kind of people to assign to its mission. But it was not a proper use of the UN function to assign intelligence agents to work there, and this was what the US was objecting to.

Shevardnadze replied that he was not a first grade student, and he understood that UN personnel ought not to be intelligence agents, but there was no proof that they were. Let's say that the Soviet side would react in the following way: it would expel 25 Americans from the USSR (maybe somewhat more, maybe somewhat less), since the appropriate Soviet authorities have corresponding information on Americans, and then would say the same thing that the Secretary had said, i.e. that the US could add extra people to make up for those that had been expelled. Would this make the US happy? At any rate, the US action could not be left without a response.

The Secretary replied that the USSR would have to decide what it would do, and the US would not want to see its people expelled, so the Secretary could not agree to such an approach. In that case, the US would respond as well.

Shevardnadze asked what this would lead to. There would be no stopping.

The Secretary said that there would be an end, since the intelligence communities knew who their corresponding numbers on the opposite side were, and these numbers were limited. But the Secretary felt that we could put this issue into one pile. There were other issues as well, and all of them were independent of each other. The two sides could see if all of these piles could be resolved on a mutually acceptable basis.

Shevardnadze indicated that the reply given by the Secretary concerning the expulsion of the Soviet UN Mission employees was not satisfactory. US intelligence services could say that he, Shevardnadze, was also an intelligence officer. So a great deal of care and a feeling of responsibility was necessary in carrying out such actions. Shevardnadze stressed that there would be actions taken in response. He pointed out that since, according to the US side, the time limit for Soviet reductions was to be October 1, there was still enough time, and the US should think again about how to resolve the situation.

Shevardnadze continued that with regard to Daniloff and Zakharov, he felt that his proposal was a good one, and the faster the cases were resolved, the better it would be. Decisive steps needed to be taken.

Shevardnadze continued that he considered that the main decision to be taken was the one about the meeting between the President and the General Secretary. And although this would be a short, working meeting, he thought that the two leaders could decide matters of basic importance, taking into consideration everything that had happened since the Geneva meeting. Shevardnadze agreed with the Secretary that the way needed to be cleared for this meeting by resolving the cases of Daniloff, Zakharov and the expulsion of the UN personnel. All of these needed to be resolved before there could be a meeting of the heads of state.

Shevardnadze indicated that as far as practical steps connected with implementation of any agreement on this were concerned, these could be coordinated during a meeting between the Secretary and himself in New York if necessary. He indicated that he was referring to the three questions that the two sides had spoken of. If the Secretary would agree to resolve the Daniloff and Zakharov cases as the Soviet side had suggested, Shevardnadze could relate this to Moscow immediately and practical preparations could be made to implement the solution. With regard to the place for the meeting between the President and the General Secretary, Shevardnadze thought that this was a good choice. He thought that the dates of this meeting could be agreed upon at the working level. It would be good if the President could indicate what dates might be suitable for him. Such a meeting could produce action decisions on all outstanding issues.

The Secretary indicated his appreciation of the agreement to meet in Iceland, but felt that we should first contact the Icelandic authorities.

Shevardnadze commented that Iceland was an attractive country and that Reykjavik was a small city, even a town, but a very nice one. He also remarked that the US has a nice base there.

The Secretary added that it would be a quieter place than London.

Shevardnadze indicated that he did not doubt that the Icelandic authorities would be happy to receive them.

The Secretary repeated that he thought that before any public announcement be made concerning the place of the meeting, we should pay the courtesy to ask Iceland about it.

Shevardnadze agreed.

The Secretary indicated that with regard to the question of dates, both he and Shevardnadze had agreed that the problematic issues facing the two countries at the moment would have to be resolved before one could focus on a date for the meeting. He indicated to Shevardnadze that it was not clear to him what framework for a solution existed, although he said that he would be prepared to rearrange his schedule to talk about such an important issue, and this could be done in New York.

Shevardnadze replied that it would depend on the readiness of the US to resolve the issue. He himself was ready today to make a basic decision with regard to Daniloff and Zakharov.

The Secretary stressed that it would not be possible to accept an arrangement concerning these two cases without an understanding and specific arrangements with regard to individuals on the transmitted list. He asked Shevardnadze if he had had a chance to reflect on this.

Shevardnadze replied that it was difficult to add to what he had already said the day before. These were unrelated issues. In accordance with current practice, the Secretary had asked that the Soviet side look at a list of people who had submitted applications for emigration. Shevardnadze had replied that the list would be examined within the limits of Soviet law, as before, and decisions would be made. But as far as the time frame was concerned, this would require some time. And the cases of Daniloff and Zakharov were different. On those two issues Shevardnadze felt that a quick decision should be made.

The Secretary indicated that he accepted what Shevardnadze had said about the length of time involved in the process of examining the list, and the fact that these matters were independent of each other. But he stressed that no decision could be made on Daniloff and Zakharov without an understanding about the Soviet view on the US list. The Secretary indicated that the names on the list should be familiar to the Soviet side since their cases had come up before. They should all be in the Soviet computer.

Shevardnadze replied that he did not like to dig down into these issues.

The Secretary said that he had meant that the names were in the system.

Shevardnadze indicated that he had already replied with regard to Sakharov, indicating that this was a useless endeavor. With regard to the other names, they would be looked at, but the decision could not be made immediately. And the two issues should not be linked to this third one. Shevardnadze did not exclude the possibility of resolving some of the cases, as had happened before.

Shevardnadze continued that in his opinion this was a matter of prestige for the US side, and that was the main thing. The US was insisting that in addition to resolving the cases of Daniloff and Zakharov, the Soviet side should make some additional concessions. But the US ought not to think of questions of prestige. This was not the main thing at the moment. When everyone would learn of the upcoming meeting between the General Secretary and the President, all such issues would be pushed into the background and would be resolved more quickly. The meeting was the main thing. It ought not to be complicated with lists. Shevardnadze recalled that he and the Secretary had pushed the hardest to have a summit meeting, and when they were in Geneva the Secretary had said that the longer the President and the General Secretary sat at the fireplace, the better.

The Secretary agreed. He then said that he had heard what Shevardnadze had said and Shevardnadze had heard what he had said, but he wanted to repeat once more that the US side would need to wait to hear the Soviet reaction to the list. With regard to the question of prestige, the Secretary had described the structure of the way things would happen, namely, as independent events. With regard to the release of the people on the list, the US would welcome this as a humanitarian gesture on the part of the Soviet Union, or perhaps as a gesture to create a good atmosphere for the summit.

Shevardnadze said that the USSR had given the US Shcharansky, and what had it gotten in return?³

The Secretary joked that what it had gotten was that the US was no longer screaming about Shcharansky.

The Secretary indicated that it was time to go and stressed that he was prepared to work on this issue personally, both here in Washington and subsequently in New York in order to resolve it and to move on to other issues.

Shevardnadze said that the main thing was that he was glad that the President had agreed to meet with the General Secretary, and that

³ See Document 193.

he could pass this on to Gorbachev, as well as the agreement about the place that the meeting should occur.

The Secretary concurred and indicated that the President would reply about a date subsequently. However, as both he and Shevardnadze had agreed, it would not be wise to think about a date until the present cases were resolved, in order that the heads of state deal only with the key issues, and not get mixed up with the other ones.

Shevardnadze said again that linkage with the third issue was not acceptable. Why not simply resolve the cases of Daniloff and Zakharov? The US had given the Soviet side a list, and the Soviet side would examine it, but this would take some time, and we should not wait to resolve the Daniloff and Zakharov cases until then, since that process could take 10, 15 or 20 days (on the other hand, it might take 5). But the Soviet side would reply, and perhaps a decision could be made on some of the people on the list.

The Secretary repeated that the US would not be ready to make a decision on Daniloff and Zakharov until there was a clear understanding of the Soviet decision concerning the names on the list. Perhaps the Soviet side could reply early next week in New York.

Shevardnadze agreed that the list would be examined, but not necessarily quickly.

The Secretary indicated that, as Shevardnadze knew, he had a great deal of respect for Shevardnadze's country, its leadership, and for Shevardnadze himself. The Secretary very much desired that there be a summit and that progress be made on all issues as soon as possible.

Shevardnadze indicated that he and the Secretary would look helpless if they left the resolution of these issues to the General Secretary and the President.

The Secretary agreed.

In conclusion, Shevardnadze stressed that the issue of the 25 UN Mission employees needed to be resolved. He did not know how, but this needed to be done.

286. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 20, 1986, 11:05 a.m.–12:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

Second Shultz-Shevardnadze Plenary on Arms Control

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Secretary Shultz
 Ambassador Nitze
 Ambassador Ridgway
 Ambassador Hartman
 Ambassador Matlock
 ASD Richard Perle
 DAS Tom Simons
 Robert Linhard, NSC
 Mark Parris, Director, EUR/SOV
 Dimitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)

U.S.S.R.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
 Deputy FM A.A. Bessmertnykh
 Ambassador Dubinin
 Ambassador Karpov
 V. Kuznetsov (Soviet Embassy)
 T.G. Stepanov (Soviet MFA)
 V.A. Mikol'chak, Deputy Chief,
 USA and Canada Division,
 MFA
 P.R. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

The meeting was preceded by a one-hour private session at which only interpreters were present.²

At the outset of the meeting, *Shevardnadze* asked to speak. Acknowledging that it had been agreed the day before that the present session would begin with a discussion of INF, Shevardnadze indicated he would like to make a few comments on the issue of nuclear testing. As the Secretary knew, the General Secretary had raised the issue in the letter Shevardnadze had delivered to the President the day before.³ Gorbachev had also made a number of recent public statements on the subject. Shevardnadze had to some degree already outlined his views with the President. But he wanted to reaffirm that, for the Soviets, testing was a “fundamental” issue to which they attached great importance.

Shevardnadze assured the Secretary that, when Moscow adopted its testing moratorium decision, it had not been seeking propaganda advantage. Rather, the Soviets viewed the testing question as of fundamental importance in any serious approach to questions of limiting and reducing nuclear weapons. They felt that this was an area where progress was possible.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 4D, 1986 Soviet Union September. Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information. Cleared by Davies and Pascoe. An unknown hand initialed for Pascoe. The meeting took place at the Department of State.

² See Document 285.

³ See Documents 280 and 283.

The U.S., sometimes at a very high level, had said in response that the Soviets were ahead of the U.S. in this area, that Moscow could afford to stop testing for a while, that it was in fact conducting other tests. This was not so. The Soviets had taken a risk. They had done so because they concluded that it would be a responsible step.

Negotiations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were now underway on testing. Shevardnadze would not say the two rounds which had been held thus far had not been useful. Discussion was necessary. But Moscow did not want to feel that there was no promise in this area.

Shevardnadze questioned whether further nuclear tests were really necessary, as U.S. experts had argued. Existing arsenals would not become obsolete and could remain in inventories for a long time. Testing was necessary only to develop new weapons. It was also necessary to develop space-based weapons. Thus, if, as the Secretary and Gromyko, and later the President and Gorbachev had agreed, there was a serious intent to stop an arms race on earth and prevent it in space, the decision to stop testing was an important one. That did not make it an easy decision; but it was a necessary decision for both sides.

Shevardnadze said he could not think of more than one or two countries in the world which would not agree with this proposition. All others, including the Delhi 6 and the participants in the recent Harare NAM Conference, were in favor. Many political leaders, including some of the U.S.'s allies, were of the same view. To be frank, the U.S. was isolated on this issue in political terms. It ought, therefore, to reconsider the matter and see if there might be possibilities in this area.

With respect to verification, Shevardnadze acknowledged it was a problem. It was necessary to perfect systems of verification. But if the U.S. and Soviet Union were to conclude an agreement, and other nations were to join them, adequate means using existing technology could be found to ensure no tests occurred. Shevardnadze noted that U.S. private scientists were now in the Soviet Union monitoring Soviet test sites. He was convinced they had no doubts the Soviets were observing their moratorium.

What precisely did the Soviets want? They wanted the U.S. to give further thought to the matter, from the standpoint of a future summit (Shevardnadze added parenthetically that he did not know when that might be). It might be that discussions should take place at a higher level. Modalities could be discussed. But Shevardnadze could say in Gorbachev's name that the General Secretary intended to keep the issue on the agenda.

Shevardnadze acknowledged that it would be impossible to decide the issue today. He wanted only to emphasize that, for the Soviets, this was a serious, important question. It was a test of the two sides' willingness to work seriously toward nuclear arms reductions, the

ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, an end to the arms race on earth, and the prevention of an arms race in space.

The *Secretary* said there were some things which could be decided today. There was a saying in the U.S.: “Don’t run before you can walk.” We should start by walking. The way to do that was to establish known means of verifying the size of the nuclear explosions allowed in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). We could then ratify that Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). Then we could proceed to discuss other issues. As Shevardnadze was aware, the TTBT committed both sides to “continue their negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapon tests.” The U.S. was prepared to honor this commitment.

As long as deterrence depended on large numbers of nuclear weapons, however, we needed to test for various reasons. We needed to ensure the quality of our arsenals. We needed to be able to ensure the safe handling of weapons. The Soviets had completed an extensive modernization of their nuclear forces in recent years, while we had remained relatively stagnant. We now were in a modernizing phase, and needed to be able to test.

The Secretary wanted to emphasize, nonetheless, what the President had said in his July letter. To the degree that we were able to reduce our arsenals (the Secretary noted parenthetically that both sides had used the figure “zero”), then we can deal with the testing program. We were ready to do so in that context. The Secretary underscored the President’s seriousness in adding the testing issue to his letter—but in the context of a related issue: reductions.

We wanted significant progress, the Secretary continued. But the most significant measure in this regard would be the drastic reduction of nuclear arsenals, and especially of ballistic missiles. The President’s commitment in this regard was strong; we were willing to take definite substantive steps. And this was an area in which we were not dealing with unknown things.

Shevardnadze noted the Secretary’s reference to the possible ratification of the TTBT. The problem with this is that it did not get to the heart of the issue. New weapons were being created as a result of testing, even at levels permitted by the TTBT. There was a danger that this trend would move into a qualitatively new sphere—space. A responsible decision was needed now to prevent that. Ratification of the TTBT would not change the situation. Moreover, in view of our past inability to make concrete progress in reducing strategic weapons, there were no guarantees in this area. That was why an “emergency” step was needed. A moratorium was the only realistic approach. It would facilitate our efforts to limit and reduce nuclear arms.

Shevardnadze said he could understand why some would want to develop new systems. It was not easy to bring such processes to a halt. What was one to do? Join the competition? But if the Soviets responded, there would be no end to the rivalry. So Moscow had decided that the most realistic approach would be to simply end testing. British, Chinese and other nuclear experts had, Shevardnadze noted, endorsed this approach.

Thus, perhaps at the level of experts, or possibly at a higher level, it would be worthwhile to look again for mutually acceptable solutions in the testing area. Again, Shevardnadze emphasized, the issue would be on Gorbachev's agenda for his meeting with the President.

The *Secretary* reaffirmed that we were willing to discuss testing, but said it was important to start with something practical. Such steps could be taken. With respect to the TTBT limits, the Soviets had accused us of violating those limits; we had made similar charges. *Shevardnadze* commented that the U.S. had not been able to make such charges of late. The *Secretary* agreed that we had not accused the Soviets of testing in the past year. But the fact was that existing methods of verification had a sufficiently high range of error to cause uncertainty. This could be removed through known methods. We simply wanted to do this, and then move on. Testing was not isolated from other issues.

Picking up on Shevardnadze's point of the day before on interrelationships in arms control, the *Secretary* noted that testing was closely linked to the existence of nuclear weapons. If there were a drastic reduction in these weapons, it would have a gigantic impact on the need to test. So there were things we could do in the short term for the purpose of having something concrete. We had made specific proposals and were prepared to move forward quickly.

Shevardnadze remarked that, just as he had obviously not convinced the *Secretary*, the *Secretary* had not convinced him. He reiterated that we should look for other ways to deal with the problem. The *Secretary* said he could be convinced of the need to look. The key to the problem, he felt, was in the START and, in a sense, the INF negotiations. We would be looking for reductions there. *Shevardnadze* proposed a compromise: the U.S. would stop testing, and the Soviets would ratify the TTBT. The *Secretary* replied that the proposal was hard to pass up.

The *Secretary* suggested that the discussion move on to INF. *Shevardnadze* agreed, and the *Secretary* opened with a summary of current U.S. views.

The *Secretary* noted that progress had been made on INF. Both sides agreed there should be an interim INF agreement with equal ceilings on U.S. and Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Europe, and an equal ceiling on U.S. and Soviet LRINF missile warheads worldwide. Both sides had contributed to this movement toward an agreement.

Recalling that the Soviet side had proposed a ceiling of 100 warheads on each side in Europe, the Secretary told Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that in the right context, the U.S. had no problem with that. The Secretary noted the Soviet proposal to freeze SS-20 levels in Asia, and that General Secretary Gorbachev had referred to it in his letter. We would, he said, be interested if the Soviet side could expand on that reference.

A simple freeze of Soviet SS-20 levels was not acceptable to the U.S. side, the Secretary continued. Reductions in Europe would increase the significance of SS-20s in Asia. Their range and mobility—especially their mobility—allows them to threaten the security of our Allies in Europe. Simply to freeze SS-20s in Asia would discriminate against Asian states, and would represent a massive shift to Asia in the distribution of Soviet LRINF missiles. This the U.S. could not accept. The U.S. position had long been that SS-20s in Asia should be reduced in the same proportion as in Europe. If the two sides reduced to 100 warheads in Europe, and reduced Asian systems in the same proportion, the Asian ceiling would be something like 63. That, the Secretary said, would be the best outcome.

As the U.S. said in the summer meetings of experts, we are prepared to settle on 100 in Europe and 100 in Asia.⁴ We were not asking for unilateral reductions; however, a lower Soviet level would result in a lower worldwide ceiling on U.S. forces, and, if the U.S.S.R. reduced SS-20s in the Asian part of the Soviet Union to a level we could accept, the U.S. in turn would undertake not to deploy its LRINF missiles outside Europe or U.S. territory.

The Secretary called attention to a second item, shorter-range systems, which he said could not simply be deferred. At a minimum, these systems should be frozen in an initial agreement. The effectiveness of an agreement reducing LRINF missile systems would be undermined if there were no concurrent constraints on SRINF missiles, the Secretary said, adding that the Soviet side must be aware that this is a matter of concern to our allies, especially West Germany.

The Secretary recalled that the Soviet side had once included constraints on shorter-range systems in its own INF draft treaty. The reluctance of the Soviet side to agree to constrain these systems now troubled us, as it suggested a possible interest in increasing them.

A third point to focus on, the Secretary said, was the question of duration of an agreement. Perhaps the issue was under control, but an interim agreement was only a step on the road to further reductions and eventual elimination of LRINF missiles. We wanted a significant

⁴ See Documents 263 and 275.

agreement with substantial reductions that would provide substantial benefits to ourselves and other countries, and we want those benefits to endure until we can work out further reductions on the way to zero.

The U.S. was interested, the Secretary continued, to note that the Soviet draft INF agreement of May 15 contained a clause referring to its remaining in force until replacement by a follow-on agreement.⁵ That is the concept the U.S. supports.

The Secretary said the U.S. was prepared to undertake a joint commitment to begin negotiations with the objective of further reducing and eliminating LRINF missiles as soon as the interim agreement enters into force. It was important, he added, to build in a follow-on concept.

In conclusion, the Secretary observed that we seemed to be getting somewhere. The Soviet side had suggested a ceiling of 100 LRINF warheads in Europe. The U.S. had no problems with that, if the U.S.S.R. would make comparable reductions in Asia. We were prepared not to insist on strict proportionality, and can accept equality between Europe and Asia. Why not 100 warheads in Europe and 100 warheads outside Europe with a concurrent freeze on shorter-range systems at the current Soviet level? In short, the Secretary concluded, the basis for an agreement is within our reach.

Shevardnadze noted in reply that U.S. spokesmen had on a number of occasions described INF as the most promising area for negotiations. The Secretary himself had said this, as had the President. The Soviets agreed. *Shevardnadze* recalled that the Soviets had earlier proposed that this issue be separated from other questions being discussed at the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks (NST). This was a significant step on Moscow's part toward accommodating U.S. concerns.

U.S.-Soviet contacts over the course of the summer had confirmed that, despite some still-substantial differences, INF was a promising area for further efforts. Such obstacles as remained struck the Soviets as of an artificial nature. The Soviets could only regard their appearance as reflecting an unwillingness to reach an agreement on INF.

The Soviet January 15 proposals had, *Shevardnadze* recalled, provided for an "ideal" solution to the problem of INF in Europe. While the U.S. might choose not to remember, the Soviets had dropped their insistence on taking UK/French forces into account, despite the threat posed to the Soviet Union by the modernization of those forces. The

⁵ An analysis of the Soviet May 15 proposal was provided in telegram 4556 from the NST Delegation in Geneva, May 15. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860378–0764)

Soviet Union will talk with them, but they are U.S. allies who have a very substantial potential against the USSR.

The Soviets also had to consider in this context U.S. reluctance to alter its traditional practice of transferring its most modern weapons and technology to the U.K. There was, Shevardnadze suggested, a moral as well as a political dimension to such an arrangement. The U.S. might have a different view if the Soviets had such a relationship with the GDR, Poland, or Hungary.

The U.S. was also insisting that Asia be included in an agreement on medium range nuclear forces in Europe. But this was not necessary, because the situation in Asia was different. The Soviets believed an interim solution was possible. They had made proposals, which Shevardnadze would not repeat. He would only say that U.S. calls for drastic reductions in Soviet SS-20 missiles in Asia were unjustified.

Similarly unjustified were U.S. demands for inclusion of SRINF in an agreement. The systems involved had been introduced by the Soviets as a response to the deployment of U.S. LRINF in Europe. Reversing that step was something the Soviets were not prepared to do. Bringing SRINF into the equation now would only complicate efforts to reach an agreement.

The Soviets did think it should be possible to find a formula for dealing with systems in Asia. To do so, however, Moscow needed to be sure it would be possible to find a solution to the problem of medium range nuclear forces in Europe, that the U.S. really wanted to remove missiles from Europe. The Soviets impression was that the U.S. did not want to withdraw these forces from Europe. Was that not right?

The *Secretary* suggested the Soviets put us to the test. We had proposed to eliminate the entire class of such weapons worldwide. If the Soviets were prepared to do that, they would find us ready.

Shevardnadze urged that the U.S. consider carefully the draft treaty the Soviets had tabled in Geneva. Possibilities had not been exhausted for reaching an agreement. It should be possible to find a solution, including for Asian forces.

With respect to the duration of an agreement, that was something delegations could resolve.

In a somewhat disjointed summary of how Moscow viewed the state of play in the Geneva NST discussions, Shevardnadze said that there was some movement overall. Further development was needed to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement. Delegates should now be instructed to try to bring the two sides closer together, keeping in mind their objective of stopping the arms race on earth and preventing its expansion to space. INF was indeed the most promising area. A means should be found of preserving the ABM Treaty and keeping it

in effect for a sufficiently long period. When this question was resolved, the way would be clear for drastic reductions which would take both sides' positions into account. Finally, there was the possibility of agreement on INF in Europe on an interim basis. The Soviets would be prepared to consider a mutually acceptable formula if convinced that the U.S. was prepared for a solution to the problem of INF in Europe.

Thus, the two delegations should be given instructions so that, in the spirit of the discussion Shevardnadze had had with the Secretary, they would be able to find the mutually acceptable solutions both leaders wanted. There would be a summit sooner or later. It should be crowned with resolution of these questions.

Additionally, there had been good movement over the summer on the question of establishing nuclear risk reduction centers (NRRC's). Here, too, the Soviets were prepared to reach a mutually acceptable solution. They believed a concrete draft agreement could be considered at a summit. It might now be appropriate for the consultations which have already taken place to become formal negotiations at the Deputy Foreign Minister or some other level.

The *Secretary* agreed. We were prepared to field a delegation at any time and to formalize the results of the discussions so as to refer them to our leaders.

Shevardnadze proposed that the modalities of NRRC discussions be worked out through diplomatic channels. He said Bessmertnykh would be the responsible official on the Soviet side and would issue the appropriate instructions. Shevardnadze added that Karpov, who would be returning immediately to Geneva, would also be receiving appropriate instructions.

Shevardnadze suggested that other "groups of questions" might also be handled through embassies. The important thing was to be in a position to move forward more boldly than in the past.

In this context, Shevardnadze recalled his discussion with the Secretary the day before on the Stockholm talks. Since that conversation, there had been progress. But now it appeared there were some steps backward. While he did not want to get into specifics, Shevardnadze wanted to note this perception. He suggested both sides order their delegations to find mutually acceptable solutions so that the conference might end on a positive note.

The *Secretary* replied that we were ready to do so, but that the thresholds would have to come down. This was a matter of principle. There was no way we could accept a threshold so high as to vitiate the other serious work which the conference had accomplished.

Shevardnadze urged that the approach to threshold issue not be one-sided. The Soviets had twice reduced the levels they were willing to

consider; the other side had not been so accommodating. Shevardnadze urged that the U.S. delegation be told it could raise the threshold. The Soviets would look at what they might do, and would be in touch with the neutrals/non-aligned. Moscow was ready to cooperate, but only on a mutual basis.

The *Secretary* repeated that we were ready, but pointed out that the Soviet threshold had been too high to begin with. *Shevardnadze* replied that they were no more guilty than the U.S. of padding their opening positions.

Returning to the NST talks, the *Secretary* told Shevardnadze we would be providing a full account of the present discussions to our delegations. We assumed the Soviets would do the same. We would convey a sense of the depth of the discussion. We would hope the Soviets registered the possibilities in START as well as in INF. We hoped they would reflect on the deep significance of the President's initiative with respect to SDI. There was potential for bold action. The implications of eliminating ballistic missiles entirely were staggering. We knew the Soviets were considering all this. We hoped they would reflect further.

The Secretary hoped he and Shevardnadze would have a chance to discuss the issues they had addressed again at some point, and that the President and General Secretary would also have the opportunity before too long.

Shevardnadze indicated that he would consider the points the Secretary had highlighted. He asked the Secretary, for his part, to consider especially how it might be possible to strengthen the ABM Treaty. As Shevardnadze had stressed repeatedly, this was of fundamental importance from the Soviet standpoint. Shevardnadze also hoped the U.S. would consider the question of offensive space weapons—however they might be termed. This, too, was fundamental.

The *Secretary* noted we had given a partial response the day before.

Continuing, the Secretary noted he had a few things to say on chemical weapons. He urged that our ambassadors at the Conference on Disarmament look at the outstanding issues: data exchange, challenge inspections, etc. There was much to be discussed in Geneva, but the Secretary felt prospects were better in the wake of recent exchanges than in the past.

On CW proliferation, it was clear from exchanges since Geneva that both sides were concerned about the problem. It might be possible to identify some things which could be done about it. Our experts should continue to meet to see if they could reach agreement.

Shevardnadze agreed. Our representatives at the CD had been cooperating well and had generated some important momentum. Shevard-

nadze put down a marker that the Soviets viewed challenge inspections as reserved for extreme circumstances. Nonetheless, to advance the conclusion of a CW convention, the Soviets could accept mutually acceptable procedures which would satisfy verification concerns without threatening the security of the inspected country, or compromising commercial secrets of the chemical industry. The Soviets found some similarity to their own views in the recent UK proposal, although certain points required further clarification.

Regarding non-proliferation, non-production of chemical weapons by commercial industry was not a simple question. They should not produce supertoxic chemicals. Measures should be agreed to prevent chemical weapons proliferation. The Soviets had taken unilateral means to ensure against precursors falling into the wrong hands. Recent U.S.–Soviet exchanges on the subject had also been productive and led to a degree of mutual understanding. This could be the basis for more effective cooperation. The Soviets would be prepared to cooperate more intensively at the expert level, or, if necessary, at the Deputy Foreign Minister level to address questions which have arisen. If this approach suited the U.S. side, there would be some basis for further work. In closing, Shevardnadze called for eliminating binary weapons, which, he said, only complicated the problem.

The *Secretary* commented that there seemed to be room for movement in this area.

Moving in the “headline” fashion he and Gromyko had used to deal with time constraints, the Secretary continued that NPT appeared to be another area where we could agree to cooperate, as we have in the past.

With respect to conventional armaments, the Secretary expressed the U.S. deep disappointment that, after making a major concession to the Eastern position on data, the East’s interest appeared to have fallen off completely. We believed an agreement along the lines we had suggested would be a good thing.

The Secretary proposed that we break off the discussion at this point for lunch.

Shevardnadze first replied that, for their part, the Soviets were disappointed with the U.S. approach to the problem of conventional arms in Europe. It should be possible to do something positive in this area.

The Soviets were in favor of concluding the Vienna talks on a positive note. No one expected a revolution there. But something positive was possible.

Shevardnadze said he was aware that NATO experts were studying recent Soviet proposals for a fresh approach to the problem of conventional arms in Europe. He felt these proposals deserved careful atten-

tion, calling attention to the fact that they represented a comprehensive package involving inspections not only of reductions but of residual forces. This was a fundamental move by the East and warranted the most careful consideration by the U.S. and NATO.

Soviet concern over next steps in European security was the reason Moscow was prepared to give an impetus to its delegates in the Stockholm conference. After that meeting, it would be necessary to decide where and in what kind of mechanism to consider the question of reducing armaments in Europe. The Soviets had an open mind on this point: a continuation of Stockholm; a new forum; or an expansion of the Vienna talks. The problem with the Vienna forum, as the U.S. knew, was that it was incomplete. The French, to give only one example, were not represented. So Shevardnadze hoped for a good response from the NATO experts.

The *Secretary* noted the range of options Shevardnadze had mentioned and confirmed that the NATO study would be completed by the end of the year.⁶ The meeting concluded.

⁶ See footnote 4, Document 256.

287. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 20, 1986, 3:30–5:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

Shultz-Shevardnadze Plenary on Regional, Bilateral Issues

PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i> Secretary Shultz Deputy Secretary Whitehead Undersecretary Armacost Ambassador Nitze Ambassador Ridgway Ambassador Hartman Ambassador Matlock	<i>U.S.S.R.</i> Foreign Minister Shevardnadze Deputy FM Bessmertnykh Ambassador Dubinin Ambassador Karpov Minister-Counselor Sokolov V.A. Kuznetsov (Soviet Embassy) T.G. Stepanov (Soviet MFA)
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¹ Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 4D, 1986 Soviet Union September. Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information. Cleared by Davies and Pascoe. An unknown hand initialed for Pascoe. The meeting took place at the Department of State.

VAdm Poindexter, NSC
ASD Richard Perle
DAS Tom Simons
Mark Parris, Director, EUR/SOV
Richard Solomon, Director, S/P
Dimitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)

V.A. Mikol'chak, Deputy Chief,
USA and Canada Division,
MFA
P.R. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

The Secretary said we had agreed to try to finish by 5:00 p.m. Mr. Perle would have to leave earlier. He had a good excuse, a birthday party.

Shevardnadze suggested that we all go. *Perle* commented that a group of 7-year-olds might not be easier than these discussions.

The Secretary recalled that the two ministers had agreed to proceed on to regional, humanitarian and bilateral issues, and allow time for a wrap-up or summary; at least he would like to have the last item. But given that there is only an hour and a half, he proposed to adopt what Gromyko and he had called a headline approach, not going through issues laboriously, but hitting high points.

Turning to regional issues, he said he would ask Mr. Armacost, who had chaired our side, to speak. He said we should recall that we have had extensive talks between experts, as well as the special talks this summer. We could then see if the ministers had anything particular to say. He would have one or two points; perhaps *Shevardnadze* would too.

Armacost said that in his view our recent discussions had confirmed the results of earlier discussions. They had been relatively non-polemical, non-emotional, professional in tone. There had been differences over the issues when it came to causes. At the level of generality it was possible to reach agreement, but when specific areas were discussed this rapidly narrowed. On some issues it might be possible to find common approaches nonetheless. For instance, on the Iran-Iraq war both sides were for an end to the war without victors or vanquished. Chemical weapons non-proliferation was another such issue, and was of course global as well as regional in character. Terrorism was a third such issue where we might be able to work together; it was also general as well as related to the Middle East. Our side had mentioned the potential for parallel interest in tension-reducing measures on the Korean peninsula, although this had not crystallized in the discussion; we had in mind in particular the Olympic games scheduled for 1988. Nevertheless, on the major issues—Afghanistan, Namibia/Angola, the Middle East—we had remained far apart.

The Secretary commented that *Armacost* had not touched on the notion of holding another round of experts' talks on Southern Africa before the end of the year, or on the locust problem, a humanitarian issue which might give room for common endeavor.

Armacost said there had not been extended discussion, although Adamishin had confirmed Shevardnadze's humanitarian interest. We had also discussed non-proliferation in South Asia, although no headway had been made concerning specific steps.

With regard to terrorism, *the Secretary* noted that we had had certain information on East Berlin, East Germany, and had come to the Soviets recently on this subject. We had had a report back that the Soviets did appeal to the people there to be careful, and we appreciated that they had responded. We had also noted the strong TASS statement concerning the Karachi terrorist incident, saying there was no justification for such acts.² This had seemed to us exactly right, and we appreciated the statement.

The Secretary said he believed it was correct to say that in Armacost's meetings and in the meetings of the General Secretary and the President we had agreed that regional issues should be a regular and systematic agenda item, for the experts, at the Under Secretary level and at the level of the ministers, if they could meet more regularly. We should still continue regularly even though there had been no specific result. These were basically worthwhile exchanges.

Shevardnadze turned first to the question of consultations. It was his impression that the Armacost-Adamishin discussions were mostly comparisons of positions, but that they had been mainly constructive. The differences between the two countries are deep, and they will not be quickly overcome. We have different fundamental approaches. But we should not exclude looking for ways to work together to facilitate progress on issues; this would contribute to world peace.

There is a specific situation illustrating this fundamental approach in the Iran-Iraq war. As the Secretary had said, both sides are interested in seeing it stopped, with neither victors nor vanquished. The Soviets have been working with both sides, including at the highest level. Unfortunately there have been no results yet. There have been various ideas of how to promote this effort, including a joint statement. But this is a very sensitive subject, which should be tackled very cautiously. He did not rule out the possibility of both sides' speaking independently on their own about the need to stop the war. For example, he intended at the UNGA to make an appeal to both leaders and peoples to stop this senseless war. Perhaps others could do the same thing. It also seemed to him that the Security Council could be used more; it had a record of being helpful on things like this. Perhaps if the U.S. made the same kind of statement, the Security Council could then be used. Resolutions could be adopted, but they should then be made to

² See footnote 2, Document 272.

work. Other forms could be examined, but they would now be difficult. He thought that at the 41st UNGA session, if many states made sobering statements to the Iranian leadership—and he stressed he was speaking of the Iranian leadership, since the Iraqis have said they are ready to end the war—it might help.

With regard to the Middle East, Shevardnadze went on, the situation is disturbing. There are deep differences in the overall approaches of the two countries. The U.S. knew the Soviet view that separate deals do not help resolve the complicated situation. But they have been seeing the emergence of a certain line. They have consulted with the U.S. representative about this. They think it would be good to start to make practical preparations for a conference on the Middle East, including the five permanent members of the Security Council and the parties to the conflict. This would imply bilateral contacts among the parties to the conflict and the Security Council members. A lot of specific work could be done taking into account the views of all sides. He urged the U.S. to think again about this, with a view to bringing the positions closer together. He had been told the U.S. had a more positive attitude toward a Middle East conference. If this were so, we should work on the specifics with a view of taking into account the interests of all the parties concerned.

With regard to Southern Africa, Shevardnadze said he did not think our consultations should be dropped. Here too there are deep differences, but he did not rule out the possibility of finding common ground which would not permit further movement toward an explosive situation. He knew the Secretary was going to the area. It was a complicated, difficult situation, fraught with potential for unpredictable—and he wished to stress “unpredictable”—consequences. The Soviets are ready to discuss ways of easing tensions in the region. He would not talk about causes; what is needed is to find ways to work in common.

With regard to joint work on natural disasters, like locusts or drought, Shevardnadze said he thought this a promising area, a humanitarian area. We could discuss this; our two countries should work together.

Turning to terrorism, Shevardnadze said this had been discussed more than once at the ministers’ level, as well as at other levels. This too was a difficult and complex problem. The U.S. knew the Soviet position that terrorism is outrageous in the eyes of the Soviet people, and the American people too, he thought. It is important to look for specific ways to cooperate which are possible despite differences in our assessments. The Soviets are willing to use U.S. information, and sometimes they are able to take preventive action. This is a good symptom. It is important not to avoid specifics, to work on specifics, for

instance specific hijackings, and the responsibility of those who commit them. There are perhaps differences here; for instance the Soviets do not understand why some are not answerable for such crimes, under criminal law. There used to be deep differences on that; perhaps something had changed. Perhaps we can work together on specifics.

Returning to consultations on regional problems, Shevardnadze said the practice of consultations at a high level is worth continuing, consultations at the Deputy Foreign Minister/Under Secretary level. There had been many arguments. Adamishin had told him about the arguments on Central America. He could confirm that their side took the correct positions on Afghanistan and Southeast Asia too, and he assumed Armacost had taken the correct American position. But he had read the record with interest, and he hoped that we could agree to have talks once a year, or as appropriate, at that level. He also did not rule out work on solving problems through foreign-minister level contacts. He had in mind not just meetings—though he was for more frequent meetings too—but also letters, communications, on issues where our intervention would be helpful in a positive way.

The Secretary said he wished to use Southern Africa to illustrate how the proposal the President had made at last year's UNGA on regional problems might work. In Angola, the parties should agree to end the violence, and this should take place together with the withdrawal of foreign forces. The U.S. and Soviet Union would then bilaterally agree on ways to support this process. Third, they could work together to provide economic assistance to an area which had been devastated everywhere by civil war, and reintegrate it into the world economy.

The Secretary continued that Angola is a case where the forces fighting each other were not so long ago together in the same revolutionary group fighting Portugal. They know each other, though they are of different tribal groups. Yet they are in a situation where they continue the conflict, and Cuban and South African forces are involved. If they could be withdrawn, this would create a different situation, especially if our two countries were working to stabilize it. And Angola in Africa terms is blessed with an exceptional capability. It has resources, and good labor force habits; the capacity for rapid development is right there. Southern Africa moreover is an area of countries dependent on foreign outlets, on South African ports, so that stability in Angola would be good not only for Angola but for the other countries as well. So this is a good illustration of the potential applicability of the three-stage process the President described.

The Secretary continued that he wished to say a little on the Middle East and the international conference idea. We believe that in the end solutions must be developed by the parties involved in a conflict. The

name of the game is to bring about that kind of contact, with the support of others. This has been discussed a lot, and in particular King Hussein has come to feel that an international forum, or conference, or context—there are various names for it—might be helpful, basically in a role of bringing about the bilateral discussions that are the essence of the matter.

It has not gone unnoticed, the Secretary said, that the Soviets have developed the idea of bilateral contacts too, in the framework of a conference. We do believe that in order to be helpful countries have to have diplomatic relations with the countries of the area. With regard to Israel we had noted that they had had a meeting in Helsinki, and perhaps Shevardnadze would be meeting Peres here. Such contacts are a good thing. But this brought him back to some of the topics they had discussed in the Secretary's private office, like emigration, where there was a need for progress. It is true that China is also a full member of the UN Security Council, and does not have diplomatic relations with Israel, but it is not excluded that it could play a constructive role.

In the meantime a number of things have happened that contribute to stability, the Secretary went on. We welcomed the Taba agreement, which should have an impact on Israeli-Egyptian relations. We welcomed Jordan's move to reestablish relations with Egypt. We welcomed King Hassan's meeting with Prime Minister Peres. It seemed to us that only Syria had been bitterly opposed, the Secretary said, and perhaps Shevardnadze could enlighten him as to why. There have also been various developments on the West Bank, admittedly of the pick-and-shovel kind, but which pave the way for more stability. Hence positions are perhaps a little different from what they were a year ago, and that is constructive.

With regard to terrorism, the Secretary continued, Shevardnadze had mentioned preventive action, and we had found collaborative action important for that. Over the past year or so we have prevented or aborted 180 terrorist acts we had found out about. It obviously requires very special elements of trust to share information and act on it. But if we can get into the habit in some sensitive areas it could be helpful. We welcomed statements in the Security Council and other statements. It is important, very important, to speak out. We thus welcome the statement about the Karachi incident. But concrete measures are also needed, and hence we especially welcome the statement that if we come across things where Soviet counsel or knowledge can be significant, we can approach the Soviets about them.

The Secretary concluded that the U.S. has to worry about some countries with whom we know the Soviets have close relations: Libya, Syria—which France is thinking about a lot these days—, Cuba, the GDR, Bulgaria. They supply safe havens for groups, especially Middle

East-type groups, which are involved in acts in Europe, particularly affecting Americans.

Shevardnadze said he wished to say something about Southern Africa. The Secretary had departed from the most important cause, the main cause, the main destabilizing factor, which is South African policy. The Soviets knew that when one talked about Angola, or Zimbabwe, or Lesotho, they are all in some way victims of South African aggressive policy. If we want to work on South Africa we need to take measures against the South African Government. It is aggressive, it is based on apartheid, it is condemned by all mankind. He was amazed that we speak so strongly about Libya, with all the potential the U.S. has, and are yet so permissive toward South Africa. Until the situation is resolved in a substantial way, by economic and other sanctions, it will be difficult to visualize progress. The Secretary would see during his visit.

It is not Cuban troops that are the obstacle, *Shevardnadze* continued. One has to respect agreements signed between sovereign governments. Angola and Cuba have the same rights as the U.S. and South Korea; their agreement is not astonishing; two sovereign states have the right to make such agreements. The Soviet Union has contacts with Cuba, and respects Cuba. They would like to leave Angola, which is a heavy burden on them, but because of Angola's security interest they have to be there. The correct assessment is that stronger measures are needed against South Africa; otherwise the situation can take an unpredictable course.

Shevardnadze said that following recent events the Soviets feel new machinery is being developed. The frontline states have been meeting. Perhaps a Contadora process is developing, and they are the states responsible for the peace of the region. If such machinery were developed it would be a big achievement. Our two countries differ, but we should not exclude doing something together. The EC has been meeting about sanctions. He was not sure what was happening. The Soviets are against economic sanctions—for instance, he was against American sanctions against the USSR—but on the South African problem there is no other way to have an impact. He realized it was difficult for the U.S. and the Europeans, which have many important ties there. But if conflict is to be prevented strong measures are required.

The Secretary commented with regard to economic relations with South Africa, our investment and trade ties are negligible in terms of our GNP, but in terms of helping solve the problem they represent employment for blacks and a presence which is used to encourage equal economic opportunity, to support educational opportunity, health opportunities in black communities in South Africa. We view—the President views—it as a mistake to remove this constructive force. All of us have a total horror of apartheid, and we work to register this

at every opportunity. We have considerable sanctions in place now against South Africa. They are aimed at apartheid, and the military forces, not against trade, which involves enterprises that employ large numbers of blacks.

Concerning Cuban troops, the Secretary went on, it is the President's idea that the reason for their presence in Angola is the threat to Angola from South Africa. If the steps envisaged in the President's plan are taken, that is a way of getting at that. He urged Shevardnadze to give some attention to the constructive thrust of the proposal.

Shevardnadze asked what the U.S. attitude had been to the recent bandit raid of South Africa into Botswana and others of South Africa's neighbors. *The Secretary* said it had been total condemnation. *Shevardnadze* rejoined that words are fine, but without Cuban troops this aggression could well have gone much further. If they were removed, what would be the effect on the correlation of forces there. This was a frank question. Mikhail Gorbachev has said the Soviet Union wants to have no troops beyond its own borders. One day this could happen; they will work for that. Cuba is the same. But now they are a stabilizing factor. No one is suggesting anything against South Africa that will be of any help. He understood there might be unemployment resulting from sanctions, but not having them will not contribute to a solution.

The Secretary replied that we have suggested many specific steps to the South Africans. That is the way we always work. We have suggested timetables for ending apartheid. We have suggested rearrangement of the governmental structures. The details are for them to decide, but we have urged them to change to a different manner of representation. We not only identify problems but suggest solutions.

Perhaps, the Secretary suggested, we should turn the discussion back to Armacost and Adamishin. *Shevardnadze* said he doubted they would come up with solutions either.

There are many differences between us, *Shevardnadze* went on. He had not asked about Pakistan, or other countries like it. He was sorry to say it, but what is needed is a fair approach by the U.S. The Secretary had mentioned Cuba, Bulgaria, Syria, and the U.S. had spoken out against them. *Shevardnadze* said he knew the U.S. leaders were against Libya, but the U.S. had not proved its case. It had withheld the evidence. Perhaps proof existed. But Qaddafi had said at Harare that he was ready to be examined.

The Secretary replied that on Libyan responsibility in East Berlin we had somewhat reluctantly, because of what it said about sources, showed cables between Libya and their mission in East Berlin, which linked them to the disco bombing.³ But Syria provides a safe haven

³ See Document 216.

for groups like Abu Nidal's. The French are particularly sensitive to this right now. Nicaragua does the same for M-19, the group that attacked the Palace of Justice in Colombia. No Americans were involved. The attack was on judges acting against drug traffickers; the attackers were trying to prevent their extradition. The Secretary said he had visited the building when he was there for the President's inauguration.⁴ It was a fine ancient building that had been decimated. Nicaragua and Cuba have given this group safe haven; in Nicaragua there was a special mass for the group. So our charges were not made casually or in a contentious way. These are things we know. It is good if people are willing to stand up against this sort of thing.

Shevardnadze said the Secretary was a man experienced with life. He did not need to advise the Secretary. But he felt data on such things should be received more critically. He could not be specific on Libya, since the Soviet Union has a different relationship with Libya than it has with Cuba and Bulgaria. But it knows those countries have nothing to do with terrorism. Information depends on people. Qaddafi has said that if there is evidence he is conducting terrorism he is willing to go to trial. The Soviet Union does cooperate with Libya, and has told them that if they are terrorists it will have nothing to do with them. He has said he is ready to go to an international trial. The Soviet Union hates some regimes, as the U.S. hates Cuba and Nicaragua, although he does not understand why, since they cannot threaten the security of a large powerful country like the U.S. *Shevardnadze* said he knew their leaders, their psychology, their mentality, their ideology, for many years. He could not agree that they have anything to do with terrorist acts. Great powers should be careful in their judgments, especially concerning small countries.

The Secretary commented that Qaddafi changes. Some days he condemns terrorism, some days he boasts of conducting it. Why is it, the Secretary asked, that Spain, Italy, West Germany, France—in short, so many countries—have acted on the basis of their intelligence evidence that the Libyan Peoples' Bureaus in their countries are used as centers for terrorism. There is a fair amount of quite compelling evidence.

Shevardnadze rejoined that the U.S. is very quick to condemn Bulgaria and Cuba. It is quick to condemn the Soviet Union, about their 25 people, with no facts, no proof. Daniloff is a fact too; he was caught red-handed, but the U.S. does not admit that fact. Great powers ought to be more fair in their assessments. If there were proof that Qaddafi organizes or finances terrorism, the Soviet Union would have to break

⁴ Shultz traveled to Bogotá for the inauguration of President Barco from August 6 to 7.

with him. The U.S. may have some facts, some letters, but you have no proof. He may be an odd fellow, but he is the leader of his people. The U.S. wants to overthrow him, but it will not be able to, because he is supported by the people. This must be treated with respect. If he could be unmasked, he should stand trial, as Hitler's people stood trial.

The Secretary said he was somewhat frustrated, because Shevardnadze was telling him there was no evidence about terrorist acts, and yet the acts go on. Many countries have evidence. It is not just the U.S. And the evidence is not confined just to European countries. In Arab countries too there is great concern about Qaddafi. There is good evidence connecting him to the mining in the Red Sea, to attempts to disrupt the Hajj. The Arab countries are very reserved toward Qaddafi. The Soviets should ask their friends in Jordan, in Egypt, in Saudi Arabia. They should talk to them privately. Qaddafi has made himself an outlaw by his actions.

Shevardnadze said the Soviets have an intelligence organization too. (*The Secretary* said he knew it.) Their intelligence organization does not confirm that Qaddafi is doing this, *Shevardnadze* continued. They would like to go to the bottom of the question of whether he is involved. This is not a secondary question of cooperating with some country with a different ideology or system. It is a question of cooperating with a leader who is planning terrorist acts. If we could help them get to the bottom of this, their approach might change. But one must be very cautious, because charges against Cuba and Bulgaria are unfair and unjustified. All of this does not exclude the possibility of acting on certain facts. Ambassador Hartman had provided some. The Soviets had not acted in the press, perhaps, but they had used them to ascertain if what we said was true, and if there is a suspicion they are prepared to intervene also in the future. *Shevardnadze* asked the *Secretary* not to tell Casey this, since Casey would then think him something he is not.

The Secretary suggested *Shevardnadze* develop talking points for use with various people. In London he should talk to Geoffrey Howe. In Italy there was Craxi. He should talk to Kohl, to Chirac. He should ask them why they expel the Peoples' Bureaus. He should ask Howe for the evidence he had on the person who put the bomb in the El Al plane at Heathrow airport, what country he was from and what connection he had with the Bureau in London. We are reflecting what we know of acts, not on our territory, or on Soviet territory, perhaps, but in countries where we are involved, and the Soviets sometimes are too.

Shevardnadze said that the Soviets had asked, and got different answers. They are told the evidence does exist, but the Americans have it. *The Secretary* replied that the evidence on the suitcase bomb on the El Al plane was entirely British. The evidence on the Peoples' Bureau

was theirs, but they tell us about it. The evidence on planning the attack on the Berlin disco was ours, but we showed it to people, and they were convinced.

Shevardnadze asked why we did not go to the International Court of Justice. *The Secretary* said that was a joke, and *Shevardnadze* knew it was a joke. The Court's judges are instructed by their countries for political cases like that. It can work on other cases. For instance we and the Canadians had named judges for an important boundary dispute. We did not entirely like the finding, but we accepted it. But political cases are different, and that is why we agreed to reserve such cases to the United Nations Security Council. *Shevardnadze* said one could make the same complaint about the Security Council, since representatives on it were also instructed.

But, *Shevardnadze* said, he did not think this was a productive line of discussion. He wished to go back to the suggestion that we can cooperate on specifics. On a specific hijacking, a specific crime, a specific question, we could cooperate. On some problems it is hard to find a common ground; we should have no illusion we can solve them all. *The Secretary* replied we should be content to settle some.

Shevardnadze said we should consider the Iran-Iraq war. *The Secretary* asked if he could give us what he planned to say at the General Assembly. We could then consider what we would say at the Security Council or elsewhere. *Shevardnadze* said he would send it to the Secretary.

The Secretary said he wished to make some points on humanitarian concerns. They had spoken privately about some aspects of human rights, *Shevardnadze* would recall. We had also noticed they had made some administrative changes; they had set up a new administration for humanitarian affairs. We had also suggested setting up a humanitarian affairs working group, to meet on a regular basis, and he wished to reiterate that proposal.

Shevardnadze agreed that humanitarian issues had to some extent been covered in the private meetings of the day before and that day. The Soviets are doing a great deal of work to improve their legal procedures, in the framework of their general approach. Where they cannot decide a particular case positively, they inform the Embassy. The lists we submit are considered in a responsible way, not just because the U.S. has asked, but because humanitarian issues are involved. A man is a man; why should he live separately from his wife? There is indeed a new department, and he thought it was the right decision to set it up. On the U.S. suggestion, there was some question of whether a permanent working group is necessary. We now have mechanisms for considering these issues, in a bilateral framework. But if it seemed that as part of that a standing consultative commission on these issues would be useful it could be done.

Turning to bilateral issues, *the Secretary* noted that some of them show promise. We have means of going through them, and there is plenty going on. Both sides favor expansion of cultural ties, and people-to-people exchanges. There are problems connected with the financial aspects, and we had made a suggestion here. But although there are problems, there are also ways of discussing these issues. He asked Assistant Secretary Ridgway to comment.

Ambassador Ridgway said the problem particularly affected the performing arts. *Shevardnadze* said he did not understand. *Ambassador Ridgway* said there is general satisfaction with the way cultural exchanges are going, but there is a problem with the balance of groups travelling between the two countries. Ambassador Rhinesmith is working on it with his Soviet counterpart.

Shevardnadze said this is precisely an area where the state of affairs is not bad. We have agreed on new exchanges in culture, for youth, for artists. People support this, and efforts should intensify. There are possibilities for working more actively, and we should do that. The Embassy should produce more interesting proposals.

The Secretary said he would like to make an overall assessment. After the Geneva Summit last year, President Reagan said our two countries owe each other “the tribute of candor.” The General Secretary too spoke of the need for straightforward talk to each other. If candor and frankness are the measure of friendship, we must be good friends, the Secretary went on. So it should be clear what has to happen next to unlock the substantive opportunities that seem within reach.

Our negotiators and experts made a good start this summer, the Secretary went on. Our side is prepared to put our backs into an effort to capitalize on the real opportunities. The two ministers had identified Ambassador Ridgway and Minister Bessmertnykh as the key points for coordinating. He thought this was a good way to proceed.

The Secretary said he would like to review where we stand. We have reached agreement on a number of points:

—We have agreed to negotiate on risk reduction centers, and we should develop a concrete statement or plan.

—We have agreed there should be additional meetings on chemical weapons proliferation, with arrangements to be worked out through this channel.

—We have quite a thorough review of the NST negotiations and have agreed there is some narrowing of gaps, especially so in INF but in a way also in START, and we have had a thorough exchange on space, in some respects better than in the past. Our negotiators should continue working on this in all three negotiating groups, with the hope that the new round can start with a strong thrust and make some accomplishments.

We have made a number of suggestions in other areas, the Secretary continued, and he would like to review them:

—On regional issues, difficult though it may be, we should continue our high-level and senior experts' meetings, and today we agreed to continue at the senior, Armacost-Adamishin level.

—Shevardnadze had said he would provide us with what he would say on the Iran-Iraq war, and we would look at it from the point of view of parallelism, whether we could consider doing the same kind of thing.

—We confirmed that we are prepared to have further experts' discussions on Southern Africa before the end of the year.

—On humanitarian issues, beyond emigration and the related issues we talked about in private, our side suggested a major effort to resolve representation list cases. It would be particularly good to resolve the remaining divided spouse cases. There are only about 20, and it would be good to clear this category off the books, and stop talking about it.

—We had discussed establishing a humanitarian working group.

—On bilateral and trade matters, cultural and people-to-people exchanges are going forward, but there are problems. There are prospects on space cooperation, a transportation agreement, reviewing consular matters, establishing a bilateral review commission, and there will be another discussion on maritime boundaries. Through these channels we will have something to say to you on an energy agreement, atomic energy and fusion research. We owe you answers there.

The Secretary continued that there was quite a lot in the list he had just read. It led him to two observations:

—First, it showed the interest of both sides in looking at practical ways to solve important questions in our relations, and to expand areas for cooperation. It would not be happening if the Soviets and we are not both interested.

—Second, that was very much what our leaders had in mind last November when they set out an agenda and a process for further work. This had not gone as well as we had hoped, but much had happened, particularly since we had decided to energize things this summer. He and Shevardnadze would now report to their leaders, and review the bidding.

We had also seen, the Secretary went on, how the Daniloff case casts a dark cloud over these opportunities. The Soviets were also interested in Zakharov, but he would speak only for the U.S. side. We have agreed on the necessity for giving great priority at our level to resolving this promptly, so that it does not stand in the way of the ability of our two leaders to move forward. We should keep open

opportunities, and be in touch. For our part, Ambassador Ridgway is ready to work on all these problems.

Shevardnadze said that in general he agreed with the Secretary's assessment. The talks had taken place in an atmosphere of frankness and respect, in a constructive spirit, despite the atmosphere before the meeting. They had built a conversation taking account of the situation in a constructive way. There had been a more concrete, more specific, more reasonable approach. In a broad way he could say our talks were becoming more disciplined. There were fewer unnecessary arguments, more of a desire to find something positive, a positive element in relations.

On the Soviet side, *Shevardnadze* went on, never before had such a broad group of diplomats, and not only of diplomatic officials, participated in preparing for a meeting with the U.S. For the first time almost all the deputy foreign ministers had participated. He noticed there was broad participation on the U.S. side too. No one had expected resolution of all difficulties overnight. But a good pattern has developed. He did not know about meeting more often—he believed the two ministers should—but we should share positive and negative experiences, and there was much positive in how we had prepared.

On the specific issues the Secretary had mentioned, *Shevardnadze* said he had tried to identify which were most promising. On nuclear and security issues they should give instructions to the delegations to work intensively for solutions, partly in the perspective of a summit meeting. *Karpov* would convey all that had been said to all members of the Soviet Geneva delegation. Some narrowing was also possible on chemical weapons, particularly non-proliferation, and on nuclear non-proliferation. There are many questions where he was hopeful there could be more cooperation, more results.

Shevardnadze continued that there are deep differences on regional questions, but even there there are some questions where we could work to normalize crisis situations in various parts of the planet, for instance Iran-Iraq. He wished to go back to the Middle East, assuming an equal interest in a stable Middle East. On terrorism there was no need to go into detail.

Shevardnadze said he would leave bilateral issues largely unexplored. In the cultural and scientific areas his experts wanted to expand contacts. In the economic and industrial area, a sensitive area, there had been some stagnation. Perhaps there could be a special meeting for an appropriate discussion of economic problems of mutual interest. Perhaps this could be at the ministers' level.

The Secretary said he would be glad to do that. Perhaps if they had a longer meeting of some days they could allocate some time to these questions, not just trade but broader economic questions. *Shevardnadze*

said he agreed to this. The meeting would have to be very well prepared, with good analysis, conclusions, prospects.

The Secretary commented that the President likes jokes, and told one about a Red Square meeting where the Defense Minister described the various fine troops marching by to the General Secretary. Then at the end of the parade came a bedraggled outfit, and when the General Secretary asked who they were, the Minister said those were the economists: he would be surprised at the damage they can do. *Shevardnadze* said they were from Gosplan. The U.S. was also rich in such people, for instance those who had created our discriminatory system against the Soviet Union. The difference is that with the Soviets they are last, whereas with the U.S. they are first.

Shevardnadze continued that he would add peaceful cooperation in the energy field. We had done good work in this area. The same was true of space. He had talked to the Soviet experts, and they were optimistic. It was a good place to cut costs, and if we could cut military programs we could spend some on peaceful uses.

The Secretary said that he took from Shevardnadze's comments the general implication that it is a good way to proceed to have experts identify specific areas. On space this has happened, and we are prepared to meet in Washington October 20–24 to start to put together an overall umbrella agreement under which the cooperation the experts have identified can take place. *Shevardnadze* said the Soviets agree in principle.

His colleagues reminded him, Shevardnadze said, to urge the Secretary to think again about nuclear testing, for it is a fundamental question for the Soviets.

Finally, Shevardnadze said, he wished to touch on fusion. He had visited the labs. This was an area where he had a certain theoretical knowledge, but he had spent a whole day with the people in the labs, and it is an area of huge promise. It could be an almost unlimited resource, and looked especially important in the wake of the Chernobyl tragedy, because it is especially promising from the standpoint of safety. It is a very reliable source. A dialogue is underway, and we need to translate this into practice. It will not be our generation which benefits, but we can lay some good groundwork. When we retire, we can retire to Mars. *The Secretary* said Shevardnadze could have it. Speaking seriously, he said it is interesting what the younger generation is learning. He realized that we need to get back to the Soviet side, that the ball is in our court.

The Secretary noted that in these meetings we always discuss how to handle the press, and try to come up with some general words. In this case he would suggest "satisfactory" for the tone. On content we had no intention of describing details of positions, but would be making

general references to topics. We will feel it necessary to say the problems we have been working on have not been resolved and are hanging over the situation. He imagined that he would be seeing Shevardnadze in New York, and that if it happened it would be a good sign. He would be responsive to Shevardnadze's call. He did not foresee differences on describing the negotiations. He would call the talks on these positive and useful, and while he would give no details on Geneva, he would say it was an important area where good prospects are emerging.

Shevardnadze said he would say the same. If the Summit comes up he would say it is on the agenda, everything depends on how we work in Geneva, agreement on the one issue is necessary, and if the U.S. side takes the same view it will be reached. *The Secretary* said this sounded fine, for he would not wish the President to go to a meeting where that was the only thing to be talked about; let us resolve the issue. *Shevardnadze* said he would say the Soviets would do everything that depended on them, he expected the Americans would say the same thing. He expected they would meet in New York. It should not be put off.

288. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 23, 1986, 10:30–11:15 a.m.

U.S. Participants

Secretary Shultz

Ambassador Ridgway

D. Zarechnak, Interpreter

USSR Participants

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Ambassador Bessmertnykh

P. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

After a brief informal exchange, Shevardnadze asked the Secretary what they should do to resolve the present situation.

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memorandum of Conversations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, September 19 & 23, 1986, Shultz/Shevardnadze at the UN. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the President's office at the UN. There is no drafting information Shultz wrote in his memoir: "I saw Shevardnadze on Tuesday. The Soviets wanted either no trial for Zakharov or Daniloff or trials for both. As a sweetener, after both were out, Shevardnadze said, 'We might give you a present' of a dissident release. Gorbachev had approved the release of the renowned Soviet physicist Yuri Orlov, who had been prominent on the list I had given Shevardnadze in Washington. On the matter of the Soviet mission staff, Shevardnadze took a tough line. His proposal was constructive, I told him, but unacceptable. Back and forth we went haggling over the terms—at our UN mission and at the Soviet UN mission. Each day a new formula was proposed and knocked down." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 745)

The Secretary replied that it would be good if the Soviet side told Daniloff that he could leave.

Shevardnadze said that he was ready to do that, provided that the U.S. would also let Zakharov go. He saw that the situation was not getting any easier, and that passions were getting heated, especially after the President's UN speech.²

The Secretary indicated that the US side had received the Soviet side's language on the Iran-Iraq war, and would try to see how to formulate something with a parallel objective and find a place to issue it, for example in the Security Council, and perhaps with a phrase noting the connection with the Soviet statement, which would move the two sides in the direction they had spoken of.

Shevardnadze replied that he was sure that something could be found. He noted, however, that the present difficulties were getting worse, especially after the President's speech, and noted frankly that he would have to reply in his speech. But he was not planning to touch on the Daniloff and Zakharov cases. If he were to begin to reveal the substance involved, there would be no end to it. The cases should be resolved between the Secretary and himself. He was empowered to do so. This was not a situation which should be brought up at the General Assembly.

The Secretary agreed. He thought it should be settled.

Shevardnadze said that he had a proposal, and that there was very little time. He indicated that he was not very adept at diplomatic trading (to which the Secretary interjected that he certainly was), but he wanted to propose the following. As the two sides had agreed, the first option was a one-for-one trade, without a trial. The second option was a trial in both countries. Then, on the working level, agreement could be reached as to how to describe it, which was also important.

Shevardnadze continued that the U.S. had transmitted a list. The two sides had agreed that this was a separate issue from Daniloff and

² On September 22, Reagan addressed the UN General Assembly: "Recently, after the arrest of a Soviet national and U.N. employee accused of espionage in the United States, an American correspondent in Moscow was made the subject of fabricated accusations and trumped up charges. He was arrested and jailed in a callous disregard of due process and numerous human rights conventions. In effect, he was taken as a hostage—even threatened with the death penalty. Both individuals have now been remanded to their respective Ambassadors. But this is only an interim step agreed to by the United States for humanitarian reasons. It does not change the facts of the case: Gennadi Zakharov is an accused spy who should stand trial; Nicholas Daniloff is an innocent hostage who should be released. The Soviet Union bears the responsibility for the consequences of its action. Misusing the United Nations for purposes of espionage does a grave disservice to this organization. And the world expects better. It expects contributions to the cause of peace that only the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union can make." For the complete text of the address, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book II, pp. 1227–1233.

Zakharov. Shevardnadze had consulted and could say that when a firm decision was worked out concerning Zakharov and Daniloff, and a certain time had passed (10 days, 15 days, a month), the Soviet side would expel one of the people on the list. Perhaps this could be regarded as a gift to the U.S. There was a person who was famous in the U.S., although not as well-known in the USSR—Orlov. If this was important to the US, the Soviet side was prepared to do it.

Shevardnadze continued that this was one side of the matter. But he said that the Secretary had promised to come back to him on the question of the Soviet UN employees, which was a separate issue. Shevardnadze was waiting for the Secretary's reply, since a machine has been set in motion, and if the issue were not clarified, there would be a response on the Soviet side, which would make it difficult to talk about normalization of Soviet-American relations, at least for some period of time.

Shevardnadze mentioned that he would not want to resolve the issue through intermediaries, of whom there seemed to be a great number, anxious to play that role.

The Secretary replied that no intermediaries were necessary.

Shevardnadze stated that our two countries realized the importance of Soviet-American relations better than anyone else, and the situation needed to be resolved quickly. The longer it would drag out, the more difficult it would become. He wished to state frankly that the decision on Orlov would not have been possible without the direct intervention of Gorbachev, since the two cases were equal, and why should the Soviet side yield further concessions? But the Soviets realized that everything had been set in motion, including the participation of the President, and some compromise was necessary.

The Secretary indicated that, first of all, he considered Shevardnadze's reply to be constructive, and he welcomed it. Clearly, the US would like to see more names from the list. Some of those individuals were quite ill. But the reply was a constructive one. The question of time, i.e. how long to delay, was a difficult one.

The Secretary then turned to the question on which Shevardnadze had asked for a reply. He said that he would first try to formulate a broad answer, and then a more concrete one. Each of our two countries have intelligence services. Neither country wants representatives of the other country in its own country in any capacity. But this does occur. The US has a special problem that the USSR does not have which stems from the fact that the US is the host for the United Nations and the large number of related organizations. So there is a difference between people in the United States who serve at a UN mission or at the UN itself on the one hand, and those that serve at a diplomatic mission. Those that serve at a diplomatic mission have diplomatic

immunity, whereas those that serve at the UN mission are in a different situation.

The Secretary was sure that Shevardnadze agreed that it was reasonable for the US to take the position that people who are here for UN activities should not be engaged in espionage. From time to time the US finds such people, and when this happens it leads to the kind of difficulties which the two countries are now experiencing. If this had happened to a representative of a Soviet diplomatic mission in Washington, or an American of such status in Moscow, they would have been expelled. Both countries would have complained, but the situation would have been different.

The Secretary continued that his observation of people in intelligence was that they were very intelligent, honorable and patriotic, but that they had a job to do and a role to play, which gave them a certain orientation, almost by definition. Therefore, given that background, as the US identifies Soviet citizens working at the UN Mission or the UN Secretariat who are connected with intelligence agencies, it is like Russian roulette, and there is going to be a hit periodically. So it would be better for both sides if Soviet representatives in the US were not from intelligence agencies, but from other agencies such as the Foreign Ministry.

The Secretary continued that Shevardnadze had asked in Washington how it would end if the Soviet side would expel US employees, then the US would expel more Soviet employees, and so on. It was the belief of the US side that the 25 people named are basically affiliated with intelligence agencies, and that there is a much larger number of such Soviet employees at the Soviet UN Mission and the Secretariat. They do useful work, but their affiliation causes problems and the possibility of a blow-up. So the US thinks they should go, and the best course of action would be for the Soviet side to replace them with people from the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, etc. and not from intelligence agencies. This would serve a limiting function. But the decision on the 25 which were named would not be changed.

The Secretary said that Shevardnadze had spoken of counter-measures. The US would not welcome this, but it was up to the USSR to decide what it should do. The Secretary had simply wanted to address the question of where this would end, and how it could be resolved. He indicated that he would let the President know of the information which Shevardnadze had passed on, and that Gorbachev personally was responsible for the decision to release Orlov. The Secretary would try to give a very quick response to Shevardnadze, and he wished to propose that if it were difficult for the two of them to meet quickly, he could ask Ambassador Ridgway to contact Ambassador

Bessmertnykh to pass on information. But if the process moved along, the Secretary would like to continue to deal directly with the Foreign Minister to work things out.

Shevardnadze replied that he had expected a different answer from the Secretary, and wished to comment on some of the Secretary's remarks. He saw that the UN had become a difficult burden for the US, and he was planning to say a few words about this in his speech. The Secretary had said that Soviet representatives and the representatives of other nations engage in prohibited activities. The Soviet side is prepared to publish the list of those that the US has proposed to expel. In addition to being unfair, professionally the US intelligence services made big mistakes. Some of the people on the list never leave the building. The list had not been put together professionally. It is arbitrary. Shevardnadze advised Shultz not to believe everything the intelligence services say. Such an approach would take the two sides too far. Political decisions needed to be taken despite various intelligence reports.

Shevardnadze continued that he had been informed that US intelligence services know how to use representatives of different countries in the UN for purposes of gathering information, i.e. know how to recruit people from different countries and regions. So the US intelligence services were not so innocent. Things should not go so far. Shevardnadze had thought that the two of them had agreed that the main thing was a meeting between the two leaders, and that all obstacles in the path of the meeting needed to be eliminated. The Secretary could have said something different about the fate of the Soviet employees. But he had not proposed anything. He had only given ultimatums. This would not lead anywhere. Shevardnadze could assure the Secretary that there would be a response, and this would not be good for Soviet-American relations. He was very concerned that everything that had been done at the Summit in Geneva and all the work that he and the Secretary had done to bring about the next summit would come to nought.

The Secretary said that he agreed with Shevardnadze's frustration at the fact that this issue was in the way. The frustration was even greater since the Secretary felt that a lot of progress had been made on substantive issues and that Shevardnadze's proposal to do preparatory work during the summer yielded good results. The Secretary assured Shevardnadze that he wanted to work with him to resolve the problem.

Shevardnadze remarked that not words but deeds were necessary. The Secretary agreed.

Shevardnadze indicated that Moscow was waiting for final information and his reply. He agreed that information could be exchanged on the level of Deputy Ministers, Ambassadors or even Counselors.

The Secretary replied that that was not how he had meant it. He would want to work directly with the Foreign Minister. He had only mentioned Ambassador Ridgway because if there needed to be a quick exchange of information, and his and the Foreign Minister's schedule made this difficult, such a quick exchange could be made in that way.

Shevardnadze asked if the question of expelling the 25 people by October 1 still remained in force. He asked the Secretary if the US side would not be ready to make a decision by the end of the day, since the Soviet side also needed to make a decision. If the US was serious about its intent, then there were people and families involved, and the Soviet Union would need to reply. There was very little time left. If, however, the view on the deadline had been changed, this was another matter.

The Secretary replied that the US position on the date stood. This was something which had been set in March, but was not connected at that time with the issue of the 25 people. But he indicated that he would give the Foreign Minister a reply by the end of the day to the question that the Foreign Minister had asked and to the proposal he had made. He would try to deal directly with Shevardnadze, but if the schedule did not permit, it could be done through Ambassadors Ridgway and Bessmertnykh or someone else on the Soviet side.

Shevardnadze said that this should be done without delay.

289. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 23, 1986, 7:30–9 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>U.S.S.R.</i>
Secretary Shultz	Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Assistant Secretary Ridgway	Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh
D. Zarechnak, Interpreter	Soviet Ambassador Dubinin
	P. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

Shevardnadze said he had been ready to meet any place. The Secretary replied that we were there because it was the Soviet Mission's turn for meeting.

The Secretary said that he wished to reply to the ideas presented by *Shevardnadze* in the morning.² He wanted to say that the President personally paid attention to this issue, and asked that *Shevardnadze* convey his thanks to the General Secretary for the fact that the General Secretary was also personally involved.

The Secretary indicated that the President had suggested a set of steps. The first step was that *Daniloff* would be released without trial. The second step was that 24 hours later *Zakharov* would be released without trial. It was understood that each side could make public the evidence that it possessed on each of these cases. At the time that *Zakharov* was released, *Orlov* together with four or five other people should be released. The U.S. side would be glad if the place of this release would be Berlin or some similar place. With regard to the question of the 25 Soviet UN Mission employees, the President gave careful consideration to *Shevardnadze's* request that the period of time (*Shevardnadze* had proposed a period of 7 days) could be extended past October 1, and the President would be glad to do so. The President also indicated that he, *Shultz*, should tell *Shevardnadze* that if in *Shevardnadze's* view it would be better, the period could be extended to

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memorandum of Conversations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, September 19 & 23, 1986, *Shultz/Shevardnadze* at the UN. Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information. The meeting took place in the Soviet UN Mission. Reagan wrote in his personal diary on September 24: "Back to Wash. arrived at W.H. about 8:30. No new progress on *Daniloff*," and then on September 25: "Geo. S. had called from N.Y. to counsel with us about *Daniloff*. He has had (Geo. S. I mean) with *Shevardnadze* & the deal cooking is *Daniloff* free—*Zakharov* free in exchange for *Orlov* + others if possible. I think we'll have to settle for *Orlov* but I recommended only if *Orlov* comes here as *Z.* leaves. The Soviets want *Z.* first & then *Orlov* about 15 days later. Of course we hold fast that the 25 KGB's leave the U.N. and go home." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 642)

² See Document 288.

fourteen days past October 1 if necessary. With the completion of these steps, which would be described as being independent, as Shevardnadze had proposed, the matter would end.

The Secretary continued that he had three other points. The U.S. offered to work with the Soviet Union to avoid misunderstandings as the Soviet side replaced its staff up to the desired level, as long as this was below 218, by October 1. The U.S. side continued to hold the view that the Soviet Union should withdraw its intelligence personnel from its UN Mission.

Finally, in Washington the two sides had agreed to the Soviet proposal for the leaders of the countries to meet in Iceland. However, the Secretary and Shevardnadze had agreed that with the present difficulties, it would be hard to set a time for this meeting. The President proposed that if this problem could be ended as described, in further reply to the General Secretary's proposal, the President was suggesting they meet in Iceland October 10, 11 and 12, 1986. The President had in mind that if this problem is worked out, he would propose to arrive in Iceland on October 10, and meet with the General Secretary on October 11 and possibly the morning of October 12, and return to Washington after that. The Secretary remarked that as the Foreign Minister could see, the President had tried to design his proposals in such a way as to make maximum use of Shevardnadze's ideas.

Shevardnadze said that he wished to repeat for the sake of clarification: Daniloff would be released without trial; Zakharov would be released without trial 24 hours after Daniloff; and the public description of this would be implemented upon mutual agreement on the basis of reciprocity.

The Secretary indicated that the two sides would need to work out how best to inform the public about this. The U.S. side believed that as things happened, they should be described, and not all at once, although the U.S. side was prepared to describe publicly the actions connected with the UN Mission employees at the time of Daniloff's release, but there would be a convention, following Shevardnadze's proposal, to publicly describe these things as independent actions. The Soviet Union would release Daniloff, the United States would release Zakharov, and the United States would make public information about Zakharov as it saw fit, and the USSR would do the same with regard to Daniloff. The U.S. would say that there had been an extension of time equal to seven days, or fourteen days if the Soviet side preferred, or some similar phrase. If the content of the proposal was acceptable, the formulation of this could be worked out.

Shevardnadze began by speaking of Orlov. He noted that the suggestion was that Orlov along with four or five other people be released together with Zakharov. He thought the arrangement about releasing

Daniloff and Zakharov without trial was basically acceptable. How to describe this publicly was not a big problem, and could be agreed at the working level. As far as the next step was concerned, he had indicated that a period of time would need to pass after the return of Daniloff and Zakharov before the decision to release Orlov was taken. He stressed that this was a very serious concession on the Soviet part. Since the Daniloff and Zakharov cases were similar, this should not be complicated by an addition of four or five extra names. However, there could be a gentleman's agreement that the Soviet side would see if it were possible to solve some of these cases, but this would be done subsequently, as had been done in previous cases. In this particular situation, Orlov would be the only one to be released. Shevardnadze stressed that without Gorbachev's intervention this decision would not have been made.

Shevardnadze continued that the two of them should decide this issue. He wished to say frankly that he could not do any better. He could not do any better. It was only because of the political decision of Gorbachev with regard to Orlov and the fact that Gorbachev took into consideration the prestige of the President that this decision was made.

The Secretary said that he would like to ask for a clarification. There was agreement by the Soviet side to the series of steps which the President had proposed, except that the Soviet side did not want to add any additional names other than Orlov's.

Shevardnadze confirmed this, and indicated that the decision about Orlov had taken some time, and it would not take 1½ or 2 months to release him, but more in the order of ten or fifteen days. With that agreed, the package was okay. The question of release of one person 24 hours later was not significant, and although there were some who attached importance to these things, Shevardnadze thought the U.S. side could be accommodated on this.

The Secretary indicated that the President had carefully considered the element of timing. If Shevardnadze said that this was a definite position of the Soviet side, the Secretary would so tell the President. The Secretary did not have any flexibility about the timing of Orlov's release. He did not know if the Soviet side had any flexibility on additional names, but he wished to say that the President was concerned about this issue. The U.S. side had given the Soviet side a list, and he wished to mention some names specifically. Two of them were quite ill: Ida Nudel and David Goldfarb. The other case was not exactly a divided spouse case, but one that was similar: an American citizen, Susan Graham, lives in Moscow, and can leave, but her husband Matvey Finkel cannot. These were the names that the Secretary was leaving with the Soviet side.

Shevardnadze replied that he had no flexibility on this issue. The maximum that could be done would be to release Orlov. With regard

to further names, they would be examined, as had been done in the past, but in this situation it would not be possible to do any more. He repeated that very serious concessions had been made by the Soviet side, and that he had not expected to receive support on this from Moscow. Frankly he thought that the President would have appreciated this.

The Secretary replied that he thought that there had been concessions all around. It was a major concession for the President to decide to release Zakharov, and he only did it because of the desire to work out the possibilities which existed.

The Secretary continued that he wanted to make the following proposal. He thought that the two sides now had a pattern of large areas of agreement. As he saw it, two differences remained. The first was that the U.S. felt that Orlov should be released at the same time as Zakharov, and the USSR felt that he should be released ten days later (the Secretary remarked that Shevardnadze had said ten or fifteen, but he was using the figure ten). The other difference was that the U.S. wished to have the release of Orlov and four or five other people, some of whose names the Secretary had indicated. The Soviet position was that it might consider these additional names in the future, but it did not wish to have them as part of the "Orlov package." The Secretary repeated that he was trying to specify the differences between the two sides, and he hoped that his description was correct. He noted that Ambassador Ridgway had added something which he had already mentioned, i.e. that each side would be free to make public its information about Daniloff on the one hand and Zakharov on the other. The Soviet side had proposed this, and the U.S. had agreed.

Shevardnadze said that this had not been a "proposal," but rather a possibility.

The Secretary agreed, and repeated that there would be no trial, but the Soviet side might wish to indicate that it had arrested Daniloff for a good reason, and the U.S. side might do the same for Zakharov, sort of in lieu of a trial.

Shevardnadze thought that this would not be a problem. The information might be made public or not. If the U.S. decided that it needed to make the information on Zakharov public, then the Soviet side would make public its information on Daniloff.

The Secretary repeated that there were these two differences, and he wanted to make sure that both sides agreed that this was the case. He would be talking with the President, and he assumed that the Foreign Minister would be talking too.

Shevardnadze said that he could agree to the release of Daniloff without trial, and the release of Zakharov without trial. And although

he only had instructions about a simultaneous release, he could take it upon himself to agree to this, since 24 hours were not important. Sometime after this, the decision on Orlov would be made. He wished to divulge a secret by saying that he had firm instructions to indicate a month's time of delay, but he would take it upon himself to agree to do this within ten or fifteen days. As a matter of fact, he would guarantee this shorter time period, and would persuade them to accept this. Any other compromise would be out of the question. This was the last one. All other lists, such as the ones presented by Ambassador Hartman and the Secretary, would be considered in the normal way, and perhaps some solutions could be found, but this should not be connected with this particular situation. Shevardnadze would personally look at those lists, and if possible make some decisions (he remarked that he always pays serious attention to these lists, and would do so in this case as well).

Shevardnadze continued that the Soviet side had made a concession about the 24-hour time difference. Orlov was a "gift" to the U.S., and the U.S. should realize what a serious move this was. This had been considered very carefully by the Soviet side, and it was not so simple to do. This was the first package.

The Secretary said that he thought that the differences between the sides (although the Foreign Minister perhaps had made a flat statement) were in the length of time between the Zakharov and Orlov release, which the Soviet side might think about, and the question of adding names to the list, which the U.S. would know about ahead of time, in addition to Orlov. The proposals which the Secretary had given to Shevardnadze had been worked out with the President, and, in essence, were the President's proposals. While the Foreign Minister could see that the Secretary had some flexibility, which he had shown, he would now go back and tell the President what the Foreign Minister had said. The U.S. side would try to think creatively, but hoped that the Soviet side would do the same, and not dig itself into a certain position, since the two sides were very close to working out a solution, and the Secretary would like to get this done and go on to other things.

Shevardnadze repeated that the Secretary would talk to the President, and he would talk to the General Secretary.

The Secretary confirmed that he and the Foreign Minister would be in touch.

Shevardnadze indicated that a solution needed to be found to free the sides of this burden.

The Secretary agreed, and indicated that the Foreign Minister had seen how much he, the Secretary, had worked on this, and how much he wanted to have the leaders of the two countries have direct contact

in Iceland, rather than indirect contact through himself and the Foreign Minister, in order to discuss broader issues.

Shevardnadze repeated that the two of them should agree that what he had said was the maximum that he could do.

The Secretary repeated that he would inform the President that this was the Foreign Minister's feeling, but that he agreed to convey the results of this conversation to the General Secretary, and that the Secretary would convey it to the President.

Shevardnadze repeated that he needed to convince people about the 24-hour time difference. (*The Secretary* interjected that the Foreign Minister could be very persuasive.) *Shevardnadze* indicated, however, that this was not that simple, since things have gone so far. These types of issues are usually decided below this level, but the machine has now been set in motion and things needed to be decided higher up. The second question was the timing of Orlov's release. He thought this could be accomplished in ten or fifteen days, although he had been instructed to say thirty days, and he would need to work to convince Moscow. This should not be complicated by other issues.

Shevardnadze continued that the Secretary should talk this over with the President again, and if the President gave his final reply tomorrow, actions could be taken, and the faster the better. He had felt that the entire U.S. felt the Daniloff case to be an important one. The situation in Moscow was comparable. There were press conferences, and people were asking, "When would Zakharov be released?" The longer this situation continued, the more difficult it would get. For the first ten or fifteen days the General Secretary did not want to get involved in this, and gave no interviews. And then in Stavropol and Krasnodar he spoke out, and now he is involved.

Shevardnadze hoped that the version of the accord which had been described was acceptable. But he was concerned about the following. He had not mentioned any number of days—seven, ten or fifteen. He had said that the U.S. side had not indicated anything about changing the deadline. The U.S. side has said that the people on the list are intelligence agents. But the Soviet side was saying that this was not so. If the U.S. insisted on sticking by its view, and was not open to compromise, what options would there be? The Soviet side would send its people home, and then the Soviet Union would take action in response. *Shevardnadze* did not know how many people would be involved, but after such a response, an end could be put to the issue. He did not see any other possibility, since the prestige and authority of states was involved.

Shevardnadze continued by asking what else could be done. There was the question of the number—25. Seven or eight of those people had already left the United States and were in Moscow. Perhaps the

U.S. side could forget about its ultimatum, and the Soviet side would also forget about it, and there would be the normal renewal of personnel at the Soviet Mission, and no sanctions would then be imposed. Otherwise, this action could not be one-sided. The U.S. should put a stop to all the furor which has been raised.

The Secretary remarked that he should be leaving soon.

Shevardnadze indicated that he was expressing his thoughts without having consulted with anyone. He thought that it seemed as if the second possibility was going to be the one to be taken, i.e. the U.S. decision would stand, and then there would be a Soviet reply. After that, the sides would see what would happen. The same situation had occurred with England, where the British expelled some Soviet diplomats, and then the Soviet Union expelled some diplomats, and after that there were negotiations. But this was bad, and should not happen before the Summit. The other option would be to forget about the whole thing, but this was *Shevardnadze's* own idea.

The Secretary indicated that the President's proposals were a set which fit together. For a moment, the Secretary had thought that the two sides were close to agreement, but the more they talked the further apart they seemed to get.

Shevardnadze said that the sides had agreed this was a separate issue.

The Secretary replied that it was not. It all fit together, although the issues were independent, as they had agreed. But it was all one package.

Shevardnadze replied that if we assumed that the issues should be taken together, what would that change? He had said at the beginning that if there could be compromises with regard to Daniloff and Zakharov, on this other issue there could be none.

The Secretary indicated that he wanted to leave the paper from which he was reading with the Soviet side so that there would be no ambiguity, although the Soviet side had written down what he had said.³ He repeated that all of these things fit together. He indicated that in the morning *Shevardnadze* had spoken of a time period after October 1, and he had possibly misunderstood this to mean one week.

At this point *Bessmertnykh*, having perused the paper the Secretary had handed over, asked if everything in it was part of a package, for example, not having Soviet intelligence personnel in the UN Secretariat.

The Secretary indicated that this was the view of the U.S. side, which it wished to point out, and the reason for the action which was taken, as he had explained. Those people are in a country, and suddenly they

³ Not found.

get caught, and it's like Russian roulette. They become stuck in glue. So let's not have intelligence personnel in the Soviet Mission. This was not a demand, but a proposal.

Shevardnadze said that he did not know all 25 people on the list, but he did know three of them personally. They were all well-known diplomats. Could the Secretary believe that he truly knew these people personally? They were professionals who had a deep knowledge of Soviet-American relations and diligently performed their tasks with regard to improving these relations. He had known them for a long time. He had also met with some of the people who never left the building. The U.S. also had such people, used for communications purposes. The unfairness of the U.S. decision was recognized not only here but by the Soviet leadership as well. How they could they swallow this without a reply?

Shevardnadze continued that perhaps what would have to be done would be for the Soviet Union to respond (although he was not sure of the number of people that would be involved), and that would put an end to it. But there was also the question of the reputation of the people who would be expelled. This would be a stigma which they would have to bear. What would a fifty-year-old diplomat say to his children and family about why he was expelled?

Shevardnadze continued that he could see a framework emerging with regard to the first part of what was discussed. With regard to the second, the only thing he could propose would be that the Soviet side would reply and then see how the U.S. Administration would react. If it also replied, then there could be no Summit. Also, if all 25 of these people were really professional spies, why was this action taken on the day of his arrival in New York. If they had been tolerated for so long, why could the U.S. not have waited a few days? Then this issue could have been discussed.

The Secretary indicated the U.S. intelligence services identify people as those who are basically with an intelligence agency. It is not dishonorable to work for an intelligence agency. But if these people are in another country, they have the instincts of intelligence agents, and from time to time they inevitably get into trouble. This was the reason for the U.S. decision, and for our action, especially since the Soviet Ambassador to the UN had made a very contentious statement regarding the level which the U.S. had set for the number of Soviet personnel. That was why the U.S. had felt that it was necessary to make such a specific connection.

The Secretary continued that he thought the President would not withdraw his action with regard to the 25 individuals, although in his reply to the Foreign Minister's question he indicated a readiness to give the Soviet side more time to let its diplomats leave more gracefully.

The Secretary wished to propose that the Foreign Minister take the set of proposals the President had given and study them. Ambassador Ridgway had taken notes, and he had taken mental notes, and would transmit these to the President. He hoped that tomorrow or the day after there might be another meeting with the Foreign Minister. The Secretary would be in New York until Friday morning,⁴ at which time he would return to Washington and remain there until Sunday afternoon, after which he would return to New York and be in New York all week. However, he could change his plans if there was need to meet with the Foreign Minister.

Shevardnadze said that it would be important to have the final view of the President. He would inform Moscow of their conversation. With regard to the 25 people; it seemed realistic that there would be a reply.

The Secretary indicated that he would tell the President of the Foreign Minister's views, including the question of the UN personnel, but he was certain that the President would not change his stance. He had shown flexibility as the Secretary had described.

Shevardnadze then indicated the Soviet side would wait for word from the U.S. side tomorrow.

The Secretary said that he would call Washington tonight, and pass on the information about this meeting, and he hoped to talk with the President tomorrow. He also hoped that the Foreign Minister would talk with Moscow.

The Secretary said that he wanted to mention two other things, not related to this case. The first was that he watched the Foreign Minister deliver his speech at the UN, and wanted to compliment him on the forcefulness of his delivery.⁵ He was saying this despite the fact that he did not agree with many of the things that the Foreign Minister said. Secondly, the Foreign Minister had spoken of his desire, and the General Secretary's desire, to eliminate nuclear weapons. The Foreign Minister had referred to the Chernobyl accident with great empathy. The Secretary wished to stress that the President felt very strongly about the need to eliminate nuclear weapons, and if there is such a strong mutual feeling, there should be a way to find how to do it.

The Secretary continued that he had met with the Chinese Foreign Minister, who had told him that if the U.S. and USSR took steps to drastically reduce their nuclear arms, then China would be ready to

⁴ September 26.

⁵ For coverage of *Shevardnadze's* September 23 address to the UN General Assembly, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVII, No. 39 (October 23, 1986) pp. 5–9. Extracts of his address were printed in the *New York Times*, September 24, 1986, p. A10.

participate in the process of eliminating nuclear weapons.⁶ He had stated this publicly, but he went out of his way to stress it to the Secretary.

Shevardnadze said that he wished to be frank and say that he did not think that there were no prospects for good Soviet-American relations. A great deal had been accomplished. If a meeting between the President and the General Secretary took place, there would be good results.

The Secretary agreed.

Shevardnadze continued that the General Secretary has some ideas about the resolution of certain issues, and the Foreign Minister was sure that the President also had some important proposals. So progress was possible, and the two sides should not be burdened by the current difficulties.

The Secretary agreed, and as he was leaving mentioned that the Foreign Minister would have to be especially nice to Ambassador Ridgway's husband and the Secretary's wife, who went to the theater without their spouses that evening.

⁶ In telegram 18013 to Beijing, September 25, the Department reported on Shultz's meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wu at lunch on September 23. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

290. Notes of a Meeting¹

Washington, September 26, 1986

*Daniloff**Outcome of Meeting with the President*

1300–1400

As the result of our meeting, my negotiating authority is as follows:²

1.) I may agree to Daniloff, Zakharov, and Orlov all being released on the same day.

2.) Alternatively,³ I may agree to Daniloff being released on Day One, Zakharov being released 24 hours later, and Orlov 10 days after that (but before the meeting at Reykjavik) on condition that Orlov's release will be announced when Zakharov is released.

3.) The present situation regarding the Soviet UN Mission, i.e.

—They are below 218

—They will provide us with a list of those who already have departed and those who are in the process of doing so

—At Reykjavik Shevardnadze will provide further information on Soviet mission personnel situation

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Daniloff Detention in the USSR September 1986, Yogurt II. No classification marking. Prepared by Hill. The editor transcribed Hill's handwritten notes specifically for this volume. An image of the notes is Appendix C. A note in the upper-right corner reads: "9/26 1600." Shultz evidently dictated the text to Hill at 4 p.m. after returning to his office from the White House. In his memoir, Shultz recalled that on September 26, he "met with President Reagan at the White House in the early afternoon. Regan and Poindexter were present, too. We discussed in excruciating detail the phrasings of what we would accept from the Soviets: how many hours would pass between the release of Daniloff and that of Zakharov, when and how various steps would be publicly announced, and so on. I took care to get everything down in writing and read my notes back to the president. I wanted to be absolutely sure I was operating with clear presidential authority." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 746) Reagan wrote in his diary on September 26: "After lunch a meeting with Geo. S., Cap W. & Bill Casey plus our W.H. people Don R. John P. etc. It was a sum up of where we stand in negotiations between Geo. & Shevardnadze. The difference between us is their desire to make it look like a trade for Daniloff & their spy Zakharov. We'll trade Zakharov but for Soviet dissidents. We settled on some bottom line points beyond which we wont budge." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, pp. 642–643) According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan met with Shultz, Weinberger, Regan, and Poindexter from 1:32 to 2:36 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

² In a September 25 memorandum to Reagan, Shultz previewed the basic formulation that was decided during the meeting. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Daniloff Detention in the USSR September 1986, Yogurt II)

³ "Alternatively" was inserted.

—Shevardnadze has put down a marker regarding 2 or 3 people at the Soviet mission. I have authorization to negotiate changes in the list of 25 as long as I stay within the overall list.⁴

4.) The announcement of the Reykjavik meeting should come a day or so after the releases, with the period being used to get Icelandic government agreement.⁵ We would seek such agreement as quickly as possible as there are many arrangements to be made.

⁴ "Satisfactory" is written in parentheses in the left-hand margin next to these four points.

⁵ "announcement of the" and "a day or so" were inserted.

291. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 26, 1986, 7–8:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>U.S.S.R.</i>
Secretary Shultz	Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Assistant Secretary Ridgway	Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh
D. Zarechnak, Interpreter	Ambassador Dubinin
	P. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

After preliminary exchanges about the difficulties of scheduling in the UNGA environment, the Secretary said that he thought that since the issues the two countries were facing were so important, they should make every effort to resolve them. He would be going back to Washington the next day, and returning to New York on Sunday, and he had read that Shevardnadze would be in the United States until sometime on Tuesday.² The Secretary indicated that he would like to see these issues settled while Shevardnadze was still in the United States, if this were possible. Perhaps of course, it might not be possible, but Shevardnadze was the most authoritative individual to work on

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memorandum of Conversations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, September 19 & 23, 1986, Shultz/Shevardnadze at the UN. Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting took place in the U.S. Mission to the UN. See Document 290.

² September 28 and September 30, respectively.

these issues. The Secretary was the person next to the President, and Shevardnadze was the one next to the General Secretary.

The Secretary continued that the day before and that day he had consulted extensively with his colleagues and the President in Washington, and he had assured them that Shevardnadze had likewise consulted with Moscow. The situation was a very difficult one. The President had made some truly hard decisions, and some important concessions, and the Foreign Minister had told the Secretary that the General Secretary had done the same. The Secretary did not doubt the Foreign Minister's words, and he had conveyed this to the President.

The Secretary thought the two sides should review the situation to see where the differences between them were, or to solve the problem, if possible. Following tradition, since the Foreign Minister was the guest, the Secretary wished to offer him the floor first, if the Foreign Minister so desired.

Shevardnadze replied that the question of who was first was not so important. The main thing was to resolve the problem.

The Secretary agreed.

Shevardnadze said that if the two of them could not agree about a settlement of the main question, they would not be forgiven. Dozens of leaders of delegations from foreign countries had asked him whether or not there would be a Summit between the U.S. and the USSR.

The Secretary confirmed that he had also been asked the same thing.

Shevardnadze said that he had spoken with the General Secretary every day concerning the situation and the overall atmosphere. The General Secretary had given him guidelines and had made compromises and concessions. The following framework had developed. Shevardnadze thought that there was basic agreement on the following:

—The investigation of the Daniloff and Zakharov cases would not go to trial.

—There would be an exchange of the two, with a twenty-four-hour interval in between, and appropriate guarantees by the U.S. side that this would be carried out.

The Secretary replied that this was so, but he wanted to make a technical observation in order to familiarize the Foreign Minister with the process which the U.S. side would need to go through. This would not take more than twenty-four hours, but it was necessary. In order for Zakharov to be released without trial, he would either have to plead guilty, in which case the judge would let him off, or (and the Secretary assumed that the Soviet side would want to take the second option) he would say that he did not contend the issue (the technical term was *nolo contendere*). The Secretary believed that the Soviet lawyers would know what that meant. Zakharov would say that he did not

contend the charge (for whatever reasons he might have), and he would be released. This would not be an admission of guilt. He could say that he was not contesting the charges, bearing in mind that he was going to the USSR. There would be no implication in this pleading, but it would need to be done, and ought to take about 24 hours to accomplish. The Soviet side saw the procedure which took place when Zakharov was released to the custody of the Ambassador. A similar procedure would need to be followed in this case. These were just the technical details which the Secretary wished to explain to the Foreign Minister so that it would not come as a surprise.

Shevardnadze commented that the same type of procedures would probably take place in the case of Daniloff.

The Secretary repeated that he simply wanted to be sure that the Foreign Minister knew what to expect.

Ambassador Dubinin interjected that the procedure whereby Zakharov and Daniloff were released to the custody of the respective ambassadors was found to be mutually satisfactory.

The Secretary remarked that it was up to the lawyers to do these things. This was how they earned their money.

Shevardnadze remarked that the main thing was the 24 hours. Each side had its legal procedures, and this needed to be reciprocal. The details could be worked out by the appropriate people on both sides.

Shevardnadze continued that with regard to Orlov, he had indicated two days before that the Soviet side would release him after a certain period of time. Some had said that this period should be thirty days, but he thought that it could be done within ten or fifteen days. This was an essential issue. The main thing was that Orlov would be released.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. side would have to come back to this issue, since the President had very definite views on it.

Shevardnadze replied that if the President had a different view, the Secretary should convince him that no other decision was possible. The Soviet side had made a concession with regard to the 24-hour gap, and it had added Orlov. What else was it expected to do? Shevardnadze continued that the Soviet side could also make a different proposal, i.e., Daniloff could be convicted, as Shevardnadze had no doubt that he would be, and Zakharov would probably also be convicted, as the Secretary probably did not doubt he would be.

Shevardnadze continued that when the General Secretary made his decision about Orlov, as Shevardnadze had indicated two days before, the General Secretary had taken into consideration the personal interest taken in the case by the President and the question of the President's prestige. The Soviet side realized what would happen after

Orlov would be released, i.e., how it would be portrayed, and despite that the decision was made. With regard to the question of releasing four or five other people, the Foreign Minister indicated that, as he had said before, these names would be examined in the usual way. He took this responsibility upon himself, and if a basis existed for the release of the individuals, the possibility would be carefully examined. This was one group of questions.

The Secretary said that he wished to reply concerning this group of questions. As he had understood, Shevardnadze had summarized the situation as follows: Daniloff and Zakharov would be released without trial following the necessary technical procedures on both sides. He added that each side could publicly describe what had happened as it wished. The Foreign Minister had indicated the last time that if the U.S. side published the information it had on Zakharov, the Soviet side would do the same for Daniloff.

The Secretary reiterated that Daniloff would be released first, and Zakharov would be released 24 hours later. There was a significant difference of positions on the timing of Orlov's release. As the Secretary had indicated, the President felt that it was very important for Orlov and Zakharov to be released simultaneously. The Secretary realized that the Soviet side did not see it this way (it had proposed that the number of days be ten to fifteen and the Secretary said he was taking it to be ten.) The Secretary added that the President actually thought that Orlov ought to be released first, but he had told the President that he did not think this would be possible for the Soviet side, and, therefore, he did not want to argue for this. Therefore, the President was insisting on simultaneous release.

The Secretary continued that he realized that the Soviet side had problems, and he was sure that the Soviet side understood that the U.S. had problems. But he wished to say a few things about Orlov which might mitigate the Soviet side's concerns.

The first thing was that, recognizing that these events would be described as independent, even though they were really connected, the release of Orlov would be described as a humanitarian gesture in light of the successful conclusion of the CDE conference at Stockholm and in view of the upcoming conference in Vienna. The second question, related to the first, was the location for the exchange. This could take place in Berlin or Helsinki. Helsinki might have a good ring, because of its connection with the Helsinki Final Act. Vienna was another possibility. All of this would depend on how the question of the location would impact on the Soviet view about timing.

The Secretary continued that the President was very interested in having additional people released, and that there be specific knowledge about them, so that we would know where we were going. The Secre-

tary had assured the President that the Foreign Minister had spoken in good faith, had taken the U.S. list, had promised to look at it seriously and do the right thing. The U.S. side would like the Soviet side to do that, and to tell the U.S. side what it thought was the right thing, so that the U.S. would know where it was going. The U.S. side had proposed a number of names to choose from. The Soviet side could let it know the decision it had taken on specific names, especially since some of the people were quite ill and no threat to the Soviet Union.

Shevardnadze replied that he could not promise to do any more than he had indicated. He had said that the maximum had been done. One side had made all the concessions, and the other side only wished to dictate, without making any of its own concessions. No additional adjustments could be made regarding the timing of Orlov's release. This would be fifteen, twenty, or perhaps ten days. With regard to the other four or five names, the Foreign Minister wished to assure the Secretary that he would personally look at the list. But no obligation could be assumed. The Foreign Minister indicated that he thought his promise to personally examine the names meant something.

The Secretary replied that the Foreign Minister's personal credibility was high with him, and he could not discount that, but he had indicated what the President's views were.

Shevardnadze replied that he, too, had indicated the General Secretary's views. Why did the U.S. side think that it was only U.S. interests and prestige that ought to be taken into consideration, and not the interests and prestige of the Soviet Government.

The Secretary replied that the prestige of both governments was important, and the U.S. did not wish to denigrate Soviet prestige, as he hoped that the Soviet side did not wish to denigrate U.S. prestige. But the two sides needed to find a way around this. He did not expect the Foreign Minister to agree, but as the U.S. saw it, the cases of Zakharov and Daniloff were different. The Soviet side said that they were equal, but the U.S. did not agree, and this was the essence of the President's difficulty. As Ambassador Ridgway had said, we are looking for a zebra, where both sides would say that they see a zebra, but where the U.S. side would say that it is half black, and the Soviet side would say that it is half white. Both sides sought to have something that each would describe in its own way.

Shevardnadze said that perhaps the two sides could each have a trial of the accused individual. In that case, the Soviet side would not release Orlov, nor three or four additional people. After the trial, there could be negotiation, and if the U.S. wished to trade, there would be a trade, and if not, not. The U.S. would probably find sufficient basis to convict Zakharov, and to give him a jail sentence. The same would happen with Daniloff, and there the matter would end. There would be no Orlov, and no question of 24 hours. This would be one option.

The Secretary agreed that such an option existed, and might happen, but it would have a bad effect, and the two sides should try to find a better solution.

Shevardnadze replied this should be done on a mutually acceptable basis.

The Secretary agreed that there was no other way.

Shevardnadze said that both sides should see what could be done. He thought that the people on the U.S. side were realistic and that they did not doubt that the Soviet Union was making one-sided concessions. The problem needed to be solved quickly, so that the interests of the two sides would be served equally.

Shevardnadze continued that since both sides were convinced that a summit was necessary and had agreed in principle that there would be one, he wished to say that the General Secretary had confirmed the dates for the meeting, and that he considered that this would not mean that the visit to the U.S. was off. On the contrary, he felt that this intermediate meeting could serve as the basis for reaching agreement on fundamental issues and giving appropriate instructions so that agreements would be prepared and ready for signature for the Summit in the U.S., and so that this would be done without delay. There were prospects of resolving the basic issues. Other issues should not get in the way of these global questions.

Shevardnadze repeated that the Soviet side had already made concessions on the 24 hours and on Orlov. What else was expected of it? He said again that if the U.S. wished to have a trial, there could be one and the U.S. and the world would see that the U.S. citizen was imprisoned and convicted for good reason. He was saying this responsibly, since he was familiar with the evidence.

The Secretary replied that he was very interested to hear that the General Secretary found that the dates proposed by the President were acceptable, and the Secretary hoped that a meeting could be arranged. As the Foreign Minister had proposed in Washington, and had repeated here, the meeting would be seen and described as a preparatory meeting which would be a “prelude” to the General Secretary’s trip to the U.S., which would come shortly thereafter.

Shevardnadze agreed.

The Secretary indicated that he thought it would be worthwhile to think of the possibility of having the meeting in the U.S. take place in 1986. This would depend on how fast things could be resolved.

Shevardnadze agreed. He then turned to the question of the Soviet UN Mission employees. He indicated that he could not say that he thought there was no promise to Soviet-U.S. relations and to resolution of the issues which had been discussed. The intermediate meeting

between the principals was important in order to resolve some basic issues. Shevardnadze had no doubt that the two leaders could give the appropriate instructions which would lead to the drafting of an agreement, either interim or global, on medium-range missiles, for example. Deadlines could be set for reaching agreement (e.g., 15, 20 days), but the most important thing was that the basic issues would be resolved. Just as in Geneva, as Ambassador Bessmertnykh could recall, the staff sat long hours and argued, and then the President decided that such and such should be done, and the General Secretary did the same.

The Secretary said that he recalled it well.

Shevardnadze recalled that the question of airline service between the two countries was argued about for a very long time in Moscow, and then the General Secretary indicated to the Secretary and to the President that the group that was discussing the question ought to stop arguing, and the Secretary made a phone call and within an hour agreement was reached. It was such a push which was needed. This was why the General Secretary proposed that a meeting be held without delay.

Shevardnadze continued that the General Secretary had also confirmed that his visit to the U.S. should remain on the agenda. It would be the final and historic stage, where agreements would be signed. Perhaps agreement would not be reached on all issues, but if there were agreements at least on a couple of issues, the hopes raised by the Geneva meeting would have been justified. It was understood that the next stage would then be the visit of the President to the Soviet Union, and other things could be prepared for that visit.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. side did want the visit of the President to the USSR to have importance from the point of view of its achievements. The documents signed in Moscow or wherever the meeting would be (presumably they would be in Moscow) should be important, and the U.S. would be working in that direction. Furthermore, the President and Mrs. Reagan would like to see Red Square. The Secretary said that he thought that the view of Red Square was one of the most striking sights he had seen. He liked to see it when it was empty because of its vast size, and the President would also enjoy it.

Shevardnadze noted that there were many attractive sights in Washington as well.

The Secretary indicated that there was this difficulty which the two nations faced at present. He thought that the two sides had described it, and he would meet with the President the following day and would discuss it thoroughly with him. It was one thing to talk on the telephone and to pass on messages and a different thing to sit down in the same room to discuss it.

Shevardnadze said that the next question was the matter of the 25 UN employees. This was a very difficult matter. He had indicated the previous day that even before the U.S. ultimatum, six or seven of the persons on the list had already left with their families for various reasons, and an additional two or three were about to leave tomorrow or the day after, in accordance with previous plans.

The Secretary asked for clarification as to whether the six or seven had left permanently.

Shevardnadze confirmed that this was the case. Going back to the list, he indicated that he could not let three of those people go. He needed them for his work in New York. They were ready to go, but he did not want to let them.

The Secretary asked who these people were, and added that the U.S. had never published the list.

Shevardnadze replied that he could give the Secretary their names, but he would like to propose a different approach. The Secretary had indicated two days ago that there could be a compromise approach to the expulsion of these people.

The Secretary replied that this was a reply to the Soviet request, i.e., the President indicated that it would be acceptable to delay the departure by seven or fourteen days after October 1.

Shevardnadze said that he understood. Perhaps the following approach could be taken. No final decision would be taken until the summit meeting. The process of personnel rotation would go on. Some people would leave and others would come. When he and the Secretary would travel with the two leaders to Iceland, they would see what the situation with the list was like then, and would reach final agreement. The process was already under way. There ought not to be intensification of debate on this issue since it touched upon the interests and the prestige of both governments. Shevardnadze said that he hoped that such a solution would be acceptable to the U.S. side.

The Secretary indicated that he wished to review what the Foreign Minister had said to make sure that he had gotten it straight: six or seven of the people on the list were already back in Moscow.

Shevardnadze confirmed that this was so.

The Secretary continued that an additional two or three were in the process of returning. This would then account for eight to ten of the people on the list. Three of the people on the list worked closely with Shevardnadze, and he felt that they were important to him.

Shevardnadze confirmed that he needed their expertise.

The Secretary asked if he had understood the Foreign Minister correctly in that the Foreign Minister would like these people to stay in New York and be there when he came to New York in the future.

Shevardnadze said that this was not correct. He simply needed them during the present visit.

The Secretary continued that the Foreign Minister had said that the process of rotation of personnel would go on and that people could be expected to come and go, including those on the list, in a normal fashion.

Shevardnadze confirmed that this was so, but that the process should not be forced. People would go and come as usual, and this will include those on the list.

The Secretary continued that the Foreign Minister had indicated that since the U.S. had agreed to a 14-day extension, and since the “preparatory” summit would take place in Iceland on October 11 (if it were to take place), this would fall within the 14-day period. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister could meet on the fringes of that meeting to finally resolve this issue. Then whatever would happen, would happen, but the Soviet side would have more information to impart to the U.S. side.

Shevardnadze confirmed that the Soviet side would have more information. He might say that none of the people on the list were left, and then there would be agreement, or perhaps he would be able to convince the Secretary that only real diplomats were left, and the Secretary might agree that they could stay. Or some other solution might be found. But the final resolution would occur in Iceland. And meanwhile, the rotation process would continue.

The Secretary asked if the Soviet side could provide the U.S. with the names of those on the list who had left the U.S. and those who were about to.

Shevardnadze replied that the Soviet side could do this and indicated that if U.S. intelligence worked well, they already knew who these people were.

The Secretary indicated that the intelligence services had not convinced him that they knew everything.

The Secretary added that the Foreign Minister had presented some interesting thoughts and the Secretary would want to reflect on them and discuss them with the President the following day.

The Secretary suggested that a time might be set for their next meeting, since he would want to convey to the Foreign Minister whatever the President had decided, and he would like to hear from the Foreign Minister whatever he wished to say.

It was decided that the next meeting would take place probably on Sunday in the latter part of the day, after the Secretary’s return to New York. The exact time would be agreed upon subsequently.

Shevardnadze indicated that these issues should be resolved before Monday. After the Sunday meeting, he would need to inform Moscow of the results and obtain agreement from the General Secretary.

The Secretary agreed. He indicated that he would talk with the President and try to resolve the issue, although it looked like it would be difficult to do so.

Shevardnadze indicated that it would also be difficult for him. The Secretary had the President close by, whereas the General Secretary was far away, and asleep when the Foreign Minister was working.

The Secretary said that he felt that if it were up to the two of them, their assistants and the President and the General Secretary, they could work things out. But there were other people who also needed to be considered.

Shevardnadze indicated that he wanted to raise another delicate issue. It was his understanding that there should be no leaks before a final solution was reached. If he were asked by reporters, he would say that there had been a meeting, that various options had been proposed, but no solution had been found yet. In general, he felt that the less fuss there was, the better.

The Secretary indicated that he took the same position. At a press briefing earlier in the day, reporters had asked him in fifty different ways about the content of his meeting with the Foreign Minister. He had replied that the meeting had taken place and that there would be a future meeting, but he did not say anything about its content. If articles did appear in the press, they were based on speculation and on historical precedents.

Shevardnadze expressed the opinion that leaks might have come from the White House.

The Secretary agreed.

Shevardnadze felt there ought not to be any leaks during this final stage. If there would be agreement on Sunday on the issues, the two sides could also agree on a text which they would use, including indication of a meeting between the President and the General Secretary, without indicating where and when it would be.

The Secretary said that he felt that the two sides would need to agree on a plan of public information, i.e., where and when, and how to describe things as they took place. The two sides should also get the agreement of the Icelandic authorities once they had solved the problems before them, and then announce the agreement to meet in Iceland and the dates of the meeting.

Shevardnadze said that perhaps this information could be given to the press on Monday, i.e., the Secretary could have a press conference and the Foreign Minister could do the same, where it would be

announced that there would be a summit in the U.S. With regard to the preparatory summit, even if agreement were reached before Monday, because of security and other considerations, perhaps Iceland ought not to be mentioned. Perhaps, if the President would have agreed to the options presented, an announcement could be made that agreement had been reached in principle about a summit in the near future, with no indication of the place, other than to mention that a summit would take place in the U.S.

The Secretary thought that there might be a better way to do this, although he was saying this without having consulted with the President. Assuming that the two sides had reached agreement (and this would not necessarily be the case), there would be the following sequence. On day one, Daniloff would be released, and both sides would describe this as they wished. On day two, Zakharov (and the U.S. would want to include Orlov as well) would be released, with appropriate statements by both sides. The U.S. view was that other individuals should be included. But whatever happened would be described appropriately by each side. In the meantime, as all this was being worked out, the two sides would approach the Icelandic authorities. The Secretary doubted that it would take longer than 24 hours to get their approval. Once this was done, it could be announced that agreement had been reached on a preparatory summit, including the dates and place, so that there would be no questions left unanswered, but the Secretary agreed that the question of how to make this public was important and ought to be agreed upon.

Shevardnadze concurred.

The Secretary said that the U.S. side would have proposals and the Soviet side would also have some.

Shevardnadze commented that if this information were not given out, there would be leaks, and this would not be desirable. It would be good if their deputies could think about all of these options before the next meeting.

The Secretary remarked that nothing had yet been leaked about the possible meeting in Iceland.

Shevardnadze alluded to the fact that this might happen in the White House.

The Secretary said that if the meeting were announced without an indication of the place, people would assume that it was Geneva and when they found out it was not, there would really be speculation. Therefore, if possible, it would be better to try to announce all of the information about the meeting.

Shevardnadze again said that the two sides ought to think carefully about how to announce the place of the meeting. Reykjavik was not a

big place. There were security considerations. If the current problems were resolved, it would be okay. If not, there would be no need for a briefing.

The Secretary told the Foreign Minister that he ought not to set himself into a frame of mind that his approach would be acceptable. The Secretary did not think that the President would buy it. But was he wrong in assuming that the two sides had agreed on Iceland?

Shevardnadze indicated that he was not wrong.

The Secretary recalled that he had gone to Iceland when President Nixon met with President Pompidou, and the Icelandic arrangements had been smooth despite the large number of people present.³

Shevardnadze replied that he had no doubt that they would be able to handle it well.

The Secretary added that he did not think that each side should bring 500 people.

Shevardnadze agreed.

The Secretary said that he thought the groups should be small.

Shevardnadze jokingly said that the General Secretary wasn't even sure that the Foreign Minister and the Secretary should participate. At any rate, there should be a small group of experts and no one else. It should be a working meeting.

Shevardnadze continued that the two sides should think about how to announce the meeting, but this was not the main thing. The dates had been agreed and the place had been agreed. If all current issues were resolved in a positive way, he would ask for confirmation from Moscow, but he did not doubt that Moscow would give it. Then the two sides could agree on a public announcement.

The Secretary concluded by saying they would meet on Sunday to compare notes, and he hoped that the results would be constructive.

³ May 31 to June 1, 1973. See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. E–15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973–1976, Documents 20, 21, and 311.

292. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 28, 1986, 8:30–11:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	USSR
Secretary Shultz	Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Ambassador Ridgway	Ambassador Bessmertnykh
D. Zarechnak, Interpreter	Ambassador Dubinin
	P. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

After some preliminary conversation about tennis, the Secretary told Shevardnadze that he had been to Washington and had talked at length with the President.² He wished to tell Shevardnadze the President's reaction to what Shevardnadze had proposed. He had told the President what Shevardnadze had said about the Soviet UN Mission personnel, and that this was an especially important issue. He had indicated to the President what the Foreign Minister had told him, i.e., that the number of UN Mission personnel was already below the number that the U.S. had indicated, and that this was correct in accordance with U.S. information. He had told the President that Shevardnadze had said that approximately ten of the people on the list had either already returned to Moscow or were in the process of returning in the normal course of rotation. He also had told the President that, recognizing the U.S. reply to the Soviet request that the deadline be extended past October 1 by 14 days on condition that the present problems would be resolved, Shevardnadze had proposed that he and the Secretary discuss the situation in Reykjavik, where Shevardnadze would have more information on the people on the list, i.e., on those

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memorandum of Conversations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, September 19 & 23, 1986, Shultz/Shevardnadze at the UN. Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission to the UN. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "I arrived at the Soviet mission in New York at 8:30 P.M. on Sunday and did not leave until well after 11:00. After some very hard dealing, Shevardnadze and I agreed:

"• Day 1: the Soviets permit Daniloff to leave the USSR.

"• Day 2: twenty-four hours after Daniloff's departure, Zakharov pleads *nolo contendere* (no contest), a legal equivalent of guilty, and the United States expels him.

"• Day 3: as soon as Zakharov departs, the U.S. announces that Yuri Orlov and his wife will be allowed to leave the Soviet Union by October 7.

"• The Soviets acquiesce in our reduction of the number of personnel at the Soviet mission to the United Nations.

"• On Tuesday, September 30, we announce that Reagan and Gorbachev will meet in Reykjavik on October 10–12, 1986.

"Shevardnadze also gave me his commitment to work on getting other dissidents and refuseniks released. I trusted him to do this." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 745)

² See Document 290.

people who will have been rotated at the Mission. The Secretary had also told the President that he had felt in his meeting with the Foreign Minister that Shevardnadze had been especially concerned about two or three people on the list whom he felt had not been properly identified. He had indicated that Shevardnadze had proposed that he and the Secretary discuss the situation in Reykjavik and resolve it there, bearing in mind the background indicated.

Shevardnadze interjected that it wasn't so much a case of improper identification, as the fact that he personally knew several of the people, whereas he did not know the others.

The Secretary confirmed that he had indicated to the President that Shevardnadze had a special concern about two or three of the people whom he knew personally. The Secretary asked if this was a proper description of the current state of affairs.

Shevardnadze nodded.

The Secretary continued that the President had said that if the other aspects of the problem could be resolved, he would go along with the Soviet side's proposal, which for now would make that issue one which could be dealt with. With regard to the other category of issues, he had passed on to the President the respective positions of the two sides, i.e., that Daniloff would be released and Zakharov would be released 24 hours later, both without trial. The U.S. could say what it wished publicly about Zakharov, and if it did so, the Soviet side would publicly say what it wished about Daniloff.

The Secretary continued that he had told the President that the U.S. position was that Orlov and his wife, along with four or five of the people on the list submitted, should be released simultaneously with Zakharov, and that the Soviet position was that Orlov and his wife should be released ten or fifteen days after Zakharov. The other names on the list would be personally reviewed by Shevardnadze, and he personally would make a judgment on them on the basis of their particular cases, appropriate Soviet law, and the circumstances involved, and indicate a decision to the U.S. side at a later date.

The Secretary continued that the President had indicated that we could not live with a time gap between the release of Zakharov and Orlov. The President felt that if this were not done simultaneously, it would be difficult for him to go on to deal with other issues. Therefore, he asked the Secretary to tell Shevardnadze that he was ready to go along with the Foreign Minister's proposal concerning the four or five other people. The Secretary indicated that he had told the President that he had gotten to know Shevardnadze during their meetings, and that Shevardnadze had looked him in the eye and had told him in good faith that he would look at the list, and the Secretary believed him. The President had accepted these assurances, provided that the

Soviet side would release Orlov at the same time as Zakharov was released. But the question of simultaneous release was of key importance to the President, and the Secretary wished to say that he could appreciate this and shared this view.

Shevardnadze remarked that this was what the *President* thought.

The Secretary said that he wanted to repeat that the President had gone along with several suggestions of the Soviet side, except for one.

Shevardnadze asked if there had been any change on the Presidential decision to meet with the General Secretary on October 11 and 12.

The Secretary replied that there had been no change, assuming that the present issues were resolved. It would not be wise to meet in Iceland otherwise. He added that the two sides had agreed that that meeting would be described as a preparatory meeting for the summit in the U.S., which would hopefully take place in 1986.

Shevardnadze replied that out of this package, he felt that the preparatory meeting of the two leaders should be put on the top of the list. The General Secretary viewed this as the most important thing, where the two leaders would give instructions to their assistants and delegations about the main issues, i.e., in area of arms control, which they thought would be the most promising for resolution. Other issues could also be discussed, of course, such as bilateral issues and regional issues, and the General Secretary indicated this in his letter.³ After this preparatory meeting, and on the basis of the instructions given, agreements could then be signed during the Washington visit.

The Secretary indicated that this was the U.S. view as well. Moreover, he felt that between the present time and the meeting in Reykjavik, the people on both sides in Geneva should be pushed as much as possible to make the most of the time available. For example, a lot of progress had been made in the area of INF. With respect to the outstanding issues, e.g., the question of duration, the U.S. had proposed a phrase from an earlier Soviet draft. With regard to Asia, Shevardnadze had indicated that the General Secretary had had some ideas, but nothing specific had yet been laid out. So it would be useful if these specific ideas were presented in Geneva, so that the delegations could work on them and prepare them for examination in Reykjavik.

The Secretary continued that the U.S. had put many proposals on the table concerning verification, and the Soviet side had said many things which were encouraging. The U.S. and the Soviet side had reached agreement on the question of verification in Stockholm, and

³ See Document 280.

this had been very encouraging. So a big push ought to be made in this area, since it was one of the very important ones.

The Secretary continued that he and the Foreign Minister had not come to grips with the question of shorter range INF systems during their meeting in Washington. As the Secretary had indicated, the U.S. felt that these weapons ought to be frozen until further decisions had been made.

The Secretary continued that these were the types of areas where progress could be made. So the delegations in Geneva should work hard at these things during this week and the coming week in order to have this in hand for the leaders to resolve at their meeting.

The Secretary agreed with what Shevardnadze had said about the importance of the Reykjavik meeting, and he hoped that Shevardnadze could see that the U.S. side wanted to do as much as possible in order to get ready for the preparatory meeting as well as it could. In this, the Secretary was following the results of the process which Shevardnadze had proposed, i.e., that the two sides work hard during the summer. This work had produced a more fruitful meeting between the two of them. And just as this work had helped their meeting, he thought that the work in Geneva could help the meeting of the two leaders in Iceland.

Shevardnadze remarked that he did not think that he and the Secretary should speak of the instructions which the leaders would give to their delegations. In principle, the two of them had had a dialogue and had touched on questions which they agreed were promising, such as the issue about the duration of the INF agreement, the duration of the ABM treaty, etc. These things had been indicated in the letter of the General Secretary, and Shevardnadze did not think that he and the Secretary ought to decide these things at present. Each of the sides would come to the meeting with its own thoughts and ideas. The two leaders would give the Foreign Ministers and the delegations a push, and Shevardnadze believed that progress would be possible in at least two or three areas.

The Secretary indicated that he agreed with the Foreign Minister, but his thought was that the delegations should not sleep in Geneva, excusing themselves by saying that the meeting was only two weeks away.

The Secretary continued that it was his personal hope, and he had heard the General Secretary speak of this, as had Shevardnadze and the President, that the world would be much better off without nuclear weapons. So if the two leaders felt this to be so important, a way ought to be found to achieve this (he indicated that he was aware of the General Secretary's statement of January 15), i.e., to take practical steps to move more rapidly to achieve this aim.

Shevardnadze replied that he agreed that a great deal of work needed to be done in Geneva. Despite the fact that agreement had not been reached, and deep differences remained between the positions of the two sides, both sides had produced various proposals, and compromises were possible. A push needed to be given, the type of push which neither he nor the Secretary could give, but which demanded a higher level political will, that is, a decision of the two leaders. Shevardnadze repeated that he considered that the main achievement of his meeting with the Secretary had been the decision on the meeting between the two leaders.

The Secretary agreed.

Shevardnadze continued that in all of his meetings in New York, the main question which had been raised was whether or not there would be a meeting between the President and the General Secretary.

The Secretary confirmed that this had also been a major topic at his meetings, but he felt that it was a question which was deeper than simply a question of a meeting. It was a desire to see a lessening of tension and a more constructive relationship between the two countries, which would have a rippling effect in many ways. It was also a question of nuclear weapons hanging over the heads of these nations. Even if a country did not possess any nuclear weapons and was not geographically near the Soviet Union or the U.S., it could see that if there were a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and USSR, the entire world would be hurt, if not decimated.

Shevardnadze said that if shortly after the Geneva summit, there had been arguments about the fruitfulness of the meeting, now the two countries, as well as everyone else, thought that the upcoming meeting should produce concrete results.

The Secretary agreed.

Shevardnadze continued that he felt that the preparatory meeting between the principals would lead to areas of accord culminating in the signature of important agreements, at least in some areas, in Washington, and this would be an historic event. It would open the way for the future visit of the President to the Soviet Union, where additional achievements could be recorded. So it would be a step-by-step process, and progress would be made all along the way.

The Secretary replied that he agreed with the Foreign Minister's concept. He thought that before the beginning of both the summit in the U.S. and in the USSR, agreements should be achieved on important issues, so that the summits themselves would ratify these agreements. However, he also felt that questions which had not been resolved should be discussed at the summits which would give additional leadership and push to the negotiators, so that important things could be resolved at subsequent meetings.

Shevardnadze replied that the negotiating process was this kind of a process, i.e., this was what agencies such as the Foreign Ministries existed for.

The Secretary remarked that he was glad there was something for them to do.

Shevardnadze wanted to ask a question, i.e., if there were no agreement on the other issues, did this mean that there would be no meeting between the leaders?

The Secretary replied that he thought that it would be difficult for the meeting to be a fruitful one unless these issues were resolved first.

Shevardnadze agreed that these matters needed to be resolved in order that the leaders could concentrate on the main issues.

The Secretary recalled that the Foreign Minister had said that the two of them would not be worth their salt if they would not be able to resolve this issue, so that their leaders could go on from there.

Shevardnadze confirmed this and added that their leaders might even say that, seeing that the Foreign Ministers could not agree on nuclear arms, space weapons or on Daniloff and Zakharov, who needed them?

The Secretary confirmed that this was a danger, and that he could perhaps return in that case to California, and the Foreign Minister could return to Georgia. And perhaps they might even be happier there.

Shevardnadze confirmed that he did have a residence which belonged to his father in Georgia.

The Secretary said that he had forgotten the melody, but by the next meeting he would recall the tune to "Georgia on My Mind" and sing it to the Foreign Minister.

Shevardnadze remarked that he wished to repeat that the question of the Soviet UN Mission personnel had been artificially created. In the first place, these people were not spies. First of all, there had been no proof of this, and there would be none. Secondly, even if they were all spies, why was this move made on the day before the scheduled meeting between the Foreign Ministers, which was to prepare a summit? So both in its essence and in its form, this issue was a contrived one. Shevardnadze did not believe that the State Department had been involved in this decision. He believed that the State Department truly wanted an improvement of Soviet-American relations. But someone who was not interested in this had thought of it.

Shevardnadze continued that to now make the conclusion out of all of this that the U.S. is making concessions and that the President is being magnanimous in meeting the interests of the Soviet side was naive. It was the Soviet side that was making concessions. A scenario of retaliatory steps had been prepared, a very serious one. All that was

needed to put it into force would be a signal from Shevardnadze. But the General Secretary had indicated that the Soviet side should wait until the heads of government would meet.

Shevardnadze realized that there were people in the U.S. who were sincerely interested in improving Soviet-American relations, and that we ought to make it easier for them. The General Secretary did not wish to disrupt the summit meeting. Perhaps the Foreign Minister did not have to indicate to the U.S. side how many people on the list had left, and how many would leave and the fact that some would leave due to normal rotation. Other issues could be decided at the meeting of the heads of state or at the level of Foreign Ministers. So there had been no compromises on the U.S. side. The U.S. actions were illegal. But it was good that a mutually acceptable solution was found. Shevardnadze felt that the Secretary's personal involvement had been very important.

Shevardnadze continued that the Soviet side had said that the cases of Daniloff and Zakharov were similar. The U.S. side said that it had proof that Zakharov was a spy, but the Soviet side was not convinced of this, and said that he was an honest citizen. On the other hand, the Soviet side had indicated that it had proof about Daniloff, and it was not coincidental that the President had referred to a possible death penalty for Daniloff in his UN speech.⁴

The Secretary interjected that this was said in reference to the penalty given for espionage in accordance with Soviet law.

Shevardnadze replied that the President must realize that such things were not done without appropriate proof in civilized countries, and although the President did not like the Soviet Union, he must consider it civilized. Shevardnadze again referred to the President's phrase as indicative of the realization of the strict punishment which could be given on the basis of Soviet law.

The Secretary again interjected that what the President did know was that the U.S. Government did not have Daniloff working for it, had not given him any tasks, and was not using him in any way. So, regardless of what he had or had not done, he was not an agent and was not engaged in gathering information for the U.S. Government, which was the U.S. definition of espionage.

Shevardnadze replied that this was a different matter. The Soviet side had different evidence. He repeated that although the two sides were in a similar situation, the Soviet side had made concessions. Zakharov would be released 24 hours after Daniloff. Shevardnadze felt that this was not a big issue, but this was not easy from the point of

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 288.

view of government prestige. He mentioned the Secretary's reference to the fact that it was important what people would say about the President's decision. But it was also important what the Soviet people would say. The Soviet Government had said that the U.S. had taken illegal steps with regard to Soviet UN Mission personnel.

Shevardnadze continued that although some Soviet citizens had returned to the Soviet Union, no retaliatory steps had been taken. People would ask why this was so. They would ask the General Secretary and others. They would ask why Zakharov was released 24 hours after Daniloff. Why had the Soviet side made all the concessions?

Shevardnadze continued that the main thing was that all of this had been agreed to, and of primary importance was the fact that a meeting between the two leaders had been arranged. Then, suddenly a new ultimatum had been given, i.e., the release of Orlov and five others. This was artificial. Someone wished to show that the U.S. side had won, that it had brought the Soviets to their knees. But in order to achieve the main goal and to comply with the wishes of the Soviet, the American and the other nations of the world, the Soviet side had gone along with all of this.

The Secretary interjected that the U.S. side did not wish to bring the Soviet side to its knees. This would not be good for either the U.S. or the USSR. He had listened very carefully in Geneva to the General Secretary, and he thought that the General Secretary had shown a great deal of wisdom when he had said, in speaking of arms control, that it would not be good for either side to make a deal that would be unfair, since such a deal would tend to quickly unravel. The Secretary also knew from his experience in business that if in working with a customer or a supplier, too hard a bargain was driven, one would come to regret it later. So there was no desire to do that in the present situation.

The Secretary continued that he and the President wished to resolve the present situation in order to move on to other issues. The President had accepted the Soviet side's proposals with one exception. Unfortunately, there were news people who only thought in concepts of who won and who lost.

Shevardnadze interjected that it was not only news people who thought that way.

The Secretary continued that he felt that the world was inhabited by people who wanted to solve problems and those that wanted to create them. He felt that he and the Foreign Minister were among those who wished to solve problems.

Shevardnadze agreed. But he indicated that he did not want to deviate from the discussion of this problem. Why was the question of Orlov introduced? From the beginning, the two sides had agreed that

the issue of the UN Mission personnel was a separate issue, as were the issues of Daniloff and Zakharov. This applied to Orlov as well. But if the release of Orlov and Zakharov was to be simultaneous, then these actions would not be independent. The Secretary must understand that this was a question of national prestige. If the two issues were separate, then the question of releasing Orlov after ten or twelve days would be no problem. The issue of national prestige would not arise.

Shevardnadze continued that among the options which had been considered on the Soviet side was to leave all of these issues unresolved until the meeting between the President and the General Secretary, but he agreed with the Secretary that this ought not to be done. In this case, both of them would be viewed as helpless since they had not been able to resolve the issue in the 22 or 24 hours that they had discussed it. He felt that it was not important whether it was a matter of ten or eight days (or perhaps twelve), compared to the major decision about a meeting between the two heads of state.

Shevardnadze continued that the Soviet side had made a significant concession on the first issue. It had also made a concession on the second issue. On the third issue, it had added Orlov, which was more than a major concession. With regard to the additional five or seven names, he had promised that if there was a basis for their release, it would be done.

Shevardnadze continued that agreement had been reached on the main thing, and that he would regret it if the timing for Orlov's release would stand in the way. For example, what if Orlov had a fever? The Secretary had indicated that he had no flexibility on this matter. Shevardnadze might be able to shorten the time period by two or three days, but could not do any more. He had given the Secretary all of the options.

The Secretary said that he wished to make one proposal. Perhaps the Foreign Minister had no flexibility on this, but he wanted to say the following. At the present time, the situation was that there was agreement that Daniloff would be released and that Zakharov would be released 24 hours later. The timing of Orlov's release was unresolved.

The Secretary wished to make the following operational proposal. He knew that there was an Aeroflot flight from Moscow to Dulles Tuesday morning.⁵ The Soviet side could put Mr. & Mrs. Daniloff, together with Mr. & Mrs. Orlov, on that flight. When the flight would arrive at Dulles, Zakharov could be waiting in a lounge to board that plane, and there could be a trade. Zakharov could board the Aeroflot flight, and Daniloff and Orlov could get off of it. In this way, there

⁵ September 30.

would be no time gap between the release of Daniloff and Zakharov, and there would be no time gap between the release of Orlov.

Shevardnadze replied that this would not change anything. The main problem was still the timing of Orlov's release.

The Secretary replied that it would change the sequence of the Daniloff/Zakharov release, which he thought might be helpful to the Soviet side, just as the change in the Orlov release would be helpful to the U.S. side.

Shevardnadze replied that this would not change anything. The main thing was that Orlov would not be released at the same time as Zakharov. If these things were independent issues, they should be resolved independently. The two sides should not add anything to the resolution of the Zakharov and Daniloff cases. The Secretary had agreed this with the President, and Shevardnadze had agreed this with Moscow. The 24-hour time gap had been agreed to. If the two sides agreed in principle that Orlov would be released subsequently, tomorrow or the day after the U.S. could hold a press conference and could say that a decision had been taken to release Orlov at a later date. Shevardnadze remarked parenthetically that the American public apparently would be very happy to receive Orlov.

The Secretary replied that he might actually become a problem for the U.S.

The Secretary then said that he wished to describe the current situation as he saw it, and also add something. On day one, i.e., on Monday, Daniloff would be released. On Tuesday, Zakharov would be released and the U.S. could say what it wished about Orlov. It would say that a date had been agreed on Orlov's release, as well as the procedure for it. Obviously, this should be a few days before the meeting in Reykjavik, to have this out of the way by then. The Secretary asked Shevardnadze if this was a reasonable interpretation of Shevardnadze's proposal, with the addition of an indication of a specific date.

Shevardnadze repeated the Secretary's suggestion about announcing a date, for clarification.

The Secretary said that Shevardnadze had indicated that it was important for the Soviet side that Orlov depart later, and that the U.S. could then announce at a press conference that it was agreed that Orlov would be released and that the U.S. would welcome him.

Shevardnadze agreed.

The Secretary repeated that he had added mention of a specific date to what Shevardnadze had proposed. He thought that the question of Daniloff, Orlov, and Zakharov ought to be resolved at least two or three days before the meeting at Reykjavik. The question of the Soviet UN personnel would still need to be discussed between Shevardnadze

and the Secretary, but the other issues would need to be resolved by then. Additionally, Shevardnadze had given his word that he would look at the list of Soviet citizens in the USSR presented by the U.S. side, but the Secretary would not say anything about this publicly. The U.S. side would wait for Shevardnadze's decision.

Shevardnadze confirmed that such an approach would be acceptable, and could now say that all issues had been resolved satisfactorily before the meeting of the heads of state.

The Secretary started to look at specific dates. He suggested that Daniloff could be released tomorrow, i.e., the 29th, and then Zakharov would be released on the following day. When the U.S. released Zakharov, it would also make a public statement about Orlov and say that Orlov would be released on October 7, i.e., one week after Zakharov. This would be two days before the President's departure for Iceland. He added that Ambassador Ridgway had just indicated to him that there was an Aeroflot flight leaving Moscow for Washington on September 30, and perhaps Zakharov could be put on that plane. The Secretary wasn't sure about what flights were leaving on Monday from Moscow. Perhaps the U.S. could send in a military plane.

Shevardnadze mentioned the problem of the time difference between New York and Moscow, but indicated that what the Secretary had proposed was basically acceptable.

The Secretary confirmed that there were eight hours difference, and suggested that the two sides begin work immediately. The U.S. would begin to process Zakharov's release the following day.

The Secretary continued that in order to have an announcement of this during working hours in the two countries, this could be accomplished if the announcement were made at 9:00 a.m. Washington time and 5:00 p.m. Moscow time. This would leave one day for going through the procedure for releasing Daniloff in Moscow. On Tuesday, Zakharov would be released, and the U.S. would make a statement about Orlov. This would be at 5:00 p.m. Moscow time, and the Soviet side could say what it wished about this, and could put Zakharov on the Aeroflot flight if it wished to do so. There would be no interference from the U.S. side.⁶

⁶ Shultz continued in his memoir: "Shevardnadze and I had met on the Daniloff problem three times in Washington and four times in New York. These meetings had been intense and personal. Most of the time only our interpreters and one other person on each side were present. Roz Ridgway was with me and her Soviet counterpart, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, joined Shevardnadze. No papers were exchanged for signature. At the moment of agreement, we went over the points carefully with each other. I was within my instructions, which President Reagan had signed off on personally. At the end, Shevardnadze and I sealed our agreement with a handshake. We had been through a tense and extended effort together. The experience built personal confidence in each other, and trust." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 747)

The Secretary thought that one other thing should be done, i.e., by Monday afternoon or Tuesday morning, each of the sides should approach the Government of Iceland independently about hosting the meeting between the heads of state. Then on Wednesday, October 1, there could be a simultaneous announcement at 9:00 a.m. Washington time and 5:00 p.m. Moscow time about a preparatory meeting in Reykjavik.

Ambassador Dubinin interjected that the news program “Vremya” comes on at 9:00 p.m.

The Secretary said that he felt that it would be useful to have a short common statement, along the lines that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to meet on October 11 and 12 in Reykjavik, and that the meeting would be a preparatory one to plan for the summit in the U.S. He handed the U.S. draft to Bessmertnykh.

Shevardnadze indicated that he could agree in principle to the indication of a date.

Bessmertnykh remarked that 9:00 a.m. was too early.

The Secretary thought that the details could be left to Ambassadors Ridgway and Bessmertnykh, including the details of Orlov’s release. But these were technical matters, and could be resolved.

Shevardnadze agreed, but there was one issue which he wanted to agree in principle. He and the Secretary would be meeting with the press either on Monday or on Tuesday, depending on how they had agreed, like it had been done in Washington where both of them had given a press conference at 6:00 p.m. The content of their remarks would be different, but the basic facts would be the same.

The Secretary remarked that the Minister had a good point, and this also argued for a Monday/Tuesday release schedule, because if it were done this way, an announcement could be made before Shevardnadze’s departure from the U.S.

Shevardnadze agreed.

The Secretary said that the meeting at Reykjavik would be the next thing announced, but this was a different matter.

Shevardnadze said that he could not refrain from mentioning the meeting. Since the dates had not yet been agreed with Iceland, but the fact of the meeting had been agreed, the two sides could say that the President and the General Secretary had agreed to meet in the near future, without specifying a date, and the Soviet side had a draft statement on this which was similar to the one the Secretary had read from.

The Secretary asked Shevardnadze when he was planning to leave the United States.

Shevardnadze replied that it was 5:00 p.m. on Tuesday. But their principal news program came on at 9:00 p.m. Moscow time, i.e., 1:00

p.m. New York time. Therefore, his press conference would need to be held at noon New York time at the latest. The place for the meeting between the heads of state could be announced later. This might even be better. Shevardnadze was concerned about security if this were announced two weeks in advance. The main thing was that agreement had been reached about a meeting. The U.S. formulation was basically satisfactory.

The Secretary remarked that if the place was not indicated, speculation would be rampant. Also, two weeks was not such a long time to make preparations. Both sides had advance teams which worked well together in Geneva, but they would still need to look around, find the most suitable facility, and so on. The Government of Iceland would need to clear some hotels and do similar things. So the more time there was to prepare for the meeting, the better. So the Secretary felt that the place of the meeting should be announced. He could not see that the Icelandic authorities would not agree to it, but they should be asked.

Shevardnadze indicated that the Soviet side would approach the Government of Iceland tomorrow morning, and would ask them for a quick reply. In all likelihood, the Icelandic Government would reply quickly, and this would permit an announcement on Tuesday in the morning about all of the things which had been agreed to. This would sound serious and convincing.

The Secretary agreed that the two sides should try to do this. He would need to get the President's agreement, but he believed that he would be able to do this. Then sometime on Monday the two countries could approach Iceland about the meeting and hopefully receive a reply by Tuesday. He felt that there was 90 percent certainty of this.

Shevardnadze felt it was 99 percent certain.

The Secretary agreed. He then indicated that the U.S. side would like to see three events. On Monday at 9:00 or 11:00 a.m., it would be announced in Washington that Daniloff was being released, and he would leave the USSR. On Tuesday at 9:00 a.m. or so, the U.S. would announce the release of Zakharov and would say that Orlov would be released one week later. The U.S. and the USSR could say whatever it wished on that score. At 11:00 a.m., the Foreign Minister would have a press conference at which he would describe everything that had been agreed to, and the meeting between the heads of state would also be announced in Washington and Moscow. The Foreign Minister could mention it at his press conference, and the Secretary could as well. Then all of this could be accomplished before the Foreign Minister left the U.S.

Shevardnadze said that he envisioned a scenario where there would be a meeting with the press tomorrow at which it would be announced that agreement had been reached on Daniloff and Zakharov. It was

agreed that the U.S. could say what it wished on Orlov. It was agreed what the two sides would do about the Soviet UN contingents. In principle, agreement had been reached on the meeting of heads of state. All this could be said tomorrow. The place of the meeting could be indicated the day after tomorrow or at another time as a separate item. Then all of the events, including the release of Daniloff, Zakharov, and Orlov and everything else, would take place after these announcements. Shevardnadze did not see anything inconvenient for either side in such an approach. This kind of approach had been agreed with Moscow with the General Secretary. For any other approach, Shevardnadze would need to cable Moscow tonight, and this would delay things.

The Secretary said that he did not think that he could agree with such an approach. There were three or maybe four independent events. The U.S. felt that these things should occur one by one and not all at once. The first event would be that Daniloff would be released and would come home. The second event would be that 24 hours later Zakharov would be released and would go home, and the U.S. would indicate what would happen with Orlov, i.e., that he would be released one week later. The U.S. side felt that it would be desirable to handle these personal issues separately, even if there were only a one or two hour lag. Then the announcement about Iceland, if it had been pinned down by then, could be made at the time of the Minister's press conference on Tuesday, at which time the Minister could say all that he wished.

The Secretary wished to say that he still needed to clear Shevardnadze's proposal on Orlov with the President, but he felt that it was a sensible one, and that he would have no problem in doing this. He would call the President tonight, and meanwhile, Ambassadors Ridgway and Bessmertnykh could work on a text so that everything would be clear and there would be no misunderstandings.

Bessmertnykh asked what would happen if the U.S. side announced the release of Daniloff, and the press would ask about Zakharov.

Ambassador Dubinin also asked what the U.S. would reply to any questions about a summit.

The Secretary said that he would say that the information being presented concerned Daniloff, and the press should hang around.

Shevardnadze indicated that he had not thought that any difficulties would arise in connection with the Soviet scenario, which he had cleared with Moscow the previous day. Perhaps both sides could wait an extra day. It was important to decide how to present the case publicly.

Bessmertnykh added there would be no time to get this accomplished by 9:00 a.m. the following day.

Shevardnadze indicated that if he were not to mention the summit, he needed time to get agreement on this course of action, and this might put things off by one or two days. He repeated that he had thought that the Soviet approach would be acceptable, indicating solution of all issues, including the question of the meeting of heads of state, and everyone in the U.S. and in the Soviet Union would welcome it. The Soviet side had thought of all possible options, including those it believed would not be acceptable to the President, but had not expected that there would be any objection to the one Shevardnadze had described. Perhaps things could be put off until Tuesday. Then agreement could be obtained from Iceland, and Shevardnadze could address at least the Soviet press, possibly without the U.S. press if the U.S. side so desired. He would then relate everything that had happened. The U.S. side could then announce Daniloff separately as it wished.

Shevardnadze indicated that perhaps the following option might be used. Agreement could be announced about a meeting without an indication of place. This was often done in international practice, and would not offend anyone. Otherwise, the decision might have to be put off. He was not saying that there would be no decision. But it would be difficult to delay his visit to Canada. As it was, he would probably have to cut back his stay in Canada and Mexico to return more quickly to the Soviet Union.

The Secretary remarked that his Africa trip would have to go down the drain, but this might be for the good.

Shevardnadze remarked that when people heard of the meeting between the President and the General Secretary, everything else would take second place.

The Secretary said that he would like to propose the following. The two sides had agreed on the content and sequence of the events and on the preparatory meeting in Iceland. They were struggling over how to announce this and were not sure how fast it could be done, i.e., Ambassador Bessmertnykh did not think Daniloff could be processed by 9:00 a.m. So the two sides should work at this, and he would have to clear it with the President, which he felt he could do. The Secretary realized that the Foreign Minister wished to mention Iceland before leaving the U.S. The U.S., on the other hand, wished to mention the meeting in Iceland separately, after the decisions on the individuals. The U.S. did not want to mix these things. Therefore, the staff people should work hard to try to arrive at a sequence that would fit both the Minister's schedule and the desires of the U.S. side. Perhaps in Moscow it would not be important to announce Daniloff's departure.

So perhaps the announcement could be made in late afternoon in Washington. It would be night in Moscow then, and would pose no difficulty. The following day the release of Zakharov would be announced in the morning and a few hours after that, the meeting in Iceland. If the Soviet side approached Iceland tomorrow, they would probably quickly agree to the meeting, and then Shevardnadze could go to Canada and talk about Soviet-Canadian fishing rights, although the Canadians would probably only want to talk about the meeting in Iceland.

Shevardnadze agreed and said that he had not studied the question of fishing rights in very great detail in anticipation of this.

The Secretary remarked that Ambassador Ridgway had cut her teeth negotiating about fishing rights. This was one of the most difficult subjects there was. Fish had no regard for territorial waters, they just swam where they wanted. Shevardnadze remarked that he did not want to talk about any difficult issues with the Canadians. It had been difficult enough in the U.S.

The Secretary replied that things had been difficult, but the two sides were very close to a final solution, and this was very good.

Shevardnadze suggested that the two sides might instruct their Ambassadors in Iceland to approach the Icelandic Government.

The Secretary remarked that this should be done in secrecy so that it was not leaked in Iceland.

Shevardnadze agreed. He also indicated that he would need to agree on all of this with Moscow, and a statement would not be possible tomorrow. The technical details about timing and procedures needed to be worked out, but the Soviet side was very interested in resolving this very quickly. This might take a couple or more hours. He would not exclude Iceland giving the reply tomorrow, and then everything could be wrapped up tomorrow. Then perhaps on Tuesday morning, there could be a press conference or announcement on Daniloff. Or perhaps this could happen in the afternoon. And Shevardnadze could make an announcement before he departed.

The Secretary said that we should not rule out an announcement on Daniloff tomorrow, even if this would be done late in the day in the U.S. The Soviet side's deadline was pushing events, and the Secretary could understand Shevardnadze's desire to do this.

And the Secretary continued that since the two sides were working without factual information, he would first want to ask his government for approval, and then set Ambassadors Ridgway and Bessmertnykh to work, making decisions on facts and sequences, starting immediately, bearing in mind the Minister's schedule.

Shevardnadze said that since such an approach was different from the one which had been approved for him, he could not agree to it at

the moment. He joked that if he had to change his document, he might be told not to come back, and would become a hostage in the U.S.

The Secretary said that the U.S. would welcome Shevardnadze. He continued that both sides had their requirements and would work within that framework to wrap everything up by the time of the preparatory meeting. He repeated that Ambassadors Ridgway and Bessmertnykh had a lot of work to do and perhaps the Daniloff announcement could be made tomorrow afternoon in order for the sequence to go through.

Shevardnadze remarked that the Secretary was looking for a statement, but agreement had not yet been reached. So Ambassadors Ridgway and Bessmertnykh should work on it. They usually did good work.

The Secretary said that the question of the content of the issues had been resolved. Now the two sides should use this solution to advance further prospects. He understood the Minister's desire to announce this at the press conference. And the U.S. needed to put things in a row—one, two, three. So there was need to work hard to fit all this in.

Shevardnadze agreed and asked when Ridgway and Bessmertnykh should meet.

Bessmertnykh suggested tomorrow.

The Secretary indicated that he would need to call the President tonight, and he would wake him up, but things needed to get moving, and Ridgway and Bessmertnykh could consult in a few hours.

The Secretary continued that he would not say anything about the Soviet UN contingent. If questions were asked about this, he would say that the issue had been discussed and that the Minister had told him that the number of representatives at the UN Mission was already below the framework that the U.S. had indicated, and the U.S. had no difficulty with this. With regard to the 25 names (which have never been published)—they were discussed, and the U.S. was informed that in the process of personnel management a significant fraction of those on the list were already in Moscow due to rotation. The Soviet side had requested an extension of time, and the U.S. had agreed. The Secretary and the Minister had also agreed to further discuss this issue.

Shevardnadze said that he wanted to make one correction. He had said that six or seven of the people on the list had departed the U.S. before the U.S. demand. As for the rest, this could be indicated as the Secretary desired.

The Secretary repeated that he was not planning to raise this issue on his own.

Shevardnadze said that if he were asked, he would confirm that the action was illegal, but that the Soviet side would not take retaliatory

steps since this could hinder the resolution of the main thing, i.e., the meeting between the heads of state.

The Secretary said that, obviously, the Minister should say what he wished, and the U.S. would say what it wished to describe the situation and what would follow. The Secretary would say this in a voice which was not contentious and would not fan the flames. He would simply describe the results. But the two sides needed to get down to work.

Shevardnadze agreed and said that the Soviet side was seeking a reasonable solution.⁷

The Secretary remarked that there would be a million press people waiting outside the Soviet Mission. His preference would be not to say anything and to tell his press spokesman, Mr. Kalb, that they had discussed Daniloff and Zakharov and other issues, and could say nothing else about it. The press would note that this was different from what had been said before. After the last meeting, it was said that the issue had not been resolved. But now, it would be said that nothing could be said. At this point, the Secretary remarked that Ambassador Ridgway had suggested that it might be better to say that the two sides were still working on resolving the matter. This might be better.

Shevardnadze remarked that he probably would not go outside.

The Secretary said that his cars might not be able to move because of the press.

Shevardnadze remarked that in that case, the Secretary could spend the night at the Soviet Mission.

The Secretary replied that that would really be a sensation. He would be held hostage.

Shevardnadze indicated that he would, after all, say good-bye to the Secretary outside.

The Secretary said that after he consulted with the President, Ambassador Ridgway would call Ambassador Bessmertnykh. If necessary, he could meet again with the Minister to work things out. However, if they did not meet again in New York, he wished the Minister

⁷ At 10 a.m. on Tuesday, September 30, in Washington, Shultz announced the release of Zakharov and Orlov. He was joined by Reagan who declared that he would meet with Gorbachev in Reykjavik October 11–12. For the text of Shultz's statement and Reagan and Shultz's exchanges with the press concerning the meeting, Daniloff's release, and the expulsion of the Soviet UN employees, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book II, pp. 1292–1299. Shevardnadze, in his September 30 news conference in New York, discussed the expulsion order and Daniloff and Zakharov's release. He said he believed a "reasonable solution" would be found at the Reykjavik meeting. (Elaine Sciolino, "Soviet Warning on Expulsion Order," *New York Times*, October 1, 1986, p. A10)

a good stay in Canada and Mexico and would look forward to meeting him in Reykjavik.⁸

⁸ On September 29, Reagan wrote in his diary: "George S. has won the day. Mr. & Mrs. Daniloff will be on their way home before the morning is over. That will be announced. Then tomorrow George will announce that Zakharov will be found guilty & sent to Russia on probation so long as he never returns to the U.S. and Orlov & his wife will be freed to leave Soviet Union within one week. Then I'll announce a meeting with Gorbachev in Iceland October 10, 11, & 12." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 643) Reagan first announced Daniloff's release at 12:24 p.m. on Monday, September 29, at a Senate campaign rally in Kansas City, Missouri. (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book II, p. 1284)

293. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

New York, October 2, 1986

SUBJECT

Reykjavik

I take the liberty of sending you these views because my schedule keeps me here at the UN and unable to meet with you this week when you are shaping your decisions about Reykjavik.

We should take a positive, self-confident and commanding approach to this meeting. The American people are all for it so we should not seem to be playing it down or disparaging its chances for solid progress. Similarly, we need not take a narrow-minded approach to low-key social events or courtesies to the Soviets when we are there.

We should not try to separate form from content or appearance from substance. As far as Reykjavik goes, they will be intertwined. To take charge of this event and manage it visibly and effectively, we need to:

- engage in serious and visible *preparations* that show we have a unified U.S. team as well as close allied consultation and support;
- aim to produce *substantive progress* (but no agreements per se) at Reykjavik that will enhance the chances for a successful summit in

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Eggplant III 1986. Secret; Sensitive.

the U.S. We will work across the full agenda, but the reality is that our work will not be seen as effective without some progress on two big issues: arms control and human rights. Gorbachev must go home with a clear sense that Moscow's continuing insensitivity to the humanitarian dimension of the relationship will assume greater significance as prospects open up in areas of mutual concern;

—and *after Reykjavik* shape a program of public statements and consultations that indicate Reykjavik was useful, but without telegraphing our detailed plans for a substantive success at Summit II in the U.S.

I. Preparations

We should identify our key players *now*, and include the full range of players from every involved agency. We will be working with this large group all through the week ahead and making it known publicly that the entire team is involved. As for Reykjavik itself, either of two options will work: either take the entire group, on the understanding that the heart of the event will be one-on-one meetings and that only I, perhaps joined by John and Don, will attend other meetings with you—or leave all but the immediate substantive staff in Washington. The reality of the hotel situation in Iceland may make the decision for us, compelling us to travel with the smallest group possible (my list is attached).²

As for the allies, I suggest that I or, alternatively, a team headed by Paul Nitze, meet the NAC Foreign Ministers in Brussels early Friday and report to you in Reykjavik mid-day Friday.³

II. Substantive Progress

Arms control will be key not because that is what the Soviets want, but because we have brought them to the point where they are largely talking from our script. This doesn't mean we will find Gorbachev easy to handle in Reykjavik, but it means we are justified in aspiring to accomplish something useful there.

We have a strong new START position on the table in Geneva. Your July proposal on defense and space is the most detailed initiative in the field the Soviets say is most significant. We are nearly down to the short strokes on INF. There have been experts meetings over the summer on nuclear and space issues, nuclear testing, chemical weapons, and risk reduction. I have just conducted a comprehensive review of all these with Shevardnadze. There is no issue on which we are not well prepared.

² Attached but not printed.

³ October 3.

I think we can realistically try to accomplish the following in Reykjavik:

- Get the focus for priority attention back on START, where we seek a ceiling on ballistic missile warheads and subceilings which can form the heart of a strategic arms reduction agreement;

- Give Gorbachev a direct and authoritative description of your July proposal on strategic defenses, and of how it responds to the concerns he expressed in Geneva;

- Settle most of the remaining issues on INF;

- Convince Gorbachev of the wisdom of our step-by-step approach to nuclear testing, in which we would first work out the verification provisions necessary to ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and then negotiate further restrictions on the number of nuclear tests in parallel with further reductions in nuclear forces.

We should also be prepared for a Gorbachev blast at your May 27 decision—and a probe on development of a mutual interim restraint decision, in part owing to his desire to avoid being embarrassed by our exceeding SALT II limits shortly before or after his U.S. visit.

If the discussions go well, you could propose a package of basic elements for agreements on START, INF and defense and space which our Geneva delegations could begin to put in shape immediately after Reykjavik. Formal agreement on such a package could be the centerpiece of a Gorbachev visit to the United States, permitting delegations in Geneva to work on Treaty texts for signature at a 1987 Moscow summit.

III. *After Reykjavik*

Assuming we will impose a press blackout during the meetings, the media pressure will be intense as we emerge. If we achieve something in the arms control field at Reykjavik, we will need to hew to a forceful and confident line with close coordination on the question of how much substance to reveal. We will need to mention general areas where the potential for substantive progress was enhanced, but without permitting the impression that Reykjavik itself was a Summit or raising false expectations for Summit II in the U.S. The theme should be that we are fully prepared for real progress and that Reykjavik contributed considerably to the potential of Summit II.

Following the two days' sessions with Gorbachev, I would stop again in Brussels on my way back to Washington on Monday the 13th. Assuming you will make a public statement or hold a press conference in Reykjavik, and return to Washington on Sunday evening, John and Don might offer to do some Congressional briefings early Monday. As Monday is Yom Kippur, you might want to hold off calling in the Congressional leadership until Tuesday. I would, of course, be ready to be sent by you to the Hill as soon as possible after my return late Monday.

The way to bring this kind of a result out of Reykjavik is to pull together a unified team under your leadership. I will gladly serve as your straw boss in this effort. Over the past year we have advanced positions with great skill and confidence. As the results of our negotiations in the field and your strong stance at home, the Soviets have come to us in many areas.

The policies you set in motion six years ago have put us in the strong position we are in today. Your handling of the events of the past month have demonstrated anew we are prepared to be tough when principles are involved, but are capable of creative negotiations in pursuit of long term goals. We are now entering the crucial phase in the effort to achieve real reductions in nuclear forces—an historic achievement in itself, and a major step toward your vision of a safer world for the future.

294. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to President Reagan¹

Washington, October 3, 1986

SUBJECT

Meeting Gorbachev: Soviet Psychology Regarding Size and Style of Meetings

It is significant that, when Gorbachev proposed the meeting in Iceland or London, he specified that what he had in mind was a one-on-one meeting (or perhaps just with Foreign Ministers), and that it should be “confidential, closed and frank.” It may be useful to speculate on his reasons for doing so, bearing in mind traditional Soviet attitudes toward meeting size and confidentiality.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron October 1986. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. Copies were sent to Bush and Regan. In an October 2 covering memorandum to Poindexter, Matlock wrote: “You asked me to do a paper on the Soviet attitude toward small meetings, and the pros and cons that derive from the Soviet view. Frankly, I can think of very few cons, since the fact is that small confidential meetings are both the most efficient way to get things done with Soviet interlocutors, and also the most effective way to demonstrate the President’s authority. A Memorandum for the President is attached which explains the Soviet view toward these matters and suggests that the President decide on a ‘small group, strictly confidential’ approach.” Matlock recommended that Poindexter sign the memorandum to Regan.

Gorbachev's Probable Motivations

1. Meeting with you one-on-one, or with just foreign ministers present, conveys the image not only of dealing as equals—which is important to him—but also the image of a leader who is as much in charge of his bureaucracy as you are of yours. We know that Gorbachev faces major bureaucratic resistance to many of his policies. Asserting his authority by meeting you alone is a powerful way to signal that he *is* in charge and will make the final decisions.

2. Meeting totally in private and confidentially normally is a sign of serious intent on the Soviet part. The Soviets know very well that most of their propagandistic proposals are not realistic. When they are really serious about striking a deal, they go private. Privacy is particularly helpful to a Soviet leader who knows he must change some traditional policies, since it makes it possible for him to structure his dealings with his colleagues, and to modify public presentations of policy issues, to make it appear that he is not really backing down. Given deep-seated Russian psychological resistance to being seen compromising on principle and the extreme importance the Soviets attach to “face,” any Soviet leader needs some “running room” to arrange justifications for policy shifts which avoid the impression within the Soviet Union that he has given way under pressure.

3. From the Soviet point of view, small meetings also have the advantage that bureaucratic elements who might oppose compromises can be excluded from direct participation. That way, the General Secretary has under his control what others are told and how it is presented to them. Infighting over “turf” is very intense in the Soviet system, and Soviets are so protocol conscious that it is difficult for them to exclude anyone from a meeting if his American counterpart is present. Shevardnadze is presumably Gorbachev’s man, so Gorbachev doesn’t mind including him. However, he clearly prefers not to open Pandora’s box by including others.

4. One possible motivation Gorbachev could have in proposing small private meetings would be to attempt to play you for the sucker by trying to get you to agree to something without the advice of technical specialists. *However, I very much doubt that this is indeed his intent.* He knows enough from dealing with you in Geneva to realize that you are not the sort of person who would buy a used car sight unseen from a fast-talking salesman without having your mechanic check it out. And he also knows from Geneva that you are not the sort to be persuaded by gimmicks and disinformation. (In any case, if he should try such a tactic, it is easy enough to deal with.)

American Interests: Using Soviet Psychology to Our Advantage

We have no interest in building up Gorbachev’s prestige because he is Gorbachev. We should not fall into the trap of feeling that one

Soviet leader is more favorable to us than another, and therefore that it is in our interest to do him favors. We should not think of Soviet political figures as falling into “good guy/bad guy” categories. They are all “bad guys” so far as U.S. interests are concerned.

However, if we want to maximize *any* Soviet leader’s ability to modify policies to reach agreement with us, we have an interest in cooperating to create conditions that permit him to manage the bureaucratic and perceptual barriers to change which are inherent in the Soviet system and Russian psychology. In this sense, *we too have a stake in small meetings and confidentiality*, though not as a personal favor to Gorbachev. (Needless to say, it is even more important to keep real and tangible pressure on him to move in our direction. Such pressure is likely to be most productive when circumstances permit us to do it relatively quietly, so that Gorbachev can cave without making it obvious that he has done so.)

Another aspect of one-on-one meetings, and very small meetings, is the impression it leaves on the Soviet leaders of your own leadership position. Russians respect strength and leadership. The past rulers they glorify are the ones who forced the Russians—kicking, screaming and suffering—into a position of power in the world. Unspeakable cruelties to their own people are almost forgotten: what counts is that they were *strong* and that they were *leaders*.

Despite all the propaganda attacks they previously levied against you, one thing is absolutely clear: both Gorbachev and the Soviet people as a whole respect you as a real leader. Your popularity here and your demonstrated political effectiveness are important factors in this judgment, but the way you handled the private meetings with Gorbachev in Geneva is not the least of them. Nothing should be done to leave the impression that your authority might be eroding as your second term progresses. In Soviet eyes, a *real* leader does not need to be propped up by a lot of “advisers.” They can understand the usefulness in having a few experts around to consult between rounds (the mechanics to check out the used cars being offered), but instinctively feel that having a lot of people, representing various “constituencies,” around the table is a sure sign of weakness and division.

The reason for this Soviet attitude derives from their own practice. When other Soviet officials are present at a meeting (except for members of one’s own immediate office or very close political or personal associates), there is a tendency to make points just for the record, to demonstrate to various interest groups represented (or who will read the record of the meeting) that the Soviet leader was vigorous in defending their interests. They suspect that foreigners have the same tendency, therefore tend to discount much of what is said at large meetings. Real business, in their eyes, is done in private—and kept private until ripe for announcement.

In sum, we can best take advantage of these various Soviet attitudes by seeing to it that you go to Reykjavik with a small, substantive staff, and conduct the meetings on a very confidential, very small group basis. This is also in keeping with our overall aim to make clear to the public that the meeting in Iceland is *not* a surrogate Summit.

I believe that you should plan to spend a substantial amount of your time in Reykjavik with Gorbachev one-on-one, just with interpreters. The rest of the time should probably be with George and Shevardnadze, with interpreters and—perhaps—a notetaker on each side, to insure an accurate historical record. If new ideas are introduced, they can be discussed between rounds with a small team which would come along to vet them. In addition, if the first day's meetings indicate that some real progress is being made, representatives from each side could be delegated to work Saturday evening on the details of possible instructions to delegations, which could be discussed by the two of you at your Sunday morning (final) session and either approved or modified, as you both see fit.

295. Paper Prepared by Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, undated

The Daniloff Case: Insights into Soviet Psychology

Aside from providing another clear example of the way a totalitarian regime can act with reckless disregard for truth, justice and the rights of individuals, the Soviet decision to arrest Nick Daniloff, and the Soviet handling of the matter after his arrest illustrates some important differences in Soviet and Western attitudes on a number of fundamental issues.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Alton Keel Files, Subject File, Iceland Planning 10/04/1986–10/06/1986; NLR-281–1–47–2–5. Secret; Sensitive. Copies were sent to Bush and Regan. Although the paper is undated, in an October 4 covering memorandum forwarding the paper to Reagan, Poindexter wrote: "I believe the way the Soviets handled Daniloff's arrest illustrates some important differences in Soviet and American psychology, and that these are relevant to our tactics in other negotiations with the Soviets. Therefore, I asked Jack Matlock to summarize these points. You may wish to take a look at Jack's paper, which has some thoughts that will be useful to bear in mind as you prepare for your meeting with Gorbachev in Reykjavik."

Soviet View of the Key Issues

1. The question of Daniloff's guilt or innocence was fundamentally irrelevant to the Soviet decision to arrest him, and to their subsequent handling of the case—except in the sense that “evidence” of his “guilt” was useful for their public presentation. This is in diametric contrast to the American approach: Zakharov would not have been arrested—and could not have been successfully prosecuted—if he had not committed a criminal act.

2. Although it doubtless had some form of high-level political sanction, the Daniloff arrest was probably intended as a limited action, to achieve a limited goal of the KGB: to force the release of Zakharov. Although it doubtless also had secondary goals (to intimidate foreign journalists and Soviet citizens in contact with them), the first was probably controlling.

3. The apparent failure of the Soviet political leadership to anticipate the vigorous public reaction in the United States and Western Europe, illustrates a persistent Soviet inability to understand fully the Western mindset—and therefore to predict accurately the consequences of their actions.

4. The Soviet attempt to exact a precise parity of treatment between Zakharov and Daniloff illustrates their penchant for trying to create an apparent parallelism where none exists—when it is to their tactical advantage to do so. (We see the same phenomena when they claim that invasion of another country is only the pursuit of collective security—support for allies who have sought their assistance.)

5. One or both of two factors must be present to induce them to draw back, once they have started on a particular course:

(a) Realization that they stand to lose more than to gain from the perpetuation of the action; and/or

(b) Clear evidence that failure to resolve the problem can result in tangible damage to matters of greater importance to them.

6. If these factors are brought clearly into play at the beginning of the dispute, the Soviets are capable of cutting their losses rapidly before more damage is done. However, if the matter escalates and the prestige of the political leaders becomes involved, it is more difficult for them to extricate themselves, even if they realize their concrete interests are suffering.

7. The Soviets had no interest in Zakharov as an individual—they were motivated by KGB institutional interests and Soviet national interests as the political leadership sees them. For the U.S., on the other hand, Daniloff's personal situation was a very important factor.

Implications for U.S. Tactics

These Soviet attitudes suggest that some tactics are likely to be more successful than others in dealing with disputes with the Soviets.

1. It is important to find ways to make clear *from the outset of a dispute* what the costs may be to Soviet interests—particularly if we intend to react in a manner different from what the Soviets have experienced historically. Ideally, such information should be conveyed privately in the first instance, to avoid unnecessary or premature engagement of Soviet prestige.

2. While it is important to our public position (and for the record) to argue the facts of the case, we should not expect to resolve contentious issues by reasoned argument. The Soviets never really cared whether Daniloff was innocent or guilty. Therefore, while we needed to make clear to the public, and to the Soviet leadership, that we knew he was innocent, we had no real hope of solving the problem until we had given the Soviets concrete incentives to solve it.

3. A corollary of the second point is that we should always be careful to avoid giving undue weight to elements of no real importance to the Soviets. [2½ lines not declassified] This was of importance to the Soviets *only* to the degree it could be used to make their case credible to our public—or to employ as implicit blackmail on us, if they thought we feared “exposure.”

4. We should always be mindful of the bureaucratic implications in the Soviet Union of the actions we take. In Daniloff’s case, the KGB doubtless instigated the arrest. It was important to move against KGB assets in order to demonstrate that their own parochial interest would be the first to suffer—and thus give them incentive to help find a solution. The fact that we finally moved against Soviet intelligence assets in the U.S. was doubtless an important element—along with the Soviet desire to get the Summit back on track—that led to its resolution. It is possible that we could have resolved the issue more quickly if we had moved at the very outset against KGB assets—before the prestige of the leadership became too much involved. The analogy in the arms control area is to give the Soviet military concrete incentives to move in the direction we desire through our defense modernization programs.

5. In trying to resolve a confrontational situation with the Soviets, we must be prepared to take calculated and reasonable risks—and make sure the Soviets understand we are. For example, we should not have hesitated to move against Soviet intelligence installations in the United States from fear that the Soviets would retaliate against us in the Soviet Union. The fact was, they have many more assets to lose in the U.S. [less than 1 line not declassified] and retaliation was unlikely if they knew in advance that we would levy a disproportionate counter-retaliation on them. But even if retaliation on their part had been more probable than it was, it would have been a basic error to convey that we were fearful of that possibility. It would have been far better for them to get the impression that we would welcome the excuse to “cream” them, regardless of what happened to us.

6. We should never take the Soviets seriously when they say “you can’t deal with us this way.” (Usually, such statements are very good evidence that we are dealing with them precisely in the most effective way.) Such statements are usually made when we tell them in advance that we will take certain concrete actions if they persist in a particular course of behavior. Their protests have some validity only in the sense that if threats or ultimata are made public, the Soviets usually find it impossible to meet them, because of their concern for face and prestige. This does not apply, however, to warnings issued privately, if they are credible.

7. Finally, our experience in the Daniloff case illustrates clearly the utility of confidentiality and direct, very candid communication, in solving such problems. It was not until we dealt with them confidentially that we worked out the solution. [*4½ lines not declassified*]

296. Paper Prepared by the Senior Arms Control Group and the Arms Control Support Group¹

Washington, October 6, 1986

*SAGE 42: ICELAND MEETING—REVIEW OF
KEY ARMS CONTROL ISSUES (U)*

The 11–12 October meeting in Iceland between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev is intended to set the stage for a full scale summit to be held in the United States late this year. This paper reviews those arms control areas of such prominence that they will inevitably be discussed in Iceland. The paper is limited to the three areas specifically mentioned in Gorbachev’s 18 September letter—ABM/SDI, INF and

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, [Oct 1986] Chron File: [No.13–No.17]. Secret; Sage. Handle via Sage Channels Only. In an October 6 covering memorandum to Poindexter, Brooks and Linhard explained: “We had a *long* combined SACG/ACSG meeting this afternoon. As a result we did some repackaging of Defense and Space and INF options. The Defense and Space changes reflect some agencies’ concern that even if the Soviets move in START we should respond only in START, not in other areas. The INF changes clarify where we might seek agreement in principle. Attached are revised talking points (Tab I) for your use at Tuesday’s NSPG, along with a highlighted copy of the revised SAGE 42 issue paper for your reference (Tab II), both reflecting the SACG/ACSG discussions. We have distributed the revised SAGE 42 to agencies for their principal’s use.”

nuclear testing—and START, the most important issue for the United States.² The intent is to identify new approaches the President might use or, where no new approaches are appropriate, to identify the areas where the President must be prepared to explain why no further US movement is possible. (S)

START

United States Position and Objectives

The United States seeks broad, deep, equitable and verifiable reductions in strategic offensive arms, with special emphasis on destabilizing ICBMs such as the Soviet heavy SS-18 missile. While remaining firmly committed to 50% reductions, we have also tabled an interim proposal which includes 1600 SNDVs (with a possible sublimit of 350 heavy bombers), a 50% ballistic missile throwweight reduction, and a combined limit of 7500 RVs plus ALCMs, with sublimits of 5500 ballistic missile RVs, 3300 ICBM RVs and not more than 1650 RVs on all permitted ICBMs except silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six RVs each or less. The proposal would produce less sweeping reductions and involves many other steps designed to reduce the differences between the two sides. (S)

Soviet Position and Objectives

The Soviets tie progress in START to an extended period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and severe constraints on the SDI program. They reject the US emphasis on ballistic missiles and seek limitations on SLCMs and on all bomber weapons, not just ALCM. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze during his meeting with Secretary Shultz and General Secretary Gorbachev in his September letter to the President simply said reductions would follow resolution of Defense and Space issues. Soviet NST negotiators have not been forthcoming since our most recent proposal was tabled in Geneva. Nevertheless, the Soviets could choose to reemphasize START at any time, including in Iceland. (S)

United States Options in Iceland

The most recent START proposal was made by the United States and the Soviets have yet to respond in a meaningful fashion, although they have tabled proposals previously made at the September 5th experts meeting. All agencies agree that the President should go on the offensive and aggressively push for offensive force reductions along the lines the United States has proposed, but that no further US movement is appropriate unless and until the Soviets make a significant

² September 15; see Document 280.

move on this issue. The President should stress the importance he places on START whether Gorbachev raises it or not. He should stress that early agreement on specific limits on the numbers of warheads on ballistic missiles and ICBMs, and on how to limit missile throwweight, especially of the Soviet SS-18, would provide a framework around which a final agreement could be built. He should also stress that the United States will not accept the linkage the Soviet Union is seeking to impose between START reductions and US non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. (S/S)

DEFENSE & SPACE

United States Position and Objectives

The United States seeks a treaty now with the Soviet Union which would commit both sides to establish an agreed way to jointly manage a stable transition to a defense-reliant strategic regime if, after 1991, either side makes a decision to deploy advanced defenses. The President's July 25 proposal to Gorbachev provides a concrete framework for an agreement which includes such a treaty. (S)

Under the President's proposal, the US and the Soviet Union would confine themselves to activities permitted by the terms of the ABM Treaty through 1991, and possibly beyond, until such time as either side determines that the program of research, development, and testing has demonstrated effective strategic defenses to be feasible and until a plan is submitted for "sharing the benefits" and "eliminating offensive ballistic missiles." At that point, a new treaty regime, to be negotiated as soon as possible, hopefully in 1986, will be triggered. Under the new treaty regime, the sides will negotiate on the plan for sharing the benefits of advanced defenses and for eliminating offensive ballistic missiles. If agreement is reached, deployment will proceed according to that agreement. If agreement is not reached after two years of such negotiation, either side will be free to deploy advanced defenses after providing six months notice of its intention to do so. (S)

The United States is continuing to elaborate on how effective defenses would provide a more stable offense/defense relationship, the importance of reversing Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty, and how the U.S. Open Laboratories Initiative can help to address both U.S. and Soviet concerns. (S)

Soviet Positions and Objectives

The Soviets are seeking to stop the US SDI program at the earliest possible stage by "strengthening" the ABM Treaty through more restrictive provisions. (S)

The Soviets are also linking agreement on reduction of strategic arms to an agreement in Defense and Space. For a 50 percent reduction

in strategic arms they still require agreement to ban development (including “scientific research”), testing, and deployment of so-called “space-strike arms.” For lesser reductions (i.e. 30 percent) they require U.S. agreement: not to exercise our right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a period of “up to fifteen years;” to adhere strictly to the terms of the ABM Treaty; and to negotiate new and more restrictive definitions governing ABM related activity. The Soviet Union also proposes bans on the development, testing and deployment of dedicated ASAT systems or space-based systems capable of striking targets in the atmosphere or on the earth’s surface. (S)

United States Options in Iceland

The most recent major move on Defense and Space issues was made by the United States in the President’s July 25 letter to Gorbachev. Ambassador Kampelman will only just have tabled the full details of the President’s proposal. Thus all agencies agree the President should use Iceland to set forth his new proposal directly to General Secretary Gorbachev and to give the rationale for that proposal, using the line of argumentation that was employed effectively by the U.S. experts, and by Secretary Shultz in his discussions with the Soviet Foreign Minister. This has already been incorporated into the President’s proposed talking points. (S/S)

There is also consensus that the President should attempt to have the discussion on Defense and Space during the first day of the meeting, after he initiates discussion of START. The objective would be to elicit Gorbachev’s reaction to the President’s presentation and attempt to address the General Secretary’s concerns during the second day—but with the President demonstrating how they can be addressed *within the framework that the President has proposed*. (S/S)

Finally, all agencies agree that further adjustments to our position during the Iceland meeting are inappropriate unless the Soviets show major—and unexpected—positive movement. However, there are different views concerning whether the U.S. should be prepared to make such offers in response to significant Soviet movement. (S/S)

All agencies agree that we would prefer to respond within the START framework to any Soviet movement in START. No agency proposes we *volunteer* any movement in Defense and Space. *Some believe*, however, that if: (1) the Soviets make a major move in START, (2) the Soviet offer is attractive enough in the context of the President’s Defense and Space proposal and would help move us toward agreement on central START issues, and (3) the Soviets hold their offer hostage to further US movement in the Defense and Space area, we should agree to hold discussions in Defense and Space with the aim of resolving differences on two areas of interest to the Soviets:

—what is meant by the Soviet proposal that we commit not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty (i.e., how would the Soviets modify Article 15 so as to achieve their purpose while not asking us to foreswear our right to withdraw due to supreme national interest); and

—differences that appear to exist now between United States and Soviet understanding of ABM Treaty obligations. (S/S)

Advocates of this option note that both sides propose that the defense programs be governed for a period of time by the provisions of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets propose an extended non-withdrawal commitment; we propose the sides confine themselves through 1991 to research, development, and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. Therefore, as part of any settlement involving continued observance of the ABM Treaty's limitation for a finite period of time, we could agree to discuss with the Soviets what is permitted and what is prohibited by the Treaty. In addition we could, while making clear our problems with Soviet proposals for non-withdrawal, suggest a specific formulation for how restrictions on withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would apply under our proposal. This subject could be taken up by the DST delegations, by a separate group of experts as the Soviets propose, or by an experts group that would work under the delegations in Geneva. (S/S)

Others believe, however, that there is no problem understanding what the Soviets mean by non-withdrawal, that the ABM Treaty definitions are already clear and agreed, and that it is not in the US interest to reopen these definitions. Any additional discussions would divert the focus from the President's new proposal and would inevitably lead to unacceptable new restrictions which would undermine the President's SDI program. They further believe the coherence of the President's new proposal would be fragmented by discussing it in such a fashion. Finally they believe that the most appropriate response to Soviet movement in START is further US movement in START to be determined after the Iceland meeting, and that we should not move further in Defense and Space until the Soviets show movement in that forum. (S/S)

In the context of the Soviets proposing major, and unexpected, positive movement, the Arms Control Support Group also considered the option of offering to attempt to narrow the gap between commonly cited "time lines" associated with the US and Soviet positions, i.e., between our proposal of 7½ years before deployment and the Soviet proposal of "up to 15 years" of "non-withdrawal" from the ABM Treaty. (S/S)

All agencies agree it is essential to recognize the fundamental differences between our two approaches. We seek Soviet agreement to a period after which we would be permitted to deploy the fruits of our

research and complete a transition to defense. We desire this to help institutionalize SDI's survival as a viable program. The Soviet objective is the opposite; after the Soviet 15 years, we would simply revert to the present situation. Therefore, until some progress is made in shifting the Soviet Union to a framework supportive of our objectives, all agencies agree it is *not* in the US interest to initiate discussions on narrowing the difference between the two time frames. We can pocket Soviet movement toward shorter time lines, but should not seek to focus discussion on this point. (S/S)

Additional Issues. Two additional areas have been reviewed for possible new approaches:

Krasnoyarsk. Although the Soviet Krasnoyarsk radar is a violation of the ABM Treaty and our modernization of the US radar at Thule, Greenland is not, if the Soviets dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar, we could consider dismantling the phased-array radar at Thule, replacing it with a modern dish radar. After extensive review, all agencies agree this option should not be pursued. Additional analysis is attached.³ (S/S)

Offensive Use of Space Systems. It has been suggested we propose a ban on testing of space systems for attacking targets on the earth's surface. (Extending such a ban to the atmosphere is unwise given the difficulty of defining "atmosphere" in a fashion which permits boost-phase intercept of ballistic missiles). We have no plans for such tests, and this could be part of a package including Soviet acceptance of our right to pursue SDI research, development, and testing. All agencies agree such a proposal is premature since we do not know what future testing the SDI program may require and such a proposal would raise verification issues which are just now being analyzed. (S/S)

Should the Soviets raise the issue of offensive use of space systems, we could counter by pointing out that existing treaties prohibit weapons of mass destruction in space, by reaffirming our continuing commitment to these treaties, and by asking Gorbachev to specify the particular Soviet concerns. (S/S)

INF⁴

United States Position and Objectives

Our goal remains the elimination of the entire category of land-based Long Range Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (LRINF) missiles. We have agreed, however, that the way to make rapid progress toward

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Documentation on preparations specific to INF issues for the Reykjavic meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XII, INF, 1984–1988.

this goal may be to reach an interim agreement at a level above zero. Any agreement must adhere to the principles we have advanced to throughout the negotiations: There must be significant reductions, both in Europe and (for the Soviets) in Asia; reductions in Asia must be proportional to those in Europe (although we can depart from this in a limited range of cases such as that indicated below). We will not permit an INF agreement to export the threat to Asia. The US and the USSR must have the right to equal global warhead limits under the agreement. There must be effective verification provisions as part of the agreement. There must be constraints on Short Range Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (SRINF). Third party systems (i.e. UK and French) will not be given formal or informal consideration in the agreement. (S)

In response to a Soviet suggestion during the last round of Experts' Talks in Washington to limit European LRINF warheads to 100 per side, we have proposed in Geneva an interim agreement that would limit each side to 200 warheads globally. Each side would be permitted 100 warheads in Europe and up to 100 warheads outside of Europe. Under such an agreement (e.g. 100/100), the Soviets could deploy their warheads "outside Europe" on Soviet soil, while the US would agree to deploy systems outside Europe only in US territory. The equal ceilings in Europe and Asia resulting from this proposal are not to become a substitute for the general principle of proportionate reductions. Our previous proposals remain on the table, including: (1) an interim *140-launcher* limit for each side in Europe (with proportional Soviet reductions in Asia), and (2) agreement to move to zero LRINF in three stages, reaching zero in a specified time. (S)

Soviet Position and Objectives

The most recent Soviet move has been to suggest a limit of 100 warheads for each side *in Europe*, but offering only a "limit" (unspecified) on Soviet LRINF forces in Asia and no mention of SRINF. The US would be limited to Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) only in Europe. The United States would have the right to match Soviet warheads outside of Europe, but such forces would be limited to deployment in the continental United States, excluding Alaska. The Soviets also would include a provision prohibiting transfer of medium range systems to third countries and insist on an agreement of limited duration. (S)

Soviet objectives include retaining a significant Soviet SS-20 force in Asia (thus driving a wedge between the US and Japan), eliminating the US Pershing-II ballistic LRINF missile, and driving political wedges between the US and our NATO Allies on the LRINF and SRINF issues. The Soviets omitted any explicit reference to compensation for UK and French forces in their last suggestion. They also removed their original

condition that UK and French forces not be modernized, but only in the context of an interim agreement of more limited duration than we consider acceptable. (S)

United States Options in Iceland

For the purposes of the Iceland meeting, modification of specific INF proposals or creation of a new option is not required. Most agencies believe that, despite Soviet claims, agreement is not near in this area because, among other issues, of the extensive verification procedures which remain to be negotiated. However, INF is likely to be an area the Soviets will want to focus on for the summit, and they may want to expand the “areas of agreement in principle.” INF is also the area about which the European allies and Japan will be most sensitive to any perceived changes in US positions; they will expect to be consulted in advance. (S/S)

The US has been forthcoming in Geneva—thus the “ball is in the Soviet court.” All agencies agree our first priority should be to press Gorbachev for a response to our specific proposal of September 18 of 100 warheads in Europe and 100 or fewer in Asia. Beyond this, our options are somewhat limited; we could:

—*Continue to insist on Soviet agreement that SS-20's in Asia will be reduced concurrently and proportionately with those in Europe under an interim agreement.* Ambassador Rowny believes that further US proposals are inappropriate without a response to our September 18 proposal and would favor such an approach.

—*Explore the range of numbers around 100 that would be acceptable for an interim level of warheads in Europe, bearing in mind our policy of returning to the principle of proportional reductions in Asia.* Clearly the problem will be determining what level in Asia the Soviets may propose or could accept between our offer of 100 warheads and their current warhead level of at least 513. We may see them show interest in a level roughly equivalent to their position in Asia at the time of the “Walk in the Woods” (90 launchers or 270 warheads; roughly their current order of battle at Novosibirsk and Barnaul).⁵ If this were the case, applying the principle of proportionality would result in 372 warheads in Europe and 270 in Asia. This would meet our criteria and should be acceptable, although we may prefer deeper reductions. Some believe an alternative of 300 warheads in Europe and 300 in Asia (or some level between 100/100 and 300/300) might be both preferable and negotiable. At issue is whether we should be prepared to pursue

⁵ Reference is to the Nitze-Kvitsinsky “Walk in the Woods” proposal in Geneva in June/July 1982. Documentation on the “Walk in the Woods” is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. V, European Security, 1977–1983.

either or both of these outcomes. Others, including OSD and Ambassador Rowny, believe this latter approach would give the Soviets 100 more warheads than they would be permitted under the application of proportionate reduction—a dramatic and undesirable departure from past US commitments to our Asian Allies, and one we should reject. (S/S)

—*Seek additional areas of agreement in principle.* As examples we could seek Soviet agreement:

—That, since both sides agree on the need for effective verification, they further agree that such effective verification provisions should include (1) a comprehensive and accurate exchange of data, both prior to reductions and thereafter, (2) on-site observation of destruction down to agreed levels, and (3) inventory control of remaining forces, including on-site inspection as appropriate.

—That Soviet SRINF would have to be limited globally as part of an agreement, with the US retaining the right to equal levels, and with a commitment to subsequent negotiations to reduce and eliminate SRINF as part of any LRINF agreement.

NUCLEAR TESTING

United States Position and Objectives

The United States seeks verification improvements to the TTBT and PNET and is willing to move forward on ratification once such improvements have been notified. A comprehensive test ban remains a long-term US objective, but only in the context of a time when we do not need to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability, and when we have achieved broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence building measures, and greater balance in conventional forces. Thus, the United States sees little prospect of commencing CTB negotiations in the foreseeable future. (U)

The President has stated that, upon ratification of the TTBT and PNET, and in association with a parallel program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons, the United States is prepared to discuss ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.⁶ No decisions have been made on details of such a program. OSD, DOE and the JCS believe any further limitations on testing (such as quotas or reduced yield thresholds) would severely limit, if not eliminate, our ability to maintain an effective deterrent. In the deliberations which led to the President's step-by-step offer, State advocated an annual quota of tests above a specific threshold. The quota, which could decrease as strategic arms

⁶ See Document 203.

were reduced, would be implemented after methods to verify it were in place and operating. Subsequent technical and policy analysis of such a proposal, conducted by DOE and OSD (with JCS support) respectively, led those agencies to conclude the number of nuclear tests required is not directly related to the number of strategic nuclear weapons in the arsenal and that a quota was neither verifiable nor it was not in the national interest. As a result, there is no interagency agreement on an acceptable approach to implement the President's offer. (S/S)

Soviet Position and Objectives

The Soviets claim to have no interest in TTBT or PNET verification improvements, although two sets of technical discussions at the nuclear experts meeting in Geneva have been generally professional. A third meeting is scheduled for November. The Soviets have not responded to the President's offer for CORRTEX demonstrations for Soviet officials (including Soviet Academy of Science personnel) at the Nevada Test Site. Nor have they responded to the President's statement in his letter to Gorbachev and his UN speech on step-by-step limitations on nuclear testing following TTBT and PNET ratification.⁷ (S)

The Soviets continue to seek the immediate cessation of nuclear testing through a moratorium followed by a comprehensive test ban. Since the most recent Soviet extension of their moratorium on nuclear testing, the Soviet Union has gone out of its way, both publicly and privately, to make cessation of testing a major theme of Soviet foreign policy. This Soviet diplomatic and propaganda offensive is comparable in scope to Soviet attempts to preclude INF deployments in 1983, the Soviet campaign against enhanced radiation warhead deployments in the late 1970s, or the 1958 Soviet campaign which led to the 1958–61 nuclear testing moratorium. (C)

In his most recent letter to the President, General Secretary Gorbachev stated that "the attitude of a country toward the cessation of nuclear testing is the touchstone of its policy in the field of disarmament and international security."⁸ The Soviets probably have made such a central theme of nuclear testing, even though they can be in no doubt as to the United States' attitude toward a Comprehensive Test Ban, because they believe nuclear testing offers them an advantageous international propaganda issue. Alternatively, US unwillingness to agree to an end to testing could provide Gorbachev a convenient rationale

⁷ Reagan made the statement in his September 22 address to the UN General Assembly. For the full text of the address, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book II, pp. 1227–1233.

⁸ See Document 280.

to use to blame the US for lack of progress in improving relations. Whatever the reason, Gorbachev himself is heavily engaged in demands for testing restrictions vastly greater than anything the United States is prepared to contemplate. (S)

United States Options in Iceland

There is no objective reason why we should worry. The intense Soviet propaganda campaign on nuclear testing has failed for the most part and United States policy remains intact. *If*, however, General Secretary Gorbachev is unwilling to agree to a summit without some, at least cosmetic, movement, then the present US position will not secure whatever benefit in meeting our objectives a summit would bring. (S)

It makes neither strategic nor political sense for the United States to alter (a) its position that the first step is effective verification of the TTBT/PNET, and (b) its opposition to a Comprehensive Test Ban in the foreseeable future. The issue is, within those parameters, whether there are any adjustments which might make it easier for Gorbachev to come to the summit without prejudicing our own position on testing or other national security concerns. OSD, DOE and JCS believe there are none. The following possibilities have been reviewed and rejected:

—*Accept explicit reference in the summit communique to the existing provision of Article 1 (3) of the TTBT obligating the parties to “continue their negotiation with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of cessation of all underground nuclear weapons tests.”* The US would tie agreement to such explicit reference to agreement to move to formal negotiations on verification improvements which would permit us to move forward on TTBT/PNET ratification. The two leaders could not commit to ratification itself since there is no reasonable chance of completing these negotiations before a 1986 summit. The President would make it clear we would expect such future negotiations to follow his step-by-step approach and thus *not* to begin until significant strategic arms reductions were achieved. (S/S)

—*Repackage TTBT/PNET verification in a multilateral context.* The US might seek to repackage TTBT/PNET verification in a way that would allow the Soviets to assert conditions had changed, perhaps by building on Soviet suggestions and seeking to involve the New Delhi Six in verification in some fashion. Multilateral verification of a bilateral treaty, however, would impair effective verification and would set a dangerous precedent for other arms negotiations. All agencies therefore judge this option to be unworkable. (S/S)

—*Agree to begin formal negotiations on the President’s step-by-step approach as soon as the TTBT/PNET is ratified.* The President would make clear that progress in such negotiations would depend on progress in arms reductions, but would explicitly commit to begin them. Negotia-

tions would have two objectives: agreement on exactly what limitations would be applied in a step-by-step fashion and detailed agreement on verification measures, which would have to be in place before any limits were implemented. This approach downplays the essential requirement in the President's approach for a program of reductions and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. (S/S)

All agencies agree that the best choice is to hang tough. The United States has made a responsible offer on TTBT/PNET verification improvements and has made it clear that discussion of further steps is possible once this verification is accomplished. The Soviets have not responded. Additional concessions are not warranted. (S/S)

SUMMARY AND ISSUES FOR PRESIDENTIAL DECISION

All agencies agree that the President's principal purpose in the Iceland meeting should be to articulate the United States position forcefully and completely. All agree that no new initiatives are appropriate in the areas of START and nuclear testing. (S/S)

In Defense and Space and its relationship to START, the following issues exist:

—If the Soviets make a significant move in START, but make that move conditional on US movement in Defense and Space, should the United States respond with movement in the Defense and Space area?

—If so, how much movement in START must the Soviets show before additional US movement in Defense and Space is appropriate?

—If the United States does respond to such Soviet movement, should the response be agreeing to discuss terms and definitions under the ABM Treaty and the subject of non-withdrawal from that Treaty? (S/S)

In INF, all options considered are logical extensions of our current position. The following issues exist:

—Should the President use the meeting to attempt to seek some specific narrowing of differences on outstanding INF issues?

—If so, should he (1) focus on exploring specific numbers around the existing US 100/100 proposal or (2) seek agreement on general principles in areas where such agreement does not now exist? (S/S)

297. Talking Points Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, October 7, 1986

—Mr. President, yesterday we reviewed preparations for your meeting in Iceland in all areas except arms control.²

—Today we will deal with arms control, which we believe General Secretary Gorbachev's letter and subsequent Soviet pronouncements make clear will be the principal Soviet focus of the Iceland meeting.

—If you have no preliminary comments to make, I will summarize where we stand and then open the session up to general discussion. I'd like to begin by reviewing our perception of what the Soviets seek.

—We are not certain about Gorbachev's agenda for this meeting. His letter implies concentrating on the areas of Defense and Space/SDI, INF and nuclear testing. The Soviets also told our Ambassador in Moscow that they are interested in some discussion of both chemical and conventional arms control.

—We believe that START, our highest priority, needs to be discussed as well to indicate the importance you place on it. The Soviets

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, [Oct 1986] Chron File: [No.13–No.17]. Secret. Brackets are in the original. These talking points were for Poindexter for the NSPG meeting that took place on October 7 from 2 to 3 p.m. in the Roosevelt Room. Brooks and Linhard sent the talking points to Poindexter under their October 6 covering memorandum; see footnote 1, Document 296. The minutes of the October 7 meeting read: "VADM Poindexter opened the meeting using his prepared talking points. (Tab B) He then asked participants to comment on possible changes in U.S. arms control policy in preparation for the President's impending meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. A general discussion ensued, based on the options and analysis in a compartmented options paper prepared by the Arms Control Support Group (attached at Tab C) [see Document 296]. Discussion focused both on the tactics the President should use and the substantive movement he might offer during the arms control portion of his upcoming meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. No detailed record of discussion was maintained." (National Security Council, Institutional Files, SR-111, NSPG 138, Arms Control—Iceland)

² According to the President's Daily Diary, on October 6 from noon to 1:05 p.m. a Senior Advisers' luncheon took place in the Cabinet Room. (Reagan Library) Reagan wrote in his personal diary on October 6: "The news is that Mrs. Gorbachev is coming to Iceland. Our news is that Mrs. Reagan isn't. We had a working lunch about the Iceland meeting. Consensus was that Gorby is trying to make it a one topic agenda—arms control. We think we should get into Human rights, Afghanistan etc." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 645) Earlier, on October 4, Poindexter sent Reagan an agenda for the luncheon, the purpose of which was "to discuss the major issues on our bilateral, regional and human rights agenda. Arms control issues will be addressed at Tuesday's NSPG meeting." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Briefing Book for Ambassador Matlock for the President's Trip to Reykjavik (4))

have not given adequate priority to the need for real reductions in strategic arms.

—Gorbachev probably expects progress only in INF, although we cannot be certain.³

—It would be consistent with past Soviet practice for him to suggest a dramatic new approach in some other area as well, perhaps on nuclear testing.

—We have conducted a review of our arms control positions. As a result of that review, all agencies agree that your principal purpose should be to articulate the United States position directly to Gorbachev forcefully and completely and that major new initiatives are not appropriate.

—Specifically we believe that:

—On START you should reaffirm the importance you place on the area, restate the offer for an interim reductions agreement you made in your July letter, and urge the Soviets not to hold progress in this area hostage to the defense and space area.

—Similarly, on INF you should make a presentation restating our current position. Since we appear to be closest to agreement in this area (although we are not as close to agreement as the Soviets claim), some believe you should use the meeting to attempt to seek *specific* narrowing of outstanding issues. I will review the suggestions that have been made in a moment.

—On nuclear testing you should continue to press the Soviets to accept verification improvements in existing treaties as the necessary next step in this area. You should also make it clear neither a moratorium on testing nor early negotiations on a comprehensive test ban are acceptable.

—Finally, on Defense and Space, we recommend you use Iceland to set forth your new proposal directly to General Secretary Gorbachev, using the line of argumentation that was employed effectively by the U.S. experts, and by George Shultz in his discussions with the Soviet Foreign Minister.

—We have prepared suggested talking points to assist you in making our case.

—Should Gorbachev raise either chemical or conventional arms control, we believe you should listen and review current U.S. positions. Once again we have prepared suggested talking points. While we

³ Linhard's handwritten notes of the NSPG meeting read: "Pres—on INF—there was an agreement all the way to 0—but they held out in Asia. —Asian weapons can hit Europe—if a figure for Asia—we will deploy Pershing other than Europe to counter Soviet in Asia—not happy about mix—they can [unclear] down GLCMs—don't want if they have missiles—we must have missiles." (Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chron, NSPG—October 7, 1986: Originals)

have not reviewed this area in depth, we see no need for any new U.S. initiatives.

—We believe you should attempt to have the discussion on Defense and Space during the first day of the meeting. The objective would be to elicit Gorbachev's reaction to your presentation, returning to his concerns during the second day, but addressing them *within the framework that you have proposed*.

—Issues remain in two areas: Defense and Space and INF.

—While all agree that no new initiatives are appropriate in the areas of START and nuclear testing, in the area of Defense and Space, some agencies believe that *if* the Soviets make a major, and unexpected, new move in START, and *if* the Soviet offer is attractive enough and if they hold their offer hostage to a major move on the U.S. part in Defense and Space, you should agree to hold discussions with the intent of narrowing differences on two areas of interest to the Soviets:

—What is meant by the Soviet proposal that we commit not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty (i.e., how would the Soviets modify Article 15 so as to achieve their purpose while not asking us to forswear our right to withdraw due to supreme national interest); and

—The differences that appear to exist now between United States and Soviet understanding of ABM Treaty obligations.

—Others strongly disagree, believing such discussion would gain us nothing, fragment the coherence of your proposal, and lead to greater restrictions which would severely undercut SDI.⁴

—Were you to agree to this approach, you would need to also consider how much movement in START must the Soviets show before additional US movement in Defense and Space is appropriate.

—The second issue concerns INF. The fundamental question is should you use the meeting to attempt to seek some specific narrowing of differences on outstanding INF issues, given the apparent Soviet belief that this is where we are closest to an agreement? You could:

—Explore with Gorbachev specific numbers around the existing United States proposal for an interim agreement of 100 warheads in Europe and 100 warheads in Asia, or

—Seek Soviet agreement on general principles in areas where such agreement does not now exist. Such agreement might be on the elements required for effective verification, on reductions in shorter range

⁴ Linhard's notes read: "Pres—if no in Alaska—why put some in E Russia—on [5?]-once we negotiated the elimination of ballistic missile *then* we will share—a new treaty signed now that would supersede the ABM Treaty—seeking an end to offensive weapons—if they refuse to eliminate offensive weapons—then we deploy." (Ibid.)

systems, or on the need for Soviet INF missiles in Asia to be reduced concurrently.

—Unless there are specific questions on other areas, I suggest we use our time to discuss these two issues: whether to respond in the Defense and Space area should the Soviets move on START, and whether to probe for specific movement in INF. Perhaps we could begin with the Defense and Space issue. George [Shultz] would you like to start?

NOTE: SHULTZ/NITZE WILL ADVOCATE MOVING TO DISCUSSIONS OF DEFINITIONS OF ABM TREATY TERMS AND OF “NON-WITHDRAWAL.” OSD, JCS AND—PERHAPS—ACDA WILL OPPOSE.

(When discussion of Defense and Space seems no longer profitable.)

—I think we should now turn to discussion of whether to use our time with Gorbachev to narrow our differences in the INF area and, if so, what to concentrate on.

—As we noted earlier, you could either explore specific numbers around our current interim proposal of 100 warheads in Europe and 100 warheads in Asia, or seek Soviet agreement on general principles where such agreement does not now exist. Is there discussion on this point?

NOTE: ROWNY WILL PUSH FOR CONCURRENT AND PROPORTIONAL REDUCTIONS IN ASIA, CLAIMING WE HAVE PROMISED THAT TO JAPAN. RECENT MESSAGE FROM NAKASONE TO THE PRESIDENT SUGGESTS STRICT PROPORTIONALITY IS NOT ESSENTIAL IN ALL CASES.

(When the meeting time is almost over.)

—Mr. President, this meeting makes it clear that we are in agreement on the basic approach for Iceland. We will reflect this discussion and your subsequent decisions in your talking points and background briefing papers.

—Thank you all for coming.

298. National Security Decision Directive 245¹

Washington, October 7, 1986

REAGAN-GORBACHEV PREPARATORY MEETING (U)

I have agreed to meet with General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, October 11–12 in an effort to accelerate progress in resolving issues in our relations with the Soviet Union. I expect the meetings to be very private and plan to take only a minimal support staff with me. The discussions will be serious and business-like and social functions will be conducted at the minimal level appropriate to the occasion. (S)

It is imperative for all U.S. Government officials to adhere totally to the press guidance established by my own statements and those approved by the State Department and the White House. No official is authorized to originate public statements regarding the Reykjavik meeting, or to provide comments in background briefings that go beyond statements made publicly by the White House or Department of State. All written remarks concerning U.S.-Soviet relations must be approved in advance by the White House or the Department of State. Should public statements or background briefings by other U.S. Government officials on particular aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations seem desirable, they may be undertaken only with the specific approval of the White House. Requests should be submitted through the Operations Coordinating Committee of the NSC. (S)

In going to Iceland, the United States demonstrates to the world that we are prepared to exert every effort to establish a constructive and serious dialogue with the Soviet leadership. I wish to stress however, that I do not anticipate signing any agreements in Reykjavik. (S)

Objective

My objective for this meeting is to increase the likelihood that the coming Summit in the United States will be productive by:

—Demonstrating my commitment to solving problems in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, to the degree the Soviets are willing.

—Identifying issues with reasonable prospects of solution, and accelerating efforts to resolve them. I will press the General Secretary

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 245 [Reagan-Gorbachev Preparatory Meeting]. Secret. Printed from an unsigned copy.

to agree to acceptable approaches to outstanding key issues in order to intensify ongoing negotiations.

—Engaging the Soviets in substantive and serious discussions on the entire range of issues on the US agenda. I will not permit the meeting to focus exclusively or disproportionately on arms control, and I will ensure that regional, bilateral and human rights issues are thoroughly reviewed.

—Demonstrating to our Allies and to the American public that the policy we have pursued toward the Soviet Union—based upon realism, strength, and dialogue—has created the potential for effective negotiations with the Soviet Union. I will, of course, continue to avoid preemptive or one-sided concessions and steadfastly resist Soviet pressures and threats. (S)

299. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan¹

October 9, 1986

Dear Mr. President:

(S) If I may, being on the other side of the world on the eve of your meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev,² I would like to summarize briefly the views I have presented to you from time to time. I know this is unsolicited advice, but it is offered only to help serve the ultimate objectives I know we share. I do believe your Reykjavik meeting with Mr. Gorbachev offers an ideal opportunity to advance your vision for reducing the risks of nuclear war. I am glad you intend to stress other issues as well: human rights, the Soviet responsibility for regional conflicts, and, in particular, their continuing warfare against the Afghan people. But in the interest of brevity, I will confine this message to the issue of security and arms reductions.

(S) With your latest, major proposal to Gorbachev on SDI and strategic missiles, you have shown how missile defenses would, in fact, complement and support deep reductions in offensive arms. Until now,

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Alton Keel Files, Iceland Planning (10/08/1986); NLR-281-2-4-1-2. Secret.

² Weinberger was traveling in China, India, and Pakistan. Documentation on his trip is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXIX, China, 1984–1988 and *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXXIII, South Asia.

Gorbachev has not seemed to realize the seriousness with which you advanced the proposal, and your determination in securing it.

(S) As you have said, it would be difficult for the Soviets to explain why they are against the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles. That is why I do not think Gorbachev will reject your U.N. proposal out of hand. In fact, Shevardnadze, in his speech following yours in the U.N.,³ pretended that the *Soviet Union* was proposing the complete elimination of nuclear missiles “whether strategic, medium-range or any other.” Yet, they have, of course, objected to eliminating intermediate range missiles (zero option), and have still not responded to your proposal for eliminating strategic missiles. The record should be clear as to who wants to eliminate missiles, and who insists on keeping them.

(S) Mr. Gorbachev’s arguments against SDI collapse in the face of your proposal: If missiles are *eliminated*, then our missile *defenses* could in no way diminish the Soviet deterrent; the defenses would only protect against cheating or third countries. And if, as you propose, we include firm and verifiable guarantees that SDI will never be used to deploy weapons in space that can cause mass destruction on Earth, Mr. Gorbachev’s complaint about “space strike weapons” is answered.

(S) As you know, I think verification is all-important and thus, agreement on real verification should be achieved before we take up numbers of warheads or any other topic. It is too easy for the Soviets to spend all the time on numbers, and then refuse to agree to any real verification, as they did in Stockholm. As we already emphasized in connection with your zero-zero INF proposal, a *ban* on missiles is far more verifiable than a numeric ceiling. For this reason, your U.N. proposal is more realistic and more achievable than most of the proposals the Soviets have been advancing. At the same time, it shows how to remove the most urgent danger of nuclear war—the continuing confrontation of hair-triggered, unrecalable missile forces—and it would do so in a more fundamental way than all the other arms control proposals combined.

(S) On intermediate range missiles, as well as on our other proposals, I feel that verification is the most important issue. It will be most useful for Mr. Gorbachev to hear from you the reaffirmation that real verification must be settled (including on-site inspection) before anything else can be settled.

(S) Also, as you know, I feel strongly we should not have the Soviets with SS–20s in Asia that are not effectively countered. If Gorbachev does not want to get rid of their SS–20s in Asia, or at least reduce them as much as in Europe on the way to zero, I can see no more effective

³ See footnote 5, Document 289.

negotiating tactic than your idea of hinting that we might have to deploy Pershings in South Korea, or—who knows—even offer them to China. In no event, in my opinion, should we agree to Soviet demands that we not ever keep our missiles in Alaska.

(S) Lastly, on nuclear testing, I hope the Soviets will accept our proposal for new verification measures for the Threshold Test Ban, so that we can ratify that treaty. I also hope Mr. Gorbachev can be disabused of the notion that he could ever push us to give up nuclear testing, as long as we need to rely on nuclear arms. An effective, deployed SDI is the only way we could give up testing. Our test program is now at its minimum effective level.

(S) In the overall balance of arms issues, I recommend that you come back again and again to your fundamental and far-reaching U.N. proposal to eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles and to protect and safeguard this outcome with truly defensive, effective SDI systems, the benefits of which you are prepared to share. These facts and arguments bear repeating, for—as the Russian proverb says—repetition is the mother of learning.

Respectfully yours,

Cap

300. Editorial Note

On October 9, 1986, President Ronald Reagan briefly addressed the press from the White House portico before his departure to meet Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland. "I'm leaving today for Iceland for a meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev of the Soviet Union," Reagan stated. "This will be essentially a private meeting between the two of us. We will not have large staffs with us nor is it planned that we sign substantive agreements. We will, rather, review the subjects that we intend to pursue, with redoubled effort, afterward, looking toward a possible full-scale summit. We'll be talking frankly about the differences between our countries on the major issues on the East-West agenda: arms reduction, human rights, regional conflicts, and bilateral contacts. We'll be talking about how we can—while recognizing those differences—still take steps further to make progress on those items and to make the world safer and keep the peace." Reagan concluded his remarks: "I've long believed that if we're to be successful in pursuing peace, we must face the tough issues

directly and honestly and with hope. We cannot pretend the differences aren't there, seek to dash off a few quick agreements, and then give speeches about the spirit of Reykjavik. In fact, we have serious problems with the Soviet positions on a great many issues, and success is not guaranteed. But if Mr. Gorbachev comes to Iceland in a truly cooperative spirit, I think we can make some progress. And that's my goal, and that's my purpose in going to Iceland. The goals of the United States, peace and freedom throughout the world, are great goals; but like all things worth achieving, they are not easy to attain. Reykjavik can be a step, a useful step; and if we persevere, the goal of a better, safer world will someday be ours and all the world's." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1986*, Book II, pages 1361–1363)

Air Force One departed from Andrews Air Force Base around 9:45 a.m. on October 9, arriving at Keflavik Airport, Iceland, at 7:05 p.m. During his time in Iceland, the President stayed in the U.S. Ambassador's residence. In his personal diary, Reagan wrote: "Just a long ride in A.F. 1. A little farewell ceremony on the S. Lawn & then about 5½ hours flying into a 4 hour time change. It was dark & raining when we arrived even though it was afternoon. Amb. Nick Ruwe & Nancy have moved out and given us their home." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, page 647)

According to the President's Daily Diary, October 10 consisted of private briefings in preparation for the October 11–12 meetings, aside from a brief visit with the Icelandic President and Prime Minister from 4:30 until 5:15 p.m. (Reagan Library) Jack Matlock, Soviet specialist on the National Security Council Staff, later wrote: "President Reagan held several meetings with his staff on Friday. They dealt mainly with issues other than arms control, which had been thoroughly aired in the briefings in Washington." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, page 217) Reagan and Gorbachev were scheduled to meet at 10:30 a.m. at Hofdi House on October 11.

301. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 11, 1986, 10:40 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US SIDE

President Reagan
 Secretary Shultz (came in at 11:30)
 Ambassador Matlock
 D. Zarechnak (Interpreter)

USSR SIDE

General Secretary Gorbachev
 Foreign Minister Shevardnadze (came in at 11:30)
 Notetaker
 N. Uspenskiy (Interpreter)²

The President invited the General Secretary to have a seat at the table.

Gorbachev thanked the President and noted that both sides had a lot of paper with them. What did this mean?

The President replied that it was to recall the things that the two of them had discussed in Geneva. He continued that he was glad that the General Secretary had proposed this meeting, since it was important to make sure that their next meeting would be a productive one.

Gorbachev replied, in turn, that he and the Soviet leadership very much appreciated the President's agreement to have this meeting.³

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron October 1986 (4/6). Secret. Drafted by Zarechnak. The meeting took place at Hofdi House. Reagan wrote in his diary on October 11: "A.M. a briefing session then a 5 min. drive to the meeting place—a waterfront home. I was host for the 1st session. Gorby & I met 1st with interpreters & note takers. Then he proposed we bring in Geo. S. & Shevardnadze. That's the way it went for all the meetings. We got into Human Rt's. Regional things & bi-partisan agreements on our exchange programs etc. I told him I couldn't go home if I didn't bring up why they reneged on their commitment to buy 6 mil. tons of grain. He claimed lower oil prices—they didn't have the money. Then it was plain they wanted to get to arms control—so we did." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 647) For the Soviet record of the meeting, see Savranskaya and Blanton, eds., *The Last Superpower Summits*, Document 28, pp. 170–179.

² Nikolai Uspenskiy is the correct name for the Soviet interpreter. In several meetings, the notetaker used a variation in the name or mistakenly recorded the Soviet interpreter as Yuri Uspenskiy.

³ In his memoir, Gorbachev recalled: "The meeting opened with a private conversation between the two leaders. Our initial exchange of views proved disappointing. The American President had little to say in answer to the arguments I advanced, in spite of the importance of the issues at stake—the growing tensions throughout the world, the setback after Geneva, the dangers we had to overcome. I outlined the proposals we had prepared in Moscow, through which we hoped to bring about a fundamental change in international politics." (Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, p. 416)

The President said that he had been looking forward to the meeting. He proposed that the two of them could meet alone, and perhaps also alternate their meetings with meetings that would include the respective Foreign Ministers. Would the General Secretary agree to such an approach?

Gorbachev indicated that he would.

The President asked Gorbachev which questions he felt they should discuss.

Gorbachev replied that he wished to begin with a brief exchange of views about the present situation, which had given rise to Gorbachev's proposal to meet with the President before his visit to the US. After that he would tell the President about the proposals which he had brought with him. At that point they might ask Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary Shultz to join them.

The President indicated that this was acceptable.

Gorbachev said that he was prepared to talk about everything that the President thought needed to be discussed here.

The President replied that there were a number of things that had been discussed and left open in Geneva, such as INF, the ABM Treaty, space arms and nuclear testing. The US side was especially interested in strategic arms proposals for the US negotiators in Geneva. Both the US and USSR would like to see a world without nuclear missiles. This was a very important issue, and the world was interested in the possibility of achieving this.

Gorbachev replied that since this was the main issue for the meeting, perhaps they could devote this first session to that issue, including the subsequent participation of the Foreign Ministers. Then in the afternoon questions of regional issues, humanitarian issues, bilateral relations, and everything else that was the subject of mutual interest could be discussed.

The President replied that the question of humanitarian issues and human rights needed to be discussed. This was a question different from the other ones in that no formal agreement would be signed on this, but this was a very important issue for the US side. The degree to which the President could work together with the Soviet side depended on US public opinion. This concerned such issues as emigration. This would never be put forward as a demand by the US side. The President was simply trying to say how important this issue was and how it would open up greater possibilities for achieving other aims if steps were taken along these lines. But the US would never take credit for this.

Gorbachev suggested that after a brief exchange about how to structure their meeting they could have a basic exchange of views on what had happened since Geneva and in the world in general and what US and Soviet concerns were at present. Then Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze could be invited to join them, at which time he could present specific arms control proposals involving strategic offensive weapons, medium-range forces, the ABM Treaty, nuclear testing, and all issues of nuclear arms and the arms race.

The President agreed and indicated that the reason for bringing up the other issues was their effect on the issue of arms control. As he had indicated in Geneva, this was not an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. But public opinion was very important in the US. One-eighth of US citizens have relatives and families with ties to the Soviet Union. Just the other day, and the President would return to this later, he had received a message from a US Senator whose mother had emigrated from Russia. Now her son had become an American Senator. Another example of such ties were the President's own ties to Ireland. In general, Americans have a very strong bond to the lands of their heritage. So it is easier for the US to reach agreements with the USSR if public opinion is not aroused by things that happen in the countries where people came from. But the President agreed that the issue of nuclear arms was the most important issue in the world today.

Gorbachev indicated that he wished to give his evaluation and the evaluation of the Soviet leadership concerning the importance of their present meeting in light of the current world situation as the Soviet side sees it.

The President agreed to listen to what Gorbachev had to say.

Gorbachev stressed that much had been said in the world about the decision to meet in Reykjavik. Many contradictory views were being presented. But he was certain that this was an important step which the President and the Soviet leadership had taken. Cooperation between the US and the Soviet Union was continuing and the present meeting bore witness to that. The process was a difficult one and was not going as smoothly as the two countries and their peoples might wish, but it was continuing. This was the main thing which justified this meeting.

The President agreed.

Gorbachev continued that many people in the world viewed the meeting between them as a chance for each of them to promote their personal ambitions, but he totally rejected this notion and considered that they were accountable vis-a-vis their governments and their countries, since too much depended on the two countries, the relationship between them, and contacts between their two leaders.

The President replied that, as he had indicated in Geneva, they had a unique opportunity to possibly decide whether or not there should be war or peace in the world, and he assumed that both sides wanted peace. The question was how to bring this about with confidence and with a decrease in mistrust between the two peoples.⁴

Gorbachev said that this was his second thought as well. Since Geneva the development of the bilateral relationship had not been smooth, and there were occasional flare-ups. The relationship was not an easy one, but it had been improving. But with regard to the main issue, which was of greatest concern, i.e., the nuclear threat, the Geneva Summit had been intended to give a push to the negotiations on this issue. A great deal has been said about the matter, but that things had come to an impasse. For when there are 50 or 100 different proposals, there is no commonality of approach and no indication of progress. For this reason Gorbachev felt that a meeting was necessary in order to push the two sides along the main directions aimed at achieving agreements which could be signed during Gorbachev's visit to the US.

The President replied that these were the thoughts of the US Delegation as well. After Geneva, the experts of both sides had presented various proposals. The US side had presented a proposal for 50 percent reduction, which was apparently too much for the Soviet side. The US had proposed a limit of 4500 on ballistic missile warheads, and the Soviet side had proposed 6400 to 6800. The US side felt that this number was too high and that with such a high level the world would still be threatened by destruction. The US, however, was ready to conclude an interim agreement, and bearing in mind the goal of total elimination of such weapons, the US would be prepared to agree to a number between those two figures, i.e., 5500.

Gorbachev replied that he wished to make it very clear to the President and the US Government that the Soviet side wished to find such solutions which would take equal account of Soviet and US interests. Any other approach would not be realistic. If the Soviet side only wished to look out for its interests or to strive for superiority in some other way, it felt that this would not stimulate US interest. An agreement could not be built on such a basis. He wanted to clearly say that

⁴ In his book, Matlock recalled: "As I listened to what he [Gorbachev] said about suspicion of 'personal ambitions,' I thought he might be referring to opposition at home to his having taken the initiative to arrange the meeting and, perhaps, to the proposals he would be making. However, his words could have referred to the suspicion that Reagan had come to Reykjavik not to make an agreement but just for show. In any event, Reagan did not ask what Gorbachev meant. Instead, he endorsed the thought that the two had the power to decide whether there would be war or peace in the world, and therefore they had to find a way to bolster confidence and reduce suspicion between them." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, p. 219)

the Soviet side was in favor of proposals which were aimed at total elimination of nuclear arms, and on the way to this goal there should be equality and equal security for the Soviet Union and the United States. Any other approach would not be acceptable. The Soviet side would count on the President and the US Government to approach the situation in the same way.

The President indicated his agreement and added that one of the most difficult issues of the negotiations was the issue of verification, to make sure that both sides did what they had promised to do. He quoted a Russian proverb: "Doveray no proveryay (trust but verify)." In previous statements, the two sides had spoken optimistically about INF and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. The negotiators in Geneva had discussed a cut-back in the number of weapons. And whether the two sides would start there or would start with proposals to decrease strategic weapons, if agreement could be reached on verification which would give confidence about the fact that neither side was doing what it had agreed not to, this could be a very big step, and the world would cheer.

Gorbachev replied that he would like to support what the President had said about the importance of verification. The two sides were now at the stage where they could begin a concrete process aimed at arriving at agreements, and verification had an important part to play in this. The Soviet side was interested in this issue. Without such verification he did not think it would be possible to have agreements leading to greater peace and an improvement of the international situation. The Soviet side was prepared, and he knew that the US was also prepared, to go as far as necessary to have complete confidence in the fact that agreements were being fulfilled.

Gorbachev said that he wished to say one more thing and then Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze could be invited in and he could present the Soviet side's specific proposals. He wished to touch upon their next meeting in the US. Reykjavik was sort of half-way point on the way to that meeting.

The President agreed.

Gorbachev said that someone had stated that Iceland was picked because it was the same distance from Moscow and Washington and that this was done in order to show that the US and USSR were working on the basis of equality in every respect.

The President replied that he had chosen Iceland out of the proposals made by the General Secretary not because he had measured the distances, but because he felt that London was too big and too busy a city and would not lend itself to the type of free discussions which they wished to have. He then asked Gorbachev if he had a date in mind

for the U.S. meeting or whether he, the President, ought to propose a date.

Gorbachev replied that, as he had written to the President and as he had stated publicly, the Soviet side felt that the meeting in the US should be marked by concrete results on important issues, primarily those concerning halting the arms race, which were of concern to the US people, the Soviet people and other nations as well. That meeting could not be permitted to fail. This would have very serious consequences. The world would say that these politicians are meeting and talking, which was good, but a great deal of time had been spent and there had been one meeting, two meetings, and three meetings without any forward movement. This would be very bad for the two countries and for the world. So the present meeting should lay a basis for the meeting in the US during which specific agreements could be signed. After there is an exchange of views and the two sides see where they are and how they should work in order to arrive at agreements to be finalized in the US, what instructions are to be given and how much work needs to be done, then the two sides could agree on the date of the meeting.

The President agreed and said that they could go forward and try to achieve such understandings. He indicated, however, that in talking about the number of missiles, he had failed to mention one important factor, i.e., an agreement on throw-weight. It would not be good if there were agreement only on the number of missiles where one side had considerably more destructive power. As he had indicated before, this would be an element of an interim step on the way to complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Gorbachev noted that exactly one hour had passed during which they had exchanged views on the basic relationship, and if the President did not object, they might now call in their Foreign Ministers, and he would like to give the US side the Soviet side's proposals on nuclear weapons.⁵

⁵ In his memoir, Shultz wrote: "In their private session, the president, as host, invited Gorbachev to speak first. I learned from the president and our note taker at lunchtime that Gorbachev had told the president that he wanted to present new Soviet proposals as soon as Shevardnadze and I joined them. President Reagan had pointed up at the outset of his remarks the critical importance of human rights and regional issues. He also said, with respect to arms reductions, 'There is a Russian saying: *doveriyai no proveryai*, trust but verify. How will we know that you'll get rid of your missiles as you say you will?' Gorbachev had replied that he accepted strict verification, including onsite inspection. President Reagan had pushed for large cuts in the warheads on strategic arms, to 4,500 for ballistic missiles as compared with the Soviet proposed limit of 6,400–6,800, adding that even 4,500 should be seen as an interim goal on the way to the complete elimination of ballistic missiles. He and Gorbachev had confirmed to each other their mutual objective of eliminating all nuclear weapons, with parity and equality at each of the steps of reduction along the way." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 758)

The President agreed.

After a short interval, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze joined the President and the General Secretary.

The President explained to Secretary Shultz that the General Secretary had started by speaking of strategic missiles and had indicated that various figures had been given in Geneva. The proposals which the Soviet side has come with would be aimed at producing results which could then be finalized and signed during the next meeting between the President and the General Secretary in the United States.

Gorbachev said that if the President did not object, he wanted to present the Soviet side's proposals, which would then give a push to the negotiators in Geneva.

The President agreed to listen to Gorbachev's proposals.

Gorbachev indicated that in the basic exchange of opinions on bilateral relations, he had recognized an admission of the mutual ultimate aim of total elimination of nuclear weapons. This stemmed from what had been agreed in Geneva, i.e., that a nuclear war must never be fought. On January 15 the Soviet side had proposed a plan for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The US side had also made various proposals. Gorbachev wished to confirm that the US side should understand that during the movement towards complete elimination of nuclear weapons, it was expected that there would be equality and equal security for both sides at all stages of this process. Neither side should attempt to strive to achieve superiority.⁶

Gorbachev said that he wanted to begin with the area of strategic offensive weapons. In Geneva the Soviet side had proposed a reduction of these weapons by 50 percent. Since then, and at present, many different options have been floated in Geneva, but now he wished to say that the Soviet side is interested in radical reductions of strategic offensive arms by 50 percent and no less. In the year's time that had

⁶ Gorbachev continued in his memoir: "George Shultz and Eduard Shevardnadze came in, and I repeated in detail our proposals to cut strategic nuclear arsenals, which boiled down to the following: negotiations were stuck in endless discussions, the argument was going round in circles and getting nowhere. What was needed was a new approach. Our strategic nuclear stockpiles consisted of three main groups: ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers. Each country had its own armament structure to meet its specific requirements, but our overall strategic nuclear arsenals were approximately equal. We therefore suggested cutting each of these three groups by 50 per cent. It was the first time that the Soviet Union had agreed to such a big reduction in its ground-based ICBM force." He continued: "It was not meant to be as a one-sided offer, since the United States was supposed to cut by 50 per cent their major striking force—their nuclear submarines and their strategic bombers—in which they were superior to us." (Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, pp. 416–417)

gone by since Geneva the Soviet side had become convinced that it would be possible to expect large reductions in these systems.

Gorbachev continued that, unlike previous Soviet proposals, wherein the 50 percent covered all weapons reaching the territory of the other side, the present one concerns only strategic weapons, without including medium-range missiles or forward-based systems. This takes into account the US viewpoint and is a concession.

Gorbachev continued that since strategic arms formed the basis of the nuclear might of the two sides, it would be especially important to have a good understanding of each other's interests and to have equality. As had been indicated before, historically the composition of the nuclear forces of the two sides has been different. Nevertheless, in reducing these forces by 50 percent, the Soviet side would be prepared to have a considerable reduction of heavy missiles in answer to US concerns. He wished to stress that this would be considerable, and not just cosmetic. However, he would expect the US side to have the same regard for the Soviet side's concerns. One example of this would be the fact that there are now 6500 nuclear warheads on American submarines which are all over the world and which are difficult to monitor. More than 800 of these missiles are MIRVed. The Soviet side knows the great precision of US missiles, both submarine-based and land-based. Therefore, each side would need to meet the concerns of the other one, and not to try to back it into a corner.

Gorbachev continued that with regard to medium-range missiles, a great deal has been said lately between the two countries and in the world. Various predictions are being made even as the two of them sat here together. The Soviet side had analyzed this issue again, taking into consideration the situation in Western Europe, the views of governments there, as well as public opinion, and had decided to take a broad approach on this issue. Solutions ought to be found which would take account of the interests of the two sides, as well as their allies. Therefore, the Soviet side was proposing to have a complete elimination of US and Soviet medium-range nuclear forces in Europe. In doing so, the Soviet side has made the concession not to count English and French nuclear forces. This was a big step, since both quantitatively and qualitatively the possibilities of developing those forces were very great. But a compromise needed to be found, and therefore risks needed to be taken.

Gorbachev continued that with regard to medium-range nuclear forces in Asia, in the spirit of cooperation and in light of the concessions made by the Soviet side, the US should take back its demands about these missiles or give instructions to both sides to negotiate this issue, i.e., nuclear forces in Asia—both Soviet and US.

Gorbachev continued that with regard to missiles of less than 1000 kilometer range, the Soviet side proposed a freeze, coupled with negotiations about this type of weapons.

The President asked if the General Secretary was talking about shorter-range missiles, and the General Secretary confirmed this.

Gorbachev indicated that he thought that the President and the US Administration should appreciate these significant steps which the Soviet side had taken on this very important issue.

Gorbachev continued that the third item was the question of the ABM Treaty and nuclear testing. He thought that in order for both sides to have greater confidence in the ABM Treaty, which was of unlimited duration, it would be important to set a specific period for non-withdrawal from the Treaty in order to strengthen its basis, which would then help to resolve questions of nuclear arms. The Soviet side was proposing a compromise, taking into consideration the US approach, which sets a basic period of non-withdrawal and an additional period for negotiations. The Soviet side was proposing to have a mutually determined period during which there would be complete adherence to the ABM Treaty by both sides. It would be important to get a mutual understanding which permitted research and testing in laboratories, but not outside of laboratories, covering space weapons which could strike objects in space and on earth. He noted that the Soviet side was proposing not to prohibit current systems, permitted today, i.e., stationary land-based systems and their components.

Gorbachev continued that there should be a specific period of non-withdrawal. The US side had made a proposal, and the Soviet side had made a proposal. Now the Soviet side was proposing a compromise, i.e., a sufficiently long period of time, but not less than ten years, followed by a 3–5 year period for negotiations on how to proceed subsequently.

Gorbachev continued that there was another issue connected with the latter, i.e., adherence by both sides to the ABM Treaty would require the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons. It was clear that if both sides did not abide by this prohibition, it would open a channel for development of ABM weapons. The Soviet side was proposing to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement on this score.

Gorbachev continued that he wished to proceed now to the question of nuclear testing. As long as no large steps had been taken to reduce nuclear weapons, including strategic weapons, there might have been doubts on the part of one of the sides about the desirability of a ban on nuclear tests. But in the context of these proposals, there would be a sufficient basis to agree on a complete cessation of such tests. There have been negotiations on this before. The Soviet side was proposing to the US to renew either bilateral or trilateral negotiations (together with the British) in order to get agreement on a comprehensive test ban. During these negotiations, each side could do what it wished about testing, but the Soviet side felt that during the negotiations, the

sides could look at questions of verification, lowering of thresholds, decreasing the number of nuclear explosions, and the 1974 and 1976 treaties. Renewing the CTB negotiations would be a good beginning and would be helpful for quickly arriving at an agreement on strategic missile forces.

Gorbachev concluded that this was the package of Soviet proposals. He wanted to suggest that the two of them give instructions to the appropriate agencies, for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Department of State, to produce a draft agreement for signature in the US. In the context of these proposals, the Soviet side was interested in effective verification and was prepared to implement such verification by any means necessary, including on-site inspection, and would expect the same of the US side. Since these were very serious issues, in order to exclude the possibility of any misinterpretation, he said he now wished to pass these proposals in writing, in English, to the President.⁷

The President replied that the General Secretary's proposals were very encouraging, although there were some differences vis-a-vis the US position. The first one concerned INF. The zero proposal in Europe was acceptable, but the missiles in Asia should also be reduced, because these missiles could be targeted on Europe, and the allies would be left without a deterrent. After consultation with Secretary Shultz, the President said that instead of the zero option, there could be a maximum of 100 warheads on each side. In this case, there would still be a NATO deterrent left. But the main issue was strategic arms. The US side also wants to reduce them to zero. But there is a problem with the question of the ABM provisions. SDI was born as an idea which would give a chance to all of us to completely eliminate strategic weapons. The US side proposed to go forward in reducing the number of strategic weapons and to sign a treaty which would supersede the ABM Treaty.

The President continued that the US side believed that the Soviet side was also doing research on defensive systems. The US side was proposing in this new treaty to go forward with development, staying within the ABM limits, and when the point was reached when testing was required beyond the limits of the ABM Treaty, the US would go forward with such testing in the presence of representatives of the other country. So if the US side were first in developing such a system, the Soviet side would observe the test. If testing showed that such a defense system could be practical, then the treaty would call for the US to share this defense system. In return for this, there would be a total elimination of strategic missiles. A two year period could be set

⁷ Not found.

for negotiating this elimination of strategic missiles and the sharing of the defense system.

The President continued that the reason for wanting such a system was that the two of them would not be there forever. Perhaps in the future there might be those who would want to cheat or there might be a madman such as Hitler who would want to have such weapons. But if both countries had such a defense system, we would not need to be concerned about what others might do and we could rid the world of strategic nuclear arms. Such a treaty would be signed by both sides and would be binding on both sides for the future as well.

Gorbachev indicated that he wished to briefly reply to what the President had said. First of all, he thought that the President's reply was a preliminary one, since these were new proposals by the Soviet side which had not been put forward before.⁸ He asked the President to study them, and they could meet again to have an exchange on this. The things that the President had said now had already been mentioned on the level of the negotiators in Geneva. The Soviet side valued the work which the specialists were doing in Geneva, but at the present talks a push needed to be given to those negotiators, and it was for this reason that the Soviet side had made its proposals.⁹

Gorbachev continued that the Soviet side had proposed to agree to the US zero option with regard to medium-range missiles and was ready to discuss the question of the missiles in Asia. But the President had gone back on his previous proposals, and the Soviet side did not understand this.

Gorbachev continued that with regard to the ABM Treaty, the Soviet side's proposal concerned a very important instrument which needed to be preserved. The US side, on the other hand, wanted to renounce the ABM Treaty.

Gorbachev continued that with regard to SDI, the Soviet side had sorted this out and was not concerned about the creation of a three-

⁸ In his book, Matlock wrote: "Gorbachev was obviously disappointed that Reagan did not show greater enthusiasm for his proposals. 'We'll consider your reaction preliminary,' the Soviet leader said, explaining that he had made entirely new proposals while Reagan kept repeating the old ones." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, p. 221)

⁹ Gorbachev recalled: "Our far-reaching proposals seemed to have caught President Reagan off guard; he appeared confused, although we had suggested something the United States had always wanted us to do, i.e. a radical cut in our intercontinental ballistic missiles. But since this proposal was part of a package the American President apparently feared some sort of trick. His Secretary of State saved the day by saying that our approach was fundamentally acceptable. During the exchange of views that followed we managed to reach an agreement in principle on a 50-per-cent cut in strategic arms. The American delegation was clearly not prepared for such a turn of events, and we often had to interrupt the talks for consultations within the teams." (Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, p. 417)

tier ABM system by the US. It would have a reply to such a system. The Soviet side was concerned about something else, i.e., moving the arms race into a new stage and into a new medium, and creating new weapons which would destabilize the strategic situation in the world. If this was what the US Administration wanted, that was one thing. But if the US Administration wanted greater security for the American people and its allies, then SDI was dangerous.

Gorbachev wished to end his quick reply to what the President had said, but asked the President to carefully examine the new Soviet proposals and to answer them point by point, with indication of where US agreed and where it had problems. This was important for the Soviet side and he thought it was important for the US side as well. He noticed that it seemed to be time to end the meeting.

The President said that he wished to say one thing. The two sides would discuss these things after lunch, and the US side would review the Soviet proposals. But he thought that the Soviet side was refusing to see the point of SDI. If US research showed that there could be such a system, and if the US went forward with such a system in the presence of offensive systems, then it could be accused of striving for a first-strike capability, since it had both protection and offensive arms. But the US would forego this. The treaty he had proposed would prevent the deployment of such a system until there was complete elimination of nuclear weapons. At the same time this system would be available to both sides, and would not be deployed until there was a complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The President continued that the General Secretary might ask why, in that case, was there a need for defensive arms at all. And the answer was that the world knows how to make offensive arms, and just as we kept our gas masks after World War I in case there would ever be a temptation to use gas warfare in the future, such a system would be in place in case there was the temptation to secretly build nuclear missiles after the world had gotten rid of them. But this could be discussed further after lunch.

Gorbachev replied that a year had passed since their meeting in Geneva, and the Soviet side had studied the question of SDI very carefully and had sorted it out. He had indicated the Soviet side's view to the President.

Gorbachev asked the President if they should continue to discuss these issues in the afternoon, or go on to other ones.

The President replied that they should go on to other ones.

302. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 11, 1986, 3:30–5:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US Side

President Reagan

Secretary Shultz

Tom Simons, Notetaker

William Hopkins, Interpreter

Soviet Side

General Secretary Gorbachev

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

G. Tarasenko, Notetaker

P. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

The President recalled that Gorbachev had presented him with a paper that morning. He had not yet had a chance to digest it, and he would like to read Gorbachev a paper here, which had some suggestions at the end.²

Having listened to Gorbachev's remarks in the morning, we agreed that reductions are the highest priority. It is time for practical steps. He also welcomed from Gorbachev's remarks the focus Gorbachev had placed on ballistic missiles.

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Reykjavik Meeting—Geneva Materials 10/12/86–10/13/86 (2). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons. The meeting took place at Hofdi House. In his diary on October 11, Reagan wrote: "In the afternoon we had at it and looked like some progress as he went long with willingness to reduce nuc. weapons. At the end of a long day Geo. S. suggested we take all the notes & give them to our teams to put together so we could see what had been agreed & where were sticking points. They worked until 2 A.M." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 647) For the Soviet record of the meeting, see Savranskaya and Blanton, eds., *The Last Superpower Summits*, Document 29, pp. 181–191.

² In his memoir, Shultz recalled the preparations made during the interim between the morning and afternoon meetings: "I assembled our team in the claustrophobic quarters of our embassy's 'security bubble,' a small, vaultlike enclosure mounted on blocks between the floor and ceiling of the room in which it was installed. There weren't enough chairs to go around. I reviewed the morning's session and the Soviet proposals. Everyone was surprised. Gorbachev's proposals were heading dramatically in our direction. He was laying gifts at our feet—or, more accurately, on the table—concession after concession. The president joined us, joking. 'Why did Gorbachev have more papers than I did?' Looking at the transparent walls, floor, and ceiling of the 'bubble,' he laughed. 'If there was water in here, could we keep goldfish?' 'This is the best Soviet proposal we have received in twenty-five years,' Paul Nitze said. Richard Perle pointed out that by accepting the zero option in Europe, the Soviets had conceded a great deal to us. But they could simply shift those missiles to Asia for a time and then move them back to Europe whenever they wished. I dispatched a team to work on the president's talking points to help frame his responses in the afternoon session. Included in his responses, the president agreed, would be his suggestion that a working group meet that evening to review carefully what had been accomplished during the day and, possibly, to prepare some agreed documents setting out the progress made. Nitze, Kampelman, Linhard, and Matlock did not go to Hofdi House that afternoon; they used the time to prepare for the evening session." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph* pp. 760–761)

Reductions in ballistic missile warheads are central, the President went on. The heart of the matter is reducing ballistic missile warheads.

We had agreed to 50% reductions and proposed 4500 ballistic missile warheads, roughly half the current Soviet level. The Soviets had proposed 6400 to 6800, and as he had said that morning, he thought that was too high.

We had been prepared to talk about lesser reductions, but we preferred to talk about 50%, as Gorbachev had that morning.

We are concerned about heavy ICBMs, the President went on, and glad to hear the Soviets were prepared for considerable reductions in these systems. (This line was omitted in the interpretation.)

We are prepared for appropriate corresponding reductions in all ballistic missile systems—including in our sea-launched ballistic missile force (the sub-launched ballistic missiles), as the Soviets had suggested. Additionally, we need throw-weight reductions, additional sublimits and effective verification.

The President elaborated that the agreement should reduce throwweight to 50% of the current Soviet level, and that effective verification is essential to both of us, and should apply the progress made in INF and other areas to what we call START.

As part of such a package, the President said, we are ready to agree in other areas.

There should be limits on air-launched cruise missiles, but not limits on other bomber weapons. We are prepared to constrain ALCMs by including them in a limit of 6000 (the interpreter said 7500) on ballistic missile warheads and ALCMs—but not include other bomber weapons, gravity bombs and SRAM.

The President then turned to a sublimit on bombers. Bombers fly slow and face unconstrained Soviet air defenses. You cannot equate bomber weapons with missile warheads, and this was not done in past arms control agreements. But we can consider a sublimit of 350 bombers, thus bounding bomber weapons.

There should be an aggregate ceiling on bombers and ballistic missiles, the President said, and we can accept the aggregate ceiling of 1600 on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers the Soviets had proposed.

If we can work out such an agreement, the President said, it should not be held hostage to progress in other areas.

Turning to INF, the President said that with respect to Gorbachev's remarks on intermediate-range nuclear forces, he had to say he was disappointed. Gorbachev's most recent letter to him had indicated that although problems remain, we might be moving to closure in this area.³

³ See Document 280.

For example, in the letter Gorbachev had written to him that with regard to Soviet systems in Asia, “a mutually acceptable formula can be found and I am ready to propose one (provided there is certainty that a willingness to resolve the issue of medium-range missiles in Europe does exist).”

Gorbachev now appeared to be backing off this position, the President noted.

This issue must be dealt with on a global basis, the President went on. He had thought we had agreed to pursue an interim, global agreement. We both agreed on an interim INF agreement with equal ceilings on U.S. and Soviet long-range intermediate missile warheads in Europe, and an equal ceiling on U.S. and Soviet long-range missile warheads worldwide.

There should be no doubt, the President said, that we require a global solution.

We can accept the Soviet idea of 100 in Europe, he went on, if other elements are worked out. The Soviets had proposed 100 warheads on each side in Europe. If we can agree on the other aspects of an interim agreement, we have no problem with that number.

Verification is essential, the President continued. In Gorbachev’s most recent letter he had said that verification is no longer a problem. The President said he assumed that Gorbachev meant that he was prepared to be constructive in finding a solution to our verification concerns.

The President also said we need reductions in Asia. As he had pointed out, the Soviets had said privately that they have a formula to propose to help resolve this issue. It would have to go beyond the formula Gorbachev had used at Vladivostok,⁴ and also beyond what he had said that morning. The President stressed that he could not accept only a freeze in current Soviet SS–20 levels in Asia.

The U.S. had long called for proportional reductions in Asia, the President recalled. If we reduce to 100 warheads in Europe, and reduce Asian systems in the same proportion, the Asian ceiling would be something like 63. But 100 in Europe and 100 in Asia is acceptable. In the right context, we could accept that.

We need to address short-range intermediate missiles, the President continued. It cannot be deferred. At a minimum this involves limiting SRINF, including a ceiling on SRINF at least at current Soviet levels, with a U.S. right to match at whatever level, and the lower the better. The Soviets had suggested this. It was in their INF draft treaty. Reluc-

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 257.

tance now to constrain these short-range systems was troublesome, he said.

The President said he welcomed the fact that Gorbachev's remarks that morning had addressed short-range warheads and indicated a willingness to freeze Soviet forces in this area.

He would not accept a ban on Pershing IIs, the President went on. We could discuss the mix of Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles, but we could not leave the Soviets with ballistic missiles in their force while we had none.

The interim treaty should also stay in force until it is replaced, the President said. The Soviets had suggested this in their May 15 draft treaty, and we supported it.

Let's settle on 100/100 now, the President urged. We are getting somewhere. The Soviets had suggested 100 LRINF missiles in Europe. We have no problem with that, if the Soviets make comparable reductions in Asia. If they could not make a proportional reduction in Asia, for example to about 60 to 65, why not 100 warheads in Europe and 100 warheads outside Europe, with a concurrent freeze on shorter-range systems at the current Soviet level. The President said that the basis for an agreement is within reach.

On SRINF, the President went on, let's agree now to address it. Let's agree to instruct our negotiators to agree on constraints on SRINF missiles in an interim agreement taking into account the capabilities of these systems and the need for a nuclear arms reduction agreement to reflect equality between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Let's agree now on verification measures, the President continued. We think they should include a comprehensive and accurate exchange of data, both prior to reductions and thereafter; and second, on-site observation of destruction down to agreed levels; and, three, effective monitoring of the remaining LRINF inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection.

Let's put the duration issue behind us, the President urged. Let's agree to instruct our negotiators to resolve the duration question in a manner which ensures that the U.S. and Soviet INF missile systems remain subject to and constrained by a legally functioning treaty system while the sides negotiate further reductions in these systems.

Gorbachev asked which treaty. Secretary Shultz said an INF treaty, along the lines the Soviets had suggested earlier. The President commented we had gotten the idea from Gorbachev.

Turning to defense and space, the President said he had taken Gorbachev's concerns about the U.S. SDI program into account in his July 25 proposal.

First of all, he said, he wanted to make clear that his proposal recognizes that the ABM Treaty is a treaty of unlimited duration. His

proposal would establish a mechanism for the two sides to move together towards increasing reliance on defense. It would not eliminate the ABM Treaty. As a result of the negotiations he had proposed, some new provisions would take precedence over certain provisions of the ABM Treaty.

His proposal would enhance strategic stability, the President went on, while diminishing the burden we both bear of continuous modernization and expansion of strategic offensive forces. His proposal envisions careful management of a transition to a stabilizing balance of offensive and defensive forces. His proposal would also lead to the total elimination of offensive ballistic missiles.

The President continued that he was willing to discuss Gorbachev's concerns. They fall into two categories.

Gorbachev had suggested that our defense might be used to attack the Soviet Union. He could assure Gorbachev that it is not being developed for that purpose.

Some argue, the President went on, that SDI will inevitably lead to space-based weapons with an offensive capability against earth. That's not true. The quickest, surest and most effective way to strike earth targets is with ballistic missiles. We already have agreements banning weapons of mass destruction in space. If Gorbachev had additional concerns on this subject, the President said, we are prepared to work with the Soviets to resolve them.

Second, the President continued, Gorbachev had suggested that we might launch a first strike against the Soviets and use our defenses to prevent retaliation. We don't have that capability, and that is not our objective. But Gorbachev's concern had led the President to propose a treaty now which would lead to the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles. Once we do that, the issue of a combination of offensive and defensive forces giving one side or the other an advantage would not arise. We would have a less costly, safer and more stable relationship.

The President said we would thereby eliminate weapons which can strike in minutes and cannot be recalled. We would end once and for all the instability that results from fears of a disarming missile first strike.

Under his proposal, the President went on, defenses would reinforce the stability achieved by eliminating ballistic missiles. Defenses would also protect each of us against cheating or the ballistic missiles of third countries. The U.S. seeks above all replacement of offensive ballistic missiles with defenses in a phased manner that provides greater stability at each stage in the disarmament process.

We are even prepared to share the benefits of strategic defense, the President said. We will agree now to a Treaty committing to do so in conjunction with the elimination of ballistic missiles.

If we eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles, the President continued, our deployments could be adjusted accordingly. Our remaining forces would be far more stable. Neither bombers nor cruise missiles are suitable for surprise attack. They are slow and vulnerable to unconstrained Soviet air defenses.

We need to consider the timing and phasing of a transition to strategic defense, the President said. The principles which would guide the U.S. in a transition would be equity (the interpreter translated "equality") and stability at every stage.

The President pointed out that his proposal is a very significant step. It would require very serious negotiation, but he was convinced that it gave us our best chance to put the security of both our nations on a better, more stable and long-term basis.

With respect to Gorbachev's suggestions of that morning, the President said it was not clear to him what would be the subject of the negotiations Gorbachev had suggested. Would it be what we have proposed, he asked, including sharing the benefits of defenses and the elimination of ballistic missiles?

Gorbachev said he would answer that later.

Turning to nuclear testing, the President said he welcomed Gorbachev's recognition that there should be an appropriate relationship between the requirement and existence of nuclear weapons and their testing.

The President said we need essential verification improvements for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. His top priority in the nuclear testing area was to fix the defective verification protocols of these two treaties. If the Soviets could agree on CORTEX monitoring, or some other equally effective system they might propose, we would ratify these treaties, the President said.

We have told Congress we will submit them for ratification, he went on. As a symbol of the importance he placed on this area, he had formally advised Congress that he would submit the treaties for ratification when Congress convened early next year.

If there is no resolution of verification, the President continued, we will work out a reservation on ratification. He had further advised the Congress that, if the Soviets do not agree to the required verification improvements, he would ask the Senate to consent to ratification with a reservation that delays the effective time of such ratification (the interpreter translated "entry into force") until he certified that the treaties can be effectively verified.

Congress supports this approach, the President said. The Congressional leadership supports it. Gorbachev should be under no illusions that there is division on this issue within the U.S.

Let's agree to fix the treaties now, the President urged. Let us make immediate progress in the nuclear testing area by agreeing here to fix these two treaties. That would be a sound and logical approach. Then we will move beyond the TTBT and PNET and immediately engage in negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program—in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons—of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.

The President said he wanted to make progress. But Gorbachev had to know that neither a test moratorium nor a comprehensive test ban is in the cards for the foreseeable future.

Perhaps, the President concluded, we can see if we can find common ground based on Soviet ideas and our ideas.

Turning to risk reduction, the President said he was pleased with the progress we have made. Let's move to agreement, he urged. He saw no reason, given the progress we had made so far, why we cannot agree on the goal of signing a formal agreement to establish these centers when Gorbachev came to the United States.

Turning to compliance, the President said it is essential. Strict compliance with existing agreements is essential to make progress on arms control. He could not stress enough how important this is. His policy decisions regarding SALT I and SALT II were the result of Soviet non-compliance. And Krasnoyarsk was especially important in this regard.

In conclusion, the President said it appears that significant progress is possible. He proposed that they both put their experts that night. Perhaps they might meet at 8:00 right there in Hofdi House. They could discuss all the issues the leaders had identified: strategic offensive weapons, intermediate-range nuclear forces, defense and space, nuclear testing. If Gorbachev agreed to this proposal, the U.S. side would be represented by the same group that had discussed these issues this summer: Ambassador Nitze, Ambassador Kampelman, Mr. Perle, Ambassador Rowny, and with Mr. Adelman replacing the two negotiators who were absent.

Believe it or not, the President said, he had come to the end.

Gorbachev said that before he reacted, however briefly, to the President's remarks, which had covered a large number of issues, he had some questions for clarification.

His first question concerned strategic offensive missiles. He asked whether the President agreed to his proposal about 50% reductions in this type of system. Was this correct?

The President replied, "Yes."

Gorbachev continued that if he understood correctly, the President had mentioned 7500. This variant had been discussed in Geneva recently, but it involved a 30% reduction.

Secretary Shultz said the right figure was 6000. Hopkins said he had made a mistake and said 6000. The Secretary explained that this meant 4500 and 1500, with agreement to limit ALCMs.

Addressing the President, Gorbachev said they had been talking about one of the impasses the Geneva negotiators had not been able to end, concerning sublimits. He had a sheet of data on the nuclear systems of the Soviet Union and the United States. The proposal was to reduce these by 50%, and since this was so, he said, let us agree to reduce all the types the Soviet Union and the U.S. have by 50%: land-based, sea-launched and those carried by strategic bombers. The whole arsenal would be reduced by 50%, as would all types. The structures have evolved historically, and if we proceed to reduce it by 50% across the board, we will reduce the level of strategic confrontation. The structure will remain the same, but the level will be lower, and this will be clear to everyone. Then the disputes which have been going on for years about limits and sublimits will be superseded by 50% reductions. The level of confrontation will be cut in half.

He asked whether the President agreed to this.

The President noted that he himself had included gravity bombs.

Gorbachev said those were details, and Shultz knew this. The Soviet Union was proposing steps to meet U.S. concerns. This included the SS-18, the heavy missiles, which would be included in the 50% reductions too. Shultz was hearing this for the first time. We should act to untie the knot. It can be done. Otherwise Karpov and Kampelman will continue beating around the bush. We need to take political decisions.

He proposed a 50% reduction in all types of these weapons, Gorbachev repeated. Bombs and some other matters can be discussed as we proceed. If the Soviets saw that the U.S. was not trying to take side bypasses in order to gain some advantage, they would take steps to accommodate us. If they saw us doing that, they would say so.

The President replied that this should be taken up by the experts, if Gorbachev agreed to his proposal. He himself did not know all the numbers. But he did know that the Soviets outnumber us by a lot. If we cut by 50%, they would still have more than we do. Our number is smaller. But it was an interesting idea.

Gorbachev replied that this is not a matter for the experts. Passing over his data sheet, he said here is the data; let us cut this in half.

The President reminded Gorbachev he had said the idea was interesting. Gorbachev should give the U.S. side a chance. The Secretary commented that it was a bold idea, and we need bold ideas. Gorbachev agreed that this was what we need. Otherwise it goes back to Karpov and Kampelman. This was the kind of porridge we have eaten for years.

The President pointed out that the Soviet figures showed over 500 bombers for the U.S. In reality we had something over 200 functioning

bombers. The rest were old and getting older. The Secretary suggested that those might be candidates for cutting. The idea was an interesting one, and we would look at it carefully.

The President asked if he could keep Gorbachev's data sheet. Gorbachev replied that he was giving it to the President. Now the President had all their secrets. Otherwise, he saw no way out of the forest. But if he felt the U.S. side was trying somehow to outsmart him, it would be the end of the negotiation.

The President said this would not happen. He asked if Gorbachev agreed to his proposal for a meeting of experts. Gorbachev said that he did, and would give the instructions.

Returning to the question of advantage, the President recalled the time, after the War, when we were the only ones to have nuclear weapons. We had offered to give them up, to turn them over to international control. We could have dictated to the whole world, but we didn't.

Gorbachev said he would like to turn to his next question. He saw that the U.S. did not like the U.S.-proposed zero option for medium-range missiles. The President replied that he liked it a lot, but on a global basis.

Gorbachev asked what had to be done for the global zero option to be acceptable. The President replied that if we got rid of them globally, this would be fine, and he was all for it. But if they were eliminated only in Europe, and the Soviets retained a number of missiles supposedly targetted on Asiatic countries, but were in range of Europe and easily moved, we do not have equivalent systems. Zero should mean elimination of a whole category of weapons, for both Europe and Asia.

Gorbachev said that the U.S. had nuclear weapons in South Korea, on bases in Asia, and forward based systems there as well. He believed that U.S. concerns had been addressed: in Europe elimination of all medium-range missiles, a freeze on short-range missiles up to 1000 kilometers and then negotiations on them, and beginning negotiations to resolve the problem in Asia, and therefore the whole problem. The Soviets had set aside British and French systems. This was a concession. They had taken forward-based systems out. Why could the U.S. not take a single step to accommodate Soviet concerns, he asked. Their proposal was simple: resolve the issue in Europe, and begin negotiations to resolve it in Asia later.

The President said that we do not have ballistic missiles based in Asia. We have naval forces there, but both sides do, and the Soviet navy is bigger than ours.

Gorbachev replied that it does not matter to the Soviets if the bomb dropped on them is from a carrier or a base. The U.S. has bases in the

Philippines. If the President was saying that these could be discussed, the Soviets were ready. All these questions should be discussed. On Europe, they should instruct their negotiators to agree to the full solution of complete elimination, setting aside the British and French systems, freezing short-range systems and then negotiating on them. In Asia both sides had concerns, but negotiations should begin, and he was sure the issues would be resolved.

The experts could discuss this in the evening, Gorbachev said.

The President agreed they should discuss it. He reminded Gorbachev that he had talked about these issues several times, including in Geneva. Gravity bombs should be distinguished from missiles which could blot out whole sections of the earth in minutes. A plane takes time to get to its target. That should not be compared to a missile which can get there in minutes. He was willing to talk about limiting the number of bombers both sides can have. But bombers cannot be compared to a missile.

Gorbachev asked what would happen if we eliminate the missiles and bombers with nuclear weapons are still flying. The President said this indicated the importance of not stopping here, with these weapons. We needed to tackle conventional weapons too. The other question is what if the Soviets had SS-20s in Asia and we took ours out of Europe. The Soviets could then still reach targets in Europe. The deterrence is the threat of retaliation. The Soviets still could hit. We have bombers, but by the time they can drop the Soviets could already have blown up Europe with their missiles. That was not much in the way of retaliation. They would be facing extensive missile and anti-aircraft defenses. That was not an equal approach.

The President said he kept forgetting Gorbachev was not understanding before the interpretation.

Gorbachev replied that he did not think this was a logical argumentation. They were suggesting solving the problem in Europe first of all. They had compromised on the British and French systems, but those would remain substantial arsenals. Arithmetic is not enough. He thought the U.S. just didn't want to remove its missiles from Europe. If that was so, the President should just say so.

Soviet missiles in Asia could not reach targets in Europe, unless that meant the Ukraine and Byelorussia.

Gorbachev said his question was: "If we find a solution on Asian missiles, do you accept zero in Europe?"

The President said the answer was "Yes." We put our missiles there because of the SS-20s. We had been requested by our Allies to do so as a deterrence against a possible attack by SS-20s. It had fallen to him to make the deployment; the request had been made to the

previous Administration. He had seen maps that showed the SS-20s could hit, perhaps not England, but France, Germany, countries in Central Europe, and down to Greece and Turkey from Asian bases. Moreover they are mobile, if the Soviets choose to move them.

The President asked whether it wasn't true that they were revealing something he had talked about in Geneva. Before we can get around to weapons we have to find out what causes mistrust between us. If we could only get to that mistrust, there would be no problem about what to do with the weapons.

Gorbachev replied that the President was right. He had said Soviet missiles in Asia could not reach European targets. All the experts know that. But the President did not believe it. And in addition it was also true that any agreement would be based on very clear criteria: no missile could be moved, verification would be defined, and it would be strict verification.

Let our experts discuss medium-range missiles, Gorbachev concluded, the President's ideas and his ideas. But did he understand that if they reached solutions, the President favored the zero option?

The President replied, "Yes."

Addressing the President, Gorbachev asked how, if what we are really doing is beginning to reduce strategic missiles and eliminate medium-range missiles, the two leaders of these nations could destroy the ABM Treaty, which is the only brake on very dangerous developments in a tense situation. How can we abandon it when we should be strengthening it, he asked. If we begin reductions, we should agree that it is important for both to have assurances that no one is going to develop systems that threaten stability and parity, especially when they are reducing.

Gorbachev continued that it is therefore logical that both sides proposed to accept the obligation not to withdraw from the treaty for a number of years. Numbers were the only difference. The Soviet side had proposed ten years, during which large-scale reductions would be taking place. This would certainly be needed. Otherwise one side could believe that the other was doing something behind its back. So it was logical to commit to 10 years and limit work to laboratory research only.

Turning to nuclear testing, Gorbachev said his proposal was a compromise which covered the U.S. proposal too. They would direct their negotiators to begin negotiations for a total ban, but this would take time, and in the first stage of negotiations a number of issues could be considered: reducing yields, the number of tests, the future of the treaties. All would be elements of these negotiations. Then no one could say we were engaging in cosmetic negotiations to deceive

opinion. We would say we were beginning full-scope negotiations which would include all these things. It would be clear movement had begun toward a total ban, at some stage.

The President replied that this was interesting, and their people should take it up. With regard to the ABM Treaty, we believe the Soviets have violated it already by the extent of their defenses, what they have built. He himself thought that SDI was the greatest opportunity for peace of the 20th Century. But we are not proposing to annul the Treaty. Rather, we are proposing to add something to it with our proposals on defensive measures that both would have, and agreeing to share the benefits if these measures prove feasible.

Gorbachev proposed to arrange things as follows: he agreed to the President's proposal that experts meet at 8:00 PM to consider all the suggestions put forward in the two meetings between the President and the General Secretary.⁵ He would be instructing his people to look for genuine solutions in all areas of nuclear arms, including verification. Now that we are getting down to the specifics, the Soviets would be fighting for verification. They will want it three times more than the U.S. side.

The President said we are both civilized countries, civilized people. When he was growing up—a little before Gorbachev had been growing up—there had been rules of warfare that protected non-combatants, civilians. Now, with the ABM Treaty, we have horrible missiles, whose principal victims are civilians. The only defense against them is the threat of slaughtering masses of other people. This is not civilized.

He was proposing something to change this, the President went on. It was something to be shared. It was not for one country only. It would protect people if a madman wanted to use such weapons—take Qaddafi; if he had them he would certainly have used them. This would not happen in their time. It would be in someone else's time. But he asked Gorbachev to think about us two standing there and telling the world that we have this thing, and asking others to join us in getting rid of these terrible systems.

Gorbachev said his remarks in reply would be less philosophical, more prompted by the nature of what they had been discussing, which was practical.

The Soviets had proposed to enter a period of proceeding to reduce the nuclear weapons of both sides, both strategic and medium-range,

⁵ The group of experts, led by Nitze and Akhromeyev, met at 8 p.m. to focus on the details of the arms control discussions between Gorbachev and Reagan; see Documents 304 and 305. A memorandum of conversation of the overnight meeting is in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XI, START I, Document 159.

and to strengthen the ABM Treaty so they could have the confidence needed while reducing. They think the period should be for a minimum of ten years, with very strict compliance with all the provisions of the ABM Treaty. That was his first point.

The second point, Gorbachev went on, was that they were accommodating the U.S. side concerning the continuation of laboratory research, to enable the U.S. to see whether it wanted a full-scope three-echelon strategic defense or something else. This, by the way, was consistent with Soviet plans too, for the U.S. would not be able to deploy the full system by then, but only some things in it. Within that period both countries would reach arsenals that, while still huge, would be much reduced. During that period anti-missile defense would make sure that no terrorist, or lunatic, or madman could do what he wanted.

Gorbachev continued that he could tell the President that at present SDI was not of military concern to the Soviet Union.⁶ The Soviet Union does not fear a three-echelon system if the U.S. decides that is what it wants. The Soviet response will be not symmetrical, but asymmetrical. The U.S. had money, and could do things the Soviets could not. The Soviets had a different concern. It was to convince their people, and their allies, that they should be prepared to begin reductions while the ABM Treaty is being destroyed. This was not logical, and their people and allies would not understand it.

The President said that the ABM Treaty is a defensive systems treaty. The Soviets had built up quite a defense, and the U.S. had not. All the U.S. is saying is that in addition to the missiles covered by this treaty, here is something bigger, that we want the world to have. We are not building it for superiority. We want all to have it. With the progress we are making we do not need 10 years. He could not have said that a few years ago, the President commented. We do not think it will take that long. Progress is being made.

Gorbachev said that the Soviets are not going to proceed with strategic defense themselves. They will have another approach. He

⁶ Soviet interpreter Pavel Palazhchenko recalled in his memoir: "Space defense—'Star Wars'—was the most sensitive issue, a 'neuralgic point' for the Soviet Union. Many on the Soviet side thought that the U.S. SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) program could not be stopped, but they hoped to restrain it at least enough to prevent a full-scale arms race in space. There was also what turned out to be ill-informed concern that space arms—for example, laser weapons—could be used to strike targets on earth. (In Reykjavik I heard Soviet nuclear physicist Yevgeny Velikhov, who accompanied Gorbachev there, say that this was technically extremely difficult, and impossible from the cost-benefit standpoint.) Reagan was prepared with an elaborate explanation of his concept of SDI and of why it should not be regarded by the Soviet Union as a threat." (Palazhchenko, *My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze*, p. 55)

took note of the President's statement that less than 10 years would be needed.

Let us turn our experts loose to work, Gorbachev said. The two of us have said a lot. Let them go to work now.

The President noted that they had been so wrapped up that they had not touched on regional, or bilateral or human rights issues, with a view to developing instructions to moving these along. He proposed that an experts' group meet on these issues too. On the U.S. side it would be Ridgway, Matlock, Rodman, Simons and Parris. He proposed that they go to work that night.⁷ Tomorrow would be the final day to see if we can come close on things.

Gorbachev agreed there should be two groups. He would think about the composition of the Soviet group, and Shevardnadze would get back to Shultz about it. Both should start at 8:00 PM.

The President proposed that the next morning's meeting be moved up to 10:00 AM. Gorbachev agreed.

The President said he had one closing remark. Gorbachev had said the Soviets do not need SDI, and have a better solution. Perhaps both sides should go ahead, and if the Soviets do better, they can give us theirs.

Gorbachev replied that the Soviet solution would not be better, but different. He was sorry to say that with regard to sharing he could not take the President seriously; speaking frankly. The U.S. was unwilling to give the Soviets oil drilling equipment, automatic machinery, even milk factories. For the U.S. to give the products of high technology would be a second American Revolution, and it would not happen. It was better to be realistic. This was more reliable.

The President said that if he thought the benefits would not be given to others, he would give up the project himself. Gorbachev rejoined that he did not think the President knew what the project contained.

The President said he had some lists concerning human rights to give Gorbachev. Gorbachev said he would accept them, and, as always, they would be carefully considered.

⁷ A second group, led by Ridgway and Bessmertnykh, met to discuss human rights, bilateral affairs, and regional problems; see Document 303.

303. Draft Memorandum of Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 11–12, 1986, 8 p.m.–4 a.m.

PARTICIPANT

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>Soviet</i>
Ambassador Ridgway	Bessmertnykh
Ambassador Hartman	Dubin
Ambassador Matlock	Mikol'chak
Presidential Advisor Rodman	Shishlin
DAS Simons	Primakov
Sov Director Parris	
Mr. Hopkins (translator)	

Assistant Secretary *Ridgway* began the meeting by proposing that the sides agree on an agenda for the discussion to follow. She suggested that several outstanding issues in the areas of regional problems, human rights, and bilateral affairs be considered and that the group work to create an informal list of promising areas for future work.² *Bessmertnykh* responded that such a list would indeed prove helpful and the Soviet side had come prepared with some suggestions of their own. He began to read from a prepared text which listed several topics for further consideration. *Ridgway* remarked that the language from the Soviet text was surprisingly formal and “political” in tone. She observed that it appeared to be more appropriate for use as a public

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memorandum of Conversations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Reykjavik Conversation October 1986. Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting took place at Hofdi House. An unknown hand wrote “DRAFT” at the top of the page. Rodman also drafted a memorandum of this conversation on February 11, 1987. (Department of State, EUR/RUS Files, Political Subject and Chronological Files, Lot 00D471, Reykjavik Summit 10/11–12/86) In a covering note to *Ridgway* on his draft, Rodman explained: “I have put this together from my notes and from Hopkins’ notes. I have heard you had some problems with my additions. Please let me know, so I can put this in final for the files.” In a handwritten note, presumably in July 1988 when Alexander Vershbow became the EUR/SOV Office Director, *Ridgway* wrote: “Sandy—As you can tell by the date, this is OBE & should stay that way. We never had note-takers in the working group & then suddenly Peter R. turned up w/ this. It’s all skewed, short on things Peter wasn’t interested in etc. I never replied because I never wanted this to be official. I’m suggesting reading & tossing, or tossing & not reading, but it is not an accurate picture. Roz.” A note in an unknown hand at the top of the covering note reads: “SP—for deep file.” (Department of State, EUR/RUS Files, Political Subject and Chronological Files, Lot 00D471, Reykjavik Summit 10/11–12/86)

² In his book, Matlock wrote: “Both working groups convened at eight that evening, one in the ground-floor conference room in Hofdi House, and the other in the upstairs common room. Discussion in the *Ridgway-Bessmertnykh* group, in which I participated, went little beyond summaries of what had been discussed earlier. The discussion of human rights was devoid of acrimony but resulted in no concrete commitments by the Soviet representatives.” (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, p. 222)

statement or joint communique and not for use as an internal working document which she envisioned would result from this meeting. Ridgway then produced a text prepared by the U.S. team and read a few examples as alternatives to the Soviet document.³ After Ambassador *Dubin* jokingly remarked that he had attempted to acquire a copy of the U.S. text from Mr. Parris prior to the meeting, Ridgway agreed to exchange copies with Bessmertnykh.

The sides then adjourned briefly to examine the two texts. Upon reconvening it was agreed that SOV Director *Parris* and MFA Minister *Mikol'chak* would work together privately in the next room to produce a mutually satisfactory text which incorporated both U.S. and Soviet language.⁴

After Parris and Mikol'chak departed, Presidential Advisor *Rodman* began the discussion on regional issues by stressing their importance in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. He recalled the experience of the 1970's when these issues exploded in our faces and derailed other important things going on. He continued that today, when we seemed to be making progress in other areas, this was all the more reason to be alert so that these issues didn't explode in our faces again. This was why it was important to maintain this regular dialogue on regional issues even though it had been unproductive so far. Someday, when some of these issues were more ripe for solution, this channel might prove to be very useful.

Soviet representative *Primakov* responded that there was a misunderstanding which he always heard when he dealt with the U.S., namely, its attitude concerning the Soviet Union's posture on regional issues. He argued that the USSR is wrongly accused by the U.S. of relegating this question to a back burner. Such is not the case. Rather, the USSR is interested in maintaining contact with the U.S. about regional conflicts in some areas, and it would like to bring the Soviet and American positions closer together in certain other areas. He said the Soviet Union is aware that the two countries may play differing roles in various solutions to regional issues.

However, Primakov added the sides could agree on measures to help bring about agreements. Although at the present time arrangements are not being worked out to achieve practical steps leading to agreements, it would be possible in the future to achieve agreements which could help confine regional conflicts. He stressed that the Soviet

³ No text was attached. However, a draft text was attached to Rodman's February 1987 copy. See footnote 1, above.

⁴ According to Rodman, Ridgway and Bessmertnykh discussed "bilateral issues" at this point, reaching an "agreement on a set of joint instructions which the two leaders would issue to their subordinates for future work." See footnote 1, above.

Union is prepared to conduct consultations with the U.S. on acute regional conflicts, adding that it would be possible to have special contacts between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Department.

Primakov then turned to a specific discussion of the *Middle East*. He noted that the U.S. and USSR had good exchanges last summer and had agreed on many questions.⁵

He attempted to describe the Soviet Union's general approach to Middle East conflicts by stating that the USSR does not believe that separate deals have "justified" themselves. However, he pointed out that conducting bilateral discussions and making contributions to solutions to problems represent something different; they are not separate deals when such discussions and solutions constitute part of a more general solution. Further he stated that if political questions are not solved, it hinders reaching a total settlement.

Primakov asserted that the U.S. side was already aware of the Soviet proposal for an international conference on the Middle East. He acknowledged that such a proposal presented difficulties in terms of participants and issues to be addressed. However, these problems could be handled by a preparatory committee consisting of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Primakov stated that the USSR has had consultations on this question with many countries, and the majority favor the creation of such a preparatory committee.

He noted that the USSR has not considered a mid-East settlement excluding the U.S. and wondered why the U.S. would be willing to exclude the USSR from such a settlement. He acknowledged that there is a big emotional question involved in all of this, namely, Soviet-Israeli relations. However, he said he thought in the framework of a peaceful settlement, all such issues could be resolved.

Rodman responded that the Middle East was a classic case for the proposition that the key to a solution was a negotiation between the parties concerned. If the parties were very close together, an international conference might not be necessary; if they were far apart (as they were now), it was hard to see how an international conference would do any good. The U.S. was prepared to consider how an interna-

⁵ In his book, Matlock recalled: "Americans were somewhat surprised that Yevgeny Primakov, then head of the IMEMO think tank, was tapped to lead the discussion of the Soviet position on the Middle East. Up to then, all such discussions had been only with foreign ministry officials; it was most unusual that a quasi-academic would be authorized to present the Soviet position on a subject as important as Israel's relations with its Arab neighbors. Incidentally, Primakov explicitly denied, for the first time that I could recall, that the Soviet government was following a 'no war, no peace' policy in the Middle East as American officials suspected." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, p. 222–223)

tional framework of some kind could help promote negotiations in the right circumstances. However, this seemed premature at this point.

Rodman continued that the U.S. had other concerns about an international conference, some having to do with our analysis of the negotiating process and some having to do with our assessment of Soviet policy. Our analysis of the negotiating process told us that, while the final outcome had to be comprehensive—in the sense of covering all points—this did not necessarily mean it was productive to tackle all the problems at once. The Israeli political structure could not handle making major concessions on all fronts simultaneously. Progress could best be made one step at a time—and we had achieved several successful negotiations in the last 13 years. To attempt a “comprehensive negotiation” could mean delaying the attainable while waiting for the unattainable. Moreover, Rodman added that the U.S. had serious concerns about Soviet policy in the region. We saw no sign that the Soviet Union was prepared to put pressure on its friends for flexibility the way we are always expected to put pressure on our friends for flexibility. On the contrary, the Soviet Union seemed to align itself with the most rejectionist elements like Syria and Libya, and seemed always to oppose positive developments like the February 11 accord and the Hassan-Peres meeting.

Rodman continued that the U.S. had yet another problem with an international conference, i.e., the suspicion that one motive for some countries’ interest in a conference was to put pressure on the U.S. These countries may believe that within the context of a conference, the U.S. could be pressed to do things it might not do in other contexts. Rodman cautioned that this was a mistaken notion. However, he added that the U.S. is not against some kind of international framework under the right conditions.

Primakov responded by again citing the inadequacy of separate deals. The U.S. could conclude ten agreements in the Middle East, and enjoy them, but unless we solved the Palestinian problem and the problem of territory we wouldn’t solve the problem at all. He cited the May 17 accord on Lebanon. There was no way to assure Israel’s security except on the basis of a solution to the Palestinian and territorial problems, including a Palestinian entity. Primakov denied that the Soviet Union was interested in destabilizing the Middle East—there was no benefit to the Soviet Union from a prolongation of the conflict. He again urged a preparatory conference, feeling that it held great promise and had the support of the countries of the region.

At this point, Rodman turned the discussion to the *Iran-Iraq* war, identifying this as an area of possibly converging interests. He stated that the U.S. had noted Foreign Minister Shevardnadze’s remarks at

the UNGA calling for an end to the war and indicated that the U.S. would seek appropriate occasions to make the same point.⁶

Primakov replied that both the U.S. and the USSR are interested in bringing the war to an end. In general, neither side wants winners or a continuation of the war. He suggested that the Security Council's activity should be stepped up on this issue and added that the USSR is ready to coordinate steps with the U.S. on this issue. Currently, each side is operating parallel to the other, but there are no joint or coordinated activities. He noted that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had discussed this question and had agreed that such steps must be taken with great care.

Rodman then began the discussion of *Afghanistan* by pointing out the importance of the issue. He emphasized that the U.S. was not impressed by the token withdrawal just announced, instead a complete withdrawal was necessary. Rodman continued that a military solution could not be achieved, nor could any solution be achieved, without the support and consent of the Afghan people. A solution was only possible on the basis of a rapid Soviet withdrawal and self-determination for the Afghan people.

Rodman pointed out that the U.S. had no desire to keep the Soviets in Afghanistan in order to "bleed" them. On the contrary, the U.S. was interested in a political solution and would be delighted to get the Soviets out rapidly. The U.S. has no strategic designs on Afghanistan and has no desire for bases there. The U.S. objective is to see Afghanistan a neutral, nonaligned country.

Primakov responded that the USSR would like to find a solution to this problem. He asked whether the U.S. Administration was ready to examine the situation soberly and realistically. He said the USSR is deeply determined to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, but first, indispensable prerequisites must be established. In this respect, there are two possibilities: international guarantees within a short time frame; or, if that is not possible, then the need to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan—something that is currently going on. He said the problem of Afghanistan can be resolved quickly if there is a desire to do so. Soviet goals are clear: Afghanistan should be an independent, sovereign, non-aligned state.

The Soviet representative (Primakov ?) then turned the discussion to *Central America*, stating that the USSR is against involvement in the crisis. He stressed that the Soviet Union has no expansionist ambitions in the region and added that U.S. claim of "vital interest" in the region are unacceptable to the USSR. He argued that, by extension, any area

⁶ See footnote 5, Document 289.

could be declared of “vital interest” to a country and thus justify involvement. He concluded by stating that the Soviet Union totally supports the Contadora and believes that a solution can be worked out to accommodate all parties.

In reference to *Southern Africa*, he (Primakov ?) noted that a group of African states are attempting to solve their problems independently. He said that given the joint moral support of the USSR, the U.S., and the West in general, they could find mutually acceptable solutions to their problems.

Primakov next gave a brief survey of Soviet ideas about how to treat regional issues. He stated that the USSR believes that exchanges of views with the U.S. are quite constructive and useful and should be continued. Referring to the document which the delegations were preparing, he said that despite his desire to do so, he did not think it would be possible to agree on acceptable language in the area of regional issues. However, he repeated Soviet interest in a continuing dialogue and offered some operating “principles” for such dialogue. Specifically, he explained that dialogue should be conducted on the basis of respect for sovereignty and the right of those countries involved to choose freely their own social structure, paths of development, and independent policies for choosing their friends and allies. He said this would be a good approach for both the USSR and the U.S. to countries where regional conflicts exist.

Primakov explained that this approach would answer U.S. concerns regarding Soviet involvement in regional conflicts. He added that it is necessary for both sides to manifest restraint, to carry on an exchange of views, to have constructive consultations, and to take well thought out measures. He added that, where possible, the USSR and the U.S. should attempt to act in a parallel manner. Finally, he suggested that if regional conflicts become acute or suddenly flare up, there should be immediate communications between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Department.

In response to the U.S. side’s presentation on humanitarian and human rights issues (U.S. presentation not available for memcon transcript),⁷ the Soviet representatives responded that during the first dis-

⁷ According to Rodman, the discussion of human rights here was more extended, including the following exchange between Ridgway and Shishlin. “The common wisdom was that improved relations and increased emigration had a relationship—the Soviets’ own people have said this. Movement on this would enable us to have forward momentum in the relationship,” Ridgway stated. Shishlin responded that “Gorbachev had taken note of the points the President had made during the first discussion of human rights.” He continued: “the U.S. side would have to understand that the Soviet Union also had its own perceptions of human rights in the United States” and that “this issue would be present in our relations.” (See footnote 1, above)

cussion held between Gorbachev and President Reagan, Gorbachev had noted specifically where the President had raised the issue of human rights, i.e., at what particular moments the issue had been raised.⁸ First, the President had said that he was not anticipating a joint public resolution of this issue. Further, the President had said that the U.S. was not interested in interfering in the internal affairs of the USSR or changing its laws in some way. The President also pointed out that the U.S. is a nation of immigrants and therefore quite sensitive to this problem.

The Soviet speaker (?) countered that the U.S. side would have to understand that the Soviet Union also has its own attitudes about human rights in the U.S. Moreover, he said, the USSR does not think that the resolution of this question lies in immigration or immigration laws.

However, he suggested that the group not go further into details on this particular subject. He thought it would be more productive, if necessary, to think about some short formulation on humanitarian and human rights issues to the effect that the positions of the sides had been set forth and discussed.

After some further U.S. remarks (?), Bessmertnykh said that the USSR does understand this U.S. concern. He noted that laws and regulations are improving, pointing to the results of the Berne conference and the Helsinki Accords. He expressed the hope that the U.S. would deal with its own human rights problems.

However, he said that the USSR did not think that Soviet-U.S. relations should depend on how the two countries view each other's respective behavior in this area. He continued that if there is a desire to put Soviet-American relations on a solid track, this question should not be over-emphasized during the preparations for the General Secretary's U.S. visit. In reference to this he noted that at a recent press conference U.S. journalists had asked Soviet representatives about the Bernard Kalb case and also about "disinformation," which had been conveyed to the USSR and Libya. He noted that the Soviet representatives had evaded answering those questions.⁹

⁸ See Document 302.

⁹ On October 8, Bernard Kalb resigned as Spokesman of the Department of State over an alleged disinformation campaign related to Libya and Qaddafi. (David K. Shipler, "Spokesman Quits State Dept. Post on Deception Issue," and Bernard Weinraub, "The Ex-Spokesman: Bernard Kalb," *New York Times*, October 9, 1986 pp. A1 and A16, respectively) Kalb addressed reporters regarding his resignation during the Department briefing on October 8 at 1:18 p.m. (Telegram 317383 to all Near Eastern and South Asian diplomatic posts, October 9; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860768-0219)

He went on to say that thanks to the fact that the U.S. side had agreed to discuss all questions at the Reykjavik meeting, including arms control, Gorbachev had said the USSR is prepared to talk about humanitarian issues. However, he repeated that Soviet-American relations should not be dependent on those issues.

Ridgway asked DAS *Simons* to describe this set of U.S. concerns, but not in terms in linkages. Simons used the metaphor that a rising tide lifts all boats. Ridgway then acknowledged that any language on the issue of human rights would have to be bracketed on the document being produced that evening.¹⁰

At this point there was a break for coffee.

¹⁰ In his book, Matlock wrote: "Although the group made little progress in solving the problems discussed, it did agree on a list of cooperative projects that might be undertaken. Also, for the first time at a summit-level meeting, the Soviet delegation had explicitly accepted a framework for discussion based on the American four-part agenda." (Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev*, p. 222)

304. Editorial Note

At 8 p.m. on the evening of October 11, 1986, working groups from the U.S. and Soviet delegations at the Reykjavik Summit in Iceland met to discuss the various arms control issues raised by President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev during their meetings earlier in the day; see Documents 301 and 302. Paul Nitze, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters, who headed the U.S. group, recalled in his memoir: "The working groups began their work at eight o'clock that evening. I chaired the American team on arms control and Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, the chief of staff of the Soviet armed forces, chaired the Soviet team." Nitze continued: "We spent a large part of the first six hours of the meeting trying to pin down what 'fifty percent reduction' would entail. Akhromeyev explained that the Soviets proposed halving the strategic arsenals of each side 'category by category.' I was quick to object to that formula. That would mean unequal end points in those categories where one side or the other had the current advantage. For example, the Soviet Union's large relative advantage in ICBM warheads with a hard-target kill capability would remain. I thought the sides must strive for equal end results; this would require unequal reductions where the current levels favored one side.

"I suggested that we begin by agreeing on a final numerical ceiling of 6,000 on ballistic missile warheads, including both ICBM and SLBM warheads, plus long-range air-launched cruise missiles, and a 1,600 ceiling on ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers and then deal with sublimits within those equal end-point aggregates. After much discussion and no agreement, we moved on to INF, then defense and space, and then nuclear testing. We eventually came back to START, but we were still hung up on the issue of equal reductions versus unequal reductions to equal end-points.

"At two in the morning, Marshal Akhromeyev rose and said he was leaving the meeting—he then added that he would be back at three. Bob Linhard [Senior Director for Defense Programs and Arms Control in the National Security Council] and I hopped into a car and drove through the frigid Icelandic night to our hotel and woke up Secretary Shultz. He received us in his suite in robe and pajamas, surprisingly alert for that hour." (Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost*, pages 429–430)

In his memoir, Secretary of State George Shultz recalled: "At 2:00 A.M., sound asleep at my hotel, I was awakened by Paul Nitze. He, along with Kampelman, Perle, Linhard, Hill, and Timbie, crammed themselves into my small sitting room. The Icelandic chill pervaded the room. I put a sweater on over my pajamas and over that a bathrobe. Nitze was agitated. He saw a chance to make real progress, but Rowny in particular in our delegation objected to any show of flexibility on our part: the Soviets would have to meet our positions entirely. Nitze went on, 'On START, they would reduce by 50 percent in every category, but we could not agree to the unequal outcome that such a process would yield.' Nitze had insisted on equal numerical end-levels on warheads and delivery vehicles. We proposed a limit of 6,000 warheads and 1,600 delivery vehicles. 'On INF, Asia is still a problem.' Paul paused. 'Akhromeyev is a first-class negotiator. Communism is a flawed system and it will fail, but Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev is a man of great courage and character. If anyone can help the USSR toward its best aspirations, he can. But he is a good man in a bad system.'

"'Akhromeyev was agreeable,' Richard Perle said. 'Then they caucused, and Karpov, we judged, argued with Akhromeyev for departing from Gorbachev's proposal: 50 percent reductions, category by category, resulting in unequal outcomes.'

"'So the military man is reasonable, and the Foreign Ministry man blocked him,' I said with a laugh. That was just the opposite of the message provided in the CIA's 'intelligence' report of twenty-four hours ago." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pages 763–764)

Shultz's recollections mirror and may in fact be based in part on the handwritten notes of his Executive Assistant, Charles Hill. In his

notes, dated October 12 at 2 a.m., Hill wrote that Nitze gave Shultz the “papers we submitted” to the Soviets on the proposals. Shultz reacted: “But these don’t capture G proposal! These are our original positions!” Nitze explained to Shultz that he was “opposed by our own” delegation. (Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, Entry for October 12, 1986) Hill’s notes from October 12 are in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume XI, START I, Documents 160, 161, and 165.

Shultz continued describing this conversation in his memoir: “‘We’re supposed to reconvene at 3:00 A.M.,’ Richard Perle noted. ‘The problem is that 50 percent cuts across the board will leave the Soviets with more than we would have in every category where they now have more on their side.’

“‘We must stand our ground on equal outcomes,’ I told them. Everyone agreed. ‘They have put something new on the table. We shouldn’t be bound by the detail of our old position,’ I said. ‘Sunday’s discussion will be less precise, but potentially bolder, because Reagan and Gorbachev will be bargaining with each other, not with their hard-line advisers. What the president will need from us in the morning is boundaries of positions and words he should stick to.’

“On INF, I told the group, ‘try to get to the point where we agree in a precise way on everything but Asia.’ On START, ‘your job is to make use of—not just reject—their offer of a 50 percent cut in heavy ballistic missiles. Apply the 50 percent cut, then say that equality is their longstanding position. But we can’t seek strict equality, as there are asymmetries in the two force structures. You guys have got to get loose from just restating our old position. Get SDI deployment worked into the equation so that continuing reductions in offensive weapons are clearly the result of a continuing SDI program.’”

“To Nitze I said, ‘This is your working group, and you’re the boss. It’s not a meeting in which everybody has a veto. There’s no rule or requirement for unanimity on our side.’ So, shortly before 3:00 A.M., Nitze led the group back to Hofdi House.

“‘I’m really sorry to have disturbed your sleep, Mr. Secretary,’ Nitze said. ‘Who do you think Akhromeyev woke up?’ I laughed. Nitze went back to work. I went back to bed. But I tossed and turned, mulling over how to handle the coming day’s inevitable pressure—and potential.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 764)

Nitze continued describing the U.S.-Soviet meeting in his memoir: “When we reassembled at Hofdi House at three, it became evident that Akhromeyev had awakened his boss too and had received authorization to agree to equal numerical end-levels on warheads and delivery vehicles. It then seemed to me that this opened up a significant prospect for real progress toward a comprehensive agreement.” (Nitze, *From*

Hiroshima to Glasnost, page 431) Detailed discussion on START and INF numbers followed. The memorandum of conversation is in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, volume XI, START I, Document 159. Nitze explained that “the two sides found themselves far apart on space and defense issues. The Soviet team continued to insist that research and testing on SDI be confined to the laboratory. I suggested language for our memorandum to our superiors that would state the three issues on which we were disagreed: one, the length of the nonwithdrawal period, two, what happened after that period, and three, what happened during that period. Akhromeyev was reluctant to agree with that. I couldn’t even get an agreement on how we disagreed.

“We worked steadily until 6:30 A.M. drafting our memorandum for inclusion in a final joint communique.” Nitze continued: “As the meeting ended after more than ten hours of intense negotiations, I realized that large doses of mentally induced adrenaline had kept me alert all night. I found Marshal Akhromeyev a challenging negotiator with a clear, well-informed mind. I believe the dark, early morning hours found a mutual respect and admiration in our relationship that are rare in the annals of American-Soviet negotiations. He was tough, determined, but he was trying to get an agreement.” (Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost*, page 432) Several draft papers, possibly versions of the communiqué, are in the Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, President-Gorbachev Meeting, Reykjavik, October 1986 (5/5).

Nitze and his team went back to brief Shultz before the next morning’s meeting. According to Hill’s notes, at 7:10 a.m. Shultz said: “Damn good! (shake hands) what we came for.” Nitze then went into details, and Shultz requested “give me all the points as you came close so I can prepare the President.” (Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, Entry for October 12, 1986)

Shultz recalled in his memoir: “At 7:10 A.M. Nitze reported in. The working parties had agreed on START: big reductions in heavy ballistic missiles and equal outcomes of 6,000 warheads and 1,600 delivery vehicles on each side. And Nitze had achieved a critical breakthrough with Akhromeyev on bomber counting rules: a strategic bomber would count as one, no matter how many gravity bombs or short-range attack missiles were on board.

“‘Damn good! It’s what we came for!’ I said, and pumped Nitze’s hand.

“‘The last sentence on sea-launched cruise missiles took an hour and a half,’ Paul said. And they had come close to agreement on INF except for the Asian question.

“‘A terrific night’s work, Paul,’ I told him.

“‘I haven’t had so much fun in years.’ He beamed. ‘Akhromeyev is very sound,’ Nitze said. ‘Great guy. We had a good exchange. Karpov was fuming. Arbatov was terrible. On our side, Rowny was negative.’

“The long night’s work was coming our way. We had won a 50 percent cut in strategic weapons to equal numerical outcomes, and, on INF, the Soviets had held to their new position that British and French systems need not be included. ‘The president’s call for the total elimination of all ballistic missiles is the crucial point of our position,’ I told Nitze, ‘because the more they cut, the less need there is for a full SDI; and if they cut entirely, there is no need for argument about SDI. Gorbachev is making these proposals and will expect credit for them. Fine, let him keep making them. His proposals are the result of five years of pressure from us.’” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pages 764–765)

305. Paper Prepared for President Reagan¹

Reykjavik, undated

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

Summary

A negotiating team led by Paul Nitze met with a Soviet team headed by Marshal Akhromeyev for about 10½ hours last night to develop draft guidance to foreign ministers on START, INF, Defense and Space, and nuclear testing, with the following results.

The groups made considerable progress on START, but the Soviets made this contingent on their position on Defense and Space which would involve additional restrictions on SDI. The Soviets stuck to their unforthcoming position on INF, and refused to accept U.S.-proposed

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, President-Gorbachev Meeting Reykjavik—October 1985 (5/5). Secret. There is no drafting information. A memorandum of conversation of this overnight meeting on arms control is in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XI, START I, Document 159. Notes of this meeting by Soviet participant Georgy Korniyenko are in Savranskaya and Blanton, eds., *The Last Superpower Summits*, pp. 192–200.

language aimed at bridging the differences between the two sides on characterization of negotiations on nuclear testing.²

START

The group agreed that there would be an overall limit of approximately 1,600 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles consisting of ICBMs, SLBMs and Heavy Bombers; and, an overall limit of no more than 6,000 nuclear weapons consisting of ballistic missile warheads, ALCMs, and heavy bombers armed with bombs and SRAMs, with such heavy bombers to count as a single reentry vehicle. The Soviets repeatedly refused to consider sublimits on these systems, saying each side should be free to allocate its 6,000 nuclear weapons as it saw fit, although they did not preclude further discussion of sublimits at Geneva. The Soviets agreed that reductions would involve significant cuts in Soviet heavy missiles.

Both sides agreed that they will seek mutually acceptable limits on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), with our side making clear that the only feasible option we had yet identified was a declaration by each side of its planned nuclear SLCM deployments. The groups developed agreed language (attached) for consideration by you and Gorbachev today.³

The Soviets reiterated, however, that their agreement to such strategic reductions remains linked to an agreement in Defense and Space calling for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for 10 years and additional restrictions on research.

INF

The Soviets did not budge from the formula that Gorbachev gave you yesterday—agreement on zero/zero in Europe, with no cuts in Asia until a subsequent negotiation. After some discussion, they suggest a freeze on SRINF at the current levels for each side (which codify an advantage to them of approximately 120 to 0). The U.S. team was just as adamant that there would be no agreement on systems in Europe

² Palazhchenko wrote in his memoir: "By the end of the day, Reagan and Gorbachev had decided to ask their experts to consider the issues in light of their discussions. Gorbachev went back to the Soviet ship *George Ots*, where he and his team stayed. He met with his delegation." He continued: "Gorbachev asked me to read through my notes of his discussion with Reagan. I did so while everyone listened, and he commented from time to time on certain points. He then appointed Akhromeyev to head the Soviet group of experts that was to discuss the issues with the U.S. group, led by Paul Nitze, overnight. The next morning the experts reported that they had agreed on the general scheme of a fifty percent strategic arms reduction, which was more complicated than what Gorbachev had proposed but still fairly simple and nontechnical." (Palazhchenko, *My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze*, p. 56)

³ Not found.

without a simultaneous agreement substantially reducing SS–20s in Asia.

Nitze said we could agree to zero in Europe and zero in Asia—but if the Soviets wanted to retain SS–20s in Asia, we would not agree to zero for the U.S. in Europe.

We pressed them on duration of an agreement and on SRINF, saying we saw no reason why the two sides could not agree on these points while acknowledging differences over the question of SS–20s in Asia. Akhromeyev would not agree even on the question of duration of an agreement.

Defense and Space

The Soviets refused to consider any formulation other than their own—agreement to non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty [for] at least 10 years, and agreement to a ban on all but laboratory research on space-based ABM systems. The U.S. team suggested that foreign ministers be instructed to examine three questions:

—How can activities with respect to the investigation of advanced strategic defenses be synchronized with the shared goal of eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles?

—Under what conditions and in what general timeframe could both sides consider a transition to an increased reliance on advanced strategic defenses?

—Until those conditions are met, what common understanding about ABM Treaty restrictions on activity associated with advanced strategic defenses can be reached?

In response, Akhromeyev reiterated the proposal which Gorbachev outlined earlier to you, and insisted that without such an agreement, the 50 percent reduction proposal in START could not be consummated.

Nuclear Testing

There is essentially no difference between the U.S. and Soviet position except that the Soviets wish to portray the negotiations, which we both agree should take place immediately, as being for the purpose of prohibiting all nuclear testing. We introduced language (below) which laid out our step-by-step approach and made clear that the *ultimate* aim was elimination of nuclear testing in parallel with elimination of nuclear weapons. Even when we pointed out to them the extent to which this language accommodated their agenda, they insisted on their alternative formulation, which is unacceptable to us because it indicates no linkage between the retention of nuclear weapons and the need to test them.

The U.S.-proposed language was as follows:

“The U.S. and Soviet Union will begin negotiations on nuclear testing. The agenda for these negotiations will first be to resolve remain-

ing verification issues associated with existing treaties. With this resolved, the U.S. and USSR will immediately proceed, in parallel with the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, to address further step-by-step limitations on testing leading ultimately to the elimination of nuclear testing.”

306. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 12, 1986, 10 a.m.–1:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANT

US Side

The President
Secretary Shultz
Mr. Parris
Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)

Soviet Side

The General Secretary
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
Mr. Uspenskiy²
Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

Gorbachev opened the discussion with a quip: the Bible said that first had come the first day, then the second, etc. The two leaders were now on their second day; there was still a long way before the seventh. The *President* said that the two should be resting. *Gorbachev* agreed, as it was Sunday.

Gorbachev suggested that the session begin with a review of the progress achieved by the two groups which had met throughout the night before on arms control and non-arms control issues.³ After *Gorbachev* declined the opportunity to speak first, the *President* gave his assessment.

The *President* said that, with a few exceptions, he was disappointed with what had been achieved by the arms control group. With respect to START, the *President* understood that the sides were able to come to substantial agreement—with give and take on both sides. Of course, there had been substantial work in this area, which had developed a

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, Reykjavik Meeting—Geneva Materials Oct 12–13, 1986 (2). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at Hofdi House. No drafting information appears on the memorandum of conversation. For the Soviet record of the meeting, see Savranskaya and Blanton, eds., *The Last Superpower Summits*, Document 31, pp. 201–220.

² Nikolai Uspenskiy is the correct name for the Soviet interpreter. In several meetings, the notetaker used a variation in the name or mistakenly recorded the Soviet interpreter as Yuri Uspenskiy.

³ See Documents 303, 304, and 305.

sizeable amount of common ground. It was the President's understanding that the working group had been able to agree on a formulation for the outlines of a 50% reduction of strategic arsenals that should move the negotiations substantially ahead. Both sides should be proud of this achievement.

On INF, the President understood that the sides had discussed a number of issues, including SRINF, the duration of an interim agreement, and verification, and that they had come to the conclusion that these issues could be handled in negotiations. But the group had not been able to solve the issue of reductions of LRINF missiles in Asia. The last issue had been discussed at great length. The question was now fairly simple, not technical at all. We had made clear since the time of our initial zero-zero proposal—a proposal to eliminate all of the class of LRINF missiles, worldwide—that we required a global agreement. This was thus not a new issue for us. It was an issue that we could no longer ignore if we were to make progress. The President said he could not and would not accept a situation in which sizeable reductions in Europe, even to zero, were not matched by proportional reductions in Asia. The Soviets knew the reasons for this—the mobility of the SS-20 and the impact such a shift in the balance of SS-20's to Asia would have on our Asian allies. These were not new arguments. However, they were real concerns to the President. Our allies in both Europe and Asia fully supported this position, in fact they insisted upon it for their own security.

The President reminded Gorbachev that, in his most recent letter, Gorbachev had written that, with regard to Soviet systems in Asia, “a mutually acceptable formula can be found and I am ready to propose one, provided there is a certainty that a willingness can be found to resolve the issue of medium range missiles in Europe does exist.” This issue, the President continued, must be dealt with on a global basis. The President had felt he and Gorbachev had agreed to pursue an interim, global agreement. They had agreed on an interim INF agreement, with equal ceilings on U.S. and Soviet LRINF warheads on each side of Europe, and an equal ceiling on U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles worldwide. We could accept the Soviet idea of 100 in Europe, if other elements could be worked out. The Soviets had proposed 100 warheads on each side in Europe. If agreement were reached on other aspects of an interim agreement, we would have no problem with that number.

The U.S. had long called for proportional reductions in Asia. If we reduced to 100 warheads in Europe, and reduced Asian systems in the same proportion, the Asian ceiling would come out to something like 63. 100 in Europe/100 in Asia was acceptable. In the right context, we could accept 100 in Europe and 100 in Asia. The President suggested he and Gorbachev settle now on 100/100 and instruct our negotiators to work out details.

Gorbachev interrupted briefly to clarify that the President's proposal was for 100 LRINF warheads each for the U.S. and Soviet Union in Europe and an additional 100 for the Soviet Union in Asia. The *President* explained that the U.S., under its proposal, would also have the right to deploy an additional 100 warheads on a global basis. In response to a question, the President confirmed that those 100 would be based on U.S. territory.

On defense and space, the President felt he and Gorbachev recognized the basic differences in the two sides' approaches. For his part, the President recognized that Gorbachev at this point was not prepared to agree with him; but the President was not prepared to move from the course that he believed correct. Recognizing this, the President proposed that he and Gorbachev instruct their negotiators to focus on what the President felt to be three critical issues. Of the three, the U.S. believed that only the first two deserved immediate attention, but recognized Soviet concerns about the third and included it to respond to those concerns. The questions were:

—First, how could activities with respect to the investigation of strategic defenses be synchronized with our shared goals of eliminating ballistic missiles?

—Second, what should the conditions and timeframe be for increased reliance on strategic defenses?

—Third, until these conditions are met, what common understanding might be reached on activities under the ABM Treaty on advanced strategic defenses?

At a minimum, the President asked, could the two sides not agree to instruct our negotiators to address these three questions in the hope of using them to move our positions closer together?

Moving to the question of nuclear testing, the President said that here, too, he had been disappointed with the outcome of the previous evening's efforts. He could only hope that that outcome had reflected a simple lack of imagination on the part of one or the other side's representatives.

The President noted that there was agreement in principle on the fact of immediate negotiations, on the agenda, on the order of subjects, and on the ultimate outcome. The President understood, however, that the sides could not get agreement because of an argument on how these negotiations should be characterized. He proposed that the two sides simply record that they agreed to immediate negotiations on testing issues. We were prepared to note that the ultimate objective, which we believed could be reached in association with the elimination of all nuclear weapons, was the cessation of all testing.

We both agreed that the first order of business should be the resolution of the remaining verification issues associated with existing

treaties. With this agreement, it was possible to get started and characterize the negotiations in a way which met both sides' needs. But we had to agree on agenda and priority. Was it not possible for the two leaders to instruct their ministers to sort out the language quickly and record this agreement in suitable fashion.

In response to a question by *Gorbachev* as to what language the U.S. proposed with respect to testing, the *President* read from a paper prepared by the U.S. arms control working group the night before.⁴

"The U.S. and Soviet Union will begin negotiations on nuclear testing. The agenda for these negotiations will first be to resolve remaining verification issues associated with existing treaties. With this resolved, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. will immediately proceed, in parallel with the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, to address further step-by-step limitations on testing, leading ultimately to the elimination of nuclear testing."

Gorbachev indicated that the U.S. position was not clear to him.

Turning to the work of the second working group, which had addressed non-arms control matters, the *President* said that its participants had done a fine job. Their breakthrough on nuclear fusion was particularly commendable.

Gorbachev asked to give an initial reaction to the President's presentation, and to ask a few questions regarding the points the President had covered.

Referring to the President's expression of disappointment with the results of the arms control working group, despite the fact that it had labored for ten hours, *Gorbachev* said he had also been very disappointed. The Soviets felt the proposals they had brought to Reykjavik had been highly constructive in spirit—and not just in philosophical terms. They had made real concessions to the U.S. in a number of negotiations and had sought to establish conditions for reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons. But they had found that, instead of seeking as they had to give an impulse to the discussions, the U.S. was trying to drag things backward.

As *Gorbachev* had said previously, the Geneva negotiations prior to the current meeting had reached an impasse. New approaches were needed, as were political will and an ability to think in broad terms, to escape this dead-end. The Soviets had crafted their proposals with this in mind. They had expected the same from the Americans.

⁴ Not found.

It was possible to record some areas of agreement, e.g., with respect to strategic systems. Both sides had agreed to reduce by 50% all components in this category, both as to warheads and delivery vehicles.

INF was an issue over which the two sides had struggled for a long time. The problems were particularly difficult because they involved not just the two countries directly concerned, but their respective allies as well. The Soviets felt that their current position satisfied all U.S. concerns: Moscow had agreed to put aside consideration of UK/French systems; it had agreed that the problem of shorter range systems existed, and had agreed to freeze and to enter into negotiations on such systems. As for Asian systems, they bore no relation to the problem of reducing INF in Europe. Nonetheless, as the U.S. had insisted on linking European systems with those in Asia, the Soviets were willing to take Asian systems into account.

Gorbachev said he had developed the impression that the President and his administration's approach to arms control proceeded from the false impression that the Soviet Union was more interested in nuclear disarmament than the U.S. Perhaps the U.S. felt it could use such leverage to force the Soviet Union to capitulate in certain areas. This was a dangerous illusion. Such a scenario could never occur.

The President had mentioned the possibility of an interim INF agreement, Gorbachev continued. The Soviet Union could not accept such an interim solution. It was not interested in palliatives or make-shift solutions. But if the question of Asian systems could be resolved—not just put into the negotiations, but dealt with in specific terms—the U.S. could agree to zero systems in Europe and some sort of equal number in Asia. Was this a correct understanding of the American position?

The President described the U.S. view of the problem posed by Soviet SS-20's. As these weapons were mobile, they could be viewed as in two categories (i.e. for use in either Asia or Europe). If the Soviets were left with 100 systems in Asia after the U.S. had withdrawn its own LRINF deterrent from Europe, the Soviets would gain an enormous advantage. This would pose great difficulties for U.S. relations with its friends in Europe, countries with which the Soviet Union was also seeking to improve relations. In response to *Gorbachev's* interruption that it was clear nothing would come of this discussion, the *President* invited the General Secretary to make some suggestions of his own.

Gorbachev complained that the President appeared to have forgotten that the Soviets had already agreed to leave out UK/French systems—a major concern. How, Gorbachev asked, could the President speak of a zero solution in Europe when the Soviets would be obliged to eliminate their INF, while U.S. allies would retain their nuclear forces. Even though American allies were integrated into a common

military structure, the Soviets were prepared not to count these systems in order to reach an INF agreement. With respect to the possibility that Soviet systems in Asia could be moved westward, the subject should not even be discussed at the President's and Gorbachev's level. Any agreement to include Asian systems would be verifiable: if there were a single fact of Asian systems being redeployed, it could be made to nullify the agreement. Thus, the concerns the President had raised were not serious. If he did not want an agreement, he should say so. Otherwise, neither leader should waste his time.

The *President* said we did not see UK and French nuclear weapons as part of NATO. The governments of those countries had made clear their deterrents were for their own defense. If the FRG, for example, were attacked, these systems would not be used. In any case, Soviet central systems were an adequate counter to such systems.

Gorbachev inquired why, given the concern the President had expressed about the FRG, the Soviets should be any less concerned about the defense of the GDR or other Warsaw Pact allies. As for UK systems, when Gorbachev had been in Britain, he had recalled to Mrs. Thatcher a published letter from her to SACEUR. The letter had expressed gratitude for U.S. assistance in modernizing the British nuclear deterrent, and had noted pointedly that these modernized forces would make the Soviets sit up and take notice. Gorbachev had explained to her that this was precisely what he had done, so she had no reason to be displeased.

More seriously, he continued, the two leaders were not at a press conference. They both knew the facts, so there was no reason to speak in banalities. The Soviets knew what the situation was with respect to the integration of UK forces; they even knew how targetting had been integrated. The importance of the topic the two leaders were discussing made it necessary that they speak frankly.

The *President* pointed out that, in fact, the Soviet Union and United States were the only two real nuclear powers. Other countries having nuclear weapons had them basically in a defensive mode. The President envisioned that, if the U.S. and Soviet Union were to start the process of reducing their own nuclear forces to zero, and would stand shoulder-to-shoulder in telling other nations that they must eliminate their own nuclear weapons, it would be hard to think of a country that would not do so.

Gorbachev agreed. He felt, in fact, that the present chance might be the only one in this respect. Gorbachev had not been in a position a year ago, to say nothing of two or three years ago, to make the kind of proposals he was now making. He might not be able to make the same proposals in a year or so. Time passed; things changed. Reykjavik would be simply a memory.

The President remarked that the two were in the same situation in this respect. But if one were soon to be without authority, it was all the more important to use the time available to contribute something to the world—to free the world from the nuclear threat.

Gorbachev said that the proposals he had brought to Reykjavik left his own conscience clear. He could look the President in the eye and say that, if it were impossible to reach agreements, it was all right. But the situation in Geneva had been marking time, and no agreements had been in sight. Now the U.S. did not appear to feel obliged to take Soviet concerns into account, while the Soviets had met American concerns. Could the two leaders not agree as follows: U.S. and Soviet INF would be eliminated from Europe; UK/French systems would be left aside; there would be a freeze and subsequent negotiations on short range systems; and the Soviets would be willing to find a solution to the problem of Asian systems.

In response to the *President's* invitation to describe in greater detail what the Soviets had in mind for Asian systems, *Gorbachev* elaborated on the proposals he had just made. U.S. and Soviet systems would be eliminated from Europe. UK/French systems would not be counted. There would be a freeze and subsequent negotiations on shorter range systems. In Asia, the Soviets would accept the U.S. formula that there be 100 warheads on Soviet systems, and the U.S. 100 warheads on its territory. The Soviets would accept this even though it would require time to reduce several times, by an order of magnitude that *Gorbachev* could not even compute. As the U.S. insisted on posing *ultimata* and as the President was unwilling to make proposals of his own, the Soviet Union would accept this. After a prompt from *Shevardnadze*, *Gorbachev* added that this concession would be made despite the U.S. build-up in the Pacific basin. This should show how serious the Soviet Union was to reach agreements.

The *President* said he agreed to the proposal *Gorbachev* had described.

Gorbachev said that was good. He then asked when the U.S. would start making concessions of its own. The two leaders had gone through half the agenda and there had been no movement from the U.S. side. The next issue would be the test of the U.S.'s readiness to meet the Soviets half way.

Prefacing his remarks on the ABM Treaty, *Gorbachev* recalled that the two sides had agreed in principle to reduce strategic forces by 50%. Agreement had also been reached on eliminating LRINF from Europe; on freezing and subsequently starting up negotiations on shorter range INF; and on 100 Soviet warheads in Asia, with the U.S. to have the right to the same number on its territory. These were unprecedented steps. They required responsible further steps in the implementation

phase. This raised the question of verification, an issue which now became acute. The U.S. would find that the Soviets would be more vigorous than the U.S. in insisting on stringent verification requirements as the two countries entered the stage of effective disarmament. If it proved impossible to agree on such provisions, it would be impossible to reduce strategic and intermediate range weapons.

With respect to the ABM Treaty, Gorbachev expressed his conviction that nothing should be allowed to “shake” the ABM regime or confidence in an ABM Treaty of unlimited duration as deep reductions began to be implemented in strategic weapons. Gorbachev felt the President could agree to this proposition. As Gorbachev had said the day before, but would repeat, once one decided to reduce nuclear arms, one had to be certain that one side could not act behind the back of the other. So it was necessary to strengthen the ABM regime. The Soviet proposal for a ten year commitment not to withdraw from the Treaty would be a step forward toward strengthening the ABM regime.

In preparing their position, the Soviets had taken into account the President’s attachment to the SDI program.⁵ Thus, under the ten-year pledge, SDI-related research in laboratories would not be banned. This was not a strict limitation on SDI. The Soviets knew where the program stood. The U.S. had scored breakthroughs in one or two areas. Moscow knew which they were. But ten years would enable the two sides to solve the problems of reducing nuclear weapons, and so was necessary. The type of arrangement he was proposing, Gorbachev reiterated, would pose neither political, practical nor technical impediments to the President’s program.

The *President* replied that the U.S. had no intention of violating the ABM Treaty. It had never done so, even though, as the Soviets knew, it believed the Soviet Union had itself done more than was permitted by the Treaty.

With respect to the SDI, the President recalled that he had made a pledge to the American people that SDI would contribute to disarmament and peace, and not be an offensive weapon. He could not retreat from that pledge. The U.S. had proposed a binding Treaty which would provide for the sharing of research which demonstrated a potential for defensive applications. This would facilitate the elimination of nuclear

⁵ In his memoir, Gorbachev recalled: “We were aware of President Reagan’s commitment to SDI and suggested allowing continued laboratory research and testing in this area. But the American President insisted that the United States had the right to conduct virtually any kind of tests within the framework of SDI, refusing to set any restrictions. Reykjavik became the site of a truly Shakespearean drama. We could interrupt the talks, get back together and break up again. Success was a mere step away, but SDI would prove an insurmountable stumbling-block.” (Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, p. 418)

weapons. The President repeated that he could not retreat from his pledge. We would share the fruits of our research—and out of our own self-interest. If everyone had access to the relevant technology, it would be a threat to no one. The President did not see why SDI could not be made a part of the ABM Treaty. He was dedicated to the establishment of mutual defenses against nuclear weapons. Reaffirming once more that he could not retreat, the President noted that Secretary Shultz wished to make a point.

The *Secretary* observed that both the President and General Secretary had spoken in terms of eliminating nuclear weapons. In what Gorbachev had said a moment before, the Secretary thought he had heard something a little different. He wanted to be sure he had heard correctly. Gorbachev had seemed to link his 10 year no-withdrawal pledge to the length of time necessary to eliminate nuclear weapons. Was that in fact the link that the General Secretary had in mind? Would the schedule be linked to what he [*we*] would be doing on START and INF, so that, at the end of the ten years of which Gorbachev had spoken there would be no ballistic missiles, to set aside other nuclear weapons?

Gorbachev reaffirmed that this was the case. The proposal he had made last January had called for 50% reductions in strategic forces and elimination of INF in the first phase of a process aimed at eliminating all nuclear weapons. Subsequent stages would involve further reductions, including reductions by third countries. But major reductions by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. would take place in this period, and so the ten year period Gorbachev had mentioned was of decisive importance. He was not retreating from, but reinforcing, the proposals he had made earlier. If one were serious about reducing nuclear weapons, therefore, there was a need to reinforce the ABM regime. Gorbachev could not agree to anything which would weaken the ABM Treaty. His goal was to strengthen the Treaty, not revise it as the U.S. had proposed. There was no logic to such an approach. Were the Soviet Union to accept it, the world would conclude it was doing so purely out of egotistical self-interest. Gorbachev would be unable to go before the Soviet people or the world with such a proposal. That was why the 10-year commitment he was seeking was necessary if there were to be major reductions in offensive forces.

Research was a different matter. The Soviets had taken into account the President's concerns. They knew he was bound by the pledge he had made to his own people and to the world. Research would continue, and this would show that SDI was alive. But such work should not go beyond the framework of laboratory research. There could be testing, even mock-up in laboratories. And such efforts would ensure against the appearance of a nuclear madman of the type the President had often mentioned.

The *President* countered that in fact it would not. What the Hell, he asked, was it that we were defending? The ABM Treaty said that we could not defend ourselves except by means of the 100 ground based systems which we have never deployed. It said our only defense is that, if someone wants to blow us up, the other will retaliate. Such a regime did not give protection; it limited protection. Why the Hell should the world have to live for another ten years under the threat of nuclear weapons if we have decided to eliminate them? The President failed to see the magic of the ABM regime, whose only assurance of safety was the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. It would be better to eliminate missiles so that our populations could sleep in peace. At the same time, the two leaders could give the world a means of protection that would put the nuclear genie back in his bottle. The next generation would reap the benefits when the President and General Secretary were no longer around.

Gorbachev recalled for the President what he described as the long and complicated history of the ABM Treaty. It had not come as a bolt from the blue but after years of discussion by responsible leaders, who ultimately recognized the impossibility of creating an ABM system, and who concluded that, if the attempt were made, it would only fuel the arms race and make it impossible to reduce nuclear arms. No one in the Soviet leadership, nor he personally, could agree to steps which would undercut the Treaty. So on this point it appeared the two leaders would have to report that they had opposite views.

The next item, *Gorbachev* felt, should be negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. When the Soviets had pulled together their current position, they had worked from U.S. proposals to try to see how the two sides' approaches coincided. What was their line of thinking? The two leaders should direct their representatives to start negotiations on ending nuclear testing.

The talks would proceed for a certain period of time. During that period, each side could do what it liked, i.e., tests would be permitted. To take into account U.S. concerns, the Soviets were prepared to agree that the agenda for such a first phase could include: test yields, the number of tests, the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties (TTBT/PNET), and verification.

These were all U.S. issues which the Soviets had incorporated into their approach. In contrast, *Gorbachev* sensed from what the President had said that the U.S. was only considering its own interests. Specifically, U.S. proposals did not adequately deal with the problem of a comprehensive test ban. *Gorbachev* could not agree to a proposal which reflected only American interests.

The conversation, he continued, had reached a point where it was time for the American side to make a move in the Soviet direction on

the ABM Treaty and CTB. There was a need for the flexibility which would demonstrate whether the U.S. was in fact interested in finding mutually acceptable solutions to problems. Gorbachev had heard it said that the President did not like to make concessions. But he also recalled an American expression which seemed apt: "it takes two to tango." With respect to the major questions of arms control and nuclear disarmament, the two leaders were the only partners in sight. Was the President prepared to dance?

The *President* in response sought to put the U.S. position on testing in an historical perspective. For three years, during the late fifties, there had been a moratorium on nuclear tests. Then the Soviet Union had broken the moratorium with a series of tests unprecedented in their number and scope. U.S. experts had subsequently determined that the Soviet Union had been preparing for that test series throughout the period of the moratorium. President Kennedy had resumed testing, but because we had made no preparations to test during the moratorium period, we were placed at a severe disadvantage. President Kennedy had vowed we would never again be caught unprepared in this area. But in fact we were still behind. The Soviets had largely completed the modernization of their weapons stockpile before announcing their moratorium.

In any case, a comprehensive test ban would have to follow reductions in nuclear weapons. And there must also be adequate verification. Until now, the Soviets had been unwilling to address this issue seriously. Now that they had done so, the U.S. stood prepared to join them. But, in view of the historical precedents he had mentioned, the President felt Gorbachev would understand why, to quote another Americanism, we were "once burned, twice shy." Nonetheless, the U.S. had made concessions to Soviet concerns. The President again read the language on testing developed the night before by the U.S. working group, highlighting the statement's final sentence on a comprehensive test ban as an ultimate goal of negotiations.

Gorbachev indicated that the U.S. language was not acceptable to the Soviet side. In their own package, the Soviets had proposed that representatives be instructed to start negotiations on "banning nuclear testing." In an initial phase, these talks could deal with other issues. But the final goal must be to achieve a CTB on both military and civilian tests. Shevardnadze interjected that the ultimate goal should be stated first. In response to the *President's* remark that the U.S. language covered the concern *Gorbachev* had expressed, *Gorbachev* complained that the U.S. formulation suggested that it did not want to state directly the subject and goal of the negotiations. Instead, it appeared the U.S. wanted the talks to drag on forever. Under the U.S. formula, talks could go well beyond the ten years during which it would be necessary

to find a solution to the problem of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union would not help provide the U.S. a free hand to test as much and as long as it wanted. *Shevardnadze* remarked that acceptance of the U.S. formulation would call into question the ultimate goal of reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons.

The *President* said that perhaps there was some difficulty in the translation, but it appeared to him that the U.S. language met Soviet concerns. (*Gorbachev* quipped that *Zarechnak* could tell the President that we were indeed talking about totally different things.) The *President* asked *Gorbachev* if the U.S. formulation would be more acceptable if the final sentence were moved to the front of the paragraph.

Gorbachev replied that it would not. Perhaps, he suggested, *Shultz* and *Shevardnadze* should be tasked with working out a formula. The problem, he said, was that the U.S. was saying that there could be talks—talks identified as having the “ultimate objective” of a CTB—but focused primarily on other things. Work on a CTB would start only at a later stage. But we should make it clear that we had already “started” work in that area. What was needed were clear-cut *formulae* without side-tracks. What the Soviets were proposing, *Gorbachev* recapitulated, was talks on a CTB, during which testing could continue, and in the first stage of which ancillary issues such as verification could be dealt with. In a second stage of the same talks, there would be movement toward a complete ban on nuclear tests. As a lawyer, *Gorbachev* felt confident that such an arrangement would allow no room for side-tracking.

The *President* remarked that *Gorbachev* had touched on something very basic with respect to our problem with one another. *Gorbachev*’s remarks reflected a belief that the U.S. was in some way trying to attain an advantage out of hostility toward the Soviet Union. While it would do no good to tell *Gorbachev* he was wrong, since it would only be the President’s word (which the President knew to be true), the President could say that we harbored no hostile intentions toward the Soviets. We recognized the differences in our two systems. But the President felt that we could live as friendly competitors. Each side mistrusted the other. But, the President affirmed, the evidence was all on our side.

To illustrate his point, the President began a quote from Marx, prompting *Gorbachev* to observe jocularly that the President had dropped Lenin for Marx. The *President* countered that Marx had said first much of what Lenin said later. In any case, both had expressed the view that socialism had to be global in scope to succeed. The only morality was that which advanced socialism. And it was a fact that every Soviet leader but *Gorbachev*—at least so far—had endorsed in speeches to Soviet Communist Party Congresses the objective of establishing a world communist state.

Moreover, even when the two countries had been allies during World War II, Soviet suspicions had been such that Moscow had resisted U.S. shuttle bombing missions to and from Soviet territory. After the war, the U.S. had proposed on nineteen separate occasions—at a time when it had a monopoly on nuclear weapons—the elimination of such weapons. The Soviet Union had not only rebuffed such offers, but had placed nuclear missiles in Cuba in the sixties. The President could go on, but he wanted simply to make the point that such behavior revealed a belief on the Soviets' part in a world wide mission which gave us legitimate grounds to suspect Soviet motives. The Soviets had no grounds for believing that the U.S. wanted war. When Gorbachev came to the United States, he would see that the last thing the American people wanted was to exchange their life-styles for war. The President suspected the same was true for the average Soviet citizen.

Gorbachev observed that, with respect to Marx and Lenin, history was full of examples of those who had sought to overcome their philosophy by force. All had failed. Gorbachev would advise the President not to waste time and energy to such an end.

But to return to the present, and, Gorbachev noted, because the President had initiated "invitation" comments in this vein, Gorbachev felt obliged to say that the Soviet Union recognized the right of the U.S. people to their own values, beliefs, society. There were things Soviets liked about the U.S. and things they did not. But they recognized the Americans were a great people who had a right to conduct their affairs as they saw fit. It was up to the American people to choose their government and their President. Thus Gorbachev had been surprised when he had heard of a recent statement by the President to the effect that the President remained true to the principles of his 1981 Westminster speech. That speech had referred to the Soviet Union as an evil empire; it had called for a crusade against socialism in order to relegate it to the ash heap of history. What would the outcome be if the U.S. sought to act according to these principles? Would we fight one another? Gorbachev failed to understand how such a statement could be considered an appropriate "forward" to the Reykjavik meeting. In any case, he reminded the President, the President had initiated the discussion.

The *President* reminded Gorbachev in turn that there was a Communist party in the United States. Its members could and did organize and run for public office. They were free to try to persuade the people of the validity of their philosophy. That was not true in the Soviet Union. The Soviets enforced rather than persuaded. Similarly, when communist parties took power in third world countries, they quickly eliminated other parties by force. In the U.S., anyone could organize his own party. There was only one party in the Soviet Union, and a

majority of the Soviet population were excluded from membership. So there was a fundamental difference in the two societies' approaches: the U.S. believed that people should have the right to determine their own form of government.

Gorbachev indicated that he would be happy to have a wide-ranging conversation with the President on the moral, philosophical and ethical issues raised by the President's remarks. For the moment, he would simply note that the situation in the Soviet Union was not as the President had described it, and that the President's remarks showed that they differed fundamentally in their basic conceptions of the world. But the two leaders seemed to agree that each side had the right to organize its society according to its own philosophical or religious beliefs. This was an issue which the two might come back to at another time. *Gorbachev* had no desire to quarrel. He was convinced, in fact, that, while he and the President might have different characters and conceptions, a man-to-man relationship between them was possible. The *President* said he looked forward to welcoming *Gorbachev* at some point as a new member of the Republican Party. *Gorbachev* commented that there had been a profusion of parties in Russia both before and after the Revolution. These things were the result of historical processes. He commented that Secretary Shultz appeared to have a contribution to make.

The *Secretary* observed that it appeared there was the beginning of a joint statement on strategic weapons. (*Gorbachev* nodded.) On the basis of the two leaders' discussion, it should also be possible to formulate a similar statement on INF. (*Gorbachev* again nodded.) On Space/ABM/SDI, there had been no agreement, but the two sides had identified and characterized their areas of disagreement. These appeared not to deal with the question of whether or not to adhere to the ABM Treaty, since the U.S. was adhering, but rather over the period involved.

Gorbachev commented that, in the context of what had been agreed to on strategic and intermediate range offensive arms, a statement on adherence to the ABM Treaty would be necessary. That was obvious.

Shevardnadze asked if the approach outlined in the President's letter to the question of the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty remained valid. The *Secretary* reminded *Shevardnadze* that the President had called for a two-stage approach. That was still on the table. *Gorbachev* asked if that meant the U.S. did not accept a ten year period.

The *Secretary* suggested three points to describe where the two sides were. They could be cast in terms of the leaders' having instructed their negotiators to explore the following areas to bridge existing differences. The *Secretary* then read the three questions the President had read in his opening presentation.

When the Secretary reached the second point, on a “cooperative transition to advanced strategic defenses”, *Gorbachev* interrupted to point out that the Soviets did not recognize the concept. It was the U.S. which intended to deploy SDI. The Soviets would not make such an arrangement possible. Their concept was different. The Secretary continued to read the three points, noting that the final point was designed to respond to Soviet concerns.

The President, the *Secretary* continued, had made clear he would not give up SDI. *Gorbachev* had said he recognized that to be the President’s position, and that the Soviets had made an effort to accommodate it. *Gorbachev* nodded, adding with a laugh that some even felt he was trying to encourage development of SDI so as to increase the U.S. defense burden. Thus, as it turned out, he was on the President’s side, and the President had not even known it.

The *President* noted that, as the oldest person in the room, he was the only one who could remember how, after World War I, poison gas had been outlawed. But people kept their gas masks. And it was a good thing, because poison gas came back. The same could happen with nuclear weapons: if, after their elimination, someone were to bring them back, we would need something to deal with that.⁶

Gorbachev commented that the preceding conversation had convinced him of the veracity of reports that the President did not like to make concessions. The President clearly did not want to give any concessions on the question of the ABM Treaty—its duration and strength, or on the cessation of nuclear testing.

The *President* replied that he felt we had agreed on testing.

Shevardnadze asked if it would be possible to consider the period during which there would be no withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. It might be possible to reach agreement on this point. *Gorbachev* reiterated that a much more rigid adherence to the ABM Treaty, for a specific period of time—say, ten years—would be necessary to create the confidence necessary to proceed with deep cuts in offensive systems. Returning to the Secretary’s earlier point, he underscored that the ten year period would coincide with the most significant reductions on the

⁶ In his memoir, Palazhchenko recalled: “Reagan produced a relatively new line, that SDI was needed as a kind of ‘gas mask,’ the ultimate protection against nuclear weapons even if the superpowers decided to destroy them. Imagine, he said, a madman like Gadhafi having nuclear weapons and threatening to use them. With space defenses, we would be protected against this eventuality, he said. He even suggested that he would be ready to share Star Wars technology with the Soviet Union, to ensure that both countries were safe. In hindsight, some of Reagan’s arguments might not sound so bad, but in the circumstances of 1986 they appeared quite implausible. *Gorbachev* was particularly skeptical about the offer of SDI technology to the Soviet Union.” (Palazhchenko, *My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze*, p. 56)

offensive side. *Shevardnadze* pointed out that there was a question of principle: if the two sides could not agree on a period for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, it would be impossible to agree on reductions. *Gorbachev* added that the Soviets had proposed a package, and that individual elements of their proposals must be regarded as a package.

The *President* expressed the view that there should be no such linkage. The U.S., for its part, believed the Soviet Union already to be in violation of the ABM Treaty. The U.S. had not even built systems provided for in the Treaty.

Gorbachev interrupted to note that, on the first two questions (START and INF) it would be possible to say there were common points. On the second (ABM and testing), there had been a meaningful exchange of views, but no common points.

With that, the meeting could end. It had not been in vain. But it had not produced the results that had been expected in the Soviet Union, and that *Gorbachev* personally had expected. Probably the same could be said for the United States. One had to be realistic. In political life one had to follow reality. The reality today was that it was possible to reach agreements on some major, interrelated questions. But because there was a lack of clarity, the connection had been disrupted. So the two sides remained where they had been before Reykjavik.

Gorbachev said the President would now report to Congress. *Gorbachev* would make his report to the Politburo and the Supreme Soviet. The process would not stop. Relations would continue. For his part, *Gorbachev* was sorry he and the President had failed to provide a new impulse for arms control and disarmament. This was unfortunate, and *Gorbachev* regretted it.

The *President* said he did, too. He had thought we had agreements on 50% reductions, on INF, on considering what to do about the ABM Treaty, and on reducing nuclear testing. Was this not so? Were the two leaders truly to depart with nothing?

Gorbachev said that that was the case. He suggested the two devote a few minutes to humanitarian and regional questions, which, he pointed out, had been discussed by the second (non-arms control) working group. The President agreed, and the two briefly reviewed papers prepared by the working group the night before.

The *President* asked to make a few comments on human rights. He had no intention of saying publicly that he had demanded anything from *Gorbachev* in terms of such issues as family reunification and religious persecution. But he did want to urge *Gorbachev* to move forward in this area, since it was a major factor domestically in limiting how far the President could go in cooperation with the Soviet Union.

As he had told Gorbachev before, one in every eight people in the United States had family connections of some sort to the Soviet Union, so a significant part of the American population was concerned by such phenomena as the shut-down in emigration from the Soviet Union. We would continue to provide lists of people we had reason to believe wanted to depart. And if the Soviets loosened up, we would not exploit it. We would simply express our appreciation.

Gorbachev expressed regret that there was not more time to address humanitarian questions. There were some specific concerns he had wanted to put before the President. And he wanted to make clear that Soviet public opinion was also concerned about the state of human rights in the United States.

One question he did want to broach had to do with expanding the flow of information between the two countries. This was of potentially great importance. On the U.S. side, the Voice of America over the years had developed an enormous capability of broadcasting to the Soviet Union. It broadcast round the clock, in many languages, from many transmitters outside the Soviet Union. The Soviets did not have the same opportunity for their broadcasts to be heard in the United States, and so, to put things on an equal basis, they jammed VOA broadcasts.

What Gorbachev proposed was this: the Soviets would stop jamming VOA if the U.S. would help the Soviet Union enhance its ability to broadcast to the United States. Perhaps the U.S. could help the Soviets rent a radio station for this purpose, or intervene with some of its neighbors to facilitate the establishment of Soviet transmitters close to the U.S. In this way, both sides would be able to relay their points of view to the others' population.

The *President* pointed out that, in the U.S., we recognized the right of the individual to hear all points of view. The press conference Gorbachev would give after their meeting would be carried by the U.S. media. The same would not happen in the Soviet Union. In response to Gorbachev's request for an answer to his specific proposal, the President agreed to look into the matter on his return to Washington, and said he would be supportive.

Picking up on the President's remarks on the media, *Gorbachev* pointed out that half of the foreign films shown in the Soviet Union were American. Virtually no Soviet films were shown in the U.S. There was no equality in this arrangement.

The *President* replied that this was a function of the market, rather than any attempt to ban Soviet films. (*Gorbachev* commented that the President was trying to avoid a direct answer.) The U.S. government could not dictate what films private entrepreneurs showed. The President noted that he did not know how films were distributed in the Soviet Union, even though he used to make films. Gorbachev said

that here was a paradox: in an allegedly democratic country there are obstacles to Soviet films; in an allegedly non-democratic country half the foreign films were American. This did not tally with the view of Soviet society the President had described earlier.

The *President* saw the explanation to the paradox in the differences between private and government ownership. In the Soviet Union, there was no free enterprise. In the U.S., films were distributed by private industry. If the Soviet Union wanted to, it could do what other countries had done and form its own distributing company. If it could convince local theatres to show its films, fine. But the government could not order them to.

Raising another question, Gorbachev asked why recent tele-bridges between cities in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had not been shown at all in the U.S., but had been seen by 150,000,000 viewers in the Soviet Union. So much for the impact of private enterprise. The *President* reiterated that the government could not compel theatre owners to show films. But he pointed to the recent visit of the Kirov ballet to demonstrate that American audiences responded positively to quality Soviet performers, and that Soviet culture did, in fact, have access to the U.S. public.

Raising a final question in the "humanitarian" sphere, *Gorbachev* complained that, for the past 30 years, the U.S. had denied visas to Soviet trade union representatives seeking to visit the United States. During the same period, many U.S. labor leaders had visited the Soviet Union. Again, where was the equality of access? The *President* agreed to look into the matter as well as the question of what could be done with respect to Soviet films.

The President said he had two additional points to raise.

First, he could not go back and tell the American farmers that he had met with the General Secretary without raising the Soviet failure to meet their obligations under the bilateral Long Term Grain Agreement to buy the minimum amount of American wheat. *Gorbachev* replied that the President should tell them all the money the Russians had hoped to spend on grain was in America and Saudi Arabia as a result of lower oil prices. The *President* pointed out that America's oil industry had suffered as much as the Soviet Union's as a result of OPEC's pricing policies. We had had no hand in creating the hardships.

Second, the President wished to read a copy of a letter to Gorbachev from National Symphony Orchestra Director Rostropovich, seeking Gorbachev's approval for certain of Rostropovich's relatives to attend jubilee concerts in the West in connection with the maestro's 70th birthday. After the President read the letter, *Gorbachev* indicated that he had received it and responded personally, and that the necessary instructions had been given to enable Rostropovich's relatives to attend the celebrations. The *President* thanked Gorbachev.

Gorbachev noted that “the moment” appeared to have come.

Shevardnadze asked if he and the Secretary were to remain “unemployed,” or if the leaders had any instructions for them.

The *Secretary* said he had tried to formulate some language on INF and space, recognizing that there had been agreement on the one hand, and a lack of agreement on the other. After being invited by *Gorbachev* to proceed, the *Secretary* read the following passage:

“The President and General Secretary discussed issues involving the ABM Treaty, advanced strategic defense, the relationship to? of offensive ballistic missiles intensively and at length. They will instruct their Geneva negotiators to use the record of these conversations to benefit their work.”

Gorbachev said the statement was unacceptable, and asked that the passage on INF be read. The *Secretary* read the following passage:

.....⁷

Gorbachev said that that was clear. He suggested that, if the President had no objections, the two Foreign Ministers might see what they could come up with while the two leaders took a brief break. *Gorbachev* didn’t mind waiting an hour or two.

Shevardnadze remarked that it should be possible to come up with agreed language on nuclear testing. That would leave the question of the duration of a non-withdrawal pledge with respect to the ABM Treaty.

Gorbachev said that that had been covered in the discussion. A withdrawal pledge was necessary to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty so as to justify the risk of reduction of strategic and intermediate range offensive weapons.

Gorbachev proposed that, if the President agreed, the two of them meet again at 3:00 pm.⁸ The *President* agreed, and escorted *Gorbachev* from the room, ending the session.

⁷ Omission of the statement is in the original as indicated by ellipses.

⁸ In his memoir, Shultz wrote: “Finally, the two leaders agreed, after a rather testy exchange, to add one more meeting. It would begin at 3:00 P.M. They designated Shevardnadze and me, with teams of advisers, to meet at two o’clock to try to work out agreed language that captured the progress made so far and develop a better way to handle the contentious space and defense issues.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 767) See Document 307.

307. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 12, 1986, 2:05–3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	USSR
Secretary Shultz	Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
National Sec. Advisor Poindexter	Ambassador Karpov
Ambassador Nitze	G. Arbatov
Assistant Secretary Perle	Notetaker
Robert Linhard, NSC	P. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)
D. Zarechnak (Interpreter)	
Others?	

This meeting was decided upon at the very last minute of the previous meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, which ended at 1:35 pm.² To save time, the meeting between the Secretary and Shevardnadze was conducted in simultaneous (without using equipment), and consequently, I was able to take (some) notes on what Shevardnadze was saying, and none on what the Secretary was saying, since I was interpreting as he was talking. The following is the gist of what I wrote down and recall:

Shevardnadze stressed that the main thing on which the sides would have to agree was the time period for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. If that could be agreed, a formula for the talks on nuclear testing could be found, and everything else could be agreed. But without agreement on the period of non-withdrawal, there could be no document. The two sides had agreed on a 50% reduction of strategic forces, on zero medium-range forces in Europe, and a solution on Asia.

The Soviet side could not agree to less than a 10-year period of non-withdrawal. The U.S. had proposed 5–7½ years, and the Soviet

¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memorandum of Conversations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Reykjavik Conversation October 1986. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Zarechnak. The meeting took place at Hofdi House. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: “That afternoon, we were back at the negotiating table. Shevardnadze and I sat on opposite sides of a long table, each of us flanked by our delegations, protagonists in the long cold war struggle over nuclear arms and ballistic missiles. I opened our discussion with what I regarded as a solvable drafting problem: the issues in nuclear testing. I found Shevardnadze cold, almost taunting. The Soviets had made all the concessions, he said. Now it was our turn: there was no point in trying to perfect language on other issues. Everything depended on agreement on how to handle SDI: a ten-year period of nonwithdrawal and strict adherence to the terms of the ABM Treaty during that period. That was their bottom line.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 768)

² See Document 306.

side had proposed 15–20 years initially. Now it had come down to 10 years, and could not go lower.

The *Secretary* indicated that the U.S. could not agree to a 10-year period.

Shevardnadze said that it would take that long to physically destroy the existing systems. It was not accidental that the Soviet side had indicated a period of 10 years. But the U.S. side wanted to create new weapons within the 5–7 year period. The General Secretary was very adamant about this time period.

Shevardnadze mentioned that other nations would have to join the USSR and the U.S. in reducing nuclear weapons at a certain point, and the *Secretary* agreed.

Towards the end of the meeting, the *Secretary* proposed to *Shevardnadze* a draft text which had been worked out during the meeting by *Poindexter*, *Perle* and *Linhard*. The *Secretary* indicated that the text had not been cleared with the President, and *Shevardnadze* should bear that in mind.³ The text was the following, which was translated simultaneously to *Shevardnadze*:

“Both sides would agree to confine themselves to research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty for a period of five years, through 1991, during which time a 50% reduction in strategic offensive arsenals would be achieved. This being done, both sides will continue the pace of reductions with respect to all remaining offensive ballistic missiles with the goal of the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by the end of a second five-year period. As long as these reductions continue at the appropriate pace, the same restrictions will continue to apply. At the end of the ten-year period, with all offensive ballistic missiles eliminated, either side would be free to introduce defenses.”

³ In his memoir, Shultz wrote: “Bob Linhard, an air force colonel and arms control expert assigned to the NSC staff, with Perle looking over his shoulder, was scribbling away on a draft, which he then passed to the other American delegates, who one by one nodded in assent. Then Poindexter passed it to me. I read the draft carefully. Linhard had combined in an interesting way ideas we had put forward earlier. Richard Perle had tried out something close to this on me before we came to Reykjavik. Poindexter had suggested to the president during our private dinner the night before, reflecting our feeling that something bold from us might be called for, that we should consider using in a dramatic way Weinberger’s idea of eliminating ballistic missiles. The president had not objected. I said to *Shevardnadze*, ‘I would like to explore with you an idea that I have not discussed with the president, but please hear me out. This is an effort by some of us here to break the impasse. I don’t know how the president will react to it. If, after we break, you hear some pounding in our area, you’ll know that is the president knocking my head against the wall.’” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 768)

Shevardnadze seemed not to have any problems with the first parts of the proposal, but immediately seized upon the last sentence, and was very critical of it. The meeting ended as this was being discussed.⁴

⁴ Shultz continued: “Shevardnadze immediately questioned why we would want the right to deploy defenses at the end of ten years. By that time, it was almost 3:00 P.M., and the leaders had returned to Hofdi House. Each side caucused. President Reagan was entirely comfortable with the Linhard idea. He regarded it as his own idea dressed up in the lingo of arms control. His most ardently held goal as president was his desire to work to rid the American people of the threat of annihilation from ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads. The caucus on each side proceeded feverishly, delaying the start of our afternoon meeting until 3:25.” (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 769)

308. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Reykjavik, October 12, 1986, 3:25–4:30 p.m. and 5:30–6:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S. Side

President Reagan
Secretary Shultz
Tom Simons, Notetaker
Dimitry Zarechnak, Interpreter

Soviet Side

General Secretary Gorbachev
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
P. Palazhchenko, Notetaker
N. Uspenskiy,² Interpreter

Introductory Explanation

The President and Gorbachev had arrived for this final meeting at 3:00 PM. For an hour before that, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had discussed language concerning arms control.³ When

¹ Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, October 1986. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on October 15. The meeting took place at Hofdi House. In his October 12 diary entry, Reagan wrote: “Final day & it turned into an all day one even though we’d been scheduled to fly out in early afternoon. Our teams had given us an agreement to eliminate entirely all nuc. devices over a 10 yr. pd. We would research & develop S.D.I. during 10 yrs. then deploy & I offered to share with Soviets the system. This began the showdown. He wanted language that would have killed S.D.I. The price was high but I wouldn’t sell & that’s how the day ended.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, p. 647) For the Soviet record of the meeting, see Savranskaya and Blanton, eds., *The Last Superpower Summits*, Document 33, pp. 228–234.

² Nikolai Uspensky is the correct name for the Soviet interpreter. In several meetings, the notetaker used a variation in the name or mistakenly recorded the Soviet interpreter as Yuri Uspensky.

³ See Document 307.

the President and Gorbachev arrived, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister informed them, separately, about their discussions. The President and Gorbachev then began their meeting, twenty minutes after the hour.

Gorbachev began by reading a counterproposal of the Soviet side, just worked out, based on the text which Secretary Shultz had transmitted to Shevardnadze, *ad referendum*, during their meeting between 2:00 and 3:00 PM. The text of the U.S. proposal, as read by the Secretary to Shevardnadze, had been as follows:

Both sides would agree to confine themselves to research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty for a period of five years, through 1991, during which time a 50% reduction in strategic offensive arsenals would be achieved. This being done, both sides will continue the pace of reductions with respect to all remaining offensive ballistic missiles with the goal of the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by the end of a second five-year period. As long as these reductions continue at the appropriate pace, the same restrictions will continue to apply. At the end of the ten-year period, with all offensive ballistic missiles eliminated, either side would be free to introduce defenses.

In introducing his counterproposal, *Gorbachev* began by saying that it incorporated the positions of the U.S. and Soviet sides and also strengthened the ABM Treaty, while drastically reducing nuclear arms. The counterproposal was as follows:

The USSR and the United States undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions. The testing in space of all space components of anti-ballistic missile defense is prohibited, except research and testing conducted in laboratories. Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus by the end of 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent. During the following five years of that period, the remaining 50 percent of the two sides' strategic offensive arms shall be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996, the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated.

Gorbachev said this contained elements of both the Soviet and the U.S. proposals. The Soviets were prepared to agree that day to confirm the situation as it exists with the ABM Treaty and to enrich it by the commitment to eliminate strategic offensive weapons.

The President said this seemed only slightly different from the U.S. position. *The Secretary* noted that there were indeed differences.

The President said he had the following proposal. (He then read the U.S. proposal cited above, under *Introductory Explanation*.)

Gorbachev said his view was that the Soviets had moved forward by adopting the periodization proposed by the U.S.—two five-year periods—while strengthening the ABM Treaty and linking strengthening the ABM Treaty with reductions. With regard to the U.S. side's formula, it does not satisfy Soviet requirements. The Soviets' main objective, for the period when we are pursuing deep reductions, is to strengthen the ABM Treaty regime and not to undermine it. He would thus once again ask the U.S. side to meet this minimal requirement. Their proposal was intended to assure that today's ABM Treaty is confirmed and strengthened, with secure obligations that for ten years it will not be gone around, that there will be no deployment of systems in space, as we go through deep reductions to elimination of offensive weapons.

Gorbachev said he wanted to stress that the ban would not be on research and testing in laboratories. They would be confined to laboratories, but this would open opportunities for both the U.S. and Soviet sides to do all the necessary research in the field of space systems such as SDI. It would not undermine SDI, but would put it in a certain framework. He asked the President for an agreement that met these requirements.

The President said that we had wanted to meet the Soviet need for ten years, and we had done so. He asked why there should be any restrictions beyond that period, when both sides will have gotten what they claim they want—the elimination of offensive missiles. Why impose restrictions beyond the ten-year period, he asked.

Gorbachev said this was not something that needed to be put down on paper.

The President said he did not see what the basic difference was, unless it was the interpretation of the Treaty.

Gorbachev said that with regard to his proposal he did not know why it could not be accepted. After ten years the two sides could find out what the solutions were through talks. The solution would not necessarily be SDI. The U.S. might find it was SDI, and the Soviets might find it was something else. He didn't see why we need to sign on blindly to SDI at this point. Thus the Soviets had come up with a formula that meets this: in the next several years after the ten-year period the two sides would find solutions in this field in negotiations. This was a broad formula that after ten years the U.S. could continue SDI if it wanted. If the U.S. wanted, this could be discussed in negotiations, after the ten years. Why pledge to SDI right now, he asked.

The President replied that he assumed both sides agreed that verification would assure that neither had ballistic missiles after the ten years. Isn't it necessary to pledge something to assure a defense

[against] someone who might come along and want to redevelop nuclear missiles, he asked.

Gorbachev said that at least it was the Soviet view that for ten years, while we proceed to the unique historical task of eliminating nuclear forces, we should strengthen the ABM Treaty regime. Why should we create other problems whose prospects are dim and whose consequences are unknown, that leave one side in doubt about reducing nuclear weapons while the other side retains them under the guise of defensive weapons. Why burden agreement by these weights? It was hard enough to come to this agreement. That is why they link reductions to doing without defensive systems for ten years. Afterwards we can discuss them. But during the ten years there should be only laboratory research. We can see what the situation is while we eliminate offensive weapons, and then discuss what [comes] next after that. It is comprehensible and logical to retain the Treaty. The U.S. side would be permitted laboratory research, and of course the Soviet side would too. In the U.S. case this would mean SDI. The Soviets were not trying to bury SDI.

The President said the Soviets had asked for ten years, and we had given ten and a half, because after ten years we would have to give the six-month withdrawal notice. During that period both sides would be able to do the research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. If they then decide to go forward with defenses, what objection can there be unless something is being hidden? This provides protection for the future. We will make it available to the Soviet side if it wants it.

If the Soviets felt that strongly about strengthening the ABM Treaty, why didn't they get rid of Krasnoyarsk and the whole defense structure they have built around their capital, the President asked. They have a big defense structure and we have none. It is a peculiar fact that we do not have a single defense against a nuclear attack.

Gorbachev again asked that the President look at the Soviet proposal, which, he said, incorporated both the U.S. and the Soviet point of view. If it were acceptable, the Soviet side would be prepared to sign off on it.

At this point *the Secretary* asked Simons to type up the Soviet proposal, and shortly thereafter Palazhchenko went to dictate an English translation of it to Simons.

The President said that he thought the two sides were very close to an agreement.

Gorbachev noted that an addition should be made to the text which the Soviet side had just transmitted to the effect that during the next few years after the ten-year period the two sides should negotiate a mutually acceptable solution concerning their future course of action.

The U.S. side feels that this should be SDI. The Soviet side might want something else. But the Soviet formula would permit finding a mutually acceptable solution for future activity after the ten-year period. Why would this not be satisfactory to the U.S.

The President replied that if both sides had completely eliminated nuclear weapons and there was no longer any threat, why would there be any concern if one side built a safeguard, a defensive system against non-existent weapons, in case there might be a need for it in the future? The President had a different picture—perhaps after the ten-year period the Soviet side would want to build new missiles, and would not want the U.S. to have defenses against them. But he preferred to see a different formula. Ten years from now he would be a very old man. He and Gorbachev would come to Iceland and each of them would bring the last nuclear missile from each country with them. Then they would give a tremendous party for the whole world.

Gorbachev interjected that he thought the two sides were close to reaching a common formula. He did not think the U.S. should suspect the Soviet Union of having evil designs. If it had such designs, it would not have gone so far in proposing reductions of strategic and medium-range missiles.

The President continued to describe his vision of their meeting in Iceland ten years from now. He would be very old by then and Gorbachev would not recognize him. The President would say, "Hello, Mikhail." And Gorbachev would say, "Ron, is it you?" And then they would destroy the last missiles.

Gorbachev replied that he did not know if we would live another ten years.

The President said he was counting on living that long.

Gorbachev said that the President had gotten past the dangerous period and would now live to be 100, but in his case he was in the most dangerous period of a man's life, especially after negotiating with the President, who was sapping all the strength he had. He had heard that the President did not like to make concessions and wanted only to come out a winner. But he thought both sides ought to be winners. *The President* remarked that he would not live to 100 if he had to worry every day about being hit by a Soviet missile.

Gorbachev replied that they had agreed to eliminate them.

The President repeated that both sides had gotten good results, i.e., a 50% reduction in the first stage and total elimination in the second. Gorbachev had pledged to his people back home that he would get a ten-year period, and the President had pledged that he would not give up SDI. He had already agreed to delaying SDI deployment, but he could go back and say that he had not given up SDI, and Gorbachev

could say that he had gotten the ten-year period. The President thought that the U.S. people and the Soviet people would cheer that they had gotten rid of nuclear missiles, and would be happy for the two of them.

Gorbachev reiterated that what the Soviets said about research and testing in the laboratory constituted the basis and the opportunity for the U.S. to go on within the framework of SDI. So the U.S. would not have renounced SDI on its side. He was a convinced opponent of a situation where there is a winner and a loser. In that case, after the agreement is ratified, the loser would take steps to undermine the agreement, so that could not be the right basis. There had to be an equal footing. The documents should be deserving of ratification as being in the interest of both sides.

The President asked what then is wrong with going by this and then saying that the question of the research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty is reserved for their meeting in Washington, that they then could decide whether it is under the ABM provisions.

Gorbachev replied that without that there was no package. He believed the Soviet side had convinced the U.S. side of the existence of an interrelationship between the issues. If we agree on deep reductions in nuclear weapons we need confidence that the ABM Treaty will be observed during the period of the process of eliminating them. This would be a very historic period, improving a dangerous situation after a period of tensions. This decision would also be in the interest of the U.S. during that time.

The President commented that they were not getting anyplace. He proposed they consider why there was an objection to the U.S. formula if they agreed that ten years down the road there would be no ballistic missiles. He proposed a recess where they would meet with their people, and see what is keeping them apart.

Gorbachev said that a phrase should be added to the text which the Soviet side had transmitted to the effect that both sides should arrive at a mutually acceptable solution, through negotiation, about what to do following the ten-year period. This reflected the President's ideas on SDI.

(At this point the typed version of the Soviet counterproposal was brought in.)

The President said Secretary Shultz would speak about differences between the two texts. *The Secretary* said there seemed to be two differences. The first is how to handle what is permitted during the ten years. The second, if he understood correctly, is that the Soviets see a period of indefinite duration for agreement not to depart from the ABM Treaty, while the U.S. side sees ten years.

Gorbachev said we needed clarity at this stage about whether to undertake real reductions while strengthening, not weakening, the ABM Treaty regime. Thus, the right to withdraw that both sides have now would not be used for ten years, and after ten years we would consider how to deal with the question. Perhaps we would keep to it, perhaps there would be new elements. But in those ten years we would strengthen and not weaken the Treaty regime.

The Secretary asked whether *Gorbachev* was saying that after ten years the aspect about not withdrawing would also be over. *Gorbachev* replied that after ten years the two sides could exercise all sorts of rights. *The Secretary* commented that that helped. *Gorbachev* suggested they add to the text the sentence "In the course of the succeeding several years, the two sides should find in the course of negotiations further mutually acceptable solutions in this field." *Shevardnadze* commented that under the Soviet proposal there would be no limit on research, except that it would be confined to laboratories.

Gorbachev asked the President to recall their meeting in Geneva. The President was host; it was on the last night; they were sitting on the sofa drinking coffee. They were in a good atmosphere. At that point Shultz came in to report that the Soviet delegation did not agree on certain points. The President had asked him, sitting there on the sofa, what the hell should be done, and suggested banging his hand on the table. He (*Gorbachev*) had gone out, and in fifteen minutes everything was fixed. Now they could go out in the same way, and the President could go out and fix everything in ten minutes. It would be another victory for the U.S. side.

The Secretary said he wanted to be clear about one thing. The Soviet proposal said that during the second five-year period the remaining weapons would be "reduced." Did "reduced" mean at a constant pace? *Gorbachev* said that the modalities could be written down in the treaty. *The Secretary* noted that the President talked about strategic offensive weapons.

Gorbachev recalled that the day before the Soviets had proposed that all types of strategic forces be cut by half. This was for the first five years. It covered the whole triad. The second five-year period would take care of the rest of the strategic forces.

The Secretary noted that our proposal referred to "offensive ballistic missiles," and the Soviet to "strategic offensive arms." These may be different categories. He wanted to be sure.

Gorbachev repeated that the Soviets had made a proposal the day before. He could say frankly it had not been an easy decision. If we try to search for agreements on subceilings, we will never get out of it. He had suggested that they cut through this, and cut everything by 50%, including the SS-18s the U.S. was concerned about. Other missiles

which were not strategic would be covered by the separate agreements that have been made.

The President and the General Secretary agreed to take a break to sort out the differences between the two texts.⁴ (The break lasted from 4:30 to 5:30 PM.).

After the break, *the President* said he had been sorry to keep Gorbachev so long, but Gorbachev knew the trouble Americans had getting along with each other.

The President continued that he had spent this long time trying very hard to meet the General Secretary's desire for a ten-year situation. This had to be his final effort. The President then read the following text:

The USSR and the United States undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions, while continuing research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent. During the following five years of that period, all remaining offensive ballistic missiles of the two sides shall be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996, all offensive ballistic missiles of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated. At the end of the ten-year period, either side could deploy defenses if it so chose, unless the parties agreed otherwise.

Gorbachev referred to the text of "research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty," and noted that reference to laboratory testing had disappeared. *The President* replied that instead

⁴ Shultz recalled this break briefly in his memoir: "We went back and forth on these points without resolution but agreed at 4:30 to take a break to assess within each delegation where matters stood. During the break, after discussion among all advisers, the president agreed that we should not change our proposals, but we worked out a new text, putting our proposals into the Soviet format." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 770) Ridgway recalled an interesting anecdote in a 2002 oral history interview, explaining that Linhard "and Richard [Perle] were deeply involved in the preparations for the Reykjavik summit. We had an interagency working group working on papers for that meeting. At the same time, Gorbachev was issuing statements about his positions on various issues. We arrived in Reykjavik with a big, fat notebook with our various positions and our possible responses to Soviet initiatives. When people said that we were not prepared for that summit, they didn't know what they were talking about! Richard and Bob [Linhard] were the master keepers of that notebook. They did a lot of the support work for the president and Shultz's dialogues with Gorbachev. One amusing aspect of their work was that they put a door across a bathtub to use as a desk. They put a typewriter on the door and pounded out negotiating positions. It was very constructive." (Oral History of Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway, February 7, 2002, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training; available on the ADST website)

the Soviet side now had the line about research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty.

Gorbachev asked what the purpose of this was. *The President* replied that their people in Geneva must decide what is permitted. The two sides have different views on this.

Gorbachev asked again whether the language on laboratory testing had been omitted on purpose. He was trying to clarify the U.S. proposal.

The President confirmed that it had been left out on purpose.

Gorbachev continued that his next question was that the first part of the proposal talks about strategic offensive weapons, and the second part about ballistic missiles. He asked why there is this difference of approach.

The President said he had received the message while he was upstairs that the Soviets were mainly interested in ballistic missiles. He had thought earlier that they were thinking of everything nuclear, and then he had heard it was ballistic missiles.

Gorbachev said no, they had in mind strategic offensive weapons. He then turned to medium-range missiles.

The President interrupted to ask what *Gorbachev* meant.

Gorbachev said he could confirm that the Soviets are for reducing strategic offensive weapons. Other agreements would cover other weapons, for instance medium-range weapons. That part on what the U.S. side called INF is in the second part of the agreement. There we would also deal with missiles with ranges of less than 1000 kilometers. He was not removing anything from the table, but he wanted to be sure there is identity in the two parts. He was not changing positions. He wished to clarify things.

The President proposed to add “strategic” to our language, making it “strategic offensive ballistic missiles.”

Gorbachev asked where aircraft were. They were in the triad, and we had agreed to reduce the whole triad: land-based strategic missiles, sea-launched, strategic bombers. The two sides had determined long ago what is strategic.

The President said we had proposed reducing all ballistic missiles on land and sea, but he was ready to include all the nuclear weapons we can.

Gorbachev said we should use the whole triad.

The President said then we should take out “strategic.” Then all ballistic missiles would be eliminated.

Gorbachev said we should include land-based, sea-based and bombers.

The President asked if that were the only thing *Gorbachev* objected to in the U.S. proposal.

Gorbachev said he was just clarifying to be sure. He would explain the Soviet position.

The President said if this was a problem we should work on it. We had agreed to the record of the group on reducing all three elements.

Gorbachev said the agreement should be identical for both sides, for the first and second five-year periods. The concept is to reduce 50% for all types. At the same time they had agreed to the American rule, taking into account gravity bombs and SRAMs.

The President said there had been a misunderstanding on our part as to what the Soviets wanted.

The Secretary said he thought we had to be careful when it came to eliminating all strategic offensive arms if we don't deal with short-range ballistic missiles. He realized we were dealing with it in another place, but perhaps this was the place to deal with it decisively.

Gorbachev said Shultz could write into the text on the second period that all strategic offensive arms will have been eliminated, "including ballistic missiles." The missiles with ranges shorter than 1000 kilometers are handled in the medium-range agreement. We should write we will freeze them and then negotiate about their destruction. Everything should be encompassed. Missiles of less than 1000 kilometers are being handled elsewhere. Freeze them and then start talks about their destruction.

The Secretary said we are talking about two stages, the first five years and the second five years. Insofar as we deal with intermediate- and short-range weapons, we talked about an agreement to last until it was superseded. But we think of this as a first batch. Presumably, he continued, what we have agreed to on INF will happen within the first five years. All the missiles will be gone.

Gorbachev said yes, including those with less than 1000 kilometers' range as well. But when you speak about ABM you speak only about strategic weapons. We have a common understanding about what is strategic.

The Secretary commented that the treaty is about anti-ballistic missiles. These are not only strategic. He recognized there may not be much of an argument here.

Gorbachev said he did not think there was a difference between the two sides.

The Secretary suggested that if we add "and all offensive ballistic missiles," we can come to closure.

Gorbachev asked again why it is different for the two periods. In the first paragraph we speak of strategic offensive arms. He did not think there had to be this contradistinction. We can sort that out when we do the paper.

The President agreed this could be sorted out. He asked whether Gorbachev was saying that beginning in the first five-year period and then going on in the second we would be reducing all nuclear weapons—cruise missiles, battlefield weapons, sub-launched and the like. It would be fine with him if we eliminated all nuclear weapons.

Gorbachev said we can do that. We can eliminate them.

The Secretary said, "Let's do it."

The President reiterated that he had thought he had gotten a message that Gorbachev was interested mainly in ballistic missiles. *Gorbachev* reiterated that there is a contradiction in the first and second periods. In the first part of the U.S. text it is all strategic offensive weapons, in the second only one type of arms, and that leaves the rest out.

The President said that if they could agree to eliminate all nuclear weapons, he thought they could turn it over to their Geneva people with that understanding, for them to draft up that agreement, and Gorbachev could come to the U.S. and sign it.

Gorbachev agreed. He continued that he now wanted to turn to the ABM Treaty. He was apprehensive about this. If the treaty is of unlimited duration, and there is to be strict observance of its provisions, and the two sides agree not to use their right to withdraw, then it is incomprehensible why research, development and testing should go on and not be confined to the laboratory. The U.S. evidently saw the Treaty otherwise. We should add to its strength.

We will be proceeding on to a broad reduction of offensive weapons, *Gorbachev* continued. This would allow for research and testing in laboratories but not elsewhere. Otherwise one side could do research, development and testing anywhere, while pretending it is not violating the ABM Treaty. This would give the impression that one side was trying to create an unequal situation. He liked to be clear. He wanted to have laboratory-only in. The Soviet side is for strict observance of the Treaty, and only laboratory research and testing. He could not do without the word "laboratory." If the U.S. side was indeed for strict observance, it should also be for "laboratory."

The President said that from the beginning of the Treaty there had been this difference. There was a sort of liberal interpretation, and also one that confined this strictly to laboratories. This was a legitimate difference. But we had gone a long way, and what the hell difference did it make. Ten years down the road some country might come along with a madman who wanted to build nuclear weapons again.

The President said they could be proud of what they had done. We may not build SDI in the end; it might be too expensive, for instance. But he had promised the American people he would not give up SDI. The Soviets now had ten years. We have an agreement we can be very proud of.

Gorbachev asked whether the U.S. side would not have the right to decide on SDI development if it put in that it recognized that work would go on only in laboratories, including SDI-related work. But he had to take a principled position that the work could only be in laboratories. This would mean it could not be transferred outside, to create weapons and put them in space. That was why strict observance meant confining work to laboratories. If the President agreed, they could write that down, and sign now.

The President said that *Gorbachev* talked about deployment as if it meant weapons in space. We already had agreements that prevented that. He thought the Soviets were violating agreements. There is the Krasnoyarsk radar. They should knock it down.

Gorbachev said the U.S. might be testing objects, and say they were not offensive, but there would be suspicions. The Soviet side said testing should take place only in laboratories.

The President said he would not destroy the possibility of proceeding with SDI. He could not confine work to the laboratory.

Gorbachev said he understood this was the President's final position. He could not confine work to the laboratory.

The President said, "Yes." We have said we will do what we do within what we believe are within the limits of the Treaty. But there is disagreement as to what the Treaty proscribes.

Gorbachev said he understood the U.S. wanted a concrete formula that gives the U.S. the possibility of conducting tests not only in the laboratory but outside, and in space.

The President said there is research in the lab stage, but then you must go outdoors to try out what has been done in the lab.

Gorbachev suggested that they write in "experimental." This includes mockups, prototypes, samples. But they needed to write "only in laboratories."

Gorbachev continued that he was not saying what he was saying to be intransigent, or rigid, or casuistical. He was being very serious. If they were going to agree to deep reductions in nuclear weapons, and the U.S. side wanted an interpretation that allowed it to conduct all sorts of research that would go against the ABM Treaty, and put weapons in space and build a large-scale defense system, then this was unacceptable. But if the U.S. agreed to confine this work to laboratories, the Soviet side would sign. That was why in their draft tests of all space elements in space were banned, except for laboratory work.

The President said he could not give in.

Gorbachev asked if that was the last word.

The President said yes. He had a problem in his country *Gorbachev* did not have. If they criticized *Gorbachev*, they went to jail. (*Gorbachev*

interjected during the interpretation that the President should read some of the things being written in Soviet newspapers.) But, *the President* continued, he had people who were the most outspoken critics of the Soviet Union over the years, the so-called right wing, and esteemed journalists, who were the first to criticize him. They were kicking his brains out.

Gorbachev would go home with the ten years, the President went on. He himself would go home with his pledge to stick by SDI, and continue research within our interpretation of the ABM Treaty when it came to research. He was not asking anything unusual.

Addressing the President, *Gorbachev* said he assumed the President was addressing him from a position of equality, as a leader of another country, on a confidential basis, and he would thus be frank.

The President was three steps away from becoming a great President, Gorbachev said, if they signed what had been discussed and agreed to. These would be very major steps.⁵ But they needed to include strict observance of the ABM Treaty and confinement of research and testing to laboratories, including SDI-related work.

But if this was not possible, they could say goodbye, and forget everything they had discussed. What had been discussed here in Reykjavik was a last opportunity, at least for Gorbachev.

He had had the firm belief when he came here—and otherwise he would not have proposed the meeting—that the proposals of the Soviet Union, of the Soviet leadership, were very far-reaching, and built on a huge reservoir of constructive spirit. With the support of the U.S. side, they could solve very important problems.

If they were able to do this, Gorbachev continued, and resolve these problems, all the President's critics would not open their mouths. The peoples of the U.S., of the Soviet Union, of the whole world would cheer. Now, if he (Gorbachev) saw that the President could not agree to these proposals, the people would say that the political leaders could not agree. What they had discussed would be left for another generation.

Gorbachev continued that the President had not made a single, substantial, major step in Gorbachev's direction.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to say just one thing. The two sides were so close to accomplishing a historic task, to decisions of such historic significance, that if future generations read the minutes of these meetings, and saw how close we had come but how we did not use these opportunities, they would never forgive us.

⁵ In his memoir, Gorbachev wrote: "The Reykjavik meeting was drawing to its end. We had not been able to overcome our differences. The talks had reached a stalemate and were becoming bizarre, with President Reagan starting to haggle—'Meet me halfway and you'll feel the beneficial effects of American co-operation'—while I was desperately trying to get across to him that he was just one step away from going down in history as the 'peacemaker President.'" (Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, p. 418)

The President said he wished to speak as one political leader to another political leader. He had a problem of great importance to him on this particular thing. He had been attacked even before he came. He had given up a long span of time. He was asking Gorbachev, as a political leader, to do this one thing to make it possible for him to deal with Gorbachev in the future. If he did what Gorbachev asked, he would be badly hurt in his own country. He asked this one thing of Gorbachev.

Gorbachev said he had said everything he had to say, just as the President had.

The President asked Gorbachev to listen once again to what he had proposed: "during that period strictly to observe all its provisions, while continuing research, testing and development which is permitted by the ABM Treaty." It is a question of one word. This should not be turned down over a word. Anyone reading that would believe that the U.S. is committed to the ABM Treaty.

Gorbachev commented that he could also say the President was using one word to frustrate a meeting that had promised to be historic. But he would speak seriously. It is not just a question of a word, but a question of principle. If we are to agree to deep reductions and elimination of nuclear weapons, we must have a firm footing, a front and rear that we can rely on. But if the Soviet side signed something that gave the U.S. the opportunity to conduct SDI-related research and testing in broad tests, and to go into space, the testing of space weapons in space, he could not return to Moscow. He could not go back and say we are going to start reductions, and the U.S. will continue to do research, testing and development that will allow it to create weapons and a large-scale space defense system in ten years.

If we say research and testing in laboratories, he could sign it, Gorbachev went on. But if he went back and said that research, testing and development could go on outside the laboratory and the system could go ahead in ten years, he would be called a dummy (*durak*) and not a leader. Ten years of research in the laboratories within the limits of the Treaty ought to be enough for the President. He was not against SDI. But the research had to be in the laboratories.

The President said he had believed, and had said so in Geneva, that he and Gorbachev had the possibility of getting along as no two American and Soviet leaders ever had before. He had asked Gorbachev for a favor, which was important to him and to what he could do with Gorbachev in the future. Gorbachev had refused him that favor.

Gorbachev replied that if the President had come to him and said things are hard for American farmers, and asked him to buy some American grain, he would have understood. But what the President was asking him to agree to on behalf of the USSR was to allow the

U.S.—at a time when they were proceeding to deep reductions and elimination of nuclear weapons—to conduct full-scale research and development, including development of a space-based ABM system, which would permit the U.S. to destroy the Soviet Union’s offensive nuclear potential. The President would not like it if Gorbachev had asked that of him. It would cause nervousness and suspicion. It was not an acceptable request. It could not be met. The President was not asking for a favor, but for giving up a point of principle.

The President said there would be no offensive weapons left to destroy, and space defenses could not be deployed for ten years or so. It was not the word, it was the implication. Gorbachev was asking him to give up the thing he’d promised not to give up. All the other language was what Gorbachev had needed. We had said we would comply with the Treaty for ten years. It is the particular meaning of one word. Gorbachev knew how this would be taken in the U.S.

The President continued that if Gorbachev thought the problem was that he wanted some military advantage, Gorbachev should not worry. He did not talk about it much, but he believed the Soviets were violating the ABM Treaty. He was not saying we should tear it down, and we should say nothing outside this room, but we should not stop at one word. Maybe Gorbachev could suggest another word to replace it. The President had met Gorbachev’s requirements. What more was needed than that?

The President said he was asking Gorbachev to change his mind as a favor to him, so that hopefully they could go on and bring peace to the world.

Gorbachev said he could not do it. If they could agree to ban research in space, he would sign in two minutes. They should add to the text “The testing in space of all space components of missile defense is prohibited, except research and testing conducted in laboratories,” as in the draft. The point was not one of words, but of principle.

He would like to move everywhere he could. He had tried to do so. His conscience was clear before the President and his people. What had depended on him he had done.

(At that point the President stood, and both leaders gathered up their papers and left the room. As they stood together before departing, *Gorbachev* asked the President to pass on his regards to Nancy Reagan. The President replied that she had decided to keep to her schedule rather than come to Iceland. On the steps outside, they shook hands and parted. Since Gorbachev was formally the “host” of the meeting, the President departed first from the site.)

309. Editorial Note

After the final meeting of the Reykjavik Summit on the evening of October 12, 1986, President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev were clearly both disappointed in the resulting stalemate. In his memoir, Gorbachev recalled: "We left the house as it was getting dark. We stood by the car. Everyone was in a bad mood. Reagan reproached me: 'You planned from the start to come here and put me in this situation!' 'No, Mr. President,' I replied. 'I'm ready to go right back into the house and sign a comprehensive document on all the issues agreed if you drop your plans to militarize space.' 'I am really sorry' was Reagan's reply. We made our farewells and he left in his car." (Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, pages 418–419) In his diary entry for October 12, Reagan wrote: "He wanted language that would have killed S.D.I. The price was high but I wouldn't sell & that's how day ended. All our people thought I'd done exactly right. I'd pledged I wouldn't give away S.D.I. & I didn't but that meant no deal on any of the arms reductions." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. II: November 1985–January 1989, page 647)

Pavel Palazhchenko, the primary Soviet interpreter during the Summit, recalled in his memoir: "In the end, of course, there was no agreement in Reykjavik. Reagan continued to insist on the need for SDI as protection against a madman and therefore refused to accept limits on it. Gorbachev said that without an agreement on defense there could be no agreement on offensive weapons—the two things were linked. What is more, he included INF missiles in that link.

"As Reagan and Gorbachev left Hofdi House, the reporters did not know what had happened, but Reagan's dejected face told the story. Their final exchange was picked up by reporters and was in most newspapers the next day, as well as the photo of Gorbachev and Reagan saying goodbye to each other in front of Hofdi House, with me standing between them.

"[Secretary of State George] Shultz gave a gloomy press conference right afterward, saying that promising agreements had been discussed but fell through because Gorbachev insisted on limiting SDI. [See Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1986, pages 9–13] As Gorbachev entered the crowded auditorium where his press conference was to be held thirty minutes later, everyone was expecting a similar assessment. But as I interpreted his words, I sensed that Gorbachev took a completely different line." (Palazchenko, *My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze*, page 57)

Of his press conference and impression of the meetings, Gorbachev later recalled: "had we not reached an agreement both on strategic and

intermediate-range missiles, was it not an entirely new situation, and should it be sacrificed for the sake of a momentary propaganda advantage? My intuition was telling me that I should cool off and think it all over thoroughly. I had not yet made up my mind when I suddenly found myself in the enormous press-conference room. About a thousand journalists were waiting for us. When I came into the room, the merciless, often cynical and cheeky journalists stood in silence. I sensed the anxiety in the air. I suddenly felt emotional, even shaken. These people standing in front of me seemed to represent mankind waiting for its fate to be decided.

“At this moment I realized the true meaning of Reykjavik and knew what further course we had to follow.

“My speech has been published in newspapers and commented on by scores of journalists, political scientists and politicians. I therefore do not quote it *in extenso*. The key phrase of the speech was: ‘In spite of all its drama, Reykjavik is not a failure—it is a breakthrough, which allowed us for the first time to look over the horizon.’” (Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, page 419)

Reagan wrote in his memoir: “At Reykjavik, my hopes for a nuclear-free world soared briefly, then fell during one of the longest, most disappointing—and ultimately angriest—days of my presidency.” (Reagan, *An American Life*, page 675) He recalled the end of the meeting and his departure from Hofdi House: “He [Gorbachev] tried to act jovial but I acted mad & showed it. Well, the ball is now in his court and I’m convinced he’ll come around when he sees how the world is reacting. I was very disappointed—and *very* angry. When I flew home to Washington, the reception I got showed the American people were behind me. They didn’t want to surrender the SDI.” (Ibid., page 679)

Appendix

A. Personal Notes of Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, November 14, 1985

NSRC 11/14 18 (1)

- Today's msg is on preventing violence -- rather than Soviet phrase of arms control
 - You deter attack by being strong
 - in 1960's, people began being interested in arms control - being strong ^{NOT}
 - be sure that you are strong enough to deter BEFORE you put faith in political documents
- Keep peace by deterrence
 - threat has been nuclear, conventional, sub-terronism
 - 13 years ago by offensive nuclear balance and no defense
 - assumptions don't work
 - in key measures they are ahead
 - 3 options
 - 1) they reduce
 - 2) we build
 - 3) build defense to offset

* 1st reason for SDI

- SDI - they have an extensive defense
- SDI - you keep building - systems mobile - proliferate etc
- ISNT IT TIME TO MOVE/TRANSITION to defense

L from considering security they get into arms control

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¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Summit Material, 11/19/85-11/21/85 OA 92178 [2 of 7]. No classification marking. For the transcribed text of these notes, see Document 146.

- Soviet agenda is to get you to forget¹⁴ about imbalances and agree to their proposals (2)

- Areas

- NST

- MBFR

- CTE - where they want no use of nukes

- CW

- ETC

- In all areas, Soviets have proposed language we feel (you have said) no more on language

SEC
STATE

- Will want to talk about NST and SII

- Just as China called on Taiwan, can expect SII early - need to keep sticking on that - he will feel the strength of your conviction

- Really detailed discussions of proposal will not be called for - but some things
IE

1. SII is a good number if applied to right thing

2. If we can get an impulse to Geneva good thing, you may want to tell him your views on guidelines

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- Tell Soviets what you intend to say (3)

- In other areas, some are in better shape than others

-- looks like we could move along on CFE - maybe something here

-- MBFR - we have reached agreement with UK/FRG - may have something Monday

-- CW - danger of proliferation is great

VP -- why turn you off in Moscow

SecState - Didn't. We offered Iran/Iraq but may be interested in CW

SecDef - Important to see all thrust on their part will be arms control - need talk that too

- 50% reductions should lead to parity - parity in effectiveness, not just warhead numbers
 ↳ result is parity, measured by effectiveness and modernization

- No further commitment to SALT

- Greater reductions on them to get to parity

- Verification at top, not bottom

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- Was not enough - also need compliance (4)
- US should not have double standard
 - Also don't know what Congress will give us.
 - On SII - do nothing at all restricting research or deployment
 - don't reaffirm ABM Treaty - a delay on deployment
 - I have heard that before deploy, nego, but not 10 yrs.
 - Agree on CW - some non-proliferation aspects worth discussion
 - Outcome
 - no restriction on SII
 - reductions on offense to parity
 - verification
 - CBMs and future meetings are good
 - Any commitment to SALT or a restrictive interpretation of ABM Treaty
 - No words in any communique in parity
 - Both sides agree on compliance
 - both terrorism
 - L for

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CJCS - Coy show how strongly feel on SDI (S)

- Don't go any further than SDI research with ABM
- Don't dignify Soviet compliance - not complying
- 17 INF - seek GLOBAL limits - not just balance in Europe
- 17 Cal - can't accept limits on modernization need mod

ICL - Carbachew looking for atmosphere to bring home

- wants:
- 1) reaffirmation of ABM Treaty
 - 2) extension of SALT

- ① would be an "indefinite" commitment
- ② would let them off the hook on violations

- If you reaffirm without any exception would hurt us

- SALT II extension allows SS-24/25 to go

ACIA - Time to do something on CW } 5 from 14/16 nations }

- Guidelines workshop for contingency is sound - but with guidelines
- really help arms control
- 1973 did some thing - 6 yrs later

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- 3
- if we try for guidelines and fail - a ⑥
~~fulfilled summit~~ -- avoid
 - Gorbachev - "friendly smile but very teeth"
 -- figures if folk love - witchy or evil
 prince
 - Rowny - They do need to "feel" SSI. Respect strength
 - 50% across board on things that
 ~~cannot~~ is very catatonic
 ↳ Conviction of SSI.
 - President - On 50% across board, they start
 ahead of us - would not get
 to 0 first
 - RCM - We pick their higher number to
 start from - 50% of theirs
 - Nitze - Pres has always said deploy requires
 consultation and amendment
 - SecDef - Don't want more restrictive interpretation
 - No reaffirmation - would pull back
 from last decision
 - Not on deployment - will not to
 mod treaty
 - Meese - Avoid reaffirming treaty in more
 restrictive provisions

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- also avoid any commitment to agree (7)

Nitzo - not correct - if no agreement, we would have to withdraw

Moose - Best avoid any commitment

Shultz - Best as going, ambiguous - avoid discussion

Cep - Yes, just lets not get further to commit us Not to display

Key A - No veto - They are already violate
∴ don't reaffirm

Pres - Soviets see Defenses as their way to black mail without fear

We could use to avoid threat

Nothing could stop us from going forward

After devel. weapons - see if nuclear powers would give up nukes in return for defense - keep gas masks

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But no veto - either join or we go ahead - no 10 years or

goal is: can this bring about end ²⁵ of nuclear threat (8)

Casey - They want reaffirm ABM for propaganda
no other purpose

Fres - no need to talk about it - we
are in treaty

Shultz - Questioned need for ABM Treaty
Response - no need to reaffirm

Fres - the press will ask - we should answer
before reaffirm, must have compliance
if they ask not

Meese - they want to get commit to use it
a future Pres.

Casey - Be careful - will hit my head with
this

Cap - All need to say is we are proceeding
in ABM treaty - you are not

RCM - Pres has said our STR program
is on record within ABM Treaty
- never say its not

Cap - ABM Treaty has permit withdrawal

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Casey - They would love to give up K-sadlan ⁽⁹⁾
to get you locked in

Pres - Just my idea of consultation -
isn't in treaty

- Want to say I hope their concerns
means they will comply

Adelmay - SRI can get us to reduce nuclear
weapons - but also other types
- Callfield, aircraft etc

- Not all problem, but most problem

Pres - 4800 miles away - 30 min MX
impacted

- Concerned about most destal system

- Tell Gorbachev - say understand
their seek 1st strike - we are
not

B. Handwritten Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev¹

Washington, November 28, 1985

26
SYSTEM II
91239

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Nov. 28 '85

Dear Secretary General Gorbachev

Now that we are both home & facing the task of leading our countries into a more constructive relationship with each other, I wanted to waste no time in giving you some of my initial thoughts on our meetings. Though I will be sending shortly, in a more formal & official manner, a more detailed commentary on our discussions, there are some things I would like to convey very personally & privately.

First, I want you to know that I found our meetings of great value. We had agreed to speak frankly, and we did. As a result, I came away from the meeting with a better understanding of your attitudes. I hope you also understand mine a little better. Obviously there are many things on which we disagree, and disagree very fundamentally. But if I understand you correctly, you too are determined to take steps to see that our nations manage their relations in a peaceful fashion. If this is the case, then this is one point on which we are in total agreement -- and it is after all the most fundamental one of all.

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¹ Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8591143, 8591239). No classification marking. For the transcribed text of this letter, see Document 163.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

As for our substantive differences, let me offer some thoughts on two of the key ones.

Regarding strategic defense and its relation to the reduction of offensive nuclear weapons, I was struck by your conviction that the American program is somewhere designed to secure a strategic advantage -- even to permit a first strike capability. I also noted your concern that research & testing in this area could be a cover for developing & placing offensive weapons in space.

As I told you, neither of these concerns is warranted. But I can understand, as you explained so eloquently, that these are matters which cannot be taken on faith. Both of us must cope with what the other side is doing, & judge the implications for the security of his own country. I do not ask you to take my assurances on faith.

However the truth is that the United States has no intention of using its strategic defense program to gain any advantage, & there is no development underway to create space-based offensive weapons. Our goal is to eliminate any possibility of a first strike from either side. This being the case, we should be able to find a way, in practical terms,

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

to relieve the concerns you have expressed.

For example, could our negotiators, when they resume work in January, discuss frankly & specifically what sort of future developments each of us would find threatening? Neither of us, it seems, wants to see offensive weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction, deployed in space. Should we not attempt to define what sort of systems have that potential and then try to find verifiable ways to prevent their development?

And can't our negotiators deal more frankly & openly with the question of how to eliminate a first-strike potential on both sides? Your military now has an advantage in this area — a three to one advantage in warheads that can destroy hardened targets with little warning. That is obviously alarming to us, & explains many of the efforts we are making in our modernization program. You may feel perhaps that the U. S. has some advantages in other categories. If so, let's insist that our negotiators face up to these issues & find a way to improve the security of both countries by agreeing on appropriately balanced reductions. If you are as sincere as I am in not seeking to secure or preserve one-sided advantages, we will find a solution to these problems.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Regarding another key issue we discussed, that of regional conflicts, I can assure you that the United States does not believe that the Soviet Union is the cause of all the world's ills. We do believe, however, that your country has exploited and worsened local tensions & conflict by militarizing them and, indeed, intervening directly & indirectly in struggles arising out of local causes. While we both will doubtless continue to support our friends, we must find a way to do so without use of armed force. This is the crux of the point I tried to make.

One of the most significant steps in lowering tension in the world — & tension in U.S.-Soviet relations — would be a decision on your part to withdraw your forces from Afghanistan. I gave careful attention to your comments on this issue at Geneva, and am encouraged by your statement that you feel political reconciliation is possible. I want you to know that I am prepared to cooperate in any reasonable way to facilitate such a withdrawal, & that I understand that it must be done in a manner which does not damage Soviet security interests. During our meetings I mentioned one idea which I thought might be helpful & I will welcome any further suggestions you may have.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

These are only two of the key issues on our current agenda. I will soon send some thoughts on others. I believe that we should act promptly to build the momentum our meetings initiated.

In Geneva I found our private sessions particularly useful. Both of us have advisors & assistants, but, you know, in the final analysis, the responsibility to preserve peace & increase cooperation is ours. Our people look to us for leadership, and nobody can provide it if we don't. But we won't be very effective leaders unless we can rise above the specific but secondary concerns that preoccupy our respective bureaucracies & give our governments a strong push in the right direction.

So, what I want to say finally is that we should make the most of the time before we meet again to find some specific & significant steps that would give meaning to our commitment to peace & arms reduction. Why not set a goal — privately, first between the two of us — to find a practical way to solve critical issues — the two I have mentioned — by the time we meet in Washington?

Please convey regards from Nancy & me to Mrs. Gorbacheva. We genuinely enjoyed meeting you in Geneva & are already looking forward to showing you something of our country next year.

Sincerely yours, Ronald Reagan

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C. Notes of a Meeting¹

Washington, September 26, 1986

9/26
1600Daniloff
Outcome of Meeting with the President
1300 - 1400

As the result of our meeting, my negotiating authority is as follows:

- 1.) I may agree to Daniloff, Zakharov, and Orlov all being released on the same day.
- 2.) ^{alternatively,} I may agree to Daniloff being released on Day one, Zakharov being released 24 hours later, and Orlov 10 days after that (but before the meeting at Reykjavik) on condition that Orlov's release will be announced when Zakharov is released.
- 3.) The present situation regarding the Soviet UN Mission, i.e.
 - They are below 218
 - They will provide us with ~~the~~ list of those who already have departed and ~~that~~ those who are in the process of doing so
 - ^(satisfactory) Shervashidze will provide further information on the Soviet Mission personnel situation at Reykjavik
 - Shervashidze has put down a marker regarding 2 or 3 people at the Soviet Mission. I have authorization to negotiate changes in the list of 25 as long as I stay within the the overall list.
- 4.) ^{announcement of} The ^{the} Reykjavik meeting should come ^{a day or so} after the release, with the period being used to get Icelandic government agreement. We would seek such agreement as quickly as possible as ~~their~~ there are many arrangements to be made.

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¹ Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Daniloff Detention in the USSR September 1986, Yogurt II. No classification marking. Prepared by Hill. For the transcribed text of these notes, see Document 290.