

**FOREIGN  
RELATIONS  
OF THE  
UNITED  
STATES**

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**1981–1988**

**VOLUME VI**

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**SOVIET UNION  
OCTOBER 1986–  
JANUARY 1989**



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**DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE**

**Washington**



# Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988

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## Volume VI

# Soviet Union October 1986– January 1989

*Editor* James Graham Wilson  
*General Editor* Adam M. Howard

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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# About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

## *Sources for the Foreign Relations Series*

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government en-

gaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), in College Park, Maryland.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. The records that constitute the Department's central files for 1981–1989, which were stored in electronic and microfilm formats, will eventually be transferred to the National Archives. Once these files are declassified and processed, they will be accessible. All of the Department's decentralized office files from this period that the National Archives deems worthy of permanent preservation will also eventually be transferred to the National Archives where they will be available for use after declassification and processing.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Reagan Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Reagan Library include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Reagan Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration's Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified records held in various Presidential libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether at-

tachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the Reagan Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were "Not found attached."

### *Editorial Methodology*

The documents are presented chronologically according to time in Washington, DC. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type.

Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type).

The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not declassified.

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the sources of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important docu-

ments and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

### *Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation*

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

### *Declassification Review*

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2014 and was completed in 2016, resulted in the decision to withhold no documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in five documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in five documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and edito-

rial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Reagan administration's policy toward the Soviet Union.

**Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D.**  
*The Historian*

**Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.**  
*General Editor*

Bureau of Public Affairs  
December 2016





# Preface

## *Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series*

This volume is part of a subseries of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the foreign policies of the administration of Ronald Reagan. Four volumes in the subseries are devoted to Reagan's Soviet policies: *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983; Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985; Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986; and Volume VI, October 1986–January 1989. The crafting and negotiation of the landmark U.S.-Soviet nuclear treaties of this era are explored in two additional volumes: *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I, 1981–1988, and Volume XII, INF, 1984–1987. Documentation on chemical weapons, nuclear testing, and non-proliferation negotiations which involve the United States and the Soviet Union will be printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XL, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation; United Nations. Discussions and decisions pertaining to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the “narrow vs. broad” interpretation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, strategic modernization, Interim Restraint Policy and the expiration of the unratified 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), and the crafting of national security strategy will be printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, National Security Policy, 1985–1988. Readers seeking further illumination of the global cold war during this period should consult *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume VIII, Western Europe, 1985–1988; *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume IX, Poland, 1982–1987; *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume X, Eastern Europe; *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Central America, 1985–1988; *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XXVI, Southern Africa, 1985–1988; *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XXXII, Southeast Asia; Pacific; and *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XXXV, Afghanistan, 1985–1989.

## *Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume VI*

This volume commences immediately following the October 10–11, 1986, weekend in Reykjavik, Iceland, when U.S. and Soviet leaders discussed the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and centers around three summits: the Washington Summit in December 1987, where President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; the Moscow Summit of May–June 1988, when Reagan stood in

Red Square and stated that his phrase of 5 years earlier—"evil empire"—applied to "another time, another era"; and a final meeting, on Governor's Island, New York, in December 1988 where Gorbachev hailed President-elect George H.W. Bush and bade Reagan farewell. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze accompanied their respective leaders on such occasions, but other times, they led delegations to Geneva, Moscow, and Washington. The documentation focuses on these key encounters among Reagan, Gorbachev, Shultz, and Shevardnadze.

The volume also documents the roles played by other U.S. officials in crafting the administration's approach to the Soviet Union. One such figure was Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who clashed with Shultz over matters of substance and style in meetings of the National Security Council (NSC) and National Security Planning Group prior to the former's resignation in November 1987. Other driving U.S. figures in the formulation of Soviet policies were Frank Carlucci (who replaced John Poindexter as the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs in December 1986), Colin Powell (who took over when Carlucci succeeded Weinberger at the Pentagon in November 1987), Fritz Ermarth (Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs at the NSC), Roseanne "Roz" Ridgway (Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs), Richard Solomon (Director of the Policy Planning Staff), and Jack Matlock, who preceded Ermarth on the NSC staff before succeeding Arthur Hartman as U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Documentation is included on the Reagan administration's four-pronged approach to U.S.-Soviet relations laid out in *Foreign Relations*, Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985 and *Foreign Relations*, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986. Carlucci lauded this framework in an April 1987 memorandum to Reagan that was drafted by Ermarth, characterizing "arms reductions, easing regional conflicts, human rights, and bilateral contacts" as an agenda that "is steady, but flexible; it can deal with positive as well as negative developments in Soviet behavior." (Document 34) As the volume shows, some in the administration, such as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates, who served as acting director during the illness of William Casey and until the confirmation of William Webster in May 1987, were skeptical of this approach. The views of Vice President George H.W. Bush and Chief of Staff Howard Baker, who provided Reagan counsel on seizing the opportunities and meeting the challenges that the Gorbachev phenomenon provided and posed, are also represented.

### *Acknowledgments*

The editor wishes to thank officials at the Ronald Reagan Library, especially Cate Sewell and Lisa Jones, and the Library of Congress, es-

pecially Jeffrey Flannery and Ernest Emrich. Thanks are also due to the Central Intelligence Agency for arranging access to the Reagan Library materials scanned for the Remote Archive Capture project. The History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency was accommodating in arranging full access to the files of the Central Intelligence Agency; Sandy Meagher was helpful in providing access to Department of Defense materials. The editor also thanks the staff at the National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland, for their valuable assistance. The editor wishes to extend a special thanks to Jon Gundersen at the Department of State.

James Graham Wilson collected, selected, and edited the documentation for this volume under the supervision of David Geyer, Chief of the Europe Division, who reviewed the volume. Kristin Ahlberg, the Assistant to the General Editor, also reviewed the volume. Kerry Hite coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification Division. Kerry Hite and Heather McDaniel performed the technical and copy editing.



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# Sources

*Sources for Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union,  
October 1986–January 1989*

The White House Staff and Office Files at the Reagan Library illuminate high-level decision-making involving the Soviet Union during the period October 1986–January 1989. Therein are files of the Executive Secretariat, which include key collections such as the USSR Country File, the Head of State File, National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs), National Security Council (NSC) Meeting Files, and the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) files. In some instances, the original version of NSDDs and minutes of NSC and NSPG meetings and their preparatory material remain at the National Security Council in Washington. Key collections of individuals include the files of National Security Advisors John Poindexter, Frank Carlucci, and Colin Powell, as well as those of Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs Jack Matlock, those of his successor, Fritz Ermarth, and the files of Senior Director for Defense Programs and Arms Control Robert Linhard. Also at the Reagan Library is a set of the George Shultz papers housed at the Hoover Institution in Palo Alto.

The Central Foreign Policy File of the Department of State includes the cable traffic between Washington and the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. The key lot file is Lot 93D188, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990. The National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland, will eventually include these collections as part of Record Group 59 (RG 59); at printing, they are in various stages of accession.

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of those Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

## Unpublished Sources

### Department of State

#### Central Foreign Policy File

#### Lot Files

Lot 89D56; C. Max Kampelman Files



Lot 89D149; Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda/Correspondence  
From the Director of Policy Planning to the Secretary and other Principals,  
January 1981–January 1989

Lot 90D397; Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989

Lot 92D252; 1 January 1984–21 January 1988 Executive Secretariat Sensitive (ES)  
and Super Sensitive Documents

Lot 92D630; Not for the System Documents, 1979–1989; Evening Reading,  
1980–1989

Lot 93D188; Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and  
USSR Relations, 1981–1990

## **Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California**

### **National Security Council Intelligence Files**

#### **White House Staff and Office Files**

#### **Executive Secretariat, National Security Council**

Agency File

Cable File

Country File: USSR

Head of State File

Subject File

National Security Decision Directives

National Security Council Meeting File

National Security Planning Group

Weekly Reports

Office of the Assistant to the President

Frank Carlucci Files

Ty Cobb Files

Fritz Ermarth Files

European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, NSC 1983–89

Alton Keel Files

Nelson Ledsky Files

Robert Linhard Files

Jack Matlock Files

John Poindexter Files

Colin Powell Files

President's Daily Diary

Personal Papers

Charles Hill Papers

George Shultz Papers

## **Central Intelligence Agency**

### **Office of the Director of Central Intelligence**

Job 89B00224R, Committees, Task Forces, Boards, Councils Files (1981–1987,  
mostly 1987)

**Library of Congress, Washington D.C.**

**Manuscript Division**

Papers of Caspar W. Weinberger

**National Security Council**

National Security Council meetings  
National Security Planning Group meetings  
Special Situation Group meetings  
Crisis Pre-Planning Group meetings  
National Security Decision Directives

**Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland**

OSD Files: FRC 330-90-0033, Official Records of the Secretary of Defense, 1981–1987

**Selected Published Sources**

Brinkley, Douglas, ed., *The Reagan Diaries Unabridged*. New York: Harper Collins, 2009.  
*Current Digest of the Soviet Press*

Shultz, George. *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State*. New York: Scribner's, 1993.

United States. Department of State. *Bulletin*, 1985–1988.

———. National Archives and Records Administration. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985–1988.



# Abbreviations and Terms

**A**, Bureau of Administration, Department of State  
**ABM**, Anti-Ballistic Missile  
**AC**, Alternating Current  
**ACDA**, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
**AD**, Anatoly Dobrynin  
**AF**, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State  
**AFL-CIO**, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations  
**AIDS**, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome  
**ALCM**, Air-Launched Cruise Missile  
**ASAP**, as soon as possible  
**ASAT**, Anti-Satellite  
**ASEAN**, Association of Southeast Asian Nations  
**ASW**, Anti-Submarine Warfare

**CBM**, Continental Ballistic Missile  
**CD**, Conference on Disarmament  
**CDE**, Conference on Disarmament in Europe  
**CIA**, Central Intelligence Agency  
**CJCS**, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
**CNO**, Chief Naval Officer  
**COCOM**, Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls  
**CPSU**, Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
**CTB**, Comprehensive Test Ban  
**CW**, Chemical Weapons

**D**, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State  
**DAS**, Deputy Assistant Secretary  
**DC**, Direct Current  
**DCI**, Director of Central Intelligence  
**DCM**, Deputy Chief of Mission  
**DOD**, Department of Defense  
**DOD/ISA**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs  
**DPC**, Defense Planning Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
**DPRK**, Democratic People's Republic of Korea  
**DRA**, Democratic Republic of Afghanistan  
**D&S**, Defense and Space Negotiations

**EA**, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State  
**EmbOff**, Embassy Officer  
**EUR**, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State  
**EUR/RPM**, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Department of State  
**EUR/SOV**, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State  
**EXDIS**, Exclusive Distribution

**FBI**, Federal Bureau of Investigation

## XX Abbreviations and Terms

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**FBS**, Forward-Based Systems

**FCC**, Frank Charles Carlucci

**FNU**, first name unknown

**FonMin**, Foreign Minister

**FRG**, Federal Republic of Germany

**FYI**, For Your Information

**GDR**, German Democratic Republic

**GLBM**, Ground-Launched Ballistic Missile

**GLCM**, Ground-Launched Cruise Missile

**GNP**, Gross National Product

**GSO**, General Services Officer

**H**, Office of Congressional Relations, Department of State

**HA**, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State

**IAEA**, International Atomic Energy Agency

**IBM**, International Business Machines Corporation

**ICBM**, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

**INCSEA**, Incidents at Sea Agreement

**INF**, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

**INR**, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

**IO**, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

**IO/UNP**, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Department of State

**IOC**, International Olympic Committee

**JCS**, Joint Chiefs of Staff

**JFK**, John F. Kennedy Airport

**JVE**, Joint Verification Experiment

**KAL**, Korean Airlines

**KGB**, Russian Committee for State Security

**KM**, Kilometers

**LPAR**, Large Phased-Array Radar

**LRINF**, Long-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces

**MBFR**, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

**MEMCON**, Memorandum of Conversation

**MFA**, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**MFN**, Most Favored Nation

**MGEN**, Major General

**MIA**, Missing in Action

**MIRV**, Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle

**MIT**, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

**MOU**, Memorandum of Understanding

**NAC**, North Atlantic Council

**NATO**, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**NEA**, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

**NIACT**, Night Action

**NNA**, Neutral and Non-Aligned

**NODIS**, No Distribution

**NPT**, Non-Proliferation Treaty  
**NRRC**, Nuclear Risk Reduction Center  
**NSA**, National Security Agency  
**NSC**, National Security Council  
**NSPG**, National Security Planning Group  
**NST**, Nuclear Space Talks  
**NTM**, National Technical Means  
**NTT**, Nuclear Test Treaty

**OAU**, Organization of African Unity  
**OMB**, Office of Management and Budget  
**OSI**, on-site inspection  
**OSTP**, Office of Science and Technology, White House

**P**, Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
**PAK**, Pakistan  
**PDC**, Perez de Cuellar  
**PDPA**, People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan  
**PERMREPS**, Permanent Representatives  
**PFIAB**, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board  
**PLO**, Palestine Liberation Organization  
**PMA**, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State  
**PNET**, Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty  
**PNG**, Persona Non Grata  
**POW/MIA**, Prisoners of War/Missing in Action  
**PRC**, People's Republic of China; Policy Review Committee  
**PRG**, Policy Review Group

**R**, Romeo Time Zone (Eastern Standard Time, USA)  
**REFTEL**, Reference Telegram  
**RSFSR**, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic  
**ROK**, Republic of Korea

**S**, Office of the Secretary of State  
**SDI**, Strategic Defense Initiative  
**S/P**, Office of the Secretary of State, Policy Planning Staff  
**S/S**, Executive Secretariat  
**S/S-I**, Information Management Section of the Executive Secretariat  
**S/S-O**, Operations Center of the Executive Secretariat  
**SALT**, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks  
**SC**, Security Council  
**SCC**, Special Coordination Committee  
**SDI**, Strategic Defense Initiative  
**SECDEF**, Secretary of Defense  
**SHAPE**, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe  
**SRINF**, Short-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces  
**SLCM**, Surfaced-Launched Cruise Missile; Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile; and Sea-Launched Cruise Missile  
**SNDV**, Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle  
**SRAM**, Short-Range Attack Missile  
**SSOD**, Special Session on Disarmament  
**START**, Strategic Arms Reductions Talks/Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty  
**SU**, Soviet Union  
**SY**, Office of Security Affairs

## XXII Abbreviations and Terms

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**TASS**, official Soviet news agency

**TNF**, Theater Nuclear Forces

**TTBT**, Threshold Test Ban Treaty

**UK**, United Kingdom

**UN**, United Nations

**UNHCR**, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

**UNGA**, United Nations General Assembly

**UNGOMAP**, United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan

**UNITA**, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

**UNSC**, United Nations Security Council

**US**, United States

**U.S.**, United States

**U.S.A.**, United States of America

**USAF**, United States Air Force

**USG**, United States Government

**USIB**, United States Intelligence Board

**USSR**, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

**USUN**, United States Mission at the United Nations

**VOA**, Voice of America

**WH**, White House

**Z**, Zulu Time Zone (Greenwich Mean Time)

# Persons

- Abramowitz, Morton**, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research
- Abrams, Elliott**, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
- Adamishin, Anatoly**, Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister
- Adelman, Kenneth L.**, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency until December 13, 1987
- Akhromeyev, Sergei**, Marshal of the Soviet Union and Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces
- Armacost, Michael H.**, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- Baker, Howard H., Jr.**, Senator, (R-Tennessee) until February 27, 1987; White House Chief of Staff from February 27, 1987, until July 1, 1988
- Baker, James A., III**, Secretary of the Treasury until August 17, 1988
- Baldrige, Malcolm H.**, Secretary of Commerce until July 25, 1987
- Belenogov, Alexander**, Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations
- Bessmertnykh, Alexander**, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
- Block, John R.**, Secretary of Agriculture from January 1981
- Brock, William E., III**, U.S. Trade Representative from January 1981
- Brooks, Linton**, Captain, USN (Ret.); Member of the National Security Council
- Burns, William**, Major General, USA (Ret.); Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Administration from April 1, 1988.
- Bush, George H.W.**, Vice President of the United States
- Byrd, Robert W.**, Senator, (R-West Virginia) and Senate Majority Leader from January 3, 1987
- Carlucci, Frank C., III**, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, from December 2, 1986 until November 23, 1987; Secretary of Defense from November 23, 1987
- Carter, James Earl "Jimmy"**, President of the United States, January 20, 1977, to January 20, 1981
- Casey, William J.**, Director of Central Intelligence until February 2, 1987
- Chernyaev, Anatoly**, Advisor to Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
- Cobb, Tyrus**, Lieutenant Colonel, USA (Ret.); Member, National Security Council Staff
- Cockell, William**, Member, National Security Council Staff
- Cooper, Henry "Hank,"** U.S. Ambassador and Chief Negotiator on Defense and Space
- Combs, Richard**, Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State
- Cordovez, Diego**, Under Secretary General of the United Nations for Political Affairs and Personal Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan Negotiations
- Crowe, William J., Jr.**, Admiral, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- de Cuellar, Perez**, Secretary General of the United Nations
- Derwinski, Edward J.**, Counselor of the Department of State until March 24, 1987; Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, from March 24, 1987
- Dobrynin, Anatoly**, Director of the International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Duberstein, Kenneth**, Deputy White House Chief of Staff from February 27, 1987, until July 1, 1988



**Dubinín, Yuri**, Soviet Ambassador to the United States

**Emery, David**, Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Administration  
**Ermarth, Fritz**, Member, National Security Council Staff

**Fitzwater, Marlin**, Assistant to the President for Press Relations

**Gaffney, Frank**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy from May 8, 1987

**Gandhi, Rajiv**, Prime Minister of India

**Gates, Robert**, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency until May 1, 1987; Acting Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from May 2, 1987, until May 26, 1987; Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from May 26, 1987

**Genscher, Hans-Dietrich**, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany

**Glitsman, Maynard "Mike,"** U.S. Ambassador and Chief Negotiator on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Arms until June 22, 1988; U.S. Ambassador to Belgium from June 22, 1988

**Gorbachev, Mikhail**, General Secretary of the Soviet Union

**Graham, William**, White House Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy

**Gregg, Donald**, Vice President Bush's national security advisor

**Gromyko, Andrei**, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet until October 1, 1988

**Guhin, Michael**, Counselor to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

**Hanmer, Stephen**, Deputy U.S. Negotiator for Strategic Nuclear Arms

**Hartman, Arthur A.**, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union until December 18, 1986

**Herrington, John**, Secretary of Energy

**Holmes, H. Allen**, Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs

**Hopkins, William**, Interpreter with U.S. Embassy Moscow

**Horowitz, Lawrence**, Aide to Senator Edward Kennedy

**Howe, Jonathan T.**, Rear Admiral, USN; Senior Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1981–1982; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from May 10, 1982, until July 1, 1984

**Iklé, Fred C.**, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

**Johnson, Lyndon Baines**, President of the United States, November 22, 1963, until January 20, 1969

**Kampelman, Max M.**, Ambassador to the U.S. Office for Arms Reduction in Geneva and Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Talks; Counselor of the Department of State from January 12, 1987

**Karpov, Victor**, Head of the Soviet Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Talks until January 15, 1987

**Kerr, Richard**, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence for Intelligence

**Keel, Alton G., Jr.**, Deputy National Security Advisor until November 24, 1986; Acting National Security Advisor from November 25, 1986, to December 18, 1986; Ambassador to NATO from December 18, 1986

**Kohl, Helmut**, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

**Kryuchkov, Vladimir**, First Chief Directorate, KGB, until October 1, 1988; Head of the KGB from October 1, 1988

**Ledsky, Nelson**, Member, National Security Council Staff

**Lehman, Ronald F.**, U.S. Ambassador and Chief U.S. Negotiator on Strategic Nuclear Arms

**Levitsky, Melvyn**, Executive Secretary of the Department of State from February 13, 1987

**Linhard, Robert**, Colonel, USAF; Special Assistant to the President for Nuclear Issues and Arms Control

**Martin, William**, Deputy Secretary of Energy

**Massie, Suzanne**, Historian

**Masterkov, Lev**, Soviet Chief Negotiator on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Arms from May 8, 1986

**Matlock, Jack F.**, Member, National Security Council Staff until April 5, 1987; U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from April 6, 1987

**McFarlane, Robert "Bud"**, Colonel, USMC (Ret.); President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from October 7, 1983, to December 4, 1985

**Meese, Edwin "Ed," III**, Attorney General until July 5, 1988

**Miller, James**, Director of the Office of Management and Budget until October 1988

**Moellering, John H.**, Lieutenant General, USA; Assistant to the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

**Murphy, Richard W.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

**Najibullah (Najib), Mohammad**, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Afghanistan from May 4, 1986

**Negroponte, John D.**, President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs from November 27, 1987

**Nitze, Paul H.**, Ambassador-at-Large and Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for Arms Control Matters

**Obukhov, Alexey**, Soviet Ambassador and Deputy Chief Negotiator on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

**Palazhchenko, Pavel**, Interpreter and special assistant to Gorbachev and Shevardnadze

**Palmer, Robie Marcus Hooker "Mark"**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Soviet Affairs

**Parris, Mark**, Director of the Office of Soviet Affairs, Department of State

**Perina, Rudolf**, Member, National Security Council Staff

**Perle, Richard N.**, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy until May 8, 1987

**Platt, Nicholas**, Executive Secretary of the Department of State until February 13, 1987

**Powell, Colin L.**, President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs from December 1, 1986, to November 23, 1987; President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from November 23, 1987

**Poindexter, John M.**, Rear Admiral, USN; President's Assistant for National Security Affairs until November 25, 1986

**Primakov, Evgeniy**, Director of the Soviet Oriental Studies Institute

**Qaddafi, Muammar**, Leader of Libya

**Reagan, Ronald W.**, President of the United States

**Redman, Charles E.**, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

**Regan, Donald T.**, White House Chief of Staff until February 27, 1987

**Ridgway, Rozanne L. "Roz"**, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

**Ross, Dennis**, Member, National Security Council Staff

**Rowny, Edward**, General, USA, (Ret.); Special Representative for Arms Control and Disarmament from April 1981

**Ryzhkov, Nikolai**, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

**Savimbi, Jonas**, Leader of the UNITA resistance in Angola

**Schifter, Richard**, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

**Shevardnadze, Eduard A.**, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union

**Shcharanskiy, Anatoly**, Soviet Refusenik denied a visa to emigrate to Israel

**Shultz, George P.**, Secretary of State

**Simons, Thomas W., Jr.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Yugoslavia

**Sokolov, Sergei**, Soviet Minister of Defense until May 30, 1987

**Solomon, Richard**, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

**Stepanov, Teymuraz**, Special Assistant to Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

**Stone, Marvin**, Deputy Director of the U.S. Information Agency

**Tarasenko, Sergei**, Special Assistant to Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

**Thatcher, Margaret**, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

**Thomas, Charles**, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

**Vance, Cyrus**, Secretary of State from January 23, 1977, to April 28, 1980

**Velikhov, Evgeny**, Science Advisor to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev

**Verity, C. William**, Secretary of Commerce from August 10, 1987

**Vershow, Alexander**, Office of European and Soviet Affairs, Department of State

**Vorontsov, Yuli**, Head of the Soviet Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Talks

**Walters, Vernon A.**, Lieutenant General, USA (Ret.); U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations

**Webster, William**, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation until May 25, 1987; Director of the Central Intelligence Agency from May 26, 1987

**Weinberger, Caspar W. "Cap"**, Secretary of Defense until November 23, 1987

**Whitehead, John C.**, Deputy Secretary of State

**Wick, Charles Z.**, Director, United States Information Agency

**Yazov, Dmitry**, Soviet Minister of Defense from May 30, 1987

**Zimmermann, Warren**, Head of the American delegation to the CSCE Conference in Vienna

# Note on U.S. Covert Actions

In compliance with the *Foreign Relations of the United States* statute that requires inclusion in the *Foreign Relations* series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan Presidencies.

## *Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency*

The Truman administration's concern over Soviet "psychological warfare" prompted the new National Security Council (NSC) to authorize, in NSC 4-A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4-A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively executive branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice, but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.<sup>1</sup>

The CIA's early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4-A.

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct "covert" rather than merely "psychological" operations, defining them as all activities "which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if un-

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<sup>1</sup> NSC 4-A, December 17, 1947, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 257.

covered the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them."

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: "propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition, and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas, and refugee liberations [*sic*] groups; and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations."<sup>2</sup>

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the Department of State and to the military without having to proceed through the CIA's administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions.<sup>3</sup> In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of the CIA's activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper "scope and magnitude" of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the CIA's authority over guerrilla warfare.<sup>4</sup> The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of the CIA's covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although the CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific proj-

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<sup>2</sup> NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, Document 292.

<sup>3</sup> Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. Wisner, "Implementation of NSC-10/2," August 12, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, Document 298.

<sup>4</sup> NSC 10/5, "Scope and Pace of Covert Operations," October 23, 1951, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1950-1955*, The Intelligence Community, Document 90.

ects from the NSC, the PSB, and the Departmental representatives originally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

*NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee*

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA's latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of NSC directives, the responsibility of the DCI for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the CIA's responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.<sup>5</sup>

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the "NSC 5412/2 Special Group" or simply "Special Group," emerged as the executive body to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA.<sup>6</sup> The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing

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<sup>5</sup> William M. Leary, editor, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; for text of NSC 5412, see *Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community*, Document 171.

<sup>6</sup> Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, pp. 63, 147–148; *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence* (1976), pp. 50–51. For texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2, see *Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community*, Documents 212 and 250.

other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.<sup>7</sup>

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy's request and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of \$25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.<sup>8</sup>

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November, he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.<sup>9</sup>

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counter-insurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who estab-

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<sup>7</sup> Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, p. 63.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 82.

<sup>9</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. X, Cuba, 1961–1962, Documents 270 and 278.

lished a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging this responsibility.<sup>10</sup>

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of "Special Group 5412" to "303 Committee" but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.<sup>11</sup>

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected.<sup>12</sup>

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation that had not been reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum 40,<sup>13</sup> which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney General was also added to the membership of the Committee. NSDM 40 reaffirmed the DCI's responsibility for the coor-

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<sup>10</sup> For text of NSAM No. 124, see *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, vol. VIII, National Security Policy, Document 68. NSAM No. 341, March 2, 1966, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 56.

<sup>11</sup> For text of NSAM No. 303, see *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 204.

<sup>12</sup> *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities*, U.S. Senate, Book I, *Foreign and Military Intelligence*, pp. 56–57.

<sup>13</sup> For text of NSDM 40, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 203.



dination, control, and conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 Committee for all major and “politically sensitive” covert operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 Committee of all approved covert operations.

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time the number of formal meetings declined and business came to be conducted via couriers and telephone votes. The Committee actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the DCI submitted annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved operation. According to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA’s individual covert action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major operations, moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in 1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d’etat against Chilean President Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval.<sup>14</sup>

*Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations Advisory Group*

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. Government approved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President for each action and expanding congressional oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert actions only after the President had signed a “finding” and informed Congress that the proposed operation was important to national security.<sup>15</sup>

Executive Order (EO) 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake of major congressional investigations of CIA activities by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the Operations Advisory Group (OAG), composed of the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who retained responsibility for the planning and implementation of covert operations. The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop recommendations for the President regarding a covert action and to conduct periodic reviews of previously approved operations. EO 11905 also banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement

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<sup>14</sup> *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities*, U.S. Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 54–55, 57.

<sup>15</sup> P.L. 93–559.

in political assassinations, a prohibition that was retained in succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence activities.<sup>16</sup>

Approval and oversight requirements for covert action continued to be governed by the Hughes-Ryan amendment well into the Carter administration, even as the new administration made alterations to the executive branch's organizational structure for covert action.

President Carter retained the NSC as the highest executive branch organization to review and guide U.S. foreign intelligence activities. As part of a broader NSC reorganization at the outset of his administration, President Carter replaced the OAG with the NSC's Special Coordination Committee (SCC), which explicitly continued the same operating procedures as the former OAG.<sup>17</sup> Membership of the SCC, when meeting for the purpose of reviewing and making recommendations on covert actions (as well as sensitive surveillance activities), replicated that of the former OAG—namely—the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the DCI, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Attorney General and Director of the Office of Management and Budget (the latter two as observers).

The designated chairman of all SCC meetings was the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Carter formalized the SCC's replacement of the OAG in EO 11985 of May 13, 1977, which amended President Ford's EO 11905 on "United States Foreign Intelligence activities."<sup>18</sup> In practice, the SCC for covert action and sensitive surveillance activities came to be known as the SCC-Intelligence (SCC-I) to distinguish it from other versions of the SCC.

The SCC's replacement of the OAG was reaffirmed in EO 12036 of January 24, 1978, which replaced EO 11905 and its amendments. EO 12036 also reaffirmed the same membership for the SCC-I, but identified the Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget as full members of the Committee, rather than merely observers.

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<sup>16</sup> EO 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 12, No. 8, February 23, 1976.

<sup>17</sup> The broader NSC reorganization sought to reduce the number of NSC committees to two: the Policy Review Committee (PRC) and the SCC. The SCC's jurisdiction included all intelligence policy issues other than annual budget and priorities reviews; the SCC also had jurisdiction over other, non-intelligence matters. Presidential Directive 2, "The National Security Council System," January 20, 1977, Carter Library, Vertical File, Presidential Directives. See also Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983), pp. 59–62.

<sup>18</sup> EO 11985, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," May 13, 1977, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 13, No. 20 (May 16, 1977), pp. 719–720.

Also in the first days of the Carter administration, the SCC-I established a lower-level working group to study and review proposals for covert action and other sensitive intelligence matters and report to the SCC-I. This interagency working group was chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (David Aaron), or in his absence, the NSC Director for Intelligence Coordination. The working group was named the Special Activities Working Group (SAWG). The SAWG was active in early Carter administration reviews of ongoing covert action and remained active through at least 1978. NSC officials in mid-1978 sought to downgrade or abolish the SAWG and replace it as needed with ad hoc working groups. Internal NSC reviews at the end of the Carter administration state that the SAWG gradually fell out of use. By late 1979, the means for debating, developing, and guiding certain covert actions was an interagency working group chaired by Aaron at the NSC. This group was referred to by several names during the late Carter administration, including the Deputy's (or Deputies) group, the Aaron group, the interagency group, the Black Chamber, and the Black Room.

The Carter administration made use of a new category of presidential findings for "world-wide" or "general" (or "generic") covert operations. This continued a practice initiated late in the Ford administration in response to the Hughes-Ryan requirement for presidential findings. The worldwide category covered lower-risk operations that were directed at broad policy goals implemented on a worldwide basis as assets allowed. These operations utilized existing assets as well as existing liaison contacts with foreign intelligence or security services, and in some cases also consisted of routine training or procurement undertaken to assist foreign intelligence partners or other agencies of the U.S. Government. A new type of document—known as "Perspectives"—provided more specific tasking guidance for these general, worldwide covert activities. Perspectives detailed the themes to be stressed in furtherance of a particular policy goal. Riskier operations required their own presidential findings or Memorandum of Notification (MON). Perspectives were drafted by the CIA and cleared by the Department of State, so the CIA could vet the operational feasibility and risks of the program while the Department of State could assess the diplomatic risks and verify that the program was consistent with overall foreign policy goals. At least initially, Perspectives did not require further coordination with OAG, SCC, or the President. Once an agreed-upon Perspectives document was finalized by CIA and the Department of State, it was transmitted to the field, and posts were required to make periodic reports on any achievements under the Perspectives guidelines. Beginning in 1978, actions in this worldwide category were authorized by the President as specific line-item addi-

tions to a previously existing “world-wide” finding, though Perspectives were still used to provide additional details.

The Carter administration initially used MONs to introduce higher-risk, significantly higher-cost, or more geographically specific operations under a previously approved worldwide or general objective outlined<sup>19</sup> in a Perspectives document. Like Perspectives, MONs had to be coordinated between the CIA and the Department of State, but they also required broader interagency coordination within the SAWG or SCC. MONs subsequently came to be used for significant changes to any type of finding, not just worldwide ones. Entirely new covert actions continued to require new presidential findings. The Hughes-Ryan amendment stipulated that Congress be notified of new findings “in a timely fashion,” but did not specify how much time that meant. During the Carter administration, the CIA typically notified Congress of new covert initiatives within 48 hours, including those outlined in Perspectives or MONs.

In October 1980, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981—also known as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980—scaled back the Hughes-Ryan amendment’s provisions for congressional oversight of covert action. While the requirement to notify Congress about presidential findings remained in place, the new Act limited the Committees of Congress that had to be briefed to the two intelligence Committees, and also explicitly clarified that this requirement to keep the Committees “fully and currently informed” did not constitute a requirement for congressional approval of covert action or other intelligence activities. Moreover, the new Act stipulated that if the President determined it was “essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States,” the President could limit prior notice to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate—a group that came to be known as the “Gang of Eight.” If prior notice of a covert action was withheld, the President was required to inform the two intelligence Committees “in a timely fashion” and provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> EO 12036, “United States Foreign Intelligence Activities,” January 24, 1978, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (January 30, 1978), pp. 194–214. Since EO 12036 governed foreign intelligence activities, all references in the EO to the “SCC” were effectively references to what was known in practice as SCC–I.

<sup>20</sup> P.L. 96–450, Sec. 407 (October 14, 1980). See also the description of the Hughes-Ryan amendment and its replacement by P.L. 96–450 in: Richard A. Best, Jr., “Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions,” Congressional Research Service, RL33715, December 27, 2011, pp.1–2; and L. Britt Snider, *The Agency and the Hill: CIA’S Relationship with Congress, 1946–2004*, Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2008, pp. 280–281.



# Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

## 1. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated

### SUBJECT

Reykjavik Chronology

Attached is a detailed chronology covering the meeting between President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, held in Reykjavik, Iceland on October 11–12, 1986. This document has been prepared, as a one-time exception to the normal practice of not publishing records of such meetings, in view of the extraordinary nature of the Reykjavik meeting.

The document is a *chronology*, not a negotiating record. Recipients should [be] meticulous in characterizing it correctly. The distinction must be maintained since it is imperative not to erode the principle that negotiating records are *not* distributed.

This document may be disseminated on a limited basis to appropriate officials within the government involved in arms control negotiations. It may be drawn upon in public and media discussions concerning the Reykjavik meeting by those authorized to discuss that meeting. Since the document is considered FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, and to preserve the precedent that records of such meetings are not normally distributed, copies should not be provided, in whole or in part, outside the Executive Branch.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, NSC, Reykjavik Records—10/19/1986 (5). For Official Use Only. No drafting information was found. Memoranda of conversations from Reagan's meetings with Gorbachev in Reykjavik are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986.

## Attachment

### Chronology of Events<sup>2</sup>

Washington, October 18, 1986

#### ICELAND CHRONOLOGY

The following is a chronology of the events during the meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev in Iceland. It is provided for the use of US government officials and spokespersons, and can be drawn upon in briefing on this subject. However, this chronology is not intended for general public release.

##### *Thursday, October 9*

The President left Andrews AFB aboard Air Force One at about 9:45 am on Thursday morning, October 9. He arrived in Iceland, landing at Keflavik airport, Iceland at 7:05 pm. where he was greeted by officials of the Government of Iceland. He then proceeded to the residence of the US Ambassador to Iceland, Ambassador Ruwe, arriving there shortly after 8 pm. The President stayed in the Ambassador's house during his stay in Iceland.

After arrival, and through the evening, the US traveling team established offices in a centrally located school building. When the team arrived, they noted that above the door of the building someone had appropriately hung a large sign calling the school the "IEOB" (Iceland Executive Office Building).

Coordination of all activities was maintained through the Operations Coordinating Committee operating from the top floor of the school building. The primary substantive work over the first evening was to ensure that all last-minute changes to the President's preparatory material were completed. This included a review of the material for the President's meeting on Friday with President Finnbogadottir of Iceland. Staff also monitored progress on reaching agreement with the US Congress on aspects of the Continuing Resolution.

##### *Friday, October 10*

Early Friday morning, the President met privately with a few of his most senior advisors to discuss his plans for the day and to be briefed on events that had occurred during the night.

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<sup>2</sup> For Official Use Only.

At 10 am, Secretary Shultz met with some of the US team in Ambassador Ruwe's office in the US Embassy. The purpose of this meeting was to lay out the game plan for providing the expert, substantive support for the President in Iceland.

At 11 am, all participants joined the remainder of the US traveling team in a meeting in Hotel Holt. This meeting, chaired by White House Chief of Staff, Donald Regan, reviewed security and laid down the basic rules for dealing with the public and press during the talks.

At 11:30 am, the President met with a core of senior staff and selected experts. The first event was a briefing and discussion focused on the general background of the Iceland meeting and on non-arms control issues. This session was held around the table in the dining room of the residence. Present were the President, Secretary Shultz, Mr. Regan, Admiral Poindexter, Mr. Speakes, Mr. Henkel, Mr. Thomas, Ambassador Hartman, Ambassador Ridgway, Ambassador Matlock, Ambassador Nitze, and Colonel Linhard. After a bit more than an hour, the group took a short break to permit the table to be set for lunch.

The conversation continued over lunch, with the discussion turning to the area of arms reductions. Following lunch, again after a short break to permit the dishes to be cleared, the group reconvened once again to complete the discussion of the arms control area. At this point, Assistant Secretary Richard Perle and Ambassador Max Kampelman also joined the discussion. This preparatory session ended at about 2:30 pm.

During the remainder of the afternoon, the President studied preparatory materials and had a formal welcoming session with the Icelandic government. The President met with President Finnbogadottir of Iceland and other senior Icelandic officials from 4:30 to 5:10 pm.

Also on Friday afternoon, selected members of the US party provided press backgrounders on the key issues. This was purposely completed before the agreed press blackout was to go into effect.

At 7 pm, Larry Speakes issued a statement on US nuclear testing policy. This statement was a direct result of extensive work accomplished both in Washington and in Iceland. The main points of the statement were as follows:

"In order to make progress toward our goals, encourage the Soviet Union to negotiate verification improvements, and ensure the necessary national consensus for our objectives, the President has decided to take two new steps:

["]First, the President will inform General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik that if the Soviet Union will, prior to the initiation of ratification proceedings in the Senate next year, agree to essential TTBT/PNET verification procedures which could be submitted to the Senate for its



consideration in the form of a protocol or other appropriate codicil, the President will, as a first order of business for the 100th Congress, request the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the TTBT and PNET. However, if the Soviet Union fails to agree to the required package of verification improvements prior to the convening of the 100th Congress, the President will still seek Senate advice and consent, but with an appropriate reservation to the treaties that would ensure they would not take effect until they are effectively verifiable.

[“]Second, the President will inform the General Secretary that, once our TTBT/PNET verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties have been ratified, the President will propose that the United States and the Soviet Union immediately engage in negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program—in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons—of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.”

That evening, the President dined with Secretary Shultz, Mr. Regan and Admiral Poindexter and had the opportunity for one final review of the most critical issues.

*Saturday, October 11*

On Saturday morning, the President had a series of briefings with his senior staff and a small core of experts, putting the finishing touches on the points that he wished to make with the General Secretary.

At 10:15 am, the US team left for Hofdi House. Besides the President, also included were the Secretary of State, the White House Chief of Staff, the National Security Advisor, Mr. Speakes, Mr. Henkel, Mr. Thomas, Ambassador Matlock, Ambassador Ridgway, Ambassador Hartman, Ambassador Nitze, Ambassador Kampelman, and Colonel Linhard.

As host for the first meeting, the President was the first to arrive. At 10:30 am, the General Secretary and his team arrived. After a greeting, and a short photo opportunity, the two leaders began a private session (with only notetakers and interpreters) in a small room in the right rear corner of the first floor of the house. The US and Soviet delegations went upstairs to waiting areas on the second (top) floor. The US side had two holding rooms and a bathroom on the left side of the house. The Soviet side had similar rooms on the right side of the second floor. Both teams shared a common, large meeting room, in the center rear of the house, where they could hold informal conversations over coffee while waiting for any requests by the leaders.

During the morning session, General Secretary Gorbachev made the following proposals in the form of a non-paper entitled “Directives for the Foreign Ministers of the USSR and the USA to prepare agreements on nuclear disarmament”:

1. *On Strategic arms.* The General Secretary proposed that the leaders instruct their foreign ministers to draft an agreement to reduce by fifty percent the strategic offensive arms of both sides “taking into consideration the historically formed distinctive features of the structures of the Parties’ strategic forces.” In short, he proposed that both sides simply cut in half inventories in certain critical categories of systems, including heavy missiles. No specific categories were identified, but the idea was clear. He also called for a solution with regard to limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).

2. *On LRINF missiles.* He proposed that the ministers draft an agreement on the complete elimination of US and Soviet LRINF missiles in Europe with “the nuclear potentials of Great Britain and France not to be affected or taken into account.” He also stated that negotiations would be initiated on shorter-range, intermediate-range missiles (SRINF), missiles with ranges below 1,000 kilometers. In this regard, he indicated to the President orally that such systems could be frozen and the subsequent negotiations focus on their reduction. In the Soviet non-paper, he proposed that negotiations should be initiated on Soviet and US medium-range systems in Asia as early as practically possible. In response, the President made absolutely clear the US and Allied requirements for reductions of Soviet SS–20s in Asia. At this point, General Secretary Gorbachev indicated no flexibility on the issue of reductions of the over 500 warheads on Soviet LRINF missiles (SS–20s) in Asia—rather he proposed the elimination of LRINF missiles in Europe and subsequent negotiations on the missiles in Asia.

3. *On the ABM Treaty issue and “on banning nuclear tests”.* In the Soviet non-paper, the issues of the ABM Treaty and, as they termed it, “on banning nuclear tests” were treated as one single area.

With respect to the ABM Treaty, the non-paper suggested that for the purpose of “strengthening the regime of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,” an understanding be reached that neither side would exercise its right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a period of ten years. In addition to strictly complying with all the ABM Treaty’s provisions throughout that period, the Soviet proposal added that testing in space of all missile-defense space elements would be prohibited except for research and testing carried out in laboratories. The non-paper also carefully noted that this would not entail a ban on the testing of such fixed land-based systems and their components as are allowed under the ABM Treaty. It went on to say that subsequently (after this 10 year period), the sides would negotiate “further mutually acceptable solutions in this area”. Finally, in the Defense and Space area, the document called for additional efforts to achieve mutually acceptable agreements banning anti-satellite systems.

With regard to nuclear testing, the Soviet text called upon the US and Soviet Union to “resume” negotiations on the “complete cessation of nuclear tests” as early as practically possible. In the course of these negotiations, the Soviets suggested that questions relating to verification, lowering the threshold of the yield of explosions and reducing their number, and to the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), could also be examined. Finally, in this area, the document noted that the “initiation of negotiations on banning nuclear explosions shall be a condition for working out an agreement on strategic arms.”

In his oral presentations, the General Secretary made the point that the Soviets were prepared to accept the US structure for addressing what they termed the ABM Treaty issue. By this the General Secretary meant that the Soviets now proposed a structure under which first there would be a 10-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, followed by a period of from 3–5 years of negotiations on “further mutually acceptable solutions in this area”. The President corrected him by describing the US proposal in this area that had been initially offered in his July letter to General Secretary Gorbachev.<sup>3</sup> The President pointed out that while both the US and Soviet proposals involved periods in which the deployment of advanced defense were prohibited followed by periods of negotiation, there were significant differences between the approaches.

The US proposal, contained in the President’s July letter to the General Secretary and reiterated in Iceland, was that both sides should confine themselves through 1991 (5 years from now) to research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. After that time, should either side wish to deploy advanced defenses, that side would offer a plan which provided for the sharing of the benefits of strategic defense in association with the reduction and total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles. After 2 years of negotiations on this plan, if no agreement had been reached, either side would be free to deploy advanced defenses after giving the other side six months prior notice.

Unlike the Soviet approach, there was no mention of a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty (a treaty that the Soviet Union had already violated) in the US proposal. And, unlike the Soviet proposal, at the end of the 2-year negotiations, both sides would have a right to deploy defenses.

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<sup>3</sup> Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986.

In discussing the US proposal, the General Secretary made the point that he did not believe that the US would ever share the benefits of its research, since it was reluctant to share technology of any kind with the Soviet Union. The President pointed out that, under the terms of the US proposal, he was prepared to sign a treaty now that would commit the United States to share these benefits in association with an agreed plan to eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles.

In the conversations between the President and the General Secretary on nuclear testing, Mr. Gorbachev did not press the President to agree to join in the Soviet nuclear testing moratorium. Instead, he proposed that negotiations resume on the elimination of testing. He said these negotiations could be bilateral or trilateral (US-UK-USSR). He outlined the agenda described in the text of the document cited above. Finally he noted that during these negotiations, each side would do whatever it wished with respect to testing or not testing.

At about 11:15 am, the leaders asked Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to join them in the discussion. This discussion lasted until about 12:30 pm. At that point, both leaders and their advisors departed Hofdi House and returned to their respective headquarters for lunch.

During the morning, the remainder of the US expert group (including Ambassador Rowny, ACDA Director Adelman, Asst. Secretary of Defense Perle, Lieutenant General John Moellering of the JCS, and others) waited on call at the US Embassy. When the Presidential motorcade arrived, the President and his senior advisors debriefed the expert group on the morning's events. Following the initial debrief, the arms control experts group began study of the Soviet positions. The President went to the residence for lunch.

From 1 pm to 2 pm, the President had lunch with the same group that dined with him on Friday with the exception of Ambassador Nitze, Ambassador Matlock and Colonel Linhard, who were working with the experts group.

At about 2 pm, the experts group joined the President and his other senior advisors in the dining room of the residence to have one final discussion before the afternoon meeting. At that time, the President decided to propose a series of two working sessions (one on human rights and one on arms control) and the experts group began to focus its efforts to prepare for such a contingency.

At 3:15 pm, the President motorcaded back to Hofdi House for the afternoon session. The same senior team that was there for the morning session returned to Hofdi with the President, with the exception of Ambassador Matlock, Ambassador Nitze, Ambassador Kampelman and Colonel Linhard—all of whom remained behind involved in preparations for the evening sessions.

During the afternoon session, the two leaders, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze continued their discussions. The President delivered a long presentation of the US positions on START, INF, Defense and Space, Nuclear Testing and Risk Reduction. The discussion then turned to the other non-arms control issues on the agenda.

The President raised specifically a number of human rights issues, handing over to General Secretary Gorbachev a package of materials on Jewish emigration, divided spouses, divided families, and dual nationals—including lists of names, graphs, charts and talking points. Gorbachev accepted the package, noting that he was similarly concerned about human rights in the United States.

The President and the General Secretary also discussed a number of regional and bilateral issues for the remainder of the afternoon session. The work by experts on non-arms control issues later that evening was based upon the full discussion and resulting foundation laid by the two leaders during the Saturday afternoon session. The meeting ended at about 5:45 and the President returned to the US Embassy.

At about 6:15 pm, the President met with Secretary Shultz, Mr. Regan, Admiral Poindexter, Ambassador Nitze, Ambassador Kampelman, Asst. Secretary Perle, ACDA Director Adelman, and Colonel Linhard in the US Embassy. The President reviewed the afternoon's discussions and gave guidance for the evening's sessions. He explained that the General Secretary agreed to have the two groups of experts meet at Hofdi House beginning at 8 pm that evening to see if they could agree on a joint instruction to Foreign Ministers covering the major arms control topics under discussion and also the other major agenda areas. At about 6:45 pm, the President returned to the Ambassador's residence.

Secretary Shultz and Admiral Poindexter then met with Assistant Secretary Ridgway and the members of the group working the other agenda areas (other than arms control) to provide more specific guidance for the evening's work.

That evening, the President had a private dinner with Secretary Shultz, Mr. Regan and Admiral Poindexter. During this dinner, a number of contingency options on arms control issues were discussed for potential use if needed the next day.

From 7 pm to 8 pm, the arms control experts group finalized their preparations in the US Embassy, and then departed for the Hofdi House. This team, led by Paul Nitze, met with a Soviet team headed by Marshal Akhromyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, for about 10½ hours in an effort to develop draft guidance to foreign ministers on START, INF, Defense and Space, and nuclear testing. The US team

found Marshal Akhromeyev prepared for frank discussion and open to explore both sides of every issue.

The US and Soviet groups made considerable progress on START, but the Soviets made this contingent on US acceptance of their position on Defense and Space, which involved additional restrictions on SDI which went well beyond those imposed by the ABM Treaty. The Soviets stuck to their unforthcoming position on INF, and refused to accept U.S.-proposed language aimed at bridging the differences between the two sides' characterization of negotiations on nuclear testing.

With respect to *START*, the groups agreed that there would be an overall limit of approximately 1,600 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles consisting of ICBMs, SLBMs and Heavy Bombers; and, an overall limit of no more than 6,000 warheads consisting of ballistic missile warheads, ALCMs, and heavy bombers armed with bombs and SRAMs, with each such heavy bomber counting as one "warhead" under the 6,000 limit. The Soviets repeatedly refused to consider sublimits on these systems, saying each side should be free to allocate its 6,000 nuclear weapons as it saw fit, although they agreed that the agreement reached during the discussions at Reykjavik would not preclude further discussion of sublimits at Geneva. The Soviets agreed that reductions would involve significant cuts in Soviet heavy missiles, but failed to define what the term "significant" meant. Both sides also agreed that there shall be mutually acceptable limits on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)—with any numerical limit on SLCMs not included in the 1,600 carrier or 6,000 warhead limits mentioned above.

The Soviets reiterated, however, that their agreement to such strategic reductions remained linked to an agreement in Defense and Space calling for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for 10 years and additional restrictions on research that went beyond those contained in the ABM Treaty.

With respect to *INF*, the Soviet side would not budge from the Gorbachev formula provided earlier in the day—that is an agreement on zero/zero in Europe, with no cuts in Asia until a subsequent negotiation. After some discussion, they suggested a freeze on SRINF at the current levels for each side (which codify an advantage to them of approximately 120 to 0). The U.S. team was just as adamant that there would be no agreement on systems in Europe without a simultaneous agreement substantially reducing SS-20s in Asia, and that we could agree to zero in Europe *and* zero in Asia.

The US side also pressed the Soviets on the issues of verification, the duration of an interim agreement, and on the proper limitations on SRINF missiles, saying we saw no reason why the two sides could not agree on these points while acknowledging differences over the question of SS-20s in Asia.

On the issue of the duration of any interim INF agreement, the US proposed agreement that US and Soviet INF missile systems will remain subject to, and constrained by, any such interim agreement until the sides complete negotiations and agree to further reductions in these systems.

On verification, the US proposed that there be agreement that there will be specific verification measures which include:

(1) a comprehensive and accurate exchange of data, both prior to reductions and thereafter;

(2) on-site observation of elimination down to agreed levels; and

(3) effective monitoring of the remaining LRINF inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection.

On the SRINF issue, the US side proposed that there be agreement to limits on SRINF missiles no higher than the current Soviet levels and other constraints on SRINF missiles which will take into account the capabilities of these systems and reflect equality between the US and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet side would not agree with the US formulations. They argued that the next step was to have the leaders address the problem of Asia, and with this solved, these other areas could be resolved.

In the area of *Defense and Space*, the Soviets refused to consider any formulation other than their own—agreement to non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for at least 10 years, and agreement to a ban on all but laboratory research on space-based ABM systems. The U.S. team suggested that foreign ministers be instructed to examine three questions:

—“How can activities with respect to the investigation of advanced strategic defenses be synchronized with the shared goal of eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles?

—Under what conditions and in what general time frame could both sides consider a transition to an increased reliance on advance strategic defenses?

—Until those conditions are met, what common understanding about ABM Treaty restrictions on activity associated with advanced strategic defenses can be reached?”

In response, the Soviet side simply reiterated the proposal which Gorbachev outlined earlier to the President.

Turning to *Nuclear Testing*, the only essential difference between the US and Soviet positions was that the Soviets wished to portray the negotiations, which we both agree should take place immediately, as being for the purpose of prohibiting *all* nuclear testing. The US side introduced language which called for both sides to agree to begin negotiations on nuclear testing. The agenda for these negotiations would first be to resolve remaining verification issues associated with



existing treaties. With this resolved, the U.S. and USSR will immediately proceed, in parallel with the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, to address further step-by-step limitations on testing leading ultimately to the elimination of nuclear testing.

The Soviet side rejected this proposal. Even when the US side pointed out the extent to which this language accommodated the Soviet agenda, the Soviet side insisted on its alternative formulation based on the document provided earlier to the President, which was unacceptable to us because it characterizes the negotiations as on the “elimination of nuclear testing” which the US side felt did not reflect the agenda correctly. The Soviet approach also failed to indicate the relationship between the retention of nuclear weapons and the need to test them, which the US feels is a simple fact.

The discussions described above ran from 8 pm on Saturday night to about 2:30 am Sunday morning. At that time, both sides requested a break to consult with their leaders. Members of the US team met with the Secretary of State in his hotel room at the Hotel Holt, and discussed the situation with Admiral Poindexter who was at the British Ambassador’s residence. The teams returned to the Hofdi House and reentered discussion shortly after 3 am. The discussions continued until about 6:30 am Sunday morning.

During the same evening, a US team of specialists on the other major agenda areas also met with a team of their Soviet counterparts. The discussions of this group ran from 8 pm on Saturday night to about 2:45 am Sunday morning. They covered bilateral issues, human rights and humanitarian issues, and regional conflicts. The Soviet side, headed by Alexander Bessmertnykh, included Ambassador Dubinin, Mr. Primakov, Mr. Shishlin, and Mr. Mikolchak. The U.S. team, headed by Ambassador Ridgway, included Mr. Rodman, Ambassador Hartman, Ambassador Matlock, and Mr. Parris.

On bilateral issues, the two sides agreed on a work plan to accelerate ongoing bilateral negotiations on a variety of subjects, including nonproliferation; risk reduction centers; nuclear energy safety; thermonuclear fusion; space cooperation; transportation; maritime search and rescue; maritime radionavigation; energy and science; combatting terrorism; maritime boundaries between the US and USSR; consulates in New York and Kiev; and search and rescue satellites.

In the human rights field, the two sides had a frank discussion of the importance of the issue in the relationship. The US side discussed such issues as emigration, dual nationals, divided spouses, and divided families, noting that the President had raised the broad subject with the General Secretary and had handed him a packet of materials. The two sides agreed to study further the question of institutionalizing the human rights/humanitarian dialogue “within the framework of



bilateral consultations at the expert level.” In a draft public statement that was negotiated ad referendum, the two sides agreed on wording that stated: “Humanitarian and human rights issues were also discussed. Both sides stated their positions and expressed readiness to continue exchanges of views on these issues.”

Regional conflicts were another subject of this working group’s discussions. The US side stressed the crucial importance of these issues to the health of the overall relationship (witness the experience of the ’70s) and argued that this dialogue was worth continuing even if many of the discussions seemed unproductive. The US side then spoke about Afghanistan, Angola, Central America, and Iran-Iraq, also mentioning the Middle East and Cambodia. A vigorous discussion ensued, particularly on the Middle East, where the Soviets made a pitch for their idea of a preparatory meeting for an international conference. Overall, however, there was nothing new in the Soviets’ presentation of their positions on regional issues.

*Sunday, October 12*

At 8 am on Sunday morning, both US groups of experts briefed Secretary Shultz and Admiral Poindexter, providing them written reports of the night’s work for the President.

At 9 am, these two advisors and Mr. Regan briefed the President and discussed the plan for the next (and supposedly final) meeting at Hofdi House.

Shortly before 10 am, the President’s motorcade left for Hofdi House. The decision had been made to have all the senior US experts available at Hofdi House for this final session. This made the US working quarters on the second floor of the house much more crowded than they had been during the first day.

Shortly after 10 am, the General Secretary and the President once again began their discussions with Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze participating. The two leaders discussed the results of the previous night and endorsed the work plan developed by the experts group on non-arms control issues. During the Sunday morning discussion, General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to eliminate all Soviet SS–20s in Europe and reduce Soviet SS–20s in Asia to 100 total warheads in return for the elimination of all US PERSHING II and GLCM warheads except for 100 warheads in the United States. The discussions ran until after 1:30 pm, well beyond the time that they were scheduled to end. With some language to work with in the START area, and new agreement in the INF area but no language reflecting this agreement, the two leaders agreed to meet again at 3 pm to see if they could reach any closure on remaining issues.

When the Soviet team departed, the US team (which had already gotten into the motorcade cars) was called back into Hofdi House.

A small group was formed (Secretary Shultz, Admiral Poindexter, Ambassador Nitze, Ambassador Kampelman, Asst. Secretary Perle and Colonel Linhard) to quickly draft language in the Defense & Space, INF and Nuclear Testing areas.

About 2:15 pm, while this work was in progress, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze arrived with a small team of advisors and the two groups had a short conversation to confirm the purpose and scope of the afternoon's activity.

At about 3:00 pm, as this short session was completed, the President arrived and the US team met with the President and Mr. Regan to discuss how to approach the upcoming session with the General Secretary. It was at this session that the following proposal, which built upon ideas that had been discussed previously as contingencies at the senior advisor level and with the President, was discussed and approved for use by the President. The text of the proposal was as follows:

"Both sides would agree to confine themselves to research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, for a period of 5 years, through 1991, during which time a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals would be achieved. This being done, both sides will continue the pace of reductions with respect to the remaining ballistic missiles, with the goal of the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by the end of a second 5-year period. As long as these reductions continue at the appropriate pace, the same restrictions will continue to apply. At the end of the 10-year period, with all offensive ballistic missiles eliminated, either side would be free to deploy defenses."

In reviewing this language, the President noted that the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles would also eliminate the remaining 100 Soviet and US LRINF warheads, and all remaining SRINF ballistic missiles that would not be covered by the conclusion of the INF agreement. This fact, he noted, allowed the proposal to fully complement the other agreements reached.

At 3:30 pm, the President and Secretary Shultz reentered discussions with the General Secretary and Foreign Minister. At about 4:30 pm, the President came upstairs to meet with his advisors. He carried with him a typed sheet containing a Soviet counter-offer which called for: a 10-year commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty; a prohibition against the testing in space of all space components of missile defense, with such research confined to laboratories; an agreement to a 50% reduction in strategic offensive arms within the first 5 years; and, an agreement that in the next 5 years the remaining strategic offensive arms would be eliminated. It contained no mention of any subsequent right to deploy defenses.

The President discussed with his advisors the demands made by the Soviet side, especially the change in the terms for the second 5 year

period. Based on his guidance, a revised US proposal was drafted to the effect that the USSR and the United States undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty. Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent. During the following five years of that period, all remaining offensive ballistic missiles of the two sides shall be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996, all offensive ballistic missiles of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated. At the end of the ten year period, either side could deploy defenses if it so chose unless the parties agree otherwise.

The President returned to the meeting room with Secretary Shultz at about 4:45 pm. Early in the discussions of that session, the President asked the General Secretary what he meant by the phrase the elimination of “all strategic forces.” The General Secretary responded that he would favor elimination of “all nuclear weapons.” The President indicated that the elimination of all nuclear weapons was also his goal. In this exchange, the President was reflecting his willingness to discuss the details, including timing, of a plan to eliminate all nuclear weapons in conjunction with a plan to reduce conventional arms or otherwise assure conventional force balance. No details of such a plan were discussed at Reykjavik.

After this exchange, the focus of the discussion returned to the two positions on the table at that time on the issue of the treatment of Defense and Space. Some time after 7 pm, the discussion ended. The President could not agree to the reinsertion of language restricting critical SDI research only to the laboratory—and the General Secretary would not alter his position on this critical point.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Shultz sent the President a memorandum on October 14 after meeting with Dubinin in Washington earlier in the day. “Dubinin said Gorbachev had repeatedly remarked on the good atmospherics of his meetings with you. The General Secretary, like us, had regretted that it had been impossible to nail down agreement in Reykjavik, but he felt that real progress had been made in a number of areas. The crux of Dubinin’s presentation was that the Soviets could not understand our strong objections to their proposal that research and testing of strategic defense technology be confined to laboratories.” The meeting ended with tentative plans for Shultz to meet Shevardnadze in Vienna in early November. (Reagan Library, Keel Files, Subject File, Iceland Planning (10/07/1986) (2)) See Documents 6 and 7.

## 2. Editorial Note

In his diary entry for October 20, 1986, President Ronald Reagan noted: "A meeting to discuss how to respond to the Soviets kicking 5 of our diplomatic people out of Russia. Four are from the Soviet Embassy & 1 from the Leningrad Consulate. This is their reply to our sending 25 of their K.G.B. types home from the U.N. We had announced we were going to reduce their staff at the U.N. which is greater than the next 2 nations put together. Now they have hinted at further action if we reply in kind. Well we're going to reply with 4 from their embassy & 1 from the S.F. [San Francisco] consulate are going to be ordered out. In addition we're going to reduce their staff to the size of ours in Moscow—that will be maybe as many as 80 or so." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, Volume II, November 1985–January 1989, p. 649; brackets in quoted text)

In telegram 18358 from Moscow, October 22, the Embassy reported that Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs USA Department Deputy Vitaly Mikol'chak had summoned U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission Richard Combs to declare five U.S. officials *persona non grata* (PNG). Reading a prepared oral statement, Mikol'chak linked this action to the U.S. reduction of Soviet staff at the Embassy in Washington and Consulate General in San Francisco. In response, Combs "made clear that U.S. actions had not been directed at poisoning [the] atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet relations," and that "we could not accept the unfounded implication that the five U.S. officers were engaged in improper activity, or that our U.N. actions were discriminatory." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860815–0208)

### 3. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 27, 1986, 11 a.m.–noon

#### SUBJECT

Arms Control Follow-up to Reykjavik (U)

#### PARTICIPANTS

The President	CIA
State	Mr. Douglas George
Secretary George Shultz	JCS
Treasury	Admiral William J. Crowe
Secretary James Baker	General Larry D. Welch
Defense	LTG John Moellering
Secretary Caspar Weinberger	White House
Mr. Richard Perle	Chief of Staff Regan
Energy	VADM John M. Poindexter
Secretary John Herrington	Dr. Alton J. Keel
OMB	Mr. William Cockell
Mr. James Miller	Colonel Robert Linhard
ACDA	Special Advisors
Mr. Kenneth Adelman	Ambassador Paul Nitze
	Ambassador Edward Rowny

The meeting opened at 11:00 a.m. in the Situation Room. The agenda was as shown at *Tab A*.<sup>2</sup> (U)

VADM Poindexter opened the meeting using his prepared talking points. He then asked Secretary Shultz to comment on the results of his consultations following the President's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in Iceland. (C)

*Secretary Shultz:* I met with my NATO counterparts in Brussels, Ambassador Rowny travelled in Asia, Ken Adelman has been to Australia, Federal Republic of Germany Chancellor Kohl has been in Washington and UK Prime Minister Thatcher is coming, and Secretary Weinberger discussed the subject at the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meeting in Scotland.<sup>3</sup> Our openness was appreciated by all. In addition, our efforts with the press have turned the story around. By

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 0139 10/27/1986 [Arms Control] (1). Secret. Brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Prepared by Linton Brooks.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed are an undated memorandum from Poindexter to Reagan outlining the issues to be discussed at the NSPG meeting and talking points for Poindexter.

<sup>3</sup> The NATO Nuclear Planning Group met in Gleneagles, Scotland, October 21–22.

and large our Allies like the results in INF, like the idea of something in nuclear testing to get the issue off their backs, and like the breakthrough in START. (C)

The idea of eliminating all ballistic missiles was in our July position. Now we need to look at what our hole cards are. I highlighted what has to go with such a step in the areas of chemical weapons, conventional forces and British, French and Chinese ballistic missiles. On the whole, the reaction was good. As people think about the world in this context, they have a great deal to do to understand its consequences. (S)

*VADM Poindexter* then asked Secretary Weinberger to debrief the reaction of the Allies at the recent NPG. (U)

*Weinberger*: Our public posture is fine. We issued the strongest communique ever.<sup>4</sup> The Allies continue to criticize INF linkage by the Soviets. Their unity is high. In private, however, there are people who are worried about the sufficiency of deterrence. Will we be able to bring up our conventional forces when our nuclear forces are decreased? All reductions proposals must be made in the context of deterrence equations that work. In bringing up conventional forces the Allies are worried about verification. They also all agree that conventional assurances from the United States hinge on Congressional funding while the Soviets have no similar problem. Finally they are concerned with Soviet refire capability and the lack of adequate INF verification. In the end, all were convinced and signed the communique as a sign of unity. They recognized that without ballistic missiles we will have a different type of deterrence, and that to maintain deterrence will require the support of Congress, etc. They are all worried about sufficiency. Admiral Crowe will discuss sufficiency later. (S)

*VADM Poindexter* then turned to the subject of instructions to negotiators, using his prepared talking points but modifying them to note (a) that Soviet Emissary Viktor Karpov had been travelling and had been taking a different position than the Soviets were taking in Geneva and (b) that START and INF instructions had been completed and sent so that only Defense and Space issues needed to be discussed. He suggested beginning with the issue of whether to discuss with the Soviets what is and is not permitted by the ABM Treaty, and called on Secretary Shultz to open the discussion. (S)

*Shultz*: If we are to reach the outcome we seek we will need to resolve this issue. It is well to start laying the ground now so that the sides can have a sense of the issue and why there has been no progress. Our negotiators should (1) express patiently and forcefully our broad

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<sup>4</sup> The communiqué is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1986, pp. 65–66.

interpretation of the ABM Treaty restrictions on testing, (2) do some creative listening, that is, listen to see when the Soviets describe laboratories what they mean. Shevardnadze used his hands to indicate the laboratories were like a box, while Dubinin suggested laboratories could be outdoor test ranges. We should let them talk and find out what they mean. (3) We should not now engage in active negotiations on this subject. Now is not the time for such negotiations. (S)

*The President:* I could not agree more. We should not begin negotiations that will lead to concessions. We know what we meant in regard to the ABM Treaty. When we go back to them we are talking about a treaty now where we will share the benefits of SDI research. They did not believe that we would share those benefits when we talked in Reykjavik. (S)

*Shultz:* He [Gorbachev] didn't say that he wouldn't share the benefits if he had such a system. (S)

*The President:* They never talk about cheating. There is a Russian proverb "Doboryai no probia" which means trust, but verify. (S)

*Weinberger:* I agree, we should not negotiate on this subject. We should not let them talk about what they can't negotiate. All the things we wish to do under the treaty are not obstacles to agreement. The obstacle is that the Soviets don't want us to work on this at all. The obstacle is they want us not to work in the same areas where they are already working. I am against discussing this subject. I disagree with George [Shultz] that ultimately we will need to resolve it. Any outcome other than the broad interpretation is less than what we need. The current instructions that we reject further limitations is all we need. A middle ground is bad. If we limit defenses in the context of a ten-year development program, we won't get there. (S)

*The President:* If the treaty bears this out, and we have not used the clause that it is a problem, can we simply lay the text on the table? (S)

*Weinberger:* You have already said the broad interpretation is correct. Conversation on this subject can only cut us back from where we are. We should stress the broad interpretation. (S)

*The President:* Can't we simply state that we are following the broad interpretation and that we will make no concessions? (S)

*Weinberger:* I am worried about any discussion of this. (C)

*Poindexter:* We will have to get into this with Congress. Can we turn now to the subject of non-withdrawal? (C)

*Weinberger:* It is difficult for a nation to say we will not withdraw from an agreement that is being violated by the Soviets. I have argued against the phrase "non-withdrawal". We could say not deploy or not test, but we should not say non-withdrawal. (S)

*The President:* My going ahead with this approach assumes that we can't get a system within ten years. (S)



*Weinberger:* In all likelihood that is correct. But this is different from saying that we will not withdraw from the treaty, especially if the Soviets continue to violate it. We should not accept non-withdrawal under any circumstances. Our goal is not to preserve the ABM Treaty. You should state to our negotiators that what we need is a new treaty. That treaty can provide that we won't deploy for ten years, but we can't accept an unlimited non-withdrawal commitment. Non-withdrawal is geared to preserving the ABM Treaty, and that is not our goal. Our negotiators should make it clear that what we are after is a new treaty. (S)

*Shultz:* I agree that a non-withdrawal pledge must not waive our ability to withdraw from the treaty for reasons of extreme national interests. I don't disagree with Cap. (S)

*The President:* We are doing the same thing they are. We believe that we are preserving the Treaty. We can't look that far ahead, so we don't want to waive all our rights. We will adhere to the six-months notice requirement. Could we not say that six months is all it calls for and they have violated the treaty? (S)

*Crowe:* I think it is important that you hear the JCS views. We have tried to keep a low profile, but we have done a lot of analyses on the military balance and our ability to deter. We are supportive of arms control, including reductions in strategic ballistic missiles. The time frames discussed at Reykjavik we had not considered before. Fifty percent reductions in five years and zero ballistic missiles in ten years have not been analyzed. We don't have a computer model to help us envision the world in 1996. We need to make a lot of assumptions. (S)

The JCS conclusions are as follows. On INF we concur with the INF approach. With regard to a fifty percent strategic offensive reduction in five years, the risks are a bit higher than today. If, however, we have a discreet proposal, and if we modernize along with the reductions, and if the conventional situation gets a little better, then we can support a fifty percent reduction. We did not address verification. (S)

Going to zero ballistic missiles in ten years is a real challenge. It will take some time until all our analysis is complete. There would be a whole new climate of deterrence in such a world. We have identified several issues:

—First, the triad would have to change to either a monad or a dyad with bombers and SLCMs.

—Second, we would need to reappraise our use of weapons in counterforce and flexible response. We would have to come up with new policies. We don't exactly know how NATO extended deterrence would work in this kind of world. We need guidance.

—Third, if SSBNs are eliminated then the entire Soviet approach to ASW will change. The Soviets will be able to shift much more of their forces to the open ocean.



—Fourth, we need to ensure we have adequate deterrence each day from today to the time we reach zero ballistic missiles. That means we have to look at when we shift from SSBNs [ballistic missile submarines] to SSGNs [cruise missile carrying submarines] and how we make that shift.

—Fifth, we know we will require more bombers, more tankers, improved air defense beyond what we have now, converting SSBNs to SSGNs, improved ASW to counter Soviet cruise missile-carrying submarines, and improved conventional forces.

—Sixth, we will need to persuade Congress and the public to increase dollars as our strategic forces go down. (S)

The military issues are much more complex than the other issues. The Chiefs support zero ballistic missiles and we are ready to run reasonable risks, but stability is the name of the game and it will require conventional improvements and other steps. Some steps can't be taken in ten years (more bombers and air defense for example). Thus we will face gaps. We may be at a disadvantage at some point during this phase down. The transition to zero ballistic missiles would involve high risks. We can't advise moving to such a situation in ten years. We have no doubt this will have to extend beyond 1996 but we don't know how far beyond. We need to get a better understanding of costs; this will not be a cost free exercise. We also need strong Allied support. We need an interagency effort to determine the policy that we will follow ten years in the future if we are to move to a zero ballistic missile world. (S)

*Weinberger:* The Soviets have an immensely strong air defense. We need to recognize that we face a great risk here. So our time table has never been reviewed and needs to be. We need a time table and if an effective defense takes longer then we will have to go longer. (S)

*Crowe:* We have the technology for defense, but we need the funding. (C)

*Shultz:* I welcome this thoughtful discussion. We need to find our way to zero ballistic missiles and zero nuclear weapons. If Reykjavik does nothing but shake up people that's fine. Adequate deterrence in a non-nuclear world means more money for conventional armaments. What we are buying for that money is getting away from being 30 minutes away from the end of civilization. We need to challenge the idea that we can't do this. We have a five trillion dollar economy. Now we are spending \$280 billion for defense; we need to look in the range of \$400 billion a year in order to get something very important. Much larger resources are available than we are using. (S)

I want to say something about Reykjavik. We need to try to make it clear that when you said you were in favor of eliminating all nuclear weapons, and people were scandalized, that you were not making a specific proposal. We should simply say that our positions are what

we formally tabled. We are very public on being ready to eliminate offensive ballistic missiles. (S)

*Poindexter:* The President's 1983 speech sought to eliminate ballistic missiles, with the ultimate aim of making all nuclear weapons obsolete.<sup>5</sup> In January 1986 we agreed that the ultimate objective was to eliminate all nuclear weapons. But this requires a balance of conventional forces, shifting the competition to peaceful means, etc. The President's position has been clearly placed on the record here. (S)

*The President:* I want to assure you I understand the calls for a shift to conventional forces is the basis of deterrence. We know our NATO Allies are only scratching the surface. They have the GNP and the people that the Soviets can't match. The Soviets need to realize that their economy can't go much further. They are up against an economic block in conventional forces. If the Soviets have to face an arms race with the rest, they can't win. This is what we are counting on, all the way down to rifles in the hands of our Allies. Then there will be no first strike advantage. We will pay through the nose, but we will not permit them superiority. (S)

At the tail end of the discussions in Reykjavik, they wanted to confine SDI to laboratory testing. Gorbachev assailed our language on ballistic missiles. He offered all nuclear weapons—rather than all ballistic missiles. We said, well, let's get back to our discussion on laboratory testing. We just said we understand what you are offering. We did not agree. Then we went back to discussing laboratory testing. (S)

I was campaigning last week on campuses. The biggest political rally was at the University of Oklahoma. There were signs saying to keep SDI, and also some signs saying get rid of SDI. I pointed out that people were misinterpreting SDI. It is a totally defensive system and we have offered to share its benefits. I got a standing ovation and there were no signs raised. Uniforms were once despised on campus, now they are accepted. The kids were on their feet when I spoke of their military in uniform. This is a different generation. (S)

*Weinberger:* You changed their views. Gorbachev does want an agreement. We have leverage because of this. (S)

*Regan:* Let me ask a question. Where does partial deployment fit? (C)

*Weinberger:* We are authorized to deploy in one area only. (U)

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to Reagan's March 23, 1983, televised address from the Oval Office in which he announced the Strategic Defense Initiative. The address is printed in *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1983, Book I, pp. 437–443, and is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.

*Regan:* Let's let this be part of the JCS study—complete deployment, partial deployment or what. The budget of the last three years has been six to seven percent of the GNP. In 1988 we could have 320 billion, with 360 billion in 1990. We will have extra money in the budget. What do we do about shaping these budgets? I don't think we will get much more than six to seven percent of GNP. (C)

*Weinberger:* We *don't* have extra money in the budget. Fifty percent of our budget is personnel. It costs quite a bit to maintain the kind of forces we have. We are doing the best planning we can do. (C)

*Regan:* If we are going to shift to a new kind of world we need to know it *now*. If a budget increase is needed to get to zero ballistic missiles, we will have to redefine our priorities. (C)

*Weinberger:* We need more money, not redefined priorities. (C)

*Baker:* If we are going to add money in order to go a different type of deterrence we need that knowledge early. (S)

*Crowe:* Deterrence will be different in this new world. (S)

*Weinberger:* And we will have to worry because they have such strong air defenses. (S)

*Poindexter:* But Stealth will help to overcome that advantage. (S)

*Crowe:* Stealth is a long way in the future. (S)

*The President:* If we were able to get an agreement and to show the Soviets they are faced with a conventional arms race, that Congress will see what they are doing, that we were going to conventional deterrence without nukes. The Soviets could not keep up with such a race. (S)

*Adelman:* Before we change deterrence we must first ask (a) is it good for us and (b) is it good for the Europeans. (S)

*Poindexter:* The question is not whether we are going to go to a zero ballistic missile world, but how best to do it. (S)

*Adelman:* Then what is the likelihood of any arms control agreement? How practical are such sweeping steps? I think we should concentrate on fifty percent reductions in START. On zero ballistic missiles, I just don't see it as happening. (S)

*Miller:* We can't get the money without cutting the domestic budget or a tax increase. (C)

*The President:* We ought to be able to find 40 programs no one wants. Again, with us going ahead with SDI the Soviets have another incentive. We will share the benefits with them if we eliminate ballistic missiles. If we don't eliminate ballistic missiles we will deploy SDI, treaty or no. What will the Soviets do if we have a shield *and* offensive ballistics? They could think that we have a first strike capability. If they move on fifty percent reductions, we should be able to move further. (S)

*Adelman:* Does massive arms control then mean massive spending? (S)

*The President:* Maybe it does. (U)

*Poindexter:* We will be working with the departments and agencies to structure an answer to the question of what we have to do now in order to be able to go to zero ballistic missiles in ten years. (S)

Admiral Poindexter then drew the meeting to a close. (U)

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#### 4. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, October 31, 1986, 1555Z

18874. For the Secretary from Hartman. Subject: Your Meeting With Shevardnadze.

1. Secret—entire text.

2. As you prepare for next week's meetings with Shevardnadze,<sup>2</sup> let me offer the following thoughts.

3. In Reykjavik we came close to striking an important arms control deal.<sup>3</sup> The possibility of getting such an accord remains very much alive, but, after two weeks of public exchanges between Washington and Moscow, your talks with Shevardnadze are now crucial for getting things back on track.

4. I do not believe the Soviets intended to entrap us in Reykjavik; what they have been playing is a two-track approach. When Reykjavik did not produce agreement, they went public to generate support for their positions.<sup>4</sup> Much as we did.<sup>5</sup> When we went on the record with interpretations of Reykjavik they disputed, they went further by citing their own protocol. It is in our interests to turn off this approach. And the failure of Europe, and our own public and Congress, to embrace

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, Background Book for Vienna Meeting. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Adam. Special Encryption. Poindexter initialed the top right-hand corner of the telegram.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 6 and 7.

<sup>3</sup> Poindexter wrote a question mark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

<sup>4</sup> Poindexter underlined "Reykjavik did not produce agreement, they went public to generate" and wrote a question mark in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

<sup>5</sup> Poindexter underlined "Much as we did" and wrote a question mark below it.

the Soviets' proposals may have sobered them up. If they want to deal, it's going to be with the administration, not around it.<sup>6</sup>

5. Shevardnadze will thus go to Vienna prepared to negotiate and may even have some new ideas. That's the word around Moscow, and it would explain Karpov's presence here rather than Geneva.

6. Your time with Shevardnadze will be limited; we will want to cover the items of interest to US (regional, bilateral, human rights)—at least in bullet form. As to arms control, I suggest you focus on SDI and the question of ABM Treaty interpretation. We are not as far apart on this as we thought October 12.<sup>7</sup> While the Soviets desire tighter limits on SDI than even the ABM Treaty's restrictive interpretation, both Shevardnadze and Dubinin have indicated since Reykjavik that there is give in the Soviet position.<sup>8</sup> For example, both have emphasized that their concept of laboratory testing encompasses more activities than just those that take place within four walls and a roof.

7. We have told the Soviets we are ready to observe "strictly" the provisions of the ABM Treaty for ten years.<sup>9</sup> This seems to me to open the way to compromise between the Soviet position and those who favor a broader reading of the treaty: We should make explicit to the Soviets that for ten years we would abide by the treaty's restrictive (i.e., 1972) interpretation, with a negotiated understanding as to exactly what limits that would entail—and not entail—for the development and testing of SDI, particularly the testing of SDI in space. (A clearer understanding of the ABM Treaty limits is essential; ambiguities could be used against us in the future. We might, for example, run the risk that Congress would hold us to tighter constraints while the Soviets exploited grey areas to push further in the field of strategic defense.)

8. We might also consider translating the President's position that SDI be non-nuclear into explicit assurances to the Soviets that we will not pursue x-ray lasers beyond a certain point (e.g., beyond underground concept tests).<sup>10</sup> The Soviets appear to have an inordinate fear of Excalibur, which I understand is, in fact, less likely to produce results in the near-term than other SDI technologies under investigation.<sup>11</sup> Moving to placate this fear could make the Soviets more amenable to other aspects of SDI, and would reduce our current vulnerability to

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<sup>6</sup> Poindexter drew a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this sentence and wrote "yes?"

<sup>7</sup> Poindexter wrote in the right-hand margin next to this sentence: "!!!"

<sup>8</sup> Poindexter wrote in the right-hand margin next to this sentence: "!"

<sup>9</sup> Poindexter circled the number of this paragraph.

<sup>10</sup> Poindexter circled the number of this paragraph.

<sup>11</sup> One of several options considered as part of the Strategic Defense Initiative, Excalibur was a proposed X-ray laser that would shoot down Soviet missiles.

charges of misleading the public (by asserting SDI is non-nuclear while pressing forward on the x-ray laser).

9. These changes, granted, would place additional constraints on SDI beyond 1991 than we now may intend.<sup>12</sup> However, we need to show some flexibility in this area to clinch a deal for deep reductions. The Soviets feel they made the bulk of the concessions in Reykjavik on START and INF, and with some justification, since they essentially accepted the basic elements of U.S. proposals. Likewise, the Soviets accepted our overall approach on the testing question. But it would not be realistic to expect them to come around to our current position on SDI and the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty.<sup>13</sup>

10. My other suggestion is that you and Shevardnadze set aside the issue of what would be eliminated in the second five-year period.<sup>14</sup> It is a time-sink with virtually no prospect of agreement at this stage. Moreover, this is the aspect of our approach in Reykjavik that has given the Europeans—and some Americans—the greatest heartburn. It is also unrealistic: Neither we nor the Soviets can agree to give up nuclear arms or offensive ballistic missiles without bringing in third countries, and it's difficult to see that happening before major U.S. and Soviet reductions are underway. If we focus attention in the negotiations, and in public statements, on the first five years' offensive cuts, we will be better off.

11. Finally, I believe we should put down a marker and some specifics on verification. We must be clear with the Soviets—and with the public—that this is a major question. We don't want anyone to be surprised when, once the principles of an accord are agreed, hard work is still needed to dot the i's and cross the t's.

12. The changes in our approach in paras 7, 8, and 10 will be contentious among some in Washington, but they seem to be in our interests, and would open the way to an arms control agreement of great significance. I look forward to seeing you in Vienna.

**Hartman**

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<sup>12</sup> Poindexter circled the number of this paragraph and drew a vertical line down the right-hand margin next to the first two sentences.

<sup>13</sup> Poindexter drew a vertical line down the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

<sup>14</sup> Poindexter drew a vertical line down the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

5. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 3, 1986

SUBJECT

Your Meetings with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Based upon our earlier discussions, the President has reviewed the plans for your upcoming meetings in Vienna with the Soviet Foreign Minister. The President agrees that the U.S. objectives for these meetings are as follows:

1. consolidate the accomplishments made at Reykjavik by confirming Soviet agreement on those issues which we feel were resolved to our satisfaction;
2. clarify the U.S. and Soviet positions in the Defense and Space area;
3. pocket the positive aspects of General Secretary Gorbachev's remarks on verification;
4. press for making progress in START, INF and in other areas where common ground exists and resist Soviet attempts to link such progress to the Defense and Space area; and
5. confirm Soviet intent to press forward with planned activities in the non-arms control areas as agreed in Reykjavik. (S)

The President also agrees with our objectives in each of the individual areas discussed at Reykjavik. (U)

—With respect to the areas of human rights, regional and bilateral issues, we should confirm the work plan developed in Iceland. (U)

—In START, we should confirm the language agreed at Reykjavik, as well as the supporting understanding reached during the U.S./Soviet experts discussions concerning the implementation of the agreed language. (S)

—In the INF and nuclear testing areas, we should seek Soviet agreement on the language that we have previously proposed. (S)

—In the area of Defense and Space, we should:

- a. note for the record the last U.S. proposal made in Reykjavik;
- b. note for the record the last Soviet proposal made in Reykjavik;
- c. identify the key differences between these positions to include:

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, Shultz-Shevardnadze, Vienna, 11/05/1986–11/06/1986 (3). Secret. Poindexter crossed out Shultz's full name in the addressee line, handwrote "George," and sent the memorandum to Reagan under cover of a handwritten memorandum on November 4. Reagan initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum to Shultz.

1. that the Soviet position is more restrictive than the existing ABM Treaty;
2. that we differ on what further reductions should occur during the second five years of the ten-year period; and
3. that we require a clear statement that either side would be free to deploy advanced defenses against ballistic missiles after the ten-year period, unless mutually agreed otherwise. (S)

The most recent instructions to the U.S. Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks (documented in NSDD 249)<sup>2</sup> provide the authoritative guidance needed in the START, INF and Defense and Space areas. NSDD 247<sup>3</sup> provides corresponding guidance in the area of nuclear testing. Also attached are other items of guidance recently approved by the President which will also be helpful to you.<sup>4</sup> With these documents to draw upon as needed, we should be in an excellent position to pursue the objectives outlined above. (S)

The President agrees that, if we are successful in achieving our objectives in Vienna, there could be a statement issued as a result of the meeting. He also agrees that if we are not successful, we should make a concerted effort to present and explain the positions we have recently tabled in Geneva to the public in the U.S. and overseas. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

John<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Dated October 29. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council: National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs), NSDD 249)

<sup>3</sup> Dated October 10. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council: National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs), NSDD 247)

<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed are two undated papers entitled "Proposed Next Steps on Conventional Arms Control" and "Treatment of Third Country Nuclear Ballistic Systems in U.S. Arms Control Proposals."

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this handwritten signature.



**6. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Vienna, November 5, 1986, 3:55–6:55 p.m. and 7:05–7:15 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Meeting between the Secretary and Shevardnadze

**PARTICIPANTS***U.S. Side*

Secretary Shultz

Tom Simons (notetaker)

Dimitry Zarechnak (interpreter)

*Soviet Side*

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

P. Palazhchenko (interpreter)

*The Secretary* welcomed Shevardnadze, and offered him tea or coffee, noting it was self-service. *Shevardnadze* said that was the best way. He asked if the Secretary were tired. *The Secretary* replied that it was not too bad; he was able to sleep on an airplane. *Shevardnadze* said he also made himself sleep on a plane, though this was not easy to get used to. *The Secretary* said his plane was like an office in the air. Everyone was there, and there was a tendency to talk and meet.

The Secretary said they had a little time that evening and the next morning. *Shevardnadze* asked how long the Secretary expected this meeting to go on. *The Secretary* said as far as he was concerned it was openended. He could accommodate to Shevardnadze's schedule. *Shevardnadze* said he could spend as much time as needed, but he had heard the Secretary had another meeting. *The Secretary* said there was a place he had to be at around 7:00 p.m., but it was a reception, so he did not need to be precise.

*Shevardnadze* said he thought it was good that they were meeting. If it had not been for the meeting in Vienna, this forum, they might have had to schedule a special meeting. They had needed to meet and talk. *The Secretary* said he agreed. *Shevardnadze* continued that they needed to see where we were, what stage we were at, what to do next.

*The Secretary* said this was a good way to express the right agenda. He had a suggestion on how to proceed when they resumed in the plenary. He felt, and the President felt, that the Reykjavik meeting had turned out to be a very good idea, because as the General Secretary had said, we are now in a new situation created by those meetings.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz—Shevardnadze Vienna, 11/87. Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Simons. The meeting took place at the U.S. Embassy. Shultz was in Vienna November 4–6 to attend a CSCE Review meeting.

So much ground had been covered in such a short space, the Secretary continued, that it was not possible to go back on it. We had to recapitulate carefully, to go back and see what the differences and areas of agreement were, as the two of them had in Washington. It should be possible to do that; in any case we needed to discuss the issues and see where things stood.

To that end, the Secretary continued, what we had done was to get up a series of written statements—we could turn them over in the plenary or wherever Shevardnadze wished—of what we felt was agreed to, and with brackets where we had not agreed. It might not contain what the Soviets understood, but the purpose was to put these things down, and have something to work from in these matters.

In addition to the subjects that had been formally addressed in Reykjavik, we had also put down some things on the subject of verification. Both leaders had seemed to stress this, and we had tried to distill what the General Secretary and the President had said, and put together some propositions on the subject.

*Shevardnadze* said he thought this was the correct approach. He wished to say two words about the significance of the Reykjavik meeting. Just an hour after the meeting ended the Secretary had noted his disappointment and sadness at the fact that we had been so close to historic agreements, but that they had not happened. Mikhail Gorbachev in speaking to reporters had made the Soviet assessment very clear too: it had been an extremely important meeting, that set a new stage not just in Soviet-American relations but as a world-scale event, making an advance toward a nuclear-free world. His assessment was that this was a major achievement for both sides, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Of course at the press conference he had also made some critical judgments, but the tone and spirit had been optimistic, particularly the phrase that Reykjavik had not taken them farther from a Washington meeting of the two leaders.

Unfortunately, Shevardnadze went on, members of the U.S. Administration—and he had to say this frankly; he had been and had to be frank; their relations permitted him to be frank—had taken some actions in quite an opposite direction. Members of the Administration had also had differing assessments and interpretations of what had been agreed on by the two leaders. There had also been one-sided assessments, and this practice was not good for international relations, for relations between two great powers.

Shevardnadze continued that he had to recall the unpleasant feelings aroused by the recent series of expulsions.<sup>2</sup> They had not been

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<sup>2</sup> In telegram 18358 from Moscow, October 22, Hartman reported that the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs had expelled five U.S. officials in retaliation for the U.S. expulsion of five Soviet employees in Washington suspected of espionage. See Document 2.

useful either for the U.S. or for the Soviet Union. This was a pity; it was sad. He had spent 25 hours talking with the Secretary in New York, including on this problem. He would not elaborate on Soviet feelings and attitudes about certain statements on the U.S. side, but he asked the Secretary to let him mention one of them.

Shevardnadze said he thought an end should be put to talk about how you can only talk to the Russians from a position of strength, putting pressure on them. Frankly, he said, they in the leadership did not take this talk seriously. But their people heard this talk, a nation of 300 million, with their history, their dignity, their potential, their faith in the future. When the President said it was the strength of the U.S. that forced them back to the table, forced them to make concessions, this should not be said by leaders of the stature of the President of the United States.

Shevardnadze said he understood that everyone has domestic problems, party or election politics, maybe other considerations. But even in that respect such statements had not gained anything for the U.S. side. From the point of view of the Soviet state they had not paid dividends. Rather the contrary.

Addressing the Secretary, Shevardnadze said he should have no doubt that the Soviets wished to deal with the U.S. They had demonstrated this in Geneva, in Reykjavik. They were willing to discuss any problems. When on both sides there was a sincere desire, not just for dialogue, but for results, the talks had been productive.

Shevardnadze said he wished to ask the Secretary one question before they went to the plenary: should we stand at the level of mutual understanding reached at Reykjavik or not? Should we believe what the President and the General Secretary had said, or not? This was the simplest question, but also the most important question. Because if we started from the understanding that the President and the General Secretary had reached—agreement to begin a process of eliminating nuclear arsenals in ten years or twelve years—he recalled 1996—then all the other problems about nuclear arms—verification, and space, and the ABM Treaty, and SDI, and nuclear testing—could be seen in a new, wholly different context.

Shevardnadze said he understood we had turned out not to be ready for the discussion, but he asked whether we should be guided by the situation that had emerged. This was a question of fundamental significance. In the speech he had made that day he had not quoted the President's words, but he had referred to them. They were in his notes. He had gotten into the habit of taking notes. Dimitry took notes; so did his interpreter. And he recalled that the President had welcomed the possibility of eliminating by 1996 not just offensive weapons but all other nuclear weapons, bombers, bombs, cruise missiles.

He understood, and the General Secretary understood, what had been said, and Gorbachev asked whether what the President had said was just an emotional outburst, or a statement by the President of a great power. What did it mean? This was a basic question.

Why had the question arisen in our minds, Shevardnadze asked. The fact was that the Soviets were faced with different interpretations, different versions by Administration members, except for the Secretary. Regan had expressed his opinion. The President had given a somewhat different opinion. Then Admiral Poindexter had given his version. The latest statement by the President was then different from that. If they looked at the U.S. delegation proposals in Geneva, they were not a continuation of the Reykjavik conversation; they did not reflect the level the conversation had had in Reykjavik.

Shevardnadze said he had considered his lengthy remarks to be necessary. He did think we needed clarity. The question was: shall we be guided by the Reykjavik understandings or not? Clarity was necessary.

*The Secretary* said he would like to comment on the points Shevardnadze had made.

He agreed that we had been through a rough patch with the expulsions that had gone back and forth. After the last action the Soviets took, he had consulted with the President, and then said, "That's the end, we do not intend to take another step, let's end it." He wanted in no small measure to give Shevardnadze credit for helping him manage their way through this bad patch. Now we needed to go on and concentrate on the positive things we could do.

The Secretary continued that he believed that things which were very difficult to manage were likely to occur from time to time in our relationship. They would be a test to people in his job and Shevardnadze's job. So we should manage these difficulties, and work things out, but nonetheless not make it impossible to continue with other things. He hoped that was where we were.

As to the question of strength, the Secretary continued, he wished to cast the matter slightly differently. He had gotten to know Shevardnadze, and felt he had a good personal relationship with him. He liked to see him and his wife when they met. But that was not the basic reason why he (the Secretary) was with him so much more than he was with the Foreign Minister of Hungary. Budapest was a charming city; he loved to go there; there were many Hungarians in our country. We honored Hungary. But he paid a lot of attention to the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union was such a consequential country in the world; it had strength. He assumed that, *vice versa*, Shevardnadze liked the Belgians, as he himself did. Belgium was an honored and important

country. But it did not have the weight in the world that the United States did.

The President was very conscious of the importance of maintaining our capabilities, the Secretary went on, and he was proud that in his tenure these capabilities had improved. But he (the Secretary) understood Shevardnadze's point, and would take it on board.

Insofar as Reykjavik was concerned, the Secretary went on, his purpose in trying to clarify matters between Shevardnadze and himself in this meeting was to try to get things as straight as possible. We should take this opportunity. That was the reason why the U.S. side had gone to the effort of putting things down on the paper he could give Shevardnadze. He was prepared if Shevardnadze was to have the people with him meet with the people on Shevardnadze's delegation to go through these papers, to make things as clear as possible, and they could then meet the next morning. If that procedure was acceptable to Shevardnadze, they could follow it, and get as much clarity as possible.

With regard to the President's attitude toward the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons, the Secretary said, that was indeed the President's goal. He had said it before Reykjavik; he had said it at Reykjavik; he had said it since Reykjavik. It remained the President's view of what we should be trying to do. What the things are that needed to be accomplished most after a certain point in moving toward that goal, and how rapidly it could be reached, presented a series of very hard questions that had to be worked at carefully. He did not have to tell Shevardnadze that; the Soviet side said the same thing. As we made reductions in deterrent capabilities, the two of us would need to be sure that balance exists in those capabilities and in the world. With all due respect, it was not just the two of us, but also other countries. It would take some doing.

As he viewed the Reykjavik meeting, the Secretary continued, the two sides had reduced their discussions to reasonably clear writing, on procedures anyway, for bilateral, human rights and regional issues. He had that document with him. They had worked out a reasonably careful statement on strategic arms, for a 50% reduction. They had gone some way through a careful statement on intermediate-range arms, although the delegation groups had not been able to come to grips with it Saturday night since it was not until Sunday morning that the two leaders, with the two of them present, had reached agreement on a global limit, with a figure.<sup>3</sup> Where that left us on short-

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Reagan's meeting with Gorbachev in Reykjavik the morning of October 12. A memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986.

range missiles was not clear. We had differences on nuclear testing, but Shevardnadze had said that he thought a little effort could bring a definitive agreement into focus.

On verification, the Secretary said he thought the statements that had been made were very interesting. There had not been time to pin this down, so we had made an effort to do so. On space and defense, it seemed to him that discussion had focussed on three areas, but because they had not been able to finish they had not been able to pin this down very well.

*Shevardnadze* said there seemed to him to be contradictions in what the Secretary had said. Had the President said elimination of nuclear weapons was the end objective, or was this an agreement achieved at Reykjavik? He understood that there had been an agreement reached, not just that this was a final goal. There had been understanding reached for the elimination of all offensive weapons by the end of 1996, and then the President had gone on to say that all types of nuclear weapons should be abolished.

On medium-range missiles the Soviet side had made the major step on French and British systems, and also the step on Asia. On defense and space they had discussed important things, although agreement was not finalized. It was not just as a final goal, but as a result, that this was important. He had not said it that day in his speech, but he recalled that the President had said it would be good to instruct their delegations to work out an agreement to eliminate all nuclear arms, land-based, sea-launched, cruise missiles, to give it to the Geneva negotiators. He had not quoted Gorbachev, because there had been no contradictions there. But elimination of nuclear weapons had not been discussed as just a final goal. It had been more profound than that.

He agreed, *Shevardnadze* continued, that if we went forward on the formula the President had proposed all sorts of problems would emerge. He valued the Secretary's proposal that we would have to proceed by stages. This was a legitimate and correct approach. There could be a first step, a second step, and the like. Third countries, England, France, China, would have to be taken into account. The problem of other countries also arose, countries with nuclear bombs. This could be resolved, we could make provisions for it in our joint work, we could discuss how to use international fora, to make sure that no madman endangered our countries.

But what he needed to hear from the Secretary, *Shevardnadze* went on, was whether we were to be guided by an agreement that the President and the General Secretary had reached or by something else. If we were not to be guided by the agreement to eliminate all nuclear arsenals, why would we be guided by the other understandings reached? After all, they had not been signed either. What then would remain as a result of Reykjavik?

Shevardnadze said he wished to recall the course of the dialogue there. He remembered it very well. First there had been the proposal for two stages. In the first strategic offensive weapons would be reduced by 50%. In the second all remaining ballistic missiles would be reduced. Then after the recess, in the meeting in which they had both taken part, there had been the additional development that all kinds of strategic offensive weapons would be eliminated by the end of the second stage. Then he recalled that the President went further on elimination of all nuclear weapons at the end of ten years. Was that agreement now in force, Shevardnadze asked, or was the U.S. now going back on it?

The Soviet side attached fundamental importance to this because they had proposed at Reykjavik that the General Secretary and the President adopt directives that the Foreign Ministers could use to finalize texts for agreements. He thought they could be used to formulate final points here for the President and General Secretary to adopt and give the Foreign Ministers to work into agreements. But in order to work seriously the Soviet side needed to know whether the two sides were to be guided by Reykjavik or not.

*The Secretary* replied that they needed to be. That was his guide. There was more clarity in some areas than in others. But on space and defense he wished to remind Shevardnadze that there had been a number of ambiguities, which had left them all tired and disappointed. Afterward the press had asked him why he looked tired and disappointed; he had replied it was because he *was* tired and disappointed. He wished to review these for Shevardnadze.

*Shevardnadze* interjected that he was sorry the Secretary had avoided answering his question: should be we guided by what the President had said, that all nuclear arsenals should be eliminated by the end of 1996? If so, we were in a completely new situation. Against that background we would have to look differently at the questions of nuclear arsenals, the positions of France, England and China, at new circumstances, at nuclear explosions. And some adjustments might be made in the outlook on SDI, because it was one situation where nuclear weapons continued to exist, and another where they no longer existed.

*The Secretary* reiterated that the President would welcome getting rid of all nuclear weapons. As he viewed it, the sooner the better. But he also recognized—and in the last hours of Reykjavik it had not been possible to spell this out—that this was an exceedingly complicated task. It was a task that disaggregated itself, so to speak. Our task is to find how the pieces fit together. There were different pieces. Some would take longer than others. It would take much time. Probably elimination of all nuclear weapons would be the most complex piece, the last step, so to speak.

As we viewed it, the most destabilizing weapons that each side had were ballistic missiles, the Secretary said. That was because each



side could wipe each other out in 30 minutes. Once they were fired it was all over. They could not be called back. It was all over (here the Secretary snapped his fingers). This was very destabilizing, particularly with the MIRVs that have emerged.

*Shevardnadze* said that was the case for the U.S. side. (*The Secretary* replied that it was the case for the Soviet side too.) *Shevardnadze* continued that this was because, for example, the elimination of their nuclear arsenal would leave them nothing in Europe, but the British and French systems, which could not destroy the U.S., could still destroy the Soviets. That was destabilizing.

*The Secretary* said that of course it was, but he was seeking to categorize the most destabilizing systems, the ballistic missiles, the U.S. side's, the Soviet side's, anyone else's, and since it is known how they are produced, it was better to have an insurance policy against someone who got hold of them. But they were the most destabilizing weapon.

The next most destabilizing weapons, *the Secretary* went on, were those delivered over long ranges, in other words bombers, submarines with cruise missiles, as distinct from ballistic missiles. But these were less destabilizing, because bombers could be called back, and anyhow took a long time to get there, and at least the Soviet side had very impressive defenses, whereas there are none against ballistic missiles. These weapons were therefore destabilizing, but in a different category.

And one might say, *the Secretary* continued, that there is a third category of all nuclear weapons. Bombers or cruise missiles with nuclear weapons were one thing; with conventional weapons it was different. They were not welcome if you were hit by them, but they were different.

And then when one talked about all nuclear weapons one had everything from various tactical weapons as such to things people produce that set off nuclear explosions. These were not destabilizing elements, but they had potent consequences, not just in what was blown up but, as the Soviet Chernobyl accident<sup>4</sup> had shown, in secondary effects. This was not desirable, but it was not as destabilizing as other things. He did not pretend to be an expert, but he had been told that you could produce a nuclear explosive device and put it in a suitcase; it was that containable. So getting rid of these was very important, but also very difficult.

So, *the Secretary* continued, if *Shevardnadze* asked if the President was committed seriously to get rid of all nuclear weapons, the answer was yes. This was not just a statement. If *Shevardnadze* asked whether the President thought it likely in 10 years' time, the answer was that

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident on April 26.



he had doubts. If Shevardnadze asked if the President committed himself in Reykjavik to do this no matter what, the answer was no. There were so many complicated things to be worked out.

On Sunday afternoon nothing had been worked out, the Secretary recalled. There was the question of what to do after the ten years. There was the question of whether to treat short-range missiles under strategic or intermediate-range, not to speak of the question of what was permitted under the ABM Treaty, which received most of the focus. Nothing had been resolved, and we needed to work on it, to capture the momentum that had been there in what the two leaders had discussed and agreed on in complete seriousness on both their parts. He had no doubt about Mr. Gorbachev's conviction.

The Secretary went on to say he also thought we could not let ourselves become so preoccupied with arms control issues that we did not pay attention to what causes tension and produces arms. The two men had talked about this and agreed that the underlying tensions needed to be addressed. Here we had had periodic discussions of tense issues, of points where the U.S. and the Soviet Union had interests and influence. These had been productive, but not very productive, and we would like to see them continued, as had been agreed at Reykjavik.

Most fundamental, the Secretary went on, were the issues that went to individuals, like freedom of religion, of movement, of emigration, of divided families and spouses. These created enormous tension in our relationship, and more fundamentally in East-West relations. He did not know if Shevardnadze had anything to say to him, but they had discussed it, and the two leaders had discussed it, and we had put it at the top of the list.

At any rate, the Secretary said, what we were prepared to do that day, that night, the next day, or of course beyond, was to take the pieces of Reykjavik, to clarify them as far as we could, to use the exercise as a means, in the format the Soviet side had suggested for Reykjavik: in his letter to the President Gorbachev had described it as a preparatory meeting, a means of giving instructions to people in the various areas where they were negotiating.

*Shevardnadze* asked what then remained of what Comrade Gorbachev and the President had agreed. He categorically disagreed with the Secretary on the question of strategic offensive arms and eliminating nuclear arsenals. This had been the subject of full mutual understanding. We could say that the conversation had developed dramatically. But this meant that on the main problems there had been full mutual agreement, including agreement on non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for ten years. After that they could not advance. But Shevardnadze recalled that the President had said they had reached solutions of historical importance, and that it was up to the Soviet Union to

move on SDI. He had not cast any doubt on agreement on the other problems. If the U.S. did not now agree with this it should say so. The truth was the truth.

The Soviets did not use words lightly, Shevardnadze continued. The General Secretary had not done so when he talked to reporters in Reykjavik, and that was what the Soviets understood. On human rights and regional issues, Shevardnadze went on, he could say categorically that we either disassociate ourselves from what was agreed or be guided by what was agreed. Of course there had to be stages, and he understood that this gave rise to complex questions. He wished to stress that we could work on these questions, like that of the other nuclear powers. But we could not backtrack. It would be bad for the President, for future generations, if we backtracked. How could we believe Bessmertnykh and Mrs. Ridgway if we could not believe the President and the General Secretary?

*The Secretary* said he had tried to explain the U.S. view. He wished to ask a question: did the Soviet Union agree that at the end of the 10-year period both sides had the right to deploy if they chose to?

*Shevardnadze* replied that he thought what had been said at Reykjavik was quite clear. He thought the Soviet side had made serious concessions. They had agreed that research work could go on within the laboratory, broadly understood, as he had told the Secretary in Reykjavik. This implies the creation, or development, of mockups, prototypes and mockup systems, including ABM systems, and including space-based ABM systems. They had gone very far.

On the question of how to think about what to do after the ten years, Shevardnadze continued, they thought we should see what is revealed. We should see what science, research and practice produce. The Soviet side did not wish to deploy, but if they saw that there was no danger to them in the U.S. deploying, they would have no objection to the U.S. doing what it wanted.

Shevardnadze said he was asking a question. The Secretary and the President had said the U.S. was ready to accept a commitment not to withdraw from the Treaty for ten years and to observe the Treaty under the narrow interpretation. What did that mean? What is permitted, and what is not permitted, in terms of development of ABM systems?

*The Secretary* said Shevardnadze's remarks showed we need a careful discussion of this and other complicated matters. What the President and the General Secretary had done was to break into new ground. Shevardnadze had just stated the Soviet position at Reykjavik, not the U.S. position. With regard to permitted activities, no one had made a statement on the narrow interpretation. We followed one in our work, but we believed the ABM Treaty had broad permissibility. We were

ready to discuss this and go into detail on our views, at Geneva, or here for that matter. But at Reykjavik these issues had not been resolved.

If we asked where we were, the Secretary continued, the answer is that we were at a different and more promising stage than before Reykjavik, but that very serious difficulties remained. We needed to set down where we were. We had set down our formal position in writing, and assumed that the Soviet position was the one they had taken in writing too. We needed to try to capture the conversation and move it forward. We had tried to set that down and do that. That was where we were, in the Secretary's view.

*Shevardnadze* replied that that day's conversation reminded him of conversations they had had at Helsinki, at Geneva, in Washington.<sup>5</sup> It seemed to him as if Reykjavik had never taken place. But the Soviet side believed that it had taken place and was a very important event. Apparently this was only the Soviet view, however. He had to conclude that we could not be guided by what had been formulated by the two leaders on strategic offensive weapons and on eliminating nuclear arms. This was the general conclusion he had to draw.

Secondly, *Shevardnadze* went on, he had thought till then, from the Secretary's statements and the President's and what they heard from U.S. allies, that the U.S. Administration was following a narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. He asked if that were changing. He knew that the President had said he was for a broader interpretation, but then it seemed that the narrow interpretation had prevailed. The Soviet side was for strict interpretation of the Treaty. This was of fundamental importance to them. It was not their fault that the question had arisen. The fact that they had offered to put a timeframe on withdrawal from a treaty of unlimited duration was a serious concession.

*The Secretary* said that the U.S. view was not the same. They thought of our agreement to the ten-year timeframe as essentially an effort to accommodate Soviet concerns, to respond to those concerns; we accepted it, but it would be a change in the treaty. And the Soviet proposal to confine research to the laboratory was not a concession, but a narrowing of the treaty. If he were *Shevardnadze* he would try to sell it as a concession too, but it was a narrowing.

On the question of definition there were two operative matters, the Secretary went on. The first was what the treaty permitted. We had done a great deal of work on this, and we were prepared to discuss it and describe how we see the background, the history. We thought

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<sup>5</sup> References are to Shultz's meetings with *Shevardnadze* in Helsinki, July 30–August 1, 1985; Geneva, November 19–20, 1985; and Washington, September 27, 1985. Memoranda of their conversations are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986.

it had a broad meaning. Second, the President had chosen to manage his strategic defense program within boundaries that were less broad than what was permitted. But this did imply a position on what was permitted as we understood it.

*Shevardnadze* said the trouble was that we had different understandings and interpretations on the meaning of the treaty. In the past he had not been familiar with this, but recently he had studied it pencil in hand. He had to say that the U.S. approach was not consistent with the actual meaning of the treaty, if we were to say that observance of the treaty meant observance in the actual sense of the word. Perhaps the Secretary's colleagues could explain the U.S. view.

*The Secretary* said this was precisely what needed to happen. This was what Reykjavik stood for. On substance a great deal had been done. There remained much to do, but it was in a more productive context. This was the meaning the world saw, and why there was such an uproar in Europe. The two leaders had come together, and they had talked more realistically than ever before about radical reductions in nuclear weapons, looking to their full elimination sometime, and some way. They had talked seriously about it, and this forced people to think about a new situation, in new ways, about new realities. He personally thought this was a good thing. But there was a long way to go to that reality. We needed to work on that here, and in Geneva.

The Secretary continued that he thought the reason it had been easier to "deal into" nuclear testing was that so much had been discussed before, whereas with space and defense issues less was achieved because there had been much less discussion, and this needed to be done on the basis of what had been said. But the instincts of the two leaders, as he had said to *Shevardnadze* before, were right on where the world was going. But big change was involved, and big change would take awhile, and involve a vast array of complicated subjects. We needed to be getting about that task.

*Shevardnadze* said the two of them would take a beating for backtracking on what their two leaders had agreed to in Reykjavik, in practical terms. But what he was particularly interested in, and what others would explain to their people, was how the U.S. saw what was permitted and what was prohibited under the ABM Treaty. Because if we regarded the ten-year period was purely formal, or if, as the President had once said, it was just a piece of paper, the question was why we needed to conclude such an arrangement. For the Soviet side, it believed the treaty should be strictly observed. More clarity was needed.

*The Secretary* said we had been ready to explain our views for a long time. We took treaty obligations very seriously, and we were concerned that the Soviets did not. He did not wish to belabor the

point, but there was the Krasnoyarsk radar,<sup>6</sup> and we were concerned, with reference to Shevardnadze's point about a piece of paper.

He might go beyond that, the Secretary continued. The U.S. side believed the Helsinki Final Act and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which the Act explicitly referred, *inter alia* obligated the signatory states to permit free emigration.<sup>7</sup> That was one reason why he felt comfortable talking to Shevardnadze about the subject more frequently than, he was sure, Shevardnadze would like.

*Shevardnadze* said that when one side had a complaint about another side, this was not surprising. In relations among states that arises. But it should be a principle to be fair. The Soviet side had stated what the Krasnoyarsk radar would be. Let us not debate on that, he said. But let us hypothesize, he went on, that it was a violation. The Soviet side also believed that the U.S. radar in Greenland was a violation, and they had more arguments than the U.S.—the actual data, and the fact that it was outside national territory. Why had he mentioned fairness and objectivity? Because the Soviet side had proposed a way of resolving the issue that relieved both sides of burdens: for the Soviets, building theirs, and for the U.S., building and reconstructing theirs. If the U.S. were serious about trust, a political solution was needed. The decision should have been taken, but the U.S. did not want to take it.

*The Secretary* said the difficulty with Shevardnadze's argument was that he had used the word "reconstruction." The treaty explicitly recognized that existing radars could be maintained and modernized, which was what was happening to ours.

This was not the place to debate this issue, however. The question was how best to use the time remaining. He had made a proposal, and asked how Shevardnadze wanted to proceed.

*Shevardnadze* said he understood what the Secretary was saying, but "reconstruction" was different from what he had in mind. The problem was that the U.S. side was building a phased array radar, which was banned in the treaty. He was ready to discuss this with the Secretary, but his impression was that some members of the Administration did not want it to be resolved. Rather they wanted it to remain, so that they could repeat again and again that the Soviets were in violation.

He was afraid of experts' debates, Shevardnadze went on, because he already had the feeling that what had been achieved in Reykjavik

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<sup>6</sup> Reference is to the long-standing point of contention over whether the Soviet phased array radar at Krasnoyarsk violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

<sup>7</sup> Reference is to the Helsinki Final Act, signed August 1, 1975, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948.

would be eroded if we transmitted instructions to the negotiators in Geneva. Indeed voices were already being heard there: Mr. Kampelman had said that the U.S. can withdraw from the treaty *within* the ten-year timeframe; reasons are already being given why the U.S. can withdraw. Of course the Soviet side would find arguments to respond to him, but the question remained from the outset: would we be guided by the agreements reached in Reykjavik? And it turned out we would not.

*The Secretary* said he believed we should, and he had told Shevardnadze how things appeared to us regarding strategic arms, ballistic missiles and all nuclear weapons. There had been no meeting of the minds on what would happen after ten years or on what the ABM Treaty means. We were ready to discuss that. What was different at Geneva was that real discussion was now possible, whereas before Reykjavik he would have said that it was not very productive.

Procedurally, however, the Secretary said he wanted to ask again how Shevardnadze wished to use their time together. They had another half hour that evening, his delegation was ready to work through the evening, and they would meet again the next morning. If Shevardnadze wished, we could use the time to look at the papers, but if he was not prepared to do so, obviously we would not.

*Shevardnadze* said good, let's look at it. The Soviet side had also prepared some drafts.

He had to conclude, Shevardnadze commented, that the Secretary was more courageous than he was. The Secretary could discount what his President had said, while he could not backtrack on what the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the leader of his country, had said. *The Secretary* recalled that at Reykjavik he had offered Shevardnadze an amnesty, and the offer still stood. Laughing, *Shevardnadze* said he was sticking to his word.

*The Secretary* asked Shevardnadze whether he had anything to say to him about individual cases or about emigration. *Shevardnadze* said he probably had nothing new to say. The lists which were normally handed over were being given consideration. Some cases had been resolved, others were being studied and were in the process of resolution.

That day he had addressed humanitarian questions in his speech, Shevardnadze went on, on instructions from his leadership. The Soviet side believed that in addition to specific problems that needed to be resolved, specific individuals and families, more fundamental work needed to be done, not just in the Soviet Union but also in other countries. Informally he could say that this was a very interesting area, and it needed more work.

The Soviets were bringing their domestic law and regulations into line with all their international obligations, Shevardnadze continued. But he had inquired, and found that the U.S. had much more work in store for it. In his speech he had mentioned the U.N. Bill of Human Rights, and he would urge the Secretary's aides to look at the document and compare it to U.S. legislation. He was mentioning just some documents. There was also the International Labor Organization. The Soviet Union had had very difficult relations with it; that was earlier. But on questions of work, which was the organization's main function, there were 167 conventions, and the U.S. had ratified just 7. He had found there were dozens of documents of international importance that were ignored in many countries.

When they really looked at it, Shevardnadze continued, they had concluded that major discussion was needed. This meant not so much a list of complaints against each other, but discussion in order to resolve problems that had piled up in this area. So on instructions from the Soviet leadership, and Mikhail Gorbachev in particular, he had proposed convening a European forum within CSCE, including the U.S. and Canada, and proposed to convene the forum in Moscow. They favored a high-level meeting, with participation by foreign ministers, experts, lawyers, other officials. It would not be a formal thing, but designed to improve actual practice in all questions. There were also questions in the Soviet case, and they would work on them, but other countries had no right to remain outside the process.

Shevardnadze said he was familiar with the Secretary's speech that day.<sup>8</sup> He himself had avoided that kind of discussion. He had many facts and complaints, and he could have produced them on the basis of existing international documents, but he had not done so. He thought it would not be a good use of the rostrum to engage in further confrontation in the Soviet-American relationship. And if the forum took place in Moscow, he thought it also needed a constructive approach.

*The Secretary* said we would study the proposal, and he welcomed the serious spirit of the Soviet approach. We would also welcome any steps the Soviets took on individuals or issues.

The Secretary continued that the U.S. side had put forward a proposal, which had seemed more or less agreeable, to establish a humanitarian working group. It would do exactly what Shevardnadze had described, engage in systematic discussion. He understood we had suggested December 1 for a first meeting.

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<sup>8</sup> Reference is to Shultz's address before the CSCE Review meeting, entitled, "Pursuing the Promise of Helsinki." (Department of State *Bulletin*, January 1987, pp. 47–50)



*Shevardnadze* replied that perhaps in the context of the proposal they had just put forward the two sides could consider what needs to be done. It was important to know what position the U.S. would take. He did not rule out discussion at various levels, but we needed a major international discussion. We needed to tackle the issues scientifically, and take practical actions. The Soviets were not afraid of the problem. They would act on what would be decided.

*The Secretary* reiterated that he welcomed the spirit in which *Shevardnadze* and *Gorbachev* were approaching this, commenting that he would leave it at that.

The Secretary then suggested that perhaps they exchange papers, and report to the waiting groups on what was expected of them that evening. He wished to explain the U.S. papers<sup>9</sup> he was handing over:

- a paper on strategic offensive arms, without brackets, essentially what their people had worked out in Reykjavik;

- a paper on intermediate-range arms, worked on by Nitze and Akhromeyev, but not complete because the leaders had not yet agreed, so that there were some brackets; but the Soviets might have other things to say;

- a paper on space and defense issues, with lots of brackets; here too the Soviets might want some changes;

- an effort to say something on verification, drawn on what the leaders had said, to say something new;

- something on testing, which had been worked on but not agreed;

- the joint public statement and work program developed by *Besmertnykh* and *Ridgway*; this might perhaps be adjusted, since there had been some progress: we had concluded an agreement on space, the Soviets had tabled things on energy and transportation which we were studying; and

- a possible covering statement which says where we derived these things from—the Reykjavik events.

The Secretary said this was a package of papers, and we would have no problem on publicizing them. In fact there were arguments in favor of making them public—most of what was in them was known—but if we did that together it would have a greater stamp of authority. It would clarify not just where we agreed but where we did not agree. All these issues needed work.

In handing the papers over, the Secretary commented that they were held together by that essential of bureaucratic life, a paperclip.

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<sup>9</sup> Copies of the papers are in Department of State, EUR/RUS, Political Subject and Chronological Files, Lot 2000D471, Shultz-Shevardnadze/Vienna 11/5–6/86.



*Shevardnadze* said that he had a shorter document, a kind of thesis-like collection of key provisions of agreements by the U.S. and Soviet sides, to be signed after further preparations, on strategic offensive arms, on medium-range missiles, on the ABM Treaty, on the prohibition of nuclear testing. He was ready to instruct his people to consider them together with the Secretary's.

*Shevardnadze* said that if the Secretary permitted and time permitted, he would like the next day to have an exchange on chemical weapons and conventional weapons. *The Secretary* replied that he welcomed discussion of both topics. *Shevardnadze* said he would not be covering a great deal, but he did wish to say something.

He noted that the document the Soviet side was proposing was an unofficial translation, bound by two paper clips. *The Secretary* asked why one was larger than the other. *Shevardnadze* said that the big one was for Reykjavik, and the smaller one for backing away from it. (Actually, they were the same, but one was back-to-front.)

Returning to the question of how to continue, *Shevardnadze* said that at the plenum of delegations in Geneva on November 7 the Soviet delegation would put forward their proposals, based on all the arrangements agreed at Reykjavik. Then, since the schedule previously agreed called for a recess on November 11, that round would probably end. The next round was to begin only in early January. He put the issue to the Secretary as a kind of problem: should we wait for the next round, or contemplate desirable interim steps, meetings, consultations and the like? This was something that should be decided.

*The Secretary* asked if *Shevardnadze* had in mind meetings like those that had taken place the previous summer. *Shevardnadze* replied that that was one possibility. Or we could consider moving up the next round, say to the beginning of December. Or there might be some other possibility. He could not be precise, and perhaps the Secretary had some suggestions.

The most acute problem was what is permitted and what is banned under the ABM Treaty, *Shevardnadze* said. He attached special importance to this issue. It could be discussed at Geneva, or perhaps they could also set up a special group at a higher level, perhaps Deputy Minister, also including other agencies. This ought to be clarified as soon as possible. He felt that without clarity on this it was hard to expect any serious progress. He put the issue to the Secretary as a question. That was all he had to say. He did not see clear prospects, but believed we should go to work. He asked the Secretary whether they should instruct their aides jointly or separately.

*The Secretary* suggested that they go in together, describe their meeting, and say they had exchanged papers and agreed that the respective working groups should convene that evening to work over

papers to see how far they could get with them, having in mind reporting to the ministers the next morning. He would be glad to have the groups meet at the Embassy. It was 7:00 p.m.; perhaps they could meet at 8:30 or 9:00 p.m.

*Shevardnadze* suggested that the groups themselves decide. He did not place much hope in their discussions, since he doubted that deputies could resolve what ministers had been unable to resolve, but they should have work to do.

The ministers joined the general meeting at 7:05 p.m., following a photo opportunity. *Shevardnadze* invited the Secretary to read the verdict. *The Secretary* said he could make a summary, as at the end of their meeting, and *Shevardnadze* could add or subtract.

The Secretary said the ministers had discussed almost all the topics one way or another. The Minister had said that the next morning he wished to have some time for chemical and conventional weapons. They had exchanged papers. He had given the Minister materials the U.S. side had prepared, which were designed to clarify where we had come to agreement, and through brackets where we had not. The Minister had given him papers the Soviet side had prepared, a more overall-type statement. They had agreed their staffs should examine these papers during the evening to see what could be made of them, and report to the ministers in the morning. He had offered the room they were in for 9:00 p.m. that evening, and the Minister, with a deference toward his colleagues that the Secretary admired, had said they should choose their own time and place.

*Shevardnadze* said the Secretary had described everything correctly. The next morning they would meet in the Soviet Embassy. He hoped they would not be empty-handed. He did not wish it to be thought that only chemical and conventional weapons were unresolved questions; they simply had not had time to cover them. It was now time for the ministers to relax, and for the assistants to work.

*The Secretary* said that Ridgway and Nitze would be the team leaders on the U.S. side, and would be in touch with their Soviet counterparts.

*Shevardnadze* concluded that the system was in place, and now functioned automatically.

7. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Vienna, November 6, 1986, 8:05–9:40 a.m.

*Secretary Shultz's Meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze*

## PARTICIPANTS

## U.S.

The Secretary  
Amb. Ridgway  
Amb. Nitze  
Amb. Hartman  
Amb. Kampelman  
Amb. Matlock  
Mr. Linhard  
Mr. Parris  
Mr. Zarechnak (Interp.)

## U.S.S.R.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
Dep. ForMin. Bessmertnykh  
Amb. Karpov  
Mr. Mikul'chak  
Mr. Palazhchenko (Interp.)

*Shevardnadze* opened the meeting by asking when the Secretary would have to leave. The *Secretary* replied that, as he understood *Shevardnadze* had to leave Vienna at 10:00, he had planned accordingly.<sup>2</sup> *Shevardnadze* confirmed that his plane would leave Vienna at 10:00.

The *Secretary* indicated he had a number of points to make on subjects which had not been discussed the day before.<sup>3</sup> He understood that *Shevardnadze* had something to say on chemical weapons and conventional arms, and was looking forward to hearing his views.

The Secretary recalled that General Secretary Gorbachev had raised in Reykjavik the question of increasing information flow between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The U.S. had since considered his specific ideas. We felt that, in general, a halt to interference in radio broadcasts—and not only of jamming of the Voice of America—would be a positive development. We were still considering the General Secretary's interest in renting a radio station in the U.S., or in working with a neighboring country to locate a Soviet transmitter near the U.S. The proposal posed difficult legal and technical issues, but we were interested in exploring every possibility.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz–Shevardnadze Vienna, 11/87. Secret. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> After meeting with *Shevardnadze*, Shultz traveled to Paris to meet with French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 6.

At the same time, we were also interested in broader discussions aimed at improving the flow of television programming, films, and printed information between our two countries. USIA Director Wick was working hard to see what, in concrete terms, might be possible. If the Soviets were willing to do so, the Director would be in touch with his Soviet counterparts to explore the matter further.

General Secretary Gorbachev had also raised in Reykjavik the question of U.S. visas for Soviet trade union leaders. The Secretary remembered this issue from his days as Secretary of Labor,<sup>4</sup> and we had looked into it since Reykjavik. It turned out that there were some Soviets that U.S. labor leaders would like to see visit the U.S. Anatoliy Marchenko, a Soviet worker who we felt had been unjustly imprisoned for his support of basic human rights, was one such case. If Soviet authorities were prepared to allow people of concern to our labor leaders to visit the U.S., we were willing to be equally flexible on a one-to-one basis for Soviet trade union officials.

Moving on to the bilateral and other issues addressed by working groups the night before, the Secretary recorded the U.S. understanding that the Soviets would be prepared in the context of meetings of the U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Review Commission to discuss humanitarian issues. It was also the U.S. understanding that both sides agreed the bilateral work program agreed to in Reykjavik should continue to be implemented.

The Secretary next raised terrorism. He noted that the U.S. had welcomed Soviet statements condemning the Karachi hijacking attempt.<sup>5</sup> In light of those statements, he hoped the Soviets were following closely emerging evidence which made it clearer and clearer that there had been Libyan involvement in the incident. We had been disappointed, on the other hand, by the Soviet Union's reaction to evidence developed by the British judicial system of Syrian involvement in the attempted bombing of an El Al airliner.<sup>6</sup> The Secretary knew that British Foreign Secretary Howe had provided the Soviet Union with specific information in this regard. We hoped that the

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<sup>4</sup> Shultz was Secretary of Labor from January 1969 until June 1970.

<sup>5</sup> In telegram 15505 from Moscow, September 8, the Embassy reported on a September 6 TASS statement condemning the attempted hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 to Karachi. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860680–0336)

<sup>6</sup> In telegram 19053 from Moscow, November 4, the Embassy reported that elements of the Soviet media had "raised the possibility of Israeli or American military action against Syria" over the attempted bombing of an El Al flight from London to Tel Aviv in April 1986 (the so-called Hindawi Affair). The Embassy noted that Soviet officials had downplayed the Hindawi Affair in conversations with Embassy officials but had "highlighted possible Syrian-Israeli tension" in conversations with Arab diplomats." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860841–0301)

Soviets would consider this information carefully, along with the more concrete question of what steps should be taken as evidence became clearer of official Syrian involvement in international terrorism.

*Shevardnadze* in response first addressed the question of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union continued to regard this as a promising area, and believed, on the basis of its assessment of the current state of negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, that it should be possible to reach agreement next year on a convention to ban chemical weapons. The Soviets had accepted U.S. views on the timing and procedures for destruction of CW stocks and on the verification of that process. Shevardnadze had said yesterday that Moscow would be prepared to address outstanding verification issues on the basis of the U.K.'s proposal of earlier this year.<sup>7</sup> The terms of this proposal were closer to the U.S. starting position than to that of the Soviet Union. Soviet representatives in bilateral discussions of the issue in New York had now been instructed to put forward fresh ideas which took U.S. views into account on the issue of non-production of CW by civilian facilities.

In short, a lot of work had been done in this area. The Soviets were willing to do more. Shevardnadze emphasized in this regard how stringent the Soviets were prepared to be on the verification question. But they had the impression that there had been no reciprocal movement on the U.S. side. The bilateral consultations now underway in New York were therefore of "critical importance." They could "make or break" prospects for a convention. In view of the new circumstances that had been created by recent proposals, it would be appropriate for the U.S. to reconsider its own position, and respond to the situation created by British and Soviet moves on verification.

With respect to conventional weapons, Shevardnadze acknowledged in advance that it would not be useful to get into a detailed discussion. But he sought the Secretary's clarification on two points.

First, what was the U.S. view of a possible "Stockholm II" option for addressing the question of conventional arms in Europe? The question was relevant because the mandate for a second phase of the recently concluded Stockholm conference<sup>8</sup> would have to come out of the Vienna Review Conference<sup>9</sup> which had begun the day before.

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<sup>7</sup> Reference is to the British proposal in August to allow a signatory to an international treaty banning chemical weapons to demonstrate its innocence within ten days to avoid on-site inspections.

<sup>8</sup> Reference is to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, which concluded on September 19.

<sup>9</sup> The third follow-up meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Vienna Review Conference, reviewed negotiations on arms control and disarmament in addition to human rights.

Shevardnadze's second request harkened back to an earlier suggestion by Gorbachev that NATO and Warsaw Pact working groups develop positions [on] European conventional arms reductions maintain "working contacts" with one another. What was the U.S. view of such an arrangement? If the Secretary were not prepared to answer in detail now, perhaps the issue could be discussed through Ambassadors at a later date.

The *Secretary* said he had four points to make in response.

First, we regarded the verification provisions worked out in Stockholm as important indicators of the workability of such arrangements. We would be watching carefully to see how well they worked in practice.

Second, we had been disappointed at the lack of a serious Eastern response to the most recent Western proposals in the Vienna MBFR negotiations. These proposals had reflected a major change in the West's position. There had been no real Eastern response, and we hoped that the Soviet Union and its allies could review the bidding, especially on the central question of verification.

Third, and with direct reference to Shevardnadze's questions, both sides had emphasized publicly our commitment to the ideal of strengthening stability and security in the whole of Europe. NATO's May 30 Halifax statement<sup>10</sup> had been followed by the Warsaw Pact's June 11 "Budapest appeal."<sup>11</sup> We applauded the Soviet acceptance of the Western concept of conventional arms control from the Atlantic to the Urals. NATO's high-level conventional arms control task force was currently engaged in a thorough review of conventional arms issues. As its report was due in December, the Secretary would like to hold off answering Shevardnadze's query on working group contacts until the study was complete. *Shevardnadze* nodded his agreement.

Finally, the *Secretary* expressed the strong U.S. view that discussion of arms control as such should be on an alliance-to-alliance basis, as distinct from confidence building measures, where other countries could play an important role.

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<sup>10</sup> Telegram 172344 to all NATO capitals and the European POLAD collective, May 31, transmitted the ministerial statement issued at the conclusion of the Halifax Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council along with a separate Halifax Statement on Conventional Arms Control that called for "increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels" and announced a high-level task force on conventional arms control. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860422-0584)

<sup>11</sup> In telegram 4692 from Stockholm, June 13, the Embassy reported on the Warsaw Pact's response to NATO's Halifax Statement on Conventional Arms Control. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860459-0413)

On chemical weapons, the Secretary welcomed what Shevardnadze had said, especially his emphasis on the importance of verification. We would be interested in further discussion of this issue. We remained convinced of the need for rapid, mandatory inspections; otherwise it would be difficult to cope with the problem. But we were dedicated to pursuing the problem further. The Secretary confirmed Shevardnadze's request for clarification as to whether the Secretary was referring to bilateral consultations in New York as the channel for such a discussion.

*Shevardnadze* next replied to the Secretary's points on media access. While he would again eschew details, Shevardnadze noted that the basis for any discussions in this area should be the principle of reciprocity. The questions involved in the regulation of information flow were indeed complex, especially as they related to the smaller countries and the developing world. That was why the Soviets supported the creation of a major forum for the discussion of such issues. For their part, the Soviets were prepared for discussions on the bilateral plane between appropriate agencies.

The *Secretary* noted that he would inform Director Wick of this and have him be in touch with his Soviet counterparts. *Shevardnadze* agreed, urging only that the Secretary emphasize to the Director the importance of reciprocity in this, as in all fields. The *Secretary* countered that reciprocity was indeed a good principle, and suggested the Soviets apply it by stopping their jamming. The U.S. did not jam radio transmissions.

*Shevardnadze* replied that in fact information from other countries did not reach the United States the way it should. When confronted with that fact, the U.S. always hid behind the explanation that its media was privately owned. But the situation was not as simple as that. In any case, this was an area the two sides' negotiators could address. The *Secretary* agreed they would have plenty to do.

Returning to the subject of trade union visas, *Shevardnadze* reminded the Secretary of a point Gorbachev had made to the President in Reykjavik—no obstacles were placed by Soviet authorities in the path of U.S. labor leaders wishing to visit the U.S.S.R. They received visas. The same approach was required of U.S. authorities if reciprocity were to be applied. Instead, the U.S. sought to choose who would come to the United States. This was unacceptable. There were 90 million Soviet trade union members; how could the U.S. make such choices?

The *Secretary* pointed out that the proposal he had made was based on a strict application of the reciprocity principle—you choose one; we choose one. *Shevardnadze* replied that the Soviets did not make the choices. To try, he said, would only lead to confusion. He did not even know, for example, if Marchenko were a union member. Probably he was not. It would be better to let the trade unions themselves make their own arrangements, without official interference.



The *Secretary* said he could tell Shevardnadze what position U.S. trade unions would take. We had consulted with AFL-CIO leader Lane Kirkland in formulating the proposal the Secretary had just made. It fully reflected Kirkland's views.

*Shevardnadze* (after prompting by Bessmertnykh) pointed out that the State Department had in the past denied visas to many Soviet trade union leaders who had been officially invited by American unions. Shevardnadze did not want to reduce the issue to an exchange of complaints, and he recognized it could not be solved in Vienna, but there was a fundamental decision to be made: if both sides favored contacts between trade unions, let the unions themselves make the decisions.

The *Secretary* noted that the words "trade union" had different connotations in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The difference in concepts was at the root of the problem. *Shevardnadze* cautioned that it would not be possible to change the structures of the two countries. It made more sense to adapt visa policies to existing structures. The *Secretary* suggested that the issue might appropriately be discussed at a future meeting of the Bilateral Review Commission. *Shevardnadze* agreed, adding that it might also be examined at the level of deputy foreign minister or ambassadors. The issue should not be put off, as it involved "millions."

Turning to the Secretary's remarks on terrorism, Shevardnadze pointed out that the Soviets had addressed this issue repeatedly and that Moscow's position was well known. He had touched on the matter the day before in his speech, as had the Secretary. The Soviet Union was ready to cooperate in efforts to prevent terrorism, to eliminate the conditions in which it could exist, including with respect to civil aviation.

As for the disappointment the Secretary had expressed in connection with the Soviet reaction to Syria's alleged involvement in the El Al bombing attempt, Shevardnadze observed that Foreign Secretary Howe<sup>12</sup> had not expressed similar disappointment when the two had discussed the issue. The Foreign Secretary had repeated the points he had made in the House of Commons. But Syria had also made an official statement on the incident. It was impossible simply to dismiss that statement. There was, Shevardnadze complained, much talk about "evidence" of Syrian involvement, but no evidence had been produced. Howe had said he would provide such evidence. "We'll see," Shevardnadze commented.

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<sup>12</sup> British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe.



There had also been allegations, he continued, of Libya's involvement in the Pakistani episode. Thus far, however, the Soviets had seen no evidence of such involvement, even in contacts with the Pakistani government. It was true that the Soviets' relationship to the Pakistanis was not on a par with that of Washington's. Perhaps the Pakistanis had provided the U.S. with something more concrete. The Soviets would welcome anything which would help them look more seriously into the question. So, on terrorism, Shevardnadze concluded, perhaps that was enough said.

As for the MBFR talks,<sup>13</sup> Shevardnadze reminded the Secretary that the Eastern side had made counterproposals since the Western offer to which the Secretary had referred. The East's proposals had been good proposals, and they could be discussed. The Soviets were not without hope that the Vienna negotiations could be brought to a successful conclusion. There were differences between the two blocs. But these were due mainly to a one-sided approach by the West.

The questions at issue in the Vienna negotiations dealt with Central Europe. What did the Soviets see taking place in these talks? Soviet territory (to say nothing, Shevardnadze noted parenthetically, of the territory of Soviet allies such as Poland and the GDR) would be subject to inspection. But key U.S. allies (such as the U.K.) would not be included in such a regime. France was not even a participant in the talks.

Nonetheless, the Soviets were for a positive conclusion to the negotiations. "Major decisions" might nonetheless not be possible in the current forum. Rather, the two sides should look to an overall solution on the scale of Europe as a whole. In this context, Shevardnadze noted, the Soviet Union at Stockholm had made a fundamental decision to open up its territory to inspection, while, again, the U.S. had been able to stand aside. This was not a complaint, it was a fact.

The *Secretary* interjected that Shevardnadze's statement was not correct. The U.S. was part of an alliance. It maintained large numbers of forces on the territory of countries which were subject to inspection and transparency. So the U.S. was not excluded.

The Atlantic-to-the-Urals concept was one which the U.S. supported, the Secretary continued. But in MBFR, we had found that, despite all the recent Soviet talk of verification and willingness to take the subject seriously, we found when we made concrete proposals that the East was not prepared to "operationalize" the concept. That was one reason why, when we were preparing for the Vienna meeting, we

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<sup>13</sup> Reference is to the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks, ongoing from 1973 to 1989.

had included verification among the issues on which we had done papers for working with the Soviet side.

*Shevardnadze* asked if the two should discuss MBFR further. The *Secretary* thought, in view of time constraints, that they probably should not. After all, the negotiations had been going on for 15 years already. *Shevardnadze* quipped that, as they had had so little success discussing how to stimulate the Geneva discussions, perhaps they should focus on those in Vienna.

*Shevardnadze* then proposed that group leaders on each side report on the working session of the previous night. The *Secretary*, noting that the report could be short on our side, replied that we would nonetheless be glad to hear the Soviet assessment. *Shevardnadze* asked *Bessmertnykh* to lead off, asking that he confine his remarks to no more than 5–7 minutes.

*Bessmertnykh* volunteered that participants on both sides could probably agree that they were disappointed in the results of the session, even if they might describe differently the reasons for their disappointment. During the course of the talks, the Soviet group had become convinced anew that—at the level of experts—the U.S. would like to revise some fundamental agreements reached in Reykjavik by the leaders of both sides.

The U.S. participants, *Bessmertnykh* complained, had been unable to produce a single proposal to “enrich” the U.S. position as outlined in Reykjavik. The two sides had carefully considered the document<sup>14</sup> *Shevardnadze* had given the *Secretary* the day before, a document, *Bessmertnykh* emphasized, based on the Reykjavik agreements. It had proved impossible, however, to reach agreement on any of the questions covered by the document. At the same time, the Soviet side had been surprised by the U.S. group’s attempt to create, in the name of the President and General Secretary, documents which did not contain what had been agreed to in Reykjavik, and which contained material which had not been agreed there.

Throughout, *Bessmertnykh* continued, a common element of the U.S. approach was an apparent desire to descend from the “high ground” of the Reykjavik meeting to a lower, pre-Reykjavik plateau. Even when the Soviet group tabled compromise language which would have allowed the two sides to continue to work on one of the main outstanding issues—the strengthening of the ABM Treaty regime—the U.S. group had had no answer. So, *Bessmertnykh* concluded, the session was disappointing. But it had also been necessary, as it had made

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<sup>14</sup> See footnote 9, Document 6.

possible a clearer view on the Soviet side of the U.S. approach “at the expert level” to these issues.

Invited by the Secretary to respond, Ambassador *Nitze* indicated that, at the outset of the previous night’s discussion, the U.S. had proposed a serious comparison of Soviet and American documents on the table. Our purpose was to clarify where agreement existed—both in the documents concerned and in fact, and to confirm our understanding of areas of disagreement reflected in the U.S. documents. Bessmertnykh had rejected this approach, insisting instead on posing a specific question: how did the U.S. interpret the ABM Treaty. Concluding that the Soviet side was seeking an authoritative description of U.S. views on this point, Nitze had provided a detailed response. Kampelman and he had also made clear that our delegations in Geneva were prepared to continue the discussion.

The U.S. group had then returned to its proposal that both sides’ documents be compared to confirm areas of agreement and disagreement. Initially, the Soviet participants appeared to want to focus exclusively on areas of agreement. Nitze had felt this was not a correct approach, as it was equally important to have a clear understanding of areas of disagreement if there were to be subsequent progress toward eliminating such differences.

The depth of disagreement on the correct approach became evident during the discussion of START, Nitze continued. The Soviet preference for addressing only issues common to both papers led them to reject any reference to an issue of fundamental importance to the U.S.—the question of sublimits and whether they should be a subject for discussion. The U.S. had raised the issue in Reykjavik, and, while it had been impossible to reach agreement on appropriate wording, Soviet representatives had clearly indicated it could be addressed later. Bessmertnykh would allow no references to this commitment—an important matter of fact on which the record was clear. Instead he sought to convey a sense of agreement when none existed. In its own document on START, by way of contrast, the U.S. had sought to describe the two sides’ differences straightforwardly and fairly. We had found no cooperation on the Soviet side.

There had also been difficulty discussing points we thought had been agreed in Reykjavik, for example on INF. It had been the U.S. impression that there were substantial areas of agreement on this basket of issues. Both the Soviet and U.S. documents seemed to confirm this impression. But the Soviet group had avoided agreement on joint language.

Finally, in an attempt to continue serious discussion of the issues involved, the U.S. had tabled the following language:

"The U.S. Secretary of State and the U.S.S.R. Minister for Foreign Affairs have agreed to hold discussions, at the expert level, with a view to bringing the two sides' positions closer together where common ground and remaining significant differences exist, based on the discussions and progress made in Reykjavik and on subsequent work in Geneva and Vienna. The results of those discussions will be considered by the two Ministers, *inter alia*, in the context of continued exchanges at their level."

When Nitze finished reading the document, the *Secretary* observed that the initiative had been an effort to respond to the question Shevardnadze had raised the day before in their private meeting: "what should be done between rounds in Geneva?"

After a whispered exchange with Bessmertnykh, *Shevardnadze* remarked that he had not expected anything different from the experts' discussions. He and the Secretary, after all, had been no more successful at clarifying the key question of what their two leaders had agreed to in Reykjavik. Therein lay the major reason for the disappointment both group leaders had reported.

Speaking frankly, Shevardnadze said, his exchanges with the Secretary in Vienna had been the least productive of those they had conducted to date. This was disappointing. The Secretary would now be reporting to the President, as Shevardnadze would be to the Soviet leadership, and to Gorbachev. For his part, Shevardnadze would say that his discussions in Vienna had confirmed that current U.S. positions boiled down to old, "mothballed" pre-Reykjavik positions plus the concessions and compromises recently made by the Soviet Union. While it would leave a "bitter aftertaste," this was what he would have to report.

Asking to make an additional point, Shevardnadze recounted how, after Reykjavik, he had been left with the impression that the U.S. felt the Soviet Union needed an improvement in relations, the resolution of nuclear arms issues, more than the United States. Here, too, he cautioned, the principles of reciprocity and equality should be the guide.

Shevardnadze felt that it would be "pointless" for the two sides to adopt a joint statement on his meetings with the Secretary. As for what should be done next, he had informed the Secretary the day before of the Soviet Union's intention to present on November 7 the paper he had handed over the day before. That paper, of course, had been based on what had been agreed to by the two countries' leaders in Reykjavik.

Shevardnadze noted that the Geneva talks would go into recess November 11 or 12. Until they resumed, the Soviets would be prepared to consider arrangements acceptable to the U.S. side to continue discus-

sion of these issues. It did not rule out further working level discussions, or even exchanges at the ministerial level. But meetings for their own sake were a luxury the Soviets did not feel they could afford. It made no sense to assemble so many people for a meeting on something neither side wanted.

As to the specific suggestions made the night before on further meetings, the Soviets had proposed a “higher-level” working group to discuss “the most important issues, like the ABM Treaty.” That proposal remained on the table.

Shevardnadze asked rhetorically if there were anything else. In response to a prompt from *Dubin* that he had not addressed bilateral issues, *Shevardnadze* acknowledged that the situation was better in that area. Meetings on bilateral and regional questions were in train and should continue.

The *Secretary* said he agreed with Shevardnadze’s last point and would comment on that publicly. As to possible meetings between Geneva rounds, the U.S. remained willing to have an exchange of the sort Ambassador Nitze had described. We were prepared in that context to describe our view of what the ABM Treaty says, and to hear Soviet views on the subject. We hoped that the Soviets would be interested in having such a discussion at some point. For the moment, they did not appear to be. So our proposal also remained on the table. There would be ways to exchange views further as both sides considered the conversations which had taken place in Vienna. And at some point we would have to decide where to go from here.

The Secretary continued that he would have to say publicly that the U.S. had come to Vienna prepared to discuss the full range of the promising results achieved in Reykjavik. We had tried to identify areas of agreement and difference so as to be able to work on the problems remaining. We had brought along statements designed to do so, and a team capable of addressing the issues seriously. So we had been disappointed when the Soviet side was not prepared to do that. The U.S. was prepared to be patient. As the Secretary had said publicly, we regarded Reykjavik as a potential watershed. For the first time in the post-war era, the meeting there had raised the hope of reversing the process of accumulating ever-greater numbers of nuclear arms. We had welcomed that.

*Shevardnadze* commented that, in describing the results of Reykjavik, what was important was not nice words and phrases, but positions. Here there were clearly deep disagreements. The *Secretary* agreed, noting that it was therefore important to identify them, as well as areas of agreement, so as to build on what had been achieved in Reykjavik.

*Shevardnadze* agreed that all this could be taken into account, but stressed the need for “guidance.” The Soviet side had until the Vienna

meeting thought that such guidance had been provided in Reykjavik at the highest level. Now the situation was different. All that they thought had been agreed had been destroyed.

The *Secretary* replied that the U.S. was not destroying anything. A vast amount of territory had been covered in Reykjavik. We should hold onto that.

*Shevardnadze* agreed, but said it would now be difficult to add to what had been done or not done. The Soviets the day before had proposed working level exchanges on “the most difficult questions.” *Shevardnadze* encouraged the U.S. to consider this proposal. He assured the Secretary that Soviet negotiators had strong nerves. They were prepared to wait for years to achieve progress, as they had in Vienna.

The *Secretary* replied that the U.S. had found *Shevardnadze*’s idea suitable as a vehicle for between-round discussions. The proposal Nitze had outlined was a direct response. It might be possible to discuss the idea at greater length in Geneva. *Shevardnadze* agreed that the matter should be looked at once again. He noted, however, that the Geneva negotiators already had a heavy load, and expressed fear that the matter would be lost sight of. If the objective was really to accelerate progress in the Geneva talks, it was important to discuss “the most important question” as soon as possible.

*Shevardnadze* indicated that he understood how, in the wake of the Reykjavik meeting, “all of you” had been under a heavy load. Perhaps there had not been adequate time to reflect on the significance of the meeting. After the U.S. had had more time to take this into account, the two sides should consult on what direction to take.

*Shevardnadze* concluded the meeting by asking the Secretary to stay behind for a brief private session.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> No memorandum of conversation of this meeting was found.

## 8. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 14, 1986

### SUBJECT

Strategy for the Soviets

### *Where We Are After Vienna*

The outcome of the Vienna meeting<sup>2</sup> has at least temporarily changed the context of our dialogue with Moscow. Since mid-1985, that dialogue has evolved within the framework of preparations for successive high-level meetings, at your level and mine. The summit process forced bureaucracies on both sides—but particularly the Soviets—to make decisions which would otherwise have been put off. The results have been impressive.

—In a series of steps culminating in Reykjavik, the Soviets have accepted our conceptual framework for arms control: substantial, verifiable reductions in offensive forces to low, equal levels; and continued exploration of prospects for strategic defense. Vienna showed that the results of Reykjavik will be difficult to translate into concrete agreements, but that these results are irreversible in political terms.

—In bilateral relations, we have put in place a vigorous and expanding framework of agreements and progress which demonstrates our ability to work with the Soviets on the basis of genuinely mutual benefit and reciprocity.

—Progress on the human rights and regional fronts has been more ambiguous, but the Soviets have agreed as a matter of practice that these issues are an integral part of the dialogue. Especially on human rights, the Soviets are increasingly being forced to debate the issues on our terms.

Thus, we have not only brought the Soviets to accept the four-part agenda you outlined in January, 1984,<sup>3</sup> we have given real content, on our terms, to our insistence that the U.S.-Soviet dialogue extend beyond arms control. These accomplishments validate your policy of active

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Chronological File, Matlock Chron, December 1986 (1/4). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Matlock. Keel sent the memorandum to the President under an undated covering memorandum, in which he wrote: "Most of what George says is eminently sound and I think it is desirable to continue the activity he has outlined in the various non-arms control elements of our agenda."

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 6 and 7.

<sup>3</sup> Documentation on Reagan's four-part agenda is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985.



engagement with Moscow, and put us in a strong position to deal with the Soviets, even in the absence of a framework of high-level meetings.

It is not clear how long the Soviets' current intransigent approach will last. In Vienna, they were clearly more interested in engaging in propaganda games than serious negotiation—an echo of 1983–1984, when they walked out of the Geneva talks and took over a year to come back. This time they are playing smarter. They are not only staying at the table in Geneva, but have asked for meetings between rounds, to which we have agreed.

This could mean that the Soviets will reengage fairly quickly, enabling us to resume serious discussion without much loss of momentum. But they could also simply be seeking to convey an image of reasonableness as they seek to build pressure on us through our allies and congressional/public opinion in this country.

#### *What We Should Do*

These are tactics we have seen before, and will no doubt see again. Our experience since 1984 suggests that a major reorientation of our own strategy is unnecessary. We do need to be clear on our overall objectives, and pay special attention to tactics.

Specifically, we should aim in the period ahead to:

—Force the Soviets to address seriously and build on the progress which was made in Reykjavik.

—As an integral part of this effort, deny them the opportunity to drive wedges between ourselves and our allies, and between the Administration and Congress.

—Sustain the momentum of our bilateral relations, forcing the Soviets to assume the blame for any slow-down.

—Give greater content to the regional and human rights elements of the agenda.

#### *The Allied Dimension*

Effective management of our relations with our closest allies will be particularly important to our success during this period. The Allies have for the most part avoided public expressions of concern over the implications for NATO and Europe of the discussion in Reykjavik. In private, however, and with the UK, France and the FRG in the lead, they have expressed deep reservations about moving dramatically on nuclear reductions without addressing the conventional balance. Mrs. Thatcher has been particularly adamant in this regard.

To prevent the Soviets from exploiting these concerns, or the Allies from exploring alternatives to the Transatlantic security relationship, we need to develop a program for alliance management over the months ahead. The thrust of such a program would be three-fold:



—To demonstrate that our follow-up to the Reykjavik meeting will not threaten nuclear deterrence or the Alliance's flexible response strategy, we should initiate a thorough discussion (by permreps, NATO committees, and the December NAC and DPC Ministerials) of our vision of deterrence in a world with fewer nuclear weapons. Such a discussion would also be an opportunity to emphasize conventional force improvements.

—To give the Allies something they can use with their publics, we should find means of highlighting the intensive consultations we have engaged in in the wake of the Reykjavik and Vienna meetings, and which will continue in the weeks ahead.

—To deny the Soviets the ability to exploit the issue across the board, we should resolve our differences in the Halifax Task Force<sup>4</sup> over the forum for pursuing European conventional arms control negotiations.

These efforts should come together at the December NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers' meetings, where we will seek communiques which send a strong signal of Allied solidarity on the full range of security issues.

#### *Congress*

The Soviets' other main target will be Congress, particularly the new Democratic majority in the Senate.<sup>5</sup> To the extent we can, we should preempt this effort by taking the initiative to brief key leaders on Soviet behavior at Vienna and our analysis of their motives. As with the Allies, we can make the case that our policy of building our strength and negotiating with the Soviets is working, and must continue if the agreements outlined in Reykjavik are to be realized. We should also emphasize such areas as human rights, where we and the Hill will be able to make common cause.

#### *Arms Control Next Steps*

Both with the Soviets and the Allies, our ability to dominate the arms control agenda will be critical to our success. Reykjavik has put us in a strong position to keep the pressure on Moscow.

—We have the basic elements for initial agreements on START and INF. Remaining obstacles (sublimits, throw weight, verification, SRINF) should not be insuperable once the Soviets decide to close.

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 10, Document 7.

<sup>5</sup> Following the national midterm elections on November 4, the Republican Party lost its majority in the Senate.

—Nuclear testing is not so far along, but our current objective—to get talks started—is less ambitious. We are agreed on the essential elements of an agenda, and the Soviets may be prepared to be flexible in order to cover withdrawal from their self-imposed moratorium.

—Defense/Space is the most open subject: while both sides propose a ten-year non-withdrawal period, differences remain over testing constraints during that period, as well as over the nature of offensive reductions in the second five years.

Our basic objective should be to complete and bring into force the 50% START and 0/100 INF agreements as soon as possible. We can identify four ways in which this objective might be achieved:

—Continue our effort to separate START and INF from other subjects, arguing that agreements in these areas are in our mutual interests and should be brought into force.

—Add a 10-year ABM Treaty non-withdrawal commitment, coupling such a commitment to 50% START and 0/100 INF reductions. Negotiations on further steps, including elimination of ballistic missiles, would continue.

—Execute START and INF reductions over ten years, and link non-withdrawal to the faithful implementation of these reductions.

—Agree to reduce from 6000 warheads in the second five years to a small residual strategic force. Such an agreement on the second five years would allow the entire package discussed at Reykjavik to come into force.

We should explore the pros and cons of these options thoroughly, and on a priority basis, so that we can engage quickly when the Soviets get serious. I have attached a paper which might serve as the basis for such a discussion. Once our review is complete, we may decide to take the initiative along one of these lines. In the meantime, our Geneva negotiators will have a chance during their early December rump session to press the Soviets once again for a serious post-Reykjavik follow-up.

### *The Full Agenda*

While our Allies, Congress and the Soviets will be focusing on arms control, we will need to keep up the pressure on the rest of the agenda as well. Specifically:

—On the bilateral side, there is no indication that the Soviets are backing away from their commitments. The danger is that our bureaucracy will do their work for them, by lapsing into inaction in the absence of the stimulus provided by the summit process. We should lock the Soviets into negotiations on the text of a risk reduction center agreement, set dates for a second session of our proposed Bilateral Review

Commission, and proceed with the fusion cooperation program. We should also accelerate interagency consideration of exploratory meetings with the Soviets on new agreements in the areas of transportation, energy and the basic sciences. A firm NSC lead will be necessary to keep the process moving.<sup>6</sup>

—On human rights, we will continue in our bilateral contacts to press on emigration and specific cases. The Vienna CSCE Follow-on Meeting will give us another means to keep the spotlight on human rights and to press for improved compliance. Deeds—emigration, specific cases—are our bottom line, but we should also seek Soviet agreement to some form of post-Vienna activity. This could take the form of one or more of the following: the U.S. “Helsinki Observers” proposal; the Dutch consultative committee; the Danish human rights conference; or, under the right conditions, Shevardnadze’s proposal for a Moscow CSCE “representative forum.” Together with our Allies, we should probe the Soviet invitation, expressing our readiness to consider it *if* the Soviets meet our other CSCE objectives, agree to consider Western proposals, and agree to conditions that would make the Moscow meeting meaningful.

—We proposed in Vienna a new round of experts discussions on regional issues. This forum has been a useful one for laying down markers on issues of concern to us, and we will press Moscow if a response is not forthcoming soon. We hope to start the next round with discussion on Southern Africa. Geopolitical issues lie at the heart of the U.S.-Soviet competition. They have received relatively little attention in recent high-level exchanges, and we will press for a round of Under-secretary-level (Armacost-Vorontsov) talks early in the new year.

### *High Level Meetings*

Pressing the Soviets now for further meetings at my level—to say nothing of yours—would convey an inaccurate sense of over-eagerness on our part. Too early a meeting could simply lock the Soviets into their current unconstructive approach. We can afford at this stage to be patient on high-level meetings, waiting for them to take the initiative once they have concluded there is nothing to gain by indirect pressure.

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<sup>6</sup> An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

## Attachment

### Paper Prepared in the Department of State<sup>7</sup>

Washington, undated

#### *Bringing the Soviets to Closure on START/INF: Four Strategies*

I. Seek to separate START and INF from other subjects, arguing that agreements in these areas are in our mutual interest and should be brought into force.

While this is the most straightforward path to realization of START and INF agreements, we cannot assume the Soviets will agree to these reductions without something on defense; they certainly are not prepared to do this now. This leads to consideration of other packages.

II. Add a ten-year ABM Treaty non-withdrawal commitment, coupling such a commitment to 50% START and 0/100 INF reductions. Negotiations would continue on further steps, including elimination of offensive ballistic missiles.

Reduction of strategic forces by 50% and SS-20's by 90% would be dramatic steps, and would warrant something on defense. If the package permitted some flexibility for testing during this period, a 10-year non-withdrawal commitment would not damage the SDI program, and such an agreement would broaden support for SDI in the Congress.

III. Execute the START and INF reductions over ten years; and link non-withdrawal to faithful implementation of these reductions.

The reductions to 6,000 strategic warheads and 100 INF warheads would be divided into 10 equal increments from 1987 through 1996. We would agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty so long as these reductions were faithfully implemented. This would be similar to the first phase of our July 25 proposal,<sup>8</sup> with the reductions deepened from 30% to 50%, and the time stretched from 5–7 years to 10 years. Other aspects, such as elimination of ballistic missiles and sharing the benefits of SDI would be addressed in subsequent negotiations.

IV. Agree to reduce from 6000 warheads in the second five years to a small residual force.

We can consider such an approach if it becomes necessary to break the current impasse over the reductions in the second five years (elimination of offensive ballistic missiles).

<sup>7</sup> Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the paper.

<sup>8</sup> This proposal is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986.

nation of ballistic missiles vs. elimination of strategic forces) in order to secure Soviet agreement to the entire package discussed in Reykjavik.

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## 9. Editorial Note

On November 25, 1986, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs John Poindexter resigned as a result of his role in the Iran-Contra affair. In his diary that evening, President Ronald Reagan recalled meeting with Poindexter that morning to accept his resignation. President Reagan went on to describe "an N.S.C. meeting to see how we'd handle the roll out of the 131st [B-52] bomber equipped for Nuclear Cruise Missiles. It puts us 1 plane above the restraints of SALT II which the Soviets & us had agreed to observe even though the treaty had never been ratified. The Soviets have regularly violated the agreement. My decision is to h—l with them we roll out the plane." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, Volume II, November 1985–January 1989, p. 661.) The minutes of the November 25 National Security Council meeting are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume XLIV, National Security Policy, 1985–1988*.

On December 3, President Reagan appointed Frank Carlucci President's Assistant for National Security Affairs. During the interim period and for several weeks while Carlucci fulfilled contractual obligations to Sears, Alton Keel served as Acting President's Assistant for National Security Affairs.

On December 18, President Reagan met in the Situation Room with his senior advisors from 11:03 a.m. to 12:10 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Reagan characterized the meeting as "a briefing & decision on replying to a covert sounding that we should contact Dobrynin re a possible meeting (secret) of someone on our side about a possible arms deal." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, Volume II, November 1985–January 1989, p. 669–670.) Present at the meeting were President Reagan, Vice President George H.W. Bush, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Vessey, Secretary of State George Shultz, Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Gates, Counselor to the Department of State Max Kampelman, Ambassador Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, Colonel Robert Linhard, Ambassador Jack Matlock, Acting President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Alton Keel, White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan, and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Kenneth Adelman. The topic of conversation

was how to achieve agreements on START and INF in a manner that would not permanently constrain research into, and development of, strategic ballistic missile defenses. Handwritten notes of this meeting are in the Reagan Library, Linhard Files, Soviet Back Channel Offer: 12/18/1986 Arms Control Senior Advisors Meeting (1).

On December 19, President Reagan met again with his senior advisors in the White House Situation Room, from 11:03 to 11:06 a.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) He wrote in his personal diary: "Met with Senior advisors in situation room—re a third party message that Gorbachev (possibly) but Dobrynin definitely want a secret rep. of ours to come to Moscow. We argued about it but between Xmas & New Years Paul Nitze & Perle will go & return." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, Volume II, November 1985–January 1989, p. 670.) No further record of this meeting has been found. The anticipated trip by Nitze and Perle did not occur.

In his memoirs, Secretary of State George Shultz recalled the efforts to establish new lines of communication in the aftermath of the Reykjavik Summit: "The president agreed that I should propose to the Soviets that we send Paul Nitze and Richard Perle to Moscow to probe how best to move forward. Word came back from Moscow: Nitze and Perle were 'not what we have in mind.' The presence of Perle, the Soviets said, would make talks 'pointless.' They were misjudging Perle, who was tough-minded but creative. Our initiative went nowhere." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 869)

## 10. Paper Prepared in the National Security Council<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 31, 1986

### *ESPIONAGE CASE AT EMBASSY MOSCOW*

On December 14 a Marine security guard assigned to Embassy Vienna voluntarily confessed to espionage [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

While stationed at Embassy Moscow he had been recruited by the “uncle” of a female Soviet employee of the embassy with whom he had a sexual relationship.

The Soviets apparently continued to meet him clandestinely in Vienna following Moscow tour.

Marine allegedly provided over 100 classified documents, largely taken from burn bags, and may have assisted in planting listening devices in the ambassador’s office in Vienna.

[*less than 1 line not declassified*] observed a meeting between the Soviet and marine, and have been able to identify Soviet, who may also be handling another US citizen spy (no further details).

Marine identified as Clayton Lonetree, an American Indian with a drinking problem. Has not yet successfully passed a polygraph so the full extent of the damage is unknown.

Lonetree returns to the US today and will be court martialed by the Navy vice Justice prosecution.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Keel Files, Subject Files, [President/NSC Chron] 12/25/1986–01/01/1987. Top Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the paper. Acting President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Keel sent the paper to Reagan the same day under cover of a handwritten memorandum: “Attached is a brief summary report indicating that a Marine security guard at the U.S. embassy in Moscow has confessed to espionage. This has *not* been made public yet, but may leak as we brief House and Senate intelligence committee’s today.” Reagan initialed the top right-hand corner of the paper. On January 10, 1987, the Associated Press reported that Sgt. Clayton Lonetree had been taken into custody on December 31, 1986. (“Marine Who Served in Moscow Embassy Held in Spy Inquiry,” *New York Times*, January 11, 1987, p. A15)

# 11. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 10, 1987

## SUBJECT

Soviet Back Channel Initiative (TS)

For some weeks now we have been in a dialogue with the Soviets via a former Kennedy staffer.<sup>2</sup> Kennedy has made it clear that he has personally been involved in facilitating these exchanges. The Soviets initiated these exchanges by telling us they had an important new arms control proposal to convey, and wished to convey it directly to a special Presidential emissary. Kennedy has made it clear that the Soviets do not wish to convey this proposal through normal diplomatic channels, and would prefer that the emissary would be someone "close to the President." The Soviets have conveyed a similar message via Duane Andreas<sup>3</sup> and Richard Nixon. (TS)

Immediately following your departure for Africa,<sup>4</sup> the Soviets changed their tactics. They said they are planning to upgrade the Chief of their Geneva delegation. Their man would be Yuli Vorontsov, roughly the equivalent to John Whitehead, an experienced professional. They evidently propose confidential high-level talks on the margins of the formal Geneva talks. They want to know who the representative (singular) of the President will be. Within minutes of my hearing about this, Kennedy called me to pressure us to name a new, high-level person like Laxalt or Rumsfeld.<sup>5</sup> (TS)

You, I and Cap agreed that we could not change our delegation on the eve of the negotiations. We decided we would tell Dobrynin:

- The President is serious about continuing this process.
- The President recognizes the significance of the Soviets upgrading their delegation in Geneva.
- When Max Kampelman meets their new man in Geneva, Max will tell him who your personal representative is. Initially, at least, it will be Max himself. We'll tell them that he is soon to be named Counsellor; that will upgrade him. And we could indicate that he may

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Chronology—Official (12/31/1986–01/25/1987). Top Secret; Sensitive. Copied to Regan.

<sup>2</sup> Lawrence Horowitz.

<sup>3</sup> Chief Executive Officer of Archer Daniels Midland.

<sup>4</sup> From January 8 to 14 Shultz traveled to Senegal, Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, and Liberia.

<sup>5</sup> References are to Senator Paul Laxalt of Nevada and former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.



soon come back to Washington and be replaced by another Presidential representative. (TS)

The President approved this procedure as an initial step. At the same time he wants to be certain we are being fully responsive to the Soviet desire to “convey a new proposal.” He believes we should give the Soviets a road map for future arms control negotiations. If the Soviets present something interesting to Max Kampelman, as his personal representative in Geneva, the President would be prepared to send a delegation to Moscow headed by someone closer to him who would not be in normal diplomatic channels. It was suggested (not by me) that I be that emissary, and the President agreed. I would only go, however, if the Soviet proposal were significant and if I were to be accompanied by Perle and Nitze. At the same time we signal to the Soviets the possibility of a visit by me, we would also indicate that this could be followed by a session between you and Shevardnadze, which in turn could lead to a Summit. All of these meetings would, of course, be conditioned on the Soviets being forthcoming in the negotiations. (TS)

I understand via Mike Armacost that you have objected to this process on two grounds:

1. It puts the NSC into the “operations.”
2. It injects a new layer into the negotiations.

With regard to point 2, injecting a new layer seems to be the heart of the Soviet proposal. With regard to point 1, I have no desire to get the NSC into “operations” whatever the word means. But you and I agreed that there would be special circumstances in which the President would desire to use the NSC. The important thing is that you be completely informed, and I have assured you that I intend faithfully to do this. (TS)

In my judgment to proceed only with step 1, that is, telling the Soviets that Kampelman is our man, leaves the President vulnerable to a possible Soviet propaganda attack on the grounds that he was not responsive. It also leaves him vulnerable to a political attack from Kennedy. Kennedy had made it abundantly clear to me that he favors a separate Presidential emissary. I have assured him that if the Soviets come up with a real proposal, the President intends to be responsive. I have also told him that henceforth we are switching to secure channels and he will no longer be in the information loop. He is not pleased with this and told me somewhat testily that he would then get his information “from the other side.” There is no doubt in my mind that if we are not responsive, we will come under attack from Kennedy. A defense that we don’t want to add another layer does little to protect the President, who remains deeply interested in pursuing every possible channel to get a good arms control agreement. (TS)

I understand via Mike that you would support a proposal that would have us tell the Soviets that if their new initiative represents a significant move forward in the negotiation process, you would be prepared to have an early meeting with Shevardnadze. Once again, assuming progress, this could be followed by a summit. The sequence would then be Vorontsov to Kampelman, who would be upgraded and given the designation of Presidential emissary, Shultz to Shevardnadze and a summit (which by the way the President feels strongly would be held in the United States). (TS)

I will present your proposal to the President on Monday.<sup>6</sup> In the meantime, we are communicating to the President's counterparts in the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Japan to let them know of this initiative, and that we intend to respond in a positive vein. We are not at this point providing specifics of our response to them, although we are indicating that Kampelman would be the initial channel.<sup>7</sup> (TS)

**Frank C. Carlucci<sup>8</sup>**

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<sup>6</sup> January 12.

<sup>7</sup> Attached but not printed is a draft message from Carlucci to Dobrynin. "With the president's approval," Shultz wrote in his memoirs, "I instructed Max Kampelman, our overall coordinator of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations in Geneva and therefore Vorontsov's opposite number, to inform Vorontsov that he would be our representative in any private-channel communications." As an indication of his new role, Kampelman received the title "Counselor to the Secretary of State." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 869–870)

<sup>8</sup> Carlucci signed "Frank" above his typed signature.

**12. Telegram From the Department of State to the Secretary's Delegation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 13, 1987, 0116Z

10182/Tosec 10265. Subject: 1/12 Ridgway-Dubinín Meeting.

1. Secret entire text.

2. Summary: Dubinín affirmed that Soviet nomination of Vorontsov to head next round of NST talks reflected a genuine desire to move the negotiations forward, rather than an attempt to gain propaganda advantage. Asst. Sec Ridgway used the opportunity to confirm that Ambassador Kampelman would remain Chairman of the U.S. Delegation in Geneva, and informed Dubinín of Kampelman's appointment as Counselor of the Department.<sup>2</sup> End summary.

3. Dubinín, who "urgently" requested the meeting, was accompanied by Soviet EmbOff Churkin. EUR/SOV Director Parris attended on U.S. side.

4. Dubinín indicated he wished to return to the subject of their conversation the previous Thursday<sup>3</sup>—the Soviet decision to name First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov head of the Soviet Delegation to the next round of the Nuclear and Space Talks. The Ambassador wanted to emphasize that, for Moscow, the motive for that action was not propaganda but substance. The Soviets were looking for a means to move the talks ahead, to give them a new impulse. Raising the level would, they felt, expand the possibilities. Solutions could be explored both in official meetings "with pen in hand" and in less formal settings "over teacups." In a word, the most important thing for the Soviets was not the external impact of their decision, but the results it produced in Geneva.

5. Ridgway expressed appreciation for Dubinín's elaboration of his message of the week before, but assured him there had been no misunderstanding on our side of the text he had left. She drew on the following talking points in welcoming Vorontsov's nomination and confirming that Ambassador Kampelman would remain the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation.

Begin text.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N870001–0195. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to Moscow. Drafted by Parris; cleared by Platt in S/S and Tracy in S/S-O; approved by Ridgway. Shultz traveled to several African nations including Monrovia to meet with President Doe on January 14.

<sup>2</sup> The Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) in Geneva resumed on January 15.

<sup>3</sup> January 9.

—We welcome your decision to appoint First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov to head the Soviet Delegation to the NST round beginning January 15 in the interest of more “active and dynamic” work at the negotiations.

—The U.S. attaches the highest priority to the Geneva negotiations and the objectives we have set in reaching deep, stabilizing reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces.

—I can affirm that the U.S. is prepared to move forward on the basis of progress already made in Reykjavik and Geneva. Agreements can be made in all three fora if both sides are willing to work without preconditions and without holding progress in one area hostage to progress in another. Forward movement at Geneva could lead to meetings at higher levels.

—Ambassador Kampelman is the President’s personal representative and will remain Chairman of the U.S. Delegation. The President has nominated Ambassador Kampelman to be Counselor of the Department of State, a rank equivalent to that of Under Secretary. He has the full support of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congressional leadership.

—Ambassador Kampelman and the other negotiators enjoy the President’s highest confidence. They have full authority in all matters of negotiations and I can assure the Soviet side that they are ready to work creatively and energetically with their Soviet counterparts to achieve concrete progress at the NST negotiations.

End text.

6. Ridgway added her personal view that, now that the two sides had exchanged positions on the composition of their respective delegations, the task at hand was to get down to business in Geneva.

7. After thanking Ridgway for her remarks, Dubinin asked whether he would be correct in interpreting them as the official U.S. response to his demarche of the week before. Ridgway confirmed this. Dubinin next asked if Kampelman’s appointment as Counselor represented a “new element in his position.” Ridgway indicated that the appointment, which had been under consideration for some time, meant that Kampelman would return to Geneva with two titles. Dubinin expressed thanks for the clarification, noting that he had been “concerned” by weekend press coverage of the Vorontsov appointment, and especially by references to Kampelman. But, he quipped, “the press is the press.”

8. The meeting concluded with Ridgway and Dubinin sharing the hope that the forthcoming round in Geneva would be a productive one.

**Armocost**

**13. Memorandum From Vice President Bush to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

RE

Phone Call from Don Kendall<sup>2</sup> January 16th 1987

"T<sup>3</sup> recently spent a full day with Dobrynin, and subsequently have had two calls from him. I will be staying with Dobrynin and his wife in Moscow next month—both Bim<sup>4</sup> and I."

A summation of the substance of his call:

Changes in Soviet Union are very rapid. The full court press is on on all this consumer stuff and Gorbachev is totally committed to internal change.

Vorontsov is "Dobrynin's boy". He is flexible and has authority. Kendall was critical of the Kampelman move, feeling that in spite of the promotion Max will not be seen as anything other than continuation of normal Geneva talks.

We need new approach, says Don, as he argues for separate channel. He said "We sent nine people over there and they couldn't even agree with themselves." The Soviets saw this and were unimpressed.

The only way to get the progress that Kendall is convinced the Soviets want is to 'get it out of the bureaucracy.' We ought to assign one person to do it—to go and to listen—one person who has the clear link to the President. That's what the Soviets want, says Don K.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, The Vice President. No classification marking. A note on the memorandum indicates that it was "self-typed." Bush sent the copy to Carlucci under a January 19 typed note, in which he stated, "This is a call for a special channel obviously stimulated by Dobrynin." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> CEO of PepsiCo.

<sup>3</sup> The "I" is in reference to Kendall.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Kendall's wife, Bim.

## 14. Editorial Note

On January 21, 1987, President Ronald Reagan met with Secretary of State George Shultz and President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Frank Carlucci in the Oval Office at the White House from 2 to 2:48 p.m. White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan attended the meeting from 2 to 2:32 p.m. Reagan wrote in his diary: "After lunch—back to office for some desk work—then a meeting with Geo. Shultz. He brought word—Soviets are suggesting a foreign ministers meeting in Moscow in Feb. & then—based on its success—a summit here in the Spring. We also discussed an arms control strategy to try on them based mainly on getting a 50% reduction in I.C.B.M.s—period. Then we'd negotiate follow up plans." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, Volume II, November 1985–January 1989, page 679. No formal minutes of this meeting have been found, but according to typed notes, (Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Secretary Shultz (1/21/87–3/12/87)), the participants discussed a set of papers sent to Reagan, which Reagan forwarded to Shultz on January 3 under cover of a handwritten note: "George—a friend who wants to remain unknown sent these and suggested they be passed on to you. They contain some pretty sound thoughts—worth looking at. Ron." (Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, Box 23, Papers on Central America (01/03/1987–01/28/1987)) In his memoirs, Shultz recalled receiving the package: "Enclosed were papers on the Middle East, Nicaragua, arms control, and other issues. I read them: I could see that the author was knowledgeable, a little off the reservation but in interesting ways, and with some views similar to my own. (I later learned that the author was [former President's Assistant for National Security Affairs] Bud McFarlane.)" (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 864)

"During the first term," McFarlane wrote in the paper on U.S.-Soviet relations, "you accomplished something truly historic in establishing a new strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union. The greatest testimony to its success is that today we are deterring Soviet expansion." McFarlane went on to discuss attempts by Reagan's predecessors to deal with the Soviet Union: "Strength is what gets you good arms control agreements and it is what deters further Russian expansion."

"But all that you have accomplished in the past six years may very well be lost in the next six months," McFarlane went on to say. "As congress cuts the Defense budget, Gorbachev will freeze capability by going into space. BUT OF COURSE IF YOU ACHIEVE THROUGH REDUCTIONS A MUCH LOWER LEVEL OF SOVIET WARHEADS, YOU WOULDN'T NECESSARILY NEED TO DEPLOY SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS. YOU COULD DEAL WITH THE LOWER LEVEL USING GROUND-BASED SYSTEMS. When you think about that, you can see the makings of a deal."

After expressing his support for Reagan's positions on strategic arms reductions at Reykjavik, McFarlane proposed not deploying space-based SDI on the condition that the Soviets reduced their stockpiles of SS-18 missiles by a fixed percentage each year. He wrote: "This last element is the new wrinkle Mr. President. It is basically using space-based SDI (which would be very heavily funded as part of the deal with the Congress) to leverage the Russians down to ever lower levels of offensive arms. And think what you would get for it here at home." It would allow Reagan to go to the Congress with tangible evidence that funding SDI was directly reducing nuclear stockpiles. "In short, it locks in support for SDI beyond your administration and keeps the Russians on the path of talks in Geneva, hoping that the Congress will give him what he would otherwise have to bargain for." (Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, Box 23, Papers on Central America (01/03/1987–01/28/1987))

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**15. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, January 22, 1987, 1337Z

879. Subject: Soviet Official on Arms Control Proposal, Vorontsov, Matlock. Ref: (A) 86 Moscow 21664.<sup>2</sup>

1. Secret—Entire text.

Summary

2. According to a Soviet State Committee for Science & Technology (SCST) official—who is probably a KGB officer—work on a draft protocol to the ABM Treaty was proceeding smoothly and the draft should be ready "soon." Vorontsov's appointment was intended to demonstrate how seriously Moscow seeks an arms control agreement with the U.S. Vorontsov reportedly met for two hours immediately prior to his departure for Geneva with Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Arms Control. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 21664 from Moscow, December 31, 1986, the Embassy reported that a Soviet official indicated that the Soviets were preparing a draft protocol to the ABM Treaty on nuclear testing. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

Dobrynin. Moscow welcomed the Matlock appointment.<sup>3</sup> End summary.

#### Work on Draft Protocol

3. At a January 19 meeting called at his request, the SCST official, a regular and long-standing Embassy contact, commented that work on the reported draft protocol to the ABM Treaty (reftel) was proceeding smoothly and should be completed “soon.” He claimed as before to be unaware of any more specific matters of its substance than last time, when in fact work on the draft protocol was likely to be completed, or how Moscow would choose to present its purported new proposal to Washington.

#### Vorontsov Appointment

4. The SCST official volunteered that Moscow intended the appointment of Yuliy Vorontsov to head the Soviet NST delegation to be seen as a significant demonstration of the Kremlin’s desire to reach a mutually beneficial arms control agreement with the U.S. Vorontsov’s appointment was neither routine nor coincidental. Gorbachev had been personally dissatisfied with progress at the last NST round and with the Soviet delegation’s work. He wanted a new approach, fresh views, more vigor and a genuine effort to cut through the red tape to get things moving. That is why he personally chose Vorontsov. To emphasize this point, the SCST official claimed that, immediately prior to his departure for Geneva, Vorontsov met for “two hours” with Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and Dobrynin to discuss Soviet strategy for the upcoming round of talks. Furthermore, Vorontsov would have immediate access to the same group, and in particular to Gorbachev whenever necessary.

#### Other Bilateral Items

5. The SCST official commented that Dobrynin had been very pleased with his recent meeting with Ambassador Hartman and considered it to have been useful. For that reason, Dobrynin reportedly intended to keep such a channel open and would welcome meetings with Ambassador Matlock once he arrived. The Soviets welcomed Matlock’s appointment in view of his knowledge both of the White House and the Soviet Union. The Soviet official added that Gorbachev himself would probably receive Matlock following his arrival if he were carrying a personal message from President Reagan—even on an insignificant bilateral matter.

**Hartman**

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<sup>3</sup> On January 30 President Reagan nominated Jack F. Matlock Ambassador to the Soviet Union.



**16. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 24, 1987

## SUBJECT

January 24 Dubinin Meeting

Ambassador Dubinin, who will be returning to Moscow Sunday<sup>2</sup> for consultations, came by Saturday morning for a review of where the relationship stands. He said he expects to see Shevardnadze, Dobrynin and “in all probability” Gorbachev while he is back.

As we agreed, I used the occasion to express our satisfaction with the more businesslike approach their new head of delegation, Vorontsov, has been taking in Geneva. I said that we welcomed the apparent realism reflected in Vorontsov’s recognition of your commitment to SDI, and his expression of willingness to defer certain issues to a later negotiation. I made clear, however, that we wanted to wrap up the remaining issues on START/INF as soon as possible. On Vorontsov’s proposal for an expert level discussion of ABM Treaty issues, I reaffirmed our view that the problem is, in the first instance, a political one.

I told Dubinin of your strong commitment to moving ahead in the months ahead, which we agreed were of particular importance. In that connection, I relayed our willingness to schedule a trip to Moscow by me as soon as we see evidence through the Kampelman-Vorontsov channel that a basis has been laid for a successful meeting. Dubinin, who appeared to be informed of the substance of Max’s discussions with Vorontsov, indicated that the Soviets would be “analysing” where things stood in Geneva when Vorontsov is in Moscow next week. I told him that Max would also be coming home for consultations.

Finally, I told Dubinin that we had noted Vorontsov’s comment that Gorbachev still had in mind a Washington summit. I asked the Ambassador to convey to Moscow your assurance that the invitation is still open.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Chron Files, January–February 1987 (1). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris and cleared by Simons and Thomas. Carlucci sent a copy of the memorandum to Reagan under a January 29 covering memorandum. Reagan initialed that memorandum, and a stamped notation indicates he saw it that day. (Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Arms Control)

<sup>2</sup> January 25.

# 17. Telegram From the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, February 9, 1987, 1817Z

1366. USNST. For the Secretary from Ambassador Kampelman. Subject: Vorontsov Conversations.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Dear Mr. Secretary:

3. I have spent the weekend reviewing my impressions of the talks with Vorontsov and where I think they leave us after his return to Moscow. My conclusions are strengthened by two dinner conversations with Jeane Kirkpatrick, who stopped in Geneva en route home from her Moscow trip of last week.<sup>2</sup>

4. Substantively, the Soviets have made no significant moves at the negotiating table. There is, however, an insistence on both form and procedure designed to create an atmosphere and a mechanism which will permit forward movement.

5. In INF, there has been much detailed probing of issues. Though the Soviets have pressed for development of a joint text as in the other two groups, Mike<sup>3</sup> continues to feel that such a joint text is less useful to him than a side by side tabulation of agreements and disagreements. Vorontsov has expressed annoyance at this, arguing that the joint text approach can just as easily reveal the fundamental differences and that a “framework agreement” between ministers and heads need not include all the details that are properly to be in a treaty. Mike, however, feels that exclusive focus on a joint text may paper over differences and is not appropriate to this stage of the INF negotiations; moreover, producing a joint text can be quickly done if needed for high level meetings. Mike gave him a set of 14 questions to which he was not obtaining responses from the Soviet delegation. Vorontsov agreed to try to obtain Moscow’s responses, though he asked whether these questions would be followed by others and suggested they were intended to stall the negotiations.

6. In START, the focus is now where it belongs, on the sublimits. Vorontsov understands that all forward movement toward agreement

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, C. Max Kampelman Files, Lot 89D56, Mink. Secret; Immediate; Special Encryption; Nodis; Mink. Drafted and approved by Kampelman. Additional correspondence related to Kampelman’s negotiations with Vorontsov are *ibid*.

<sup>2</sup> Kirkpatrick was in Moscow as part of a Council on Foreign Relations delegation.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Maynard “Mike” Glitman.

requires the resolution of that issue. He requested a memo, which Ron<sup>4</sup> prepared, to show that our requirements are based on U.S. military needs and will affect us as well as the Soviet military structure. He left for Moscow implying that the Soviets may accept figures close to ours on the 4800 ballistic warheads and 3300 ICBMS, but would want us in return to give up the ban on mobiles and our 1650 limit.

7. Defense and space is far along on a framework agreement but with brackets on all the important questions. The atmosphere is quite businesslike and, at the heads of delegations level, constructive. Both sides are making efforts at resolving less important and nonsubstantive differences. Vorontsov informed me his delegation is unfamiliar with our private exchanges. He is returning to Moscow with my strong recommendation that he look at a seven-year non-deployment mutual pledge as a significant step forward, to be followed by new negotiations at a next stage following treaty ratification. He is indicating Moscow will also require restraints on the testing of space based “weapons” albeit not on sensors.

8. There is no doubt that due to news stories from Washington, Vorontsov returns to Moscow with less optimism than when he came here. He said Gorbachev is convinced that the President has decided to go “broad” on the ABM Treaty and to move to early deployment. The decision, he continued, to make those moves now, in the face of Moscow’s messages to us that they want to come to agreement with the Reagan administration and will be flexible, is a clear rebuff to Gorbachev which he cannot ignore. In Vorontsov’s discussions with Ken Adelman in my home on Wednesday evening,<sup>5</sup> he again sharply expressed discouragement and, as he left, repeated his question as to whether the negotiations any longer served a real purpose. I, of course, responded that the Washington deliberations are based on the premise that there is no Geneva negotiating result at this time. Should our Geneva talks produce a treaty, that would then become the supreme law of the land and govern our behavior. He responded with great skepticism, saying that the “military-industrial complex” seemed to have the upper hand in Washington and that those who did not want an agreement with Moscow were prevailing. This, he said, would strengthen the hand of those in Moscow who either did not want an agreement with Reagan or felt it was unattainable. Gorbachev, he said, would have to consider these new factors and make a decision.

9. I do not know whether a Geneva agreement in our interest is attainable on its own merits, although I believe it may well be if we

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Ron Lehman. No memorandum has been found.

<sup>5</sup> February 4.

want it. If it is not—and we should know it by the summer—our bona fide negotiating positions will lessen the prospect that we and SDI can be blamed. We can then with justification proceed with our SDI testing and an early deployment decision. On the other hand, were failure at the Geneva talks to follow a U.S. decision now to be “broad” or to proceed to early deployment, this would give the Soviets an overwhelming propaganda opportunity and reinforce allied and congressional views that the President’s desire to force an SDI decision on his successor is the reason why we lost the 50% reduction opportunity. It is not in our interest to put the President in this position and thereby burden his last 22 months, particularly since it is unlikely to achieve our SDI objectives.

10. In this connection, I am influenced by Admiral Crowe’s testimony of January 21 before the Senate Armed Services Committee where he said that we should not act as if SDI is “in the parking lot and we don’t know where to put it.” He expressed his personal view that a decision to deploy could not be made this year and that we still had many unanswered questions before we had an SDI “system.” He concluded that it would be premature now to make an early deployment decision and that one now need not be made.

11. It is, of course, possible that Gorbachev’s desire for an agreement will lead him temporarily to forego a propaganda opportunity and proceed with our Geneva talks seriously, seek a ministerial meeting, and go on to a Washington summit. In the event of a Presidential decision not to wait until the summer before deciding on early deployment and going broad, we should try to minimize the negative impact on our negotiations. The optimum would be to see if serious negotiations with the Soviets, can be continued. I believe this would require an early constructive letter from the President to Gorbachev. If this is not possible, we should at least try to sustain the Geneva operations so that they remain publicly credible, although the allies will be indignant no matter how many emissaries we send to explain and the Congress will proceed to cut SDI funding and restrict its program.

12. The Congress will examine whether we are abandoning the legislative criteria of feasibility, survivability, and cost effectiveness at the margin. Allies will want to know if we’re still committed to the ABM Treaty (and will probably not be entirely reassured by an affirmative response).

13. The Soviets, in their customary hard-headed approach, will want to know what the new policy factually means as to our testing program. If we have specific tests in mind, can we be specific so that it does not look like an open-ended assault against the ABM Treaty? Can we reassure them that our commitment to a period of non-deployment remains? If we want to do this, a Presidential letter to Gorbachev is

probably required. I am concerned, however, that such a letter, in the context of allied, congressional and press criticisms, may require that we give the Soviets more to chew on than is necessary now. In any event, if a letter is to be sent, I would like my hand to be involved in its formulation.

14. I am sorry to burden you again with my reactions to current developments as I see them. I don't want to sound like a broken record, but I know you want honest rather than popular reactions from me.

15. Congratulations on a good television performance on Sunday. I just saw it. I thought Sam Nunn was quite restrained. I am sending a similar message to Frank Carlucci.

**Kampelman**

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**18. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 14, 1987

SUBJECT

Conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dubinin

The Soviet ambassador came to my office with his interpreter for a 30-minute conversation. He made general remarks about Gorbachev's internal reforms and said they coupled with new directions in Soviet foreign policy. I interjected that, in that context, you and your administration felt very strongly about human rights, and that human rights issues were involved in the larger quest for a peaceful, more stable world. Dubinin said we could quarrel over the way we define these values, but that Soviet society was moving toward ever more democracy. I said all Americans were keenly interested in Soviet internal developments and welcomed any liberalization of the Soviet system.

When I asked him about new directions and initiatives in Soviet foreign policy, the ambassador reviewed Gorbachev's public initiatives since Geneva 1985. He said Reykjavik had been full of positive potential, and asked—the most important question, as he put it—whether it was

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Chron Files January–February 1987 (4). Secret. Sent for information. Copied to Bush. Reagan initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

now possible to move ahead with your Administration during the next two years. I replied that your Administration was negotiating seriously now and prepared to move ahead. I reiterated your determination to explore the possibility of a more stable strategic environment based on life-sparing defenses and reductions of nuclear forces. I said that negotiating approaches which seemed aimed at killing the SDI program, by imposing constraints beyond the ABM Treaty, were not promising. I then noted that at one time the Soviets had shown interest in delinking some offensive agreement from difficult space issues. I asked the ambassador to clarify the present Soviet position.

Dubinina emphasized that the USSR did not aim to kill SDI as a *research* program, and repeated the point to assure that I did not misconstrue Soviet tolerance as going beyond research. He expressed concern about what he was hearing regarding SDI and other US military programs. I noted that you were reviewing a range of issues naturally arising from progress in the SDI program, but that no deployment decisions were being made. In response to my question about the Soviet view of linkage, he noted that both sides were proceeding in general terms from the formulae of Reykjavik and that, as Gorbachev had stressed many times, they represented a “balance of mutual concessions” in which everything was related.

I concluded by saying that I would characterize the visit as a courtesy call. Dubinina expressed full agreement.

## 19. Notes of a Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 24, 1987, 1:15 p.m.

### FCC Meeting Notes

#### PARTICIPANTS

The President, Jeane Kirkpatrick, The Vice President, Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger and Don Regan

G. First question is P. too weak for us to deal with.

Vance: Certainly not. Congress would support any agreements or departures R.R. would support. Others said Iran-Contra is a domestic affair.

G. How long would it take R.R. to negotiate agreement. When does politics take over.

Americans: Must be completed by September 1987. J.K. disagreed. We have more time.

G. R. not a fiasco. Reproached H.K. for criticizing R. H.K. said R. not well prepared. G. said in R. there possibility for continuing dialogue.

G. Talked about U.S.-Soviet Relations for 1½ hours. Attacked Vance and Brown for destroying U.S.-Soviet Relations. I thank you Brown, for bitter lessons of embargo.<sup>2</sup> Can no longer see U.S. as viable economic partner. Had to develop own grain industry, computer industry, S&T. U.S. not reliable partner. We look for new forms of cooperation.

G. Rejected desire for investment. Not interested in economic relations.

Jones: Tried advise on prohibited-permitted. G. changed subject.

G. U.S. dominated by military-industrial complex, but you not hopeless.

G. U.S. wants military superiority.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, The President (02/12/87–04/28/1987). No classification marking. Presumably drafted by Carlucci. The meeting took place in the Oval Office at the White House from 1:15 to 2:02 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Kirkpatrick reported on her recent trip to Moscow as part of a Council on Foreign Relations delegation that included herself, former Secretaries of State Kissinger and Vance, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David Jones, and former Senator Charles Mathias Jr. "G" refers to Gorbachev; "P" refers to Reagan; "H.K." refers to Kissinger; "R" refers to the 1986 Reykjavik Summit; and "J.K." refers to Kirkpatrick.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the grain embargo the Carter administration imposed on the Soviet Union after the December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, which Reagan lifted in April 1981.

G. I heard three things: a) Nuclear war is catastrophe; b) Soviet security not incompatible with security of all other countries; and c) Soviets won't be all powerful. Nobody can impose will on world.

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## 20. Memorandum to the File<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 24, 1987, 3 p.m.

### MEETING PARTICIPANTS

The President and Frank Carlucci

I called the President's attention to the request in Suzanne Massie's letter (attached) that she be assigned a specific task. I told the President I thought it was fine for him to be talking with Suzanne Massie but assigning her specific tasks was another matter. While she may be very sensible and clear-eyed about the Soviets, they are obviously aware of her direct channel to the President. They would unquestionably try to use her in some way. Given her anxiousness to serve as an emissary (I reminded the President she had wanted to be Ambassador to the USSR), there was a clear potential for danger.

The President responded that he had not given her any tasks, but that she may be useful someday if he wanted to get a message across. I told him that if he planned to use her in any way to do one of two things: either someone like I should be present during the conversation or he should make a written record of what he told her. I repeated this suggestion somewhat later in our conversation.

The President indicated he was aware of the dangers and would heed my advice. Although, at the same time, he did not suggest that I be present. (Suzanne Massie is scheduled to meet with the President

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, The President (02/12/1987–04/28/1987). No classification marking. Drafted by Carlucci. The meeting took place in the Oval Office from 3 until 3:03 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Dairy)



and Mrs. Reagan in the Oval Office on Wednesday, February 25, at 2:00 p.m. to 2:30 p.m.)<sup>2</sup>

### Attachment

#### Letter From Suzanne Massie to President Reagan<sup>3</sup>

Cambridge, February 6, 1987

Dear Mr. President,

I just arrived back at Harvard, and knowing that today is your birthday, hasten to add my wishes which, alas will reach you belatedly. But I have been thinking of you most especially today, and as the Russians say “Many years!” and may you have health, happiness and much fulfillment in this new year for you!

When I arrived I found your letter of January 13 waiting for me. How very thoughtful and sensitive it was of you to write. Thank you. I was deeply touched by your words and especially by your personal p.s. Of course I had not received it when I saw you on Tuesday, so missed the chance to thank you personally.

Yes, I did think I could do a special job in Moscow just now. I should probably have made that a little clearer to you before, but in our meetings I always hesitated to put myself forward and in retrospect perhaps that was a mistake. In any case, I do want you to know that it was not just my own plain nerve, but the flood of phone calls I received from senators, the military and many private citizens after the article appeared in the N.Y. Times on December 19 and the editorial on the 30th that prompted me to send it to you.

Of course I know Jack very well. During the past three years we have consulted frequently by phone and have had many meetings. He is indeed an experienced government servant. I was given a Soviet reaction to his appointment which I communicated to Secretary Shultz

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<sup>2</sup> According to the President’s Daily Diary, Reagan met with Massie in the Oval Office from 2:08 to 2:41 p.m. on February 25. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No substantive record of the conversation was found. In his personal diary entry that evening, Reagan recalled “a fine meeting with Suzanne Massie. Very interesting—she suggested maybe I should go to Moscow instead of Gorbachev coming here. Then she dropped bomb. A top Soviet official told her Gorbachev might well be killed if he came here. There is so much opposition to what he’s trying to do in Russia—they could murder him here & then pin the whole thing on us. I don’t find the warning at all outlandish. The K.G.B. is capable of doing just that.” (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, Vol. II, November 1985–January 1989, p. 693)

<sup>3</sup> No classification marking.

in our recent meeting, but which you should perhaps also know as it may affect responses to initiatives you might make.

There are certain problems I think you need to know, and which I hope Jack can solve. The situation in our Embassy in Moscow and Consulate in Leningrad is depressing. Morale is low. The staff are coping gallantly as best they can, but their activities are significantly hampered by the loss of Soviet personnel. It is my view that certain actions on our part which led to this result were, in sum, counterproductive and not really helpful to our interests. For instance, I witnessed the spectacle of our leading specialist on the Plenum, on the day the Plenum opened, doing his duty cleaning the courtyard instead of being able to devote full attention to his speciality. There are certain Soviets who are simply delighted that they have succeeded in being able to cut us off completely from any contact with Soviet citizens—many of whom were very devoted and helpful—in the Embassy. I think the security problem is bound to be compounded by having inexperienced—and lonely—Americans running around Moscow. Forgive me, Mr. President, if I am out of bounds, but I am compelled to say that in my view, you were not well advised in this instance. Ideology, as the Soviets themselves are finding out these days, is no substitute for common sense.

It is a very exciting and interesting time there now. Mr. Gorbachev is moving fast and with determination, but the situation is complex and not without danger. I believe that we should use the new mood for openness to explore certain possibilities—one of these being media reciprocity, among many other things up and down the scale. On Tuesday,<sup>4</sup> I had the chance to discuss my recent trip and conclusions with a group of senators and I hope I will have the chance to discuss these with you at some greater length, as I knew this would be impossible when I saw you this time.

I so much enjoyed seeing Mrs. Reagan both before I left and when I returned. I hope she will seriously consider coming to Leningrad for the opening of the Wyeth exhibition of which she is honorary chairman. I believe this could be a fine diplomatic opportunity in which you would have nothing to lose and a great deal to gain. It was also wonderful to see you looking so fit, and as always, handsome. What a constitution! It makes me wonder what you have for breakfast.

In closing may I say, that as you honor me by calling me a trusted advisor, then I will be bold enough to say that I think I could help you more if we were able to meet or talk a little more regularly than every six months or so. I like to be able to follow things through and I don't

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<sup>4</sup> February 3.

feel I can do that now. I could also help more if you were to give me a specific task to accomplish—as you did when you sent me for the cultural exchange. I believe that Russians trust me and that I could make a contribution.

Right now, there are some perceptions about the changing USSR and the situation there which I would like to share with you before I go back again. I plan to be at Harvard until February 28, then I leave March 3 for a month in Leningrad and Moscow and will be back about April 1st. If you think it might be helpful to you, would your schedule permit us to meet informally, as we have on the past two occasions, on February 24 or 25? Or perhaps we could at least talk on the telephone? I may be reached here at Harvard at (617) 495 8703.

As always, I send my warm wishes to you and Mrs. Reagan, and again, many thanks for your wonderful letter.

Sincerely,

**Suzanne Massie<sup>5</sup>**

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<sup>5</sup> Massie signed “Suzanne” above her typed signature.

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## 21. Notes of a Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 25, 1987, 1:30 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

The President, Secretary Shultz, Don Regan

Where we are w/Soviets

Have process in motion comes from Geneva summit.

At this round modest progress. Tone more businesslike. Mvt. on substance as well.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Secretary Shultz (01/21/87–03/12/87). No classification marking. Presumably drafted by Carlucci. The meeting took place in the Oval Office at the White House and lasted from 1:32 to 2:06 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)

Soviets accepted our proposal we tabulate when we agree/disagree.

Will buy 4,500 ballistic missile ceiling.

Regional dialogue—Armacost to Moscow,<sup>2</sup> and we will probe Afghan.

P. Are we going to have a summit?

G.S. Getting to point where human rights not a block.

P. No bows or credit when they turn people loose.

G.S. Soviets want high level meeting. Want me come to Moscow. We should structure things for visit in late March or early April. If these productive meeting, it is a basis for summit.

G.S. Need regain initiative w/coordinated step to assert our agenda.

Clarify for Soviets and encourages them move in our direction.

We want entice them finish START and INF and accept agreement w/space compatible w/SDI going forward.

Preview INF treaty in letter to Gorbachev. Armacost set stage for visit by G.S.

President review progress, give a vision beyond 2 years and identify practical steps.

Timing should coordinate w/private initiatives.

[Omitted here are discussions unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

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<sup>2</sup> For Armacost's report to Shultz, see Document 26. Further documentation on Armacost's conversations in Moscow is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXXV, Afghanistan, 1985–1989.

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## 22. Editorial Note

On February 28, 1987, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev announced he would no longer link an INF Treaty to other arms negotiations. On March 3, President Ronald Reagan hailed Gorbachev's decision in a 3:30 p.m. appearance before reporters assembled in the White House Briefing Room: "This removes a serious obstacle to progress toward INF reductions and is consistent with the understanding which Mr. Gorbachev and I reached at our 1985 Geneva summit meeting: that we would indeed seek a separate agreement in this important

area. I want to congratulate our allies for their firmness on this issue. Obviously, our strength of purpose has led to progress. To seize this new opportunity, I have instructed our negotiators to begin the presentation of our draft INF treaty text in Geneva tomorrow. I hope that the Soviet Union will then proceed with us to serious discussion of the details which are essential to translate areas of agreement in principle into a concrete agreement. And I want to stress that of the important issues which remain to be resolved none is more important than verification. Because we're committed to genuine and lasting arms reductions and to ensuring full compliance, we will continue to insist that any agreement must be effectively verifiable." Reagan went on to announce he was recalling Ambassadors Max Kampelman, Mike Glitsman, and Ron Lehman, to meet with him in Washington. (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1987, Book I, pp. 191–192)

In a personal diary entry for March 10, Reagan recalled "a very brief N.S.C. meeting—talked about tone I should take if we do a Foreign Policy speech soon. We have to tread a narrow path—acknowledging the Soviet arms proposal etc. but at same time pointing out their intransigence in Afghanistan etc." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, Volume II, November 1985–January 1989, p. 698)

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## 23. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated

### SOVIET MOTIVES

1. We believe the Soviets recognize that the Iceland package concept had run its course, that they had lost ground in trying to influence our Allies, and that the package concept made the Soviet Union appear to be the primary obstacle to progress in arms control. Thus, Gorbachev perceived a need for a new approach.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, The President (02/12/1987–04/28/1987). Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper. Reagan initialed the top-right corner of the document. Acting Director of Central Intelligence Gates sent the paper to Shultz, Weinberger, and Carlucci on March 13 under a covering memorandum. Carlucci sent the package to Reagan, who commented in the upper right-hand corner: "So let's take advantage of this eagerness to put something over on us. RR." On March 16, Carlucci sent the paper to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Casey, and Howard Baker under cover of a memorandum that conveyed Reagan's response. (Ibid.)

2. The Soviets probably calculate that encouraging progress on INF by demonstrating Soviet flexibility will increase the political pressure on the US Administration to move from INF to the main issues—that is, SDI and strategic forces. In this connection, the Soviets have long believed that an active arms control process itself works to their advantage because of the political pressures (external to the Executive Branch) it brings to bear in the United States to reduce the defense budget and to make concessions.

3. The Soviets anticipate that the agreement will contribute to friction between the United States and its Allies, who are nervous about decoupling. At minimum, they probably hope to thwart deployments in the Netherlands.

4. Gorbachev and his advisers know that the initiative would remove a significant US military threat to the USSR itself (and its command and control at the outset of conflict) while simultaneously rolling back a significant US political/security initiative in Europe.

5. Gorbachev undoubtedly also believes that this is a propitious moment for a new initiative because of his perception that the Administration is politically vulnerable.

6. The Soviets, and Gorbachev in particular—while uncertain whether an agreement can in fact be reached—almost certainly calculate that an agreement and summit with President Reagan in the run-up to the American Presidential election in 1988 could significantly influence the political debate in the US vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the election.

7. Gorbachev's initiative probably is not attributable to his need at home for a political victory. While he is confronted with obstacles in his efforts to modernize the Soviet economy, he does not yet appear to have serious political difficulties in the Politburo or the Central Committee; indeed, the initiative itself makes clear that his colleagues still are allowing him considerable running room.

**24. Minutes of a Policy Review Group Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 18, 1987, 1–2 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Secretary Shultz's Trip to Moscow, April 13–16 (U)

**PARTICIPANTS**

*The Vice President's Office:*

Donald Gregg

*State:*

Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway

Ambassador Richard Schifter

Mark Parris

*OSD:*

Dr. Fred Ikle

Frank Gaffney

*CIA:*

[name not declassified]

Richard Kerr

*JCS:*

General John Moellering

*ACDA:*

Director Kenneth Adelman

Michael Guhin

*USIA*

Marvin Stone

John Kordek

*White House:*

General Colin L. Powell

*NSC:*

Robert E. Linhard

Fritz W. Ermarth

*Colin Powell* opened the meeting by stating its purpose as assuring proper interagency support on the broad range of subjects being prepared for visit of Secretary of State Shultz to Moscow, 13–16 April. (C)

*Overview*

*Ambassador Ridgway* gave an overview of the trip agenda and trip planning. She stressed we would be pushing our entire four-element agenda (arms reduction, regional conflict, human rights and bilateral issues), seeking convergence in all areas that could then be turned over to other appropriate fora for further work. She noted that we would be prepared for a Soviet stand-pat performance, like Vienna 1986, or a Reykjavik-like package of surprises. On logistics, she noted the need for two aircraft to handle a large delegation, provision for doing secure paper work, the short-handedness of US Embassy Moscow, and the need for herself and Paul Nitze to brief allies on the eve of the trip. Because of Under Secretary Armacost's recent trip to Moscow on regional issues and the impending US-Soviet commission meeting on

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Chron Files January-February 1987 (9). Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Although no drafting information appears on the minutes, Ermarth sent a draft to Powell under a March 19 covering memorandum, recommending that Powell approve the minutes "for records purposes." Powell initialed his approval. (Ibid.)

bilateral matters, she expected arms control and human rights to get the main attention during the Shultz trip. In response to queries, she stressed that regional conflicts would get full emphasis required by our policy. (S)

### *Arms Control*

*Bob Linhard* briefly surveyed procedures for interagency arms control work to prepare for the trip, expressing confidence that established patterns would work well. *Ambassador Ridgway* noted the need to combat a public impression that this would be an INF meeting; the whole US-Soviet agenda would be worked. It was noted that a major Presidential address, probably on 10 April,<sup>2</sup> would set the stage for the trip. In the arms control area, a number of difficult issues would have to be worked, e.g., SRINF before the trip. CIA judged that the Soviets were likely to stall progress on INF in Geneva, awaiting a chance to interact at the ministerial level. (S)

### *Regional Conflicts*

*Ambassador Ridgway* stated the expectation that the full range of regional issues would get attention. The Secretary would assure that our concerns on specific regions and the general critique about Soviet policies would be aired, including the costs and risks imposed by Soviet behavior on the overall US-Soviet relationship. *Ken Adelman* posed the question as to whether we would be making specific proposals on regional conflicts. (S)

### *Human Rights*

*Ambassador Ridgway* observed that, while we note some positive gestures on Gorbachev's part, we have a cautious assessment of his policies toward human rights. In addition to our established set of concerns about known victims of Soviet repressive policies, about Jewish emigration, divided spouses, etc., we would be raising concerns about religious victims, whether the Soviets would institutionalize positive steps. We would also give new emphasis to open communications, including our condemnation of continued jamming and demand for other forms of openness, e.g., non-interference with the mails and telecommunications. In response to a question, *Ambassador Ridgway* stated our policy toward the Soviet proposal for a human rights conference in Moscow: We neither accept nor reject because to accept would give Moscow a bonus it doesn't deserve, while rejecting would seem gratuitously negative toward recent Soviet positive moves. (S)

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<sup>2</sup> On April 10, the President delivered remarks at a luncheon hosted by the Los Angeles World Affairs Council. For the text of Reagan's remarks and a question-and-answer session, see *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1987, Book I, pp. 365–372.



*Bilateral Issues*

*Ambassador Ridgway* noted that the bilateral element of our agenda contained many elements were deserving attention in Moscow. A space cooperation agreement could well be signed there, along with agreements on search and rescue cooperation. (C)

*Further Discussion*

*Marvin Stone* stressed the importance of hitting the Soviets on jamming of VOA. *Don Gregg* asked whether there would be any refinement or narrowing of the agenda between now and the trip. *Ambassador Ridgway* said normal channels through the Soviet embassy in Washington would be used for that purpose. She added that the Secretary intended to repeat US unhappiness with Soviet nonperformance under the Long-term Grain Agreement. She also pleaded for agencies involved in managing exchanges to remain mindful of the importance the President ascribed to them in their own management decisions, avoiding unilateral steps that harmed them. (S)

*Richard Kerr* cautioned that we should be prepared for an aggressive Soviet defense of its recent human rights performance and be prepared for some surprise proposals. (S)

*Fred Ikle* noted that surprises should be met with no more than a commitment to carry them back to Washington for study. (S)

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## 25. Notes of a Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 18, 1987

*The President's Meeting with Secretary Shultz and Howard Baker*

1. Moscow. Started meetings. Object is to bring things to you to settle. Want unified Admin. posture. Met with Wright.<sup>2</sup> He will be there. We worked out schedules so not talking to same people at same time. I'm not comfortable w/his refusal to lay off legislating arms control before trip.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Secretary Shultz (03/13/87–04/15/87). No classification marking. Presumably drafted by Carlucci. The meeting took place in the White House Oval Office from 1:33 to 2:05 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) An unknown hand wrote in the upper right-hand corner: "EXCERPTS SENT TO APPROP STAFF MEMBERS 3/19."

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Speaker of the House of Representatives James "Jim" Wright.

2. INF. Continuing to work. Trying to see if anything in START and space that we could bring to you.

3. Armacost has finished. Will brief you on Friday.<sup>3</sup>

4. Focus on human rights in Moscow.

Before going consult w/human rights organizations & Jewish Community.

Will develop public diplomacy and private efforts before we go.

Our policy working; consistent but not shouting.

Want Sovs to comply w/Helsinki acts.

During mtg I would:

1) Acknowledge progress, but long way to go.

2) Want to have them make divided family cases routine. Want unconditional release of political prisoners.

3) Push for unrestricted emmigration.

Want to move HR discussion into new areas.

1) Jamming and communications.

2) More media appearances.

3) Access thru telephone & mail.

4) Religion. 1/3 prisoners are for religious reasons.

5) Reinforce commitment to regular forum for US-Sov. dialogue on human rights.

Bait to use.

Trade & Economics. Not linked, but mentioned in same breath.

Gob. pushing for openness. Open society will be necessary for them, & is consistent w/human rights. If treat people decently could unrestrict emmigration & people wouldn't leave.

P. Sounds good.

Useful to know when agreeable to have Gob. visit here.

[Omitted here are discussions unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

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<sup>3</sup> March 20. See footnote 1, Document 26.

**26. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 20, 1987

## SUBJECT

Moscow Consultations on Regional Issues

1. *General Impressions*

—Hopes are stirring in Moscow for an upturn in US-Soviet relations. Your visit next month is considered a potential turning point which could shape the contours of the relationship for the next several years. Dobrynin virtually predicted a 1987 summit in the United States. The Soviets are prepared to discuss the full range of issues when you are in Moscow. It is clear that they will focus on nailing down an INF agreement, and exploring for further give in our position on Defense and Space. It is somewhat patronizing of Moscow to tell us repeatedly that they are still ready to deal with the Reagan Administration. But it is also an accurate measure of Mr. Gorbachev's own apparent need to lock in some arms control understandings promptly.

—The Soviets are prepared to discuss regional questions with us, but this is not high on their agenda. Vorontsov is an urbane and engaging diplomat who knows how to put a benign face on Soviet policy. But the Soviets put no new ideas in play during this week's talks. They played defensive ball on Afghanistan and Cambodia. With respect to Southern Africa and Central America, they seemed to relish our difficulties while wrapping themselves in UN resolutions and international legal principles. On the Middle East Peace Process, they recited familiar procedural proposals whose major purpose is to get them into the game.

—From what I saw in Moscow, Soviet society doesn't work very well. It is little wonder that Gorbachev has set domestic reform as his number one priority. There *is* a palpable sense of change. *Glasnost* has stimulated a good deal of intellectual ferment. Whether Gorbachev can

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1987 March 20 Mtg. w/the PRES. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Shultz saw it. Talking points for Shultz's meeting with Reagan, based on Armacost's trip, are *ibid*. The same day, Shultz met with the President, Carlucci, and Baker in the Oval Office. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary, March 20, 1987) According to Carlucci's meeting notes, which mistakenly identify the date as March 21, Shultz reported on Armacost's trip: "sense we have is that things in motion on Afghanistan. [The Soviets] don't want us to be the agents for getting this done. . . . [Soviet] papers saying their withdrawal will be defeat for US (U.S. wants them there to be bloodied)." (Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Secretary Shultz (03/13/87–04/15/87))

control the forces he is unleashing is anybody's guess. The highly touted structural reforms of the economy appear to me a pretty mixed bag. None of the Foreign Ministry people I encountered could provide an intelligible explanation of these reforms. Perhaps Gorbachev or Ryzhkov can furnish a more effective rationale. Having seen Moscow for the first time, I will never again believe a DIA threat assessment of the Soviet Union!

## 2. *Afghanistan*

This issue was the centerpiece in my regional discussions. It came up in my talks with Vorontsov, Shevardnadze, and Dobrynin; all took the same line.

—The Soviets declare emphatically that they are getting out of Afghanistan. Shevardnadze said they have told the Afghans that the mission of the Red Army has been completed, and that a timetable for troop withdrawals has been set. Having avoided characterizing the Afghan government as “communist” or “socialist”, Moscow has preserved the latitude to dissociate Soviet interests from the fate of the current government in Kabul. The *Moscow News* has carried articles in its English and Russian editions describing plans for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan as a strategic setback for the *United States*.

—Assuming the Russians have made a firm decision to withdraw, they are preserving maximum flexibility on the tactics and timing of their withdrawal. They pointed to the Afghan government's 18 month timetable as a display of flexibility, and called for a more forthcoming response from Pakistan. They did not tip their hand as to what may be offered at the next round in Geneva. I am confident they have not come to their bottom line.

—The Soviets described national reconciliation as a process that is well underway, and urged us to encourage the Mujahidin in Peshawar to get on board. The Soviet game plan is not entirely clear, but they seem to be exploring several tracks.

- At one level they are encouraging political accommodations at the grass roots. For example, they claim that Afghan authorities are prepared to recognize resistance elements as self-defense units under the leadership of locally elected commanders, if they end their rebellion; these units would not be required to disarm and would be recognized as local authorities.

- At the same time efforts have been intensified to broaden Najib's government, and senior Soviet officials speak as though they anticipate its transformation into a coalition. They deny that Najib intends to monopolize power; and affirm he is prepared to share it; Vorontsov even allowed the inference that at the end of the process Najib might no longer be in charge.

—On the other hand they did not display much interest in Yaqub's idea of inviting former King Zahir Shah to form an interim government.

The Soviets were firm in rejecting any suggestion that the current Kabul authorities be left on the sidelines. They dashed any hint that they might take leading members of the PDPA party back to Russia with their troops. Shevardnadze discounted the ability of a neutral figure or figures to manage things, claiming they would be unable to command the loyalty of the army, bureaucracy, and party structure. Whatever misgivings the Soviets have about Najib, they claimed he is making headway in coopting the Mujahidin resistance leaders, luring refugees back home, and bringing new blood into the regime. (Either Soviet intelligence is lousy or our own is deficient; I suspect Moscow is indulging wishful thinking.)

—Although the Russians showed little daylight between themselves and Najib, they acknowledged they had their lines out to former King Zahir Shah. And they seemed to hope that discussions can be initiated among Afghans in Kabul, Peshawar, and Rome to advance the process of national reconciliation.

—The Russian leadership continued to assert an interest in a neutral, non-aligned Afghanistan. But they did not appear interested in discussing neutralization arrangements—at least with us.

—The Soviets again and again portrayed the Mujahidin Alliance in Peshawar as out of step with the effort to find a peaceful solution to the Afghan conflict. They attributed this to our weapons, our money, and our advice. (Vorontsov, incidentally, conceded that Soviet aircraft losses are up and he registered concern with reports of additional Stinger deliveries.)

—I was quite blunt with my opposite numbers on the Afghan issue. I told them their 18 month timetable provided no basis for a settlement; that their concept of national reconciliation was flawed; that they were on the wrong side of the nationalist issue, and should stop throwing good money after bad; that if they chose to prolong their involvement, we will obviously not abandon our friends; and that they should get their troops out of Afghanistan promptly if they are serious about promoting real change in East-West relations. I took a direct hit in their press as the “coordinator” of our interference in Afghanistan, but the Soviet government described the talks as useful. I believe you should go after them again on this during your April visit.<sup>2</sup>

### *3. Other Regional Issues*

The discussion of other regional issues tended to be more perfunctory.

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<sup>2</sup> Shultz met with Soviet officials April 13–15. See Documents 38–47.

—*Middle East*. The Russians stuck to their procedural proposals (international conference and preparatory committee), and plowed no new ground. They appeared somewhat smug about the development of their contacts with Israel, and were obviously buoyed by the enthusiasm of Europeans for an international conference. I am not sure there is much to be done on this issue when you are in Moscow. If the Soviets raise it, you should brace them to modify their positions on substantive issues, e.g., their tendency to indulge the rejectionist Arab countries, to endorse “maximalist” positions, etc.

—*Southern Africa*. Adamishin was travelling, and Vasev, a rigid and unimaginative technician, did the talking. He had nothing new to say. He did confirm Angolan interest in exploring the idea of opening the Benguela railway, but did not disclose Soviet thinking about the project. If Chet<sup>3</sup> gets anywhere with the Angolans in early April, there may be an opening for raising this issue again. Otherwise I see little purpose in devoting much time to this with Shevardnadze, though a passing reference to our contacts with the ANC, our developing relationship with Mozambique, and renewed interests by Luanda in talks with us may be useful to keep the Soviets off balance.

—*Central America*. The Soviets enjoy posturing on this issue, offering gratuitous criticism and advice. I would not indulge them in your talks.

—*Iran-Iraq War*. The Soviets share our concerns about the war, but do not fear an imminent Iraqi collapse. They are persuaded Iranian intransigence will persist as long as Khomeini is on the scene, and harbor doubts about the efficacy of an arms embargo. They want to continue consulting in New York, but unless there is some break in the situation on the ground, I doubt that possibilities for joint or parallel action will emerge in time to warrant devoting much time to this during your visit.

—*India-Pak Nuclear Competition*. We share obvious interests in this area, but Moscow claims it is already urging restraint on India, and is counting on us to hold the Pakistanis back. So long as India expects that Congress will impose aid cuts or new certification requirements on Pakistan, the Indians have little incentive to cooperate in joining a regional dialogue with Islamabad. Under these circumstances the Russians will remain reluctant to expend political capital in Delhi. If the Congressional picture changes by mid-April, it could be timely for you to put in another word on the subject.

—*Cambodia*. I sense that Shevardnadze was somewhat uneasy about the situation in Indochina. He has just had a first-hand dose of

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<sup>3</sup> Chester Crocker.

ASEAN's distrust of Moscow's intentions. There are reports that he pressed Hanoi unsuccessfully to exhibit more flexibility. We should keep the pressure on them, focusing on the parallels between the Cambodian and Afghan situations. This is worth mentioning during your visit.

—*Korea*. The Soviets are not prepared to lean on Pyongyang for fear of jeopardizing their privileged access. Beijing is prepared to play a more helpful role. Still there may be some useful things for you to mention to Shevardnadze depending on where North and South Korean haggling over the terms of reengagement in the North-South dialogue stands when you get to Moscow.

#### *4. Future Regional Talks*

I tabled a suggested schedule for the next round of regional experts talks while I was in Moscow. EUR should follow up with the Soviets so that agreement on these exchanges can be announced at the end of your trip. In addition, they want to add consultations on UN-related issues of mutual concern prior to the UNGA. This would be useful, and agreement on such consultations could also be announced.

**Michael H. Armacost<sup>4</sup>**

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<sup>4</sup> Printed from a copy that bears his typed signature.

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#### **27. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Levitsky) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 23, 1987

##### **SUBJECT**

A Second Marine in the Security Guard Espionage Case

A second Marine who served as a guard in Embassy Moscow has admitted during a polygraph examination on March 20, 1986 that he helped Lonetree commit espionage against the United States. This

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, 1987 SYS 4 RWR INT 40151–40200. Secret; Sensitive.

Marine, Cpl. Arnold Bracy, was also sexually involved with a Soviet national who worked as a cook in the Embassy. The Soviet woman introduced the Marine to a KGB operative who apparently also worked with Lonetree.

When the two Marines worked together, Bracy claims to have deactivated, reset or disregarded alarms, knowing that Lonetree and the Soviets were in sensitive and restricted areas of the embassy, including the communications area. He has said that he gave cipher combinations to Lonetree knowing that Lonetree was allowing the Soviets into the secured areas. He said that Lonetree provided the Soviets with classified documents out of the burn bags, as well as blue prints of the embassy building. It appears that the Soviets repeatedly were allowed into sensitive areas of the embassy for hours at a time when the two Marines were standing duty together.

Lonetree transferred from Moscow to Vienna in March, 1986. Bracy's tour of duty in Moscow began in July, 1985 and ended in August, 1986 when he was caught fraternizing with the Soviet cook. At that time, he stated he was approached by her, but denied sexual involvement or espionage activity. He was then removed from post and debriefed. No other incriminating information was obtained until the polygraph examination conducted by the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) in California.

Bracy admitted to receiving about \$1,000 from Lonetree for the espionage activity. Bracy has terminated his cooperation with the Government and has requested an attorney.

On Sunday afternoon, March 22, counterintelligence representatives of the Department of State and the CIA conferred with NIS colleagues to pursue jointly the new investigative leads and other appropriate steps.

**Melvyn Levitsky**



**28. Memorandum From Barry Kelly of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 24, 1987

SUBJECT

Follow-up to Longtree<sup>2</sup> Espionage Case

Attached at Tab I is the first report submitted to you relating to the potential damage to the national security as a result of the marine guard previously assigned to our embassy in Moscow who was arrested on December 31, 1986, for being a KGB agent. New information has been developed as the Naval Investigative Service has pursued this case and it now appears the damage is far worse than we previously projected.

The NIS located and interviewed last week (March 19, 1987) another marine guard who served in Moscow with Longtree. This individual, Arnold Bracy, a black marine corporal, has admitted knowing about Longtree's espionage in Moscow as well as helping him in his espionage activity for which Longtree paid him \$1000. Bracy confessed to his activity for two days, but was unable to pass a polygraph examination on the completeness of his confession. On Saturday, March 21, he asked for a lawyer and his interview stopped. He is currently in custody pending formal espionage charges being filed against him. The NIS is concerned about their ability to successfully prosecute Longtree; however, Bracy's information may assist the success of this prosecution and, as such, Bracy may be granted immunity.

Bracy provided the following new information:

Longtree admitted to Bracy that he worked for the KGB in Moscow for some time prior to January 1986. During the time period prior to January 1986, when he was the marine guard in our Moscow Embassy during the evening (the Embassy required only one marine guard on duty during that time period), Longtree allowed 1–4 KGB technicians into the secure areas of our embassy on "numerous occasions." During the period from January 1986–March 1986 (when Longtree was transferred to Vienna) Longtree and Bracy worked together to *allow KGB technicians into every secure area of the embassy*. This included access to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, 1987 SYS 4 RWR INT 40151–40200. Top Secret. Prepared by Major. Powell wrote in the upper right-hand margin of the memorandum: "Pres. & VP have seen. CP 25/3"

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Clayton Lonetree.

[2½ lines not declassified]. The KGB team would be granted access to the space by Longtree and Bracy would turn off the alarms and CCTV systems which were put in place to detect surreptitious entry. The KGB teams would normally enter the secure space at 2:00 a.m. and work until 5:00–6:00 a.m. Longtree and Bracy also periodically had the duty of burning the classified trash [*less than 1 line not declassified*] and Bracy saw Longtree routinely segregate TOP SECRET and SECRET documents out of the burn bags for transmittal to the KGB.

In March 1986, Longtree was transferred to Vienna. Bracy remained in Moscow until August 1986 when he was sent back to the U.S. early for fraternization with a Soviet national who was a cook in the marine kitchen. Bracy was introduced to this woman (Galyia) by Longtree's female paramour who introduced Longtree to the KGB. Bracy admits being introduced to the KGB in a park by Galyia but does not admit working for the KGB after Longtree departed Moscow.

#### *Damage*

[2 paragraphs (14 lines) not declassified]

I am concerned that since so many agencies are involved in potential loss of intelligence, it may be very difficult to determine or willing to admit the extent of the loss. It may be advisable to ask PFIAB to undertake a study of the impact of this espionage loss as they did so well in the Howard matter. PFIAB gave the President a very clear and rapid readout on the damage of the Howard case. When we asked the intelligence community to give us a damage assessment of the Pelton and Walker espionage cases a year ago, we are still waiting and hope we get an answer this summer.

I will follow this closely and keep you advised.

## Tab 1

**Memorandum From David Major of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)<sup>3</sup>**

Washington, January 15, 1987

## SUBJECT

Longtree Espionage Case

As you will recall Marine Sgt. Longtree has been arrested by the Naval Investigative Service and charged with being a KGB Agent while a Marine guard in Moscow and Vienna. The following is an assessment of what we know about this case to date and the policy implications:

*Damage Assessment.* It appears Longtree was recruited by the KGB in Moscow in February 1986 and continued to work for the KGB when he was transferred from Moscow in March 1986 [to] Vienna. He continued to work for the KGB while in Vienna, until his last known meeting with the KGB in Vienna on December 14, 1986.

The amount of damage to national security he did is still being evaluated. At a minimum it is serious and could prove to be extremely damaging but not anywhere compared to the damage of the Walker or Pelton cases. Our current assessment is based on what he has confessed to which is substantially less than the damage he could have done.

*Known intelligence comprised based on Longtree's confessions:*

*[The text was redacted in the version of the document on file.]*

—He provided personality assessment data on a [*less than 1 line not declassified*] secretary in Vienna as well as a number of FSNs working in the Embassy.

—He admits making a surreptitious entry into the communication room in Vienna and stealing three Top Secret documents (these have not been identified to date).

—He admits to, being tasked to implant listening devices in the ambassador's office in Moscow and Vienna but denies having done so.

*Worst case damage scenario of what Longtree could have done:*

—[*1½ lines not declassified*] He had the opportunity to steal burn bags containing State Department classified documents on almost a daily basis in Moscow and Vienna. [*1½ lines not declassified*]

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<sup>3</sup> Top Secret. The text was redacted in the version of the document on file.

—He periodically guarded a warehouse outside the Embassy compound in Moscow that contained items placed in the Embassy secure areas and he may have allowed KGB technical teams to place listening devices in these items (desks, chairs, etc.).

—[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

—He could have compromised the communication center on a regular basis.

*Longtree's recruitment:*

—He was not blackmailed. In September 1985 he met a 26 year old attractive female Soviet national who worked in the customs section of our Embassy in Moscow. This relationship was facilitated because the female Soviet national was invited to Marine parties held in the Embassy. He began a secret sexual relationship with her in January 1986 using her parents' apartment. (A number of the other Marines knew of this but did not report it, despite the fact it was a violation of regulations.) In January 1986 she introduced him to her "uncle" in a safehouse. During the second meeting with the uncle Sasha (either a co-opted or officer of the KGB/SCD) he asked for classified information which Longtree willingly provided. The female participated in these debriefing meetings with the KGB in Moscow. (She was fired by the Embassy in December 1985 for poor work performance, and is reported to be currently working for the Irish Embassy in Moscow.) Longtree was not blackmailed in any manner. When he was transferred to Vienna, Sasha continued to meet Longtree in Vienna from June 1986 until December 14, 1986. They had numerous meetings during which period Longtree admits receiving \$3500.

*Motivation:*

—Longtree admits to being motivated by his fascination with the intrigue, was flattered the KGB was interested in him, and sought revenge against the US because of injustices committed against the Indians in the past 100 years (he is an American Indian).

Unlike other cases we have seen in the past the KGB continued to offer Longtree the opportunity to defect openly. This may indicate he had knowledge of doing something for the Soviets in Moscow the KGB wished to protect at all cost. He was scheduled to travel back to Moscow in January 1987 for further training.

*Policy Implications:*

—This vindicated our policy of excluding Soviets FSN working in the Embassy in Moscow and may suggest we do the same in other Warsaw Pact countries.

—This puts into question the CI training given by the State Department to the Marine guards being assigned to Warsaw Pact countries.

—This could be the impetus to begin giving aperiodic CI polygraphs to Marine guards assigned to Warsaw Pact countries.

**29. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Schifter) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 25, 1987

SUBJECT

Human Rights in the Soviet Union during the Period 1953–1986

*Summary.* In the years immediately following Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet Union gradually emerged from the state of fear engendered by his despotic rule. With the Secret Police less powerful and less oppressive, the Soviet people discovered they could speak more freely and intellectuals began to assert their independence. This state of affairs, known as "the thaw," continued through the Khrushchev years (ending in 1964) into the early part of the Brezhnev era. Thereafter, however, the Soviet government began to resist the efforts of intellectuals to broaden their freedom of expression. The intellectuals responded by forming human rights groups, which engaged the government in a continuing struggle. This struggle, which began in 1965, ended in 1977 with a sharp clamp-down by the Soviet government on what had become known as the dissident movement. Arrests, long-term imprisonment or commitments to a mental institution became the price paid for dissidence. With the return of the Secret Police to the center of governmental authority, the period 1977–86 became a period of severe repression. *End Summary.*

*Stalin's Legacy*

Ever since the purges started in the 1930s, Stalin had governed the Soviet Union through his Secret Police apparatus. It was, therefore, natural that after Stalin's death in March 1953, the man who stood at the helm of that apparatus, Lavrenti Beria, would consider himself the rightful heir to the throne. Some of his colleagues had different notions. They united under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev in an effort to oust Beria. With the help of the military leadership, which took personal responsibility for the arrest of Beria, they succeeded. Beria and some of his erstwhile colleagues were executed and the Secret Police was removed from the center of authority.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1987 Mar. Apr. U.S.-Soviet Mtg w/ Gorbachev. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Schifter. Copies were sent to Ridgway, Solomon, Abramowitz, Derwinski, Kampelman, and Adelman. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Shultz saw it.

*Khrushchev's "Thaw"*

With Khrushchev assuming the leadership of the country, a major cleansing operation was initiated. Tens of thousands of Stalin's prisoners were released and "rehabilitated," which meant that the state acknowledged that they had been wrongly imprisoned. Then, in February 1956, speaking to the Twentieth Party Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, Khrushchev delivered his famous anti-Stalin address, fully acknowledging the despotic character of the Stalin regime.

In his memoirs, Khrushchev revealed his and his colleagues' fears of the Secret Police during Stalin's days and in the months immediately following Stalin's death. Khrushchev's decision to move the Secret Police from the center to the margin of the Soviet bureaucratic apparatus and to clip its wings was clearly the result of his personal experience. His decision to rehabilitate former political prisoners and to initiate investigative proceedings against some NKVD officials appears to have been motivated by a genuine desire to purge all vestiges of Stalin's rule from the Soviet system.

The people in the Soviet Union had been so traumatized by Stalin's rule that it took quite some time before they fully realized that they would no longer be punished if they spoke up more freely. It took them about four years before they fully understood that much that had theretofore been prohibited was now allowable. The period known as "the thaw" ensued. This period of greater freedom of expression, largely in the cultural area, was brought about by intellectuals outside the government. The government's response was basically passive: it allowed certain developments to take place which it would have heretofore prohibited. An example was the authorization to publish Alexander Solzhenitsyn's "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich," a book about life in Stalin's prison camps.

Intellectuals were now pushing very hard and realized that the government was, by and large, not pushing back. What characterized the thaw, therefore, was a reawakening of the people in the Soviet Union, reflected not only in greater freedom of expression exercised by intellectuals, but also in the recognition by average citizens that they could now speak their mind without having to fear that they would soon be hauled off by the Secret Police and sent to Siberia.

Greater freedom of expression for individuals acting individually was the hallmark of the human rights advance during the Khrushchev period. These individuals did not attempt to act in concert, to create a "movement."

*The "Movement in Defense of Legality"*

Khrushchev fell in 1964 and was replaced by Brezhnev. Conditions affecting freedom of expression did not change immediately. Before

long, however, it became evident that a new wind was blowing from the Kremlin. In 1966, two well-known writers, Daniel and Sinyavsky were convicted for the authorship of books which had been published abroad during the Khrushchev era. From then on the state authorities, which sought to limit freedom of expression, and the intellectuals, who wanted to see the area of freedom enlarged, began to play a cat-and-mouse game. The intellectuals kept pushing for greater freedom and the state authorities would from time to time slap back, imprisoning some of the most outspoken critics of the regime or, in some instances, resorting to a new form of punishment, the commitment of sane persons to institutions for the mentally ill. It was this cat-and-mouse game, namely the government's efforts to repress intellectuals who wanted to exercise freedom of expression, that made these intellectuals dissidents and, in due course, created the dissident movement.

What characterized these Soviet dissidents and their movement was the modesty of their program. These were not revolutionaries who were attempting to overthrow the government. They did not even ask for fundamental change in government policies or the structure of the state. All they asked for was freedom of expression and for the Soviet Union to interpret its own laws reasonably, so as to permit such freedom of expression. In fact, when this group of intellectuals joined to form an organization they called themselves the "Movement in Defense of Legality." In spite of the clear statements of disapproval from the government, the movement kept growing. Though it was originally centered in Moscow, offshoots developed elsewhere. Many of these offshoots developed into something the government found increasingly troublesome: they began to identify themselves with the cultural aspirations of the Soviet Union's national minorities, such as the Ukrainians, Georgians, and the Baltic peoples. These minorities were committed to withstand efforts at Russification. They wanted to see their respective languages and cultures preserved. Their counterparts among the Jews, also committed to cultural revival, had one other goal: emigration.

Thus, by the early Seventies, for the first time in close to 50 years, numerous dissident groups were functioning as such in the Soviet Union.

### *The Clamp-down*

By 1972, however, a change in the Government's response could be noted. While most moves against dissidents still appeared haphazard, a comprehensive effort was launched in January 1972 to end the Ukrainian dissident movement. (The danger of Ukrainian separatism remains to this day an issue of deep concern to the Soviets.) More than 100 young Ukrainian intellectuals were arrested, tried and convicted of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and received maximum sentences: 7–10 years of hard labor, followed by 3–5 years of internal exile.

Arrests and trials occurred in other areas of the Soviet Union as well. A celebrated case was the expulsion, in 1974, of Alexander Solzhenitsyn. In 1976 the newspapers carried warnings that too much ideological laxness was being tolerated. And then, in 1977, the iron hand of a newly invigorated KGB came down on the dissident movement. Its leaders were arrested, tried for anti-Soviet agitation, and sentenced to heavy prison terms (usually seven years of incarceration plus five years of internal exile). By 1980, when Andrei Sakharov, the leader of the dissident movement, was exiled to Gorky, the movement had been destroyed.

In the succeeding years there were additional arrests. Wherever and whenever a potential dissident spoke up, the KGB would quickly bring such dissident activity to an end. Dissidents would not only be deprived of their freedom, but would also be subjected to extraordinarily harsh treatment in prisons and prison camps or mental institutions. The Soviet apparatus of repression was now operating more brutally than it had at any time since Beria's arrest. With Brezhnev in decline and Yuri Andropov, head of the KGB, increasingly assuming the Soviet Union's leadership position, the KGB was once again at the center of state authority.

This state of affairs carried forward into the period following Brezhnev's death, when Andropov became General Secretary, and then into the year in which Chernenko served in that position, when Gorbachev was clearly the heir apparent. It also carried forward into the first 15 months of Gorbachev's leadership.

It is only during the last 10 months that we have witnessed changes in the Soviet Union's domestic behavior that has significant human rights implications. It is to an analysis of these changes that the next memorandum will be devoted.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 32.



**30. Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 26, 1987

SUBJECT

Briefing Shultz on President's View of Afghanistan, Today, 3:30 p.m.

In your 3:30 p.m. meeting with Secretary Shultz today, you should apprise him of the exchange that took place at yesterday's 9:30 a.m. NSB<sup>2</sup> about the treatment to be given Afghanistan during the Secretary's visit to Moscow. The bottom line: The Secretary should convey a very strong message about the importance of the Soviets getting out, and should instruct those preparing his materials accordingly. Suggested talking points are attached.<sup>3</sup>

After Linhard briefed the President on arms control issues, I chimed in with the point that any letter the President sends to Gorbachev and Shultz's instructions must hit the Soviets hard on Afghanistan and other regional issues. I noted the potential embarrassment should the President submit an INF agreement for ratification when there are more Soviet troops in Afghanistan than there were in 1980. I said that we should avoid a mechanical linkage that made agreement on INF dependent on Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, but the record must show a great US effort to put pressure on them.

Senator Baker spoke for some degree of linkage, saying that the political situation is very different from 1980: The Soviets do want out of Afghanistan; they also want an arms control agreement; and the President is politically stronger than was Jimmy Carter. The President endorsed the thrust of this conversation, although not in detail. He certainly wants any letter and the Secretary's instructions to be very stern on Afghanistan.

I suspect that Secretary Shultz will not welcome this message. His people (Roz Ridgway, who is coordinating his trip materials) expect to hit regional issues only perfunctorily because they were "covered" in Armacost's recent trip. Mike did hit them hard on Afghanistan; but that is no reason why the Secretary should not.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Secretary Shultz's Moscow Trip April 1987 Pre-Trip Background Material (3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

<sup>2</sup> Reagan met with Bush, Powell, Ermarth, Baker, and Duberstein for a national security briefing on March 25 from 9:22 to 9:45 a.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 4 below.

We know from intelligence materials that the Soviets perceive exploitable daylight between the Secretary and some of his key advisors, on one hand, and that portion of the President's policy outlook (SDI, anti-Soviet biases, Reagan Doctrine on freedom fighters) which they ascribe to the influence of the "military industrial complex", on the other. They want to use differences within the Administration to amplify differences between it and the Congress and within the Alliance. For this reason it is vital that the Secretary work to alter this Soviet perception. They are much more likely to bite the necessary bullets on arms control and the regional issues if they see the Secretary taking very tough positions. If they see him trying to soften Administration positions, they are likely just to play along without clean decisions to determine how much softening will occur.

On Afghanistan and arms control specifically, it would, in my view, be a mistake to declare a mechanical linkage or conditionality. The Soviets won't believe it and the Administration will be roundly attacked for it. Moreover, the Administration doesn't have to go this far because it is doing so much more than its predecessor to fight the Soviets in the field in Afghanistan. We have to sound three kinds of messages from the highest levels to maximize our pressure:

The invasion of Afghanistan prevented ratification of an arms control agreement very much favored by Congress and the Executive in 1980 and demanding less political trust than anything we are now negotiating.

Failure of the USSR to make a clean break and to withdraw places a grave and continuing burden on all decisionmaking within the Administration and the Congress on how far to go with the Soviets on any issue. Attacks on Pakistan are not only politically counterproductive, they present a risk of confrontation.

A clean Soviet decision to get out of Afghanistan would signal that Gorbachev really intends to reform Soviet external policy and to seek a healthier, more tolerant relationship with the outside world. This would generate good will and concrete positive responses from the US and other countries.

This would fit well with the President's four part agenda with the Soviets and also within Shultz's plan for a broader discussion of global trends.

Rodman, Linhard and Oakley concur.

#### *RECOMMENDATION*

That you use the talking points (Tab I) in your meeting with Secretary Shultz.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Tab I, undated talking points, is attached but not printed. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

**31. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 27, 1987, 1:30–3 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Review of Security Problems Embassy Moscow (U)

**PARTICIPANTS**

The President

The Vice President

*The Vice President's Office*

Craig Fuller

*State*

George P. Shultz

Ambassador Jack Matlock

Robert Lamb

*OSD*

Caspar W. Weinberger

Craig Alderman

Lt General William Odom

*CIA*

Robert M. Gates

*JUSTICE*

Arnold Burns

Ann Rondeau

*FBI*

Judge William Webster

*JCS*

General Robert T. Herres

Lt General John Moellering

*White House*

Howard Baker

Ken Duberstein

*NSC Staff*

Frank C. Carlucci

Colin L. Powell

Barry Kelly

David Major (notetaker)

(1:40 p.m.) *The President* began the meeting by stating that as the facts of the Marine espionage case in Moscow emerge, it appears the damage to our national security may be severe; we must get on top of this situation immediately. Our actions must be well coordinated, and we must take the steps necessary to protect our national security interests against the activity of hostile intelligence services. We should remember, however, that Marines have defended our embassies faithfully for years. The President asked Frank Carlucci to coordinate an overall effort to assess the extent of the damage to our national security from recent espionage cases as well as to recommend what actions we should take to improve our defense against espionage attacks upon all our embassies. The President stated he will also ask his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board to participate in the review of these developments. The President then turned the meeting over to Frank Carlucci. (U)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, 1987 SYS 4 RWR INT 40151–40200. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. [The text was redacted in the version of the document on file.] The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

(1:41 p.m.) *Frank Carlucci* stated that this may be the most serious espionage case we have faced in years. The ramifications extend from political intelligence to COMSEC to counterintelligence issues. While the Marine case is our primary concern today, the problem is broader, and we must consider the impact of other recent espionage cases on our national security. He asked each official present to give a short assessment of the situation as it appears now and to advise what steps are currently being taken to respond to this challenge. He also asked the Department of Justice to weigh the merits of prosecution of the Marines involved against the need to get as much information as quickly as possible to complete a timely damage assessment. He then asked Bob Gates, Acting DCI, for his comments. (C)

(1:42 p.m.) [1 line not declassified]

[The text was redacted in the version of the document on file.]

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

[The text was redacted in the version of the document on file.]

*Frank Carlucci* then asked Secretary Weinberger to comment.

(1:47 p.m.) *Secretary Weinberger* characterized the case as a very serious loss of intelligence information. DOD is currently looking at measures that should and must be taken in the wake of this incident. DOD has decided to recall the entire Marine detachment in Moscow. This detachment will be returned to Quantico for further investigation. The Marines are looking at this incident to study lessons learned, to include: the possibility of more regular use of polygraph with Marines assigned to a Warsaw Pact country and better psychological profiling of Marines selected for the program. DOD will study the basic qualification criteria for the Marine guard force and the possibility of improper unequal treatment of Marines by the other embassy personnel as a contributing factor in this case. (C)

*Secretary Weinberger* then asked Lt General Odom to comment on the impact this may have. [The text was redacted in the version of the document on file.] (TS/[codeword not declassified])

(1:50 p.m.) *Lt General Odom* indicated that [The text was redacted in the version of the document on file.].

*Mr. Carlucci* then asked the Secretary of State for his comments. (U)

(1:52 p.m.) *Secretary Shultz* indicated he agreed with the general outline of the previous comments. The State Department is taking a number of immediate steps to respond to this situation. All electronic communications have been shut down to and from Moscow. A courier is flying daily to Frankfurt from Moscow with cable traffic and from there cables are being forwarded. The Embassy has been put on a 6-day work week cycle, and State security is in the process of erecting a new secure conference room on the sixth floor which will be operational

prior to his arrival in Moscow. State security is also installing a new temporary secure voice link and communication system to be in place by the time the Secretary arrives in Moscow. (S)

Concerning the Marine problem, it is necessary to look at the whole issue. The root problem is one of management. We must review what else has happened in Moscow and in other Warsaw Pact countries between women and Marines. Unfortunately, the regularity with which this happens is impressive. Recently Marines have been caught in the following: 2 for sexual contact with Soviet foreign nationals, 2 for attempting to rape a British national during December 1986 in Moscow, 2 for currency violations, and 4 for having unauthorized females in the Marine residence in Moscow. (C)

The problem is that personnel must be more aware of the implications of these kinds of activities. This reflects on the methods by which the embassy is managed; Jack Matlock (the new Ambassador in Moscow) understands the issue and will take the needed corrective actions. (U)

We need to think of the people going to Moscow. The Marines have a 40-year history of success. Yet sexual contact with Marines is a fact of life we must learn to cope with better. It is too early to say what to do. We need to explore the situation and then find out what changes should result. (U)

*Secretary Shultz* also stated that one good thing about this situation is that the arrests have been made and the facts suggest this has not been going on for a long period of time. (U)

To preclude the possibility of further involvement by Marines friendly to Longtree and Bracy, all Marines are being pulled out of Moscow. (U)

The relationship between the State security officer in Moscow and the Marines must be examined to evaluate the chain of command and ascertain the checks and balances in place from a management point of view. (U)

We know that spying takes place, however, in this case we have caught the Soviets spying on our sovereign territory; we should register the fact of our displeasure in some manner with the Soviets. He added that while we should register a complaint, he did not know how to do this. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* ended by stating “This is the most distressing thing I have been involved with in all my years of government service.” (U)

(2:00 p.m.) The *Secretary of Defense* responded to the Secretary of State’s comments by noting the Marines are managed to the extent they can be, but they work for State security. He added he was very worried about the Secretary of State’s planned meeting in Moscow. He

seriously doubted a secure telephone link could be set up in sufficient time for the trip. The phone might be secure, but there is no secure area in our embassy, since the KGB had unlimited access to the embassy on 20–30 occasions. (S)

*Lt General Odom* commented that given the access the KGB had to the embassy, he believes it will not be possible for State security to build in two weeks an area that will be secure. [2 lines not declassified] (S)

The *Secretary of State* asked if DOD and NSA were saying that it was impossible for him to have secure communications during his visit to the Soviet Union. (C)

Both *Secretary Weinberger* and *Lt General Odom* responded that is exactly what they were advising. (C)

*Mr. Carlucci* asked DOD, NSA and State to work together to try to resolve the issue of reestablishment of secure spaces in our embassy by the time the Secretary of State traveled there. (C)

(2:01 p.m.) *The President* then asked if the Marines were indoctrinated in any way prior to being assigned to Moscow. (U)

*Secretary Weinberger* indicated that he felt the training was insufficient and should be expanded. (U)

*Secretary Shultz* stated that the Marines have a regular school they attend that is six weeks long; 40% of the Marines who start the school are screened out. They are taught and should know that fraternization with the locals is against the rules. (U)

*Mr. Carlucci* commented that in all fairness, the Soviets have also sexually targeted individuals other than Marines in the past. They have done the same to Ambassadors, embassy wives and military attaches. (U)

*Mr. Gates* commented that we are currently making a worst-case scenario; we may yet be lucky and find out the damage is not as bad as we currently are predicting. It is important we talk to everyone and find out what happened. (C)

*Secretary Shultz* concurred that we are assuming the worst-case situation. (C)

(2:04 p.m.) *Mr. Burns* stated he also believes this case looks like it could be one of the most serious in our history. As such, it is important to ascertain the extent of damage. There is some attractiveness to granting one or both of the two Marines immunity. A few years ago, we had another serious espionage case involving Christopher Cook, a Lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force assigned to SAC as a missile launch officer. Cook attempted to volunteer his espionage services to the Soviets and was caught. He was subsequently granted premature immunity. The damage was considered so serious after he described what he did that the Air Force attempted to withdraw the immunity grant. This

was not possible and Lt Cook walked away from his espionage activity with no punishment. (U)

It has been the experience of the Department of Justice, as a result of a number of other espionage cases, that premature immunity provides no assurance that the truth will emerge. If we go the immunity route at the wrong time, the government loses the necessary leverage to get the truth. (U)

For these reasons, the Department of Justice recommends that discussion of immunity is premature and recommends the legal process be followed. The UCMJ allows for great flexibility in prosecution and allows for the death penalty in espionage cases. That will give the government a lot of leverage to ferret out the truth for a damage assessment. (U)

*Mr. Carlucci* then asked that the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense and State keep the NSC and the President advised of the progress on this matter. (C)

(2:07 p.m.) *General Herres* commented that the Marines go through a very intensive screening process; however, the State indoctrination program is very short. (U)

(2:08 p.m.) The *Vice President* advised that the remedies to this problem are to insure that counterintelligence concerns are taken seriously by embassy personnel in Moscow. He apologized to the Secretary of State in advance and stated that the environment that allowed this to happen had been sown by the attitude of Former Ambassador Art Hartman. (S)

The *Vice President* stated he received a briefing from the FBI on the counterintelligence problems in Moscow in 1984 at which time he read a cable sent by Art Hartman entitled *Counter-productive Counterintelligence*. This cable reflected an attitude of disregard for CI and everyone attending the meeting should read this cable. (The cable mentioned is attached to the minutes of this meeting.) (S)

The *Vice President* characterized this situation by stating, he is appalled by what happened and we must begin to take counterintelligence concerns for our embassies seriously. (U)

*Mr. Carlucci* added that this case must be viewed in the broad context of other espionage cases. We must look at the leadership, procedures, attitude, training and legal aspects of this problem. *Mr. Carlucci* asked whether we need to reevaluate the espionage laws and determine whether there should be some relaxation of the law to allow for easier prosecutions. He would undertake to establish an interagency task force to address the issues raised by this case and attempt to look for corrective actions that should be taken in the future. (C)

*The President* commented he had just returned from a trip to the midwest where he met with some students and educators. He asked



whether this espionage case, along with others, was not the by-product of the value neutral, no opinion of right or wrong attitude that has become pervasive in our educational institutions. (U)

The meeting was adjourned at 2:11 p.m.

### **Attachment**

#### **Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>2</sup>**

Moscow, November 5, 1984, 1552Z

14220. For the Secretary and Under Secretary Armacost. Subject: Counter-Productive Counterintelligence.

1. Secret entire text.

2. I have watched with amazement the expanding activities of a small group of people inside and out of the government who, by wrapping themselves in the mantle of defenders against hostile intelligence operations, are making mischief that can set back indefinitely any movement towards dealing seriously with the Soviet Union. The more I learn about the ideas being floated in the guise of strengthening counterintelligence, the more I am convinced that the real effect of such proposals will be to make it impossible to have any operational capability here in the Soviet Union for no gain in US security at home. Some of the purveyors of these proposals are perfectly well aware of that likely outcome and would welcome it because they have never believed that any contact with the Soviet Union—either overt or covert—serves any useful purpose. If these decisions are made in this direction, we may as well close up shop here and go home. On the basis of our talks with the President I don't think that is what he wants.

3. You are already aware of the influence of the counterintelligence drumbeaters in selling their ideas to the Hill. Specifically in the Leahy-Huddleston Amendment. Their next objective is to make a run at the President. Presenting him with a set of interagency options arrived at in a group called IG-CI that is stacked against the foreign policy, foreign-intelligence and real national security interests of the United States—to say nothing of its ignorance of the President's policy. Rather than working to enhance the effectiveness of the FBI by giving it the resources it needs, the IG-CI has concentrated on a set of proposals frankly geared to forcing a reduction in Soviet official presence in

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<sup>2</sup> Secret.



the US (which for several years has been limited by a ceiling). These proposals are accompanied by a misguided effort to build up the number of US personnel assigned in Moscow. Ignoring questions of efficiency, vulnerability to entrapment, and logistic support for our employees.

4. Quite apart from the outrageous effort by ignorant people to instruct me on the way to staff this post, I object to these schemes on the simple ground that they run absolutely counter to our policy. First, they are not based on realism because they ignore the absolutely predictable Soviet reaction, which will take the form of retaliation designed to hurt us most—this after all is the closed society. They are based not on a premise of strength but of weakness. They assume that we are so inept that we cannot combat the threat of a few hundred resident Soviet citizens and a few hundred Soviet visitors each year. While the Soviets somehow manage to cope with over 200 American permanent employees, dozens of long-term construction specialists on our building site, and 50,000 American visitors each year. The argument also neglects the fact that we are an open society that will not close for this purpose and agents of any nationality including unfortunately a few Americans can be bought by the Soviets and their third country friends. And finally, most importantly these proposals are guaranteed to sabotage the realistic dialogue we seek with the Soviets. You'll recall the deep personal anger of Gromyko when we placed limits on his airplane. The all-out assault (and that's what it is) on Soviet official presence in the US, coupled with demands for an increase here, will lead to four years of arctic, solid-frozen relations. Is that what the President wants?

5. I would ask you to take a personal hand in turning off this foolishness. Which I understand is to be discussed at a senior-level interagency meeting on November 9. It is no coincidence, I'm sure, that this meeting is on the calendar for a time when the President will be resting after the campaign away from the White House, and many other senior officials will be taking a breather.

6. I am prepared—even delighted—to be quoted to the President, Bill Casey and Bud McFarlane on this whole issue. If it goes ahead, it will rival, perhaps exceed Carter's grain embargo as a self-defeating move in dealing with the other superpower.

**Hartman**

**32. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Schifter) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 28, 1987

SUBJECT

Human Rights in Gorbachev's Second Year: "Openness" and "Restructuring"

*Summary.* Driven largely by domestic concerns, namely his desire to reinvigorate the Soviet Union and improve the operations of the economy, Gorbachev has initiated major programs to open up to public scrutiny and debate governmental operations at the local level. For the same reason he has loosened somewhat the rigid controls recently in effect with regard to cultural activities. Change with regard to other aspects of freedom of expression has been far more limited and driven more by efforts to improve the Soviet Union's public-relations image. There is no indication as yet of any change in the Soviet Union's basic structure as a totalitarian dictatorship, in which the fundamental human rights spelled out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (and therefore covered by the Helsinki Final Act) are denied and in which the secret police apparatus plays a central role. *End Summary.*

*The Gorbachev Innovations*

At first blush, it seems that confusing and contradictory messages are coming out of the Soviet Union these days concerning respect for human rights. As we try to analyze recent developments, we often speak of "mixed signals." Some observers suggest that Gorbachev is pressing for liberalization, but that some hardliners, particularly in the KGB, are attempting to sabotage his efforts through acts of a repressive nature.

We cannot speak with certainty as to what goes on in the Soviet leadership behind the scenes. However, the leaders do speak out and their statements are published. A careful reading of these statements, when placed in the context provided by Soviet history and Leninist ideology and terminology, helps provide us with an understanding of the new developments in the USSR.

What the new leaders emphasize and demonstrate is their belief in Marxism-Leninism and their intent, in the spirit of Lenin, to "get the Soviet Union moving again" toward its socialist goals, through

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, C. Max Kampelman Files, Lot 89D56, Box 2, Human Rights. Confidential. Drafted by Schifter. Copies were sent to Ridgway, Solomon, Abramowitz, Derwinski, Kampelman, and Adelman.

more and harder work, improved management, and greater efficiency. This preoccupation with better economic performance appears to influence all aspects of Gorbachev's program, including the innovations that have human rights implications. What may appear as "conflicting signals" turn out to be part of a logical scheme if we sort out the various strands of the Gorbachev program that relate to human rights.

For purposes of this analysis, the programs of "openness" and "restructuring" are divided into three distinct categories:

- (1) Personnel changes and other governmental reforms;
- (2) Loosening controls over cultural affairs; and
- (3) Other aspects of fundamental freedoms.

(1) *Personnel Changes and Other Governmental Reforms*

This is the area in which Gorbachev is making the most profound changes, taking the greatest risks, and encountering his most substantial opposition. His motivation is clear. He recognizes the weakness of the Soviet economy and wants to strengthen it. As management of the Soviet economy is an integral part of governmental operations, Gorbachev's efforts at improving the economy are an essential element of his program of governmental reform.

One of the major problems identified by Gorbachev has been the personal and professional inadequacy of a great many persons in leadership positions. The major culprits, in his opinion, were Leonid Brezhnev and other people associated with Brezhnev in the 18 years in which he led the Soviet Union. Gorbachev and his associates have now replaced Brezhnev and his crew in the principal positions of leadership. But Gorbachev has concluded that that is not sufficient, that the orders from the top are not effectively carried out at lower levels, that it is necessary to reach into the lower rungs of the bureaucracy and shake things up, replace those who take bribes, are drunk on the job, or fail to perform effectively and efficiently.

As the leadership could not possibly identify all the weak links throughout the entire Soviet system, another way had to be found. It was "glasnost." The bureaucracy, it was made clear to all, was no longer sacrosanct. Persons criticizing public officials would no longer be incarcerated or committed to mental institutions. On the contrary, their comments would be welcomed and action would be taken thereon. In order to effect improvements in the operations of the state and its enterprises, citizens would not be limited in their critiques to the naming of individual wrong-doers. They could also feel free to offer their thoughts on what they might perceive as inefficiencies on the local level, at which they could observe conditions directly. In that way the whole country could become involved in the effort to upgrade economic and other governmental operations.

Closely related to the opening up of the bureaucracy to public scrutiny and criticism is Gorbachev's emphasis on the rule of law. In a country in which so many aspects of the citizen's life are regulated by the government, the arbitrary use by local officials of administrative discretion can be particularly oppressive. As another element of "openness" Gorbachev has insisted on the writing and publishing of laws and regulations on a variety of subjects which in the past have been controlled through vague confidential policy guidelines. The purpose of the new approach is to let the officials know precisely what the limits of their authority are and to let the public know these limits so that they can insist that officials do indeed follow the instructions they have received.

This change in the rules under which the Soviet state operates is indeed most profound. For many a Soviet citizen this is what freedom of speech is all about. All that citizen ever wanted to do in exercising freedom of speech was to complain about the wrongdoing in front of his own eyes and about officials who were treating him unfairly and unjustly. He can do that now.

To the government officials the effect of this change in the rules has been equally profound. The entire Soviet bureaucratic system is built on lock-step advancement based on seniority. The road ahead was always safe and secure. All one had to do is engage in apple-polishing, including cooperation in the petty (or not so petty) graft in which one's superiors were involved. By playing along in this manner, one was fully protected against all criticism. The bureaucracy was sacrosanct.

This system of rule by a sacrosanct bureaucracy, the prohibition of any kind of criticism of its work, had been in effect since the rise of Stalin to one-man leadership in the early Thirties. Khrushchev tried to tackle some aspects of the problem toward the end of his period in office. His efforts along these lines may very well have been a factor in his downfall. What this means is that Gorbachev's openness and restructuring with regard to the Soviet bureaucratic system is taking the Soviet Union back to the Twenties, the time of Lenin, and that portion of the post-Lenin period in which Stalin had not yet achieved sole and supreme power.

But one of the essential elements of Leninism is that no questioning of the basic structure of the system is allowed. *That facet of the system remains unchanged.* Openness is limited to the exercise of freedom of expression on local problems. It does not extend to questions of basic governmental policy. The rules prohibiting the discussion of such questions remain fully in force. The lines are clearly drawn.

Nevertheless, the Nomenklatura, the term used to describe the privileged state and party bureaucracy, is troubled and the Nomenkla-

tura is powerful. If Gorbachev falls, his efforts with regard to governmental restructuring will be the principal cause.

(2) *Loosening of Cultural Restrictions*

In their allegedly classless society, the Soviets recognize as a subgroup of the working class the men and women who work with their brains. They are referred to as the “intelligentsia.” In his analysis of conditions in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev appears to have recognized that this group, in particular, had lost hope, had been affected by a malaise which sapped its vitality. In focusing his attention on the intelligentsia in an effort to change the basic outlook of the group, Gorbachev may have been motivated by a number of factors, namely (a) the recognition that in the information age this is indeed the group whose performance will most significantly affect the future development of the Soviet economy; (b) an understanding that it is the intelligentsia from which dissidents and any dissident movement might spring.

Cynics among the ancient Romans expressed their disdain for democracy by suggesting that all that the people wanted were *panem et circenses*, bread and circuses. As the Soviet intelligentsia has sufficient bread, Gorbachev appears to have concentrated on the equivalent of circuses, changes in the drab field of Soviet culture. Thus we now see books published or to be published, theatrical plays, and films allowed to be shown, all of which were heretofore on the prohibited list.

What must be underlined in this context is that a close examination of the books now being published raises questions as to why they were prohibited in the first place. Nabokov may have been prohibited because of the Soviet Union’s insistence on high standards of morality in its literature. (This relates to personal, not political morality.) Pasternak’s writings have political implications, but relate to a period in the long-distant past.

Other heretofore prohibited books as well as plays and films which may now be published or shown reflect Gorbachev’s theme of glasnost. They show the cruelty and brutality of the Stalinist system but also its utter senselessness: the victims of the terror were not enemies of the state, just ordinary people who were being persecuted without good reason.

Another aspect of Gorbachev’s “new thinking” is that history is to be rewritten once more. Stalin’s failure as a military strategist in 1941 is again to be noted. And there is even the possibility that old Bolsheviks like Zinoviev, Kamenev and Bukharin, all executed in the Stalin purges, who have for decades been non-persons, will be mentioned again. But there is no suggestion at this time that any other aspects of Soviet or of world history are to be reviewed. Lenin’s friends and colleagues

will be rehabilitated posthumously, but not the persons he considered his enemies.

Thus, to date there is no indication that the new cultural freedom is reaching beyond the limits which Lenin would have permitted. No books are published, nor plays or films shown, nor history books rewritten which challenge basic Marxist-Leninist assumptions. We must assume the leadership believes that it can keep things that way. Whether it will succeed, or whether the intelligentsia, once its appetite has been whetted, will push beyond the lines of the presently permissible, whether the authorities will resist, and if so, how successful they will be, only time will tell. What must be kept in mind is that the Soviet government's ability to maintain controls in this field is formidable: it owns the printing presses, the theaters and the movie projectors. It may very well have the power it needs to keep the intelligentsia in check.

### (3) *Other Aspects of Fundamental Freedoms*

The "mixed signals" referred to at the beginning may be a reflection of the major changes in the behavior of Soviet authorities in the areas of local governmental reform and of culture, which contrast with the minor changes in the Soviet behavior pattern in all other areas affecting human rights. To be sure, there have been hints of further changes in the offing and some observers have expressed great hope that there will be a general relaxation of controls. This memorandum concentrates only on what *is* and does not seek to predict future developments.

When we examine the field of human rights beyond the areas of local governmental reform and of culture, we come up against the limitations imposed on Soviet citizens because of their political outlook, their religion, their desire to maintain their native culture, or in the case of Jews and Crimean Tatars, their ethnic descent. In all these areas there appears to have been no basic change. Public expressions of dissent and failures to adhere to regulations governing the formation of associations, including religious associations, remain punishable.

Whereas the changes set forth in (1) and (2) above seem to be driven by domestic imperatives, concern over the Soviet image abroad seems recently to have brought about some relaxation in the treatment of dissent. The most significant evidence of such relaxation has been the release from prison, exile and mental institutions of about 100 political dissenters, including Andrei Sakharov and other personalities well known in the West.

The limited significance of the prisoner releases is underlined by the following:

(a) more than 600 persons remain on the list of *known* political prisoners; estimates of the total number of political prisoners range from 1,000 to 10,000; no one has been released from Special Regime

Labor Camp 389/36–1 at Perm, known as the most brutal of the camps, where many political prisoners have died;

(b) as distinct from Stalin's prisoners, whom Khrushchev declared "rehabilitated," i.e. totally exonerated, the recently freed prisoners merely had their terms cut short; Irina Ratushinskaya told us that the KGB officer who told her that she would be released added expressly that she was *not* being rehabilitated;

(c) persons released from confinement were required to sign statements that they would henceforth refrain from "illegal activities;"

(d) released prisoners who are believed less likely to cause harm abroad than at home are pressed to leave the country.

The recent prisoner-release program, it should be noted, is neither a large-scale "rehabilitation" effort nor a large-scale amnesty. The Soviet authorities have announced that releases are based on case-by-case reviews of the files. It would appear that with the political dissident movement destroyed and the Jewish emigration movement focusing on departure from the country, the release of persons associated with either group is deemed tolerable. The religious and nationality movements that are committed to staying in the U.S.S.R. are deemed greater threats and persons affiliated with either of them seem to have a more difficult time getting released.

What must be kept in mind, therefore, in analyzing the present state of human rights in the Soviet Union, is that hundreds if not thousands of political prisoners remain in jail, exile or mental institutions, that we don't know of any change in the treatment of these prisoners, that the power and practices of the KGB have not changed, that the same is true of the laws and regulations governing religion, that abuse of psychiatry has not been ended, that private organizations may not be formed, that no Samizdat ("self-published") literature is now circulating (as it did in the Seventies), that all media remain under central State control, that the one-party system remains untouchable, and that the same is true of what Lenin called "democratic centralism," i.e. control of the party from the top.

Note: Discrimination against Jews and the emigration issue will be dealt with in a separate memorandum.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Not found.



**33. Memorandum From Barry Kelly of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 6, 1987

SUBJECT

Moscow Embassy in Context

The Soviets have scored a major intelligence success. The KGB has successfully compromised our Embassy in Moscow. Before the investigation is completed, foreign missions other than Leningrad and Vienna will be effected by KGB success in using the tried and true tools of espionage—sex, money and revenge. Our national security has been severely damaged by the Marine cases and several other recent espionage cases. There are a number of concurrent actions that need to be undertaken to (1) prevent further damage, (2) change some inadequate procedures and practices, (3) respond to the Soviets and (4) conduct an extensive damage assessment.

—Departments and agencies are working now on an urgent basis to prevent further damage.

—PFIAB has been tasked to conduct an extensive review of our current security procedures and practices on a worldwide basis.

—An interagency working group under the PRG is ready to begin a thorough assessment of the damage to our national security from a number of Soviet espionage cases.

—Our response to the Soviets needs further development. The following paragraph suggests the context for a response.

The Soviets expect that we will make them pay a price for such flagrant violation of our embassies. They have enjoyed the intelligence success. Now they must be made to pay the traditional price. Their operation has been exposed. It is time for the consequences. The consequences in the past have often been tied to substantive issues under negotiations between the U.S. and the USSR, thus preventing or inhibiting ongoing negotiations of vital interest to both sides. In the Danilov case, we very successfully kept our response to procedural issues. Important ones to be sure but still procedural issues. Our response in cutting back the Soviet presence in this country resulted in some real counterintelligence gains. The Soviets were surprised and their intelli-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, 1987 SYS 4 RWR INT 40151–40200. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Powell saw it.



gence activities damaged. In the same manner we could keep our response to procedural issues such as:

- Should we occupy the new Embassy in Moscow?
- Should we allow the Soviets to occupy their new site at Mount Alto?
- As the Soviets do in Moscow, should U.S. guards screen visitors to the Soviet Embassy?
- Should we further reduce the respective staffs at our embassies and consulates?
- Limit the size of diplomatic pouches to restrict Soviet technical collection activities in the U.S.?
- Encourage cultural exchanges but end technical exchanges?
- Seek the cooperation of our NATO allies to apply similar procedural restrictions on reciprocal diplomatic issues with the intent of improving their overall security vis-a-vis the USSR.

There are a number of areas where we can craft an appropriate response to the Soviets that will have the support of the American people and Congress and yet provide us with some real counterintelligence gains.

#### *RECOMMENDATIONS*

That you agree that our response to the Soviets be within procedural framework for counterintelligence gains.<sup>2</sup>

That you approve the use of this memo to develop press guidelines.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

<sup>3</sup> Powell wrote "OBE" beside the approve option. Attached but not printed is a list of U.S. Government responses.

### 34. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 6, 1987

#### SUBJECT

Looking Ahead on US-Soviet Relations

Your speech in Los Angeles<sup>2</sup> and Secretary Shultz's trip to Moscow<sup>3</sup> will open a new phase in the minuet with the Soviets. At Reykjavik, Gorbachev was unable to catch you in a prelaid trap because you neither gave in on SDI nor accepted the outcome as a political failure. For a time thereafter Washington was distracted by Iran-Contra, while Moscow was both puzzled—by Washington developments and unexpected European anxiety about Reykjavik—and seized with its own internal politics. Moscow continued to probe us for backchannels, but the game slowed down.

By the end of February, you were getting the political effects of Iran-Contra under control and about to table an INF draft treaty. Gorbachev, having managed some internal problems of his own, knew he had to make a move and, once again, "delinked" INF from Space and START to recover initiative.<sup>4</sup>

We remain unsure what course Gorbachev is on. We know he still wants to kill SDI, deflect your administration from broader policies that challenge the USSR, and to get some sort of "detente on the cheap." By delinking INF he could seek to facilitate relatively easy progress to a major nuclear reductions agreement, leading to a summit and wider political effects that will help him indirectly with other goals, such as killing SDI and straining US-NATO relations. Or he could be trying, once again, to set up a Reykjavik-like situation: Expectations of easy progress are generated; Gorbachev makes dramatic new offers which we cannot accept without undue penalty to SDI or to European security (e.g., zero nuclear forces in Europe); and then Gorbachev tries to tag

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Chron Files March-April 1987 (2). Secret. Sent for information. Prepared by Ermarth. A copy was sent to Bush. Reagan initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner. A stamped notation on the memorandum also indicates that the President saw it. Ermarth sent a copy of the memorandum to Carlucci under an April 6 covering memorandum requesting that Carlucci send the memorandum to Reagan "with the NSPG package" or prior to the April 7 NSPG meeting. (Ibid.) For the minutes of the NSPG meeting, see Document 35.

<sup>2</sup> See Reagan, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a Los Angeles World Affairs Council Luncheon in California." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1987*, Book I, pp. 356–372)

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 38–47.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 22.

you once again with a failure, this time to influence the 1988 elections. We certainly know Gorbachev is a bold political gameplayer. Moreover, we still lack evidence that the Soviet side has examined the military implications of its own arms reduction proposals, leaving us wondering about their seriousness.

These uncertainties have made it impossible for you to shape your policies around some interpretation of what is going on in Moscow. Your policies toward the USSR arise, not from Kremlinology, but from our national values (peace with freedom), our international responsibilities (toward allies and insecure regions), from your visions (e.g., SDI), and from your already-accomplished legacy of rebuilding American strength. Your own view of that legacy is vital. Some would have you “cash in” for quick breakthroughs on arms reduction; but this could all too easily become “selling out” your legacy, particularly on SDI. Rather, the situation calls for patient and demanding steadiness on your part that will allow that legacy of strength to survive. Gorbachev’s policies are crafted largely to distract you and American public opinion from these goals.

The wisdom of your four-part agenda for US-Soviet relations—arms reductions, easing regional conflicts, human rights, and bilateral contacts—is that it is not seasonal, but perennial; it is steady, but flexible; it can deal with positive as well as negative developments in Soviet behavior. The main purpose of your speech in Los Angeles will be to rearticulate this policy, to take stock of recent developments, and to remind Americans and Soviets of its underlying values and goals. It will contain some good news—promising Soviet moves on arms and human rights, along with big remaining problems; some bad news—continued Soviet failure to move positively on regional conflicts; clear statements on what it will take from the Soviets to move the relationship ahead; and a strong reminder to all that only the compass of freedom points to real peace and human progress.

George Shultz must go to Moscow with his seatbelt securely fastened to your policy. Gorbachev may well present him with an easy path to an INF agreement and a summit in the US. But the record shows that George must be prepared for Reykjavik-style ploys, designed to exploit differences within your Administration over handling SDI or the dilemmas our European allies see in an INF agreement. George’s foremost goals should be those he has fully under his control: Learning where the Soviets are coming from in this new tactical phase; and telling them clearly where we stand. This Moscow meeting is not the setting for negotiations, i.e., making changes on the spot in our positions, especially given the demeaning and insecure situation created by the Soviets at our embassy.

In the next day or so, you shall decide what, if any, changes, George should communicate in our arms positions. He should bring back

Soviet reactions and positions. He should also be instructed on how to deal with Soviet probing about the conditions and timing of another summit. You have set no conditions, but an INF agreement acceptable to us and the Europeans should be possible. It is quite possible that Gorbachev is now eager for a US summit in September or October as a prelude to celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in early November. We should let him be the eager one. There will be plenty of tactical maneuvering over the next six months, and George is wisely viewing his trip as one of two or probably three ministerials before a possible summit.

In this busy and possibly volatile period, it would be unwise to focus too much of your political capital on US-Soviet bilateral diplomacy at whatever level. As your own successful policies have shown, our management of the relationship is largely a function of effectively managing the surrounding strategic and political realities: our domestic political and economic health, our defense strength, our alliances, our regional security interests, and our image in the world as a repository of hope for the future. They are what need the most attention.

Ironically, Gorbachev gets more than his share of applause for “initiatives” because he is the one who must try to revive a stagnant system, activate a weak foreign policy, and assault strong American positions. Superficial impressions disguise the fact that the US is historically strong and the USSR historically weak and more deeply troubled. Of course, nearing the end of your term, you face challenges in keeping your legacy intact. National convictions that elected you twice, overwhelmingly, may be weakening somewhat. A sober but forthcoming attitude toward Soviet initiatives, constant articulation of your basic policies, and, above all disciplined adherence to them by your Administration will all contribute to success in the most vital task, making sure your policies survive and carry on beyond 1988.

Breakthroughs with the Soviets on terms contrary to your goals are possible in an instant. Breakthroughs consistent with your goals are always possible, but uncertain. If they don’t occur, so be it. If you succeed in your basic task of fortifying and transmitting your legacy of strength and steadiness, then future progress by future presidents in assuring peace with the Soviets will be credited to your policies, your visions, and your name.

**35. Electronic Message From Fritz Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to Sandra Kelly of the National Security Council Staff<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 7, 1987, 3:09 p.m.

SUBJECT

NSPG Notes, 7 April, Non-arms-control

A Document is attached to this message.<sup>2</sup>

NSPG 7 April 1987, WHSR, chaired by the President. Fritz W. Ermarth minutes of discussion on subjects other than arms control. Transmission to Robert E. Linhard.

Opening the meeting, the President stressed that our total agenda with the Soviets—human rights, bilateral contacts, and regional conflicts, along with arms control—should get fully balanced treatment. He invited the Secretary of State to give an overview of his impending trip to Moscow.

Secretary Shultz noted that the Soviets appeared to be evaluating the situation and putting out different kinds of views about prospects, as they had after Geneva and around Reykjavik. We have to listen and focus on what we want. Gorbachev decided to delink INF from the other talks to spur the process of engagement with us. Impressive progress was being made on bilateral issues, following Ambassador Ridgway's agreement with the Soviets at Reykjavik. We had a bilateral review commission which had recently met. Human rights had been placed squarely on the agenda.

The Secretary of State saw improved quality in our regional discussions with the Soviets lately, especially in talks of Undersecretary Armacost in Moscow. Secretary Shultz stated his intent to hit the Soviets hard on human rights, while noting some improvements, and on Afghanistan, where they had to recognize the need simply to get out as the condition of a settlement. He thought there was some prospect

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, SecState Moscow Trip: April 13–16, 1987 (1) NSPG—April 7, 1987. Secret. An unknown hand wrote in the top right-hand corner of the messages: "Fritz's Points." The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room from 11:08 a.m. to 12:08 p.m. Reagan, Bush, Craig Fuller, Shultz, Ridgway, Nitze, Rowny, Lehman, Weinberger, Ikle, Crowe, Moellering, Adelman, Gates, Douglas George, Meese, James Baker, Martin, Miller, Graham, Duberstein, Howard Baker, Carlucci, Linhard, and Ermarth attended. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) The full minutes of the meeting are in Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, 1981–1987, NSPG 0151 04/07/1981 (1).

<sup>2</sup> Not found attached.

for movement on Angola, where Savimbi—with whom Shultz had met secretly—wanted to explore compromise.

On arms control Secretary Shultz thought an INF agreement was now most accessible but that a START agreement was of primary importance to the President and his Administration. We were approaching this soberly but fully ready for business. The Secretary said he felt no pressure to come home with agreements and was prepared to walk away from tempting agreements that were faulty.

He also noted that throughout President Reagan's tenure, US-Soviet relations had suffered atmospheric ups and downs, with the KAL shootdown,<sup>3</sup> the Daniloff arrest,<sup>4</sup> and now the Soviet penetrations of our Moscow embassy. This latter development, which the Secretary termed sickening, made it difficult to do business with the Soviets just now. Unlike President Carter's surprise over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, the Reagan Administration was not surprised by Soviet misbehavior of this kind although it produced situations hard to handle. He noted that Ambassador Matlock had made a strong protest to the Soviets this morning.

The President remarked that, on human rights issues, the Secretary should draw attention of the Soviets to his pledge not to exploit or claim credit for positive moves the Soviets might make.

The Secretary agreed he would stress this to Shevardnadze. He noted that the Orlov release, the return of Sakharov, and some other cases meant that some two thirds of our pleas to the Soviets about specific individuals had been met.

#### *Arms control discussion*

Frank Carlucci asked the group to return to non-arms control issues for the balance of the meeting, noting that Secretary Shultz had treated most of them in his opening remarks.

Secretary Shultz repeated that he would hit the Soviets hard on Afghanistan and saw some positive signs on Angola. He was more pessimistic about Nicaragua and Cambodia. The message on Nicaragua would be "keep your cotton picking hand off Central America." On human rights he said we planned to go beyond our usual lines (divided spouses, political prisoners, emigration, and fulfillment of Helsinki) to press on religious prisoners, freedom of mails and international telecommunications, jamming and other media issues. He noted that the Soviets had proposed a human rights conference in Moscow (agreed

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 8, Document 123.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Nicholas Daniloff, a U.S. journalist who was arrested on September 2, 1986, in Moscow by the KGB and accused of espionage.

by all to be an oxymoron); we were in consultation with allies on how to treat this and believed that stating some firm conditions, such as freedom for non-governmental groups to participate openly, would give us leverage.

Responding to questions on how he would treat the Soviet invasion of our embassy, Secretary Shultz said he was struggling with the right way to phrase a strong protest. He was considering a message to the Soviets that said: You are creating an environment so hostile and difficult that perhaps we shall decide to limit our representation to an ambassador and a few other people, limits that would also apply to the Soviets in the US. He found this unappealing but was angry and felt that something needed to be done.

The President cited this matter as an illustration of his argument that military competition springs from mistrust, not the other way around, and here we had a Soviet action calculated to generate mistrust.

Secretary Baker asked whether this was not the perfect time to cancel the Soviet claim on their new chancery building on Mount Alto.

Secretary Weinberger said stress must be on complete reciprocity in these matters. He noted that there was no security for official Americans in Moscow and that none could be provided by vans and trailers introduced in a hurry. The President asked whether advanced technologies could nullify Soviet penetrations; Secretary Weinberger responded that this was being explored.

Secretary Shultz reported that efforts were being made to provide secure voice, messaging, and conferencing for his trip to Moscow. He was being told that he could be confident in the security being provided. If needed a small plane would be available to fly messages to Helsinki for transmission. In response to continued expressions of doubt about Moscow security, Secretary Shultz opined that not to go would be a political defeat. Secretary Weinberger stressed that he was calling merely for consideration of alternate sites, e.g., Geneva or Helsinki. The President repeated his plea that we look to advanced technology to outfox the Soviets in this business.

The Secretary of State observed that, despite intermittent flaps over espionage and such matters, the President's agenda was dominating the US-Soviet relationship and steady progress had been made since 1984 in pushing this agenda. Frank Carlucci thought this was a good closing point, and the President adjourned the meeting.

### 36. Telegram From the Consulate in Frankfurt to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>

Frankfurt, April 8, 1987, 2056Z

5317. Personal for Secretary from Matlock. Following text is Moscow 52. Subject: Dobrynin on Your Visit.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. In two-hour private conversation today, Dobrynin indicated that Soviet aim during your visit is to “clear the way” for completion of an INF treaty before the end of 1987, and also—if possible—agreement on the elements of a START/DST agreement. These would be concluded at a summit in U.S. this year.

3. Re INF he indicated that Soviets would have no major problem with our verification proposals, and that they would wish to have inspectors in missile-producing facilities. (He implied that if there is a problem re verification, it would be because they were more demanding than we.)

4. Re SRINF, he indicated that Soviets will propose that SRINF be reduced to zero in a specified number of years (period subject to negotiation). He implied that Soviets could not accept Pershing II conversion, but did not rule out a U.S. right to deploy up to the Soviet ceiling. On latter, however, he observed that since Soviets willing to go to zero rapidly, we would hardly find it practical to deploy weapons in this category.

5. Regarding START and DST, he repeated the observation made to Horowitz last December<sup>2</sup> that it might be possible to proceed with 50 percent reductions on the basis of a simple non-deployment commitment for a fixed number of years, plus agreement not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for that period. I received the impression that Gorbachev might make such a proposal to you in private, through Dobrynin did not promise that he necessarily would do so.

6. Since pouch to Frankfurt is closing for today, I will report other details of this conversation to you tomorrow,<sup>3</sup> and in person in Helsinki.<sup>4</sup> I do want to alert you, however, to the possibility that you may

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Secretary Shultz’s Moscow Trip April 1987 Pre-Trip Background Material (9). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Shultz later wrote in his memoirs that the cable was hand-delivered from Moscow to Frankfurt as a result of security concerns at the Embassy in Moscow and that he received it on April 9. (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 883)

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 9 and 11.

<sup>3</sup> Not found.

<sup>4</sup> Shultz was in Helsinki April 12–13 and met with Finnish President Koivisto.



be faced with Soviet proposals along the lines indicated when you come next week.

**Matlock**

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**37. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 10, 1987

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

It has been a long time since you and I last communicated directly. I am pleased that the visit of Secretary Shultz to Moscow offers us an opportunity to resume our direct dialogue.

I can recall at Geneva sitting before a fireplace and commenting that you and I were in a unique position. Together we can make the difference in the future course of world events. Let us pray that you and I can continue our dialogue so that the future will be one of peace and prosperity for both our nations and for the world.

I can also recall commenting to you that the very reason we are engaged in arms reductions negotiations is because of military competition that stems from the fundamental mistrust between our governments. If we are able to eliminate that distrust, arms reductions negotiations will be much easier.

There has been a recent incident that has caused problems between our two countries, and I feel strongly about this issue.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, however, I am encouraged by many of the steps you are taking to modernize your own country and by the improved dialogue between us on arms reductions. There has also been some progress on human rights, although much more needs to be done. But the dialogue on regional issues has been quite fruitless so far, and I hope that we can make strenuous efforts in this area, especially on Afghanistan.

Secretary Shultz will come to Moscow prepared to deal with a broad range of issues. He will carry with him positions that I have reviewed carefully and that are designed to improve the climate

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State Correspondence File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8790364) (#1). No classification marking. Shultz handed the letter to Gorbachev in Moscow on April 14, see Document 42.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the bugging of the Embassy in Moscow.

between our two countries and to build on the progress we have already made in the arms reductions area.

I look forward to positive discussions during Secretary Shultz' visit, and to a personal report from him immediately upon his return.<sup>3</sup> Nancy joins me in sending very best regards to you and Raisa.

Sincerely,

**Ronald Reagan**

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 48.

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### **38. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, April 13, 1987, 11:30 a.m.-1:25 p.m.

#### **SUBJECT**

The Secretary's Initial One-on-One with Shevardnadze 11:30 am-1:25 pm,  
Monday, April 13, 1987

#### **PARTICIPANTS**

*United States*  
The Secretary  
Mark R. Parris (Notetaker)  
Dimitriy Zarechnak (Interpreter)

*Soviets*  
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
Interpreter

The Secretary opened the meeting by explaining the reason for his limp: he had pulled a muscle in his leg. Noting that he was aware that the Secretary was active in sports, Shevardnadze quipped that he had

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Trip—Memcons 4/12–16/87. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Parris. This one-on-one conversation was preceded by a plenary session in which Shevardnadze greeted Shultz and went over the schedule for the latter's stay in Moscow. See Document 39. Prior to arriving in Moscow, Shultz stopped in Helsinki. At the conclusion of his meetings, Shultz traveled to Brussels to brief the North Atlantic Council before returning to the United States.

heard that the Secretary liked to choose opponents less skillful than himself. The Secretary said it was always nice to win. Shevardnadze turned to substance by noting that a number of problems had accumulated since their last meeting.<sup>2</sup> Unfortunately, it seemed to have become a tradition that the atmosphere should turn unfavorable in advance of high-level US-Soviet meetings. That had happened before the Geneva summit and before the Reykjavik meeting. Shevardnadze recalled that he and the Secretary had had to devote most of their time during their last meeting in Washington to “the problem which had created the atmosphere” surrounding that meeting (a reference to The Daniloff affair). Now there was a similar atmosphere.

Shevardnadze said it was important to decide how he and the Secretary should proceed. Time was short. Shevardnadze was prepared to discuss any point the Secretary might care to focus on in their traditional spirit of frankness. So, he asked the Secretary, how should they proceed?

The Secretary agreed that their recent talks had been marked by tension, a tension itself produced by things outside the immediate scope of their agenda, and, more specifically, by the actions of Soviet intelligence services. It was important to face these problems. The Secretary wanted to take a few moments to describe how the situation looked to us and to hear the Foreign Minister’s views. The Secretary regarded it as one of his duties to deal straightforwardly with such matters, but to do so in a manner which did not disrupt the ability to deal with other issues. So he wanted in private to deal with the issue clearly, and then get on to other issues. After he had dealt with this first order of business, the Secretary noted, he wanted to make a few additional comments in the area we called “human rights” before getting into arms control issues in the plenary session.

With respect to other bilateral issues, the Secretary’s sense was that they were proceeding reasonably well. There had been good talks in Washington at the Bilateral Review Commission.<sup>3</sup> The head of our delegation to those talks, DAS Thomas Simons, was prepared to pick up in Moscow where they had left off two weeks earlier on certain issues. So if Shevardnadze would designate someone to represent the Soviet side, the two might carry on “satellite discussions” while he and the Foreign Minister went about their own programs.

There was, however, one point that the Secretary wanted to make on the bilateral side. That point was simply that the environment in

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 7.

<sup>3</sup> The Department transmitted an account of this meeting in telegram 85300 to Moscow, March 21. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870556–0667)

which our diplomats in the Soviet Union [worked?] was very difficult. There was an asymmetry in the working environment between Moscow and Washington which worked to the Soviets' benefit. Simons and his interlocutor could address the issues involved in this asymmetry, but the Secretary wanted to emphasize the importance he attached to creating working and living conditions for our staff in the Soviet Union which would enable them to concentrate on their tasks without having to be distracted by administrative duties. Perhaps before he left Moscow, Simons and his partner could report on this matter to the ministers. Shevardnadze agreed to the suggestion. The Secretary proceeded to introduce the "current problem," which, he noted, had created a strong atmosphere. As he had said in his press conference of April 10,<sup>4</sup> we were very angry both with the Soviets and ourselves that this (note: the Moscow Marine problem) had happened. But it seemed to us that the root cause of the matter was a complete lack of restraint on the part of Soviet intelligence services and their relentless targeting of US Mission staff. Constant surveillance, bugging, entrapment, microwave beaming, the use of spy dust had created an oppressive environment for our people. We were not naive, nor were the Soviets. But this sort of thing could be overdone and could easily get out of hand.

Then there was the problem of the new US Embassy chancery building. We had been examining the structure for some time. The Secretary had to say that the building was just honeycombed with various types of listening devices. Our intelligence services had to admire Soviet techniques. But at this point it was an open question as to whether we could deal with what had been put there and still have a secure working environment. Some felt that the presence of these devices was so pervasive that the only solution was to tear down the present structure and start over.

In any case, we were determined to provide our people in Moscow with a secure working environment, regardless of the time or effort that might be involved. And, as the President had said, we would not move in until we were satisfied that the facility was fully secure.<sup>5</sup> We would not permit the Soviets to occupy their new chancery in Washington until that was the case. That was unfortunate, as both sides needed the additional working space. We had not come to any conclusions on what to do with our building, but from what we had seen so far, extreme changes would have to be made, if it could deal with the problem at all. This would be expensive and take time.

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<sup>4</sup> Presumably reference is to Shultz's news conference of April 8. (Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1987, pp. 24–27)

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to Reagan's radio address of April 11. (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1987 Book II, pp 377–378)

Frankly, the Secretary noted, the problem had become so acute that many in the US were asking what was the point of maintaining a respectable presence in the Soviet Union. The USSR was a great and powerful country, and we had always felt it warranted a strong US Mission. But we needed an ability to operate, an atmosphere less hostile from an intelligence view.

Shevardnadze's initial reply was a quote from Turgenev: "if one wished to cover up one's own sins, one had to cry loudly about the sins of others." This, Shevardnadze felt, summed up how the US was acting now. Shevardnadze appreciated the compliment to the Soviet intelligence services, and would convey it. But he had been asking himself, especially after the President's recent speech, what could explain the official US outcry over this affair? He had concluded that the answer was twofold. The US was seeking on the one hand to divert attention from its own internal problems and, on the other, to obscure the international debate on security issues in hopes of pushing these issues into the background during the present visit.

Shevardnadze said that the Soviets were well aware of the extent of US intelligence activities. Whole networks had been created to support spy operations in various countries and at various levels. The whole world knew what was going on.

For its part, the Soviet Union had not sought to capitalize on US domestic problems such as Irangate.<sup>6</sup> Moscow had been relatively restrained on such issues as the contras and illegal operations against Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola and elsewhere. Nonetheless, the Soviets knew what US agencies and institutions were responsible for working out such plans.

Now the US was trying to use incidents of varying kinds to play political games. Shevardnadze recalled the outcry over "spy dust." Only jokes remained from the incident. He recalled the "diplomatic wars" of the previous fall, and the 25 hours he and the Secretary had spent on related matters during their September meetings.<sup>7</sup> The outcome of that series of moves had not been to the US benefit.

Now the US was trying to start a new cycle—it might be called "electronic wars." As for recent allegations that Soviet intelligence had penetrated the US Embassy in Moscow, the Soviets had felt compelled in the response to these allegations to show the world the real face of US intelligence. The Soviets had not exhibited all the evidence they had of US intelligence operations against Soviet diplomats (the Secre-

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<sup>6</sup> Reference is to the Iran Contra scandal.

<sup>7</sup> Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986.

tary could consult his own experts for the details). But if the Secretary desired, Shevardnadze could arrange to show him some of the masterpieces of the US electronic industry.

Shevardnadze observed that he and the Secretary, as persons with important responsibilities, must decide whether to continue this kind of war, or end it and go on to serious matters. The President had accused the Soviet Union of putting sensors in US buildings. But where was the proof? He could accuse anyone of anything by such methods. The Soviets had both arguments and proof. Shevardnadze was prepared to “prove” that he was right. For example, the Secretary had mentioned the problem of working conditions for US staff in Moscow. Maybe Soviet authorities did interfere with the work of US employees. But only when they were involved in intelligence work. The Secretary should look into what went on in the Embassy. Shevardnadze handed over a paper (attached) describing the activities of US personnel, including some still attached to the Embassy, engaged in intelligence work.<sup>8</sup> He also gave the Secretary a list of Soviet demarches since 1986 on such activities.<sup>9</sup>

As for the new office building in Moscow, if the US wanted to tear it down, that was its decision. The Soviets had no intention of tearing down their chancery in Washington. They could detect the clever devices the US had installed there. The US could probably do the same in Moscow. So maybe demolition was not a good idea.

The Secretary asked to make a few comments. First, the pattern of Soviet intelligence activities far exceeded in oppressiveness whatever the US was doing. The result was that the process periodically got out of hand and exploded into the kind of problem we now faced.

Second, Shevardnadze was wrong to conclude that our protest of what the Soviets had done in our Embassy was a function of our internal political problems or of a desire to obscure important substantive matters. The Secretary would not be in Moscow if the latter conclusion were valid. The President had said, and the Secretary agreed, that we had important things to discuss and that we should do so. But problems like those the Soviets had created did not make the process easier. As for the timing of the incident, that was a function of when we had detected the compromise of our facilities which had resulted from the Soviets’ subversion of two Marines. It had nothing to do with Iranagate or any related problem.

In reply, Shevardnadze asked the Secretary to explain why US intelligence services had implanted dozens, hundreds of monitoring

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<sup>8</sup> Not found.

<sup>9</sup> Not found.

devices in Soviet diplomatic buildings—and even in the bedrooms of Soviet personnel. This was outrageous.

The Secretary noted with irony Shevardnadze's concern over "dozens" of devices. It was his understanding that the quantity of such devices implanted in our new office building by the Soviets was endless. If Shevardnadze wanted evidence, no doubt his intelligence services could provide it. We would have to deal with the problem eventually either through demolition or by digging the devices out in a way which left the structure intact. The Secretary noted on the basis of his experience in the contracting business that, when a party failed to deliver what was provided for in the contract, that party was liable for the costs. In this case the Soviets had delivered more than the contract called for.

Shevardnadze protested that this was all groundless. The Soviets had taken out many devices from their missions in the US. They had excellent instruments for finding such devices. Perhaps they could give the US some help in this area.

The Secretary said he wished he were just peddling a line, but that that was unfortunately not the case. If the Soviets had some sophisticated technology to give us, however, we would be glad to have it. We accepted Shevardnadze's offer.

Laughing, Shevardnadze said that, yes, the Soviets had some good equipment. They were not as backward technologically as some in the West would like to believe.

The Secretary said that he never put down Soviet technology, especially in the area of espionage. In that field, the Soviets were first class.

The Secretary noted in bringing to a close this segment of the conversation that he had made his points. Whether Shevardnadze accepted them or not, the problem the Secretary had raised was a major and continuing one. Dealing with the new office building would be a long and hard process. We also wanted to register as strongly as possible the disruption that the Soviet "full court press" on our people here caused us. The Secretary added that he would like to proceed to human rights matters.

Shevardnadze repeated that, to the degree that Soviet authorities were complicating the lives of American personnel in Moscow, it was because those employees were themselves engaged in intelligence activities. All the Americans had to do was respect Soviet laws. If the US had real evidence to back up its claims, it should produce it. So far, Shevardnadze had not seen any.

The Secretary opened his presentation on human rights by expressing his pleasure that the discussion took place against the backdrop of a number of significant humanitarian steps by the Soviet govern-

ment. This was a welcome change from some previous meetings. The changes which were taking place in accordance with Soviet law and for the Soviets' own reasons had been noticed in the US. We welcomed such steps as Sakharov's return from exile, the release of some political prisoners, progress in resolving divided family and separated spouse cases, and what appeared to be an upturn in emigration.

On a personal basis, the Secretary was pleased to note the progress that had been realized on the list of names he had given Shevardnadze the previous September, when the Foreign Minister had undertaken to look into the cases involved and to act where appropriate. This had happened, and the Secretary wanted to give Shevardnadze due credit.

Regrettably, two of the persons on the list, Inna Meiman and Anatoliy Marchenko, had died. But the Secretary asked Shevardnadze's help in resolving the two remaining cases, Ida Nudel and Leyla Gordievskaya. The Secretary had met on several occasions with Nudel's sister, and it would be a fine humanitarian gesture if the two could be reunited in Israel.

There was also an outstanding agenda in the case of Inna Meiman. Her death had left her husband, Naum, alone in the world except for his daughter in the US. It was difficult to take seriously arguments that his previous work in sensitive work barred his departure, since that work had taken place 30 years before. Also outstanding was the case of Inna's son, Lev Khitroskiy, whom Shevardnadze had informed Cyrus Vance would be allowed to emigrate. The Secretary hoped this commitment would be honored.

The Secretary raised the case of Vladimir Slepak, who, he pointed out, had sought for 17 years to leave the Soviet Union. Prior to his departure for Moscow, the Secretary had met with Slepak's two sons. They had asked him to deliver to Slepak photographs of Slepak's two grandsons, whom he had never seen. The Secretary said he had heard reports that Slepak had been mistreated and placed under house arrest over the weekend. He hoped those reports were not true. The Secretary urged that Slepak's case be reviewed and that he be allowed to emigrate to Israel, offering to take him and Nudel out on his own plane if the Soviets would permit it.

The Secretary said that the President had asked that he take the opportunity to mention several cases in which the President had taken a personal interest: the gifted pianist Vladimir Feltsman; separated spouse Matvey Finkel, separated spouse Galina Goltzman; and dual national Abe Stolar.

Finally, the Secretary suggested that the Soviets allow the prompt departure of the small number of people who had asked to leave the Soviet Union and were seriously ill. There was great interest in these



cases, and, from the Soviet standpoint, they were a problem. The Secretary hoped something could be done about them.

The Secretary then ran through a number of areas of US concern in the human rights field. He noted that most of the specific cases he had mentioned appeared on the representation lists of divided families, separated spouses and dual nationals which the US from time to time presented. These lists were short, and the Soviets had acted on many cases. We would like to see the rest resolved and to remove them from our agenda.

The Secretary welcomed the upturn in emigration. The numbers were not what they had been in the past, but they were better than in recent years. We felt strongly that a sustained, significant increase was called for. A good start would be the prompt processing of outstanding refusenik cases. This was an issue we had often discussed before. The Soviets had accepted information we had given them on the subject. The Secretary suspected that Shevardnadze had had something to do with the positive developments we had seen.

Another area we had discussed in the past was that of political prisoners, of which over 100 had been released. We welcomed that. But as the cases which had been released were different in no important respect from the remaining political prisoners, we hoped that those still being held would also be released. The Secretary added that, in line with the General Secretary's new thinking, an end would be put to the practice of psychiatric commitment on essentially political grounds, and that such establishments as the notorious Perm prison camp would be closed down.

The Secretary commented on the problem of religion in the Soviet Union. He noted that relatively few of the political prisoners released recently were religious believers. We did not believe that people should be jailed for their religious beliefs, and we knew it was not formally a crime in the Soviet Union to profess a religion. But we also know that Soviet rules and regulations prohibiting religious believers from organizing bible study groups, conducting religious classes for children, and carrying out charitable or social activities made it difficult for them to practice their beliefs. We thus hoped for progress in this area, consistent with the obligations the Soviets had undertaken in the Helsinki Final Act.

Turning to the question of the free flow of information, the Secretary recalled that we had welcomed General Secretary Gorbachev's willingness to discuss the question of radio jamming at Reykjavik. USIA Director Wick had since written Propaganda Secretary Yakovlev with a number of proposals for pursuing that discussion.<sup>10</sup> Unfortu-

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<sup>10</sup> Wick's letter is in Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, P870079–2167.

nately, we had received not a reply. We hoped that there would be one soon, as we were anxious to expand our dialogue in this area. But we believed that information exchange was a much broader issue than jamming, and an essentially positive one. Jamming was illegal and should be ended. The same held true for continuing Soviet interference with postal and telephone communications between US and Soviet citizens. We hoped that the Soviet Union would bring its practices into compliance with the obligations they had assumed at Helsinki and under the UN Declaration on Human Rights.

So, in conclusion, we were encouraged by the progress that we saw taking place. We hoped to get some sense of what it was that the Soviets were doing which could excite the heart of so hard-bitten an anti-communist as Margaret Thatcher.

Shevardnadze said he would like in reply to ask two questions:

First, why did the US refuse to associate with the Bern Declaration?<sup>11</sup>

The Secretary answered that we felt the document represented a backward step in some important respects. We felt no purpose was served by undertaking commitments which were more restrictive than those we had already undertaken in other fora. There were some good things in the Bern document, but there were also limitations. We were nonetheless willing to continue to work in this area.

Shevardnadze posed his second question: The Secretary would recall the Soviet proposal at the opening of the Vienna CSCE Review Conference<sup>12</sup> for a serious discussion of all humanitarian problems, including human rights, in Moscow. What, Shevardnadze asked, were the US views on this issue?

The Secretary indicated that the US continued to study the problem with its allies. We believed that the site of such a conference should be one in which the Helsinki process was already being fully lived up to. That was why we were so interested in some of the things which were now happening in the Soviet Union; we were trying to understand what was going on.

Personally, the Secretary had counseled his fellow Foreign Ministers in Vienna that it would be a mistake to reject outright the Soviet proposal. He had suggested that the idea be considered on the basis of whether conditions might emerge which would justify such a Moscow

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<sup>11</sup> Reference is to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, an international agreement signed in Berne, Switzerland, on September 9, 1886. At the time of the Shultz-Shevardnadze conversation, the United States was not a party to the convention. On October 31, 1988, Reagan signed the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, which took effect on March 1, 1989.

<sup>12</sup> Shevardnadze elaborated on this proposal in Document 6.

meeting. There were of course, other considerations, but this was the main one.

Shevardnadze said he had posed the question because profound changes were taking place in the Soviet Union. Laws were being perfected; entire institutions of legality and lawmaking were being overhauled. The fact that this process was underway suggested that some elements of Soviet society were outdated, and that they could be improved. The problems involved touched on economic and humanitarian problems, and had a social and political aspect.

As for the points the Secretary had made, it was of course possible to continue to discuss specific cases. The Soviets knew such cases did exist. They had accepted lists of such cases from individuals and governments, including the US. But Moscow also considered it important to discuss the problems which affected all mankind, and wanted to do so on a solid, scientific basis.

The Soviets recognized that there was much to be concerned about in their country in this area. They were publicly addressing some of these problems, e.g., the need for greater democracy. But other countries had some of the same problems, often in even more acute form. It was important to have honest information about the true status of things. The Soviet Union was now dealing with this problem, and would continue to do so. But it was equally important to have information on how such problems were being dealt with in other countries, e.g., the US, the UK, France and Poland.

The Soviet Union was for fully respecting the obligations that had been undertaken in the Helsinki Final Act, at the UN, and elsewhere. It would like a serious discussion either in an international conference along the lines of the Soviet Vienna proposal, or on a bilateral basis, of, say, the problem of unemployment. This was an old question, but an important one. Shevardnadze knew that the Secretary would say that unemployed in the West received welfare and were not hungry. Shevardnadze did not dispute this. But if one is serious about freedom and human rights, one must recognize that the right to work is fundamental. There was also the problem of the homeless. Was this not a problem? According to US statistics, two million Americans were without adequate housing. Shevardnadze held up lists of “tens and hundreds” of Americans who had died of exposure—42 in Philadelphia alone since 1985.

Then there was the question of the status of blacks in the US. Every country had its own specific characteristics. As a multinational society, the Soviet Union was particularly attuned to the problems affecting ethnic groups in other countries. In that regard, Soviet citizens could not help but be concerned by US statistics indicating that half of the 1.5 million black single parent families lived below the official poverty

level. Another figure: although blacks make up 12 percent of the US population, they account for 45 percent of all prisoners. Black children suffered from high levels of illiteracy.

As the Secretary could see, Shevardnadze concluded, he could go through a list of his own on human rights questions. For example, as a multi-ethnic society, the Soviet Union was particularly concerned by the problem of assimilation of emigrants to the US. The Soviets would like to have a serious discussion of the fate of emigres from the Ukraine, from the Baltic Republics, from Poland once they reached the United States.

For its part, the Soviet Union was not offended that the US raised issues which “had to be raised” about the Soviet Union. But the Soviets were similarly entitled to raise questions about the US in the humanitarian field.

That, the Foreign Minister explained, was why the Soviets felt a conference could be useful, not as a propaganda exercise, but as a forum for serious discussion.

The Secretary, Shevardnadze noted, had raised the question of Soviet psychiatric practices. Shevardnadze could assure the Secretary that the Soviets were prepared to open up any psychiatric institution in the USSR to western observers so that they could see for themselves what was going on. Participants in a Moscow conference would be able to see any individual or group. On the basis of reciprocity, they should have every opportunity to see how people live.

Similar points could be made, Shevardnadze continued, on the question of media access and information flow. The BBC was no longer jammed in the Soviet Union. The question was a bit different with respect to the US. The US wanted the Soviet people to listen to American radio broadcasts. So did Soviet authorities. But the Soviets also wanted American audiences to get information about the Soviet Union. The issue was already being discussed, but could also be addressed in a Moscow conference.

In short, many problems in the humanitarian area had piled up. They should be discussed. What the Soviets had in mind was not mutual recriminations and polemics, although some of this was to be expected. Rather, they hoped for a serious look at the issues, and, where possible, to determine what could be done to build confidence and trust and to increase the flow of information. This should be done in a businesslike and nonpolemical fashion.

(At this point, Shevardnadze was given a note, and asked to be excused. On his return five minutes later, he indicated he had just spoken to Gorbachev, who sent the Secretary his best regards, and looked forward to their meeting at 3:00 pm the next day.<sup>13</sup>)

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<sup>13</sup> See Document 42.

The Secretary said that the US was very interested by some of the things now taking place in the Soviet Union, some of which Shevardnadze had mentioned. We were anxious to hear even more about the process, which sounded important. We were more than ready to discuss the kinds of problems Shevardnadze had mentioned as well as the specific cases and categories of cases that we had raised. The Secretary suggested that Assistant Secretary Schifter, who had accompanied the Secretary to Moscow, meet with whomever Shevardnadze might designate for such a discussion. They could then make a report to Ministers prior to the Secretary's departure.<sup>14</sup> Shevardnadze readily agreed, noting that he had been prepared to propose a similar arrangement.

In response to the Secretary's query as to whether the Soviets could provide space for the Schifter meeting, Shevardnadze said that would be no problem. The Foreign Minister quipped that, however, there should be no eavesdropping. The Secretary said it made little sense to eavesdrop on our own bilateral conversations. Shevardnadze recalled how, on the occasion of their first meeting in Helsinki, the Secretary had counseled him to keep his briefing book covered during the initial photo op.<sup>15</sup> Shevardnadze had never forgotten that advice.

The Secretary suggested that, after lunch, the two take up arms control issues. Regional questions could be taken up in a latter meeting. Shevardnadze agreed, asking if the Secretary would prefer to start after lunch in a one-on-one or plenary mode. The Secretary felt it would be best for arms control experts to be present so that, if there was work to do following the meeting, they would be ready to work. Shevardnadze agreed, and the two proceeded to lunch.

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<sup>14</sup> Schifter's conversations on human rights are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLI, Global Issues.

<sup>15</sup> References are to Shultz's meetings with Shevardnadze in Helsinki, July 30–August 1, 1985, scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986.

39. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, April 13, 1987

## SUBJECT

Shultz-Shevardnadze Meetings, April 13, 1987

## PARTICIPANTS

*United States*

The Secretary  
 Jack F. Matlock  
 Paul Nitze  
 Kenneth Adelman  
 Rozanne L. Ridgway  
 Richard Perle  
 Robert Linhard  
 Thomas W. Simons, Jr. (Notetaker)  
 Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

*Soviets*

Eduard Shevardnadze  
 Aleksandr Bessmertnykh  
 Victor Karpov  
 Yuriy Dubinin  
 Sergey Tarasenko  
 Aleksey Obukhov  
 Vitaliy Micol'chak  
 P. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

[Omitted here is the first session of the Shultz-Shevardnadze meetings during which they discussed the schedule for their talks.]

*Second Session*

Shevardnadze commented that he was not used to the interpreting equipment, but it was okay. The Secretary agreed. Shevardnadze suggested that they proceed to security issues, the heading the Soviets give to arms control. He wished to say a few words first.

The Soviet side understood the meeting of the foreign ministers to express the desire of both sides to achieve progress in the main area of U.S.-Soviet relations. A great deal of work had already been done, above all at the Geneva meeting of the President and the General Secretary, the talks and negotiations there, including the important

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Trip—Memcons 4/12–16/87. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Graze and Pascoe. The meeting took place in the Foreign Ministry Guest House. For Shultz and Shevardnadze's "one-on-one" conversation, which took place prior to this conversation, see Document 38.

statement on the inadmissibility of nuclear war, of war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and a number of basic agreements. The next landmark was Reykjavik.<sup>2</sup> That could well be described as historic. It laid a sound foundation for definite progress in the security area, for understanding on global problems, for a dramatic reduction of nuclear arsenals. It was not useful to discuss why a significant agreement had not been signed at Reykjavik. A basic understanding had been reached on nuclear missiles, on strategic offense. There was a foundation for further work and negotiations. It was very important to proceed on the premise that both countries were equally interested in reaching a sound agreement. Any idea that one was more interested than the other would be a great mistake. We should use the chance that the two countries have now.

Shevardnadze said he hoped the Secretary agreed that this objective can be realistically attained. The Soviet side believed it was realistic to expect to reach an initial agreement on the reduction of nuclear arms with this Administration, and this year. The most interesting area was medium-range missiles. There had been interesting exchanges in Reykjavik, and we could realistically expect this. There were also the broader security issues, strategic weapons and space. But today they should concentrate on medium-range missiles. If the Secretary agreed, he would ask him as the guest to speak first, and tell him how he thought they should proceed.

The Secretary said he welcomed Shevardnadze's remarks, and shared his appraisal of Geneva and Reykjavik. He agreed they should start with the INF/medium-range subject, but he wished to make the point also made in the General Secretary's speech in Prague,<sup>3</sup> that radical reductions in strategic weapons remains the root of the problem. He was not sure there would be plenty of time to dig into it; we should make as much progress as possible, and further instruct our negotiators.

Their private talk had been good, thorough and constructive. They had discussed the problems arising from intelligence matters. They had briefly touched on other bilateral issues, and Tom Simons would be meeting with Shevardnadze's designee; he hoped that before their own meetings ended they could receive at least a brief report on how matters stood. They had had an exchange of thoughts on human rights. He had designated Assistant Secretary Schifter and Shevardnadze would designate someone to dig into these matters thoroughly and report back to them. At lunch Shevardnadze had reported on his Asian

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<sup>2</sup> Documentation on the Geneva and Reykjavik summits is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 5 below.



trip, and developments in Kampuchea. With all due respect to arms controls, if tensions in other areas could be reduced and understanding achieved, our ability to move ahead on arms control would be increased. He knew Shevardnadze agreed.

Shevardnadze said that in practical terms they would need to have some additional discussions, working groups on this or that. Comrade Bessmertnykh would be his chief of staff. They could designate experts to discuss any aspect in a working-group setting.

The Secretary responded that working groups were a good idea. We could follow it as well in the arms control field. If they could move along in the medium-range field, the negotiators were there, and could report back to them. Shevardnadze agreed.

The Secretary suggested Ambassador Ridgway for non-arms control issues, Ambassador Nitze for arms control. Shevardnadze said he would name Bessmertnykh and Karpov, the usual players. The Secretary interjected “the usual suspects.”

The Secretary continued that he would be glad to go through INF issues totally, as we saw them. He would make an initial statement, wished to hear Soviet views, and then they could discuss things.

First, he said, we are continuing work on a treaty. We had tabled a draft. It was based on the Reykjavik formula of 100 missiles on each side, with the Soviet side’s in Asia—exactly where to be determined—and ours in the U.S. This was the Reykjavik formula, and we hold on to it.

We believe that concurrent constraints on short-range missiles and effective verification must also be included. He had been interested to read General Secretary Gorbachev’s speech, where he commented in a general way on verification. Our objective remains the total elimination of all Soviet and U.S. LRINF missiles. When the General Secretary speaks and uses “elimination and reduction” and so on, we are in the process of agreeing to reduce them drastically. We believe strongly that the last small remaining increment should be eliminated.

There were additional reasons, the Secretary went on, why this would be to everyone’s advantage, yours and ours. Our point of view was also that of our ally Japan, also of China, and Korea.

100 warheads is a needle into them from the Soviet side. We would like more stable relationships all around. We did not see what the Soviet side gained by provoking them in this way.

Second, the Secretary said, we have to think of reductions and verification as related problems. You have emphasized verification and we have emphasized verification. If we have two substantive outcomes and one is more easily verified, the more verifiable outcome has a lot to recommend it. It is much harder to verify 100 missiles on each side



than none. It simplifies things; it would increase confidence all around. If we have gone practically all the way from 1400 to 100, why not go the rest of the way for greater ease of verification. Ambassador Glitman could develop the argument in detail, but it would undoubtedly be easier to verify.

Third, the Secretary went on, there was the question of location. Both sides felt strongly about this, and it could be eliminated as a point of argument if we went all the way to zero.

It thus seemed to us that no persuasive case could be made for retaining the remaining SS–20's. They did not counter U.S. forces in Asia; they were provocative in the Asian context; the General Secretary had sought in his Vladivostok speech<sup>4</sup> to improve the Asian context. If we keep 100 warheads it would be clear that this was because the Soviet side wanted to keep them, not because we wanted to keep them, and we would of course have to if the Soviet side did.

So the reasons were verification, the provocative aspect, and to avoid acrimony over location, the Secretary concluded. We were ready to proceed to a global ceiling of 100, as agreed at Reykjavik, but we believed that the agreement would be stronger if we went all the way to zero.

The Secretary then turned to the question of so-called SRINF missiles. We defined these in terms of weapons systems, and the two we had in mind were the SS–12 mod–2, the Scaleboard, and the SS–23, known as the Spider. He asked Shevardnadze not to ask him where these names came from. Shevardnadze said he did not know either. The Secretary ventured that the issue is probably not worth much research. Shevardnadze said Professor Nitze probably knew.

The fact that we are aiming for massive cuts, whether the outcome is 100 on a side or zero, the Secretary went on, gave SRINF great additional importance. Our position from the beginning of the negotiations had been and remained now that they must be constrained, if not definitively dealt with, as part of an LRINF agreement. Certain principles were involved: 1) restraints, 2) any restraint had to be world-wide, for the same reason we needed global LRINF, because they were so transportable; and 3) we must preserve the principle that had guided us in other areas, namely the principle of equality.

So we had the position that these systems should be constrained, at or perhaps below current Soviet levels; that the constraint should

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Gorbachev's July 28, 1986, speech in Vladivostok, in which he called for a drawdown of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and better relations with Asian nations. (Philip Taubman, "Soviet Announces Decision to Trim Its Afghan Force," *New York Times*, July 29, 1986, p. A–1)

be worldwide; and that the U.S. must have the right to match that level, since we did not have comparable forces deployed. He wished to state strongly that we could not accept inequality. It made no sense either from a military deterrent point of view, or politically, from the point of view of a treaty on this subject.

The basic Soviet position had been set forth in Gorbachev's speech, in comments by Karpov in Geneva, and there were other ideas. He would be interested in Shevardnadze's comments, on precisely what Gorbachev had in mind, and he would perhaps have some questions. Just as verification was important for LRINF, the same consideration applied in the SRINF area. In terms of substance, if the Soviet side accepted our proposals, or, i.e, we could achieve an outcome like them, further negotiations should be agreed as part of an initial agreement. These should begin promptly, say within 6 months after an initial agreement was settled.

Finally, the Secretary went on, we had talked back and forth on verification. There had been discussion and agreement on the general principle at Reykjavik, another one of its little-noticed accomplishments. We had tabled a draft on this subject, and urged the Soviet side to do so as well. So we should work to go forward, and get into the guts of the problem in detail.

The detail should include comprehensive and accurate data exchange both prior to and after reductions began; on-site observation of destruction down to agreed levels; and effective monitoring of remaining inventories and related facilities—and this would be easier if there were none. This work would be complex, but it was necessary, and if we wanted to aspire to an early agreement, this was a subject we had to dig into promptly. He thought we were within hailing distance of an agreement. We would like Shevardnadze's comments.

The Secretary asked if Ambassador Glitman had any comments. Glitman responded that he did not, but he knew where the system names came from: they were NATO designations. The Secretary said he would not ask where NATO came up with them.

Shevardnadze said he would try to comment on some of what the Secretary had said and lay out the Soviet position.

In general, Shevardnadze said, it seemed to him that we should not revise the principles of the understandings reached at Reykjavik. With regard to medium-range systems, what the American side called INF, the agreements were very clear: zero for Europe, 100 warheads in the Asian USSR, and the same number on U.S. territory. As for location, he thought the clarity achieved should not be revised. Both sides had understood that missiles should not be deployed so as to reach the territory of the other side. On the global solution for medium-range missiles, we should proceed on the Reykjavik understanding

that all categories should be discussed and resolved, but that in the present situation in the region—it was complex, the U.S. had bases there, and there were other elements—they thought the agreement reached at Reykjavik was best at this time.

When this agreement on medium-range missiles was reached, it had involved some risk for the Soviet side. They had set aside the nuclear arsenals of Britain and France, which had ambitious modernization programs, and this had not been easy for them, a concession. They found positive things in the U.S. position, and the U.S. had presented a draft. Objectively speaking there were elements in it that were basically acceptable. But certain aspects in the draft needed to be more precise, and he would also have to speak about certain elements in it that were not acceptable to the Soviet side. He did not mean to advertise the Soviet approach, but he was sure the U.S. side appreciated the flexibility the Soviet side had demonstrated.

Shevardnadze went on to say he surely remembered the Reykjavik formula for short-range missiles, or in your term SRINF, which is a more complex term. He treated the U.S. side's desire for greater clarity with understanding. He would sum up briefly.

Since the two sides had agreed on the zero option for Europe and 100 warheads in the U.S. and in Soviet Asia, the Soviet side proposed that the two sides begin negotiations without delay on the reduction and elimination of operational-tactical missiles, or SRINF missiles, if necessary in a special working group within the Geneva negotiations framework or elsewhere. The foreign ministers' deputies should discuss arrangements on where and how this should be handled.

Next, right after the signing of an INF agreement, Soviet operational-tactical missiles would be withdrawn from the GDR and Czechoslovakia, as Mikhail Gorbachev had said.

Next, SRINF in Europe would not be withdrawn to areas outside Europe. He knew this was a question the U.S. and also its allies were asking. They would be eliminated.

In proposing negotiations on operational-tactical missiles, the Soviet side had no desire to drag out finding a solution to this problem, and was ready to include a statement that operational-tactical missiles in Europe would be eliminated within an agreed period of time. He did not rule out that this could be done before we had finished the elimination of medium range missiles.

Shevardnadze said the Soviet side was ready to take a very broad view of the problem of nuclear missiles, including tactical missiles. He did not know whether the terminology was clear. What he had in mind was that missiles of up to 500 km. range could be discussed in the framework of negotiations on conventional and chemical weapons.

Why? Because it was known that they are included in the structure of conventional military formations and units, and it would be inappropriate to discuss them in isolation.

The Soviet side was ready to discuss the question of limiting operational-tactical missiles in Asia, Shevardnadze went on, considering equal ceilings for the U.S. and USSR. This would be similar to the handling of medium-range missiles in Asia. This should be looked at in Geneva.

It should not be hard to agree on a timeframe to eliminate medium-range missiles in Europe. The U.S. side had a different view, but the difference was not fundamental. There was a question of stages, with different procedures. Shevardnadze said the Soviet side tentatively proposed a compromise whereby at each stage both sides would take reductions not on a percentage basis but on a proportional basis, so that both sides would approach the final stage with equal numbers of warheads. Both sides should take reductions in the first stage and they should be proportional. This was not just for political reasons, but also to test verification arrangements. The Secretary had quoted Mikhail Gorbachev in Prague correctly.<sup>5</sup> Agreement should include the following elements. First, there should be verification, including on-site inspection, of the dismantling of launchers and subsidiary structures, and of those remaining. Second, this should apply to all facilities in the deployment areas, including test sites, manufacturing plants, training centers, and storage areas. Third, there should be access for inspectors to relevant military bases in third countries, to prevent circumvention—this was fundamental. There had been a special discussion of this at the recent meeting of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers, and the Soviet Union's friends in the GDR and Czechoslovakia had agreed that their facilities where missiles are now deployed would be subject to inspection.

Shevardnadze went on that this corresponded to what the Secretary had said, but further discussion was required. In the U.S. draft treaty, there were elements the Soviet side did not accept. Medium-range missiles in Europe were to be eliminated, but the U.S. wanted the right to convert them to short-range missiles, from Pershing II to Pershing Ib; moving GLCMs to ships, and making them SLCMs; or putting them in a non-nuclear mode. All Soviet medium-range missiles had to be destroyed, meanwhile, including those in Asia. This was not acceptable, not just for the Soviet Union, but also for others. The Soviet side could not agree that the weapons of one side would be eliminated while the

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to Gorbachev's speech in Prague, April 10, 1987, in which he reiterated his position of advocating large cuts in nuclear stockpiles. ("Excerpts From Gorbachev Talk on Arms and Social Changes," *New York Times*, April 11, 1987, p. 5)

other would just make rearrangements of its military presence on the European continent. There could even be a buildup with other types and the degree of confrontation would increase. The nuclear arms race would move from one area to another, with the rebuilding of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe. The U.S. side recognized that it could easily convert back from Pershing Ib to Pershing II. This was not endurable. It would place the Soviet Union in an unequal position as concerns security. It was surely not in the U.S. interest to push the Soviet Union to convert SS–20s to other systems. That path had no end; there would be no agreement, no reductions.

Shevardnadze said he wished to stress the importance of the Soviet proposal to negotiate reduction and elimination of operational-tactical missiles as rapidly as possible.

Other elements of the U.S. draft were at least doubtful. This included the unacceptable U.S. claim to a right to retain so-called subsidiary facilities. Another problem was the possibility to increase the number of warheads on medium-range missiles from 1 to 3. Finally, there was a ban on Soviet deployment of ground-based cruise missiles while the U.S. retained and introduced new types of conventional cruise missiles.

With regard to the process of continuing medium-range negotiations, Shevardnadze said, the Soviet side favored making the delegations work more intensively, taking account of the U.S. draft at the beginning. The Soviet side intended to propose a comprehensive draft at Geneva. It had prepared such a draft. It was also ready for discussions at other levels if there was a need for this. They had already raised the level of their delegation, and they were ready to go higher, including to the foreign minister level, as well as to use embassies more intensively.

Shevardnadze proposed to proceed in the following way based on the results of their discussion: 1) they should determine those parameters where the sides have similar positions, and only additional technical work is required; 2) determine those areas where the experts should seek comprehensive solutions, since many Soviet proposals had emerged since the conclusion of the last Geneva round and changed the situation; and 3) decide which questions cannot be resolved here and required further work at Geneva. He proposed that the ministers designate a working group to go to work and report to them at the next plenary. It was necessary to work here and in Geneva, and to report to our leaders and to the press. The overall situation should be reported to the public.

Shevardnadze said that summed up what he had to say on medium-range missiles and short-range INF.

The Secretary said he thought the suggestion of going to a working group was a good one, and he was prepared to do it, but he had some questions for the sake of clarity.

First, the Secretary said, he wished to correct a misunderstanding about Reykjavik. The Reykjavik agreement he recalled was to reduce to 100 warheads globally, with none deployed in Europe or where they could hit Europe, and the Soviet side's in Soviet Asia, and the U.S. side's in the U.S. Shevardnadze had added the provision that they could not be deployed where they could hit the territory of the other side. There was no logic to our putting our missiles in Chicago. There was a logic to putting them somewhere else. The logical place for them was Alaska; there they would have some meaning. He wished to clarify. We had looked at the records, and the only restriction was that those remaining should be on the territory of each country, and the Soviet side's should be in Soviet Asia.

Karpov explained what the Secretary had said to Shevardnadze in Russian.

The Secretary went on to say this was the kind of argument that would be avoided if we went to zero instead of keeping some. We had agreed some would remain in Reykjavik, and we would stick to this. But he urged Shevardnadze not to put out of his mind the possibility of global zero; it would be much less complicated.

The Secretary said his second point concerned conversion. The U.S. side would comply completely with the limits in any agreement. It would be verifiable as the Soviet side would insist, and we would insist. An INF agreement must constrain shorter-range systems, and we would meet our obligations under such an agreement. If there is a concern that missiles could be reconverted to longer-range missiles, we would consider having the Soviet side verify that the components needed to make them longer-range again had been destroyed, if the missile stayed here. But if we were to have the right to deploy short-range systems, he wished to recall the point he had made about equality. It was up to us to decide how to get there consistent with the treaty. The same points could be made concerning the Soviet point on GLCMs. Regarding SLCMs, we had agreed to try to find some mutually acceptable solution to the question, but it was a difficult question because no one had figured out how to verify a solution.

Shevardnadze said he would return to the question of cruise missiles.

The Secretary noted that the two sides had talked a lot about it. The Soviet side had used a phrase to describe what we call short-range missiles. Estimates of range vary, and perhaps ranges can be made to vary too. But there was a question of intended coverage. He asked

whether the Soviet side intended to cover both the SS–23 and the SS–12 under its concept of what is to be limited.

The Secretary said he had another comment about what was to be done in Asia. The same rationale as concerns a global ceiling for LRINF applies to SRINF: they are highly mobile, and it makes sense to think globally, so why not a global solution?

Once again, the Secretary went on, he wished to stress equality. He recognized the effort the Soviet side had made in proposing a limited timeframe for negotiations, but that begged the question of how far we were to go at this time. It also left Asia open, and that was a problem.

Shevardnadze asked the Secretary whether he insisted on the option to convert.

The Secretary said he believed we should have the right to deploy to match Soviet levels based on the principle of equality. How to get there is up to us. But by assuming the obligations in a treaty we could deal satisfactorily with the point Shevardnadze had made that one should not reconvert back upwards. He supposed this meant that the Soviet side would have the right to see the increment that would make possible recreation of long-range systems made subject to the verification provisions of the treaty.

Shevardnadze said that with regard to Europe he saw a mutually acceptable outline emerging. The Secretary had spoken of equality. The Soviet side had made an exception to it when it had set aside British and French systems, but, he said, let us not speak of that now. But if we could agree to eliminate U.S. and Soviet LRINF, immediately negotiate SRINF and put a timeframe on that negotiation, the question of equality would be taken care of. The Soviet side was not proposing to drag the negotiation out for decades. It favored a quick negotiation and elimination of all operational-tactical missiles with a range of 500–1000 km.

Concerning the Secretary's concern about the composition of the operational-tactical missiles to be reduced and eliminated, Shevardnadze said, he could agree that the parameters should be further discussed. This was not a big problem. The experts could reach agreement, and then the ministers could.

With regard to Asia, Shevardnadze recalled that at Reykjavik they had decided to leave 100 warheads on Soviet and American territory. He thought the clarification that Soviet missiles could not reach U.S. territory and American missiles could not reach Soviet territory was a positive clarification. He could not imagine this situation could be handled any other way. If the U.S. side wanted deployment that could reach Soviet territory, the Soviet side would have to take a similar step



to guarantee its security. Alaska had been mentioned at Geneva, but he was not sure where things stood. He noted that Glitman agreed

The Secretary rejoined that he could speak for Ambassador Glitman. He wanted to be sure it was clear whether we agreed or not. The U.S. interpretation of Reykjavik was that we had agreed simply to leave 100 warheads, not in Europe, deployed in the respective countries. There were no other parameters, and no undertakings on our part not to deploy so as to be able to hit the Soviet Union.

Shevardnadze asked if the Secretary would agree to the possibility of Soviet deployments that would hit the U.S.

The Secretary repeated the U.S. position. Shevardnadze repeated his question. The Secretary said he was sure the question of location was a thorny one, and one more reason why in our view we would be better off without these systems.

Shevardnadze said it was hard to understand why they should look at any other arrangements beyond what their leaders had agreed to. The Secretary said they could improve on that without backing off. His leader would prefer a zero outcome, and he knew that from talking to him. As Shevardnadze contemplated where to put them, he should think about verification complications; about the aggravation—to use a mild term—to friends of ours.

The Secretary asked whether there were further questions to be considered before they established the working group?

Shevardnadze said he believed the problem of deploying medium-range missiles in Alaska was contrived. He frankly did not see the need for them. The sides had to be guided by the approach of not reaching the other's territory. This was fair; it was scientific. Japan should respond to the problem in the normal way. Japan should find it all right that there would be a radical reduction to 1/5 of what had been there, and a possible global solution open, with Europe as an example. The latest statements by Japanese Foreign Ministry officials indicated that they accept it. He could not see why the U.S. side needed anything else. They had given the U.S. Alaska, and now it was a problem.

The Secretary said we had bought it fair and square. He spoke with confidence when he said his Japanese colleagues were glad for reduction but preferred zero. He asked whether Turkey and Norway were in Europe? The location question was not easy. He suggested that the ministers leave it to the experts for a while.

Shevardnadze said he would do that, but the Alaska argument did not stand up. If it were a bargaining point, let us bargain. But let us not waste time, he urged. It was not fair. To be fair we should not be able to hit each other's territories.



Director Adelman said the Soviet side had mentioned reductions of SRINF systems while we were reducing LRINF by the terms of the treaty we had underway. He wondered about Shevardnadze's views concerning what belonged under the treaty, and what belonged under follow-on arrangements.

Shevardnadze replied that in the treaty they could include a provision for beginning negotiations on reducing short-range missiles and beginning their reduction. This would be a general provision on the basic treatment of operational-tactical missiles, for inclusion in the treaty. They handled it this way in their draft treaty.

Obukhov said the sides should agree to negotiate on the reduction and elimination of these missiles and on the timeframe for that. This could be written into the treaty. The sides would predetermine the future of operational-tactical missiles. The experts could find the best language for doing this.

The Secretary suggested there might be a good statement in the treaty that the subject of SRINF missiles would be treated; the principles for treating them might be included, along with provisions for follow-on negotiations; probably a mandate should be stated in the basic treaty. Shevardnadze said that sounded right, provided only it was in the direction of an improvement in the situation, and not in the direction of waiting for an agreement in the treaty. Negotiations could be started right now, without any delay.

The Secretary said he did not think we should start new negotiations until we had the environment for it, but we could work that through. He would ask Ambassador Glitman to represent the U.S. on the working group.

Karpov said he had a question about short-range missiles and their relation to other missiles. The Soviet side believed that negotiations could be started right away to discuss the elimination of short-range missiles in Europe. The American position was that we should proceed in stages, recording in the treaty the U.S. right to match, and then discussing a future beginning of negotiations in six months. The Soviet position was more radical. Why was it not acceptable?

The Secretary replied that whenever we start to discuss this, in a working group or otherwise, we would need to think more about principles. He had stated some: equality, a global basis, a level where we are equal at no more than we have at present. We would need to consult with our Allies, and would probably want a level lower than now, but not necessarily zero. We need to give some guidance.

Nitze pointed out that if we went to zero for operational-tactical missiles as the Soviets defined them, shorter-range systems would become more important, and he was not sure we wouldn't want to raise issues of even shorter-range missiles.

The Secretary said there were many questions, and they could not be tackled all at once. He suggested that the ministers let Glitman and his counterparts grapple with the issues. Shevardnadze said Obukhov and Masterkov would join Ambassador Glitman; they knew each other well. They could come up with a good solution. They should be authorized to work through the night to the morning.

The Secretary suggested a short break, and Shevardnadze agreed.

### *Third Session*

Shevardnadze asked whether the ministers should move or stand in place. The Secretary said he was for motion. Shevardnadze said he was too. The Secretary asked whether they should turn to strategic weapons. Shevardnadze agreed. The Secretary asked whether he should start again. Shevardnadze invited him to.

The Secretary said that once again he wished to quote his favorite author, the General Secretary: “radical reductions in strategic weapons remain the root of the problem.” The U.S. side agreed wholeheartedly. At Reykjavik the General Secretary and the President had agreed on the basic principle of 50 percent reductions to equal levels, and now is the time to get into the details, to get to a draft treaty. The U.S. side hoped its negotiators would table one at the beginning of the next round or shortly thereafter.

Very important agreements had also been achieved at Reykjavik and earlier, the Secretary continued: 6000 warheads, 1600 missiles and heavy bombers, and a heavy bomber counting rule. This was a good and important beginning, a good basis on which to work. In saying we have to work we referred to sublimits to turn these principles into a treaty.

Sublimits on ballistic missiles seemed essential to us, the Secretary went on. More than anything else, ballistic missiles and their warheads were the greatest threat to strategic stability, more than bombers and ALCMs, and required a special sublimit. The President had had this view of the issue from the beginning, in his Eureka speech.<sup>6</sup> We understood the Soviet view, expressed in the meetings of August/September 1986, about the 80–85 percent concept, and we have converted this into a sublimit of 4800 warheads on ballistic missiles. This was the first thing on which we needed to agree. Perhaps we did agree, but this was not set out clearly and concretely.

Within the category of ballistic missiles, the Secretary continued, ICBMs constitute, once again, the greatest threat. They are continuously

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<sup>6</sup> Reference is to Reagan’s commencement address at Eureka College on May 9, 1982. (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1982, Book I, pp. 580–86)

on alert, they are by and large more accurate. There had been a variety of proposals to limit them. We had started at 2500, and now we were at 3300. Soviet needs had been identified, and we had increased the number as discussions had gone on. This was consistent with the general idea of 50 percent reductions, given where the Soviets now were.

The Secretary said there were three other matters of special concern to us: heavy ICBMs was the first. From what the Soviets had said, the implication was that the Soviets were willing to accept a limit of 1500 warheads. The general proposal had not been translated into specific numbers, and this was what we had done. The U.S. side thought this required special treatment, and was glad the Soviet side did too.

The Secretary said we also thought missiles with more than 6 warheads deserve special attention, as an especially great threat to stability, one more invitation to a first strike.

Our third concern, the Secretary continued, was with mobile missiles. We recognized there were certain advantages to stability in the mobile mode of deployment, but it created extreme problems of verification. He recalled the powerful statements of the General Secretary on verification. It was important to maximize our agreements on verification, and mobile missiles were extremely hard to track.

The Secretary said we were proposing a sublimit of 1650 to deal with these three problems, with zero for mobile missiles. This would cover many Soviet systems as well as our MX Peacekeeper missile.

On throwweight, the Secretary continued, the Soviet side had agreed that this is a legitimate problem. You offer a unilateral statement to the effect that you will reduce our throwweight by 50 percent, and welcome it. But we thought this should be a commitment, codified in the treaty in such a way that what came down, as with INF, did not bounce back up again.

The Secretary went on to say that as we have reflected on Soviet statements about the difficulties of coming down, given their force structure, which we of course also had, we had decided to propose that reductions take place over seven years from whenever the treaty became effective. We hoped to move promptly, even this year or early next year, to a treaty, and were prepared to work hard. This proposal was designed to meet the force structure problem.

On verification, the Secretary said he agreed with the great and essential importance attached to it by the General Secretary, including in his speech on Friday. He recalled being at Reykjavik with Shevardnadze when they were with their two leaders, and how they had outdone each other on the importance of verification. The sides needed to bear down on it, particularly with respect to something as important

as strategic arms. We hoped to table a draft treaty which would include our thoughts on verification. As with medium-range missiles, the issues were complex and difficult, so we needed to work hard; this was essential.

In summary, the Secretary said, the U.S. side thought the levels of 1600 and 6000 agreed to by the two leaders were excellent, and we should build a structure within which we would turn these principles into reality. We proposed 4800/3300/1650, a throwweight limitation, and dealing with the problem of verification.

Shevardnadze said he had a few words on how the Soviet side saw the situation in the negotiations. Of course, there had definitely been some progress, some rapprochement in the positions of the two sides on strategic offensive weapons, regarding 50 percent reductions. There had also been some movement on verification. He wished to summarize the Soviet position, based on the Reykjavik understandings.

First, there should be a reduction of 50 percent in strategic weapons within five years, within elimination of the weapons reduced. Second, both sides should retain the traditional triad with 1600 missiles and no more than 6000 warheads. Third, to speak of SLCMs again, additional levels should be set. This was a move by the Soviet side toward the U.S. position. Fourth, we should not revise the Reykjavik agreement that the two sides would at their own discretion define the residual force structure, as among the elements of the triad. At Reykjavik Mikhail Gorbachev had proposed 50 percent reduction of the entire triad, and the President had agreed. Fifth, Soviet heavy missiles would be reduced by 50 percent; this was also a move to accommodate the U.S. position. By reducing Soviet missiles in this way, the aggregate number of warheads on heavy missiles would be reduced by 50 percent.

With regard to subceilings, Shevardnadze went on, the Soviet side was fundamentally against this objective. It was not part of the Reykjavik agreements. The Soviet side had quite appropriately criticized ceilings and subceilings in Reykjavik, and the U.S. side should not try to break the mix of strategic forces as it is now, and demand that the Soviet Union change its mix. Shevardnadze and the Secretary had been participants at Reykjavik, and Shevardnadze's memory was firm that subceilings had been removed from the agenda. He had taken careful notes. They had been withdrawn by our agreement that heavy bombers should be counted as one weapon if they were equipped with gravity bombs and SRAMs. Nitze disagreed, but it was recorded.

Nitze said he did disagree.

Shevardnadze said that if the two sides agreed to go back to counting every bomb and SRAM within the 6000 aggregate (he said he knew this would not be acceptable), the Soviet side was prepared to think about the possibility of limiting warheads to no more than 80 percent

of the overall number of nuclear weapons, or 5100, with no more than 60 percent, or 3600, on any type launcher. They were not against using such terms, with the understanding of which systems were included in each category to be agreed in Geneva.

Turning to sea-launched cruise missile systems, Shevardnadze said we had agreed to the principle of limitations on nuclear-tipped weapons. There might for instance be functional characteristics put on conventional systems that distinguished them from nuclear-tipped. This would require inspection of all ships, as the Soviets had said in Geneva many times. Otherwise all sea-based missiles would have to be counted as nuclear-tipped, on the model of other arms control negotiations.

Concerning strategic weapons one cannot ignore the need for mutual restraint, Shevardnadze went on. The U.S. side refused now to comply with the Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms and SALT II.<sup>7</sup> But now we were in a qualitatively new situation, one of change. We were reaching for an INF agreement, we were dealing with Asia, we were making progress in other talks. The Soviet side proposed that we agree on restraint while the Geneva talks continued; that we should exchange data on our force levels at Geneva or elsewhere as of an agreed date; and agree not to increase, effective for a fixed period of time, with the possibility of prolonging it. That seemed to Shevardnadze to have a valid logic.

In sum, said Shevardnadze, there had been some movement to accommodate 50 percent reductions, but there were differences, and it was not easy to find a common language.

Turning to space, Shevardnadze said this question had been discussed within the Soviet Government, in anticipation of the Secretary's visit. Perhaps it would be possible to agree on instructions to our delegations, or key provisions, today or tomorrow, as guidelines for our delegations. If there were agreement on medium-range missiles, key provisions on strategic offensive weapons and some elements on space could also be signed at the highest level. We were dealing with the full scope of issues on medium-range missiles, and an agreement could be prepared and signed this year. The problem areas on strategic offensive weapons and space weapons were more difficult, and were interrelated, but we could set the drafting of key provisions as an objective. The ministers could designate some of the reserve players to think about some of these questions too.

To summarize, Shevardnadze said, the Soviet side favored sticking to the Reykjavik formula. It was intelligent, reasonable and simple: the

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<sup>7</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXII, SALT, 1969–1972, and *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1972, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980.

qualitatively existing structures should not be changed; it had been agreed at the summit to reduce the whole triad by 50 percent, including the three elements of ICBMs, heavy bombers and SLBMs. As the Secretary would recall, there had been only one condition.

The Secretary said he agreed wholeheartedly that there were plenty of problems. He remembered the references to force structures at Reykjavik. The U.S. side had never imagined it as a problem in arithmetic. But the sublimits we were proposing were approximations of the idea, making it more specific, understandable and workable. We were trying to translate principles into numbers, see what the content was and make adjustments. This was the nature of our approach to sublimits.

Concerning cruise missiles, the Secretary said he would be interested to hear Shevardnadze's ideas on how limitations could be verified. He had suggested two ways, differentiating between conventional and nuclear-tipped, or counting them all as nuclear weapons. He hoped Shevardnadze could expand on that. He found the problems baffling, but was ready to listen.

Shevardnadze rejoined that he could not say much that was new. It was in the interest of the U.S. to distinguish between nuclear missiles and those for other purposes. The idea was to find observable, functional ways to distinguish missiles. Otherwise we would have to count them all as nuclear. He saw no other way.

The Secretary recalled that at Reykjavik we had suggested putting the issue aside for the time being. Now Shevardnadze had brought it up again. If Shevardnadze had any ideas, the Secretary said, he would be interested.

The Secretary continued that he inferred from what Shevardnadze had said that he was aspiring to skepticism concerning going very far very soon on START and space. He had not heard any thoughts on space from Shevardnadze. The U.S. side had some. The General Secretary had said strategic arms were the root of the problem, and the U.S. side thought they deserved heavy emphasis. A draft treaty could turn potential into reality. We should work on its provisions as we were working on INF. He had no objection to aspiring to the kinds of things this year that Shevardnadze was talking about.

The Secretary suggested an additional working group on START, and an additional group to shape up issues overall.

Shevardnadze said there should be one group on strategic weapons and space. It was not proper to separate them.

The Secretary said he had some new thoughts to suggest in the field of space. He wished to reiterate our view that it was important to move on strategic arms, whether or not this was related to space. The U.S. side had prepared a statement. He would give it to Shevard-

nadze; it was nine pages long.<sup>8</sup> He suggested that the experts study it and discuss it, and the ministers might then return to it. It dealt with important and fundamental issues.

On space, the Secretary continued, the U.S. had made two very constructive offers. One had been the President's letter of last July,<sup>9</sup> the other at Reykjavik. Neither had rung bells with the Soviet side. Now we were trying again, with some new thinking.

Shevardnadze commented that it was good they had not rung bells, since this produced new thinking. The Secretary rejoined that Shevardnadze might like the old bells better; they had been good bells.

He continued that the Soviet side had not liked our offers, and we had not liked theirs. We had recognized that 50 percent reductions were historic and unprecedented in and of themselves. The President had sought to provide assurances of stability and predictability for the strategic regime. He was serious about this. This seriousness would be reflected in the philosophical piece the Secretary would give Shevardnadze in a moment.

The U.S. side had a new proposal to improve predictability, the Secretary continued, in the context of the 50 percent reductions we were discussing on the offensive side, and remembering that we were a long way from the offense-defense relationship discussed in 1972. We were prepared to undertake a mutual commitment until 1994, or seven years, not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy defensive systems whose unilateral deployment would not be permitted under the Treaty. This was a major step for the President, particularly in light of the encouraging progress being made in the SDI research program. It was contingent on the START reductions, and would not alter the right to withdraw as a result of a material breach or if even the supreme national interest was jeopardized, and it was imperative to redress the violation of the ABM Treaty in the case of the Krasnoyarsk radar. The effect would be that either side could deploy after 1994 unless they decided otherwise, and they might. The U.S. side wished to engage the Soviet side on the problem of the offense-defense relationship and on a transition that would ensure stability.

The U.S. side had some further thoughts on predictability, the Secretary continued. We were prepared for an annual exchange of data on planned activities of the two sides in the defense field. We had on the table previous proposals on open laboratories and reciprocal observation of testing. This set of things was designed to enhance

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<sup>8</sup> Not found.

<sup>9</sup> Scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986.



stability and predictability. It would do so into the 1990s. The Secretary reminded Shevardnadze that seven years was a long time. In political time 1994 was two presidencies away, and that was quite a reach outward for President Reagan to make on non-withdrawal. This package, together with a new offensive environment from START, would enhance mutual confidence. Both sides could pursue their defense plans, while enhancing stability. We needed a new effort to restructure our thinking, through reductions and reexamination of the offense-defense relationship.

In presenting the paper, the Secretary said it was on the lengthy side, and he suggested that the experts go over it and bring it back to us with additional argumentation. It was useful while we did the nuts and bolts to step back to the philosophical and conceptual bases, and this was an effort to do that.

Shevardnadze said the fact that it was lengthy did not necessarily make it bad. The Secretary said a tight budget made us get the maximum use of paper. Shevardnadze said he knew the U.S. side was poor. The Secretary said that the country was doing great; it was only the government that was broke.

The Secretary proposed two additional groups, on strategic weapons as such, and on space and related matters. He hoped the group on space and related matters could deal with the proposal he had just made on behalf of the President, as well as the paper.

Shevardnadze said he had some thoughts to set out, and asked if the Secretary had to leave at 6:00 p.m. The Secretary confirmed that. Shevardnadze said he had listened carefully to all the Secretary's points, and they deserved careful attention. He would consider them with pencil in hand. New thinking and concepts were useful. He had the following to say.

As the Soviet side had said at Reykjavik and after, what was of serious concern to it was that the U.S. Administration fully intended to renounce the only existing arrangement that now provided strategic stability. That was why the broad interpretation had emerged. It meant abandonment of the ABM Treaty, and it was strange to hear it said that it was consistent with the ABM Treaty. As the Soviet side had said and reiterated many times, SDI was dangerous in itself. As a concept it was more dangerous even than strategic offensive weapons, because the world situation would be uncontrollable if it were implemented. Mikhail Gorbachev had said he would find a response to it. Shevardnadze was surprised that the U.S. side had not taken this seriously. It knew the Soviet system and its leaders. These were not words thrown to the wind. If Gorbachev said he would find a response he would find it.

The Secretary interjected that we listened carefully to what Gorbachev said. We had great respect for Soviet capabilities. We observed



Soviet ABM defenses around Moscow, from which the Soviet side had undoubtedly learned. Shevardnadze rejoined that these were within ABM Treaty limits. The Secretary replied that our program was, too.

Shevardnadze continued that no one wanted to prevent the U.S. side from conducting research within ABM Treaty limits. The Soviet side did—witness the Moscow defenses—and within the Treaty. It should be possible to reach an agreement on the problem of outer space. The Soviet side understood President Reagan's personal commitment to SDI, and took account of it in its own proposals.

The Soviet position was that the sides should not exercise the right to withdraw from the Treaty for ten years, but should stay strictly within the Treaty, and not develop, test or deploy systems or components forbidden under Article V. They should agree on a specific list of systems and devices banned from launching into space. They thought it should be possible to define the borderline between permitted and not permitted, and they could not understand why the U.S. side was not willing to try, as they had proposed in Geneva and elsewhere. Ideas had been presented by Soviet and /American scientists on how to do so, and the Soviet side wanted to involve academics more. The sides could hold an SCC session this year, and consider raising the level, perhaps to defense ministers or their deputies, to make it possible to engage in profound discussion. Such a special SCC session would have to be well prepared to discuss the complaints of both sides on how the Treaty was being implemented. Both sides had radar stations. The Soviet side had made a proposal that the U.S. side did not like, but it could be considered at the SCC, and other ideas as well. If the Soviet side could convince the U.S. side that the Krasnoyarsk radar would operate within the functional regime for space-track radars once it was commissioned, and if the U.S. side could convince the Soviet side on the radars it had complained about, a mutual concern could be removed. But, Shevardnadze continued, the Soviet side had seen the new U.S. guidelines for deployment of global /S/T, and this was a ban, and for elimination of its existing system. The U.S. was in effect ignoring world public opinion. The great majority of countries, in the UN and in public organizations, was for eliminating S4AS/T systems, nuclear testing and other things. The Soviet side was prepared to eliminate its system—the U.S. had raised the idea—on a mutual basis.

Our discussion of defense and space has brought out new elements, Shevardnadze went on. The experts should study them, and develop new guidance to the delegations in Geneva. He would give the Secretary a document of 3½ pages. It was not long, but certain points deserved attention.

Shevardnadze said the U.S. side had proposed an exchange of data for work underway. He was not rejecting this proposal; it deserves

serious attention. The Soviet side also favored open laboratories. This was the President's idea, but when the Soviet side submitted it in Geneva, the U.S. side abandoned it. The Soviet side was for an international inspectorate for space arms; it was for data exchange. It would study the U.S. ideas carefully.

Shevardnadze said the ministers had decided on a first group on medium-range missiles. He thought the second group should study both strategic offensive weapons and space. They cannot be divided, they are an integrated complex. If this were acceptable, Karpov and the U.S. team could meet that day and the next, and report back recommendations.

The Secretary reiterated that the problems of strategic arms are many and knotty whether or not they are related to space, and the U.S. side much preferred a group on them alone, but would not object to a group on space and related matters. Perhaps they should return to the issue, since they did not see it the same way. He would prefer to keep his schedule, but could return from 8:30 to 10:00 p.m. Shevardnadze suggested one group and two subgroups, though there might not be enough people. Perhaps there could be two subgroups, with Karpov, one strategic weapons and space. Simons suggested, and the Secretary presented, the idea of one group with subgroups, the Vienna formula. The Secretary said Vienna had been a catastrophe, but the concept was not bad. Shevardnadze tentatively agreed, and they agreed to meet again at 8:30 p.m.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> See Document 40.

**40. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz's Delegation to the Department of State and the White House<sup>1</sup>**

Brussels, April 15, 1987, 1647Z

Secto 6027. Subject: Memorandum of Conversation. Time: April 13, 1987, 8:30–10:30 p.m. Place: Foreign Ministry Mansion, Moscow.

**PARTICIPANTS**

US  
Secretary Shultz  
Ambassador Nitze  
Ambassador Ridgway  
Ambassador Matlock  
Mr. Adelman  
Ambassador Rowny  
Ambassador Lehman  
Ambassador Cooper  
Mr. Perle  
Mr. Timbie  
Mr. Kamman (notetaker)

Soviet  
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
Ambassador Dubinin  
Vice Minister Bessmertnykh  
Ambassador Karpov  
Mr. Tarasenko

**SUBJECTS**

Arms Control: Testing, CW, INF, Other

Summary: At a plenary session running about 90 minutes, the Secretary covered the arms control issues not discussed earlier in the day, ranging from nuclear testing to chemical weapons. Several issues were delegated for more detailed exploration to small groups or individuals. Shevardnadze professed to be flexible on initiating nuclear testing negotiations and proposed a competitive trial of CORRTEx<sup>2</sup> and seismic verification techniques. He agreed there was little separating the positions of the two sides on nuclear risk reduction centers. At the conclusion of the session, Shevardnadze requested a one-on-one meeting with the Secretary at which he asked whether the U.S. was interested in concluding an INF agreement, since Gorbachev would be

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow trip—Memcons 4/12–16/87. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Kamman.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a method of verifying the size of underground nuclear explosions using a cable buried close to the center of detonation.

asking the same question in his meeting with the Secretary the following day. The Secretary said categorically that the answer was yes and reviewed the key elements of the U.S. INF position as well as other important objectives in the relationship. End summary.

Shevardnadze welcomed the Secretary back to the negotiating table and said he assumed the Secretary had been able to rest a bit. The Secretary said he had attended a seder at Spaso House and had been able to meet some of the people about whom he had talked to the Foreign Minister earlier in the day. He added that Mrs. Shultz had had a very fine day, seeing many things the Secretary wished he had time for. Shevardnadze gave the floor to the Secretary to present whatever thoughts he wished.

The Secretary noted that the U.S. delegation had considered the Soviet idea of forming an arms control working group, with three subgroups for the various issues. A group had already begun to meet on INF. The group dealing with strategic arms would be ready whenever the Soviets wished, either simultaneous with the present plenary or the following morning, as the Soviets wished. The group dealing with space and related issues would have to work out a time, but the U.S. suggested that in addition to Amb. Cooper, it could include Amb. Nitze, Mr. Perle and Col. Linhard. They, too, could begin the next morning. Shevardnadze said the Soviets wanted to accept the U.S. formula. After some banter at Karpov's expense, it was agreed that Karpov would be the Soviet designee for strategic issues, and he would get together with the U.S. team immediately after the plenum to fix an agenda and time for the strategic sub-group. Similarly, the space arms group could set its schedule after the plenary.

The Secretary then turned to the remaining agenda items, which he listed briefly as follows: Nuclear testing, nuclear risk reduction centers, nuclear non-proliferation, chemical weapons treaty, chemical weapons non-proliferation, conventional forces and arms, the Vienna CSCE follow-up, and a new item concerning a possible control regime for missile technology transfer, which he would explain further later in the session. He further suggested that regional issues be discussed the following day. Shevardnadze indicated his concurrence in this work program.

The Secretary said that on nuclear testing, he hoped it would be possible to launch a negotiation. The two sides had come close in Reykjavik, but didn't quite make it. The key need was for confidence in compliance, which in turn depended upon improved verification. That was why we had set forth our views on the verification aspects of the TTBT and PNET; we had explained the CORRTEx system, which we had demonstrated at the Nevada test site. The Secretary recalled that the President had said in Reykjavik that we were prepared to

proceed with step-by-step progress on testing issues in parallel with offensive reductions, to occur after the two treaties were approved on the basis of adequate verification. We had said we would accept a single forum for negotiating the various testing issues if the Soviets would agree to our step-by-step approach. We did not understand why the Soviets had a problem with the need to begin with verification, since this was the key to the other issues. The Soviet side had been talking about negotiations on verification in parallel with further limits, while the U.S. wanted to take these up sequentially. But recently, Soviet representatives had suggested that both sides postulate the goal of a comprehensive ban, while dealing in parallel with TTBT, PNET and further testing limits short of a CTB. This is a potentially constructive suggestion. Now we need to get started with negotiations. In our view, a single forum should deal with these issues, and it should first take up verification improvements. However, at the same time, it could consider the agenda for further limitations which could be implemented in parallel with reductions in nuclear arms. Both sides agreed that the ultimate goal was a comprehensive ban. Verification would be the foundation for the single forum. This was a change in our position designed to meet the Soviet position. Recapitulating, the Secretary said there could be an agenda discussion in parallel with verification improvements; when verification had been agreed and implemented, negotiations could take place on other steps. He concluded his presentation by urging that the two sides get started on the negotiation. He indicated that we had some language to propose regarding the initiation of talks.

Shevardnadze said the thoughts expressed by the Secretary were deserving of much attention. The Soviet side was prepared to display flexibility and take a constructive approach, seeking real results at the negotiations. The talks currently under way were fruitless. The Soviet side favored full-scale negotiations on all nuclear testing issues. The principal goal of such negotiations should be a comprehensive ban. Verification, limits on yields and number of tests, and verification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties<sup>3</sup> were all important aspects. With respect to verification, the Soviet side had listened to the opinions of U.S., Soviet and third-country scientists. In the opinion of these experts, the hydrodynamic or CORRTEX method of verification was insufficiently precise, with a margin of error of 30 percent. For measuring low yields, this was not sufficiently accurate. The more reliable method was seismic. The Soviet Union was proposing to conduct at government-to-government level, joint experiments employing the seismic method, to include

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<sup>3</sup> References are to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET) of 1976.

exchange of data on the results at both countries' test sites. The Soviets would not rule out the possibility of an American device being tested at a Soviet site and vice versa. Such experiments could be carried out in 1988. After doing the necessary work to try out the seismic method. The two sides could compare it with the corrtext method for both precision and comprehensiveness.

Shevardnadze then said he wanted to ask a "side question". The Soviets had noted that a lot was being said in the U.S. Congress about a 1 KT threshold. Did the U.S. Administration have any sympathy for this idea? The Secretary quickly responded, "The answer to that is no."

Continuing, the Secretary said the other thoughts expressed by Shevardnadze about finding the best way to measure yield were very constructive. The Soviet estimate of the range of error for CORRTX was about the same as our own information. That was why the two sides ought to get started on negotiations in which the two sides would set forth verification objectives. We would be ready to shift our position, to discuss in the initial negotiations the agenda for follow-on talks in a step-by-step fashion. We were prepared to reach agreement here in Moscow to begin negotiations.

Shevardnadze said that as far as verification was concerned, the positions have moved closer. On objectives for the negotiations, we were closer there as well. He still favored the idea of a 1 KT threshold, however, and wanted to register his position in favor of it. The Secretary interjected that some members of Congress would like this idea, but the President would never agree to it. Shevardnadze continued that much depended on testing, for example in the realm of non-proliferation. He thought they had good experience with exchanges with American scientists, and it would be good to let the scientists compete in determining the best verification method. Should this issue be turned over to a separate working group?

The Secretary thought the two sides were basically in agreement. He suggested that we write out some language to see if, in fact, we agreed. Then we should get started on the talks. He would designate Mr. Adelman to work with the Soviet side to draft a paragraph the following day. Shevardnadze said he, too, would designate someone.

The Secretary indicated that on nuclear risk reduction centers, the two sides had discussed the issue in the past and it was our view that we should now be able to move forward. Two distinguished Senators, Nunn and Warner,<sup>4</sup> were interested. Mr. Perle had done a lot of work on the issue, and could follow through for our side. Shevardnadze said nearly everything was agreed, except a few words needed to be

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<sup>4</sup> Senators Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) and John Warner (R-Virginia).

removed. The Soviet side would designate someone to work on a final version with Mr. Perle. The only thing required was to drop from the U.S. draft the concept of exchanging information on political statements through the center—otherwise, the two sides were in basic agreement.

The Secretary reviewed nuclear non-proliferation, citing the way the two countries work together. The next round would be in June in Moscow, as he understood it. He wanted to mention one area of great concern to US, the situation relating to India and Pakistan. We were concerned, as were the Soviets, since we wanted to bring the threat of proliferation under control. We had raised the issue at the highest level with Pakistan, and for that matter, with India. Our message is getting through. We saw a number of things Pakistan could do, such as ratifying the NPT, accepting full safeguards, agreeing on a regional nuclear-free zone, and others. Pakistan appeared to be paying some heed, and to be willing if India goes along. We were also talking to India. The USSR had some influence on the subcontinent, and we would suggest that our non-proliferation representatives—in our case, Ambassador Kennedy—work on a proposal to be put to Pakistan and India.

Shevardnadze said if nuclear tests were not stopped soon, the two countries would encounter many problems in trying to prevent proliferation. He cited Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, Brazil and Argentina. The main way to stop this trend was for everybody to stop nuclear testing. As nuclear powers, the USSR and the U.S. had to show a responsible position to the non-nuclear powers. With respect to nuclear-free zones, the U.S. had a highly selective approach. Frankly, he could not understand (nor could the Australians) why the U.S. refused to sign the treaty of Rarotonga.<sup>5</sup> There was also the proposal on the table to declare the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-free zone, as suggested by the DPRK. And the idea of nuclear-free zones had come up in his discussions with various East Asian countries such as Indonesia and the countries of Indochina. There was much sentiment in East Asia for declaring a large area a nuclear-free zone. A practical approach was required, and the USSR was ready to discuss this way of heading off the nuclear threat. With respect to India and Pakistan, Shevardnadze said he was convinced that India and its leaders by no means sought nuclear weapons, but they could not avoid the issue so long as Pakistan was developing them. He urged the U.S. to lean more heavily on Pakistan.

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the August 1985 Treaty of Rarotonga, which created a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific.



The Secretary said we would be continuing to talk to the Pakistanis. He agreed that it would help non-proliferation if we could reach agreement on testing. It would be even more favorable if we embarked on nuclear weapons reductions. We should use every argument at our disposal, and we hoped for Soviet cooperation. If Shevardnadze would bring this point to the attention of his non-proliferation representative, we would do the same. Shevardnadze agreed to do so, anticipating that the non-proliferation negotiators would ask in turn that they be able to point to solid agreements on nuclear weapons between the two great powers.

The Secretary took note of General Secretary Gorbachev's April 10 speech<sup>6</sup> reference to chemical weapons, especially his statement that the USSR had stopped production of such weapons. It was good to see the Soviet Union acknowledging that it possessed chemical weapons, since it had not previously done so. Shevardnadze said the Soviet Union had never been asked, tongue in cheek. The Secretary went on that openness was important to achieve progress. We needed to look at the size of chemical weapon stocks, the extent of production facilities, and especially the issue of verification. We wanted a broad approach to a chemical convention. Mandatory inspection provisions were indispensable. The British proposal was inadequate, and the Secretary had told them so. From our viewpoint, we needed timeliness (since production facilities could be quickly rearranged to conceal what had been in production) and full exchange of data prior to treaty signature. The Secretary noted that the Soviet delegation in Geneva had been concentrating on agreement in principle, but when it comes to verification, the details are everything. A treaty would be very valuable; it could help prevent proliferation of chemical weapons. We are prepared to talk about a ban as well as ways to combat proliferation. We have been especially concerned about the use of CW in the Iran-Iraq War. If the Soviet side would like, it could pursue the CW issue with Mr. Adelman, who had a lot of experience with it.

Shevardnadze said that although Gorbachev had treated the chemical weapons issue in his Prague speech, he would like to make a few specific points. The USSR favored elimination of CW arsenals. This could be quickly done. The Soviet Union thought a treaty could be completed and perhaps signed this year, or at least by next year. The bilateral consultations we had held on this issue were useful. It would also be useful to discuss biological weapons, i.e., "non-chemical" weapons. Gorbachev had indicated that the USSR has stopped production of chemical weapons and was building an installation to destroy them.

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 5, Document 39.



This would permit rapid implementation of a convention following signature. The USSR and the U.S. should work together on this. The USSR was in favor of the principle of challenge inspection, provided that the challenge was directed at a facility covered by the convention. If the challenge was directed at a facility not covered by the convention, the state receiving the challenge should be able to propose alternative means of establishing the facts. This was the idea in the British proposal. It would be hard to adopt an “automatic” challenge provision and this approach was not favored in Geneva. The U.S. might have some difficulty accepting this, since it would apply to private firms. The USSR was ready to work with the U.S. on this issue, taking into account the ideas of other countries such as Sweden. The Soviets were prepared to instruct their delegation; they should concentrate their efforts on this question (of inspection). It would be a great pity to pass up an opportunity to ban these terrible weapons.

There are not many remaining questions. The Secretary expressed appreciation for these thoughts and said the U.S. wanted to work closely with the USSR. He offered to have Mr. Adelman go into detail with a designated Soviet representative. Shevardnadze said Stashevskiy, one of Karpov’s deputies, would be available to work with Adelman on both the nuclear testing and chemical weapons issues. The Secretary said he knew Mr. Adelman would be offering an invitation for the Soviet Union to visit a chemical weapons destruction facility in the U.S. Shevardnadze said this was an interesting idea and the USSR would consider it.

The Secretary discussed conventional forces and armaments, observing that interest in this sphere was growing as people began to see serious prospects of reducing nuclear weapons. That was a point he had noted in the April 10 Gorbachev speech, and he was glad to see it. The Gorbachev approach seemed to be to establish a conventional balance at lower levels. In this respect, verification was a key element. We had been disappointed in the lack of a Soviet response to the Western proposal for data exchange (on conventional forces). The mandate talks were in progress in Vienna. It was appropriate that the two alliances talk to each other. To have a good CSCE conclusion, we would also need to see human rights performance compatible with the Helsinki Final Act.

Shevardnadze said it was true that Gorbachev had mentioned the conventional balance. He had in mind the fact that the Warsaw Pact might have advantages in certain categories, while NATO was superior in others. The fundamental approach was to lower the level of military confrontation. The U.S. was familiar with the Warsaw Pact Budapest appeal.<sup>7</sup> The objective was to achieve major reductions with strict verifi-

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 11, Document 7.

cation, including on-site inspection, as had proved possible in the Stockholm negotiations. This should occur by stages, with the balance maintained at reasonable adequacy at each stage. Imbalances would be removed not through increases, but through reductions. Apparently the U.S. agreed with this concept. It would be useful to have exchanges of data regarding U.S. and other troops in Europe, as well as Soviet troops. This was not easy, but it could be done. The two sides should address tactical nuclear weapons and offensive ("strike") air forces.

These both affected the balance as well as the military doctrine of the two sides. The GDR and Czechoslovak ideas of a non-nuclear corridor were useful. The USSR would like to see a meeting of Foreign Ministers of CSCE states to deal with both tactical nuclear and conventional forces. They could also consider ways to prevent surprise attack and sudden troop concentrations. This would permit a comprehensive approach to reducing the scale of military forces in Europe. The Soviet Union believed it was on the right course in this effort. Shevardnadze said the Secretary had mentioned the Vienna talks. It was necessary to consider all relevant forces in that forum, including the forces of France and Spain which had heretofore been excluded from consideration. At the Stockholm talks<sup>8</sup> under the rubric of the Helsinki accords the two sides had achieved progress in verification. It was now time to examine sharp reductions in forces in Europe. Shevardnadze wanted to make one point: the U.S. was right that Warsaw Pact-NATO contacts were useful, but one should not offend the neutral and non-aligned nations, who had much to contribute and who had played a very important role at Stockholm. The Secretary said we didn't have to offend anybody, but when one was discussing questions that did not affect the forces of the neutral countries, this was different from confidence building measures. We could probably work out a role for reporting to the neutral and non-aligned. The mandate talks would have to deal with the conceptual problems. With respect to the Soviet idea of incorporating tactical nuclear weapons, our first priority should be SRINF. It would be better not to mix nuclear issues with conventional at this stage.

The Secretary turned to his last agenda item, indicating that he was giving advance notice of a demarche that would be made to the Soviet Embassy in Washington on April 16. This related to nuclear missile technology transfer. The United States and several other industrialized countries would be announcing agreement to control the transfer of nuclear-capable missiles. While nuclear weapons themselves were controlled, there was a need to control the missiles as well. The

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<sup>8</sup> Reference is to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures, which concluded on September 19, 1986.

U.S. would be inviting the Soviet Union to join in this effort, and was prepared to send a working-level delegation to Moscow to explain what we had in mind. We hoped it would be of interest to the USSR, and would welcome having the USSR with such capability in this field, consider joining this effort. Shevardnadze said the Soviet Union would consider our demarche and if worthwhile, would join. If not, they would tell us so.

The Secretary said he had covered all his agenda except regional issues, which he would propose to take up the next day. He thought it might be good to decide what to tell the press. He thought it premature to try to describe the status of the issues under discussion, but would propose to identify the topics that had been discussed and the duration of the meetings, as well as the fact that working groups had been set up. Shevardnadze said that was basically what was in the Soviet draft press statement. With the exception of the need to add a mention of the working groups. At this point, the session broke and Shevardnadze invited the Secretary to join him for a one-on-one meeting in an adjacent room.

In the one-on-one session, attended by interpreters and notetakers, Shevardnadze said he recognized there would still be extensive debate and discussion of the details of various issues, but he wanted to put a question frankly to the Secretary in anticipation of the meeting the next day with Gorbachev. The question Gorbachev would be asking was whether the U.S. was interested in concluding an INF agreement.

The Secretary said categorically that the answer was yes. As he had told Shevardnadze in the morning, the U.S. was prepared to stand by its Reykjavik offer of 100 on each side, on a global basis. The President believed that it was better to move to a global level of zero, and we hoped the Soviets would consider this. Nevertheless we were prepared to settle for 100 if this was as far as the Soviet Union was prepared to go. The Secretary emphasized that on SRINF, the key principles for US were global application and equality. We couldn't present an unequal treaty to the Congress. It wouldn't be good for either side. Having the right to deploy equally was of major importance. Whether we chose to exercise that right was a different question. There could be a formula of a freeze on SRINF at or slightly below existing Soviet levels, with the right to match these on the U.S. side, and a subsequent effort to achieve reductions within that envelope (for which we needed further consultations with our allies). Thus an agreement on a global total, with the right to match, combined with agreement on subsequent negotiations in line with the expressed Soviet views, would be about where we should come out.

Another issue, the Secretary continued, was verification. We seemed to be proceeding along parallel lines on this issue. So the

short answer to Shevardnadze's question was yes. Moreover, after the discussion just concluded in plenary, we might add to INF an agreement to initiate negotiations on nuclear testing. This might produce agreement that would allow ratification in the fall. With verification in hand, we could then proceed with discussions of further steps in the testing area. He hoped language would be agreed the following day to start negotiations, with the goal of treaty ratification by fall.

There might be other issues ready for agreement. Personally the Secretary felt—as did the President and Gorbachev—that strategic arms were the main thing. We had made some headway in Reykjavik. Maybe we could make some more.

Finally, the Secretary wanted to stress how important it would be to register progress on at least one or two regional issues. This would send a powerful signal. And the Soviets had no idea what an impact there would be if the changes in Soviet society could produce something positive in the field of human rights. Naturally, the Soviet Union had its own reasons for the actions it was taking, but as he had mentioned earlier, it would have great impact if, for example, some of the people such as Ida Nudel and Vladimir Slepak could be released. People were watching the Soviet Union these days, and they hoped the world would become a better place as a result of changes occurring in the country.

Shevardnadze said he had not had time to describe all the Soviets were doing and planning to do, and he hoped the Secretary would hear it from Ryzhkov and Gorbachev the next day.<sup>9</sup> If not, he would try to cover it with the Secretary before the visit was over. The Secretary welcomed discussion along these lines.

Returning to INF, Shevardnadze made two points. First, it was not easy for the USSR to agree to disregard French and British systems. Second, the withdrawal of the Soviet operational/tactical missiles from the GDR and Czechoslovakia was not merely removal but destruction of these missiles. This would leave 60–65 missiles of operational/tactical range, and the USSR was ready to negotiate their elimination as well. This showed that the Soviet Union was serious in removing obstacles to an agreement.

Shevardnadze said he had always spoken frankly with the Secretary, and he wanted to say in that spirit that the USSR had no compelling military need to alter the military balance in Europe. But if there was real mutual interest in an agreement, it could be achieved. More work was clearly needed, but what was required at this stage was a political decision.

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<sup>9</sup> See Documents 41 and 42.

Regarding strategic and space weapons, Shevardnadze said he had not looked carefully at the document the U.S. side had presented. He would do so later in the evening. He thought there were prospects in these areas, and the two sides should not reduce their efforts. He hoped the U.S. was also studying the paper presented by the Soviet side, which contained some new points.<sup>10</sup> The Soviet Union had no monopoly on truth, and would be glad to hear U.S. ideas. He concluded by saying that in any case, INF appeared to hold the greatest promise.

The Secretary thanked him and said the discussion had been worthwhile. There was a mutual desire to take advantage of sharp reductions in nuclear weapons. This was the President's objective as well.

Shultz

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<sup>10</sup> See footnote 5, Document 45.

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#### 41. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, April 14, 1987, 10 a.m.–12:50 p.m.

##### SUBJECT

Secretary's Meeting with Chairman of the Council of Ministers Ryzhkov from 10:00 a.m. to 12:50 p.m. Tuesday, April 14

##### PARTICIPANTS

###### *United States*

The Secretary  
Ambassador Matlock  
Assistant Secretary Ridgway  
Policy Planning Chairman Solomon  
DCM Combs (Notetaker)  
Interpreter Hopkins

###### *Soviet*

Chairman of the Council of Ministers Ryzhkov  
Foreign Trade Minister Aristov  
Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh  
Ambassador Dubinin  
Interpreter

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Trip—Memcons 4/12–16/87. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Combs; cleared by Graze and Pascoe. The meeting took place in the Kremlin. In Secto 6015, April 14, Shultz conveyed to Reagan his meeting with Ryzhkov, noting, "I think his remarks reveal that he understands the essence of his country's current economic woes, even if he may be overly optimistic about the prospects for overcoming them." (Ibid.)

After a five-minute photo opportunity, Ryzhkov welcomed the Secretary on behalf of the Soviet Government. Noting that the Secretary was heading the first representative delegation since Reykjavik, Ryzhkov said the Secretary's visit had engendered considerable hope for progress on key questions of mutual concern. Shevardnadze had briefed Ryzhkov in detail about the April 13 talks,<sup>2</sup> which Ryzhkov understood had been lengthy and substantive. Ryzhkov saw no need to repeat the points Shevardnadze had made to the Secretary.

After Reykjavik, Ryzhkov continued, areas for special attention during the Secretary's current visit had been more clearly defined. The main questions were INF, SRINF, strategic weapons and space-related issues. These, above all, should be resolved. Ryzhkov understood the issues were complex but hoped reason would prevail. During the past two years (since Gorbachev's becoming General Secretary), the Soviet side had changed its position and compromised on the key issues before us. This did not signal Soviet weakness but rather a Soviet intent to resolve these issues, particularly since history had unfolded so that our two countries could determine the world's political climate. And if the vital issues were resolved, and trust—without which nations could not coexist—were built up between us, then other matters such as humanitarian and economic problems could also be resolved.

Ryzhkov recalled his 1986 discussion with the Secretary in Stockholm,<sup>3</sup> at which he and the Secretary agreed to discuss economic matters at their next meeting. The Secretary was a well-known economist, a doctor of economic sciences who had considerable practical experience in economic affairs. Ryzhkov proposed they exchange views, in particular regarding global economic matters. He would like to pose two questions that interested him personally: First, how did the Secretary evaluate prospects for our bilateral economic relations? We of course knew the current situation. Were there further possibilities, or should the Soviet Union look elsewhere? Second, how did the Secretary evaluate prospects for East-West trade generally? Of course the Secretary was Ryzhkov's guest, and perhaps the Secretary would wish to discuss additional questions.

The Secretary thanked Ryzhkov for his hospitality and said he could agree generally with Ryzhkov's opening statement. The issues under discussion with Shevardnadze were extraordinarily important and should be resolved. And we needed to find the line in our mutual behavior leading to greater stability, less confrontation and greater

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<sup>2</sup> See Documents 38–40.

<sup>3</sup> Minutes of this meeting are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986.

trust in the relationship. In the Secretary's view, stability, less confrontation and trust derived from three factors.

The first of these was the broad area of human relations and the organization of society, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other jointly signed documents. This has to do with the rights people enjoy, including free movement and the openness of society. From what we have seen and read (the Secretary noted he had read the General Secretary's speeches), encouraging progress had been made in the USSR, although we believe there is much room for improvement.

A second factor is the quantity and quality of human contacts between our two countries. The President and the General Secretary agreed on the importance of such exchanges at Geneva,<sup>4</sup> and in fact both their quantity and quality have since improved. This was positive and very important.

A third factor is the existence of extraordinary tension in various regions of the world, where both of us are involved to varying degrees. Afghanistan is one obvious example, of course there are others. We have tried to address these problems in our bilateral dialogue but have made little headway toward achieving greater stability. This is quite worrisome. The technological and economic trends in world development underscore the importance of learning to interact constructively.

The Secretary said he would be glad to comment on Ryzhkov's two questions. He would also like to hear Ryzhkov's view of changes in the Soviet economic system. The Secretary had read about them, and they seemed profoundly important.

Regarding Ryzhkov's first question, on the prospects for bilateral trade, the Secretary personally thought they should be bright. Whether they would be was another question. As the Secretary saw it, the basic reason for promising prospects stemmed from profound change in worldwide economic trends. We were rapidly moving into an age where the fundamental economic ingredient is information and its handling. The most important capital is human capital.

In this realm, the Secretary continued, neither of us has monopoly on human talent. This has been demonstrated by astonishing achievements in both countries. We have just read, for example, that Soviet cosmonauts went into open space to repair a docking problem—and no one was greatly surprised by this accomplishment. The United States had also done such things. But no other country beyond our two could match us.

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<sup>4</sup> Reagan and Gorbachev signed an agreement on contacts and exchanges in scientific, educational, and cultural fields in Geneva in 1985.



So the prospect of increased bilateral economic ties is there. Whether we can summon the ingenuity to make it happen is another question, but underlying economic trends indicate that somehow it should be accomplished.

The same holds true for East-West trade generally, the Secretary continued. It is as if intensified economic interactions were struggling to happen. They are hindered by tensions and mistrust that in turn stem from how we have organized things. If these barriers can be eliminated, the interactions will grow quickly. The Secretary added he could not help but feel this was also the Soviet side's instinct. He felt this when he first met Mr. Gorbachev at Chernenko's funeral.<sup>5</sup> The Secretary had spent many hours with Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders. As he listened to Gorbachev, he immediately sensed a new cast of mind.

The Secretary could not predict how interrelationships would develop. But he felt that mutual developments, together with creative and fluid thinking, could possibly—perhaps not probably—take us in interesting new directions. He therefore valued the opportunity to talk to the Soviet leadership about these matters. He would also find it valuable to hear from Ryzhkov about economic developments within the USSR.

After thanking the Secretary for his remarks, Ryzhkov said he would first like to comment on the need for greater mutual trust. The Secretary had spoken of three factors. As Ryzhkov saw it, there must be a base and a superstructure. The base was our political relations. Today these were to a large extent shaped by confrontation, above all in the military field. Ryzhkov did not want to dwell on this point and leave no time for discussion of economic matters. He would note that issues of mutual security and human rights should be looked at from all angles, including that of the Soviet Union. (The Secretary interjected his agreement that a global approach was required.) Let us conduct serious dialogue on these matters. You may raise our problems, we of course will cite yours. Some practices you regard as normal we feel are abnormal. Ryzhkov said he did not know whether the U.S. planned to participate in the proposed Moscow human rights meeting, which should provide a forum for serious discussion.

Ryzhkov said he would now like to turn to economic changes in the Soviet Union. The word "perestroika" had become international, and many questioners from abroad asked why the Soviet leadership

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<sup>5</sup> The memorandum of conversation among Shultz, Bush, and Gorbachev at Chernenko's funeral, March 13, 1985, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986.



had adopted this course. Seventy years of Soviet power had seen tremendous advances. The country had gone from extreme backwardness to advanced status, with great scientific, technical and intellectual potential. Our socialist system did this and we deeply believe in this system.

However, at the end of the 1970's and beginning of the 1980's, Soviet economic dynamism began to falter. The causes were not systemic; they were strictly subjective. Frankly the reason was that the leadership did not perceive an objective change in economic conditions, which required a fundamental shift from extensive to intensive economic growth. For years we had emphasized extensive development, in which new production facilities were added to the existing ones. But a point was reached when readily-available natural resources were exhausted and the workforce for demographic reasons became inadequate. A new approach was needed, but the old, outmoded extensive approach lived on. The moment unfortunately was lost.

Our economic mechanism, Ryzhkov continued, to a certain extent did not allow assimilation of scientific achievements into the economy as a whole. We believe in the advantages of a planned economy as a whole. We believe in the advantages of a planned economy, but central planning began to spread to trivial things, to permeate the entire economy. This suppressed initiative at the production level. Workers became executors rather than creators and innovators.

This historic significance of the April 1985 Central Committee Plenum was that newly-elected General Secretary Gorbachev frankly and openly put these questions before the party and set forth general ways to correct the situation. The next two years involved a search for more specific ways to address our problems. A new economic model is taking shape, and the next Central Committee Plenum will consider the question of economic management.

The essence of this modernization process will be in management and planning. While the planned nature of the Soviet economy will be preserved and improved, management will be democratized at the enterprise level. The higher levels must be constrained to plan only essential elements. All the rest should be regulated by economic norms, with production units given freedom to determine their own economic policies. The main problem is to find the optimum balance between the center and the production units. In addition, capital stock will be revitalized, particularly in the machine-building sector and also in the computer and biotech sectors. And new forms of economic activity, on the basis of individual and cooperative initiative will be fostered. This will pertain primarily to services, retail sales and public catering.

The foreign economic area is also being reorganized, Ryzhkov said. International trade has become complex. We have decided to give 20

ministries and 70 large enterprises the right to conduct direct international trade. We are also introducing new forms of economic cooperation by developing cooperative ties with enterprises abroad and by creating mixed or joint ventures in the Soviet Union. We have received some 200 proposals for joint ventures and have found some 125 to be of interest.

Ryzhkov said he had touched upon only a few aspects of “perestroika.” It affected virtually all areas of Soviet life, including the media and public organizations. Of course, one might well ask how “perestroika” is going. It would be an illusion to say that it is progressing as quickly as we would like. Old traditions are hard to overcome, as are old formulae, formed over decades. Time is required for people to adapt to new ways. People need to become accustomed, to understand.

We know that people abroad talk about opposition to “perestroika.” This speculation comes from ill wishers. There is no opposition in any real sense. There is a natural process in which the old tries to resist the new, a manifestation of Newton’s third law of physics that every action engenders a reaction. We are deeply convinced in the correctness of our approach. It is firmly supported by the people. Some, even at the ministerial level, come to us and say they cannot understand what is wanted, that they have been educated in another way. We reply: Thank you, you have done a good job, but now you should retire and we will find new faces.

Ryzhkov said he would like to comment briefly on international economic relations. He was very glad Secretary Shultz saw bright prospects and hoped this view was widely shared. The Secretary noted his view was not limited to him alone but did not come from the sometimes lumbering process of government consensus. Then you too need “perestroika,” Ryzhkov joked. The Secretary responded that in our system “perestroika” was a continuous process. The magazine “Fortune” each year listed the 500 most successful companies, and the lists vary considerably from year to year. Companies must take risks, seek rewards, or they can go to sleep and lose. The market does this, although political trends also play a role. What is clear is that a society that cannot renew itself will almost certainly atrophy. So the Secretary was impressed with what Ryzhkov had been saying.

Ryzhkov said he felt East-West relations were at a crossroads. Sooner or later the West, led by the U.S., would select one of two courses. The first, preferred by some circles in the U.S., was to isolate the USSR from the international economy through embargo and various trade restrictions. The fundamental idea seemed to be that the Soviet Union would somehow disrupt or sow discord in the world economy.

The second approach saw the Soviet Union and its socialist allies as an organic part of the world economy, as equal economic partners.

The Soviet side favored the second course. This would be economically beneficial to all. It would also inevitably affect the overall political climate positively.

The Soviet economy would not fail if the U.S. adheres to its present course. Soviet plans are based upon the USSR's internal possibilities. We can manage without close economic cooperation with the United States. And the U.S. does not represent all western countries, any more than the West represents the world as a whole. But it should be understood, Ryzhkov said with feeling, that the Soviet leadership was not interested in disrupting the world economy, in imposing embargoes, in waging economic warfare. We experienced difficult relations with the FRG lately but did not reduce the supply of Soviet natural gas to that country. When, at the 27th Party Congress, Gorbachev spoke of a system of international security, he listed economic security as one of four essential components.<sup>6</sup> We try to conduct our policies accordingly.

But we are often told we are a closed society, and we find that our interest in becoming associated with international economic organizations, even as observers, is rebuffed. On bilateral trade, Ryzhkov said he was glad Secretary Shultz foresaw bright prospects. The Soviet leadership believed there was great potential for Soviet-U.S. trade, although it presently is in very bad shape. This is due to restrictions the U.S. side had imposed. Even so, several of your allies are quietly increasing trade with us. For example, Mrs. Thatcher showed considerable interest in trading with us, and indeed her visit stimulated an upturn in bilateral trade. You grant other socialist countries, such as Hungary, MFN. Why not the Soviet Union?

I am convinced, Ryzhkov said, that sooner or later our economic relations will realize their potential. The timing depends upon us. We should begin by eliminating the barriers, such as the lack of MFN for the Soviet Union, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.<sup>7</sup> The U.S. businessmen Ryzhkov talked with favored this. But the initiative must come from the political leadership.

Aristov interjected that U.S. barriers were holding back the process. Tariffs on Soviet goods were as high as 70 percent, when the normal was 3 to 5 percent.

Ryzhkov said he wanted to underscore the underutilization of the combined scientific and technical potential of our two countries. This

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<sup>6</sup> See "Excerpts From Gorbachev's Talk at Party Parley." (*New York Times*, January 28, 1987, p. A-8)

<sup>7</sup> Reference is to the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, which linked U.S. trade with the Soviet Union to emigration visa for Soviet Jews.

was not natural. In addition, one observes certain economic tensions among advanced capitalist countries. These do not add up to economic warfare but could develop into something dramatic. They could be considered similar to early earthquake warnings. The Soviet side hopes they do not develop further. On the other hand, the Soviet Union represents a huge market, so huge that it is hard to grasp. The U.S. should consider this carefully. In sum, we invite a serious dialogue on economic matters.

The Secretary said he could agree with much of what Ryzhkov had said. We needed to find a strategy for developing economic relations. U.S. policy is clear: We favor trade between the U.S. and the USSR, between East and West, except for items involving sensitive military technology. The Carter administration's grain embargo did not fit into that policy. Ronald Reagan campaigned against the embargo and removed it shortly after he became President.<sup>8</sup>

But one should reflect upon why the grain embargo was imposed. This leads to a point that needs to be part of our joint strategy to improve relations, including economic ties. The grain embargo came into being in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This shows something Ryzhkov earlier touched upon. When we consider military, regional, human rights and bilateral matters, we see that each in some ways has a life of its own. But in a more profound sense, these aspects of our relationship are all interrelated. So, in my meetings with the Foreign Minister, and when the President meets the General Secretary, we discuss all four major areas. If we are to succeed in normalizing our relations, we must address each of these areas.

The lack of MFN and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, right or wrong, are connected with emigration. Ryzhkov had mentioned Hungary: Jackson-Vanik did not apply because Hungary placed virtually no restrictions on emigration. Emigration has of course been a big issue in the Soviet Union. We are pleased to see recent positive developments in this area. The point is that the relationship is complex and must be addressed in its entirety.

The Secretary said he would like to raise a technical problem he had discussed with Kosygin—who had an interesting, creative mind—years ago, when the Secretary was Secretary of the Treasury.<sup>9</sup> How does a large, highly-centralized economy like that of the Soviet Union (as Ryzhkov had himself noted), with five-year plans, huge when compared to any particular component of our market, interact with the

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<sup>8</sup> On April 24, 1981, Reagan lifted the partial embargo of grain sales to the Soviet Union his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, had imposed in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

<sup>9</sup> Shultz served as Secretary of the Treasury 1972–1974.

United States? We discussed this problem in terms of grain. The problem from our side was how to handle a buyer so large that his purchase plan could manage the market, without the knowledge of others in the market. Kosygin pointed out the Soviet problem: The Soviet side needed to know how much grain was available and what the price would be. After an interesting discussion, we arrived at a solution that later became a minimal number of tons; we agree that additional amounts can be purchased without our prior agreement, to a deficit limit. In short, there are technical as well as political problems, and there are ways to solve them.

Ryzhkov said he believed a resolution along the lines the Secretary described could be applied today, he had a list of items needed by the Soviet economy but blocked by U.S. political restraints (note: the list, handed over by Ryzhkov, is appended).<sup>10</sup> Perhaps we could use quotas and conditions as in the grain agreement. We favor establishing the necessary conditions for progress.

The Secretary welcomed that comment but wanted to suggest another idea. Ryzhkov had earlier mentioned that Soviet enterprises could deal directly in foreign trade. This could make the interface between our two economies less complex, since the difference in scale would be reduced. Ryzhkov commented that Secretary Shultz's diplomatic side had prevailed over his political side. So let us create the necessary political conditions, and many things will take care of themselves.

The Secretary said this was the correct note to mention in summary. The Secretary agreed with Ryzhkov's earlier comment that in the sweep of history an expansion of U.S.-Soviet economic relations was virtually inevitable. We need to create the right conditions. Knowledgeable people of good will can grapple with the issue of the best interface between our disparate economies.

Ryzhkov thanked the Secretary for an interesting discussion. They could easily continue if there were more time. The Secretary agreed, saying there was much to discuss. Ryzhkov noted the need to communicate, to move forward on basic problems. The discussion began in Stockholm a year ago had now been continued, and Ryzhkov said he hoped it would be continued in the future. The Secretary said he also hoped this would happen.

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<sup>10</sup> Attached but not printed is the informal translation of a paper handed to Matlock. The paper listed examples such as refusal by the United States to issue export licenses 1980–1983.

**42. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, April 14, 1987, 3–7:25 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

The Secretary's Meeting with Gorbachev April 14

The Secretary met with Gorbachev in the Kremlin between 1500 and 1925 Moscow time April 14. The Secretary was accompanied by Ambassador Matlock, Ambassador Paul Nitze, EUR Assistant Secretary Ridgway, EUR DAS Tom Simons (Notetaker), and Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter. Gorbachev was accompanied by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, CPSU CC Secretary Anatoliy Dobrynin, Ambassador to Washington, Yuriy Dubinin, Gorbachev Chief of Staff Anatoliy Sergeyevich Chernyayev, and P. Palazhchenko, Interpreter. Chief of Staff Marshal Akhromeyev later joined the meeting.

The Secretary had handed Gorbachev a letter from the President<sup>2</sup> before the meeting began, and Gorbachev began by thanking the President for his letter and his kind invitation. The Secretary replied that it reflected the President's personal sense of communication that the President felt he had developed with Gorbachev. Gorbachev said that frankly this provided an incentive to him, despite unpleasantnesses, to continue to seek cooperation with the Reagan Administration as he was doing. He was a realist, and knew that America would remain America under any administration, pursuing its own national interests, not affected by one party's being in government. The Secretary said this was sound thinking. Gorbachev said it was part of his new thinking, and invited the U.S. side to join in this new thinking.

The Secretary said he had just had one of the most interesting conversations he had ever had with a Soviet leader in discussing economic matters with Mr. Ryzhkov.<sup>3</sup> He was anxious to learn what the Soviets were doing and it was clear to him that important changes were taking place which had a potential to change not just Gorbachev's country but the whole world. Gorbachev replied that he hoped that when the Secretary left the Government, as all politicians eventually must, he would be one of the active supporters of broad cooperation between the Soviet Union and the U.S. Their number was not substan-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Trip—Memcons 4/12–16/87. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Graze and Pascoe.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 37.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 41.

tial at present. The Secretary said he had been one since he had been Secretary of the Treasury in the early 70's.

The Secretary noted to Gorbachev that he had told Shevardnadze one of his most difficult tasks was to help manage U.S.-Soviet relations in an upward direction, where we see events that pose severe difficulties. It was hard to work to keep the trendline positive. Gorbachev said there are those that speak of trust, and yet it is very hard to find solutions to international and bilateral problems with the U.S. when trade and economic relations begin to move, as relations in the cultural field were to some extent beginning to move, it would be easier to develop trust. There were so many obstacles and logjams that were hard to clear, and not only in economic relations. What was needed was not just a Soviet bulldozer but also an American bulldozer.

The Secretary replied that this was true, but a good example of what he was talking about, of flare-ups that are hard to manage, is the so-called spy scandal. We had protested vigorously against Soviet assault on our building here, which we had found honeycombed with devices. He had told Shevardnadze that our intelligence agencies respect Soviet techniques. But things had gone so far that 70 members of the U.S. Senate voted against his coming here. The President and he had not agreed. They believed we needed to overcome the difficulty. But it does reflect what we regard as an overbearing intelligence effort on the Soviets' part.

Gorbachev said the President and the Secretary had acted correctly, despite the situation which has been so much discussed. Both the President and the Secretary knew well that their country does at least ten times what the Soviets do when it comes to spying. He had seen no evidence from the U.S. side of what the Soviets had done to the Embassy under Ambassador Matlock's predecessor,<sup>4</sup> while the Soviets had presented evidence of what the U.S. had done against their building in Washington. He still did not believe there was anything in the U.S. building and he awaited proof. But he knew that U.S. Marines led a turbulent, loose life. Perhaps some secrets leaked out as a result, but where they went—to the Soviet Union or elsewhere—he did not know. He guessed that even if the people in Congress did not know what the U.S. was doing, the Secretary did. When political officials meet, they should not look like naive young ladies. The U.S. financed CIA activities in the intelligence field, and the Soviets were engaged in such things, too.

However, Gorbachev continued, he believed that the fact that the U.S. knew so much about the Soviets in the military and intelligence

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<sup>4</sup> Arthur Hartman.



fields was not so bad. Such things helped us know each other better. If we didn't, there would be less stability and trust, and greater risk. Intelligence is in general constructive, provides a stabilizing element in relations, and helps prevent rash political and military action. What do we expect from Dubinin and Matlock, Gorbachev asked, but full and comprehensive information, to help develop realistic policies based on full information about society in all its aspects. They are in the main intelligence people, and thank God they exist. This was not all they existed for, and their activities were more varied, and we both understood this. A certain range of activities was understood, and people understood them. But attributing things to the Soviets, like breaking into the office of the Ambassador, he rejected.

The Secretary replied that he agreed that a degree of information helps and encourages understanding. But the most valuable material that crossed his desk was open material. Getting to know people, and not covert means, was what helped most. He was not naive; these things took place. But he wished to ask a question. Gorbachev had said he did not believe there had been physical penetration of one of his intelligence agents inside our embassy building and he rejected the charge that the ambassador's office had been broken into. The Secretary's question was: Could he tell the President that it was against Gorbachev's policy and rules to allow his intelligence agencies to physically penetrate our Embassy building? Gorbachev replied "This is precisely so." The Secretary thanked him and said he would report that to the President.

Gorbachev asked the Secretary to consider also what the Soviets had shown to the press in Moscow and Washington of what the U.S. had done to their Washington embassy.<sup>5</sup> The question of razing the building arose. It should be borne in mind that the Soviets have shown only a fraction of what they had found, including in Dobrynin's residence. The Secretary replied that he did not know what we would decide about displaying evidence, but he had seen physical evidence, and it had the respect of our intelligence agencies. The Soviets had done a good job. But it may make our building unusable. That remained to be seen.

Gorbachev said sarcastically that this was how the Soviets cooperated with the U.S., and asked where we should go from here. He hoped the Secretary had not come to tell him about the hoopla in America, about the spy mania. He wanted to tell the Secretary that he had some

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to an April 10 press conference during which Soviet officials charged that the United States had systematically spied on the Soviet Embassy in Washington. (Thom Shankar, "Soviets Hurl Bugging Charges Back at U.S.," *Chicago Tribune*, April 10, 1987, p. 1)



experience, perhaps limited, but he had spent two years interacting with the present American administration. It always seemed to him that the administration acted as if nothing had happened in the Soviet Union, as if the administration did not see or did not want to see what the Soviet Union had done to create a healthier environment for bilateral relations and international relations.

The Secretary interjected that, on the contrary, the President was fascinated with what was going on here. Whenever he heard that a person had been here, he invited him or her in to hear their views. The Secretary was also very interested. He only wished he had more opportunity to listen, to travel, to get a feel for what was going on, because it was quite clear to him that important things were taking place. He wanted to understand them, and they seemed positive to him.

Gorbachev replied that he had been speaking of something else. What he meant was that the Soviet side had taken many steps to try to create a new situation, to give new prospects and more dynamism to U.S.-Soviet relations. It was not simply his own view that the U.S. did nothing in return. No other U.S. administration had had such opportunities to improve things. Yet, it missed and wasted them. He could wait for a new administration, and try with them. But we had a relationship, a dialogue with the U.S. side now, a degree of understanding, personal relationships, knowledge of each other. This created an atmosphere where the next stage should be agreements on important matters, if there was desire on the U.S. side to pursue this. Each time the Soviet side moved, the U.S. placed a new burden, created fresh difficulties. The chance should not be lost, yet the U.S. scuttled and frustrated things. The U.S. should not think the Soviets were so weak they just wanted to court the U.S., or that it could just pocket Soviet concessions. The base of such an approach was illusion.

Gorbachev continued that he was speaking frankly because generally time was passing. There was very little time. Either we would find solutions in the months remaining or nothing would come out of our relationship, and we would only keep the fire banked, so as not to lose everything.

Gorbachev said he would like to hear the Secretary's view, and the foreign minister's, of what the Secretary had brought. Otherwise, they could talk and part, and there would be no movement, no progress, and they would all be sorry for the wasted time. He asked: Is the administration ready to do something in the time remaining or not?

Turning to medium-range missiles, Gorbachev said the Soviets had made an effort to go part way and more to create a good situation for this administration to reach an agreement with the Soviets despite its problems. This would be helpful to the Soviets and the Americans given the domestic situation in the Secretary's country. The Soviets had taken a step he considered more than enough to push things forward.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. side was ready to reach an agreement on medium-range missiles, and he felt we were pretty close to a basis for it. He would tell Gorbachev where the matter stands as he saw it. We were agreed on the central number: reduction to 100 warheads, or 33 SS-20 missiles, on a global basis with the Soviets' in Soviet Asia and ours in the U.S. We were prepared to stick with that, although he had told the Foreign Minister we thought there were important reasons why it would be more advantageous to both to go the rest of the way and eliminate the 33 launchers and 100 warheads. But we were prepared to stay with the 100 although we preferred zero for good reasons.

Gorbachev said this was what had been agreed at Reykjavik. The Secretary said precisely. Gorbachev and the President agreed that verification was important, as Gorbachev had said again Friday, and the U.S. side had tabled a draft treaty with detailed verification suggestions. The Soviets had said they agreed in principle and might go even further. But the essence was in the details, and we awaited the Soviet response to our suggestions. We felt that what we agreed should be a model agreement on verification, and we hoped it would lead into an agreement on strategic matters. Gorbachev had properly labelled this the root of the problem in his Friday speech and the Secretary agreed with that.<sup>6</sup> He ventured to say that one important reason we considered zero preferable to 100 was that it enhanced substantially confidence that we can verify the end result. This was easy to understand.

So somewhere, the Secretary continued, there should be a clear path to agreement on those central issues. Then came the question of so-called short-range missiles. We had seen the Soviet proposal. The Foreign Minister had given it in detail the day before. We had gone over some details. He wished to state the principles which we thought should govern this matter. They were not inconsistent with the particular proposal which the Soviet side had made. We had not thought it through completely, but they did not seem to contradict the Soviet position.

First, the Secretary said, there should be some understood top limit. The Soviets had said they would take their missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia and destroy them. After that, there would be some number left. Gorbachev interjected at the translation that the best top limit would be zero. The Secretary said he understood. Gorbachev said those missiles would be withdrawn and destroyed independently of whether a short-range missile agreement had been reached.

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 5, Document 39.

Second, the Secretary went on, this top number remaining had to be understood to be global. The reason was the same as for LRINF, but was even more important, since these missiles could be more easily moved, could be thrown in an airplane, were very mobile. The only thing that made sense was to move to a global basis. As far as he could see, the Soviets agreed with that, but he was just stating that.

Third, the Secretary continued, was the principle of the equality. The Soviets had always insisted on it, and so did we. We did not have these kinds of missiles deployed, but in any agreement we had to have the right to equality, whether we exercised it or not.

Gorbachev said the third principle was linked to the first. If the missiles removed from the GDR and Czechoslovakia were destroyed, equality would be achieved at that level and achieved for the remaining missiles when they would be eliminated. There was a basis for agreement on shorter range missiles. But disarming in order to rearm did not make sense. If shorter range systems were reduced to zero in Europe, the global issue was removed from the agenda. The Soviet side was ready to deal with short-range missiles. There was no problem from the Soviet side.

In fact, Gorbachev continued, all the problems were on the other side. You in NATO were like a cat walking around a bowl of hot porridge (*kasha*). Agreement had to be reached now. If it was not, it would be clear to the Soviets finally what kind of an administration they were dealing with. They had made all the moves. They had set aside British and French systems despite the modernization programs. They were removing missiles from the GDR and Czechoslovakia. U.S. FBS were still there. The Soviets were prepared to discuss reaching an agreement covering all these things. In the West they said you could not take Gorbachev at his word, but had to test him. Well, here was the test. His proposals were realistic. Steps had to be taken.

There were two kinds of politicians, Gorbachev went on. The first kind were people who were happy to take part in negotiations under this or that administration. They got paid. What happened in the world didn't matter to them. They then went and wrote their memoirs, White House years or White Hall years. The Secretary interjected that he and Nitze could make more in private business. Gorbachev said he knew that, and that was why he hoped they were in a different category, the category of politicians who saw where the world was going, what the trends were, what could be done. They knew their responsibility, and that should mean the responsibility to reach specific agreements. That was the harder path, but it was what the world needed.

The Secretary replied that the President and he both wanted an agreement, and he would tell Gorbachev why. The world had seen a relentless build-up of the numbers of nuclear warheads. They thought

it was essential to mankind and to their own country to reverse this trend and start downward. The only way to start was to take opportunities to do something somewhere.

Returning to the short-range issue, the Secretary said he thought from this that we could agree on the principles involved, although the part about numerical expression needed more work. First, there should be a limit, say at the level of the present Soviet short-range systems, minus those in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, but in any case a limit. Second, any limit whatever, that or zero, would apply on a global basis. Gorbachev asked what this meant. The Secretary began to explain that neither would have any or each could have some. Gorbachev asked if this meant the whole world. The Secretary said yes, it would be worldwide at zero or whatever number. The second principle was that the limit should be global.

The third principle was equality, the Secretary went on, as it has been honored in our relationship. Since we did not have these systems, we needed the right to match, whether we exercised it or not. Gorbachev asked whether we wanted it even if the Soviet side were ready to eliminate these weapons. The Secretary rejoined that the Soviet side was not ready to do so right now but needed a period of time. Gorbachev asked whether the U.S. side would still want to match if the Soviet side wrote into the agreement that the Soviet Union would destroy all remaining missiles in months or years. The Secretary said we would want the right to match.

Gorbachev said that a formula could be found. He hoped that the U.S. would not want this even if the Soviet Union destroyed what it now had in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, and pledged to eliminate the rest over a period of time. The Secretary said that the principle of equality, the right to match, was essential. This was not just on behalf of the U.S. The U.S. had allies in NATO. The proposal Gorbachev was making to him now was new. Some members of our alliance were not prepared to go to zero in this category, or they might have in mind a finite number other than zero. We had to talk this out. But it had to be clear what we were talking about among us.

Gorbachev said that as he understood the Secretary's position—and he had information that the Secretary had consulted with U.S. allies—the Secretary was on a kind of probing mission, a kind of intelligence mission. He could not agree to either accept or reject any Russian proposal. He had to reserve the right to have another look. He kept referring to U.S. friends, as if the Soviets did not have friends. Despite this, Gorbachev had thought the Secretary would have well-thought-out proposals. But it seemed he was on an intelligence mission, as Carlucci and Baker had said the day before.

The Secretary said he would try to define where the matter stood. He would like to see it completed. Gorbachev said he was still collecting

information. The Secretary recalled that Gorbachev had said that collecting information was a good thing. Gorbachev said that the Secretary was the most competent to do so. The rest was baloney. The Soviet side had said everything to the Secretary—more than the Secretary had expected. Further, they were ready to tackle tactical missiles. But the Secretary was fearful. The Secretary said that we agreed on many points and the task was to narrow differences and complete this thing. That was what he was trying to do.

Gorbachev asked what the foreign minister had thought of his conversation with the Secretary. Shevardnadze said the U.S. wanted to have a certain number of short-range missiles deployed and didn't make a complete proposal. The Soviet proposal was for rapid negotiations to eliminate these systems. The U.S. proposed to make it possible to have them in a treaty, and begin negotiations only after six months. The Soviet move was more far reaching, and because the U.S. didn't have them, it was a move toward the U.S. It was amazing that the U.S. objected to unilateral Soviet elimination of operational-tactical missiles.

The Secretary said that we were 90 percent there, and he was trying to finish. Gorbachev said that was a clever move. Shevardnadze said they had discussed the principle of equality, and what it means, the day before. The Secretary said they were making headway.

Gorbachev said he would summarize the Soviet position on medium-range and related short-range missiles. On medium-range missiles, the Soviet side reiterated the Reykjavik option. It fully agreed with the U.S. that at the present stage there was a possibility of real agreement on verification questions. This was of priority importance. Verification of medium-range would have value in the future for other types of weapons. Dobrynin commented that this meant START. Gorbachev continued that verification includes inspection with no obstacles of bases, production facilities, deployment areas, of facilities whether or not they have Pentagon contracts, including in third countries. The specifics are for our negotiation.

On related shorter-range systems, Gorbachev said the Soviets were ready for negotiations concurrently with medium-range negotiations. On what they call operational-tactical missiles. If the U.S. believed that a medium-range agreement could be ready earlier than a short-range missile agreement, the Soviet side was ready to include principles on shorter-range missiles in a medium-range missile agreement.

Gorbachev said those operational-tactical missiles the Soviet Union had deployed as a response to Pershing II would be removed and eliminated in the context of a medium-range agreement. Concurrently there would be negotiations on the remaining systems, and the Soviets favored their elimination. This would take care of the problems of equality, globalism and a top limit. On Asia, he thought the approach

should be similar to the one for medium-range missiles. We should apply the same principle as for medium-range missiles, that is, either equality at a low level, with Soviet systems in the Asian USSR and U.S. systems in the U.S., or zero for both the U.S. and the USSR.

The Secretary said he did not think geographic location made sense, since these weapons were so easily moved. Gorbachev said that in that case, the Soviets were for global zero.

The Secretary turned to the question of how to express agreement: as part of an INF or medium-range treaty, the subject of what we call short-range systems should be treated. He thought we understood which systems are involved. Gorbachev replied, "the 23's and upwards."

The Secretary continued that short-range missile questions should be settled on the basis of a global limit, with an immediate top number derived by subtracting the missiles in Czechoslovakia and the GDR from the present Soviet number. The U.S. would have the right to match the Soviet number whatever it was. It would be up to the Soviet Union, but it could announce in advance its desire to eliminate the remaining missiles. We had not decided what our position would be. We were talking about a finite number of SRINF missiles. Negotiations would determine whether this was zero or above.

Gorbachev said he thought the Secretary was now defending the U.S. position taken before he had heard the Soviet proposal to eliminate all short-range missiles, and not just those in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Now the Soviets had proposed not a freeze, but negotiations that would lead in a short time to elimination. Why then, rearm, he asked. Why would the U.S. add more? This had no logic. There was perhaps a legalistic reason for insisting on the right to match. But this was hair-splitting. If we said that all would be eliminated in a short time, why would the U.S. want any? But the Soviet proposal was new to the U.S. side in its detail and fundamental novelty. He invited the Secretary to examine it and think why the U.S. should arm while the Soviets disarmed, how the U.S. would look to the world.

The Secretary said he would be glad to think about it, and he had his own view on it. But the principle was not casuistic; it was an essential, important principle. He would have to sit in front of senators to defend an agreement and say they must ratify it. He would need argumentation. Dobrynin had been there and would understand. (At the translation, Gorbachev said the Soviets would send their people to help; this would be a new form of cooperation. The Secretary said they should tell the Senate it should not ratify it. Gorbachev laughed and said he understood.) If he sat there and said the U.S. had agreed the Soviets could have more than us, they would say he should have his head examined. But if he said the Soviet Union had this number,

would negotiate, had said they wanted to go to zero, and we had the right to match, if the Senate wished to invest in a new weapons system, it would be different. But the right was an important consideration.

Without it there would be deep trouble. This matter would be examined with extreme care, like the verification side, as it should be. There was an argument for zero in long-range systems, and he had to say also for other systems. If there was some production, inventory, lots of associated things, they would have to be chased around and verified.

Gorbachev said he thought they could start that part of the discussion here. The Secretary had the latest Soviet views, the Soviets had heard the Secretary's arguments. He saw the possibility of success unless the U.S. intended to scuttle the matter. The Soviets were ready for any outcome, with this administration. The Secretary had not cleared away his doubts as to whether the administration wanted an agreement, but they were fewer.

The Secretary said we should try to translate the conversations into something written down, but he thought the ingredients were there. The basic structure was that on short-range missiles, the Soviets had made a proposal, and we owed them an answer. He invited comment by Ambassador Nitze.

Nitze noted that as he had said before, as one looks at the full panoply, there is a problem at below the range of what we call INF. For tactical nuclear forces, there is an imbalance in Soviet favor; the same was true of conventional forces. The Soviets had suggested discussing these in another forum, but they needed to be carefully considered, and with our allies as well. The Secretary noted that from what the General Secretary had said he was fully aware that there are other units of work. Dobrynin commented that these are different kinds of things. Gorbachev said he was not linking tactical forces with medium-range and short-range missiles. If the Secretary did not object, he would like to propose discussion of the big questions of Reykjavik, beginning with strategic weapons, but he proposed a seven-to-ten minute break first.

During the break, from 4:45 to 5:10 p.m., the Secretary and Gorbachev exchanged views on prospects in the world economy and their implications for the two countries. Gorbachev complained about U.S. opposition to Soviet interests in joining GATT, and the Secretary explained that GATT was established to regulate trade relations among free-market economies. Gorbachev also asked why, if Americans were so confident that Soviet products could not compete in the U.S. market, there were so many additional restrictions on their entry.

On resumption, Gorbachev asked the Secretary to summarize the positions of the two sides on strategic offensive weapons. The Secretary said he was a little disappointed. He felt we had moved a long way



at Reykjavik but we did not seem to have moved any further. We agreed that at Reykjavik on limits of 6,000 warheads and 1,600 launchers and we also agreed to cut into the main elements of the various types of forces in the triad. He remembered that Gorbachev had used that kind of expression in Hofdi house.

Gorbachev said we had found a good solution there, of cutting every element by half. Nitze objects, but the President, had not. The Secretary said it was a question of translating the agreement into numbers. They had passed the issue over to Nitze and to Akhromeyev, and in their meetings they had come up with the very important rule on counting bombers. We had come up with numbers that were illustrative of how to cut into the forces. Starting with that idea, we have come down to equal levels, to equality recognizing the force structures that have emerged in different ways. It would be unreasonable for the Soviets to force us, or for us to force them to match structures. But we needed to come down through some process that gave stability as it went along, recognize the various in force structures, and dealt with important weapons systems. So, in the process of the Akhromeyev-Nitze session and subsequently we had changed positions quite a lot to meet ideas that the Soviet side had put forward. He had thought we were getting somewhere, although the night before we had, if anything, gone backward.

Gorbachev asked in which elements the Secretary saw backward movement. The Secretary replied that the Soviet side had seemed to walk away from the concept of sub-limits. Even if we reduced on a mechanical basis, which made no sense, we would end up with sub-limits. We had expressed our view and provided some rationale, and we should argue back and forth.

The Secretary went on to say that within the total limit of 6,000 warheads we thought it important to state a limit on ballistic missile warheads. The reason was that by contrast to weapons delivered by aircraft, they were the most threatening. They were fast, they were accurate, they were non-recallable. The U.S. had suggested a limit of 4,800, derived from the idea of halving. The Air Force felt this would put quite a crimp in its forces since it suggested a limit of 1,200 cruise missiles and might limit the possibilities of the stealth program. It would also limit ballistic missiles on our submarines. It would keep alive our land-based forces, and as they were modernized it would squeeze submarine weapons further up against the ceiling. None of this was easy, but it seemed workable and we had thought that the Soviet side, with more or less the same kind of reasoning, had agreed on it. So we thought it important that there be a ballistic missile ceiling within the 6,000.

Gorbachev said that it seemed to him that we had decided at Reykjavik to do without sub-limits. What did we talk about, he asked.



On strategic force structures both the USSR and the U.S. had its own specific features which had emerged historically. Both had all three legs, but the share of each was different in each country. The Geneva talk showed that neither side could agree on sub-limits. At Reykjavik it had been agreed that sub-limits led to an impasse. They were where the devil is, each side insisting on certain points that were not acceptable to the other. So, at Reykjavik the Soviet side had proposed to take what existed, the triad as it was, and to reduce it by 50 percent over the first 5 years. The triad would remain as it was, but with 50 percent remaining for each element. Gorbachev said he had asked himself before what the U.S. was after with sub-limits, and the U.S. had said that this was an acceptable approach. It was simple, it was understandable. If it were abandoned today, he would suspect the U.S. of seeking an advantage. It seemed to him the simplest and best way.

The Secretary said that it did not work. It did not give the stability, the equality, and equal numbers necessary. The general idea was to respect structures, but the idea of getting to equal numbers required a process that ensured stability. Akhromeyev and Nitze had worked on that. We were looking for more concrete expression of the more general idea. Simple arithmetic would not yield a good result. We were seeking reasonable reflections of our views. (At this point, Chief of Staff Marshal Akhromeyev joined the group.)

Gorbachev said their impression was that the U.S. was trying to make Reykjavik fall apart and blame the Soviets. The Secretary rejoined that we were just trying to make the approach work.

Gorbachev asked if the Secretary considered it correct to state that at present strategic parity existed. The Secretary said the Soviets had a greater number of strategic missiles than we did, that there were variations in structure and that their land-based missiles were awesome, far outstripping us. Developments in other fields were also impressive. The U.S. side thought the Soviets were formidable.

Gorbachev asked whether the Secretary meant to say there was no strategic parity. The Secretary said we would like to feel comfortable that we could give a good account of ourselves, but the Soviets had made an impressive modernization effort. They had many new systems. The number of warheads was growing at alarming rates. This had in fact led to the reinvigoration of our efforts during President Reagan's tenure.

Gorbachev said that by Soviet data numerical equality, even closely calculated, existed. The same held for the overall capability of the two sides. Parity existed at a high level, and reductions were needed, but it existed. The U.S. side spoke of the threat from Soviet land-based missiles. They felt an even greater threat from our less vulnerable and very accurate SLBMs. And as Shevardnadze had pointed, there existed

a mechanism, in SALT II, that provided us with limits and reductions, even though it was not ratified. The Soviet side had taken reductions to be in compliance.

We had had a mutual understanding that there is strategic parity, Gorbachev went on. If the structure today provided for strategic parity, then there would be the same balance with a 50 percent cut, but lowered by half. Why not do this? There would not be anything new, and sub-limits would be avoided. Pushing for limits and sub-limits gave rise to mutual suspicions that bad intentions were involved in defining them. We needed simple means, and the Soviet side had thought we had a good one at Reykjavik. He was amazed that this was questioned. He, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister had been there, and the Secretary personally had supported this approach.

Shevardnadze added that when the Soviet side had proposed reductions by one half, it had proposed something it had never proposed before—50 percent reductions of its heavy missiles. Previously the maximum had been 33 percent. Second, a rule counting heavy bombers as one system had been agreed. We know how many weapons there are, so this was a principled question. Third, there was a question they had discussed the day before: it worried the Soviet side a little that the U.S. was adding a new timeframe, going from 5 years to 7 years. This looked like a hardening of the U.S. position compared to Reykjavik, as had also occurred in the space area.

Akhromeyev said he and Nitze had discussed sub-limits for about two hours. It seemed there was agreement at that time that heavy bombers carrying gravity bombs and SRAMs would count as one launcher and one warhead. For many years such a solution had not been found, and it had been a great accommodation for the Soviet side. Nitze had said that in that context the question of all sub-limits was removed, except for the sub-limit on heavy missiles. We had agreed on 50 percent cuts in other categories. That was the essence of Reykjavik.

Nitze said that when Marshal Akhromeyev and he had met, they had negotiated from 8:00 p.m. to 2:00 a.m., and reached no agreement. The reason that there was no agreement whatsoever was that Akhromeyev was insisting on 50 percent reductions by category from the levels then existing, and Nitze would not agree to anything that did not involve equal end levels. At 2:00 a.m. Akhromeyev rose and said he was leaving and would return at 3:00. They both left, and returned at 3:00, and he said he was authorized to agree to equal levels. This resulted in 1,600 launch vehicles on both sides, and 6,000 warheads on each side, including reentry vehicles, SLBMs, ICBMs and a number of long-range cruise missiles. Then the question arose as to how to count heavy bombers not carrying long-range cruise missiles. Marshal Akhromeyev suggested that heavy bombers carrying gravity bombs and

SRAMs be counted as one weapon, warhead and delivery vehicle. Nitze had considered this a fair settlement of a difficult question.

Nitze continued that he had suggested a sub-limit of 4,800 for reentry vehicles, but Akhromeyev did not agree. He said he was authorized to reduce heavy missiles to half of what the Soviet side then had, but he was not authorized to agree to either 4,800 nor to 3,300 for ICBMs. Near 6:00 a.m. they began to work out a final set of three paragraphs on the extent of agreement achieved. He had suggested that a sentence be included to the effect that either side in follow-on negotiations was entitled to raise the question of sublimits. Akhromeyev asked that it not be included in the paragraph, and assured Nitze it was not needed, saying that either side was free in a negotiation to raise what it thought fit. Nitze had asked that Akhromeyev give him his word that this was a situation on which Nitze could rely. He had assured Nitze that this was so, and on that basis Nitze had agreed not to include the sentence.

Akhromeyev said Nitze's account was essentially accurate except for one point. He had told Nitze he was authorized by his leaders to the rule counting bombers as one delivery vehicle and one warhead only on condition that the question of sub-limits thereby be removed. So that if the U.S. now withdrew from that agreement, the bomber counting rule should be withdrawn too. Nitze said he did not remember this condition, but he was sure of the agreement that we could subsequently raise sub-limits.

Gorbachev said he remembered that Akhromeyev and Nitze had talked and had meetings, but then he had met with the President. They had considered the report of ten hours' work, and what agreements had been reached. He had a record of agreement to 50 percent reductions in ballistic missiles, and agreement to counting bombers with gravity bombs and SRAMs as one launcher and one warhead. There had been no mention of sub-limits.

But if one looked simply at the entire mass of strategic weapons systems reduced by one-half, Gorbachev went on, and the concession on heavy missiles, this was an improvement for the U.S., and a concession on the part of the Soviets. He asked the Secretary to recall that they had agreed and given the matter over to their negotiators. Where we had stumbled was on SDI, on the ABM problem. Now new questions were being raised, and were being used to weaken the Reykjavik agreement. He simply could not accept such an approach. The Soviet side did not want to outstrip the U.S., but to accommodate it. It had thought it could reach an agreement with this concession. Even the President had agreed to it all. The one question that remained was the concession he had asked for on SDI.

Gorbachev said he wanted to turn to the ABM regime. The U.S. had buried SALT, and nothing had been created yet to take its place.

The burial was proceeding. Every Administration including the present one had issued reports until 1983 that underlined the one single interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Now the U.S. planned to go into space with weapons, and squeeze the Soviet Union from there. And that was in a context of a situation where chances were emerging to reduce strategic offensive weapons. That made the Soviet side suspicious. When the ABM Treaty limits looked too narrow for U.S. SDI plans, lawyers appeared with a broad interpretation. But so far they have not been able to prove it is correct even to the U.S. people. The Administration was going ahead without looking around. The Soviet Union had had specific debates with the U.S., where it was hard to find answers. In this situation there suddenly came the idea of the U.S. side's extending the arms race into space. The Soviet side was supposed to look on this as routine, rain today but not tomorrow. But no: what was involved was changing existing ideas of parity and balance. Why should the Soviet side help, Gorbachev asked. He simply did not trust the U.S. side.

Gorbachev said he considered this a very critical moment in the process of reducing strategic offensive weapons. But as he had said on a number of occasions—and this was a position that was worked out—this was a serious matter, not a machine gun, serious. He had the firm conviction that if the U.S. side went to deployment of ABM in space, there would be no agreement between us even on 50 percent reductions.

The Soviet side was not engaged in that kind of research to the extent the U.S., Gorbachev went on. Soviet research concerned the ABM defense of Moscow, one limited anti-missile base. It was hard to predict the success of SDI; they would have to rely on the U.S. But he thought Americans did not invest in things that were not cost-effective, and that meant the U.S. thought it could be done. He thought that since the U.S. was that committed, the Soviet objective should be to take care of its own interest, not to make the U.S. task any easier. The U.S. was trying to impose a choice on the Soviets, and they preferred the U.S. discontinue SDI as unnecessary. But while the U.S. felt it might be able to do something with SDI, to gain advantage, or superiority, this was an illusion. The U.S. side would not achieve it. The Soviet response would be asymmetrical; it would not necessarily be in space; and it would be less expensive.

Gorbachev said that if the U.S. violated the ABM Treaty and deployed SDI, the Soviet side would implement its program to defend its interests. This would create a most dangerous situation. There would be no trust for the U.S., and the situation would not be quiet for the U.S. It would have to watch the Soviets, for they would not sit idly by. Gorbachev asked whether it was responsible policy to destabilize the existing arrangements and SALT at a time when the contours of a strategic arrangement were emerging.

The Administration had painted itself into a corner, Gorbachev went on. The orders had been placed. Industries had been engaged. It expected a technological breakthrough, with computers and information systems. Had it concluded, with President Johnson, that he who rules space rules the world?, Gorbachev asked. Mr. Secretary, he said, this was a grave illusion.

But if the Administration was that committed to SDI, he went on, he proposed to record the Soviet side's agreement to the U.S. side's conducting laboratory research. The SDI program would be preserved. That was the thought, and they had returned to the idea. They could talk about it if it would help the Administration untie the knot. They were thinking of an interpretation of laboratory not inconsistent with the ABM Treaty. The Soviet side could now explain, for the first time, that it consider laboratory work ground-based research in various scientific institutions and research centers, conducted without launching an object into outer space.

Obviously we could discuss in the negotiations which objects would be specifically banned from space, Gorbachev went on. This was a last effort. He had run out of gas for further new proposals. U.S. policy was one of extorting more and more concessions. This was not polite. Two great powers should not treat each other like that. In later years people would look back and wonder at it.

The Secretary said he was crying for Gorbachev.

Shevardnadze noted that the day before the Secretary had proposed a limit of seven instead of ten years for non-withdrawal. He cited the Russian proverb the further you go into the forest, the more firewood you see.

Gorbachev said he wished to end on this topic by saying that the Soviet side was ready to begin the process of working out an agreement to end all nuclear testing, with the understanding that we would begin with the treaties and further limitations.

In sum, said Gorbachev, the Soviet side was ready to work to develop key provisions for all agreements, on strategic offensive weapons, on space, on nuclear testing. These, with the treaty on medium-range missiles, could become the subject and the main result of a political agreement, and this could happen toward the end of this year or in the autumn. And if that happened the two sides could proceed to develop legally binding treaties between the Soviet Union and the U.S. on all three questions.

The Secretary said he would comment on all three areas but only briefly. The U.S. side was dedicated to trying to find agreement with the Soviet side in all three. He was even more aware after that day's discussion of how difficult it would be.

On strategic weapons, the Secretary said, since we were not able to agree on the kind of two-stage approach to vast reductions discussed at Reykjavik, we had concentrated on 50 percent reductions, which would in themselves be a magnificent and unprecedented thing to bring off. Gorbachev commented that this was again a retreat from Reykjavik. The U.S. was afraid to reduce nuclear weapons. Still the Soviet side was ready to proceed. Politics was the art of the possible.

The Secretary rejoined that as he had said to Shevardnadze we had made various proposals and none of them had rung a bell. We had therefore gone to another one, not as large as the ones the Soviets had rejected. This showed how anxious we were to make an important agreement in this field. 50 percent would be breathtaking. Gorbachev said he agreed.

On sub-limits, the Secretary said perhaps we should not call them sub-limits; we might find another phrase. But we should hold on to the 1,600, the 6,000, the halving of heavy missiles, and we should try to hold on to the bomber counting rule. We should try to see how it was possible to squeeze the numbers to equality in a way that preserved some stability. Our 4,800 number is approximately half the Soviet number, based on the Soviet side's percentage. The point was that numbers are needed to make the principle real. A very strict inspection regime would also be needed. By the time we were through there would not be anything left in either country. We would not need intelligence services because everything would have been discovered.

The Secretary said the American side thought we should keep driving. We hoped to be in a position at the next START round to present a full draft agreement. We had no objections at all to setting out next fall or at some point, as definitively as possible, what a strategic agreement would look like, or what an agreement on space would look like, if we could find them.

We thought it important to recognize defense, the Secretary went on. The Soviets did recognize it, and we should more than we do. The Soviets had extensive air defenses. Like us they poured concrete around silos. They had their Moscow ABM, which we recognized was permitted. They had mobile systems, hard to verify. We both put missiles under the sea; that too was defense. The concept was as old as warfare. It was important to see that it could contribute to stability. This was what the President had tried to do. It would be good to engage at the philosophical level. He had given over a paper, and even though Karpov had said there was nothing new in it, it might serve to engage us.

Gorbachev said he thought it was a great historic misfortune that the President had met with Teller.<sup>7</sup> Without that there would be no

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<sup>7</sup> Reference is to Reagan's September 14, 1982, meeting with scientist Edward Teller.



SDI. As to air defenses, the Soviets were doing them, the U.S. was doing them. But SDI was different. It changed the whole situation. The Secretary would recall the time it had taken us to develop an approach for treating existing arsenals the various commissions, Smith,<sup>8</sup> Nitze. Now it seemed that instead of using that, the U.S. was opening up an arms race in space, all into the unknown, the devil knew where it would lead. Dreams were fine, they were important in politics, but one could not turn politics into dreams. As for strategic defense with an arms race in space, he rejected it. It would be destabilizing.

The Secretary said it was important to keep at work. The ten-year commitment had been offered in the context of elimination of all ballistic missiles. He had to point out that seven years was an eternity in U.S. political time, two Presidents away in terms of U.S. politics.

The Secretary continued that Gorbachev had mentioned nuclear testing. He knew Gorbachev had thought a lot about it. The U.S. placed importance on starting negotiations to deal with it. Shevardnadze and he had discussed finding a measure of agreement. They had talked of various means of verification under discussion by scientists, CORTEX, seismic. These ought to be tried out, to see what works best to try to improve what goes on. So they had assigned people from both sides to draft an agreement to start negotiations. They had reached agreement on all except the last paragraph, the Secretary said, and he had merged some language and brought it over. The way to get started with negotiations was to agree to start. If we had a start to negotiations right away, it should not be difficult to have the two treaties ratified by the fall. If the text he was presenting was agreeable, he would [be] glad to be in touch with the President, and thought he would find it agreeable. They could thus agree here in Moscow and get started.

Gorbachev said he would have the comrades look at the issue as a whole, and would give a reply the next day.

Gorbachev asked the Secretary what he thought of the laboratory testing formulation. He (Gorbachev) saw the possibility of a compromise. The Secretary said he was willing to listen, but wished to give Gorbachev the President's view. This was that we had the ABM Treaty, and had a program conducted in accordance with it. (At the translation, Gorbachev said in accordance up to now, but not in the next stage. The Secretary assured him that it would continue to be.) The program would continue. Questions abounded, and no decisions on them had been made. We were making laborious progress studying them, largely in the Secretary's own department, and the results would be presented to the President, who would look at them and look at the program.

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<sup>8</sup> Gerard Smith, the lead U.S. negotiator in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks.

Until then, he would see what could be done consistent with the Treaty. He was leery of changes. He was willing to listen, but in candor he had to say that the President's view was that the ABM Treaty gave us guidance. Gorbachev said the Soviets were not saying it should be changed, but observed. The Secretary said the U.S. was saying "let's observe it."

Gorbachev asked why the U.S. delegation in Geneva was avoiding discussion of what was permitted and not permitted under the treaty. The Secretary said he understood Ambassador Kampelman had given many explanations. Gorbachev said he had his own information, and urged the Secretary to try to develop some new instructions.

Gorbachev appealed to the Secretary to give careful thought to all aspects of strategic offensive weapons across the entire triad and to related ABM Treaty questions. The President should look again at all aspects. The Soviet side thought compromise was possible on all aspects, without prejudice to the President or his interests. There might not be enough time to complete a treaty, but there was time to agree on basic provisions. There had been years of discussion, of clarifications. These were assets that should not be wasted.

The Secretary assured Gorbachev he would give the President a full report when he saw him in California, and would supplement his written report with a sense of how Gorbachev had said it, to give the full impact of Gorbachev's view, as the Secretary had given Gorbachev the President's view.

Gorbachev said he had covered all the ground he wanted to propose, and invited the Secretary to touch on items of interest.

The Secretary said he would like to mention one he had discussed with Shevardnadze, and another he would raise later with Shevardnadze. First, he wished to say that he thought the decisions we saw coming forward on emigration, on political prisoners, on representation list cases, on the category we call refuseniks, a range of decisions related to the new thinking in Gorbachev's society, were something we welcomed. These things meant a lot to the U.S. side. He could only express the hope that there would be a continued flood of developments in this area.

Gorbachev said the Soviet position was well-known, and he had nothing to add. The Soviet side would be prepared to consider everything that emerged in the humanitarian area. During the first three months of 1987 permission to depart had been given to 1,500, which was 1,355 more than the year before. Thirteen percent had been refused for security reasons. They were considering further cases.

But, said Gorbachev, he had received a letter from the Secretary from some rather prominent Soviet Jews. They had heard that the Secretary



would raise human rights, the spy mania, and also Jews, and they had written protesting against the way he would raise these questions. They had drawn attention to the fact that the Secretary dealt only with a certain group of Jews, people who did not like it here, or had complaints. He showed no interest in the mass, the millions of Soviet Jews; they were out of his field of vision, when he presented things as dramatic, and very bad. They noted that in his meetings he seemed to prefer to meet people who were irritants. And they asked whether the Secretary of State and other American officials were not stimulating this. That would be interference in internal affairs, and they did not accept it. Gorbachev said he would consider the issues the Secretary had raised. Life is life, he said, and things need solutions. But steps in the direction of interference should be ended.

The Secretary said he welcomed Gorbachev's comments, as a way of saying that if Jews wanted to practice their religion, to learn Hebrew and teach it to their children, that would be alright with Gorbachev. He believed that if emigration were open there would not be much of a problem. He suggested Gorbachev look at Hungary. It was completely open, and there was no emigration. So he welcomed what Gorbachev had said.

Gorbachev replied testily that if the Secretary did not like the way things were the Soviets would do their best to make the U.S. happy, and he hoped the Secretary would also work to improve things in the U.S. Since the Secretary has gotten into polemics, Gorbachev wished to say that the Soviets would soon be celebrating 70 years since the Revolution, and had quite a record on relations between nationalities, with self-determination and autonomous areas for even the smallest. The U.S. had many nationalities, ten million Poles, Russians, Hispanics, all kinds. It could learn from Soviet experience, and they were willing to give counsel. He suggested that the new Ambassador,<sup>9</sup> who knew the Soviet Union well, get in touch with the Central Committee to develop recommendations.

The Secretary said he wished to discuss so-called regional issues before he left. This was a very important topic. Gorbachev said this was worth going into the next day; the Soviet side had much to tell the Secretary. At this meeting he wished only to say one thing. It seemed to the Soviet side that the U.S. considered regional problems and conflicts as a special reserve for maneuver, a means to regulate the level of confrontation, of use of force, of anti-Soviet propaganda. If that were so and if it did not change, he was sure our relations would face very great trials and tests.

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<sup>9</sup> Jack F. Matlock. See footnote 3, Document 15.

Gorbachev said the Soviet side believed that we should not turn such problems into areas of confrontation between systems, or between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, if the U.S. saw it that way. He did not want to oversimplify. Many problems had piled up. It was his deep conviction that we could interact and cooperate. But, for instance, he frankly did not see any interest on the U.S. side in finding solutions in the Middle East.

The Secretary said he would welcome a chance to discuss these things, and had some ideas. Gorbachev said that after the Geneva meeting he had had the impression that it might be possible for us to cooperate to seek a solution to the Afghanistan problem. That had dissipated. U.S. policy was now to put sticks in the spokes, and we were beginning to do so. It was unacceptable for either side to adopt the idea that the worse for the other side, the better for it. The Secretary said he agreed with that.

Gorbachev said we should discard the old stereotypes, the old approaches, and try to interact. No one in the world could substitute for our two countries, for our responsibility. He wished to say again that it was not the Soviet position not to take account of U.S. interests, but they could not accept the U.S. considering all other countries as a hunting ground or fiefdom, the rest as second-rate.

Gorbachev said he welcomed the process that had begun with the visit of Secretary Armacost and hoped it would continue. We gain through that more understanding, possibilities of interaction. It was not Soviet policy to pick a fight with the U.S., but rather to take legitimate U.S. interests in the world into account. It expected the same from the U.S. It was not true that the cause of tensions was the two systems. Until 1917 there had been only one system, the capitalist system, and there had been the First World War, not to speak of all the other wars. In World War II we had had a coalition of states with different systems. What did exist was each country's national interest, but it was not just us who had one. Seeking a balance of such interests was the art of foreign policy, and at each stage a new balance existed, and a new approach was needed.

Gorbachev said he had told Margaret Thatcher that she should not try to use the ideas of the Fulton speech,<sup>10</sup> of the 1940's and 1950's, to deal with the problems of the end of the 20th century. He invited the U.S. and the leaders of the U.S. to consider what the Soviets were saying with understanding. Reconstruction was required here too. The U.S. side could not outsmart the Soviet side, nor could the Soviet side

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<sup>10</sup> Reference is to Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech, which he delivered at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946.

outsmart the U.S. side. But they could work together, think how to do it, in the interest of normalization of relations both bilateral and international.

Gorbachev asked the Secretary to convey his greetings to the President.

The Secretary said he would. He added that if he ever had a chance to visit and discuss these things, he would find that there were very powerful forces at work that had nothing to do with capitalism or socialism, but affected both. They were changing the world, and this deserved discussion. Gorbachev said he agreed. The Secretary said there was a lot of potential conflict, and at a minimum it would be an exercise in damage control. The proverb that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure applied.

Gorbachev said the U.S. and the Soviet Union and other international partners should remember that solutions are not for one or the other to make, but only in common. This was not the case at present, and that was the problem. There was a great deal to think about, and it was better to think, meet, compare than to think about how to destroy each other. Those were the good things Nitze and Akhromeyev did, though they did it for succeeding generations.

Gorbachev said it had been a pleasure to meet the Secretary again to resume discussions and exchanges. He had not been so happy with what had transpired, but what was was, and the exchange had clarified positions. He still thought we could find a solution on medium-range missiles; the others would be more difficult. The Secretary said “difficult, but not impossible,” and suggested they agree on nuclear testing.

The Secretary said he would tell the President that Gorbachev had mentioned the possibility of a visit to the U.S. in the fall. If that developed as something genuine they should probably have in mind another meeting at his level with Shevardnadze. He would be glad to receive him in the U.S. as part of the planning process. It could be worked out. But for a high-level meeting we wanted content, and good preparation, for it to be successful.

Gorbachev said he could confirm that as before he wanted a “resultful” summit. He was ready to go to the U.S. and spend as much time as possible to achieve it. But the foreign ministers should do some preliminary work. He felt there was a definite possibility of movement on medium-range missiles, on testing, and perhaps other topics. The foreign ministers should work more intensively, and if there were agreements there could be a summit of the President and the General Secretary. But we should not relegate things to Geneva; he confessed he was kind of allergic to it.

**43. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the White House<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, April 15, 1987, 1230Z

Secto 6022. Brussels for Secretary's Party only. Subject: Memorandum for the President—My Meeting With Gorbachev April 14.<sup>2</sup>

1. (Secret—Entire text)

Memorandum for the President From the Secretary.

2. The big gold doors that open to St. Catherine's Hall in the Kremlin seem like a Hollywood set, and the guy inside seems right at home in this larger-than-life setting.

In four and a half hours with Gorbachev, I covered it all. I began by telling him that the overbearing Soviet intelligence effort against us is creating the kind of hostile environment that cannot but negatively effect our relationship. I noted that your decision to send me here despite the votes of 70 U.S. Senators against the trip was evidence of your seriousness about relations. Gorbachev claimed we do more spying than they do. Although both sides do it, and disclaimed knowledge of physical penetration of our Embassy. He said it was against his policy and rules. When I asked if I could report that to you, he said, certainly so. Without doubt, he got the point about how seriously we take this.

On human rights, I challenged him to step up to freedom for Soviet Jews. He cited increased emigration figures to me, and said they would continue to consider and work on humanitarian issues. But when I raised Jewish rights here, he got hot under the collar about interference in internal affairs before he broke off. I also introduced regional issues, and was especially clear about our views on Afghanistan, as a warmup for my more thorough discussion with Shevardnadze.

Most of the discussion was on arms control. Gorbachev's main tactic in most areas was to assault us for backtracking on the agreements you had reached in Reykjavik, and here I did not give an inch. On START and space, Gorbachev was not particularly productive. He did not seem to have thought through our new proposals. I laid them out clearly and took a firm stance. He went at the question of permitted activities on SDI and I repeated your positions strongly. I told him that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow trip—Memcons 4/12–16/87. Secret; Nodis; Niact Immediate. Sent Immediate for information to Brussels.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 42.

SDI was a necessary, good, and permanent program, and fully in accord with the ABM Treaty.

In INF, we did not come to agreement, but Gorbachev went far enough to lead me to conclude that the groundwork has been laid if the Soviets want to go ahead. I pinned him down to a set of principles consistent with my instructions.

—SRINF would be part of an INF Treaty. (I asked if it were clear what systems we were dealing with, and Gorbachev replied “the SS-23 and upward.”)

—Limits on SRINF would be global in character.

—There would be some understood top limit, for instance one derived by subtracting from the current Soviet level, the systems withdrawn from Czechoslovakia and the GDR and then destroyed.

—I insisted on the principle of equality, which would give the U.S. the right to match the Soviet number whatever it was.

—There would be follow-on negotiations about the remaining systems.

—Gorbachev pressed me for an answer to his statement that the Soviet position would be zero. I said that we were part of an alliance and this was the first time he had stated this position. Maybe he could dictate to his allies but we couldn’t. So we would consult with them before deciding. We had not yet decided on our position, or whether we would favor zero or a finite number.

There was one other area of progress, but the Soviets may back off. We worked out language on starting negotiations about verification of nuclear testing that could lead to ratification of the treaties. I will give you the details in another cable. The language is totally within the instructions you gave me and, if the Soviets don’t wake up to the fact that we are coming out better on this one, we could nail it down here tomorrow. This would be useful in view of the speaker’s arrival in Moscow<sup>3</sup> just as I will be leaving.

It’s not peaches and cream. It’s been a rough day but we have gotten somewhere at least. Gorbachev talked about a summit in the U.S. based on substantive achievement. He indicated that he was thinking of an INF agreement, an agreement in nuclear testing, and a set of principles or instructions to negotiators on START and space. He talked about coming in the fall or before the end of the year. I did not bite except to say that a summit should be carefully prepared by a visit to Washington by Shevardnadze. If we look too interested in this package they may raise the ante. So I’m continuing to low key it.

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Speaker of the House of Representatives James “Jim” Wright.

I have a 30 minute interview on Soviet TV Wednesday,<sup>4</sup> so some things here are changing—in part owing to the strong policies you have put in place and stuck with.

Shultz

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<sup>4</sup> April 15.

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#### 44. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, April 14, 1987, 9:35–11:55 p.m.

##### SUBJECT

Secretary's Third Plenary Meeting with Shevardnadze, Tuesday, April 14, 9:35 pm to 11:55 pm

##### PARTICIPANTS

*United States*  
The Secretary  
Ambassador Matlock  
Ambassador Nitze  
Ambassador Ridgway  
ACDA Director Adelman  
Asst. Sec. Perle  
Mr. Parris (Notetaker)  
Ambassador Glitman  
Ambassador Cooper  
Ambassador Lehman  
Ambassador Rowny  
Gen. Moellering  
Mr. Timbie  
  
(Later)  
Mr. Solomon  
Mr. Ermarth  
  
*Soviet*  
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Trip—Memcons 4/12–16/87. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Parris. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the Foreign Ministry Guesthouse.

Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh  
Ambassador Dubinin  
Ambassador Karpov  
Ambassador Obukhov  
Mr. Tarasenko (Foreign Minister's staff)  
Mr. Mikol'chak (Acting Chief, USA Dept.)

*Shevardnadze* opened the meeting by noting that the Secretary had had an opportunity to discuss a broad range of issues throughout the course of the day. It was important to have such discussions, both in bilateral terms and in terms of the problems of the modern world.

*Shevardnadze* suggested the two talk for a moment on how to summarize their discussions the next day. Some of the working groups were still deliberating. The ministers should find time to listen to them so they could be in a position to sum up the results of their work. Or perhaps it would be better to listen to reports of each group in turn.

The Secretary asked to make a suggestion. He had certainly found the day's discussions worthwhile. He had heard some things he had not previously known about, and about which he would like to hear more. With Ryzhkov and the General Secretary he had had a longer range sort of dialogue. There ought to be more such non-confrontational discussions of how the world was changing, since both Ryzhkov and the General Secretary seemed to find them interesting. The Secretary hoped that this would be possible.

As to organizational matters, the Secretary suspected that the working groups were as anxious to hear from the ministers as vice versa. He personally had been able to report only briefly to members of his delegation, as he had spent much of the last several hours handing out ice cream and Easter favors to the children of our Embassy staff.

It was the Secretary's sense that most progress had occurred in the area of LRINF, or, as the Soviets called it, medium range missiles. The Secretary proposed to summarize his understanding of what had been achieved. *Shevardnadze* could then comment if he had a different view. After hearing the ministers' summaries, working groups could get down to work on, as it were, an instructed basis.

The Secretary believed there had also been some progress in the area of nuclear testing. He understood that there was a final paragraph of the paper presented by the U.S. side<sup>2</sup> which was not agreed. But if sufficient work could be done in Moscow it could lay a basis for something signable before the year was out. The Secretary said he understood there had also been some forward movement in the area of chemical weapons, but he had seen no paper on this.

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<sup>2</sup> Not further identified.

As for START and Defense/Space (D&S), the working groups' efforts should be reviewed, but the Secretary thought the Minister would agree that it had proved difficult to move the ball very far forward. At least we should seek to record where we agreed and disagreed. So, if that approach seemed acceptable to Shevardnadze, the Secretary was prepared to proceed.

*Shevardnadze* responded: "tonight"? Perhaps, he suggested, it would be better to proceed in the morning. *Shevardnadze* himself had not had time to be briefed by his subordinates. He would like to get a report. Perhaps it would be better to review the arms control agenda the next day. *Shevardnadze* agreed that INF had priority. Testing was also promising, but he had not had time to carefully review the document the U.S. side had prepared. Why not spend an hour and a half summarizing these points the next day.

Also, *Shevardnadze* was not sure what the Secretary wanted to do about the Space Cooperation agreement. If he were still interested, perhaps the two ministers could sign the document after their Wednesday meeting.<sup>3</sup> Perhaps, then, they should focus on regional and other issues in the current session.

The *Secretary* agreed—with one amendment. Since there was already some measure of agreement on INF, that working group should have the benefit of the ministers' views tonight so that their work could proceed. Otherwise they would be flying blind. The Secretary could summarize our understanding of the situation very quickly. If *Shevardnadze* could do the same, it would be helpful. *Shevardnadze* agreed and asked the Secretary to proceed.

The *Secretary* stated that, first of all, both sides agreed on the Reykjavik formula of 100 warheads on a side, on a global basis, with residual U.S. missiles in the United States and Soviet missiles in the Asian part of the Soviet Union. As a side note, the U.S. had pointed up certain considerations which made a global zero desirable, especially from the standpoint of verification. The Secretary hoped Soviet experts could give some thought to the complications and expense inherent in the kind of intrusive inspection regime now being considered at levels above zero.

Continuing, the Secretary said that there was agreement that verification was a central issue. Both sides agreed that it would be necessary to ensure the highest confidence in our ability to certify compliance with any agreement. Our views had been expressed in detailed form in our draft treaty; the General Secretary had indicated that the Soviet side would be responding.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 45.



On SRINF, there was agreement that we were talking about the SS-12 and SS-23. These systems would be restrained under any INF treaty. Moreover, the concept for dealing with SRINF was a global concept. This was particularly important in view of the ease of transporting such systems. Finally, it was agreed that immediately after the entry into force of an INF agreement, SRINF would be subject to a numerical limit which would be derived from the formula: the current Soviet total minus those systems which would be taken out of the GDR and Czechoslovakia and destroyed. This would be the maximum number allowed. The U.S. would, the Secretary affirmed, have a right as a matter of principle to match Soviet deployments in this field. Follow-on negotiations on SRINF would determine precisely what their ultimate level would be. The General Secretary had said that the number should be zero.

The Secretary concluded his presentation by noting that the progress which had been made on INF issues had narrowed remaining questions to one: what level of SRINF should be permitted. The Soviet side was proposing zero. The U.S. owed an answer. We would consult with our allies on the subject, which would be the subject of subsequent negotiations.

*Shevardnadze* repeated that he thought it advisable that the ministers use the evening to work with their respective associates in analyzing what had emerged from the day's discussions, especially what the Secretary and Gorbachev had had to say on medium range missiles. Certain things could be recorded now as agreed, but many other questions required further discussion. By 2:00 the next day, the Soviet side would be able to take more definitive positions on some of the points the Secretary had referred to, and to identify more precisely fundamental differences. So he urged that working groups labor tonight. *Shevardnadze* would make himself available if necessary.

As a general rule, *Shevardnadze* suggested, working groups should base their work on the Reykjavik outcome. He thought both sides saw eye to eye on the points addressed in Reykjavik. There was agreement, for example, on the formula of zero medium range warheads in Europe and 100 in Asia. There was agreement to make decisive headway on verification issues. *Shevardnadze* noted that Gorbachev's Prague speech appeared to be consonant with U.S. proposals in Geneva, so there should be no particular problem on verification. Delegations could assume there would be more areas of overlap than otherwise. *Shevardnadze* confirmed that the Soviets would be tabling a draft of their own in Geneva, and agreed that the key outstanding question was what to do about operational/tactical missiles, or, to use U.S. terminology, SRINF.

On that score, the Soviets had already decided what to do about systems in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, and *Shevardnadze* assumed

the U.S. would have no objections to that decision. Consideration should be given as to how to record the fate of the balance of SRINF systems in an agreed document. It was necessary to decide when to start negotiations on such systems, on the purpose and objectives of such negotiations, maybe even on the time frame for their elimination, in order that these issues not complicate agreement on an INF treaty. Shevardnadze was prepared to record agreement on these points today, but said he could do so in a more definitive way on Wednesday. He would also be prepared by then to discuss the mandate for SRINF negotiations. Bessmertnykh interjected that not all of the points which the Secretary had referred to could be considered agreed.

The *Secretary* replied that he had described what he had gleaned from the day's discussions. His working groups would be operating on the basis of those impressions. Shevardnadze should instruct his team on their approach. By the next meeting, the two ministers would want to be able to agree on what had been accomplished and to give their Geneva negotiators instructions. They could also compare notes on where nuclear testing issues stood. In general, they should identify areas where we agreed so that work could go ahead. If agreements were not possible, we would keep struggling. The Secretary asked Shevardnadze if they should spend the remainder of the evening on regional issues.

*Shevardnadze* first returned to INF. There were no differences, he said, on medium range missiles. On SRINF, there were areas where the two sides' positions had drawn closer. Others required additional study so it would be possible to reach more definitive agreement the next day. Let the experts work throughout the night, taking into account the General Secretary's comments to the Secretary.

The *Secretary* agreed—with one reservation. Shevardnadze had said that he would be available to his experts. The Secretary would not. He intended to sleep.

*Shevardnadze* said he did as well. The experts could do all the work. They could then report on their accomplishments. But what did the Secretary think? Should the ministers listen to separate reports from each group in their next session? The *Secretary* said they would have to be concise; there was only limited time. *Shevardnadze* said another option would be for ministers to summarize their working groups' understanding of areas of agreement and disagreement. This would probably be more concise. The *Secretary* quipped that, if the ministers misspoke, their experts would let them know. *Shevardnadze* said he doubted that they would be "overly courageous" in that respect.

Shevardnadze asked the Secretary how extensive a discussion of regional issues he thought advisable. Should they cover all issues? If so, they would get little sleep. Shevardnadze would be interested in

discussing the Middle East. The Secretary had expressed interest in Afghanistan; Shevardnadze was also interested in that problem. He would be interested as well in anything the Secretary had to say on Central America.

The *Secretary* noted that Under Secretary Armacost had recently had a comprehensive review of regional issues with First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov. But the General Secretary had said earlier that Shevardnadze might have something on Afghanistan, and the Secretary had been interested in some of Shevardnadze's remarks over lunch the day before on his trip to Southeast Asia. For his part, the Secretary was prepared to address the Middle East, and had a few points to make on southern Africa.

(At this point, *Shevardnadze* was called out of the room for about five minutes.)

On his return, he suggested that the regional discussion begin with the Middle East and then go on to other areas. The Foreign Minister was prepared to lead off.

Shevardnadze described briefly the state of play on U.N. consideration of an international conference on the peace process. Moscow was well aware of the U.S. lack of enthusiasm for the concept of an international conference and for the establishment of a preparatory commission (prepcom) of the permanent members of the Security Council to set the stage for a conference. Shevardnadze wanted to make clear that, in advancing these fora, the Soviet Union envisaged their serving as a means of bilateral as well as multilateral cooperation, and felt they could provide for the active participation of all parties to a possible settlement.

An alternative approach such as that the Soviets had proposed was increasingly necessary in view of the possible consequences of the Iran-Iraq war. Moscow was not in a position to forecast the results of the war, but they clearly would have an important bearing on an already complex Middle East situation. The permanent Council members, including the U.S. and U.S.S.R., should take the lead in dealing with this problem. The U.S. had extensive political and economic interests in the region. The Soviet Union could not ignore developments so near its borders. They ought to share ideas on reaching a political settlement of the region's problems. It might be possible to find common ground with respect to a prepcom and possible concerted action in the Security Council.

The *Secretary* said he had a few questions. As a matter of principle, we neither ruled in nor out the idea of an international conference. It was simply a matter of what a conference could do. If a conference showed some prospect of helping the peace process, we were for it; if not, we were against.

The Secretary said he had the sense from Shevardnadze's remarks that the Soviet Union agreed that disputes between two countries could best be worked out between the two countries themselves. In effect, what the Soviets were saying was that were an international conference to take place, actual resolution of differences would take place via direct bilateral contacts. Other participants, and the conference as a whole, could give counsel and advice, but it was really up to the parties themselves to come to terms. Specifically: between Israel and Syria the issue was the Golan; between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians, the West Bank; between Israel and Egypt, things were basically settled; between Israel and Lebanon, the problem was security—Lebanon was being used as a platform for attacks on Israel. There was a need for these countries and Israel to discuss and resolve these problems, each in their turn. The Secretary emphasized that he was simply trying to get a clear idea of what the Soviet Union felt a conference could or could not do, and whether Moscow believed that a conference was compatible with the idea that issues should be resolved on the basis of bilateral contacts. He had the impression that that was what was being said, but wanted to be clear about this.

*Shevardnadze* in reply explained how the Soviet position had evolved. The Soviets did not want a conference for its own sake. They thought it could play a useful role. But as they had discussed the concept, they had concluded it would be most likely to produce concrete results if prepared under the lead of the permanent members of the Security Council. In addition, all the parties most directly involved would have to be active participants in the process: Israel, Syria, the Palestinians, Jordan. Other states in the region, while not directly involved, would have a role as well. But the permanent Council members should take the lead to lay a propitious foundation for the work of a conference.

Why had the Soviet Union taken the initiative to propose a two step prepcom/conference approach? First, because efforts over the previous decade to bring about an overall settlement by means of separate agreements had only complicated matters. Second, as he had earlier noted, the possible consequences of the Gulf war loomed increasingly large. There was no time for delay. It was a time for action, particularly by countries with influence in the region. The U.S. had good (even "confidential") relations with Israel and other states. So did the Soviet Union. Both countries, as well as other permanent Council members, could do much to prepare the way for a successful international conference. But, *Shevardnadze* concluded, he felt he had not convinced the Secretary and his colleagues.

The *Secretary* replied that he had already described the circumstances under which we felt a conference might be useful. We failed

to see how the permanent Council members could collectively play a useful role. Their interests in the region differed widely, as did their influence. As he had said earlier, a conference could be useful if it facilitated direct contacts between the parties. We were interested in Soviet views on that score.

But, the Secretary continued, there was another problem. If, by some miracle, the Arab-Israeli dispute were to be resolved, a genuine need would arise in the area for economic development. Syria's economy was in shambles; Jordan's was better off, but hurting; Egypt was in rough shape. But there was much that could be done if neighboring countries could work together. An example would be to bring water from the Red or Mediterranean Seas to the Dead Sea to restore its traditional level and, possibly, produce electrical power.

A conference, were it to continue beyond a Middle East settlement, ought to be able to address these kinds of needs and opportunities. This might involve a different set of participants. Countries which had the resources to make a contribution to post-settlement economic development included Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as well as the FRG and Japan. Some permanent Council members, e.g., China, were limited in what they could do. The Secretary did not know what the Soviet approach would be. France had a strong historical interest in Lebanon, and the U.K. in Jordan, but it was not clear what they could contribute. How, the Secretary asked, did the Soviet conference proposal address such economic considerations?

Shevardnadze asked if the Secretary was proposing an international economic conference on the region.

The *Secretary* said he could envision a number of scenarios. A group could be assembled; direct bilateral contacts could resolve the salient issues; and that would be the end of it. Or, a conference might be conceived as a continuing body which could look at longer-term problems. This might be something to look at. For the moment, it was a question mark.

What was clearer was that, to qualify as a participant in any conference, there were certain tickets of admission. One was acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 on the basis for a settlement.<sup>4</sup> Another was to recognize Israel's right to exist. Yet another was to renounce the use of violence—necessary to insulate the process from terrorism. If someone wanted to disrupt the process, they did not belong in it. That should be said right up front.

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to UNSC Resolutions 242 (November 22, 1967) and 338 (October 22, 1973), which called for a Middle East peace settlement based on borders prior to the Six-Day War.

So, the Secretary summarized, he had been trying to focus on some of the issues. He could envision a useful conference, but certain things had to be so. In the Soviet's own case, we were aware that they had been talking to the Israelis. Israel thought that diplomatic relations should be reestablished. It was even more interested in problems relating to Soviet Jewry, such as emigration. These questions would inevitably arise in connection with organizing a conference. They would have to be answered.

The Secretary endorsed the concerns Shevardnadze had expressed over the situation in the region. The superficial stability of late was deceptive. Things could explode without warning. So the problems were well worth working on.

*Shevardnadze* said he would consider all that the Secretary had said. Although he felt some of his ideas might be difficult to implement, they should nonetheless be considered.

The idea of an international conference should also be considered for another reason—growing international support for the concept. A majority of the Arab states were now in favor. Even in Israel, influential voices were being heard in support of the approach. Among the Security Council members, the PRC and France backed a preparatory commission; the U.K. was wavering. Only the U.S. remained adamantly opposed.

Perhaps, *Shevardnadze* suggested, the U.S. could give additional thought to the idea. Maybe consideration should be given to organizing bilateral discussion on a more “permanent” basis. Maybe the discussions our representatives had been having were not adequate. More “permanent” talks could probably best take place below the Deputy Foreign Minister level. Perhaps our Ambassadors could take a more active role in the process.

To “round out” the discussion of the Middle East, the *Secretary* summarized briefly his understanding of the conversation. The two sides agreed that, regardless of their sponsorship, the parties most directly involved must decide how to resolve their disputes. So, in the end, the most important thing was to establish bilateral relations.

At this point the Secretary said he had received a note from his arms control back-benchers. They would like to be about their business of following up on the first part of the evening's conversation. But they did not want to be rude about leaving. The Secretary suggested that they should feel free to depart. *Shevardnadze* agreed that everyone who was sleepy should leave.

[Glitman, Holmes, Moellering, Cooper, Timbie and Rowny left the room, to be replaced approximately half an hour later by State S/P Director Solomon and NSC staff member Ermarth.]

After Shevardnadze had suggested that there was no need to continue the discussion on the Middle East, the Secretary recalled the General Secretary's statement that Shevardnadze would have some things to say on Afghanistan. The Secretary would be interested in hearing them, and had a few points of his own.

*Shevardnadze* said that he really had nothing very novel. Soviet views on the elements of a political settlement were public knowledge. Shevardnadze himself had recently been in Kabul with Dobrynin. Their purpose had been to get an idea of their own of the process at work there. The situation was complex, tense. But major events were taking place. Shevardnadze proposed to share with the Secretary his personal impressions from the trip.

First, Shevardnadze related, the current leadership had adopted a genuine policy of national reconciliation. They had concluded that the Afghan revolution was of a "national democratic" character. They were thus seeking to enroll the active support and participation of the national bourgeoisie, the clergy, and entrepreneurial elements. These efforts had elicited strong popular support. After almost eight years of war, people were tired; they wanted peace.

The leadership was, moreover, taking decisive steps to implement its new approach. Many in the West belittled the significance of these steps. This was a mistake. An important (and wise) decision had been adopted on a ceasefire. The government was trying to follow through on this commitment; wherever there were no challenges from the other side, peace had been established.

The Soviets themselves had taken certain actions. Part of its limited contingent had been withdrawn. The U.S. had belittled the step, but the force in question was significant. Moreover, a timetable for withdrawal of the remainder of Soviet forces had now been established. The final "schedule" was eighteen months. The people and government of Afghanistan fully supported this schedule.

The Geneva proximity process was also going forward under the leadership of the U.N. Secretary General's personal representative.<sup>5</sup> Talks were proceeding smoothly, although there was still a difference of opinion on the withdrawal question. The Soviets expected progress in the next round.

As for the Pakistanis, the Soviets had the impression that, left to their own devices, they would be "bolder" in their relations with the DRA. The Soviets had their own contacts with Pakistan, of course, and from these had the sense that Islamabad was interested in a political settlement. For their part, the leaders of Afghanistan had made clear

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to Diego Cordovez.



their willingness to cooperate in establishing a real coalition government with Zahir Shah, the king's former prime minister, and even with those forces currently fighting the government from bases in Pakistan.

Shevardnadze said that he had been very favorably impressed with the Afghan leadership during his visit. He had not known any of them before, and was struck by the level of their political maturity. They took a very broad view of things, and enjoyed strong support from the people. Shevardnadze often found in his discussions with Western leaders a reluctance to deal with the Afghan regime. Shevardnadze was not able to take seriously suggestions that, somehow, the current leadership had to go. If one did not assume that a government of Afghanistan already existed, no coalition government was possible. So the task was to ensure that the program of national reconciliation was successful. No one should stand in its way. The policy of the current regime was correct and held great promise.

As for the U.S., it could, if it wished, play an important role in bringing about a political settlement. The Soviets knew of America's special relationship with the Pakistani leadership. The U.S. could help Pakistan deal with the Afghan refugees and use its influence to help the Afghan people establish the conditions for true democracy.

Returning to the question of Soviet troops, Shevardnadze emphasized that a deadline for their withdrawal had been announced. The Soviets wanted their troops out. They were not interested in securing any special advantages; theirs was an honest approach. No one should doubt their sincerity.

The *Secretary* said the U.S. saw the situation somewhat differently.

In the first place, it was hard to view the current government as representative of the Afghan people when a third of the country's population was in Pakistan or Iran. These people had had to leave as a result of the Soviet invasion. They had a right to a say in considerations affecting Afghanistan's future, and they were not in a position to make their views known. Of the population which remained in Afghanistan, a high percentage were fighting the Soviet presence. It was difficult to feel that the current government represented these people. We believed that any real policy of national reconciliation would have to be validated by means, e.g., internationally supervised elections, which would enable the Afghan people openly to express their preferences about who would lead them. Traditionally, the Afghans did not want a strong central government.

We were frankly concerned, the Secretary continued, by the tendency of the war in Afghanistan to spill over the border into Pakistan. People were being killed as a result of recent raids. The situation was worsening. We strongly supported Pakistan. We welcomed the Soviet announcement that it would withdraw from Afghanistan, but their



eighteen month timetable was far too long. The guiding principle in such a process should be how long it should take from a logistical standpoint. If, as Shevardnadze had said, the current regime was supported by the people, there should be no problems in the wake of a withdrawal; trouble would arise only if it were not.

The Secretary reaffirmed U.S. support for the efforts of the Secretary General's personal representative on Afghanistan and proximity talks. There had been some headway. As the situation on the ground continued to evolve, we hoped the Soviets would reexamine their view on national reconciliation and the 18-month troop withdrawal schedule. We wanted to see an early political settlement. The conflict was a thorn in the side of our bilateral relations. The situation was a tragedy for the Afghan people. Moscow's reputation in the Islamic world was suffering as a result of the war. These were all arguments for reaching agreement on a political settlement. The U.S. had no interest in securing advantages in Afghanistan. Afghanistan could never be a threat to the Soviet Union. Our only concern was that the country regain its neutral, nonaligned status. In any case, we would continue to work on the problem, because the continuation of the war was a tragedy.

The Secretary said that he had heard a report that the Soviets might be willing to withdraw their forces in eleven, rather than eighteen months. Was there anything to the report?

*Shevardnadze* said he knew nothing of it. The *Secretary* commented that rumors often simply get started. *Shevardnadze* repeated that he had had nothing to do with any such suggestion. Perhaps the U.S. had some ideas.

Picking up on the Secretary's reference to Moscow's "invasion" of Afghanistan, *Shevardnadze* said that invasions were one thing; the presence of forces of one country on the territory of another on the basis of an agreement between the two sovereign states was another. This had to be reckoned with. If the Soviet Union was leaving Afghanistan, it was not because it was being driven out, but because the current leadership felt it possible to run the country without their presence.

*Shevardnadze* said he urged the U.S. to look carefully at what was occurring in Afghanistan as the government implemented its national reconciliation policy and ceasefire proposals. In only two months, 10,000 armed rebels had come over to the government's side. On the basis of agreements with the authorities, they had taken over responsibility for the security of their villages. Over 45,000 refugees had meanwhile returned to Afghanistan, recently responding to Kabul's offers of land and financing for improvements. This process was taking place despite Pakistani attempts to frustrate efforts to return to relocating camps away from border areas. But the process was deep-rooted and would be impossible to stop.

Shevardnadze again emphasized that the U.S. could contribute to a political settlement if it wished. It would be best, in this context, not to arm "forces" based in Afghanistan with sophisticated weaponry like the Stinger missile. The Soviets knew of the great volume in which such arms were being shipped. It would be better if there were greater restraint. As to Moscow's relations with the Islamic world, they were good and no great cause for concern to the Soviet Union. But if there were a drop in arms supplies to the resistance, it would be a real contribution to an Afghan settlement.

The *Secretary* replied that we supported those who fought for the independence of their country. It pained us to see the war continue. We wanted it to end. But we and the Soviets seemed far apart on this issue.

*Shevardnadze* countered that we were far apart not only on the issue of Afghanistan. He would be candid. The U.S. administration seemed to think it normal practice to fight legally constituted governments that the U.S. chose not to view as legitimate. This was the case with Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Angola and Kampuchea. But these governments were legitimate. They had been elected. They represented their people. The U.S. approach was a gross and flagrant violation of the sovereignty of these countries, including Afghanistan.

The *Secretary* said he was surprised to hear Shevardnadze suggest that the Kampuchean government had been elected by the people of Kampuchea. The Secretary knew of no such election. Kampuchea had been occupied by Vietnam. The Vietnamese should not be there; they had no business there. The U.S. supported the ASEAN countries in this matter. The Chinese were also disturbed by Vietnam's presence in Kampuchea. As in the case of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Vietnam should get out. There were Kampuchean refugees all over the world. The message of refugees was that something was wrong in their own country.

As long as they had gotten to the subject of Kampuchea, the Secretary continued, Shevardnadze had suggested over lunch the day before that he had gleaned some sense of movement toward a resolution of the problem during his recent Asian trip. What was Hanoi's current attitude?

*Shevardnadze* in reply asked the Secretary if he had ever been in Kampuchea.

The *Secretary* said he had not. He had been in all the surrounding states: Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia. He had not been in Hanoi. But he had the impression from his travels that the pace of economic development in Vietnam compared unfavorably to that of other South-east Asian States. He supposed that was a function of Vietnam's having made a career out of war. Hanoi's withdrawal from Kampuchea would

be welcomed by all the countries of the region and contribute to its stability.

*Shevardnadze* pointed out that the Vietnamese had learned to fight against the U.S. and France. They were good soldiers. The Secretary agreed they fought well.

*Shevardnadze* said he had asked the Secretary if he had visited Kampuchea because he himself had been to the country for the first time on his trip. While there, he had seen a great deal, including a macabre, sombre museum devoted to the crimes of the Pol Pot regime.<sup>6</sup>

The *Secretary* interjected that he had nothing good to say about Pol Pot. *Shevardnadze* asked to be allowed to continue. The Foreign Minister was convinced that, but for Vietnamese assistance, there would be no Kampuchean people on the face of the earth today. The Kampuchians had to be rescued. The Vietnamese had taken the task on their shoulders.

Now the situation in Kampuchea was improving, albeit slowly. Vietnam's position on the withdrawal of its troops was clear. They could not withdraw in an irresponsible manner. If they did, civil war would break out the next day. Pol Pot forces, armed to the teeth with arms of U.S. manufacture, would make the move they had long been waiting for. So it would be irresponsible for Vietnam simply to pull out.

*Shevardnadze* urged that the Secretary consider another point. The Kampuchean leadership had said it was ready to cooperate with all opposition groups, including Sihanouk.<sup>7</sup> They had even sought the good offices of a number of states in this effort. Even those who had taken up arms against the government would be welcome, with the exception of the Pol Pot group. Vietnam had endorsed this approach. The initiative was an interesting one which should be given a chance. *Shevardnadze* had the impression that the ASEAN countries were as interested in finding a political settlement to the Kampuchea problem as the states of Indochina. In the absence of external pressure, progress should be possible.

As for Vietnam's economic situation, it was a consequence of the lengthy U.S. experience in the country. This was not just a matter of a year or two; the war had left a deep impression. The Soviets were doing what they could to help. The Vietnamese leadership was itself embarked on a restructuring of its economy. *Shevardnadze* was convinced that, with time, Vietnam would be a totally different country.

The *Secretary* said he did not consider this a particularly fruitful area for discussion. *Shevardnadze* replied that he had not expected it to

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<sup>6</sup> Reference is to ousted Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot.

<sup>7</sup> Norodom Sihanouk, the exiled King of Cambodia.

be. Knowing the kind of person the Secretary was, it was not by chance that Shevardnadze had urged him to visit Kampuchea. It would change his viewpoint. There had been a national tragedy there. One could not just sit in judgement and ignore the legacy of the previous leadership—half of the population had been exterminated. The Secretary repeated that nothing good could be said for Pol Pot. Nothing.

Shevardnadze noted that often in the West it was suggested that the governments of Afghanistan and Kampuchea should be changed. It was said that those in power should be expelled and others invited to form a government. The U.S. had done something of the sort in Grenada in a matter of days. The Soviet Union could not follow suit. It was not prepared to assume the shame for such a move. Shevardnadze acknowledged that such a statement might not be pleasant to the Secretary.

The *Secretary* said he found it very pleasant. He would tell the Foreign Minister how the U.S. had become involved in Grenada. We had moved at the request of neighbouring governments after Grenada's rulers had begun killing one another. We had citizens on the island who were in danger. Our troops were there only a short time. The few who had stayed on for a longer period were engineers. Their task was not to repair battle damage, but to deal with the consequences of the Bishop<sup>8</sup> regime's economic mismanagement. An election had put the current leadership in power. They were Grenadans. We were not telling anyone in Grenada what to do. So we were quite proud of what had happened in Grenada. U.S. troops were out. Vietnam's were still in Kampuchea. The Soviets had been in Afghanistan for years.

The Secretary said he saw little purpose to be served by continuing to go around this circle. But a time might come when people in the areas that had been discussed were ready to settle things. He wanted Shevardnadze to know that when such a time came, the U.S. would be on the side of those who reflected what the people wanted. That would be the touchstone of our approach. In Afghanistan, that meant that the views of the refugees would have to be taken into account.

The Secretary noted that Shevardnadze had mentioned the Iran-Iraq war earlier in the conversation. This was an area where U.S. and Soviet views did not diverge so radically.

*Shevardnadze* said he would come back to the Iran-Iraq war. He wanted to emphasize that the U.S. had no grounds whatever for invading Grenada. Vietnam had gone into Kampuchea to save the Kampu-

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<sup>8</sup> Maurice Bishop, the leader of Grenada who was deposed on October 14, 1983, following a U.S. invasion of the island nation.

clean people. The U.S. had toppled the legitimate government of a neighbouring country. This could only be viewed as open aggression.

The U.S., Shevardnadze continued, had allies and friends neighbouring the Soviet Union—Turkey, Japan. The Soviet Union had friends in America’s neighborhood—close friends like Cuba and Nicaragua. Moscow was helping these friends. Despite its own needs, it would continue to help them, because it supported their cause. The revolution in Nicaragua was a popular one. The Soviet Union would support it morally and materially. The Soviets were concerned by the Administration’s open support for efforts to subvert the Nicaraguan government and could not be disinterested in the matter.

Shevardnadze said that the Soviet Union attached great importance to the emergence of a mechanism for the settlement of the complex situation in Central America—the Contadora<sup>9</sup> group. Contadora’s approach was interesting and could be effective. It deserved support. Recent proposals by the Contadora foreign ministers merited close study.

Shevardnadze reemphasized that he was calling the Secretary’s attention to these matters because the Soviets were concerned by the Administration’s policy toward Nicaragua. That was why Shevardnadze had raised Grenada. One must draw conclusions from the past. Nicaragua was a small country, but the Soviet Union supported it.

The *Secretary* said he, too, was concerned about those fighting in Nicaragua. His concern was that the U.S. was not doing enough to support them. Nicaragua had made itself an unwelcome presence. It was coordinating subversion against its neighbours and harboring terrorists. Without exception, the countries of the region felt Nicaragua must find its way to a democratic form of government. We agreed. We would persist in our approach, and did not welcome the huge shipments of armaments which the Soviet Union was supplying to Nicaragua by direct and indirect means. Indeed, Nicaragua’s continuing military buildup was the major destabilizing factor in the region. Cuba’s actions were also disruptive. For our part, we would continue to help those fighting for their independence and freedom.

The Secretary observed that he had been to Nicaragua. He had met with Ortega<sup>10</sup> in good faith to assess the prospects for a negotiated settlement. They had met again in Mexico. But the dialogue had proven fruitless. Contrary to what had been agreed, Nicaragua had sought to

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<sup>9</sup> Documents related to the Contadora process toward a peaceful settlement in Nicaragua are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XV, Central America, 1985–1988.

<sup>10</sup> Shultz met Nicaraguan leader Daniel Ortega in Managua on June 1, 1984.

undermine the Contadora process Shevardnadze had just praised. So the U.S. had had to break off talks. We continued to work for peace in the region. There had been some progress.

*Shevardnadze* asked if the U.S. supported the Contadora process. The *Secretary* pointed out that we had helped launch it, but felt its prospects would be better if we were not too closely identified with the effort. The Secretary himself had discussed the idea with Foreign Minister Sepulveda when Sepulveda was still Ambassador in Washington. We supported Contadora's 21 Objectives. If they were implemented, we would be content.

*Shevardnadze* said it would be well if the U.S. and the Soviet Union both expressed their support for Contadora and the support group. Perhaps the U.S. could consider a joint statement or agreed paper on the subject.

The *Secretary* replied that the U.S. had expressed its support for Contadora many times. There was no reason to do so jointly. We were playing an active role in the region already.

*Shevardnadze* said he would leave the matter there. Referring to an expression he had used the day before, the Secretary commented that he and the Foreign Minister had not "rung the bell" very loudly in their present discussion. He asked the Foreign Minister's concurrence in moving on to southern Africa.

The *Secretary* introduced the subject by describing the need of the southern African states for a reliable transportation outlet to the sea. Various routes made sense. One was the Benguela Railroad, which a number of states in the region had expressed interest in reopening. The problem was that part of the line ran through territory controlled by Jonas Savimbi's UNITA. Savimbi had now announced his willingness to have the line reopened if it were guaranteed that it would not carry military cargo, and if it were subject to international supervision. The Secretary personally felt that the Angolan government would be wise to talk to Savimbi on the matter. He was a genuine leader of an important tribal group in the country. He was an impressive guy.

*Shevardnadze* asked if the U.S. had talked to the Angolan government about the idea. The *Secretary* said that there had been discussions. Talks had been broken off over the past year, but, a week to ten days before, a "very tentative" meeting had been held under the auspices of OAU chief Sosu.

*Shevardnadze* said that the reason he had asked the question was that the Angolan leaders were also nice guys. Shevardnadze knew them all. They were interesting people who were capable of a serious dialogue with the U.S. in pursuit of solutions. The Secretary suggested they talk to Savimbi. *Shevardnadze* said that was their decision to make.

The Secretary asked how the Soviets' hands off approach on Angola squared with their support for national reconciliation in Afghanistan.

*Shevardnadze* underscored the sincerity of the Afghan and Kampuchean governments' commitment to national reconciliation. The U.S. may not recognize the legitimacy of those governments, he continued, but Angola was different. The current government had been in power for over a decade. It had problems, but it was running the country. That could not be seriously questioned. *Shevardnadze* said he could not understand the U.S. mentality on this issue.

The *Secretary* asked why, if *Shevardnadze* was correct, the civil war continued. Why were the Cubans still there?

*Shevardnadze* shot back that he would tell the Secretary why. How many troops did the U.S. have in South Korea? Why should the U.S. have rights that other countries do not. Should only major powers like the U.S. and U.S.S.R. be able to send troops where they wish, while small countries could not?

The *Secretary* said he had only asked why the Cubans should be necessary if the Angolan government was popular with its own people.

*Shevardnadze* said the Secretary knew what the main destabilizing factor in the region was. It was South Africa. This was a reality which had been recognized even by the U.S. and its allies. That was why the Cubans were needed: to defend Angola. South Africa threatened not only Angola, but all the countries of southern Africa. It was the only threat to the region.

The *Secretary* said that the U.S. agreed on the evil of the apartheid system and on the desirability of change on the part of the South African government. We were working toward that end.

With respect to Angola, however, it was simply impossible to ignore the strength and staying power of Savimbi and UNITA. He controlled a major part of the country. He had been a leader in the war against Portuguese rule. It was necessary to put him and the other leaders of the colonial war back together. Savimbi didn't claim leadership of all of Angola, only a segment.

The U.S. was also committed to a settlement of the Namibia problem on the basis of UNSC Resolution 435.<sup>11</sup> This could be brought about if the Cubans left Angola. An independent Namibia would insulate Angola from South Africa.

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<sup>11</sup> Reference is to UNSC Resolution 435, adopted on September 29, 1978, which called for the establishment of an independent Namibia. Documents related to U.S.-Soviet negotiations toward this end are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXVI, Southern Africa, 1985–1988.



As for the Benguela Railroad, its reopening would benefit the countries Shevardnadze had expressed concern over. Savimbi had made a forthcoming offer. It had surprised the Secretary.

*Shevardnadze* pointed out that the conversation was getting into issues which were the exclusive prerogative of the Angolan government. If the U.S. were serious about dealing with the problem posed by South Africa, appropriate means were available. The issue was being discussed at the U.N. Steps could be taken to make South Africa less of a threat to the security and stability of the region. But it appeared that this was another area where he and the Secretary would find conversation difficult.

The *Secretary* acknowledged that this was probably true. The U.S. was in touch with all groups in South Africa who might have a role to play in the event the government recognized the need for changes. The question was how to manage the process to ensure a negotiated, peaceful transition. The situation did not, for the moment, look promising.

The Secretary suggested that the discussion move on to Chad. Qadhafi had been expelled, or nearly so. We hoped he would stay out. He had had no business being in Chad in the first place. We hoped he had no aspirations to return.

*Shevardnadze* asked if the U.S. had contacts with Qadhafi.

The *Secretary* replied that we did only in the sense that we had to deal with his terrorist actions. We didn't need those kinds of contacts.

*Shevardnadze* said it was well that the U.S. had left Qadhafi alone. Moscow continued to oppose the presence of any outside interference in the affairs of Chad, whether by the U.S., France or Libya. Qadhafi knew this. The U.S. did, too. There was no problem in this regard.

The *Secretary* said he hoped that Qadhafi did, in fact, know the Soviet view. Perhaps he would pay attention to it.

Commenting that it was becoming a long day, *Shevardnadze* recalled that the Secretary had asked about the Iran-Iraq war. Why not take up that issue and call it a day? This was not the first time the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had discussed the matter. The situation was very grave. The Soviets did not know how the war would end. Perhaps it would be best not to be too specific about who had initiated the war, or who had aided and abetted one side or the other. The main thing was how to end this senseless war. Even Qadhafi had called it "senseless." Did the Secretary know that?

The *Secretary* said it did not much change his opinion of Qadhafi.

*Shevardnadze* said the Soviets were aware that the U.S. was in touch with the Iraqi leadership. They also knew of prior American contacts with Iran. Maybe, *Shevardnadze* mused, they were still going on. For



their part, the Soviets had tried to maintain a dialogue with both sides, but to no avail. Iran seemed determined to press the war to a successful conclusion. The consequences of such an outcome would be great. The question was, what to do?

The Soviets felt that only the UN Security Council seemed capable of doing anything about the problem. The Secretary General's forthcoming visit to the region to promote mediation deserved support. The problem was being discussed in the Security Council. There had even been a proposal that it be taken up by Foreign Ministers. Moscow agreed with the U.S. view that no purpose would be served by such a meeting unless it were well prepared. This might be something the two sides could consider. Sanctions could also be examined, although they were a thorny issue. They were not always effective, but they could be looked at.

Shevardnadze said that they had recently discussed the issue with the Iraqi foreign minister, who had not ruled out the stationing of U.N. troops on Iraqi soil in the event of a ceasefire. Maybe this was not the answer, however. UNIFIL's presence in Lebanon had not prevented fighting there. In any case, these matters could be studied. The Soviets did not rule out that, if the necessary preparatory work were complete. Foreign Ministers of the permanent Council members might meet on the Iran-Iraq war.

The *Secretary* thanked Shevardnadze for his ideas and said the U.S. shared many of the concerns the Foreign Minister had expressed. The principal lever was to stop the flow of arms to Iran. The public outcry over the small shipments which had reached Iran from the U.S. last year was a function of the shipments themselves, not of the significance of the contents of those shipments.

The U.S. was also concerned about possible spillover of the war to other countries. We had made clear our readiness to help our friends in the Gulf. We could support U.N. mediation of the conflict, but saw little hope of success. As for the use of U.N. peacekeeping or monitoring forces, experience had shown that such arrangements worked only if both parties to a conflict agreed in advance to their introduction—as in the Golan Heights. UNIFIL had had difficulties because not all the parties welcomed them. The U.S. was prepared to work with the Soviet Union to promote a solution. The Secretary knew that Ambassador Walters had a good relationship with his Soviet counterpart at the U.N. They could continue to talk. But, for the moment, we did not have an answer.

*Shevardnadze* said he didn't either. Noting that it had been a long day, he suggested that, since bilateral issues had been discussed in working groups, they need not occupy much of the ministers' time. If the Secretary agreed, perhaps it would be possible to discuss the

exchange of Consulates General in Kiev and New York. As for the other issues on the bilateral agenda, Shevardnadze would instruct his subordinates not to quibble, so that they could be wrapped up before the Secretary's departure. Perhaps the Secretary could give similar instructions. Economic issues had been taken care of in the Ryzhkov meeting. The remaining elements of the agenda were being considered in working groups. Was the Secretary ready to conclude?

The *Secretary* said he was. As the delegations rose from their chairs, he asked Shevardnadze to give his regards to the young Communists whom the Foreign Minister would see the next morning. *Shevardnadze* said that they were good people.

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#### 45. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, April 15, 1987, 2:10–4:10 p.m.

##### PARTICIPANTS

###### US

Secretary Shultz  
Amb. Nitze  
Amb. Matlock  
Amb. Lehman  
Amb. Glitman  
Amb. Ridgway  
Amb. Rowny  
Amb. Cooper  
Amb. Holmes  
Mr. Perle  
Mr. Linhard  
Mr. Mobbs  
Mr. Timbie  
LTG Moellering  
Mr. Adelman  
Mr. Ermarth  
Mr. Simons  
Mr. Parris  
Mr. Stafford (notetaker)

###### Soviet

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
Vice-Minister Bessmertnykh  
Amb. Dubinin  
Amb. Karpov  
Amb. Masterkov  
Amb. Obukhov  
Mr. Mikel'chak  
Mr. Tarasenko

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow trip—Memcons 4/12–16/87. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Stafford; cleared by Graze. The meeting took place in the Foreign Ministry Mansion.

## SUBJECT

## Final Plenary

Summary: The Secretary and Shevardnadze reviewed the results of the three days of discussions, focussing primarily on arms control. In each arms control area, they listed areas of agreement and key remaining issues. In INF, they agreed on the Reykjavik formula of 0/100, with reductions occurring in two or three phases over 4–5 years, and with strict verification provisions. On SRINF, the Soviets proposed immediate negotiations on the elimination of these missiles within one year. Areas of disagreement included conversion of LRINF missiles, the degree of concurrency in the reductions, and the location of the remaining LRINF missiles. On START, the sides agreed on 50% reductions to 1600/6000, on separate limits covering nuclear-armed SLCMs of longer range, on strict verification, and on the heavy bomber counting rule. Disagreements involved linkage of START to Defense and Space, sublimits, and the timetable for reductions. On Defense and Space, the sides agreed on nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period of time and strict compliance with the Treaty during that period. They disagreed on the timeframe for nonwithdrawal, the right to deploy after the period, and testing restrictions during the period. Starting dates for Round VIII of NST were set for April 23 for INF and May 5 for START and Defense and Space. On nuclear testing, the sides agreed to task experts to study alternative verification techniques. On CW, the sides agreed to reciprocal visits of CW destruction facilities. Shevardnadze handed over responses on several human rights cases that had been raised by the Secretary. End summary.

*Shevardnadze* opened the plenary by saying he had just come from a meeting of the Komsomol Congress. The participants in this Congress came from an interesting generation; they were on a different intellectual level and were amazing people. *The Secretary* said he had found the writers with whom he had just met similarly interesting. The writers had said that Shevardnadze was probably meeting with the Communist League this morning and would probably be talking about glasnost. *The Secretary* said he hoped Shevardnadze had done so, or the writers would be disappointed. *Shevardnadze* replied that Soviet writers are very active these days. Returning to the subject of the Congress, he said the spirit was so enthusiastic, he did not feel like leaving.

*Shevardnadze* said he had a package of documents which he wished to hand over.<sup>2</sup> These responded to requests that had been received from the Secretary, President Reagan, and other American representatives; they included emigration, reunification, and other cases which

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<sup>2</sup> Not found attached.

had been considered and favorably resolved. The Soviet side had given all cases serious consideration and study.

Turning to arms control, *Shevardnadze* said he had met with his “foremen” and wished to share with the Secretary some of their views. Regarding medium-range missiles, he had received the following information from his associates. This subject was the one where the most headway had been made, and which provided the best chance for agreement in the near term. He understood that, both yesterday with Gorbachev and in the regular plenary meetings, the Secretary had agreed that the sides would be guided by the Reykjavik agreement on medium-range missiles. They had agreed to implement reductions in medium-range missiles in a phased manner. The U.S. side proposed three phases, the Soviet side two. Their negotiators would straighten this out. The sides agreed that the overall timeframe for reductions would not exceed five years. The U.S. side proposed four years, the Soviet side five. A mutually acceptable solution could be found here. The sides agreed to include provisions on strict verification. They could record verification principles in general terms, while details could be worked out in Geneva. There was agreement on provisions regarding the elimination of operational-tactical missiles in Europe. The Soviet side favored elimination of these missiles. Gorbachev had expressed the view in his meeting with the Secretary that the sides needed negotiations to achieve their final objective—the elimination of medium-range missiles and perhaps of operational-tactical missiles. *Shevardnadze* said he believed there was agreement in principle on the implementation of an agreement on operational-tactical missiles. This would be done promptly, in a timeframe of one year. After the agreement was signed on medium-range missiles, they would be eliminated in 4–5 years; the sides could find a comprehensive solution here. Operational-tactical missiles would be eliminated within one year. The Soviet side disagreed with the following aspects in the INF area: conversion of medium-range missiles and other arms; lack of concurrency in reductions—the U.S. wanted the Soviet side to reduce in the first phase while the U.S. did not, and the Soviet side preferred proportional reductions; and the location of medium-range missiles within striking range of the other side—deployment in Alaska would be unacceptable to the Soviet side. The Soviet side could not adopt the following provision of the U.S. approach to operational-tactical missiles: the right to build up while the Soviet Union eliminated. *Shevardnadze* said he hoped the U.S. would reconsider the Soviet proposals and that he also hoped he had accurately characterized the areas of mutual agreement and disagreement. He looked to the delegations to negotiate more actively and intensively. He could agree to restart the INF negotiations on April 23. Since medium-range missiles represented the most promising area, perhaps

the sides could have their delegations work at a higher level and coordinate better with their foreign ministers. In the next round, the delegations could continue to work on the U.S. draft treaty and the Soviet side would table its own draft.

*The Secretary* said he appreciated the detail of Shevardnadze's report. He was disappointed, however, because he had thought he had made headway with Gorbachev. He could only guess that the Soviet working group did not agree with the General Secretary. *Shevardnadze* joked that, in that case, perhaps the working group should resign. *The Secretary* said he agreed on the Reykjavik formula of a global 100, with Soviet deployments in Soviet Asia and U.S. deployments in the U.S. Nothing had been said at Reykjavik about Alaska. Some staged manner of reductions clearly was the way to approach the problem; he assumed this could be worked out. The timeframe for reductions was close, and could also be worked out. He agreed on strict verification; the U.S. had spelled out its ideas in detail in its draft treaty and he was sure the Soviet side would have ideas of its own. The negotiators could go into this. With regard to SRINF, he had agreed with Gorbachev that this category would include the SS-12 and the SS-23. He had set out U.S. principles for this category that he thought had been agreed to by Gorbachev. These principles included the following. First, the sides should make provision for this category in an INF Treaty. Second, the number of SRINF missiles existing at the time negotiations started would be the present Soviet number minus those withdrawn and destroyed from the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Third, the concept for handling these missiles would be global, not European. This was because these missiles are highly mobile and can be put in airplanes and moved around quickly. Geographic restrictions on the missiles would therefore make no sense. *The Secretary* said he thought Gorbachev had agreed on that, and he was surprised to hear that there were differences on this point. Fourth, it was important that the U.S. have a right to equality, which implied a right to match the Soviet level. He thought Gorbachev had agreed on this. Fifth, the sides agreed on follow-on negotiations about SRINF. Gorbachev had said the Soviet position in these negotiations would be that SRINF missiles should be reduced to zero. Shevardnadze had now added that they would go to zero in one year (he hoped this meant zero globally). The Secretary had said the U.S. position was that we must consult our allies on this question; he would do so tomorrow in Brussels.<sup>3</sup> In summary, he had thought that SRINF issues were narrowed down to the question of the positions of the sides in the follow-on negotiations on remaining SRINF

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<sup>3</sup> Shultz traveled to Brussels the evening of April 15 and briefed NATO Foreign Ministers the following day.

missiles—the Soviet side said zero and the U.S. side would provide a response. He did not know what the Alliance response would be, but it would be essential that the reductions be global. Shevardnadze had said Alaska was unacceptable, but nothing had been said about this at Reykjavik. The U.S. side did not accept the Soviet concept of defining “strategic” on the basis of being capable of reaching the territory of the other side. The U.S. side based its definition on range. If the USSR had a missile that could hit a U.S. ally, such as Japan, it was the same as hitting the U.S. So the sides differed on the place of deployment. The U.S. side would continue to advocate the complete elimination of LRINF missiles, but it was quite prepared to sign a treaty leaving 100 missiles. It would prefer elimination to ease verification; the confidence level would be much higher and the expense of verification much less. The Soviet side might want to consider this. The expense of verification was not negligible at all; it involved lots of manpower and the equipment was costly. The U.S. would like to save the money; nevertheless, it wanted very strict verification. *The Secretary* said he felt when he left the meeting with Gorbachev that the sides had just about gotten there on INF. From what Shevardnadze was saying, he now felt that the sides had not gotten there after all. He asked what the Soviet side wanted to keep in Asia when it proposed to eliminate SRINF only in Europe.

*Shevardnadze* said there was a question he must straighten out. Did the U.S. side agree to prompt negotiations on operational-tactical missiles, or did it want to wait to sign a medium-range missile treaty first? If the U.S. side were to agree on prompt negotiations conducted concurrently with those on medium-range missiles, these negotiations could solve the question of eliminating operational-tactical missiles in Europe as well as issues in Asia. Perhaps the outcome would be similar to that for medium-range missiles, perhaps there would be zero operational-tactical missiles in Asia. The question was when these negotiations would begin. The previous day, the Secretary had said that the U.S. in principle advocated elimination of medium-range missiles. The Soviet side wanted elimination of operational-tactical missiles as well. The question of Europe and Asia would have to be discussed in the negotiations. If the sides could agree today when the negotiations would begin, then they could solve the other problems. If they could start without delay, they might set the objectives of eliminating all operational-tactical missiles in Europe in one year and also solving the issues in Asia.

*The Secretary* said the sides had already been negotiating on SRINF missiles since 1983; the U.S. side was ready to continue addressing this subject. The question was what subject would be left over after the sides got through with their current negotiations. Perhaps all SRINF

missiles would be eliminated. In other words, the U.S. side was ready to negotiate and had been doing so. Its proposal was already on the table, and the sides had been talking about it here. *Ambassador Glitman* noted that the U.S. side had an article in its draft treaty that dealt with SRINF, Article IV. The U.S. side had been discussing this with the Soviet side. The Soviet side had recognized in the past the importance of this issue, and had addressed it in its own draft treaty that it had previously tabled. *The Secretary* concluded that the U.S. answer was yes, it was ready to discuss this question and it had been.

*Shevardnadze* replied that this was important, and that he would say the two sides were ready to start negotiations on operational-tactical missiles. When the U.S. side reacted with incredulity, *Shevardnadze* said the U.S. side should not jump to conclusions. The question was how to address the problem in Geneva. The sides could perhaps have a special group in Geneva; this was not a problem. There would be a formula. He understood the U.S. side agreed to start negotiations on operational-tactical missiles.

*The Secretary* replied that the sides could not say that they would start such negotiations when they had already done it. They should say that they would continue the negotiations, and would make this topic the first order of business when they reconvened on April 23, a date on which the U.S. side agreed. He would be glad to say that on April 23 the sides would make this question the first order of business in the negotiations.

*Shevardnadze* said he would thus assume the U.S. side did not object to continuing negotiations on operational-tactical missiles. But there was a fundamental point to straighten out here. If there were no agreement on operational-tactical missiles, would a medium-range missile agreement be signed?

*The Secretary* said an INF Treaty must treat SRINF missiles. It might not be complete treatment, so it might be necessary to have follow-on negotiations. He had set out the principles involved, to which he thought the General Secretary had agreed. He did not know what the final objective of the follow-on negotiations would be; the Soviet side wanted zero, the U.S. side would have to consult. The U.S. side would not walk away from the negotiations leaving this question totally up in the air. There was no reason to do so, based on the previous day's discussion. The sides had gotten the question pinned down to the Soviet number with negotiations on where to go from that number. He had thought the issues were narrowed down very well, and that there were things the sides could say about an INF Treaty.

*Shevardnadze* said he still thought there was some misunderstanding here, if the U.S. side assumed a medium-range missile treaty could be signed despite no agreement on the entire complex of operational-



tactical missile issues. The sides must negotiate in the framework of Geneva, or in a parallel forum. The U.S. side said it was addressing this question, but it must be discussed on a fundamentally new basis based on the positions described the previous day. New conditions required a new approach. He did not think there was cause for alarm. Why not have a separate negotiating group in the framework of the NST negotiations?

*The Secretary* said the U.S. side was prepared to make this question the first order of business. He could give the press the following statement: the draft U.S. treaty contains SRINF limits; the Soviets have made a proposal on this question; the sides will discuss it as the first order of business when they reconvene April 23. The U.S. side was anxious to get this question settled.

*Shevardnadze* suggested the sides say the U.S. needed to consult with its allies and the sides would decide this issue later. This was a fundamental issue—when the negotiations would begin and what format they would involve, and whether it would be a separate negotiation or within the framework of the Geneva talks. *The Secretary* said the negotiations had begun in October 1981 and again in March 1985. This was not a new issue.

*Shevardnadze* said the U.S. draft treaty called for negotiations after the signing of an agreement. If the U.S. was not ready to agree to negotiations now, it should consult. *The Secretary* replied that the U.S. draft made certain statements that the SRINF issue needed to be agreed on. The sides could not separate the issue off; it must be agreed in the context of an INF Treaty. They could probably get this issue settled, or at least get close to the settlement.

*Shevardnadze* pulled out the U.S. treaty and said there was confusion due to the U.S. proposal that negotiations on operational-tactical missiles start after signature of an INF Treaty. If there were negotiations in parallel with those on medium-range missiles, then he thought there would be no ground for dispute. As to how and where those negotiations would proceed, this could be settled in practical terms.

*The Secretary* responded that the U.S. provision for follow-on negotiations was operative only if there was something left on which to negotiate. The U.S. side was fully prepared to continue its current efforts to negotiate. Moreover, *Shevardnadze* had been reading from Article XIII, which dealt with leftover LRINF missiles; the U.S. would prefer to eliminate Article XIII by going to a global zero on these missiles. Article IV dealt with SRINF missiles. Both sides agreed they wished to work energetically on the SRINF issue. In the previous day's discussion of SRINF missiles with the General Secretary, the sides had made a lot of headway. The Secretary had thought they had established a set of ideas to govern the subject, that on a numerical basis the sides



would come down to a number derived from the present Soviet number minus those in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. The General Secretary had said the Soviet side was prepared to eliminate these missiles, and today Shevardnadze was saying this would be done within one year.

*Shevardnadze* said these were difficult issues. Everything said by the General Secretary regarding missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia stood. The discussion now should focus on the principle of handling this class of systems. The sides needed the immediate start of negotiations, regardless of outcome. The Soviet side favored zero in Europe and would discuss Asia. It favored a global solution, but could not do that today. It needed negotiations now; it was the U.S. idea to start SRINF negotiations after the conclusion of an INF Treaty.

*The Secretary* said the sides had been negotiating, and the U.S. wanted to continue. If they could get it done as part of an INF Treaty, the U.S. wanted to. The sides should agree on a global basis. *Shevardnadze* said the sides should agree about negotiations.

*The Secretary* said the two Ministers could tell the delegations to work on the problem energetically. It could be done; the U.S. wanted to settle. *Shevardnadze* said the Soviet side favored immediate commencement of discussions of this issue. The U.S. should consult, and the sides would clarify the problem on April 23. *The Secretary* said there was no disagreement on the importance of addressing the problem. *Shevardnadze* said he was talking in principle about negotiations. Agreed negotiations ought to start immediately without delay.

*The Secretary* said he would put this subject to the press, the NATO allies, and Ambassador Glitman in the following way. The sides had agreed on the Reykjavik formula of 100 LRINF missile warheads on each side. Both favored a strict verification regime; the U.S. had tabled its in detail, the Soviet side would table its soon. The most important remaining issue was SRINF, about which the sides had been negotiating from the beginning. During the meeting with the General Secretary, the sides had made considerable progress in this field. They had agreed that by the time an INF agreement was concluded, the USSR would remove its missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia and destroy them. This category must be handled on a global basis. The U.S. must have a right to match; it could not be in an unequal position. The Soviet side had said remaining missiles should be eliminated within one year. The U.S. side would take that up with its Allies, and would expect to continue negotiations on this subject energetically in Geneva as the first order of business when the talks reconvened April 23.

*Shevardnadze* said he thought the sides should specify a formula for the negotiations. Perhaps before the signing of an LRINF agreement, the question of operational-tactical missiles would be solved. If the sides were to start discussion now about how many warheads were

allowed at each stage, they would not have sufficient time. Instead, there should be a discussion in principle of how to conduct the negotiations.

*The Secretary* replied that the sides had agreement on the principle of globality; they should say so. They had agreement on equality. He could see if there were going to be reductions to zero in a year, it would make no sense for the U.S. to deploy. He did not think the U.S. would deploy, but he could not say so. He needed to get the agreement ratified, so the principle of equality was important. He was thinking about guidance to the negotiators here.

*Shevardnadze* replied that if the sides were going to talk about the principle of equality, then they must discuss everything in detail. The question arose of the U.S. build-up of operational-tactical missiles. He thought today the sides should agree that they would negotiate on operational-tactical missiles with a view to eliminating those missiles. This elimination responded to the principle of equality.

*The Secretary* said zero was an equal number. He recognized it was the Soviet position, and that the Soviet side had added that elimination would be done in one year. He would discuss this in Brussels the next morning.

Turning to the papers that *Shevardnadze* had handed over, *the Secretary* said he had not read the papers, as they were in Russian, but he could see they contained names of people. He welcomed and appreciated the Soviet response. As *Shevardnadze* knew, the U.S. always handed over representation lists. Ambassador Matlock would give the list to Bessmertnykh after the meeting.<sup>4</sup> *Shevardnadze* said the list looked like a telephone directory. *The Secretary* said some names would be familiar to *Shevardnadze*.

Returning to arms control, *the Secretary* said the sides had agreed to restart INF on April 23. The U.S. side had suggested earlier that the other groups resume May 5, partly because it would give Ambassador Kampelman more time to recover and also because the U.S. side had a lot of work to do to prepare its draft START treaty, which it wanted to present at the next round. If May 5 was agreeable to the Soviet side, the sides could agree to that. The April 23 starting date for INF would indicate the urgency the sides lent to those talks. *Shevardnadze* said he could agree to those dates.

*Shevardnadze* continued that he should note a few things about START. The sides had agreed to 50% reductions to 1600 delivery vehicles and 6000 weapons. They would limit nuclear-armed SLCMs of

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<sup>4</sup> Not found.

longer range to a separate agreed level while assuring proper verification.

*The Secretary* said it was agreed that SLCMs would be treated separately; the greatest difficulty lay in how to handle verification. *Ambassador Nitze* interjected that the Reykjavik formula on SLCMs was that a mutually agreed solution would be found.

*Shevardnadze* said that it was also agreed that reductions in strategic offensive arms must be strictly verified. The following elements were unacceptable to the Soviet side: the U.S. attempt to isolate a START solution from an agreement strengthening the ABM Treaty; U.S.-proposed limits intended to disrupt the structure of Soviet forces; and a U.S.-proposed timetable that was not on the basis of the Reykjavik agreement. The sides would need additional study of a mutual restraint regime on strategic offensive arms. Their experts could discuss appropriate restrictions on building up arms while the sides negotiated in Geneva.

*The Secretary* said there was agreement on 50% cuts and the 1600 and 6000 levels. Also agreed were discussions on the SLCM question and the need for strict compliance. On the latter, the sides could learn from their INF effort. The sides disagreed about the possibility of delinking START from Defense and Space. On the question of force structures, the sides needed a path to reductions that recognized they had different structures, that neither side can force systems on the other, and that they need an equitable and stable way to come down. The U.S.-proposed sublimits came from the 50% idea, and from ideas the Soviet side had proposed last year, such as the 80–85% proposal. The U.S. had proposed other restrictions within the total. The sides had agreed on 50% reductions in Soviet heavy missiles, to a level of 1500 warheads. He would tell the press that the sides had discussed START issues, but had not made much headway. He would have to go then to the points he had just outlined. These were important markers derived from Reykjavik. The U.S. would continue to pursue its proposal. The General Secretary had said strategic offensive weapons were the root problem; President Reagan agreed, and the U.S. side would continue to work on it. *The Secretary* added that the heavy bomber counting rule had also been agreed.

*Shevardnadze* said there was not much point in debating these issues now. The General Secretary had said the Soviet side held to its Reykjavik position regarding levels and sublevels. The sides should let their negotiators debate these questions. With regard to Space, he could say that the sides had agreed on nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period of time and strict compliance with the Treaty during that period. There was no agreement on a specific timeframe, so the sides would need a general formula for now. The Soviet side disagreed

with U.S. plans to deploy large-scale systems by 1994, which signified the collapse of the ABM Treaty by then. Perhaps the two Ministers would discuss the rationale for space-based defense systems next time. He had read the U.S. paper; it was a fascinating document, but he categorically took issue with it. The Soviet side had a different approach; they wanted to eliminate nuclear arsenals. Space defense should not be deployed. He stood ready to discuss this question with the Secretary at greater length next time. He expected the U.S. side would carefully consider the Soviet proposal on the issue of ABM research, as well as their proposal for a list of devices whose introduction into space would be banned. These were new ideas which required study, and which could be discussed in the future. The Soviet side also expected responses to its proposals on ASATs and space-to-earth weapons.

Summarizing on arms control issues, *Shevardnadze* said the Soviet side would table a medium-range missile treaty in the next round. They proposed to accelerate work on a joint paper. He wished to underscore the importance of the paper the Soviet side had provided on Monday<sup>5</sup> on key provisions of START reductions and space limitations. The Soviet side considered it possible to reach agreement at the summit level on an INF Treaty. He knew the U.S. side would be tabling a START Treaty, but thought, in practical terms, that there was insufficient time to agree on all strategic issues. The subject was too complex. The key provisions represented a framework scheme to address at the summit level, if a summit were to take place, along with an INF Treaty. The Soviet side also expected an answer to its proposal for a special SCC session at the level of Defense Ministers or deputies. Everything regarding the ABM Treaty had to be cleared out of the way, including the question of violations. The sides might raise the level of SCC negotiations; it would be a good idea for Defense Ministers or deputies to get together to discuss ABM Treaty issues thoroughly.

*The Secretary* said both sides had said that START was a matter of extra importance; it deserved a great effort. The question of a framework or set of statements on START could be decided at some time in the fall. The approach should be to have the negotiators work on the issues and do a summary statement at that time on where things stood. The sides should try to resolve as many issues as possible and see where they were when the time came. Regarding ASATs, the U.S. side had not heard how limits could be verified and still did not see how this could be done. The Soviet side had the only operational system. On space-to-earth weapons, the U.S. SDI program had nothing

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<sup>5</sup> April 13; see Documents 38–40. Paper not found.

to do with this subject. Ballistic missiles that go through space to the earth were all too efficient for this job. The U.S. side had provided assurances about SDI. The SCC idea was interesting. It might be fun to have the Defense Ministers go at it. Weinberger had provided an invitation long ago to meet Sokolov, and had gotten no answer. He was sure Weinberger would welcome a chance to meet.

*Shevardnadze* suggested the two Ministers make the Defense Ministers get together and quarrel while they watch; it would be a switch in roles. Regarding ASATs, the Soviet side wanted a fundamental decision to ban them. Soviet scientists had come up with interesting ideas for verification as had some U.S. scientists. A decision in principle was needed on both ASATs and space-to-earth arms. On nuclear testing, he thought the Secretary had been a bit too optimistic the previous day. His associates proposed that the sides agree to a single forum with a view to limiting and terminating nuclear testing. Taking into account U.S. statements, the name for the negotiations could be Negotiations on the Limitation and Termination of Nuclear Testing. The first order of business would be yield verification and ratification of the existing treaties. The sides had agreed on the need to improve verification and would conduct agreed experiments at each other's test sites.

*The Secretary* said he had thought, given the discussions and reports he had received from his delegation, that the sides might have the basis for getting negotiations going. He thought it was now too late to negotiate language. What *Shevardnadze* had said was quite a distance from what the U.S. side was willing to set out. It was important to get an understanding about the process of verification. It would be a good thing, if there were a summit in the fall, to complete the efforts on the two treaties. The sides needed to negotiate to make such an advance. Given the current emphasis on compliance issues, both sides needed to have confidence that verification was assured. The Soviet side had made interesting comments on Monday about CORTEX, its views that seismic methods were better, and its readiness to use these methods at respective test sites to find out. He was willing to say now that both sides agreed that means of verification were important, and the sides would set out now to have experts work on this. He assumed the sides were ready to task experts for cross-testing experimentation. *Shevardnadze* agreed.

*The Secretary* said he was inclined to tell the press that the sides were prepared to seek the best methods of verification through joint work. *Shevardnadze* said he agreed with this formulation. The sides needed a decision in principle on negotiations. They could let their experts get together and continue in the same vein as in previous experts meetings.

*The Secretary* replied that he would say that experts will continue to meet on the subject of nuclear testing, that it would be useful to

pursue the question of various means of verification and their relative accuracy, and that they would instruct their experts to investigate this subject. *Shevardnadze* said the U.S. experts were tough. *The Secretary* said Baker had been rewarded for his toughness; he had been promoted to ASD.<sup>6</sup>

On chemical weapons, *Shevardnadze* said the sides agreed to accelerate work on a convention prohibiting these weapons, would agree on a strict data exchange, would implement reciprocal visits at the expert level of CW destruction facilities, and would continue intensive bilateral discussions on these issues. On Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, there were no particular problems.

*The Secretary* said, regarding *Shevardnadze's* points on CW, that he thought discussions had gone beyond the question of agreeing on the need for strong verification measures. The U.S. side had made precise verification proposals. A key question was the need for mandatory challenge inspections; the sides needed to get down to detail there. The U.S. regime was more stringent than the Soviet regime and that of some U.S. Allies. A general statement on CW should not indicate that the sides had resolved the challenge inspection issue. The agreement to visit destruction facilities was good, and the sides should report that. He had agreed with *Shevardnadze's* other points, but the sides must record the important differences in the verification area. *The Secretary* added that the U.S. side was ready to receive Soviet experts at the U.S. destruction facility when they wished to come. He asked when U.S. experts could visit the Soviet facility.

*Shevardnadze* said this could be worked out elsewhere. With regard to challenge inspection, the Soviet side had always advocated the most global, comprehensive verification measures. Many countries, however, did not share the Soviet approach. At the ongoing negotiations, there was a British proposal, and an Indonesian and Swedish proposal, which must be considered. He would like to hold additional consultations on this issue, even at the Ministerial level.

*The Secretary* said this was fine, as long as there was no misunderstanding on *Shevardnadze's* part that the sides had a fundamental difference of view that was unresolved. But there were things worth saying on CW. *Shevardnadze* said it was up to the Secretary to decide what he would say to the press. *The Secretary* said he would report things that were accurate. He wanted to record for the U.S. people where the sides had managed to come together, that the sides knew they had differences, but that they were also capable of resolving some problems.

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<sup>6</sup> Robert B. Barker, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy.



*Shevardnadze* said he thought what the sides had said the previous day about the Secretary's meeting with Gorbachev was just that. It had been a constructive, useful meeting, but many other things were outstanding. These plenary sessions, and the meetings with the General Secretary and the Prime Minister, reflected the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Those relations were complex and contradictory, but there were truly real and good prospects for improving relations in the security area and on other bilateral matters. All in all, the negotiations had been useful. There were many results; other things were outstanding and would require further contacts. The INF negotiations could be accelerated to work out the conditions of an agreement; this was perhaps the main conclusion from these sessions. His general conclusion was that the experts had discussed a broad range of issues.

Regarding other issues, *Shevardnadze* noted that the question of consulates appeared to have been put on the back burner. If the U.S. side had lost interest in this question, the Soviet side would not insist on a resolution. It was up to the U.S. side; the Soviet side could live without an additional consulate. *The Secretary* replied that the U.S. side intended to follow up on that question, and would be prepared to do so before long.

*Shevardnadze* said that, before concluding, he wished to say that the less noise made about spy mania, the better. The U.S. side might find itself in a very difficult situation. It would not be able to find any sensors at its building. It could go to the International Court of Justice and invite experts to look for sensors. The problem was a failure of U.S. experts; they had put the Secretary and the President in a bad position. The sides should seek a normal atmosphere for joint work. They should not create artificial difficulties. He thought it was his duty as a Soviet citizen to say this. In conclusion, he was thankful for the Secretary's openness and candor during these negotiations. The dialogue had been very forthcoming and useful.

*The Secretary* replied that, with regard to the espionage area, *Shevardnadze* did not have to convince him of the efficiency of the Soviet intelligence services. The U.S. side believed that the degree to which the Soviet side had gone in its activities, particularly against the U.S. Embassy, was excessive. The problems in the new building were quite substantial. How it would fix them, the U.S. side did not know.

*Shevardnadze* asked what problems the Secretary was talking about. *The Secretary* said the beams at the Embassy were honeycombed with devices. Getting those devices out would raise questions of the structural soundness of the building.

*Shevardnadze* said the Secretary was being deceived. *The Secretary* said this was incorrect; he had seen the situation himself that morning. He did not know when the U.S. side could move into its building, but

per the agreement between the sides, the Soviet side would not be able to move into its new building in Washington until the U.S. side moved in in Moscow.

*Shevardnadze* asked if the Secretary could show him at least one of the devices to which he was referring. His people told him that the Soviet side was not doing this. If there was something there, the U.S. side should show them. The U.S. side should organize an exhibit like the Soviet side had.

*The Secretary* said the next time one of his experts made this claim to him, *Shevardnadze* should bet him that if evidence could be produced, *Shevardnadze* would win ten tickets to the Bolshoi. *Shevardnadze* would win the tickets; in fact, the expert probably would refuse the bet. The situation at the U.S. Embassy was impressive; *Shevardnadze* would be amazed if he saw what the Soviet side had done. The Secretary had seen it.

*Shevardnadze* replied that the sides should have international experts look at the situation. Why does the U.S. side spare the Soviet side? The Soviet side had not spared them. He need not have raised this issue, but he had.

*The Secretary* said he shared *Shevardnadze's* estimate of the quality of the discussions they had held. He appreciated all the time the two Ministers had had together personally. The two sessions the day before had been very rewarding. There was an unfulfilled agenda item—ideas about the future. He had discussed this some with Ryzhkov and Gorbachev, but they hadn't been able to go into much depth.

At this point, *the Secretary* requested that he and *Shevardnadze* have a one-on-one discussion,<sup>7</sup> and the plenary adjourned.

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<sup>7</sup> See Document 46.



**46. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, April 15, 1987, 4:05–4:20 p.m.

## PARTICIPANTS

*U.S. Participants*

Secretary Shultz

D. Zarechnak, Interpreter

*Soviet Participants*

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

P. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

After the end of the final plenary, the Secretary asked Foreign Minister Shevardnadze for a short private meeting. He told Shevardnadze that he had described to President Reagan the meetings he had had in Moscow, and the President was glad to hear the report. He had told the President that General Secretary Gorbachev had indicated a willingness to have a meeting with the President in Washington within a general time frame, which was mentioned. This was in the form of a general statement, and not a specific commitment. The President had asked the Secretary to convey to Shevardnadze that as possible dates for the visit were examined, and bearing in mind that it was important that these dates be convenient for the General Secretary, the President thought that a convenient time would be late September or October of this year. Fall would be a suitable time. More specific dates could be agreed as the time got closer.

The Secretary continued that the President and he had agreed that if the Summit became more tangible and the dates were set, it would be good to have another meeting of the Secretary and Foreign Minister. He had indicated to the President that the General Secretary and Shevardnadze had agreed that a Summit would need to be well prepared and, therefore, the U.S. would be glad to welcome the Foreign Minister in the U.S. for this purpose.

The Secretary indicated that in reply to questions from the press on this issue, he would say that other than the General Secretary's replies to the questions shouted to him before his meeting with the Secretary, the topic had not been discussed very much, but it was agreed that a useful meeting would need to have content and be well prepared.

Shevardnadze agreed, and said that the Soviet side felt that if there were an arms control agreement, a Summit would be realistic. Gorbachev agreed with this. The Soviet side felt that the two sides

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Trip—Memcons 4/12–16/87. Secret. Drafted by Zarechnak. A stamped notation indicates that Levitsky saw it. The meeting took place in the Foreign Ministry Mansion.

were now in a situation where real results could be expected, especially in the area of INF. Shevardnadze realized that there were difficulties to be resolved on the U.S. side, and that all viewpoints needed to be considered. Different countries had different approaches. Each side had its own ideology, concepts, approaches and interests. But the Soviet Union also had its allies, who had their interests and concerns. For example, the GDR and Czechoslovakia were concerned about the movement of missiles from their territory. But all of these difficulties could be surmounted.

Shevardnadze continued that late September and October was a good time of year, but he thought that in order to finalize a draft of a treaty, it was necessary to have a foreign ministers' meeting. It would also depend on the work done in Geneva.

The Secretary said that he would relay this to the President.

Shevardnadze added that he thought, and Gorbachev and Ryzhkov had said this as well, that the Secretary's meetings, on the whole, had been positive. The Secretary could convey to the President that this was the common opinion of the Soviet leadership. The discussions had been frank. Of course, not all frank discussions were useful. But the discussions of the last several days had had many useful elements which could permit the two sides to lay a basis for a Summit meeting. The Secretary might recall that during their first one-on-one with him, Shevardnadze had asked him if the U.S. were interested in an agreement on INF missiles. After his discussions with the Secretary, he had told Gorbachev that the Secretary *was* interested in such an agreement.

The Secretary thanked Shevardnadze.

Shevardnadze indicated that now the two sides would have to roll up their sleeves and get down to work.

**47. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

April 15, 1987, 1757Z

Secto 6030. Subject: My Last Day in Moscow. Memorandum for the President. From: George P. Shultz. Subject: My Last Day in Moscow.

1. My last morning in the Soviet Union O'Bie<sup>2</sup> and I were driven through a spring morning snowstorm a short distance out of Moscow into rural Russia. The wooded, muddy scene was reminiscent of Appalachia. We stopped in a well-preserved 17th century Russian orthodox church which was crowded with traditional icons, lit candles, and believers. The old ladies chanting along with bearded priests were vivid reminders that there is still some vestige of religious intensity inside the Soviet Union.

2. We stopped and laid a wreath at Boris Pasternak's grave. Pasternak's novels are only now being made available here. The scene this morning in Peredelfino could have come out of the pages of his *Dr. Zhivago*.

3. The highlight was a two-hour discussion with nine Soviet intellectuals, novelists, poets, and artists.<sup>3</sup> They were all exhilarated by Gorbachev's openness policy. Some of these writers are only now being allowed to publish works they wrote 20 or 30 years ago. But they all emphasized that this current level of "glasnost" must be considered just a beginning. I left with them a variety of books by current American authors which they eagerly accepted.

4. These dynamic people all said that we cannot conceive of the importance of good relations between the US and the USSR to this process of openness. And they told me that the US is a beacon of strength to those struggling to speak and write freely here.

**Shultz**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow trip—Memcons 4/12–16/87. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information to the Department of State. The telegram was sent from the Secretary's aircraft en route to Brussels from Moscow.

<sup>2</sup> O'Bie was the nickname of Shultz's wife, Helena (nee O'Brien).

<sup>3</sup> An account of this meeting is in telegram 6357 from Frankfurt, April 24. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Trip—Memcons 4/12–16/87)

## 48. Editorial Note

On April 16, 1987, Secretary of State George Shultz met with President Ronald Reagan at the Western White House in Rancho del Cielo, California. Chief of Staff Howard Baker and President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Frank Carlucci also attended. No formal minutes have been found. In his personal diary entry, Reagan recorded that "about 5:30 Geo. S. arrived to brief on the Moscow trip. Howard & Frank came too & the press covered arrivals & departures. There is reason to believe we may be on the path to some arms reduction." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, p. 711.)

According to notes of this conversation, Shultz described having been well received by the Soviets and afforded "unprecedented" access. He went on to characterize Shevardnadze as "pugnacious" on Central America while a conversation on the Iran-Iraq war was "positive." When it came to arms control, he wrote: "We have deal on INF. [The Soviets] have seen our treaty, & they accept verification." Shultz reported that Gorbachev accepted the inclusion of the SS-12 and the SS-23 as Short-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces (thus covered by the INF Treaty). (Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Secretary Shultz (4/16/1987–05/28/1987))

At 6:50 p.m., President Reagan remarked to gathered reporters: "I have just received a full report from Secretary Shultz on his talks in Moscow and his consultations with our allies. And George, as usual, put forward our positions in Moscow with firmness and great skill. It's clear to me that the visit was very useful in advancing the dialog between our countries in a number of areas—human rights, bilateral relations, regional issues, and the arms reductions." Asked the question of whether an INF agreement in hand was a prerequisite for a summit that year, Reagan responded: "I think that it—I look forward to and am hopeful that we can have a summit. But it must be one that is carefully planned and prepared and that there must be something that we feel we can accomplish." (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1987, Book II, pp. 381–382)

49. **Memorandum From Barry Kelly of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, April 16, 1987

SUBJECT

Status of Various Embassy Security Investigations

Above and beyond agency damage assessment studies and investigations resulting from the Marine espionage case, the U.S. government has created four separate bodies to look at various aspects of Moscow Embassy security, the damage from recent espionage cases and the implications of recent espionage cases for the security of our classified information and operations overseas. We have sought to define the mandate of each of the four elements engaged in this issue with care to prevent excessive overlapping jurisdictions and frictions.

The four bodies are as follows:

*James Schlesinger.* In January, Secretary Shultz asked Mr. Schlesinger to conduct a thorough review of the new Embassy Chancery building in Moscow and to provide recommendations about what should be done with the building. Mr. Schlesinger is nearing the end of that study and expects to provide his recommendations to Secretary Shultz at the end of May or in June. State expects the Schlesinger recommendation to be the basis of a Shultz decision on this issue. In fact, an NSPG will most likely be required for a final decision.

*PFIAB.* In NSDD 268,<sup>2</sup> signed April 14, 1987, the President instructed PFIAB to provide recommendations about security of our overseas missions worldwide, including the suitability of our Embassy in Moscow as a secure environment to conduct classified activity. PFIAB is to provide the President an interim report by July 13, 1987.

*Melvin Laird.* In his press conference on April 7,<sup>3</sup> the President announced that Melvin Laird would chair an assessment review panel under the authority of the Secretary of State. In his radio address on Saturday, April 9,<sup>4</sup> the President stated that Laird had been asked to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, 1987 SYS 4 RWR INT 40201–40225. Secret. Prepared by Collins and Major. Stamped notations indicate that Carlucci and Powell saw the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> On file in Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat: National Security Council, National Security Directive Decisions, NSDD 268.

<sup>3</sup> *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1987, Book I, pp. 345–347.

<sup>4</sup> Reagan delivered a radio address announcing the Laird review panel on April 11. (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1987, Book I, pp. 377–378.)

investigate security at our embassy (in Moscow) and give his assessment to the President through the NSC.

*NSC Damage Assessment.* As one element of the President's charge to you at the NSPG on March 27<sup>5</sup> to coordinate the Government's effort in the aftermath of the Marine case, the NSC staff is coordinating an interagency espionage damage assessment working group which is looking at several recent espionage cases, including the Marine case.

As the new groups begin their work, we face some confusion about exactly what each will do regarding our mission in the USSR.

—Both Schlesinger and PFIAB have been tasked with providing recommendations about the new Chancery building. Schlesinger will report to Secretary Shultz in May/June; PFIAB to the President in July. Schlesinger is looking at the issue from top to bottom; PFIAB will study existing information. The issue which may need to be resolved: (1) how the Schlesinger and PFIAB recommendations regarding the new Moscow Chancery are to be coordinated and how we will structure the decision process regarding next steps on the Chancery issue.

—There is confusion about the charter of the group Melvin Laird will chair. According to State, Secretary Shultz, before he departed for Moscow, determined that the Laird group should head an *Accountability Review Board* along the lines of an Accountability Board called for in the Omnibus Diplomatic Security Act. Laird has indicated to State that he is reluctant to take on some aspects of the Accountability Review function, in particular, a role that would require his body to assess individual responsibility for the Moscow situation. There is a great deal of pressure from Congress on the Administration to conduct an accountability review. It was for this explicit reason Shultz commissioned the Laird study. If Laird is successful in persuading State that he should not study accountability, Congress will most likely do it for us. The bottom line is that Secretary Shultz needs to resolve with Laird the accountability aspects of of his Commission's mandate.

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 31.

**50. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 18, 1987

SUBJECT

Shultz Moscow Visit

I have briefed Former Presidents Carter, Ford and Nixon on the Shultz Moscow Visit. All appreciated the contact.

President Ford laid particular emphasis on not allowing the Soviets to place any constraints on SDI deployment. President Nixon was not surprised that little progress had been made in the START Space and Defense area. He expressed concern about the Zero SRINF proposal. While politically it is hard for the Europeans to refuse such a proposal, he noted, it does entail a rupture "in the seamless web" of the NATO flexible response doctrine. Europeans worry that acceptance of the Zero option would move us closer to a massive retaliation response to a Soviet attack in Europe where we would be in the position of "trading Cleveland for Berlin."

President Carter was supportive of the INF initiative, including the Zero SRINF proposal. He said he would so state publicly if you desired.

I also talked to Zbigniew Brzezinski who was quite supportive of our approach, although he acknowledged the concerns of the Europeans. He raised one caution and one suggestion. We should avoid getting into the Carter trap whereby we raise expectations on a treaty and a summit to the point where we generate pressure on ourselves to make unwise concessions. The suggestion was that we consider a dramatic new proposal on conventional reductions.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Files, Howard Baker (03/27/1987–04/28/1987). Confidential. Sent for information. Copied to Howard Baker and Shultz.

51. **Note From Ambassador-at-Large Nitze and the Counselor of the Department of State (Kampelman) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 15, 1987

Mr. Secretary:

On May 15th at 3:00 p.m., Dr. Lawrence Horowitz met with us for a debriefing following a brief trip he had made to Moscow earlier this week. The meeting was pursuant to an understanding he had reached with Ambassador Kampelman at the latter's home on the evening of Saturday, May 9, just prior to Dr. Horowitz' departure for Moscow. The Moscow trip followed a recent invitation from Anatoliy Dobrynin, consistent with a series of such visits by Dr. Horowitz, representing Senator Ted Kennedy, with Soviet officials, beginning with Andropov's leadership.

On Tuesday, May 12, Horowitz spent approximately 1½ hours with Dobrynin and his deputy, Korniyenko. On Wednesday, he spent a similar amount of time meeting with Mr. Zagladin, Dobrynin's other principal deputy.

The tone of the Dobrynin meeting, personally warm, was "uncharacteristically rigid" in substance and at variance with the tone of their last similar meeting in Moscow in December.<sup>2</sup> After some discussion of Presidential politics in the United States, characterized by distorted Leninist analysis, Dobrynin asserted that the very promising developments between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. following the latter's initiative in December had clearly failed. (The code name for this Soviet overture was "Project 5.") General Secretary Gorbachev had been encouraged by the President's response that he was willing to have his personal representative meet with Dobrynin in Moscow for informal discussions of how to break the Geneva log jam. The President's decision to include Richard Perle in that delegation was interpreted by the Soviets as an inability on the part of the President to carry through on the spirit of the Soviet overture. (Horowitz said that he challenged the validity of that conclusion in that the participation of Perle would have helped produce a U.S. consensus behind any results achieved and would have been of assistance in the later ratification of any treaties coming out of Geneva.)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Ambassador Nitze's Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, July 1982. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 9.



Dobrynin stated that the Soviet government now believes that only an INF agreement can or should take place with President Reagan. They are convinced that President Reagan will not take any steps designed to meet Soviet “weapons on space” concerns and that without some satisfaction in that area, no START agreement is possible. Dobrynin very candidly stated that the President is now obviously weaker than he was in December and does not have the ability to get his way with Congress. They are also convinced that the President has no intention of showing any SDI flexibility and that it is already too late. Furthermore, the Soviets see no need to negotiate on SDI since the Congress will meet their present concerns by prohibiting tests which would violate the ABM Treaty. (Confidentiality, says Horowitz, must here be protected.)

Horowitz informed Dobrynin that in his view and that of Senator Kennedy, such a Soviet conclusion would be a “tragic mistake.” He pointed to the fact that a Presidential veto of any legislation restricting SDI would be upheld by the Senate. He also said that postponing the issue until there was a new President would only mean that an “arms race in space” would get underway in the interim; and the identity and program of a new President are today totally unknown. It is Horowitz’ view that those assertions, coming from him, may have had an impact on Dobrynin, but he is uncertain. Kornyenko was very tough and Dobrynin seemed to be associating himself completely with those tough views.

There was a discussion on INF with Horowitz concluding that the Soviets are eager for that agreement and optimistic that one could and would be negotiated in Geneva. Dobrynin showed no sympathy for the concerns of the Germans and the uncertainties of our European Allies. He also verbally closed the door on any possibility that the 100 INF warheads agreed upon at Reykjavik as a global limit would in any way be reduced to zero. The Soviets, he asserted, already know how they are going to deal with the 100 in Asia. He said that 33 would be aimed at U.S. nuclear weapons in Korea; 33 would be aimed at our bombers in Japan; and 33 on the Far East which they identified as a “special problem” relating to the U.S. activity there, with no further explanation.

Dobrynin asserted that the Soviets had made all the INF concessions they were going to make and that they had made more than their share. They were prepared to have an LRINF agreement without any provision dealing with SRINF. Dobrynin denied that Gorbachev had proposed to the Secretary a global zero SRINF program. (It was Horowitz’ impression, however, that the Soviets would be prepared to get down to zero globally on SRINF if that was the U.S. insistence.)

In the discussions dealing with *SPACE*, Dobrynin said that the Soviets could not accept any agreement which implied that they would

at any time acquiesce in the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty. He, furthermore, asserted that the Soviets could not accept any agreement or statement of principle which would legitimize any withdrawal from ABM or imply that the ABM Treaty had a finite life to it.

Dobrynin said that the Soviets would be prepared to have a statement of principle on START pronounced at the Washington Summit, but that statement of principle had to recognize Soviet linkage with SPACE and the Soviet commitment to the ABM Treaty. The statement of principle could lightly acknowledge those Soviet concerns, but there had to be some such acknowledgement.

Horowitz informed us that he pointed out to Dobrynin that such a statement of principle was worthless and would not bind a new President; would have no validity in American law; would not make a new negotiation on the subject with a new President any easier; nor would it improve the chances of later ratification of a treaty. He said that it was his view that there was still time for a START treaty. The problem was a serious substantive one, but not one of time.

Horowitz said that Dobrynin's messages were always directed toward Senator Kennedy and no specific reference was made to any likelihood that Horowitz would be sharing what he learned with any Administration officials. The meeting concluded with Dobrynin asserting that he could not visit the United States before autumn. He then expressed the hope that Horowitz would visit him again in Moscow within the next three months so that they could take further inventory of where they stood.

On Wednesday morning,<sup>3</sup> Horowitz had breakfast with Ambassador Jack Matlock who told him that he had seen Dobrynin at dinner the previous Friday night.<sup>4</sup> Matlock felt that the tone of his conversation was much more positive than the tone of the conversation with Horowitz, but that it was substantively similar.

Horowitz then met with Zagladin. The latter stated that he wanted to spend time with Horowitz so as to "tone down the negative impression" that Dobrynin may have given him. He said that nothing had changed substantively since Secretary Shultz' visit to Moscow and that the substance communicated to the Secretary was not altered. He asserted, however, that it was necessary for Dobrynin to be inflexible because the substance communicated to the Secretary was established policy and Dobrynin could not deviate from it. Furthermore, since Gorbachev was out of Moscow, there was no way for Dobrynin to receive authority to moderate his tone or reflect what he had learned

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<sup>3</sup> May 13.

<sup>4</sup> May 8.

from Horowitz. Zagladin stated on more than one occasion that there was no “closing of the door.” The U.S., however, had to realize that there could be no START agreement without some SDI linkage which would include a compromise agreement on testing. With respect to START, Horowitz clearly understood that there would be some flexibility in recognizing U.S. concerns about additional sub-limits.

It was significant that Zagladin urged Horowitz to communicate to Senator Kennedy and to Administration authorities that the Administration should study the May 8, 1987 Soviet “key elements” statement in Geneva (text provided to Secretary in Moscow).<sup>5</sup> He specifically read out loud the reference to a Soviet requirement that a negotiated and signed START treaty could be ended if any of the parties proceeded to “practical creation” of a space-based ABM system. (The Soviet word is “development.”) There had to be some such conditionality in any START agreement and this conditionality was absent in the U.S. draft treaty. He emphasized the statement was carefully drafted and that the words “practical creation” were designed to be a discussion opener. He hoped the United States in Geneva and elsewhere would probe the meaning of those words with the Soviets and suggested those words might provide a cover which would satisfy the SPACE requirements of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. He also suggested that it was necessary to have some acknowledgement by the U.S. of what was agreed upon on January 5, 1985, that the purpose of the negotiation and agreement was to prevent an “arms race in outer space.”

Zagladin asked Horowitz to cable him whether he was able to communicate his message to U.S. authorities. Kampelman authorized Horowitz to say he had communicated it to Kampelman, who was aware of the Soviet paper, took it seriously, had instructed U.S. negotiators in Geneva to probe, and intended himself to probe further with Vorontsov when they next met.

It was Horowitz’ conclusion that the difference in emphasis between his Tuesday and Wednesday conversations might reflect a division on the part of those who advise Gorbachev. He also believes that Gorbachev very much needs and wants a Summit in the Fall. Horowitz, speaking as a concerned citizen, felt this gave us a great deal of leverage. He saw no advantage for the United States in having Gorbachev receive a triumphant tour in the United States by signing an agreement which was not as important to the United States as the President’s desire to achieve radical reductions in the strategic weap-

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<sup>5</sup> See telegram 5233 from the Nuclear and Space Talks delegation, May 11. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870626-0692)

ons. (This is a point worthy of more serious consideration by the United States.)

NOTE: Horowitz believes that Dobrynin accurately reflected current Soviet thinking. Kampelman is doubtful, believes that Zagladin's conversation was also a part of the Soviet message, and looks upon the "tough" part of the message as consistent with a well established Soviet negotiating pattern, particularly as the talks come close to the "last 20 minutes."

Horowitz stated that Dobrynin responded further to Kennedy's family reunification concerns by giving him the travel papers to deliver to two of the families on the Senator's list.

**Paul H. Nitze<sup>6</sup>**

**Max M. Kampelman**

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<sup>6</sup> Printed from a copy that bears these typed signatures.

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**52. Memorandum of Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dubinin)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 15, 1987

On May 15 I was seated next to Soviet Ambassador Dubinin at a social occasion. He used it to obtain a reporting cable.

He asked me how I saw US Soviet relations. I said OK, he said best ever. "We can get an agreement." When will NATO be ready with its answer? I said probably by the Venice Summit<sup>2</sup> in the meantime the USSR should work with us on verification. We are also interested in Start. He said we could define "laboratory." I said nothing doing. We were not going to negotiate an interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

He asked about their proposal to negotiate off a working document instead of a treaty. I said that we were willing to listen if the working

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Frank Carlucci Files, Howard Baker (04/29/1987–06/23/1987). Confidential. Drafted by Carlucci on May 18. Copies were sent to Ermarth and Linhard. There is no indication where this conversation took place.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the G-7 Summit held in Venice June 8–10.

document corresponded to the treaty and did not go beyond it. He wondered about our response to their proposal for a meeting of Defense Ministers. I said Cap was always ready to travel.

He pushed hard on Afghanistan. I said there would be no peace till they got out and allowed real self determination. He asked if they could have a “special dialogue” on Afghanistan. I simply said “interesting idea.”

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**53. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 28, 1987

SUBJECT

Meeting Between the President and the Secretary of State Relating to Moscow Embassy Situation

In his last meeting with you Secretary Shultz<sup>2</sup> said he would discuss the Moscow Embassy Security situation with you at some future time. The following is an update in preparation for that meeting.

—Schlesinger<sup>3</sup> returned from his trip to Moscow last night (5/27). He may indicate the construction of the Embassy building is not as bad as reported in the press.

—Secretary Shultz was recently briefed on the results of the joint [*less than 1 line not declassified*] fly-away teams that visited 10 countries to look at the state of security. The teams have provided several recommendations about improving security at overseas missions. Among the recommendations is the need for a standardized non-fraternization policy which can be strictly enforced. The teams found this area a weak element in our security policy.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, 1987 SYS 4 RWR INT 40301–40325. Secret. Copied to Howard Baker. A stamped notation indicates that Reagan saw the memorandum on May 29. Reagan initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> The President met with Shultz, Howard Baker, Carlucci, and Duberstein from 1:31 to 2:04 p.m. on May 27. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No substantive record of the meeting has been found.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, whom the President had appointed to review the construction of a new Embassy in Moscow after the discovery of Soviet bugging devices.

—The teams also found little or no counterintelligence [3 lines not declassified].

—The Naval Investigative Service continues to pursue the espionage investigation involving the Marines. To date, they have interviewed 155 Marine Security Guards (MSG) and polygraphed 104. Out of this group, two have admitted espionage and two are strongly suspected of espionage. Six more have shown deception on polygraph questions relating to espionage. In addition, between 45 and 50 Marines have admitted unauthorized contact with criteria country citizens or other infractions of regulations or illegal activities, some of which may involve KGB recruitment operations directed against MSG personnel.

—To date, investigators have discovered no physical evidence in Moscow to prove the Soviets made entry into our Embassy's secure spaces.

—Secretary Shultz may raise the issue of funding needs to address issues raised by the Moscow security situation and the problems we are finding at other posts.

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#### 54. Editorial Note

On June 3, 1987, President Ronald Reagan flew from Andrews Air Force Base to Marco Polo Airport, Venice, to participate in the Venice Economic Summit of the G-7 nations. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) On June 12, Reagan flew from Marco Polo Airport to Tempelhof Central Airport, West Berlin. At 2:20 p.m., he delivered a speech at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin. "We hear much from Moscow about a new policy of reform and openness," Reagan declared. "There is one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of freedom and peace. General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!" (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1987, Book I, pp. 634–647) Following this speech, Reagan returned to Andrews Air Force Base via Tempelhof Central Airport and Koln-Bonn Airport. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

On June 15, Reagan delivered an address from the Oval Office at 8 p.m. "Six years ago the United States proposed a step called the zero option, the complete elimination of U.S. and Soviet land-based longer range INF missiles. At the time, many labeled it ridiculous and sug-

gested the Soviets would never accept it. Well, we remained determined, and this year the Soviets adopted a similar position. So, tonight I can tell you that, with the support of our allies, the United States will also formally propose to the Soviet Union the global elimination of all U.S. and Soviet land-based, shorter range INF missiles, along with the deep reductions in—and we hope the ultimate elimination of—longer range INF missiles.” (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1987, Book I, pp. 653–655) Negotiators and administrative officials referred to this tandem of short-range and long-range INF as the “global double zero” proposal.

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**55. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 26, 1987

SUBJECT

The Next Six Months with the Soviets

The Venice and Reykjavik meetings<sup>2</sup> cleared the decks for a very active phase in our relations with both the Soviets and the Allies. We need to integrate our Soviet strategy with our policies within NATO and to put the emerging calendar of events to work for us.

Gorbachev seems to have concluded that his interests are best served by remaining engaged with you, and he is working from your agenda. You thus hold strong cards to nail down historic arms reductions and to put our gains on human rights, regional issues, and bilateral cooperation on a firm basis for your final year in office and beyond.

Venice and Reykjavik also underscored that there are more than two players in the East-West game. NATO governments face tough political choices on next steps in nuclear and conventional arms control and modernization. Where they come out will bear great influence on

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Subject File, Soviet: Six Months. Secret; Sensitive. Shultz handed a copy of this memorandum to Reagan during their June 26 meeting, which took place from 1:17 until 1:41 p.m. at the White House and which Reagan, Shultz, Bush, Howard Baker, Duberstein, and Carlucci attended. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) Notes from this conversation are in the Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Secretary Shultz (05/29/1987–08/13/1987) [Meetings with the President—notes].

<sup>2</sup> References are to the Venice G–7 Summit, June 3–11, and the Reykjavik NATO Ministerial meeting, June 11–12.

our dialogue with the Soviets, and could define the direction of the Alliance for the remainder of the century.

Thus, the next six months may represent a decisive moment for your East-West policy. There will be at least three main events to steer matters with the Soviets—two visits by Shevardnadze and your summit with Gorbachev. With the Allies, the action will be more continuous and complex, and we should plan on intense, visible consultations to manage it. The strategy below outlines the groundwork we must lay through the summer and early fall so that your leverage is at a peak at a fall meeting with Gorbachev.

#### *First Shevardnadze Meeting*

Now that our SRINF position is on the table, we expect the Soviets to agree soon to a July meeting. We should use the occasion to set in motion an intensive work plan leading to a summit this fall. Specifically:

—We should aim at wrapping up an INF agreement by late summer. In advance of the meeting, Mike Glitman will pursue Soviet hints of flexibility on German Pershings and the remaining 100 LRINF. Our INF delegation should plan to remain in Geneva over the summer to focus on remaining issues, notably verification.

—We should keep the Soviets' feet to the fire on START, parrying their calls for a "key provisions" agreement by emphasizing how near we are to an agreement of historic importance, and continuing to insist that we work on a joint draft treaty. Over the coming weeks, Max Kampelman will probe in Geneva for any softness in the Soviets' linkage of START to SDI, and seek to put off the ABM Treaty interpretation issue.

—We will try to secure Shevardnadze's agreement to a sequenced approach to nuclear testing negotiations, with delegations initially addressing verification of existing treaties and the agenda for a second phase. This will enable us better to support the nuclear testing program. We also need to resolve interagency differences on chemical weapons to get off the defensive on this issue.

—Human rights will have an especially high profile if recent backsliding on emigration and political prisoner releases continues. My letter to Shevardnadze<sup>3</sup> already has put down a firm marker on this score. I will be in close touch with Congress and private groups to ensure we can confront Shevardnadze authoritatively with the truth that token gestures will not do the trick, and that we need routine Soviet implementation of its Helsinki Final Act commitments as a

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<sup>3</sup> The letter was transmitted in telegram 184547 to Geneva, June 16. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N870005-0294)



continuing mechanism for solving such issues as emigration and family reunification. We will also consult with the Allies at the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting<sup>4</sup> to firm up an end game strategy aimed at extracting maximum Soviet concessions on human rights.

—We want to move the regional discussion beyond recitations of positions to results on the ground. With Shevardnadze, we can reinforce the message that the key to an Afghanistan settlement is for Moscow to make the hard decisions on a withdrawal and an interim regime. We can also exploit Soviet expressions of flexibility on the Middle East to obtain substantive concessions on the peace process. And we can press in the UN and privately to secure Soviet cooperation to end the Gulf War.

—On the bilateral front, we should concentrate on restoring momentum to your people-to-people initiative. We have collaborated with Charlie Wick on a draft letter to Gorbachev which would reemphasize the importance you attach to this area. We can also use the Shevardnadze visit as a way to get started with expert-level discussions on new exchanges agreements in the areas of Basic Sciences and Transportation, and as the occasion for signing the agreement reached earlier this year on establishing Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers.

—Finally, we can use the occasion to reinforce the strong demarches we have already made on the need for Soviet cooperation in restoring Embassy Moscow to full operations and in implementing Jim Schlesinger's recommendations on the new embassy building.

With the Allies, we should take every opportunity during this period (High Level Group meetings, reinforced NAC's) to urge implementation of the Montebello nuclear modernization program<sup>5</sup> and Conventional Defense initiative, while taking the lead in shaping a comprehensive arms control approach that protects our nuclear guarantee to Europe.

We should achieve a NATO consensus during the summer on draft mandates for negotiations on conventional stability and on confidence building measures, developing initiatives for each to put the Soviets on the defensive. We will also need to shore up NATO consensus for our overall approach to the Vienna CSCE follow-up conference and later meetings on human rights. I will share our strategy for the forthcoming Shevardnadze meeting with my NATO (and Japanese) ministerial colleagues beforehand, and give them a report after.

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<sup>4</sup> The Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting took place January 15–18, 1989.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the October 27, 1983, decision by NATO's Nuclear Planning Group to reduce stockpiles of short-range intermediate nuclear forces while modernizing remaining systems.

*September Shevardnadze Meeting*

Shevardnadze's attendance at the UNGA traditionally provides an opportunity for a meeting here or in New York. The focus of a September meeting would largely depend on progress in INF. It is conceivable that we would already have reached sufficient agreement to have announced a summit. If so, we would use the September session to review progress across the full agenda which might be recorded at a summit. If not, outstanding INF issues would claim priority. In either case, we would want to:

—Push hard on START, if necessary exploring a document short of a full agreement which could subsequently lead to a full START treaty during your administration. We would also review the bidding on such issues as nuclear testing and chemical weapons to determine how they might figure in a summit.

—Press for human rights progress, taking advantage of the Soviets traditionally greater flexibility on human rights in advance of high level meetings.

—Follow-up on our summer diplomatic efforts in such areas as Afghanistan, the Gulf and the Middle East, and review the results of expert-level meetings in those areas.

—Take stock of progress in implementing existing bilateral exchange agreements and of negotiations on new agreements which could figure in a summit meeting: basic sciences, transportation and various Coast Guard-related agreements.

—Provide the Soviets with a definitive statement of our needs for completing our new chancery in Moscow, following technical work on the Schlesinger recommendations.<sup>6</sup>

Normally, at the UN, I meet with Summit Seven ministers, and with the British, French and Germans. There is also a host of bilaterals with other Allies. These will be good occasions to tie them into our objectives for the second Shevardnadze meeting.

Throughout the period, we will work closely with the Allies to coordinate an active strategy for the human rights/humanitarian side of CSCE, and to push for conclusion by the end of 1987 of both the Vienna meeting and NATO-Warsaw Pact informal talks on a mandate for conventional stability negotiations. A high priority will be to orchestrate semi-annual ministerial meetings of the Defense Planning Committee and the North Atlantic Council in order to demonstrate the unity of our defense and arms control programs.

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 61.

*Gorbachev Visit*

The climactic event with the Soviets would be a Washington summit. The Soviets have hinted that early October or late November would be most convenient for Gorbachev. As the Soviets have made clear that an INF agreement would be a condition for a summit, there would be a natural tendency to view signing of that Treaty as the focal point of the event. We would need to ensure that our full agenda received full attention. To do that, we would rely on:

—Emphasis during the summit in private and in public statements on the importance of consummating a START agreement enshrining 50% reductions as the priority task of the next year.

—High visibility events keyed to human rights themes by you and other administration spokesmen. The end-phase of the Vienna CSCE meeting would be a natural opportunity; radio or other addresses by you and other senior spokesman could also be used. We should be prepared to acknowledge progress where it is underway, but hammer away at the need for long-term improvements and seek concrete Soviet commitments to procedures that would guarantee them.

—A major address on regional issues and strategy during the pre-summit period. The UNGA is the obvious forum.

—Events during the summit which focus on cooperative activities of interest to us: signing of bilateral exchange agreements; a ribbon cutting at the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center; a Rose Garden reception for participants in people-to-people programs.

We should also be willing to allow Gorbachev to pin down a second meeting in Moscow, to be scheduled for the summer of 1988, while reiterating the visit would have to be well-prepared.

*High-Level NATO Consultations*

If we can achieve an INF agreement and schedule a U.S.-Soviet summit, we would want at that point to hold a high-level meeting with our allies. Such a session would set the stage for the Gorbachev visit, provide a high visibility opportunity to emphasize our full four-part agenda, provide visible Alliance consultations, and reaffirm the NATO security and arms control consensus. I think it should take place in Brussels. After the Gorbachev summit, you could write to each of the Allied leaders to report the outcome.

*A Final Note*

This is an ambitious agenda. I believe it is a realizable one. With the necessary clarity in our objectives and unity in our ranks, we should be able to close out 1987 in a strong position to achieve even greater progress during your final year in office.

## 56. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup>

Washington, June 29, 1987, 1833Z

200231. Subject: Presidential Message on Iran-Iraq.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Please deliver the following letter from the President to General Secretary Gorbachev. There will be no signed original. Since the President will announce several of these points Tuesday morning,<sup>2</sup> delivery of this letter should take place ASAP.

3. Dear. Mr. General Secretary:

Over the past several months the permanent members of the Security Council have made extraordinary progress in the effort to advance the goal of bringing to an end the tragic and dangerous conflict between Iraq and Iran. We have now reached a major milestone in this effort, with agreement in principle on a Security Council resolution mandating an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal to international borders. I much appreciate the cooperative attitude of the Soviet Union, which has contributed substantially to this important achievement.

I believe you share our judgment that for the resolution to have an impact on the combatants they must realize that the Security Council is prepared to take measures to enforce its order. Thus, I would urge we reach agreement now, at least among the permanent members, on specific implementation measures. These would include mechanisms for verifying a ceasefire/withdrawal in the event of compliance, and enforcement measures, preferably an arms embargo, in the event of refusal of one or both parties to comply.

I am convinced that we must now focus intensively on reaching this agreement. Therefore, I have asked Secretary Shultz personally to lead our delegation in New York when this issue is brought before the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870687–0263. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis; Immediate. Drafted by H. Lampert (IO); cleared by W. Courtney (NSC), G. Kulick (IO/UNP), Simons, R. Mueller (S/S), M. Creekmore (NEA), and in substance by N. Smith (IO) and D. Goodman (IO); approved by Armacost. Sent Immediate for information to Paris, London, Beijing, Baghdad, and USUN. For Gorbachev's response, see Document 59.

<sup>2</sup> On June 30, Fitzwater issued a statement, on behalf of the President, concerning U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf. For the text, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1987*, Book I, pp. 729–730.

Council. We believe this should be no later than mid-July, given the dangers of serious deterioration in the Gulf. I have instructed Ambassador Walters to explore these issues carefully with your officials in Moscow. Finally, I also urge that our deliberations in New York be intensified, and have directed that, beginning the week of July 6, our UN Delegation be augmented by experts to assist in bringing this matter to a speedy conclusion.

Success in this vital endeavor depends upon our common commitment to press ahead resolutely and swiftly to resolve the remaining issues, while we continue to support strongly the complementary mediation efforts of the Secretary General. As Under Secretary Armacost noted to Ambassador Dubinin,<sup>3</sup> the U.S. and the USSR can play a special role in this process. When our countries decide to work together at the UN, we can achieve results.

Sincerely, Ronald Reagan

**Shultz**

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<sup>3</sup> Transmitted in telegram 175523 to Moscow, USUN, and Secretary of State Shultz's delegation to the ASEAN post-ministerial meeting in Singapore, June 19. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870676–0149)

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**57. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Kampelman) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 1, 1987

SUBJ

Ministerial with Shevardnadze

There are signs of both Soviet activity and inactivity which should be carefully noted and evaluated in Washington. They disturb me.

It is significant that we still have not received a response from Moscow as to a date for the ministerial. Your message<sup>2</sup> on proposed

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1987 July 1 Mtg. w/the PRES. Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 55.

dates was conveyed to Shevardnadze while he was travelling. Vorontsov told me ten days ago that the earlier proposed date was probably unsatisfactory because it conflicted with the FRG President's<sup>3</sup> visit to Moscow. He thought, however, without committing Shevardnadze, that the dates of July 13 and 14 would probably work and we would hear when Shevardnadze returned to Moscow. It is now ten days since Shevardnadze's return to Moscow and we have heard nothing. We have reason to assume that the dates and possible new negotiating moves depend on Gorbachev, who until quite recently, was preoccupied with matters of the economy.

A related development covers the private channel<sup>4</sup> Dobrynin has with his Senator<sup>5</sup> friend, who received a message from Dobrynin last week. On Friday morning, the Senator asked me to meet with him and shared with me that message to the effect that "things are moving rapidly" and the Senator's friend, serving as liaison, should hold himself in readiness to return soon to Moscow. That afternoon, the date of July 15 was proposed by Moscow and for personal reasons rejected, with a suggestion by the Senator's friend that he could come sooner. Dobrynin responded by reaffirming that "things are moving rapidly" but that it was not necessary for the Senator's friend to rush to Moscow.

We do not know the "whys" for all of the above. We do know that matters have come to a grinding halt in INF this week and Soviet movement appears to be frozen.

It is my opinion that the Soviets are proceeding on the assumption that we require a ministerial more than they do; that we require a summit; and that we are sufficiently eager for some kind of an arms control agreement with them so that they have leverage and want to play it. It is essential that we not feed that misperception. We should always appear publicly to want to meet with the Soviets, which is why you invited Shevardnadze to Washington and why the President invited Mr. Gorbachev to Washington. Whether they accept is for them to decide. It is our view that our joint interests and world stability would be strengthened if these meetings and an arms-reduction agreement take place, but we are a strong country and can certainly live without those meetings or an agreement if the Soviets do not agree.

It is also my strong recommendation that we begin at all levels of Government, from the White House down, to emphasize our interest

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to West German President Richard von Weizsaecker.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the Horowitz-Dobrynin channel.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to Senator Edward M. "Ted" Kennedy (D-Massachusetts).

in not only achieving the abolition of all nuclear systems in the world with a range between 300 and 3100 miles (LRINF and SRINF cover 500 to 3500 kilometers), but that we also want what the President and Mr. Gorbachev agreed upon in Geneva in November, 1985, *i.e.*, 50% reductions in all long-range strategic missiles to the level of 1600 launchers and 6000 warheads agreed upon in Reykjavik. The Soviets have been playing coy in this area and it would not hurt us to begin expressing the view that we hope Mr. Gorbachev has not changed his mind with respect to these important reductions.

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## 58. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>

Plains, July 17, 1987, 5 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

Former President Jimmy Carter  
Frank Carlucci

### SUBJECT

Briefing of President Carter

The main purpose of my visit was to brief President Carter on the Persian Gulf. I went through the actual status of our escorting plan, the vote in the UN and the debate in the Congress.<sup>2</sup> President Carter was interested in all the details, particularly the vote in the UN since he had discussed this on his trip with both the Soviets and the Chinese. He seemed mildly surprised to hear that Dick Walters had received some positive signals from the Chinese with regard to the embargo resolution. He voiced no criticism of our decision other than to note that he thought our escorting was rather provocative. I assured him that this was not our intent; we were simply escorting U.S. Flag vessels on the high seas, and our ships represented a threat to no one. He did not pursue the point further.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

*Moscow.* Carter noted that the Soviets had rolled out the red carpet for him.<sup>3</sup> Like everyone else, he found Gorbachev impressive. He

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Memos for the Record 1987. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the U.S. reflagging and escort of Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf.

<sup>3</sup> Carter met Gorbachev in Moscow on July 1.

thought that Gorbachev was at a crossroad on the arms control issue. He was debating whether it was in his interest to make an agreement with Ronald Reagan or to wait until the next president. I noted that Gorbachev had commented to Gandhi<sup>4</sup> that it would be in his interest to deal with Ronald Reagan. Carter thought that that might well reflect his thinking but he still hadn't fully made up his mind. When I noted that the Soviets were throwing up essentially false obstacles on INF (100 in Asia and the Pershing 1–A's) Carter did not disagree. In fact he said he told the Soviets this. When he mentioned the 100 in Asia, pointing to the problems that this created for the Japanese and the Chinese, the Soviets responded with a smile, "we don't want to put all our cards on the table at once."

I told Carter we had not seen much Glasnost in Soviet foreign policy. The Angolans were refusing to negotiate seriously on Cuban withdrawal, a massive arms shipment had just arrived in Nicaragua and the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan was 20,000 troops larger than when Carter left office. Progress in human rights was little more than a trickle.

Picking up on the latter point, Carter said he had met with refuseniks during his visit. He was more upbeat on the human rights issue than I was but acknowledged that emigration was still far too low. He noted, however, that a number of refuseniks with whom he had met preferred to stay in the USSR.

Carter asked how we might bring about a thaw in US-Soviet relations. I responded that it was very simple. All they needed to do was remove the obstacles to an INF agreement and go ahead with the Summit. At the same time it was important that we both make progress with SALT. This was an agreement that stood on its merits, and we needed to push it. The Soviets had to recognize that SDI was going forward. Once they did and stopped trying to kill it via START, we could negotiate with them on a period of stability. Carter did not argue this point.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

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<sup>4</sup> Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.



**59. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, July 18, 1987

Dear Mr. President,

I have carefully read your message<sup>2</sup> and considered the views contained in it.

We, too, are seriously concerned over the growing tensions in the Persian Gulf area. We discussed this issue more than once with the U.S. side, including at the time of Secretary of State Shultz's visit to Moscow. Our position of principle on this acute and complex problem has been set forth in the recent statement by the Soviet government.

One has to note with regret that thus far it has not been possible to slow down the dangerous trend in this region, let alone reverse it. There are several reasons for this.

First, it is the continuation of the senseless bloodshed between Iran and Iraq, which contributes, objectively, to aggravating the situation. Here, as I understand, there are opportunities, and good ones, for joint actions by our two countries in the UN Security Council in favor of an earliest cessation of this prolonged conflict on just terms. There are, however, other sources of the escalation of tensions, which I shall discuss further.

Before doing so, I wish to inform you, Mr. President, about the many-sided efforts that the Soviet Union has been making to settle the Iran-Iraq conflict. As you may be aware, we have established special direct contacts with the leaderships of Iran and Iraq and are engaged at this time in intensive talks aimed at bringing the positions of the belligerents closer together, and encourage them toward a peaceful solution.

I would like to particularly emphasize that these efforts pursue no selfish ends, let alone directed against legitimate interests of third

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Head of State Correspondence File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (879073). No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. Levitsky sent the translation and the Russian-language copy of the letter to Carlucci under cover of a July 18 memorandum, in which he explained that Dubinin handed the letter to Armacost. An attached NSC Correspondence Profile indicated that Carlucci sent the letters to Reagan on July 20 and that the President "noted" the letters on July 21. Telegram 222128 to Moscow, July 18, provided the Embassy with an English version of Gorbachev's letter to Reagan and reported on Armacost's meeting with Dubinin. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

<sup>2</sup> See Document 56.

countries. Our only goal is to prevent a situation where a dangerous line would be crossed, beyond which a regional conflict could escalate into an international crisis, our objective is to help end the war.

We intend to continue and intensify those efforts.

Such an active bilateral diplomacy is called upon, as we see it, to organically supplement and bolster the broad multilateral efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war, and we attach paramount importance to our participation in those efforts. And I agree with your view that in this area the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have good prospects for constructive cooperation. Currently, our two countries, along with other UN Security Council members, are playing an active role in working out effective measures promptly to channel the Iran-Iraq conflict toward peaceful solutions. Our representatives have been instructed to press on with the efforts seeking, in particular an immediate ceasefire, an end to all hostilities and a prompt withdrawal of all troops to internationally recognized borders.

It is our firm conviction that a special role in carrying out the decisions now being prepared by the world community belongs to the UN Secretary General. Indeed, it is on his actions that will depend to no small degree the further steps which may be required if the adopted resolution is resisted by either of the parties in the conflict. In the event of such an undesirable development the recommendations of the Secretary General will, understandably, carry a lot of weight. In this connection, we expect, Mr. President, that you will find it possible to give necessary support to the peacemaking mission of the Secretary General and will join us in contributing to its success.

As for your proposal that experts participate in the work being done in the Security Council, I can reaffirm our positive attitude to it, given, naturally, the concurrence of the Council's other permanent members.

Now I must come back to the question of the causes for the increased tensions in the Persian Gulf area. I must say frankly: these are not confined to the continued hostilities between Iran and Iraq. We cannot ignore the buildup of the US military presence in the area, to say nothing of the contrived pretexts used in an attempt to disguise it. True, there are not only your warships, but ours as well in the Persian Gulf. However, simply looking at the facts as they are—and I am sure you have every possibility to do so—would show that our naval presence is in no way comparable to yours either in scale or in operational functions. A few Soviet warships to which references are being made in Washington, are escorting on a temporary basis our merchant vessels at the request and with the knowledge of the littoral states.

Moreover, guided by the desire to use every opportunity to make the situation better, the Soviet Government has proposed that all war-

ships of the states outside of the region be withdrawn as early as possible while Iran and Iraq in their turn refrain from actions which would pose a threat to international shipping.

We are gratified by the constructive reaction of most countries, including those involved in the conflict, to that proposal. We would like to expect that the US leadership will also view it in a positive light, in the spirit of cooperation.

Also, some statements by representatives of your administration seem to indicate an interest on the American side. If such an impression is justified, then we would be prepared to discuss this question with the US in more concrete terms in any format suitable for you.

Speaking in broader terms, I want to emphasize that I share the idea which you expressed in concluding your letter: when our countries decide to act together, the results will not be long in coming.

Sincerely,

**M. Gorbachev**

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**60. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 21, 1987

SUBJECT

Gorbachev's Reply to Your Letter on the Iran-Iraq War

Last Saturday, July 18, Soviet Ambassador Dubinin came in to State on an urgent basis to deliver Gorbachev's reply (Tab A)<sup>2</sup> to your letter of June 29 (Tab B)<sup>3</sup> inviting Soviet cooperation with us in the UN Security Council on political steps to end the Iran-Iraq war.

Gorbachev's letter is positive in tone and mentions US-Soviet cooperation on a resolution calling for a cease fire and withdrawals. But he goes downhill fast from there. He is not forthcoming on subsequent

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Chron Files, July-August 1987 (2). Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Bush and Baker. Reagan initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Reagan saw it on July 21.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed. See Document 59.

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed. See Document 56.

steps, such as sanctions, other than admonishing us to join them in supporting the Secretary General's efforts. In fact, the Soviets have been less active and exposed than we, as symbolized by Shevardnadze's absence from the UNSC session.

Gorbachev strikes a few additional notes with negative edges.

—He calls attention to Soviet bilateral diplomacy with both Iraq and Iran, which we cannot replicate, claiming that it is not directed at selfish ends or harming the interests of others.

—He complains that US naval presence is a significant source of regional tension, while claiming that the Soviet naval counterpart is in no way comparable and that it operates at the request of littoral states (implying that ours does not). He also implies that there should be an Iran-Iraq agreement to end attacks on shipping, independent of the overall war.

—He reaffirms the Soviet proposal to remove the naval presence of all "non-regional" states, and claims to hear support from Iran and Iraq, many other states, and even some voices in your Administration. Although he does not do so explicitly in his letter, Gorbachev is asserting elsewhere that the USSR is a regional state while the US is not.

There is nothing surprising in Gorbachev's letter; it tracks fully with Soviet actions we are seeing. Moscow is clearly trying to play all sides against the middle at low risk: Seeking to establish a reputation for statesmanlike cooperation; to appear moderate but fully engaged to the Gulf states; to keep political lines open to both Iran and Iraq; and to paint us as partisan and bellicose. For the moment, we have little choice but to let Moscow play this game. If we get into a more confrontational situation with Iran, we can expect the Soviets to step up their efforts to play the peacemaker, seeking broader regional influence at our expense.

**61. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 28, 1987, 2:06–3:12 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Embassy Security Issues

**PARTICIPANTS**

The President

*The Vice President's Office*

Craig Fuller

Donald Gregg

*State*

Secretary George Shultz

Deputy Secretary John Whitehead

Ronald Spiers

*Treasury*

Secretary James Baker

*Defense*

Secretary Caspar Weinberger

GEN William Odom

*Justice*

Brad Reynolds

*OMB*

James Miller

*CIA*

Judge William Webster

[name not declassified]

*JCS*

GEN Robert Herres

ADM Jonathan Howe

*FBI*

John Otto

*White House*

Howard Baker

Kenneth Duberstein

Frank Carlucci

Colin Powell

Barry Kelly

Fritz Ermarth

John Lewis

*The President* opened the meeting and made the following points: The reports from Jim Schlesinger, Mel Laird and Anne Armstrong all underscore one fact: our past practices have not been up to the security and counterintelligence job we face today overseas. The President said he is determined this situation will be corrected. We face a sophisticated, well funded, well organized assault, but he is convinced American management and technology can match any challenge our adversaries mount. To do so, we must organize ourselves better, marshal the best minds and management talent we have, and think creatively. We must build and maintain secure, efficient facilities overseas. Our personnel program must recognize the threats our people face and prepare them to meet those effectively. Overseas and in Washington our managers must have authority to provide security and be accountable for doing so. And we must do what is necessary to prevent adversaries from taking advantage of our open society by holding them to acceptable behavior in this country. The President added that he was

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, 1987SYS4 RWR INT 40526–40549. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

interested in hearing assessments of these three reports and recommendations of where we go from here. (S)

*Mr. Carlucci* then turned the floor over to Secretary Shultz. (U)

*Secretary Shultz* noted that his 20 minutes of allotted time was reasonable since we have a major problem and must do something about it. He pointed out that although the State Department has been working on embassy security issues, State has not been moving fast enough. He indicated he had read the major reports and would make comments on the following topics focusing mostly on Moscow but applicable to the other bloc countries: (S)

*The NOB:* (U)

*Secretary Shultz* noted we have a reasonable degree of unanimity and that we should work to be as sure as possible about security of the NOB. Clearly we should tear down most of the building. Schlesinger recommends that we tear down the top three floors and that we build an annex. In discussing this issue with Schlesinger, Shultz believes we should knock down the top five floors of the NOB. (S)

*The President* asked how many floors are there? (U)

*Secretary Shultz* replied that there were nine floors with a pool in the basement. Shultz went on to say that the problem is not with the ground floor: it is what's above and below. It's for this reason that Shultz supports the Johnny Foster concept of "slicing" maybe as low as the first floor. Although we can't count on it to do a full job, we can do certain things to insure our security. My specific recommendation on the NOB, however, is to incorporate the "slicing" concept at the lowest floor possible, together with deconstruction and rebuilding of the top five floors. Concerning the twin towers, the question must be asked, do we need the space? Size is a factor. We do not need additional space. Additionally, if we increase our size, the Soviets may want to increase theirs. The annex thus raises the reciprocity problem; they may want to build something here. An annex cannot be built until later, so we do not need to make the decision now. The annex has potential for the future. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* continued that to rebuild the NOB is a big job. We should bring everything in to rebuild the NOB. This is very expensive and we can't get the funding from Congress to do it properly. Because this has a great deal to do with security, we should work with the intelligence committees to obtain appropriate funding. Secretary Shultz indicated that he had worked with some members of these committees, and that they were receptive. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* continued that there is no way the NOB could be ready for occupancy for at least five years, adding that the concept, money, Soviet agreement, and the unusualness of the construction job

would require that amount of time. This will obviously be performed by a private contractor and the employees who perform this work must all be American and heavily screened. (S)

*The Old Embassy Building:* (U)

*Secretary Shultz* noted that there is unanimity that the old embassy is inadequate, particularly since we will have to utilize it for at least the next five years. The old embassy is in need of major renovation to fix the security. The renovation cannot be a band-aid approach. *Secretary Shultz* indicated that State is in the process of working with an architect, and efforts are under way to secure the facility and space, communications in particular. *Secretary Shultz* noted that he has been advised that the cost to renovate and rehabilitate the old embassy would be somewhere between \$16–20 million. Based upon his experience, he would put it closer to \$30–35 million. That is a lot of money for a building we do not think will be permanent. But again, the budget is a problem. We need the money to do the job. This is of such importance, however, that maybe we just ought to do what needs to be done and someone will pay for it. (S)

*The President* asked that once we had fixed up the old embassy building and moved in to the new building, who gets the old building? (U)

*Secretary Shultz* responded that under the current agreements the old building will go back to the Soviets. However, we are negotiating to keep the old building [1 line not declassified]. Additionally, we could perform certain activities in the old building which would be to our advantage, e.g., consular business. This would allow us to keep the Soviets out of the new building, insuring that the new building is all American and very secure. We might also utilize the old building for living quarters. (S)

*The President* asked that in cleaning up the old building and making it presentable, can we make sure that we also make it reasonably secure? (U)

*Secretary Shultz* responded that he was not an expert, but that if we go about it right we can provide good secure space and facilities. *General Odom* agreed with the Secretary totally, indicating that activities could be conducted to insure a high level of confidence about certain aspects, even though security for all spaces would be doubtful. *The President* noted that he was thinking about the residence, where people go home and can't talk about work. *Secretary Shultz* noted that all our people in Moscow know that they should not talk about their work in their residence, or any place outside the embassy. Furthermore, our people must remember never to take things home from work. Our people must lead double lives in Moscow and seem to accommodate

themselves to that. But on the plus side, professionals want to go there because it is an interesting and challenging assignment; so it is not all bad. *The President* noted that it was not as good as America, that a little 12 year old girl from Wisconsin told him that. *Secretary Shultz* agreed with the President and noted that when one leaves the airport in Moscow one sighs with relief that it is over. (S)

*Organization:* (U)

*Secretary Shultz* indicated that he would like to go on to another topic which was somewhat more controversial. Secretary Shultz recalled for the President the PFIAB Report, where Professor James Q. Wilson, a knowledgeable and brilliant man, set forth the concept from which his PFIAB recommendations stemmed, which are as follows: State Department has a role: its role is to engage in diplomatic and representational activities abroad. One acts as an American, mingles in the society, goes to bars, meets people and hopes that they might ask you to dinner and to reciprocate. One interacts with the people. One tries, in an overt way, to learn as much about that society as possible. That is the culture of the State Department. We want our people to get around and to learn about the culture and the people. Reporting by State officers constitutes important knowledge about the country. [1 line not declassified] Wilson concludes, however, that if that is the culture, one cannot bring oneself to worry about security and counterintelligence. Therefore, it is not possible in the State Department to administer a good counterintelligence program. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* noted that in not speaking as the Secretary of State but speaking as a manager, he does not think Wilson's concept will work. If counterintelligence and security is part of our mission we must work them. Counterintelligence and security are part of the problem and we have to live with them. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* noted that when Mr. Carlucci was in Portugal he recognized that there were Communists there. We must, therefore, be ready to change the culture and management consciousness in State. Secretary Shultz noted that he has been working on this since becoming Secretary of State. He further noted that private business handles security a great deal better than the Government. Secretary Shultz then indicated that he wanted to talk about some of the reorganization recommendations. He indicated that he did not think that the DSA concept was a good idea, although recognizing that we need a strong security bureau. He has increased his security bureau by five times since becoming the Secretary, however, State counterintelligence is doing a crummy job, even though it is improving. He reiterated that he agreed that we need a separate bureau, but that it must be from within State rather than separate. He would, therefore, resist a spin-



off or separate agency. Secretary Shultz also raised the issue of the audit function being conducted and certified by the CIA. He agreed that an independent audit function is a good idea and that standards must be set up as to what we are aiming at. Regardless of what we decide, however, we can never say something is 100 percent secure. Just as the Secret Service cannot provide 100 percent security for the President. *The President* requested Secretary Shultz to use another example. *Secretary Shultz* noted that there are certain people who will say that they can never secure anything 100 percent. He further believes that the CIA should not be the one to conduct the audit. Perhaps we could struggle with creating some kind of interagency, independent audit, with some kind of an outside aspect to it that would guarantee its independence, rather than hand it over to the CIA. (S)

*Personnel:* (U)

*Secretary Shultz* indicated that the selection of personnel should begin with the manager at post. There is no doubt that people should be screened and selected carefully. If we were to look at some of the resumes like that of Sergeant Stufflebeam, we would have realized early on that he had been in all kinds of trouble in previous posts. Perhaps there was a thought that someone was going to punish this guy and send him to Moscow. We should, therefore, start with the simplest things and this would eliminate many of the problems. Having worked industrial personnel, psychology tests are all right, but common sense management, security and counterintelligence, must be up front in the manager's mind. Secretary Shultz noted that he has an ID badge. When he started wearing it every day, everyone else began wearing one. He observed time and again that when it comes to safety, and all other things are the same, better management consciousness and treating people right makes the difference. Therefore, accountability must be the Ambassador's; and he must know it. Every agency also must know that it cannot thumb its nose at the Ambassador. The Ambassador must approve assignments. (S)

*Polygraph:* (U)

*Secretary Shultz* then moved on to the topic of polygraph, noting that he cannot see applying lie detector tests to a class of people as in the State Department. Secretary Shultz noted that he has been persuaded by Judge Webster, Helms and Casey that lie detector tests are good for investigative and interrogation techniques. But again, he has great apprehension in applying them to classes of people. Secretary Shultz noted that one can kid oneself that just because people pass the lie detector they are bona fide, noting the recent CIA Cuban double agents as an example. He added that someone who is nervous also might fail the test. Secretary Shultz again questioned the application of the

polygraph in an embassy setting noting, however, that he is not addressing DOD or the Agency. He simply cannot see it. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* concluded by noting that the previously mentioned topics were searching and depressing problems but that we are looking into it and that we care a lot. (U)

*Mr. Carlucci* then turned the floor over to Judge Webster, asking if he could abbreviate because of time. *Judge Webster* opened his remarks by noting that we are in agreement on most of the issues. He noted that he agrees with Schlesinger that none of this will work unless we integrate the physical, technical and personnel security. He would also underscore putting the rehab of the old embassy building first, noting it is the most important. We should spend money and move immediately. Noting that in consultation with CIA, NSA, FBI and with more unanimity than on any other study, the highest priority was placed on the refurbishment, security and habitability of the old embassy building. Next, the review of personnel nominations for assignment to Moscow must be more comprehensive. Regarding the polygraph examination, Judge Webster noted that he took a polygraph examination the previous day to reinforce his support for the program. He conceded that the polygraph is a tool that can fail to detect deception, but further noted that it is important to keep people focused on accountability for looseness of talk. He could not think of a better setting where this applies than a diplomatic situation. (S)

Regarding the NOB, *Judge Webster* continued, we should take it down as far as we could go. If Secretary Shultz says five floors, we support that decision but that we should bring home the parts taken down for technical examination. (S)

*Judge Webster* noted that he further supports the concept of the DSA set out in PFIAB, recognizing that there is some apparent disagreement on how it's to be constituted. Responding to Secretary Shultz' concern on CIA certification, he noted that the DCI certifies the facility as the head of the Intelligence Community. He noted that Congress would probably support this more than an audit function inside the State Department. *Secretary Shultz* noted that he did not mean inside the State Department but independent. (S)

*Judge Webster* continued that the new building is going to require lots of cooperation from the Soviets and that the Soviets are not going into Mt. Alto until we are in good shape in the NOB. (S)

*Judge Webster* concluded by noting that Congress is looking for solutions. If we make Congress a part of it, we could move much more quickly. *Secretary Shultz* agreed totally. (S)

*Mr. Carlucci* then called upon Secretary Weinberger for discussion. *Secretary Weinberger* agreed to "slicing" the new building. He further

agreed that we should refurbish, rehab and make secure the old embassy building noting that we could be there a long time. He suggested, however, that the Soviets should be asked to help pay for the new building since it's their fault we have the added expenses. We should make this a part of our demand. He further agreed with the earlier comments about not being able to combine the State Department culture with the counterintelligence and security culture. The counterintelligence and security culture is a basically suspicious, negative approach to insure our security. It, therefore, takes a different mind set and a different group of people. All of this cannot be put into the State Department. One cannot audit one's own activities. He further agreed that the DCI was in the best position to insure competency to store classified information. Secretary Weinberger went on to describe the Soviet Union as the only country in the world seeking world dominance. That doesn't mean we can't visit and work with them, but they cannot be in charge of our security. He went on to confirm his belief that the Ambassador must look at the people assigned to him, but then asked what do we do with a bad Ambassador? Secretary Weinberger indicated that Ambassador Hartman was a big problem. We must, therefore, have an outside agency that knows the game and looks at security. State, therefore, can look at the culture. We further must apply these rules to all countries. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* noted that he would like to say a word about Ambassador Hartman. The Secretary described Hartman as doing more about security than his predecessors, although he left a lot to do. *Secretary Weinberger* indicated that he would like to say a word about Sergeant Stufflebeam. *Secretary Shultz* noted that Stufflebeam's problem with bad checks was in the file. (S)

*Mr. Carlucci* summarized the results of the meeting noting that we have identified three problem areas: (1) the NOB, noting that the sentiment on the Hill is to tear it down; (2) management, with the degree and separation between the bureau of security and the State Department in question, and (3) the standards set for personnel. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* asked as to how we could bring all three together so the President can make a decision, noting that there is a lot we agree upon already. He reiterated that he wanted a bureau of security, but inside because he wants the culture at State to change a little. *Mr. Carlucci* noted that there is heavy pressure from the Hill on this issue and that if the President doesn't make a decision, Congress will make one for us. He asked if Secretary Shultz would send in a report setting forth his position on the issues. *Secretary Shultz* indicated that he would be delighted and would send in a report noting the disagreements and he would do this before Congress goes home. We should be able to say to Congress that the President has done such and such. *Mr. Carlucci* reiterated that we must do something before Congress recesses. (S)

*The President* asked who will do the work if we start to work on the building? *Secretary Shultz* noted that only American workers would be employed. *Judge Webster* noted that we must be assured that what has happened will not happen again. (S)

*Jim Baker* asked what is the nature of the polygraph system. *Judge Webster* responded that [1 line not declassified]. (S)

*Howard Baker* noted that it was important that we stake out a position on this issue. He suggested that the President's radio address this Saturday would be a good time for the President to make a remark about this issue. If we do not move quickly, this will become a Congressional issue rather than the President's. He then asked *Secretary Shultz* how long until we can move on this matter? *Secretary Shultz* responded "pretty fast." (S)

*Howard Baker* identified the key issue as the NOB, i.e., are we going to tear it down or not? *Secretary Shultz* noted that he and *Judge Webster* were practically in agreement. *Judge Webster* noted that to tear down the NOB is an emotional thing. But if we allow the Soviets to set the standards with whatever we do, it will be difficult. *Howard Baker* noted that it was important to have this fundamental question answered in time. (S)

*The President* stated that he could accept what he has heard at the meeting. If there is a need to rebuild, he agreed to go with the five floors and not the three, and to "slice." (S)

*Secretary Weinberger* indicated that the building need not be the only issue for the President's radio program, but personnel issues also could be addressed. *Secretary Shultz* agreed. (S)

*General Odom* noted that the skills to do competent audits requires representatives of other agencies and not just the CIA. (U)

*Secretary Shultz* noted that as he sees it right now when it comes to assuring communications one looks to CIA. *General Odom* indicated that if we find a technical penetration, often it is because of custodial problems involving personnel, locks, etc. All too often penetrations are premised on custodial problems. (S)

*Howard Baker* noted as one final item: let's insure that we leave this to be the President's decision. *Mr. Carlucci* stated that he would like to see the option of what we would sacrifice if we take the NOB all the way to the ground. *The President* noted that with what we have in the basement, we have no need to do that. *Judge Webster* noted that standards can be upgraded. (S)

The meeting concluded at 3:12 p.m.

**62. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz and Director of Central Intelligence Webster to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, August 3, 1987

We met on July 30<sup>2</sup> to follow up on the July 28 NSPG meeting<sup>3</sup> on Embassy Moscow and general security issues. As a result of our discussion, we have largely agreed on what must be done and how we should now move to get on with the job. Our objective is to achieve a sound and integrated security and operational stance at Embassy Moscow and elsewhere overseas, and put in place a rational structure and procedures here in Washington which will assure that good security is central to our overall diplomatic and intelligence efforts.

We have focused on the following five areas of priority and endeavor as they formed the core of the NSPG discussion.

*The Existing Office Building (EOB)*

There is full agreement between us that we must thoroughly rehabilitate the existing Embassy office building to make it safe, secure and habitable. This work has already begun. We have shipped in the necessary construction materials to give us a new secure Embassy communications center by mid-October. Additionally, work is under way to replace the building's heating system (which failed last winter), to install a fire protection system, to upgrade the electrical power capacity, and to install a much needed new elevator. Demolition and renovation of the upper floors of the building's sensitive areas will be accomplished on an accelerated basis. We have already reprogrammed some funds for this and we will get whatever further funds we require to do this thoroughly and well. Current estimates are this may take as much as \$35 million to accomplish.

We are going to have much more central coordination and backstopping of Embassy Moscow in this rehabilitation of the existing building and all of the related support activities. Ambassador Gary Matthews has been given full-time responsibilities as Special Coordinator for Moscow and our missions in Eastern Europe. He will pull together the joint efforts to get things done and get them done well and on time. We have also contracted with an experienced, top-notch architectural/engineering firm in Washington which will advise us in overseeing all of this work on the existing building.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, 1987 SYS 4 RWR INT 405263–40549. Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> No minutes have been found.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 61.

We believe that we should aim to retain the existing office building as part of our overall Embassy presence in Moscow.

*The New Office Building (NOB)*

There is no difference between us on how to proceed in correcting the Soviet-penetrated structure of our new Embassy office building in Moscow. We agree that we should (a) deconstruct the top five floors; (b) install an anti-drilling barrier at the fifth floor level; and (c) “slice” the existing columns of the structure at ground level. The reconstructed top five floors would be made state-of-the-art secure; at the same time we would also make the lower three floors of the new building—on which only unclassified operations will be conducted—secure for all but the most sensitive activities. Finally, we propose that this approach on dealing with the NOB be carried out in a design layout which is consistent with the separate annex building recommended in the Schlesinger report. This will leave open the option should we later decide there is a need for an annex.

Our agreed recommendation, as outlined above, is predicated on the essential technical ability to carry this out and do so in a timely fashion. This approach will be *very* expensive, but it is money well spent. We should consult with the congressional leadership on how to fund this effort. One alternative could be to supplement the intelligence community budget. This would offer the advantages of concealing from the Soviets just how much we have done to correct and protect against their penetrations.

*Organizational Structure*

Physical security and counter-intelligence must have our highest priority at all times. We must be organized in such a way that a security consciousness is an integral part of our daily procedures and actions. For this we need an organizational structure which has real clout and heft.

We believe that the basic security organization has to be part of the Department of State in order to give us the accompanying ability to affect the overall diplomatic culture of what we do and how we do it. This effort began already two years ago, in the wake of the Inman recommendations, and we have identified and put in positions of responsibility excellent people to carry out high-quality work with dedication. Now we should move this even further.

Specifically, we propose the establishment of the position of Director of Diplomatic Security, an official who would be at the Executive Level III directly responsible to the Secretary of State. This person would be part of the Department of State and not constitute a separate agency as envisioned in the PFIAB report. This arrangement would

place this individual and the organization structurally closer to other elements of the Department he would influence. The approach also avoids creating yet another Under Secretary position since we do not favor the proliferation of under secretaries.

We believe that the first Director of Diplomatic Security should be an individual recruited from outside the Department of State.

Diplomatic Security would have its own separate line item in the State budget. The Director will have broad responsibilities for all aspects of diplomatic security, including personnel, physical and technical.

#### *Audit/Inspection Functions*

We propose the establishment of a unit which would set the standards for protecting Embassies from penetration by foreign intelligence activity and monitor conformity with those standards. The head of this unit would be named by and responsible to the DCI, who will report problems and recommendations to the Secretary of State for his action as the person responsible for the management of embassies and missions abroad. Its staff would be drawn from the various agencies involved in our diplomatic and intelligence functions abroad. This unit could be co-located together with the Director of Diplomatic Security.

The unit would have a working level advisory group consisting of the Director of Diplomatic Security and equivalent level personnel from the other agencies involved. Additionally, there would be a high-level Board, including the Secretary of State and the DCI, which would meet once each quarter or on call. This latter body would have the authority to recommend to the Secretary of State that he rescind the ability of a particular facility to receive, retain or perform classified functions in the event of serious security problems. In the event of disagreement by the Secretary of State, an appeal could be made to the President.

#### *Polygraphing*

We have a difference of opinion on the issue of polygraphing. The Secretary of State believes that the polygraph should be used in cases of legitimate investigation and not be used as a general screening device or applied to entire classes of individuals. The DCI believes that all personnel assigned to Moscow should be polygraphed. We will continue our effort to reconcile differences in this area.

#### *Budgetary Realities*

Secure, effective operations at Embassy Moscow, and elsewhere, require major funding. We must look at this in the same light as other critical areas in our national security. Regarding Moscow alone, it has been observed that the intelligence and insights we derive from secure



Embassy operations are just as important to us as one of our spy satellites—which cost us hundreds of millions each. We cannot afford to do any less for the security of our diplomatic and intelligence facilities abroad.

It follows from the content of this memorandum that the security requirements we now face, including in Moscow, will have a major impact on the State Department budget. The major funding which will be required can best be obtained, protected, and effectively utilized if State is designated a national security agency. Without this, the Department will continue to be buffeted by the budgetary cuts now and yet to come.

#### *Conclusion*

We believe that we have achieved a solid and substantial measure of agreement in key areas and we must now proceed. The efforts we already have under way, and that which we propose in this memorandum, will give us a solid and secure basis for this very important area of our national security.

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### **63. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 4, 1987

#### **SUBJECT**

Visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

#### *Overview*

You know full well the problems in many crucial areas of U.S.-Soviet relations. Shevardnadze's visit is about the possibilities for bridging some of them.

We have advanced far toward the aspirations in the agenda you set with Gorbachev nearly two years ago in Geneva. If we keep at it vigorously, you can have a record of solid achievements and will anchor American policy toward the Soviet Union in a realistic framework for years to come. That framework embodies high standards for measuring progress in the relationship and will serve Western interests well.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Meetings Files, President's Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze September 1987 (2). Secret; Sensitive.



The Soviets are engaging us actively across *our* full agenda. They have tabled a draft START treaty to match ours, moved toward us on CW verification, and cooperated fully in the first-ever military inspection on Soviet territory. Emigration is up and many pressing individual cases have been settled; there is still a long way to go, but human rights are now firmly on the U.S.-Soviet agenda—a far cry from the days when Gromyko and company simply brushed the subject aside. The Soviets are actively pursuing our regional dialogue, have shown some cooperation on the Gulf War, and may inch painfully toward a settlement that will leave Afghanistan independent again. Our exchange programs, including your people-to-people initiative at Geneva, continue to grow.

The Soviets may calculate that apparent movement in these areas will pressure us on arms control, their top priority. But they also may recognize they are coming down to the wire in pushing forward on fundamentals with you. They seem intent on testing the limits of American willingness to deal.

Our challenge is to turn Soviet activism to our advantage, move closer to the arms reductions now within reach, and put our gains on human rights, regional issues and bilateral cooperation on a firm basis for the future. We will need patience in some areas (INF, summitry) and aggressiveness in others (START, human rights). After the visit, we can assess results, consult with Allies, and then continue discussions with Shevardnadze the following week in New York.

#### *Shevardnadze's Meetings with You*

Shevardnadze will call on you on September 15, the first of his three days in Washington, so you will set the tone and direction for the rest of his visit.<sup>2</sup> My thoughts on the substantive issues are set forth below.

I will meet with Shevardnadze privately that morning and then will pre-brief you. Upon his arrival at the White House, Shevardnadze and I will sign the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center agreement in your presence. John Warner and Sam Nunn, who fathered the concept, and our negotiators, Richard Perle and Colonel Bob Linhard from the NSC staff, should attend. You can welcome the agreement as a useful expansion of our ability to communicate and thus reduce the chance of inadvertent conflict.

In your private meeting, you should review the overall state of relations, outline our areas for priority attention—START, human rights, and Afghanistan—and discuss summit prospects. At lunch, you

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 67.

can elaborate on the calls for “openness” you sounded in your Berlin and “Chautauqua” speeches,<sup>3</sup> and perhaps ask Shevardnadze to review domestic developments in his country.

### *Summit Prospects*

In his June letter, Shevardnadze told me he wanted to evaluate prospects for a summit. With the developments in INF, those prospects are good, and the Soviets are giving every sign they want a meeting this fall. Shevardnadze may have specific dates, perhaps late November. He likely will make an INF accord a precondition for a summit.

We should be laid-back about a summit, reiterating that you would welcome a well-prepared meeting that covers all the issues. If Shevardnadze suggests dates and they fit your schedule, you could accept in principle and propose that advance teams begin work. You should affirm that we want to wrap up INF, but stress two points—this is not a summit precondition for us, and you are prepared to wait as long as necessary to make sure an agreement is verifiable, even if that means slipping a summit to later. If, however, Shevardnadze brings what we need on INF and other issues, the stage would be set for you to announce summit dates in your UNGA address.

### *Arms Control*

NST. Shevardnadze told Max Kampelman that the Soviets want progress in all NST areas and both sides should prepare options on key issues. We should press Shevardnadze to follow up.

—We want to focus on *START*. It indeed is the “root problem” and worth a serious effort, and Soviet actions suggest they may be more serious about pushing ahead. We should think through our own options, encourage Shevardnadze to get into a real discussion of stumbling blocks, and be prepared to negotiate if he has new ideas on issues of interest to us.

—We should not assume we are out of the woods yet, but barring Soviet troublemaking, *INF* now is down to detail work in Geneva. There are some issues to take up with Shevardnadze, especially the need for Soviet action on verification. We should turn away any

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<sup>3</sup> Shultz is referring to Reagan’s June 12 remarks on East-West relations, made at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin. See Document 54. The text of Reagan’s remarks is printed in *Public Papers: Reagan, 1987*, Book I, pp. 634–638. The Chautauqua reference is to Reagan’s August 26 remarks on U.S.-Soviet relations made before the Town Hall of California meeting in Los Angeles and broadcast via satellite to a conference on U.S.-Soviet relations, held in Chautauqua, New York. The text of these remarks is in *Public Papers: Reagan, 1987*, Book II, pp. 977–982. Both addresses are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.

demands for further assurances on FRG Pershing missiles or associated warheads, but be ready to look at solutions on phasing of reductions.

—*Defense & Space*. We should reiterate as necessary our problems with the Soviets' new treaty, emphasize the constructive nature of the ideas we offered in Moscow in April, and encourage the Soviets to relax their linkage to START.

*Other Issues*. We should remind the Soviets that progress on *chemical weapons* depends on their addressing in detail all aspects of a ban. On *conventional forces*, our message is simple—no neutrals and no nuclear weapons in new talks on conventional forces. How we handle *nuclear testing* will depend on current discussions on a mandate for future negotiations.

### *Human Rights*

Shevardnadze will press Moscow's own agenda on human rights. He will probably complain that we have failed to give credit for the limited steps the Soviets have taken over the past year, and will try to focus the discussion on their proposal for a Moscow CSCE conference, and their desire for reduced rhetoric from U.S. officials at international meetings. The Soviets have agreed to send an expert with Shevardnadze to deal with specific cases.

We must block any attempt to sidetrack the human rights discussion to a lower level or divert it from our primary concern—people. You can reiterate our willingness to acknowledge progress where we see it but underscore our need for assurances that any improvements will be sustained. We should press for reliable practices and procedures in a number of areas, as well as a process for systematic, regular exchanges on individual cases. You can reiterate that we have not closed the door to a Moscow conference but emphasize that the burden is on Moscow to meet the strict criteria we have outlined in the Vienna Follow-up Meeting. On rhetoric, you might note that as Soviet practices improve, so will the description—but we are not offering tradeoffs.

### *Regional Issues*

By September, we will be almost through the 1987 cycle of experts meetings, providing a good basis for discussion of regional subjects. I think your time is best spent on Afghanistan and Iran-Iraq. The situation on both these issues is liable to be rather fluid. Both you and I should raise destabilizing Soviet bloc arms supplies to the Third World.

The *Iran-Iraq War* will provide a highly volatile backdrop to Shevardnadze's visit. Moreover, U.S. efforts to engineer a second UN resolution may be coming to a head. You should emphasize the importance of this effort for ending the war, reducing the risk of wider conflict, and demonstrating the ability of the U.S. and USSR to collaborate and

deal with regional conflicts in the UN context. You can point out that the U.S. and USSR worked together on the first resolution, and should do so on the second.

On *Afghanistan*, the UN-sponsored proximity talks will resume in early September in Geneva, followed shortly by U.S.-Soviet experts talks, also in Geneva. These sessions should give us a better sense whether the Soviets are prepared for a serious effort to disengage or will stick with their current wait-and-see strategy of ballyhooing the Kabul regime's attempt at national reconciliation, applying pressure on Pakistan, and attempting to erode broad support for tough UN resolutions on Afghanistan. You should stress the importance of early, significant and realistic Soviet movement on the two key issues—a practical national reconciliation process acceptable to the resistance, and a timetable for prompt removal of Soviet troops.

#### *Bilateral Issues*

You can reaffirm the importance of expanding bilateral contacts, including people-to-people exchanges. Since we have just reviewed bilateral questions in Moscow. I plan to focus on two key operational issues. One is Soviet agreement to tying up loose ends in a package of understandings on the functioning of diplomatic missions in both countries; this would take a major load off our Embassy in Moscow. The other is continued Soviet cooperation in getting our Embassy back on its feet after the Marine affair. I hope, too, to outline our plans for dealing with our new chancery, on the basis of the memo Bill Webster and I sent you in July.<sup>4</sup>

#### *Public Affairs*

A key part of our strategy will be communication with the Allies, Congress, and the public. We will brief *Allies* before and after the visit. I will meet with *Congressional* leaders and various *human rights organizations*. We will conduct press briefings to lay out the opportunities for progress while keeping public expectations realistic. I plan to say a few words to the media after your sessions with Shevardnadze, and to hold a full press conference at the end of the visit.

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 62.

**64. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, September 10, 1987

Dear Mr. President,

I think you and I were right when last October we arrived at what was virtually a concurring view that our meeting in Reykjavik had been an important landmark along the path towards specific and urgently needed measures to genuinely reduce nuclear arms. Over the past several months the Soviet Union and the United States have made substantial headway in that direction. Today, our two countries stand on the threshold of an important agreement which would bring about—for the first time in history—an actual reduction in nuclear arsenals. Nuclear disarmament being the exceptionally complex matter that it is, the important thing is to take a first step, to clear the psychological barrier which stands between the deeply rooted idea that security hinges on nuclear weapons and an objective perception of the realities of the nuclear world. Then the conclusion is inevitable that genuine security can only be achieved through real disarmament.

We have come very close to that point, and the question now is whether we will take that first step which the peoples of the world are so eagerly awaiting. This is precisely what I would like to discuss at greater length in this letter, being fully aware that not too much time remains for the preparation of the agreement between us. The Reykjavik understandings give us a chance to reach agreement. We are facing the dilemma of either rapidly completing an agreement on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles or missing the chance to reach an accord which, as a result of joint efforts, has almost entirely taken shape.

It would probably be superfluous to say that the Soviet Union prefers the first option. In addition to our basic commitment to the goal of abolishing nuclear weapons, which is the point of departure for our policy, we also proceed from the belief that at this juncture of time there appears to be a convergence of the lines of interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, and the rest of the world. If we fail to take advantage of such a favorable confluence of circum-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Meetings File, President's Meeting With Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze September 1987. No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation provided by the Soviet Embassy. Also on file is the Russian-language version, which is dated September 10. A notation in an unknown hand on the first page of the unofficial translation reads: "Handed to President by Shevardnadze on 9/15/87." For the memorandum of conversation of Reagan's meeting with Shevardnadze, see Document 67.

stances, those lines will diverge, and who knows when they might converge again. Then we would risk losing time and momentum, with the inevitable consequences of the further militarization of the Earth and the extension of the arms race into space. In this context I agree with the thought you expressed that "the opportunity before us is too great to let pass by."

To use an American phrase, the Soviet Union has gone its mile towards a fair agreement, and even more than a mile. Of course, I am far from asserting that the U.S. side has done nothing to advance the work on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. We could not have come to the point when the treaty is within reach had the United States not made steps in our direction. And yet, there is still no answer to the question why Washington has hardened its stance in upholding a number of positions which are clearly one-sided and, I would say, contrived. I would ask you once again to weigh carefully all the factors involved and convey to me your final decision on whether the agreement is to be concluded now or postponed, or even set aside. It is time you and I took a firm stand on this matter.

I further request that you give careful thought to the recent important evolution in our positions on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, which in effect assures accord. We are ready to conclude an agreement under which neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would have any missiles in those categories.

The implementation of such a decision would be subject to strict reciprocal verification, including, of course, on-site inspections of both the process of the missiles' destruction and the cessation of their production.

I have to say that we are proposing to you a solution which in important aspects is virtually identical with the proposals that were, at various points, put forward by the U.S. side. For that reason in particular, there should be no barriers to reaching an agreement, and the artificial obstacles erected by the U.S. delegation should naturally disappear, which, as I understand, will be facilitated by the decision of the F.R.G. government not to modernize the West German Pershing 1A missiles and to eliminate them. Of course, we have no intention to interfere in U.S. alliance relations, including those with the F.R.G. However, the question of what happens to the U.S. warheads intended for the West German missiles needs to be clarified.

We are proposing fair and equitable terms for an agreement. Let me say very candidly and without diplomatic niceties: we have in effect opened up the reserves of our positions in order to facilitate an agreement. Our position is clear and honest: we call for the total elimination of the entire class of missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers and of all warheads for those missiles. The fate of an

agreement on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles now depends entirely on the U.S. leadership and on your personal willingness, Mr. President, to conclude a deal. As for our approach, it will be constructive, you can count on that.

If we assume that the U.S. side, proceeding from considerations of equivalent security, will go ahead with the conclusion of the treaty—and this is what we hope is going to happen—then there is no doubt that this will impart a strong impetus to bringing our positions closer together in a very real way on other questions in the nuclear and space area, which are even more important for the security of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. and with which you and I have come to grips after Reykjavik.

What I have in mind specifically are the issues of strategic offensive arms and space. Those are the key issues of security, and our stake in reaching agreement on them is certainly not at all diminished by the fact that we have made headway on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles. What is more, it is this area that is pivotal to the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship, and hence to the entire course of military-strategic developments in the world.

At the negotiations in Geneva on those questions the delegations, as you know, have started drafting an agreed text of a treaty on strategic offensive arms. The Soviet side is seeking to speed up, to the maximum possible extent, progress in this work and shows its readiness to accommodate the other side and to seek compromise solutions. To reach agreement, however, a reciprocal readiness for compromise is, of course, required on the part of the United States.

Things are not as good with regard to working out agreement on the ABM Treaty regime, on preventing the extension of the arms race into space. Whereas we have submitted a constructive draft agreement that takes into account the U.S. attitude to the question of research on strategic defense, the U.S. side continues to take a rigid stand. However, without finding a mutually acceptable solution to the space problem it will be impossible to reach final agreement on radically reducing strategic offensive arms, which is what you and I spoke about in both Geneva and Reykjavik.

If we are to be guided by a desire to find a fair solution to both these organically interrelated problems, issues relating to space can be resolved. The Soviet Union is ready to make additional efforts to that end. But it is clear that this cannot be done through our efforts alone, if attempts to secure unilateral advantages are not abandoned.

I propose, Mr. President, that necessary steps be taken, in Geneva and through other channels, particularly at a high level, in order to speed up the pace of negotiations so that full-scale agreements could be reached within the next few months both on the radical reduction



of strategic offensive arms and on ensuring strict observance of the ABM Treaty.

If all those efforts were crowned with success we would be able to provide a firm basis for a stable and forward-moving development not just of the Soviet-U.S. relationship but of international relations as a whole for many years ahead. We would leave behind what was, frankly, a complicated stretch in world politics, and you and I would crown in a befitting manner the process of interaction on the central issues of security which began in Geneva.

I think that both of us should not lose sight of other important security issues, where fairly good prospects have now emerged of cooperating for the sake of reaching agreement.

I would like to single out in particular the question of the real opportunities that have appeared for solving at last the problem of the complete elimination of chemical weapons globally. Granted that the preparation of a convention banning chemical weapons depends not only on the efforts of our two countries, still it is the degree of agreement between our positions that in effect predetermines progress in this matter. It is our common duty to bring this extremely important process to fruition.

If the veneer of polemics is removed from the problem of reducing conventional arms, a common interest will be evident in this area too. This is the interest of stability at a lower level of arms, which can be achieved through substantial reductions in armed forces and armaments, through removing the existing asymmetries and imbalances. Accordingly, we have fairly good prospects of working together to draw up a mutually acceptable mandate for negotiations on conventional arms. The Vienna meeting would thus become a major stage in terms of a military dimension, in addition to the economic, human and other dimensions.

One more consideration: we believe that the time has come to remove the cloak of dangerous secrecy from the military doctrines of the two alliances, of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. In this process of giving greater transparency to our military guidelines, meetings of military officials at the highest level could also play a useful role.

Does it not seem paradoxical to you, Mr. President, that we have been able to bring our positions substantially closer together in an area where the nerve knots of our security are located and yet we have been unable so far to find a common language on another important aspect, namely, regional conflicts? Not only do they exacerbate the international situation, they often bring our relations to a pitch of high tension. In the meantime, in the regions concerned—whether in Asia, which is increasingly moving to the forefront of international politics, the Near East or Central America—encouraging changes are now under



way, reflecting a search for a peaceful settlement. I have in mind, in particular, the growing desire for national reconciliation. This should be given careful attention and, I believe, encouragement and support.

As you can see, the Soviet leadership once again reaffirms its strong intention to build Soviet-U.S. relations in a constructive and businesslike spirit. Time may flow particularly fast for those relations, and we should treat it as something extremely precious. We are in favor of making full use of Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Washington to find practical solutions to key problems. In the current situation this visit assumes increased importance. Our foreign minister is ready for detailed discussions with U.S. leaders on all questions, including ways of reaching agreement on problems under discussion in Geneva and the prospects and possible options for developing contacts at the summit level. He has all necessary authority with regard to that.

I want to emphasize that, as before, I am personally in favor of actively pursuing a businesslike and constructive dialogue with you.

Sincerely,

M. Gorbachev

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**65. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 14, 1987

SUBJECT

Avoiding Arms Reduction "Framework Agreements"

Last week, as part of the paper which addressed arms reduction strategy options,<sup>2</sup> I strongly recommended that you should *avoid* any commitment to develop a "framework agreement" covering the START and Defense & Space areas. However, in our subsequent discussions, we really didn't spend enough time on this critical point. Shevardnadze

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, Shevardnadze Visit, October 30, 1987: Meeting with President (1). Secret; Sensitive. Powell initialed for Carlucci. Copied to Bush and Howard Baker. A stamped notation indicates the memorandum was received on September 14, and another indicates that the President saw it. Reagan initialed the top of the memorandum. Also on file is a list of participants for the Oval Office "pre-brief" and 1 to 2 p.m. meeting with Shevardnadze on September 15.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

may attempt to make a US commitment to a “framework agreement” a precondition for a summit. Additionally, in reviewing our options with George Shultz, my recommendation against making such a commitment seemed to give him some concern.

By a “framework agreement” I mean something that could have the political effect of binding the US to some course of action. It most likely would take the form of a free-standing document, like the “Statement of General Principles” Gorbachev proposed to you in Reykjavik. It would most likely commit the US and USSR to conclude a START Treaty and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for some period of time.

We can record progress at a summit without signing a framework agreement. For example, a summit communique could record agreement to instruct negotiators to pursue Treaties incorporating the same outcomes. What we must avoid is any statement, announcement or agreement that can be used by the Soviets politically to bind our hands with respect to the SDI program while not legally binding the Soviets to begin START reductions because:

First, *a framework agreement could block SDI while not getting reductions*. Such agreements are basically political instruments. As such, they can politically block new options (like moving to the deployment of SDI); but neither side would begin reducing existing forces until there is a signed and ratified treaty.

Second, *a framework agreement at this time could also remove Soviet incentive to conclude a START Treaty*. If the Soviets can block SDI without having to begin the reductions of strategic forces until a START Treaty is signed, what is their incentive to conclude such a treaty on US terms? They could haggle as long as it takes to get a START Treaty on their terms, and simply wait for the next Administration to give them a better START deal.

Finally, *a framework agreement could allow the Soviets to manipulate the US domestic political scene*. As long as there is the prospect of concluding a START Treaty, the political opposition must be responsible in handling arms reduction issues. The Soviets understand this. The Soviets could feed the idea that a framework agreement is all that can be achieved during the remainder of your Administration. This would open you to criticism for not getting a START Treaty, for the terms of the framework agreement, and for signing such an agreement in the first place. This would then increase pressure to conclude a START Treaty *on Soviet terms* during your Administration.

Our primary concerns should be the first two listed above. We should not risk blocking SDI or reducing Soviet incentives to negotiate a *good* START agreement. The third reason is relevant because it could provide Soviet leverage to force you into a bad START agreement.

The Soviets understand that if the meetings with Shevardnadze end without the announcement of a fall summit, the US press will term the meeting a failure. They will use this to get things they want including:

(1) a US agreement to include in the INF Treaty text, or in a document that could be associated with that Treaty, some provision covering the US warheads for German Pershing IA missiles; and

(2) US agreement that we will conclude *both* an INF Treaty *and* a “framework agreement” covering START and Defense & Space at a fall summit.

We must be prepared for the Shevardnadze meetings to come down to the Soviets giving us a choice on Thursday<sup>3</sup> of either accepting these terms or not getting an agreed announcement of a summit. While a summit announcement would be useful, accepting either of the above terms as the price for obtaining such an announcement would be disastrous over the long run.

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<sup>3</sup> September 17.

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## 66. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 15, 1987, 8–10:40 a.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary

EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)

Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

U.S.S.R.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Sergei Tarasenko, Advisor to the Foreign Minister (Notetaker)

Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

### SUBJECT

Overview of Shevardnadze Visit, Human Rights

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz—Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in Shultz’s private office at the Department of State.

The SECRETARY opened the meeting by noting that he and the Foreign Minister had three days. The Secretary was glad that Shevardnadze had allocated that much time; for our part, we had been glad to accommodate the Foreign Minister's request for an additional hour for this initial session. The Secretary suggested, however, that the two break at about 10:45 to greet their respective delegations as a matter of courtesy.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed to the Secretary's suggestion, and conveyed both his own greetings and the best wishes of General Secretary Gorbachev, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Gromyko, and Chairman of the Council of Ministers Ryzhkov.

THE SECRETARY expressed his appreciation for their greetings, noting that he had found his April trip to Moscow<sup>2</sup> stimulating. He could see that important things were going on in the Soviet Union. They were fascinating to the Secretary as a person. They also had obvious implications for relations between our two countries. We would be interested in hearing more about them while Shevardnadze was here. Indeed, reflecting in part the discussion he had had in Moscow, the Secretary thought he and the Foreign Minister might speculate a bit on what the world would be like in five or ten years to put in perspective the environment for their present discussions, and to get away from the framework of current problems they had argued about often in the past.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had also given a lot of thought to the problems of his country, and of international problems. There was no clear dividing line, he added, between a nation's internal affairs and the face it presented abroad. (THE SECRETARY commented that this was true, although hard for people to understand.) SHEVARDNADZE said it was true even for small nations, to say nothing of countries like the U.S. and Soviet Union. Perhaps, he suggested, it would be possible to discuss the question at greater length on the barge trip that evening.

THE SECRETARY replied that another alternative was to do so the following afternoon. He added that he had invited the Carlucci to join the Secretary, Shevardnadze and their parties for the barge trip. The Secretary felt that it would be useful for Shevardnadze to get to know the new National Security Advisor in an informal setting. SHEVARDNADZE said he would be pleased to meet Mr. Carlucci.

Turning to the "nature" of their current meeting, Shevardnadze said it was not an easy thing to describe. While there had been some advance discussion of the schedule for plenary sessions, no agenda had been set for the private meeting. Shevardnadze proposed that

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<sup>2</sup> See Documents 38–46.

“concrete” discussions be left aside for plenary sessions with advisors, allowing the two Ministers to engage in a more free-flowing exchange. THE SECRETARY agreed.

SHEVARDNADZE thought it would be useful for the Ministers briefly to assess the current situation and what additional measures might be necessary to build on the accomplishments of the last four years. The U.S.-Soviet relationship was at a critical stage. On the one hand, a good deal of work had been done to normalize relations. The meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev had been important elements in this process: while no agreements of global significance had been signed, these meetings were landmarks in U.S.-Soviet relations and beyond. Shevardnadze said he often used the expression “the spirit of” Reykjavik or Geneva. Some said there was no such spirit. Shevardnadze always said that there was indeed such a spirit, and that it still existed. (THE SECRETARY said he agreed).

SHEVARDNADZE continued that, even if the Geneva meeting produced nothing more than the two leaders’ agreement that nuclear war was unacceptable and must never be fought, that alone would make it a historic event. Despite the serious disappointment it produced, the Reykjavik meeting was also important, as were the periods leading up to and following the summit. Reykjavik had taken the two sides from merely talking about limiting nuclear arms to a discussion of what actually to *do* to limit, reduce, and ultimately eliminate them. That was the significance of Reykjavik.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed. He often pointed out to skeptics that, if one compared the situation before and after Reykjavik, it was clear that more had occurred there than at any previous summit meeting. The session was extremely productive, even though nothing had been signed. What we wanted now was to consolidate and develop the progress that had been made there. It was our sense that important agreements had been brought within reach.

Continuing his analysis, SHEVARDNADZE pointed out that, after Reykjavik, a good deal of practical work had been done. Shevardnadze’s meetings with the Secretary had been important elements of that process. Shevardnadze recalled that their initial 1985 meetings in Helsinki, Washington and New York had been, in a sense, the start of the process. Shevardnadze especially remembered a moment during a one-on-one when the two ministers had agreed that “everything depends on us” to improve the relationship. They had shaken hands on that.

THE SECRETARY expressed his own strong feelings on the importance of moving toward a more normal relationship between the U.S. and Soviet Union, even recognizing the enormous differences between

the two societies. As one looked ahead five or ten years, the Secretary mused, it would be better for both sides and for the world in general if we had relations in which we could talk out problems, in which disagreements could occur, but in which we were not afraid to work with one another. This was the kind of approach the Secretary had had in mind since he began dealing with the Soviet Union in the seventies, during the Nixon Administration; this was the approach he had had in mind over his past five years as Secretary of State. This was what he would like to see emerge from the dialogue which had been set in motion. There was no more important objective on the international scene.

The Secretary continued that the two sides had managed to establish an agenda of important topics. They had by now learned how to discuss them. There had been progress in many areas. So we were beginning to be on the way. We needed now to keep working at it, and working hard at it.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that he had commented on what had already been done as a prelude to discussing what might now be accomplished. Since Reykjavik and as a result of his meetings with the Secretary, much practical work had been done on reducing nuclear arsenals and in the general area of arms reductions. Much had also been done to bolster trust between the two sides. We were now at a crucial moment, when the accumulated “quantitative” steps to date could be expected to make a “qualitative” difference. (THE SECRETARY said this was well put.) It was thus important to correctly analyze the situation and prospects for further progress, taking all this into account.

Shevardnadze said he would be frank: the current U.S. administration had at most eighteen months in which to work. (Shevardnadze commented in an aside that he nonetheless expected his relationship with the Secretary to continue well beyond that.) There was perhaps even less time to make decisions. To use to the fullest the time remaining, it would be necessary to intensify contacts and negotiations across the board.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed. What the U.S. wanted to accomplish in the time remaining to the Reagan Administration was to accomplish as much as possible in terms of specific agreements, especially in the arms control field. But it was also vital to create an atmosphere of greater confidence, mutual trust and understanding which would carry the relationship forward into the years ahead. There had been some progress in this area; things were somewhat better than they had been in the past.

SHEVARDNADZE interjected that they were unquestionably better. It was important to have trust between the two governments.

Moreover a firm foundation had been laid for major success in the central area of the relationship—arms control. The two sides were not starting from scratch. It was possible to say that, with mutual efforts and adequate political will, an important agreement on INF could be reached. True, in quantitative terms, INF accounted for only about 2% of the nuclear arsenals of both sides. Such an agreement was nonetheless of great importance to Europe, and the Soviet Union wanted to reach such an accord. While there was much to work out, the current situation in Geneva suggested this could be accomplished in the relatively short term.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed that every effort should be made to get the remaining work done, perhaps by extensive use of working groups during the Foreign Minister's stay. The Ministers could hear the groups' reports, make their contributions, and keep the pressure on to ensure progress, as they had done during the concluding days of the Stockholm CDE meeting<sup>3</sup> when Shevardnadze had been in Washington the previous fall. The U.S. also agreed that INF was important regionally, even if, since there were more missiles in the strategic area, General Secretary Gorbachev had been correct in calling that the "root problem." An INF agreement was also important, the Secretary continued, because it would be the first time that nuclear weapons had actually been reduced. This would be an important step to the goal both sides' leaders had said they supported: the elimination of nuclear weapons.

But the U.S. did not by any means, the Secretary added, rule out making headway—if possible reaching an agreement—on strategic arms, especially since the parameters for such an agreement had been laid out in Reykjavik. The problems involved were more difficult than those in INF, but we needed to make greater efforts for that reason.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed, adding that Moscow believed the ground had been prepared for some time for a breakthrough in START. The Soviet side was prepared for a separate START agreement. Shevardnadze did not agree with those who contrasted START and INF; it was necessary to concentrate on both, and on strengthening the ABM Treaty as well. All should be done in parallel to arrive together at the finish line.

THE SECRETARY said we should "do it." Procedurally, he suggested the Ministers agree on a pattern for dividing work between themselves and working groups. The Secretary proposed establishing an arms control group which might subdivide itself into subgroups.

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures, which concluded on September 19, 1986.



He proposed a separate group on bilateral and human rights issues. Following whatever headway the two Ministers could accomplish in their own meetings, the groups could go to work and report back as appropriate. The Secretary noted that the Soviet side had brought along a high-powered delegation. We had assembled our delegation chiefs from Geneva to supplement our local expertise.

SHEVARDNADZE noted jocularly that the U.S. had a larger team this time, as it was at home. It could draw on the resources of the Pentagon and “other agencies” to support its efforts. THE SECRETARY said he had come to have the highest regard for Soviet experts. SHEVARDNADZE said that they were like the Secretary’s Soviet experts. The key was they would do what they were told by the political leadership. THE SECRETARY said that this was exactly right.

SHEVARDNADZE said that he would describe at greater length the main lines of Soviet ideas on arms control. As for working groups, the Soviet side would propose that groups be formed on the following issues: nuclear and space arms, nuclear testing, chemical weapons, perhaps the Vienna CSCE conventional arms discussions, and U.S.-Soviet bilateral issues, including trade and economic matters. The Soviet side also had along an expert on humanitarian questions. Shevardnadze felt that regional issues might best be handled by the Ministers themselves, although he was prepared to accept a separate group if the U.S. wished. Shevardnadze said he had a paper<sup>4</sup> to hand over reflecting Soviet ideas on how to utilize plenary sessions.

THE SECRETARY indicated that the structure Shevardnadze had described was generally agreeable. Paul Nitze would be the overall coordinator for the U.S. on arms control issues; Rozanne Ridgway and Tom Simons would cover bilateral and human rights questions. The Secretary suggested that the Ministers inform the delegations that such arrangements had been agreed upon, to enable them to sort things out while the Ministers were at lunch. He invited Shevardnadze to read the Soviet side’s suggestions on the plenaries.

SHEVARDNADZE proposed that the first afternoon’s plenary<sup>5</sup> be devoted to the nuclear and space talks and to nuclear testing. Shevardnadze added that it was particularly important to discuss testing in view of the inability of the two sides’ experts to reach agreement on this issue in recent exchanges. Shevardnadze noted that it might also be possible to discuss chemical weapons during the afternoon session, but that that topic might have to await the next day.

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<sup>4</sup> Not found attached.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 68.



For the Wednesday<sup>6</sup> morning plenary, Shevardnadze proposed a discussion of European conventional weapons, military doctrine, and nuclear nonproliferation. The afternoon session might then be devoted to regional issues.

THE SECRETARY responded that the sequence Shevardnadze had described sounded fine. We definitely wanted to have addressed all those issues by Wednesday afternoon. There would clearly be more to say on some issues than others.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that it might make sense for the two Ministers to do some regional issues one-on-one, in addition to those sessions in which experts would be present. THE SECRETARY responded positively, proposing that perhaps one additional person be present. For the U.S., that would probably be Under Secretary Armacost. SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed. As for the timing of that session, it could be scheduled as the program progressed. THE SECRETARY agreed.

SHEVARDNADZE concluded his agenda proposals by suggesting that the final plenary Thursday morning<sup>7</sup> could be given over to reports by experts, including in the bilateral area, and an assessment of results.

THE SECRETARY said that Shevardnadze had proposed good working arrangements. As the discussions proceeded, he added, the Ministers could decide whether they should meet to discuss any issues directly. They would also be able to share some thoughts on the boat ride. If necessary, they could also consider an evening meeting after the Wednesday dinner, although it would be a late one. The Secretary added that he had invited members from the NST Congressional observer group to the dinner, and noted that the Congressional leaders involved were anxious to meet Shevardnadze. SHEVARDNADZE said this would be very interesting. THE SECRETARY said he would have to excuse himself the next day at 11:00 to introduce the President, who was giving a speech in the building.<sup>8</sup> Shevardnadze was welcome to attend, but the Secretary had to be on hand for the speech. SHEVARDNADZE said this would be no problem.

THE SECRETARY said he would like to make a few comments on the subject of human rights in the privacy of this meeting. There might also be some further discussion of the issue during the experts' meetings.

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<sup>6</sup> September 16. See Document 70.

<sup>7</sup> September 17. See Document 74.

<sup>8</sup> President Reagan spoke at 11:13 a.m. in the Loy Henderson Conference Room at the Department of State to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1987*, Book II, pp. 1036–1039)

The U.S. had noted many things which the Soviet side had been doing. The Secretary understood that these things were primarily a function of what the Soviet Union felt to be in its best interest and reflected official policy. But we had watched closely, and had seen some positive steps.

The Secretary also recalled that, during their extensive discussions the previous fall, the Secretary had raised a number of names. At that time, Shevardnadze had agreed to look into them. The Secretary had accepted that as a statement of intent. He had said nothing about it publicly. He had since noticed when actions had subsequently been taken on a number of the cases he had raised. The Secretary saw this as an act of good faith on the part of the Minister, and wanted Shevardnadze to know he respected the effort he had made.

The Secretary continued that he was certain Shevardnadze appreciated the impact these kinds of issues could have on the general tone of and outlook for U.S.-Soviet relations. We continued to be concerned by certain categories of problems. While some political prisoners had been released, for example too many others remained imprisoned. People remained in jail on religious grounds. We could not understand why Soviet authorities continued to prevent certain married people from living together. There were still questions on the conditions for emigration: substantial increases in numbers had occurred, but we remained worried about the arbitrariness of the application of restrictions on the basis of state secrecy.

We had felt recently that it was possible to discuss such issues in a more direct and clear way. Thus, Shevardnadze's suggestion that he would be willing to organize a separate working group on human rights was welcome. We had also welcomed the Soviet side's apparent receptivity during recent consultations in Moscow to the idea of regularizing procedural aspects of our dialogue on human rights. The Soviet side had in the past complained that some of the lists we presented were flawed in one way or another. That was a fair point. For that reason, we had proposed regular meetings to go through the lists and discuss the cases involved in an orderly, productive way. So there were some positive things to point to along with the negative.

In that spirit, the Secretary informed Shevardnadze that Ambassador Matlock would be passing to Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh certain materials which could be examined further by working groups. The Secretary said he would like personally to present Shevardnadze with an album of photographs and information on some cases of particular interest to the U.S.—divided spouses. These were not high-powered people, only people who had had the misfortune to fall in love across international borders. The Secretary noted that the album was appropriately bound in red.

After leafing through the album, Shevardnadze said he would comment in a minute on the Secretary's remarks on human rights. First, however, he would like to return to a question of the organization of their work.

In preparing for this visit, Shevardnadze had reviewed some of his earlier conversations with the Secretary. It had struck him that those conversations had invariably been very good. But he had found that many of the things the two had discussed had never gone beyond paper. Thus, the two had had to go over the same ground the next time around. Perhaps some means could be found to register the results of their meetings in a document. Shevardnadze said he did not have in mind a public document, but a simple record of what the two had agreed on and discussed. Staffs could be told to work on the basis of such a document, whether the issue was arms control, human rights, or regional questions, leaving the Ministers to move on to new issues.

Thus they would accumulate "capital." Shevardnadze said he, personally, was for such an approach. This would not be the two Ministers' last meeting; perhaps they could try it this time and see how it worked. Shevardnadze stressed that he did not want to over-formalize their meetings. But any meeting between political leaders was important; all the more so when there were areas of agreement to record. Frankly, Shevardnadze quipped, he would not even suggest such an approach were the Secretary not an economist. Everyone knew economists were most interested in the "bottom line. That's what Shevardnadze was trying to focus on.

THE SECRETARY said that Shevardnadze's idea was interesting and said he would consider it. SHEVARDNADZE said it might be hard to implement, but would be worth a try. It might serve as a focal point for working groups. THE SECRETARY expressed his understanding of the concept to be that working groups would formally report to Ministers on areas of agreement and disagreement that had been identified. This would give the Ministers a clear idea of where obstacles had to be overcome, as well as a record of the the meeting. It would be important, the Secretary thought, not to spend too much time worrying about wording of joint documents. This could be counterproductive. SHEVARDNADZE said this was what he meant by not wanting to over-formalize the process. THE SECRETARY said he would talk it over with his people. SHEVARDNADZE said perhaps we could initiate the approach for their next meeting. THE SECRETARY said we should see if we could start it during this visit.

Returning to human rights, SHEVARDNADZE began by describing what he described as the main trend in the Soviet Union today, whether in the field of politics, social development, economics or culture—*demokratizatsia* (democratization). Democratization was the "basis for everything.

To understand the importance of the term, Shevardnadze explained, a familiarity with Soviet history was necessary. After the Revolution, there was a dictatorship of the proletariat. A dictatorship was a dictatorship—direct restraints on individual liberties had been necessary. During the fifties Moscow had spoken of the “state of the whole people.” Now there was a feeling that Soviet society had become ripe for a policy of total democracy. It was a multifaceted process, legal codes were being revised; the question of individual liberties was being reconsidered. But it was a process already fully underway.

Shevardnadze said that the Secretary knew how much he (Shevardnadze) respected him. Thus he should not take it amiss when Shevardnadze said that, if certain cases which had been raised in the past had been resolved, it was not out of respect for those who had raised those cases. Rather, it was a reflection of a deep-seated process already underway in the Soviet Union.

THE SECRETARY said he welcomed that. He much preferred that something important happen because the Soviet side considered it important for itself than that it be done for “us.” Such an approach would ensure that the changes lasted, that they became regularized. So the Secretary welcomed what Shevardnadze had said.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the approaches of persons like the Secretary were not without importance. Democratization was part of a general “*perestroika*”—rebuilding. Not all change came about immediately. Among those who had not changed were too many who sat in offices and dealt with the kind of people the Secretary was concerned about. Bureaucrats were bureaucrats, whatever may happen between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Shevardnadze assured the Secretary, however, that, when he received lists, he read them, followed up on them. Sometimes he found that a case which should have been resolved had not been. *Perestroika* was a battle, as was democratization. The most difficult thing to effect was a revolution in the minds of men; that was what was happening in the Soviet Union today.

In any case, Shevardnadze continued, the Soviet Union now could react calmly when presented with lists. He recalled that on his last visit the Secretary had given certain lists to the General Secretary. There had been nothing wrong or surprising about this. These were issues which should be dealt with in a serious, solid fashion, without theatrics, in a quiet and firm way. They should not be manipulated for political advantage, as some did. Such actions hampered efforts to deal seriously with the problems involved. The Soviet side was ready to work seriously on any cases the U.S. might submit. So that was one side of the matter.

On the other side, Shevardnadze continued, he had no desire to engage in an “eye-for-an-eye” debate. But issues existed in the human

rights field on which the two sides disagreed. The Secretary had talked a minute before about political prisoners in the Soviet Union. But Shevardnadze had been told there were people in the U.S. who had been in jail for fifteen years for demonstrating outside airbases. Maybe this was true, maybe not. Shevardnadze admitted his knowledge of such things was not exhaustive.

THE SECRETARY said the U.S. was prepared to discuss any cases the Soviet side wished to raise. He doubted that anyone had been imprisoned for demonstrating in front of an airbase. He agreed, however, that our dialogue on such issues should be a two-way street. We would listen to Soviet cases if they would listen to ours.

SHEVARDNADZE said that this was appropriate. He said that “his people” had lists which they would be presenting. He had not personally read them, he added, and could not be sure that everything on them was true. The Soviets also would present lists of Nazis now believed to be residing in the U.S. They also wished to raise the cases of the hijackers Brazinskas<sup>9</sup> (pronouncing it Brzezinski).

THE SECRETARY reiterated that we were prepared to talk about all these cases. He was familiar with some of those Shevardnadze had mentioned. They could all be discussed in working groups.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed. He wished to raise as well a delicate issue. The Secretary, he said, was well aware that the Soviet Union was a multinational state composed of many ethnic groups. Bringing this about had been the work of generations, and the Soviet people were legitimately and sincerely proud of this accomplishment. Briefly describing the structure of the Soviet state, Shevardnadze noted that, if the Secretary reviewed what some “ideologically oriented” U.S. institutions were writing about Soviet ethnic issues, he would find it hard to believe. He wanted the Secretary to know that an irresponsible approach on such matters was unacceptable as far as Moscow was concerned. The U.S. was also a multinational state, although it had dealt with the problems this posed in its own ways. The Soviet side respected that, feeling that a very responsible approach was called for in this area. Shevardnadze said that, having personally studied nationality problems closely, he could say that it would be very unpleasant were the Soviet Union to reciprocate for some of the things which were happening. In this regard he pointed out that the Soviet Union had a certain advantage in any comparisons in that ethnicity was the “organizing principle” of the Soviet state. He asked the Secretary

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<sup>9</sup> Reference is to Pranas Brazinska and his son, Algirda, Lithuanian citizens who were charged with the hijacking of Aeroflot 244 in October 1970 and who later sought asylum in the United States.

to understand that he raised the issue only because of the trust which existed between the two Ministers. A confrontation over such questions would be in the interest of neither side.

Turning to what he described as another “important question,” Shevardnadze observed that it had been no accident that the Soviet proposal for a Moscow humanitarian issues forum had arisen in the context of democratization at home. Shevardnadze noted that, when the Secretary had last been in Moscow, there had been no limits on his freedom of movement or contacts. (THE SECRETARY acknowledged that he had felt a totally different atmosphere from previous visits.) Shevardnadze said that all participants in a Moscow forum would have similar access to whomever they wished to meet.

Shevardnadze suggested one might wonder why the Soviet Government was being so accommodating. Simply put: it wanted people to know the truth about what was happening in the Soviet Union—how Soviet citizens lived, what was changing, and in what directions. If such things were known, trust would grow. Therefore, Shevardnadze suggested that the U.S. consider whether or not it could take a more positive stand on this issue. Were there to be no Moscow conference, Shevardnadze stressed, it would not mean the end of democratization. The process would proceed.

THE SECRETARY agreed that exchanges of people were important in building trust and mutual confidence. That was why the President had been so interested in expanding people-to-people contacts. It was not just the magnificent Bolshoi Ballet which told us something about the Soviet people, it was events like the Chautauqua meetings.<sup>10</sup> (SHEVARDNADZE interrupted to comment on how impressed Soviet participants in the most recent Chautauqua meeting had been, and to recall similarly positive experiences among participants at the Jurmala conference the year before.) The SECRETARY noted that we had also noted progress in areas—such as the issuance of more authorizations for visits abroad—we had not previously pushed.

On the Moscow Conference proposal, the Secretary repeated what he had said in Moscow—we had never said “no.” At the same time, there were conditions which should exist for any site chosen for such a gathering. Some of the factors which the Secretary had cited earlier in the conversation were relevant here and could be addressed in more detail by working groups. So at this stage it appeared that the Soviet Union might be moving in the right direction, but that the necessary conditions did not yet exist. The Secretary concluded by noting that working groups could examine this question in more detail. SHEV-

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<sup>10</sup> See footnote 3, Document 63.

ARDNADZE quipped that, if there were a conference, it would be good; if there were not, it would be no tragedy.

Shevardnadze said he would like to return briefly to two areas where some progress had been made—INF and the whole complex of issues associated with strategic arms, including the ABM Treaty.

On INF, it was the Soviet view that an agreement could be reached in a relatively short period. The Soviet side would try to lay out its ideas later in the day, including some ideas on where compromises might be possible. They saw a need for very intensive work. Unfortunately, they had received the latest U.S. proposals<sup>11</sup>—totalling 50 pages—only the day before. Shevardnadze did not mean to complain, but if he had taken the time to read the document carefully, it would have taken days.

THE SECRETARY said that that was why our experts were along. They could do the reading. SHEVARDNADZE said he hadn't meant to criticize. His side was also familiar with the need to "harmonize" the views of differing agencies. But if the political leadership did not give an impulse, the process could drag on for months. THE SECRETARY agreed, but said he believed a good deal could be done at this point with a little prodding from above.

SHEVARDNADZE said "yes." A similar prod, he felt, was necessary on START. That was why Moscow had difficulty understanding what appeared to be a complication of the negotiations in recent months by the U.S. side. He would have more to say on this in the plenary session. At the same time, there were points of convergence, and the Soviet side would like to move ahead. Both sides needed to try harder to remove obstacles in order to achieve mutually acceptable solutions. Perhaps in this context the idea of seeking agreement on key provisions made sense. There were also prospects with respect to the ABM treaty on the basis of the decisions reached at Reykjavik.

We had good delegations in Geneva, Shevardnadze continued; negotiators were negotiators. Perhaps the Ministers should identify points of departure or instructions for the delegations. These could include tentative timeframes or a timetable for their deliberations. Shevardnadze's fear was that otherwise there would be no agreement and the negotiations would simply continue.

Even if an agreement were reached, Shevardnadze noted, there was the question of ratification. This was of vital importance from the Soviet standpoint; their experience in this regard was bitter. "We want guarantees," Shevardnadze said, that a treaty would be ratified.

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<sup>11</sup> Not found.



What then, did he propose? Specifically, he suggested that the Ministers seek to formulate instructions to their negotiators in concrete terms. There might be a deadline of one month for the “first” agreement (comment: presumably INF) and (unspecified) deadlines for the second (comment: presumably START/D&S) agreement.

[At this point, Shevardnadze handed the Secretary a folder.]

General Secretary Gorbachev’s letter to the President,<sup>12</sup> of which Shevardnadze wished to give the Secretary an advance copy, had been written in this spirit. Shevardnadze assured the Secretary that he had all the necessary authority to discuss any issues relating to further contacts, including at the summit level.

In a more personal vein, Shevardnadze said he had thought much in the last few days about where the relationship stood. He had reached the conclusion that, even where the dialogue was most advanced, e.g. on INF, there was no guarantee that an agreement would be ready for signature during his visit. The idea had thus come to him that perhaps the two Ministers should plan on another meeting. Perhaps, Shevardnadze continued, the Ministers should task their delegations to roll up their sleeves and prepare draft texts. Within a month it should be possible to reach an agreement.

The two Ministers, therefore, might plan to meet in a month, or perhaps a little later. They could then review prospects for agreement on the “first” and “second” agreements, and thus for a summit.

Shevardnadze was quick to add that he had not discussed this idea with Gorbachev or the rest of the Soviet leadership. The idea had come to him when he received from Kampelman the fifty-page U.S. new INF proposals. Shevardnadze’s people had of course given them an initial perusal. Based on their initial report, it was Shevardnadze’s impression that much work remained before it would be possible to say, “yes, there will be an agreement.” Shevardnadze emphasized the importance of being able to make such a call, pointing out that, in the absence of an agreement, there could be no summit. He urged the Secretary to consider his idea, noting that he did not expect an immediate answer.

THE SECRETARY said that he would like to respond with some “parallel” thoughts. He agreed that the two Ministers should give some political push to their negotiators and “up front” the arms control group. The remaining issues had been identified and needed to be wrapped up. The Secretary suggested that the negotiators work over the days Shevardnadze would be in Washington—and for that matter

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<sup>12</sup> See Document 64.



while Shevardnadze would be in the United States—to resolve as much as they could.

Briefly summarizing the outstanding issues on INF, the Secretary mentioned the phasing of reductions, verification, and the German P-1a issue, which, he noted, the Soviets had raised. The Secretary did not see why it would not be possible to push people to resolve these issues while Shevardnadze was in the U.S., or even in Washington.

As for START and D&S, the Secretary hoped to hear while Shevardnadze was here any problems the Soviets might have with U.S. positions, and for the Soviets to hear ours. The Ministers should try to give these discussions an impulse as well.

The Secretary was intrigued by the idea of another meeting between the two Ministers before a possible summit. He felt that a meeting would be necessary, but not necessarily in Geneva, or with its purpose set out so clearly in advance. His fear was that, if the negotiators knew the Ministers were coming in a month, they would simply wait until they showed up to produce. Would it not be better to get the issues out of the way while Shevardnadze was here, and use a follow-up meeting to push in other areas? Both sides wanted a successful summit. This would require careful preparations across the board. So, the Secretary suggested, the Ministers should let their people accomplish as much as possible, and then take stock Thursday to see where they should go.

SHEVARDNADZE said there was no disagreement between them. He had meant what he said about the idea being purely his own. The General Secretary did not know it had been raised. The concept had come to him when he received the weighty, new U.S. proposal. While he was not in a position to comment in detail, he had asked his experts if it met Soviet concerns. They had said it did not. It had been Shevardnadze's intention to complete work on an INF Treaty during his visit. This remained very desirable, and so he was prepared to have his experts work night and day to make that possible.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed. He also wanted Shevardnadze to understand that, if it were useful to meet, he would rearrange his schedule to do so. This had his highest priority. His only concern was that the two sides' negotiators would wait for the Ministers to come to Geneva rather than pushing to achieve results under the scenario Shevardnadze had proposed. Instead, they should work here in Washington. If they did not, the Secretary and Foreign Minister should "whack" them on the head.

SHEVARDNADZE said he was prepared to go upstairs and whack them one in advance. As to rearranging schedules, Shevardnadze was also prepared to do what was necessary. He had a busy fall planned, with a trip to Latin America after his stay in New York, and extensive

commitments in Moscow after his October 9 return. But he would be prepared to meet as necessary. Perhaps his idea could serve as a fall-back option.

THE SECRETARY said this would be fine.

SHEVARDNADZE expressed the view that the next summit would have to be different from Geneva and Reykjavik. It would require a major result. Such a result would depend in large part on the efforts of the two Ministers.

THE SECRETARY noted that Shevardnadze had earlier mentioned nuclear testing. Much progress had been made in Reykjavik on this issue, but since then experts had accomplished little. Movement in this area would also have relevance with respect to the ratification concerns the Foreign Minister had expressed, as it would allow ratification of two pending treaties.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed. Returning to the question of further meetings at the foreign minister level, he confirmed his willingness to have experts work hard while he was in Washington. Perhaps, he suggested, he was wrong in his assessment of the new U.S. proposals; perhaps it would not take as much time as he feared to reach the necessary agreements. His proposal for a meeting in a month or so could remain an “in case” option—an interim step. THE SECRETARY suggested that the possibility be left open and that the two sides do what they could while Shevardnadze was in Washington.

The Secretary noted that the afternoon session would run for two hours or so, and that at around 5:00 pm he would have to go to deliver a speech before the boat trip. At the plenary meeting, perhaps Shevardnadze could give his views on INF, START, D&S and nuclear testing. Then the working groups could roll up their sleeves and get to work. Each Minister could meet with his group the following morning, and the first order of business at the morning plenary could be a review of what further instructions were needed by experts. The Ministers could then go on to other issues.

If Shevardnadze agreed, the Secretary suggested that the two go to greet their delegations. They could inform them on what had been agreed and what was expected of them. SHEVARDNADZE added “and we could whack them on the head.” THE SECRETARY said it would also be a nice gesture to get a photo of the both delegations with the Ministers.

After a brief review of arrangements for the photo-op, the meeting concluded.

**67. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 15, 1987, noon to 2 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze of the USSR (U)

**PARTICIPANTS***US*

The President

Vice President

Secretary of State George P. Shultz

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger

Howard H. Baker, Chief of Staff

Kenneth Duberstein, Deputy Chief of Staff

Frank C. Carlucci, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President for Press Relations

Kenneth Adelman, Director, ACDA

Paul H. Nitze, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State

Max M. Kampelman, Counselor of the Department of State and US Negotiator  
on Space and Defensive Arms

Edward Rowny, Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State

Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State

Ambassador Jack Matlock, US Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Thomas Simons, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State

Robert E. Linhard, NSC Staff

Fritz W. Ermarth, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Dimitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)

*USSR*

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh

Ambassador Yuri Dubinin

Gennadi Gerasimov, Head, Information Department

Ambassador Victor Karpov, Head, Arms Limitation and Disarmament  
Department

Teymuraz Stepanov, Senior Assistant to the Foreign Minister

Sergei Tarasenko, Head, General Secretariat (Notetaker)

Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, President's Meetings With Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze September 1987 (2). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Ermarth. The conversation took place in the Oval Office, the Cabinet Room, and the State Dining Room at the White House. Ermarth sent a copy of the memorandum to Carlucci under a September 21 covering memorandum, requesting that Carlucci approve it. Carlucci initialed his approval. (Ibid.) A copy of the 12:25–1:05 p.m. portion of the conversation, which Simons drafted on September 22, is in Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz—Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87.

At noon, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze was escorted by Secretary Shultz into the Oval Office to meet the President. He was accompanied by Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and Ambassador Dubinin. Secretary Shultz noted to the President that he and the Foreign Minister had had several hours of conversation in a positive and constructive tone. While exchanging pleasantries in front of press teams, Shevardnadze also characterized his earlier conversation with the Secretary as thorough and fruitful, creating a good atmosphere.<sup>2</sup> In response to a press query, the Foreign Minister noted that the letter he carried to the President from General Secretary Gorbachev<sup>3</sup> did not mention a summit date. He refused to characterize the contents of the letter to the press, explaining that he would then have nothing interesting to tell the President. (U)

At approximately 12:10 p.m., the President led Secretary Shultz and Minister Shevardnadze into the Rose Garden for the signing of the agreement on Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers.<sup>4</sup> (U)

The plenary meeting of the President with the Foreign Minister commenced in the Cabinet Room at approximately 12:30 p.m. *The President* opened his remarks by welcoming Mr. Shevardnadze once again to Washington. He noted that our relationship has not seemed so promising in many years. If we can achieve the arms reduction that lies before us and progress in other areas, an historic improvement in our dealings with each other and in the cause of peace is possible. (U)

*The President* briefly surveyed the whole shape of the relationship to open the exchange. On arms control, he noted, we are near major achievements; issues remain, but can be solved. On human rights and bilateral issues we see some progress and a lot more needs to be done. The area where we are most disappointed concerns regional conflicts. These conflicts are dangerous for both sides. They have blocked our cooperation in the past and could continue to do so. They have local sources. But they are not purely local; they engage the superpowers. Our concern with Soviet policy is that it causes or inflames such conflicts by seeking to impose a political system unwanted by the people and by its lavish supply of arms to aggressive and irresponsible regimes. There can be no general improvement in our relations while such Soviet policies continue. But if those policies change for the better, then great improvements are possible. (S/S)

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<sup>2</sup> For the text of this exchange, see *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1987, Book II, p. 1033.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 64.

<sup>4</sup> For the text of Reagan and Shevardnadze's remarks, see *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1987, Book II, pp. 1033–1034. The accompanying text of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center is in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 1987, p. 37.

Afghanistan, *the President* said, is the most troubling case. There will be no solution as long as a communist-dominated regime in Kabul, however disguised, is the goal. For the Afghans will fight this, and we shall support them. We shall not desert them for a phony political settlement. On the other hand, if the Soviets really want to withdraw, then they should simply do so. Practical arrangements for this can be made with the Resistance and Pakistan. Once the Soviets give convincing evidence of their determination to withdraw without control over what they leave, then their security interests can be safeguarded. So long as this war drags on, it will be a drag on our relationship and a danger to us both. (S/S)

*The President* noted that, one way or another, the other regional conflicts that concern us—in Central America, Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia—resemble Afghanistan. Efforts to impose by force an alien political system that the people do not want, does not work, causes continuing war, suffering, and international danger. We cannot progress while this legacy of the Brezhnev era persists. You are trying to overcome that legacy in internal affairs, the President said. We want you to do so in foreign policy too. (S/S)

On Iran-Iraq, *the President* noted, we have parallel interests in ending the war, and have cooperated in the UN. Now is the time to press Iran to accept Resolution 598<sup>5</sup> and, if it does not, to move immediately ahead to a second resolution on enforcement. Rather than moving toward more cooperation, however, Soviet policy is backsliding. It seeks to take diplomatic advantage—but any advantages gained this way will not last and will be costly to Moscow in the Arab world and the West. It seeks to put pressure on our military presence in the Gulf, which is modest and responsible—but this will fail because we have compelling reasons to stay, and regional support. If your claim to “new thinking” is real, the President said, surely you should turn aside from local maneuvers and join us in real cooperation. (S/S)

On Human Rights, *the President* noted, the Soviets have made positive steps, and he welcomed them. He said that he especially appreciates recent resolution of three cases: Vladimir Feltsman, Matvei Finkel, and Iosif Begun. But more must be done to assure free emigration, to release political prisoners, to let divided spouses rejoin, to end persecution of religious dissenters. The President said the Soviets would gain greatly if they quickly allowed all current Jewish refuseniks to emigrate and assured the same right to future applicants. The Soviets actually diminish the value of positive steps, he said, if they dribble them out grudg-

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to UNSC Resolution 598 of July 1987 calling for a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war.

ingly for diplomatic effect. We note, the President continued, that revisions of your laws on political offenses are under consideration. That is good news. The world longs to see more justice in your great country. It is suspicious of mere gestures. We do not belabor human rights issues to put you on the political defensive or to gain bargaining advantage. We are simply trying to communicate what we deeply believe it takes to bridge this gap between us. (S/S)

In this connection, *the President* reminded the Foreign Minister of the proposal he made in June for reducing the division of Berlin, including tearing down the Berlin Wall.<sup>6</sup> People would believe you mean glasnost at home and abroad, if you acted in Berlin. If you cannot bring yourself to take a big step in Berlin, the President continued, then join us in taking some small ones such as improved air access, international conferences, and perhaps the Olympics in Berlin. (S/S)

On Bilateral Affairs, *the President* noted, we have made important progress, especially in cultural exchanges and contacts among our people. This must go forward. I am deeply committed, he added, to more contact among common people, especially our young people. There are a number of subjects on which we have serious complaints. The one I wish to mention here concerns our Embassy. We shall need and expect your full cooperation—on a scale you are not used to giving—in order to solve the problems we have found there. That cooperation will be necessary for our relationship to advance. (S/S)

*The President* then turned to Arms Control. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center Agreement signed today shows we can make progress. Now it's time to tackle the major issues. Let me share my thoughts on priorities, he continued. (U)

The START agreement, *the President* said, should be our top arms reduction target. Since Reykjavik, there have been some useful procedural steps, such as exchanging draft treaty texts, but on substance, we are about where we were a year ago. I'm not satisfied with that, the President said, and I hope you and the General Secretary aren't either. I hope you and Secretary Shultz will take a fresh look at the issues and see what can be done to solve them. (S/S)

We should wrap up INF, *the President* continued. Chancellor Kohl has volunteered a statesmanlike step that should remove the artificial obstacle the Soviet side created. Let me make it absolutely clear, the President said, we will *not* agree to any formal negotiations—in the Treaty or apart from it—on German systems or our established program of cooperation. You should accept Kohl's decision and get on with an agreement. Yesterday we tabled specific proposals on the remaining

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 54.

issues that divide us. Your team needs to address them if there is to be an INF agreement. (S/S)

On Defense and Space, *the President* made two points: First, he disagrees with the Soviet demand to hold up START for an agreement on Defense and Space. This is an artificial linkage. Second, he cannot accept Soviet attempts to cripple SDI. You know my views on the importance of the SDI program, the President said, and everyone knows you have long had your own strategic defense program. So let's be clear: SDI is not going to be bargained away. We've offered proposals to ensure stability and predictability in the strategic relationship as SDI research goes forward. If the Soviets want to find a way forward, avenues are available. (S/S)

With respect to compliance, *the President* welcomed Soviet cooperation in recent US inspection of a Soviet exercise. This was a good start at improving openness and confidence in Europe. Unfortunately, many compliance problems remain. The Krasnoyarsk radar is the biggest of all. Krasnoyarsk is not an issue of our making. The Soviets built the radar where they shouldn't have. Halting construction or claiming that the radar is not for early warning won't answer our concerns or get them back into compliance. Neither will touring a few visiting Americans. As long as the radar stands, it will remain an obstacle to progress both in reaching agreements and in ratifying them. (S/S)

*The President* concluded by saying that he sees a bright prospect in the Foreign Minister's visit this week and his work with us in the months and years ahead. Our experience with an earlier Soviet statesman from the republic of Georgia<sup>7</sup> was, the President said, mixed. The President added that he was increasingly confident that the Foreign Minister's place in the history of our relationship will be remembered more fondly, and that this was certainly his deep personal hope. (C)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* began his response to the President by noting it was difficult to say all he had to say in the brief time available. Karl Marx, he recalled, had once written that he had written a long book because he had so little time. He noted that he and Secretary Shultz had started and would continue a thorough and constructive dialogue on all issues. Shevardnadze said he did not think endless debate about who was right and wrong on all the issues would be constructive. Responding to the President's critique of Soviet policy toward Afghanistan, he said if US arms had not been supplied, there would be peace in Afghanistan; if the US had been more respectful of the people of Central America, there would be peace there. But he would not dwell on this, preferring what he regarded as more construc-

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<sup>7</sup> Reference presumably is to Stalin.



tive debate. He noted that he had discussed human rights and humanitarian affairs at length with the Secretary, that working group exchanges would take place, and that this was positive. He took strong exception to the implication he drew from one of the President's points on human rights, namely that there was some propaganda purpose in Soviet moves. Soviet actions deemed positive by the US are driven by the internal requirements of democratization, he said. He noted that the President had once again stated his desire to see the Berlin Wall torn down and said this plea was offensive to the German people because the GDR was a sovereign country which had the right to decide when and where to build or tear down its walls. (S/S)

Turning to arms control, *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* stated that very substantial progress had been made since the summits of Geneva and Reykjavik. The two leaders had agreed that nuclear war was unwinnable and should never be fought. While short of substantive agreements, there had been an advance on the global problem of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons. We had reached a crucial moment in world affairs. Our relationship could be transformed if we could move ahead on an INF agreement and get major breakthroughs on strategic offensive arms and on assuring strict compliance with the ABM Treaty. The outlines of agreement had emerged and were visible. We faced the simple question, according to Shevardnadze, do we want agreement or not? We had initial understanding. Problems remained, as the President had noted. But we had to maintain momentum. (S/S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* stressed that Gorbachev saw the time factor as very important because he wants to sign an agreement with the President. Therefore, Shevardnadze said, he and other Soviet leaders saw it as very important that his conversations with Secretary Shultz should speed up the process toward signing an INF agreement and registering substantial progress toward radical reductions in strategic arms. For the Soviet side as well as the US side, achieving radical reductions in strategic arms and progressing toward their elimination was indeed the "root problem". In pursuit of such agreement, the Soviet side had aired new views in Geneva and would continue airing them in Washington. (S/S)

However, *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* continued, the ABM Treaty must be preserved; if the Treaty was destroyed, no strategic agreement was possible. There were ways to preserve the ABM Treaty. The Soviet side had recognized the President's commitment to the SDI program. It had begun with insistence on preserving the ABM Treaty, then it proposed non-withdrawal for a 15–20 year period, then a period of 10 years, and other concessions. The Soviet side was ready to seek mutually agreeable solutions. It had proposed establishing the dividing line between permitted and prohibited activities in space and lists of



permitted activities. Such a list would be submitted to the US providing a good businesslike basis for proceeding. Another approach would be to agree, without conditions or lists of activities, to adhere for 10 years to a strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty and to 50% reductions in strategic arms. We could instruct our negotiators to proceed on this basis. Meanwhile, the Soviet side found very worrisome what it saw as US introduction of new complications: Above all, reintroduction of sublimits which were unacceptable to the Soviet side because of their impact on Soviet heavy ICBMs and which had been set aside at Reykjavik; reintroduction of the Backfire, which had long been a clarified issue; exclusion of SLCMs from discussion. These approaches showed no desire to reach agreement, according to Shevardnadze. (S/S)

The Soviet side had a new proposal, *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* said, which should be of interest to the US side, according to which no more than 60% of either side's warheads could reside in any element of the Triad. In practical terms, which Shevardnadze noted Secretary Weinberger would understand, this meant that no more than 3600 warheads would reside on ICBMs. This should be satisfactory to the US. (S/S)

Thus, according to *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze*, we had the outlines of approaches to dealing with our nuclear arsenals. There were good prospects for progress. We could make progress this year on a chemical weapons accord, perhaps agreeing within six months of the next year. How much, Shevardnadze asked, can be accomplished in the next 18 months, a significant time frame? An INF agreement is within reach, he said, and work must continue on remaining obstacles. The Soviet side had not yet been able to study fully the new US INF treaty draft; first impressions revealed that it still posed problems. Remaining issues, including thorough study of the US draft, would take time. Therefore, he said, it was necessary to use every minute and every hour of his stay in Washington to intensify effort. A breakthrough of the difficulties in the way of a 50% reduction of strategic arms was possible; agreement could also be reached on strengthening the ABM treaty regime. Momentum must be maintained. He was ready to work. (S/S)

As a final thought, *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* added, if all obstacles to an agreement on LR and SR INF missiles had not been cleared away, he would not rule out another ministerial meeting a month hence to wrap up work on an INF agreement and to decide when a summit should take place. No time could be wasted, however; as many questions as possible had to be resolved now. (S/S)

At the close of the Foreign Minister's presentation, *the President* asked Shevardnadze to join him for a short *tete-a-tete* in the Oval Office prior to lunch. The Foreign Minister was accompanied by Mr.

Bessmertnykh and his interpreter. After stating that the US would always plead for free emigration as a general right, the President used the occasion to plead for specific emigration cases of concern to him. He asked that the Soviets allow Abe Stolar's daughter-in-law to accompany father and son in leaving the USSR. He pled that the right to emigrate be granted to Ida Nudel, who had waited 15 years to join her sister in Israel; to Naum Meiman who was seeking to join his daughter in the US; and to Vladimir and Masha Slepak whose only two sons lived in the West and who had worked at their professions for many years. The President recognized the special sensitivity that might be attached to the Soviets doing anything for Leyla Gordiyevskaya, the wife of the man who had defected in England, and suggested that the Soviets might handle this by simply exiling or banning her. (S/S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* responded by saying that he would assure careful consideration to what the President had requested. He was not familiar with these cases but would certainly look into them. (C)

At that point, the President led the Foreign Minister to the East Wing for lunch. During cocktails, Shevardnadze cited Gorbachev's warm remembrance of Reykjavik; the President reciprocated this. *Secretary Shultz* mentioned the formula often repeated by both leaders, that nuclear war could not be won and should never be fought. *The President* noted that this statement always got strong applause. He noted that the vast devastation of any nuclear war would render life unlivable for the survivors; Chernobyl had demonstrated this. And with only a small fraction of the total nuclear power available to the two superpowers, *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* added. (C)

*The President* opened luncheon conversation by asking about the progress of restructuring in the USSR and what kind of resistance it faced. *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* replied by noting that the most important revolutions take place in the mentalities of the participants. Everyone in the USSR wants restructuring, but for some it is difficult to adapt their thinking, for some ministers and for some ordinary people. To work in democratic conditions, with public debate, is more difficult than simply following orders. (C)

*Secretary Shultz* suggested that Shevardnadze relate the capsule history of Soviet evolution that he had presented in their earlier conversation. *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* noted that the USSR had gone through several stages after the Revolution: War Communism, the Dictatorship of the Proletariat—under the well-known constraints of dictatorship—then the State of the Whole People, and now a quest for overall democracy. Every system had its ups and downs, he noted. (C)

Recalling that the American Revolution, an armed revolt, had left some smudges in the White House, dating from the British attack, *the President* asked whether some of the innovations being pushed by

Gorbachev harked back to concepts of Lenin which had been blocked under Stalin. (C)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* affirmed this was the case. He said many progressive ideas of Lenin had failed to be implemented for objective and subjective reasons. Among the objective reasons were lack of time to achieve industrialization and economic embargoes by the West, the virtual isolation of the USSR into the mid-1930s. On the subjective side, Shevardnadze said, the Soviets now admitted that they had made errors and had allowed violations of their own laws. (C)

*The President* asked whether restructuring was affecting the farming sector; he asked about the status of private plots and whether they were not more productive than collectivized agriculture. *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* replied that new policies were developing in Soviet agriculture, with all oriented toward achieving economic results. There have always been private plots in the villages; now city dwellers were encouraged to develop them too. In Georgia, his republic, he noted that 45% of state-procured meat came from private plots. He went on to say that the collective and state farms would remain the backbone of Soviet agriculture because modern machinery could only be used efficiently on large farms, of 30, 40, 50,000 hectares. But the contradictions between collective and individual incentives in agriculture were now being overcome. Shevardnadze's family, he recalled, had a private plot. He used to make his own wine. He had been characterized as the foremost diplomat among winemakers in the USSR. Responding to a question from the *Vice President*, *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* noted that the size of private plots varied according to regional land availability but tended to be around one-half a hectare, or about one acre. He noted that most rural income is still derived from work on collective land. (C)

*The President* recalled that he had grown up in farm country where several farmers would together buy and use expensive equipment, the sharing of which was a social bond and event. (U)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* turned the conversation to compliance with arms control agreements. He noted the US charge that the Krasnoyarsk radar violated the ABM Treaty. He said the recent visit by US Congressmen to the radar, which they had photographed, showed its true purpose. On one hand, he reflected, there might be a similar Soviet visit to US radars in Greenland and England where the Soviet side saw violations. On the other, he said, there existed a mechanism in the Special Consultative Commission to prevent violations or assess charges of violations. There were experts there. What was needed, according to Shevardnadze, was an end to polemics about this. In the fall, the SCC would reconvene. Soviet leaders had formally proposed that Secretary Weinberger meet with Soviet Minister of

Defense, General Yazov, within the SCC or otherwise, to lay this matter finally to rest. Experts could contribute and leaders could decide. Such a meeting of defense ministers could also address questions of military doctrine and of force asymmetries which the Soviet side was willing to address. (S/S)

Before asking Secretary Weinberger to respond, *the President* asked Paul Nitze to comment on Shevardnadze's points on violations of the ABM Treaty. *Ambassador Nitze* noted that Shevardnadze was fully familiar with the US contention that the Krasnoyarsk radar was a violation because it was an early warning radar in the wrong place, and that US radar improvements in Greenland and England were not because they were permitted modernization, mere conversion of dish to phased-array type radars. *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* responded that the Soviet side might visit these sites, but it would take a meeting of defense ministers to resolve the problem. (S/S)

*Secretary Weinberger*, addressing the point on force asymmetries, noted that for 13 years the US had sought to get the Soviets to recognize their existence and importance. If the Soviets were now ready to do so, perhaps we would see some progress. As to the radars, our radars at Thule and Fylingdale were allowed modernization while Krasnoyarsk was many hundreds of miles out of place. If, he continued, a meeting of defense ministers would establish once and for all that Krasnoyarsk was a violation, then it would be a good idea. (S/S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* responded by noting that he had asked General Yazov why he was violating the ABM Treaty; General Yazov convinced him that he was not. The defense ministers should meet to settle this. (S/S)

*Secretary Weinberger* recalled that he had proposed a meeting of defense ministers a couple of years previous, but apparently the message did not get through. Now there was a new Soviet defense minister; and we would consider the idea of such a meeting. He asked Shevardnadze to pass his greetings to Boris Petrovsky, the former Soviet minister of health and an acquaintance from the early 1970s. *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* said it was a pity that Petrovsky was not defense minister; then there would be no Krasnoyarsk problem. Careful thought must be given to removing this problem from the agenda. (S/S)

*The President* interjected a private fantasy, as he put it: What if we were attacked by extraterrestrial beings? Wouldn't our conflicts seem unimportant? In that event, *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* replied, we probably wouldn't even care about meetings of our defense ministers. *Secretary Shultz* added that we ought to encourage meetings of our top defense leaders—of which exchanges under the Incidents at Sea

Agreement<sup>8</sup> were a model—at least to spread the workload from the diplomats. *The Vice President* cited a fanciful intercept of a conversation in an alien space craft: “Keep calm. Four heads are better than two.” (C)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* asked the Vice President about his impending trip to Europe. The *Vice President* said he saw it as a very important trip he was eager for, a trip which would include Poland. *Secretary Shultz* queried *Shevardnadze* on his impending travels to Latin America. The latter noted that he would be visiting Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, a first for any Soviet foreign minister. He would not, he said, be going to Nicaragua. (S/S)

*The President* observed that time was running out, that a hungry press wanted some comment. After a brief exchange, resumption of work at the State Department was confirmed for 3:30 p.m.<sup>9</sup> *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* thanked the President for his hospitality and conveyed warm regards to Mrs. Reagan from General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev. *The President* said it had been a pleasure and that he would have to convey those regards by phone since the First Lady had departed for California for events connected with her campaign to help children and combat drug abuse. *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* said he was aware of the First Lady’s activities in these areas. (U)

The lunch terminated at 2:00 p.m. (U)

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<sup>8</sup> Reference is to the 1972 Incidents at Sea Treaty between the United States and Soviet Union.

<sup>9</sup> See Document 68.

68. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 15, 1987, 3:30–5:30 p.m.

## SUBJECT

First Shultz-Shevardnadze Plenary

## PARTICIPANTS

## U.S.

The Secretary  
 Ambassador Kampelman  
 Ambassador Ridgway  
 Ambassador Nitze  
 Ambassador Matlock  
 Director Adelman  
 Col. Linhard  
 Mr. Simons (notetaker)

## U.S.S.R

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
 Dep. FonMin Bessmertnykh  
 Ambassador Karpov  
 Ambassador Dubinin  
 Ambassador Obukhov  
 Mr. Stepanov  
 Mr. Tarasenko  
 Mr. Mamedov (notetaker)

(Not at the Table)

Ambassador Glitman  
 Ambassador Lehman  
 Ambassador Cooper  
 Mr. Parris

Mr. Nazarkin  
 Mr. Masterkov  
 Mr. Sokolov  
 Mr. Kutovoy

*Shevardnadze* said he understood they had two hours. *The Secretary* confirmed they had until 5:30, and invited *Shevardnadze* to begin.

*Shevardnadze* said he would try to adhere to the rules in order to accelerate the process. He would present his ideas more precisely, and go quickly. The only inconvenience was that it would have been good if the U.S. had tabled its documents in Geneva a little earlier. The Soviet side had not had enough time to analyze them and compare the positions, so that his position would not take the latest U.S. proposals into account. He had people who would be working on this, and would report tomorrow.

*Shevardnadze* said he wished to turn to business. He would start with the issues relating to the preparation of an agreement on medium-range and shorter-range missiles. Both the Soviet and U.S. sides realize they are seeking a global solution. There was no difference on that. But a number of questions remain. They are both procedural and substantive, but can be overcome if the political will is there. The mission of his delegation and his mission was to facilitate the prepara-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz—Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons. The meeting took place in the Madison Room at the Department of State.

tion of a draft agreement. It would be ideal if this could be achieved during his stay in Washington.

Shevardnadze continued that with regard to the class of medium-range missiles, there are many agreed points, and they should step up the search for solutions. The Soviet side had proposed what he might call a non-standard one: to remove all the warheads to one place under the supervision of inspectors. He knew not all people on the U.S. side agreed with this, and he wished to explain the reasons for it.

The Soviets wished to make it impossible for the missiles of both sides to be used during the first year, Shevardnadze continued. This would build confidence, politically as well. Inspection would give confidence that the warheads had been removed and subsequently eliminated. By warheads they meant “design-mechanical parts, which would be destroyed, and fissionable material, which would be turned over for utilization.” He thought utilization means the same thing in all languages.

*The Secretary* said he understood, and agreed with that. What the Soviets had said previously about warheads had stirred everyone up. The issue might not be too difficult to resolve. People had understood the Soviets wished to destroy fissionable material. This was not what they had proposed in Geneva. Reentry vehicles contain fissionable material, but also intricate shells or casings, and some contain guidance systems. Shevardnadze was talking about the casing when he described the “design-mechanical part.”

*Shevardnadze* replied that he was not talking only about the casing; there were also guidance systems and detonators. When the Secretary said casing, Shevardnadze was distinguishing between the structural part and the fissionable material. And the fissionable material is to be removed and utilized.

*The Secretary* said we agreed on the removal of the fissionable material. He thought the definition of what the mechanical part consists of should be set out with some care. But this should be a resolvable problem.

*Shevardnadze* said he thought this approach should provide a solution of principle, and the experts could work on the details. *The Secretary* said this could be one item for the working group that was being organized. *Shevardnadze* noted that one problem for the Soviets was that they had two people designated for each group, so some people were called on to be two places at once.

Shevardnadze continued that he wished to turn to a second aspect. Definition of a “warhead” should help with the simultaneous process of dismantling by both sides. The Soviet proposal is that within one year the Soviets would eliminate the SS-4’s, and the U.S. would eliminate



the Pershing II. The Soviets would then remove and dismantle enough warheads so that the residual will correspond to the warheads on U.S. cruise missiles. The mathematics were complex, and this too was a topic for the experts.

*The Secretary* said that the mathematics might be complex, but there were differences in concept. The U.S. side had a different view of what should be done. It understood that the Soviet side wanted to disassemble and dismantle this class over five years. The U.S. side thought three years should be enough. We needed to proceed in a deliberate fashion to destroy and verify as we go. We should leave it to each other to appraise what should come out first; for our part we did not wish to take out all Pershings first. We wished to start at the same time, and to reach zero in three years; somewhere in between we would reach equality. The two sides should wrestle with this problem, and see what they are arguing about.

*Shevardnadze* said they should take into account that they were assuming different dates. The U.S. side was working with three years for medium-range and one year for shorter-range missiles; the Soviet side had 5-year and 2-year periods. They should readjust themselves to discuss the option that would suit both sides best.

*The Secretary* said that should not be impossible. The U.S. recorded one year from what the Soviet side had said in Moscow; that was where it came from. The situation was of course different for LRINF. *Shevardnadze* said he realized that, and would explain why later.

*Shevardnadze* continued that according to the Soviet draft, over the next six months the U.S. and the Soviet Union would complete the work of undocking and dismantling the remaining medium-range missiles. In two years they would eliminate all medium-range missiles and launchers; the timetable and specific procedures for destroying them would be subject to negotiation.

*The Secretary* replied that whatever the sequence verification would be needed. This was the burden of the protocol the Soviet side had not yet had time to study. We needed to make sure we had estimated non-deployed systems, and these should be destroyed too.

*Shevardnadze* said the principal premise of the Soviet approach was to remove warheads, verifying this with inspectors on both sides. This seemed to them the correct approach concerning the timetable, the phasing issue.

There is a serious obstacle, *Shevardnadze* continued, in U.S. unwillingness to eliminate all its medium-range warheads, its wish to except the West German P1a's. This could jeopardize the treaty. More broadly, it aroused serious doubts about the partner's willingness to implement global double zero. For purposes of a treaty, the two sides should base themselves on the following principles:



—Launchers, missiles and warheads were to be destroyed during an agreed period, with specification to be made at the beginning.

—The U.S. and Soviet Union would stop production of missiles in the 500–5000 km. range, both types that existed at the date of conclusion of the agreement and any new types, both ballistic missiles and land-based cruise missiles. They should end production of launchers for such warheads.

—The U.S. and Soviet Union would not transfer missiles and launchers for such warheads to third parties. He did not know how much this principle was reflected in the latest U.S. draft. If the U.S. had difficulties with implementing this, and specifically had difficulties with a number of shorter-range warheads, the Soviet Union could consider a timetable that would help the U.S. over these difficulties.

The Soviet side proposed to liquidate missiles, launchers and warheads in this class over two years in two phases, Shevardnadze concluded. In the first year after entry-into-force of an agreement the shorter-range warheads would be put into a status that would preclude their use in sites on the national territory of each side. They would be concentrated in one place, and would include P1a warheads. In the second phase all shorter-range launchers and warheads of all missiles in this class would be eliminated. The matter was hard to explain; perhaps the experts could go into it.

*The Secretary* asked to comment. They had been talking about warheads and what the working group could discuss. They had been discussing a process that would lead to zero, first for LRINF and then for SRINF.

The U.S. concept was to eliminate long-range INF in three years rather than five, but phase by phase rather than all together. The U.S. side thought that in dealing with something new and different it was best to take care, to go step-by-step and verify how things were going. This was a different concept. Let us hear each other's point of view and explain our own, the Secretary urged.

On shorter-range missiles, the Secretary continued, the Soviet side had them and we did not. In Moscow they had suggested these should be destroyed in one year, and we had agreed. This had been in response to the problem of equality.

The German P1a were not part of this negotiation, the Secretary continued. The U.S. side did not own them, and we were only talking about those we owned. The Soviet side had raised questions, and Chancellor Kohl had made a statement of what he would do, and we in turn had made a statement of what we would do as he took those steps. The net was that as we reached the end the German P1a's would also be gone, missiles and warheads, as he had stated. That would not

be part of this agreement, but it would happen. The result the Soviet side was looking for would be achieved. But it could not be included in the agreement, since the systems were not exclusively U.S. or Soviet.

Concerning the Soviet proposal to stop producing, the Secretary said, we agreed with the Soviet side. We had none; we were going to eliminate that class; and since we would not have any, we could not transfer them. With regard to the arrangement between the U.S. and West Germany, Chancellor Kohl and we had gone on the public record. He assumed Shevardnadze had no doubt in his mind as to what we would do.

*Shevardnadze* said he had addressed some principles concerning how the Soviet side understood global double zero. The experts should compare what the two sides understood by global zero. If they were discussing zero seriously, the West German warheads could not remain outside. The relations of the U.S. with the Federal Republic were up to the U.S. If there were troubles, the Soviet Union was not responsible for them. But the situation troubled them. The Secretary could conceive of what this meant to the Soviet people, for psychological, moral, political and other reasons. The sharp reaction came from that.

Those warheads had to be destroyed, *Shevardnadze* continued, and this had to be reflected in some form in an agreement. He asked whether they could not look for a compromise solution. The Soviet side was willing to look, he said, but it had to be convinced, from the top leaders down to every citizen. This was a matter of principle.

He agreed that Kohl had made an important statement, *Shevardnadze* said. But it had not even been a government statement in parliament. Let Kohl work for another twenty years, if the West German people wanted him, but tomorrow there might be someone else. That was for the launchers. It was a different matter for the warheads that belonged to the U.S. Kohl and Genscher had told the Soviets and the world: concerning the warheads talk to the Americans and reach an agreement with them. This was a matter for Soviet-American talks. It could not be evaded.

*The Secretary* replied that as concerned the content of what would happen, that was clear from Chancellor Kohl's statement. It had been discussed and approved by the FRG's constitutional congressional body, and represented a clear and reliable statement of what the German Government intended. We had followed up on it. The net was that the missiles would no longer be operative, as INF came to pass. That was the result the Soviet side said it sought. Ways of saying that could be discussed, but the U.S. side thought that nothing could be more authoritative than what the Federal Chancellor had said, and we had followed up on.

The experts could discuss that, the Secretary suggested. Both the content of what would happen and the procedure were important. The

Soviet side sought a procedure that would leave it confident. We would try to explain why it should be.

*Shevardnadze* said he had to make one thing clear. The P1a warheads belonged to the U.S., and not to the FRG. How could the Bundestag make decisions concerning U.S. property? Therefore the warheads were a matter of principle. If we were talking about Pershing II's we should also be talking about P1a's. He did not know how many there were; perhaps 400. The matter was not simple. Kohl and the Bundestag could say what they wanted, but these belonged to the U.S. side. The question could not be left open. Kohl had said that the missiles would be destroyed after the U.S. and Soviet Union had carried out an agreement, there were his five points. What guaranteed that before destruction the U.S. would not return the same warheads to those missiles? This should be reflected in some kind of agreement. Or they could look at another avenue; but he was not prepared to talk about that right then.

*The Secretary* said those warheads were not just owned by the U.S. West Germany and the U.S., on behalf of NATO, had undertaken this system together. The Germans had an undertaking concerning ownership of nuclear weapons which he assumed the Soviet side was happy to have them keep. As a result, this was a cooperative enterprise, in which the U.S. controlled the warhead part, and the Germans the missiles. But the U.S. in a sense did not own the warheads; it could not just take them away; it was a cooperative system. So we had said that as they did what they said they would do, we would remove the warheads, and the fissionable material would wind up like other fissionable material.

The Secretary said they should ask the working group to examine the issue, but the U.S. side was not in a position to include this issue in an INF agreement or do anything other than seek an understanding with the Soviet side about what will happen. There would be a result, which should be agreeable to the Soviet side; it had been produced by the West Germans; we needed to find a form to express it.

*Shevardnadze* reiterated that the two sides had to search for a solution. The issue could not be left aside. The U.S. side could say that they belonged or did not belong, but the issue needed to be made clear. From bitter experience the Soviets were sensitive. They could not leave it aside. Perhaps the experts could come up with something clever.

With regard to the timetable, *Shevardnadze* continued, he wished to set the record straight on one point. He did not wish to leave the impression that the Soviet Union opposed eliminating missiles and warheads in a short period. Mikhail Gorbachev had proposed the solution for shorter-range missiles. They had nothing against going along with three years for medium-range and one year for shorter-

range. But it was hard to imagine how this would work, and the topic was new. They asked how it would be feasible practically and technically. Shevardnadze asked whether U.S. experts had developed technologies for doing this without hurting the environment or creating other negative factors. If so, he requested that the U.S. side share this, and if it were practical the Soviet side could accept it. If not, perhaps a longer period was called for.

*The Secretary* said the two sides should share their thoughts on this. He knew that some on the U.S. side had wanted to proceed more rapidly, precisely because this would be new and we needed to be careful, but we had decided three years was feasible. This was something the working group could take on.

The Secretary added that he also assumed the Soviets would have studied the material we had presented on verification. We would be interested in the Soviet response.

*Shevardnadze* said he had two words on verification. Dropping the Asian missiles had helped solve many problems. He therefore had not understood the President's comment concerning verification.<sup>2</sup> Frankly, the Soviet side resented such remarks. He knew the U.S. side was telling people it was proposing more simplified verification. The Soviet side was in fact proposing global effective verification. The two sides needed to work more on this. As far as he knew the U.S. was looking for revision of the stringent proposals it had made. The Soviet side was willing to look at a mutually acceptable solution. But it was not fair to accuse the Soviet side of being afraid of verification. It also had a rostrum.

*The Secretary* said we had noticed. If we succeeded in reaching an INF agreement, it would have the strongest verification in the history of arms control by a long shot. He had said to Mr. Gorbachev in Moscow that verification would be easier with zero than with any finite number. We were now talking about zero, and verification was simplified; this was all we had done. 100 warheads meant production, and contact was required with the processes. Zero meant no production or testing; the requirements were different. That was the nature of the adjustment. Concerning inspection, it was important to retain this right, for U.S. and Soviet facilities in basing countries, until the systems were eliminated, no longer there. But the Soviet proposal for worldwide inspection everywhere was unnecessary and unwarranted; it was not a good proposal.

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<sup>2</sup> Reference presumably is to Reagan's refrain of *Dovorey no provorey* ("Trust but verify"), which he invoked at a public event the previous day. (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1987, Book II, pp. 1029–1033)

*Shevardnadze* replied that it was needed if there is suspicion. *The Secretary* rejoined that we have a provision for suspect sites, and that should be retained. *Shevardnadze* said the Soviet side would see what the U.S. documents contained. It was not simply for rigid verification, but it wanted verification as tough as possible. *The Secretary* replied that the U.S. did too. *Shevardnadze* said that meant they had made progress. *The Secretary* recalled that at Reykjavik the President and the General Secretary had vied with each other concerning their commitments to verification before the two ministers. *Shevardnadze* said that the two sides had made good headway since then.

Summarizing, *Shevardnadze* said that on medium-range and shorter-range missiles the outlines of an agreement were emerging quickly, and there was much for the two delegations to do. He would not simplify. They needed to talk about the P1a's, about phasing and about verification, taking the new U.S. proposals into account; they would study them, and perhaps reply the next day. *Ambassador Karpov* interjected that the Soviet side would need to scrutinize those proposals. Not all details were clear, and they should not go into details at this time. *Ambassador Obukhov* said they needed thorough study.

*The Secretary* said the experts should work on these matters. He would remind the U.S. working group members before the Soviet members that he expected to receive a report on their work before the two ministers met again. Their first order of business was to see what impulse they could give. *Shevardnadze* noted smilingly he had briefed his people at the Embassy. *Karpov* noted the experts would not be looking into space.

*Shevardnadze* said he had asked his people to prepare guidelines on the problems where they could not reach agreement, on INF and shorter-range systems, on strategic offensive arms and on defense and space. *The Secretary* said the experts should see what they could come up with. *Shevardnadze* said the issues should be clear by the next day.

*Shevardnadze* suggested they turn to strategic offensive arms, and *the Secretary* agreed.

*Shevardnadze* noted that he had told the Secretary that morning and repeated to the President that the Soviet side considered this the root problem. The Soviet side was for independent reductions in strategic offensive arms. Reykjavik had been an important step. There had been agreement in principle to 50% reductions, and to 1600 delivery vehicles. To both the Secretary and the President he had said that the Soviet side was seeking to reach agreement with this U.S. Administration. This meant that time was relatively short. He believed that reserves existed. No doubt the negotiators were working hard. The Soviet side had submitted a draft which took account of the U.S. text; it should be possible to speed things up on that basis.

There were general problems, Shevardnadze went on. He did not wish to engage in polemics, but the U.S. side had destroyed the SALT II Treaty. It planned to implement unlimited deployments of sea-launched cruise missiles. There were also purely negotiating problems. On many elements the U.S. position did not take legitimate Soviet security interests into account.

For instance, it called for sublimits on Soviet ICBM warheads that were unacceptable, and it sought to eliminate heavy missiles. In Moscow he and the Secretary had agreed they should take structures of forces into account. At least he had thought the Secretary had agreed. But now the U.S. position in the talks tries to upset the structure of the Soviet strategic arsenal.

The Soviet side could not accept the proposal to ban mobile ICBM's, Shevardnadze went on. It did not think the proposal was warranted or justified. In April he and the Secretary had discussed the advantages of mobiles for stability. He could say that these advantages were great, and this truth should not be ignored. The Secretary had said verification was difficult, but this difficulty should not be exaggerated. Mobile ICBM's were verifiable. The U.S. had had experience with this: the SS-20's were mobile, and had presented no great verification difficulties.

Shevardnadze continued that it caused a certain irritation, as he had said to the President and to Ambassador Kampelman, to see an inexplicable demand artificially raised in the talks for limitations on the TU-22M, the Backfire. He thought Ambassador Kampelman had also been surprised. *The Secretary* said Ambassador Kampelman spoke for himself. *Ambassador Kampelman* said Minister Shevardnadze could speak for him, so long as he could then speak for Minister Shevardnadze.

*Shevardnadze* continued by asking why we should change agreed counting rules. He and the Secretary had discussed this in Reykjavik, and he had thought the matter agreed. Now the U.S. side seemed to have adopted a different approach. This looked like an artificial obstacle. The sooner the U.S. got away from it the better for the two sides' common interests. If it was there for diplomatic bargaining, it should be dropped, for the sides were running out of time.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to believe that what the whole Administration, including the top level, said about its interest in concluding a strategic arms agreement was sincere. He would repeat for the experts what he had told the President: the two sides could talk about establishing a quantitative ratio within the strategic triad, based on equal security for all sides, providing that the proportion of any one component should not exceed 60% of the total number of warheads. The experts would know what to think of this new proposal. It had no preconditions. It took into account the U.S. desire to reduce the

proportion of land-based ICBM's in the Soviet arsenal, and worked out to 3600. This had figured in various phases of the talks, and was a compromise proposal. The experts should work on it.

Another question the Secretary had raised in Moscow, Shevardnadze continued, concerned the relationship of strategic offense and defensive armaments. This was a major, serious question. It had a theoretical or ideological side, and it had practical aspects. The Secretary had given him a paper, which he had read and had his people read. The Soviet side had prepared a response. To read it would take an hour and a half; it was about 12 pages. He would like to hand it over. He asked if it were available in English. *Bessmertnykh* said they had it only in Russian. *The Secretary* said it could be given to Simons or Parris. *Shevardnadze* said there should be work for everyone. He proposed they discuss the paper<sup>3</sup> when they met again.

Shevardnadze asked if the Secretary had comments on strategic offensive weapons, or whether he should go on. *The Secretary* invited him to go on. *Shevardnadze* said the next question was how to preserve the ABM Treaty and prevent an arms race in space. This was not a new question. At Reykjavik it had been agreed that the two sides would not use their rights to withdraw from the Treaty for a period of 10 years. He did not understand why the U.S. side now proposed that this should be 7½ years. They understood the President's desire to continue with SDI. That was why the Soviet proposal provided for research and testing in laboratories, and for mockups, models and the like, even though earlier they had not taken this approach.

Shevardnadze continued that he had told the President that day that if the ABM Treaty were exploded there would be no agreement on strategic offensive arms. This was the firm view of the Soviet leadership. The sides should work on preserving the ABM Treaty and on 50% reductions in offensive arms. Both were possible, both the first and the second.

Shevardnadze went on that favorable conditions for reducing offensive weapons lie in the obligations of both sides not to withdraw from the treaty. They had made a pragmatic proposal: to agreement on lists of what will be banned in space. This was not the freshest proposal, but it was constructive. The lists would be drawn up irrespective of the purpose of the devices on it. The Soviet side had given some examples before; it was now prepared to give the specifications of which devices would be involved. This was solid work, and the Soviet side would hand it over. Unfortunately it had been left at the Embassy.

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<sup>3</sup> Not found.



Shevardnadze said that the two sides could speed up their work on a treaty for reducing strategic offensive arms, but if time did not permit them to finish, the Soviet side had proposed drafting key provisions, and the two sides could get back to that version as well.

He did not rule out another option, Shevardnadze went on. The two sides could abandon the effort to agree on characteristics or specifications of devices to be banned, and he and the Secretary could simply reach a firm agreement that over the next 10 years the two sides would firmly adhere to the ABM Treaty and would reduce strategic offensive weapons by 50%.

On the question of deviations from the treaty, Shevardnadze continued, he had stated to the President on behalf of the Soviet leadership the Soviet view that the work of the SCC should be overhauled, and proposed a meeting in the SCC this fall of the two Ministers of Defense. It was important to both sides to be assured that the ABM Treaty was not being violated, and to go ahead with 50% reductions. There was thus a need to clarify the question of violations, including the Krasnoyarsk radar. Hence it was not accidental that they had invited some Members of Congress to visit Krasnoyarsk. They also wished to talk about Greenland. The U.S. side said this was experimental, but it was in fact a new system. There was also the proposal for a high-level meeting. If we could get rid of doubts in these ways, we could create optimal conditions for proceeding to cuts in strategic arms.

For the Soviet side, Shevardnadze said, the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty was inadmissible. The Treaty should be retained for 10 years as it had been written by its authors, some of whom were in the room that day.

From the Soviet point of view, serious cuts in strategic offensive arms were a very promising prospect indeed, Shevardnadze concluded.

*The Secretary* said he found Shevardnadze's remarks serious and interesting.

On START, the Secretary said the U.S. side wished to reach an agreement that provided for large cuts. He wished to summarize the U.S. view of where things stood:

- We agreed on 6000 warheads, and 1600 delivery systems.
- We agreed on a bomber counting rule.
- We agreed on 154 heavy ICBM's, and the U.S. side had said this should be expressed in warheads, assuming ten per delivery system.
- The Soviet side had said that the effect of agreed reductions would be to reduce Soviet throw-weight by 50%, and we thought this should be translated somehow into the agreement.

The U.S. side regarded all this as of key importance, the Secretary went on. The U.S. side had also said that ballistic missiles are different



from bombers or cruise missiles. The Soviet side had made the suggestion—he thought it was in August 1986—of a formula of 80% applied to the total. We had applied this to 6000, and derived 4800. We thought these distinctions crucial, and the reasons for them clear. We had also called for an ICBM warhead sublimit of 3300. The Soviet side had now proposed 3600, but derived from a formula for all legs of the triad. We continued to think it was important to distinguish between land-based ballistic missiles and other forms, particularly submarine-launched ballistic missiles, whose accuracy is not so great. These are important distinctions. We had also proposed a limit of 1650 on heavy and highly-fractionated ICBM warheads. The Secretary said he wished to underline the importance of the 4800 sublimit.

The Soviet side had raised questions concerning SLCM's, the Secretary went on. The U.S. side understood the importance of the questions, but saw no way of verifying these systems. We had thought about it, but not figured one out. If Shevardnadze had thoughts, we were ready to listen. *Shevardnadze* said they had proposed a good formula. *The Secretary* said it must have slipped by him, and invited him to propose it again.

With regard to mobiles, the Secretary continued, there is the same difficulty in verifying. There was a problem of verifying the SS-20. That was the reason zero was better than 100 warheads. In our view, therefore, mobiles should also be at zero, for verification will be easier there than for any finite number. But if Shevardnadze had thoughts on that, the Secretary said, he would be glad to hear them.

The Secretary said there were other issues as well, like counting rules, Backfire and some others. They had not been put in as talking points. The Soviet side should listen to the problems we had raised, and try to resolve them. Just because SALT provided one rule for heavy warheads did not mean we should not think it over. We wished to hear Soviet thoughts, and express ours. This was a matter for the working group to pursue.

If the two sides could put their minds to work on the strategic area, the Secretary said, we had identified important elements of agreement, and should push forward.

Turning to the ABM Treaty and space, the Secretary said that here we had an anomaly. Both sides said they wished to live up to the ABM Treaty, but they had agreed that the constraints on defense in the 1972 treaty should be followed by reductions in offense, and that had not happened. The Soviet side had four times the numbers it had then, and ours were up too. Offense had increased in a way not envisaged by the ABM Treaty. The offense-defense relationship had gotten out of kilter. Both sides should want to put it back in perspective.

With regard to the ABM Treaty, the Secretary said the U.S. side would read the materials presented by the Soviet side. The sides should

also explore Shevardnadze's second option. There was irony involved in saying we could not have reductions in strategic offensive arms if the other side violated the Treaty, when each says the other is *now* violating it. This needed to be cleared up.

The Secretary said he would like to summarize where things now stood:

—In the context of 50% reductions, each side would give up its withdrawal rights. Both sides had put this proposal forward.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> The version on file ends at this point.

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## 69. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 16, 1987, 9–10:20 a.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

U.S.  
The Secretary  
EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)  
Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

U.S.S.R.  
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
Vasiliy Sredin (Notetaker)  
Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

### SUBJECT

INF, START

THE SECRETARY opened the meeting by volunteering a few comments on the read-out he had received from the U.S. arms control working group on their work of the night before. Specifically, he wanted to address INF and START.

On INF, the talks had confirmed a conceptual difference on the question of phasing, with the issue being three versus five years. As Shevardnadze had suggested the day before, there were clearly some

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz–Shevardnadze–Wash—9/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in Shultz's private office at the Department of State.

practical problems to be dealt with as well. The issue was less one of principle than of the operational and practical consequences. We were trying to draw more of our technical experts into the discussion so as to come up with a solution which was careful, verifiable and conclusive. As the two Ministers had agreed the day before, we would be undertaking something totally new in destroying this class of weapons; we wanted to get it right. The Minister's remarks of the day before seemed to reflect the same approach, and we appreciated this. So we would continue to explore the matter from a practical standpoint.

Regarding the verification material we had presented earlier in the week, the Secretary continued, the U.S. understood that the Soviet side would need time for careful study. We were prepared for detailed discussions when the Soviets were.

With respect to German P-1a's, the Secretary had listened carefully to what Shevardnadze had said the day before. It was beginning to dawn on him that he (the Secretary) had not fully understood what had been bothering the Soviet side. The Secretary suggested he state what was dawning on him, that Shevardnadze see if his understanding was correct, and that, if so, the two sides see how they might deal with the problem.

The Secretary understood the Soviet position to be that, when the U.S. removed its warheads from the German P-1a's, the Soviet side needed to know what would happen to those warheads. They might be shipped back to the U.S. But perhaps the Soviet side saw that as an "unknown"; perhaps this was not definitive enough. The Secretary had not until the day before appreciated this aspect of the problem.

What the U.S. was prepared to do to deal with it was to handle the warheads in the same fashion as any other warheads taken out of operation: i.e., they would be brought back to the U.S., fissionable material would be extracted, and the shell destroyed in accordance with agreed procedures. Thus, the Soviet side would be able to conclude that the warheads no longer existed. Observing that Shevardnadze had begun to take notes, the Secretary invited him to comment.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Secretary had made an important clarification as far as the P-1a warheads were concerned. But there were two aspects to the question. The Secretary's clarification had dealt with one aspect—what would happen to the warheads once they were withdrawn. That was useful. But the question remained of *when* those warheads would be withdrawn. This point had to be clarified as well.

Shevardnadze pointed out that the Soviet delegation in Geneva had laid out various options for dealing with this problem, e.g. the separation of warheads from missiles and the concentration of systems in specific areas. These proposals had sought to take into account U.S. concerns. And the destruction timetable proposed by the Soviet side

had sought specifically to take into account both U.S. and FRG concerns. Nonetheless, Shevardnadze observed, what the Secretary had said was very significant.

THE SECRETARY reminded Shevardnadze that the U.S. could not regard a discussion of German P-1a's as part of an INF agreement; nor could we merge discussion of the issue into the negotiations themselves. Chancellor Kohl had stated (and the statement had been given an official character by a subsequent vote of the Bundestag) clearly what he was prepared to do with the P-1a's. The U.S. had said it would be prepared to take action on the P-1a warheads consequent to the Chancellor's action. We had said we would be prepared to return them to the U.S. in accordance with whatever procedures might be developed. As Karpov had noted the day before, there were more than 72 warheads involved, and we understood that all warheads designed for use with the P-1a would have to be made inoperative. So, with respect to Shevardnadze's second question, the timing was the timing laid out by Kohl in his statement.

SHEVARDNADZE reiterated that the question of *when* was very important. The Soviet Union attached the greatest importance to the timing of the destruction of the warheads involved. If one assumed that the P-1a's were left aside in an agreement, a situation would eventually emerge in which U.S. and Soviet LRINF and SRINF were eliminated and the P-1a's and their warheads would remain. This situation must be excluded. The Soviet proposals in Geneva had tried to deal with the situation Kohl had created in indicating that FRG systems would be dealt with only *after* the Soviet Union and U.S. completed the elimination of their LRINF and SRINF. Thus, the Soviets had suggested that under such circumstances a residual Soviet SRINF force equal in number to remaining FRG Pershings would remain in the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Working groups could weigh again the various options, and what the Secretary had said was very important. The question of "when" nonetheless remained. Unless it was resolved, a time could come when the Soviet Union and its allies could find themselves in a situation unequal to that of NATO.

THE SECRETARY suggested he explore the issue further. He thought one had to read the Kohl statement carefully with respect to timing. The issue was precisely when the U.S. would be relieved of its obligations to keep our warheads in Germany and could bring them back to the U.S. This would largely obviate the question of their destruction. We needed to explore this question, and the Secretary wished to do so before responding definitively to Shevardnadze's remarks. The problem seemed to be that Kohl's statement contemplated the withdrawal of P-1a's as the elimination of U.S. and Soviet systems was taking effect. The Soviet approach seemed formally to integrate this

latter process with the P-1a question. We would probably have difficulties with that linkage. But our working groups could grapple with the problem. And the Secretary would see how he might be able to clarify the timing question.

SHEVARDNADZE said he thought possible a solution which did not adversely affect the prestige of the FRG or the security of the parties involved. Experts could consider the options and should be able to come up with a solution acceptable to the U.S. and to Chancellor Kohl. The Soviet Union did not want to embarrass him, as it knew he had difficulties within his coalition, as well as outside the government. Moscow had tried therefore to take his interests into account, as well as its own.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the matter be left there. Working groups could address it further. SHEVARDNADZE noted that there was sufficient time remaining to work the issue, as well as such matters as verification. A lot of detail work remained to be done, but it should be possible to define basic parameters of agreement during his stay in Washington.

Shevardnadze said he had instructed his people to pull together a rough draft of a list of areas which were agreed and which required further work on INF. Once they were in hand, the same thing could be done for strategic and space weapons. But priority attention should be on the "first" complex of issues (INF), so as to determine how much time was necessary to agree on the outstanding issues. Those were the instructions he had given his people; he had asked for a first draft by the end of the day, or by tomorrow morning at the latest. Without such a list, it was difficult to address final solutions. And experience had proven that what had initially been secondary issues could assume paramount importance in the final stages of such a process. So now was the time to sum up what had been done, and what had not been done.

THE SECRETARY said Shevardnadze had outlined a good approach. He recommended that, as the working groups labored, they do their best to keep the list short by resolving as much as possible. SHEVARDNADZE said he believed that process was already underway. The number of outstanding issues was being reduced; but he would like to see them reduced still further. THE SECRETARY said he would like to see the list zeroed out. That would be a "third zero."

SHEVARDNADZE said he was ready. If some details remained, they should be dealt with, because the two sides were embarking on a new, important enterprise. It was important for the details to be right. So he had told his people that they should seek, as Shevardnadze had suggested yesterday to the Secretary, to pull together instructions to delegations to prepare a draft agreement in, say, a month, so that an end could be put to that part of the work and there would be a draft agreement available for signature.

THE SECRETARY said he did not plan to sign any such agreement. He would leave that to his boss.

SHEVARDNADZE protested good-naturedly that the two of them were responsible for producing the document. Therefore they needed a complete text on the "first" complex of issues (INF) and, if possible, on the second (START/D&S) as well if they were to avoid being criticized by their chiefs. Before Reykjavik, there had been a major preparatory effort, but even it had been inadequate. Had more been done, major agreements could have been signed. The two sides would have no right not to sign a major agreement at the next summit. So it was important to resolve as many questions as possible in advance.

In response to THE SECRETARY's remark that our working groups could get started on the process right after lunch, SHEVARDNADZE said he was keeping in the back of his mind the suggestion he had made the day before for a second meeting with the Secretary a month later, in Geneva. THE SECRETARY said he was, too. He was certain there would be such a meeting before a possible summit, regardless of what we were able to do on INF. SHEVARDNADZE said the idea of a follow-up meeting had returned to him the night before after their boat ride, as he reflected on all the details that remained to be wrapped up. He feared that unless the two sides' negotiators were faced with a deadline of a month or forty days when the Ministers would seek an accounting of their progress, talks could go on forever. So he felt a second meeting would be necessary to deal with the details, although every effort should be made to resolve issues of principle while Shevardnadze was here. THE SECRETARY said he hoped that would be possible.

SHEVARDNADZE indicated that, if time permitted, he would like to say a few words on Afghanistan. Perhaps the issue could be discussed at a plenary session, but Shevardnadze believed the two Ministers' one-on-ones were particularly useful.

THE SECRETARY said he would be glad to hear what Shevardnadze had to say, but suggested that detailed discussion be put off to the afternoon. Perhaps a fairly small group could be convened in the Secretary's office to discuss regional issues. If necessary, time could also be allotted for a discussion of regional questions in plenary session. SHEVARDNADZE agreed to the approach.

THE SECRETARY said he would like to make a few points on START. Reflecting on the reports of the U.S. working group (and he had been told the discussion of START issues was useful), he wanted to take the opportunity to emphasize to Shevardnadze the importance we attached to the concept of an overall limit on ballistic missile warheads, within the overall 6,000 warhead limit which was already agreed. The reason for this was straightforward: weapons carried by

airplanes were in a different class from those mounted on ballistic missiles.

This was obviously true in a descriptive sense, and past Soviet proposals had seemed to reflect this. We had taken this into account in suggesting a 4,800 limit on ballistic missile warheads, applying the Soviet figure of 80% to the 6,000 limit agreed to in Reykjavik. The problem we had with the current Soviet 60% proposal was that it would allow all 6,000 warheads to be on ballistic missiles. That would be undesirable, as ballistic missiles were the most threatening and destabilizing element of the triad. So we needed to find means of forcing those numbers down. The Secretary wanted Shevardnadze to understand the importance the U.S. attached to the 4,800 limit on ballistic missile warheads within the 6,000 overall warhead limit.

The Secretary added that he wanted to express appreciation for the paper which Shevardnadze had presented the day before in response to a paper the Secretary had presented on the offense-defense relationship during his last visit to Moscow. We were having the paper translated into English, and would read it with interest. The Secretary hoped that working groups could have a good discussion on the issues involved, because we felt that the Soviet side's presentation of the paper was a constructive step.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the two Ministers leave that particular discussion to a later stage, since Shevardnadze also found the topic interesting.

On START, Shevardnadze said that the Soviet position was not based on egotism or gamesmanship. It was based rather on the fact that a strategic structure already existed—the triad, which both sides had configured to meet their specific needs. What the U.S. was proposing would shatter that structure, to the detriment of Soviet security interests. Shevardnadze had already said the day before that, at this stage, the Soviet Union could accept a 3,600 limit on ICBM's. That was a significant step in the American direction. The experts could play further with the figures, but that was the Soviet number. Shevardnadze said he could not accept the Secretary's contention that ballistic missiles were more destabilizing and dangerous than bombers. Bombers were very dangerous indeed, as U.S. experts would be able to tell the Secretary. Otherwise, why would the U.S. want to keep so many?

THE SECRETARY acknowledged that each side had accepted the concept of a strategic triad as insurance against degradation of any one "leg." He acknowledged as well that bombers and cruise missiles were important weapons. If they were not, as Shevardnadze had said, neither side would have them. But their characteristics were quite different from those of ICBM's: they were more easily intercepted; they could be recalled; they were slower. (SHEVARDNADZE interjected



that ballistic missiles also had their vulnerabilities. THE SECRETARY said he didn't know what they were.)

The Secretary explained that the concept behind our 4,800 sublimit was that it allowed for a certain minimum space for the air leg of the triad. Since both sides had a major investment in that leg, the restructuring issue should not arise. The sublimit represented a simple "notation" about one leg of the triad in a minimal way, amounting to no more than about 20%. But the Secretary did not want to reach any conclusions in the current discussion. He wanted simply to underscore the importance that the U.S. attached to the 4,800 figure.

SHEVARDNADZE said he was certain that if the decisions were up to the two Ministers, they could agree to eliminate all nuclear weapons. As in Reykjavik, they could agree on eliminating everything. Shevardnadze recalled the logic of Gorbachev's proposal in Reykjavik: each side had built up a triad in accordance with its needs; why not cut each leg by 50%—ICBM's, SLBM's, and strategic aircraft. The Soviet side had thought that the President and the Secretary had agreed. Then all kinds of limits and sublimits had begun to appear. Shevardnadze feared these had confused the issue. He believed that the most realistic, simple approach remained that proposed by Gorbachev in Reykjavik. When his experts told him it would not work, his response was always, "Why not? Let's cut them right in half."

Shevardnadze noted that the Soviets had sought to be responsive to U.S. concerns on heavy missiles in similar fashion. They had offered to reduce such missiles by half. But their offer had been sidetracked. This was not fair. Perhaps this was only simple mathematics, but simple mathematics sometimes served as the basis for higher mathematics.

THE SECRETARY acknowledged that there had been problems. The U.S. had been trying to translate relatively simple concepts into concrete agreements which enhanced stability and equality. Thus, when we proposed that, within a limit of 6,000 warheads, no more than 80% would be on ballistic missiles, the triad concept would survive. Similarly, were there no more than 3,600 ICBM warheads (although our position was 3,300) there would be a constraint, but the triad would still be there. There would be, in short, room for differences in structure, to reflect both sides' different needs. We did not want a solution which forced either side to restructure. Our approach would not have this effect. But the Secretary did not want to consume time in a detailed discussion of this issue. He wanted only to emphasize the importance we attached to the number 4,800 so that Shevardnadze understood our views fully. SHEVARDNADZE noted that they could return to strategic arms later in the day or the following morning if the Secretary liked.

THE SECRETARY suggested that, procedurally, they focus on regional issues during the afternoon with a different and smaller group.



Three quarters of an hour remained before the Secretary had to excuse himself to greet the President. The Secretary suggested that the Ministers reassemble the plenary group of the previous afternoon. He understood that Shevardnadze had a number of points to make on arms control issues which had not been covered. So did the Secretary. Arms control working groups could be active in the afternoon.

SHEVARDNADZE asked if the Secretary thought the working groups should be asked to give brief reports at the morning plenary. Perhaps, since the two of them had already received individual reports and discussed the issues, that could be dispensed with. THE SECRETARY thought that reports would not be necessary, and recalled that Shevardnadze had said he had some points to make on conventional forces, chemical weapons and nuclear testing. We would be glad to hear what he had to say, and working groups could be deputized to follow up on the plenary. SHEVARDNADZE agreed, noting that he would have something to say in each area.

THE SECRETARY proposed that in that case they adjourn to the eighth floor, where the Secretary would invite Shevardnadze to lead off and then offer some comments of his own. He would, however, have to depart at 11:00 sharp. SHEVARDNADZE said he understood.

As the meeting concluded, the SECRETARY said that the two Ministers should allocate time to briefly review the work of the bilateral working group. SHEVARDNADZE agreed.

70. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 16, 1987, 10:20–11 a.m.

## SUBJECT

Second Shultz-Shevardnadze Plenary

## PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>USSR</i>
The Secretary	FM Shevardnadze
Counselor Kampelman	DepFonMin Bessmertnykh
Ambassador Ridgway	Ambassador Dubinin
Ambassador Nitze	Ambassador Karpov
Ambassador Matlock	Ambassador Obukhov
Director Adelman	Mr. Stepanov
Col. Linhard	Mr. Tarasenko
Mr. Burton (notetaker)	Mr. Sokolov (notetaker)
	( <i>Not at Table</i> )
Ambassador Glitman	Mr. Nazarkin
Ambassador Lehman	Mr. Masterkov
Ambassador Cooper	Mr. Kutovoy

The meeting began with a photo opportunity. The reporters asked about press reports of optimistic U.S. assessments of the meetings so far. *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* said “we also made some optimistic statements.” Asked about progress in the working groups, Shevardnadze replied that if the groups had not made some progress, “we wouldn’t be sitting here.” *The Secretary* commented that he and the Foreign Minister had agreed that the experts might not be perfect but they were the best we had.

*Shevardnadze* said that since the two ministers had very little time this morning, they had to be very specific. Yesterday in plenary<sup>2</sup> and then on the CNO’s barge, they had touched on some of the aspects of the nuclear testing. He wanted to call the Secretary’s attention to two ideas.

The first, he continued, was that the Soviet delegation at the Conference on Disarmament recently had introduced a draft of key elements of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear testing. The draft provides for the broadest possible verification measures, beginning with announcement of nuclear tests and ending with on-site inspection

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz—Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burton. The meeting took place in the Madison Room at the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 68.

of testing sites. He would like to hear the American response, and sensed that it was somewhat positive. He also wished to suggest that the two sides put their discussions on nuclear testing on a more regular basis.

*The Secretary* said that he believed it was always useful, in multilateral settings, to have U.S. and Soviet representatives have special communication between each other. This was good practice—Max Kampelman is the master of it.

*Shevardnadze* said both the U.S. and Soviet delegations at Geneva are very prestigious and expert on nuclear testing and chemical weapons, and it would be useful to cooperate more actively. He wanted to propose reaching agreement on a joint statement on large-scale talks on nuclear testing, including ratification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties. The Soviet side had prepared such a draft and would provide it to the American side. He understood a working group would meet today. He noted that since we had had consultations but they had failed, it would be important to make such a joint statement.

*The Secretary* said the U.S. has a text and is interested in seeing the Soviet text. The U.S. continues to emphasize improved verification of the magnitude of nuclear tests so we can, as *Shevardnadze* suggested, ratify the two treaties. We have a different view, he thought, about a cessation of testing. The U.S. believed that so long as we rely on nuclear weapons, there must be a testing process. But progress could be made as the volume of nuclear weapons went down and this reduction impacted on testing. The ultimate goal, he said, would be eliminating nuclear testing. He concluded that the experts could discuss this, and the U.S. would table a draft text of a statement.

*ACDA Director Adelman* said that the nuclear testing experts would meet immediately after the plenary.

*Shevardnadze* said the U.S. had done an enormous amount of work to improve verification, and the two sides were beginning to take a joint look at it, including discussions in Geneva. He wanted to remind us that the Soviet proposal to reduce the threshold to one kiloton (1KT) remains on the table. He knew there was not much enthusiasm in the U.S. Government for this idea, but he thought it should be discussed. He was aware of interest by many in Congress and in the U.S. public, just as there was among the Soviet public.

*The Secretary* replied, "Some in Congress."

*Shevardnadze* said, "The majority, I think." He then asked whether the U.S. could consider limiting the number of nuclear tests, say, to four per year, to make progress on the quantity of nuclear testing.

*The Secretary* answered that further down the road we could consider limits on the total number of tests, that this might decline over

time as the number of nuclear weapons declined. But today, we haven't even agreed on the first step, which is the first reductions of nuclear weapons, although we're working hard on that.

*Shevardnadze* said he thought we did not need at this meeting to address nuclear non-proliferation in detail, but in the context of nuclear testing, he wanted to say that if the U.S. and Soviet Union failed to find a solution on nuclear testing and there were no progress on reducing nuclear weapons, it would be impossible to stop nuclear proliferation. There are many states capable of developing nuclear weapons. He didn't want to list them now, but the monopoly of the nuclear club could not be maintained. So it was of "cardinal importance" to make progress.

*The Secretary* said that both sides have worked hard on nuclear non-proliferation, and there has been good progress over the years in associating a large number of states with the NPT regime. The efforts that the U.S. and Soviet Union had made, separately and together, had been broadly successful, and the situations predicted 20 to 25 years ago about nuclear non-proliferation had not happened. So, it was important to keep working.

In this connection, he had two things to mention. One he had mentioned before to *Shevardnadze*. It involved the Soviet sale of a nuclear reactor to India without full-scope safeguards. The other was the possible suspension of South Africa from the IAEA. The Secretary did not hold any brief for apartheid, as *Shevardnadze* was aware. But it would not be wise to expel South Africa from the IAEA, both because it would breach the principle of universality, and in part because we needed to keep a hand on South Africa in view of its capabilities. So excluding them would not be a good idea. Ambassador Kennedy had discussed these matters with the Soviet side, and we knew the Soviets took them seriously.

*Shevardnadze* said the most reliable thing is to end nuclear tests.

*The Secretary* said nuclear testing is the tail—the dog is nuclear weapons; the way you get started is in INF, then START.

*Shevardnadze* replied, "It's both". The best way is to eliminate nuclear weapons. He wanted to suggest that they move on to chemical weapons.

He continued that it is possible to say the two sides are not far apart. Lately, a great deal has happened to bring the positions of the two closer together. Yesterday, in his conversation with the President,<sup>3</sup> *Shevardnadze* had said that elimination of chemical weapons is not a

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 67.

remote prospect. We could conclude a convention during the Administration, and Shevardnadze and the Secretary would have the prospect of signing an historic agreement. Shevardnadze's people in Geneva said it was a real prospect.

He continued that the Soviet side had accepted the American position for a bilateral data exchange. Some complex issues have arisen but they are looking for solutions. Work could proceed on a convention, and American wishes to exchange data even earlier could be accommodated. For example, the first exchange of data would take place during the final stages of negotiation on the convention; the second exchange would take place after the ban had been concluded but *before* signature, if the U.S. and Soviet Union gave mutual assurances of intent to sign. As for the content of the exchange, the Soviets understood there were no differences on that. Shevardnadze said he was offering this explanation to set the record straight. On inspection, the Soviet side favored three inspections of declared facilities and three challenge inspections. Regarding challenge inspection, the U.S. side was aware that the Soviet side had made proposals not to deny such requests.

Thus, it seemed to Shevardnadze that the two sides were discussing important elements of a final agreement to ban chemical weapons. There was some American reserve about intensifying efforts at Geneva. The Soviet side had made proposals for intensifying activities. In the context of U.S.-Soviet bilaterals, the two sides could work out on-site inspections. If the two sides could reach agreement and find common ground, it could be possible to improve and intensify efforts in other areas.

Shevardnadze said he was concerned about the French position. The French don't seem to want to ban chemical weapons right away. He thought the U.S. and Soviet Union should both work more actively with the French.

On visits to facilities, he continued, some things have already been done, and the U.S. side has Soviet ideas. In early October, there will be a visit to the Shikhany. The Soviets could arrange a separate visit later for American experts to see Soviet facilities in greater detail. This could be arranged if the Soviet side could visit an analogous U.S. facility.

*The Secretary* said he believed such visits should be reciprocal and noted it was agreed that the Soviets would visit our CW facility at Tooele, Utah.

*Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh* said Tooele was a different type of facility than Shikhany; Dugway Proving Grounds is the analog to Shikhany; Chapeyev was the analog to Tooele.

*The Secretary* said "I feel the need for a working group."

*Shevardnadze* commented that the question remains about reciprocity.

He also wanted to raise the question of binaries. He said that the effort to ban chemical weapons could not ignore developments in the United States. He wanted to state frankly that the U.S. binary program gives the Soviet side a sense of anxiety, because the foundation for a treaty has been laid, and we “should cross the t’s and dot the i’s on binaries.”

In this connection, he was not insisting on it, but wanted to suggest making a joint statement expressing an obligation not to transfer chemical weapons to others. He thought this would be useful, bearing in mind certain complications.

Shevardnadze continued that, just as we had set out our position on medium range missiles, namely that an agreement could be done in a short time, we could say the same thing about chemical weapons. Questions about confidence, on-site inspection, elimination of CW—all this permits us to create expectations of concluding a treaty.

*The Secretary* said Shevardnadze had said quite a bit. Shevardnadze’s August 6 statement<sup>4</sup> was a very positive development, and his statements today were welcome. Experts’ work is necessary, since there are a lot of details to be considered. Our experience in INF is that when you have moved on the big issues, lots of other issues arise that assume importance, and these need to be dealt with.

The Secretary welcomed Soviet comments on bilateral data exchange. On binaries, the Soviet Union said it recently had halted production of chemical weapons. We halted production in 1969. So the U.S. has felt that some modest modernization was important as an interim measure. The U.S., like the Soviet Union, could not ignore the number of countries with a CW capability, and one argument for working hard now is the risk of proliferation, which is far greater than in the area of nuclear weapons. Chemical weapons had been used in the Iran-Iraq War and we were very concerned about Libyan activities regarding Chad. Thus, the spread of chemical weapons was a concern. The Secretary welcomed Shevardnadze’s statement about transfer. This was a very complicated question. There are precursors that are not chemical weapons but can be used to make them. Thus, there is the problem of understanding what it is you are restricting the transfer of. This is very tricky.

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Shevardnadze’s speech before the United Nations Disarmament Conference in Geneva, in which he conveyed Soviet willingness to accept verification procedures as part of a chemical weapons treaty. (Paul Lewis, “Soviet Says Pershing Missiles Are Main Impediment to Pact,” *New York Times*, August 7, 1987, p. A-1)

In conclusion, the Secretary said he welcomed Shevardnadze's comments, and they should be discussed constructively in a working group.

*Shevardnadze* said he had his experts on hand and they were ready to work.

*The Secretary* said he had some important business to attend to. The President was coming to the Department and the Secretary should be on hand to greet him. This was of overriding importance.

*Shevardnadze* said he wanted to clarify one point. Time was running out in Vienna and final decisions would soon have to be made. There was a debate going on about formulating a mandate for negotiations. NATO refuses to incorporate tactical nuclear missiles or aircraft in the negotiations. The Soviets had been trying hard to come up with a compromise. We could let a working group discuss it, but what the Soviets propose is a formulation that "the subject matter of the 23 would be armed forces and conventional arms, including dual-purpose forces located on land." He said the Soviet side had been scratching their heads trying to come up with something better, and would welcome U.S. suggestions. The experts could work on it.

*The Secretary* said Ambassador-designate Ledogar<sup>5</sup> would be available. *Ambassador Ridgway* noted that Ledogar had confirmation hearings but would be available to meet.

*Shevardnadze* said he had a final suggestion—that the foreign ministers meet in Vienna to conclude the CSCE follow-up meeting. Perhaps he and the Secretary would be in a better mood than their last meeting in Vienna.

*The Secretary* said he had no problem with Shevardnadze's suggestion in principle, it is just a matter of scheduling.

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<sup>5</sup> Stephen Ledogar, chief U.S. delegate to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions negotiations.

71. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 16, 1987, 3–3:50 p.m.

## PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*  
 The Secretary  
 EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)  
 Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

*U.S.S.R.*  
 Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
 P.R. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

## SUBJECT

INF, Syrian CW

THE SECRETARY opened the unscheduled private meeting by observing that he had thought hard about what Shevardnadze had said in their morning conversation about the P-1a problem. The Secretary had described at that time what the U.S. planned to do with the warheads for that system. Shevardnadze had responded with an explanation of the Soviet concern that a situation could arise in which only the FRG would retain operable missiles.

The Secretary then read the text of Chancellor Kohl's August 26 statement on P-1a's.<sup>2</sup> He then told Shevardnadze that the U.S. interpreted this to mean that, at the moment U.S. and Soviet INF missiles had been eliminated, Kohl's statement would take effect. At that same moment, the U.S. would take the P-1a warheads remaining in the FRG and bring them back to the U.S. Thus, there would be no point at which the only operational missiles would be German missiles, because their warheads would be withdrawn at the same moment as other INF systems ceased to exist. The Secretary emphasized that he wanted to say this to Shevardnadze because he believed it to be specific to both ends of the system.

SHEVARDNADZE said he believed the Secretary. But he thought that what the Secretary had said should be reflected in a document.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz—Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in Shultz's private office at the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 26346 from Bonn, August 26, the Embassy reported on Kohl's announcement that the Federal Republic of Germany would not modernize its Pershing 1A missiles, and was prepared to dismantle them if the United States and Soviet Union signed, ratified, and adhered to an INF treaty. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870697–0730)



THE SECRETARY pointed out that what Kohl had said had been approved by the Bundestag, and so that was a clear event. As for what the U.S. would do consequent to the Chancellor's statement, the Secretary had described that to Shevardnadze. The Secretary could consider what, beyond just sitting and talking with Shevardnadze, we would be prepared to do. Shevardnadze could be confident that what the Secretary had said was what would take place.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that the question he had raised was not a mere formality. The P-1a warheads belonged to the U.S. The Soviets were negotiating with the U.S. All other aspects of INF systems—from launchers to weapons to associated facilities—would be covered by the agreement being negotiated in Geneva. They would all be documented. What the Secretary was proposing would not be documented in any way. A means had to be found to deal with this problem.

Shevardnadze suggested that the U.S. was not so constrained as it appeared to think. Kohl and Genscher had told the Soviets officially that "the missiles are ours; the warheads belong to the U.S. Its up to you and them to decide what to do with them." It would be no disaster for U.S.-FRG relations were the warheads to be covered by the INF treaty. That was how Shevardnadze saw it, in any case. Moreover, the U.S. obligations to the FRG had been formulated before the onset of the INF negotiations. The situation had now changed fundamentally. The FRG would in all likelihood be grateful if the U.S. and Soviet Union could agree on a way to resolve this problem.

THE SECRETARY said that Shevardnadze had asked what the U.S. would do with the P-1a warheads and he had told him. Shevardnadze had asked about the timing of withdrawals, and had expressed a concern, which the Secretary understood, that the FRG not retain operational missiles once the Soviet Union had given up its own. The Secretary had responded to that. That should have dealt with the content of the matter. Now the question was how to express that content beyond their conversation. (SHEVARDNADZE interjected that this was exactly the problem.) THE SECRETARY said he had not thought that through yet. He wanted to consider the various possibilities, but first wanted to make sure that the content was clear to Shevardnadze.

SHEVARDNADZE did not respond directly, but observed that he had consulted with his experts on the problem as well, and said they had identified various options. Shevardnadze had outlined one that morning. This was not a situation in which there was no way out.

THE SECRETARY replied that he did not think the idea of leaving a residual Soviet SRINF force behind to balance remaining FRG P-1a's was a good option. SHEVARDNADZE said it was only one option. He suggested that experts take up the problem on an urgent basis, noting that they had little time. Perhaps they could work all night.

THE SECRETARY agreed it should be possible to solve the problem, subject to expressing it in a satisfactory way.

SHEVARDNADZE concurred that how to reflect any solution in a document was key. The Soviet side believed the Secretary and Kohl. But international norms generally dictated that such understandings be reflected in accords. Any solution should be reflected in a manner which meets the interests of the U.S., the Soviet Union, and their allies. THE SECRETARY said the issue would be resolved, and suggested that they move on into his outer office for a discussion of regional issues.

Before adjourning, SHEVARDNADZE made a few points on Afghanistan.

THE SECRETARY then raised a final point. He had obtained information that Syria was developing a chemical warfare capability, a capability which included missile delivery systems capable of reaching Israeli cities. If correct, this was potentially very ominous. Without getting into whether or not Syria intended to use such weapons, their existence would represent a threat to Israel. It was impossible to state how Israel might react to such a threat. Thus, the potential existence of a Syrian CW capability was a threat to regional stability.

The Secretary said he did not know what information Shevardnadze had on this matter, or even if our own was correct. But he urged Shevardnadze to use whatever influence the Soviet Union had with Syria to discourage the development of a CW capability. The Secretary recalled Shevardnadze's past expressions of concern over CW proliferation, and made his approach in that spirit.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that he had no information on the issue the Secretary had raised. Relations between the Soviet Union and Syria were indeed full and good. Soviet information on developments there was generally solid. Shevardnadze said he would keep the concern the Secretary had expressed in sight. He suggested that the Secretary might also want to consider the possibility of disinformation. As for the Syrians, Shevardnadze knew that they were very concerned about the possibility that Israel would acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems, including missiles.

THE SECRETARY said he would not have mentioned the issue if he did not consider our intelligence credible. But he did not exclude that our information was wrong. He expressed appreciation for Shevardnadze's offer to keep the issue in sight. It would be unpleasant were the concerns the Secretary had expressed to come to pass.

SHEVARDNADZE confirmed that he would look into the matter. He agreed that it would be not only unpleasant, but "inadmissible," were it to be proven true.

After a brief further discussion of the agenda for the subsequent meeting on regional issues, the private session ended.

## 72. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 16, 1987, 3:45–5:30 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *U.S.*

The Secretary  
Deputy Secretary Whitehead  
Under Secretary Armacost  
Assistant Secretary Ridgway  
Mr. Ermarth, NSC Staff  
EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)  
Dimitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)

#### *U.S.S.R.*

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh  
Ambassador Dubinin  
Minister Counselor Kutovoy  
Mr. Mamedov (Notetaker)  
Mr. Korchilov (Interpreter)

### SUBJECT

Regional Issues, Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq

THE SECRETARY opened the session by noting that he had wanted to spend some time on regional issues. The Foreign Minister and he had set a rough agenda: Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, Kampuchea, Central America, Southern Africa.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that both sides' regional experts had recently reviewed most of the areas the Secretary had mentioned. Shevardnadze was not sure he would be able to say much new.

THE SECRETARY said he had the same fear. Moreover, if he said anything, he would have to check with Armacost to see if it was right. But an effort had to be made. Perhaps the Foreign Minister would like to lead off on Afghanistan.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would be happy to, adding that he would check with Bessmertnykh to be sure what he was saying was right from the standpoint of U.S. interests.

In a more serious vein, Shevardnadze said there was no need to say again that Afghanistan was a serious problem which troubled Moscow greatly. But before he described the Soviet view of the problem

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz—Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in Shultz's outer office at the Department of State.

in detail, he wanted to talk a bit about the overall Soviet approach to regional questions, focusing on what he termed “fresh elements of that approach.”

In the past, each side had sought essentially to “expose” the other in their dialogue on regional issues. Perhaps this was all right; perhaps it would continue. But the effort tended to overshadow the main task of uniting to find a solution to regional problems. There had recently been some changes in this pattern: consultations had become more specific, with negotiations underway in some areas; certain positive trends were emerging; even in areas where past incompatibility of interests had frustrated progress, prospects seemed to be opening up. On the question of a Middle East peace conference, for example, the two sides had once had very different approaches. There were still major differences on specifics such as participants, goals, and such, but positions on the concept were much closer now than they had been. Given a constructive approach, similar possibilities existed in other areas. Common ground could be found. Shevardnadze did not rule out that something could be done together in Afghanistan.

With respect to Afghanistan *per se*, Shevardnadze pointed to some serious developments in the process of finding a settlement “within” Afghanistan. The Foreign Minister said he knew what the U.S. thought of the current Afghan regime, and admitted that he held no “brief” for the current Afghan leadership.

But the Soviets did see how the face of that regime was changing. These were not the same people who had come to power in 1978, although some of those people were still around. What had changed were the views, the concepts of the leadership. It was the reality of what was going on in Afghanistan that had made them change and seek to develop new policies. In seeking to face squarely the contradictions of their approach, they had developed the policy of national reconciliation. This was not a phenomenon unique to Afghanistan; it could be seen in many countries. It had to be reckoned with.

Shevardnadze invited the Secretary to look at what was underway with respect to Afghanistan. The Soviet Union had taken a clear political decision that its forces would be withdrawn. “This decision will be carried out.” The Afghan government had instituted a ceasefire, which had recently been extended. It had also announced that there would be a multiparty system in the country. All classes, sectors and ethnic groups would be able to participate, including members of the bourgeoisie and clergy. A decision had been made to share power with the opposition, and a list of positions amounting to half of the government’s portfolios, including that of prime minister, had been released as open to those currently opposed to the regime. The process of the return of refugees was also continuing, albeit slowly, and special committees had been set up to facilitate their reabsorption.

Shevardnadze said he did not mean to imply that the situation was ideal, or that conditions were perfect. But neither could one ignore what he had been talking about. Shevardnadze knew personally of people who had not understood the April revolution<sup>2</sup> and its slogans, but had returned after the new policy of national reconciliation had been announced.

What was needed now? First, Shevardnadze said, the withdrawal of Soviet forces. This would have great importance in terms of policy, political impact and many other aspects. The Secretary had said before, and Shevardnadze agreed, that it was up to the Afghans to build their own future. Afghanistan would become a neutral and nonaligned country; the Soviet Union also wanted to see this happen.

Second, Shevardnadze continued, there should be an end to interference. The Secretary was aware that such interference was taking place. This was a real issue. So on the one hand there was the withdrawal of Soviet forces; on the other there was an end to interference. This was an area in which the U.S. could make a real contribution.

A process which could lead to a political settlement, of course, was underway. Negotiations were being conducted. During the next round, agreement could be reached on a timetable. This was not just a remote possibility, it was realistically possible. The Soviet Union was for this.

But who would be responsible for an end to interference? Sometimes it was said that the PDPA should go and a coalition government be established. But who would ensure that this would work; who would say who would govern?

Shevardnadze said with emphasis that there *is* a government in Kabul. It was governing. The most realistic approach would be to recognize that fact. Whether one considered it a good or a bad government, it was a reality. It existed.

So, Shevardnadze concluded, he had tried to give the Secretary some sense of how the face of the PDPA regime was changing. Moscow felt that the process of national reconciliation held many interesting aspects which deserved attention.

THE SECRETARY asked to comment on what Shevardnadze had said. Perhaps the time had come for a genuinely serious dialogue on Afghanistan. We welcomed Shevardnadze's unambiguous, emphatic statement that the Soviet Union had decided to withdraw its forces. There were many details to be worked out on how that would happen, but the Secretary wanted to leave those aside for the moment.

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the April 1978 Communist takeover in Afghanistan.

What we should ask ourselves at this time is: what kind of Afghanistan could one see, was one ready to see, in a post-withdrawal situation? One could then ask: what does it take to move from the present situation to that one hoped to see after withdrawal? These were both hard questions, but well worth talking about.

Shevardnadze had said the Soviet Union wanted a nonaligned Afghanistan ruled in accordance with the wishes of the Afghan people. The U.S. accepted that. At times we also heard that the Soviet Union could envision a situation for Afghanistan analogous to that of Austria or Switzerland. We also could imagine such a regime described by guarantors in a Geneva meeting. We could see neutrality brought about by an understanding among those guarantors and by a parallel understanding with Afghanistan.

As to what the guarantors might undertake, we could envision the following:

- To respect and observe the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and permanent neutrality of Afghanistan.

- Not to bring Afghanistan into any military alliance or other security arrangement or invite or encourage Afghanistan to enter into such alliance or arrangement.

- Not to introduce foreign military personnel or establish foreign military facilities or bases.

For its part, THE SECRETARY continued, Afghanistan, however represented, would undertake:

- To be a permanently neutral state.

- Not to enter into military alliances or other security arrangements.

- To prohibit introduction of foreign military facilities or bases.

In short, these constraints would exist among the guarantors and on the part of Afghanistan, and within the context they provided, Afghanistan would be free to determine its political orientation and foreign and domestic policy, including its aid and trading partners and participation in regional or international organizations. As Shevardnadze would note, there was a parallel to the Austrian model. The question was how to get there.

As for Afghanistan itself, the Secretary said we would be the first to admit that it would be difficult to bring about reconciliation in a situation as strained and bloody as the present one. We thought that the process would have the best chance in the context of a situation in which there was an interim government. One could also envisage the presence in Afghanistan of international agencies that might have access to the developmental funds which would be necessary in a post-withdrawal situation. The presence of such agencies could have a calming effect.

The Secretary reiterated that in such a transition period, a government which was viewed as having a limited purpose and duration would have the best chance of success. Such a government would be neither organized nor constituted as a permanent government. Its tasks could include the following:

- To promote stability during Soviet withdrawal.
- To establish the ground rules for selecting its legitimate successor.
- To develop an amnesty for former regime officials, so that people with the necessary skills could begin to return.

How to constitute such a government would be difficult. But the U.S. felt that for it to succeed it would need sufficiently broad support to carry out these kinds of tasks. The present regime seemed to appreciate this, and for this reason to have offered posts to others. Our view remained, however, that the current government did not have the kind of base necessary to make the process work. As far as we could see, for example, the net flow of refugees continued to be out of the country.

The Secretary continued that, if a government of the sort he had been describing could get underway, sufficient momentum could develop for it to succeed. Because the country would need to take advantage of the technical and other skills held by many of those associated with the current regime, they should have little difficulty being accepted. This could help bring about the national reconciliation process Shevardnadze had called for.

This, then, represented current U.S. views on the subject. As potential guarantors, if this kind of an arrangement were in place, it would cause us to change our behavior, just as the Soviet Union would have changed its own. In the interest of giving Shevardnadze a fuller flavor of what we had in mind, and since everyone had been citing Armacost as such an authority on the subject, the Secretary would ask the Under Secretary to comment further.

UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST said he had little to add. He shared the Secretary's view that this was a time for practical exchanges on the subject. The Secretary had put forward some ideas for achieving a solution.

We welcomed the sense of urgency which Shevardnadze had conveyed. But we were a bit perplexed on certain points. Shevardnadze had said the Soviet Union was prepared to withdraw its forces, but no withdrawals had occurred. Moscow had emphasized national reconciliation, but all the proposals which had been advanced had the same bottom line of dominance by the PDPA. This was no basis for national reconciliation. Similarly, when the Kabul government had first refused to talk to Cordovez, and then accepted a new round, we had expected to see new proposals. We were perplexed when this did not happen.



We had earlier sensed that the Soviets and Pakistanis were moving into a more serious discussion of Afghanistan; that process had ended this spring, while attempts to intimidate Pakistan had intensified. Perhaps Moscow was counting on a public rift between Islamabad and Washington over nuclear issues to make its task easier. If so, ARMA-COST believed the Soviets were underestimating the resilience of Pakistan and overestimating the likelihood of a public row.

SHEVARDNADZE said sarcastically, "that's right, all our policies are based on the hope of a split over nuclear issues." ARMACOST said he only wanted to emphasize that there were practical ways of getting to the kinds of outcomes the Soviets said they wanted. The sooner we could get into that kind of a discussion, the better.

Shevardnadze said that Armacost's remarks had contained "nothing reasonable" in terms of seeking solutions. They reflected "yesterday's reality." Shevardnadze could complain about what the U.S. was up to as well, but there was insufficient time.

The Soviet Union was prepared to find a practical way of resolving the Afghanistan problem. Armacost had confined himself to groundless accusations. Why did he say that the DRA had advanced no serious proposals in the last proximity round? Shevardnadze thought it had been a good round. There would be another. Shevardnadze hoped for progress.

Moreover, U.S. representatives should go to Kabul and talk to Najib themselves to persuade him to resign and invite in a new government. Moscow was not prepared to talk to him in this way. Shevardnadze agreed with the Secretary, there should be some serious discussions.

The Secretary had described principles for a neutral state in Afghanistan. There were no differences between the two sides positions on this point. The Soviet Union wanted the principles of nonalignment and neutrality to be the foundations of the government of Afghanistan. But the U.S. had not answered the basic question: what to do with the current regime. There was a government in power, it was functioning, it had all the attributes of governing and important sources of support and influence throughout the country. Afghanistan was not a chess-board on which the Soviet Union and Armacost could just move pieces. Who would ensure a situation in which the current government would go and another be put in power? If this question was not answered, the rest remained simply good wishes. Shevardnadze was, in short, talking about a real situation. As to Armacost's statement that the Soviet Union sought to play on U.S.-Pakistani divisions, it was devoid of substance.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the focus of the discussion be narrowed. In a general way, he had outlined the conditions which guarantors might agree upon, and on which the Afghan government



might agree upon. Shevardnadze appeared to have agreed to those conditions. So that might be identified as where both sides wanted to end up, and could be put aside for the moment.

Shevardnadze had said that the Soviet Union intended to withdraw from Afghanistan. We recognized that that would be a very difficult process: when would it start? How long would it continue? These issues were being negotiated in the proximity talks. There would be another round. So for the moment the Secretary would prefer to put these issues aside as well.

Instead, he suggested focusing on the nature of the governmental process which would be underway while withdrawal was taking place and prior to the establishment of a post-withdrawal, neutral nonaligned government. That was a hard question. We were suggesting certain ways to address it.

One consideration was that it had to be clear to the Afghan people where the guarantor powers stood on the question of a neutral and nonaligned Afghan regime further down the road. They needed to see a future compatible with underlying attitudes within the country.

Another was that it would be useful to introduce some neutral international agencies. They might be able to help with economic reconstruction, and might have a peacekeeping role or be able to provide political expertise. But, in general, an international presence of some sort could be useful.

A third point was the idea that the government during this period should have the limited purpose of managing the transition, with the expectation that it would go out of business once the task had been completed. So there was the problem of designing ground rules for selecting a legitimate successor regime. This was a complicated task, which must be undertaken by the Afghans themselves, since Afghanistan was not historically a country which had easily submitted to central rule. So a successor regime had to be designed which fit Afghanistan.

There would also be the task of promoting stability while the process of withdrawal was underway. This would be hard, because of the hatred which had been aroused and the scores there were to settle.

An amnesty would also have to be promoted so that those who left, whether current refugees or regime officials, would feel confident that they could return and take part in the life of the country.

Those, then, were the tasks, the Secretary said. They were difficult. For a government to accomplish them, it would require a broad base of public support. Again, it was hard to see how the current regime was up to the challenge. That was why some were interested in the former king,<sup>3</sup> although one could not be sure that he was the right

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Zahir Shah, the King of Afghanistan, who was ousted in 1973.

person. As for those in the current government, they, too would have to be included in some way. They should not just be thrown out.

The Secretary concluded by reiterating that we realized these were all real, hard problems. The solutions were not “in the can.” People had to struggle with them. In that spirit we were prepared to think constructively and, if the Soviet side was willing, to sit down quietly and discuss and work on the problems. The Secretary wasn’t saying he had all the answers. He had tried only to outline our ideas on a possible approach.

SHEVARDNADZE said he also had no pat answers. He had wanted frankly to describe how the Soviet side saw the situation and correlation of forces in Afghanistan. He had tried to outline the reasons why it was necessary to deal with the current regime in Kabul. That government might not be ideal, but it existed. The question was what to do about that.

On the question of guarantees, the Soviet side felt it important that it be established that, once Soviet forces had withdrawn, guarantors would pledge that there be no interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.

As for the principle that Afghanistan’s government should be neutral and nonaligned, that was up to the Afghan people themselves. This was not a case of unconditional surrender, in which other powers could, as the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had done with Nazi Germany, devise principles and impose them on another country. That could not be done in Afghanistan in such a way that Soviet forces would leave the country and the government would simply resign. That could not be.

So Shevardnadze felt the dialogue should continue. But it was important that it be based on realities. Otherwise, it could turn out to be a waste of time.

THE SECRETARY said he had described Afghanistan not as a country defeated, as Nazi Germany had been after World War II, but as a country in turmoil, and partly occupied by Soviet forces. Large parts of Afghanistan were controlled by forces opposed to the current government. The government was able to govern in some areas, but could not control the country; it was not able to provide the most fundamental requirement of a government—law and order. A large percentage of the country’s population was not even in Afghanistan, and many of those who were were actively fighting the government. So these were all hard questions, but they were certainly the reality.

The point the Secretary wanted to make, however, was that the U.S. was willing to work with the Soviet Union. It was Moscow’s option as to whether it wished to do so. We were open to the possibility.

SHEVARDNADZE said he could debate the Secretary on the situation in Afghanistan, but that was not his purpose. The situation was

certainly complicated, but it was well known to the Soviets. No one felt the realities there more painfully than the Soviet Union.

The question remained, however, what to do with the current regime. No one could answer that question: not Armacost, not the Secretary. Saying that the current regime was bad and that a new one should just be created would not work. One had to assume that this was an independent country. The U.S. might ask how that could be the case with Soviet troops there. They would be withdrawn. So one should proceed from the assumption that it was up to the Afghans to form whatever regime suited them.

What should be the basis for such a regime? Zahir Shah, Shevardnadze believed, was acceptable to the U.S., as he was to the Soviet Union and, apparently, most others. Moscow had had good relations with the ex-king when he was in power. It could cooperate with him now. But who would presume to tell the current regime in Kabul that it should go and Zahir Shah should rule? That was something for the current leaders themselves to consider.

THE SECRETARY said that reminded him of a baseball story. When pitcher Warren Spahn, having reached the (still active) age of 40, was asked when he would retire, he replied, "the batters will let me know." That's how it was with the current regime. If Soviet forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan tomorrow, the current regime could not survive. So one had to look at alternatives. This did not mean that members of the current government did not have a role to play. Skills and expertise were scarce commodities in Afghanistan. Any successor regime would need all the country had to offer, regardless of politics. That was why the U.S. believed that if it were possible to pull together a government designed to be an interim regime, with clearly defined transitional tasks, it would be easier for people to give it their support, knowing that it would ultimately leave power. But these were decisions which the Soviet Union had to face more than the U.S. For our part, we were prepared to try in whatever way we could to be constructive in helping to create a situation in which Afghanistan could become a more stable, nonaligned country.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, at last, the Secretary was getting to the main thing. Shevardnadze said he was convinced that, once Soviet forces had withdrawn, the current regime would not collapse. The Secretary's information was one-sided; but it should not be surprising that the Soviet information on such matters should be more reliable.

THE SECRETARY and ARMACOST said that in that case the Soviets should go ahead and withdraw. SHEVARDNADZE replied that they had decided to do just that. But there had to be guarantees that

interference from Pakistan would stop. Once these two elements were in place, the Afghans would be able to build their own country. That was the logic of the Soviet position. The U.S. and Soviet Union could cooperate on this basis if Washington was willing. The Soviet Union would not be willing to agree to U.S. bases in Afghanistan, but neither did it want any for itself.

ARMACOST noted that everything that Shevardnadze had been talking about was already covered by the various instruments negotiated in the Geneva proximity talks. The only missing element was the instrument on withdrawal.

SHEVARDNADZE said that there would be a timetable. But the Soviets needed—and the Afghans needed—guarantees of the sort Shevardnadze had described. “At present,” the dialogue in Geneva was with the current regime in Kabul. It made no sense to suggest that that regime should conclude an agreement, and then disappear so that others could rule. And Shevardnadze had to say that these were not really bad people. He had even considered suggesting that he and the Secretary travel to Kabul to meet them.

THE SECRETARY said he had been to the Khyber Pass. SHEVARDNADZE said he should see it from the other side.

THE SECRETARY suggested that, in the interest of time, the Ministers move on to the Iran-Iraq war. He noted that earlier that year there had been a special moment when a strong resolution (598), worked out largely by the U.S. and Soviet Union, had been unanimously approved by the Security Council. It had been an historic moment; the Secretary had felt like clapping. It had been an expression of the world community’s sense that the war had gone on long enough, and that it was time to end it.

The UN Secretary General (SecGen) had now completed his mission to the region. The Secretary had not yet had a detailed report, but understood we had a preliminary read-out, and asked Armacost to summarize what we knew.

ARMACOST said that the reports thus far were conflicting, and said we would need to wait for a more definitive report from the SecGen.

THE SECRETARY felt, however, that the two sides should be prepared if the SecGen’s report was not satisfactory to move on to consideration of a second resolution. A second resolution might or might not be totally effective, but if all the Security Council members worked at it, the party most likely to reject it—Iran—would at least find it more difficult to obtain arms, and where it found them would have to pay more for them. That would represent some headway. But, THE SECRETARY noted, Shevardnadze had had greater opportunity to judge Iranian intentions than he. The Secretary would be interested in his views.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Iran-Iraq war was a terrible thing. He, too, however, was encouraged by the way the U.S. and Soviet Union had cooperated in seeking to end it. This was something very precious, and Shevardnadze looked forward to a more detailed discussion once the results of the SecGen's mission were known.

Shevardnadze saw two basic questions at the center of the problem: first, the war itself and what was needed to end it; and, second, the situation in the Security Council in that context.

Shevardnadze felt that at this point every effort should be made to realize the potential inherent in Resolution 598. The Soviet Union was not against a second resolution. But it was essential to consider carefully what guarantees existed to ensure it was implemented. If not one, but two, resolutions remained only on paper, it would undermine the Council's credibility. That was the main problem "we" faced. So bilateral and multilateral consultations on the issue should continue.

Were an embargo and sanctions to be imposed, it would be important that they be fully implemented. A resolution containing such elements would have to be effective.

There were also considerations relating to the situation in the Gulf itself. The area was close to Soviet borders. As a result, Moscow had made official statements to that effect, and Shevardnadze wanted to underscore what had been stated therein. The continued presence of massive military potential in the region was dangerous.

The Soviets were realistic, however. They recognized the need for minesweepers in the Gulf. They were ready to cooperate with the U.S. and others on such problems. But the concentration of dozens of warships, tens of thousands of personnel, and senior command structures was dangerous.

So, on the one hand, there had been good cooperation in the Security Council. The Soviets were prepared to continue to support what the U.S. was trying to do there. But the other side of the U.S. approach was something Moscow could not support.

As for the fact that the Soviets were in contact with both parties to the conflict, that was of course true. There had been some good contacts with both sides. Iran knew that Moscow was supplying arms to Iraq and would continue to do so. The Soviets had told Iran frankly that if the war did not end they would have to vote for a second resolution. So Moscow was using all means at its disposal to move things forward. So far, unfortunately, these contacts had produced no results. But neither had the U.S. military build-up in the Gulf.

THE SECRETARY countered that our presence in the Gulf *had* produced results. It had been the only way to deal with threats by Iran against the flow of oil out of the Gulf and against Gulf state govern-

ments. The size and presence of U.S. forces in the region was directly related to Iranian behaviour. We had laid no mines, nor taken any aggressive action. When the threat diminished, the size of our force would be diminished. But our interests in the region were historic due to the enormous flow of energy resources through the region, and their importance to us and our friends. So we would stick at it, as we had for generations. (SHEVARDNADZE said that was up to the U.S.).

On the Security Council, THE SECRETARY agreed that our cooperation to date had been precious. In the absence of the SecGen's report, the Secretary suggested that the Ministers return to the subject the next day. The Secretary was also certain that the matter would be under review when the two Ministers were in New York the following week.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet Union also wanted to support the SecGen. So that was a point in common. THE SECRETARY expressed his hope that the SecGen's trip had been successful. But, as Shevardnadze had suggested during the previous evening's discussion on the CNO's barge, that did not seem likely. SHEVARDNADZE said he had only expressed some doubts; they were not based on any hard information.

The meeting ended on a discussion of the quality of the luncheon offered earlier that afternoon by Ambassador Dubinin.

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### 73. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 16, 1987

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

It was a great pleasure for me to receive personal greetings from you and Mrs. Gorbachev yesterday.<sup>2</sup> Nancy and I appreciate your thoughtfulness.

At the signing of the Agreement on Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, I said that I look forward to the day when you and I can come together to sign even more historic agreements in our common search

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<sup>1</sup> Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC, Head of State Correspondence File, U.S.S.R. General Secretary Gorbachev (8790986, 8791196). No classification marking. Carlucci sent the proposed letter to Reagan for his signature on September 16; Reagan signed the letter on September 18.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 64.

for peace. My meeting yesterday with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and his delegation was a constructive and useful step in that direction.<sup>3</sup>

Nancy and I wish to take this opportunity to convey to you and Mrs. Gorbachev our personal best wishes and our hope that the coming months will see further steps toward our common goals.

Sincerely,

**Ronald Reagan**

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 67.

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#### **74. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 17, 1987, 9:35 a.m.–2:30 p.m.

##### **PARTICIPANTS**

*U.S.*

The Secretary

National Security Advisor Carlucci

EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)

Dimitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)

Joined meeting in progress:

Ambassador Nitze

Ambassador Ridgway

Ambassador Glitman

Director Adelman

*U.S.S.R.*

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Mr. Sredin (Notetaker)

Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

Joined meeting in progress:

Ambassador Karpov

DepForMin Bessmertnykh

##### **SUBJECT**

Bilateral Issues, INF, START, Nuclear Testing, and Summitry

THE SECRETARY opened the meeting by explaining that he thought it might be useful to have National Security Advisor Carlucci

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz—Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in Shultz's private office at the Department of State. All brackets are in the original.



present for the final session. SHEVARDNADZE said it was good that Carlucci had joined the Ministers. THE SECRETARY said that in fact he had been there all along. Carlucci was a strong colleague in his role at the White House and had been helpful in working the various problems. SHEVARDNADZE said this was an important factor.

THE SECRETARY said he hoped the next time he came to Moscow Carlucci could accompany him so that Carlucci could meet the other members of the Soviet leadership and get some sense of their outlook and the quality of their minds. His problem was that it was Carlucci's job to sit next to the President so that there was professional expertise available to the President when the Secretary was busy. SHEVARDNADZE noted that he had already formally invited Carlucci to visit Moscow, and would at some point outline his ideas on arrangements.

THE SECRETARY said that the two Ministers' purpose that morning was to take stock, to push further where they could, and to get some sense of where to go from here. Both had had a large number of working groups focusing on different subjects. Perhaps they should work through the groups reports. SHEVARDNADZE said he understood that the Ministers would hear from the groups later. THE SECRETARY explained that they were assembled on the eighth floor, and observed that they would certainly want to hear from the Ministers later on the results of their private meeting. But for the moment it might be best for the Ministers to take the time they needed, as their private sessions were always productive, and then meet with their delegations. SHEVARDNADZE agreed.

On bilateral issues, THE SECRETARY began, it was his understanding that there had been an extensive, worthwhile discussion and that the experts were close to an agreement on satisfactory arrangements for our respective embassies. One issue which remained was the number of people we needed to send to Moscow to renovate our existing office building. The Soviet side had insisted on a specific number; we had provided an outside estimate of 140. The Soviet side had counterproposed, suggesting they would be prepared to take a positive approach to applications above that number. We had accepted the concept, and reduced our number to 75, assuming such a positive approach. Agreement on this point was important to us, as we wanted to pour on the manpower to get the job done.

A second outstanding issue was the question of letting our people visit Moscow without buying an expensive Intourist package. The Secretary knew that this was an official sanction, but urged that it be dropped in the spirit of their discussions. So, in general, a lot had been accomplished in this area, but the Secretary wanted to bring these two points to the Foreign Minister's personal attention.

SHEVARDNADZE reiterated that he hoped it would be possible later to hear reports from our experts. In the bilateral area they had



done good work. On the first question the Secretary had raised, “we can agree.” This should not be a question which is impossible to resolve. The specific number, be it 65, 75, or 85, was not a problem. The important thing was that the principle of reciprocity be respected. (THE SECRETARY said he agreed.) The second question could be resolved “in the same fashion.” Shevardnadze recalled how the guest-of-embassy question had arisen in the wake of their discussion the previous year of the Daniloff affair. But this was not a question which could not be resolved, and, if necessary, the Minister would look into it in order to find a solution. THE SECRETARY thanked him for the offer.

Moving on to human rights, the Secretary noted that there had been good, lengthy discussions at their level and that of experts. It was his impression that a real process of dialogue had taken hold. He had found helpful Shevardnadze’s explanation of what was taking place in the Soviet Union in this field. So the two sides were making progress. Some cases still required special attention, as did the categories the Ministers had discussed. The Secretary reminded Shevardnadze that the Foreign Minister had said he would look into what further could be done on the Soviet side.

SHEVARDNADZE said that he, too, had been briefed by his experts on humanitarian issues. They had said their discussions had been interesting, constructive and non-polemical. Perhaps they could be given the floor to make a more detailed report. Shevardnadze said that in general he wanted the two sides’ experts to feel responsible for the larger political dimension of their work. They often spent the night arguing over fine points, but sometimes their efforts were not fruitless. Shevardnadze said he had been told that the U.S. side would also give attention to problems raised by the Soviet side. This was good; it had not always been the case. As such, it was a “noble” development in the two countries’ dialogue on such matters. As to the specifics that the Secretary had referred to, they would be considered.

THE SECRETARY acknowledged that they would have more detailed reports later, but noted that the Foreign Minister’s appraisal that the two sides were making progress, and that the dialogue had become more constructive, coincided with his own.

SHEVARDNADZE took the opportunity to raise the case of a Soviet defector, Bogatiy, whom the Foreign Minister alleged U.S. officials had denied the Soviet Embassy in Washington an opportunity to interview. The Embassy had now been contacted directly by Bogatiy, who had expressed a desire to return to the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze expressed the hope that the State Department could facilitate a meeting, and would take no steps to obstruct Bogatiy’s return to the Soviet Union were he to make his desires clear.

THE SECRETARY said it was U.S. policy that people should come or go as they chose without official interference. We would of course

need to be sure that the individual in question in fact wanted to return to the Soviet Union. The Secretary was not personally familiar with the case, but believed that there would be no problem in principle in determining whether Bogatiy was interested in meeting with Soviet authorities, and, if he were, it would be done.

SHEVARNADZE reminded the Secretary that he had complained of Soviet bureaucrats on Tuesday.<sup>2</sup> The Soviet Union was probably not the only country with this problem.

Shevardnadze said he had one more question regarding reciprocity in radio broadcasting. The matter had been discussed at length in the past. Shevardnadze hoped it could be considered by the U.S. at a high level; otherwise it would be difficult to resolve. The guideline here should be reciprocity in the access of U.S. and Soviet citizens to the other side's ideas. Shevardnadze understood that it might be difficult for technical and other reasons to achieve reciprocity, but urged that a solution be found.

THE SECRETARY said that we had never had any problem with our citizens' having access to Soviet broadcasts. We had never jammed them and did not now. (SHEVARNADZE interjected that Moscow wasn't jamming either. THE SECRETARY acknowledged that at least VOA was not now jammed.) There was a system for allocating broadcast channels. USIA Director Wick had made clear our willingness to discuss the problem. As Wick had reminded the Foreign Minister at dinner the night before, he was awaiting Soviet answers to some questions he had raised on related issues. Wick was prepared to work, and the Secretary would relay to him Shevardnadze's expression of interest. SHEVARNADZE said this would be fine.

As for regional questions, THE SECRETARY observed that there had been no working groups, but confirmed that he had now seen reports on the UN Secretary General's trip to Iran and Iraq. As had been expected, the results were somewhat ambiguous, and would have to be struggled with in the Security Council next week. Our first impression was that we should be ready to proceed with a second resolution, even though, apparently, Perez de Cuellar had not returned completely empty-handed.

SHEVARNADZE agreed that there was a need to discuss the Iran-Iraq war, particularly as they had had little time to do so the day before. Shevardnadze was also interested in hearing U.S. views on Central America, as he would be visiting the region immediately after his stay in New York. The Ministers might also find time for a few

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<sup>2</sup> September 15.

words on the Middle East. There was no time for other regional issues, but perhaps they could be taken up in the plenary session.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the two Ministers first run through the list of working group reports, and then join their delegations for the plenary. If necessary, they could return to regional questions later in a smaller group. The Secretary would probably want to have only Carlucci and Armacost present. SHEVARDNADZE agreed, noting that the discussion the day before with Armacost on Afghanistan had been a useful, if extensive one.

The SECRETARY agreed, and suggested moving on to arms control. He asked Shevardnadze to lead off.

Drawing on joint materials prepared by U.S. and Soviet arms control working groups the night before (Tab 1),<sup>3</sup> Shevardnadze summarized areas of agreement and disagreement on INF:

#### *Agreed Points*

—Prior to the process of eliminating INF ballistic missiles, nuclear explosives and guidance systems will be removed from reentry vehicles. The remaining reentry vehicle structure will then be eliminated under agreed procedures.

—When reentry vehicles for German Pershing 1a missiles are withdrawn, they become U.S. reentry vehicles not associated with an existing POC and therefore will be subjected to the same elimination procedure as for reentry vehicles removed from U.S. and Soviet INF ballistic missiles.

—The sides agree on the need for effective verification of an INF agreement and on the necessity promptly to develop an effective verification regime.

#### *Remaining Questions*

—The United States proposes to retain an operational force of IRMs at proportionately lower levels for the period of reductions; the Soviet Union proposes to render all such missiles inoperable in one year by removing their nuclear weapons. The sides agree to continue to seek a mutually acceptable solution to this question.

—The United States proposes to eliminate shorter range missile systems in one year and longer range missile systems in three years; the Soviet Union is proposing to accept such a timetable if it can be shown that this would be possible taking into account technical and

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<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed are the Report of the Working Group on the Nuclear and Space Talks, a draft plan for Phasing of INF Reductions, and a U.S.-Soviet Joint Statement on Nuclear Testing.

environmental considerations. Otherwise, the Soviet Union proposes a longer period such as five years for IRMs and two years for SRMs. The sides agree to send experts on this issue to Geneva promptly, to reinforce the INF negotiating group and help resolve this question.

On the final two points, Shevardnadze commented, the differences were of a practical nature. He did not rule out that experts would be able to resolve them, and, on the destruction question, made clear that, if U.S. experts could convince their Soviet counterparts that their approach was technically feasible, Moscow was prepared to go along.

THE SECRETARY observed that his points coincided perfectly with those Shevardnadze had read. The Ministers thus were in the healthy position of being able to talk about essentially operational, workable questions about what they had already decided they wanted done. The issues were technical, but they had to be done right. So the experts should be told to make as much progress as they could while Shevardnadze was here. The Secretary believed the remaining technical issues could be resolved; there were no issues of principle involved.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed. Agreement in principle had been reached. There was only one remaining issue of principle—how to reflect the understanding which had been reached on German P-1a's in documentary form. The Secretary the day before had promised the Minister an answer to this question.

THE SECRETARY noted that his version of the agreed NST paper had a third area of disagreement on the question of the timing. The Soviet side had, it appeared, proposed a timetable for the elimination of P-1a warheads. The Secretary confirmed SHEVARDNADZE's understanding that the Secretary was referring to the third paragraph in the section describing areas of disagreement, which read:

In the United States view, Chancellor Kohl's statement of August 26 and the publicly stated U.S. position that once the FRG carries out the approach stated by Chancellor Kohl, it will withdraw the P-1a reentry vehicles and eliminate them per the same procedures as agreed upon for the U.S. and Soviet SRMs, has resolved the question of the German Pershing 1—a missile system; the Soviet Union proposes that there be a timetable for the elimination of the warheads for these missiles.

The Secretary repeated the passage he had read the day before from Chancellor Kohl's August 26 statement, i.e., that "with the elimination of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles" the FRG program of P-1a dismantlement would take place. The Secretary told Shevardnadze that the U.S. regarded that moment as the moment in which its program of cooperation (POC) with the FRG on P-1a's ended, and at which the warheads for those missiles would revert to unencumbered U.S. ownership. At no time would the FRG, therefore, become the only country in possession of operable missiles of the type covered by the Treaty.

The Secretary noted that he had worked with Mr. Carlucci to put the assurances he had given Shevardnadze the day before into written form, which he would like to read to the Foreign Minister. He then read the following points:

The U.S. understands the August 26 statement by Chancellor Kohl to mean that he will notify us of the end of our program of cooperation and dismantle the Federal Republic's Pershing 1—a missiles with the final elimination of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles.

The beginning of this dismantlement process would of necessity mean that this program of cooperation between the U.S. and the Federal Republic had ended.

Therefore, at the end of the three-year period (the Secretary added "or at the end of whatever period was worked out"), when the last U.S. and Soviet INF missiles are eliminated, the conditions established by Chancellor Kohl's August 26, 1987 statement will be met, and the US/FRG program of cooperation will have ceased.

At that time, the U.S. reentry vehicles will be withdrawn and subjected to the same procedures to be used to eliminate the reentry vehicles of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles.

The Secretary said he thought these points should satisfy Soviet concerns. We had, he added, no problem putting them in writing in a letter he could give Shevardnadze, so the Soviet side would have a document. Thus, we felt that we had dealt with both the timing and disposition of the P-1a's in a way which should be satisfactory.

SHEVARDNADZE asked how what the Secretary had described would be reflected in a document. What kind of document?

THE SECRETARY speculated that he might write a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the Vice President in his capacity of President of the Senate. The Secretary could specify that this was what we were doing, making it official U.S. committed policy. We could provide the Soviet Union with a copy of the letter as an assurance that the process described in the letter would take place.

SHEVARDNADZE said that he did not think this would work. Correspondence between the Secretary and Congress was not a document for the Soviet Union. The warheads on the German P-1a's were a subject for negotiation between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Kohl had told the Soviets that himself. The Soviet demand was not a capricious one, and had nothing to do with the missiles involved. It was the warheads that belonged to the U.S. The question was how to record the resolution of the issue. The formula that the Secretary had suggested was fine from the U.S. perspective, but not from the Soviet. Were Shevardnadze to agree, his lawyers would accuse him on his return to Moscow of being an illiterate.

THE SECRETARY said that they would on the contrary compliment him on his adroitness. The Secretary offered to explain again the key elements of what he was suggesting.

The U.S. was not, he stressed, discussing with the Soviet Union the warheads on the FRG P-1a's. We were discussing warheads which were the property of the U.S. and unencumbered by POC's with the FRG. That discussion, along with Kohl's statement, had produced the conditions under which those warheads currently on FRG P-1a's would become unencumbered U.S. warheads. Although we believed that should satisfy the Soviet side, we were prepared to record what the Secretary had described in writing in a way which made it clear that this was committed U.S. policy. Thus, the Soviet Union would know precisely how the P-1a warheads would be handled, and when. And Moscow would know there would never be a situation in which the FRG would have a weapons system after everyone else had eliminated theirs.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that the relationships between such major problems were routinely handled on the basis of international agreements. That was why the two sides were negotiating on INF missiles. That was why the most minute details of a possible agreement were being negotiated. Such things could only be done on the basis of a government-to-government agreement. Were it otherwise, there would be no need for treaties. The Secretary could sign letters to Congress, and Shevardnadze to the Supreme Soviet.

What was the difference from the Soviet standpoint, Shevardnadze asked, whether the P-1a warheads were on American or German missiles? The U.S. had no right to transfer warheads to the FRG, and the Soviet Union did not say that it had. Moscow did not believe that the U.S. had violated the NPT agreement. The warheads in question were American, and therefore the subject of negotiations between the two countries. Any solution to the problem they posed must be based on a treaty.

Shevardnadze said he could and did believe that the Secretary was prepared to write the letter he had described. But what about his successor? A successor might not agree with the position the Secretary had taken. He might say that the Secretary's actions were not legal. There was no reason to dramatize the impact on U.S.-FRG relations of dealing with the P-1a warheads in the framework of a treaty. Kohl himself had told the Soviets that the warheads were not his, and to work out their disposition with the Americans.

THE SECRETARY said that was precisely what the Ministers were struggling over, and again offered to describe the situation as the U.S. saw it. The warheads were not exclusively those of the U.S. at the moment. They were part of a carefully constructed POC with the FRG. POC's with other countries were not the subject of bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations. But the Soviet Union had raised certain questions about this POC, and Kohl had made a declaration which is binding and

official, since it had been the subject of debate and a vote in the Bundestag. The FRG had stated, as a consequence, that, at the time all the missiles the U.S. and Soviet Union were negotiating about were eliminated, the POC would end at that moment. When the POC ended, the warheads would become unambiguously ours.

SHEVARDNADZE interrupted that the U.S. did not, however, want to put that in the draft agreement.

THE SECRETARY replied that the scenario he had described was of interest to the Soviet Union, but was not part of the negotiations. We were nonetheless prepared to inform the Soviet Union of our thinking on the subject. Once the warheads were ours, he continued, and out of the context of a POC, they became a warhead like any other INF warhead, and would be dealt with like any such warhead. That was something we could discuss with the Soviet Union.

So the bottom line was that, “with” the end of the U.S. and Soviet INF programs, there would be no operable German P-1a’s. Shevardnadze had said he needed a written record of the scenario the Secretary had described. We had no problem recording that scenario and giving the Soviet Union a copy of the document. So their need for something official and written would be met.

SHEVARDNADZE asked whether the document would be simply a letter or a pledge by the U.S. government.

THE SECRETARY replied that it would be an understanding on the part of the U.S. government recorded as a letter between the executive and legislative branches. This was done quite often. In this case it would enable us to deal with the problem posed by the U.S.–FRG POC. As for warheads which were unambiguously ours, that was a matter between the U.S. and Soviet Union, and would be covered by the way we describe in a treaty what happens to such warheads.

After a pause of several minutes, during the course of which Palazhenko appeared to be explaining the interrelationships that the Secretary had described, SHEVARDNADZE said that the Secretary’s option should be passed on to experts. What the Secretary had described seemed to contain the essence of an agreement. The question was how that agreement should be reflected in a treaty. The Secretary might indeed write Congress; and Moscow considered what Kohl had said important. But that was not enough. The key was that any solution be reflected in a treaty.

THE SECRETARY said we saw the problem in the following way. The treaty would deal with things which were totally Soviet or American. A moment would occur when the warheads on P-1a’s became ours in an unencumbered way. The Soviet side had said it was concerned not only with those warheads which were part of our POC, but with



our entire inventory of warheads designed for the P-1a. The U.S. had said that, at that moment when the warheads on German missiles became like those warheads which were unambiguously ours, they would be encompassed by the agreement. Shevardnadze has asked when this would occur. The Secretary had said that would depend not on the Soviet Union, but on a program between the U.S. and FRG. So it was up to us to negotiate that not with the Soviet Union, but with the FRG.

But the Kohl statement had been made, and the Bundestag had given that statement the status of official FRG policy. We had said that we interpret the Chancellor's use of the word "with" to mean that, "with" the elimination of U.S. and Soviet missiles, the FRG would start its own program of dismantling. That would mean the end of our POC with the FRG. Therefore the warheads involved would become unencumbered, and would fall within the treaty and be destroyed in accordance with whatever procedures we agreed to.

SHEVARDNADZE said these were all good statements. The question remained how they could be reflected in a treaty. He asked if the U.S. would be prepared to include in the treaty the language which U.S. and Soviet experts had agreed to the night before, and read the first "tick" of the "agreed" section he had read earlier in the conversation.

THE SECRETARY said there could be no specific reference in the agreement to FRG P-1a missiles, or to any POC involving a third country. The treaty would state what would happen to nuclear warheads for missiles with ranges covered by the agreement. U.S. warheads on FRG P-1a's, once unencumbered by our POC, would fall within that category, and could be treated as such. So it was a matter of meeting the definition in the treaty. The experts had agreed on this.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the leaders of the relevant working groups be invited to join the Ministers. Any understandings, he stressed, would have to be reflected in the treaty. That was why the experts had agreed on a formula that after the termination of POC's, warheads included in POC's became U.S. property. This was all true, but it was important that all this be reflected in the treaty.

THE SECRETARY said that the two Ministers could sit and argue the point forever. But he wanted to make clear that the U.S. could not agree to have POC's with a third country included in a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Soviet Union. On the other hand, we were prepared to say that unencumbered warheads associated with missiles in the relevant ranges would be destroyed in accordance with agreed procedures. We had taken pains to describe how that would come about. (SHEVARDNADZE said he understood.) THE SECRETARY noted that Mr. Carlucci (who had stepped out of the room briefly, passing the Secretary a note on his return) had a suggestion.



SHEVARDNADZE quipped that the national security apparatus always came to the rescue. He suggested as well that the Ministers hear from their working group leaders how they had intended their agreed language to be used. Picking up on a point the Secretary had made earlier, he recalled that the Soviet side had insisted the night before on a timetable for the elimination of U.S. P-1a warheads. The U.S. had disagreed. This "central question" should be cleared up.

THE SECRETARY said there was no need for a schedule. What Shevardnadze was talking about would happen "immediately." CARLUCCI added that on "Day One" after the end of the destruction period, our warheads would come out. THE SECRETARY emphasized that we were not disagreeing about the content of a solution to the problem, only how to express it. He reiterated that Carlucci had an idea to try out on the Foreign Minister.

CARLUCCI suggested that the U.S. might be able to refer in a treaty to "residual reentry vehicles, including those which by unilateral decision have been released from existing programs of cooperation."

SHEVARDNADZE said he understood. This was closer, he said. If the Secretary did not mind, however, perhaps the Ministers could invite their working group leaders to join them.

[After a brief pause in the discussion, NITZE, GLITMAN, BESS-MERTNYKH AND KARPOV arrived.]

SHEVARDNADZE opened the next phase of the discussion by reiterating that he wanted an INF treaty to reflect the agreed language that the working groups had arrived at. He briefly described the option that the Secretary had outlined, as well as that proposed by Carlucci. He asked Karpov to describe the Soviet understanding of how the agreed language worked out the night before on INF was to be used.

KARPOV indicated that the Soviet side understood that the language was to be reflected in an INF treaty. NITZE said that the issue had not been discussed in those terms. What had been discussed was the relationship between the Kohl statement and our own position on systems covered by POC's, and, finally, how those warheads covered by POC's would be eliminated. As to whether or not the discussion would be reflected in a treaty, the issue had not been addressed.

After further discussion between Nitze and Karpov relating to the content of the agreed statement, SHEVARDNADZE interrupted to pose once again the question of whether the language agreed to was to be included in a treaty.

THE SECRETARY emphasized that two quite different sets of issues were being discussed. One could be reflected in a treaty. The other, dealing with arrangements made with a third country, we were simply informing the Soviet side about.

KARPOV noted that the U.S. and Soviet working groups had not envisaged that the INF treaty would refer to the dismantling of the P-1a's themselves. Rather, he said, the treaty should include more general language on the elimination of all warheads associated with missiles covered by the treaty. He thought language could be found to satisfy U.S. concerns; how to reflect this in the treaty could be discussed.

GLITMAN pointed out (and KARPOV challenged) that neither the U.S. nor Soviet treaty texts referred to warheads except as a unit of account.

After a brief discussion of how the Soviet text handled warheads, SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the experts be given an hour to agree on language which could be included *in* an agreement. Shevardnadze said he wanted no "gentlemen's agreement." The important thing was what was in the treaty itself. The Foreign Minister noted that Carlucci had suggested an interesting way of dealing with the problem. Shevardnadze believed a solution can be found.

THE SECRETARY agreed to Shevardnadze's suggestion that the working group leaders make an effort to come up with acceptable language based on Carlucci's proposal. CARLUCCI said it could be done quickly. BESSMERTNYKH asked for a clarification that what was being discussed was language in the text of the treaty. CARLUCCI said it would be an amendment to the protocol. THE SECRETARY said that the treaty and protocol were the same thing in a broad sense. SHEVARDNADZE suggested the group get started. GLITMAN summarized some of the advantages of amending the protocol, rather than the treaty: both were equally binding from a legal standpoint, amending the protocol would require fewer textual revisions of language already agreed in the treaty.

SHEVARDNADZE again suggested that the group get to work, and asked for a copy of the points<sup>4</sup> the Secretary had read on the relationship between the Kohl statement and the elimination of U.S. P-1 warheads not encumbered by POC's. THE SECRETARY handed over a copy, explaining that the points were provided the Soviets for their information only; we were prepared to incorporate them in a letter of the type the Secretary had described, not in a bilateral undertaking.

BESSMERTNYKH asked for clarification that the U.S. POC with the FRG would terminate in "about the same time frame" as the elimination of INF systems. THE SECRETARY replied, "not about, but exactly at the same time." That was what Kohl had said.

[At this point (11:30) NITZE, GLITMAN and KARPOV left the room.]

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<sup>4</sup> Not found.

[After the Ministers had begun to discuss START, NITZE, GLITMAN and KARPOV returned at 11:50. START discussion will be picked up below.]

THE SECRETARY quipped that INF was always interrupting useful discussions. He would be glad to get it out of the way. He then asked Glitman to report.

GLITMAN said that a solution had been found.

—There would be a technical change in the first paragraph of the agreed statement, substituting the word “weapons” for “explosives” in the interest of precision;

—A new sentence would be added in that paragraph as the third sentence, to read: “Such procedures should apply to all residual reentry vehicles, including those which by unilateral decision have been released from existing programs of cooperation.”

—A new, final sentence would be added to the same paragraph: “The protocol on elimination should reflect these procedures.”

Glitman noted that it would still be necessary to work out agreed procedures on the return of warheads to the U.S.

SHEVARDNADZE said he thought it would be a mistake to leave any gaps. The Secretary had said that the elimination of U.S. warheads would coincide with the elimination of U.S. and Soviet missiles, and that was correct. There should be no gap of, say, five or ten days.

THE SECRETARY said that that should not be a big problem. Aircraft and/or trucks could be prepositioned and “away we go.”

BESSMERTNYKH asked if they could be removed before the “deadline.”

NITZE said procedures could be worked out to ensure simultaneity. SHEVARDNADZE said that was necessary.

KARPOV suggested adding language to take care of the problem. Could the U.S. accept adding to the second paragraph after the words “same elimination procedure” the phrase “and time frame”? GLITMAN replied that the time frame would be different. THE SECRETARY said it would be different because what was being discussed would be the last units to be dealt with. Others would already have been eliminated.

KARPOV suggested dealing with that problem by adding the word “final” before the word “elimination” in the following clause, so that the entire sentence would read:

When reentry vehicles for FRG Pershing 1a missiles are withdrawn, they become U.S. reentry vehicles not associated with an existing POC, and therefore will be subject to the same elimination procedure and time frame for final elimination as for reentry vehicles removed from U.S. and Soviet INF ballistic missiles.

THE SECRETARY noted that, if this language were accepted, the final tick on areas of disagreement would become unnecessary since it would have been established that the destruction process would be collapsed to zero. There would thus be no need for a timetable. KARPOV asked if the tick should be struck. NITZE said, "yes."

SHEVARDNADZE remarked with a broad grin that experts did not always make things more difficult. He expressed his understanding that the understanding he and the Secretary had reached would be reflected in the treaty protocol.

KARPOV said Glitman had told him he was prepared to move quickly in Geneva to wrap up additional details, including those pertaining to the protocol. GLITMAN said there was still a lot of work to do on issues like verification procedures.

THE SECRETARY said in his view there remained two things to do. First, to agree on a destruction schedule. This was mainly a question of examining the technical problems involved, and both sides seemed prepared to take on that task in a constructive spirit. (NITZE interjected that our technical people would be in Geneva within the week.) Second was the verification protocol. Here, too, it appeared both sides wanted a strong verification process. The Soviets had our protocol, and we looked forward to discussing it when they were ready. But there appeared to be no differences of principle. So that is what it would take to wrap up an agreement. SHEVARDNADZE endorsed the need to move ahead on these details.

[At this point NITZE, GLITMAN and KARPOV left the room. BESSMERTNYKH remained.]

[The Secretary and Shevardnadze resumed their discussion of START, reported below without interruption].

At the invitation of the Secretary, SHEVARDNADZE read aloud the START segment of the NST working group joint report, prefacing his remarks with the comment that there had been little "useful product." (Text of report at Tab 1.) Summarizing, Shevardnadze said his experts had reported no movement forward, with the exception of the Soviet acceptance of the principle that no more than one leg of the strategic triad could account for more than 60% of total warheads. So, he concluded, what should be done?

THE SECRETARY said it was his opinion that this was an area where more progress was possible, but that the P-1 and other issues had so dominated these talks, as well as those during his April visit to Moscow, that the Ministers had been unable to focus on START. He hoped that there would soon be a time when this was not so.

The Secretary did feel that some useful points had been exchanged during Shevardnadze's visit. While the Soviet side had not agreed to

the 4,800 warhead limit we proposed, we had had a chance to explain our rationale for seeking such a limit. It provided some minimum, agreed content for the air leg of the triad by ensuring that the entire 6,000 unit warhead limit was not all on ballistic missiles. Not a third, but only 20% of the 6,000 limit would be reserved for the aircraft leg. It was important to have that understood.

The question of the 3,300 ICBM warhead limit—which the Soviets thought should be 3,600—also bore discussion. There was no question about the fact that ICBM's had special significance.

[At this point, NITZE, GLITMAN and KARPOV returned, and the balance of the INF discussion reported above occurred.]

The triad, the Secretary continued, did not have three equal legs. Land-based ballistic missiles were distinguished by two characteristics: they were always on station (unlike SLBM's); and they were more accurate than other systems. They were also associated with the throwweight problem.

The Secretary said this was all by way of saying that we recognize that differences in force structures exist. We needed to design sublimits so that they did not force either side to restructure. There was no disagreement on that point.

On mobiles, the Secretary believed that what was needed was a very intensive discussion of the issue. Our problem was that we had no good idea of how to verify them. We would be interested in any ideas the Soviets might have, but we saw the issue as one of great difficulty. That was what was behind our attitude on mobiles. Shevardnadze had suggested the day before that we had not had difficulty in the past monitoring the mobile SS-20. The fact was that we had stated repeatedly that there would be a real verification problem if 100 such systems remained after the conclusion of an INF agreement, and that their elimination would dramatically ease the problem. So the Soviet side could contribute constructively to START prospects by addressing the question of how we verify the number of mobile missiles. The Soviet Union was a vast country, with extensive road and rail systems. We were talking about an enormous task. But we were willing to listen.

As for Defense and Space, we did not have much to add at this time. We would take a hard look at what had been presented by the Soviet side. The Secretary did believe, however, that, as we looked back at the context in which the ABM Treaty had been negotiated, one could not help but be struck by the fact that it had been assumed the defensive regime would see offensive reductions to levels below those prevailing in 1972. In fact, the reverse had happened. Offensive levels had exploded. Even a START agreement incorporating 50% reductions would not get us to the levels which existed in 1972. That was why we saw no justification for any linkage between a START agreement

and the ABM Treaty. In the right atmosphere, this might be discussed further. For the moment, the Secretary wished only to underscore the importance we attached to getting at the “root problem” described by General Secretary Gorbachev in Prague and again in his *Pravda* article of that morning. We were in full agreement with the General Secretary.

SHEVARDNADZE said it was no accident that in his Prague speech Gorbachev had said that strategic stability could be ensured with only 5% of current arsenals. At the next stage, even that 5% could be eliminated. This assessment was based on the analysis not only of Soviet experts, but of American authorities as well. The Soviet Union was sincerely interested in a radical reduction of strategic arms, in establishing stability at the lowest possible levels of armaments.

This was the guideline adopted in Reykjavik. Unfortunately, as he had noted the day before, after Reykjavik there had been an erosion of the understandings reached there. Shevardnadze called for a return to the Reykjavik understandings.

The Foreign Minister said he agreed with the Secretary that existing force structures should not be broken up. That would only result in a new race to build weapons. So if reductions were desired, the two sides should seek to preserve the traditional structures of their arsenals.

Perhaps the two Ministers could formulate instructions to their delegations to work henceforth on the basis of the Reykjavik understandings, taking into account the Ministers’ discussions. Shevardnadze believed that the Ministers—and Carlucci—should constantly monitor and interact with their delegations in Geneva. In the absence of such an effort, there would be no breakthrough.

There were, Shevardnadze continued, differences on the question of sublimits. For example, he said, on mobile missiles, he believed the problem could be resolved. The Secretary’s people could tell him that ballistic missiles, which were as big as a house, could be monitored by systems which could read the numbers on license plates.

Overall, there had been substantial progress on verification. Who would have predicted that U.S. specialists would be visiting Soviet nuclear test sites, or that U.S. Congressmen would be visiting the Krasnoyarsk radar? Radical reductions in strategic arms would require more inspection and other forms of verification.

THE SECRETARY said the U.S. would listen, but that Shevardnadze should not underestimate the difficulties involved in monitoring mobile missiles.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed, but pointed out that the U.S. was also developing a mobile missile. THE SECRETARY said we would be prepared to give up the effort in the context of an agreement.

SHEVARDNADZE pointed out that, were 50% reductions agreed to, a verification regime would have to be worked out, as it would for



INF. THE SECRETARY agreed, adding that it would have to be much more extensive. In the INF context, we were dealing with a zero outcome. For START, we would have to deal with production facilities, test flights, and a whole range of activities besides just the numbers of launchers and warheads involved. SHEVARDNADZE acknowledged this to be the case, and suggested that a sub-group might be created in Geneva on verification matters. THE SECRETARY said the important thing was to get to work on the problem.

Turning to the ABM Treaty, SHEVARDNADZE said that in the wake of the Reykjavik summit, leading Soviet experts and scientists had devoted considerable attention to the problem of how to strengthen the ABM regime. Shevardnadze thought that some good alternatives had been put forward. One would be a simple undertaking not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years, while "strictly" observing its provisions, as one would for any agreement. The U.S. knew the Soviet position on the question of research and testing; Moscow had taken a number of steps to accommodate American concerns. Another alternative was an agreement on a list of devices which would be barred from placement in space, without regard for the intent of such an action. That issue had been referred to experts.

Concluding his remarks on the ABM Treaty, Shevardnadze underscored that it "was the view of all Soviet leaders and of the leadership as a whole that unless the ABM Treaty were preserved for at least 10 years there would be no START Treaty."

As for the Secretary's point that the ABM Treaty had not prevented either the development of new types or major increases in strategic offensive weapons, Shevardnadze saw the matter from a different perspective. In 1972, no one was talking about reductions of strategic weapons. Now the situation was different: a whole class of weapons was being eliminated by an INF agreement; at Reykjavik agreement had been reached on the principle of 50% reductions in strategic arms. So the situation was new, and means had to be found to take all of this into account. Shevardnadze did not believe that the situation with respect to the ABM Treaty was hopeless. If both sides wanted radical reductions in strategic weapons, a solution could be found.

THE SECRETARY assured Shevardnadze that the U.S. was prepared to look for such a solution. We would think carefully about what Shevardnadze had said. We knew the Soviet side would reflect on what we had said. The Ministers should return to the issue later, and in the meantime should keep the pressure on their delegations.

The Secretary noted that the paper which Shevardnadze had presented Tuesday afternoon on the offense-defense relationship had been translated, but that the Secretary had not yet had a chance to read it. He would study it, and appreciated that the Soviet side had responded

to the paper the Secretary had given Shevardnadze on the subject in April.

Changing the subject, the Secretary noted that the nuclear testing working group had produced a piece of paper for their consideration. SHEVARDNADZE said he was prepared to accept a zero solution on this matter. THE SECRETARY said that would depend on what happened with nuclear weapons.

Taking up the paper, SHEVARDNADZE asked what were the differences. As the word “continuous” was bracketed in the first sentence, was it unacceptable to the U.S.?

THE SECRETARY explained that our only concern was to be clear. The word suggested that the negotiations would go on endlessly and without normal breaks. That clearly was not the intent. But this should not be a big problem.

SHEVARDNADZE said perhaps the Soviet side could agree to drop the word if the U.S. would agree on the next point (whether to accept alternative bracketed phrases indicating, respectively, that negotiations on interim steps would begin “after” or without waiting for ratification of the TTBT and PNET treaties).

THE SECRETARY and CARLUCCI expressed the view that explicit language that negotiations would begin before ratification could complicate the ratification process itself. Both expressed the view that, once the treaties were presented, ratification would be a quick formality. But if it would make it easier for the Soviet side to agree, the U.S. would be prepared to drop both sets of brackets. BESSMERTNYKH said that this would be acceptable, and SHEVARDNADZE concurred.

BESSMERTNYKH pointed out that the nuclear testing working group had agreed on additional language that morning which should be included in any final text. After ACDA Director Adelman was called into the meeting to confirm this, THE SECRETARY agreed to the inclusion of the sentence:

This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination.

In so doing he made clear his understanding that the nuclear testing negotiations would not become involved in issues being discussed in such other fora as the NST talks. Noting that the dates for beginning negotiations had been left blank in the draft statement, the Secretary asked when they should start. BESSMERTNYKH suggested December 1, which would give the delegations time to prepare. THE SECRETARY expressed concern that the process of developing improved verification provisions for the TTBT and PNET not be delayed. SHEVARDNADZE



said he agreed with this. THE SECRETARY proposed the phrase “before December 1.” SHEVARDNADZE agreed. (Final text at Tab 2.)<sup>5</sup>

Shevardnadze next turned to a question he had raised with the Secretary during their first meeting—the possibility of a joint statement summarizing the results of their talks. THE SECRETARY said he would like to have Assistant Secretary Ridgway on hand for that discussion. As she was being summoned, the two ministers spoke highly of her and Bessmertnykh’s skill in preparing the final statement issued at the 1985 Geneva summit. SHEVARDNADZE said that Ridgway was held in great respect in Moscow.

Once Ridgway arrived, Shevardnadze handed the Secretary a Soviet draft (Tab 3)<sup>6</sup> joint statement for consideration.

THE SECRETARY indicated that we had no problem in principle with the notion of a statement. He suggested that Ridgway and Bessmertnykh produce a joint draft, which the Ministers could review later.

Noting that the Soviet document referred to another meeting of the Ministers in Moscow in October, the Secretary noted that this was something he and Shevardnadze had already talked about. The Secretary agreed that such a meeting was necessary, particularly with a summit in prospect. He observed further that the Soviet draft’s reference to a summit would inevitably be read as signifying that a decision had already been made that it would occur this year. If that was the Soviet view, it would be better to say so now rather than wait a month. If we have indeed reached that point, we should not be playing any games at all. So if it were possible to give in the statement even a rough idea of when a summit would occur, it would avoid a lot of unhelpful speculation.

The language of the Soviet draft, the Secretary continued, suggested they were thinking in terms of a November meeting. As a practical matter, if it went beyond then, one would run into a jammed December period here. The Secretary cautioned that he may not have drawn the right inference from the Soviet text. But he did not want to mention a summit in an official announcement unless it was firm. This should not be a matter for speculation.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed with the Secretary’s statement that another meeting at their level was necessary. They would need to review how work was progressing on an INF treaty and what needed to be done to move ahead on strategic offensive and space arms. The

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<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed is the Joint Report in Washington with the amended language “before December 1.”

<sup>6</sup> Not found; the final version of the Joint Statement is in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 1987, pp. 39–40.

President and Gorbachev's meeting should not be merely a ceremonial occasion to sign an INF agreement. There should be a serious discussion of strategic arms and of the ABM Treaty. The two sides' state of preparations was low in those areas. But if the two Ministers pushed their experts and delegations, much could be accomplished before they met in October. This would create a solid groundwork for the top leaders' meeting as well. When the Secretary was in Moscow, he would have the opportunity to meet with General Secretary Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders. Perhaps Mr. Carlucci could accompany him.

THE SECRETARY said he would try to find him a seat on the plane. The question was, would the President let him go?

The Secretary reiterated that he had felt from the beginning that another meeting between the two Ministers would be necessary before a summit. So he agreed with what Shevardnadze had said. Both sides wanted a summit which would be a success in every way. That took a lot of planning.

If a summit were to take place this year, there was only a limited time frame in which it could occur. It would be a mistake to wait until late October to get people working on planning for so important an event. There would be a real risk that things would not be done as well as they should be. For that reason, the Secretary was asking Shevardnadze if the Soviet draft represented a proposal that we agree definitively that there would be a summit.

SHEVARDNADZE said that in terms of the basic Soviet approach that was the intent. But he proposed that the Ministers reflect a bit on how to proceed.

Like the American side, the Soviets had a busy fall coming up, including the 70th Anniversary of the October Revolution. That was not a problem. The General Secretary would find time to meet with the President, sign a significant agreement and make progress on strategic arms. The General Secretary had empowered Shevardnadze to make arrangements for a future summit. But Shevardnadze did not want to be overly hasty. Perhaps it would meet the Secretary's concerns if "this fall" were added to the Soviet text.

CARLUCCI, having asked to comment, said it would be fine to add that phrase, but as the person responsible for White House planning of a Gorbachev visit, wanted to have a clear understanding of the Soviet position. The Soviet draft's words "to sign a treaty" suggested that that was a sufficient condition for a summit. But Carlucci thought he heard a new element in what Shevardnadze had been saying—that there needed to be progress on START as well. We wanted progress in that area, of course, but we did not want a situation to arise in which a meeting had been agreed only to be confronted with new obstacles. We wanted as much certainty as possible.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the language of the Soviet text be worked to take this concern into account. He had meant to suggest only that the foundation for a good discussion on START should be laid by Ministers.

THE SECRETARY said he felt the discussion of what the leaders would do to be too narrow. An INF agreement would be signed. They would discuss all other areas of arms control, including START. We would also expect to review bilateral and human rights questions, as well as other issues, as the two leaders had in Geneva and Reykjavik. In other words, this was a *summit*. There would be a treaty signing, but there should be a broad discussion between them which contributes to the development of the relationship and to stability. It would be, the Secretary emphasized, “a big meeting!” The Ministers could now be confident that an INF agreement would be completed, and there was a need to discuss every other area as well. They might, for example, take up Afghanistan, as the Secretary and Shevardnadze had yesterday.

SHEVARDNADZE explained that in drafting their statement the Soviets had wanted START to be in “capital letters.” This did not mean they meant to rule out other issues, but strategic arms should be mentioned because of their international importance. It would be a mistake to create the impression that the two leaders would sign an INF agreement and then just sit around on strategic arms.

There was one other great concern that Shevardnadze wanted to mention—ratification. As he had told the Secretary before, the Soviet experience in this area was bitter. Moscow expected a debate in the Senate on ratification of an INF agreement. The Soviets feared (and had been warned by some Congressional leaders) that the debate would be more difficult were there no progress in the strategic arms area. The Soviet people would not understand were the General Secretary to sign an agreement which was later rejected by the Senate. There should be no risks in this regard.

Shevardnadze repeated that a meeting of Ministers would be a good thing. It would help clarify prospects for movement in arms control in the minds of Congress and elsewhere. The Ministers could agree on dates and an agenda for a summit. Shevardnadze did not rule out that a meeting could take place in November or even late October (Note: the interpreter first said “April” instead of October.) THE SECRETARY replied “no way.” SHEVARDNADZE said he was just throwing out ideas.

THE SECRETARY said that this would be the event of the year. If it became part of a process which led to 50% reductions in strategic arms, it could be the event of a decade or more. So it would be broad in content. There should be progress in START. The General Secretary should spend some time seeing the United States. It would be a major event. It would take real planning.

As for ratification, the Secretary was not worried about the problem. He thought it likely that the general tone of the relationship would be as important as anything.

SHEVARDNADZE said that there were really no differences between them. He was talking about November or December. The General Secretary would find the time for so important a meeting, despite his busy schedule. The important thing was that the groundwork be carefully laid. So it would be better not to talk about specific months. Perhaps one could say "this year."

THE SECRETARY said that Shevardnadze needed to keep in mind that December is difficult. A meeting during the first part of the month was not impossible, but the month filled up fast. As Bessmertnykh knew, it was a funny month in the U.S. The latter part of November would be better for many reasons. The Secretary did not know when Congress would adjourn, but it would be more likely to be in session in late November than early December. It would be desirable for Congress to be here and for the General Secretary to meet with Congressional leaders. So the range of possibilities was not broad at that time of year for things to go in the best possible way. Therefore, the sooner we established a time frame for planning purposes, the better it would be.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the statement include the following elements: first, the Ministers would "speak in favor" of a summit meeting this year; second, they would announce a meeting in Moscow in the second half of October and a framework for preparations for the meeting. As for specific arrangements for a summit, these could be decided during the Moscow meeting.

THE SECRETARY said he would prefer to say that a summit would take place in the latter part of November, without reference to specific dates. This would give us a basis for planning. The Soviets, like ourselves, had people who needed to do advance work, who would want to satisfy themselves that the program and arrangements for a visit were those which the General Secretary felt were to his best advantage. There were security questions to consider. Someone had to make these kinds of decisions on his behalf, and would need time to work.

SHEVARDNADZE said these considerations were of as much concern to him as to the Secretary. If the Secretary wanted to be more precise, perhaps Shevardnadze could agree to the phrase "this fall." He did not want to be too specific.

THE SECRETARY said that Ridgway had a suggestion, and read the following formulation:

... a view toward a summit between President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev during the second half of November,

with the exact dates to be determined in the course of the Ministers' meeting in Moscow."

SHEVARDNADZE asked if it were necessary to say "November." November was the last month of fall. THE SECRETARY said we could say "fall," but that that meant November. SHEVARDNADZE urged that "fall" be used. He said he did not like sensations, and felt any reference to November would be sensational. Moreover, it would undercut the significance of the Secretary's October visit to Moscow if the timing of the summit were so precisely defined.

THE SECRETARY asked Shevardnadze to envisage what would happen were his option accepted. "Fall" means there will be a summit this year. The interest will be intense. The Foreign Minister was aware that there was always a stakeout outside the Department when an important visitor was present. Ridgway had just told him that the largest stakeout in memory was outside awaiting his departure. If the expression "this fall" were used, someone would ask what that meant. The Secretary would have to say, obviously, after the Ministerial. And people would realize that doing it in December would be hard. So what did that leave?

It was also important from both sides' standpoints that the planning process begin, that advance people be in touch with one another. Everything that the General Secretary did would be on TV in both countries. The Soviet side would want him shown to best advantage. The General Secretary's own people would have a better sense of his preferences than our own. So we needed to start work. We did not need precise dates, but we needed to get busy. The Secretary said this not to prod, but because he wanted the visit to be a great success, because he wanted to do everything he could think of to make that happen, and because he knew what a major effort would be required. The Secretary knew the visit would go better if it were well thought out in advance. This took time and effort.

Perhaps, he suggested, the Ministers could ask their two colleagues (Ridgway and Bessmertnykh) to work on a draft and show the Ministers some phraseology, accepting the general structure of the Soviet draft. If the Foreign Minister wanted to leave the question of timing vague, the Secretary would not push. But the more they could answer these kinds of questions, the better off they would be.

SHEVARDNADZE said he thought it would still be better to say "this fall," with dates to be determined during the Ministers' meeting. This would demonstrate that the two sides were proceeding seriously and responsibly.

THE SECRETARY asked Carlucci if he had any ideas. Carlucci said that, if it was impossible to be more specific on timing, there should at least be a decision to proceed with planning. He agreed with

the Secretary that trying to organize an October meeting would be an impossible task.

SHEVARDNADZE interrupted to say that he was not talking about a purely “formal” meeting of Ministers. When they met, they would be able to deal with all aspects of planning for a summit. He was proposing a serious approach. If it would be better for the Secretary, Shevardnadze would be prepared to meet with him in mid-October. There was another consideration. Shevardnadze had not even reported to his boss that there was agreement in principle to conclude an INF agreement. THE SECRETARY said he hadn’t either.

SHEVARDNADZE said he thought a good formula had been found for describing the timing of a summit. This did not mean that local contacts could not take place in advance of the Ministers’ meeting.

CARLUCCI said that that was fine, as long as tentative planning could proceed for approval by Ministers. The thing we needed to avoid was a last minute crush.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested seeing how things developed as they proceeded. He would inform Moscow of the results of his visit. Who knew? Perhaps he would be told the agreement he had reached was unacceptable. (THE SECRETARY said in that case he would have to stay here.) As for the language of the statement, Ridgway and Bessmertnykh could work on it.

The Secretary agreed, noting that there were a number of aspects to be dealt with. First, that the Ministers were satisfied that an INF agreement could be finished in principle. Second, that we have in mind a summit in the U.S of the two leaders in the fall of 1987. Third, that the Ministers would meet again in Moscow in late October to further plan the content of the meeting and to review the many subjects already being discussed, including strategic arms, as well as to set specific summit dates. The Secretary noted that by that time we would have the benefit of the thinking of advance personnel for purposes of operational planning. Finally, the statement should indicate that we expect to be able to sign an INF agreement and perhaps other things and to move forward the broad agenda between the two countries when the leaders meet.

SHEVARDNADZE said that this was broadly acceptable.

THE SECRETARY asked Carlucci when the President returned from Philadelphia.<sup>7</sup> CARLUCCI answered that he would be in the White House at 3:20 p.m.

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<sup>7</sup> The President was in Philadelphia to deliver a speech commemorating the bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution.

THE SECRETARY suggested that there were a number of things that should be done. The statement should be worked. The Ministers should get formal reports from their working groups. They should agree on how to release the statement.

While the Secretary could make no commitments because he did not know the President's schedule, he wondered if it would not be good for Shevardnadze and him to see the President again that afternoon. This would give him a chance to react directly to what they had been discussing. After CARLUCCI indicated that he thought the President would be available, the Secretary suggested that he and the Secretary plan on moving to the White House in about an hour and a half.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would be delighted to see the President again, especially since he had something to report.

THE SECRETARY said that Ridgway (who had left the room earlier to begin work on a U.S. draft) would get together with Bessmertnykh as soon as she was ready. In the meantime the two Ministers could have some sandwiches which had been brought in and then meet with their working groups.

The meeting concluded with a discussion of press arrangements for that afternoon and the following morning.

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## 75. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 17, 1987, 5:45 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*  
The President  
Secretary Shultz  
Chief of Staff Baker  
Duberstein  
Carlucci  
Matlock  
Zarechnak, Interpreter

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz—Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87. Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting took place in the Residence at the White House.



U.S.S.R.  
Shevardnadze  
Dubinin  
Bessmertnykh  
Sredin, Notetaker  
Palazhchenko, Interpreter

THE SECRETARY began the call by reporting briefly to the President the results of his meetings with Shevardnadze. He noted that the meetings had been businesslike, constructive and productive, and cited their agreement in principle to conclude an INF agreement, agreement to hold a Summit meeting during the fall, and the agreement on an approach to dealing with nuclear testing (which had already been announced to the press). He pointed out that both agreed on the importance of accelerating negotiations on strategic arms reductions, and noted that discussions had covered all areas of our four-part agenda. There had been a thorough discussion of human rights issues, and Shevardnadze had outlined for him some changes that were underway in the Soviet approach to these issues, changes which, he stressed, were being made for Soviet reasons, not as the result of pressure from abroad. In preparation for the fall summit, Shevardnadze had invited the Secretary to Moscow in October to review progress as of that time, and the Secretary had accepted.

SHEVARDNADZE thanked the President for his kindness in receiving him again and complimented the hospitality which had been accorded him throughout his visit. He endorsed the Secretary's comments regarding their meetings and added that, in his opinion, a summit meeting should be possible this year, although much work still remains to be done. While he was pleased that agreement had been reached in principle to conclude an INF agreement, he was disappointed that more progress had not been registered in regard to strategic systems and to space and defensive weapons. The Soviets had made some significant proposals in these areas and were concerned that the U.S. had not yet seen fit to reciprocate. He looked forward to Secretary Shultz's visit to Moscow to finish off the various preparatory details for the summit and hoped that more rapid progress could be achieved in START by that time.

THE PRESIDENT said he hoped Shevardnadze was not reestablishing a linkage between START and INF. SECRETARY SHULTZ pointed out that the Soviets had not asserted a formal linkage, but that there is a relationship between the two negotiations, and he was encouraged by Gorbachev's comments about the importance of achieving a START treaty. They would try to complete the INF treaty by October, and then push ahead on the other negotiations.

THE PRESIDENT then reviewed his invitation to Gorbachev to come to the U.S., and SHEVARDNADZE assured him that they were



planning a meeting in this context. He was unable, however, to discuss concrete dates since he had not yet had time to report to and consult with Gorbachev. He said that he was proposing a thorough discussion of all aspects of the summit meeting when Secretary Shultz came to Moscow in October. Of course, Mr. Carlucci would also be more than welcome to come with the Secretary for these meetings.

THE SECRETARY said it would be a very good thing if Mr. Carlucci could accompany him to Moscow.

The Secretary also told the President that he had explained to Shevardnadze that December would be a difficult month for us for the summit. The President nodded and added that the latter part of November would be fine.

SHEVARDNADZE said that all decisions now had to be tentative since he had not yet been able to discuss the matter with Gorbachev. He needed to report to him, and then the concrete date could be discussed with Secretary Shultz in October.

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## 76. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 17, 1987, 6:30 p.m.

*US Participants:*

Secretary Shultz  
National Security Advisor Carlucci  
Ambassador Matlock  
Ambassador Ridgway  
D. Zarechnak, Interpreter

*USSR Participants:*

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
Deputy Minister Bessmertnykh  
Ambassador Dubinin  
P. Palazhchenko, Interpreter

Upon returning from the White House, the group was met by Assistant Secretary Ridgway, who privately informed the Secretary of the incident in East Germany involving the shooting at two American

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz—Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87. Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting took place in Shultz's office at the Department of State.

servicemen by at least one Soviet soldier in East Germany. Ridgway showed the Secretary a copy of a draft press release by the US Department of Defense, which was the following:

(text of press release)<sup>2</sup>

The Secretary immediately brought this to the attention of the Foreign Minister (Zarechnak interpreted the text into Russian). The Secretary urged Shevardnadze to take immediate steps to deal with the issue, so that it would not blow up. He indicated that this kind of a thing could often derail other good achievements. He thought that Shevardnadze ought to investigate the incident quickly, and perhaps the Soviet side might issue an apology. He tended to believe that the information in the press release was accurate, although, of course, he could not be absolutely certain.

Shevardnadze replied briefly that the incident would first need to be investigated. The Secretary agreed. Ambassador Dubinin said that an inquiry would be made immediately.<sup>3</sup>

The Secretary then mentioned to Shevardnadze that October 19 and 20 would be convenient days for him to come to Moscow. Shevardnadze replied that it would be better if the Secretary could come later that week. He mentioned that there was a meeting of the Supreme Soviet scheduled for the beginning of the week of Oct. 19, which he would only need to make a brief appearance at, but which would probably occupy a lot of General Secretary Gorbachev's time, thus making it more problematic to arrange a meeting with the Secretary. The Secretary indicated that it would be more difficult for him to come to Moscow at the end of the week in light of the visits of foreign dignitaries in Washington. Shevardnadze replied that the beginning of the week might be possible, but he would need to look at this more closely.

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<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is the September 18 draft press release. See also Robert Pear, "U.S. Serviceman wounded by Russian in East Germany," *New York Times*, September 18, 1987, p. A-6.

<sup>3</sup> In telegram 295788 to Berlin and Bonn, September 22, the Department reported that during a September 18 meeting with Ridgway, Dubinin delivered a formal statement that "made a number of false charges against the USMLM unit, but the Soviets explicitly acknowledged their own culpability in the incident and, for apparently the first time, offered an outright apology, coupled with an undertaking to prevent such incidents in the future." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870782-0599)

**77. Notes Prepared by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci)<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 18, 1987

**PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ, SENATOR  
BAKER, KEN DUBERSTEIN AND FRANK CARLUCCI IN THE  
OVAL OFFICE ON SEPTEMBER 18, 1987**

Matlock describes atmosphere in USSR. Access to media significantly different from one year ago. People coming to think the world not as hostile as was. This could be a problem when time for sacrifice comes. Even allow demonstrators. Newspapers now carry news; are worth reading.

GPS S & Afghanistan. We will leave Afghanistan—maybe 5 months, maybe a year. The political decision has been made. Will be done while this Administration in office.

Want to engage in process of withdrawal; foresee a lot of bloodshed.

GPS The China of your Administration could be USSR. Different than detente. Detente was making existing systems interact. Gorb. changing theirs; we interact w/changed system. An aspect of the Reagan doctrine.

P Gorb. has been only leader who has not advocated Soviet global expansion.

M.E. We have been reluctant to get involved w/USSR. Why reluctant on Intel. Conf.?

Thatcher cable urges we go w/o Shamir. Can't.

I come back to Perez suggestion. I recommend we try. Entirely dependent on surprise. Can't leak.

After prearranging, part. Sham. & Hussein you & Gorb. invite States around Israel to US during Summit to launch bilateral peace negotiations.

Chances of bringing it off are low. But if try, before I go to USSR I go to Israel to get honorary degree. Go to Shamir. If he buys I go to Jordan, possibly Egypt. If both of them on board we could put to Soviets when FC & I in Moscow.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Secretary Shultz (08/14/1987–11/03/1987) [Meetings with the President—notes]. Secret. The meeting took place from 1:35 to 2:06 p.m., and Matlock attended from 1:35 until 1:43 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

The call would be made. You & Gorb. would sit down with them and get process going.

P needs to react.

Moscow toward end of week of October 19.

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## 78. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

New York, September 24, 1987, 3–4:24 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary

Ambassador Walters

Under Secretary Armacost

Assistant Secretary Ridgway

Assistant Secretary Murphy

Mr. Burton (SOV), Notetaker

Mr. Hopkins, Interpreter

SOVIET UNION

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh

Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovskiy

Ambassador Belonogov

Mr. Tarasenko (MFA)

Mr. Posuealuk

Mr. Palazhenko (Interpreter)

The *Secretary* opened by saying that, as always, there were many issues to discuss, but the focus on today's meeting should be on the Persian Gulf.

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* said that was his understanding.

*The Secretary* said he would be glad to have the Foreign Minister start off, review the situation as he sees it, give his appraisal and perhaps describe where we go from here. The Secretary said that first, however, he wanted to echo something Shevardnadze had said. The U.S. and Soviet Union had acted together with their colleagues on the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz—Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burton. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in Walter's office at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

Security Council in a unified way, and that is one factor that made an impression. If we didn't agree as we go along, we didn't agree, but the effort to maintain unity was one we should continue to make. Further, if the UN effort on the Iran-Iraq War succeeded, it would be a strong step in a direction that both the Foreign Minister and the Secretary advocated—a more effective UN and Security Council.

*Shevardnadze* said he had no particular enthusiasm for going first, but he would do so. He said that in broad terms, he had tried to express his views from the UN rostrum. He agreed that there were some positive elements and trends which should be preserved. One was the fact that Resolution 598 was adopted.<sup>2</sup> It was a good resolution, a balanced resolution, one which made it possible to work with both Iran and Iraq, which also took into account the interest of the littoral states, and which made it possible to settle “this grave conflict”.

He continued that a very important element, in the process of drafting the resolution and to a substantial extent in the subsequent stage, was that states were ready to take steps to implement Resolution 598. It was very important from the Soviet standpoint that the unity of the UNSC permanent members be preserved. The permanent members were facing a difficult test. It was a positive fact that the Secretary General's visit to the region was not without results. It would have been naive to expect, if anyone did, that the trip would overcome all difficulties. That would have been unrealistic given the differences that exist, but tomorrow the permanent members could speak in support of that mission and what had been done.

He continued that the report of the Secretary General, the list of steps being proposed, and the two sides agreeing in principle, were important aspects of the current situation. Yesterday in his UN speech, *Shevardnadze* had said that the primary task was still to achieve a ceasefire.<sup>3</sup> Today, he still believed it was the primary problem. He had been worried at the prospect that Iran would flatly reject the demand. But they seemed to be accepting it, admittedly with some reservations and conditions. Those conditions and reservations, of course, were significant.

In addition to a ceasefire, other points had been outlined by the Secretary General, such as control of troops and subsequent measures. These should be taken up.

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<sup>2</sup> UNSC Resolution 598 was adopted on July 20, 1987, an immediate ceasefire between Iran and Iraq, the repatriation of prisoners of war, and a withdrawal to the international border.

<sup>3</sup> For excerpts of *Shevardnadze's* September 23 speech, see “*Shevardnadze Speaks at the U.N.*,” *New York Times*, September 24, 1987, p. A-7.

There was also the question of setting up an international body of inquiry which would become an unbiased body to determine the reasons for the conflict and who was the aggressor. This was a most difficult question, and it must be seen in the context of the whole issue.

Shevardnadze continued that the Iraqis were not morally or psychologically ready for a commission. He knew from his own meetings with (Iraqi Foreign Minister) Aziz that it was a very sensitive matter for Iraq. But Shevardnadze had urged him to have a change of heart. The Iraqis were most interested in the ceasefire, given the consequences of the war. They would have to take a stand, including from the UN rostrum. But Aziz had agreed that it was a parallel process—ceasefire, withdrawal of troops, exchange of prisoners of war, and in parallel, establishment of a UN investigating body. That was the first time, Shevardnadze thought, that the Iraqis had mentioned “in parallel”. Clearly, they had reservations. They did not want to find themselves in a trap. But on that basis, very active diplomatic efforts could begin, including the possibilities available to the Secretary General, the Security Council, and “all of us.”

Shevardnadze said he had talked at some length with the Iranians. He understood there was a paper from the Iranian delegation in which they accepted the resolution and a ceasefire, and then provided details of their position. Some details were acceptable and some less so, but the position still was a basis to look for compromises.

So that was how Shevardnadze saw the situation. He had said in Washington, and wished to repeat, that the Soviets were very worried about the “massive” American military presence in the Gulf. He understood the U.S. had interests, including important economic interests, and other states did as well. But it seemed to Shevardnadze that what had happened was completely needless and a complicating factor.

It was not a good situation to talk of cooperation in the Security Council and helping the Secretary General, but on the other hand, a group of countries had, behind the back of the Secretary General, decided to build up arms in the region. Shevardnadze did not approve and could not approve of this. He recognized, nevertheless, that it was an established fact, but he was very concerned. No one could say what would happen. The Iran-Iraq War could shift to a new battleground, with the Gulf itself the arena. The buildup should not have taken place after the UN Resolution.

But, Shevardnadze said, it was a decision that had been made. So what should happen next? We must continue to insist on the role and functions of the UNSC. Perhaps consideration could be given to making forces available to the UNSC. The UN flag would have a very different impact from that of the U.S. flag or those of other nations.

That, however, was for the next stage. The first task was to look at the steps in the Secretary General’s report. If there were a ceasefire,

it would make possible all other courses of action. Shevardnadze and his people had worked late last night to think of ideas, but could not come up with anything better than what he had said. The situation was very complicated.

Shevardnadze said he had heard what the President of Iran had said. The Iranians were very tense. Shevardnadze would meet tonight with the Gulf States (NOTE: he mentioned specifically Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait), and would try to get a feel for their attitudes. If something very substantial developed, he would report his impressions to the Secretary.

As for the Iranians, the Soviets had had contacts. Whether it was Shevardnadze or his deputies speaking to the Iranians, the Soviets had consistently told them that the Soviet Union would work for Resolution 598 and that it was the right resolution, that the Soviets would work in the Security Council for every word and phrase of the resolution. The Soviets had also told the Iranians that the resolution would not be the last step and they would talk about other steps to implement the resolution. Shevardnadze said he had no plans to meet with the Iranians, but his deputies would otherwise make contacts in the framework Shevardnadze had outlined.

Shevardnadze said that what the Iranians stated from the rostrum was one thing; there were people in Iran who would like to cut Iran off from the world. But he had found that the Iranians do not in fact want to be isolated.

So, Shevardnadze continued, he wished to urge calm and restraint. Perhaps, he quipped, Secretary Weinberger could restore order during his current trip, and the Secretary and Shevardnadze would just have been wasting time in New York. But, he concluded, it was an established fact that the Security Council permanent members had been able to work in unity on Resolution 598. In that same spirit of unity, they should work for the resolution's implementation. It provided a basis that did make progress possible.

*The Secretary* said he appreciated Shevardnadze's thoughtful comment and constructive efforts. The U.S. had a parallel analysis—of course, the U.S. did not talk directly to Iran, but we discuss the situation with others.

The Secretary said he wanted to comment about our ship presence. The U.S. believed its naval presence in the region was a constructive factor. It had helped prevent Iranian intimidation of the Gulf states. It was a passive force, there for defense, and any provocations came from Iran. Stopping Iranian mining of international waters also was a constructive force, not destructive. If there were a ceasefire, then the need for our presence would diminish, and we would act accordingly.

The Secretary continued that he agreed wholeheartedly that Resolution 598 was a good resolution, and we should stick to it. Our effort here in New York was to implement it. The fact that the Resolution was unanimous gave it strength. A resolution to follow 598 was very important. The behavior of Iran—and for that matter, Iraq—had been affected by the Resolution. So a strong and visible effort was very important.

The Secretary said that, like Shevardnadze, he had found the Iranian response a little more forthcoming than had been expected. It still fell far short of satisfactory or what Iraq would accept, but nevertheless, it was something to work with. The Secretary's impression was that Iran was a country which faced lots of decisions and had difficulty coming to grips with the need for a precise response. The effort on an enforcement measure would be catalyzing.

As the Secretary understood it, the Iranians had accepted the idea of a ceasefire and establishment of a commission of inquiry. However, the idea of an informal or undeclared ceasefire without any troop withdrawal was very troublesome. As we had worked on Resolution 598, the link between a ceasefire and troop withdrawals was a very important element. Iran now occupied territory of Iraq of such a nature as to make it impossible for Iraq to resume oil shipments by sea.

The Secretary continued that it seems to him that if you read Resolution 598, a number of parallel actions were required. His reading was that parallel establishment of a commission of inquiry was consistent with the Resolution. We did not see any need to change the resolution in any way. We did not want to get into the position of changing the resolution but rather working within its framework. He suspected that the work of the commission would not be so easy, and would take longer than Iran thought, to gather evidence, work through it and come to conclusions. So, delaying key elements of the resolution was kind of an implicit statement by Iran that if the conclusion of the commission were not satisfactory from Iran's standpoint, then all bets would be off.

In our discussions with the Secretary General, he continued, we needed to give him full support, to have him in a position where he was working for implementation of Resolution 598 as it stood, recognizing that he had certain flexibility to work with, but also recognizing that the kind of sequencing Iran envisioned was not consistent with the resolution, and he needed to change that with Iran. To the extent the U.S. and Soviet Union could point toward that outcome in their contacts, it would help the Secretary General. A strong and visible effort to show we were prepared to follow through on Resolution 598 would be an important motivating force, and we had to think through how to do that. Our objective should be action.



In summary, the Secretary said he saw quite a similarity of both analysis and what should be done. We should not just push ahead blindly with the Resolution, ignoring the possibility of some constructive diplomatic activity. But, neither should we let up and make the resolution invisible. The Secretary proposed that the U.S. and Soviet Union should get together on instructions that the Secretary General should have in hand as he tried to work. As he had listened to Shevardnadze, it had seemed that his view was not too different.

*Shevardnadze* said he thought there was no serious difference with the Secretary. The Secretary's statement that if the ceasefire took effect then U.S. military forces would be reduced, was very encouraging. There was a basis for working for the resolution. At this stage, he saw the resolution as an adequate basis to settle the crisis.

In any settlement, he went on, there were priority steps. The most difficult on the part of Iran was the decision to accept a ceasefire. The Iranian government had inculcated fanaticism in its people—an entire generation educated in a fanatical pursuit of total triumph and the removal of Saddam Hussein. But there were some forces in Iran that were more “educated” (NOTE: moderate) and they saw things differently.

Shevardnadze said that was one point he wanted to make. A second was the establishment of an international investigating body. This could be a fundamental decision which could help forces in Iran argue for a ceasefire. This problem would be put in the forefront. We should proceed from the premise that there would be a parallel process—ceasefire and commission of inquiry. Shevardnadze was not ready to say who should be on such a group; perhaps the U.S. and Soviet Union should discuss it, although Shevardnadze was unprepared. But it was an issue that would come to the forefront. We should also speak to the Iraqis. They have said they were not afraid—no one should be afraid. So, Shevardnadze saw a process consisting of a ceasefire, initiation of a commission of inquiry, and subsequently other steps could occur; troop withdrawal, return of prisoners of war, and other steps mentioned in the Secretary General's report. Thus, parallel establishment of a commission of inquiry would have a positive impact in Iran.

*The Secretary* replied that Iraq's attitude toward a commission of inquiry suggested that the answer would not be quite as simple as Iran expected. The commission would take some time, and the answer was not likely to be absolutely clean cut, it was important that conditions that went parallel with the commission of inquiry were conditions that would contain stability within them. So the Secretary welcomed Shevardnadze's comments on return of prisoners of war and troop withdrawals.

The Secretary said he thought Shevardnadze's comments on the difficulties of a ceasefire for Iran were very perceptive. If that were so,

then the Iranians must be pushed. From the Iraqi standpoint, the Iraqis could not have Iran sitting for a long period on territory that represented Iraq's export capability.

*Shevardnadze* said that after tomorrow's meeting, the Secretary General would get down to practical work and a good deal would become clearer. It would be naive for *Shevardnadze* to expect that the Secretary General would produce in a week an agreed formula. It would be a painful process; as Mr. Armacost knew from his work, the Afghanistan-Pakistan talks had gone on for a long time, and now were in their ninth round, he thought.

The Secretary General must be given some leeway, some freedom of maneuver within Resolution 598. It might take him several trips, and perhaps the appointment of a special representative to be present in the region. But the fundamental points now were unity in the Security Council, faithful implementation of the resolution, and readiness to support all efforts of the Secretary General. The priority step was a ceasefire with subsequent steps, and it was desirable to resolve as soon as possible the issue of a commission of inquiry. So, *Shevardnadze* concluded, within that framework, we could say we had agreed.

*The Secretary* said he wanted to make a couple of points. It was not desirable to give a sense of endless patience. Rather, we should give the impression of impatience, that it was time to move ahead with the resolution. We should make clear we are ready to have the Secretary General look at the situation, but that we were looking for action, and we would implement the resolution if we did not see action.

The degree of responsiveness of Iran, the Secretary continued, was due to the unanimity and forcefulness of the resolution relative to Iran. So, we should take steps to make clear we were working on steps to enforce the resolution. That would be a strong and visible effort.

The Secretary General needed support, plus flexibility, some room for maneuver. But it probably would be advantageous to have made it clear that the resolution was the basic framework we must work with, and he had no flexibility to change it.

The Secretary went on that the commission of inquiry was consistent with the resolution. The Secretary, like *Shevardnadze*, was not prepared to make a statement, but we should think about it.

The notion of parallel steps did mean that troop withdrawal would go with the ceasefire. We would have to keep coming back to that, because the absence of troop withdrawals in exchange for a ceasefire would fundamentally undercut the resolution. Obviously, there would have to be a ceasefire in order to carry out troop withdrawals, so there would have to be some sequencing, but that was not the same thing as allowing a ceasefire in place. So there were parts of the resolution we simply had to stick with.

*Ambassador Walters* said that the Secretary General kept telling him and Ambassador Belenogov that he needed guidance, so if the Secretary and Foreign Minister wanted the Secretary General to do something, we would have to tell him.

*The Secretary* said we wanted to put the Secretary General in the position of being a real mediator. We had to give him an idea of what he had to work with, and what not, with Resolution 598 as his basic document.

*Shevardnadze* said perhaps tomorrow some formula could be found in the Secretary General's proposals. The Iranians and Iraqis had not approved the proposals but they were thinking about them. Perhaps the permanent members could develop a statement, by the President of the Security Council, that the permanent members approved the recommendations of the Secretary General, both their content and their sequence. It would help the Secretary General if the Security Council stated its view that it supported him, perhaps in a statement by the President of the Council. That would be an action—an energetic action. We were placing great responsibility on him.

*The Secretary* commented, "And great opportunity."

The Secretary continued, suppose we tried our hand at such a statement, to see what it might look like? We also needed to consider instructions for the Secretary General, to give him a mandate for his mission. Both the U.S. and Soviet delegations could try their hand at that, compare them, and check around with others. Even if we did not have it all agreed, we could have it along and discuss it at the Secretary General's lunch.

*Shevardnadze* said such a statement could be drafted. As for pressure on Iran, the fact that the resolution had been adopted was pressure. All subsequent steps were pressure, for example, the fact that Iraq had agreed to the resolution and Iran had not. We had to have a subtle and consistent approach, but one mixed with flexibility. There will be a breakpoint for Iran—a graduated approach. If there were certain elements in Iran advocating a "healthier" approach, the Secretary General needs to understand that. If there were not, then other things would need to be done.

*The Secretary* said he wanted to restate—without swinging it around like a baseball bat—the importance of doing things on the so-called second resolution, so we would make clear our determination to follow through on the resolution. He suggested that we establish a drafting group, so there would be the fact as well as the appearance of work getting done. This was the sort of thing he had in mind to make clear there was *not* endless time and there *was* determination to move ahead if the Secretary General's mission was unproductive.

*Shevardnadze* said, so that was agreed. He quipped that it would be good if after their meeting, the war would end.

*The Secretary* rejoined that there was more possibility of that than there had been in a long while; the fact that the Soviet Union and U.S. were working together had something to do with that.

*Shevardnadze* asked why Secretary Weinberger had gone to the Middle East. His trip had caused a stir in Iran.

*The Secretary* said the trip had been planned for some time. He noted that Secretary Weinberger went periodically to visit the Gulf states, and with our ships there, it gave an added reason for the trip. Under the circumstances, the U.S. considered that it would not be wise to call off a long-scheduled trip; from our perspective, that might have sent the wrong signal. But he could assure *Shevardnadze* the trip was not a provocative act.

[Here follows discussion of proposals for defense ministers meeting, ministerial dates, arms control, Moscow agenda.]

*The Secretary* said there was a press stakeout in front of the Mission and he and *Shevardnadze* should consider what to say about the Iran-Iraq situation. The Secretary suggested that they tell the media they had spent a productive hour discussing the subject, would meet again at the Secretary General's lunch, and that both he and *Shevardnadze* gave him support on Resolution 598 and its implementation. Beyond that, however, they would give no details.

*Shevardnadze* suggested they add a point in favor of unity in the Security Council.

*The Secretary* said, "Good," and suggested they say, "We both place great value on the ability to work in a unified fashion."

*Shevardnadze* agreed.

There was some discussion whether to appear together or separately before the media, with a decision on the latter. The meeting then concluded.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Following the conclusion of this meeting, *Shevardnadze* and Shultz offered brief remarks to the press that stressed the importance of implementing UNSC Resolution 598. (Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1987, p. 54)

## 79. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 14, 1987, 1:45–2:45 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Upcoming Shultz-Shevardnadze Meetings in Moscow

### PARTICIPANTS

The President

Mr. Donald Gregg (The Vice President's Office)

#### *State*

Counselor Max Kampelman

Rozanne Ridgway

#### *Treasury*

Secretary James Baker

#### *Defense*

Secretary Caspar Weinberger

Dr. Fred Ikle

#### *Energy*

Mr. William Martin

#### *OMB*

Mr. James Miller

#### *ACDA*

Mr. David Emery

#### *CIA*

Mr. William Webster

Mr. Robert Gates

#### *JCS*

Admiral William Crowe

Vice Admiral Jonathan Howe

#### *White House*

Chief of Staff

Kenneth Duberstein

Frank C. Carlucci

Colin L. Powell

Marlin Fitzwater

#### *NSC*

Robert E. Linhard

Fritz Ermarth

#### *OSTP*

William Graham

#### *Special Advisors to the President*

Ambassador Paul Nitze

Ambassador Edward Rowny

The NSPG meeting, October 14, opened at 1:45 p.m. The President opened the meeting using the Talking Points recommended to him (Tab A).<sup>2</sup>

*Mr. Carlucci:* Secretary Shultz is hosting a lunch for President Duarte,<sup>3</sup> Mr. President; so he cannot be here right now. Max Kampelman is representing Secretary Shultz. Max, can you give us a setting for the Moscow trip?

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 0168 14 Oct 1987 [Shultz-Shevardnadze Meetings in Moscow]. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. No drafting information appears on the minutes.

<sup>2</sup> Not found attached.

<sup>3</sup> Salvadoran President José Napoleon Duarte.

*Ambassador Kampelman:* I talked to the Secretary before I came. He reassured me that he intends to cover the full agenda of US concerns. It is his hope that we'll not spend the full meeting in Moscow on INF. Important issues in the INF area do remain; for example, verification. However, we would like to have to emphasize INF in this meeting again. The Soviets did raise the German issue again, and we may have to deal with it. However, I received a personal message from my counterpart, Mr. Vorontsov who indicated to me that he hopes that we would be able to move to resolve this promptly.

*Mr. Carlucci:* We may have just seen a crack in the Soviet position on this earlier today.

*Ambassador Kampelman:* I would expect that because the Soviet negotiators are really not first-drawer. The negotiators may be trying to improve upon the deal that was agreed in Washington. We'll deal with all the issues involved in Moscow. The primary emphasis that we should have is on START, and, Mr. President, Reykjavik provides a good basis for this. The Soviets have come part of the way towards us on things like sublimits and throwweight. The Soviets have said that START is the root problem, and they're ready to seriously work to resolve the START differences. If they are serious, we are ready to see where we can go too. They know for sure that in no way will they be able to block SDI.

*The President:* I hope they know that.

*Ambassador Kampelman:* After Geneva, they knew that you were serious. They realize that SDI is real, and that they have to learn to live with it.

*Mr. Carlucci:* That's what Shevardnadze said to me during his visit.

*Ambassador Kampelman:* We need to tie SDI into a stabilizing process. From this point of view, we can also minimize the domestic problems with respect to SDI. In a sense, we can strengthen SDI out of this stabilizing process rather than weaken it. The Soviets have indicated interest in Chemical Weapons. We have a problem dealing with this area, but we have the same teams ready to deal with it in Moscow as we did in Washington. We will have Working Groups in each area; one of them will be in CW. I don't know if testing will come at this meeting.

*Mr. Carlucci:* I think we solved that in Washington, at least for the time being.

*Ambassador Kampelman:* We need to ensure that we keep the show on the road with respect to nuclear testing. We have to sort out who will be the head of the US delegation and be ready for the talks that will start by the first of December.

*Mr. Carlucci:* Mr. President, we do have some significant issues in the INF area. . . . (The President interrupts)

*The President:* I'd really [like to] to return to SDI. Some group did an excellent film that I saw at Camp David over the weekend. It really refutes the scientific groupies that have it all wrong. I think if the American public saw this film, they would understand a hell of lot better.

*Colonel Linhard:* Sir, the group was the American Defense Preparedness Agency<sup>4</sup> Association, a civilian group. They have a regular series of awards for SDI achievement, and you have routinely supported their functions.

*The President:* Can we help these further?

*Colonel Linhard:* We have to be careful that we maintain the proper White House involvement, but there's no reason why you can't help this group, and we have been supportive in the past.

*Secretary Weinberger:* The public really needs some additional information. The public is with us, and the more information we give them, the more supportive they will be.

*Secretary Baker:* The Worthling<sup>5</sup> Poll agrees with what Cap just said. However, there is some confusion out there about exactly what SDI is. This film may be able to help.

*The President:* (Speaking to Howard Baker) Can we kind of push this along?

*Howard Baker:* Yes, we'll get on with it.

*Mr. Carlucci:* Are there any other comments on INF?

*Judge Webster:* I have a comment which I think I want to make at this point. I think I need to speak for the technicians. We're very concerned about the verifiability of the INF Treaty and, especially, the current position which does not remove the infrastructure of Soviet INF forces. We should have no infrastructure remaining, although I know there is some price on the NATO side. I think we should forbid all operations in training and have the personnel leave the bases that are being eliminated, and we need strong on-site inspection. But more than anything else, Mr. President, there should be no effort to close on these nut-cutting details in Moscow, but rather come back and work it with the experts who can work on this issue. We need time to look at the issue. (Judge Webster then used the Talking Points attached at Tab B.)<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> An unknown hand crossed out the word "Agency."

<sup>5</sup> An unknown hand crossed out "Worthling" and wrote "Wirthlin." Reference is to Richard Wirthlin, a prominent Republican pollster.

<sup>6</sup> Not found attached.



*Mr. Carlucci:* Mr. President, we've looked at this very issue twice, and there are significant impacts on NATO that have to be considered.

*Judge Webster:* I understand that we have looked at this before, but I want to make sure that we consider verification in light of the ratification problems we're going to have.

*Dr. Graham:* I agree with Judge Webster. I understand the Soviets don't want to give us data on their nondeployed missiles anyway.

*Ambassador Kampelman:* Mr. President, Judge Webster has experts of his on each delegation. It is very clear that we have to work hard on verification, and we'll do so.

*Judge Webster:* We need to ensure that this is the case.

*Admiral Crowe:* I agree with the DCI's concerns. I'm more than happy to abide by whatever restrictions we need to ensure that they are met.

*Mr. Carlucci:* Let's turn to START. The Soviets have offered us a limit of 3600 or 60% of total weapons on each of the three legs of the Triad. The JCS looked at this and found it not to be acceptable. Last time we met we looked at sublimits, and we have a dazzling array of options in sublimits involved. I understand yesterday there was a discussion on the sublimits issue with the Chiefs and the Secretary of State. I thought perhaps we might have the Chiefs comment on this area.

*Secretary Weinberger:* I think that's a very good idea. The JCS examined priorities with respect to sublimits. Bill Crowe, maybe you could speak for the Chiefs.

*Admiral Crowe:* Our discussion was sparked by the offer of the Soviets to limit each leg of the Triad to 60%. As Mr. Carlucci said, because of uncertainties in the future, we think it's unwise to limit our flexibility by accepting this proposal. However, based on a request by Mr. Carlucci, we did review the priorities involved with the sublimits issue, and I'd like to report on those now. Our number one priority is the 6000 RV limit. Number two is protecting the bomber counting rules achieved at Reykjavik which permits us to compensate for other aspects of the agreement.

*Secretary Weinberger:* I would note, Mr. President, that Bill Crowe told me yesterday that the finding of Military Sufficiency in the START area rests most heavily on maintaining the bomber counting rule.

*Ambassador Kampelman:* Mr. President, you got this in Reykjavik. Many people have run Reykjavik down often. This is certainly one of the accomplishments of that meeting.

*Admiral Crowe:* This was a spectacular accomplishment of that meeting which allowed us possibilities in other areas. But let me return to priorities. Number three, we feel that we should pocket the 1540 limit on heavies. We need to pocket this limit in some way.



*Mr. Carlucci:* The Soviets have already agreed to the 1540 limit.

*Admiral Crowe:* Our fourth priority is the 4800 limit on ballistic missile reentry vehicles. Those priorities are the vital priorities. Those are the ones we absolutely have to have. Beyond that we have opinions on the others. Number five, we need to have acceptable counting rules for ALCMs and ballistic missile reentry vehicles. Number six would be the ban on mobiles. Number seven would be the limit of 3300 or 3600 on ICBM RVs. We'd be willing to delete this in order to avoid the 60% being applied to all three legs of the Triad.

*Secretary Weinberger:* The Soviets want an INF agreement and a START agreement. We should stand firm and we'll get them. They may try to link this stuff to Defense and Space, but if we can hold in Moscow on no linkage, we can get the progress we seek. I agree with the priorities the Chiefs stated. The ban on mobiles, however, is important. There's a lot of discussion currently about whether we have wavered on this subject. I would note, Mr. President, though, that Congress has not given us funds for either M-X or Midgetman in sufficient numbers. So we need to keep trying to get the ban on mobiles.

*Ambassador Rowny:* Mr. President, I have one question for the Chiefs. What about throwweight?

*Admiral Crowe:* Ed, we would very [much] like to see a 50% reduction in throwweight, but it's not clear to us that we can measure throwweight. For example, we just revised the throwweight estimates for the SS-24 by some 15%. However, that 15% change in throwweight can translate into a 300% change in yield. So the delta is between what we can measure and what we want is just too significant, and we don't understand how we can make those measurements.

*Mr. Carlucci:* That change on the SS-24—doesn't that put that into the Heavy Class?

*Secretary Weinberger:* Mr. President, they're ahead of us in throwweight by a significant amount—5.3 to 1 as I understand, and we are concerned about throwweight.

*Judge Webster:* I agree with the Chiefs though that it's extremely difficult to measure.

*Admiral Crowe:* We would certainly like it, but as I said, we don't believe we can find a measureable number.

*The President:* Are all those numbers—are they all counting warheads?

*Admiral Crowe:* Yes, that's right, Sir.

*The President:* Therefore, all the 6000 are warheads, and the 1540 are heavy warheads inside the 6000. Isn't that true?

*Admiral Crowe:* Yes, that's true.

*The President:* What is the 4800 number?

*Admiral Crowe:* That's the number of reentry vehicles on ICBMs and SLBMs only.

*The President:* And what is the 3600 number?

*Admiral Crowe:* That's on the ICBMs, but I would note, Mr. President, that the 4800 is the important one.

*Ambassador Kampelman:* We feel the 4800 number is essential.

*Mr. Carlucci:* In light of the Chiefs' discussion, I don't see any point in going through the six substantive options in our paper and the two timing options, unless there's someone who wants to talk about them. From what I see, it would be very hard for us to make a move on any option before Moscow. Therefore, I think, Mr. President, we have consensus to stay with the flexibility which you have already provided and you have already given us some flexibility on the 3300 sublimit, and we can work on the remainder of this in Moscow.

*Ambassador Kampelman:* The Soviets do want a START agreement, and that gives us leverage. There is a time element involved. They know if they want a START agreement during this Administration, they have to move quickly. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee members told me that they expected that the absolute deadline would probably be a March–April time frame for them to have enough time to ratify such a Treaty during this Administration. I told this to the Soviets.

*The President:* When we started we had the Triad, and they had most land-based things. They had a chip on their shoulders and said that we were trying to restructure their forces. Why couldn't we just get the numbers we want and let them structure their forces anyway they like? Are we really trying to restructure their forces?

*Ambassador Kampelman:* We certainly are.

*Admiral Crowe:* We are nice guys, Mr. President, but I agree. We want to affect their force structure.

*Mr. Carlucci:* Yes, we are trying to affect their force structure.

*The President:* But if they want the land-based stuff, so what?

*Mr. Carlucci:* Mr. President, we're after the most destabilizing systems and the most destabilizing systems we've identified are associated with land-based systems. We're trying to affect that now.

*Secretary Weinberger:* The Soviets have got air defenses, and they have a heavy investment in heavy missiles. We need to change these relationships in order to give us a level playing field.

*Mr. Carlucci:* The Chiefs have done a good job on setting priorities; we should be able to build on this. Let's turn to Defense and Space. We have three options which I could summarize as hold firm, extend our nondeployment commitment to 1996, or accept one of the two

Soviet positions. The first Soviet position provided was a set of lists and labs; the other would be for us both to agree to abide by the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. However, the Soviet version of the Treaty is just as strict as the Senate.

*Secretary Weinberger:* No, no, it's much worse; it is more strict than the strict interpretation held by the Senate. We also need to force them to delink the Defense and Space area from START.

*Ambassador Kampelman:* Okay, we do want them to delink, but we may reach a point where having a START agreement in hand, we need to face linkage again. At that point, it may be that we will be able to help ourselves by having something in the Defense and Space area. All I'm asking is we keep this in the back of our minds.

*Secretary Weinberger:* That's what they did at Iceland to us. We need to delink and not discuss Defense and Space until START is standing alone on its own two feet. I dislike having things in our minds until we need them. We can get a stand-alone START agreement if we just hold firm. I think they want their START, and the Chiefs' priority has given us a way to get there, if we can hold firm.

*Ambassador Kampelman:* I don't know of anyone offering a different position at this point.

*Mr. Carlucci:* I understand that ACDA is considering extending the period for 10 years. Dave Emery, would you mind giving us the ACDA view?

*Mr. Emery:* ACDA thinks that extending the Treaty through 1996 would give us reserve leverage useful in achieving progress in START.

*Mr. Carlucci:* Well, I'm not sure I understand that completely. But we did have a 10-year position at one time, and we changed and dropped it back to seven years, and the Soviets complained about that, but we do have a good position.

*Mr. Carlucci:* No one supports moving to the Soviet position. Therefore, Cap, we're spared your speech on lists and labs. Are there any other issues?

*Ambassador Kampelman:* In Geneva, we are dealing with the lists and labs. We're handling them by asking a lot of questions, and that's very useful. Is there a study of the JCS on the labs and criteria?

*Admiral Crowe:* No, we received a briefing from Abrahamson and we concluded that the Soviet list of criteria is not in our interest. We could build a list of things that we could accept.

*Mr. Carlucci:* But would Cap?

*Secretary Weinberger:* Yes, of course, if the list is free<sup>7</sup> allows us to do whatever we want anywhere. I want no restrictions. Any restriction

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<sup>7</sup> An unknown hand crossed out "is free."

on testing is too restrictive. It's just a scientific matter; you're asking me not to think about something. If we would have taken this attitude, we would never have had the auto or the Cinema industry. For example, Mr. President, you'll note that on their list, the electromagnetic masked accelerator is restricted to 1.2 grams per fathom. That's certainly too restrictive (laughter).

*Dr. Graham:* I second everything that Cap said. Nothing worries the Soviets more than having US technology focused on a problem. They will try to set a framework of constraints on our technology and then gradually tighten it.

*Judge Webster:* I agree, too. We have less than 10% confidence in our ability to verify any of these restrictions.

*Ambassador Nitze:* We should have a study on this area and understand why we don't like the Soviets' limits and what we could accept as limits. It's going to be very hard to argue with Congress if we don't have any study. It would be a real morass.

*Secretary Weinberger:* I can argue very comfortably without a study that no restriction is a common sense position. No study can tell us what we need, and no study can look into the future and determine what restrictions will hurt us or not. This seems fairly obvious to me.

*Admiral Crowe:* Paul does have a point though with respect to Congress.

*Ambassador Kampelman:* I agree. It is something we have to be concerned about.

*Admiral Crowe:* We will be asked about how we looked at criteria. We will look at this.

*Ambassador Rowny:* I'm very encouraged, Mr. President, by dropping some of the sublimits, and I believe we probably could get a deal on START now that will help with INF ratification and the like.

*Mr. Carlucci:* Well, this meeting has helped quite a bit. Let's avoid leaks. Leaks would be absolutely fatal to us in our ability to achieve our negotiating aims. Do not debrief your staffs.

*Admiral Crowe:* On INF, I would make one other point. The Chiefs are very interested in modernization in other areas that will be needed to reorient to the new military situation after INF. We should not look at the INF agreement as a money-saving device. We are going to devote that money into other areas. We absolutely need the High Level Group's Montebello Decision to be implemented.

*Secretary Weinberger:* I fully agree with the Chiefs. We need modern systems; we also need modernization of conventional forces *after* an INF agreement to ensure we have proper deterrence.

*The President:* I know that we need modernization; we certainly need to replace our older systems.

*Secretary Weinberger:* Especially modern conventional systems.

*Admiral Crowe:* And a buildup of modern short-range nuclear forces.

*Mr. Carlucci:* Thank you very much.

The meeting ended at 2:35 p.m.

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## 80. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, October 22, 1987, 11 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

### SUBJECTS

Organizational questions, human rights, INF

### PARTICIPANTS

#### US

The Secretary  
National Security Advisor Carlucci  
Asst. Sec. Ridgway  
EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)  
Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)

#### USSR

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
CPSU Secretary Dobrynin  
Deputy ForMin Bessmertnykh  
Shevardnadze Advisor Tarasenko  
(Notetaker)  
Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

SHEVARDNADZE opened the meeting by welcoming the Secretary and his delegation, noting that he was glad to see Mr. Carlucci and Ambassador Ridgway once again.

The Foreign Minister expressed satisfaction that the Secretary had been able to reach Moscow despite the transportation problems he had faced. The meeting was one of great importance. Shevardnadze did not need to tell the Secretary how critical their Washington discussions<sup>2</sup> had been; he had already given his assessment at the time and when they met in New York.<sup>3</sup> The whole world had responded to the results of the Washington visit.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow/Washington Oct. 1987. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in the Guesthouse of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. All brackets are in the original. Shultz departed the United States on October 15 to visit Jerusalem (October 16–17), Jidda (October 17), Jerusalem (October 17–19), Cairo (October 19), London (October 19–20), and Helsinki (October 20–21), before arriving in Moscow.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 66–76.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 78.

The current moment in U.S.-Soviet relations, Shevardnadze felt, was a crucial one. There were important problems to be discussed. Tomorrow the Secretary would meet General Secretary Gorbachev.<sup>4</sup> That meeting would deal with the key problems on the agenda, with respect to both substance and future contacts. The results of the ministers work today, Shevardnadze stressed, would determine what the General Secretary would have to say on future contacts. He had been intimately involved in preparations for the Secretary's visit, and would make the final decisions. As to the organization of the visit, Shevardnadze's preference was to focus most of the discussion in the present narrow group. He liked the flexibility which this approach had given during the Washington meetings. Given the limited time available, Shevardnadze suggested that the ministers might hold a brief plenary session with their delegations to allow working groups to get underway immediately. The session need take no more than a few minutes, after which the ministers could resume their discussion.

In addition to meeting in the morning and afternoon, Shevardnadze raised the possibility of an evening session as well—perhaps about 8:00 pm. This would enable the ministers to get reports from working groups, particularly on progress in INF. Other working groups might give their reports the next day.

As to the sequence in which they should address the issues, Shevardnadze suggested that the ministers concentrate after the brief plenary meeting on INF. If time permitted, they could move on to strategic arms and space, nuclear testing, chemical weapons and conventional arms reductions in Europe, in that order. They would want to discuss regional problems, perhaps focusing on a few priority areas: Afghanistan, the Middle East, the Iran-Iraq situation, and Kampuchea. Shevardnadze understood that the Secretary also wanted to discuss Korea, and the Minister thought that a good idea. If the Secretary had anything to say on Central America, that, too, would be welcome.

Shevardnadze noted that there had been a detailed discussion of human rights and humanitarian matters in Washington. If the U.S. desired, the Soviet side was prepared to continue that dialogue in a working group. As for bilateral matters, here, too, the main burden should be on working groups. If the two ministers took up the full range of bilateral issues, they would need two days for that alone. The Washington approach worked well in bringing into the ministers' field of vision only those issues which required their attention.

Thus, Shevardnadze concluded, he proposed that the ministers talk until lunch, and resume about 3:30 pm for two hours of discussion.

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 84.

Then there could be relatively free time until 7:00 or 8:00 pm, when they could meet again. Tomorrow at 11:00 the Secretary would see General Secretary Gorbachev; Shevardnadze was not certain how long the meeting would run—probably at least two hours. There was then a lunch at Spaso House. At 2:30 or 3:00, the ministers might hold a concluding meeting, taking into account the results of the session with the General Secretary and of the efforts of working groups. Shevardnadze understood the Secretary would end his visit with a pre-departure press conference.

Shevardnadze observed that in Washington the ministers had recorded their discussions in a joint statement.<sup>5</sup> If all went well during the Secretary's talks, perhaps it would be well to have aides prepare such a statement for the ministers' consideration.

With respect to working groups, Shevardnadze proposed the following breakdown: INF; strategic arms and space; a single group covering nuclear testing, conventional arms and chemical weapons (CW); regional issues; bilateral affairs; and humanitarian questions. Such an arrangement was consistent with what had been done in Washington, except that a separate INF group would be able to devote full time to the remaining, high-priority issues in that area. Shevardnadze noted that, while some of the Soviet negotiators in Geneva had not yet arrived due to the weather, the Soviet side would find a way to staff the various groups.

THE SECRETARY said he appreciated the effort the Soviet side had made to get him to Moscow despite the fog which had made it impossible for his plane to land. That was a good sign.

As to procedures, the Secretary thought Shevardnadze's suggestions were, broadly speaking, exactly right. The Secretary agreed that discussions between ministers and a few others were productive, as were those of working groups. Plenary sessions were not. Their utility was primarily in that they provided an opportunity for a photo opportunity—which was not a negligible factor. The Secretary agreed that the delegations should be assembled to be advised of the division of labor that the ministers had agreed upon.

The general scenario which the Minister had described struck the Secretary as fine. He was prepared to meet at 8:00 pm as Shevardnadze had suggested. As for the next day, it would be good to try to keep to the schedule Shevardnadze had described, but the Secretary was prepared to work as late as appeared to be worthwhile. His plane would not leave until he was ready, and he could always use the train again if his plane could not get into Moscow. The important thing was

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 6, Document 74.



to complete as much as possible. The only timing consideration from the Secretary's standpoint was that he was due to brief NATO foreign ministers in Brussels on Saturday.<sup>6</sup>

As for working groups, the Secretary suggested that a single arms control group be created, which would have authority to divide itself as appropriate. No purpose was to be served by repeating the arguments we had had in Geneva over whether there should be one vs. three groups. It would be better to let the groups decide such matters for themselves.

As for INF, we were prepared to agree to a separate sub-group, and the Secretary had picked a strong team to address that issue. Paul Nitze would be in charge overall of both the umbrella group and the U.S. INF squad. Ambassador Glitman and his legal advisor, along with Adm. Howe, Col. Linhard and James Timbie would support Nitze on INF.

The Secretary believed that there were useful things which the strategic arms subgroup could discuss as well. But there were some fundamental issues which needed to be discussed at higher levels—by the ministers and perhaps the General Secretary. So the Secretary hoped that strategic arms could be a major focus of his and Shevardnadze's own talks.

The Secretary agreed that the ministers did not themselves need to address nuclear testing, since basic agreement had been reached in Washington on starting negotiations. Mr. Adelman was prepared to address the issue in Moscow with respect to modalities. Similarly, Amb. Holmes was prepared to discuss problems relating to negotiations on chemical weapons (CW). Mr. Thomas could work with whomever Shevardnadze designated on conventional arms issues, but we felt that the focus of those discussions should remain in Vienna.

On regional issues, the Secretary said he had been considering who on the U.S. side might be able to lead a working group discussion. He personally felt that it would be best to discuss such questions at the ministers' level. It was hard to see how working groups could supplement the ministers' discussion. The Secretary agreed that the ministers should discuss Iran-Iraq, as well as Afghanistan and the Middle East. He had some points to make on Southern Africa, and he wanted to touch in a "staccato" fashion on a few other areas.

The Secretary agreed that a group should be put to work on bilateral issues. He felt that the ingredients were there to reach some useful understandings. The U.S. was prepared to work on them in Moscow. It was important to do what we could to avoid situations which could

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<sup>6</sup> October 24.



spoil the atmosphere. If necessary, the leaders of the working groups could refer questions to the ministers for decision, but the Secretary hoped they would be able to find solutions on their own. He had even threatened the U.S. team with “irrational decisions” if anything were referred to the ministers.

On human rights, the Secretary felt that some good procedural arrangements were evolving. The Secretary himself had some points he would like to make to Shevardnadze in this area once the plenary session was out of the way. Ambassador Schifter would be able to elaborate in the working group.

The Secretary suggested that the ministers adopt the convention which had evolved in Washington of calling on the working groups as necessary for expertise during the ministers’ own meetings. By the same token, if the experts had issues they felt the ministers needed to discuss, they could bring them to their attention.

The Secretary said he had one additional question on the “personnel side.” He wondered if it would be possible to arrange for himself and Carlucci to meet with Minister of Defense Yazov. There had, of course, been some recent correspondence between Yazov and Secretary Weinberger. If Yazov were in town, perhaps he could be invited to the Spaso House luncheon the next day—just to say hello.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that, as it turned out, Yazov would be at the Soviet luncheon immediately following the present session. THE SECRETARY said that was excellent.

SHEVARDNADZE confirmed that, as the Secretary had suggested, there would be a single arms control group which could further split up as necessary. THE SECRETARY concurred.

SHEVARDNADZE asked if he understood correctly that the Secretary would prefer not to have a regional working group. The SECRETARY reiterated that regional issues were something that the ministers themselves needed to address. Perhaps, he mused, Mr. Solomon could serve as chairman of a U.S. working group. Running through a list of U.S. delegation members who might participate in a regional group, the Secretary noted that all but Solomon and Mr. Ermarth would be otherwise occupied. The two of them might discuss regional questions, but the Secretary would want to cover such matters primarily at the ministers’ level.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed, concurring as well in the Secretary’s comments on bilateral and human rights groups. He reconfirmed that the ministers would meet that evening at 8:00 pm, and that Friday morning<sup>7</sup> would be free until the Gorbachev meeting. Then, Shevardnadze said, the two ministers could work until their “triumph.”

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<sup>7</sup> October 23.

THE SECRETARY agreed, and suggested that Shevardnadze take the lead in the plenary session which followed.

[During the plenary running from 11:45 to 12:00,<sup>8</sup> the two ministers briefed their delegations on the arrangements which had been agreed. Promptly at noon, the ministers resumed their private meeting.]

Following their return from the plenary session, SHEVARDNADZE asked the Secretary to lead off.

THE SECRETARY said he had three comments to make with respect to human rights, noting that they could be taken up in more detail at the experts' level.

First, he had welcomed Shevardnadze's statement during their last meeting that the changes which were taking place in the Soviet Union represented moves the Soviet leadership considered desirable in terms of their own priorities. Such an underlying rationale would help to ensure that the changes themselves would be sustained.

Second, the Secretary appreciated the progress which had been made in resolving cases on the "short lists" he and the President had in the past given Shevardnadze. There were, however, a few names remaining from the list, which the Secretary wanted to mention explicitly: Abe Stolar, Naum Meiman, Leyla Gordiyevskaya, and Aleksandr Lerner.

The Secretary expressed his hope that, in line with previous Soviet statements, it would also be possible to resolve the remaining divided spouse cases. Such cases, along with blocked marriage cases, should not be on the two ministers' agenda.

We had been encouraged, the Secretary said, by moves thus far with respect to political prisoners and possible legal reforms. But it appeared that under some of the revisions which were being discussed, many people remained imprisoned for what should no longer be considered violations. The continued detention of persons on political charges was inconsistent with obligations assumed by the Soviet Union, and we hoped it would be terminated.

Finally, the Secretary said, he would like to speak a bit about Jewish and other emigration. As Shevardnadze was aware, the U.S. had the world's largest Jewish population. We thus had a strong interest in the question of Soviet Jewry. Having just come from Israel, the Secretary had recently been personally exposed to concerns there on the subject.

The Secretary noted that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were similar in that both had large ethnic minorities. The difference was that unlike

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<sup>8</sup> No record of this conversation has been found.

the U.S., most of the minorities in the Soviet Union had their roots within Soviet territory.

In that context, and while reaffirming the U.S. position that emigration should be open and free, the Secretary noted that there seemed to be particularly rapid progress of late in the resolution of ethnic German emigration cases. He suspected that that reflected in some sense a Soviet perception that Soviet Germans had an ethnic homeland in Germany.

The Secretary said it was not for him, with respect to Jewish emigration, to make the argument for a Jewish homeland. But he had been deeply struck by a recent conversation with Ida Nudel, in which her first words after leaving the Soviet Union had been, "I'm home." So Israel had a pull for Jews. The Secretary suggested it might be worth the Soviet Union's while to look at the Jewish emigration problem in that light.

The Secretary recalled that Shevardnadze had said during his recent visit to Uruguay that, essentially, any Jews who wanted to leave the Soviet Union would be allowed to do so. If that statement represented Soviet policy, it would be an important development.

Finally, the Secretary observed that we had noticed a more liberal Soviet policy with respect to the issuance of tourist visas for travel to the U.S. The Secretary felt that the ability to come and go in this manner was a potentially important element in an increasingly encouraging pattern which we welcomed.

SHEVARDNADZE thanked the Secretary for his views, and said he wanted to highlight a few positive elements with respect to humanitarian problems. These were, he noticed, only initial signs, but they were positive ones.

First of all, the Soviet side had detected a more businesslike approach on the part of the U.S. in searching for mutually acceptable outcomes on human rights, both at the level of ministers and in working groups. Moscow had particularly appreciated the Secretary's remarks after Shevardnadze's Washington visit to the effect that the two sides' discussion of such issues was a "two-way-street." This was true, and the Soviet side was prepared to discuss questions raised by the U.S. in a businesslike fashion. This was General Secretary Gorbachev's approach, and it was a positive one. Of course, the Soviet people sometimes questioned certain aspects of the United States' behavior. That, too, was acceptable.

On a practical level, of course, there was a need to move ahead, Shevardnadze continued. This was particularly true in the case of the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting. There were issues there, the resolution of which should not be postponed longer. Specifically, the issue

of a Moscow meeting on issues relating to human rights was of fundamental importance in the U.S.-Soviet dialogue and the CSCE process as a whole. The Soviet side had made concrete proposals; it was prepared to discuss the full range of issues in a Moscow meeting. The Soviet Union would not perish if a meeting did not occur. But Moscow wanted, and was prepared for, a serious, solid discussion. If the West was not prepared to accept the Soviet proposal, it should say so. But setting conditions for holding a meeting was unacceptable; it amounted to "political racism."

Shevardnadze suggested that the U.S. delegation in Vienna be given the instructions necessary to speed up the process and make decisions. There was, he noted, also a French proposal for a conference to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. Moscow did not see the issue as an either/or proposition. More than one conference on human rights themes could be held. A solution could be found without preconditions.

Shevardnadze complained that, while the atmosphere in Vienna was good, it was essential to avoid old approaches and attitudes. Developments had reached a stage in which the U.S. and Soviet delegations should take a stand on when to conclude the Vienna meeting.

In this context, Shevardnadze wondered whether it would be useful to consider a document for release on the conclusion of the Vienna meeting which would represent a "code of conduct" on human rights issues. This would not just be a rhetorical exercise, but a substantive document. It might be useful, Shevardnadze suggested, for working groups in Moscow to discuss the abortive Bern document to determine the source of U.S. concerns with respect to that document. The Soviet side had attached much importance to the Bern document, which, Shevardnadze noted, had been endorsed by a majority of delegations present. If the U.S. had problems, they could be discussed in a business-like manner.

Shevardnadze noted that there were other outstanding questions where U.S. decisions were necessary.

He noted that the U.S. still owed a response on the question of Soviet access to facilities for radio transmissions into the U.S. When Gorbachev had raised the issue with President Reagan in Reykjavik, the reaction had been generally positive. Wick and Yakovlev had met subsequently, but there had been no progress since. So further clarification of U.S. intentions were needed.

Exchanges were another area where the Soviet side hoped for a positive U.S. response. Soviet trade union delegations continued to be refused visas. As the individuals involved reflected mass organizations, the impact on Soviet perceptions of the U.S. was as significant as it was negative.

Shevardnadze noted that the Secretary had raised the question of reform of Soviet laws. In fact, an in-depth review was underway. The process was not an easy one, as some of the legislation had been around for decades. But Shevardnadze had noted that the Secretary had said nothing about legal reform in the U.S. Was the U.S. prepared to discuss, for example, the repeal of laws on capital punishment of minors? There was also legislation on the books which was inconsistent with some of the highest ideals of mankind.

As for the specific points the Secretary had made, Shevardnadze confirmed that quite apart from inquiries by the U.S., steps were being taken to resolve many cases. There was indeed a trend toward greater emigration, with 12,000 to 13,000 Jews having been permitted to leave. The increase had been due to changes in the law and to improvements in administrative procedures.

Shevardnadze acknowledged that he had met with Jewish leaders in Uruguay, and that he had said that there were no substantive barriers to those who wished to leave. He had also said that, if there were those who had been exposed to state secrets, it might not be possible for them to leave now. But all other constraints had been removed. So, it was clear that the Soviet Union was dealing with these issues in a constructive way.

Returning to the question of a Moscow human rights forum, Shevardnadze complained that some seemed to think the Soviets were begging. This was not the case. Moscow had thought that the West would welcome the opportunity to see at first hand what was happening in the Soviet Union. If that was not so, fine. But a decision was needed.

With respect to the Secretary's comments on ethnic groups, Shevardnadze characterized some of his assertions as "debatable." Shevardnadze suspected that Polish and Baltic minorities in the U.S. would welcome a more open U.S. approach to their ethnic heritages. For its part, the Soviet Union had resolved the problem of nationalities. The economic and financial costs had been great, but where nationality concerns were involved, the Soviet Union was prepared to bear the expense.

THE SECRETARY said he would like to make a few comments. On the question of radios, we were ready to work on the problem with the Cubans under the right conditions. Wick remained ready to discuss the options.

With respect to U.S. legislation, Assistant Secretary Schifter would be prepared to arrange for Soviet representatives to sit in on Supreme Court consideration of the issue of capital punishment for minors issue.

On ethnic rights, the Secretary said he would be happy to have Soviet suggestions, but it was his impression that American minorities

had no qualms about expressing themselves. CARLUCCI quipped that he could testify that the Italians didn't feel discriminated against.

THE SECRETARY noted Shevardnadze's comment that 12,000–13,000 Jews had been allowed to leave the Soviet Union. That implied a major increase in numbers by the end of this year, since, according to our figures, only 9,000 to 10,000 had thus far received notification. If the numbers were going to increase, the U.S. would welcome it, because people in the U.S. continued to compare current levels to those of the seventies, when they had reached 50,000. DOBRYNIN interjected that those were different times. Those who wanted to leave had departed.

THE SECRETARY said he welcomed Shevardnadze's confirmation that Soviet-citizens were free to leave within the single constraint he had mentioned, and specifically without reference to specific family relationships. This was very important, positive information.

As to the state secrets issue itself, many of the cases to which the requirement was being applied looked to us to be questionable. The individuals concerned often appeared to have only marginal access to secret information, or to have had it long ago. So this was an issue where greater clarity and consistency were needed.

With respect to the Vienna meeting, the Secretary welcomed the Soviet desire to wind up the conference. The U.S. shared that objective, both with regard to its human rights and security dimensions.

On the question of conventional arms, we believed that an alliance-to-alliance format was necessary. Nor could we accept the inclusion of nuclear weapons in a mandate.

But, the Secretary repeated, we welcomed the Soviet desire to move ahead. Schifter would be glad to review our concerns on the Bern document. As to Shevardnadze's "code" proposal, it seemed to the Secretary that, between the Helsinki Final Act, the UN Declaration of Human Rights, and the Madrid Concluding Document, there were enough statements about what we agreed to. The emphasis now must be on performance.

As for the Moscow forum proposal, Ambassador Zimmermann had recently laid out the indicators we would use in formulating our final position. The U.S. had no illusions that the Soviet Union could not live without a Moscow meeting. As to Western interest in the Soviet Union, the recent Chautauqua meeting had demonstrated clearly how interested Americans were. The Secretary put himself at the head of the list in that regard, and expressed the hope that at some point he would be able to see more of the Soviet Union.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had a further suggestion. American representatives often used outdated material in their presentations on

humanitarian questions. For example, they often used the figure 400,000 to describe the number of Jews who sought to emigrate from the Soviet Union. The Soviet side had no objections to establishing procedures to improve the quality of information available to the U.S. side. In this spirit, it had recently invited a group of American District Attorneys to the Soviet Union to get a better idea of Soviet legal practice. There had also been a proposal for reciprocal visits to U.S. and Soviet psychiatric hospitals. Shevardnadze admitted that there had been unauthorized practices in the past. The important thing was that neither side should base its positions on incomplete or speculative information.

THE SECRETARY said he thought Shevardnadze's idea a good one. We had noted recent, apparently positive steps in the area of psychiatric practice. As for our information on potential Jewish emigrants, the Secretary acknowledged that it was inferred from information which was to some degree dated. If Shevardnadze was suggesting that Ambassador Matlock meet with Soviet representatives for the purpose of determining who, in the Soviet Jewish community, wanted to leave, and if the purpose of the exercise was to help bring this about, the Secretary was prepared to agree. But our starting point in such an exercise was that those who wished to leave should be able to do so.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that, in principle, the Soviet side would be prepared to meet to refine figures in a businesslike discussion.

THE SECRETARY said that this was fine, but that the starting point must be that those who want to go will be able to do so.

SHEVARDNADZE said, "all right." He then said he had another suggestion. Shevardnadze felt that UN human rights institutions such as the High Commission were not being fully exploited. Perhaps the U.S. and Soviet delegations at the UN could cooperate in remedying this. THE SECRETARY said that the UN superstructure was already too extensive and should be cut down. SHEVARDNADZE did not pursue the idea further.

Clearly changing the subject, Shevardnadze stated that the primary human right was the right to life. THE SECRETARY said that all should have the right to live in peace . . . and prosperity.

The Secretary said that "topic A" on the agenda was INF. The working groups were already struggling with the issue. Shevardnadze felt that the two ministers had given INF a good push during their Washington meetings, but things seemed to have gotten confused since—particularly on the question of warheads for FRG Pershing 1a missiles. The U.S. had thought that that issue had been settled in Washington. We had been puzzled by subsequent Soviet statements. For our part, we were prepared to reaffirm what had been said in Washington. There was no desire to change anything which had been agreed to.



DOBRYNIN interjected that it was the U.S. delegation in Geneva which had put the Washington agreement in question. THE SECRETARY pointed out that Carlucci had been the author of the language which had been agreed to in Washington. SHEVARDNADZE said he remembered; it had been good language. THE SECRETARY asked Carlucci to review the language in question.

CARLUCCI read the following paragraph, taken from the Washington NST working group's report to ministers:

"Prior to the process of eliminating INF ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons and guidance systems will be removed from reentry vehicles. The remaining reentry vehicle structure will then be eliminated under agreed procedures. Such procedures should apply to all residual reentry vehicles, including those which by unilateral decision have been released from existing programs of cooperation. The protocol on elimination should reflect these procedures."

Carlucci noted that the ministers had then discussed the question of timing. This led to agreement on the following additional language—subsequently incorporated into the working group report, which Carlucci also read:

"When reentry vehicles for FRG Pershing 1a missiles are withdrawn, they become U.S. reentry vehicles not associated with an existing pattern of cooperation, and therefore will be subjected to the same elimination procedure and timeframe for final elimination as for reentry vehicles removed from U.S. and Soviet INF ballistic missiles."

Carlucci noted that, as best the U.S. could understand, subsequent confusion had arisen with respect to how the agreed language should be included in the INF Treaty. He asked Shevardnadze to clarify that point.

SHEVARDNADZE said the Soviet side had also thought the P-1a problem had been solved in Washington. He also had a copy of the agreed text. He recalled that he had insisted in Washington that the language in question be included in the Treaty. The ministers had subsequently agreed that it could be incorporated into a protocol to the Treaty. CARLUCCI acknowledged that this was correct.

Noting that Carlucci had correctly stated the language agreed to, SHEVARDNADZE read aloud the Russian version of the second passage that Carlucci had read, emphasizing the phrase "in the same timeframe for final elimination as for reentry vehicles removed from U.S. and Soviet INF ballistic missiles." This point, i.e., "the same timeframe", was fundamental, Shevardnadze said.

CARLUCCI said that it appeared that the problem had arisen when the lawyers in Geneva had sought to reduce the working group report to legally binding language, specifically in Article 8 of the Treaty. While the U.S. felt that the Soviet concerns should have been met by the



language we had proposed in Geneva, Carlucci said we would be prepared to add a passage which would read as follows:

“When such reentry vehicles are released from programs of cooperation, they shall be withdrawn and eliminated no later than the same day that the last U.S. and Soviet LRINF reentry vehicles are eliminated under the agreed schedule of reductions.”

CARLUCCI said that he felt that this language should meet the concerns Shevardnadze had expressed.

THE SECRETARY said that, as in Washington, the U.S. was prepared to address Soviet concerns that Moscow not be faced with a situation in which the FRG retained some INF nuclear missiles and the Soviet Union had none. The statement that Carlucci had read should make clear that, physically, this could not be the case.

A conversation between Shevardnadze and Bessmertnykh ensued, at the conclusion of which BESSMERTNYKH noted that the final statement Carlucci had read did not appear to apply to SRINF. CARLUCCI and RIDGWAY confirmed this.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet side would consider Carlucci's suggestion. The key to any solution was a destruction schedule which took into account both sides' interests. From Moscow's standpoint, it appeared that there were two possibilities:

—First, the two sides could destroy a portion of warheads for shorter range missiles during the final six months of the destruction period. This portion could be from 80–100 units. A variant of this approach would be to consider an elimination timetable for these 80–100 warheads which could change, within the overall INF elimination period, depending on the time in which the U.S. withdrew and destroyed its warheads for the FRG Pershing 1a's.

—A second possibility would be a schedule of reductions in accordance with which U.S. and Soviet longer-range and shorter-range INF missiles were destroyed, for example, 10 to 15 days prior to the end of the overall elimination period. In the course of this final week and a half to two weeks, American warheads for the Pershing 1a's would be withdrawn from the FRG.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that the final alternative seemed to have elements in common with the suggestion Carlucci had made. It presupposed, however, a common timeframe for both longer and shorter range INF missiles. Shevardnadze suggested that the problem be turned over to experts for further work. There were several variants now on the table. All appeared to be consistent with the Washington agreement on P-1a's. The experts should be instructed to report back to ministers by the end of the day.

DOBRYNIN emphasized that the Soviet proposal covered missiles in both range bands.

BESSMERTNYKH asked to set the record straight on some aspects of what had been agreed to in Washington. The Washington discussion had covered two main areas: procedural questions relating to eliminating warheads, which, Bessmertnykh emphasized, applied to *all* U.S. and Soviet warheads; and the timeframe issue, which also applied to all warheads, including those on FRG P-1a's. Bessmertnykh had tried to make clear in Washington that a situation could not arise in which U.S. warheads on FRG P-1a's remained undestroyed even one or two days after the elimination of the last Soviet INF warheads.

THE SECRETARY said he understood that. For that reason, he and Carlucci had been careful in Washington to emphasize Chancellor Kohl's use of the word "with" in describing the U.S. position. That term provided the flexibility necessary to handle the problem. CARLUCCI noted that we interpreted the term to connote "simultaneity."

On the question of the "mix" of shorter- and longer-range systems, the Secretary noted that this point had been addressed at length during his April visit to Moscow, when he had emphasized the importance of a U.S. "right to match" Soviet shorter-range missiles. We had understood the General Secretary's offer to eliminate such missiles within a year to respond to this concern. The U.S. had an inventory of P-1a's in the continental U.S. which had once been in the FRG. We had agreed that they would be destroyed under an INF agreement. We were prepared to forego the right to redeploy them and "undeploy" them later on the understanding that all Soviet SRINF missiles would be gone in a year. That point needed to be emphasized.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the point at issue was the question of a timeframe. That was what had to be defined. Suggestions had been made by both sides. He suggested that experts be set to work. BESSMERTNYKH observed that the need for a combined time frame for longer- and shorter-range missiles stemmed from the fact that a certain number of U.S. warheads for shorter-range systems would remain until the very end.

THE SECRETARY urged that, in trying to resolve the P-1a problem, elements which had previously been worked out not be rearranged. The one-year time frame previously accepted for shorter-range missiles applied to warheads for those U.S. P-1a's now in the continental U.S. We had no desire to redeploy these missiles; they would be destroyed in the first year.

SHEVARDNADZE pointed out that one of the proposals he had just read would permit a certain number of U.S. and Soviet missiles (sic) to remain until the end. The provision for an additional 10–15 days for dealing with U.S. warheads on FRG Pershings should enable the two sides to reach a mutually acceptable solution.

CARLUCCI asked for a clarification of the new Soviet proposals. Did he understand correctly that a portion of the warheads for shorter-

range missiles—from 80 to 100—would be left for a final round of destruction? Did he understand further that the schedule for elimination of the remaining 80–100 reentry vehicles could change, depending on what happened to longer-range missiles?

SHEVARDNADZE said there would be a joint schedule.

CARLUCCI indicated that he had asked the question because it was important for the Soviets to understand that we could not accept a formula which would equate FRG P-1a's with Soviet and U.S. INF missiles. DOBRYNIN said that the Soviet proposal was consistent with the Kohl statement.

THE SECRETARY said that he remained concerned about the "mix" of the reduction schedule. Perhaps the U.S. could reserve a certain number of its P-1a's in the U.S. as a counterpart for Soviet shorter-range missiles retained until the end of the process.

BESSMERTNYKH said the problem was not how the missiles involved were labeled. SHEVARDNADZE emphasized that the main portion of the shorter-range missiles would be destroyed in the first year-and-a-half. But, if the U.S. felt constrained by the Kohl statement, the Soviets would have to leave a certain number of their own warheads—perhaps 80–100—until the end.

THE SECRETARY asked if the Soviet proposal envisaged retention of a certain number of U.S. P-1a's in the U.S. as well. BESSMERTNYKH repeated that terminology was not important; numbers were. There were 72 U.S. warheads on FRG Pershings. The U.S. also had SRINF systems in the U.S.

CARLUCCI asked if that meant that the Soviets envisaged that there would be U.S. SRINF in the U.S. until the end. DOBRYNIN and BESSMERTNYKH said that this could be the case, up to the agreed limit. CARLUCCI said that, as long as it was clear that there could be no one-for-one trade-off of Soviet for FRG missiles, something might be worked out along these lines. BESSMERTNYKH said that was why the Soviet proposal used a number larger than 72. THE SECRETARY suggested that the subject be given to experts to be worked over during lunch.

The meeting ended without further discussion.

81. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, October 22, 1987, 3:30–5:30 p.m.

## SUBJECTS

INF; START; Defense and Space

## PARTICIPANTS

<i>US</i>	<i>USSR</i>
The Secretary	Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
National Security Advisor Carlucci	CPSU Secretary Dobrynin
Asst. Sec. Ridgway	Deputy ForMin Bessmertnykh
EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)	Shevardnadze Advisor Tarasenko
Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)	(Notetaker)
	Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

THE SECRETARY said he would like to open by making a few points on INF.

On the question of the phasing of destruction, the Secretary said the U.S. could accept the Soviet formula that equality between the two sides' forces would be reached at 150 warheads 70% of the way through the process. The U.S. believed that LRINF reductions should be completed in three years. SRINF would be destroyed within a single year, with some minor exceptions, were the formulation proposed by the Soviet side that morning to be accepted. In the context of a three-year destruction schedule, the U.S. would be prepared, to agree that a limited number of missiles could be destroyed by launching within a specific, limited period—perhaps six months after entry into force of a Treaty. There would, of course, be myriad details to be worked out under such an approach, e.g., spares, etc. But if the Soviet side could accept the limitations he had described, the Secretary said, the U.S. could go along.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that the original Soviet proposal had been that LRINF missiles be destroyed in five years; the U.S. had called for a three-year destruction period. The Soviet side had now reached the conclusion, however, that its LRINF missiles could in fact be destroyed in three years by detonation. If the U.S. were prepared to accept some launches to destroy as well, it would make it easier to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow/Washington Oct. 1987. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the Guesthouse of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

complete destruction within that timeframe. So that seemed to take care of one outstanding issue.

With respect to SRINF, the original Soviet proposal had been for destruction within a year. Subsequently, Soviet experts had concluded that at least 18 months would be necessary to complete the task. The Soviet side was nonetheless prepared to destroy all SRINF in less time if it should later be established that this was feasible. But for the moment, 18 months seemed an irreducible minimum.

THE SECRETARY suggested that it might be possible to agree that SRINF destruction should take no more than 18 months, or in 12 if that proved technically feasible. SHEVARDNADZE said that he could agree to a 3 years/18 months framework for LRINF/SRINF destruction. THE SECRETARY said that this was acceptable, with the proviso that SRINF would be destroyed in 12 months if it proved to be technically feasible.

CARLUCCI reiterated that the formulation the Soviets had proposed before lunch for dealing with the P-1a problem implied some exceptions to this general rule. SHEVARDNADZE confirmed this.

Moving to a new subject, THE SECRETARY recounted Ambassador Glitman's assessment that the structure of brackets which had emerged in the context of drafting the INF Treaty was such that the resolution of certain key issues would allow whole clusters of brackets to fall away. Perhaps the most serious group of remaining issues had to do with verification. It was probably not for the ministers themselves to resolve these issues, but they should seek to give their experts a push so that it would be possible to get through the massive amount of detailed work which had to be done.

CARLUCCI added that there were certain areas, e.g., exceptions to suspect site inspections, where the two sides should focus their efforts. He suggested that working groups be told to work on such problems even as the ministers continued their discussions, and into the night if necessary.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed to this approach. But he wanted to raise another issue at this time—noncircumvention. The Soviet side attached great importance to this problem, as, he was sure, did the American side. Differences in this regard had been narrowed, but assurances were still needed that the Treaty would be complied with, particularly regarding the non-transfer to third countries of types of missiles covered by the accord. The U.S. had proposed language affirming that neither side would do anything inconsistent with the Treaty. Perhaps a way could be found to bring the two approaches together in a way which met the concerns of both sides.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the subject was best handled by working groups. The U.S. was concerned about overly vague language

which could be mischievously interpreted at a later date. Experience suggested those concerns were not exaggerated. So experts should wrestle with the problem, and come up with language which was not overly general. SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed, but on the clear understanding that there should be no transfers of INF missiles to third countries. THE SECRETARY said that the more specific the language involved, the better.

CARLUCCI suggested that the INF working group should be briefed on the ministers' discussion. It was pointed out that the experts would be convening at 4:30.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that there had been some difficulty in Geneva with respect to the exchange of data on INF. To overcome those difficulties, he proposed that the two sides agree to exchange data on LRINF and SRINF launchers and warheads "now." The Soviet side was prepared to provide its data "even today or tomorrow."

THE SECRETARY welcomed this, noting that the last thing either side wanted was a surprise on data late in the game. He agreed that there should be an early exchange, in Moscow if possible.

DOBRYNIN emphasized that the Soviet side was ready to exchange aggregate data in the areas Shevardnadze had specified immediately, on a reciprocal basis. As for other data, it could be exchanged prior to signature of the Treaty. THE SECRETARY agreed.

SHEVARDNADZE asked if verification issues should be taken up by the ministers or their working groups. THE SECRETARY said that the ministers should lean on working groups to ensure they gave these issues top priority. If the overall groups found themselves trying to do too much, perhaps it would be possible to break off those members most familiar with verification to address outstanding problems on an *ad ref* basis.

SHEVARDNADZE asked if the Secretary was proposing the formation of a verification sub-group. THE SECRETARY said that this might be a way of telling the working groups to focus on verification. CARLUCCI said that he would advise Nitze that a verification sub-group should be established. Urging that they intensify efforts to reach compromise solutions, SHEVARDNADZE agreed that experts should intensify their discussion of verification.

Following a brief exchange on SS-24/25 production/assembly inspection and the difficulties of SLCM/GLCM verification, THE SECRETARY suggested that these issues also be referred to experts. SHEVARDNADZE agreed, noting that the experts had to consider a daunting range of problems: inspections of missile destruction; non-circumvention; inspections of initial data exchange; inspections of final assembly points for ballistic missiles and GLCM's; procedures for the destruction

of warheads and of INF subsidiary structures. They would need adequate authority to satisfactorily address them all.

CARLUCCI noted that the U.S. team had been given instructions to enable them to address the questions Shevardnadze had raised. If the Soviet side did as well, progress should be possible. SHEVARDNADZE said this was good.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the discussion return to the question of Pershing 1a's, and handed over a U.S. draft responding to the "alternatives" presented by Shevardnadze during the morning session. The text read as follows:

The United States and the Soviet Union agree that all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and their associated reentry vehicles will be eliminated within an agreed overall period of elimination. It is further agreed that all such missiles will, in fact, be eliminated fifteen days prior to the end of the overall period of elimination. During the last fifteen days, a party shall withdraw to national territory reentry vehicles which, by unilateral decision, have been released from existing programs of cooperation. Subsequently, these reentry vehicles would be eliminated using agreed procedures.

SHEVARDNADZE sought confirmation that this was U.S. language which had not been agreed to by Soviet experts.

A discussion of the text ensued, during the course of which BESSMERTNYKH expressed concern that the U.S. language did not make sufficiently explicit the link between the withdrawal and elimination of reentry vehicles, or the relationship between these actions and the concept of a single time frame. After checking with the Secretary, CARLUCCI passed Bessmertnykh a new draft, identical to the original except for the substitution of the final two sentences by the following single sentence:

During the last fifteen days, a party shall withdraw to national territory reentry vehicles which, by unilateral decision, have been released from existing programs of cooperation and eliminate them during the same time frame using agreed procedures.

On reading the revision, BESSMERTNYKH nodded and explained the significance of the change to Shevardnadze. SHEVARDNADZE agreed "tentatively" to the new draft, but suggested that experts study it in more detail. THE SECRETARY expressed the hope that the agreement which had just been reached would put an end to the P-1a issue.

CARLUCCI undertook to brief the working group on the results of the ministers' conversation, and to set experts to work on the verification issues Shevardnadze had listed. In response to SHEVARDNADZE's comment that solutions on some of these points should be possible, CARLUCCI said that the experts should work on them all night if necessary.



SHEVARDNADZE said that, before leaving INF, he wished to touch on something he found disturbing—increasing talk of “compensation” as the prospect of a Treaty became more concrete. Shevardnadze said he wanted to make clear that if the U.S. were to start an arms race in another area it should know—and the U.S. military should know—that the Soviet side would respond. Moscow did not want this. If the U.S. saw the Soviet Union acting in a way which caused it concern, it should raise the problem. But nothing should be allowed to undermine the progress which an INF Treaty would set in motion.

THE SECRETARY cautioned that there was a strong and natural desire on both sides to seek the strongest possible deterrent within the framework of whatever rules were agreed to. This was a natural, ongoing process. We viewed an INF Treaty as of great importance, but as only one part of a broader pattern. It would be necessary to address more directly areas beyond INF—notably strategic arms—to affect that pattern. Treaties were important because they set parameters. Where activities were not bound by agreements, however, neither side could expect the other not to continue the process of military development. The Secretary said he could see why the Soviet side might find “compensation” a provocative word, but it simply described a process which would go forward in the absence of formal restraints.

SHEVARDNADZE protested that it was wrong to open a discussion of how to “compensate” for limitations established by a treaty at the very moment that the treaty was being completed. He concurred with the Secretary’s suggestion that the conclusion of an INF Treaty underscored the importance of parallel work on strategic and other arms.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed with that, pointing out, however, that the debate could lead to different conclusions. In the wake of a INF Treaty, for example, something would have to be done about the conventional imbalance in Europe. If it were impossible to negotiate a more balanced situation—and the experience of MBFR did not inspire confidence—then we would have to correct the balance. That was why it was important to agree on a mandate for conventional stability talks in Vienna and get talks underway.

The history of strategic arms negotiations was also enlightening in this regard. Initially, the focus had been on limiting launchers. But then MIRV’s had been developed, and the problem had to be rethought. Now both sides had agreed on the concept of counting not just launchers, but other variables as well. But those things which were not controlled would be worked on, as they had in the past. All of this, the Secretary concluded, reinforced the importance of a comprehensive approach.

SHEVARDNADZE expressed concern that the pace of weapons development generally exceeded that of negotiations. It was thus



important to avoid new rounds of the arms race whenever possible. This implied the need for close involvement of the military on both sides.

As to the question of conventional imbalances in Europe, it would be good to discuss this question both multilaterally and bilaterally. The Soviet side viewed the mandate discussions in Vienna as important. It had also encouraged direct contacts between Ministries of Defense to discuss doctrinal questions which, after all, were the basis for “everything” in the military field.

[At this point Carlucci, who had left fifteen minutes before to brief the U.S. working group, returned.]

CARLUCCI said that the Soviet side was typing up the Russian version of the text which had been agreed to. BESSMERTNYKH asked if the Secretary would need to phone the President. THE SECRETARY said that he would want to tell the President that the discussion was going well.<sup>2</sup>

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet side shared that view. He added that it appeared the ministers had done what they could on INF. Did the Secretary wish to move on to strategic arms?

THE SECRETARY said that he was prepared to make a few preliminary remarks to set the stage.

His starting point was that final decisions with respect to strategic arms and related issues would have to be made by the two countries’ leaders. But the ministers and delegations in Geneva could lay the groundwork for a fruitful discussion at the summit.

Beyond that was the problem of verification, which would be extraordinarily difficult—much more so than in INF. This was essentially a job for the delegations, but the ministers should not ignore it at their level. A good INF agreement would whet appetites for progress in START, and perhaps open up avenues for creative work. It was a fact that an INF agreement alone would be of much less significance than if coupled with a START agreement.

The Secretary recalled that General Secretary Gorbachev had referred to strategic arms as the “root problem,” and that he had suggested that it might be possible to conclude a START agreement by the following spring. The U.S. agreed, and was prepared to work to make it possible to present a signed treaty to the Senate for ratification in 1988. The Secretary noted that the breakthroughs made in Reykjavik and subsequent moves by both sides had established the basic foundations for a START agreement: a 6,000 warhead limit, a 1,600 launcher

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<sup>2</sup> Following this meeting, Shultz spoke on a secure voice line to Reagan from 10:55 to 11:00 a.m. Washington time. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Dairy)

limit, and a bomber counting rule. The main outstanding elements were sublimits and mobile missiles. Were these resolved, there would be agreement on the basic numbers.

In more specific terms, the Secretary noted that both sides shared the basic concept of a triad in structuring their strategic forces. The U.S., for its part, considered it important that a certain minimum percentage of nuclear weapons be devoted to air-breathing delivery systems. In that context, we had noted past suggestions by the Soviet side that it would be prepared to limit ballistic missile warheads to 80% of overall aggregates, since this implied that the remaining 20% would be reserved for air-borne systems. As applied to the 6,000 warhead limit agreed to in Reykjavik, the Soviet 80% figure would come out to 4,800. If the Soviet side were prepared to accept such an outcome, it would be a major step forward.

The Secretary noted that other possible sublimits could also be considered to regulate other elements of the triad. Shevardnadze had expressed in Washington the Soviet side's willingness to agree that no more than 60%—or 3,600—warheads should be on any single leg of the triad. For its part, the U.S. had proposed that ICBM warheads should be limited to 3,300 because of the qualitative differences between ICBM's and other types of launchers. The U.S. was prepared to go to 3,600, but was not prepared to apply such a limit to both ICBM's and SLBM's, so that was another point of difference between the two sides.

The Secretary noted that the U.S. had also called for a 1,650 warhead limit on heavy and highly fractionated missiles, and believed this to be a reasonable proposal. The U.S. knew of the heavy investment that the Soviet Union had made in mobile ICBM's and was prepared to consider means of taking that into account. There was much to be said for mobile missiles, which, because of their survivability, tended to enhance stability. But we had wracked our brain to come up with a means of verifying any limits which might be agreed to. The Secretary suggested that an intensive effort be made to come up with solutions to this problem before the President and Gorbachev met.

Noting that he had not mentioned other outstanding differences, the Secretary briefly summarized his understanding of where things stood in the strategic arms talks: much had been accomplished as a result of the Reykjavik meeting; the U.S. considered the 4,800 limit a necessity; the 3,300 or 60% limitation should be applied only to ICBM's because of the qualitative difference between them and SLBM's; even with the 1,540 limit, it was desirable to concentrate efforts on particularly destabilizing weapons systems; there was a need to pin down 50% throwweight reductions; there was much to be done on verification in general, and on mobile missiles in particular. So that was the U.S. view of the state of play on START, and the Secretary's assessment of what needed to be decided at a political level.

In response to the Secretary's query as to whether he had anything to add, CARLUCCI said it would be good to have Shevardnadze's views on START.

SHEVARDNADZE said he shared the Secretary's view that there had been progress in the strategic arms area since Reykjavik. The fact that both sides were working from a joint draft treaty was itself a step forward. There had indeed been movement during Shevardnadze's Washington visit—notably the Soviet agreement to a 60% warhead limit on any leg of the triad. But, in anticipation of the Secretary's meeting with the General Secretary the next day, what were the main obstacles to further breakthroughs?

Shevardnadze said that he did not intend to get into a detailed discussion of numbers. Gorbachev would do that the next day. Rather, Shevardnadze wanted to call the Secretary's attention to some frankly discouraging factors.

Shevardnadze said that the progress which had been achieved since Reykjavik had been undermined to a significant degree by certain artificial obstacles erected by the U.S. delegation in Geneva. He complained specifically about the U.S. approach to ICBM's which, he said, struck the Soviet side as designed to eliminate all heavy missiles. He also objected to the U.S. insistence upon a mobile ICBM ban, insisting that a combination of national technical means and cooperative measures should be sufficient to overcome verification problems. Nor could Shevardnadze understand why the Backfire bomber question, which had been resolved in SALT II, should have been revived. There were also problems with respect to U.S. demands on counting rules and definitions. All these complications had appeared after the Reykjavik meeting, apparently with the purpose of making it more difficult to conclude a treaty. If the U.S. were serious about achieving 50% reductions, they should be dropped.

An even more difficult problem, Shevardnadze noted, had to do with the ABM Treaty and its relationship to any agreement on strategic arms. If the U.S. was prepared to agree that the ABM Treaty would remain operative, 50% reductions were possible; but if the U.S. insisted upon the "broad interpretation," it was another matter.

In Washington, the Secretary had noted that there were areas of overlap in the two sides' positions on the ABM Treaty. This was true and to some degree encouraging. The Soviet side was trying to be creative in its approach to the problem. It had dropped the terms of its insistence on a non-withdrawal pledge from twenty to ten years. But ten was a minimum. Similarly, Moscow had clarified its position on laboratory research in order to move closer to the U.S. position. If the ABM Treaty were observed and there were agreement to ten years of non-withdrawal, the Soviet side could accept a broad interpretation of the word "research."

On the important definitional issue, the Soviets had also sought to find a means of reaching a mutual understanding—their proposal to develop lists of devices to be banned from outer space if they exceeded certain agreed parameters. Shevardnadze said he understood there had been some misunderstanding in Geneva of the Soviet position. He reaffirmed his Washington offer remained fully in effect: whatever was not expressly banned under the agreed parameters would be permitted.

Perhaps, Shevardnadze suggested, the confusion in Geneva stemmed from the complexity of the Soviet “parameters” proposal. In that case, the Soviet side was prepared to accept a simple obligation to observe for ten years the Treaty as signed and interpreted in 1972. Were it necessary to clarify certain points, the Standing Consultative Committee—reinvigorated as necessary by, for example, the participation of Ministers of Defense—could do so.

Shevardnadze noted that there was a broader problem as well. The Secretary had spoken of a summit. The two sides had agreed it would take place that fall. It was clear that an INF agreement would be available for the signing. But what would be the basis for further high-level contacts? The next task was to find points of convergence on START and related issues. If there were greater clarity on the role of the ABM Treaty, it would be possible to return to the idea of a key provisions agreement which could be signed at a fall summit and serve as the basis for a full-scale treaty to be signed at a second summit in 1988.

As to the Secretary’s remarks on sublimits, Shevardnadze repeated that the General Secretary would be prepared to address them the following day. Shevardnadze reaffirmed that Gorbachev viewed strategic arms as a “pivotal” problem, and urged that the Secretary be prepared in his discussion with the General Secretary to address the ABM Treaty and those artificial obstacles to concluding a START agreement which had arisen since Reykjavik. Shevardnadze then read what he described as excerpts from past conversations with the Secretary, in which the Secretary had spoken favorably of bridging the two sides’ positions on the ABM Treaty.

After asking for the floor, CARLUCCI noted that the U.S. did not accept the validity of any linkage between the ABM Treaty and a START agreement, but asked for a clarification of the Soviet position on ABM observance. Both sides agreed that the Treaty banned the deployment of prohibited systems. The U.S. view was that space-based systems based on other physical principles could be developed and tested. What was the Soviet position on this point?

SHEVARDNADZE replied that the ABM Treaty banned the testing, development and deployment of space-based ABM systems. But the Soviet parameter proposal was an attempt to begin a serious scientific discussion of the issue Carlucci had raised. Why was the U.S. avoiding such a discussion?

CARLUCCI responded that, if the Soviet objective was to achieve greater predictability with respect to deployment, the U.S. could probably accommodate that desire. If, on the other hand, the objective was to place constraints on the development of SDI, that was something else.

SHEVARDNADZE reiterated that the Soviet side had itself taken important steps to accommodate the U.S. position: on the definition for laboratories; in proposing a discussion of parameters below which activities in space would be permitted. There had been no U.S. response.

THE SECRETARY said that he wanted to make only a few points in the interest of time. First, it appeared that both sides agreed that START delegations should focus their attention on verification questions, with the Soviet side to provide ideas on how to verify mobile ICBM's. The objective should be to achieve sufficient progress so that the two leaders could have an informed discussion of these issues at their meeting.

With respect to the ABM Treaty, the Secretary understood the Soviet position, as articulated by Shevardnadze in their September meeting to consist of the following elements: (a) a ten-year pledge not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, defined as observance of the "narrow" interpretation of the Treaty; and (b) the Soviet "list" proposal, which the U.S. took to permit testing in space within certain limits.

SHEVARDNADZE replied, with respect to the list proposal, that any activity below agreed thresholds would be considered to be permitted. He noted, however, that those thresholds had not yet been defined.

The meeting concluded with Shevardnadze's observation that it had been a good one, and that the ministers would reconvene that evening at 8:00.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> The meeting reconvened at 9 p.m.; see Document 82.

82. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, October 22, 1987, 9–11:45 p.m.

## SUBJECTS

Gomel radar, Hawaiian missile test, Embassy demonstration, SLCM limits, CW, conventional arms mandate, Murmansk proposals, regional issues (Cambodia, Korea, Southern Africa, Central America, Iran-Iraq war)

## PARTICIPANTS

<i>US</i>	<i>USSR</i>
The Secretary	Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
National Security Advisor Carlucci	CPSU Secretary Dobrynin
Asst. Sec. Ridgway	Deputy ForMin Bessmertnykh
EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)	Shevardnadze Advisor Tarasenko
Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)	(Notetaker)
	Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

SHEVARDNADZE opened the meeting by noting that working groups were continuing to work on arms control questions, particularly INF. Agreement had been reached on language to cover the Pershing 1a problem. It might be useful for the ministers to hear a report later, but not at this time.

THE SECRETARY acknowledged that there was agreement on P-1a language. Agreement had also been reached during the ministers' afternoon session<sup>2</sup> on the phasing of the elimination of missiles, although a few points remained to be worked out.

There were also a number of verification issues to be dealt with. Referring to a note that Carlucci had just passed him, the Secretary suggested that the working groups be told they should work all night, if necessary, to resolve as many such issues as possible. He was inclined to agree with the suggestion, since it was more likely that the experts would produce results under such circumstances. So, the Secretary suggested, perhaps the ministers could let INF stew in its juices and review the experts' work the next morning.

CARLUCCI interjected that it was important that verification issues be handled right, or it would come back to haunt both sides.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed, but wondered if it might not be useful for the ministers to share their sense of where the main differences lay

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow/Washington Oct. 1987. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in the Guesthouse of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 81.

on verification. CARLUCCI responded that the issues involved, e.g., procedures for inspection of suspect sites, were technical and probably not worthy of the ministers' attention. What was needed was to tell the experts to solve the problems and refer those they could not to the ministers. SHEVARDNADZE agreed to that approach, and to the suggestion that the ministers should receive reports the next morning.

THE SECRETARY asked whether there should be joint reports, or whether the ministers should be briefed separately by their experts. Perhaps separate reports, which could then be reviewed in a joint session after a meeting with the General Secretary, were the way to go. SHEVARDNADZE said he thought it would be best to have a clear picture before the meeting with the General Secretary, and proposed a half-hour meeting beginning at 9:30 the next morning.<sup>3</sup> THE SECRETARY agreed, and asked Carlucci to inform working groups of the ministers' decision.

The Secretary asked Shevardnadze if he could quickly touch on a few unrelated issues.

First, he wanted to call the Foreign Minister's attention to a recent Soviet missile test which was supposed to have overflowed the Hawaiian Islands. This was the sort of thing which didn't help as the two sides sought to deal with important issues.

Second, the Secretary advised Shevardnadze that the U.S. had raised in the Standing Consultative Committee (SCC) in Geneva the question of the Soviet radar located at Gomel.<sup>4</sup> We had as yet received no answer. This was the kind of issue which raised serious questions in the areas of compliance and verification, and the Secretary urged a prompt and constructive Soviet response.

Finally, the Secretary referred to an incident that afternoon in which Soviet citizens had been beaten and seized in front of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. He wanted to register officially our objections to the Soviet authorities' handling of the matter.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that he had no information on the Embassy incident. It would be looked into, but if there had been a violation of Soviet law; the perpetrators would answer for it.

As for the missile test the Secretary had referred to, the trajectories involved did not go over Hawaii. They terminated 900 kilometres to the north of the Islands.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 83.

<sup>4</sup> Reported on in telegram 10962 from Geneva, October 15. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870848–0686) Shevardnadze's response is in following paragraphs.



THE SECRETARY reminded Shevardnadze that the announcement of the test series had given coordinates which would have involved an overflight of Hawaii. CARLUCCI pointed out that the test could complicate ratification of an INF Treaty; he was confident of ratification, but incidents like the test did not help. DOBRYNIN said that the splashdown had been a long way from Hawaii. CARLUCCI replied that it had gotten closer with each conservative Senator who stood up to denounce it.

SHEVARDNADZE, now reading from prepared papers, affirmed that the test had been conducted in accordance with standard procedures, and that there had been no violations of "the rules." Moscow had given the required three days' notification to all concerned. No objections had been raised, and reentry had been 900 km from Hawaii.

THE SECRETARY acknowledged that the facts Shevardnadze had recited were correct, but added that the announcement in question indicated that the trajectory extended over Hawaii. The U.S. was not charging that anything "illegal" had occurred.

SHEVARDNADZE took the point, suggesting that in the future both sides be careful about test launches. The SECRETARY said he thought that a good idea.

On the Gomel radar, SHEVARDNADZE, again reading from a paper, told the Secretary that a detailed response to the U.S. query had been given the day before in the SCC. Perhaps it had not caught up with the Secretary because of his train trip.

The substance of the Soviet reply, Shevardnadze continued, was that the radar previously located at Shary Shagan was not an ABM radar. In any case, when the facility had been dismantled and physically destroyed, the U.S. had been informed. One of the vans associated with the radar had been given to an industrial enterprise located in Gomel, and this was probably what U.S. national technical means had detected. An second radar had been destroyed along with its van; a third van had been transferred to Moscow. The Soviet side would be prepared to show U.S. inspectors the vans in Moscow or Gomel to satisfy their concerns.

As for allegations that a large radar had been set up at Gomel, Shevardnadze indicated that some components of the dismantled Shary Shagan facility—notably a rotating device and the van he had mentioned—had been transferred to Gomel. But the van had been stripped of its associated equipment consistent with ABM Treaty requirements. Shevardnadze reiterated the Soviet side's readiness to show the vans in Moscow and Gomel to U.S. inspectors.

After confirming that the information Shevardnadze had just provided had also been conveyed to the U.S. SCC delegation, the SECRETARY said we would follow up there.



SHEVARDNADZE took the opportunity to express dissatisfaction with the operation of the SCC in recent years. It did not work like the ministers worked. The Soviet side had proposed that Defense Ministers become involved in the Committee's operations to remedy the problem, but that had not worked out. Perhaps the ministers should instruct their own deputies to look into the matter. For his part, Shevardnadze would be prepared to assign Bessmertnykh the task.

Noting that the U.S. had in the past raised the Krasnoyarsk radar in the SCC, Shevardnadze pointed to the recent Soviet decision to allow U.S. congressmen to visit the site as evidence of Moscow's desire to "solve" the problem. Perhaps, Shevardnadze suggested, Deputy Foreign Ministers could look into this matter as well and develop proposals for resolving it before a summit.

CARLUCCI noted that, in the context of the INF Treaty, the two sides were looking at alternatives to the SCC to deal with compliance questions. The basic idea was for a senior group which could be convened on an *ad hoc* basis, rather than a permanent body. DOBRYNIN said that that was exactly what the Minister was proposing for the issues he had mentioned. CARLUCCI said the U.S. was not happy with the SCC either. THE SECRETARY said that this was something the two sides could consider. SHEVARDNADZE said that the notion should be put on the agenda and, if possible, resolved.

Moving on to strategic arms matters, Shevardnadze said he had an item to raise which had not been covered in the afternoon discussion—specifically, sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM's). At the Reykjavik meeting, he recalled, the problem had been discussed at length. Ultimately, the Soviet side had agreed to separate out the issue, but only on the understanding that agreement would subsequently be reached on numerical limits for SLCM's. The Soviet side was aware of U.S. arguments with respect to verification, but did not believe the issues involved to be insoluble.

But the first step, Shevardnadze believed, was to define a SLCM ceiling. Moscow proposed 400. Once this was done, means could be found to verify compliance. Shevardnadze said he could tell the Secretary informally that Soviet scientists had some ideas on the subject that they would soon be in a position to share.

THE SECRETARY said that it was the U.S. sense that verification of SLCM's was not possible. The fact that it was impossible to distinguish between nuclear and conventional warheads on ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM's) had led us to the reluctant conclusion that all GLCM's should be banned. We were nonetheless willing to listen to Soviet ideas.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, in addition to the ideas being developed by Soviet scientists, another approach might be to limit the num-

ber of submarines capable of carrying SLCM's. It was possible to determine the number of SLCM's each vessel could carry. But scientists could also get together to share ideas on how to resolve the problem. Resolution of the SLCM issue, Shevardnadze emphasized, was particularly important in the context of 50% reductions. THE SECRETARY said the U.S. was prepared to work at the problem. SHEVARDNADZE suggested it be turned over to experts.

THE SECRETARY commented that the experts should give priority attention to the verification of the more basic ingredients of a START agreement, notably mobile missiles. If the Soviet side had ideas on that subject before a summit, the U.S. would be particularly interested. SHEVARDNADZE agreed that experts should also address that issue.

The Foreign Minister next raised nuclear testing, noting that there appeared to be progress in getting negotiations on that subject underway. He suggested that the ministers hear a report from experts at some point. THE SECRETARY said it was his impression that work on that subject was well in hand.

With respect to chemical weapons, SHEVARDNADZE remarked that experts appeared to be discussing some specific ideas, and proposed that ministers hear a report the next day. THE SECRETARY agreed, commenting favorably on the progress which had recently been made in the Geneva CW negotiations. But as differences narrowed, the importance of ensuring that any agreement would adequately cope with the formidable dangers presented by chemical weapons and their proliferation became clearer and clearer. To do the job right would not be easy.

SHEVARDNADZE observed that, the longer the conclusion of a convention on a global ban was put off, the harder it became to deal with the problem. He suggested that "some ideas" be prepared by experts for adoption at a summit, since the two leaders had addressed chemical weapons when they met in Geneva.

THE SECRETARY agreed that the effort could be made, but emphasized the difficulty of the issues involved. It was not just a matter of the U.S. and the Soviet Union; verification provisions would have to apply to the whole world.

DOBRYNIN said that as much as possible should be prepared for a summit. CARLUCCI pointed out that, while we might be able adequately to verify compliance in the U.S. and Soviet Union, under a global ban it would be necessary to be able to go into every corner of the planet. SHEVARDNADZE said on-site inspection could handle that. The Soviet Union was not afraid. CARLUCCI said the U.S. wasn't either. SHEVARDNADZE acknowledged that more than just the U.S. and Soviet Union were involved. But cooperation between the two could have a tremendous impact.

THE SECRETARY agreed that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had to show leadership on CW if anything were to be accomplished. The most threatening aspect of the problem, of course, was the dispersion of the capability to produce CW. This was what had to be addressed, but the more one worked on the problem, the greater the difficulties involved appeared to be. The Secretary said he did not want to sound discouraging, but only wanted to be realistic. He proposed that the ministers listen to what their experts had to say. He could tell Shevardnadze that much work was being done in the U.S. on the problems he had mentioned as prospects of agreement on a convention grew.

SHEVARDNADZE welcomed the Secretary's statement. He noted that, if the sentiments the Secretary had expressed were added to statements by U.S. allies in favor of early conclusion of a convention, there was a good chance of achieving that objective.

Shevardnadze noted, however, that the U.S. binary program was still on the agenda. THE SECRETARY pointed out that the Soviet Union also had CW, adding that replacement of U.S. stocks by binaries would create a safer situation than the present one. SHEVARDNADZE said he did not understand why, if there was agreement that all CW should be destroyed, new weapons should be created. Binaries did not worry the Soviet Union from a military standpoint. CARLUCCI interjected that that was because Soviet forces had more modern stockpiles.

SHEVARDNADZE acknowledged that the Soviet Union had in the past produced CW. What did Carlucci want, that it should now be placed before the International Court? Moscow had ceased production. It was not proposing to destroy all CW. It was willing to accept mandatory challenge inspections. What else did the U.S. want? The Soviets had opened up their CW facilities for inspection. Everything the U.S. had asked for, they had agreed to.

CARLUCCI pointed out that it was in the interest of neither side to eliminate its stocks entirely when states like Libya or Syria or Iran retained a CW potential. SHEVARDNADZE replied that this could be handled by making the entry into force of a convention dependent upon the adherence of certain countries. If they did not adhere, implementation of the convention could be delayed.

Moving on to the the question of conventional weapons, Shevardnadze said that he understood that experts were engaged on that subject. He proposed that ministers review their work the next day. THE SECRETARY agreed, noting that he agreed with what Shevardnadze had said earlier in the day about the need to reach early agreement on a CSCE mandate for conventional stability discussions.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, before moving on to regional issues, he wanted to call to the Secretary's attention one additional point—

General Secretary Gorbachev's recent Murmansk proposals.<sup>5</sup> They had, Shevardnadze recalled, been quite specific with respect to a huge area of interest to the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and many European countries as well. Perhaps the Secretary was not in a position to discuss the specifics of the proposal, but Shevardnadze proposed that the General Secretary's suggestions be considered by experts, including military experts. Such a discussion could conceivably lead to agreement on regional confidence building measures, including bilateral measures.

THE SECRETARY said the U.S. was still studying the Murmansk initiative and would like to do so further before making any commitments to consultations of the type Shevardnadze had suggested. Our initial response was cautious.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that many of the ideas advanced in Murmansk were not new. The nuclear free zone proposal had been around for some time. Shevardnadze again suggested that experts study Gorbachev's proposals.

THE SECRETARY said that we would need first to consult further with our allies. He was aware that the nuclear free zone concept was not new; indeed, it had a "long beard." The U.S. would look further at the Murmansk proposals and be in a position to discuss them in more detail when next the Secretary and Shevardnadze met.

THE SECRETARY said he had some items he would like to mention in the area of regional affairs.

Starting with *Cambodia*, the Secretary noted that there had recently been some encouraging developments with respect to national reconciliation in that country. The main stumbling block remained Vietnam's occupation, since it was difficult for a genuine process of dialogue to develop under such circumstances. Prince Sihanouk, we felt, could be an important figure in such a process, and we felt it would be a good idea if the Soviet Union could use its influence to encourage Vietnam to enter into negotiations with the Prince and the ASEAN countries. The U.S. considered ASEAN a serious, responsible organization, and we thought highly of its efforts. Hanoi, on the other hand, was paying a price for its isolation.

SHEVARDNADZE said he thought that, despite the two sides' differences of principle over Cambodia, he detected some convergence of views. He knew that both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. supported the notion of a neutral, nonaligned Cambodia, as well as a political settlement of the problems of that country. Both sides opposed the return of Pol Pot (THE SECRETARY interjected: "absolutely").

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to Gorbachev's October 1 speech in Murmansk proposing to make the Arctic a nuclear-free zone.

SHEVARDNADZE said that what was required now was to look at the situation in the region from a new angle. There were new processes and trends which needed to be encouraged. The withdrawal of Vietnamese forces should not be a problem: Hanoi had set a timeframe; its own economic difficulties provided an incentive to withdraw.

As for the Heng Samrin<sup>6</sup> regime's national reconciliation policy, Shevardnadze had a somewhat different view. A practical dialogue was, in fact, underway. The Cambodian leadership was prepared to meet with Sihanouk. What was wrong with that? Why did such contacts need to be linked to the question of Vietnamese withdrawal? Could there not be parallel movement in these areas? The present Cambodian leadership, Shevardnadze reiterated, was ready for a dialogue. It had recognized Sihanouk's influence and was willing to have a dialogue with other opposition elements, except for Pol Pot.

Another point to keep in mind was the emerging relationship between the Indochinese states and ASEAN. The Indonesian "cocktail" proposal was an interesting one. THE SECRETARY remarked that the Vietnamese did not appear to want to come. SHEVARDNADZE replied that Vietnam and Indonesia had had an understanding, but the situation had changed.

If a solution were desired, Shevardnadze continued, the U.S. and Soviet Union might be able to help, but only on the basis of national reconciliation. The U.S. had good contacts in the region. The Soviet Union would be willing to use its own. There were some interesting ways to approach the problem, but it was important that any approach be realistic.

THE SECRETARY said the U.S. was prepared to work. There was a difficult problem, however, similar to that the Soviets themselves had in Afghanistan—Cambodia was occupied by forces of another country. The Cambodian government was supported by those forces. So it was hard to organize national reconciliation around that government—even though it might include truly nationalistic elements who could be useful—because it was seen as a government put there by an occupying power. In any case, the Secretary was glad to have had the discussion, and glad to see that the Soviets were thinking about Cambodia.

On Korea, the Secretary said it was important that the Olympics go off without difficulties.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Reference is to the pro-Vietnam Communist leader of Cambodia.

<sup>7</sup> The Olympic Summer Games were scheduled to take place in Seoul in September 1988.

On Southern Africa, there seemed to be some headway being made with the Angolans on the Cuban problem. Cuba now wanted to join the talks, and that was hard to understand. It was also hard for us to understand the unwillingness of the Angolan government to join in a process of national reconciliation with Savimbi.

Thus, the Secretary felt that it would make sense for Under Secretary Armacost and First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov to get together to go over such issues in detail. If there were to be a summit, perhaps they could meet before the event.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would have no objection to such a meeting.

Noting that the Secretary had run through a number of issues, Shevardnadze first returned to Cambodia. He urged that the U.S. give further thought to the situation there. He did not want to argue over the Secretary's characterization of Vietnam's military presence in Cambodia: the U.S. might call it an occupation; the Cambodians called Vietnam's intervention "salvation." But this could be discussed at the Deputy Foreign Minister level.

On Korea, Shevardnadze was glad that the Secretary had mentioned it, but felt that the problem should be viewed in a broader context than just the Olympics. The U.S. must have noted recent DPRK confidence-building proposals: their proposal for a high-level bilateral meeting; their expression of readiness unilaterally to reduce by 100,000 their military forces; and their proposal for the creation of a nuclear-free zone on the peninsula. These initiatives could provide a solid basis for peace and tranquility on the peninsula.

As for the Olympics, the Soviet Union had given the issue a good deal of thought. The games were not just an athletic event. If there were a sincere interest in the political unification of the peninsula, some sort of parallel arrangements—perhaps not on a 50–50 basis—should be held in the North. This would be an important step toward the establishment of mutually good relations between the Koreans.

THE SECRETARY reminded Shevardnadze that the U.S. had for some time been seeking to bring about bilateral discussions between the leaders of the two Koreas, but that our efforts had always run into North Korea's preference to talk directly to the U.S. After the December elections in South Korea, there would be a new leadership in Seoul, and we would see where the process went.

On the Olympics, South Korea had made an offer, and it was not a bad one. The Secretary expressed the hope that it would be possible to settle the question, which, he agreed, had a heavy political component. But it was also an athletic event which could contribute to confidence building on the peninsula.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed, and suggested that both sides consider how they could help in practical terms.

Moving on to “Angola,” Shevardnadze agreed that some interesting trends were underway. Angola’s dialogue with the U.S. was good, but Cuban participation in that dialogue was natural. It would be inappropriate to exclude the Cubans, since the issue was the reduction of their forces.

The key question, however, remained Namibia; and the key source of tensions in the region, South Africa’s policies. Shevardnadze acknowledged that the U.S. did not approve of all of South Africa’s positions.

THE SECRETARY interjected that we did not approve of any of South Africa’s racial policies, as his recent speech had made clear.<sup>8</sup> We agreed that these policies were the root of the problem in the region. As for Namibia, we felt there were good prospects for achieving progress. There were positive trends. But the Cuban role remained a problem. As the Angolan government had invited the Cubans in, the Secretary saw no reason why Cuba should be at the negotiating table. We did not object *per se*, but we wondered what that said about the Angolan government.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that it was the sovereign right of Angola to do what it considered best. There was no need to argue that point.

On a broader plane, Shevardnadze was encouraged by currents of growing opposition to the South African regime. What was happening was akin to the Contadora process underway in Central America. The progressive countries of Africa were uniting their efforts; perhaps the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could support those who were opposing South Africa.

On Namibia, Shevardnadze said that UNSC 435<sup>9</sup> remained a good basis for a resolution. He suggested both sides intensify their efforts on behalf of its implementation, either jointly or in parallel.

Finally, Shevardnadze raised the possibility of joint efforts to provide humanitarian aid to the countries of Southern Africa. Famine and poverty were becoming growing problems. Perhaps the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could help in some way.

THE SECRETARY said that this would be a good subject for further discussion. He invited Carlucci, as an old African hand, to comment.

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<sup>8</sup> Reference is to Shultz’s September 29 speech before the Business Council for International Understanding in New York City. (Department of State *Bulletin*, November 1987, pp. 9–12)

<sup>9</sup> Reference is to UNSC Resolution 435, passed on September 29, 1978, which called for the establishment of an independent Namibia.



CARLUCCI pointed out by way of introduction that he had served in South Africa, Zanzibar and Zaire. SHEVARDNADZE quipped that he had left a heritage behind. CARLUCCI said he was familiar with the various books and articles which had been written by the Soviets and other communist-backed organizations about his service in Africa.

On the substance of Shevardnadze's remarks, Carlucci said he welcomed the Foreign Minister's indication that Moscow would be prepared to provide more economic aid to Africa and the world. This was interesting, because the Soviet Union had in the past contributed such a small percentage of its GNP for aid. Properly applied, such assistance could make a real contribution in Africa, and could help bring about a peaceful evolution of the situation in the region.

Carlucci took strong exception to Shevardnadze's comparison of the situation in Southern Africa to that of Central America. Central America was an area of traditional American influence into which there had been an intrusion of foreign influence. Carlucci wanted to put down a marker that such influence should be withdrawn.

SHEVARDNADZE asked whether Central America was a plum that the U.S. had inherited. He said that he was against such a "spheres of influence" approach. The Soviet Union, for example, would never seek to apply such an approach to a country like Iran. CARLUCCI asked about Afghanistan. SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow supported a neutral, nonaligned Afghanistan. CARLUCCI said that the U.S. supported a neutral, nonaligned Nicaragua.

SHEVARDNADZE asked Carlucci what kind of Soviet presence he objected to in Nicaragua. CARLUCCI replied we objected to the presence of Soviet military equipment. SHEVARDNADZE said, "So what?" CARLUCCI said it was out of all proportion to Nicaragua's legitimate needs and therefore posed a threat to its neighbours. The U.S. was for democracy in Nicaragua; the Soviet Union could contribute to the successful implementation of the Arias plan by reducing Nicaragua's reliance on military aid and encouraging it to live in peace with its neighbours.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would respond to Carlucci's comments point by point. With respect to Carlucci's remark that the Soviet Union did not carry its weight in terms of foreign aid, Shevardnadze claimed that Moscow regularly allocated 1.8% of the Soviet budget for assistance. His suggestion had simply been to see if the U.S. and Soviet Union could work together in this area.

Shevardnadze said he could not understand a mentality which said Nicaragua had no right to import weapons to defend itself while Pakistan had a right to receive billions of dollars worth of armaments free of charge. What was the difference? Shevardnadze could not understand the spheres of influence approach which Carlucci had articulated.



There were no Soviet military personnel in Nicaragua, although there were Soviet weapons.

THE SECRETARY said he would like to pursue the discussion, but also wanted to get to the Iran-Iraq war. CARLUCCI said that he would like to reserve the right to return to the points Shevardnadze had made. SHEVARDNADZE said he would too, adding that the Arias plan was a “beautiful precedent.”<sup>10</sup>

THE SECRETARY noted that U.S.-Soviet experts talks on Central America and the Caribbean would be held in London the following week. This was an area where our experts had in the past made little headway. But the Guatemala plan<sup>11</sup> had potential if implemented. The main obstacle to implementation appeared to be Nicaragua’s refusal to talk to the resistance, despite the fact that all the Presidents of the region were urging Ortega to do so. The Secretary suggested that both sides try to ensure that the London discussion was a constructive one. Such exchanges had in the past been dry and confrontational, but there had been fruitful conversations in other areas. Perhaps the same could take place on Central America. The Secretary said he would talk to Elliott Abrams about it.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow was following very closely what was happening in the region. Nicaragua was living up to the pledges it had made. CARLUCCI said, “to some of them.” SHEVARDNADZE repeated that Nicaragua was observing those pledges it had made. CARLUCCI pointed out, *inter alia*, that there were still 7,000 political prisoners, that there had been no ceasefire. DOBRYNIN said that Nicaragua had already done a great deal. CARLUCCI said we welcomed what had been done, but could not ignore what had not.

THE SECRETARY noted that the Guatemala City agreement was quite explicit about what the various parties should do. There were explicit requirements for freedom of the press, of association, of political expression—which meant, in effect, no political prisoners. One of the good things about the agreement was its concreteness, for example on the question of a ceasefire. If there were no ceasefire, it would be hard to get people talking to one another. It thus appeared to us that Nicaragua was less than serious.

SHEVARDNADZE acknowledged that Nicaragua had made certain commitments, but pointed out that the Guatemala City plan imposed collective commitments as well, including a commitment of

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<sup>10</sup> Reference is to the Central American Peace Agreement, proposed by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, to resolve Central American conflicts, signed by Presidents of five Central American governments in Guatemala City on August 7, 1987. Also known as Esquipulas II or the Guatemala accords.

<sup>11</sup> Reference is to the Central American Peace Agreement.

non-interference. Yet by financing anti-government groups in Nicaragua the U.S. was directly interfering in the affairs of a sovereign country. Nothing should be done to hinder the process of seeking a political settlement, Shevardnadze concluded. If the U.S. had complaints about Nicaragua, Managua had equally valid complaints against the U.S.

CARLUCCI asked if Shevardnadze was suggesting that Nicaragua was not financing anti-government forces in El Salvador.

THE SECRETARY interjected that the important thing was that various things were supposed to happen together. If one element failed, all would fail. As for the U.S. funds which Shevardnadze had alluded to, we had made clear that, were the Guatemala City agreement to be implemented and conditions of political stability established, those funds could be used for economic reconstruction. Thus, they provided as much an incentive to compromise as to fight. The problem was that the right circumstances were not emerging despite our efforts to be constructive.

CARLUCCI said that one area where the Soviet Union could be helpful was to encourage Nicaragua to stop subverting its neighbors, especially El Salvador, but also Honduras. This would be a constructive contribution. He wanted to emphasize that he was saying this in a non-polemical way.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Presidents of five countries had agreed on the fundamental questions with respect to a settlement in Central America. Shevardnadze had been encouraged by this to believe that a regional solution was emerging. Some might not be doing everything that they could, but the Soviet Union was encouraging the process. As for the threat allegedly posed by Nicaragua, the idea was ludicrous. Nicaragua could threaten no one; its economy was in shambles.

CARLUCCI reiterated U.S. support for the Guatemala City agreement, but again stressed the importance of Nicaragua's living up to its commitments and abandoning attempts to subvert its neighbors.

Moving on to the Iran-Iraq war, the Secretary said he would like to describe how we viewed the situation. The key point was that Iran was becoming more, not less, aggressive. The Secretary General had a good brief as he set off for the region to see if the parties would accept UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 598<sup>12</sup> in the wake of the New York meeting of the permanent members of the Security Council. The U.S. felt that he should receive a prompt reply from the parties, and that the permanent members should reach their conclusions on next steps on the basis of that reply.

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<sup>12</sup> See footnote 5, Document 67.

For its part, the U.S. was sympathetic to the Secretary General's view that active work in the UNSC by permanent members on a second resolution would have a positive impact on his diplomatic efforts. We thus hoped it would be possible for visible work in the UNSC to get underway. Our concern was that, if the process dragged on, a potentially strong stand of the UNSC would be made to look foolish.

The Secretary pointed out that he had agreed with Shevardnadze during their New York meeting that the unity among permanent members which had been achieved on this issue was something special and should be preserved. But we had to build up the UN to make it work. The first resolution had made a contribution. Although we were not prejudging the outcome of the Secretary General's mission, we believed now there was a need for a follow-up. So perhaps the U.S. and Soviet Union should say something about the Iran-Iraq war and follow-up in the UNSC. The Secretary said he would welcome Shevardnadze's views.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed that the Secretary General was well equipped at present to undertake next steps. Resolution 598 contained "reserves" which had not yet been used. The Secretary General should now undertake more intensive efforts, consistent with the additional authority given him by the permanent members in their New York meeting.

The situation was by no means hopeless. There was agreement by both parties to a ceasefire, even though Iran had reserved its position in some respects. A decision had been made in New York by UNSC permanent members not to limit the flexibility of the Secretary General with respect to the sequence of his discussions with the parties. Thus far, it was true, there had been no practical steps except for an initial visit to the region and subsequent consultations with the permanent members. Now was the time, Moscow felt, for intense diplomatic efforts vis-a-vis the parties. In the event Iran refused to implement a ceasefire, the Soviet Union, for its part, would favor the establishment of an international body to deal with the situation. This would demonstrate the seriousness of UNSC. But at this point it was premature to speak of a second stage; the important thing was to help implement the first.

Shevardnadze recalled that, during their New York meeting, he had told the Secretary that the massive, unjustified U.S. military build-up in the Gulf could only lead to an aggravation of the situation and to unpredictable results. This was, in fact, happening, regardless of U.S. motives. The results of the massive U.S. presence were very serious, the situation in the Gulf increasingly grave. The area was close to the Soviet Union, which could not be indifferent to the situation, and the dramatic events it could produce.

What then, did the Soviet Union propose? It was one thing, Shevardnadze observed, when so imposing a military presence was assem-

bled by the U.S. It was another were it to occur under UN auspices. The latter was the only reasonable approach. Shevardnadze did not suggest that the U.S. should just pull out. But preparations should be made to replace U.S. forces by forces under UN auspices. There was no other way out for the U.S. and its allies.

Shevardnadze thus recommended that the UN Military Staff Committee be convened at the level of heads of general staff to discuss the situation in the Gulf. This would be the first step in a discussion of how to replace the U.S. presence in the Gulf with a UNSC force. The problem, Shevardnadze emphasized, was a real one, and one the U.S. should be prepared to address soberly, particularly in light of recent clashes in the Gulf.

Shevardnadze pointed out that he had also warned in New York that a situation could emerge in which the Iran-Iraq war itself would become a secondary matter, with the situation in the Gulf assuming major multilateral significance. The Soviet Union neither welcomed nor approved of such a development. The situation in the Gulf should remain a function of the Iran-Iraq war. One should react to events in the Gulf not on the basis of emotion, but of a sober assessment of the realities.

Shevardnadze recalled that Carlucci had complained about Soviet arms shipments to Nicaragua. Moscow did not provide Iran with arms. But even if the U.S. and Soviet Union were to agree on an embargo of Iran, the Iranians would obtain arms. They had an indigenous industry; there was a black market. The Iranian leadership was multiplying its efforts to whip up a war hysteria among its people. While the U.S. might complain about Nicaragua's leaders, the Secretary and Shevardnadze had discussed and agreed upon the nature of those of Iran. But one had to deal with the fact that they were the Iranian government. So the situation was not just disturbing; it was explosive. Moscow did not consider it too late to find a solution. But against the backdrop of the massive U.S. military presence, the Secretary General's own efforts were undermined.

THE SECRETARY said he was very discouraged by Shevardnadze's remarks. It almost sounded as if the Foreign Minister were saying that Iran should be forgiven for mining international waters. The problem was that Iran had gotten use to getting away with anything it did. The Iranians needed to be called to account.

What would happen, the Secretary asked, if the Secretary General reported that Iraq had accepted his call to implement UNSC 598, but Iran had not? The UNSC's card would be called. We would have to move on a second resolution in that case. On the basis of their previous discussion, the Secretary had thought Shevardnadze would as well.

SHEVARDNADZE said that he agreed that a second resolution had to be prepared. It was important that Iran and Iraq know that the

UNSC would be consistent. But the U.S. should think about the impact of its presence in the Gulf. A second resolution should be implemented in the context of UN, not U.S., forces. The permanent members could provide the necessary vessels. The necessary machinery was in place. Perhaps it should not be engaged tomorrow, but, if there was a genuine desire for an effective second resolution, there was no other way to deal with the situation.

THE SECRETARY said that there was a problem with a UN military force. What Shevardnadze had said suggested that the Soviet side had in mind a blockade of some sort. No oil would get out; nor arms in. So that was one purpose for such a force.

Another possibility would be a peacekeeping force of some kind. But experience had demonstrated that such arrangements worked best when both parties agreed that the UN should assume such a role. In the present instance, however, that would be tantamount to the two parties having accepted UNSC 598, which was not the reality. As we had said before, the U.S. was in the Gulf in response to a problem which threatened our friends, the flow of oil, and international navigation. When the problem ended, the level of our forces would recede.

If UN forces were in the Gulf to take military actions against the aggressor in the war, and had rules of engagement to enforce the peace, it would be an anomalous situation. Our own vessels were there in a very different spirit. There was also the complication that Iran—because of asymmetries in oil export patterns—would be willing to see the war in the Gulf end in order to pursue the land war without distraction. So when one spoke of a UN force, it was important to have a clear conceptual and operational understanding about what was involved.

We were not, the Secretary emphasized, simply being negative. We had given the matter a good deal of thought. We had considered, for example, the possibility of UN-flagged tankers. But if those tankers were attacked, who would react?

The U.S. was not, the Secretary said frankly, entirely comfortable in the Gulf. If a way could be found to do the job we were doing, we would not object.

But the key point the Secretary wanted to underscore was that, if the SecGen returned a negative report, the UNSC would have to do something. The U.S. wanted to maintain the unity of the UNSC. If the Council could do something constructive it would be a good thing for the UN's reputation. The Soviet Union had itself called for strengthening the organization; this would help.

SHEVARDNADZE asked flatly why U.S. ships were in the Gulf.

THE SECRETARY said the reason was two-fold. First, to protect U.S.-flag ships plying the oil trade through international waterways.

Iran had also been aggressive—to put it mildly—against the Gulf states, most recently with its Silkworm missile attacks, but before that with its pressure on Saudi Arabia and attacks on Islamic holy places there. It had no support whatever throughout the Muslim world, as a recent speech by Egyptian Foreign Minister Meguid had made clear. Shevardnadze had, as he had indicated, shared with the Secretary in the past his views of Iran, and the Secretary had agreed.

So these were the reasons the U.S. fleet was in the Gulf. If the Soviet Union were there instead as protectors of oil in the region we would not find that acceptable either. But that was not the main reason. And, the Secretary reemphasized, the level of our presence would recede once these problems were resolved. We had better uses for our forces.

SHEVARDNADZE commented that, if freedom of navigation were the problem, it would be dealt with by the UNSC. That was why the Soviet Union was proposing a meeting of the Military Staff Committee. As to how the force should operate, that could be referred to the military themselves. THE SECRETARY said he did not see how the concept would work.

SHEVARDNADZE said that it would first be necessary to define a UN force's task. The chiefs of staff would be able to decide the best way, operationally, to ensure freedom of navigation. It would be better to activate the Military Staff Committee than to let the U.S. or the Soviet Union try to establish order anywhere they wanted. So if one defined the overall task as freedom of navigation, the Military Staff Committee was the appropriate instrument to carry out the task. That instrument should be used.

Shevardnadze said that on a parallel track it would then be possible to prepare for a second UNSC resolution. But implementation of a second resolution against the backdrop of the massive U.S. military presence in the Gulf did not follow.

Thus, Shevardnadze proposed convening the Military Staff Committee. The Committee could work out the operational details if given a clear task. Freedom of navigation was the task. If Iran did not comply, there would be a need for an appropriate follow-up. For such a task, the machinery provided for in the UN Charter should be used. Convening the Military Staff Committee would send a strong signal.

THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. believed that U.S. ships had a right of innocent passage anywhere in the world. If they were challenged, it was the duty of our Navy to help them.

The Secretary felt that Shevardnadze's remarks on the use of the Military Staff Committee did not quite track. It was true that the military could tell one how to implement a particular decision. Often, the Secre-

tary noted, their recommendations caused the political leadership to review its original decision. But rather than *start* with the military, one should start with the political concept of what to do. Only then should military advice be sought. In the present case, the concept was lacking.

The Secretary said that perhaps it would be possible to return to the subject at a later date. For the moment, he welcomed the chance to have heard Shevardnadze's thoughts on the Gulf. He wanted to underscore once more in closing his strong view that, in the event the Secretary General's efforts were unsuccessful, the Security Council must act.

The meeting ended on that note.

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### 83. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, October 23, 1987, 9:30–10:20 a.m.

#### SUBJECTS

INF Verification Issues

#### PARTICIPANTS

##### *US*

The Secretary  
National Security Advisor Carlucci  
Asst. Sec. Ridgway  
Ambassador Nitze  
EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)  
Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)  
Members of U.S. Arms  
Control Working Group

##### *USSR*

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
Deputy ForMin Bessmertnykh  
Ambassador Karpov  
Shevardnadze Aide Stepanov  
Shevardnadze Advisor Tarasenko  
(Notetaker)  
Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)  
Members of Soviet Arms  
Control Working Group

SHEVARDNADZE opened the session with the comment that there was little time. He asked that the leaders of the two working groups summarize the results of their work to date. While there appeared to have been progress in some areas, the Foreign Minister had the impression that there were still issues which required effort.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow/Washington Oct. 1987. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in the Guesthouse of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.



THE SECRETARY commented that as far as he could see there had been no progress at all by the working groups. The Soviet group had even bracketed language on which the ministers themselves had agreed.

VORONTSOV said that the brackets were honest ones. The Soviet delegation had not been informed of the ministers' decisions the night before. Now they were informed. SHEVARDNADZE quipped that the experts should be given a C– for their work.

THE SECRETARY observed that the meals in Geneva were obviously too good, because the Soviet delegation wanted to refer everything to Geneva. The Secretary had been under the impression that Moscow, not Geneva, was the Soviet capital.

In response to the Secretary's invitation, NITZE briefly reported that the working group had identified six areas of agreement and 14 unresolved issues. He pointed out that, when presented by the U.S. side with such a tally, the Soviet team had added 6 more unagreed items. So there were a total of 20 outstanding issues, mostly dealing with inspections, and most of those dealing with suspect sites.

VORONTSOV remarked that all of the issues on the list which had been drawn up were important and would need to be resolved before a treaty was signed. Some, however, were of special importance. For example, the U.S. appeared determined to have ICBM's inspected along with missiles covered by the treaty; there was also the question of inspections of U.S. bases in third countries. Resolution of these two key questions would, Vorontsov thought, make it possible to resolve many others. He asked that the ministers provide instructions which would make this possible.

THE SECRETARY said that Vorontsov's first point had to do with the U.S. desire to inspect bases where missiles similar to the SS–20 were located, i.e., where ground-mobile ballistic missiles were located. That narrowed the focus considerably. Our objective was not to look at all ICBM bases.

As for third country basing, the relevant bases were those where U.S. INF had been deployed. We had made specific proposals on that subject, and were prepared to discuss it further.

SHEVARDNADZE said he feared the experts had not fulfilled their main task—to find solutions. The two sides were at a crucial stage. The Secretary was about to meet with General Secretary Gorbachev.<sup>2</sup> A full 25 issues remained unresolved, many of by no means secondary importance. As Shevardnadze had said the day before, the moment

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 84.



called for bolder approaches by both sides if there were to be an agreement. Instead, the experts had given their ministers 25 issues to take before the General Secretary. What kind of an agreement could one expect from such a process?

THE SECRETARY noted that, in Geneva, the Soviet delegation had been inclined to say it needed instructions from Moscow. Now it wanted to refer everything to Geneva.

SHEVARDNADZE said that some issues could be left for Geneva. But the fundamental questions needed to be resolved during the Secretary's stay. The experts should be instructed to reach solutions to as many problems as possible by the end of the day. Even at this stage, however, was it not possible to report to the General Secretary that all the outstanding issues lent themselves to solutions, including the central verification issues which had been mentioned? The Secretary's statement suggested he believed this to be the case.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed. He did not want to tell the President that there were as many issues as ever. All could be resolved. The Secretary had gone over them with his experts that morning. They could all be worked out.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that the question of data exchange had been worked out the day before. Non-circumvention, which had been the subject of a fruitful discussion by ministers on Thursday,<sup>3</sup> was not bracketed.

THE SECRETARY suggested putting the experts back to work.

VORONTSOV said that the experts still lacked instructions on how to handle the question of verifying ground-mobile ICBM's similar to the SS-20.

THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. side had developed a statement which might help solve the problem, and read the following text:

—The primary purpose of our proposal to inspect facilities for GLBM's over 500 km in range is to look at facilities where clandestine SS-20 activity (production, deployment, training, etc.) might be carried out under cover of ICBM activity.

—Of special concern are ground-mobile ICBM facilities, since these systems most closely resemble SS-20's.

—Therefore, we are prepared to consider narrowing our proposal from all ICBM's to ground-mobile ICBM's.

—The precise idea would be to subject facilities associated with road-mobile GLBM's with range over 500 km to suspect site inspection.

—Paying special attention to road-mobile ICBM's is appropriate here, since, as your people say, there is great similarity between SS-20's and mobile ICBM's.

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<sup>3</sup> October 22; see Documents 80–82.

—This is a significant step in your direction on an issue your people say is very important to you, although, as you know, we believe the real solution is to ban mobiles entirely.

VORONTSOV noted in response that such an approach had been discussed in Geneva. The Soviet side had proposed to respond to U.S. concerns by providing information which would enable the U.S. to distinguish between the SS-20 and Soviet mobile ICBM's through use of national technical means (NTM). If the U.S. were prepared to consider this approach, perhaps in the context of its own new proposal, it might provide a path to a mutually satisfactory solution which did not require on-site inspections.

THE SECRETARY expressed doubt that such an approach would obviate the need for on-site inspections. CARLUCCI seconded his reservations.

VORONTSOV said that an effort should be made to determine if NTM were sufficient by themselves. BESSMERTNYKH pointed out that it would be a military absurdity for the Soviets to attempt clandestinely to replace mobile ICBM's by less capable SS-20's. SHEVARDNADZE said this was not the time for horse-trading.

THE SECRETARY noted that both sides had to deal with the reality that they had to go the extra distance where necessary to satisfy themselves that any treaty could be verified. That was the source of the U.S. insistence on adequate arrangements with respect to ICBM's similar to the SS-20. No one was seeking unilateral advantages.

BESSMERTNYKH noted that the Soviet side had doubts of its own about verifying a GLCM ban. The U.S. could conceivably disguise GLCM's in SLCM canisters. But this kind of approach led to a blind alley.

CARLUCCI acknowledged that there were enormous problems in verifying SLCM's. But one had to apply the rule of reason. When one confronted a truly impossible situation, there was no choice but to make compromises. But where a reasonable solution presented itself, it should be explored.

THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. would be prepared to listen to the Soviet explanation of how SS-20's could be distinguished from mobile ICBM's through NTM. But we also wanted to be sure that any questions could be addressed through on-site inspections. CARLUCCI pointed out that we were only talking about fifteen on-site inspections per year.

Noting that time was running short, SHEVARDNADZE suggested that experts resume their work.

NITZE pointed out that they would still run into difficulties. He thought it unlikely that it would be possible to verify an SS-20 ban

solely through NTM. VORONTSOV said the same could be said for a GLCM ban.

CARLUCCI pointed out that the Secretary's earlier statement should have made it much easier for the Soviet side to accept ground inspections of ground-mobile ballistic missile facilities. It narrowed the scope of the problem considerably.

SHEVARDNADZE asked what should be done.

BESSMERTNYKH noted that the concerns Nitze had expressed should be taken care of by the Soviet offer to allow inspection of production sites on a continuous or near-continuous basis. NITZE replied that the U.S. side had not found the proposal satisfactory. SHEVARDNADZE asked why not.

THE SECRETARY noted Bessmertnykh's use of the word, "continuous." That was a key point. Less than a continuous regime would be worthless, but a continuous arrangement would be another thing. KARPOV noted that that was what the Soviets had proposed.

THE SECRETARY said that perhaps it would clarify the situation if the ministers went through the entire list of 20 outstanding issues. SHEVARDNADZE felt it would be better to ask the experts to continue to work the details, leaving the ministers to address main questions.

Noting that the ministers were to meet with the General Secretary at 11:00 THE SECRETARY concurred.

Before leaving, the Secretary took the Foreign Minister aside for a three-minute discussion of Soviet insistence that visitors of U.S. Embassy personnel who were not immediate relatives purchase expensive Intourist packages. Shevardnadze undertook to look into the matter.

84. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, October 23, 1987, 11 a.m.–3:30 p.m.

## SUBJECTS

Ministers' reports; Iran-Iraq war; START and "key provisions"; summitry

## PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*

The Secretary  
 National Security Advisor Carlucci  
 Ambassador Nitze  
 Ambassador Ridgway  
 Ambassador Matlock  
 EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)  
 Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)

*U.S.S.R.*

General Secretary Gorbachev  
 Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
 CPSU Secretary Dobrynin  
 Gorbachev Advisor Chernyaev  
 Marshal Akhromeyev  
 Dep ForMin Bessmertnykh  
 Ambassador Dubinin  
 Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

GORBACHEV opened the meeting with a grin and a hearty "So, we go forward!" He welcomed the Secretary, noting that his presence in Moscow so soon after Shevardnadze's Washington visit spoke for itself. The relationship had entered a more dynamic phase. The Soviets welcomed this. Of course, the most important thing was substance; Gorbachev felt that, there, too, something was emerging.

THE SECRETARY agreed that we must always focus on substance. It was also true that there was often a relationship between the pace of meetings and progress on substance. Much had been achieved during the Washington discussions. And, as the Secretary had said in his luncheon toast the day before, in ten years, people would record that the Reykjavik meeting had accomplished more than any previous summit.

GORBACHEV said he agreed. Reykjavik had been a kind of intellectual breakthrough: its "shock effect" had been similar to a stock market reaction.<sup>2</sup> When people settled down, however, they realized a new stage in the U.S.-Soviet political dialogue had been entered, especially as regards security issues.

Gorbachev said he also wished to welcome the other members of the Secretary's delegation. Some, like Ambassadors Ridgway and

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow/Washington Oct. 1987. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in St. Catherine's Hall at the Kremlin.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the so-called Black Monday stock market crash earlier that week.

Matlock, he already knew. Now he knew Carlucci as well. He hoped Carlucci could make a constructive contribution, as, Gorbachev understood, he had in Washington. He should do the same in Moscow.

THE SECRETARY said he and Carlucci had worked well and easily together since the seventies, when Carlucci had been in the Office of Economic Opportunity, dealing with the problems of the poor. They had then worked together in the Office of the Budget. Few in our government had such varied and extensive experience as Carlucci.

GORBACHEV commented that Carlucci must have learned from this experience that no agreement was possible without taking into account the interests of both parties. He said this, Gorbachev quipped, because he knew that when Nitze and Akhromeyev got together, they invariably sought to achieve some advantage over the other. (THE SECRETARY said that this was the first time he had heard that about Akhromeyev; he knew it was true about Nitze.)

GORBACHEV said it was good that the military was represented in today's discussions, noting that that fact, too, marked a new element in the relationship. For if there were to be no war, if there were to be disarmament, the military would have to speak to one another. THE SECRETARY agreed, recalling that the Incidents at Sea<sup>3</sup> agreement between our two navies had weathered successfully the ups and downs of U.S.-Soviet relations over the years. We believed that there should be meetings between defense ministers, and between Akhromeyev and Admiral Crowe.

GORBACHEV said that would be good. He then suggested a brief discussion of how to structure the meeting. Consistent with the process of democratization now underway in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev would make some suggestions, but would welcome the Secretary's ideas as well. Perhaps, Gorbachev offered, the Secretary and Shevardnadze could first summarize their discussions since the Secretary's arrival as a basis for further discussion.

THE SECRETARY said that was a good approach. He opened his summary by noting that a good procedure had by now been established for structuring his meetings with Shevardnadze: relatively small meetings between the two ministers were integrated with the efforts of experts in individual working groups. This process had produced good results. (GORBACHEV interjected that it had indeed been well tested.) THE SECRETARY explained that individual working groups had been set up on bilateral, human rights and arms control. There had also been a "spur of the moment" exchange on regional issues, but the

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 8, Document 67.

ministers themselves had had a more productive discussion of such issues at their level.

On arms control, the ministers had tried to use their discussion to help our delegations in Vienna reach a mandate for conventional arms talks. There had been a useful discussion on chemical weapons (CW). A special sub-group had been set up to address INF issues; and the ministers had themselves talked about strategic and defense and space matters.

The Secretary said that the U.S. objective in Moscow, and his own instructions, were to complete an INF Treaty, or, failing that, to move the discussion to the point where it was clear that it would be possible to do so. But the President had always felt that strategic arms were a key, and we had noted Gorbachev's statements that such weapons were a "root problem," and that a treaty on strategic arms could be completed by the following spring. The U.S. agreed, and would like to see the issues involved moved to a point where, when Gorbachev came to the U.S.—and we hoped he would come—it would be possible to have an in-depth discussion of strategic arms, laying the groundwork for completing a treaty. So that was the U.S. objective.

On the question of intermediate range missiles, we had settled some issues, including the so called "German Pershing" question. Most of that progress, the Secretary noted, had been made by the ministers themselves. We had frankly been disappointed by the attitude we had encountered on the part of Soviet working group representatives, but the working group had now been put back to work. The Secretary had been particularly concerned by a tendency to seek to refer controversial issues to Geneva. The Secretary had rejected this on the grounds that the Geneva delegation's instructions came from Moscow, and that this was where the decisions should be made. So, the Secretary could not report as much progress as he would have liked to, but he could report that the job was doable.

On strategic arms and the ABM Treaty, the Secretary felt that the discussion between the two ministers had been worthwhile. They had been able to identify the key political decisions which needed to be made. They had also identified the main detail work which had to be addressed. On the latter point, it was becoming clear as we struggled with the final stages of the INF Treaty how difficult verification issues became as operational details were worked out. The task would be even more difficult with strategic arms, where the problems would be far more complex.

It would thus be important to begin pushing on strategic arms verification issues now. In that context, the differences in perspective on mobile land-based missiles was of particular importance. The Secretary said he had explained to Shevardnadze that our problem was not one

of principle, but reflected the difficulty of verifying whatever might be agreed to on mobile missiles. So he and Shevardnadze had agreed that the problem would get priority attention. By the time of Gorbachev's visit, the Secretary thought it should be possible for Gorbachev and the President to address this problem.

The Secretary said that that concluded his summary, offering Carlucci the opportunity to comment further. CARLUCCI declined.

GORBACHEV asked Shevardnadze to summarize for the Soviet side.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed in principle with the Secretary's assessment. GORBACHEV interrupted to ask whether, if the two ministers agreed, it was up to him and the President to disagree. SHEVARDNADZE said that he had said he agreed "in principle." THE SECRETARY said that, were it not for the agreements which Gorbachev and the President had reached in Reykjavik, there would be nothing for the ministers to discuss.

SHEVARDNADZE acknowledged that the understandings which had been reached during his Washington visit on INF were based on the Reykjavik discussions. As for what had happened after the Washington visit, it had in the previous day's discussions with the Secretary been possible to reach agreement on many principled questions which had seemed very difficult and complicated. It had been possible to agree on a text regarding the German P-1a which was suitable both from the standpoint of the U.S.-FRG alliance relationship and from the Soviet standpoint. Another difficult issue which had been resolved was that of the time frame and procedure for the elimination of intermediate and short range missiles (IRM's and SRM's): for IRM's the timeframe would be three years; for SRM's, 18 months, taking into account technical possibilities. There had also been a good discussion on non-circumvention; Shevardnadze thought a compromise was emerging. Verification remained a tough question which required an objective approach, in view of the sensitivity and complexity of the issues involved, and the vital interests at stake.

GORBACHEV said that the Secretary had quite correctly emphasized the importance of verification not only for IRM's and SRM's but also for strategic offensive arms. The issue would become even more important. Everything should be done to ensure that both sides had the confidence they needed.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed, noting that it was also important to take into account the two sides' different patterns of production and deployment of strategic weapons. THE SECRETARY replied that the U.S. had no quarrel with that proposition.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had agreed with the Secretary that, on some issues, decisions were needed "today." Were they referred back



to Geneva, negotiations could go on indefinitely. GORBACHEV said that fundamental issues should indeed be resolved while the Secretary was in Moscow; technical questions could be referred to Geneva.

As for what he called the “second set of issues,” Shevardnadze seconded the Secretary’s reference to Gorbachev’s description of the radical reduction of strategic offensive weapons as the “root problem.” Here, the results of the ministers’ discussions had been more modest. Shevardnadze said he had described in frank terms to the Secretary the day before Moscow’s perception that Soviet steps to accommodate U.S. interests had been met with U.S. moves which made progress in the area even more difficult.

GORBACHEV asked Shevardnadze if it were not the Minister’s view that the problem of space, which had not been resolved in the Reykjavik “marathon,” and had emerged as a problem afterwards, had arisen again as a difficulty. Further, while the Soviet Union had shown flexibility on the issues involved, the U.S. had remained locked in concrete. How, then, should one move on this central problem for U.S.-Soviet relations and for the world?

SHEVARDNADZE said he would like to address this issue, but wished first to summarize U.S. steps in the strategic arms talks which had become complicating factors. He cited specifically U.S. insistence on: eliminating heavy missiles; a one-sided approach to warhead counting rules; a ban on mobile missiles; and the inclusion of Soviet medium bombers in a START Treaty. In addition, the U.S. was refusing to agree on a sea launched cruise missile (SLCM) sublimit, despite the agreement in Reykjavik to do so. Shevardnadze said that he had conveyed to the Secretary the Soviet view that these issues were all resolvable if the necessary basic decisions were taken.

As for the ABM Treaty, Shevardnadze reported that he had indicated that if there were a retreat from the agreements reached at Reykjavik—i.e., a ten-year non-withdrawal period of strict compliance with the ABM Treaty—there could be no agreement on strategic offensive arms. Shevardnadze had also reviewed the Soviet position on activities which could proceed in laboratories and test ranges, along with their more recent proposals on the parameters for devices to be banned from space. It had been Shevardnadze’s impression, however, that there had been insufficient time to discuss these matters in detail.

Finally, Shevardnadze concluded, he had reminded the Secretary that, to have a “full scale” summit, it would be important to have an agreement on key provisions—as had often been discussed in the past. Shevardnadze said he would not address the discussions which had taken place on conventional and chemical weapons, which had been handled primarily by working groups. There had been a discussion of regional issues, particularly the Persian Gulf, which went on until nearly midnight. It had been a very substantive, occasionally sharp talk.



GORBACHEV interrupted to say that perhaps it would be worthwhile to diverge for a moment on the Gulf. The situation which was emerging there was of concern to the Soviet Union for two reasons. First, because it appeared that the U.S. had not adequately calculated the consequences for itself, for the Soviet Union, for the world. Second, because the Gulf had emerged as an area where the two superpowers had been able to cooperate effectively on an important international problem. The Soviets had felt that there was still untapped potential for such cooperation, but now the U.S. had apparently decided to go it alone. Moscow did not consider recent U.S. conduct in the Gulf appropriate and regretted America's rejection of its earlier cooperative approach.

THE SECRETARY's attempt to respond was cut short by SHEVARDNADZE's request that he be allowed to complete his report. Shevardnadze said that he had outlined to the Secretary the Soviet position that the unity of the Security Council (UNSC) should be preserved. He had also described the Soviet leadership's view that, if all other means had been exhausted to bring about implementation of UNSC Resolution 598, resort should be made to the UN military staff committee.

Summing up, Shevardnadze said that, on INF, prospects of an agreement were by no means remote. With the necessary effort and will, outstanding issues could be resolved within twenty days. In addition, there was a need for intensive work on a key provisions agreement regarding 50% reductions of strategic offensive arms and the ABM Treaty, since for the moment there was no solid basis for resolving the issues involved. It was the ministers' task to prepare by the summit a solid basis for discussion of those issues.

Having been invited by Gorbachev to comment, THE SECRETARY said he had little quarrel with Shevardnadze's summary. On INF, he agreed that the two sides should settle as many issues as possible before his departure, leaving the Geneva delegations to cross the t's and dot the i's. Otherwise we would be waiting for months. GORBACHEV said he would welcome such an approach.

On strategic arms, THE SECRETARY stressed that this was an area of great importance. Shevardnadze had said that Gorbachev would have some thoughts on this subject. The Secretary would be glad to hear them.

With respect to what Gorbachev had said on the Gulf, the Secretary agreed that U.S.-Soviet cooperation in UN diplomacy on the region had been good, and we continued to want to see it work. We wanted to see it work because it could end a poisonous war. We wanted to see it work because nothing could strengthen the standing of an organization like the UN as successfully dealing with a difficult prob-

lem. It would enhance the prestige of the UN to demonstrate that when the U.S. and U.S.S.R united on something, they could make it happen. So we had no desire to go it alone in the Gulf. To the contrary, we wanted the UN process to work.

As to the U.S. military presence in the Gulf, the Secretary pointed out that there were more European vessels than our own and that, if Soviet ships were added, the U.S. presence amounted to only about a third of the total. Why were we there? Because Iran, and the war generally, posed a threat (a) to our friends in the Gulf, and (b) to the flow of oil of great importance to Western nations. We had to stand by our friends and safeguard this vital supply. The Secretary said he had told Shevardnadze that, as the problem receded, the level of U.S. forces would recede.

GORBACHEV objected that the presence of U.S. forces had complicated the situation, not made it more secure. That was not even in the U.S. interest. Gorbachev understood the U.S. interest in securing the flow of oil, but not its methods.

THE SECRETARY acknowledged that the argument could be made either way, but said that the stronger argument was for having forces in the Gulf. When, for example, Iran mined international waters, was caught by the U.S., claimed that their vessels carried only food, and then were proved to have lied before the UN, people tried to say it was provocative. It was not provocative; it simply forced Iran to realize that they could not say anything and get away with it. It was not provocative to force Iran to deal with reality.

Iran was a first class menace. It had inflamed the Islamic world by its attacks against Saudi Arabia and its holy places. The Secretary commended to Gorbachev a recent speech by the Egyptian foreign minister,<sup>4</sup> a thoughtful and deeply religious man, who had roundly condemned statements by Iranian leaders as having nothing to do with Islam. Iran was creating turmoil and needed to be contended with, not necessarily in a confrontational way, but in a way which demonstrated that it could not get away with everything.

The Secretary reported that he had discussed these points with Shevardnadze the night before, as well as the situation in the Security Council. The Secretary General was carrying an implementation package to the parties. Iraq would accept the resolution. The Secretary and Shevardnadze had discussed what to do in the Security Council if, by the end of the month, the Secretary General had ended his work and Iran was still playing games. There would be a need for follow through

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Ahmed Asmat Abdul-Meguid.

by the Council. We did not want Iran to make a fool of the UNSC; the Council's credibility was on the line.

GORBACHEV said he did not want to get into an extended discussion. This was, however, an important problem, one which could "bury" many things, including U.S.-Soviet negotiations. He wanted to emphasize he hoped that the U.S. would weigh all aspects of the situation and not react to transient events on an emotional basis. This approach was fraught with danger. Gorbachev urged that the cooperative line which had been established earlier be maintained. Its potential had not been exhausted. THE SECRETARY agreed, noting that there was important work to do in the UN.

GORBACHEV said that he would like to go back to something the Secretary had said earlier. Not only had there been a more dynamic process recently, there had been concrete movement in some areas. If one looked back at the road running from the Geneva summit through Reykjavik to the present, much was clearer than it had been in the past. Gorbachev believed both sides had a better understanding of their roles, and the responsibility they bore for continuing to work to achieve practical results. This was an important first result of the post-Geneva period.

There was also, Gorbachev continued, a certain common experience of working together. Gorbachev valued the exchanges he had had with the President and with the Secretary, as well as the relationship the Secretary and Shevardnadze had developed. Such relationships had been missing during the early years of the Reagan administration, and had proved an important factor in finding solutions to mutual problems. So, despite occasional difficulties, there was an atmosphere of cooperation and common interest without which nothing could be achieved. This was a second post-Geneva achievement.

Moreover, each side had taken steps (Moscow felt that it was ahead in this respect) to accommodate the interests of the other. This had generated great expectations in both countries, and in the world. Indeed, we were approaching a stage where results were to be expected. If they were not forthcoming, it would be counted against the U.S. leadership, and that of the Soviet Union as well. One had to face that reality. From that perspective, Gorbachev wanted to react to the ministers' reports.

Gorbachev said it was his impression that an INF agreement could be completed soon. He agreed that the main issues should be resolved in Moscow so as to leave only technical questions (drafting and editorial work) for the negotiators. Were it possible to overcome the remaining issues, it would be an important, significant achievement to present to the world. This raised a question: if an agreement was near, why were certain things, such as the continued deployment of INF, continuing?

Perhaps one should consider a joint moratorium effective November 1, even before signing of a Treaty. Such a move would correspond to the political decision which had been made to conclude an agreement. It would show that the Treaty was already working, and demonstrate a mutual readiness to sign an agreement.

On strategic offensive arms and space, Gorbachev wanted to reiterate his Prague remarks (re the “root problem”), which the Secretary had cited. Strategic offensive arms and space were the most important issues for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. because they determined the strategic situation between the two countries. There was as a result a special urgency to find mutually acceptable solutions to this complex of issues.

In Reykjavik, there had been serious exchanges on these issues, which had given impetus to the whole process. The Soviet side had since tried to show its commitment to finding solutions on the basis of the “essence” of the Reykjavik formula—50% reductions of strategic arms and 10 years of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

But what was happening in the Geneva talks? Haggling was taking place. The Soviet side had thus been thinking about how to move the process forward. Stripped to its essentials, the problem boiled down to two issues: strict observance of the ABM Treaty; and the establishment of an optimum correlation of the elements of both sides’s strategic forces, i.e., of the triad.

On the first issue, the Soviet side had proposed no withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for 10 years; “or” a second “variant,” related to the first—to discuss what could be in space and what could not be in space. Moscow was awaiting a response to its proposals.

On the second issue (optimum correlation), the Soviet side had looked carefully at the problem and proposed a new formula. Under that formula, there would be a distribution of levels for warheads on the three elements of strategic forces. Each side could compensate to make up for shortfalls in any one leg by withdrawing reentry vehicles from another. In other words, distribution would be by warheads, but compensation would be made by reentry vehicles.

So where was the compromise? Gorbachev asked. The U.S. would agree to record in legally binding form its non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for ten years, with strict compliance. The Soviet Union would agree to distribution levels to be established for warheads on each leg of the triad. Specifically, the Soviet side was prepared to accept, within the 6,000 warhead aggregate limit, the following sub-limits:

- 3,000–3,000 ICBM warheads
- 1,800–2,000 SLBM warheads
- 800–900 ALCM warheads

Such reciprocal movement would enable negotiators to move quickly to a point where a key provisions agreement on strategic offen-

sive arms and space would be possible. Thus the agenda for Gorbachev's visit to the United States would conform to that he had discussed with the Secretary during his April visit to Moscow: signature of an INF agreement; signature of a key provisions agreement based on the compromises Gorbachev had outlined; and an agreement on nuclear testing. This would be a solid agenda for a summit.

Gorbachev said he was aware that not everyone in the U.S. wanted an agreement on strategic arms and space, and sought to use such irritants as the Krasnoyarsk radar to undermine prospects for such an accord. Noting that the Soviet side also had complaints about U.S. radars in "Scotland and Greenland," Gorbachev said that he was prepared to remove Krasnoyarsk as an obstacle on a reciprocal basis. Specifically, he could inform the Secretary that, as a unilateral initiative, the Soviet Union was prepared to impose a twelve month moratorium on further construction for the Krasnoyarsk radar. It expected a similar step from the U.S. This would make possible serious work on strategic offensive and space issues in their interrelationship.

THE SECRETARY asked to respond, noting that anytime the General Secretary made a suggestion, it was studied in the U.S. with greatest seriousness. Nonetheless, the Secretary would venture some initial reactions.

The Secretary welcomed Gorbachev's comments on INF, and the impulse he seemed to be prepared to give both sides' negotiators in Moscow to get a Treaty in hand.

On the ABM Treaty and related questions, one of the Secretary's objectives in Moscow had been to clarify precisely what the Soviet side had proposed during Shevardnadze's Washington visit. Cautioning that he did not want his questions to imply interest on the part of the President, who had strong feelings on the subject, the Secretary said he wanted to be sure he correctly understood the Soviet position. Specifically, he understood that Moscow called for a ten-year non-withdrawal period and for compliance with the ABM Treaty "as negotiated."

GORBACHEV interrupted to state: "in the form we observed it before 1983."<sup>5</sup> There had been no differences of interpretation up till then. This had been established not only by Soviet sources, but by the U.S. Congress, on the basis of documentation provided by the Departments of State and Defense.

THE SECRETARY said he was only trying to clarify that when Gorbachev spoke of compliance, he meant compliance as defined in

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<sup>5</sup> Reference is to Reagan's announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative in March 1983.

the DOD report of 1985<sup>6</sup> and similar documents, which served as points of reference. GORBACHEV repeated: “as we both interpreted it, and observed it, before 1983.”

THE SECRETARY said he did not want to argue, but pointed out that legitimate questions of interpretation of the ABM Treaty had arisen. He also noted that, in recent years, some believed that the Soviet side had sought to establish a “narrower than narrow” interpretation of the Treaty. But it would be useful to know how the actual Soviet position corresponded to points of reference like the DOD document the Secretary had described.

GORBACHEV replied that what he meant was the actual practice of both sides before 1983, which reflected their underlying interpretation of the Treaty. If there were differences in interpretation, the Soviet Union was ready, as Gorbachev had told the President in Reykjavik, to come to the rescue in dealing with SDI. Gorbachev felt that the Soviet proposal for agreeing on what could and could not be placed in space held promise in this regard, subject to a ten-year non-withdrawal commitment. This would allow SDI research within agreed parameters. Orders to research institutes would remain and could be filled, but there would be limits. But the key was that there should be no “weapons” in space. In the meantime, the Soviet side would have agreed to the U.S. approach on sublimits.

THE SECRETARY said he wished to clarify further the Soviet position, again with the caveat that his questions did not imply acceptance of that position. He was not in a position to do that. But as he understood it, the Soviet position included the following elements: a ten-year non-withdrawal period; activities as traditionally understood under the ABM Treaty; additional activities in space within the confines of certain specific thresholds; none of these activities to include deployment, which is prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

GORBACHEV added: “not just deployment, but testing of weapons.” He again emphasized the word, “weapons.” What is permitted, he continued, should be discussed and defined.

THE SECRETARY said that perhaps as much as could be said on the subject had been said. He reiterated that he was only seeking clarification of the Soviet position. He was not agreeing with that position on behalf of the President. He wanted to emphasize this. GORBACHEV said he understood.

On the other side of the equation, THE SECRETARY continued, was the issue of how to effect 50% reductions. We believed much

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<sup>6</sup> Reference is to *Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative* (Washington, DC: Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Department of Defense, June 1986).

progress had been made, and would like to make an alternative suggestion, recognizing that in the past the question of sublimits had posed a problem for the Soviet side.

There appeared already to be certain broad areas of agreement. The two sides agreed: on a common, albeit bracketed, common text; on a 6,000 warhead aggregate ceiling; on a 1,600 bomber/launcher limit; on a 1540 heavy missile sublimit; on a bomber counting rule; and on reducing throwweight by 50%, while seeking to codify this in language which would prevent subsequent increases in throwweight once this level were reached.

One of the sublimits which the U.S. had proposed, which had been picked up in the proposal which Gorbachev had just made, was a 3,300 warhead ceiling on ICBM's. In Washington, the Soviets had instead proposed a 3,600 limit for all legs of the triad. The U.S. felt it was important to distinguish among the legs of the triad comprising ballistic missiles, on the one hand, and air-delivered systems, on the other. At the same time, land-based missiles could be distinguished from SLBM's in that the former were always "on station." These factors lay behind our desire for a minimum number of warheads to be allocated to the air-delivered leg of the triad, and thus behind our call for a 4,800 ballistic missile warhead sublimit.

In the interest of trying to move the process forward, the U.S. was prepared to drop individual ICBM and SLBM sublimits in exchange for a 4,800 common limit with freedom to mix ballistic missiles.

As the Secretary had said before, when it came to mobile missiles, the question was one of confidence in our ability to verify any limits which might be agreed upon. We did not see an answer to the problem. Perhaps the Soviets could demonstrate how it could be solved before Gorbachev came to the U.S.

That then, was the situation, the Secretary concluded. There was still the question of the 1,650 limit. But our proposal was intended to relax the sublimit problem somewhat, while capping ballistic missiles.

GORBACHEV said that if means could be found of dealing with the whole complex of issues on strategic arms and space in their interrelationship, the question of mobiles could be solved. The Soviet side knew that the U.S. was deploying its own rail mobile MX, as well as the Midgetman. THE SECRETARY said we would prefer to ban mobiles and drop those programs. GORBACHEV pointed out that SLBM's were also, in a sense, mobile, and that, while the flight time for an ICBM could be calculated, that of an SLBM could not. THE SECRETARY noted that in both cases it was very short, and, once fired, the missile could not be recalled. That was why we distinguished between them and air-delivered weapons.



GORBACHEV said that, when he described the potentials of the two systems, he simply wanted to point out that both sides had reason for concern. But he wanted to make clear that he did not want the U.S. to feel insecure as a result of any reductions. This would create an unstable situation which was not in the Soviet interest.

THE SECRETARY said he recalled that Gorbachev had made a similar point in Geneva. It was a point that the Secretary accepted. The Secretary also recalled that in Geneva Gorbachev had stressed that neither side should require the other to restructure his deterrent. Such an approach would not work. That was why we had proposed an arrangement which would cap ballistic missiles but leave the question of structure within the 4,800 sublimit to the choice of the side concerned.

GORBACHEV said that he thought the basis existed for work toward a key provisions agreement. This could be the central element of a Washington summit, in addition to the signing of an INF Treaty. Agreement on key provisions would enable the leaders to give their delegations clear instructions to conclude a Treaty which could be signed at a subsequent Moscow summit.

In this regard, Gorbachev said he wanted to address an idea raised in the past by Amb. Kampelman and others that, if it were possible first to reach agreement on a START treaty, it would be much easier to deal with space. This was not a realistic approach; the two sides should not waste time on it. The problems should be dealt with in their interrelationship. The Soviet Union was willing to accommodate U.S. concerns, but any agreement should reflect the interests of both sides.

THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. was prepared to work on these things, but expressed doubts that the Geneva delegations would be able to deal with them adequately. This was something for Gorbachev and the President to decide. What the negotiators could do was to lay the ground for a fruitful discussion at a summit. He had made some suggestions to that effect.

First, the Secretary suggested that the Geneva delegations should be instructed to work with priority and energy on verification questions, and particularly on how we would verify whatever was agreed to on mobile missiles. INF had shown how difficult such issues could become; we did not want to wait until February or March to begin work on verification in START.

Second, with respect to the various positions that had been tabled in Geneva, the negotiators ought to try to clarify things as much as possible. They should seek to explain the rationale behind their positions. This would help when Gorbachev and the President got together.

Third, the Secretary suggested that the negotiators continue the process of seeking to eliminate brackets in the various texts being



discussed. As to parameters, instructions could emerge from a summit meeting, in light of what had already been agreed upon before a summit.

GORBACHEV said he saw some weaknesses in the Secretary's suggestions. First, there had been no mention of the problem of space. If that were not addressed, movement in other areas made no sense. The problems should be tackled in their interrelationship. Why, Gorbachev asked, was the U.S. delegation avoiding a discussion of space issues, including the most recent Soviet proposals?

Gorbachev also expressed his "overall impression" that the Secretary's three suggestions reflected an effort to reject the idea that a key provisions agreement should be prepared in time for a Washington summit. The Secretary was proposing "vague" provisions. Everything that he had suggested should be done, but the goal of such activity should be a key provisions agreement to sign at a summit. Gorbachev repeated with emphasis that such an agreement must be completed in time for a summit for signature by himself and the President in Washington.

In sum, Gorbachev concluded, the delegations in Geneva should be instructed to work on a key provisions agreement. Were this not possible, the Soviet side would have to postpone results until the next administration. This was not what it wanted. It believed there were good possibilities to achieve a Treaty with the Reagan administration.

THE SECRETARY said that he was not trying to be vague. Much was already agreed, largely as a result of Reykjavik. The question was as to next steps. The Secretary agreed with Gorbachev on the need for clearer instructions to negotiators, but reiterated that, with due respect for our delegations in Geneva, the basic decisions would have to be made by Gorbachev and the President. What the negotiators could do was prepare the ground. That was why the Secretary had emphasized the need for clarity and continued work on verification, especially as it related to mobiles.

GORBACHEV proposed that, in that case, the negotiators be instructed to prepare a draft key provisions agreement text, not just engage in desultory discussions.

THE SECRETARY agreed that, the further along the process was by the time of Gorbachev's meeting with the President, the better. Much preparatory work could be done. But the big decisions would be made by the leaders themselves. We were as anxious as the Soviet side to capture the breakthroughs made in Reykjavik so that they could be put into effect.

GORBACHEV said that Reykjavik already had its place in history. But a second Reykjavik was not possible. It was impossible to meet

again for an extemporaneous discussion. It had been possible to preserve Reykjavik despite the efforts of those who would bury it. But a second Reykjavik was impossible. It would be a political loss for both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union had said it wanted to improve relations with the U.S.; the U.S. was lagging behind. Perhaps this was due to Ambassador Matlock's reporting.

THE SECRETARY said that what was happening in the Soviet Union was interesting.

GORBACHEV said he would explain the reference to Matlock. He had with him an interesting document that, when he had first seen it, he had decided he must raise it with the Secretary. Holding up a copy of the State Department publication, "Soviet Intelligence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986–87,"<sup>7</sup> Gorbachev alleged that it contained "shocking revelations." Specifically, he noted the pamphlet's treatment of a "Mississippi Peace Cruise" which Gorbachev had commended to President Reagan during the Geneva summit as an example of the kinds of people-to-people activities they had agreed to expand. Now, it turned out, the U.S. had discovered that these same agreements—and this same cruise—were being used by the Soviets to deceive Americans. Gorbachev asked if the example he had given the President had been chosen on purpose for inclusion in the study.

THE SECRETARY said he was unfamiliar with the pamphlet, and asked if he could keep it. GORBACHEV said it was his only copy. He had raised the issue, he continued, because the Soviet leadership had made a decision to improve U.S.-Soviet relations across the board. There was no interest in Moscow in nourishing hatred for the U.S. Could the U.S. not live without portraying the Soviet Union as an "enemy"? Was it a "must" to do so? What kind of a society would need such an approach? It did not bother Gorbachev when Charles Wick said that perestroika was all a show, but how could the Secretary of State negotiate with people he considered "enemies." Gorbachev asked the Secretary to consider all of this carefully, because Moscow genuinely wanted to improve relations.

THE SECRETARY said that the desire to improve relations was mutual. The skepticism which many in the U.S. displayed toward events in the Soviet Union was a function of things which had been done by the Soviets in the past and which had bothered us a great deal. GORBACHEV interjected that some feared that Americans would

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<sup>7</sup> Reference is to *Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda 1986–87*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987).

be less skeptical, and so developed active measures which portrayed two years of progress in expanding exchanges as KGB penetration.

THE SECRETARY asked to give some examples of the kind of things which bothered Americans. “Poor” Jimmy Carter, to cite one, was a man of good will, who suddenly learned a lesson when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. It was a good lesson. KAL was another episode. We were not sure how that had happened.

GORBACHEV interjected that the Secretary should begin with Gary Powers and the U-2 incident. THE SECRETARY replied that the problem was that Gromyko had sat in Madrid<sup>8</sup> with other foreign ministers and said, “yes, we did it, and we will do it again.” A chill had gone through the room. GORBACHEV asked how much the U.S. had paid for the pension of the pilot who flew KAL 007. THE SECRETARY said he would not dignify the comment with a response. GORBACHEV said he would ignore the Secretary’s remarks as well. THE SECRETARY told him to read Gromyko’s speech, which had appalled everyone who heard it.

The Secretary continued that, more recently, Soviet sources had sought to spread rumors that the U.S. had invented AIDS and was trying to spread it. We had thus been glad when Soviet authorities had informed us the campaign would stop. GORBACHEV asked why, in that case, the Secretary was raising the issue.

THE SECRETARY said he would describe his own attitude, which, Dobrynin could verify, had remained constant since the seventies. One had to recognize that the improvement of relations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. was the most important endeavor in international affairs. There was no more important task. It was a difficult task, because our societies were different. GORBACHEV interjected that the Soviet Union did not tell the U.S. how to change. THE SECRETARY said that neither did the U.S. The Soviet Union had its own system. It was seeking to change that system. The Secretary was fascinated by the process, and would like to know more about it. But it was a Soviet problem, not ours. Holding up the pamphlet, GORBACHEV asked how, if what the Secretary was saying, such documents could happen. The SECRETARY repeated that this was the first time he had seen it. He suspected it was not as bad as Gorbachev had said.

GORBACHEV replied that the document, and the approach it represented, was a throw-back to an old approach. When he had recently met with American teachers of Russian, he had asked them if they had encountered in the Soviet Union any lack of respect for the United

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<sup>8</sup> Information about this episode is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985.

States. They had said, no. Nor would the Secretary find the Soviet Union portraying Americans as enemies or ready to precipitate a bloodbath, as Soviet citizens were portrayed by the U.S. The President liked to say that everything was possible once confidence was established. Did documents like this one produce confidence? There had been some improvement in contacts between the two countries, and the Soviet side welcomed this. But the U.S. seemed to be afraid of it. How weak the U.S. must be to react so. Gorbachev said he would like to conclude this sharp exchange on the note with which he had begun—a desire to improve relations. The desire was there on the Soviet side. The U.S. should reflect on this.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed. GORBACHEV said, “Good, let’s forget it.” THE SECRETARY said he also lived by it, and fought for it, which was not always easy. GORBACHEV said the discussion did not detract from the value of the meeting or diminish its importance. It was but another indication that the two sides should use the U.S.-Soviet bulldozer to move closer to one another.

Gorbachev asked the Secretary how they should conclude the meeting.

THE SECRETARY said that, in terms of content, while there was work to do, he had nothing to add. He only wanted to emphasize that the agenda we had agreed to was a broad one, and that we needed to address all the issues it covered, from human rights, to Afghanistan, to the various security issues. We needed constantly to be looking for areas where we could take constructive action. For example, the evening before the Secretary and Shevardnadze had discussed the situation in Southern Africa; maybe there was something which could be done there. So there was a broad agenda, and we should see what could be done at the ministers’ level, as well as at the level of Gorbachev and the President.

The President, for his part, hoped that Gorbachev would come to the United States. He was prepared to receive the General Secretary with great respect, and dignity, and friendship. Gorbachev had mentioned a reciprocal visit to Moscow, as had been agreed in Geneva. The Secretary was sure the President would like to see the Soviet Union, and not just Moscow. So the President hoped Gorbachev would want to come. From the President’s standpoint, the most convenient time would be late November. There should be an INF treaty by then. The Secretary did not have a clear idea of Gorbachev’s calendar or how long he might wish to stay, but he wanted him to know that he would be welcome to come to do business, and to know that he would be received with appropriate official honors. In addition to personal interaction with the President and himself, the Secretary suggested it would be well for Gorbachev to meet with Congressional leaders and people

from different walks of life and regions of the U.S. Knowing Gorbachev's broad interests, the Secretary thought he should also take away some sense of American life in such areas as science, technology and agriculture.

GORBACHEV asked what kind of agenda the Secretary would expect for a Washington summit in light of the day's exchange.

THE SECRETARY said that it would reflect the broad nature of the relationship itself. There would certainly be an INF Treaty to sign. There should be sessions between Gorbachev and the President, supported by advisors, and possibly working groups, on the range of substantive issues. It might be appropriate to hold the discussions in a special setting, e.g. Camp David or Williamsburg, to allow for sustained substantive concentration.

The Secretary thought that there should be an official program which would demonstrate respect for the General Secretary and the Soviet Union. There should also be opportunities for exposure to Congress and to Americans from various walks of life. The Secretary believed it would be very desirable for the General Secretary to travel beyond Washington, in part out of "personal motives." The Secretary wanted to see relations between the two countries improve. He had had the privilege of seeing a fair amount of Gorbachev. He was convinced that the General Secretary would be liked and respected were he to get around the U.S.; he would be considered a "good guy." His direct, engaging and curious manner would strike a responsive chord among Americans. These then, were the ingredients; they could be shaken up in any manner.

GORBACHEV said he wanted to return to the business part of the visit. What would be prepared for the meeting in the strategic arms/space areas?

THE SECRETARY could only tell Gorbachev what he would like to see emerge—a result which would enable us, given a push by Gorbachev and the President, to complete work on a Treaty by sometime the following spring. But, the Secretary acknowledged, he could not guarantee what might emerge. He asked Carlucci to comment.

CARLUCCI said he felt the chances of reaching agreement on START were good. The President would like to reach an agreement. But Carlucci had to say he was troubled by the emphasis Gorbachev had placed on linking the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty to START. This would be very difficult. The President had made a personal and public commitment to proceeding with a managed transition from mutually assured destruction to a reliance on a combination of offensive and defensive systems. He believed this to be a stable means of preventing war in the future. He was unwilling to accept artificial restraints on SDI. There was thus a need to identify ways of meeting

the Soviet desire for greater predictability without putting restraints on SDI through the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

GORBACHEV countered that it turned out that the agenda that he had discussed with the Secretary in April had not emerged, to wit: an INF agreement; an agreement on key provisions of a strategic arms/space treaty; and progress on ending nuclear testing. Under such circumstances, he had to wonder about the meaning of summit. Would the two leaders gain or lose vis-a-vis their own countries and the world?

It had been right to have the first summit in Geneva. There had since been another. There had been many meetings between the Secretary and Shevardnadze. So what would be better? A summit meeting or something else? Gorbachev said he feared that people would not understand if the two leaders kept meeting and had nothing to show for it, especially since they both agreed, and had said publicly, that strategic arms were the key.

THE SECRETARY suggested that, in that case, perhaps they should consider different ways to conclude an INF accord. Since it was virtually complete, it should be signed, ratified and put into effect. It would carry more weight if it had the President's and Gorbachev's imprimatur, but it might be signed by negotiators in Geneva. The Secretary admitted, however, that he had not given serious thought to appropriate means of signing the treaty in the absence of the President and Gorbachev.

The Secretary also noted Gorbachev's apparent view that a summit should be linked in some way to reaching agreement on the President's SDI program. Carlucci had described the President's strong views on this. The question was: was it possible to find a formulation which would give the Soviets the assurances they needed while preserving the strength and thrust of the President's program? The answer was: we did not know. Some ideas had been advanced, but the Secretary did not want to overstate their prospects.

GORBACHEV said that, when he had asked about the agenda for a Washington meeting, he did not mean to suggest he did not want to come. He did want to visit the U.S., but had to emphasize what he had said in April. A meeting could not take place unless it produced really substantive results. A third meeting without movement would not be taken seriously. Gorbachev had therefore dwelt on the agenda because he wanted a summit—a summit *in* America. He believed that in the remaining month and a half enough progress could be made in Geneva to justify a visit, perhaps not in November, but in December. A meeting was necessary. He was prepared to come. He was not maneuvering. He was insisting on the need for a key provisions agreement on strategic arms and space because he was convinced that the quantitative wherewithal was there to produce a qualitative result if the two sides worked hard over the next month and a half. Perhaps

the delegations would not be able to resolve everything, but the basic structure that Gorbachev and the Secretary discussed in April should be the basis for any visit.

SHEVARDNADZE commented that further contacts presupposed such an approach. If the President were to come to Moscow, the ground-work would need to be well laid.

THE SECRETARY said that it was not the format, but the content of Gorbachev's suggestions which made him cautious. The content was there, but there were different ways to express it.

GORBACHEV said that the negotiators should give it a try. THE SECRETARY said he doubted that they would be equal to the task. The decisions involved had to be resolved at a higher level—at that of ministers or higher. The issues involved went to the heart of the President's SDI program. As to timing, if things went beyond early December, one ran into a period which would not be good for a visit. A further delay would be possible, but the later a meeting took place, the less time the Reagan administration would have to seek its ratification and fight for it.

GORBACHEV noted with a laugh that much was clearer as a result of his talk with the Secretary. Both sides now needed to do some thinking and to clarify what should be done. Gorbachev would report to the Soviet leadership; the Secretary to the President. Did the Secretary agree?

THE SECRETARY said he would prefer to set a date, but had no authority to say he could predict with any confidence when Gorbachev and the President could agree on an ABM/Space/SDI package. There may be possibilities, but the Secretary did not know what they might be. GORBACHEV said that this was all the more reason for the Secretary to report to the President. He could decide.

THE SECRETARY said that he also thought that there was merit to the proposition that meetings of the leaders of the two superpowers should be able to meet "without the world shaking." There was much to discuss; it was not necessary that every central issue be resolved. GORBACHEV said he agreed, but felt that this round should be conducted in the manner he had described.

THE SECRETARY asked how Gorbachev would propose to describe the outcome. The Secretary, for his part, would say that there had been a full round of discussion, would describe what had been done on INF, and would indicate that we expected to complete the Treaty in the near future. He would indicate that strategic arms and space had been discussed and that, while there had been a good exchange of views, he did not see, particularly in the space area, any immediate prospect for an agreement. He would say that the General



Secretary had not felt comfortable at this time setting a date for his visit to the U.S., and that we would continue working in this area.

GORBACHEV agreed with the Secretary's assessment, with the addition that he would say that he would probably write the President a letter.<sup>9</sup> Gorbachev agreed that the process should be described as moving ahead, and that an INF agreement could be expected. Such an agreement would help in reaching agreement on the more central issues of strategic arms and space.

THE SECRETARY asked if the Soviet side had given thought to how an INF Treaty might be signed so that the ratification process could begin.

GORBACHEV said he believed on the basis of his discussion with the Secretary that there was still time to make progress in strategic arms. He wanted to explore further possibilities for compromise within the timeframe the Secretary and Shevardnadze had agreed to for a summit—i.e., within the current year. At present the Secretary clearly had to consult with the President. But there was time to work. If the two sides were successful, there would be a solid basis for a Washington summit.

THE SECRETARY said he hoped Shevardnadze was right, but pointed out that time was running out. He hoped the General Secretary was right, and would work hard to prove him right. GORBACHEV said he was sure of success if Nitze and Carlucci put their backs to the task. THE SECRETARY said he thought that assessment was wrong. GORBACHEV said that he would write the President, in that case. The "front" would have to expand.

THE SECRETARY said, "so be it." But he warned that Gorbachev should weigh carefully the advisability of tying the entire relationship to SDI. It was not that people would get mad and stop trying, but time was running out.

As for himself, there was one promise the Secretary intended to collect from Shevardnadze—to see a bit more of the Soviet Union. GORBACHEV said that the Secretary would have plenty of chances. THE SECRETARY said he certainly would in about 15 months. GORBACHEV noted that the Secretary knew many people in the Soviet Union.

SHEVARDNADZE remarked that it was not good that the U.S. seemed to be afraid of a key provisions agreement. The Soviet side was not speaking about SDI, but about the ABM Treaty. THE SECRETARY repeated that we were not against a key provisions agreement as such, but were concerned as to its substance. The Secretary had been candid

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<sup>9</sup> See Document 88.



in explaining that, while he hoped for substantive progress on ABM matters, he did not feel as confident as in the strategic arms area.

GORBACHEV said that the U.S. should reflect further on the matter. If, however, the U.S. position was that there was nothing to talk about with respect to space, it should say so.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that the U.S. had had a number of things to say about space in Washington. The principle of non-withdrawal was acceptable. We had put forward the idea of a seven-year period, i.e., to 1994. The Soviet side was talking about ten years. So there were areas of overlap. There was less agreement on what happened at the end of that period. And the heart of the matter, and most difficult of all, was what happened during the non-withdrawal period itself. The ABM Treaty barred deployments, and so there was agreement on that. As for what kind of actions were permitted, the U.S. position was that the Treaty, as negotiated, was consistent with an interpretation which allowed a fairly broad range of activities, although this was not the definition used in structuring our SDI program.

GORBACHEV said that this was the approach which made the Soviet side so suspicious as to U.S. plans. THE SECRETARY emphasized the President's view of the importance of freedom to determine the feasibility of a defense against ballistic missiles, noting that the U.S. had proposed various confidence building measures, e.g., open labs, to meet stated Soviet concerns over predictability.

GORBACHEV asked what might be signed in Washington on nuclear testing. THE SECRETARY recalled the agreement reached during Shevardnadze's Washington trip to begin negotiations on nuclear testing, and on how to go about the task. Working groups were discussing modalities in Moscow. It was our expectation that the negotiations would focus first on experiments to resolve questions on verification techniques, and "as this was being done" it would be possible to seek ratification of the two existing treaties. By next spring, they might be ratified. In the meantime, some testing would remain important.

DOBRYNIN commented that it seemed to him a paradoxical situation had arisen. The President seemed to have made clear in his press conference earlier in the week that he considered INF essentially completed and START the main priority task. This was creating the impression that strategic arms issues would be the major issue at a summit. But since both sides knew that Moscow insisted on linking a START treaty to progress on space, the situation was headed for catastrophe. Why not rethink the matter, and use the remaining month and a half to achieve progress?

THE SECRETARY said he had no objection to such an approach, except that it did not appear realistic. The President had also pointed

out in his press conference<sup>10</sup> that the ABM Treaty had been premised on the assumption that strategic arms would decrease; instead they had increased by a factor of four. Even if strategic arms were reduced by 50%, there would still be twice as many warheads as in 1972. That was why we had felt it inappropriate to link strategic arms reductions to space.

GORBACHEV said that that seemed to indicate that everything which could be said had been said. But the dialogue was not over. Gorbachev had the advantage that he could write directly to the President. THE SECRETARY said we would expect a letter. GORBACHEV said it would come in short order. There was still time to reach an agreement on key provisions. This was a crucial juncture in the relationship.

THE SECRETARY acknowledged that a possibility existed. But he thought it unlikely. GORBACHEV said the Secretary could believe that if he liked. CARLUCCI said that this did not mean Gorbachev was not still welcome. GORBACHEV said he wanted to come, but not just for a reprise of Shevardnadze's Washington visit—he and the Secretary had essentially worked out the INF agreement then. THE SECRETARY assured Gorbachev that, if the working groups had their way, he would still have plenty to work out in Washington.

GORBACHEV volunteered the notion that a “halfway” meeting might be appropriate for signing the INF agreement if he did not visit the U.S. in 1987. But this would mean that the President could not come to Moscow in 1988. For his part, Gorbachev wanted to come to Washington. But the substance had to be ready.

CARLUCCI said that there would be INF, and progress on START. But SDI was the President's program. What Gorbachev had said about SDI, as Carlucci understood it, seemed to be incompatible with that program. This was a key issue.

GORBACHEV said he would write the President. If there were no result, the only thing to do would be to sign the INF agreement at an appropriate level outside the context of a Washington visit. But Gorbachev was not in favor of such an approach. CARLUCCI said he didn't say nothing was possible; he said that Gorbachev's goals appeared incompatible with SDI.

GORBACHEV said they had to be made compatible. One could not just walk away from the problem.

He concluded the session with a brisk, “O.K. These have been good talks,” and moved around the table to shake hands with the U.S. delegation.

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<sup>10</sup> For the full text of this press conference, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1987*, Book II, pp. 1218.

**85. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, October 23, 1987, 5:10–6:20 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Shultz-Shevardnadze Concluding Session, October 23

**PARTICIPANTS***U.S.*

The Secretary  
National Security Advisor Carlucci  
Ambassador Matlock  
Ambassador Nitze  
Ambassador Max Kampelman  
ACDA Director Adelman  
Ambassador Ridgway  
Ambassador Schifter  
DAS Thomas  
Mr. Afanassenko (Interpreter)  
Others

*U.S.S.R.*

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
CPSU Secretary Dobrynin  
First DepFor Minister Vorontsov  
DepFor Minister Bessmertnykh  
MFA DepDirector Sukhodrev  
Ambassador Grinevskiy  
Deputy Director Glukhov  
Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)  
Others

SHEVARDNADZE noted this was the concluding session. The working groups could inform the Ministers of the work they had done, of what was emerging and not emerging, of what had been accomplished at their meetings. He asked the Secretary which group should speak first. The Secretary suggested arms control.

VORONTSOV said he would begin with the working group on arms control, and specifically with the group on INF. The evening before the U.S. side had asked a number of questions, and the Soviet side was now ready to provide answers. During the morning a basic question had been raised about the excessive involvement of strategic missiles in the INF Treaty that the U.S. delegation wanted. The Soviet side had said it was ready to provide information (going beyond national technical means) on what was an INF missile and what was an ICBM. They had already told the U.S. delegation there was a difference in size: the SS–20 was 3 meters longer and had seven axles, unlike the SS–25. They were now ready to give the U.S. side a photocopy, admittedly not very clear, but clear enough for the U.S. side to see clearly that they were distinguishable. In the photocopy, the SS–20 was at the top and the SS–25 at the bottom; the picture showed side and above views. This eliminated the need for on-site inspections of the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow/Washington Oct. 1987. Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting took place in the Guest House at the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

SS-25; the U.S. can receive sufficient information on it from national technical means.

With regard to on-site inspections: if the U.S. agreed to inspection of all infrastructure of all IRM and SRM missiles, including in Europe and including test ranges, the Soviet delegation would then agree to 10 inspections per year. On a related U.S. question, the Soviet side was ready for OSI's for up to ten years: during the first five years, 10 per year, and during the second five years 2–3 per year.

The next U.S. question concerned the time when the inspectors would have access to a facility after entry at the entry point. The Soviet side proposed that this be from 6 to 12 hours, depending on how far the facility was from the entry point and what the weather was.

Another question was whether there would be limits on inspection activity, Vorontsov went on. The Soviet side thought there should be none at operational bases.

The next question was whether the inspected side had the right to terminate an OSI. The Soviet side held that if the agreed procedures had been strictly followed, there should not be such a right.

The next question was whether information learned by the inspecting party could be confidential. The Soviet side thought it could be confidential if the sides so decide. (Bessmertnykh corrected an initial misstatement by Vorontsov on this point.)

The next question was whether there could be inspection of launch boosters for R&D purposes. The Soviet side could agree only to notification, without inspection, of existing boosters; national technical means should be adequate for verification.

The next question was whether missiles could be destroyed by launching during the first six months. The Soviet side thought no more than 20–25% of deployed and non-deployed missiles should be so destroyed.

The next question, Vorontsov went on, concerned non-circumvention. The Soviet side continued to insist on the need to include in the Treaty a provision on non-circumvention; it could be more or less similar to Article 12 of the SALT II Treaty.

Those were all the U.S. questions, Vorontsov concluded.

THE SECRETARY said he was sure there was room here for discussion, but there was not time to paw through this material. It would be worked with. NITZE said the U.S. side would like to discuss these replies in full detail with the Soviet team. Otherwise it would be impossible to form a judgment. The question was when and how this discussion could take place. He hoped it would be soon. THE SECRETARY joked that it could not be done in Moscow, for then the U.S. delegation would miss its plane. NITZE commented that it would have to be in

Geneva. The Secretary said it was too bad they had wasted so much time; they could have finished that off.

SHEVARDNADZE said many of these questions had been discussed, and all had to be resolved. It was hard to be definite about them. The ministers could only ask the delegations to move ahead on medium-range and shorter-range missiles, taking account of the Secretary's talk with Mikhail Sergeivich Gorbachev, the talks the ministers had had, and Vorontsov's answers. They could ask them to speed up their work, on the question required for the protocol. The time period might be two or three weeks. They could ask them to complete most of their work in that time, taking into account the discussions during these meetings.

THE SECRETARY said the delegations should see where they were next week. These issues had been pawed over endlessly. The ministers should ask the delegations to report to them at the end of the next week. SHEVARDNADZE suggested that every week he and the Secretary take stock and give the delegations a new impulse.

NITZE asked when the Soviet data would be available. THE SECRETARY said he assumed it would be available Monday or Tuesday, or whenever the delegations reconvened; it could be now if the Soviet side was ready. SHEVARDNADZE said it would be Monday,<sup>2</sup> the next working day. This was not a problem. The Soviet side had prepared the data and agreed to provide it; it would be done.

Shevardnadze asked for a report on nuclear testing. GOLOVKO said the working group on nuclear testing had had two meetings. On organizational matters it had adopted the following recommendation: that the first round of negotiations begin November 9; that during that round it consider organizational and procedural questions on the conduct of the negotiations, and practical work on the first experiment. It would be desirable if improved verification procedures could be agreed in the first half of 1988. With regard to the second part of the discussion, the Soviet side had suggested three working groups, on the experiment, on practical matters and on legal issues. To accelerate things, the Soviet members had proposed visits to test ranges. The U.S. members had thought this an interesting suggestion, and said they would take it into account in formulating the U.S. approach. The third part of the discussion had been about a possible statement during the Secretary of State's visit, to the effect that the two sides had decided to begin negotiations November 9 in Geneva.

DIRECTOR ADELMAN said the U.S. side was happy the group had agreed to begin negotiations November 9, well ahead of the Decem-

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<sup>2</sup> October 26.

ber 1 date discussed in Washington. They had agreed to the first step, and the U.S. side welcomed the Soviet ideas on how to structure the negotiations. It would take them into account when it returned to Washington; we would let our negotiator decide on how to proceed.

SHEVARDNADZE asked whether the statement could be issued. ADELMAN replied that we had agreed to that. (Some banter on venue—Geneva, Vienna, Morocco—followed.) SHEVARDNADZE said that meant we could say in public we had agreed to begin November 9, and parenthetically that the group had done good work.

On chemical weapons, BATASANOV said the working group had based itself on the procedure adopted in Washington, with host country beginning, so he would begin in Moscow. He could not report brilliant results, but the group had done detailed work in two meetings. It had found that the sides had coincident or similar views on a number of issues, such as inspection facilities and CW non-proliferation. They had determined that these deserved special attention, especially at the next bilateral discussions scheduled for December. The Soviet side had raised the desirability of giving new impetus to the discussions, in view of the possibility of a summit meeting, and had proposed a draft statement. The U.S. side thought this premature. A joint report had been discussed; the Soviet side had proposed that it treat agreed areas, and further areas. The U.S. side had proposed a shorter draft, on further work. It could not agree to a positive assessment, so there was no report. But the discussions had helped clarify matters.

AMBASSADOR HOLMES said the working group had had positive and useful discussions, building on the exchange in Washington. It was good to give political-level direction to talks on those areas where the delegations in Geneva should concentrate: the participation of all CW possessors and CW-capable states; strengthening verification in light of new technology and dual-capable industries; security; data-verification; additional confidence-building measures. The Soviet side made proposals and agreed to submit these in the Geneva bilateral talks. Concerning areas of disagreement, the U.S. side had noted its view that the U.S. had a right to an adequate, modernized, safer capability in the CW field.

SHEVARDNADZE asked what the status of binaries was.

BATSANOV said the Soviet side had expressed the view that binary production would have negative political consequences. But when it came to dealing with the issue in the working group report, the Soviet side had said that while it understood there was a difference, it saw no need to make a positive statement on the U.S. program in the report. It had thus proposed neutral language; but this had not been acceptable to the U.S.

THE SECRETARY said this was an important issue, and he thought clarification was progress; it had been discussed the night before too.

SHEVARDNADZE said discussion was a step forward, but he saw little progress to report. He asked for a report on conventional weapons questions.

GRINEVSKIY said the group had held three meetings, based on the ministers' instructions to consider strengthening conventional stability and reducing conventional armaments. The principal topic had been the mandate for discussions among the 23, and the principal difficulty had been tactical nuclear weapons. In Washington, the Soviet side had proposed compromise language concerning dual-capable weapons. Here in Moscow the U.S. side had tentatively agreed that such weapons could be included in negotiations, but no common language had been found. The U.S. side thought they should be considered only as conventional weapons. Second, the working group members had agreed to recommend continued consultation on a bilateral basis in Vienna, and inclusion of military experts who could discuss—for example in January—the systems of greatest concern to each side. Third, the Soviet side had given a detailed explanation of the proposals made at Murmansk, and had proposed bilateral discussion of them. The U.S. side had expressed “a certain interest,” and said it would consider the proposal after it had discussed the matter with its Allies. The sessions had not been very productive, but they had continued the exchanges begun in Washington, and made things clearer.

THOMAS said the clear focus of the working group discussion had been the Soviet desire to include tactical nuclear weapons in the arms control discussions in Vienna. The Soviet side had suggested two ways to do this. First, it had suggested dealing with dual-capable systems. The U.S. side had tried to make clear that while we did not rule out discussion of dual-capable systems in their conventional aspects, there was no chance of discussion of their nuclear aspect. Second, the Soviet side had suggested that tactical nuclear weapons be included in future negotiations; the U.S. side had made clear we could not accept this. Exchanges on consultations had been more precise. Both sides, as indicated by Ambassador Grinevskiy, agreed it would be useful to continue their consultations of their representatives on furthering progress in the Vienna discussions concerning conventional armaments. But that was as far as things had gone.

SHEVARDNADZE said “alright.” THE SECRETARY suggested they turn to START and space. SHEVARDNADZE asked if the Secretary had questions on what had been reported. THE SECRETARY replied that he thought the report had been adequate, and suggested they continue. Noting that the ministers themselves had discussed, SHEVARDNADZE suggested they turn to bilateral issues.

SUKHODREV reported that the working group had first considered the work program agreed to in Washington. They agreed work



was off to a good start. He would not mention all the issues. But the two sides had expressed satisfaction with the results of the work of U.S. and Soviet officials in the Vienna talks on fusion; there it had been agreed that further consultations would take place. At some point, quantity should turn into quality, SUKHODREV commented. At the talks on science and technology in Moscow, the Soviet side had presented some 30 topics as of possible interest; the U.S. side had promised to consider them carefully, and the two sides saw reason for cautious optimism. The working group had also discussed specific questions of an administrative and consular nature, concerning the consulates general in San Francisco and Leningrad, on which the U.S. side owed a response to Soviet proposals made six months ago. With regard to cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space, the Soviet side had proposed consultations on political-legal and international-legal issues, and the U.S. side had agreed to consider this. Finally, the two sides had considered the package on conditions for diplomats. Here they had not agreed. Basically there were two unresolved issues, numbers for temporary repair workers and guest visas.

SIMONS said Sukhodrev's report was a substantially accurate description of the working group discussions. These had had basically the two elements Sukhodrev had described. First, they had reviewed progress on the bilateral work program since Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Washington. They had agreed that in general things were moving forward nicely. On what the Soviet side called science and technology and the U.S. side called basic science, the subsequent talks in Moscow had been productive, and the U.S. side owed the Soviet side answers. Simons said he mentioned the topic because Minister Shevardnadze had drawn particular attention to it in Washington, and progress had been made since. On fusion, it was true the sides had welcomed the results of the Vienna discussions the week before on design work, though this was without prejudice to future decisions on construction. The second element was the package of issues on living and working conditions for diplomats. As Sukhodrev had said, there were substantially two disagreed points we still needed to deal with.

THE SECRETARY commented that while ministers dealt with stratospheric topics, the people at their missions were trying to work along. The two issues were very important. The ministers should try to come to grips with them.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that he thought the two sides could be more active on this at the level of their embassies. On the Soviet side there were commitments. He was ready to meet with Ambassador Matlock about this, and Ambassador Dubinin could meet with the Secretary. The basic principle should be one of reciprocity.

Shevardnadze suggested they turn to humanitarian issues. GLUKHOV reported that the Soviet side in the working group had asked



some questions about U.S. practices, and the U.S. side had responded satisfactorily to some of them. The Soviet side had also given Ambassador Schifter some answers on questions of interest to him, humanitarian cases, including departures from the Soviet Union. Schifter had also been interested in changes underway in the Soviet Union, in Soviet regulations and practices. The Soviet side had raised the humanitarian aspects of the Vienna CSCE conference; as it understood the U.S. position, it did not give rise to optimism. The talks had been respectful, and without unnecessary polemics.

AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER reported that Glukhov had characterized the talks correctly. There had been questions on both sides. They had agreed that the purpose of the talks was not to develop or propose texts. The U.S. side had raised questions in three broad areas: emigration, what he would call word crimes, including psychiatric treatment, and communications, like telephone and mail. On emigration, the U.S. side had urged the Soviet side to remove our representation lists from the agenda of the relationship by resolving the cases. He had stressed the issue of separated spouses; of the eleven on the list, one had been resolved a while ago, another the day before; we hoped the remaining nine would be resolved soon. He had also focused on three emigration issues: security, parental veto, and first-degree relative provisions. On security, we were not asking that those who really possessed secrets be released, but we were asking for those who had never possessed any, or whose secrets were obsolete, or had become public knowledge. The Soviets had said such cases were now being processed under new procedures under the auspices of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. But it might be that an “over-my-dead-body” attitude could still be found. THE SECRETARY said that was not a good way to put it. SHEVARDNADZE said there were no such people in the Soviet Union. SCHIFTER said perhaps there were some [the] ministers had not heard of. Finally, he said, he had been told about the Soviet program to review legislation.

THE SECRETARY said he thought it was a good thing we had systematized and regularized our discussions of human rights.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested the Secretary might wish to conclude. He had earlier mentioned the possibility of a joint statement; there was now too little time, so this seemed impossible.

THE SECRETARY said he thought the meeting had been satisfactory. In his press conference he would characterize the spirit as constructive, and tough on the subjects that had been discussed. On INF we were close to completing a treaty. We had made some progress on strategic arms, less in the space area. In April he had given Shevardnadze a paper on the relationship between offense and defense. In Washington, Shevardnadze had given him a similar paper. This was

becoming an interesting way to proceed. We had done another such paper, and we were perhaps building a set of thought together. He wanted to turn it over to Shevardnadze.<sup>3</sup>

In accepting it, SHEVARDNADZE said that was a good thing. He agreed the meetings had been interesting. There had been useful discussions of the entire complex of our agenda. Perhaps some new elements had emerged at the working group level; perhaps they could ask the Soviet desk in the State Department and the USA Department in the Ministry to propose a kind of protocol on what had been decided, what had been agreed and what had been disagreed.

THE SECRETARY said he assumed Shevardnadze was suggesting something to be developed over a period of time, and not that minute. SHEVARDNADZE said he had in mind a week or ten days. The Secretary said "okay."

SHEVARDNADZE noted that in this meeting they had not talked about strategic offensive weapons or the ABM Treaty; but they had talked about them for three hours with the General Secretary. THE SECRETARY said it had been 4½. SHEVARDNADZE replied that it had been almost five, but only three had been on these topics.

THE SECRETARY said he should perhaps apologize to the luncheon guests on behalf of the Ambassador and himself; he hoped to see Shevardnadze again at Spaso House.

SHEVARDNADZE joked that the Secretary could go to his press conference,<sup>4</sup> and Shevardnadze would go to the American Embassy. He commended the format of the meetings; it produced good results and allowed full use of time; it should be used in the future. He would in his comments to the press characterize the talks as constructive and businesslike; the atmosphere had been good; and on the whole the exchanges had been productive. It would not have been possible to make progress on the central INF issues without discussions at their level. On START, too, today the General Secretary had made some proposals which brought greater clarity to the issue of limits and sublimits. He hoped the U.S. side would consider the question of ABM in a spirit of good will. He did not consider that the reserves on this issue had been exhausted. All he had said on it in Washington remained in effect, on devices and the like. He did not know what had happened in Geneva, but what he had said in Washington stood, and he hoped it would be considered.

The Secretary's visit had been useful, Shevardnadze concluded, in improving US-Soviet relations. He thanked the Soviet side's American

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<sup>3</sup> None of these three papers has been further identified.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 6, Document 89.

counterparts and colleagues for their contribution. His only regret was that he had not been at the American Embassy.

THE SECRETARY said that was not the only thing to regret, but he agreed with Shevardnadze's assessment. He asked Shevardnadze to pass on Mrs. Shultz' thanks for a fine program to his wife. SHEVARDNADZE said he would repeat a proposal of two years before: they should turn over the most difficult questions, like space, to their wives. They had good views on such topics; they could find common ground.

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## **86. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, October 26, 1987, 1402Z

403. For Secretary Shultz from Jack Matlock. Subject: Bessmertnykh on Secretary's Meeting with Gorbachev.

1. (S—Entire text.)

2. On the margins of a lunch for Dick Solomon today, Bessmertnykh (strictly protect) made the following "purely private" observations about our Friday meeting with Gorbachev:<sup>2</sup>

—The meeting did not go "as planned"—with implication that Soviets had planned for a date to be set.

—He claimed that Gorbachev drew a hasty conclusion from the absence of an agreement on "key principles" in your list of summit agenda items as evidence that U.S. has rejected the idea of such an outcome. Gorbachev, he said, was not expecting absolute [garble] race, but only an indication that U.S. is committed to try to work out such an agreement.

—All options are genuinely open, with a summit this year a real possibility.

—Drafting of Gorbachev's letter to the President "has started" and it should be delivered "in a few days".<sup>3</sup>

—Soviets are "satisfied" with substantive results of the meeting.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1987 Oct. 26 Mtg w/the PRES. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Alpha.

<sup>2</sup> October 23; see Document 84.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 88.

—Aim of Soviet position is not to “kill” SDI, but to establish some predictability. Furthermore, current positions are still negotiable.

3. Bessmertnykh asked me, in light of the above, to “try to persuade Washington” not to make statements which would in effect, lock the Soviets into a given position. He said that they had been careful in their own statements not to burn any bridges. He also said what they were pleased with the way you handled the issues in your press conference here. His worry, he said, was that others in Washington might make statements which would make it more difficult for the Soviets to repair what he clearly understands is a major blunder on Gorbachev’s part.

4. I, of course, explained to Bessmertnykh the severe damage which on appearance of using the summit date to pressure the President could inflict on our relations.

4. Comment: Bessmertnykh, of course, has some axes to grind and I do not take his explanations as gospel. However, I am struck by Soviet efforts to put your meetings in a favorable light, and believe that there may in fact be efforts underway here to repair the damage. In particular, we probably should refrain at this time from characterizing Soviet policy as out to “kill SDI”. This may turn out to be the case. But to date the evidence is far from conclusive.

**Matlock**

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**87. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 27, 1987, 0404Z

333863. For Ambassador Matlock from the Secretary. Subject: Points for Shevardnadze Meeting.

1. I appreciated the fast report on your conversation with Bessmertnykh, which reinforced my own impression that there was a disconnect of some sort during the Friday meeting.<sup>2</sup> I understand that you and Dick Solomon may have an opportunity tomorrow to see Shevard-

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N870009–0189. Secret; Niact; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Parris; cleared by C. Thomas (EUR) and Levitsky; approved by Shultz.

<sup>2</sup> See Documents 86 and 84, respectively.

nadze.<sup>3</sup> You should use that meeting to make the following points, which you may say reflect my personal views.

2. Begin points:

—We considered the Moscow meeting to be genuinely productive in an active and accelerating series of contacts.

—We were therefore puzzled by the General Secretary's reluctance to set dates for a summit, as had been agreed in Washington. We have therefore been cautious in our public characterization of the Soviet position.

—We continue to believe that an INF agreement is worthy of signing by our top leaders.

—We do not view an INF Treaty as a substitute for progress in other areas, or believe that its signature should be the sole reason for a summit meeting.

—On the contrary, as the Secretary repeatedly made clear in Moscow, we are as interested as the Soviet side in codifying in treaty form the Reykjavik agreement to reduce strategic offensive arms by 50 [percent?].

—Nor are we seeking to avoid a discussion of the role of defense in an environment of decreasing offensive arms.

—The Secretary provided in Moscow some ideas on how our Geneva delegations might address these issues in preparation for a meeting between the President and Gorbachev. Soviet proposals in Moscow and Washington have also given our experts material to work on.

—Such work could pave the way for a serious and potentially productive discussion between the two leaders on these vital problems this year, as the General Secretary said he would like.

—As the Secretary said to the General Secretary, we are convinced that, in the final analysis, the key decisions relating to this complex of issues will have to be made by our leaders themselves.

—But there is no reason why a successful, substantive Washington meeting of the type I have described could not be followed—as you have suggested—by a spring visit to Moscow, where a START Treaty could be signed.

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<sup>3</sup> Solomon and Matlock met with Shevardnadze on October 28. In telegram 419 from Moscow, October 28, Matlock commented: "Despite his imminent departure for the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers' meeting in Prague the next morning, Shevardnadze presented the image of being relaxed and unhurried, if somewhat tired. He took notes on Solomon's report on the planning dialogue, and his extemporaneous remarks imparted a clear message of concern about the impressions of erratic or manipulative Soviet behavior that the Secretary might have taken away from his visit to Moscow the preceding week." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870887–0215)

—Obviously, for any of this to occur, we need to preserve the atmosphere of trust and mutual responsibility which the General Secretary cited as among our post-Geneva achievements.

—The kind of unpredictable changes of course which we experienced in Moscow last week can only undermine such achievements.

—It leads to suspicions that one side is seeking to extract last-minute concessions from the other, or using procedural enticements to gain substantive gains. These tactics won't work.

—At this point, we have avoided drawing hasty conclusions as to Soviet motives.

—We believe it is in our mutual interests to put the dialogue back on a positive track as quickly as possible, and take seriously the General Secretary's repeated statements that he still wants to visit Washington this year.

—We hope that the General Secretary's message to the President will clarify Soviet intentions and reestablish the basis for continued concrete progress of the type we achieved in Washington and Moscow.

—As the Secretary said in Moscow, time is already working against us.

End points.

3. FYI: In using above material, Secretary wants you to be sure not to convey any sense whatever that we are ready to deal on defense and space.

Shultz

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**88. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, October 28, 1987

Dear Mr. President,

I am sure that you have already been informed about the negotiations that our foreign ministers had in Moscow and about my rather

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, 1987 Sept.-Oct. Memos for Pres. R. Reagan. Secret; Sensitive. The letter is an unofficial translation prepared by the Soviet Embassy. Shultz sent the letter to Reagan under a covering memorandum of October 30.

lengthy talk with Secretary of State George Shultz and your Assistant for National Security Frank Carlucci.<sup>2</sup>

Let me say frankly that all of us here are of the same view—those discussions were businesslike, constructive and, what is most important, productive. I think you would agree that the Washington and Moscow stages in the dialogue evolving between us have moved us substantially closer to the concluding phase in the preparation of the Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. We are gratified by the fact that together with your emissaries we were able to surmount what seemed to be the major obstacles and to find compromise language and understandings, which, given continued political will on both sides, enable our delegations in Geneva to finalize the treaty text within the next two or three weeks.

You must have noted that on the last day of the talks the Soviet side made an additional effort on, among others, the question of inspections and verification. We hope that the U.S. side will respond with appropriate reciprocal efforts.

As I see it, the Moscow talks give fresh evidence that our relations are in the process of dynamization, for which the meetings at Geneva and Reykjavik provided the point of departure. I am referring not only to the increasing pace of contacts between our countries but also to the fact that we have really come to grips with the question that both of us believe is the key to ending the nuclear arms race and stabilizing Soviet-US relations. The task of a deep, 50 per cent cut in the strategic offensive arms took center stage in our discussions in Moscow.

And this was by no mere chance, since both you and I are now equally attuned to putting the negotiations on strategic offensive arms onto a track of practical solutions. As I have already written to you, it is necessary to speed up the rhythm of the negotiations in order to make it possible within the next few months to reach full-scale agreements in that area.

With this in mind, on the eve of the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State we in the Soviet leadership once again carefully considered the possibility of imparting additional impulses to the strategic offensive arms negotiations. I set forth in detail to Mr. Shultz the concrete conclusions that we had reached.

Specifically, we took into account that the US side, as it had repeatedly stated, including statements at a political level, attached particular importance to setting specific limits for the distribution of warheads between the various legs of the strategic triad. We carefully assessed the various options of the evolution of the situation, as well as the

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 84.

prevailing trends of a technological and military-strategic nature, and concluded that we could accommodate your position. It is easy to see that certain combinations of the numerical parameters that we proposed produce a picture that is close to the one that US officials at various levels have recently been outlining to us.

Let me add that the new formula that we have proposed has inherent flexibility in it, namely, each side would be able to compensate for a lack in the number of delivery vehicles of one kind by increasing the number of delivery vehicles of another kind within the aggregate limit.

I hope that our proposals will be considered with due attention by your experts and that both sides will now have a broader base for reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.

Of course, work on an agreement reducing strategic offensive arms should be accompanied by efforts to assure continued compliance with the ABM Treaty. Here again, we want nothing more than what was said in Washington, namely, for ten years not to use our right to withdraw from the Treaty.

I recall the words that particularly struck me in one of your letters to me, that our negotiators have to “concentrate on measures which prevent the erosion of the ABM Treaty and strengthen the role that treaty can play in preserving stability as we move toward a world without nuclear weapons”. In the same letter you added: “Proceeding in this fashion might avoid a fruitless debate on generalities and open the way to concrete, practical solutions which meet the concerns of both sides”.

In that regard we were also encouraged by the exchange of views in Washington last September, in which your side noted as a point of agreement that in the context of an accord on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms a period would emerge in which certain rights, including the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, would have to be given up, and the obligations under that Treaty strictly observed.

We have therefore a common basis in that matter too. What remains is, in effect, to agree on the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Is that an unreachable goal? So this is what the matter comes down to right now. It is here that we have to look for a solution. We are ready to do so.

Let me repeat: what is involved here is observance of the ABM Treaty. As to how we view this, we have explained this to you, notably quite recently in Washington.

In order to keep the discussion of those issues within such reasonable bounds and not to allow it to get bogged down in over-complicated



technicalities, or, conversely, in generalized concepts, I propose that along with the Geneva negotiations we might use a channel for constantly checking the course of the negotiations and expressing more freely both our concerns and proposed options. Such a channel could be set up through contacts, specially dedicated to this subject, between the Soviet Foreign Minister and the US Ambassador in Moscow and the US Secretary of State and the Soviet Ambassador in Washington. Of course, some other option could also be considered.

In this regard it is important to act taking into account the fact that the time we have for working out a START Treaty is limited and that it would be desirable to complete it in the first half of the next year and to sign the treaty during your return visit to Moscow.

Of course, we have to clear the path toward such a treaty, removing from it both the natural difficulties, such as the questions of verification—and here I agree with the suggestion Secretary Shultz made, on your behalf, to focus even now on that area—and the complications artificially injected into the negotiations, such as the inclusion of our Backfire medium bomber among strategic arms, the demand for a total ban on mobile ICBMs and the unwillingness to resolve the issue of SLCM limitation.

I am convinced that reaching agreement on strategic offensive arms in the context of compliance with the ABM Treaty is a realistic possibility. In addition, the experience gained in the negotiations on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles can to a substantial degree be useful for us in this area too.

We were, after all, able to agree on starting fullscale negotiations on nuclear testing, although just a few months before this had seemed something beyond our reach.

I believe it is necessary to exert a joint, persistent effort to resolve the problem of banning chemical weapons (although let me say honestly that I am profoundly disappointed by your position on binary weapons).<sup>3</sup> The same applies to conventional arms reductions, in which not only our two countries but also our allies and other European countries are interested.

As early as last April, in my conversation with Mr. Shultz I set forth my concept of our next meeting with you. I continue to be of the view that in addition to signing the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, we should also seriously discuss the START–ABM Treaty problem. I want our ministers and our Geneva delegations not

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<sup>3</sup> On October 16, Reagan announced the modernization of 155mm binary chemical artillery projectiles. (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1987, Book II, p. 1197)

to stand on the sidelines in this matter, so that they could do everything to facilitate to the utmost the work you and I are to do.

If we are to crown your visit to the USSR with a strategic arms treaty, we cannot avoid the need to reach at least an agreement in principle on that matter at our next meeting. The form in which such an agreement would be couched is after all not too important. It might be key elements of a future treaty, if we follow the suggestion you personally made in the spring of 1985.<sup>4</sup> Or, perhaps, instructions or directives that we could give to the delegations to speed up work on such a document.

As I understand, in Moscow the Secretary of State favored working out instructions for the delegations. The important thing is to have a common understanding at the summit level of the goals that we seek to achieve and of the ways of reaching them within the short time available.

If we have a sufficient degree of agreement as to our intentions on that score, we shall be able to enrich our forthcoming discussions in Washington with a meaningful agenda.

I am conveying this letter to you through Eduard Shevardnadze, who is fully aware of my thinking concerning the further evolution of Soviet-U.S. relations and the specific plans for giving it effect. He has all necessary authority to reach agreement with you on all the main aspects of the forthcoming summit meeting, including its agenda, the duration of my stay in the United States and the precise dates of the visit. I would ask you to note, if this coincides with your possibilities, that based on my calendar of activities before the end of this year, the preferable time for my visit to Washington would be in the first ten days of December.

I hope that you will take advantage of our Minister's visit to discuss and resolve the relevant issues, as they say, on the spot.

Sincerely,

**M. Gorbachev<sup>5</sup>**

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<sup>4</sup> For documentation on START negotiations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, 1981–1991.

<sup>5</sup> Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

**89. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, October 30, 1987, 9:05–11:40 a.m.

**SUBJECTS**

Washington and Moscow summits; START; Defense and Space; human rights

**PARTICIPANTS**

<i>US</i>	<i>USSR</i>
The Secretary	Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
National Security Advisor Carlucci	Deputy ForMin Bessmertnykh
Asst. Sec. Ridgway	Shevardnadze Aide Stepanov
Ambassador Matlock	Ambassador Dubinin
EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)	Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko
Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)	(Notetaker)
	Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

[The meeting opened with an initial restricted session, with Ridgway, Stepanov, Matlock and Dubinin joining later.]

SHEVARDNADZE responded to the Secretary's invitation to lead off by noting that he had nothing special to pass on "one-on-one." Rather, he had recalled in preparing for the present meeting how, at the end of the Secretary's April, 1987 visit to Moscow, the two had met alone for a few minutes.<sup>2</sup> On that occasion, Shevardnadze had asked the Secretary a simple question: Did the U.S. really want an INF agreement? The Secretary had said yes.

After that, a lot of tough, creative work had gotten underway. That work had produced the results the two ministers could see in their present meeting. So perhaps it was time to ask another simple, perhaps naive question: Was the U.S. really interested in an agreement on strategic arms? Shevardnadze was convinced that one could be concluded in the time available. So this was a simple, but an important question.

THE SECRETARY said he thought that a START agreement was readily possible. He had found General Secretary Gorbachev's letter,<sup>3</sup> a copy of which had been handed over the night before, to be very positive in that respect. He believed that the letter had given the ministers a solid foundation for their discussions. What they should try to

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow/Washington Oct. 1987. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in Shultz's outer office at the Department of State. All brackets are in the original.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 46.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 88.

do, and what their negotiators should try to do in Geneva, was to give the President and General Secretary what they needed to have a fruitful discussion, a discussion which would enable them, in turn, to give the negotiators instructions which would allow the conclusion of a START agreement by the following spring.

In fact, the Secretary continued, he would go further. Prefacing his remarks by quoting the following passage from Gorbachev's letter,

"I am referring not only to the increasing pace of contacts between our two countries, but also to the fact that we have really come to grips with the question that both of us believe is the key to ending the arms race and stabilizing U.S.-Soviet relations,"

the Secretary observed that both sides shared the conviction that satisfactory relations were essential. It was necessary to work to make progress, and this was being done.

The Secretary noted that the world was changing. It was no longer the bipolar world of the past, and would be even less so in the future. It would become more complex, and the two superpowers needed a relationship which could develop into a more productive way of interrelating in such a world. The Secretary said he knew that the General Secretary thought in terms of emerging trends; he appreciated as well the significance of Shevardnadze's having personally met with S/P Director Solomon earlier that week<sup>4</sup> following Policy Planning staff talks in Moscow. So Shevardnadze had asked a question about strategic arms. The Secretary had given an unequivocal answer. But there were broader trends emerging in the relationship which were also potentially very significant.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that he had asked the question because he had had the impression that, when the General Secretary had outlined new Soviet positions on strategic arms in Moscow, the Secretary had not been responsive. Shevardnadze wanted to be clear on where the U.S. stood. As always, the Soviet side was in favor of achieving breakthroughs in this key area.

THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. very much wanted to do so as well. He believed there was much to say at the moment on strategic arms. The General Secretary's Moscow proposal and his letter provided the basis for a good discussion. But the most difficult subjects before the two ministers were those relating to activities in strategic defense work during whatever non-withdrawal period was agreed to with respect to the ABM Treaty. As yet, there had been no closure on that issue; the ministers would have to discuss it later.

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 87.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that this was a central problem, and asked to make another point. Later the two would have to talk about a program of further high-level contacts, including a summit. As the Washington summit was no longer a remote possibility, the Soviet side attached great importance to getting preparatory work underway. There should be an intense work program to ensure that the two leaders did not have to spend hours or days on things that could be done at a lower level. THE SECRETARY said he agreed.

SHEVARDNADZE said the issue was where the leaders should focus their attention. The Secretary had met with Gorbachev for almost five hours in Moscow.<sup>5</sup> But the leaders should not hold day after day of lengthy meetings. It would be too much. Rather, there should be good preparations so that the short time available at the summit could produce tangible, significant results.

THE SECRETARY said he could assure Shevardnadze that he and his staff were prepared to devote all their energies to the task. The Secretary was willing to be available for discussions with Ambassador Dubinin, and to interact as necessary with U.S. negotiators in Geneva. It was important that the summit be a success. The Secretary wanted the meeting to give to the U.S. and Soviet people, and to the world, a feeling that positive developments were taking place in the relationship.

SHEVARDNADZE said that this would be well.

THE SECRETARY noted that there were various ways that the ministers could organize their discussion. They could focus on INF and strategic arms; or they could take up questions relating to the dates and program for a summit. The Secretary noted that he also had some points to make on human rights.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the discussion initially focus on summit preparations. Once there was agreement on a concept for Gorbachev's visit, it would be possible to work out an agenda. The leaders could not be constrained in what they would discuss, but it would be important for them to have some plan of action, some sense as to how they might best organize their own work. Shevardnadze was prepared to discuss INF and strategic arms questions in detail, but that conversation might best await settling of summit-related questions.

THE SECRETARY agreed to this approach, and, while other participants were being summoned, made a few points on human rights. He noted that Shevardnadze had said in Moscow that exit permission had been granted to 12,000–13,000 Soviet Jews. The Secretary expressed the hope that this meant that numbers actually leaving would rise sharply in the near future. That would be a highly positive sign. The Secretary

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 84.

noted that we remained concerned about the grounds being used to deny applications to emigrate, and particularly about the use of security as grounds for denial.

Briefly running through the categories covered by the U.S. representation lists, the Secretary urged that remaining cases on the list be resolved by the time of the Washington summit. The Secretary particularly called attention to four names which had been raised in the past at the highest level (Abe Stolar, Naum Meiman, Leyla Gordiyevskaya, and Aleksander Lerner), and noted the particularly poignant case of Anatoliy Michelson, who had been separated from his spouse for thirty-one years. The Secretary noted that, in the Gordiyevskaya case, Gordiyevskaya had recently agreed to the confrontation meeting requested by the Soviet Union. We therefore felt it appropriate that his wife should be allowed to visit him, as Mrs. Howard had been allowed to be with her husband in the Soviet Union.

SHEVARNADZE said he would comment in a moment on Soviet views of how to deal with such problems in advance of a summit.

[At this point Ridgway, Matlock, Bessmertnykh and Stepanov joined the group, and there were brief, separate discussions by both delegations of the text of a possible joint statement which had been worked out earlier in the morning by Ridgway and Bessmertnykh.]

The SECRETARY brought the meeting back to order by noting that the President would be leaving Washington for his mother-in-law's funeral early that afternoon. He would nonetheless be able to meet with Shevardnadze for about an hour. The Secretary suggested that the ministers should wrap up their own meeting by noon to enable the Secretary to brief the President, and to allow the Foreign Minister to prepare for the White House session.

SHEVARNADZE said he was aware of the scheduling considerations and appreciated the President's finding time to meet with him under the circumstances.

As to the ministers' own meeting, Shevardnadze noted that it seemed they had just said goodbye in Moscow. In a sense, the current exchange could be seen as a conclusion of the Moscow meetings. The sequence was perhaps unusual, but there was a logic to it. The issues under discussion in Moscow were important, and the two sides had a responsibility to their people and the world to deal with them correctly. Thus, Shevardnadze had not been able to share the view of some who had spoken of the Moscow meetings as a disappointment, as a failure.

Rather, in Moscow it had been possible to make important strides in consolidating the work done at the Geneva and Reykjavik summits. Many obstacles to an INF agreement had been removed in Moscow. There had been a good working environment. Important proposals

had been made in the area of strategic offensive arms and there had been an in-depth discussion of the full range of issues in U.S.-Soviet relations. So, as the General Secretary had written to the President, the Moscow talks had been meaningful and productive; they reflected a new stage in the relationship.

THE SECRETARY said he, too, had thought the Moscow meetings worthwhile. He had said so in his press conference,<sup>6</sup> where, he noted, he had not used the word “disappointment.” That was a word the press had used. For his part, the Secretary was glad that Shevardnadze was in Washington. The Foreign Minister had mentioned that he wanted to open with a discussion of issues related to a summit. The Secretary invited him to share his views.

SHEVARDNADZE stated that, even before the Washington summit, the two sides needed to consider long-term plans for future high-level contacts. If the two ministers’ talks were successful, there would be a Washington summit. But what of the next stage? Shevardnadze pointed out that at their meeting in Geneva, the President and General Secretary had envisioned a return visit by the President to the Soviet Union. The question was when. During the spring? Later?

As to the objectives of future summit meetings, Shevardnadze proposed to start with the President’s return visit. What should the goal of a Moscow summit be? It seemed to Shevardnadze that the Secretary would agree that the result of a Moscow summit should be the signing of a treaty on strategic offensive arms and the complex of questions related to a treaty. There was, Shevardnadze observed, little time—a matter of months—to accomplish the “gigantic” amount of work necessary to achieve that objective. But given the importance that both leaders attached to this key problem, Shevardnadze felt that accelerated efforts by the ministers, by experts and scientists in both countries, could be successful. The key, he felt, was to lay a sound foundation at the Washington summit.

What did Moscow envision for a Washington summit? No doubt an INF agreement would be ready for signing. In the car from Andrews AFB the night before, Shevardnadze recalled, Deputy Secretary Whitehead had said some of the signals from Geneva since the Moscow meeting had not been encouraging. Shevardnadze had had different reports as late as that morning: he had the impression that what had been agreed to in Moscow was being put into effect; progress was being made in resolving remaining issues. Perhaps the U.S. delegates had not had a chance to study what their Soviet counterparts were

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<sup>6</sup> Reference is to Shultz’s October 23 Moscow press conference. (Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1987, pp. 22–25)



saying, but Shevardnadze was certain that ultimately it would prove possible to resolve outstanding differences. So the first item on the Washington summit agenda would be the signing of an INF agreement. Shevardnadze urged that delegations be given instructions to enable them to complete work in two to three weeks; more time was not available.

The next item the leaders ought to address in Washington was strategic offensive arms. Shevardnadze felt that the proposals the General Secretary had made in Moscow should largely take care of the major obstacles to a START agreement. The Soviet side had made important steps toward the U.S. position in these proposals; they should largely have solved the problem of sub-limits. Shevardnadze did not want to get into details, but he assumed that the implications of the Soviet proposal's provision for diverse options in the distribution of warheads on the various elements of the triad would not be lost on the U.S. There were, he emphasized, solid foundations for exploring mutually acceptable solutions.

Next on the Washington summit agenda as seen from Moscow was the question of strengthening strategic stability in the context of 50% reductions in strategic offensive weapons. Reductions of such a magnitude, together with the elimination of INF missiles and projected agreements on tactical missiles and conventional weapons would create a totally new environment. So it was logical to address the question of strategic stability between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., because so much depended on this factor. Reductions should take place in a manner which strengthened stability.

What, Shevardnadze asked, were current foundations of strategic stability? A key mechanism was the ABM Treaty. This was a fundamental point. In making that point, the Soviet side was not asking the U.S. to agree to anything new or extraordinary. Shevardnadze wanted to emphasize this. Rather, it wished to reinforce a notion the President had expressed in one of his letters to the General Secretary that "negotiators should strengthen the role the Treaty can play in preserving stability as we move toward a world without nuclear weapons." Shevardnadze recalled that the Secretary had spoken in the same vein during their September meeting in Washington<sup>7</sup> in stating that "in the context of an accord on 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms, a period would emerge in which certain rights, including the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, would have to be given up, and the obligations under that Treaty strictly observed."

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<sup>7</sup> See Document 68.



Shevardnadze pointed out that the Soviet side had made a number of suggestions as to how the ABM Treaty should operate in the context of the environment he had described. What were the key elements of those suggestions? Nothing, he stressed, that was new.

—First, obligations with respect to non-withdrawal would go into effect simultaneously with the entry into force of provisions for 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms.

Shevardnadze noted that the two sides differed on how long this period should be, but felt that it would be possible to resolve this question.

—Second, after the 50% reductions had been completed, the two sides would during a 2–3 year period prior to the termination of the non-withdrawal period negotiate future obligations in the ABM area.

Shevardnadze said he wanted to address the question of violations of any future agreement. The issue was as serious for the Soviet side as for the American. There should be complete confidence that treaty provisions were being observed. The Standing Consultative Committee in Geneva (SCC) was a proven mechanism for ensuring such confidence, but it needed to be reinvigorated. To this end, it should be given the power to inspect sites of suspected violations. Shevardnadze noted that if a violation were not corrected by the offending party, the other side would of course be free of any obligations with respect to reducing strategic offensive arms. This would provide an additional, effective guarantee against violations.

Shevardnadze said he also wanted to focus on a point which had come up in Moscow, but which the ministers had not been able to discuss at length—the Soviet proposal for negotiated parameters, below which there would be no restrictions on activities by either side. That proposal remained in effect. Shevardnadze had not been able to determine why there was confusion on this point in Geneva, but he wanted to make clear that below agreed thresholds all activities—including testing—would be permitted. Moreover, he emphasized, any thresholds would be the result of mutual agreement. So, the Foreign Minister felt that this was an important attempt to accommodate U.S. concerns in this sensitive area.

As to the duration of the non-withdrawal period, Shevardnadze recalled that the ABM Treaty was a document of unlimited duration; thus, there was a presumption that, at the end of any non-withdrawal period, it would remain in force. President Reagan and the General Secretary had of course reached agreement in Reykjavik on the duration of the non-withdrawal period itself. Shevardnadze mused that on the plane from Prague he had given some thought to the discussion in Reykjavik. The main issue there had not been the duration of the

withdrawal period, but the question of laboratory research. That issue had subsequently been removed from the agenda. The Soviet position now was that not only laboratory work, but production and test range activities were permissible. And certain activities in space would also be permitted by Moscow's "parameters" proposal. So the concept of a non-withdrawal period had been agreed in Reykjavik; any agreement on 50% reductions in strategic arms would have to be on the basis of the Reykjavik understanding.

Shevardnadze reminded the Secretary in that context of the need to remove certain artificial barriers to a START agreement erected by the U.S. Geneva delegation since Reykjavik. The Soviet side was ready to discuss legitimate new concerns, but the sooner that it was possible to eliminate elements that had been introduced essentially for bargaining purposes, the better. There was no time for such games.

Shevardnadze recalled that the Secretary had emphasized in Moscow the importance of focusing on verification as part of intensified efforts to achieve a START agreement. He agreed with the Secretary's suggestion that preparations should be made to enable leaders to address the problem in Washington. The two sides' experience in INF had demonstrated the difficulty of the problems involved; they would be more difficult yet with respect to strategic arms. Perhaps, Shevardnadze suggested, a special group—including scientists and relevant specialists—could be set up to focus on verification problems in advance of the summit.

Shevardnadze felt that the elimination of chemical weapons should also be addressed at a Washington summit. He noted that the two sides had discussed the possibility of a joint statement to be issued by leaders. Perhaps this could be considered further.

On nuclear testing, Shevardnadze felt that the recent agreement to initiate full-scale negotiations made extensive discussion of this issue in Washington unnecessary.

Shevardnadze did feel that there would be a need to discuss regional conflicts and means of reducing tensions. It would be up to experts to make such an exchange productive. The leaders themselves should be able to reach some conclusions on such areas as the Middle East and the Iran-Iraq war, not just exchange views. So there was a need for thorough preparations.

Humanitarian questions should also be discussed, Shevardnadze believed. Exchanges on such issues had become a standard element of high-level meetings, including at the summit level. Responding to the Secretary's earlier remarks on human rights, Shevardnadze suggested that deputy ministers be tasked with meeting on the subject in advance of a summit. They might: review bilateral discussions to date; look at what could be done to take care of cases which still needed solutions;

and develop a work program for the future. This was an issue, Shevardnadze concluded, which would not go away.

Returning to his point of departure, Shevardnadze repeated the Soviet view that a Washington summit should lay the groundwork for the signing of a treaty on strategic arms at a Moscow summit. If that premise was correct, the logical next question was: how should a Washington summit be concluded? How should it be “crowned.” The General Secretary had spoken in Moscow of an agreement on “key provisions.” If the U.S. was uncomfortable with that phrase, perhaps the expression, “key elements,” which the President had used on a number of occasions, was more acceptable. Shevardnadze recalled that the Secretary had referred in Moscow to “instructions for delegations.” In Reykjavik, there had been a discussion of “directives to ministers.” The important thing was not the format, but whether or not the results of the Washington summit gave negotiators in Geneva what they needed to work. The leaders needed to define the tasks on which negotiators should focus.

Shevardnadze called the Secretary’s attention to the Gorbachev letter’s recommendation that some mechanism be established to ensure against any slow-down in the Geneva negotiations in advance of a Washington summit.<sup>8</sup> The key element was the involvement of the ministers themselves, communicating through their respective ambassadors, since they (the ministers) would be able to ensure coordination of the many agencies involved on both sides in the conduct of the negotiations. The ministers’ task would be to keep abreast of developments in Geneva, to provide their leaders with periodic reports, and to get the necessary decisions at the highest level.

Shevardnadze said that under such circumstances he saw no need for any new channels. The necessary channels were in place and well tested. Shevardnadze was glad that Carlucci had now joined the process. Shevardnadze did not know if an additional meeting would be necessary at their level before a Washington summit, but he certainly foresaw the need for one or more meetings thereafter to prepare for Moscow.

Shevardnadze noted with satisfaction that both sides had apparently felt it would be appropriate to conclude the present visit with the release of a joint statement of some sort. If it were possible to agree on language, such a statement could be the vehicle for announcing the General Secretary’s visit to Washington.

In that context, Shevardnadze added, he would like to comment a bit on scheduling considerations. Given the process underway in the

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<sup>8</sup> See Document 88.

Soviet Union, the demands on Gorbachev's time were enormous. It would, in fact, be impossible for him to be outside the country for more than two or three days. This would make it necessary for him to limit himself to meetings and such protocolary events as could be held in Washington itself. Of course, the focus of the visit would be meetings with the President—probably several rounds. The General Secretary would also be prepared to meet with members of Congress. Two to three days would be ample time for such a program.

Shevardnadze hastened to add that the limits on Gorbachev's time in the U.S. did not mean that the Soviet side would expect the President's return visit to be similarly limited. Nor did it exclude the possibility that the General Secretary would be prepared to travel outside Washington on future visits. But on this occasion, what was required was a businesslike series of meetings between him and the President, and with other American political leaders.

Shevardnadze said in concluding his remarks that he had tried to address the main considerations to be taken into account in planning for a Washington summit. It might be possible to get into a more detailed discussion of specific issues of substance later in the day. But he wanted to emphasize that the important thing for the moment was to remove any obstacles which might get in the way of a visit. And here the key point was whether it would be possible to find mutually acceptable language to record the two sides' views on the ABM Treaty.

Shevardnadze stressed that there was no need in such an effort to refer to the SDI program. The U.S. program existed. The U.S. believed in SDI; the Soviets did not, and had said they would respond if it became a reality. There was no need for further discussion of the issue. What did need to be addressed was the status of an existing treaty to which both countries were a party. There was no reason to amend the Treaty. But there appeared to be agreement that it should be preserved, even if only for a certain period of time. This was the important thing. Moscow had no interest in getting into a discussion of the SDI program.

Shevardnadze informed the Secretary that the General Secretary had been very pleased with the discussion he had had with the Secretary and Carlucci in Moscow. The task now was to complete the business at hand, without a lot of noise, but with respect for the interests of both sides. Shevardnadze said that he had outlined to his Warsaw Pact colleagues in Prague the day before the approach he had taken with the Secretary. He had received their mandate, with which he felt even America's NATO allies could agree.

Noting that Shevardnadze had made a very full presentation, THE SECRETARY said he would like to comment. He cautioned that, in view of the breadth of the Foreign Minister's remarks, he might not address each point. The Minister should not read anything into such an omission.

As to the “pacing” of the summit process, the Secretary said that we would also like to see events unfold satisfactorily. An INF agreement was in sight. We were anxious for the kind of progress toward a START treaty which would allow a Moscow summit to take place sometime before autumn of 1988. Two such events, together with the kind of progress Shevardnadze had described in other areas, would represent an important advance in the relationship.

In more specific terms, the Secretary continued, there was agreement that the INF Treaty should be completed promptly. If the two ministers could not make this happen, they should resign. Early agreement was possible. But the reports the Secretary was receiving from Geneva made him uneasy. The negotiators would have to be pushed. The Secretary was prepared to get into the various outstanding issues with Shevardnadze, but it was not for the ministers to negotiate every detail. The agreement could and should be completed in two to three weeks. But so far there had not been a lot of progress.

On strategic arms, the Secretary hoped it would be possible for the ministers to get into a more detailed discussion. The Secretary had the sense that a START agreement was doable, but he wanted to follow up on the General Secretary’s statements in Moscow and his letter to confirm his understanding of the Soviet position.

The Secretary expressed the view that it was always important to keep an eye on issues affecting strategic stability. As the number of nuclear missiles was reduced, the issue became particularly important. Shevardnadze had outlined some ideas for dealing with the problem. We could agree with some of them; others were less convincing. That was why we had suggested some time before that a discussion of the offense-defense relationship would be useful—the issue was really one of strategic stability.

For its part, the U.S. believed that a pattern of more defense and less offense contributed to stability. We understood that the Soviets disagreed. This showed the need for grappling with the problem on the conceptual and philosophical level, as well as on the level of details in the negotiations themselves. The Secretary thus welcomed the fact that Shevardnadze’s presentation had approached the problem from a somewhat more philosophical tack than in the past. Perhaps the two sides were moving toward some common viewpoints as a result of that process.

Noting that he wanted to come back to the questions of strategic arms and strategic stability, the Secretary said he would first move through the agenda that Shevardnadze had outlined.

The Secretary acknowledged that there had been some good exchanges on chemical weapons. It remained to be seen if the two sides would be in a position to agree on a joint statement by the time of a

summit. Progress had certainly been made, but there were still some important differences to deal with.

On nuclear testing, the Secretary agreed that leaders would not need to address the issue themselves. But the Secretary said he thought the negotiations could be referred to in any concluding statement, as could joint work in non-proliferation, where there had continued to be good discussions. Perhaps experts could work on possible formulations in these areas.

The Secretary also agreed that there should be solid preparations for the leaders' discussion of regional issues. Shevardnadze had mentioned Iran-Iraq and the Middle East. The Secretary thought Afghanistan should also be mentioned, and noted that the two ministers had had an interesting talk in Moscow on Southern Africa.

As for the Persian Gulf, the Secretary said that the key question of how to respond to the situation there in the wake of the UN Secretary General's forthcoming report would in all likelihood have been worked through by the time of the summit. But the subject was an active one, and one on which the two sides had successfully cooperated to a degree.

The Secretary welcomed the Soviet side's apparently growing readiness to discuss human rights matters in a businesslike and constructive fashion. He asked whether, in putting forward his proposal for three-pronged discussions at the deputy foreign minister level, Shevardnadze had in mind Deputy Secretary Whitehead. Or perhaps the Foreign Minister was thinking in terms of duplicating working group arrangements at a lower level. Noting that he was willing to go in either direction, the Secretary said that he would welcome it if Shevardnadze really meant that senior Deputies should be involved. SHEVARDNADZE said that was exactly what he meant.

THE SECRETARY said that it would be acceptable from the U.S. standpoint to describe what negotiators should do subsequently as "instructions." Like Shevardnadze, he was less concerned with the words themselves than with the objective—to get a treaty.

As for channels, the Secretary agreed that those official channels already in place were fine. There was no need for new ones. Both sides were blessed with good ambassadors, and the two ministers should take a personal interest in the course of the Geneva negotiations to intensify the process there. The Secretary was ready to do his part.

Having quickly run through the issues Shevardnadze had raised, the Secretary turned to procedural arrangements for the Washington summit.

As to the length of Gorbachev's stay, the Secretary observed that a longer visit would obviously be preferable, but if time were a constraint it was for the General Secretary to decide. The Secretary did

believe that adequate time should be budgeted for at least two to three good discussions between the leaders. Time would also be needed for the events which would enable the U.S. to show Gorbachev the respect that was due him and to expose him to persons of significance in our system. It would be particularly important for him to meet with members of Congress. A full three days would be necessary for such a visit, and they would have to be carefully planned at that to take full advantage of the time available.

Noting that the General Secretary's letter had referred to a December visit, the Secretary said that this was generally agreeable to the President. If the visit were to last three days, perhaps the best time would be the first Tuesday through Thursday of December.<sup>9</sup> This was something which could be discussed at greater length with the President.

SHEVARNADZE said he could say frankly that the best time for the General Secretary was December 7, 8 and 9. The second week in December would be the best.

THE SECRETARY said that he and Carlucci would have to check on that (Carlucci left the room to do so).

Returning to the issues of strategic arms and strategic stability, the Secretary said he wished to ask Shevardnadze a question. The Soviet side was aware of the U.S. view that a 4,800 ballistic missile warhead sublimit was essential. In this context, certain elements of the General Secretary's Moscow strategic arms reduction proposal and of his letter had caught our attention.

—First, we had noted that the sum of the lower ranges of the ICBM and SLBM sublimits in the Moscow proposals was 4,800.

—Second, we had noted that in his letter the General Secretary had spoken of a willingness to accommodate U.S. positions, and of the "inherent flexibility" of his new proposals with respect to the possibility of making adjustments between different elements of the triad within aggregate warhead limits.

The Secretary's question, then, was this: should the U.S. take this to mean that, in the context of an agreement on other elements of a START treaty, the Soviet side would be willing to agree to a 4,800 warhead limit?

SHEVARNADZE said he would answer by repeating the figures which Gorbachev had given the Secretary the week before. He felt that these provided the basis for working out various options without breaking up historically formed force structures.

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<sup>9</sup> December 8–10.



THE SECRETARY agreed that neither side should try to recast the force structure of the other in the image of its own. That was why the U.S. was interested in maintaining an element of flexibility within aggregate levels.

SHEVARDNADZE proceeded to read the figures which had been proposed by Gorbachev in Moscow. Having done so, he noted that the Secretary had focused on an important point in Gorbachev's letter with respect to the distribution of warheads among the various elements of the triad. Shevardnadze suggested that the formulation Gorbachev had used provided the flexibility necessary to have a concrete discussion on the correlation of warheads to delivery vehicles, taking into account the historical evolution and geopolitical determinants of force structures on both sides, and the need for each side to respect the other's interests.

Shevardnadze proposed that experts work on the problem to enable the ministers to address it in more detail at a later date. He noted in passing that Gorbachev's proposals had been debated in Moscow for months; the discussion had been very difficult. But the Soviet side had felt the need to try to meet U.S. concerns half-way. After receiving a whispered message from Bessmertnykh, Shevardnadze noted that Gorbachev's proposal provided for "certain combinations . . . (which) produce a picture . . . close to the one that U.S. officials . . . have recently outlined . . .". Shevardnadze also drew the Secretary's attention to the sentence in Gorbachev's letter which the Secretary had cited, and which referred to "inherent flexibility."

THE SECRETARY said that that was an important sentence. It seemed to say that neither side should force the other side to accept its force structure model. It thus had a certain resonance for us. But if one took that sentence, along with the numbers Shevardnadze had read, it appeared that by adding the lower ends of the SLBM (1,800) and ICBM (3,000) sublimits, one could conclude that the Soviet side could accept a 4,800 sublimit on ballistic missile warheads. If that conclusion were correct, however, it followed, since the force structures of the two sides were different, that the mix between SLBM's and ICBM's would be different for each within that overall sublimit. The Secretary asked if these inferences were, in fact, correct.

SHEVARDNADZE did not respond directly. Instead, he reaffirmed that the Soviet proposal had brought the two sides significantly closer together both conceptually and as regarded numbers. He proposed that the specifics of the "correlations" involved be worked by experts so that by the time of the Washington summit the leaders could be presented with options. At this point, Shevardnadze did not believe there were major differences in the two sides' approaches.

THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. would like to see instructions emerge from Washington which included the following areas of agree-



ment: a 6,000 warhead aggregate limit; a 1,600 launcher limit; the Reykjavik bomber counting rule; a 4,800 ballistic missile warhead sublimit; and a 1,540 limit on heavy missiles.

There were many other questions to be resolved in connection with such a framework. Each side had its proposals. Specifically, there was the question of mobile missiles. The Secretary welcomed the reference to that problem in the General Secretary's letter. This was an area where negotiators needed to bear down, because it remained unclear how any agreement on mobiles could be verified. It would be good if experts could come forth with ideas by the time of the summit, so that this, too, could figure in the instructions to be issued there.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Gorbachev's letter had limned the main elements of the Soviet approach. "Definitive numerical correlations," should be refined by experts before the Washington summit so that they could be incorporated in instructions to ministers and negotiators. As for mobile missiles, this was a complicated question. At present, the development and deployment of such missiles was not banned. The U.S. would understand that the Soviet concern, given the composition of its deterrent and the capabilities of U.S. counterforce systems, was survivability.

Another, related Soviet concern was long range SLCM's based on submarines and surface ships. Shevardnadze reaffirmed the Soviet view that agreement had been reached at Reykjavik that numerical limitations on SCLM's would be developed. So there was plenty for experts to do, but the latest Soviet proposal had created a qualitatively different framework for their work. As long as each side was prepared to take into account the interests of the other, it would be possible to develop options with respect to the distribution of warheads on the various legs of the triad.

THE SECRETARY acknowledged that SLCM's were a real problem. The verification difficulties were immense. We had made a proposal at Reykjavik and were willing to return to it.

As for mobile missiles, the Secretary agreed that mobile missiles were more survivable, and to that extent contributed to strategic stability. The U.S. was not opposed to them in principle; we simply did not know how to verify them. If verification were possible, there would be a lot to be said for mobiles. But the verification problem was baffling, and we were anxious to hear Soviet ideas for solving it.

The Secretary said the discussion on strategic arms had been a good one. He felt confident that, with good will, it would be possible to provide leaders with well-prepared options which would enable them to provide the instructions necessary to bring a START treaty within reach.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed fully. That was why the Soviet side had been talking in terms of a key provisions agreement, or whatever it might be called, at a Washington summit. Two or three options could be prepared for the leaders consideration, and they could decide how to instruct ministers and delegations.

THE SECRETARY said he had tried to describe quite explicitly where the U.S. felt the discussion should come out. He believed the U.S. approach fully respected the Soviet desire to preserve its traditional force structure. SHEVARDNADZE said that the key thing was that the two sides' positions had drawn closer together.

BESSMERTNYKH said he wanted to emphasize the importance of the Soviet decision to accept sublimits for each of the three elements of the triad. In the past, they had tried to make one suit fit a tall and a short man; now a single piece of cloth could be tailored to the specifications of each. The figures and ranges given implied it would be possible to find combinations, within the ranges described in the Soviet position, which met the interests of both sides.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that there was no number between 1,800 and 2,000 which would meet U.S. SLBM needs. If there were to be agreement on a 4,800 ballistic missiles ceiling—and there had to be such agreement—there would have to be greater freedom to mix than the Soviet proposal appeared to allow for.

BESSMERTNYKH said that the 4,800 figure could be seen as the optimal U.S. figure; the Soviet side might have an alternative figure. SHEVARDNADZE repeated that there might be different figures, and expressed confidence that mutually acceptable solutions could be found.

THE SECRETARY agreed that the matter should be discussed further. The key point for the U.S., however, was the 4,800 sublimit; it was hard to envision that we could accept an agreement which did not contain such a provision. That was why the Secretary had been so intrigued by the language of the General Secretary's letter.

Moving to the question of strategic stability, the Secretary asked to review areas of agreement and differences.

The Secretary said that he could agree on the need for reinvigorating the SCC. Frank Carlucci had suggested one possibility in Moscow (an *ad hoc* senior level group akin to that provided for in the INF Treaty draft) which the Soviet side had seemed to find acceptable. Shevardnadze had nominated Bessmertnykh to look into the problem for the Soviet side; we were prepared as well.

On the ABM Treaty, both sides agreed on the concept of a non-withdrawal period. There was not yet agreement on the duration of such a period, but there was on the concept. The Secretary noted that

the U.S. proposal for a seven-year period was couched in terms of the period ending in a given year—1994. Thus, the longer the two sides talked, the more important it was to keep that in mind.

As for the Soviet proposals on observance of the ABM Treaty, we had had some difficulty extracting them from the Soviet delegation in Geneva. The Secretary had heard what Shevardnadze and Gorbachev had said in Moscow, but when our delegation sought to firm up these statements in Geneva, they had seemed to disappear. This was frustrating.

Thus, the Secretary proposed to restate his understanding of the Soviet position. That position envisioned, first of all, a ten-year non-withdrawal period. During the course of that period, various things happened. Strategic arms were reduced over either a five to seven year period, depending upon the outcome of the START negotiations. But the reduction period would be completed before the end of the non-withdrawal period. At some point before the end of the non-withdrawal period, e.g. three years, discussion would be held on the implications for strategic stability of reduced strategic arms.

The Secretary stated that the U.S. was prepared to discuss such issues, both during and before the entry into effect of a non-withdrawal pledge. He noted that the two sides had already exchanged papers on strategic stability which had looked at the problem not only from the standpoint of fewer strategic arms, but of emerging research in defensive systems. We had welcomed this exchange and some of the suggestions made by the Soviet side in this regard.

Moving on to the question of what should occur at the conclusion of the non-withdrawal period, the Secretary asked Shevardnadze to confirm his understanding that the Soviet position was that the ABM Treaty would remain in force. This, of course, implied that the Treaty's option to withdraw on six months' notification would also become operative.

There was also the question of the kinds of activity which would be permitted during the non-withdrawal period. This was perhaps the toughest complex of questions. The Secretary understood the Soviet position to be that there was a level of activity—generally described in the U.S. as within the "narrow interpretation" outlined in the March, 1985 Department of Defense statement—which was permitted. As an alternative or supplement to this regime, the Soviet side had articulated a list of activities and a concept that, within certain thresholds, either side could undertake whatever it wished in space. Was this understanding correct? If so, it would be well to have it spelled out in Geneva.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would repeat the Soviet position. First, there would be a ten-year non-withdrawal period. Two to three years before the expiration of that period, negotiations would begin on the

ABM Treaty, i.e., on what would happen after the expiration of the ten-year non-withdrawal period. This would more or less coincide with the termination of the 50% reduction period (the duration of which, Shevardnadze acknowledged, was not yet agreed). As for the Soviet "parameters" proposal, any activity below the agreed parameters (Shevardnadze emphasized that those that the Soviets had proposed were not yet agreed) would be permitted. It was up to the U.S. to debate whether such activities were or were not consistent with one or another interpretation of the ABM Treaty. As to the duration of the non-withdrawal period, the Soviet side felt that the steps it had taken to accommodate U.S. interests should allow the U.S. to agree to ten years.

As for the confusion in Geneva, Shevardnadze could not explain it. He had "interrogated" his negotiators. They had said they had faithfully explained the Soviet position to their American counterparts, who appeared to have misunderstood them. But perhaps there was another problem.

THE SECRETARY asked if he was correct in his understanding that, at the end of the non-withdrawal period, and whatever the status of negotiations on a post-non-withdrawal regime, the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty would become operative once again. SHEVARDNADZE said, "Without question." BESSMERTNYKH added, "If the two sides hadn't agreed otherwise."

Returning to the question of dates for a Washington summit, THE SECRETARY said Carlucci had determined that December 7, 8 and 9 were convenient for the President, so those dates could be considered agreed.

The Secretary noted that it might be good to turn to the draft joint statement (which Ridgway, Carlucci and Bessmertnykh had worked on periodically throughout the session). The Secretary said that the U.S. could not accept a reference in the statement to something which had not yet been agreed—i.e., a ten-year non-withdrawal period. The concept of a non-withdrawal period was not a problem, but the ten year figure was not agreed. A joint statement was not the vehicle for negotiating the point.

SHEVARDNADZE asked what the Secretary suggested. THE SECRETARY repeated that the issue was being negotiated in Geneva. The concept of a given period was agreed; what was not agreed was the length of the period or what should take place therein. The joint statement should limit itself to describing what had been agreed upon. Ten years was not agreed. This would not, of course, prevent either side from expressing its view of how long the period should be in subsequent discussion with the press.

SHEVARDNADZE said he could see the Secretary had a bias against round figures. THE SECRETARY pointed out that seven was considered a lucky number in the U.S.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would have to consult with Moscow on the point. The rest of the statement was acceptable. As to the timing of the visit, Shevardnadze suggested that the statement should indicate only that Gorbachev would come to the U.S. during the second week in December. The General Secretary's arrival plans were not yet fixed; it would be best not to use precise dates.

THE SECRETARY cautioned that the President's schedule became complicated later that week, and briefly described the normal protocol for such important visits. SHEVARDNADZE said it would be best to think in terms of a December 7 arrival for the General Secretary; he doubted he would arrive on a Sunday. Perhaps the statement could refer to the "first half of the second week of December." THE SECRETARY said that this was agreeable as long as Shevardnadze understood that the President's schedule would make it difficult for the visit to extend past Wednesday. SHEVARDNADZE indicated this was understood. THE SECRETARY suggested that the statement say the visit would take place December 7, 8 and 9 to avoid speculation. SHEVARDNADZE said it would be better to say "beginning December 7," but added that he would have to clear that with Moscow.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the meeting adjourn to allow Shevardnadze to make his phone call. He added that, with respect to the statement's language on the ABM Treaty, he could report to Moscow that there was agreement on the concept of a non-withdrawal period, but that the U.S. could not accept a reference to ten years. SHEVARDNADZE said he understood this, but had to get instructions.

Changing the subject, THE SECRETARY recalled that during Shevardnadze's September visit, the Foreign Minister had raised the case of a Soviet defector, Bogatyi, whose wife had expressed an interest in returning to the Soviet Union. We had subsequently sought to facilitate a meeting between Bogatyi and the Soviet Embassy, but Bogatyi had refused. The Secretary had just been informed that Bogatyi was now ready to meet with Shevardnadze, by which the Secretary assumed he meant with a member of the Foreign Minister's staff. The Department was prepared to help organize a meeting. SHEVARDNADZE thanked the Secretary for the information. BESSMERTNYKH said that the meeting should include Mrs. Bogatyi as well.

The meeting concluded after a brief discussion of the timing and modalities for the release of the joint statement (copy of final version attached).<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Not found attached; see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1987, p. 70.

90. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 30, 1987, 1–2 p.m.

## SUBJECT

Meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze of the USSR (U)

## PARTICIPANTS

## US

The President

Secretary of State George P. Shultz

Howard H. Baker, Chief of Staff to the President

Frank C. Carlucci, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kenneth Duberstein, Deputy Chief of Staff to the President

Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State, European and Canadian Affairs

Robert E. Linhard, NSC Staff

Fritz W. Ermarth, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Dimitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)

## USSR

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh

Ambassador Yuri Dubinin

Ambassador Victor Karpov, Head, Arms Limitation and Disarmament

Department

Teymuraz Stepanov, Senior Assistant to the Foreign Minister

Georgiy Mamedov, Deputy Director, Foreign Ministry's USA Department

Sergei Tarasenko, Head, General Secretariat (Notetaker)

Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

Following a welcome session in the Oval Office<sup>2</sup> and a brief photo-op on the portico, *the President* opened the meeting in the Cabinet Room by once again welcoming the Soviet Foreign Minister to Washington. He expressed hope that Shevardnadze could see something of Washington because this might help when Gorbachev visited. He teased Shevardnadze and Secretary Shultz for their shuttle diplomacy, saying it made him and General Secretary Gorbachev look like two tennis players trying to keep two balls in the air simultaneously. *Secretary Shultz* said he and his colleague were literally in the air a great deal. (U)

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, President's Meetings with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, 10/30/1987 (2). Secret. Drafted by Ermarth. All brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Green sent a copy of the memorandum to Levitsky and Sandall under a November 5 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to a brief informal exchange between Reagan and Shevardnadze with the press prior to the meeting. (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1987, Book II, p. 1255)

*The President* said he had read the General Secretary's letter,<sup>3</sup> that he and his colleagues would study it further and respond to it, and that he regarded it as a very statesmanlike contribution to our dialogue, to progress in our relations, and to peace. He said the letter provided a sound basis on which to proceed. He noted that the two sides now seemed fully confident that they could complete the INF treaty and sign it at a summit in Washington in early December. He noted further that important details still had to be resolved in Geneva, speedily but carefully. This truly historic agreement, he said, had to stand the test of critical scrutiny and the test of time. The President added that between now and the summit, we would continue our dialogue and negotiations on all aspects of our agenda. He said he had been told that the morning's meeting between Shevardnadze, Secretary Shultz, and Mr. Carlucci had been productive.<sup>4</sup> He expressed delight that the two sides had agreed to a summit meeting in Washington. Then he asked the Soviet Foreign Minister for his assessment of progress. (C)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* opened by reporting that he had just talked with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev who had asked to have his warm greetings and best wishes conveyed to the President and the First Lady, especially his condolences on the death of Mrs. Reagan's mother.<sup>5</sup> He apologized for being a few minutes late for the meeting, noting that this was unusual but that the physical pace of movement in US-Soviet relations was becoming difficult to keep up with. He observed that Reykjavik and four ministerial meetings had brought substantial changes to US-Soviet relations. Guided by the General Secretary and the President, he said, tremendous work had been done. He wanted especially to note progress in the principal area, movement toward the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear arms. Gorbachev, he said, had described the dialogue at Reykjavik as having accomplished a "profound intellectual breakthrough." (S)

*Shevardnadze* observed that we now had in hand an agreement on eliminating medium and short-range missiles. Some questions remained, but they could be resolved; it was "doable." This meant that, during Gorbachev's stay in Washington, this historic agreement could be signed. But, he continued, both the American and the Soviet people would not be satisfied with this. Therefore, the focus was now shifting to the key problem of our time, the task of achieving deep and radical reductions in strategic arms. During the Moscow ministerial of the previous week, Gorbachev had put forth new proposals regarding

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 88.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 89.

<sup>5</sup> Nancy Reagan's mother, Edith Davis, died on October 27.



agreement on the structure of various legs of the TRIAD in terms of warhead numbers.<sup>6</sup> This, he said, had moved the Soviet position closer to that of the United States. (S)

Today, *Shevardnadze* continued, the ministers had discussed the very important problem of assuring strategic stability after the INF and START agreements. Complete confidence in strategic stability was required. The most important mechanism for assuring that stability, he insisted, was the ABM Treaty. Major progress on this had been achieved today, he said, in his discussions with Shultz and Carlucci in that both sides had accepted the formula of pledging non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period. He said that, for the time being, there was no agreement on the the duration of that period, but that Gorbachev had expressed confidence that an acceptable solution could be found. *Shevardnadze* expressed satisfaction that both sides were taking into account the importance of the historically evolved structure of the other side's forces, which put the dialogue on an objective, even scientific, basis. (S)

As to the further course of events, *Shevardnadze* said, the next step was to be the President's meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. The two sides had agreed that a summit in the second week of December, starting on December 7, was mutually convenient. He anticipated events largely in the Washington area, involving meetings with the President and other officials and with elements of the Congress. He said that a definitive program could be worked out in bilateral channels and that the General Secretary wanted it to accommodate thorough talks with the President that advanced US-Soviet relations. The priority of this aspect of the summit was logical, he said. (C)

*Shevardnadze* said the next stage, as anticipated at the Geneva Summit in 1985, would be for the President to come to the USSR, an event the Soviet people looked forward to. It was vital, he continued, that all the Soviet and American experts work hard to complete for that visit an agreement providing for the radical, 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive forces. Without exaggeration, he said, this would be the most important breakthrough, the most historic event. *Shevardnadze* said that he and Secretary Shultz and Mr. Carlucci must launch preparatory work to assure that the Washington summit could produce agreement on the main elements and instructions for our delegations in Geneva on how to culminate such an agreement in Moscow. In Gorbachev's view, this was the main task. (S)

*Shevardnadze* went on to say that the main channel of communication for moving ahead on this score would be through embassies and

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 84.



respective foreign ministries, with all involved agencies cooperating and working actively. After this meeting, he added, the parties had to sit down and think about practical options for accomplishing the tasks of the two summits, first in Washington and then in Moscow. This would involve a great deal of work. Reflecting on the Moscow ministerial of the previous week, *Shevardnadze* rejected the view that it had been a disappointment; he asserted that it had been useful and productive, making very important progress on very important issues. The meeting with Gorbachev had been very important. Now talks would continue on the whole agenda, nuclear forces, the ABM Treaty, regional issues, and also human rights so that the next summit would be successful. Much hope and trust had been invested in the prospect that the two leaders would live up to the challenge. (C)

*Shevardnadze* concluded by thanking the President for his time and attention, especially given the “nuances of the situation” (apparently a reference to the death of the First Lady’s mother). (U)

*The President* then asked Secretary Shultz to report. (U)

*Shevardnadze* interrupted to hand over the official copy of Gorbachev’s latest letter to the President which had been conveyed to the US side on the Foreign Minister’s arrival at Andrews Air Force Base. (U)

*Secretary Shultz* noted that a joint statement had been agreed upon and would be issued simultaneously at around 1400 hours Washington time in both capitals.<sup>7</sup> *Shevardnadze* interjected that the Soviet side agreed with the text. (U)

[NOTE FOR THE RECORD: As of around noon, when the meeting of ministers broke up at the State Department, the passage in the joint statement regarding the commitment of the two sides to adhere to the ABM Treaty “for an agreed period” had bracketed language which continued “of ten years,” language the Soviet side insisted upon and the US side rejected. Between noon and 1300 hours, *Shevardnadze* evidently talked by phone with Moscow—he said, directly with Gorbachev—and was authorized to drop insistence on “of ten years.” This phone call apparently caused the slight tardiness of the Soviet delegation to the White House and concerned the disagreement over the duration of the period of pledged adherence to the ABM Treaty, both referred to by *Shevardnadze* above.] (S)

*Secretary Shultz* continued by noting that *Shevardnadze* had presented a fair summary of their earlier discussions. The Secretary wanted to highlight a few things. He appreciated that all involved had to make a major effort to complete the INF agreement so that the President and

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<sup>7</sup> The joint statement declared that General Secretary Gorbachev would visit Washington in December. (Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1987, p. 70)

Gorbachev could sign it. This meant that the two tennis balls might have to be in the air a while longer. The Secretary said that he and Shevardnadze had made a mutual pledge to each other to get this done. They had promised together to work the hard issues before them, which was important both for the Washington summit and the Moscow summit. (S)

The second thing *Secretary Shultz* wished to highlight was the improved ability of the two sides to talk about such sensitive subjects as human rights. He and the Foreign Minister had agreed to charge deputy foreign ministers (to be named later) to review current status, resolve outstanding cases, and create a program for the future in the area of human rights. This would raise the matter to a higher level of attention and assure substantial progress. He looked forward to a day when not so much time had to be devoted to talking about human rights because the problems had been solved. He thought this could be done. He continued, saying that it would be a very positive development if the two sides could make progress on regional issues and permit this topic to be dealt with successfully at the Washington Summit. This would contribute greatly to progress on arms reduction because regional conflicts are such a source of tension and distrust which fuel the arms competition. Arms are the product not the cause of the tension. Resolution of regional conflicts would make arms control much easier. (S)

The third outcome of the ministerial so far, *Secretary Shultz* noted, was that we had achieved a very ambitious target in virtually completing the INF agreement and now were making a strong effort on START for the next summit. (S)

*The President* asked Mr. Carlucci if he had anything to add. *Mr. Carlucci* said he thought the two ministers had covered everything very well. (U)

*The President* thanked Shevardnadze and Shultz for their summaries and noted that he wanted to make several points on issues he considered most pressing. He said he agreed with the General Secretary that we must emphasize concluding an equitable and verifiable START treaty which provides 50 percent reduction in our strategic arsenals and does so in a manner that adds to mutual security and to stability. We should, he said, aim to complete such a treaty in the first half of 1988 and sign it in Moscow next year. That would assure, he continued, that the tennis game with the two balls in play would produce a win for both sides. (S)

*The President* went on to say that we are not reluctant to address the subject of Defense and Space. On the contrary, he had offered a number of proposals in this area. But, he emphasized, there should be no misunderstanding; he would not surrender the promise of a safer

world offered by SDI. He expressed the firm view that the December summit could be used to give greater impetus to the negotiations to conclude treaties on both areas, START and Defense & Space. Formal, verifiable treaties should be our goal, he said, and we should not settle for anything less. (S)

*The President* said he looked forward to seeing Foreign Minister Shevardnadze again with General Secretary Gorbachev in December, when the two sides would conduct a thorough review of our entire agenda. He asked Shevardnadze to convey warmest regards from the President and Mrs. Reagan to Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev. He noted that the US and Soviet leaderships could by the wrong decisions precipitate disaster upon the world, but they could also take the decisions that avoided disaster and promoted a more peaceful world. (C)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* responded to this by recalling the great impact at the UN General Assembly of the results of the September ministerial in Washington where it had been agreed to eliminate two classes of nuclear missiles. It was his third participation in the UNGA and he found it difficult to describe how much the atmosphere had changed from previous meetings. There was no indifference to our achievement, he said; people were tired of living in fear of annihilation. We were on the true and right course, he said; we had a unique chance to move ahead and had taken important steps today. The Soviet side would do all that depended on them. He foresaw distinctly positive trends under the leadership of the President and the General Secretary. (C)

*The President* then adjourned the meeting to the Oval Office where an exchange of pleasantries continued until the President, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze repaired to the White House Press Room to make public statements.<sup>8</sup> (U)

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<sup>8</sup> Reagan's remarks and a question-and-answer session with reporters are printed in *Public Papers: Reagan, 1987*, Book II, pp. 1256–1258.

91. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 30, 1987, 3:40–4:35 p.m.

## SUBJECT

Summitry, INF, Embassy Moscow, Regional Issues

## PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>USSR</i>
The Secretary	Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
National Security Advisor Carlucci	DepFor Minister Bessmertnykh
Ambassador Nitze	Ambassador Dubinin
Ambassador Kampelman	Ambassador Karpov
Ambassador Ridgway	Shevardnadze Aide Stepanov
Ambassador Matlock	Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko
DAS Simons (Notetaker)	(Notetaker)
Mr. Zarechnyak (Interpreter)	Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

SHEVARDNADZE said they should begin by putting Karpov on the carpet.

THE SECRETARY said he would first like to make a few comments on the Summit. For the Summit meeting to go off well, the two sides needed to prepare all the details carefully. They needed a program showing what would happen, all the events, and establishing the way work would be done.

In their meetings the two ministers had been stressing content, and that was of course central. But we knew from previous experience that the Soviet side had excellent advance and security people. They need to work with our team. Teams are needed that consist of substantive people, event managers and security people. The two sides needed to put them together. The Soviet side should get their people here as soon as they are designated. On the substantive side, Tom Simons would be responsible for us. It was important not to let the event-managers take over completely. The two sides could also be in touch through their ambassadors, but the Soviets should identify their people. When they did, we would be ready to work.

CARLUCCI noted that we now have a White House Planning Group set up. He had spoken with them, and Roz Ridgway had participated in their work. The sooner the Soviets designated a point man the better off the two sides would be.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow/Washington Oct. 1987. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons. The meeting took place in Shultz's office at the Department of State.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed that the preparatory and organizational work requirements should be studied now. On the Soviet side Bessmertnykh in the MFA would be in charge overall, responsible for the planning and the arrangements. Of course the Embassy would also be involved. The Soviet side would probably send an advance group, which would include security people. They would arrange these things as soon as he returned to Moscow, and inform us through our Embassy in Moscow. A detailed program would be needed; Bessmertnykh would be in charge, and he would be looking in on it. The Secretary had raised an entirely appropriate question.

THE SECRETARY recalled that on our side all such things were in Roz Ridgway's domain. He suggested that the ministers then hear a report on INF.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed they should listen.

NITZE said Karpov and he had discussed INF that morning. Karpov had had a list of 36 items, he had had a list of 28. The point was not the number of issues, but that neither side considered progress in Geneva to have been satisfactory. They had discussed how the situation could be improved, but had not reached a consensus on that. He would describe some of the issues.

First, the U.S. side felt the need to inspect some facilities for the SS-25, even though it was distinguishable from the SS-20. Viktor Karpov did not feel such inspection was appropriate. The Soviet side for its part still had problems with our final assembly procedures.

Second, on non-circumvention, the U.S. proposal for a commitment not to undertake any international obligation that would be in conflict with the Treaty, was not satisfactory to Karpov. He felt it was too narrow, that something broader was needed; no solution had been reached.

Third, the Soviets had made a proposal concerning agreed follow-on negotiations. We had explained why it was impossible for us to raise this with the British and French; this included dual-capable aircraft.

A fourth issue concerned inspection of facilities on Allied territory, Nitze went on. We had said that some such inspection might be possible, but it had to be limited to bases for which we retained responsibility, and should involve limited numbers of inspection, not concentrated against any one country.

Nitze concluded that issues like these were significant. They needed to be resolved, and fairly promptly.

KARPOV said Nitze had described the more important issues.

The Soviet side considered the question of inspection of SS-20 bases an artificial issue, Karpov went on. The ostensible purpose was to guarantee that the first stages would not be used for the SS-25.

The Soviet side was willing to accept verification of the absence of production of the SS-25, and also of the SS-21 and 23. Hence it had proposed verification of production of SRF and INF. The issue could be surmounted. Inspectors could verify that no items like missiles and warheads were leaving the production facilities, which would be designated. They thus agreed on system verification. In the Soviet Union systems had distinct production characteristics: they were all assembled in factories and put whole into containers. In other words they were not disassembled. When production of the SS-20 was stopped, production of its first stage was also stopped. It had a similar but not the same first stage as the SS-25; to show that it could not be used for the SS-20 inspection at the point where it leaves the factory would suffice. The container could be opened, say from the top and the sides, to show this. Verification at operational bases was not necessary. There was no hidden agenda, no "chemistry," as the Russian saying went, about this.

The two sides also differed about the cessation of GLCM production, Karpov went on. They were similar to SLCMs, and the Soviet side wanted assurance that the U.S. had stopped producing GLCM's. The Soviet side was willing to accept absence of production by inspection at the point where they left the factory. It thought this was fair. It thought additional impetus should be given to this in Geneva.

The Soviet side was concerned that the U.S. position on non-circumvention created an extra burden in the negotiations, Karpov went on. There were examples and precedents in both bilateral U.S.-Soviet and multilateral agreements where the U.S. had accepted such obligations. U.S. arguments against them were not persuasive. That day the two sides had discussed a formula concerning pledges not to undertake obligations, official or unofficial, inconsistent with the Treaty. One question was when these would be effective, i.e. if they were only effective when the treaty came into force, could one side undertake such obligations before then? A second question was what form the obligation could take: would it be formal, or would it be informal, under a program of cooperation. There was food for thought here.

With regard to follow-up negotiations, Karpov went on, there had been arguments for and against. The Soviet side wanted to hear U.S. arguments; the process should go on. They had talked about a clause concerning further discussion of medium-range and shorter-range systems, particularly aircraft. The U.S. had pointed out that there were other forums for such discussion. The exchanges on this should continue.

With regard to inspections on Allied territory, Karpov went on, the U.S. declared itself for inspections on its territory, but it also had bases on Allied territory and in other countries. If one adopted the

U.S. position that as soon as a base ceased to exist inspection would stop, the result would be an unequal position. Soviet territory would be open to inspection, but U.S. and Allied territory would be closed. There should be a compromise under which bases in third countries should be open to inspection. A solution appeared to be emerging in Geneva. A solution would give the two sides practical confidence that nothing was being done against the Treaty.

There were also technical questions, Karpov concluded. The Soviet side was trying in Moscow to develop positions that would remove these, but not everything depended on the Soviet side. It thought the U.S. side was overcomplicating some of these questions. It thought they could be solved in simpler ways, without compromising the effectiveness of elimination and verification of the systems.

THE SECRETARY asked Shevardnadze to comment. SHEVARDNADZE said he had listened, but things had not become clearer for him. The question was whether they should take decisions or wait.

NITZE said that Karpov had stated some points more clearly than before in their discussions, and we would need to consider what had been said, and get back to the Soviet side. On other questions the situation was clearer than Karpov had suggested, for instance on the question of an “unequal” approach. The U.S. side was ready for inspection in Allied countries, but once we were gone suspect-site inspection should be terminated; there could be a close-out inspection, but there should be no more.

Kampelman said that when we had left Moscow the week before we had seen that some issues were unresolved. What disturbed us was that issues we had then thought were resolved by the Vorontsov statement were still not resolved. An hour before he had heard from Geneva of one such example concerning inspection. It concerned the issue of when the inspecting party notifies the inspected party of the place and time of inspection. Vorontsov had said that the time of notification should be at the time of entry into the inspected country. The U.S. side had thought the notes of the meeting indicated agreement on this. Now, an hour ago, he had been informed that this was not so. The Soviet Delegation in Geneva now held that notification should take place *before* the point of arrival in the country. This was not unimportant. Short notice should be short notice, in order not to permit the inspected side to make changes. This was just an example, an illustration. Our own negotiator had pleaded with us to make the point that resolved issues should not be reopened. This did not answer Shevardnadze’s question on how to expedite things, but it was clear they would not be expedited by reopening resolved questions.

NITZE said another such example concerned the point at which both sides reach equality. It had been 70% of the reductions; now the



Soviet side had reopened it and was saying 80%. We had thought this was settled.

SHEVARDNADZE asked what was going on.

KARPOV explained that the Soviet side had proposed 70% on the assumption of a 5-year schedule; now, with three years agreed, they were proposing 80%. The Soviet side was proposing 29 months for the first stage, the U.S. 25 months.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested jokingly to the Secretary that perhaps the two of them should move to Geneva and go to work.

THE SECRETARY said he had a suggestion to make. Karpov, Nitze, and Kampelman had discussed these things. Some issues were better articulated now. He suggested the ministers ask them to go through the issues carefully before Shevardnadze left Washington, and then the ministers should be in touch with their Geneva negotiators on the basis of that screening, and impress on them the need to get rid of the chaff. He had been told about an issue, defined as an issue because it was in brackets, which suggested resistance to settling.

Then, the Secretary went on, they should do what they had agreed to do in Moscow. They should take careful stock—perhaps on Wednesday evening and Friday evening—and keep their people in touch in some manner, keep pushing along. He was not necessarily talking about going to Geneva. They had to keep confidence in their negotiators. But they needed to push along, to speed things, to identify issues. For instance there was the issue of whether information learned by inspectors could remain confidential. The U.S. said no; the Soviets said only if both sides want it to. He could not understand why there could not be agreement on that. They should get rid of issues like that.

The issues that had been talked about here were more significant, the Secretary continued. He asked Shevardnadze to remember that most of them had to do with verification. This was a tremendously important topic, they both agreed. The U.S. side would ratify the Treaty. There would be great commotion, but it would be ratified. But the questions raised during the ratification process would all be about verification. Today's statement had conditioned people to think in terms of a strategic arms agreement. Everyone knew that verification of such an agreement was going to be even more difficult. We were walking on INF; we would have to run on strategic arms. So, when in doubt, the two sides should lean a bit in the direction of verification provisions.

SHEVARDNADZE commented that in this set of issues, two or three would require political-level decision, decision at the ministers' level. Perhaps they should be left aside for that. In addition to letting the delegations work, perhaps the ministers should encourage them



to practice tradeoffs, to speed things up, not to resist. The Secretary and he should tell them to practice tradeoffs and leave two or three things for their level or for the summit level.

THE SECRETARY said strongly that none should be left for the summit level. They needed to get it done, so it could be signed.

SHEVARDNADZE said of course he agreed. He suggested that in the remaining two to three weeks, he start receiving Matlock. If there were U.S. concerns, he would work on them. He would similarly ask the Secretary to receive Dubinin. They should use their ambassadors, as well as their negotiators, since the ambassadors had direct access to the ministers. In 15–20 days things should be resolved.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed. He liked Shevardnadze's putting it in terms of days. If there were tradeoffs, this was the time to make them. He thought the two of them had done what they could on that topic.

NITZE asked what time he and Karpov should meet. SHEVARDNADZE asked where the 35 questions had come from; they should be removed by tradeoffs and by leaving the more difficult ones to be settled at ministerial level through the ambassadors. THE SECRETARY said Nitze and Karpov should arrange a time to meet.

The Secretary said he had one request to make on behalf of some Senators. This was the Senate Observer Group, which took an interest in arms control, and was on the whole positive. Senator Stevens had written him, and suggested that he and his colleagues visit Moscow before the Summit. They wanted to visit Shevardnadze and, through that, to develop a point of contact for discussion as they consider ratification of this treaty. If Shevardnadze were prepared to receive them, Roz Ridgway could follow up. This would be helpful. Shevardnadze had met with them before, and they were constructive.

SHEVARDNADZE said that in principle he was ready to meet with them. He would communicate with the Secretary on when and how it would be done once he returned to Moscow.

THE SECRETARY asked Ambassador Ridgway whether there were a report concerning the Persian Gulf. AMBASSADOR RIDGWAY said she would check. (Nitze and Karpov were arranging their meeting, which did not take place due to Shevardnadze's subsequent decision to take off that night at 10:00 p.m. for Moscow.)

THE SECRETARY told Shevardnadze that while they were waiting for the report he would like to give Shevardnadze a gift. He thanked Shevardnadze on that occasion for the gift the latter had left him and his wife. Shevardnadze had noted the paperweight on the President's desk. The Secretary had given it to the President, who had kept it. It bore the seal the Secretary had shown Shevardnadze on the Eighth

Floor. He wanted to give Shevardnadze the same paperweight. He had also given Gorbachev one. SHEVARDNADZE expressed appreciation.

THE SECRETARY suggested they touch on bilateral issues. There were two points still unresolved: temporary duty people and guest visas. Shevardnadze had told Matlock these should be resolvable. The Secretary appreciated that. He wanted to register that living conditions for our people were an important topic. He invited Simons to comment.

SIMONS addressed the remaining differences concerning repair workers for existing office buildings. The Soviet side had offered 40, and mentioned 50, with an assurance that requests above this would be favorably considered. We did not wish to bump up against the number, and felt we needed 75, although this included guards as well as repair workers as such.

SHEVARDNADZE said 50 sounded reasonable. As he had said before, he would be willing to meet with Matlock, after the holidays; the Secretary should also meet with Dubinin. BESSMERTNYKH added this was something that should be resolved taking into account both sides' wishes.

Ambassador RIDGWAY reported that no report from Perez de Cuellar on the Gulf situation had been received.

THE SECRETARY said that on the Gulf he hoped that both sides would be able to move strongly in support of positive trends, if that were what Perez de Cuellar reported. If Iran was not forthcoming, we would need to move quickly to language showing other countries our resolve. He hoped we would be able to move strongly together, and not be separated.

SHEVARDNADZE said Vorontsov was currently on a trip to the area. He had met with the Iraqis, was meeting with the Kuwaitis, would be in Tehran that day or the next. He had asked Vorontsov to feel out the situation, to see if there were any new elements that deserved attention. He did not think everything had been done to develop the possibilities inherent in the resolution that had been adopted. He thought the Secretary General could be more active; this might involve trips to the region and the like. Even if there were sanctions he would need to be active, of course without postponing things to a remote future. When Vorontsov returned to Moscow, if he had something to report, Shevardnadze would be in communication with the Secretary.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed that the Secretary General should continue to be active whatever happened. But his efforts needed strengthening. We thought so, and so did he. And strengthening them included mandatory sanctions.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the two ministers think about it; peace might have been declared that day without their having been informed.

THE SECRETARY asked if Shevardnadze wanted to raise further questions.

SHEVARDNADZE said it appeared to him that the two main tasks were now organizational arrangements for the Summit and accelerating efforts at Geneva. He would be personally involved, and knew the Secretary would too. If instructions were needed, he would be prepared to give them. The Soviet side would have an integrated group looking at these problems.

Turning to a regional topic, THE SECRETARY said he and Shevardnadze were agreed that Armacost and Vorontsov had had a good meeting. Shevardnadze had commented that if something good could emerge on one regional issue, that would be a positive addition to the Summit agenda. The U.S. side thought perhaps it would be good for Armacost and Vorontsov to have another meeting the week of November 16 in Geneva.<sup>2</sup>

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed. Vorontsov's presence in Geneva was also desirable for INF; it would be good for Kampelman to be there too.

KAMPELMAN said he agreed. He had told Vorontsov he was willing to meet with him, although he understood Vorontsov's busy schedule. He would be pleased to go.

SHEVARDNADZE said it was therefore agreed that Vorontsov would go to Geneva on the 16th and meet first with Armacost and then with Kampelman. THE SECRETARY said that was all right with him.

The Secretary reported the exchange on Iran-Iraq to Carlucci, who had been out of the room; he noted Shevardnadze would be reporting to him on Vorontsov's return. CARLUCCI asked if the November 16 meeting was to be announced. SHEVARDNADZE said it should not be announced immediately; he would discuss it on his return to Moscow. THE SECRETARY said he would note in public that our regional experts on Central America would be meeting October 28 in London, and that we were working toward an Armacost-Vorontsov meeting on regional issues in general before the Summit.<sup>3</sup>

SHEVARDNADZE said the two sides needed a whole program. He would discuss this on his return to Moscow. He thought that day's meeting had been extremely useful. They should have more such productive days. THE SECRETARY recalled what he had said in the Cabinet Room: he was willing to work personally on these matters, though

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<sup>2</sup> A description of this conversation was transmitted in telegram 12119 from Geneva, November 16. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N870009-0485)

<sup>3</sup> Shultz raised the matter of the Armacost-Vorontsov meeting in his press conference after this meeting. (Department of State *Bulletin*, December 1987, pp. 71-73)

that did not necessarily mean more meetings elsewhere. SHEVARD-NADZE said that was his approach too.

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## 92. National Security Decision Directive 288<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 10, 1987

### *MY OBJECTIVES AT THE SUMMIT (U)*

General Secretary Gorbachev has accepted my invitation to attend a Washington Summit, beginning December 7, that should witness the signing of an INF agreement and a thorough review of all elements on the U.S.-Soviet agenda. The signing of the INF treaty represents a triumph and vindication for the policy that this Administration has followed toward the Soviet Union from the start. It demonstrates that realism, strength, and unity with our allies are the prerequisites for effective negotiation with Moscow. We must keep this principle in mind as we address all issues related to the Summit. We must also bear in mind that the nature of the Soviet regime, while it may be changing slowly, sets limits to what we can achieve with Moscow by negotiation and diplomacy. (S)

#### *Objectives*

I have a carefully calibrated mix of objectives for the Summit. All are important. They include:

- the completion and signing of an INF agreement in a form and manner that maximizes Alliance solidarity and the prospects for ratification;

- making real progress toward a START agreement and moving toward a treaty on Defense and Space that furthers the promise the Strategic Defense Initiative holds for a safer world through deterrence based increasingly on defenses;

- taking diplomatic and public affairs actions which at a minimum assure that the Summit is seen as an event addressing thoroughly our whole agenda. Prior to and at the Summit, we should create political pressure for the Soviets to take positive steps on our human rights, regional, and bilateral concerns. For example:

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<sup>1</sup> Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council: National Security Decision Directives (NSDD), NSDD 288. Secret.

- On human rights, we should make the point that while there has been some progress on the Soviet side, it has been marked by tokenism; it has not been institutionalized nor made irreversible, and is therefore far from adequate. We should seek Soviet adherence to all human rights conventions signed by the U.S.S.R., and vast improvement in emigration, repatriation, and resolving divided family cases. If the Soviets raise the issue, we should clearly say that they have a long way to go before we can give support to the idea of a human rights conference in Moscow.

- We should make clear that the absence of any progress on regional issues is a fundamental impediment to a general improvement of our relations. We should be firm on the need for a prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, urge agreement right away to a transitional regime free from Communist domination, and repeat our willingness to facilitate their withdrawal and to guarantee a genuinely independent, non-aligned and neutral Afghanistan. We should make clear our grave concern about the turn for the worse in Soviet policy in the Persian Gulf—shielding Iran from a second UNSC Resolution as Iran's behavior towards us and the Gulf Arabs becomes more belligerent, and allowing their Bloc partners and clients to ship arms to Iran that could be used against us. We should put the Soviets on notice that they are at a crossroads: cooperation now on a second resolution would mean real progress on the regional agenda, but persistence in their current policy could damage U.S.-Soviet relations and put us on a potentially very dangerous collision course. (S)

In conducting this Summit we must strike a sensible balance. While seeking concrete agreements in arms reductions which serve our national interests, we must not foster false illusions about the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Such illusions would only undermine our ability to continue conducting the realistic policies which brought us an INF agreement and have enabled us to meet the Soviet challenge world-wide. (S)

Our conduct at the Summit and the framing of its results must in no way complicate our efforts to maintain a strong defense budget and key programs like SDI; they must help us maintain support for the Contras, Mujahidin, UNITA, and the democratic resistance in Cambodia; and they must reinforce Alliance unity. In brief, the Summit should seek simultaneously to codify progress in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, prepare the way for future progress, yet make clear where fundamental differences remain which block progress. (S)

**93. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 13, 1987

[Omitted here are discussions not related to the Soviet Union.]

*Soviet/East Europe*

On 3 August 1987, President Reagan signed a Memorandum of Notification (MON) which authorized an increase in our Soviet/East European media and influence program. *[less than 6 lines not declassified]* Our enhanced program is designed to exploit the current Soviet policy of “glasnost” and the revolution in electronic communications, two phenomena which offer an unprecedented opportunity for our covert action program to impact on Soviet audiences. Last year, some 500,000 books, periodicals, audio cassettes, and video cassettes were distributed inside the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Although measuring the impact of our programs in these countries has been difficult because we lack access there, we have tried to monitor as closely as possible the distribution and infiltration of our materials.

We are reasonably certain that at least two-thirds of our materials reached their intended audience, i.e., the intelligentsia and other elite groups. We also know from comments of defectors and recent exiles that our books, newspapers, and periodicals are eagerly read and passed from hand-to-hand.

Current political trends in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe reflect increased liberalization and internal debate on the need for more openness or “glasnost.” These trends are consistent with US policy objectives, and will be encouraged and promoted by this covert action program.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 89B00224R: Committees, Task Forces, Boards, Councils Files (1981–1987, mostly 1987), Box 11, *[text not declassified]*. Top Secret; *[handling restriction not declassified]* The paper was prepared for a meeting between Webster and the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board (PIOB).

**94. Non-Paper Prepared by Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 18, 1987

**HOW TO DEAL WITH GORBACHEV**

Because of strength and philosophy, the U.S.-Soviet relationship will always be unique and always difficult to manage.

But it is increasingly clear that the Soviet Union is going to be seen by history as Ronald Reagan's "China."

If so, what is that going to mean:

- A Soviet Union basically focused on its own internal situation;
- A reduction of Soviet intervention to exploit regional conflicts;
- An ability to solve practical problems between us;
- A steadier attitude: no euphoria, no depression. A safety net of economic, cultural, etc., links that will enable the relationship to ride out points of crisis that inevitably will come along.

We have already seen progress in all four areas of our agenda. Just as with China, we see the other side changing on *our* terms.

How do we go about keeping this momentum up and institutionalizing it?

Again, look at the China model. China decided to change because of fear—fear of falling too far behind the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union is now changing also because of fear—fear of China's reforms, fear of Eastern European restlessness—but most of all because of fear of falling permanently behind the U.S.

Our interest is to keep the Russians well behind us but not so far behind that they become desperate and dangerous.

So it is a matter of *managing* change. Here are some general principles:

- Keep holding out the vision of the future that the Soviets are not capable of handling without change (the information age).
- Keep making it clear that their old policies just will never work (regional intervention, attempts to limit SDI, non-market economics, etc.)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1987 Nov. 16 MTG w/ the PRES. No classification marking. An unknown hand wrote in the upper right-hand corner: "Mtg w/ Prez 11/18 (GPS gave this to Prez)." According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan met with Shultz, Howard Baker, Carlucci, and Duberstein from 1:36 to 2:13 on November 18. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Carlucci's readout of the meeting indicates that Shultz distributed and summarized his "non-paper" at this meeting. (Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Secretary Shultz (11/04/1987–11/18/1987))

—Don't urge better relationships (it will be read as though we are reaching) but always be quick to act to build them when the opportunity comes.

—Give Gorbachev all the chances he seeks for greater exposure and attention. The more he talks up his programs the higher the expectations he arouses among his people and the world's.

—Keep our role of being the "psychologically superior" party. So far, we have brilliantly allowed Gorbachev to posture as the innovator and take the credit for moves that come in our direction and follow our agenda.

—And when we make trade-offs, be sure they tend to lock in our positions and our version of the future. We are doing this with INF. We can do it with SDI too.

The road ahead is going to be rocky—but more so for Gorbachev than for us. He, like Mao, is trying to fire up his people without giving them any incentives; he so far will not permit deviations from basic Marxist-Leninist principles. If he remains rigid in this regard, his programs won't meet his people's aspirations. Young Soviets will be glad to go to more rock concerts but unwilling to work harder for no added economic benefits. One part of the society will be bitterly disappointed, the other will be alarmed. The strains this will generate should tend to keep the Soviets focused inward—but the process of reform is unlikely to be checked even if a "Deng" will have to replace Gorbachev in order to do it.

We have entered one of those rare historical periods when significant planned change is possible in relations between states. We are at a crossroads where East and West could transform the nature of their postwar relationship with a more constructive form of competition. It is American ideas, strengths, and policies that have drawn the Soviets in this direction. It will be up to us to carefully manage its continued progress through a balance of toughness and inducement.



**95. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 18, 1987

**PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ, KEN  
DUBERSTEIN, SENATOR BAKER AND FRANK CARLUCCI ON  
NOVEMBER 18, 1987 IN THE OVAL OFFICE**

P AP says we requested joint session with Soviets.  
HHB Sovs requested, and I consulted with combined leadership. They said if Soviets ask we must do it.  
P AP says we requested and people mad at us.  
HHB Republicans say we should stop Soviets from requesting it.  
GPS We told Soviets we could go along with joint meeting in place of joint session. I told Soviets this not a good idea.  
HHB Reads caucus resolution.  
P Why does AP say this Administration initiative.  
HHB We can't have joint session. Do what is needed to get Soviets off joint session.  
GPS We would go back to a series of meetings.  
GPS We had good discussions in Geneva. We not there but can get there. We can fix it so there is no INF agreement, and no summit. Republicans will then be satisfied. We can go back to Soviets—me or CLP—& tell them joint session won't work out.  
GPS All Congressional delegations received in Moscow.  
HHB We must get Soviets not to pursue their request.  
P Back to AP article.  
GPS HHB and I will handle.  
HHB & P This is a disgrace.  
GPS My meeting.

US-Soviet relationship. Over next 2½ weeks our mood will change. You will become engaged. You will say you not satisfied with strategy on particular issues, you want to talk more broadly. I know your interest is deep.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Carlucci Files, Secretary Shultz (11/04/1987–11/18/1987). Secret. No drafting information appears in the memorandum, but it was prepared on November 19. According to the President's Daily Diary, this meeting began at 1:36 and ended at 2:13 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

I have a non-paper<sup>2</sup> which I will give you.

1. Because of strength and philosophies US–USSR relations will always be difficult to manage, will be seen as RR's China. Things are changing.

a) USSR, as China, becomes focussed on internal situation.

b) What that may mean is reduction in regions conflicts ability to sit & resolve practical problems.

We evolve into a steadier attitude. No euphoria, no depression. Safety net of economic and social links. A steadier, different kind of relationship.

c) We have seen Soviets accept our 4 point agenda. We see other side changing on our terms.

How exploit this? Look at China model. China changed because of fear of USSR. USSR now changing because of fear—of what? Of China. Of Eastern European restlessness.

Our interest is to keep USSR behind us, but not so far they become afraid. Principles:

Encourage them to change.

Let better relations come out of change, rather than reaching for it.

Give Gorbo full exposure (FCC note. Sounds like we support him) Allow him to posture as innovator and take credit for moves toward our agenda.

Road ahead rocky, but more for him than us. They will keep looking inward to solve problems.

There is historic moment here and we need to engage.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 94.

**96. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 19, 1987, 1307Z

532. For the Secretary from Matlock. Subject: Dobrynin on START Sublimits.

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. When I called on Dobrynin yesterday to deliver the First Lady's letter to Mrs. Gorbachev, we had a brief exchange regarding the principal items on the summit agenda. In that context, I asked Dobrynin (as I have in the past) whether the Soviets could accept the 4800 sublimit for ballistic missiles, with freedom to mix. While in the past he has never hinted that they would go beyond their current position, this time he said that the 4800 ceiling should be no problem so long as the freedom to mix applied both to ICBM's and SLBM's. In other words, they would not insist upon an SLBM sublimit if we would not insist upon an ICBM sublimit. I did not comment on his statement other than to tell him that I would share his remarks with you.

3. Comment: This is the first time, to my knowledge, that a responsible Soviet official has indicated that they might accept the 4800 ceiling. I pass it on for whatever it may be worth. I should note that Dobrynin made the comment quite informally, and therefore U.S. officials should not rpt not mention this exchange to other Soviet officials.

4. Regarding other topics, there was nothing new. I did note that Dobrynin seemed relaxed regarding the prospects of finishing the INF agreement and, in discussing START, did not harp on the "necessity" of "strengthening the ABM Treaty" simultaneously. I do not interpret this to mean that the Soviet position on this point has changed. But the lack of stress could signal continued flexibility in the Soviet approach.

**Matlock**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, Secretary's Meeting With the President, 11/20/1987. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Calypso. In telegram 361819 to Moscow, November 20, the Department instructed Matlock to tell Dobrynin that Shultz had received this report and found it to be useful. (Ibid.)

97. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, November 20, 1987

SUBJECT

Scope Paper on December US-Soviet Summit

This memorandum is an overview of the purposes and the tactics of the summit.

Gorbachev comes to Washington appearing to share our agenda: To reduce nuclear arms, to promote a more secure world, and to enhance US-Soviet cooperation. But the two sides' underlying aims are still far apart.

We seek accommodation that enhances Western security and solidarity, constrains Soviet ability to expand, and increases prospects for freedom throughout the world, including within the USSR. While engaged diplomatically with the USSR, we want to safeguard our ability to compete unilaterally as needed.

Gorbachev, on the other hand, wants an accommodation that buys a breathing space from competition on our side while he revives the communist system at home, enhances its ability to project power (including military power) in the long run, preserves past Soviet gains as a superpower, and continues to allow expansion of Soviet influence at low cost. He wants to undermine the competitiveness of the US and its allies by creating a new detente environment. At one time or another, Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev all sought detente with the West to consolidate and ultimately advance Soviet power.

It's like the marriage of the wealthy Hollywood producer and the young starlet—they both go to the altar, he for matrimony, but she for alimony.

Despite its formidable military power and resourceful political leadership, however, the Soviet empire is in deep trouble at home, in East Europe, and around the world. It can only get out of that trouble with far-reaching reforms and, even then, only with Western help. This gives us the opportunity and obligation to demand a high price on behalf of peace, stability, and freedom.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, US-Soviet Summit November-December 1987 (5). Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Bush and Howard Baker. Prepared by Ermarth. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Reagan saw it on November 23. Reagan initialed the memorandum next to the date. Ermarth sent the memorandum to Carlucci under a November 19 covering memorandum, requesting that he sign and forward the memorandum to the President.

*Our Objectives at the Summit*

Your major objectives at the summit have been outlined in your NSDD 288.<sup>2</sup> They are:

To sign a stabilizing and verifiable INF Treaty that is ratifiable.

To move forward toward a stabilizing and verifiable START agreement with 50% reductions, and a Defense and Space Agreement which protects SDI.

To explore possibilities for a 1988 summit, avoiding counterproductive pressure on START, Defense and Space, and other issues.

To pressure the Soviets for more constructive behavior on regional conflicts, especially Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war, on human rights, and on contentious bilateral issues such as our embassy.

To describe a fundamentally better relationship with the Soviets and our conditions for it, namely progress in reducing dangerous military imbalances, expansionist Soviet behavior, and Soviet oppression of its own population and neighbors.

To maintain your policies of strength, realism, and dialogue that have already made East-West relations more stable and safe, which means avoiding illusions and euphoria.

To display the political realism and competence that reassures our friends and allies.

*Gorbachev's Objectives*

Gorbachev's objectives are in varying degrees antithetical to ours:

He appears ready for an INF agreement that achieves nuclear reductions under intrusive verification. His larger goals are denuclearization of NATO and detente at the expense of Western strength and solidarity.

He seems ready to move ahead on START, but how ready to complete agreement remains to be seen. He still is bent on blocking SDI, but has relaxed his conditions as he has grown more confident that US domestic politics and budget difficulties will help him. Now he sees some agreement in principle on the ABM Treaty and a rush to a START treaty in 1988 as his best tactics.

He wants to reduce pressure on regional issues and human rights by talking civilly and making modest moves in our direction that don't hurt Soviet regional interests or domestic control. We don't rule out the possibility of a dramatic Soviet initiative, perhaps on Afghanistan, to show how forthcoming the USSR has become.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 92.

A major Soviet goal is to gain better access to Western technology and capital without paying too heavy a price in geopolitical, military, and other concessions. This is vital to Gorbachev's domestic plans. At the summit, he probably won't appeal directly for US economic aid, but appeal for it indirectly, in the guise of trade and joint ventures, over the heads of the Administration to Congress and the business community, and to our allies.

Gorbachev sees the summit itself, on balance, as a plus in his domestic political struggles, which have obviously intensified in recent months. There is a downside to his being seen with his politically controversial wife in the capital of the Main Adversary. But foreign policy goals, approved by the Politburo, make it worthwhile.

The Soviets think they have an advantage in the fact that you will soon leave office. They are ready for accommodations with you because they believe you can make them stick and that this will prevent your successors from being as tough as you have been in the past.

To promote our own objectives, we must be stubborn and clever in using Soviet eagerness for continued engagement. In historic and strategic terms, the Soviets need more from us than we need from them. We can afford to set high conditions for agreement, and hold to them patiently. We can afford to be sure that the agreements we reach push future events in our direction. If they don't promise to do that, we can afford to forego agreements. We want accommodation on our terms, but don't need it. They want accommodation on their terms, but need it on almost any terms they can get.

### *Soviet Tactics*

Gorbachev's target at this summit is to lock you into a 1988 "calendar of high expectations." This would be based on a) enough convergence of our positions on the ABM Treaty and on START provisions to excite expectations that a START/D&S package could be completed in six months or so, and b) commitment to another summit sometime between April and July, vaguely conditioned on achieving these agreements. This would put us under great pressure next year. We expect him to use a "soft sell", not attacking SDI directly but seeking to use the ABM Treaty to constrain it. But we cannot rule out his taking a fairly demanding position.

On regional issues and human rights, Gorbachev will counterpunch, but not belligerently, seeking our cooperation on self-serving Soviet proposals.

Gorbachev is bold and highly manipulative. He knows the value of appearing sincere at all times. He knows how to be soft and reasoning as well as hard and demanding. He has a good "tag team" relationship with Shevardnadze, a sense of the differences within your Administra-

tion, and a very open political arena in and outside Washington. He'll work the media, the Hill, and the business community.

But he faces constraints and liabilities. He knows you are very resolute. A life-long communist and not a worldly man, he may be a bit apprehensive coming to the Capital of Capitalism. Security concerns will constrain his movements and flexibility once summit plans are set. Constantly on his mind will be Moscow politics, where his political aims and personal fate are on the line.

#### *Pitfalls and Dangers for US*

The most obvious pitfall for us lies in the temptation to sign up to the "calendar of high expectations" for 1988 which would oblige us either to sacrifice what many will call "the arms control deal of the century", or to negotiate a very complex START treaty under a tight deadline, possibly jeopardizing SDI. The guard against this is simply to reject setting a time frame for a summit conditioned on uncertain and difficult agreements. We can welcome another summit as well as progress on strategic arms reduction, but must proceed toward both on their own merits.

The summit could engender public illusions which undermine our strength and realism. The best way to combat this danger is to assure clarity where US and Soviet positions do not converge, and where Soviet rhetoric does not match Soviet actions.

We should avoid a lot of discussion of very long-range or possibly impractical goals, e.g., eliminating nuclear weapons, whose impact on our strategic interests is uncertain, particularly as seen by allies. This danger will be contained by careful preparations.

A dramatic failure that appears our fault is unlikely. A solid INF agreement before summit time, and the interest of both sides in a political success are guards against this. If Gorbachev makes appealing proposals we cannot endorse, and accuses us of blocking further progress, we'll combat this by setting the record straight.

#### *Our Tactics at the Summit*

The exact tactics you and your team should follow will depend somewhat on the summit schedule still to be finalized and on incoming intelligence. But we already have a tactical concept.

It will involve careful and thorough preparations, detailed in a complete meeting book prepared for you. We shall pay careful attention to participants and their roles, in meetings and spin-off sessions or working groups. This will allow you to control the level of detail you want to get into.

We shall regulate the timing of issues so that the real arm wrestling over NST issues comes only after INF is signed. We shall seek to build

on your experience with Gorbachev with new material on him and how to work his personality. We'll have some suggestions as to how to throw off Soviet tactics if they are putting us on the defensive.

We shall prepare our positions on possible communique language beforehand and maintain tight control over negotiations of such language.

Media control will be much harder in Washington than in Reykjavik or Geneva, and the Soviets will exploit this. We shall discipline what the Administration says, however. Your public remarks, e.g. arrival statement and toasts, will set a friendly, forward-looking, but sensible tone.

Pre- and post-summit events are being arranged to create the balanced impressions we believe appropriate, e.g., your meetings with the Afghan Resistance and with human rights groups.

### *The Key Issues*

At TAB A you will find a listing of the key issues likely to come up at the summit and brief notations on how we see them. They will, of course, be covered more extensively in your Background and Meeting Books. I am attaching this glossary of issues because we don't plan to send you separate issue papers except on subjects, mainly on arms control, where you must make policy decisions.

## **Tab A**

### **Paper Prepared in the National Security Council Staff<sup>3</sup>**

Washington, November 19, 1987

## KEY ISSUES FOR THE SUMMIT

### *I. THE BROADER RELATIONSHIP*

#### *Our View of the Gorbachev Regime*

Gorbachev and his colleagues are genuinely seeking ways to revive a sick economy, society, and political system while preserving one-party rule and the essence of a planned economy. They are having serious political battles over how fast and far to go. Outcomes are hard to predict and true liberalization of the system is not intended, is a long shot in any case, and will take a long time if it happens. A

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<sup>3</sup> Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper.



conservative backlash is always possible, and one may be occurring now. Meanwhile, not much fundamental about the system or its foreign policies has changed.

*Gorbachev's "New Thinking" about Foreign Policy*

Gorbachev tries to persuade the world that Moscow has an entirely new way of thinking about foreign policy, based in cooperation, interdependence, and common causes, such as peace, ecology, etc. He wants to increase the role of the UN because it tends to be hostile to US interests. While it may produce something eventually, Soviet "new thinking" is mostly rhetoric so far. Soviet policy toward Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, the Middle East, and other areas shows the familiar quest for advantage at the expense of the West, pursued with new energy and flexibility. Similar "reforms" of Soviet foreign policy, designed to appeal to the West, were seen under Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev.

*Our Conception of a Better Relationship*

America is prepared to contemplate a fundamentally improved relationship with the USSR. But that improvement must come from attenuation of the causes of past hostility and mistrust: The dictatorial nature of the Soviet system, its preoccupation with military power, and its hegemonical, subversive, and imperial approach to other nations. This is asking a lot but a lot is at stake, the real basis of peace being, as Sakharov<sup>4</sup> says, states respecting people, their own and others. If the USSR changes its ways and nature, it can join the world and prosper from its rich resources and human talent. In the meantime, we shall observe what the Soviets do in the world and at home, responding on the basis of our own values, interests and commitments. We are not reluctant to engage with the Gorbachev regime; we hope it holds the promise it proclaims. But we want to see deeds and engage in practical projects for peace, human welfare, and freedom, not vague designs that disguise the reality of continuing Cold War. It is precisely the eagerness of the Soviet regime for a breathing space from competition that gives us the possibility of resolving real security problems, if we are patient and demanding.

*1988 Summit in the USSR*

The Soviets want to schedule a summit in the USSR next year mainly to put us under time pressure to complete a START agreement and especially to force concessions on SDI and the ABM Treaty. We

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov, whom Gorbachev ordered released from internal exile to Gorky in December 1986.

can welcome a summit next year, but must avoid firm commitment to a timeframe or to linkage with agreements that will be hard to complete and could be dangerous to SDI. If we can complete a satisfactory START agreement that protects SDI, a 1988 summit in the USSR would be a triumph, while a summit without a START/D&S package will probably be unacceptable to the Soviets. The Soviets sometimes mention an April date, which is almost surely too early. July seems more reasonable; thereafter our party conventions interfere.

## II. ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

### *Strategic Defense and the ABM Treaty*

SDI could favorably alter the nature of the strategic environment and the superpower relationship. It is non-threatening to a non-threatening country, but still very frightening to the Soviet leadership. Moscow has given up on a direct attack, and now sees the ABM Treaty as the tool to constrain SDI, mainly a lengthy period of nonwithdrawal and definitions of what is allowed under the Treaty. You will discuss with NSC principals whether any change in our position is advisable. The basic Soviet aim is unlikely to change.

### *Strategic Arms Reductions*

The Soviets have been moving haltingly toward our positions in START to hold it hostage for concessions on SDI. We can probably get something near our current demands on subceilings. The Soviets will almost surely hold out to allow mobiles, and seek other concessions from us. These issues will be reviewed at NSPGs

### *INF Ratification*

How the Soviets act on regional issues, human rights, and arms control compliance will affect prospects for ratification. We can use this as leverage. How reasonable and credible our arms control actions appear in early 1988 will also affect ratification. A signed but unratified Treaty would be a bad outcome for us and NATO, because our deployments would halt and SS-20s would remain in place.

### *Nuclear Testing*

We must preserve the ability to test so long as deterrence depends on nuclear weapons. But we probably can move to improved verification of existing treaties, a worthwhile goal even as testing continues.

### *Conventional Arms*

Reducing nuclear weapons makes conventional imbalances more important. The Soviets are making appealing but vague proposals. With the best of will, designing good proposals is very hard in this complex area. We need to be seen moving systematically, but carefully,

with our allies in the coming year, not giving too much credence to Soviet proposals. Still, the Soviets need to cut their armed forces for economic reasons and wish to impress the West; therefore they may make some unilateral reductions.

#### *Chemical Arms Ban*

The whole world would welcome this, and we must be seen working on it. But it is practically unverifiable inside or outside the USSR. The Soviets could and probably would cheat, at least for fear others would. This goal awaits a better world than the one we live in.

#### *Compliance*

The Soviets have violated past agreements, some egregiously; they have not cleaned up their record. But they are much more active in trying to obscure it with public ploys, because they know their record blocks future agreements. We have the right, need, and ability to insist on a much improved performance, the key target being the Krasnoyarsk radar.

#### *"Glasnost" in Soviet Military Affairs*

Soviet strategic secrecy continues to hamper confidence in arms control and to excite suspicions of Soviet intent. You have called for more openness on the Soviet military budget and policies. The Soviets have said they will give more data in a "couple of years." Because their bureaucratized economy makes money meaningless, they may not know what their real military budget is. But they do know what their total force posture is and what programs they are working on. We must keep up the pressure for "glasnost" here.

### III. REGIONAL CONFLICTS

#### *General*

Soviet misbehavior on regional conflicts not only prevents a general improvement in US-Soviet relations, it causes vast suffering and risks confrontation which even the Soviets do not want. Moscow continues to rely on imposing or protecting communist regimes, exporting arms, and playing on local rivalries to be a global superpower. It claims "new thinking" but conducts old actions. We must insist on improved Soviet behavior as part of the price of a general accommodation.

#### *Afghanistan*

Over eight years of war, over 5 million refugees, uncounted dead and wounded mark a continuing outrage and tragedy for which the Soviets are solely responsible. They do want to get out, but so long as they want to protect a communist regime even more, they cannot. We have to insist that they drop the Kabul regime and withdraw quickly.

The Soviets are hinting again that they are ready for this move; but the record of duplicity obliges us to be skeptical.

#### *Iran-Iraq*

After cooperating on UNSC resolution 598, the Soviets are now blocking progress by tilting toward Iran and providing political cover for Iranian belligerence. The Arabs are increasingly critical. We need to tell the Soviets how serious this issue is to us and press them for an arms-embargo resolution that they and their clients comply with.

#### *Middle East Peace Process*

To match our position of influence in the Middle East, the Soviets want an international conference that includes them, asks little of them, and isolates Israel. We can only tolerate an increased Soviet role and a peace conference if both deliver intransigent Arabs, mainly the Syrians and Palestinians, into direct bilateral talks with Israel and step-by-step compromises. It is unlikely that the Soviets will, or can, deliver this.

#### *Cambodia*

Because of their relations with China, the Soviets would like some “fix” to the Cambodia problem. But their policy there is rather like Afghanistan. The key is withdrawal of Vietnam’s forces and talks with the Resistance.

#### *Angola*

Despite continued Soviet military aid, Moscow’s client is not doing well and, as elsewhere, the Soviets are angling for some political device to help the client survive at lower cost. We must press for a pullback and then pullout of Cuban troops and negotiations with the UNITA freedom fighters.

#### *Central America*

The Soviets are increasingly confident that the “peace process” will allow the Sandinistas to survive and consolidate. They encourage Managua to play along to undercut the Contras, while they continue to supply arms. We shall be unable to talk them out of this policy save by actions that cause events to move in another direction or by intolerable concessions on other issues.

#### *East Europe*

The domestic illegitimacy of communist regimes and turbulence in Moscow have made East Europe particularly unstable at present. There could be a blowup somewhere that forces Moscow to intervene, however reluctantly, and severely disrupts East-West relations. You have called for an end to the Brezhnev Doctrine. Soviet diplomats have hinted that it is dead. We should press Moscow to declare this so that

East Europe can go its own way and no longer be a cause for Soviet-sponsored repressions and potential crises.

#### *Berlin*

Both as a symbol of new openness in the heart of Europe and to keep Berliners confident that their hopes lie with the West, you have proposed initiatives to ameliorate conditions affecting the city, and eventual dismantlement of the Wall. Practical plans are in discussion among the allies. We need to keep this project alive with low-key reminders to the Soviets, until we are ready to make formal proposals.

### IV. *HUMAN RIGHTS*

#### *General*

We press the Soviets on human rights because it is morally necessary and because we believe a government's respect for human rights at home is a measure of its trustworthiness in international affairs. Your administration's efforts have made it impossible for Moscow to duck the human rights agenda. Under Gorbachev, considerable effort has been made to get the USSR off the defensive, by discussing human rights issues with us, making some accusations of their own, releasing some political prisoners and raising emigration levels somewhat. There has been some liberalization on the cultural front, and certain repressive laws are under review. But the repressive apparatus of the system remains intact. Moscow political battles have persuaded Gorbachev to move in conservative directions recently, reducing hope that the system will change fundamentally. Yet pressures from many parts of the society for liberalization and the need for economic reform require such change. Hence, pressure from us on human rights continues to be necessary and useful, and the summit must register our continuing concern. We need to guard against the Soviets using diplomatic talk to deflect pressure.

#### *Individual Cases*

The Soviets have granted release to many of the refuseniks, divided families/spouses, and political prisoners we have been pleading for. But a good many cases remain to be resolved. Names and appropriate points for summit discussions will be provided. We must now give more attention to the broader themes and principles of healthy human rights performance.

#### *Themes*

The following are our main themes: Prisoners of conscience (from 400 to 4000 political prisoners are estimated to be still incarcerated); religious freedom (interest in religion is growing; but free practice is still restricted, especially for Jews, and minority sects persecuted); abuse

of psychiatry (while continuing, this area is likely to see some real improvement); and, of course, free emigration for Jews and all others desiring to leave (emigration levels are up, but still far below levels of the 1970s and known demand; the thrust of new Soviet laws seems aimed at restricting, not relaxing, emigration). In the final analysis, human rights and political liberties are tied; hence we press for free flow of information and more democracy in the USSR.

#### *Moscow Human Rights Conference*

At the CSCE meeting in Vienna, the Soviets are pressing the West to agree to a conference on human rights in Moscow. Some of our allies are inclined to accede to this. The Soviets want it to take pressure off. We want to use their interest to maintain pressure for real and permanent improvements. We must resist a conference that gives moral sanction to continuing dictatorship, and therefore cannot accede to one without a vastly improved Soviet performance.

### V. BILATERAL ISSUES

#### *General*

There has been positive movement in a number of areas of our bilateral relationship, and the summit can give new impetus. Our strategic aim is to stimulate more openness in Soviet society, while not giving away sensitive technology and free capital. The Soviets, on the other hand, generally seek to limit our impact on their society while using exchanges to promote their version of detente and for technology gains. Nevertheless, we both have sufficiently overlapping interests to want these bilateral ties to prosper.

#### *Embassy and Representational Issues*

The extent which the Soviets use their diplomats for espionage and their efforts to penetrate our embassy in Moscow have created a kind of representational warfare between us as we have sought to protect our embassy and gain some measure of equivalence and reciprocity in our diplomatic postures. On our embassy, we have decisions yet to make and much work to do. But the Soviets have said they will be cooperative; we must hold them to this.

#### *Media Reciprocity*

The Soviets have virtually free access to our media; we are working hard to open theirs up to us and the West generally. Even with new "glasnost", they have a long way to go. Hence, it is extremely important that we exploit opportunities for you to address the Soviet people, and hammer away on such Soviet practices as jamming and malicious disinformation against us.

*People-to-people and Cultural Exchanges*

These are developing in directions we seek, more contact with less inhibiting control by the Soviet state. Your personal interest helps to sustain momentum.

*Science and Technology Exchanges*

We are progressing with the Soviets in many areas under existing or developing agreements. A comprehensive new agreement on cooperation in basic science is around the corner but probably won't be ready by the summit. We have to continually balance the potential benefits against the risks of technology loss.

*Economics and Trade*

The Soviets want to expand trade with us, which could happen if they had more competitive products to sell and more hard currency to buy. What they are really after are a) more access to sensitive technology (which we restrict for strategic reasons), b) easy, government-guaranteed credits (a form of foreign aid we deny on political grounds, e.g., Jackson-Vanik-Stevenson amendments), c) entry into GATT and the IMF (which we oppose because the Soviet system and its policies are hostile to these bodies), and d) US government support for participation of American firms in joint ventures within the USSR (blanket US endorsement of this new Soviet approach to gaining capital and technology is probably unwise at present from both a political and a business point of view). We should take the line that US-Soviet economic relations should improve along with, but not ahead of, improvements in Soviet international behavior and internal economic practices. Fulfillment of their own pledges under the Long-term Grain Agreement would help.

98. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, November 23, 1987, 10:15 a.m.–1:50 p.m.

## SUBJECT

Organizational matters, INF, summit planning

## PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*

THE SECRETARY

Gen. Powell

Amb. Ridgway

EUR/SOV Director Parris (notetaker)

Mr. Zarechnyak (interpreter)

*U.S.S.R.*

FOREIGN MINISTER

SHEVARDNADZE

Marshal Akhromeyev

Dept. ForMin Adamishin

Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko  
(notetaker)

Mr. Palazhchenko (interpreter)

SHEVARDNADZE opened the meeting by welcoming the Secretary and his party. He welcomed as well the Secretary's initiative in suggesting the meeting at this conclusive stage of preparations for the summit. There was no question that the outstanding issues required the two ministers' joint effort.

Shevardnadze took advantage of the opportunity to congratulate Gen. Powell on his nomination as National Security Advisor—an appointment which reflected the confidence the President and American people placed in him. Shevardnadze asked that his congratulations be passed to Powell's predecessor, SecDef designate Carlucci, who, despite the brevity of his stay at the NSC, had "done good work." It was good that the Soviet side had had the chance to get to know him.

Moving on to the program for the two minister's talks, Shevardnadze noted the Secretary's reference during the preceding photo-op to INF as being the first priority. This was indeed the starting point, and the Soviet side had the expertise available to deal with it, to complete the Treaty. Marshal Akhromeyev's presence at the table testified to that.

Organizationally, Shevardnadze suggested that the ministers hold an initial plenary meeting with their full delegations to announce whatever order of work they agreed on, and to commission working groups. Perhaps delegation chiefs could brief the ministers on what progress had been achieved over the last few days, and what might still be pending. The ministers could then decide what to address themselves

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Geneva—11/23–24/87. Secret. Drafted by Parris. All brackets and blank underscores are in the original. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission.



and what to delegate to experts. Akhromeyev would lead the Soviet INF working group. It might be wise as well to establish subgroups to expedite work in this priority area. Should any problems arise, the ministers could be called in to make decisions.

Shevardnadze thought it well also to set experts to work in non-arms control areas. The Soviet side had fielded a team headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin which was prepared to work on language which might be used at the summit—perhaps as a joint statement of some sort. Shevardnadze noted that he would have liked to have Bessmertnykh available for this task, but he was being kept busy in Moscow. Adamishin also knew the issues well.

Shevardnadze proposed that, after the ministers had run through INF Treaty-related issues, they could take up the schedule for Gorbachev's Washington visit. They could then move on to questions relating to strategic offensive arms reductions and the ABM Treaty, as they pertained to instructions which the two leaders might give delegations at the summit. While the discussion would of necessity be of a preliminary nature, something might emerge from it. Regional and other matters could also be taken up as time permitted.

Thus, Shevardnadze suggested, the ministers could work until 1:00 or 1:30, then recess until 4:00, when they might resume work at the U.S. Mission. The Soviet side accepted with pleasure the Secretary's invitation for dinner. The ministers would meet the next morning at 10:00, with lunch at the Soviet Mission.<sup>2</sup> There could be a second plenary meeting after lunch: if the experts had done good work, they could be praised; if bad, reproached. Of course, the INF team would have license to break in on the ministers' discussions whenever it proved necessary. Perhaps there could be an initial report on their progress in time for the afternoon meeting. But more important than any formal arrangements was the need to make the best use of the time available, to make the necessary decisions.

THE SECRETARY said that the approach Shevardnadze had outlined paralleled that that the U.S. had in mind. The Secretary agreed that there was a need for flexibility in order to be sure the job got done. To state what Shevardnadze had said in a somewhat different way, the Secretary sketched his own view of how the ministers should use their time.

The first priority was clearly to complete an INF Treaty. So, after the brief plenary that Shevardnadze had suggested, it would be well to enlarge the ministers' discussions somewhat.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 100.

On the U.S. side, we would add Glitman, Kampelman, Linhard and Nitze, who would lead our team. After a general exchange, the experts could be despatched to get to work on wrapping up a Treaty.

After they had gone, the ministers could move on to a discussion of the summit schedule. The Secretary had brought some detailed suggestions.

During the lunch break, each minister could meet with his working group to see what progress had been made. The Secretary expressed the hope that the INF Treaty could be completed that afternoon, so that some of the expertise being tied up in the effort could be devoted to strategic arms reductions. In the meantime, the ministers might talk about human rights, regional affairs and bilateral issues. This could be the basis for subsequent discussions by Ridgway and Adamishin on summit-related materials. The Secretary noted wryly that he had warned his experts that, if they were unsuccessful in resolving the remaining INF issues, he and Shevardnadze would get to work on START without them. He quipped that Akhromeyev would not like that.

AKHROMEYEV said that the experts would have to take a break from INF in that case.

After a brief discussion of dinner arrangements, the ministers adjourned at 10:40 am to join their full delegations.

[During a 25-minute plenary session,<sup>3</sup> the two ministers went over the arrangements which had just been agreed to. The only additional element was THE SECRETARY's suggestion that each side's Geneva INF delegation be standing by to turn any agreements reached into Treaty language. SHEVARDNADZE agreed.

At the conclusion of the session, the ministers resumed their smaller group meeting, joined by the following: Nitze, Glitman, Kampelman, Linhard and Matlock; and Karpov, Obukhov, and \_\_\_\_\_.]

When the meeting resumed at 11:05, THE SECRETARY volunteered to lead off with a few remarks on INF. SHEVARDNADZE agreed.

THE SECRETARY prefaced his comments by noting that Kampelman and Vorontsov had had a good meeting the week before. They had found solutions to many items, but left some problems unresolved. At the end of their meeting they listed a number of problem areas, which the Secretary said he would take up in order, commenting briefly on each.

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<sup>3</sup> No record of this meeting has been found.

First, he indicated, was the problem of monitoring the non-production of weapons systems banned by the Treaty. Kampelman and Vorontsov had discussed a way to monitor what comes out of the SS-20/25 final assembly facility. The task now was to settle on how that would work, what means inspectors would have available to them, etc. There was no facility in the U.S. comparable to the facility in question for the SS-20/25, but the Soviets had given us a list of candidates for monitoring in the U.S., and the U.S. had chosen one plant. Now it was necessary to agree on perimeter/portal monitoring, on the facilities to be monitored, on the procedures to be used, and on the treaty language that would embody these decisions.

Another problem related to the basic inspection regime. This was of paramount interest with respect to prospects for Treaty ratification. A regime was needed which provided confidence in baseline data, in the elimination process, and in the continued absence of INF missiles. This meant we needed, on the one hand, an agreed concept of short notice inspections as they applied to verifying baselines and closeout inspections, and, on the other, a procedure which gave confidence that there would be no prohibited missiles in so-called suspicious sites.

Vorontsov had objected to Kampelman that our approach would allow very large numbers of inspections. We had therefore offered a ceiling on all short-notice inspections. There would be an initial phase of 20 inspections a year, during the drawdown period, when there would be a lot to observe. That would decline after 3 years to 15/year; and after 8 years to 10/year. So it was important to close in Geneva on the types and numbers of onsite inspections in the basic inspection regime.

A third general category involved suspect site inspections. This problem derived from the fact that the SS-20 and SS-25 were so similar, and shared such similar support infrastructures. We thus needed to pay special attention to the SS-25 sites, and had proposed the right to onsite inspections for SS-25 facilities. Vorontsov had suggested ways to enhance national technical means (ntm) which we found interesting.

The two sides also had to settle their differences over means for determining the range of missiles.

Then there was the question of how to deal with the fact that some of the missiles covered by the Treaty were based on third country soil. Both sides thus needed to find a way to inspect such sites. The U.S. had suggested a straightforward way to do so by an exchange of notes with the third country involved—a procedure which would both recognize the sovereignty of that country and satisfy the parties verification needs.

Finally, the delegations had exchanged a substantial amount of data, but the process was not complete. Some 200 non-deployed intermediate range missiles (IRM's) remained unaccounted for.

These, the Secretary concluded, were the issues which had to be solved for there to be an agreement. The U.S. team was prepared to work with the Soviets to resolve them immediately.

SHEVARDNADZE thanked the Secretary for his presentation. He agreed that a good deal of work had been done by delegations. Kampelman and Vorontsov had also had a productive session. Shevardnadze did not want to enumerate the many problems which had already been solved—including those wrapped up through the efforts of the ministers themselves. But he did recall that some very tough, very complicated issues—notably the FRG P-1 problem—had been dealt with successfully. At the time, the ministers had thought that, once the P-1 issue was cracked, other details would be easy. The details had also turned out to be difficult.

Shevardnadze thought it logical that verification issues had now come to the forefront. Both sides wanted absolute certainty that the provisions of the Treaty would be observed. (AKHROMEYEV interjected, “everybody wants more verification.”) SHEVARDNADZE continued that the current phase of the INF negotiations were like a kind of academy, preparing the two sides for more difficult verification problems in the START context. (THE SECRETARY noted that this was an important point. It suggested that, where difficulties arose, both sides should err on the side of more, rather than less, verification.)

SHEVARDNADZE agreed, observing that he did not want to get into a comparison of which side had done more to ensure the success of the INF talks. What had been achieved thus far was the result of an integrated process, of joint efforts. What then, were the important outstanding issues?

Shevardnadze noted that the Secretary had already raised the question of verifying the end of production of INF missiles. The Foreign Minister had been encouraged by some ideas shared by the U.S. side on this point the previous day. They had contained some positive elements, which were welcome.

Another difficult issue raised by the U.S. was rocket boosters. The Soviets side frankly did not consider this issue integrally related to the Treaty. But recent developments had to some degree clarified the problem, and it might soon be possible to remove it from the agenda. The ministers probably did not need to address it.

Based on its analysis of the current state of play in the negotiations, Shevardnadze could tell the Secretary that the Soviet side would be proposing a comprehensive solution on all outstanding verification issues.

For example, the Secretary had correctly emphasized the importance to verification of data exchange. The Soviet side was prepared

to agree that, in verifying baseline data, up to 10 inspections could be carried out concurrently.

The Soviets were also prepared to agree to inspection to establish the fact of elimination of banned systems. This applied as well to support facilities. Thus the elimination of operational bases including supporting structures could be verified.

Another question raised by the Secretary had to do with the annual quota of regular and suspect site inspections. The Soviet side was prepared to agree, during the three years of the elimination provisions, to a combined total of 20 regular and suspect site inspections. During the next five years, the number would be 15; during the final five years, 10. Shevardnadze asked for confirmation that this corresponded to the U.S. position.

After an exchange of clarifications, GLITMAN and THE SECRETARY said there appeared to be agreement on this point. SHEVARDNADZE stated that it should be recorded as resolved. THE SECRETARY agreed.

SHEVARDNADZE next took up the question of third country facilities. Noting that the matter was as sensitive to Moscow, because of its alliance relationships with the GDR and Czechoslovakia, as to the U.S., he recognized the political and sovereignty questions posed by the issue. The latest U.S. proposal, he stated, was that suspect site inspections should apply to all basing countries for the 13-year duration of the Treaty. The Soviet side was for its part prepared to agree that no more than 50% of the inspections provided for in any given year would take place in any single country. This appeared to provide the basis for an agreement. The lawyers could work out the precise terms.

THE SECRETARY expressed his agreement, subject to the proviso that inspectors should respect the laws of the country where the inspection was taking place. SHEVARDNADZE agreed emphatically that sovereignty had to be respected.

The Foreign Minister then took up what he referred to as a “less pleasant” matter—monitoring non-production. The Soviet side was for such verification on an equitable basis. As proposed by Moscow, verification means would be permanent, including onsite inspections of non-production of missiles eliminated under the Treaty. NTM—supplemented, as the U.S. had proposed, by non-destructive onsite inspections—would provide a reliable means of ensuring there was no production at former production facilities. The Soviet side had agreed as well to verification of non-production of launchers of all types of missiles to be eliminated, both ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

Here, however, the two sides’ positions parted company. The U.S. sought to apply different criteria to land based ballistic missiles than

to ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM's). Since all Soviet land-based INF missiles were ballistic, this meant that the U.S. proposal applied different criteria to Soviet and U.S. missiles covered by the Treaty. This was thus a fundamental question. Should the ministers address it, or turn it over to their experts for further work?

THE SECRETARY replied that the issue could and must be solved. In fact, however, it was two different issues. The first was: at those facilities which produced both SS-20's and 25's, what procedures could be developed to ensure that no SS-20's were being built? Some of the things the Soviet side had said seemed to suggest that it might be possible to find a mutually satisfactory operational regime, but would have to be examined in more detail. The issue appeared to the Secretary, however, to be settleable.

The second issue had to do with those facilities producing launchers for U.S. missiles which would be banned by the Treaty. The Soviet side would be able to verify that such production had been shut down.

The Secretary continued that, during his discussions the week before with Kampelman, Vorontsov had recognized that there were no facilities in the U.S. which replicated the SS-20/25 joint production plant. Vorontsov had nonetheless expressed a desire for the sake of equitability to obtain the right to monitor a facility which had some relationship to the production of systems banned by the Treaty. He had given Kampelman a list of five facilities from which to choose. We had now chosen one. When the Soviets monitored it, they would find the production of the components involved had ceased. But that, after all, was the point of the exercise.

SHEVARDNADZE observed that the situation between the SS-20 and 25 was analogous, from the Soviet standpoint, to that for the U.S. GLCM and SLCM. Any mutually acceptable solution had to take that into account.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that the GLCM and SLCM systems shared the same missile. What was different was their launcher. GLCM's could not function without their launch apparatus. That was why verification of non-production of GLCM's had focused on launchers for those missiles. The U.S. was prepared to allow inspections of production facilities for GLCM launchers.

"Maybe so," SHEVARDNADZE replied, but that did not mean that the issues could simply be forgotten. THE SECRETARY countered that the U.S. had proposed measures for verifying the elimination of GLCM's which we felt met Soviet needs.

AKHROMEYEV explained that, in verifying non-production of the SS-20, the U.S. was able at the same time to monitor the number of SS-25's produced, even though the SS-25 was not covered by the

INF Treaty. The Soviet Union should have a reciprocal right to count production of SLCM's, even though they were not covered by the Treaty.

THE SECRETARY reiterated that there were no differences between the GLCM and SLCM *missiles*. They could only be distinguished by those facilities which would make the missile involved usable as a GLCM. The U.S. had dealt with that to give the Soviet side confidence that the U.S. would have no GLCM capability.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that the quantities of missiles involved were also important, as Akhromeyev had said.

THE SECRETARY replied that that was not the object of the inspection regime the U.S. had proposed. The object was to ensure non-production of the SS-20. The legitimate Soviet object was to verify non-production of the U.S. capability to have GLCM's. The U.S. had given the Soviets a regime which achieved that.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the problem nevertheless remained on the agenda, as far as the Soviets were concerned. ICBM's were not covered by the Treaty. Any solution had to be on the basis of reciprocity and mutual acceptability. The Soviet side had offered options for dealing with the problem. The experts could explore it further; perhaps they could present suggestions to ministers by the end of the day. Shevardnadze thought it best to let his experts describe the Soviet approach in detail.

As for monitoring launcher non-production, this should also continue to be discussed, Shevardnadze said. This was the best means of ensuring non-production, he thought. He emphasized that the Soviet side was prepared to accept a permanent monitoring presence at production sites.

But monitoring ICBM's themselves was another matter. As Shevardnadze had said earlier, they were outside the framework of the Treaty. The Soviet side was nonetheless prepared to be realistic. Where the issue was the stationing of SS-25's in former SS-20 bases, Moscow had agreed to verification. But outside of such a context, the U.S. had no claim on ICBM's, except in a START agreement. Thus, experts should work on this obstacle as well. But it was up to the U.S. to remove it; there was no fallback position on the Soviet side.

THE SECRETARY explained that the U.S. sought only a regime which gave maximum assurance that there were no SS-20's. That was the rationale for our insistence on inspecting facilities where they had once been deployed. (AKHROMEYEV pointed out that the Soviets had agreed to that.) THE SECRETARY added that another problem was that the infrastructure and training activities associated with the SS-25 were parallel to those for the SS-20. Thus, one could argue that



there could be SS–20's wherever there were SS–25's—that training and infrastructure for the latter could be exploited for use with the former. These considerations were behind the proposals we had advanced. We did not take issue with the notion that the Treaty did not cover ICBM's; but the similarity of arrangements for the SS–20 and 25 gave us problems. We hoped that the Soviet side would have some ideas in the working group for working on those problems.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Secretary's comments on the SS–25 were similar to those he could make about SLCM's. AKHROMEYEV said that the U.S. approach forced the Soviet side to raise the question of inspecting SLCM's aboard ships.

SHEVARDNADZE said he understood the Secretary's concerns with respect to Treaty verification. He pointed out (with a straight face) that Soviet legislative bodies would also take a hard look at the Treaty. Some were already interrogating Akhromeyev. Thus, there was a need for reciprocity in the Treaty. Perhaps the working group could approach the problem from this standpoint.

THE SECRETARY reemphasized that there was nothing in the Treaty which addressed SLCM's. It did address GLCM's, which had a launch apparatus different from that used at sea.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that the Secretary had spoken about the parallel operational infrastructure for the SS–20 and 25. But the GLCM and SLCM shared the same *production* infrastructure. Instead of trying to make the problem harder, the two sides should be creative about trying to find solutions.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the issue be turned over to working groups. Their focus should be those elements which distinguish prohibited from non-prohibited items under the Treaty. For the SS–20/25, the distinguishing features were the size, weight, and other physical characteristics of the booster. For the GLCM/SLCM, the distinguishing features were their launching apparatus. Distinguishing characteristics were the key to the problem. Perhaps the working groups could find a means of resolving it in an equitable way.

SHEVARDNADZE said he was nonetheless concerned about the question of differences and similarities. The question of the first stages of the SS–20 and SS–25 arose because they were similar. Looked at in this light, the GLCM and SLCM were also similar. But this was a question for the experts, Shevardnadze agreed.

THE SECRETARY underscored that the starting point for the U.S. position on GLCM/SLCM's was that the missile involved was identical. The distinguishing characteristic was the launcher, and that was what had to be focused on.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had one other question to raise—the U.S. position on defining the maximum range of ballistic and cruise



missiles with a range of less than 500 km. The Soviet side had proposed a clear and verifiable means of solving the problem: an exchange of detailed data in conjunction with the conducting of tests in the presence of inspectors. This was a reliable method. If the Secretary was not prepared to agree to this proposal, the issue could be turned over to experts, but Shevardnadze could not understand the reason for any objections. The night before, he had asked Karpov to assume the role of a U.S. negotiator in seeking to convince him. Shevardnadze had not been impressed by the arguments he had heard.

THE SECRETARY said he was surprised. Karpov was usually so persuasive. He suggested that the working groups withdraw to begin their work, seeking first to put into Treaty language those areas which had been agreed during the ministers' meeting. After some discussion, the suggestion was adopted, and Nitze, Kampelman, Glitman, Linhard, Akhromeyev, Karpov, Obukhov and \_\_\_\_\_ left the room, and the discussion moved on to matters relating to the schedule for Gorbachev's Washington visit.

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## 99. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, November 23, 1987, 5:30–6:15 p.m., 6:50–7:35 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Shultz-Shevardnadze Meeting, November 23 Afternoon

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *U.S.*

George P. Shultz,  
Secretary of State  
Colin Powell, National Security  
Advisor-designate  
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant  
Secretary of State, EUR  
Jack F. Matlock, Ambassador  
to Moscow  
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy  
Assistant Secretary of State, EUR  
(notetaker)  
Dimitry Zarechnak (interpreter)

#### *USSR*

Eduard Shevardnadze,  
Foreign Minister  
Anatoliy Adamishin,  
Deputy Foreign Minister  
Sergei Tarasenko (part),  
Special Assistant to the Foreign  
Minister  
Sergei Nagradov, Soviet Mission,  
Geneva (notetaker)  
P. Palazhchenko (interpreter)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Geneva 11/23–24/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on November 24.

*Shevardnadze* began by saying that it was possible he would interrupt their conversation in 7 to 10 minutes in order to talk to Moscow. *The Secretary* said that was perfectly understandable.

The Secretary said they had two alternatives for beginning their discussion. First, they could discuss aspects of summit planning not touched on that morning. Second, they could hear Ambassador Ridgway and Minister Adamishin report on their discussions. *Shevardnadze* said he preferred to begin with the program, beyond the meetings with Members of Congress. He recognized that the Congress was the main thing for the American side.

*The Secretary* said he would like to give our thought about the visit as a whole. He would like to go through it and explain it. *Shevardnadze* said that was fine with him; he would compare it with what he had. *The Secretary* said he would go down his schedule.

The Secretary continued that we understand the General Secretary will arrive on Monday<sup>2</sup> at 4:25 p.m., at Andrews Air Force Base. He himself would be there to meet him. *Shevardnadze* said the time he had marked was 4:40 p.m., and asked about 5:00 p.m. *The Secretary* said the Soviet side should let us know. *Shevardnadze* said he had 4:40 p.m. marked, but that might change; there was not much difference.

*The Secretary* continued that he would escort the General Secretary to his hotel, and nothing further was planned for that evening. It would be late in Moscow time, and we assumed that he would wish to rest up.

*Shevardnadze* said the only additional detail he had was that the General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev would like to invite the Secretary and Mrs. Shultz up to tea at that point; Gorbachev had asked him to convey the invitation on his departure. *The Secretary* said that would be most gracious. *Shevardnadze* added that he had just talked to Gorbachev, who asked him to convey his best wishes to the Secretary. *The Secretary* thanked *Shevardnadze*.

The Secretary continued that the official arrival would take place the next morning. The way these things worked was that the General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev would drive to the White House, arriving at the Ellipse, which was in a sense behind the White House. There would be photographs, and, assuming the weather was nice, the band would play, there would be a salute of guns, soldiers in Revolutionary uniforms would march, the national anthems would be played. The President would make remarks which would start the visit; the General Secretary would make some remarks; and they would then go inside and start their meetings.

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<sup>2</sup> December 7.

*Shevardnadze* said he had that marked for 10:00 a.m. *The Secretary* said they would try to start punctually, and by the time it was over, with interpretation, it would probably be about 10:30. *Shevardnadze* said this meant remarks lasting about five minutes. *The Secretary* said that was the usual thing, and that remarks usually touched on the outlook for the meetings. We would provide the Soviet side with copies of previous remarks by others.

The Secretary continued that they would then go into the White House. Mrs. Reagan wished to host Mrs. Gorbachev and other spouses for coffee on the State Floor. Mrs. Gorbachev could stay as long as she chose; usually the period was about half an hour. In the meantime the President and the General Secretary would start their meeting. We expected this to last about an hour and a quarter or so. It would be an initial meeting. There were questions about format. In the history of our summit meetings there were several. Some, as at Geneva, had included just the two of them plus interpreters. Some, as at Reykjavik, had begun with the two of them, and then the Secretary and *Shevardnadze* had been called in. Sometimes there had been as many as six or seven on a side. They would want to get some idea of how the subject matter would flow. We recognized that as they talked they might wish to stay together longer.

*Shevardnadze* said he had some ideas about subject matter; he could outline them later.

*The Secretary* continued that we had thought that since this was the initial day, rather than having an official lunch that day each leader could have lunch with his own people, a relatively brief lunch. The President would then welcome the General Secretary back at 1:30 p.m. *Shevardnadze* said that assuming the first talk began at 10:30, they had planned, if the President agreed, that it would conclude at about noon. Lunch would last until 1:00 p.m.; 50 minutes should be enough for it. *The Secretary* said this would be no problem. The real point was to reconvene at about 1:30. Then the event would be at 1:45, the signing of the INF Treaty. They would then move to a larger room at the other end of the White House, the State Dining Room where *Shevardnadze* had had lunch, and there each leader would give a television message, basically on INF, arms control and the like. This would be the first treaty ever reducing nuclear arms, and that was worth remarking on. The messages would be relatively short, to the American and Soviet peoples.

The Secretary continued that they might then move on to another meeting, in the West Wing, in the President's offices there. We were looking at about an hour and a half, or perhaps longer, but it would be useful at some point to end the meeting, to allow time before the dinner, with some discussion of the developments of the day. We

would need to consider how to handle the press. They would have plenty of event footage that day, but we should consider what to say about the content of the meetings. We were thinking of starting the White House dinner at 7:00 p.m.

*Shevardnadze* said he had something a little different. The signing was marked for 1:30, concluding at 2:15. *Adamishin* pointed out to him that his program included fifteen minutes for arrival and signing; he asked about the television messages. *The Secretary* said he was allotting half an hour for that; it could perhaps be condensed to allow more time. He asked if the Soviet side wanted the signing at 1:45, after the General Secretary arrived. He pointed out that it usually took about fifteen minutes to arrange the people, but it was a good question as to whether the signing would take a half hour. *General Powell* said it would probably not; the White House would walk it through and see.

*The Secretary* continued that the meeting could take longer, but suggested that the sides try to see how long the signing would take. The U.S. side had figured that the messages would take half an hour together, with translation time. We had thought of concluding the broadcast at 2:45, but it could take longer. *Shevardnadze* asked if the signing could be at 1:30, with the event, including the messages, concluding at 2:45. *Adamishin* said this should be thought about.

*The Secretary* reiterated that we would walk through the ceremony, and try to have events concluded by 2:45. He did not wish the General Secretary to feel constrained; if he had things to say he should say them. *Shevardnadze* said he thought a fifteen-minute message should be enough. However, after the signing the U.S. seemed to want a meeting; that was not in the program he had.

*The Secretary* said he would explain our rationale. The essence of the visit would be the discussions between the President and the General Secretary. We wanted to allocate sufficient time for that. It was important for them to have as much time as possible together the first day. The reason was that out of their discussion would come questions that others would need to work on: *Shevardnadze*, himself, *Powell*, *Ridgway*, *Akhromeyev*. That was why there was a lot of meeting time the first day.

*Shevardnadze* asked when the second conversation would begin. *The Secretary* said it would begin whenever the General Secretary and the President and whomever they wished to have with them walked to the working side of the White House, along the colonnade *Shevardnadze* would remember, to the Oval Office or the Cabinet Room. This would begin as soon as the messages were over, he thought around 2:45. The working party would leave, and they would get back to work.

*Shevardnadze* said the Soviets' problem was that at 4:00 p.m. they were planning a meeting with scientists and intellectuals. He thought

there should be a way to accommodate that. *The Secretary* said he wondered if the Soviet side would consider having that meeting in connection with the meeting the Vice President wished to have Thursday morning,<sup>3</sup> where they might be invited. We had thoughts on that, he said. *Shevardnadze* said they already knew they would be invited, and there were 50 or 60 of them. He asked how long the second meeting between the leaders would last.

*The Secretary* said that assuming it began as soon as possible after 2:45, we might agree to end it around 4:30. In that way the Soviet side could schedule the intellectuals for 5:00 p.m. The General Secretary would not get to take much of a deep breath for the White House dinner, however. *Shevardnadze* said that was a question for the Soviet side, whether he was strong enough. *The Secretary* said we knew he was strong enough. *Shevardnadze* said that was okay, then, from 2:45 to 4:30.

*The Secretary* said he would next like to describe how our State Dinners proceeded. Guests began to arrive at 7:00 p.m.: the General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev, *Shevardnadze* and his wife, the Ambassador. He, the Secretary, would greet them and take them up to the Family Quarters, which *Shevardnadze* would remember from his meeting last September. *Shevardnadze* said he did remember.

*The Secretary* continued that the President and Mrs. Reagan would thus host four or five people on the Soviet side and perhaps the same number on the American side until about 7:30. At that point they would go down to the East Room. The two pairs would come in together, and the guests would be gathered to be received by the four. After that they would proceed into the dining room, where about 120 people would be served. There would be tables of eight, with an American host at each: the President and Mrs. Gorbachev at one, Mrs. Reagan and the General Secretary at another, the Secretary and Colin hosting others, with Soviet dignitaries scattered around to give them a chance to talk.

The Secretary recalled the Strolling Strings who had played for *Shevardnadze* on his last visit. At the State Dinner a larger group would play at dessert time. The President would then give a toast, and then the General Secretary would give a toast. These would be televised; the columns would lift and the cameras would be there. This would be an occasion for formal prepared statements broadcast to both the Soviet Union and the United States. This would be the fourth such occasion during the day: arrival, the signing, the post-signing TV statements and the toasts. They would then get up from the tables, have

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<sup>3</sup> December 10.

coffee and liqueurs for about fifteen minutes, and then there would be entertainment in the East Room, singers and the like. The President would then escort the General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev to their departure, which would take place around 10:45 p.m.

*Shevardnadze* said this was all acceptable, but he had one request from Gorbachev: that it all be completed by 9:00 p.m. *The Secretary* said that would be almost impossible. The first meeting in the Presidential living area would be for only a few people. It was a warm and friendly atmosphere, which would help things move along. Then there would be the receiving line. That would take time; there was always some character who wanted to talk. Armand Hammer<sup>4</sup> would probably be there. *Shevardnadze* joked that ten minutes would not be enough for him.

*The Secretary* continued that the dinner and toasts would come next. Possibly the entertainment could be curtailed. But the President and the First Lady enjoyed offering it; there was a pace about it. He could give the message to the White House that the General Secretary wanted the dinner shortened. Perhaps the reception and the entertainment could be made shorter. But he doubted it would be possible to depart before 10:30 at the outside. He had been to many dinners. After the senior guests left there was dancing. He himself would go home. General Powell would probably stay.

*General Powell* said he too would be going home. The U.S. side would, however, shorten the event. *Shevardnadze* said that would be desirable. It was after all the first day. *The Secretary* pointed out that it would include two substantive discussions, four occasions for saying or doing something publicly, on television. It was a very full day, and the General Secretary in addition would be meeting with intellectual and academic people.

We did not have a clear idea of what Mrs. Gorbachev wanted to do, the Secretary said. We were anxious to work on this, to make sure that she was paid attention to properly. *Shevardnadze* said he would have some suggestions, but it was important to discuss the main program first.

*The Secretary* continued that that morning the U.S. side had laid out notionally what might happen Wednesday morning, beginning with Congress and going on to a meeting with the President lasting roughly an hour. *Shevardnadze* said the Soviet side had reserved the time between 9:00 and 11:00 for that. He was not sure; perhaps that meant a meeting between 11:00 and 12:45 with the President. *The Secre-*

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<sup>4</sup> American businessman associated with Occidental Petroleum, and friend of Reagan, Armand Hammer, (1898–1990), who was known for his close ties to the Soviet Union.

tary said we would like to persuade the Soviet side to start earlier, at 8:00.

(At that point Shevardnadze was notified of his call. In response to his apology, the Secretary repeated his assurances considering appropriateness, and accompanied him to his car. The meeting resumed at 6:50 p.m.; the Soviet side was joined by Shevardnadze's special assistant Sergei Tarasenko.)

*Shevardnadze* suggested they proceed to the December 9 schedule. *The Secretary* said he wished to return first to the State Dinner. They had discussed its length. We would not want to drop things that are customary. People might say for instance that there is usually an entertainment, but we had not had one for the General Secretary. But we would try to compress it. *Shevardnadze* replied that this was fine, and we should tentatively say 9:00 or 9:30; fifteen minutes did not make much difference. *The Secretary* replied that 9:30 was early. But we would do our best. He suggested they turn to December 9.

The Secretary continued that the U.S. side had suggested we start early, at 8:00. This was partly because it would be afternoon in the Soviet Union, partly because it would allow for a very extensive program and still a morning meeting with the President. *Shevardnadze* asked what time the meeting with the President would begin. *The Secretary* said we were thinking of shortly after 11:00. His schedule showed 11:10. He would expect the General Secretary to be with the Senators for over an hour. This would be a discussion-type meeting. It would not be easy to bang the gavel. But it took only ten minutes from Capitol Hill to the White House. We were thinking of a meeting of about an hour.

*Shevardnadze* said his schedule showed a meeting with the President from 11:00 to 1:00 p.m., in the Oval Office. It was fine to begin at 11:00 if that was alright with the American side. *The Secretary* said we could try to begin at 11:00 a.m., and to discipline the meeting with the Senators to end at 10:45. *Shevardnadze* said the meeting should therefore be from 11:00 to 12:45.

*The Secretary* continued that he then hoped to host the General Secretary at the State Department for luncheon. Normally this lasted about two hours. There would be a receiving line, the luncheon, toasts. He thought two hours would leave time for the General Secretary to get to the White House for the afternoon meeting. *Shevardnadze* said his schedule showed the State Department luncheon beginning at 1:30; at 12:45 the meeting with the President ended, he would then go to the Residence, and then come to the State Department at 1:30.

*The Secretary* said that would be late. Luncheons usually started at 12:30. If it began at 1:30 it would end about 3:30, making it hard to schedule the meeting with the President. He would have had a full



morning, and would perhaps need a deep breath. *Shevardnadze* suggested that the meeting with the President begin at 10:30 and also end early, permitting the State lunch to begin at 1:00. *The Secretary* said it could start anytime. But the long events we had talked about were important. If the Soviet side accepted the schedule they had talked about that morning, it would have a certain pace.

*Shevardnadze* said that with regard to the Congress they might have a chance to talk about it the next morning. But if the meeting with the President began at 10:30, and lasted two hours, the State luncheon could begin at 1:00. *The Secretary* said then it would probably end at 3:00. *Shevardnadze* suggested that it might be shortened; two hours was a long lunch. *The Secretary* said he would try. His receiving line would be longer. He might be able to remodel the meal events, but one function of the lunch was to allow a lot of people to meet the General Secretary. He was thinking in the neighborhood of 200 people. They would be people from the business and academic communities, and Congress, as well as from the Executive Branch. The General Secretary might want to address them, have something personal to say. That was what could be accomplished at an event like that.

He was also envisaging a group that was sort of fun. This was a chorus from Yale University, the Secretary continued. This hurt him, because he was from another university, a rival, but the group had a repertoire in Russian. He thought that might be a nice touch. But this was the sort of thing he could lop off. No one would be the wiser; it was not something usually done at State. But if the General Secretary heard the group and then went around Yale singing, he would feel right at home. Still, he would try to shorten the lunch a little.

*Shevardnadze* said then another meeting with the President was contemplated. *The Secretary* replied that this was right. *Shevardnadze* said he had it down for 4:00. The Secretary had it for nearer 3:00, but sometimes one needed time to communicate with Moscow. He asked about a meeting from 3:45 or 4:00 with the President.

*The Secretary* said he thought that could be done. Mrs. Reagan had the idea of inviting Mrs. Gorbachev for tea, starting at 3:45 or 4:00. This could also begin later. Her idea was that it would be a nice touch for the President and the General Secretary to join the ladies for tea, and for the General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev to leave from there. So whatever the time the meeting ended, that would last about 15 minutes. *Shevardnadze* said that was good.

*General Powell* pointed out that that would compress the time to the Soviet dinner to something over an hour, with travel time. *The Secretary* said that would make it harder for the Soviet hosts. He had the dinner listed as from 7:00 to 9:00. He thought the Soviet side had gotten this from the U.S. side. If the U.S. side had different ideas, he



would like to hear. *Shevardnadze* said no, that was how the Soviet side had planned it. What they could do as hosts in Washington was limited. *The Secretary* said he knew they would do very well. *Shevardnadze* said it had been easier with Dobrynin, since he had such a good voice. *The Secretary* said we were entirely in Soviet hands.

*General Powell* noted we expected the General Secretary would wish to go to the Embassy after the luncheon at State, before meeting with the President. *Shevardnadze* said that was true, but all these things were close. Both leaders would make brief remarks, toasts, at dinner. *The Secretary* said that was true, and they would be public, televised. He had thought that two of the best statements at Geneva had been the dinner toasts, made extemporaneously. Afterwards he had suggested that they say to each other what they had said the night before, but they said they could not remember what they had said.

The Secretary continued that the next day the Vice President had wished to host the General Secretary for breakfast. But he was agreeable to meeting at the Soviet Embassy if the Soviet side wished. It could be either way. We had thought it would be interesting to the General Secretary to have a little prepared discussion, about the world outlook. In that connection he had a list of people, to give a little of the flavor of what we had in mind. In addition to U.S. Government people we had put down some people in so-called private life.

First there was Walter Wriston. He was the retired head of Citicorp. During his tenure there he had had as much influence as anyone on the world of finance. And he continued to think about the impact of technology on financial markets. He had developed the concept of the information standard, the idea that we are not living under the gold standard or anything like that, but under the information standard.

Then there was Ralph Gomery. He was the chief scientist at IBM Corporation. He had a very fertile mind; he was not just an engineer, but also a thinker. Then there was Arnaud Penzias. He was in charge of research at Bell Laboratories, one of the world's great laboratories. *Shevardnadze* said he had heard of him.

Then, *the Secretary* continued, there was Doctor Mary Wood, of the American Chemical Society. She was knowledgeable about materials, fiber optics, ceramics and the like. It was a reality that the materials of the future, or even of the present, were very different from those of thirty years ago. Then there was Dr. Frank Press. He was President of the National Academy of Sciences, and a strong advocate of U.S.-Soviet scientific exchanges. (*Shevardnadze* nodded.) Then there was Harold Brown. He had been Secretary of Defense in the Carter Administration, and would be well known to *Shevardnadze*. (*Shevardnadze* nodded again.) He was extraordinarily bright; he was a one-time President of the California Institute of Technology, one of our top schools.

The Secretary continued that he thought this was a group which, if needed, could have a good discussion with the General Secretary. He would be willing to do some of the needling. He thus had in mind more than a pleasant breakfast. He had tried to identify people the General Secretary might wish to continue to be in contact with.

*Shevardnadze* thanked the Secretary: these were interesting people; he had heard of some of them. *The Secretary* said that if that kind of meeting took place, they would probably want to spend about an hour and a half together; it took some time to get a good discussion going. He thought that pointed the General Secretary toward a wrapup meeting with the President starting at 9:45 or 10:00, somewhere like that. They could take stock of what they had accomplished; examine the work of the working groups; shape up some kind of joint statement. That could flow into a working lunch at the White House. Then we would see a windup event, at which they could issue whatever had been agreed on, after which each leader could make a statement.

The Secretary continued that we understood the General Secretary would want to do a press conference, and then to meet with leaders of business and industry. There would be time for that. He could then depart at 7:00, or something on that order.

*Shevardnadze* said their schedule had Gorbachev inviting the Vice President at 9:00 a.m. It could not be earlier. If it lasted an hour and a quarter, that would mean a meeting from 10:30 to 12:00 with the President. If that was incorrect it should be corrected. Then they had been told there would be a working lunch in the Family Dining Room, with a group to be determined. *The Secretary* said that would be a small group, composed of the immediate close associates of both men.

*Shevardnadze* said he understood. There would then be the departure ceremony. He did not know how the Secretary visualized the meeting. It looked like 12:00, with a departure ceremony at 2:00. *The Secretary* said it would be something on that order, around 1:30 or 2:00. The scenario went as follows. They would be adjacent to the State Dining Room. At the other end, perhaps in the East Room, things would be arranged for the departure ceremony. It was likely to be cold, and it was better to do it inside than outside. Perhaps it could go as in Geneva: a departure statement could be read out, and then the President and the General Secretary could make remarks, with all of it televised. The President would then escort the General Secretary to his automobile and, when he was ready to leave, see him off. *General Powell* noted that the Vice President intended to see him off at the airport. *The Secretary* noted he would like to be there too.

*Shevardnadze* said we were therefore looking at 2:00. The remarks would be brief, perhaps 3–5 minutes. The meeting with business leaders was all planned. Then, at 5:30, there would be the press conference, at

the Soviet complex. The General Secretary also had interests there of an internal nature; he would be meeting there with the people at the Embassy. Concerning departure, 7:00 was probably too early. The Soviet side was asking for 8:00, if that would not be too much of a problem. The U.S. side had wanted 9:00; the Soviet side was asking for 8:00. Both *the Secretary and General Powell* said that would be alright.

*The Secretary* asked whether the meeting with businessmen would precede the press conference. *Shevardnadze* said it would; they wanted all events to be concluded before the press conference. *General Powell* noted they had spoken of this earlier; *Shevardnadze* said that had been taken into account. *Powell* said we hoped the event would take place at our press center. *Shevardnadze* said that since the General Secretary had decided he wished to meet with staff of the Embassy, he wanted to combine the two events. They were thinking of about 400 press. He had not seen the new Soviet building, and would like to.

*The Secretary* said that meant the press conference would be in the Soviet quarters, and not in the press center. *General Powell* noted that because of the numbers involved, we had thought the press center would be an appropriate place. *The Secretary* said there would be thousands of press involved, struggling to find a place, from all over the world. If the General Secretary came to the press center we would set up, there would be television cameras, reporting facilities. This was something to consider. The General Secretary would have greater access to the press pool. 400 was not a bad number, but there would probably be 3000 people covering.

*Shevardnadze* said the Soviet side realized they could not accommodate everyone. *The Secretary* said it would still be desirable to accommodate as many as possible, and where they were. *Shevardnadze* said they had taken a firm decision on this: the General Secretary wanted to see the Soviet community, see the building, and have his press conference. The whole thing would take about two hours. They had equipped a room in their club for the press conference.

*The Secretary* said that if that was what the Soviet side wanted, that was it. What was now open was the question of Wednesday, of Congressional contacts, and the Soviet side would give us its ideas the next day. *Shevardnadze* recalled that he had said earlier, and justifiably, that this was a serious problem, with many nuances. They could talk about it the next day. The two sides should not dramatize the problem; they would find a way to resolve it.

*General Powell* said the joint session had been just one idea among many. They had been working on these ideas for two weeks. It was important to resolve the issue quickly; not to do so was to risk the U.S. press concentrating on it, and putting on the heat. *The Secretary* said they would resolve it the next day.

*Shevardnadze* said he would say one thing: the U.S. side had decided there would be no joint session, that it would not happen. The Soviet side would give the U.S. side its formal reply the next day. *The Secretary* replied that he would only say that there were various patterns for such things. Visitors go to Capitol Hill in different ways. They meet groups in various ways. What the U.S. side had outlined was not typical; it would be a unique pattern of events. Some guests met Members of Congress in hotel rooms. That would not lend itself to reaching out to the Congress in the same way.

*Shevardnadze* reiterated that he would tell the Secretary the next day. He did not see it as a tragedy if there were no joint session. The Soviet side could give up its contacts with the Congress. The main thing about the visit was the treaty. He would be talking to Moscow that night, and give the Soviet reply next day. *The Secretary* said that the great bulk of the Members of Congress wanted to see and have contact with the General Secretary. What some people were doing and saying was not typical of the rest. *Shevardnadze* noted that the General Secretary had already met and talked with most Members of Congress, in Moscow. They would discuss these problems, and the sequence, the next day.

Summing up, *the Secretary* said that at dinner they could hear how the people working on the INF treaty were doing, where we were and what needed to be done; next day he would hear *Shevardnadze's* thoughts on Congressional contacts, and give his thoughts; and he hoped there would be time for discussion of strategic arms. The U.S. side wanted forward motion, so that in their many meetings the President and the General Secretary would be prepared, would not start cold. He also hoped to turn to regional issues, bilateral issues, human rights issues.

There were a couple of outstanding issues on the bilateral side, the Secretary went on. They had talked about them before, and we hoped to resolve them. One was the number of temporary people, the other guests of embassies. On temporary workers we could accept the number of 50, suggested informally by the Soviet side, if he understood from *Shevardnadze* that if we had a need for surges the Soviet side would look on that in a sympathetic way. On guests we would like to see the sanction removed. We had no parallel sanction. Tom Simons could talk about these things endlessly, but we preferred to get them done.

*Shevardnadze* said that when the Soviet side came to Washington, if the two of them were able to it might be a good thing for them to sit down with their ambassadors on this. He knew they would be busy, but it would be good to sit down with the ambassadors and resolve all the issues of interest to their embassies. They could meet for perhaps

30–40 minutes and discuss all the issues. He did not see any reason why they could not be resolved. *The Secretary* said he agreed to do it that way.

The Secretary said he had two additional things to raise on the summit. The first was the sequence; we would need to take that up. The second was who the Soviet delegation would be. They had mentioned Shevardnadze and Akhromeyev. He had made a point of having Carlucci meet the Defense Minister in Moscow because he was aware of what was happening to him. There had been recent exchanges of cables between ministers of defense. He and Shevardnadze had agreed that the ministers should carry more of a load.

*Shevardnadze* interjected they should not do so by fighting. *The Secretary* said no, by working out problems. They had two relatively new ministers, and if both the Minister of Defense and Akhromeyev came, they could meet with Carlucci and our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Crowe. We had been thinking of setting aside some bloc of time, for some program of discussions. On Wednesday morning the General Secretary would probably be in contact with Congress, so the two might go to the Pentagon. No special effort was necessary.

*Shevardnadze* said he found the Secretary's arguments convincing. The Soviet side had been thinking along the same lines. But it was just not possible for Yazov to come. They were in favor of contacts between the ministers, but this time they could just not arrange it. What the form of those contacts could be Akhromeyev could discuss, as well as others.

*The Secretary* said the U.S. side would like to use the occasion of the leaders' meeting also for other meetings. He was sure Crowe would like to receive Akhromeyev even if Yazov were not there.

On composition, *Shevardnadze* said, he thought that of the Soviet side had been conveyed to the U.S. by cable. It would be the General Secretary, Shevardnadze, CPSU CC Secretaries Yakov'lev and Dobrynin, Akhromeyev, the General Secretary's chief of staff Chernyayev, and Kamentsev, now Deputy Prime Minister responsible for all foreign economic relations. Kamentsev was an interesting man; he knew a great deal. *Ambassador Ridgway* said he had been an old fisheries counterpart of hers. *Shevardnadze* said jokingly Kamentsev was a great fisherman.

*The Secretary* suggested they break for dinner. It would take 20 minutes to get to the site, so they might meet there at 8:30. *Shevardnadze* joked in conclusion that they could then sit till morning.

100. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, November 24, 1987, 10:20 a.m.–1:05 p.m.

## SUBJECTS

Summit schedule, INF

## PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*

THE SECRETARY

NSC Advisor Powell

Asst. Sec. Ridgway

Amb. Matlock

EUR/SOV Director Parris (notetaker)

Mr. Zarechnak (interpreter)

*U.S.S.R.*

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Dep. ForMin Adamishin

Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko

Shevardnadze Aide Stepanov

Unidentified Soviet notetaker

Mr. Palazhchenko (interpreter)

SHEVARDNADZE opened the meeting by noting that most of the program for General Secretary Gorbachev's Washington visit had been agreed the day before. As for Mrs. Gorbachev, she would participate in all events in the official program, with the exception of the General Secretary's meetings with the President. The Soviet side understood that Mrs. Reagan would also offer tea to Mrs. Gorbachev. Also possible were a visit to the Library of Congress, the National Gallery of Art, perhaps a trade center. Mrs. Gorbachev also expected to take a tour of the city. Specific times for such events could be determined later.

THE SECRETARY said this all sounded good. He noted that Ridgway had just reminded him that a Soviet exhibition would be in Washington at the time under the General Exchanges agreement. Mrs. Gorbachev might be interested in visiting the site. SHEVARDNADZE said he would make a note of this, but pointed out that time was limited.

In any case, he continued, the Soviet advance team would return to Washington about November 27. It might include Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh, who would have final Soviet suggestions for the program. THE SECRETARY said in that case the U.S. side would await his arrival before proceeding with planning for Mrs. Gorbachev's schedule. SHEVARDNADZE agreed that this was the best approach.

As for the question of contacts with Congress, Shevardnadze recalled that the U.S. had ruled out what he called the "first option"—an address to a joint session of Congress. As far as the Soviet side was

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Geneva—11/23–24/87. Secret. Drafted by Parris. All brackets, except those that indicate the omission of material, and blank underscores are in the original. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission.

concerned, the “second option” suggested by the Secretary the day before was not satisfactory.

Perhaps there was a third option: the ministers could agree that the General Secretary would have contacts with Congress, but the form and venue for those contacts could be considered at a later date. Perhaps, for example, the General Secretary might invite Congressional leaders to visit him at the Soviet Embassy, as would the Vice President. Shevardnadze thought such an arrangement would not be inappropriate, particularly in view of the precedent established for the Vice President. It would, moreover, eliminate a number of problems of concern to both sides.

To prevent the usual wave of speculation, however, both sides would have to stick to a common line with respect to the Congressional side of Gorbachev’s program. Shevardnadze proposed that they simply say that the rest of his program was very full, that there was little time available, and that his five meetings with the President were the main focus of the visit. Again, the Vice President’s breakfast at the Soviet Embassy would help establish a precedent for any meetings there which Gorbachev might have with Congressional leaders.

Emphasizing that the idea he had just elaborated was his own, and had, he said, occurred to him that very morning, Shevardnadze suggested that, for the moment, the two sides inform the press that there would be contacts, and that the form of those contacts would be determined later. That was all that needed to be said.

THE SECRETARY asked if his understanding was correct that Shevardnadze’s idea did not yet reflect a hard preference. SHEVARDNADZE said it reflected *his* preference.

THE SECRETARY commented that the sooner the matter could be clarified, the better. Any lack of clarity would lead to speculation. If this was the way the Soviet side wanted to handle the matter, it should be brought to the attention of Congress and the press.

SHEVARDNADZE asked if the Secretary believed that Congress might feel that the executive branch was making the decision for them were the Secretary to accept such an approach.

THE SECRETARY said that that was not the way it would happen. He would have to tell Congress that Gorbachev had decided he did not wish to accept Congress’s invitation to come to the Hill, but rather wished to extend an invitation of his own to the leadership. The Secretary could not accept such an invitation for the leadership. It would be their call. He was sure they would come, but also sure that they would be disappointed that the General Secretary had not accepted their invitation.

The Secretary recalled that, in seeking to structure a Congressional program satisfactory to Gorbachev, the U.S. side had had three objec-



tives: to give him a chance to meet with the leaders of both houses; to give him a chance to meet with Senators who were members of committees relevant to the ratification of the INF treaty; and to expose him to a wider range of the membership of both houses by means of a televised address. The Secretary did not see how the final objective could be accomplished under the scenario Shevardnadze had described. Perhaps it would be possible to achieve some of these objectives by combining some of the events the Secretary had earlier proposed: perhaps Gorbachev could first meet with the leadership of both houses on the Hill and then invite certain key Senators to the Soviet Embassy.

SHEVARDNADZE said he thought it best for both sides to limit themselves at this time to confirming that there would be contacts, leaving the form to be determined later. There should be a “full stop” after that statement.

As far as the Soviets side was concerned, the most appropriate format would be for Congressional leaders to come to the Soviet Embassy to see Gorbachev, as the Vice President would do. The main purpose of the General Secretary’s visit, after all, was not to have an exchange with Congress, but to meet with the President, sign the INF Treaty, and chart a course for the future. There was no need to overdramatize things if certain elements of the schedule did not work out; this happened all the time in preparing for high-level visits. As for the concerns the Secretary had expressed with respect to ratification of the INF Treaty, that was a matter between Congress and the executive branch.

THE SECRETARY observed that, for planning purposes, the U.S. side needed to be working this problem with Congress. When he returned to Washington, therefore, the Secretary would tell the Congressional leadership that he had presented to Shevardnadze the idea which had been developed with them. He would report that Gorbachev did not feel that that approach was suitable, but still wanted contacts with Congress, and wanted to invite leaders to the Embassy. The Secretary would solicit the leadership’s reactions. He cautioned that it would be better, as the problem worked itself out, were the Soviet side not in direct contact with the Hill.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviets would not be in touch with Congress. Noting that we would, THE SECRETARY said it would be well to have the clearest possible understanding of what the Soviet side considered feasible options. SHEVARDNADZE said he had given the Secretary his own preference, for contacts at the Soviet Embassy.

THE SECRETARY urged that, as Moscow considered the matter further, that it consider how attractive Congress might find the proposition of first hosting Gorbachev and then being his guest at the Soviet Embassy. The reciprocity angle could be important, and the Secretary



was not certain that the Vice President's precedent would be compelling on the Hill. SHEVARDNADZE said he doubted that such a two-tracked approach would work—there was too little time.

THE SECRETARY described a range of options which the Soviets might consider in inviting Congressional leaders to the Embassy. There was the "leadership" itself, comprising perhaps 10–12 persons from each house. There was a larger number of Senators and, in a different way, some House members, who had a special interest in arms control and related matters. And then there was the concept of having the "leaders," supplemented by ranking members of the most important Senate committees. This would be an even larger number—35 or so persons.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would not invite so large a group. He had in mind just the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate. In response to a question from THE SECRETARY, SHEVARDNADZE confirmed that he was thinking in terms of only 2 persons. There would be plenty of opportunities to meet other members of the two houses. Symbolically, Gorbachev would pay his respects to Congress by meeting with its two most senior representatives. A similar formula could be used when the President came to Moscow—the President could meet with the leaders of, respectively, the Council of Nationalities and the Council of Soviets.

Describing briefly the interplay between party affiliation, seniority and committee structure in Congress, [the Secretary] pointed out that, in the House, a minimum of five Representatives (the Speaker, majority and minority leaders, and their whips) constituted the "leadership." There was a similar structure on the Senate side, with the exception that there was no speaker. So, if the Soviets side limited Gorbachev's contact to two, it would cut out seven persons properly considered part of the Congressional "leadership." When the President met with the "joint leadership," he normally met with about 20 people.

SHEVARDNADZE observed that he was not interested in the party structure of the Congress.

THE SECRETARY acknowledged this, but pointed out that, if Gorbachev wished to meet with the Congressional leadership, that meant a certain group. The Secretary would not speak for them. But if Gorbachev invited only Democrats, he might well find that they would consider it inappropriate to accept the invitation on grounds that it could be considered a partisan gesture. The Soviet side could do what it liked. The Secretary was only giving his best advice. But he needed a clear idea of what Moscow wanted in order to convey it to the Hill. The Congressional leadership would make the final decision. Were Gorbachev to seek a meeting only with Democrats, it would make a very "interesting" political statement.

SHEVARDNADZE said it was no more of interest to him whether a member of Congress was a Republican or Democrat than it was for the Secretary whether or not a Soviet legislative leader belonged to the CPSU. The Soviet side had a perfectly legitimate interest in inviting the Speaker of the House. Had not the Secretary himself said yesterday that—Heaven forbid the thought—if something happened to the President and Vice President, the Speaker would be next in succession.

THE SECRETARY said he withdrew. He had tried earlier to give Amb. Dubinin advice. The Ambassador had chosen not to take it. The Secretary was trying to give Shevardnadze advice. Shevardnadze was choosing not to take it. So be it.

For scheduling purposes, however, the U.S. needed to know how much time the Soviet side wished to allot to a Congressional contact. The Soviets could invite whom they wished. Congress would decide how to respond. For his part, the Secretary would simply report to the Congressional leadership that the General Secretary had not accepted the invitation they had issued, and would be in touch on his plans.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that the idea of a joint session did not originally come from Moscow. It had come from some members of Congress. Had it not become an issue of principle, the variant that the Secretary had suggested would have been fine. In explaining to Congress what had happened, the Secretary would have to make clear—and if he didn't, the Soviets would—why the idea of a joint session had not worked out. The Soviets, for their part, would be prepared to describe why they had not been able to accept Secretary Shultz's second variant. But such a debate could go on forever. That was why he was proposing that both sides simply say at this point that there would be contacts with Congress, with the format to be determined.

Moreover, Shevardnadze continued, if in explaining its decision on a joint session, the justification were offered that no communist leader had ever addressed Congress in joint session, it would appear somewhat strange. As for the problem of maintaining order in the chamber, such an explanation would also do little good for the common cause.

THE SECRETARY noted for the record that Ambassador Dubinin had approached him before the arrival of the Soviet advance team and indicated he had instructions to raise the issue of a joint session of Congress. The Secretary had said at that time that this would be a sensitive issue, and that the Secretary should be allowed to work the problem quietly so that, if some other format appeared to be preferable, no one would be embarrassed. The issue had nonetheless burst into the public domain, with much speculation as to whether the White House or Congress had first asked for a joint session.

That created the situation Shevardnadze was reacting to, and the Secretary understood his reaction. The U.S. had offered an alternative which, as Shevardnadze had said, the Soviet side would have found attractive had not the issue of a joint session been raised. Now, the Soviets seemed to feel it necessary to reject that alternative, and instead invite two or more people from Congress to the Embassy as a substitute. That was the General Secretary's decision; he could invite whom he wished. Congress would decide. The Secretary's only suggestion was that the Soviets not overreact, and that they take into account that there was something called "the leadership" which they might want to invite beyond the two Shevardnadze had mentioned.

SHEVARDNADZE repeated that, based on his two conversations the day before with Moscow, he could affirm that the Soviet leadership deemed the "second variant" suggested by the Secretary to be unsuitable. That decision had been made against the backdrop of the situation created in the U.S. with respect to a joint session. Shevardnadze said that the ideas he had shared with the Secretary about a "third variant" had been his own. He did not know how the General Secretary would react to them. That was why he had proposed a flexible formula for describing what might take place: there would be contacts with Congress, the format for those contacts would be determined later. Shevardnadze would consult with Moscow and might be in a position to confirm his proposal to the Secretary later in the day or the following morning.

THE SECRETARY asked if he was correct in assuming that, whatever the ultimate form of Gorbachev's contacts with Congress, the Soviet side had agreed that he would meet with the President at 10:30 Wednesday morning.<sup>2</sup> SHEVARDNADZE confirmed this.

Shifting the focus a bit, THE SECRETARY noted that the ministers still needed to discuss how to order subjects for discussion by leaders, and how to organize any work they might generate. While final decisions would be made by the leaders, the Secretary offered a few suggestions.

He felt it would be good for the two leaders to start with a one-on-one. That format could, of course, be employed at the beginning of any of the five scheduled meetings. But experience had proved that it was generally preferable for the leaders to be joined by at least their foreign ministers, who could then organize any follow-up efforts. The Secretary also recalled that the format followed for several of the Geneva meetings, where there had been about six on a side, had also been productive. It would be particularly important to have present

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<sup>2</sup> December 9.

for certain discussions those who would be expected to head working groups on the subject under discussion.

SHEVARDNADZE commented that the leaders would no doubt decide how best to structure their meetings, including what role ministers should play. Certainly, when security issues were discussed, the appropriate people—Akhromeyev on the Soviet side—should be present in order to head their working groups. Other members of the delegations could also participate as necessary, depending on the leaders' desires. But probably one plenary meeting of entire delegations would be a good thing, at either the beginning or end of the visit. In response to THE SECRETARY's suggestion that there be both opening and closing plenaries, SHEVARDNADZE agreed that advance teams could consider this idea.

As for the sequence in which issues should be taken up, Shevardnadze proposed that the initial session be devoted to a discussion of the general state of the world in the wake of the Geneva and Reykjavik meetings. It would be important to assess the prospects opened up by the conclusion of the INF Treaty in Europe and in the world. With the elimination of INF conventional arms and the prevention of a new arms race in Europe [verification] became more important, as did the problems of tactical nuclear and conventional weapons. It would be well for the leaders to discuss these issues. Moreover, if the President were interested, the General Secretary would be prepared to engage in a discussion of military doctrine and the philosophical aspects of security in Europe and elsewhere. Without clarity of viewpoints on these kinds of issues, it would be difficult to reach agreements on conventional and chemical weapons.

At a second meeting, Shevardnadze continued, it might be possible to explore compliance problems, particularly as regards the ABM Treaty. Compliance assumed greater importance in the context of an INF Treaty ratification debate and progress on a START Treaty, and both sides could take steps to end the compliance debate. Some attention should also be given to nuclear testing, where there was now a basis for a more promising dialogue.

A third meeting could address regional, human rights and humanitarian concerns of both sides. Shevardnadze believed that there were grounds for a constructive discussion by the leaders of Afghanistan, Central America, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. Differences existed between the U.S. and Soviet approach to each of these areas, and they would continue, but bilateral exchanges of views to date had established that it was possible to arrive at mutually acceptable formulas in some cases.

Bilateral issues could also be covered at the summit. Good results had been achieved in a number of areas: space cooperation; environ-

mental protection; maritime navigation; transportation; communications; people-to-people exchanges, including youth exchanges. So there was plenty of experience to build on.

As for the situations of the two sides' Embassies, Shevardnadze and the Secretary had already agreed to have their Ambassadors meet during the General Secretary's visit. The leaders should not have to take up these concerns.

Finally, for the final session, there should be some review of results during the visit. The result of such a review might be a joint statement of some sort. But, even if there were no statement, a review would be necessary. There should also be a discussion of a post-summit work program. There would be little time before the President's visit to Moscow. There were many START issues to be resolved. So it would be important to have some agreement on how the ministers and their experts could expedite the process. Shevardnadze had said the day before that the ministers' four meetings in three months had been a record. He was certain that they would break that record after the Washington visit. There might also be contacts between Defense Ministers during this period.

In sum, Shevardnadze concluded, these were his tentative suggestions, subject to approval by leaders. He thought, however, that they might provide useful reference points for planning purposes.

THE SECRETARY said that he agreed that it was important to have a sense of how the issues might flow to guide preparations. The subjects which Shevardnadze had laid out corresponded to the U.S. view of what the agenda should be.

As to the order in which the issues should be addressed, the Secretary believed that the guiding principle should be to allow the leaders to generate work which could be undertaken during the visit on a more or less continuous basis. That suggested that strategic arms and ABM issues should be addressed no later than Tuesday<sup>3</sup> afternoon. (SHEVARDNADZE said, "of course.")

Some subjects, THE SECRETARY pointed out, could be quickly dealt with by leaders, and then reflected in a joint statement or review of the results of the visit. He would put nuclear testing and nuclear non-proliferation in that category. (SHEVARDNADZE shook his head affirmatively.) THE SECRETARY noted that there was a history of good common work on NPT, and said he understood a statement on the subject was being worked up. On nuclear testing, he pointed out that impressive progress had already been achieved in the newly opened negotiations in Geneva, and expressed the view that it would be good

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<sup>3</sup> December 8.

to have presented two pending nuclear testing treaties to the Senate by the time of a Moscow summit. Perhaps Bessmertnykh could explore this with U.S. interlocutors when he was in Washington. (SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed.)

On human rights, THE SECRETARY recalled that he had made some positive public statements about the more systematic, comprehensive dialogue which was developing. But the purpose of that dialogue was results. There had been some positive results, but there was also more to be done. As Adamishin and Deputy Secretary Whitehead had just been over the relevant material, so the Secretary would not belabor it. He only wanted to emphasize that, the more the Soviets did "for their own reasons," and the prompter, the better. The Secretary said he suspected that, as in the past, the President would want to take up human rights issues in a private setting with Gorbachev.

In the regional area, it appeared that Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf and Southern Africa had emerged as potentially the most fruitful areas for discussion. Other areas should also be addressed in some measure by the leaders or foreign ministers. Before moving on to bilateral issues, the Secretary said that he wanted to return in more detail to Afghanistan and the Gulf War.

With respect to bilateral affairs, considerable progress had been made on issues which might be referred to in any joint statement. The U.S. had in mind: renewal of the World Ocean Agreement; announcement of intention to conclude negotiations at the earliest possible time on a Basic Sciences agreement and of a global climate and environmental change initiative; a reference to progress in quadripartite cooperation in the design of a fusion test reactor and to the two sides intention to hold exploratory talks on a transportation accord in January; and a review of people-to-people and cultural exchange activities. The Secretary also indicated our willingness to hold another round of talks in Washington the first week of December, observing that, if sufficient progress could be made, it might also figure in a final statement.

The Secretary proposed that USIA Director Wick meet during the summit with an appropriate Soviet interlocutor for a discussion of media access and related questions. SHEVARDNADZE said that Yakovlev should meet with Wick, as he had in Reykjavik.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed with Shevardnadze that it would be well at the summit to map out a work program for their own efforts. They both had busy schedules, and it would be a good thing to know when they would be getting together.

[At this point (12:15), Nitze and Akhromeyev entered and asked to interrupt the ministers' meeting to make a report.]

SHEVARDNADZE, after indicating that he would first like to make a few points in response to the Secretary's intervention, indicated that

he saw no differences between his and the Secretary's views on the sequencing and agenda of discussions during the visit.

THE SECRETARY replied that there might be a few differences of nuance. For example, we would want to explore further what the Soviet side had in mind in proposing a discussion of military doctrine. The Secretary recalled that he had read an article of Gorbachev's on the subject in September, and pointed out that the two sides had been exchanging ideas on the offense-defense relationship over the previous year. Perhaps this could serve as the basis for a discussion at the summit.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed that this was the key question, and one which required clarity at the highest political and military levels. He emphasized the importance of Gorbachev's concept of "sufficiency" in any attempt to end the arms race, and reiterated that the General Secretary would be prepared to address these "fundamental issues" at the summit.

As to the Secretary's comments on the bilateral agenda, Shevardnadze noted that they agreed completely with the materials that had been prepared for his use—even the order of subjects was the same. It was clear that the many meetings which had occurred in recent months had produced results. He wondered if Akhromeyev and Nitze would be able to report the same.

On the question of a possible joint statement, Shevardnadze said he could tell the Secretary a secret—a great deal of work was being done in Moscow to prepare language covering all of the areas the Secretary had mentioned: arms control; confidence building measures; bilateral issues. Regional issues were also being carefully examined to come up with language which would be acceptable not only to the U.S. and Soviet Union, but to third countries as well. When Bessmertnykh arrived with the Soviet advance party, he would have proposals to share. ADAMISHIN added that, through the good efforts of the U.S. side, Soviet representatives had a good sense of what the U.S. felt would be appropriate. SHEVARDNADZE suggested that it might prove desirable to organize working groups in Washington, as had been done in Geneva and Reykjavik, to prepare language on specific issues. Shevardnadze would suggest groups on political-military issues, regional affairs, and perhaps humanitarian questions.

THE SECRETARY said that any preparatory work on a joint statement should be done quietly, so that the document could, as in the past, appear to flow in form and in reality from the decisions of the leaders. This was the way the Geneva joint statement had emerged; we seemed to be on a similar track for Washington.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed with the Secretary with respect to the need to schedule more precisely their future meetings. Both had



busy schedules, and Shevardnadze was already hearing complaints from other foreign ministers—most of them U.S. allies—that he was never available. It would be good to have a framework for any meetings after the Washington visit.

Shevardnadze then asked Akhromeyev and Nitze to report.

At Akhromeyev's suggestion, Nitze led off by noting that good, solid progress had been achieved during the course of the morning. Treaty language was being worked in detail. All the data had not yet been received, but the Soviet side had promised it by well before the summit.

Four issues, Nitze explained, had remained outstanding prior to the morning's session:

—On non-production of ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBM's), there was agreement on the continuous portal method, but disagreement over the location of site which could be monitored by the Soviets in the U.S. The Soviet side wanted the Hercules, Utah plant; the U.S. had selected the Longhorn, Texas facility from the Soviet list.

—On non-production of ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM's) launchers, there had been agreement on locations (Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union; and General Dynamics in San Diego); but there had been disagreement on methods. The U.S. could accept only non-continuous monitoring by onsite inspections; the Soviets insisted on continuous monitoring.

—On GLBM range, the U.S. insisted on use of the maximum tested range plus 10%; the Soviets on the maximum tested range alone.

—On inspection of SS-25 bases other than SS-20 bases converted after November 1, the U.S. sought enhanced use of national technical means (NTM); the Soviets were not prepared to enhance.

As a result of the morning's discussions, two of these four items had been agreed: the Soviet side had agreed to non-continuous monitoring of GLCM launcher non-production; the U.S. had accepted the Soviet approach to GLCM range determination.

In the fourth area—inspection of SS-25 bases—the U.S. had offered a number of modifications to its position designed to move it toward that of the Soviet side. It had reduced the number of inspections required and shortened the period in which they would occur. The Soviet side had clung to the position that enhanced NTM was unacceptable in principle, making a solution to the problem impossible.

On the first issue—GLBM non-production, the Soviet side had urged that the U.S. substitute for the Longhorn plant a facility capable of producing GLBM boosters.

AKHROMEYEV said he would not repeat what Nitze had said. All issues had been resolved but two: enhanced NTM verification of



SS–25 bases where no SS–20's had ever been deployed; and a Soviet right to monitor a U.S. facility capable of producing Pershing II stages or boosters.

Akhromeyev said he nonetheless felt that the discussion had opened up some possibilities. Before exploring them further, the delegations had decided to seek guidance from their ministers. Thus, Akhromeyev proposed separate fifteen minute caucuses, after which the working groups might reconvene and, hopefully, reach agreement.

After a brief discussion, it was decided that the Soviet delegation would caucus, and advise the U.S. side of its decisions. The U.S. delegation would then return to its own mission to meet, and negotiations could resume after lunch.

[At 1:00, the Soviet participants, plus Akhromeyev returned to the conference room, where original U.S. participants were joined by Kampelman, Glitman, and Nitze.]

AKHROMEYEV proposed the following proposal to resolve the two questions which Nitze and he had earlier identified as not agreed:

—With respect to SS–25 bases where SS–20's had not been previously deployed, the Soviet side was prepared to agree to enhanced NTM as the U.S. had proposed for three years—the period in which INF missiles would be eliminated—or less, if a START agreement were signed and ratified. The number of such inspections would be no more than 6 per year, for a total of 18 inspections over three years. The inspecting side would designate the bases to be inspected.

—On GLBM production facilities, the U.S. was aware of Soviet views with respect to the facility in Utah. If, however, it was not possible to satisfy Soviet desires in this respect, the Soviet Union could accept the site in Orlando.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that Disney World was located there. AKHROMEYEV said the inspectors could check it out. He was not interested.

NITZE asked Akhromeyev to clarify that the Soviet position referred to the Martin Marietta plant near Orlando. AKHROMEYEV did so. NITZE pointed out that all the machinery relevant to the production of P–2 boosters had been removed from that plant. Did this fact have any impact on the Soviet position?

AKHROMEYEV suggested that perhaps in that case the U.S. would prefer to agree to Hercules.

NITZE noted that inspection of the Martin Marietta facility would demonstrate that no P–2 motors were being produced. But he wanted to be sure that Akhromeyev understood the situation there. POWELL said that the equipment might still be in place, but production had ceased.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the meeting break for lunch.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed, but in closing emphasized that the proposal Akhromeyev had just made was the maximum the Soviet side could accept. As it was, he and the Marshal might have to seek political asylum in Switzerland.

THE SECRETARY suggested he seek it in Orlando instead.

The meeting concluded on that note.

## 101. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, November 24, 1987, 4:15–4:55 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Shultz-Shevardnadze Meeting, November 24 Afternoon

### PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>USSR</i>
George P. Shultz, Secretary of State	Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister
Colin Powell, National Security Advisor-designate	Marshal Akhromeyev, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
Paul Nitze, Special Advisor for Arms Control	Anatoliy Adamishin, Deputy Foreign Minister
Max Kampelman, Counselor of the Department of State	Viktor Karpov, Director, Arms Control Department, MFA
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State, EUR	Vasiliy Sredin, USA/Canada Department, MFA (notetaker)
Jack F. Matlock, Ambassador to the USSR	Mikhail Farafanov, Soviet Mission, Geneva
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, EUR (notetaker)	P. Palazhchenko (interpreter)
Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)	

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Geneva—11/23–24/87. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from a draft copy. No final version has been found. The meeting took place in the Ambassador's Office.

*Shevardnadze* asked whether the Secretary were flying that night. *The Secretary* said he planned to fly the next day.<sup>2</sup> For the afternoon session, he suggested they listen to the group that had been working on INF, that he then hear from *Shevardnadze* on START, and that they then come back to regional and human rights issues. (The ambassadors had been called.) He asked where the ambassadors were. *Shevardnadze* said that on such important matters there were bound to be casualties.

(There was an informal exchange on the Secretary's experiences in the South Pacific.)<sup>3</sup>

(When the group had assembled) *the Secretary* said he thought the session should start with this group. They should try to finish INF. He would therefore go back to some of the questions he had raised before lunch.

First, the Secretary said, there was the question of the SS–20 and national technical means (NTM). We had studied the Soviet proposal very carefully. The problem with our proposals might be that they had addressed first on-site inspection (OSI) and then NTM inspection. What was important was to give comfort to people that we would have a rounded verification regime, so that we could say that what we had undertaken would be carried out. In the course of the discussion we had modified NTM substantially. The Soviet side had made a proposal which reduced the timespan and the number of inspections. He could say that we accepted it, but he had to say that the Soviet side had done the minimum. We would have criticism on this account. But we could see the Soviet side had struggled. We understood that. We accepted the proposal.

Turning to the issue of the U.S. site to be monitored by the Soviet side, the Secretary said this posed a different kind of problem. There was a history here. The Soviet side was in the unique situation of concurrently producing the SS–20 and the SS–25 in the same facility. These missiles were different, but similar in many respects. We had agreed that they should be monitored. In the process of negotiation it had been suggested that production should be monitored as it came out of the factory, and this had been agreed satisfactorily.

There was no comparable situation in the U.S., the Secretary continued. We were in the odd situation of seeking a place where nothing was produced; that was indeed the point. During the talks between Kampelman and Vorontsov the week before,<sup>4</sup> Vorontsov had said there

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<sup>2</sup> Shultz flew to Brussels on November 25 to brief NATO Foreign Ministers on the INF negotiations.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Shultz's service in the U.S. Marine Corps in World War II.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 91.

should be a kind of reciprocity. There was a problem of image to be handled. We had not liked it, but had seen a point there. So we had invited the Soviets to propose places. They had proposed five places. We had looked them over, and picked one: Longhorn. It does not now produce, but there would be parallel monitoring that that was so. The point was not that there is nothing interesting there, but that there is nothing there that is prohibited. We had taken it from the list the Soviet side gave us. The Soviet side did not like our choice. People in Washington were asking what was going on, why we were rolling from one thing to another.

Longhorn was by a considerable margin the facility on the Soviet list that was easiest for us to handle, the Secretary went on. That was why we had picked it, and think it the right facility, among those the Soviets had offered, to apply the correct perimeter monitoring procedures.

*Shevardnadze* said he had a few words of comment. It was good that the two sides had reached agreement on the first question. The Soviet side had made a step in the U.S. direction. The U.S. side knew the treaty was not addressed to ICBM's. When the Soviet side had accepted a compromise, it had taken a big step in the U.S. direction. The Marshal and he had taken a great deal of responsibility in a very sensitive sphere of Soviet security.

On the second question, *Shevardnadze* said, Marshal *Akhromeyev* knew more than he did.

*Akhromeyev* said he had talked to *Vorontsov* after the latter returned to Moscow, and *Karpov* had participated too. After talking to *Kampelman* *Vorontsov* had asked Moscow to supply him with a list of U.S. production facilities. They in Moscow had supplied the list; there were five facilities on it. Of the two referring to cruise missiles, the two sides had since agreed on monitoring of one. That left three relevant to current or past production of *Pershing II*'s.

The Soviet side had not specified that it wanted Longhorn, *Akhromeyev* said. The U.S. side had proposed it for inspection. The Soviet side had proposed the Utah site. The U.S. side had said that was unacceptable. The Soviets had discussed why not among themselves. According to their information the Utah site produced portions or stages of the MX. They had thought that the MX was indeed not subject to the INF Treaty, that the U.S. was entitled to its objection.

They had discussed the issue among themselves the day before, *Akhromeyev* went on. After meeting at night they had decided that this had to be the reason for the U.S. decision: the Soviet side should take the same attitude as the U.S. did toward the SS-25. It had then suggested the Florida site. The U.S. side then said that was also unacceptable. It seemed to the Soviet side that the U.S. was offering one

and only facility, and telling it that it must accept it, although all three were now or in the past related to Pershing II production. It was hard to understand why Orlando should not be subject to Soviet inspection.

*The Secretary* said our perspective was different. The Soviets had listed five sites. We had agreed to inspection of the cruise missile launch facility. It was then a question of picking one of the three remaining possibilities. We had picked the one that was easiest for us to handle. It was not particularly the MX production which troubled us. Longhorn was simply easier, and we had taken it. We did not see why we should withdraw the choice.

*Akhromeyev* said he would explain again. The Soviets had furnished the list not for the U.S. to select one, but as a list of three any of which the Soviet side could choose. It did not say which one it chose in turning over the list.

*The Secretary* said we were saying that the Soviet side gave us a list, we had picked one, and they now say we had picked the wrong one.

*Ambassador Karpov* said they had furnished Vorontsov the list of sites for his personal information. He had given it to the U.S. side in good faith. The Soviet side had thought Utah was the best sight, as the most analogous to Votklinsk. Then it had gone to Orlando, as a place of assembly for PII stages. Texas had not produced the PII, but the PIa, a somewhat different category. The Soviet side had proposed Orlando that day, if Utah was not acceptable.

*The Secretary* said this clarified matters somewhat, but this process of seeking to satisfy a need for a U.S. facility had started not because of what the facility produced, but to give a visible sense of reciprocity. We were going round in circles.

*Ambassador Kampelman* said he would explain his understanding of what had happened. Karpov and Akhromeyev had not been there. We had been asked to make a selection among the sites on the Soviet list. We had said this would take a few days. We were then asked when the selection would be made. We had made it over the weekend. We may have acted through a misunderstanding, but there were reasons for that misunderstanding.

*General Powell* said he had been the one with the painful task of working with the U.S. side's bureaucracy on this. The one thing these facilities had in common was that Pershings were no longer produced in them. After lots of study and anguish we had offered Longhorn. We had thought it would be accepted. It had seemed a responsive offer to us.

*Akhromeyev* said one element was not being taken into account. Verification was a legitimate function, provided for in the treaty. In the same way that the U.S. side would verify that there was no produc-

tion of SS-20's at Votklinsk, the Soviet side would verify that there was no Pershing production. They had the right to do so whether the Pentagon liked it or not. The Soviet side did not like verification at Votklinsk either, but had agreed to have it, and the Pentagon would have to agree too. Vorontsov had not chosen Longhorn. The Soviet side had proposed a site, and the U.S. had not liked it. It had then proposed a second, and could not understand why the U.S. did not like that either. But under the treaty the Soviet side had the right to verify.

*Karpov* noted that U.S. data indicate that the Orlando plant is a final assembly facility.

*The Secretary* said the two sides wanted to wind up this matter. They should want to do so in a way that made them feel good about it. Colin Powell had been in touch with Mr. Carlucci. The U.S. side had been authorized to accept the Utah plant. But the U.S. side felt the process had put them in a bad position as negotiators. A rationale had been provided, a list had been provided, we had picked a site, and then we had had to go back. There had been a fierce struggle in our own defense establishment. We were making a concession, but we did so with reluctance. What it stood for was a desire to move forward. As negotiators we would take our lumps. But negotiators survive. In the months ahead another group would be meeting in this same way on START, dealing with harder issues, and we hoped that our acting in good faith on this occasion would be borne in mind.

*Akhromeyev* said both sides were in trouble; as the Russian saying went heads would be cut off when they returned to Moscow. *Shevardnadze* said both sides might be forced to seek asylum in neutral Switzerland. *Akhromeyev* said the President and the General Secretary could explain what had happened to each other. *The Secretary* commented he doubted either would want to hear.

*The Secretary* continued that that settled all INF issues. Their people should work through the afternoon and the night. There was also data to come from the Soviet side. It had not arrived yet, but the U.S. side had to have it.

*Shevardnadze* said he recognized that the Soviet side had given its word, but the matter had turned out to be technically not so simple.

*Akhromeyev* quoted the Russian proverb "when there is death there should be a payment." This was the third time the Soviet side had promised the data. The trouble was that the Army was just not interested, traditionally, in production facilities. Perhaps there was a different relationship of the military to production in the two countries. In the Soviet Union the Army just ordered so and so many, and did not worry about stocks. Now it was trying to determine what there were.

They would have the data by Thursday or Friday.<sup>5</sup> They too were interested in precision.

*The Secretary* said we should avoid a situation when figures are given and then have to be withdrawn. The U.S. side preferred that the Soviet side take the time necessary. Precision was needed. But this did not change our impatience.

*Akhromeyev* said he understood. On his return to Moscow he would give every order. The thing would be done.

*The Secretary* said that discussion of strategic arms would have a different cast. For instance, Glitman would be out. If Shevardnadze would join a larger group, it would be good to hear his thoughts on strategic arms and the ABM Treaty. They could then return and do regional and other issues, while the group considered what Shevardnadze had said. Later they could rejoin them to hear what they had to say.

*Shevardnadze* said he understood what the Secretary had said to mean the two sides had completed the main body of work on INF. *Akhromeyev* said “congratulations and thanks.” Nitze had earned his bread. (He rose and crossed to shake Nitze’s hand, and others then shook hands as well.) *The Secretary* said he was thinking of inviting participants to a glass of wine after their meetings were over. Meanwhile the press was on a vigil. He suggested that Shevardnadze and he go down and say to them that we had completed all the INF issues, and then come back. *Shevardnadze* asked the Secretary to confirm that they would make the announcement now, and then have press conferences later. *The Secretary* confirmed this: the reason was that it was 5:00 in Europe, and 7:00 in Moscow, and the European press needed this news. *Shevardnadze* joked that they should perhaps raise a glass after the press conference.

(The principals reconvened after 10 minutes, at 5:05 p.m., in the larger downstairs conference room, with the arms control group.)

[Omitted here are the last four paragraphs of this draft memorandum, which are identical to the first four paragraphs of Document 102.]

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<sup>5</sup> November 26 or 27.



102. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, November 24, 1987, 5:05–5:40 p.m.

*D&S EXCERPTS—GENEVA MINISTERIAL*

*Shultz-Shevardnadze Meeting, November 24, 5:05–5:40 pm*

*Shevardnadze* said there was cause to congratulate the leaders, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev and President of the United States Ronald Reagan, on an important and momentous occasion. It had begun with them at Geneva, and they had carried it on at Reykjavik. Their contribution had been decisive, in Moscow and Washington. He was truly pleased and happy that we had reached the final stage; we were witnesses to a momentous occasion.

*The Secretary* thanked *Shevardnadze* for his words, and said he agreed with them. One of the things the sides had seen in the past two years was how difficult it is to translate what the leaders had agreed into a treaty. But it was now a done thing. Now the sides should move on to a bigger task. There was less time this time, before the Moscow meeting. But perhaps we had acquired practice and a sense of competence that we could confront the problems. He valued his relationship with *Shevardnadze* and their ability to work together. Reykjavik had also been the first place General Akhromeyev had appeared, and when the Secretary had heard he was to be here he had taken it as a good sign.

*Akhromeyev* and *Shevardnadze* both thanked the Secretary.

*The Secretary* went on to say he and the Minister had discussed how to proceed over lunch. They had exchanged thoughts on how the issues in strategic arms and space could be put forward, including on how to arrange discussion at the summit. After the group had heard what the minister had to say, the ministers would continue their private discussion, and then they could all reconvene later in the afternoon.

*Shevardnadze* said our peoples had certain differences, even divergences. But they also had certain things in common, having to do with their national characters. One was that they were never satisfied with what they had done, never stopped, but always kept going. The two of them had solved an important problem that day, and they were already thinking of even more important, responsible tasks. He wanted

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Geneva—11/23–24/87. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from a draft copy. No final version was found. The meeting took place in the First Floor Conference Room at the U.S. Mission.



to recall what the General Secretary had said on numerous occasions: that radical reductions in nuclear arms were the crucial element of the current stage in international relations. The groundwork had been laid at Reykjavik. He wanted to share some comments, some elements of the Soviet side's vision of what the structure of a future agreement should be.

What are the specific provisions they have in mind?, Shevardnadze asked. Building on the joint statement at the last summit meeting, they had in mind instructions from our leaders to our negotiators. The first priority was to define what areas these should cover. He needed to stress a few things.

First, Shevardnadze went on, if the U.S. had any doubts that fifty percent reductions should have a place, it should say so now. This was a fundamental principle agreed at Reykjavik. The instructions must contain the main landmarks agreed there. It had been agreed that there should be non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. In Washington there had been agreement in principle that its provisions should be adhered to as it was signed and ratified. That was his understanding, Shevardnadze said. The agreement had to include the provisions agreed to with the U.S. side. Here he had in mind the 1600 delivery vehicles and the 6000 warheads on them. They had not disagreed on this.

As for the main provisions of the treaty on strategic offensive arms, Shevardnadze went on, the instructions could include agreed levels for each element of the triad. He understood additional work was required on this, but the General Secretary's statements to the Secretary in Moscow had an importance that the Soviet side was ready to record. They took account of U.S. concerns, if not fully.

Further, Shevardnadze continued, limitations on SLCMs should be included in instructions to negotiators. He wished to stress that the issue was one of fundamental importance to the Soviet side. It had been discussed at Reykjavik; there it had been agreed that limits must be established. We could not afford not to set out the main parameters.

Further, it would not be redundant to mention certain details, Shevardnadze went on. This meant procedures for reductions and for verification. These would be main features. There were also the unilateral obligations agreed on: the Soviet approach of reducing heavy launchers to 154, and the obligation to reduce ICBM/SLBM throw-weight by approximately 50 percent. They had debated this at various times.

Further, Shevardnadze said, on the ABM Treaty, the time-frame must be reflected in the instructions. The Soviet side favored a specific time-frame of at least 10 years, in accordance with the principle agreed to at Reykjavik. It would be advisable to record the main fundamental landmarks for the delegations, the steps the side would take—10-year

non-withdrawal and follow-on negotiations, to take account of the developments in the strategic environment, as the Soviet side had stressed in various negotiations.

Finally, there should be a common approach to compliance. The two sides should tell their delegations to explore the list of devices which it would be prohibited to put into outer space. These devices would be listed irrespective of the purposes for which they had been designed. He thought it important to stress that. Such a clarification would be important.

That was all he had wanted to say, Shevardnadze concluded. The Soviet side had a rough draft paper on how it saw the instructions to negotiators. After discussion of the conceptual approach, their colleagues could work on a first reading of it. They would not of course finish, but a first exchange of views would be helpful. It would prepare the dialogue in Washington and the decisions to be made at that level. Shevardnadze asked if anyone had anything to add.

*The Secretary* said he had a few comments to make, although he would not go into detail. As at Geneva two years before, the U.S. side agreed with the basic notion of 50 percent reductions in strategic arms. But numbers had been mentioned, and there was one important concept which had not been described as we felt it had been agreed, and that should be mentioned in any instructions. The 1600 vehicles and the 6000 warheads had been mentioned. Shevardnadze had mentioned the number 154 with regard to heavy launchers. This had been translated in our discussion into 1540 warheads; the two sides should seek to keep to warhead counting. With regard to the reduction in throw-weight, the U.S. side felt it should be codified, be made part of the agreement, so that it would not come back up. There was also the bomber counting rule agreed at Reykjavik; it was an essential element of this picture. With regard to SLCMs, this was an important weapons system. But there was no agreement on how to verify it; it was extremely hard to handle. The suggestion had been made of declarations on each side. But verification was elusive.

He wished to correct one point, the Secretary continued. Shevardnadze had mentioned a number of times that a 10-year non-withdrawal period had been agreed at Reykjavik. That had been in the context of a proposal which the President had made, and the Soviet side had rejected; it had then come off the table. The U.S. side had a different proposal on the table now. The proposal the President had made was to reduce all ballistic missiles over a ten-year period, and in that case to have a non-withdrawal period of the same duration. It had thus been heavily conditioned. The whole proposal could not be picked apart. Our present position was for a non-withdrawal period to 1994, which amounted to seven years beginning with the current year. It did

not float forward. After that either side would have the right to deploy if it so chose.

The Secretary went on to say that it would be worthwhile if they could find a way toward agreement on sublimits in this meeting. The General Secretary had proposed some in Moscow. Some aspects of what he had proposed were totally out of accord with the U.S. force structure. Others were intriguing, as he had told the General Secretary. He wished to stress the desirability of agreement on a limit of 4800 for ballistic missiles warheads. This was a number which we believed sensible. In some ways it was derived from suggestions the Soviet side had made.

The Secretary said we had noted that in the General Secretary's proposal 3000 and 1800 added up to 4800; we had done the arithmetic. We hoped they added up to that. Karpov said they did not. Different people were saying different things. We said that what Shevardnadze and Akhromeyev said across the table was what counted. What others said was just talk, although it was interesting.

The General Secretary had mentioned an ALCM sublimit of 900, or of 800 to 900, the Secretary continued. We were assuming that the Soviet side had bombers. The fact that the Soviet side was developing them had led us to believe the 4800 limits was in the Soviet interest as well as ours. If it were acceptable to the Soviet side, we were prepared to be flexible on other sublimits. We had many times said there was a basic difference between ICBMs and sea-launched missiles, in accuracy, in warning time. Hence we had always stressed ICBM's.

These were just initial reactions, the Secretary said. He suggested that the arms control group make an initial run-through, and then perhaps some of the group could reconvene upstairs. We might then see where we should go. It was important for the two leaders to have a fruitful discussion on these topics, and not just to repeat previous positions.

The Secretary asked Ambassadors *Nitze and Rowny* whether they had additional comments. They did not.

*Shevardnadze* said that limits on long-range SLCMs were important to both the U.S. side and the Soviet side. There were ways to verify them, although that was another question. One could limit the types of submarines on which they would be deployed. U.S. and Soviet scientists had interesting ideas on how to verify. They could meet to share them, even before the summit. What was important was to agree on the principle that there should be limits.

On the 10-year period, *Shevardnadze* said both he and the Secretary had been at Reykjavik. The period had not been conditioned as the Secretary had described it. He would remember that the Soviet side

had started at 20, and then come down to 10. In the last proposal it had been agreed that there would be a non-withdrawal period of 10 years. In Washington it had been mentioned as agreed. Of course that did not give the delegations the right to back away from it.

On sublimits, Shevardnadze went on, an important step had been taken when the General Secretary outlined limits on the various elements of the triad in Moscow. This ought to be discussed in detail, the entire set of issues, building on the experience the two sides had gained; by this he meant in INF. We had a body of experience, and should use it. We had showed a readiness to search for common ground, to make concessions taking the concerns of the other side into account. Agreement could be reached in a short period, on the assumption, of course, that the ABM Treaty would be preserved.

*Akhromeyev* added that the rest was details. The group should study what Shevardnadze had said and report to the ministers. *Shevardnadze* suggested the group start its work. *Akhromeyev* said both sides could present their concerns. *Shevardnadze* commented that the material had to be agreed on by the summit. *The Secretary* asked Shevardnadze when he planned to leave. *Shevardnadze* replied that night. *The Secretary* joked that their colleagues would have to talk fast.

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### 103. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Webster to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 24, 1987

Dear Mr. President:

I know you have been given a great deal to read as you prepare for your meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. Nevertheless, I would urge you to read this brief essay on Gorbachev's longer-term strategy and the perspective with which he views the Summit. It was prepared by my deputy, Bob Gates, a career Soviet specialist, who talked with you prior to the Geneva Summit and has helped prepare

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Fritz Ermarth Files, US-Soviet Summit November-December 1987 (12). Secret. Under cover of a December 3 memorandum, Ermarth sent Powell copies of Webster's memorandum to Reagan, Gates's memorandum, and a copy of a memorandum from Powell to Reagan, recommending that Reagan read Gates's memorandum. (Ibid.) Powell subsequently transmitted the CIA memoranda to Reagan under a December 4 covering memorandum; Reagan initialed this covering memorandum and approved Powell's recommendation that he read Gates's memorandum. (Ibid.)

for the past half dozen or so US-USSR summit meetings. I think you will find it both interesting and useful.

Respectfully yours,

William H. Webster<sup>2</sup>

### Attachment

#### Memorandum Prepared by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Gates)<sup>3</sup>

Washington, November 24, 1987

#### SUBJECT

Gorbachev's Gameplan: The Long View (S)

The December Summit and INF Treaty are important achievements for the Administration and for Gorbachev. Yet, while there is substantial uncertainty about the US strategy toward the USSR beyond 1988, Gorbachev's gameplan potentially can be played out over a prolonged period—thus giving him and the USSR a significant advantage. His long range strategy is an important backdrop for the Summit. Understanding it is essential to maintaining perspective during and after the meeting and to identifying both pitfalls and opportunities. (S)

#### *Domestic Imperatives*

There is general agreement among the Soviet leaders on the need to modernize their economy—not so much for its own sake or to make Soviet citizens more prosperous but to strengthen the USSR at home, to further their own personal power, and to permit the further consolidation and expansion of Soviet power abroad. They differ as to the pace of change and whether economic modernization also requires a loosening of political controls. Gorbachev thinks so; many on the Politburo either disagree or harbor serious reservations. (S)

There is also general agreement in the Politburo that economic modernization requires a benign international environment. The Soviets' need to relax tensions is critical because only thus can massive new expenditures for defense be avoided and Western help in economic development be obtained. The roots of Gorbachev's dynamic foreign

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<sup>2</sup> Webster signed "Bill" above his typed signature.

<sup>3</sup> Secret.

policy are to be found at home and in the need for a prolonged breathing space. (S)

### *Foreign Policy Consequences*

The elements of foreign policy that spring from domestic economic weakness are a mix of new initiatives and longstanding policies.

1. Gorbachev wants to establish a new and far-reaching detente in the late 1980s to obtain technology, investment, trade and, above all, to avoid major new military expenditures while the Soviet economy is revived. Gorbachev must slow or stop American military modernization, especially SDI, that threatens not only Soviet strategic gains of the last generation but which also, if continued, will force the USSR to devote huge new resources to the military in a high technology competition for which they are ill-equipped. The Soviets know that detente in the early 1970s contributed significantly to downward pressure on Western defense budgets, nearly halted military modernization, weakened resolve to counter Soviet advances in the Third World, and opened to the USSR new opportunities for Western technology and economic relations. (S)

2. A less visible but enduring element of foreign policy—even under Gorbachev—is the continuing extraordinary scope and sweep of Soviet military modernization and weapons research and development. Despite Soviet rhetoric, we still see *no* lessening of their weapons production. And, further, Soviet research on new, exotic weapons such as lasers and their own version of SDI continues apace. Virtually all of their principal strategic weapons will be replaced with new, more sophisticated systems by the mid-1990s, and a new bomber is being added to their arsenal for the first time in decades. Their defenses against US weapons are being steadily improved, as are their capabilities for war-fighting—command, control, communications and leadership protection. As our defense budget declines again, theirs continues to grow, slowly but steadily. Gorbachev is prepared to explore—and, I think, reach—significant reductions in weapons, but only in ways that protect existing Soviet advantages, leave open alternative avenues of weapons development, offer commensurate political gains, or take maximum advantage of US unilateral restraint or constraints (such as our unwillingness in the 1970s to build a limited ABM as permitted by the treaty). (S)

3. The third element of Gorbachev's foreign policy is continued protection of Soviet clients in the Third World. Under Gorbachev, the Soviets and Cubans are now providing more than a billion dollars a year in economic and military assistance to Nicaragua; more than a billion dollars worth of military equipment was sent to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in the first six months of this year; more than four

billion dollars in military equipment has been sent to Angola since 1984. And, of course, Cuba gets about five billion dollars in Soviet support each year. At a time of economic stress at home, these commitments speak volumes about Soviet priorities. (S)

4. The fourth element of Gorbachev's foreign policy is new and dynamic diplomatic initiatives to weaken ties between the US and its Western allies, China, Japan, and the Third World; to portray the Soviet government as committed to arms control and peace; and to suggest Moscow's interest in diplomatic solutions to Afghanistan and Cambodia. In Europe, Gorbachev through INF is trading a modest military capability for what he sees as a significant political gain. We can and should expect new and bolder initiatives including conventional force reductions—possibly unilateral—that will severely test Alliance cohesion. Similarly, new initiatives with China and Japan will be attempted to overcome bilateral obstacles to improved relations and to exploit problems between them and the US. And, in the Third World, they will seek to take advantage of any relaxation of US vigilance or constancy. (S)

### *Conclusions*

There clearly are great changes underway inside the Soviet Union and in Soviet diplomacy. Yet, it is hard to detect fundamental changes, currently or in prospect, in the way the Soviets govern at home or in their principal objectives abroad. The Party certainly will retain its monopoly of power and the basic structures of the Stalinist economy will remain. A major purpose of economic modernization—as in Russia in the days of Peter the Great—remains the further increase in Soviet military power and political influence. (S)

These enduring characteristics of Soviet governance at home and policy abroad make it clear that—while the changes underway offer opportunities for the United States in arms control, Afghanistan and other areas—Gorbachev intends improved Soviet economic performance, greater political vitality at home, and more dynamic diplomacy to make the USSR a more competitive and stronger adversary in the years ahead. (S)

Westerners for centuries have hoped repeatedly that Russian economic modernization and political reform—even revolution—signaled an end to despotism and the beginning of Westernization. Repeatedly since 1917, the West has hoped that domestic changes in the USSR would lead to changes in Communist coercive rule at home and aggressiveness abroad. These hopes, dashed time and again, have been revived by Gorbachev's domestic agenda, innovative foreign policy and personal style. (S)

While Gorbachev arrives in Washington after a serious political setback, at 57 he can afford to take the long view: he will likely be in



power long after his adversaries at home and abroad have moved off the world stage. His domestic needs and foreign policy initiatives offer the United States significant opportunities but they must be seized with an appreciation of Gorbachev's long range perspective and strategy as well as with realism (particularly with respect to our very limited ability to influence internal developments in the Soviet Union). And, somehow, amid the inevitable media extravaganza of the Summit, a sober—even somber—reminder of the enduring features of the regime and the still long competition and struggle ahead will be needed. (S)

**Robert M. Gates**

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#### **104. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 4, 1987, 7:30 p.m.

##### **PARTICIPANTS**

LTG Colin Powell, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Fritz Ermarth, National Security Council Staff  
Vladimir Kryuchkov, First Chief Directorate, KGB  
Yuriy Dubinin, Soviet Ambassador  
Interpreter

Ambassador Dubinin had called Powell to invite him to dinner to go over some additional details for the summit meeting. Powell called back to inform them Gates was coming only about 20–30 minutes before the dinner. When we met at the restaurant there was some awkwardness at the outset but as soon as we sat down at the table (Kryuchkov and Gates sitting side-by-side), Kryuchkov observed that this was an occasion of historic importance—that two such senior officials of the two intelligence services had never met. He noted that others of our services had met “under tables” in other places but that this was a first. Gates noted that it was the first time that two officials of the services had dined face to face in Moscow or in Washington, although each side certainly was intimately familiar with the daily lives of the other in the two capitals.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, US-Soviet Summit November-December 1987 (12). Confidential. Printed from a December 7 draft copy. The conversation took place at the Maison Blanche restaurant.



Kryuchkov then said to Gates, “You speak Russian”. When Gates responded it had been many years ago, Kryuchkov said “we hear that you understand it”. Gates said that he would not trust his imperfect Russian for a conversation as important as this. The two spoke a little German and then relied on the interpreter the rest of the evening. Kryuchkov indicated that he spoke Hungarian as well as German.

The conversation was generally one of banter and debating points, punctuated by several serious discussions. Kryuchkov for example commented on the fact that General Powell was drinking vodka while he, Kryuchkov, was drinking scotch. When the waiter came around and Kryuchkov told the interpreter he wanted scotch, the interpreter started to order Johnny Walker Red and Kryuchkov quickly corrected him to order Chivas Regal. A few minutes later, when Kryuchkov made a comment that CIA knows about everything, Gates observed to him that he had known Kryuchkov would order Chivas before he ever opened his mouth. He initially took Gates seriously and then laughed.

Kryuchkov said a few things that indicated he was well aware of Gates’ background. Gates responded that while Ambassador Dubinin could occasionally watch him on television, Kryuchkov and his associates remained a considerable mystery in their personal lives. Kryuchkov responded that he found that hard to believe. He said that perhaps the dinner could be the opening of a different kind of glasnost. He then went on to comment that glasnost had reached such a level in the Soviet Union that it was beginning to rival the availability of information in the United States. Gates told him that was hardly the case and that we would begin to believe in glasnost when a Soviet version of *Aviation Week* began to be published with the kind of information the US magazine has.<sup>2</sup> He indicated familiarity with the magazine, and Gates told him we knew they had many subscriptions. He laughed.

Gates told Kryuchkov that he must be able to run his service on a considerably smaller budget than CIA thanks to the assistance of the Western press and the US penchant for leaks. He said that was hardly the case. Gates said that, in the spirit of glasnost Kryuchkov had referred to, and that inasmuch as they had the opportunity to review many CIA assessments of their economy and military strength, perhaps they should begin to share such assessments in return. He responded that many CIA assessments are quite good but that some of them are not “entirely objective”.

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<sup>2</sup> *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, a weekly magazine with a long-standing reputation for publishing stories based on classified information and confidential sources with the U.S. military services.

There then followed a discussion between Powell, Ermarth and Kryuchkov on perestroika, with Powell noting the difficulties of keeping such a process under control and Ermarth indicating the difficulties of economic reform in the absence of a money economy and particularly in light of the fact that military costs cannot really be calculated. Kryuchkov conceded most of these points, though noting that “one should not be too hard on the military”. In this connection he told Gates that he would share a “secret”—that perestroika was proceeding much more slowly than they had anticipated it would two years ago.<sup>3</sup>

During the course of the conversation Dubinin raised several matters relating to the summit with Powell and Kryuchkov freely jumped in to offer his own views. In fact when Powell indicated that one of the stumbling blocks was that the Soviets had not provided pictures of the SS-25s and SS-20s as promised, Kryuchkov said there must have been some misunderstanding and that providing such pictures was “impossible”. He spoke strongly not only on issues involving the arrangements for the visit but as in this case on substantive issues involving the treaty. He asked if the US always used the tactic of throwing up last minute obstacles. Gates said he had helped prepare six or so US-Soviet Summits, that both sides usually had last minute problems, and that somehow they always worked out.

Kryuchkov said that he had carefully read the *Newsweek* article on Director Webster.<sup>4</sup> He said that he had been much impressed by Mr. Webster’s comments that CIA was not going to take a position on policy issues. He strongly endorsed that, saying that the special services had no business involving themselves on policy. He added that he had seen in the *Newsweek* story a quote from Mr. Webster to the effect that CIA still had good sources in the Soviet Union. He indicated that perhaps, in the spirit of glasnost, Gates would share a list of those people with him. Gates asked whether he would be willing to make an exchange of lists. He laughed. Kryuchkov asked that Gates pass his

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<sup>3</sup> In an undated attached note to Gates, Ermarth indicated that the memorandum of conversation “looks good and thorough.” However, he added that the following passage should be included at this point: “Referencing the Yeltsin affair, Ermarth wondered whether we were seeing some political backsliding in Moscow. Kryuchkov replied by saying that Yeltsin had simply turned out to be inadequate to his job, seeking to impose reform from above in the old ways. Did we think, asked Kryuchkov, that Yeltsin was some kind of democrat? Ermarth replied that Yeltsin probably had both strong and weak points, but that informed Americans were concerned about something else, namely the way the party boyars pounced on Yeltsin when he went down. This was reminiscent of something rather frightening in Soviet politics. Kryuchkov responded rather thoughtfully that he understood this point, adding that he found this conversation useful because it gave him insight into the American mentality.”

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Russell Watson and Richard Sandza, “Cleaning Up the Mess,” *Newsweek*, October 12, 1987, p. 24.

greetings on to Director Webster and that perhaps the latter should consider visiting the Soviet Union with the President for the 1988 summit, which he felt was most likely to occur.

At one point, Kryuchkov commented on the security arrangements for the visit and their desire for a successful, safe visit. Gates told him that Americans and our media were quite taken with the General Secretary and that he would be very warmly received—apart from demonstrators. He said they still worried about security. Gates said we always should worry about security for our leaders, that we knew only too well what a crazy person could do. In this context, Kryuchkov noted how warmly Nixon had been welcomed in Moscow in 1972, and observed that the applause for him would have been even warmer had he not been bombing Hanoi and Haiphong.

In the discussion of intelligence role in policy, Gates said that the policy decisions were made by people like General Powell. At that point Kryuchkov recalled a joke about the Czech General who operated under two rules. Rule one is that the General is always right and rule two is that when the General is wrong people should remember rule number one.

When Kryuchkov was asked his first impressions on visiting the United States, he commented on how powerful it seemed—that you could “feel the power”. Several times he referred to how rich and economically powerful the United States is. In this connection at one point he turned to Gates and said that he hoped that CIA was telling the US leadership that the Soviet Union was not a weak, poor country that could be pushed around. Gates assured Kryuchkov that we had a very good understanding of the strength of the Soviet Union and of its power. Gates reminded him of their history in terms of the large armies they had maintained in the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries at a time when the West European kingdoms were just getting organized. Gates recalled their history of constant warfare as they expanded to the east and to the south and that he could be assured that we did not underestimate their power or their pride. We then had a discussion, in which Dubinin participated actively, about World War II. Gates recalled General Powell’s conversation with Marshal Akhromeyev about the siege of Leningrad and that one could not fail to be moved by the sacrifice and courage of the people of Leningrad—and one did not have to be Russian in listening to Shostakovich’s Leningrad Symphony in order to be moved.

In the discussion of Soviet history, Dubinin noted that whenever Russia had relaxed its vigilance whether during the time of the Mongols or in the 1930s, they had been invaded and paid a terrible price and that therefore they must not relax vigilance ever again. He refused to be drawn into a discussion with Ermarth over Stalin’s responsibility for the German invasion.

In the context of Kryuchkov's reference to cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II, Gates said, expressing his personal opinion, that he felt it was a special responsibility of the two intelligence services to ensure that movement toward a more constructive and mutually beneficial relationship should be based on complete realism. Gates quoted Gorbachev's comments to Secretary Shultz some time ago that intelligence was valuable because it reduced the danger of miscalculation out of ignorance and contributed to stability and understanding. He added that there are, in fact, very deep differences between the two countries and that their gigantic arsenals did not simply appear out of nowhere but are a manifestation of deep distrust and even fear on the part of both sides. Gates said that the detente of the 1970s had been a false start. There had been a great deal of unwarranted optimism that surrounded the 1972 summit and the period that followed and yet the deep differences between the countries came to the fore as problems associated with human rights, the Third World and strategic forces quickly dissipated the warm feelings of the early 70s.

Gates continued that if we were to have a more enduring relationship in which the purposes of peace and lessening tensions were served—more than a passing bit of sunshine—it had to be based on a realistic assessment of the deep differences between the sides and a willingness to confront those problems, that we not confuse rhetoric and reality. Only thus could a lasting relaxation of tensions take place. While Kryuchkov seemed to take these comments on board, his only response was to pick up on Gates' reference to human rights, to object to its being raised, and to say that there had been unwarranted interference in the 1970s. Gates said that Kryuchkov misunderstood. While human rights is an issue of continuing concern to us and a real problem between the two countries, Gates had recalled it simply as being one of the factors that helped destroy detente in the early 1970s. He reminded Kryuchkov of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. There then followed a discussion about whether the law was still in effect and Kryuchkov asking what had become of Mr. Vanik.

There was considerable discussion of Afghanistan. Kryuchkov confirmed that they wanted to get out of Afghanistan but had to find some kind of a political solution in order to do so. He expressed particular concern about the possibility of a rise to power in Afghanistan of another fundamentalist Islamic state. He noted that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States needed a second fundamentalist state like Iran. He observed in passing that the United States seemed to be fully occupied trying to deal with just one fundamentalist Islamic state. Ermarth noted that in contrast to Iran, if the Soviet Union left Afghanistan they would confront very much the kind of Afghanistan that

existed before they invaded—that is, a fragmented, weak state that posed no danger to anyone. Gates said they had the additional advantage in comparison to our experience in that there was no Cam Ranh Bay in Afghanistan.

Kryuchkov invited Gates to come to the Soviet Union on several occasions through the dinner. The first time was in connection with Gates' comment about human rights when he said that Gates should come and see for himself and indicated that he was quite serious. The second was in connection with a discussion of technology transfer, and about our respective embassies. We had been talking about economic relations and technology transfer, during which Gates had commented on our concerns over Soviet use of advanced western technology for military purposes. Kryuchkov asked if we could draw a firm distinction between technology for civilian and for military purposes. We acknowledged that in many instances that was quite difficult. Ermarth noted the COCOM process and the effort to try and make distinctions in that forum. In this context, Gates noted that technology transfer probably could come in the other direction in some areas if our new embassy building was any indication. Kryuchkov laughed at that and indicated there was "no problem" with our embassy in Moscow. He said that we were being too modest about our own technical capabilities and that Gates should come to Moscow to look not only at our embassy but also look at what they had taken out of their embassy here in Washington.

At the end of the conversation when Gates said that perhaps he would visit after he retired from CIA, he responded "If you wait, I certainly will be gone". He urged Gates to come sooner and said that he could "give you a visa tomorrow".

Commenting on his visit to Washington, he noted that he had gone to the Kennedy Center to see a Polish conductor. He said that the theater scene in Washington is "very pale" compared to the forty or more theaters in Moscow. He noted that there are never tickets available to those theaters in Moscow, but, of course, "I can always get tickets". Gates said CIA had no such influence in the US, and added that CIA is forbidden by law to be active within the United States. Kryuchkov responded very firmly, "that is not quite so".

We had a discussion on who had responsibility for monitoring American compliance with arms control treaties in the Soviet Union, Kryuchkov indicated it was the KGB's responsibility to draw together information about American activities but that there was nothing comparable to our National Security Council that would draw together the views of the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs as well as the intelligence services.

At one point during the dinner, Gates told Kryuchkov that because he had shared a secret, Gates would share one with him. He said that

CIA had been told by the State Department that the General Secretary would like to have tapes of the Moscow evening news so that he could see how his visit is being handled on Soviet television. Gates indicated that there is only one place that can do that and that Kryuchkov should tell the General Secretary those tapes are a gift from CIA to him in the hope of a successful summit. He thanked Gates and then added, "That is probably the only thing you are doing," presumably he meant to help make the summit a success. Dubinin was genuinely surprised at Gates' information, indicating they had been told the tapes were being provided by "a friendly television station". Gates said that is not altogether untrue, but that this would remain our secret.

The Soviets were clearly having a problem keeping under control the number of members of Congress being invited to the embassy to meet with Gorbachev and they discussed with Powell certain people who wanted to be invited but were being told no. Powell indicated he would help in anyway he could. Gates commented that they would have to rely on his discretion to keep secret the fact that the Soviet side and the American Administration were colluding together against the Congress in this way. At that point Kryuchkov rather deftly made some reference to Gates' personal relationship with the Congress. Gates responded that it was "wonderful".

As we left the dinner, Gates told Kryuchkov that it had been a very interesting conversation and that he hoped it would not be harmful to either of their careers.

**105. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 7, 1987, 6:30–7:15 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Shultz-Shevardnadze Meeting December 7 Evening

**PARTICIPANTS***U.S.*George P. Shultz, Secretary  
of StateColin Powell, President's  
National Security AdvisorRozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant  
Secretary of State (EUR)Jack F. Matlock, U.S. Ambassador  
to the USSRThomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy Assistant  
Secretary of State (EUR) (notetaker)

Peter Afanassenko (interpreter)

William Hopkins (interpreter)

*USSR*Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign  
MinisterAleksandr A. Bessmertnykh,  
Deputy Foreign MinisterYuriy Dubinin, Soviet  
Ambassador to the U.S.

P. Palazhchenko (interpreter)

After welcoming Shevardnadze, *the Secretary* said his assumption was they were there to work out procedural questions. Before proceeding to that, he said, there was one last question on the INF Treaty. The Treaty said—and he was reading from it—that there would be photographs provided of the missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment listed below. The U.S. side had no picture of the SS–20. The canister did not tell the U.S. side anything; it was not a missile. This was a problem. The U.S. side did not want a treaty signed with a violation built into what was submitted to the Congress. He had heard a description of how Soviet missiles were constructed, how they were fired from canisters. But there must be some way to provide what was needed, not just because of the treaty text, but for verification that SS–20's were not SS–25's. The two sides had been discussing the matter for quite some time. The other pictures were there. This was a central matter. He knew Ambassadors Ridgway and Bessmertnykh had been spending the weekend talking, but at this point the question was unresolved, and the treaty requirement was unequivocal.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit, 12/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons. The meeting took place in Shultz's office at the Department of State.



*Shevardnadze* said that frankly he could not discuss this question at that time. The treaty was there. It had been prepared; the language had been prepared and printed. He had been told at midnight the night before that it was all completed.

*The Secretary* said that was true, but it said that certain photographs would accompany it, and this one was lacking. He did not see why this was such a difficult question.

*Bessmertnykh* said that, as he understood it, the Soviet side had given the Secretary of State the explanation that the missile was always in the canister. That was what the Soviet side meant by missile in the text, although it was not always so spelled out. Without the canister the missile did not exist. The Soviet side was waiting for its experts, who were coming, and would discuss the question with them.

*Shevardnadze* said the problem was unexpected to him.

*The Secretary* said the two sides had been discussing it. There had to be ways to get at it. He wished to register that this was a very important matter. We needed the information for the agreed verification procedures to go forward.

*Shevardnadze* said he would look into it.

*The Secretary* said that was good.

The Secretary continued that during his ride into town with the General Secretary, the latter had thought that after he and the President had had a private talk, they should go on to broader business, and invite Shevardnadze and the Secretary to join them. The Secretary had replied that he thought the President would wish to get down to business as quickly as possible, but there was a key person for that whom the General Secretary had not yet met: Colin Powell. It would be well if he were there too, because a lot of the coordination burden would fall on him. The General Secretary had heard this, and had readily agreed; he had added that he would probably bring another person too. The Secretary had replied that that was entirely up to him, and the matter had been left at that. The Secretary said he thought that was a good way to proceed. The General Secretary, he continued, had also seemed well disposed toward the working group process, and to getting it going as quickly as possible. The U.S. side was agreeable to that, the Secretary said; it was a good process.

*Shevardnadze* said he was aware of the conversation between the General Secretary and the Secretary of State. He thought this was a good idea. Dobrynin would be the additional man on the Soviet side. He and the Secretary had worked with this kind of group.

Shevardnadze suggested they think of the procedure for a plenary meeting, a broader meeting; it would not have to be regular. *Ambassador Dubinin* said the U.S. side had suggested this. *Shevardnadze* said the question was when it should take place.



*The Secretary* said the U.S. had in mind a meeting of the two delegations, where there could be an official photograph as well as views exchanged. *Shevardnadze* said that perhaps there could be one near the beginning, where a picture could be taken. Hence there could be the two leaders, then the larger group, and then the smaller group would remain; toward the end of the visit there might be another plenary meeting. He was only suggesting this. He invited the Secretary's views.

*The Secretary* said he would propose a variation on this. The meetings might start with the two leaders, who would then call in the two foreign ministers; there would be some substantive discussion, and some discussion of working group arrangements; and then before the end of the allotted time, they would agree to stop where they were, and form a plenary. There would be photographs, and the two leaders would say what working groups would be formed, and get people going. This would legitimize the working groups. The plenary would have the function of being instructed.

*Shevardnadze* said this was a good idea. This form of work was part of the practice of the two ministers; he understood that the first meeting would end with it. *The Secretary* said that was good. Continuing on, the two leaders could then have another private meeting if they wanted one, but the core would be three on a side, calling in the others as needed.

With regard to working groups, the Secretary continued, the first would be on arms control. If desired the working group could, as they had done in the past, organize within itself people to talk on a particular topic. But the main people should focus on strategic arms. The objective of both sides was to move as far as they can, and maximize the chance of completing a treaty in time for the President to visit Moscow. The other subjects would be under the auspices of the other working group. He thought that ought to be under Ambassador Ridgway, who had the job of coordinating the work on the joint statement. She and Ambassador Bessmertnykh had already made headway on this, although there were blanks and the most important task was to fill them in. And they too could spread out individuals to talk on particular topics.

*Shevardnadze* said this was basically as they had discussed it; it was the right approach. He had a question, however: did the U.S. side still agree the task should be to develop instructions to negotiators?

*The Secretary* said it did. They should try to move things along, and they should not keep what their leaders wanted to do on this a secret from their negotiators. There should be a section in the statement to record what the leaders wanted the negotiators to work on. The Soviet side had raised the topic of counting rules, and the U.S. side thought certain key ones ought to be discussed. They would need to do hard work on verification, building on INF, and push the negotiators

in certain directions, not that more would not be required than in INF. There were a number of other issues that would also need to be addressed. The Soviet side had mentioned SLCM's; there were also obviously questions of what the two sides needed to do on strategic defenses and the ABM Treaty. But whatever they brought out, the leaders and the working groups working back and forth, they would want to record, so the world could see it.

*Shevardnadze* said it was not of basic importance whether this was called instructions or key parameters or key elements; what was important was what the leaders agreed to concerning strategic offensive weapons, the ABM Treaty and verification and related issues. *The Secretary* said the U.S. side saw things the same way.

*Shevardnadze* said there would therefore be one working group on arms control, and if they wanted another on human rights, regional and bilateral issues. On the Soviet side, that group would be headed by Ambassador Bessmertnykh, and they could establish subgroups. *The Secretary* noted that Ambassadors Ridgway and Bessmertnykh had been working on a statement, and when they received material on arms control, they could plug it in. *Shevardnadze* said that was agreed.

*The Secretary* asked if it were agreed who would be at the plenary. *Shevardnadze* said the Soviet side had received the list of people who would be on the U.S. side, and would act accordingly. He did not have the Soviet list, but they did have the White House list, and they would have approximately the same group. Then, *Shevardnadze* continued, the other meetings would proceed in the usual way, and then probably in the last stage another plenary would be required; this would be appropriate.

*The Secretary* reviewed the leader's meetings: there would be a meeting the morning of the next day; another the afternoon of the next day, after the signing; another Wednesday morning; then another Thursday morning; and then the working lunch. Perhaps there would be an occasion Thursday morning, before the lunch. He hoped things would be far enough along to be wrapped up, though there might be some details to be worked out during the lunch. But then there would be lunch, and then the ceremony where the joint statement would be issued.

*Shevardnadze* asked whether the instructions, the key parameters, should be part of the joint statement. *Bessmertnykh* said this had been the U.S. proposal, but in his discussions the possibility of issuing them separately had not been ruled out. *The Secretary* said it would be appropriate to reflect the outcome of the meeting in the statement. One important part would be the instructions to negotiators. That was the way the U.S. side saw it.

*Shevardnadze* said the important thing was to have another plenary meeting. They would need to consult again before the working lunch, or the fifth round, as the U.S. side put it.

*The Secretary* said he would be doing nothing during the visit except to work on it. If there were problems that would benefit by discussion between the two ministers, he would make time for that. *Shevardnadze* agreed that if there were need, they would be able to consult, even early in the morning or after the other meetings. *The Secretary* said each thus knew the other had the flexibility for that. The working groups would have their own schedules, but he imagined they would be working Tuesday and Wednesday evening. They should roll up their sleeves and go to work. *Shevardnadze* said jokingly that the two ministers should require them to do so. *Bessmertnykh* had had time to sleep out in Washington. *The Secretary* said in the same vein that he had had nothing to do. *Shevardnadze* said no, he had heard *Bessmertnykh* had done good work. (*Bessmertnykh* knocked some paper on wood.)

*Ambassador Ridgway* noted there were three documents in play. First, the two sides had agreed to expand their civil aviation agreement. Second, we were awaiting the Soviet side's approval for renewing the World Ocean agreement, which could be accomplished by an exchange of notes. Third, our negotiators on nuclear testing had developed a statement on the joint experiment. They were presently comparing texts, but if this were completed the statement could be issued by ministers. Unlike previous summits, the two sides did not have anything big or novel enough to merit signature in the presence of the leaders, but the ministers could register agreement on these documents.

*The Secretary* said he thought the testing document was good; it showed some advance. It was his hope that the process would mature enough so that the U.S. side could move the two treaties into the Senate in time for them to be acted on by the Moscow Summit. He and *Shevardnadze* had agreed on this approach in that very room. The statement would help them do that.

*Simons* noted that it was a question of finding time for the ministers.

*The Secretary* said the ministers could also finish off the embassy arrangements. *Shevardnadze* suggested that they find some time in the evening to sit and listen to their ambassadors. He favored removing the remaining obstacles on that topic. They should sit down and listen. *The Secretary* said "fine." *Shevardnadze* continued that they should give appropriate instructions to their people by the next meeting. These were elementary questions. It depended on both of them to clear the way, to get rid of all the obstacles. *The Secretary* said that was good.

*The Secretary* raised the question of the ministers finding time slots in their respective schedules for meeting. With reference to the embassies question, *Shevardnadze* said that before the ministers met they

should have their ambassadors sit down and identify the questions that deserved ministers' attention. *The Secretary* said perhaps the ambassadors could settle the matter. He observed that Ambassador Ridgway seemed skeptical. *Ambassador Ridgway* said she had always favored small group discussion. *Shevardnadze* said that these were small questions compared to those they had solved in INF. *The Secretary* commented that all questions look big if you are on the receiving end of them. *Shevardnadze* said the two should work at it, and they would be able to find solutions.

*Bessmertnykh* explained to *Shevardnadze* that on the ministers meeting he and *Ridgway* had had in mind a simple procedure for an exchange of notes and photographs. *Shevardnadze* said it was just a question of defining the procedure. *The Secretary* pointed out that there was going to be a lot going on on Tuesday, and that the outcome would be on Thursday, so that there was less to do on Wednesday; perhaps it would be worthwhile to issue the statement Wednesday. It was not of comparable stature to some other things, but it would show matters were progressing. *Shevardnadze* said he agreed.

*The Secretary* asked if there were more things to clean up. He knew *Shevardnadze* was tired. *Shevardnadze* said smilingly that he was not too tired.

With regard to the photograph, *Shevardnadze* said, he would look into it right way, and tell the Secretary what the answer was. *The Secretary* said the two sides had been turning the problem over, and there had to be some way of identifying the system, somehow, with the purpose of distinguishing it from the SS-25. This was very important. This was not a trivial question. *Shevardnadze* asked if only the SS-20 were involved. *The Secretary* said that was all; the other photographs were there. *Shevardnadze* said he would look into it; they had done more difficult things.

**106. Memorandum for the Record<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 7, 1987

## SUBJECT

Secretary's Ride with Gorbachev December 7

Following his evening meeting with Shevardnadze,<sup>2</sup> the Secretary reported to General Powell, Ambassador Matlock, Charlie Hill, Mel Levitsky and me on his long ride back from the airport with Gorbachev, and Mrs. Shultz' with Mrs. Gorbachev.

He said Gorbachev was in a fine and excited mood. Compared with what he had been in Moscow (in October), the Secretary said, he was a man who had come up for air and was off and running. Of course he was not freewheeling, but he clearly wanted to do business. He was heavily focussed on START. He had stressed the importance of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and the importance for East-West relations generally of making progress in it.

Gorbachev had asked the Secretary about critics here; he said there were critics of what was happening in the USSR too. The Secretary had told him that those who were most vocal here did not represent all that much, but that moving forward in our relations cannot be like coming into a dark room and throwing on the light. Gorbachev had been taken by that. He had said it was exactly the way he described perestroika at home: it could not be a question of overnight change. The Secretary had said that should be the concept of our relations: building a relationship by solving concrete problems.

Gorbachev said he liked to go out and meet with human beings, so he was sorry he could not do more in Washington. The Secretary had replied we were too, and hoped he would some day. Gorbachev had said he would like to, either as General Secretary or not as General Secretary. The Secretary asked if he had not lost weight. He said he had. He worked hard, and sometimes wore other people out, but that was the way he had to live his life; afterwards someone else could do it.

Gorbachev had also mentioned the many letters the Central Committee and he had received from American individuals, all on the theme of peace.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit, 12/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 105.

The Secretary said Mrs. Shultz had found Mrs. Gorbachev different from in Geneva, softer and very curious (and quite knowledgeable) about Washington. Matlock pointed out he had passed on some materials at Soviet request; the Secretary commented that she seemed to have studied them. She had seemed very interested and excited.

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## 107. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 8, 1987, 10:45 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Meeting with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev of the USSR (U)

### PARTICIPANTS

#### US

The President

Vice President

Secretary of State George P. Shultz

Howard H. Baker, Chief of Staff

Colin L. Powell, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Mark Parris, Department of State (Notetaker)

Fritz W. Ermarth, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Dimitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)

#### USSR

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

Aleksander Yakovlev, Member of the Politburo and CPSU Central Committee

Secretary

Anatoly Dobrynin, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

Sergei Tarasenko, Head, General Secretariat (Notetaker)

Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

Following the welcoming ceremony, the President and General Secretary Gorbachev arrived at the Oval Office at 10:45 a.m. and exchanged pleasantries during a 15-minute photo-op.<sup>2</sup> One-on-one discussions began at 11:00. (U)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit, 12/87. Secret. Drafted by Ermarth. The meeting was held in the Oval Office at the White House.

<sup>2</sup> For Reagan and Gorbachev's remarks as well as their informal exchange with members of the press, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1987*, Book II, pp. 1452–1455.

*The President* opened by giving the General Secretary a pair of cuff links, made by an American jeweler, on which was the symbol from Isaiah, the beating of swords into ploughshares. The *General Secretary* responded that this was indeed an appropriate symbol on a day in which the two leaders would truly be beating swords into ploughshares by signing the first treaty that did this. (S)

*The President* then said he would like to start with a particular request that the General Secretary consider a list of names of Soviet citizens, a list involving separated families and other cases.<sup>3</sup> He handed Gorbachev a card listing the names of Soviet citizens to whom he wished the Soviet government to grant exit visas. *The President* then asked that no notes be taken on the American side because he wanted to make a purely personal suggestion in the area of human rights. (S)

Responding to the President's off-the-record point, the *General Secretary* said he wanted the President to understand that the Soviet government considered human rights a priority issue. He said it had not been easy to create unity among the Soviet people after the revolution in a country made up of so many diverse ethnic and national groups. But this had been done. He noted that the USSR was comprised of 15 national republics, each with its own national language, government, press, literature, and culture. And there were, additionally, 38 lesser ethnic groups with autonomous governmental structures, able to develop their own institutions and culture. The question of assuring human rights to a multiethnic population was an important question permanently on the Soviet agenda. There were always problems. Perestroika is dealing with all kinds of problems, not just economic but cultural as well, and the situation was steadily improving. (S)

Turning to emigration, *Gorbachev* said that the USSR was taking a realistic approach to the problem. The President would have noticed this. Some cases were being refused "for a time." But Gorbachev wanted the President to understand that the Soviet government would do its utmost to remove this problem from the agenda. He added that he always appreciated the tact with which the President addressed this delicate and sensitive issue; the Soviets react, he said, with great sensitivity when it becomes the subject of political declarations. He repeated his assertion that the human rights situation was improving and that it was a top priority for his government, which was made up of elected bodies representing all nationalities, workers, farmers, intelligentsia, women, young people, all of whose rights were important. (S)

*The President* noted that the United States was a unique nation whose population all derived from foreign origins. *Gorbachev* said he

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<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed is the list of Soviet "cases of special interest."



understood this. *The President* went on to note that some Americans had ties to the Soviet Union. He mentioned that, on the question of religion, while there were different philosophies, even primitive African tribes had some idea of God and worship. He noted that some one-half million Jews sought to leave the USSR for religious-cultural freedom. *Gorbachev* said these figures were completely unconfirmed. (S)

*Gorbachev* then challenged the President whether there were any human rights problems in the United States. *The President* admitted we had our problems because people are people, but that our Constitution protected basic human rights. *Gorbachev* proposed a seminar of experts to debate the matter, adding that he could not share the President's positive assessment of the human rights picture in the United States. *The President* responded that anybody can leave the US, and *Gorbachev*, in turn, that this was not the only human right. The Constitution protects freedom of worship, said the President. But what about episodes of anti-Semitism in the United States, queried *Gorbachev*. The President observed that individuals have their prejudices, to which *Gorbachev* agreed. (S)

But, *the President* said, over the previous weekend 200,000 individuals had gathered to demonstrate on human rights in the USSR.<sup>4</sup> *Gorbachev* acknowledged this and repeated that the USSR considered the matter to be serious and important, which is why it had decided to discuss it with the US government. He repeated his proposal to convene a joint seminar on it, and suggested that this discussion be closed. Responding to another reference from the *President* to freedom of worship, *Gorbachev* proposed that the President visit the USSR in June 1988 when the Millennium of Christianity in Russia would be celebrated. Representatives of many religious denominations would come. The President could visit churches of numerous Christian denominations in the USSR and see for himself what was happening. However, *Gorbachev* said, he would not sit as the accused before a prosecutor. (S)

*The President* said he meant no threat by his line of argument. The *General Secretary* said he felt no threat, but that all countries had laws regarding immigration and emigration. The *President* responded that few restricted the right to leave their country. Many peoples wanted to come to the United States and we could not receive them all, but governed their entry under a system of quotas. *Gorbachev* said if quotas on immigration are acceptable, why not quotas on emigration? Why, he asked, does the United States guard the border with Mexico with fences and guns? What kind of democracy is this? (S)

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to a December 6 protest in front of the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow. (Celestine Bohlen, "Soviet Agents Disrupt Protest in Moscow," *Washington Post*, December 6, 1987, p. A-17)



The US-Mexican border was completely the reverse of the situation on Soviet borders, replied *the President*. Because of poor living conditions in Mexico many wanted to come to the US; we could not absorb them all. The President reiterated that the fundamental point was that the USSR prevented people from getting out, that it compelled them to stay. (S)

*Gorbachev* said he was willing to continue discussing these and other problems, but not today. He and the President agreed to move on. (C)

*Gorbachev* observed that the two leaders had covered a long road from their first to this third meeting between them, a road marked by important and difficult issues. During that time, their dialogue had become much more profound, had begun to contain elements of trust between the two parties. There was an improved ability to address questions quietly and productively, a greater willingness to deal with political responses on each side, and political will to move ahead. (S)

*The President* recalled an episode in Geneva when staff experts who had been working in another building came to the two leaders to report roadblocks in their efforts. *Gorbachev* continued the recollection by reminding the President how the leaders had urged progress by pounding their fists on the table; *the President* recalled this too. *Gorbachev* noted that this had been an important political moment illustrating how bureaucrats, sometimes very intelligent ones, forget who is really in power. People elect leaders, while officials are merely appointed. (S)

*Gorbachev* said it was not oversimplifying to claim that there had been a true change for the better in US-Soviet relations. Exchanges and discussions resolving important problems were underway. We would now sign the first agreement ever eliminating nuclear weapons, a fact of historic importance. We recognized, he said, that the process was not easy, that we had different views. Questions were being asked about prospects for ratification. The General Secretary said he was himself being asked to explain why the Soviet Union was to dismantle four times the number of weapons NATO and the US side would. He said he would succeed in explaining the value of the treaty to the Soviet people as the President would to the American people. He then referred to a letter from a student pleading that he and the President not become captives of emotion. (S)

*The President* suggested that ministers be invited to join the meeting at this point. The *General Secretary* agreed. *The President* said that he and the General Secretary were doing something very important for the future of the child who had written the letter. *Gorbachev* said he personally felt that a very important aspect of the current steps being taken in the US-Soviet relationship was the mental or psychological change being made in the minds of men, which he deeply felt. *The*

*President* agreed. This had somehow to be captured, responded the General Secretary. (S)

*The President* expressed gratitude to Gorbachev for his efforts in improving a relationship that was far from easy. *Gorbachev* agreed that striving for cooperation was not easy, but that we should not be afraid to do it. He expressed pleasure at the President's remarks at the welcoming ceremony. He expressed the view that, if there was no gap between what the President said and the actions that were taken, then there would be practical progress and he would find the Soviet side to be a good partner. (S)

*The President* mused that, were we confronted with a hostile threat from another planet, then our differences would disappear and we would be totally united. *Gorbachev* recalled having discussed this idea before. At this point Shultz, Shevardnadze, Baker, Yakovlev, Powell, and Dobrynin joined the meeting. Launching into a general statement on next steps in arms control, the *General Secretary* expressed thanks to the people who had worked on the INF Treaty. He said the signing of this treaty radically changed the whole situation, activated the discussion, and increased international pressure for new progress. The momentum had to be maintained and, along with the experience gained, to be applied to the problem of reducing strategic offensive forces. In this context, he noted that the two sides had agreed at Reykjavik on a 50% reduction of strategic offensive forces and on nonwithdrawal from the ABM treaty for period of 10 years. After Reykjavik the US side raised the issue of sublimits within the framework of 6000 strategic nuclear warheads. The Soviet side had sought to accommodate, accepted the concept of sublimits, and had offered proposals on the distribution of forces among the various legs of the triad. The US side had special concerns, specifically regarding Soviet heavy ICBMs. For its part, the Soviet side had concerns about US SLBM forces. Both sides were taking account of each others' concerns. Secretary Shultz had been given a new Soviet proposal on sublimits in Moscow and had been asked to respond in Geneva. The General Secretary turned to Secretary Shultz and asked again what was the US position. (S)

*The President* stated that he wanted to react to one of the General Secretary's points, namely, the 10-year delay regarding defenses both sides were planning. The President said he would like to see that period shortened a bit. He did not have in mind a sharp cut because there were technical limits to what is possible, but the US side felt it might be able to push defensive research to permit deployment a few years earlier. He felt, however, that the differences between the two sides on this and on sublimits could be negotiated. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* asked to review the range of arms reduction problems which the sides would try to resolve during the visit of the Soviet

leader. He began by noting, as Gorbachev had, areas of agreement following Reykjavik: A reduction to 6000 strategic nuclear warheads, 1600 launchers/delivery vehicles, and a limit of 154 heavy ICBMs with 1540 warheads. *Gorbachev* interjected that the latter figure was a 50% cut when the US had originally only asked for 35%. *Secretary Shultz* noted that the US welcomed this, adding that these limits would include a 50% cut in Soviet throwweight. *Gorbachev* again interjected his agreement. *Secretary Shultz* said that these areas of agreement should now be incorporated in a treaty with the understanding that Soviet missile throwweight would fall 50% and not go back up. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* continued, observing that bomber counting rules had been agreed by Nitze and Akhromeyev at Reykjavik. We had now to devise necessary counting rules for other weapons—warheads on missiles, cruise missiles on aircraft, etc., subjects on which we had proposals which working groups could address. *Gorbachev* interjected that there were some related questions of principle to discuss. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* said that, regarding vital issues of verification, we should advance using the principles established in INF and instructing our negotiators on the basis of those principles. *Gorbachev* agreed. Then, the Secretary continued, the various sublimits had to be addressed, among which the most important was the ballistic missiles sublimit within the 6000 allowed warheads. In Moscow, the Soviet side had stated a proposal for 800–900 ALCMs. The other side of this idea from the Soviet side was Marshal Akhromeyev's proposal of 5100 warheads on strategic ballistic missiles. The Secretary said the US thought this too many; 4800 was a better level, but the concept was important and we seemed to be agreeing on that. *Gorbachev* interjected that the Soviet side had a compromise proposal. *Secretary Shultz* noted that this was an important statement. *Gorbachev* objected laughingly that the Secretary had not even heard the Soviet proposal yet, but could be assured that the Soviet side was looking for a compromise. *The Secretary* suggested 4803 as a good compromise. In the same jocular fashion, the *General Secretary* responded that this number would be capitulation, not compromise; whereupon he turned to the President to take up his earlier remark about a 10-year period of nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty being too long. Why was the US side moving away from the 10-year period discussed at Reykjavik, asked *Gorbachev*. So much had been agreed there and then the US side retreated. Why? (S)

*Secretary Shultz* reminded *Gorbachev* that US acceptance of a 10-year nonwithdrawal period was conditioned at Reykjavik on total elimination of ballistic missiles in the same period. *The President* recalled that even elimination of all nuclear weapons was discussed at Reykjavik. But these approaches were no longer a factor in our discussions, concluded *Shultz*. We could work on defining the period of nonwithdrawal. *Gorba-*

*chev* asked what period the US was now proposing. That, replied *the Secretary*, would depend on other aspects of the negotiation. *General Secretary Gorbachev* agreed to set these subjects (START and ABM) aside for the moment, but noted that there was a linkage between them and that this remained an issue of principle for the Soviet side. (S)

*The President* asked the General Secretary to humor him a bit by letting him see the deployment of advanced strategic defenses in his lifetime. *Gorbachev* replied by observing how healthy the President was and opined that he had many active years ahead of him. If we made the right decisions, he continued, we would see good results in our lifetime and our children would see them beyond us. But if we continued in the manner of the past 45 years, there would be no such progress. (S)

*Gorbachev* noted that Secretary Shultz had raised the issue of SLCMs, which had been discussed at Reykjavik in a special framework outside the 6000 warhead limit. Now that our positions were coming closer on a whole range of issues, the matter of SLCMs became particularly significant. It was not settled yet, but to prevent circumvention there would have to be a limit, something like 400 would be worthy of discussion. The nature of SLCMs and the problems they posed had changed considerably in the years since the SALT negotiations addressed them. *Gorbachev* asked what particularly bothered the US side in coming to grips with the SLCM problem. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* replied that the verification problems posed by SLCM limits were very difficult, particularly distinguishing between those with nuclear and those with conventional warheads because the two looked exactly alike. But the US side was prepared to discuss this because it recognized the importance of the matter. The Secretary knew that Akhromeyev had some thoughts on the subject of verifying SLCMs and the US was prepared to hear them. (S)

*The General Secretary* said that to focus things he wanted to introduce some new points about SLCMs. First, he repeated, there had to be a limit on their numbers. Second, the Soviet side had insisted that they had to be restricted to two types of submarines only. But, because the US had so many types of surface ships that could carry SLCMs, the Soviets were prepared to agree that they also could be deployed on two types of surface ships as well. Third, *Gorbachev* would address verification. Both sides, he insisted, had the technical means to verify SLCMs, the equipment that would allow determination of whether nuclear weapons were aboard a ship and what yield they were, without actually boarding the ship. This was what Akhromeyev had alluded to. Now either the US was concealing its capability, continued *Gorbachev*, or it lagged in such capability to verify nuclear weapons aboard ships. If the former, this would be bad; if the latter, then the Soviet

side would sell the technology to the US—if the price were right. In any case, the technology existed to permit identifying the presence and yield of nuclear weapons aboard ships, said Gorbachev. Thus, we could work out limits on SLCMs, establish that they would be deployed only on two types of submarines and two types of surface ships, and work out technical details of verification. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* repeated the interest of the US side in hearing what the Soviets had to say, but wanted to register considerable skepticism about verification of SLCM limits. *Gorbachev* offered to conduct a demonstration to prove the verifiability of such limits by technical means, to which *the Secretary* responded that it was too easy to switch warheads on SLCMs to make such a demonstration really convincing. *Gorbachev* repeated his insistence that suitable technology was indeed available, a matter that had been discussed with Paul Nitze. Both sides had verification concerns, but they were resolvable. Again *Shultz* noted the willingness of the US side to listen but advised that not just Paul Nitze, but a lot of skeptical admirals had to be convinced. (S)

In approaching these questions, the *General Secretary* said, we had to involve scientists more in our work, to provide a broad basis for realistic policy. He said that Western scientists had complained that their knowledge was not being adequately used in these areas. He had a letter from a British Nobel prize winner proposing an East-West commission of scientists to advise both the President and the Soviet leadership more reliably. Without scientists there could be no solutions to our problems. (S)

*The President* noted the late hour, and *Secretary Shultz* remarked that it might be time for a larger meeting in the Cabinet Room. But first the Secretary wanted to make another point or two to guide working group activity. With regard to mobile missiles, he said, the US had no problem in principle with allowing them. But the verification problems were exceptionally difficult and the working group had to focus on them. (S)

*Gorbachev* agreed with the President that it was about time to break off this part of the meeting, but he too wanted to add one more point, on nuclear testing. He noted that we were now negotiating about new limits on testing as part of a process leading to nuclear disarmament. This was good; we had momentum. We had already decided to exchange visits of monitoring experts and to conduct experiments in yield measurement. He had an idea he wanted the President and others to think about. Since the negotiations now underway were aimed at the ultimate result of a total prohibition on all nuclear testing, why not, now, declare a bilateral moratorium on testing for the duration of these negotiations. This would be an act of enormous importance the whole world would support. He asked that the President and his

colleagues not respond immediately to this idea but think it over carefully. Then noting that time was short and the matter of forging instructions to negotiators for future arms talks paramount, he passed to the President a Soviet paper containing the tentative proposals of the Soviet side, as discussed at the last ministerial in Geneva. *The President* passed to the General Secretary a comparable US document covering START and Defense and Space issues.<sup>5</sup> (S)

At the close of the meeting the two sides agreed that there would be two basic working groups, one on arms control chaired by Nitze and Akhromeyev and one on other parts of the agenda chaired by Ridgway and Bessmertnykh. Further, *Secretary Shultz* proposed that, in briefing the press, both sides stick to general statements about the atmosphere and topics of discussion. *Gorbachev* agreed, noting some concern as to whether the US side would stick to this. *The Secretary* insisted that we always did. (S)

The meeting concluded with the President giving the General Secretary a tour around the Oval Office. The Soviet party departed at 12:30 p.m. (U)

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<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed are separate, undated Soviet and U.S. proposals for START.

**108. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 8, 1987, 2:30–3:15 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

President's Meeting with Gorbachev, December 8 Afternoon

**PARTICIPANTS***U.S.*

Ronald Reagan, President of  
the United States  
George Bush, Vice President  
Howard Baker, Chief of Staff  
George P. Shultz, Secretary of State  
Frank Carlucci, Secretary of Defense<sup>2</sup>  
Colin Powell, National Security  
Advisor  
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant  
Secretary of State (EUR)  
Jack F. Matlock, U.S. Ambassador  
to the USSR  
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy  
Secretary of State (EUR)  
(notetaker)  
Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)

*USSR*

Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General  
Secretary, CPSU CC  
Eduard A. Shevardnadze,  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, CPSU CC  
Secretary  
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, CPSU CC  
Secretary  
Vladimir M. Kamentsev, Deputy  
Chairman, Council of Ministers  
Sergei Akhromeyev, Chief of  
Staff of the Armed Forces  
Yuriy V. Dubinin, Soviet  
Ambassador to the U.S.  
Sergei Tarasenko, Special  
Assistant to Shevardnadze  
(notetaker)  
P. Palazhchenko, MFA USA/  
Canada Department  
(interpreter)

*The President* suggested the two leaders take up their discussion where it had left off.<sup>3</sup>

*Gorbachev* said he would complete his presentation of that morning by adding a few words, with the President's permission.

*The President* invited him to do so.

*Gorbachev* said he believed the President felt like him and their colleagues following the signing (of the INF Treaty). The two sides had begun to discuss the key problem of reducing nuclear weapons.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit, 12/87. Secret. Drafted by Simons. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Reagan spoke at 1:45 p.m. in the East Room of the White House and praised U.S. and Soviet arms control negotiators, after which he and Gorbachev signed the INF treaty. (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1987*, Book II, pp. 1455–1456)

<sup>2</sup> Carlucci was sworn in as Secretary of Defense on November 23.

<sup>3</sup> See Document 107.



There was also the concern about conventional and chemical weapons. This was becoming very important. It was coming to the forefront of concern. He did not wish to overdramatize. There was no need to panic. But the Soviet side was in the process of assessing whether harm was being done to equality, to the balance of security. They had been listening to what was being said in Europe. They had the feeling in Moscow that it was hoped in Europe that we would give due attention to chemical weapons, to conventional weapons. The President and he should discuss this. They should give instructions to their colleagues to move forward.

Turning first to conventional weapons, Gorbachev recalled how the two sides had begun the process of eliminating medium-range and shorter-range missiles. The President had recalled in his remarks that he had put forward the zero option. Gorbachev said he had thought the President would then say the Soviets had appropriated the idea for themselves. But the President had put the thought in more sophisticated fashion. Gorbachev had noticed that.

But, Gorbachev went on, when they began to discuss this question there was the issue of British and French arms. They had debated it. The Soviet side had decided to set it aside. Then they had discussed missiles in Europe and in Asia. At Reykjavik it had been decided each side could retain 100 warheads, with the Soviet warheads in Asia. Later they had decided to go to complete zero. They had moved step by step. All these things had gone into the treaty the two sides had just signed.

This experience should not only help with strategic offensive arms discussions, Gorbachev continued. It should also help with conventional weapons. In the West it was said that the Soviet Union had a superiority in armed forces and weapons. In the East it was said that NATO had a superiority in weapons. And both sides were right. Each side had the data proving its case. The two sides should agree to sit down. They should see who was trying to outsmart whom, and who was serious. They should look at the asymmetries. It should be a process; they should go step by step.

Gorbachev went on that the President and he should decide to move forward toward a mandate for negotiations between the two alliances. Perhaps they should lock their negotiators in a room. They could give them food, of course, but they would instruct them to prepare proposals. Some were saying that the Soviet Union should take certain steps even before this had been done. They said the Soviet Union had an advantage in Central Europe. No one talked about NATO's advantages in Southeastern Europe, which existed, and in an area close to the Soviet borders.

This should be put in the final document (of the Summit), Gorbachev said. They should put their cards on the table. They should think



of first steps to lessen confrontation. There was the concept of corridors, of thinning out forces in certain corridors. There was the question of discussing military doctrines. They should seek a common concept of sufficiency, sufficiency for defensive purposes. He would not expand on this list. But the atmosphere created by signing the treaty was not less important than the treaty itself. The two leaders should talk about what he had suggested. This would be well received by the allies of both countries, and in Europe generally.

Turning to chemical weapons, Gorbachev said that at a certain point the British had made a valuable initiative. The Soviet position had in fact been a certain hurdle. The Soviet side therefore took major decisions. After that work went forward toward a convention to ban all these weapons, among all the participating countries, including the United States.

Then there came a slowdown, Gorbachev went on. As the Soviets saw it, someone was holding back the process. It could be either the Soviet Union or the United States. The Soviets knew it was not they. They had stopped production of these weapons. They were building, in fact completing, a facility to destroy them. It was not the Soviet side that was slowing things down. Perhaps it was the U.S. side. Perhaps there were some concerns on the U.S. side. Maybe it was the binary weapons program. The U.S. had already funded production of 155 mm. shells.

Verification was also very important, Gorbachev continued. The U.S. was still proposing verification only of state facilities. That would include all the Soviet Union's, but not all the U.S.'s. There was no equality there.

Gorbachev concluded that the final document (of the Summit) should express a common view that would make it possible to give momentum to the negotiating process. This would enrich their meeting. It would be welcomed by the peoples of Europe, the peoples of the world.

He had wished to raise these two questions, Gorbachev said, by way of concluding their initial meeting. He could confine himself to this at that point.

*The President* said he did not think anyone on the U.S. side did not favor more disarmament. The U.S. side thought the main priority should be to move forward in START. But if we continued on that path, we would face the question of short-range, or battlefield, weapons. It would only be possible to eliminate them if we had first restored a balance in conventional weapons. The two sides should find a way to move forward on this. But, he recalled, it was not armaments that created distrust, but distrust that created armaments.

*Gorbachev* commented that confidence could not grow in an empty place. The arms control process would help it grow. That was dialectics, under the Marxist approach.

*Secretary Shultz* said that the U.S. side wanted to work with what had been said at that meeting, about conventional weapons, about chemical weapons. That was desirable. But the question was not so much one of language as of content.

The U.S. side would like to see the mandate being worked on in Vienna finished as soon as possible, the Secretary continued. It was pretty well along. In the framework of the Vienna talks there was also discussion of human rights. The Soviet side had made proposals, the U.S. side had made proposals. It was the Helsinki framework which held all these things together. So the two sides needed to deal with all these aspects. The U.S. side wanted to do that. Then, as *Gorbachev* had said, the sides should proceed on to deal with the asymmetries. They should try to move toward an equal situation at lower levels. The U.S. side had some ideas. Perhaps they would parallel those of the Soviet side.

Like the Soviet side, the U.S. side made a point of moving forward as a member of an alliance, the Secretary continued. This was not something the U.S. and the Soviet Union could just do together. Most of the arms under discussion on the Western side belonged to U.S. allies. But it was true that the U.S. and the Soviet Union had important parts, and could energize things.

*Gorbachev* said he supported what Secretary Shultz had said concerning the linkage to allies. The working group should work on this topic during the visit. They should develop ideas. When they had done so, the two sides should consult with their allies. Then Carlucci and Soviet Defense Minister Yazov could meet. This would move the process forward.

*Secretary Shultz* said he was all for meetings between defense officials of the two sides. But we had to be careful about acting as if the U.S. and Soviet sides could work things out, and *then* consult with allies. We could not have that. It would not work. The allies see the importance of the issues, but the two sides needed to go about it right. But they should come to grips in Vienna with all the topics that had been discussed. This meant not only a mandate for negotiations on conventional weapons but also a mandate for confidence building measures. They should get that done, in the early part of the next year.

*Gorbachev* said the two sides had a common view that the topic was important, and he agreed we should not rush, but he had reservations when he heard Shultz say it. The Warsaw Treaty Organization had put proposals on the table eighteen months ago. It had still not received an answer. As he had told the President, he had not come to

Washington to bicker, but to do real politics. At the stage we were at, recriminations and complaints just served to delay things. Gorbachev pointed to the main negotiators, sitting at the back of the room. They had felt this on their skins, he said. One needed to be persistent to succeed.

Gorbachev continued that with regard to substance the U.S. side had said there was generally agreement. But he had one question. He did not want to link conventional disarmament to Helsinki. Helsinki included many things, human rights and other things. We should tackle conventional disarmament straight on. We should not make a package. The U.S. had made Jackson-Vanik fifteen years before. That was a package, and over fifteen years the U.S. had been unable to untie it.

*Secretary Shultz* said the U.S. side was prepared in the working group to discuss conventional arms in relation to the CSCE process. Our Ambassador at Vienna, Warren Zimmermann, would be there. Perhaps a subgroup could be formed to work on this problem.

*Gorbachev* suggested that the formulation in the statement could stress cooperation with allies; that was important. *Secretary Shultz* said Gorbachev had better believe it. That was, *Gorbachev* added, if the chairman agreed. *The President* said he did.

*Gorbachev* asked about chemical weapons. *The Secretary* said this was a more severe problem. For fifty years there had been a consensus against them. This had been broken. It was important to try to put it back together.

*Gorbachev* asked if the Secretary were referring to the 1925 Convention.<sup>4</sup> *The Secretary* said that he was. It had worked, more or less. Actually, the fact that some countries had possessed these weapons had probably had some deterrent effect. But there were now many countries which had or could have them. They had been used in the Iran-Iraq war. At the same time there was the problem of verification. There was a need for a broad consensus. But it would be hard to get.

The U.S. side thus saw both the urgency and the difficulty of the issue, the Secretary said. There was real work to do. The two sides had had excellent discussions on the topic, in the content of his meetings with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. The U.S. side wanted to see progress. But it had no illusions. He suggested that they have their people work on it. This could be reflected in any statement. But the problem was genuinely difficult.

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the Geneva Protocols prohibiting the first use of chemical and biological weapons.

*Gorbachev* asked if the U.S. side saw the goal, for the two sides and for others, as speeding up the drafting of the convention. *Secretary Shultz* said it did, as long as we went about it realistically.

*The President* commented that any country with a fertilizer plant could make chemical weapons. It was an almost impossible task to know that they are not being made. *Secretary Shultz* said we thus had an impossible but necessary task. Chemical weapons were potentially very destabilizing. *Gorbachev* said there was no cause for panic.

*Gorbachev* continued that he wished to draw the President's and the Administration's attention to another issue. The Soviet side had noticed that in European political and journalistic circles there was discussion of how to compensate for the elimination of INF missiles in Europe. If such thinking prevailed, it would be very dangerous. The two sides should interact and take a common stand. There could be new weapons, of great new capacity. If all the talk of reinforcing or adding new forces in Europe became true, the whole process would be more difficult. This was especially true since they had agreed to eliminate INF missiles over a certain period of time.

(At this point, at 3:00 p.m., Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh and Disarmament Department Director Viktor Karpov took their places at the table.)

*The President* commented that it was here that we needed to take the most steps to create trust. There was a legacy of mistrust because of Soviet expansionism. *Gorbachev* commented that compared to American expansionism the Soviet side's was a small child. *The President* responded that the U.S. side did not think so. There had been four wars in his lifetime, and the U.S. had not gained an inch of territory.

Under the U.S. system, the President continued, it was not enough just to say something. You had to do something. We had people here from every part of the world. There was thus a kind of dual loyalty. The first question asked was what you were; more and more people had to name three or four places. There was a pride in where one's parents and ancestors were from. They were proud of them, as well as of being American. So there were elements in our country that had big resentments over what happened where they had come from. Signing the treaty was therefore not enough. There was also the question of getting it ratified.

*Gorbachev* said the Supreme Soviet was even larger than the Senate. It had some 2000 members. He expected ratification would be a sharper process than usual. It opened up many questions. There was the question of why the Soviets had been so generous toward the Americans. They were eliminating four times as many missiles. But it used to be that parity had been recognized. So the question was why it was being broken. The Soviets would need to tackle this even before the formal

ratification process. It was not easy to take the first step toward disarmament. People asked how it was possible to have disarmament with the U.S. when the Soviet Union was ringed with U.S. bases. People asked how Gorbachev could bow down to the U.S., and do more.

Gorbachev continued that he had just seen a recent Gallup poll in the U.S. and the Soviet Union. It had been an independent poll. It had shown that there were not many enthusiasts for the treaty in the Soviet Union. About half the Soviet people had expressed certain doubts. After all the Soviet government had said the principle should be equal security. That was one reason why he had brought Dobrynin along; he was head of a commission in the Supreme Soviet. So was Ligachev. But he thought he would have Dobrynin with him.

*The President* said that Gorbachev's comments underlined the need for trust. If Gorbachev genuflected before him, he would stomp his foot. *Gorbachev* said he was not referring to himself personally. He was one thing. But pride was a matter for a nation. He represented a nation. We had to deal with each other on the basis of equality, of respect, of taking each other's concerns into account. We needed to make real policy.

The U.S. side accused the Soviet side of all sorts of sins, Gorbachev went on. What was needed was to look forward instead. During the forty-five years since the War so much had piled up that if we just went on with complaints—on the Soviet side there were all sorts of doctrines to complain about, the Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Carter Doctrine—we would put each other on trial. This was not the constructive policies people wanted. Gorbachev advised the Vice President to reflect on that. Unless policy reflected what people wanted, you could win an election, but not succeed in the long term.

*The President* commented that the U.S. side welcomed moves toward democratization in the Soviet Union, toward glasnost.

*Gorbachev* replied that he wished to say a few words about that. It was people's greatest wish to go to bed and wake up in the morning to see everything changed for the better. But even in fairy tales the heroes had to go through trials, and in real life things were even harder. He would continue to fight conservatism. He would continue to fight those who sought to shackle people in dogma. But he would also fight adventurists. They were the equivalent of the Red Guards in China, who wanted to push ahead without thinking.

It would not be easy, Gorbachev said. But the present leadership had taken a firm stand to move along that path. Certain politicians, perhaps Matlock, were looking for an opposition. There was opposition, in every single Soviet. It would be foolish to deny it. They were children of their times. But of political opposition there was none. There would be debates. There would be differences of views, and exchanges of

views. But he could assure the President and his colleagues that the Soviet side would be moving ahead toward democratization. That was, if the U.S. would permit them to do so. He asked the American side to let the Soviet side do it their own way.

*The President* said there was a U.S. President who had once said something very profound. That was Franklin Delano Roosevelt. In America there had also been people who had thought that government should have more control of people. Roosevelt had asked where, if people did not have the capacity to run their own lives, we would find among them the tiny group that could run not only their own lives but those of others.

He did not want to offend Gorbachev, the President continued, but he had recently talked to a U.S. scholar who had visited Gorbachev's country. On his way to the airport he had had a taxi driver, a young man finishing his education but also driving a taxi because he needed money. The professor had asked the young man what he was going to be; he had replied that he had not yet decided. The professor got to the Soviet Union, and there he had had basically the same conversation, with a taxi driver finishing his education, but also driving a taxi. When he had been asked what he would be, he had replied: "They haven't told me yet."

*Gorbachev* said he knew the President liked anecdotes about the Soviet Union. It was indeed a country rich in anecdotes. He had only one request: that the President not ask Matlock to collect anecdotes for him. This would stop relations entirely; that would be the biggest joke.

*Secretary Shultz* asked if he could get a word in edgewise. People were waiting for the working groups to start. There had been discussion of strategic arms that morning. Notes had been exchanged; there were things to work with. Gorbachev and the President had also had a discussion about conventional and chemical weapons, so that was additional material. There was one area that had not been touched on. Perhaps they could reach it the next day. That was regional issues. (*Gorbachev* interjected agreement.) Here *the Secretary* assumed the working group would plow in without guidance from the leaders' discussion.

*Gorbachev* said he would welcome that. Bessmertnykh and Ridgway knew their respective positions. *The Secretary* joked that the problem was that they knew the positions of both sides.

*Gorbachev* said the Soviet side intended to conduct a more business-like discussion of regional issues with the President and his colleagues. But there was too little time for it that day. They could get into it the next day.

*Secretary Shultz* said that as self-appointed housekeeper, he might also mention the nuclear testing statement as something to issue the

next day. It would be good to have a continuing flow of things out of the meeting. *Gorbachev* said the two sides should look at it.

*Gorbachev* said he had made a note to himself that morning. His thought was that in discussing the ABM Treaty, where the two sides agreed on a non-withdrawal period, they should say not only, as the Soviet proposal had it, that if one side violated the ABM Treaty the other side would have the right to resume increasing offensive weapons, but that if one side violated it the other side would have the right to end its moratorium on ASAT weapons, i.e. not only to resume production of offensive arms but also to resume ASAT production. That would be an equal obligation for both sides.

*Secretary Shultz* said it was not clear to him what *Gorbachev* meant by a moratorium on ASAT. *Gorbachev* said the Soviet side had been observing such a moratorium since 1983; of course it was unilateral. *The Secretary* said that our moratorium was imposed by Congress. *Gorbachev* said he knew that, but in actual fact it was a moratorium. *The Secretary* said he now understood what *Gorbachev* was driving at.

*Secretary Shultz* continued that in his view the ABM Treaty deserved discussion in the working group, and perhaps also back at the main table: the President had important thoughts on it.

*Gorbachev* asked if they should call it a day for the time being. Or perhaps the President wished to make suggestions on strategic weapons that day. *The President* replied that he did not.

*The Secretary* asked if it were agreed to begin the arms control working group at 4:00 p.m. *Shevardnadze* asked if it would take place at the State Department, and *the Secretary* confirmed that it would.

*Gorbachev* concluded that in the previous two hours they had made an important event. It was a bridge to the future. The Soviet side was ready to build it over. By the time the President came to Moscow the two sides of the bridge should be locked together. *The President* said they should meet in the middle. *Gorbachev* said he agreed fully.



109. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 9, 1987, 10:35–10:45 a.m.

## PARTICIPANTS

*U.S. Participants:*

President Reagan

D. Zarechnak, interpreter

*USSR Participants:*

General Secretary Gorbachev

P. Palazhchenko, interpreter

The President started the meeting by passing to the General Secretary a baseball from Joe DiMaggio (who had attended the State dinner the previous evening) for his (and the President's) autograph. Gorbachev indicated that he had heard of the request, and was glad to comply.

The President then told the General Secretary that in the coming two days they would be working hard to set in motion the other things that needed to be accomplished in order that the people on both sides could work hard in the winter and spring to make a summit in Moscow possible next summer. He indicated that he would be prepared to keep his people working at this, in addition to what the two of them would discuss this morning and tomorrow.

The General Secretary replied that he welcomed this, and that it was not only his feeling, but also that of the Soviet leadership, to continue to work at these issues, and to make the process even more dynamic, not only in the main area of arms control, but in other areas as well, in order to prepare a good visit by Reagan to Moscow which would also be productive and important.

Gorbachev continued that a good time for the visit, when it was not too hot, would be the early summer, perhaps early June or late May. This would allow time for the process of ratification and also would allow for time for a lot of work to be done on a new document on strategic arms and other issues.

The President agreed.

Gorbachev continued that in his conversation with Mrs. Reagan the other night, he had indicated that a program could be arranged which would include time for meetings between the President and himself, meetings of working groups, but also one or two days during which the President and Mrs. Reagan could see the country.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Fritz Ermarth Files, US-Soviet Summit November-December 1987 (14). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Zarechnak. The meeting took place in the small office next to the White House Oval Office. Undated Russian and English draft versions of joint instructions to the Delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States at the Geneva Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms are *ibid*.



The President replied that that would be nice. He could not agree to a date, however, until he knew when some other things would be taking place, e.g., the Economic Summit, which usually occurs in early summer. So he would need some time before agreeing to a date. But he did want to go to Moscow.

The President said that this visit had been a rather short one, but perhaps some time before the President left office, the General Secretary and Raisa could return, not for a Summit, but simply to see the country, and California specifically, since one has not seen America without seeing California.

Gorbachev agreed that this was a good idea, and that there should be regular meetings between the leaders of the two countries, and not always official visits. If we wish to restructure our relations and improve our dialogue and cooperation, all these things could be done in a more normal way, including visits to the U.S. to get to know the country. Such a trip would be important to get a deeper knowledge of the U.S., and would be a possibility.

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## 110. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 9, 1987, 10:55 a.m.–12:35 p.m.

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *U.S.*

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Secretary Shultz

Secretary Carlucci

Sen. Baker

NSC Advisor Powell

EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)

NSC Staff Member Ermarth (Back-up  
Notetaker)

Mr. Zarechnyak (Interpreter)

#### *U.S.S.R.*

GENERAL SECRETARY

GORBACHEV

FornMin Shevardnadze

Politburo Member Yakovlev

CPSU Secretary Dobrynin

Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko  
(Notetaker)

MFA Officer.\_\_\_\_\_(Back-up  
Notetaker)

Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit, 12/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in the White House Oval Office. All blank underscores are in the original.

The meeting was preceded by a ten minute one-on-one with only interpreters present.<sup>2</sup>

THE PRESIDENT opened by noting that the day before had been a proud one. But as the General Secretary himself had said, the two leaders had to keep working.

The President said he wanted to return to some of the subjects the two had talked about in their first meeting, especially the relationship between strategic offense and defense. The two sides' experts had met the day before on START and had had a good discussion. The U.S. had stressed two important issues: verification and counting rules. On verification, our ideas built on what we had learned from the INF negotiation. Counting rules were also important. Issues like sublimits could not be decided until we knew exactly how different types of weapons were to be counted. However, the President was encouraged by Soviet willingness to compromise between 4800 and 5100 ballistic missile warheads. Were it possible to come to agreement on this, the President would be prepared to be forthcoming on an ICBM sublimit. (Gorbachev made a note at this point.)

The President noted that the Soviet side had also discussed sea-launched cruise missiles and had suggested new ideas for their verification. The General Secretary had also expressed a readiness to examine verification of mobile missiles. The U.S. appreciated Gorbachev's suggestions, and, while we had some doubts, we were willing to study his concepts.

Moving to a discussion of the U.S. defense and space position, the President noted that the arms control working group was taking up these issues that day. Each side seemed to understand the other's position on START, but this wasn't true in Defense and Space. The President wanted to urge that the two sides move *together* in a direction in which they were already going separately.

Specifically, he indicated that, if it were possible to agree on a treaty reducing strategic arsenals by 50 percent and preserve the opportunity for effective strategic defenses, the two sides would stand on the threshold of a new and stronger regime of strategic stability. Offensive nuclear weapons had helped to keep the peace for over forty years. But now it was necessary to look to the future. The President and Gorbachev held awesome responsibilities. Their only means to avoid nuclear war was to be prepared to strike each other's homeland with devastating consequences, not only for their countries, but for the world. Their successors, and, more importantly, their peoples, deserved better. For his part, the President wanted to strengthen peace by finding

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 109.

new ways to save lives rather than threaten to avenge them. Providing a better, more stable basis for peace was the central purpose of SDI.

The President pointed out that effective defenses against ballistic missiles could strengthen stability in a number of ways. First, they would significantly increase uncertainty about whether missiles could penetrate defenses to destroy the other side's capability to retaliate. This would become even more important after a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms.

Second, defenses would provide an alternative to accepting massive devastation if a missile were ever launched in error or against either side by another country.

Third, defenses could reinforce arms reductions. Fifty percent reductions, combined with increasingly effective defenses, could offer a real hope of protecting people, not just weapons.

Finally, defenses would underwrite the integrity of arms reductions by reducing the advantages of cheating.

In short, the President noted, the combination of effective defenses and a 50 percent reduction in strategic arsenals would establish a whole new concept of strategic stability. It would be the measure people in the U.S. held most important—by removing any incentive to strike first in a crisis. But it would also improve stability by the measure the Soviet military held most important—by ensuring that neither side could be surprised by the military advances of the other. Thus we could improve strategic stability by both U.S. and Soviet standards.

The President observed that he had noticed Gorbachev's March 1, 1987 remarks in *Pravda*, which focused on the issue of deployment. The President considered that the right approach. He was therefore prepared to negotiate with Gorbachev a period during which neither side would deploy strategic defenses beyond those permitted by the ABM Treaty. The length of the period could be agreed once the terms were settled. At Reykjavik, Gorbachev had talked of ten years. The President believed it would be possible to agree on the length of the period once the terms were settled.

Moreover, in order to reassure Gorbachev that the Soviet Union would not be surprised by events during the non-deployment period, the President was also prepared to commit to a package designed to increase predictability for both sides. He would ask Carlucci to describe that package in a moment. In brief, however, the President was offering Gorbachev predictability during a non-deployment period of certain length. In return, the President needed to protect the existing U.S.—and Soviet—right to conduct, in the words of Marshal Grechko,<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Andrei Grechko, the Soviet Minister of Defense at the time of the 1972 signing of the ABM Treaty.

“research and experimental work aimed at resolving the problem of defending the country against nuclear missile attack.” Both sides needed a clear right to deploy defenses after that period.

The U.S., then, was seeking a separate, new treaty of unlimited duration that could go into effect at the same time the START treaty went into effect. This second treaty would contain a period during which both sides would commit not to deploy defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty. After that period of time, both sides would be free to deploy such defenses without further reference to the ABM Treaty, after giving six months notice of intent to deploy. During the non-deployment period, both sides would have the right to pursue their strategic defense programs, conducting research, development and testing, including testing in space, as required. Their negotiators in Geneva could explain in detail the U.S. concept of deployment.

As Gorbachev would see, the President was trying to create a future in which the two sides would have reduced strategic offensive arms by 50% and could pursue their respective strategic defense programs as common elements in a new regime which Gorbachev had called “strategic stability.” In that context, the President had taken special note of the General Secretary’s interview with Tom Brokaw the week before, in which Gorbachev had acknowledged the existence of a Soviet analogue to SDI. This was a step in the right direction.

This then, was a summary of the U.S. position, the President concluded. He would ask Secretary Shultz to comment in further detail.

SECRETARY SHULTZ handed out a Russian text<sup>4</sup> of what he described as elements on which negotiators in Geneva might build.

First, he noted, there would be a period of time during which both sides would commit not to deploy defensive systems currently prohibited by the ABM Treaty. The Secretary noted in this connection the President’s remark that it would be possible to agree on an appropriate time period.

Second, after that period, both sides would be free to deploy defenses not currently permitted by the Treaty after giving six months notice of an intent to deploy and without any further reference to the ABM Treaty.

Third, during the non-deployment period, both sides would have the right to pursue their strategic defense programs, conducting research, development and testing, including testing in space, as required.

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<sup>4</sup> Not found.

Fourth, to enhance strategic stability, promote predictability, and ensure confidence that prohibited deployments were not being undertaken during the non-deployment period, the U.S. proposed that the two sides meet regularly to do three things:

- Exchange programmatic data and briefings on each side's strategic defense programs;

- Arrange for agreed mutual observation of strategic defense tests and visits to strategic defense research facilities;

- Arrange for intensive discussions of strategic stability to begin not later than three years before the end of the non-deployment period.

The Secretary added that all of this should be seen in light of the fact that the period in question would span several Presidential terms. The relevant research would be going on. No one could tell what the situation would be at the end of the period. The two sides would, however, have an opportunity to discuss matters in the context of what was taking place at the time.

The Secretary suggested that Carlucci briefly describe the type of confidence building measures (CBM's) the U.S. had in mind under its proposal.

SECRETARY CARLUCCI explained that such CBM's would be designed to give each side the predictability it needed. The U.S. had earlier put proposals for "open labs" on the table in Geneva, but had received no response. There were other things which could be done. There were things which would make it possible to observe research in space. The U.S. would be prepared to open up such facilities as Livermore Labs and Stanford Research; the Soviet side might be prepared to open up its own facilities, such as those which produced chemical lasers.

With respect to joint observation of actions in space, the U.S. was aware of the Soviet near-space vehicle. We had our shuttle. If, for example, the U.S. sought to conduct a sensor experiment in space, the Soviet near-space vehicle could be maneuvered close enough to satisfy Moscow that no offensive weapon was being tested. Such activities could be undertaken without compromising the security or integrity of the programs involved on either side. Carlucci noted that Marshal Akhromeyev was scheduled to visit him at the Pentagon that afternoon. Carlucci had invited Gen. Abrahamson to brief him in detail on U.S. space defense CBM ideas.

THE PRESIDENT, noting that Gorbachev had probably heard enough from U.S. representatives, invited the General Secretary to share any reactions.

GORBACHEV said that he did, in fact, have a few words in response. First, he could not on the level of principle support the proposal the President had just outlined. The thrust of that proposal

was to invite the Soviet Union to join the U.S. in undertaking a kind of SDI program. Gorbachev had said before Moscow had no intention of developing its own SDI; he had even urged the President to renounce the program. If the U.S. proceeded, the Soviet side had made clear it would develop a response. But that response would take a different path from SDI.

What then, were the proposals of the Soviet side? The ABM regime had worked well for fifteen years. True, some concerns had been expressed with respect to compliance with the Treaty, including in the recent past. But a mechanism for dealing with such problems existed in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), which had worked well in the past. Such concerns could be discussed and removed. But in fact both sides had basically observed the Treaty in the past.

But now we were entering a new phase, a phase of reducing strategic offensive arms. Not only would it be necessary to continue to observe the ABM Treaty, it should be strengthened—as had been agreed at Reykjavik—through a commitment not to withdraw from the Treaty as strategic offensive arms were reduced. On the basis of such an approach, which presumed an interpretation of the Treaty consistent with that which had been used since Day One of its existence, it would be possible to begin work on the specifics of reducing strategic arms by 50%.

The President, Gorbachev noted, had himself said that SDI was not up for negotiation. If he were now proposing to structure the two leaders' discussion of strategic offensive arms reductions by linking that subject to SDI, Gorbachev had to say it would be a slow process. It would take time first of all just to define SDI. Space was a new area for both countries; there were no criteria for making judgments. Both sides would be groping in the dark. Such an approach would lead the dialogue down a blind alley.

Gorbachev underscored that he objected in principle to SDI. If America wished to pursue the program, that was its business—to the extent its activities were consistent with the ABM Treaty.

But if there was a real desire for accommodation on both sides, the Soviet approach was a practical one. Taking into account the U.S. desire to implement SDI, Moscow simply proposed that neither side use its right to withdraw from the Treaty for ten years. Two to three years before the end of that period, there could be a discussion of what to do next. If the U.S. had decided to deploy SDI, it could say so. But during the ten years of the period the Soviet side would have the assurance that, while strategic offensive arms were being reduced, the U.S. would observe the ABM Treaty and not use its right to withdraw. This was something the two sides could agree on.

As for SDI research, it could continue, and the U.S. could decide what to do after ten years. If the U.S. were to violate the ABM Treaty

during that period, the Soviet side would be released from any obligation to continue reductions, and would have the right to build and perfect weapons, as well as to cancel its anti-satellite (ASAT) moratorium. But that would occur only if the U.S. decided to deploy SDI.

The Soviet Union, for its part, did not want a new sphere for the arms race. It did not want to deploy SDI. Moscow did not know what, precisely, it wanted to do in the areas involved.

Therefore it proposed a straightforward approach: 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms; agreement on a period of non-withdrawal; observance of the Treaty as it had been observed in the past. As for SDI, the U.S. could do research. Should it ultimately decide to deploy, that would be up to the U.S., but after the termination of the withdrawal period. This proposal would make it possible to implement 50% reductions in strategic weapons in the context of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and to continue research. Before the end of the ten year period, there could be a discussion.

For the Soviet side, it would be less expensive to explore ways other than through SDI-type deployments to ensure its security. Thus, SDI was not acceptable from a political standpoint; it was not acceptable from a military standpoint (as it was destabilizing); it was not acceptable from an economic standpoint. It could wear out the Soviet economy. It was up to the U.S. to decide if SDI made sense for itself in economic terms; the Soviet Union had decided it did not. Should the U.S. decide to deploy SDI at the end of a non-withdrawal period, Gorbachev warned, the Soviet side would have to respond. But that response would be less costly than SDI.

Gorbachev suggested in conclusion that the two sides seek a solution which enabled the U.S. to develop SDI, but would do so in a way which did not make SDI an obstacle to progress in the reduction of strategic arms. Gorbachev had outlined the Soviet proposal for guaranteeing peace. For the U.S., the answer was SDI. For the Soviet Union, the answer was different: nuclear disarmament; maintenance of the ABM regime; and no extension of the arms race to space.

THE PRESIDENT volunteered an answer of his own. It was possible to proceed immediately with 50% reductions. Any other options were years ahead for both sides. It would be better not to link the two concepts. The discussions thus far had revealed some common ground. Let the working groups go to work. But one issue should not be made hostage to the other.

As for SDI, the President offered a counterargument to Gorbachev's suggestion that the program would step up the arms race. The President saw it as essential to the realization of the dream of a non-nuclear world. The secret of nuclear weapons was spreading inexorably. If the U.S. and Soviet Union ever reached the point where they had eliminated all their nuclear arms, they would have to face the possibility that a



madman in one country or another could develop a nuclear capability for purposes of conquest or blackmail. The situation was not unlike that after agreement had been reached to ban the use of poison gas. People had kept their gas masks. There would always be a need for a defense. The U.S. and Soviet Union could eliminate their nuclear arsenals without fear of nuclear attack by other countries if they had a reliable defensive shield.

In this context, the President had been encouraged by Gorbachev's acknowledgment of a Soviet program akin to SDI. He was grateful for Gorbachev's words because a future based on an ability to counter any attack would be based on *real* stability, not the stability that came from the ability to destroy.

GORBACHEV observed that the American press had distorted the thrust of his remarks to Brokaw. He had not said that the Soviet Union had its own SDI. He had said that the Soviet Union was engaged in many areas of basic research, including some covered on the U.S. side by SDI. He had not gone beyond this. He had added, moreover, that the Soviet Union would not deploy SDI, and had urged the U.S. not to do so. The Soviet Union would find a different path. The U.S. would not draw the Soviet Union into an SDI program.

On the other hand, if the U.S. wanted to reduce strategic arms, it would have to accept a ten-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. At the end of that period, the U.S. could decide what it would do. The Soviet side could accept that, although it was definitely against SDI.

As for prospects for a START agreement, Gorbachev expressed his readiness to cooperate and respond to the major U.S. concerns. Moscow was ready to reduce heavy ICBM's by 50%. As for sea launched cruise missiles (SLCM's), he had yesterday shared his ideas on verification with the President.<sup>5</sup> He was also ready to look again at the sublimits question. So, he was ready to work to achieve a treaty. But if the President wanted to link that process to SDI, if it had to involve SDI, there would be no START treaty either with the President or his successors.

SECRETARY SHULTZ asked if he might describe a possible work program, in view of the previous discussion. Both sides, he noted, seemed to be committed to achieving a START agreement. Work was already underway among experts.

The Secretary clarified that the President did not mean to suggest that a START treaty be linked to Soviet acceptance of SDI. In fact, he had said there should be no linkage to anything.

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<sup>5</sup> See Documents 107 and 108.



GORBACHEV interjected that a START treaty had to be linked to the ABM Treaty.

THE SECRETARY continued that the question was not one of whether the Soviet Union liked or did not like SDI. Neither side could tell the other how to see to its own defense. But the proposal Gorbachev outlined seemed on the surface not to be inconsistent with what the U.S. wanted.

For its part, the U.S. side believed that the proposal the President had made was consistent with the ABM Treaty. Mr. Gorbachev might not agree with that assessment. But the point was that it made no sense to set out down a certain path when both sides knew they did not agree on what, superficially, they seemed to agree on. The President had proposed a means of ensuring that they were sure what we meant.

The Secretary recalled that the Soviet side had asked for predictability. The President's proposal would guarantee that there would be no deployments against the Soviet Union for a certain period. The President had said it should be possible to agree on the number of years such a period would last. He had also said that, when the period ended, either side could do what it chose.

The question remained, what would happen in the meantime? We had tried to get at that question through the means that Carlucci had described. These would give the Soviet side confidence in what the U.S. was doing. We would hope Moscow would reciprocate by permitting similar access.

The President's proposal had also incorporated the Soviet idea that, before the end of the agreed period, there would be agreement in advance to discussions of the situation created as a result of strategic reductions and the results of research to that point. This discussion would take place several years in advance of the end of the period. While each side would have the right to do what it wished at the end of the period, this discussion would allow both to take into account facts which had emerged in the interim. This could have an impact on the ultimate results.

So, the Secretary continued, the President's proposal was not an effort to link Soviet acceptance of SDI to a START treaty—even though we could not understand why Moscow was opposed to SDI. Rather, it was an attempt to give the Soviet side greater confidence that it understood what was going on on the U.S. side. But to agree on radical reductions of strategic arms, based on an understanding of the status of the ABM Treaty both sides knew in their bones was not shared, made the U.S. side uncomfortable and was probably unwise. That was why we hoped that Akhromeyev would listen to what Abrahamson had to say. Who knew? Perhaps the two of them would come up with something new.

GORBACHEV asked why the U.S. could not accept the Soviet formula: 50% reductions in strategic arms; a ten-year non-withdrawal period; discussion two to three years before the end of that period on what to do next. This was a simple approach. There was no reason to encumber the discussion of 50% reductions.

SHEVARDNADZE interjected that it was important to consider another factor—if the President were to pay a return visit to Moscow, there had to be a decision on what such a visit might produce. Shevardnadze had been operating on the assumption that the purpose of the visit would be to sign an agreement on 50% reductions in strategic arms in the context of the preservation of the ABM Treaty for an agreed period, as he and the Secretary had publicly stated. This had been the basis for all their discussions. If the two sides started to open up philosophical questions about what might happen years from now, the President's visit could not be crowned by signature of an agreement.

That was why it was critical, Shevardnadze said, to define the parameters of observance of the ABM Treaty in the context of 50% reductions. If the question were consigned to experts, there would never be a decision. A key issue was to decide on the duration of the non-withdrawal period. Another was limits on SLCM's. The size of those limits and their verification could be discussed, but a decision was needed.

Finally, Shevardnadze continued, there could be no question of the INF Treaty becoming the end of the process. It could not stop. Nuclear proliferation was a growing problem, which made it all the more important to maintain the momentum of nuclear arms reductions. The President's visit could provide a major stimulus to this effort. As for SDI, it was not and had not been a subject for discussion. Secretary Shultz had made clear it was the President's program. But there was a need to clarify certain questions or there would be no START agreement.

DOBRYNIN reiterated Gorbachev's point that the ABM Treaty had worked well for fifteen years. Now the U.S. seemed to be proposing that, at the Washington summit, the two leaders in effect announce that this treaty of unlimited duration would cease to be. That was the effect of the President's proposal: there would be three years of negotiations, and then there would be an open arms race.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the Soviet side was forgetting something. Prior to Gorbachev's assuming office, there had been violations by the Soviet side of the ABM Treaty. The Krasnoyarsk radar was the principal example. But there were other differences of interpretation. We believed that the Treaty allowed research into weapons which it did not specifically address. The Treaty had dealt with ABM interceptor missiles; it did not ban research into and development of

other systems not even envisioned at the time. SDI clearly was covered by the clause which covered other physical principles. It was not an interceptor missile. But there were real questions of when the Soviet side would begin to abide by the ABM Treaty.

SECRETARY SHULTZ proposed that he seek to outline areas where broad agreement seemed to exist.

First, the two sides agreed on the concept of a period of time—as yet undecided—when there would be no deployment of antiballistic missile systems beyond what was permitted by the ABM Treaty. There was agreement that, at the end of the period, either side could do what it chose to do. The U.S. had sought to pick up on the Soviet proposal that there should be agreement in advance that the two sides would discuss problems of strategic stability well before the period ended.

Where there was no agreement was on the question of what actions could be undertaken during the period in question. The U.S. would have no problem agreeing to the formula, “the ABM Treaty, as signed and ratified,” because it considered its SDI program to be consistent with that concept. The Secretary said that he had heard that Gorbachev was tired of hearing Grechko quoted back to him, but stressed that that was part of the record. The point he was making was that the two sides differed on such questions of interpretation.

GORBACHEV interjected that these differences had emerged only in 1983. Prior to that, there were no differences, as Congressional hearings and Pentagon reports made clear. Only after SDI had been proposed did the U.S. seek to make the Treaty fit the program. A lawyer had been found to make the case. But, as Bismarck had said, a lawyer could be found to justify anything. What was going on was obvious to everyone. The U.S. should have more respect for the Soviet side than to expect that they would not see through this.

If the U.S. wanted 50% reductions, Gorbachev reemphasized, there had to be a commitment of 10 years on the ABM Treaty. There would be nothing on SDI before that in any case. The issue was not that complex. But the U.S. side was trying to make things “foggy.”

THE PRESIDENT replied with some feeling that it was not he who was making things foggy. He wanted to make things clear. He did not want to talk about links to SDI, but about 50% reductions, about how the Hell the two sides were to eliminate half their nuclear weapons. He wanted to talk about how the two leaders could sign an agreement like the one they had signed the day before—an agreement which had made everyone in the world so damned happy it could be felt in the room at dinner the night before. “Let’s get started with it,” he concluded.

GORBACHEV said he was ready. The two leaders should make clear that they were working on agreed reductions and were making

progress. They should also indicate that, as they began this important process, they reaffirmed their commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years. This should not be a problem. The period could be for nine years if that would help.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the issue be set aside for a moment. He felt there had been some progress. There was agreement on the concept of a certain period. There was agreement on what should happen at the end of that period. The two sides were not there yet on actions [that] were to be permitted during that period, but that could be worked. But there was clear agreement on the need for major cuts in strategic arms. Indeed, the Secretary had felt electricity on this point. That was the place to start.

GORBACHEV said he would like to return for a moment to the issue of SLCM's. If this question were not resolved, he warned, there could be no agreement. The Soviet side had outlined clearly its position. What was the U.S. stand on this issue?

THE PRESIDENT said he thought this was a matter for experts. GORBACHEV said that they would be unable to do anything without guidance from the top.

SECRETARY SHULTZ reminded Gorbachev that the U.S. had problems with the verification of SLCM's. The General Secretary had said the day before that the Soviet side had some ideas for dealing with verification. We were ready to study them. If we could be satisfied that they were workable—and that was a big question—this would be a realistic basis for proceeding. At this point, the Secretary concluded, he was not in a position to respond to Gorbachev's proposal for a SLCM ceiling of 400 missiles.

GORBACHEV noted ironically that the U.S. had no answer on this and other issues he had raised, only more demands of the Soviet side. But this was not the kind of momentum that was needed. The U.S. was simply squeezing more and more concessions out of its partner. Verification of SLCM's should be more of a problem for Moscow than Washington, Gorbachev pointed out, in view of the U.S. advantage in numbers of SLCM's. Once there was agreement on a number, the verification problem could be resolved. If it proved impossible to satisfy the U.S. on verification, the Soviets would remove their insistence on a numerical limit.

SECRETARY SHULTZ repeated that the U.S. would study the Soviet SLCM proposals.

GORBACHEV replied, "good," adding that the conversation had been a good one. It had made it clearer what both sides wanted. Gorbachev emphasized in closing this phase of the discussion the importance he attached to reductions of strategic arms—a key issue in

the relationship, and one which required a responsible approach from both sides. Obviously, no agreements were possible except on the basis of equality.

THE PRESIDENT said jocularly that he, for one, had no desire to come to Moscow to be disappointed.

GORBACHEV said he had not meant to suggest any linkage. If the President wished to come to Moscow without a START agreement, he would be welcome. But he should say so. For his part, Gorbachev felt that there was, in fact, a common understanding that the visit should be marked by the signing of an important document. The Soviet side wanted to push toward that goal. If the President was operating from a different set of assumptions, all he had to do was say so. The Geneva negotiators would probably be just as glad to spend their time playing soccer. But Gorbachev assumed that the Administration shared his assessment that an agreement was possible. The President's visit would be an important one; but if he wished to finesse the question of a treaty, he should say so.

SECRETARY SHULTZ observed that Gorbachev had heard with his own ears what the President had said on that count. For himself, he could assure Gorbachev that, whenever he (the Secretary) went off to meet with Shevardnadze, the President made clear in no uncertain terms what he wanted the Secretary to accomplish. The Secretary thought the President had made his views on a START agreement pretty clear to the General Secretary as well a moment before.

GORBACHEV acknowledged that this was important. But one had to decide beforehand in building a bridge whether it should go across a divide or alongside it. The Soviet approach was that there should be a good treaty by the time the President came to Moscow. If there was another view in Washington, it would be best to make that clear. In Russian, Gorbachev recounted, there was a saying: "If you respect me, don't make a fool of me. Tell me what you want."

THE SECRETARY quipped that he hoped this didn't mean GORBACHEV was giving up. GORBACHEV replied that, on the contrary, that was why he had urged against any link between START and SDI. There should be a good treaty by the time of the President's visit.

THE PRESIDENT said he thought that was what he, himself, had said earlier. He had said that the two sides should be seeking to eliminate strategic weapons. So one objective, whether or not the U.S. deployed SDI, would be 50% fewer missiles. But this should only make the two sides more interested in defense, since they would both become more vulnerable to other nuclear states.

GORBACHEV replied that it would be a long time before that was a problem, since even after a 50% reduction, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. arsenals would still vastly outweigh those of other states.

Responding to a suggestion by Secretary Shultz, THE PRESIDENT suggested a brief discussion of regional issues. These issues, he noted, would greatly influence the long-term character of the two sides' relations and their immediate future as well.

Afghanistan was at the top of the U.S. list. There were more Soviet troops in that country than when the President had entered office. The U.S. and Soviet Union had had extensive discussions about Afghanistan. We understood each others point of view. The President welcomed Gorbachev's declarations of intent to withdraw. But it was long since time to act on these declarations. This would signal the beginning of a new era in East-West relations and in international affairs generally.

The nature of the conflict meant that a settlement depended mainly on the Soviet Union, the President continued. The U.S. would do its part to help if the Soviet Union actually withdrew. The U.S. and other governments could help assure that Afghanistan did not become a threat to Soviet security. The U.S. was prepared to do its part to ensure the emergence of a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan. It was time, now, here, at the summit, to set dates certain for the starting and ending of the withdrawal of Soviet forces, so that all troops were out by the end of 1988.

The President said he also wanted to address the Iran-Iraq war. The two sides needed to return to the pattern of cooperation which was reflected in their joint support for UNSC Resolution 598. The President was worried that subsequent Soviet policies were a departure from that cooperation, that they encouraged Iranian intransigence and belligerence. The day before, the Iraqi foreign minister had said that Iraq accepted Resolution 598 in all its parts. Iran was still undercutting the process. Now was the time for the President and Gorbachev to lend their weight to the process for the sake of the potential impact on the Iran-Iraq war, and for the sake of the dignity and future status of the Security Council itself. The U.S. and Soviet Union should be moving forward together on a second resolution. But since Iraq was going along with the UN, a boycott of Iran could help end the war.

Finally, the President mentioned Berlin, which he felt could be the site of positive developments. The President said he felt Gorbachev could and should tear down the Wall that day. But, in any case, the U.S. and Soviet Union should take smaller, practical steps to ameliorate the division of the city and to symbolize their mutual desire to overcome the division of Europe in a humane and stabilizing way. The U.S. had been working with the British and French on such proposals, and would soon present them to the Soviet Union. The President hoped for a positive response. He also urged that there be an end to shooting incidents involving the two sides military liaison mission activities—acknowledging that such actions did not take place on Gorbachev's orders.

GORBACHEV noted that his list of priority regional questions coincided perfectly with that of the President. In general terms, he continued, Moscow was convinced that—whether in Central America, Kampuchea, Afghanistan or the Middle East—there was increasing support for regional political settlements. This new phase showed up in expanded contacts between opposing groups, in an upturn in political reconciliation, in a search for coalitions. A situation was developing, in short, where U.S.-Soviet cooperation could produce results. Indeed, if the two leaders could express their willingness to work together to resolve some of the issues involved, it could have a major impact.

On Afghanistan, Gorbachev noted, the Cordovez process had produced agreement on instruments regarding non-interference, on guarantees by the U.S., U.S.S.R., Pakistan and—desirably, at least—Iran. There was also agreement on the return of refugees; although this was primarily a matter for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could make a contribution. The withdrawal of troops was the only remaining issue.

On that point, Najib had made a proposal—on which Moscow had been consulted—that Soviet forces be withdrawn within twelve months, with a provision that this timetable could be reduced. But the start was linked to the process of national reconciliation, specifically with the establishment of a coalition government.

It was up to the Afghans to decide the composition of that government. As for Moscow, it shared the view that Afghanistan should be independent and nonaligned. The Soviets recognized that Afghanistan could not be considered a “socialist” country. There were too many non-socialist characteristics: a multi-party system, tribalism, capitalists and clerical elements. The Soviets were realists. They did not want to try to make Afghanistan socialist.

They could not, of course, be indifferent to the situation there. There was a 2,000 mile common border. But he could assure the President that the Soviet Union wanted no bases in Afghanistan, nor any presence which would affect the strategic situation in the region. Instead, it wanted to complete the process of withdrawal on the basis of negotiation and national reconciliation.

The Afghan government, Gorbachev said, was taking a realistic approach. It had expressed its willingness to share up to 50% of government portfolios, including that of prime minister, with the opposition. The U.S. and Soviet Union could not make the necessary trade-offs. But if the Soviet side used its influence in Kabul, and the U.S. worked through those with whom it was in contact—and, Gorbachev noted matter of factly, he knew the President had received opposition leaders—it might help the two groups become reconciled to one another.

As for the withdrawal of Soviet forces, Gorbachev said that two events should coincide: the onset of withdrawals; and the end to “your”



transfer of arms and financing of the opposition. From Day One of the withdrawal, Gorbachev volunteered, Soviet forces would engage in no operations except in self-defense. If the President could agree on that, the U.S. and Soviet sides could cooperate to resolve the problem. Moscow had no intention of seeking to leave behind a regime acceptable to itself alone. It would have no problem with a non-aligned and independent government. So perhaps he and the President should reach a "gentleman's agreement" that the Soviets would talk to Najib, and the U.S. to the opposition.

THE PRESIDENT said that the problem with the scenario Gorbachev had described was that one side would be left with the army, while the other would have to fire up its arms. The resistance could not be asked to do this. *All* the Afghan people should have the right to settle matters peaceably. One side should not have a monopoly of force.

GORBACHEV reiterated that an early solution to the Afghan problem was now possible. He suggested that the issue be discussed further by experts. THE PRESIDENT agreed.

On the Iran-Iraq war, GORBACHEV said he saluted U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the adoption of UNSC Resolution 598. Such cooperation was to be valued all the more because it was so rare. The question now was how to move things in the region in the direction of a settlement. The President knew what kind of people "those guys" in Iran were. It was not a simple matter.

The Soviet Union, for its part, had no desire to create problems for the U.S. in the region. Moscow sought instead a means which would enable the U.S. to move away from its current exposed position without harm to its interests. The Soviets had no interest in seeing things get out of control, or in seeing U.S. economic and other interests in the region suffer. The fact that there was a convergence of U.S. and Soviet interests on this point should help them to find mutually acceptable approaches.

What the Soviets feared, on the other hand, was a situation in which the Iranians felt themselves to be cornered and resorted to extreme measures. The Iranian leadership's ability to inspire their population to remarkable efforts had been proven. The Islamic fundamentalism to which they appealed transcended the Gulf conflict.

The Soviets therefore felt that every effort should be made to exhaust the potential of UNSC 598. If Moscow became convinced that nothing else would work, it would accept a second resolution. But Iran's capacity for rash actions if pushed into a corner had to be kept in mind.

Gorbachev therefore suggested that a "real" force be established on behalf of the UN to implement 598. This would allow the U.S. to



reduce its presence without prejudice to its image or interests. The resolution's provision for resort to "impartial bodies" might also have some potential. In conjunction with use of the UN military staff committee it might prove an effective means of dealing with the situation.

In any case, Gorbachev reiterated, Moscow had no desire to undermine American prestige or interests in the region. Rather, it wanted to work with the U.S. to determine if there [were] means which had not been exhausted to ensure full implementation of 598. If all else failed, he repeated, the Soviet Union would support a second resolution. But Gorbachev felt that the first still had untapped potential.

In a final comment on the Gulf, Gorbachev pointed out Iran's proximity to Iran [*Iraq*], noting that, were Moscow to press too hard on the war with Iraq, it could complicate the Soviet position in Afghanistan.

SECRETARY SHULTZ said he hoped it would be possible to discuss this issue further later in the afternoon, or at some other point during the General Secretary's visit. GORBACHEV agreed.

Responding to THE PRESIDENT's reminder that the two leaders needed to join their wives, GORBACHEV indicated he had one additional point to raise. Handing the President a folder, he recounted that North Korean leader Kim Il Sung had asked that he convey to the President a personal message on the establishment of a "buffer zone" on the Korean peninsula.<sup>6</sup> Gorbachev said he would not read the four-point proposal, which, he emphasized, Kim had asked be closely held. The initiative had not been shared with all members even of the North Korean leadership.

THE PRESIDENT accepted the folder.

SECRETARY SHULTZ used the opportunity to urge that Gorbachev consider a positive reference in any joint statement to the Olympic movement.

GORBACHEV replied that Moscow wanted the Olympic games to take place, but urged that some events be held in the North. The International Olympic Committee was working on the issue. It should not become a political question.

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<sup>6</sup> Attached but not printed are the Russian version and an unofficial translation of Kim's proposal.

111. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 9, 1987, 4:15–5:50 p.m.

## SUBJECT

Shultz-Shevardnadze Meeting, December 9 Afternoon

## PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>USSR</i>
George P. Shultz, Secretary of State	Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Colin Powell, National Security Advisor	Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister
John C. Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State	Evgeniy Primakov, Director, Oriental Studies Institute
Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of State	(fnu) Rybakov, Director, Legal and Treaty Department, MFA
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)	(fnu) Glukhov, Deputy Director, Cultural and Humanitarian Affairs Department, MFA
Jack F. Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR	Sergei Tarasenko, Special Assistant to Shevardnadze (notetaker)
Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State (HA)	Interpreter
Richard Solomon, Director, Policy Planning Staff	
Warren Zimmermann, U.S. Ambassador to the CSCE Review Conference, Vienna	
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (notetaker)	
Mark R. Parris, Director, EUR/ SOV (notetaker)	

*The Secretary* suggested that the two ministers hear the reports of the working groups, and then go through the joint statement.

*Shevardnadze* suggested they try to wrap up by 6:00, although there was also the possibility of coming back after dinner. *The Secretary* said they should try to finish by 6:00. Or, *Shevardnadze* suggested, they could come back early the next day.

*The Secretary* suggested they hear the report of the ambassadors. (Ambassador Dubinin was not there.) He then suggested they hear the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit, 12/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons and Parris. The meeting took place in Shultz's office at the Department of State. The abbreviation (fnu) in front of two Soviet participants indicates first name unknown.

report of the regional affairs subgroup. (Mr. Solomon had not yet arrived.) He then suggested they hear the report of the human rights subgroup.

Addressing the Secretary and the Minister, *Ambassador Schifter* noted that during his luncheon address<sup>2</sup> the Secretary had spoken of a down-to-earth, pragmatic, businesslike approach. That had characterized the human rights discussions.

Schifter continued that the U.S. side had expressed satisfaction that the group of separated spouses, which continued to be of concern, was now down to three, and the hope that, as in INF, the Soviet side would go for the zero option. The U.S. side had explained the cases that were left. Schifter said the Ministry and Shevardnadze personally had the U.S. side's thanks for what had been accomplished in this area.

Other questions raised, Schifter went on, included the U.S. concern that the commission of the Presidium which reviewed denials had not acted as affirmatively as we had thought it would. There had been some reversals, and some reaffirmations of denials where the classified work cited had been performed 10, 15 or 20 years before. There seemed to be reason to hope that another look would in the General Secretary's terms lead to new thinking.

Schifter continued that the U.S. side had noted progress on German and Armenian emigration from the Soviet Union, and the last two months had brought a slight upturn in Jewish emigration. It had expressed the hope that the Soviet side would look at the rules, to help resolve an issue that remains a point of difficulty with us.

The U.S. side had then described its expectations concerning the policy of glasnost, Schifter went on. It had noted progress on recognition of the principles of freedom of speech and religion. People imprisoned under Articles 70, 190–1 and others of the relevant codes<sup>3</sup> had been released. We had hoped that all political and religious prisoners would be released under the amnesty. We were disappointed that this had not yet happened. We recognized that this was the Soviet side's internal affair, but we had noted that if people can do things in 1987, people who did the same things in 1982, 1983, or 1984 and are in prison for them should be released. We had expressed the hope that preference would be given to people in ill health in prison, especially in Perm Camp 36–1.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> For the lunchtime remarks of Shultz and Gorbachev, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 1988, pp. 8–10.

<sup>3</sup> References are to articles from the penal code relating to so-called anti-Soviet agitation.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to a Siberian Labor Camp.

Schifter continued that the U.S. side had heard the Soviet delegation on matters of interest and concern to it, on a variety of topics. This included the death penalty for minors. The U.S. side had arranged presentation of the relevant court papers in a case before the Supreme Court, and had escorted a Soviet representative to the Court to hear argument in the case. It would be decided within the next month or two, and during the hearing the Soviet had attended three judges had supported reversal of the law; two more might be found. The law applied in a small number of states.

The two sides had also discussed homelessness, Schifter went on, including people on grates around the Department of State. The U.S. side had explained that the main cause was deinstitutionalization of people who were mentally ill but did not threaten violence to themselves or others. Matters had been raised that could be topics for fruitful discussion.

Schifter concluded that the U.S. side saw developments that brought improvements in the Soviet Union, but problems continued to exist which we hoped would evaporate.

*Rybakov* said he would present the viewpoint of the Soviet side in the human rights subgroup. Its impression was that both sides were interested in the topic and considered it important. The exchanges had been non-formal, deep, serious and candid. They were in the spirit of efforts to depart from the stereotypes of the past, get rid of obstacles to businesslike Soviet-American cooperation. It had been characteristic that each side had raised any question it wished. They had different historical and social traditions, but neither side departed from a businesslike approach. They had not just listened but heard, taken the viewpoint of the other side into account. On some aspects, they had openly exchanged suggestions. They had touched on conceptual approaches and specific facts.

Rybakov said the Soviet side had asked how the U.S. solved various human rights questions. This was of interest to Soviet society, from an economic, political and ethical point of view. There was interest in rights and freedoms, in how obstacles to full development of the individual were removed. The Soviet side had asked about homelessness; about capital punishment for minors; about repression for racial or sexual reasons; about exit and entry procedures; about international terrorism; about drug abuse.

The question of practical cooperation had had an especially systematic basis, Rybakov went on. The Soviet idea of a Moscow international conference on humanitarian issues had been raised. There the two sides continued to differ substantially. But it was still realized that there was a solid potential in both countries for developing cooperation in this area, which would foster peace and understanding.

The dialogue was already taking place in terms of new thinking, Rybakov concluded. Though complex, it was feasible. The whole atmosphere of the dialogue was different from what it had been not long ago. The Soviet side had considered the discussion useful, and believed it should proceed.

*Ambassador Zimmermann* said there had been a brief discussion of CSCE. He was not able to report progress. In CSCE there had been useful discussion of military security, but the human rights area had not kept up. With regard to the text, the Soviet delegation had not been able to accept positive language even when it was introduced by neutrals. There had been balance in the Helsinki process from the beginning, and the tradition that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. It would not be possible to conclude on conventional arms until human rights was also concluded. If the Soviet delegation were given more flexible instructions on human rights, the U.S. delegation would work closely with it, in order to end Vienna as soon as possible.

*The Secretary* said that the practice of systematic discussion was a good one. It was progressing well. The U.S. side was ready to work with the Soviet side to bring Vienna to an end.

*Shevardnadze* said there had been a useful exchange. A good practice was emerging. The atmosphere had been calm. His question was the extent to which we intended to reflect this in the joint statement. *The Secretary* noted there was a sentence in the proposed text which registered the fact of continued discussion in this area. *Shevardnadze* said he was familiar with the text. If the Secretary thought that was sufficient, the two sides could confine themselves to that sentence. *The Secretary* said the U.S. side thought it was fine. When the U.S. side briefed on the document, it would be comfortable saying the discussion had been good. We could go forward at Vienna based on it. *Shevardnadze* said that was sufficient. There were limited possibilities as to what could be included.

In his meeting with Congressmen, *Shevardnadze* went on, Gorbachev had expressed the desire to pursue cooperation in various forms: experts, jurists, lawyers. But the details could get out of hand in a document. In practical terms the two sides should be guided by what had been discussed at the top level. *The Secretary* said the U.S. side agreed. *Shevardnadze* thanked the group. Schifter concluded that we would continue the dialogue.

(Schifter, Zimmermann, Rybakov and Glukhov left the room to continue discussion in their subgroup.)

*Primakov* said jovially that the two sides had spent many hours on the easiest problems—regional issues—and had failed to produce agreed rules of conduct. But they had produced better understanding. The following points seemed to him agreed:

—First, that settlement of regional disputes was one of the main tasks of international life and our bilateral relations;

—Second, that settlements should be achieved by political means;

—Third, that both were against involving the two countries in conflict situations, and should consult to avoid such involvement;

—Fourth, that a rapprochement of positions at the global level—as was taking place here in Washington—will help mutual understanding, and thus help solve regional conflicts; and the converse was also true. The principle was important.

It would be counterproductive to prioritize various goals, Primakov said, and we had concluded that we should try to move forward across a broad front. But the situation was becoming different. This was true objectively, in that in many areas the prospects for national reconciliation were improving. It was also true subjectively, in that both sides were in favor of eliminating conflict situations. Philosophically, they were no longer looking at such situations from the perspective of confrontation, with a view to exploiting them against the other.

When it came to specifics, they had spent a lot of time on Afghanistan, Primakov said. The U.S. side had given a positive response to the Soviet statement that there was no link between troop withdrawal and national reconciliation, which could take a long time. The Soviet side had given a positive response to the U.S. statement that, once Soviet troops were withdrawn, the U.S. would do nothing to build up its military position, to use Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. The U.S. side had confirmed what had been in the Geneva documents for two and a half years: that if the Soviet Union put in place an acceptable timetable, the U.S. would guarantee non-interference.

Addressing the Secretary directly, Primakov said that was important to the Soviet side, given recent statements in the U.S. which suggested this was not the U.S. position. For the agreement provided that if there were an acceptable withdrawal timetable, this would then rule out arms deliveries to the insurgents, those whom the U.S. called *mujahadin*.

The two sides differed in their interpretation of the internal situation in Afghanistan, Primakov continued. The Soviet side believed that the national reconciliation process could lead to stabilization. It thought all forces should be included. It thought the proposal of the Afghan leadership created conditions for this. It thought the U.S. and the Soviet Union should facilitate contacts among the forces. The U.S. side, for its part, thought that the prospects for national reconciliation were insignificant, and appeared to ignore the current government as a political force.

The Iran-Iraq war had been discussed, Primakov continued. With regard to ending the war, the interests of the two sides were identical. Three specific questions had arisen.

First, Primakov went on, there was the second resolution. The Soviet side thought that perhaps the U.S. side exaggerated the benefits of a second resolution. It would not stop arms deliveries, which depended mainly on free markets.

Second, there was the political aspect of ensuring that the second resolution did not interfere with the first. It should not rule out agreement to consider all means to revitalize the first.

Third, there was the U.S. military presence, which added to the difficulties, in the Soviet view. If the U.S. were to decrease that presence, one could consider the UN mission again. The Soviet side knew there were difficulties, but thought a UN mission could help the U.S. reduce its military presence, of course with reliable guarantees for freedom of navigation.

Primakov continued that the two sides had also discussed the Middle East. The problem was now acquiring a nuclear dimension. It could come in the next ten years or so, and ten or twenty years was not long in history. Another problem was Islamic fundamentalism. This was developing, and could hurt the prospects for an Arab-Israeli settlement. The Soviet side had said that steps toward a separate peace had borne no adequate results. They clearly did not help. But one should distinguish between separate steps and interim steps toward a comprehensive settlement. The Soviet side had clarified its views on the conditions for a conference. If the U.S. were to support it and announce this support, this could have positive impact, especially in view of the Israeli elections, where there was a danger of further movement to the right. The process of preparing for the conference could thus improve the conditions for a settlement.

*The Secretary* said that had been very interesting.

*Solomon* said he and Primakov had spent almost six hours together. They had known each other in their academic capacities for almost a decade. The talks had been useful. The two sides had agreed there is a historic opportunity to resolve conflicts through negotiations, and that this could have a profound effect on bilateral relations, and develop confidence between the two countries. They should try to consider ways of disengaging East-West competition from regional conflicts as much as possible. The U.S. side had pointed to the risk or danger to the credibility of the negotiating approach to these issues, and to the national reconciliation processes. Both sides had agreed they should try to make progress. The U.S. side had pointed to the need, in the period ahead, to put regional issues on a level in tandem with START and other arms control issues.

Abstract principles would be of little help, *Solomon* went on. What was needed were concrete steps, and there were serious disagreements on the specifics.



On Afghanistan, Solomon continued, both sides had agreed that the issue of troop withdrawal had to be resolved independently of arrangements for an interim government. Both supported the Geneva proximity talks, where the one outstanding issue was that of troop withdrawals. Both reiterated that once this issue was resolved, they would fulfill their obligations under the Geneva instruments.

However, Solomon said, serious differences remained regarding the timetable for withdrawal. The Soviet side continued to withhold setting a date certain for the start and finish of withdrawal in 1988. That remained the key issue.

On the Iran-Iraq war, Solomon continued, both sides agreed on the need to begin immediately to draft a second, enforcement resolution.

*The Secretary* asked if it had been agreed that work on the resolution could begin. *Solomon* said it had. The Secretary asked if this could be said publicly.

*Primakov* said he would like to clarify. The Soviet side had thought and said for some time that it should be possible to start considering some additional measures, including a second resolution. But this should not interfere with the first resolution. It was aware that there were complexities involved for the Secretary General, implications that he had failed. So there could be a different form of signal that additional measures were needed; the signal did not have to be public. But the sides should stipulate that the second resolution was made necessary by the fact that the Secretary General needed additional guidance.

*The Secretary* said that, as had been said with the President, if the two sides could come out with agreement that work should start on a second resolution, this would help the Secretary General. The Foreign Minister of Iraq had told the Secretary General on Tuesday that Iraq accepted Resolution 598 in all its parts, without ambiguity or reservations. The Secretary General had told the U.S. side that he was totally frustrated with Iran, and did not know what to do.

Something to step up the pressure was needed, the Secretary went on. The passage of 598 had had an impact on Iran. The prospect of a follow-on resolution with unanimous Security Council support would also have an impact, if Iran saw that the Security Council members were out of patience, and a process had started.

He agreed with *Primakov* that the second resolution should support the first, the Secretary continued. It would give the Secretary General added leverage. He (the Secretary) was not sure that an unanimously passed embargo, which all followed, would be so inconsequential. Countries selling to Iran would be put on the spot. Shipments could be publicized.

The Secretary said he thought that if the two sides could let it be known publicly that they had discussed the topic and decided to start,

that would be useful. It would be good for the Security Council. He was worried that Iran was playing a game. The two sides should not permit that.

*Shevardnadze* asked if Solomon were finished.

*Solomon* said he was not, but would be brief. On the Middle East, there was agreement that the conflict was dangerous to both sides' interests, and that stability in the region was further threatened by long-range trends like the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and the increasing destructiveness of modern weaponry so readily available in the international arms market. But the sides disagreed, as before, on the procedures for promoting peace. The Soviet side continued to promote the idea of a plenipotentiary international conference. While not ruling out an international framework, the U.S. side urged that we concentrate on setting up direct negotiations—as the only formula likely to achieve durable results—and on creating the political conditions that would make such negotiations possible.

*Solomon* said the two sides had discussed three Far East topics.

On Cambodia, *Solomon* said, there was agreement on the need for a political settlement, national reconciliation and the withdrawal of all foreign forces. The U.S. side stressed that prompt withdrawal of Vietnamese troops remained the key to resolving the conflict, and that this should proceed without linkage to national reconciliation. The Soviet side indicated that it was using its influence in Hanoi to press for a negotiated political settlement. The American side indicated its continued commitment to a political settlement and its support for ASEAN's efforts.

*Solomon* noted that time had not permitted a discussion of southern Africa or Central America, although the working group had left open the possibility of returning to these issues.

*The Secretary* expressed the views that there seemed to be better prospects for movement on regional issues than ever before. The discussion on Cambodia, Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war seemed to bear this out.

*Shevardnadze* said he thought the exchange of views among experts had indeed been useful. Now it might be a good idea to discuss how the discussion should be reflected in a possible joint statement. *Shevardnadze* thought that conceptually the problem could be divided into two parts: on a general level, it would be well for the document to indicate that the two sides would be working to find solutions to regional problems; but it might be best not to get into too much detail about what, specifically might be done. Some of these issues, e.g., Afghanistan and Iran-Iraq, would require further discussion at the ministerial level or higher. Another point was that, if an attempt was

made to develop common language for every region, it would take too long. It would be well, on the other hand, to support positive trends which had been identified—such as the expansion of the phenomenon of national reconciliation.

*Bessmertnykh* observed that the two sides were at a “crossroads” in terms of working joint statement language. It would be too difficult to seek common language on every regional issue. Better to confine the effort to broad, fundamental problems.

*The Secretary* agreed that if an effort were made to cover every issue we would drive ourselves crazy. He felt we should nonetheless be able to find clear and mutually acceptable regional language for a joint statement. There were proposals from both sides. They contained differences, but the Secretary thought these could be worked out.

More important, however, was the point Shevardnadze had made that we should continue our efforts to deal with the problems themselves. The specifics need not be reflected in the joint statement, but we should see what could be done. It might be possible to express the view that things had become a bit more open, and that that was important. Ridgway and Bessmertnykh could find the necessary language.

*Armacost* noted that the only reason to have language on specific regions was to register areas of agreement. It made no sense to register disagreements. But if, for example, agreement could be reached to say something positive about the Persian Gulf, it would be constructive. *The Secretary* pointed out that the two sides could be more specific when they briefed. Putting specific language into a joint statement ran the risk of being misunderstood by the countries involved.

*Primakov* suggested that it would be useful to make a reference to UNSC 598 in the joint statement, given its significance. Perhaps there could be a general paragraph on regional issues, with a reference to UNSC 598 as illustrative of the progress which could be made through joint efforts.

*Shevardnadze* said the Soviet side could accept a call for full implementation of 598. Language on a follow-on resolution would be more difficult. He doubted agreement could be reached. It might be better not to address the issue in a joint statement.

*Primakov* said it might be possible to express support for the Secretary General, without being more specific. *Shevardnadze* pointed out that the General Secretary had outlined for the President the Soviet side’s views on practical actions to secure implementation of 598. There was no desire to avoid the issue. Were the joint statement to include a reference to the Resolution’s provision for involvement of an “impartial body,” that might be a good thing. But for the moment Shevardnadze was not comfortable going beyond that.

*The Secretary* suggested that Ridgway and Bessmertnkyh be instructed to work out a general statement on regional issues. Perhaps they could develop something constructive to say separately about 598. *Shevardnadze* endorsed this approach.

*The Secretary* reiterated his sense that the content and clarity of the two sides' regional discussion was gradually improving. The report the ministers had heard suggested that the sub-groups had had the best conversation ever, even though neither side had had anything dramatic to say.

*Shevardnadze* said it would be well to note in the joint statement the positive trends which the sub-group had identified, and which could be important factors in resolving regional disputes. He had in mind such phenomena as movement toward regional settlements and national reconciliation.

*The Secretary* noted Solomon's report that the Soviet sub-group had expressed "95%" certainty that the Soviet Union would attend the Seoul Olympics. *Primakov* said he had never said that. *Solomon* said Shishlin had been specific on this point. *Shevardnadze* recalled that Gorbachev had set forth the Soviet position to the President that morning.<sup>5</sup>

*The Secretary* noted that Gorbachev had indicated that the Games should go forward, but in the proper way. Was there any chance that the Soviet side could accept an endorsement of the Olympics in the joint statement? Many American athletes sincerely hoped that the Soviets would be there, even though it would probably mean we would win fewer gold medals. An endorsement could help lift the cloud now hanging over the Olympic movement; it need not indicate the Soviet Union would be in Seoul. The Secretary asked *Shevardnadze* to consider the idea.

*Shevardnadze* said he knew what Gorbachev had said. He had said it would be desirable to have the Games take place on a parallel basis in both the North and South. The split need not be 50–50, but holding five or ten events in the North would be a good idea.

*The Secretary* said he withdrew his suggestion. *Shevardnadze* asked if this meant that the U.S. ruled out holding any games in the North. *Armacost* noted that there was an IOC proposal to hold the final two events in Pyonyang. The North had not responded, and time was running out. *Shevardnadze* said that the lack of a North Korean response was another reason why he should not address the matter. He asked the date of the deadline. *Armacost* said it was January 17.

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 110.

*Shevardnadze* said that it would be better not to address the issue in a statement. Moscow supported the Olympic Games. It would be good to find a way to hold them which would make a contribution to the unification of Korea. "Unification?," *the Secretary* asked. *Shevardnadze* said yes.

*The Secretary*, noting that Ambassador Dubinin was unavailable, asked Ambassador Matlock to report on their discussion of issues affecting the functioning of Embassies.

*Matlock* said that it had not been possible to come to closure on the package under consideration. Dubinin had sought to add a number of new conditions which had not previously been discussed. The U.S. had taken the position that it would be unwise to take this approach. We had *desiderata* of our own. If both sides were to bring in new issues it would be impossible to reach agreement. Nonetheless, the U.S. had accepted the list Dubinin handed over, and would look into what might be done.

*The Secretary* noted that this seemed to mean the ministers would have to wait before making any decisions. *Shevardnadze* suggested that they discuss the question the next morning; perhaps they could reach agreement then. *The Secretary* pointed out that many issues had been under discussion for some time.

It made no sense to hold areas where agreement had been reached hostage to new questions. *Bessmertnykh* commented that the items Dubinin had raised were not covered by the package. *Matlock* said he thought some might be resolved, but complained that there would never be closure if new issues were constantly introduced. *The Secretary* said that it would be well to get the issue behind us. *Shevardnadze* repeated his offer to meet with the Secretary on the issue the next day. *The Secretary* agreed.

The meeting concluded after a brief discussion of specifics relating to the draft joint statement being prepared under the direction of Ridgway and Bessmertnykh.

**112. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 10, 1987, 8–9 a.m.

**PARTICIPANTS***U.S.*

Secretary of State Shultz  
Ambassador Nitze  
Dr. Hopkins (Interpreter)

*USSR*

Foreign Minister Eduard  
Shevardnadze  
Ambassador Dubinin  
Ambassador Karpov  
Mr. Igor Korchilov (Interpreter)

Shevardnadze asked Ambassador Dubinin to begin the discussion of questions concerning the respective embassies. Dubinin said that there were a significant number of questions for the Soviet side that had still not been solved. He observed that there were more problems for the Soviet side than for the U.S. side. The first concerned the possibility of hooking up the Soviet Embassy to U.S. TV cable facilities.

A second problem concerned permission for the Soviet Embassy to set up an antenna at the Embassy residence compound so as to receive direct TV broadcasts from the Soviet Union.

The third item he addressed concerned lifting a ban on having a TV antenna repaired at the Soviet Embassy so as to be able to get U.S. TV signals.

The fourth item concerned removal of restrictions on purchasing materials necessary for various jobs at the Embassy. The current purchase limit on materials is \$100.

Another problem that Dubinin addressed was a request to lift a U.S. ban on the purchase of building materials to be used for construction purposes at the Soviet Embassy. He suggested going back to some of the practical measures that had been used in this context at an earlier time.

Next Dubinin requested that the U.S. lift its ban on acquisition of air and rail tickets by Soviet Embassy personnel in the U.S.

He likewise requested that restrictions be lifted for Soviet Embassy staff and personnel who desire to rent apartments in Washington in places of their own choosing. He said the State Department would be informed about each apartment thus rented.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit, 12/87. Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy.

Shevardnadze noted that there were similar restrictions on U.S. diplomats in the Soviet Union through the UPDK.

Dubinina continued that furthermore the Soviet side was requesting that no traffic fines be given Soviet vehicles parked near buildings where Soviet offices are located as well as at sites and locations which would be agreed to by the State Department.

Dubinina reported that it had also been requested that police posts be set up by the Soviet military attaché and a permanent police post be set up with 24-hour police protection by the consulate in San Francisco.

He said that except for the question of obtaining building materials, all these questions had been on the agenda for discussion since the first day of the current negotiations.

Dubinina continued that the U.S. side had raised the following questions. It had expressed a desire to increase the number of workers allowed in the Soviet Union to help construct the U.S. Embassy. When Shevardnadze asked what numerical increase the U.S. side desired, Dubinina said that the latest U.S. position was 75 people. The Soviet side had officially been allowing 50. He said that although that had not been reported to Shevardnadze, the U.S. side said it would study whether that number would be sufficient.

Dubinina next addressed the U.S. concern about visits to the USSR by guests of diplomats. The USSR currently allows relatives of diplomats to visit; however, the U.S. side is requesting that visitation restrictions be eased for friends and acquaintances.

Dubinina said that at the conclusion of the meeting with Ambassador Matlock where these items had been discussed, the U.S. side had also put forth a series of desires which would improve living and working conditions for embassy personnel in the USSR. He said the Soviet side had received a list of additional U.S. desires and suggestions. He said that the Soviet side had stated that it would study the request, since it was impossible to respond to the given items immediately. He noted that there would be one more meeting of experts on these questions later in the day. He said it was still not clear at the given moment how things would be worked out in terms of the first group of questions of interest to the two sides.

Shevardnadze asked on what basis guests, relatives and friends of U.S. diplomats were allowed in. He wondered whether it was by quota or whether other kinds of limits were set. Dubinina replied that there were no limits for relatives. He said that the Soviet side had not given its agreement on the U.S. request for visits by friends and acquaintances, since that represented a new proposal.

Shultz asked about the so-called "package."

Dubinina replied that all of these things were part of the package. Shultz said that he thought that Matlock and Dubinina should be told



that if diplomats cannot solve these problems, then they will simply have to live with the existing situations. He expressed optimism that all these problems could be solved.

Shevardnadze said that above-mentioned problems would be studied. The Soviet side would be in touch in 8 to 15 days as to which problems could be resolved and which ones would need further discussion. He said that if there were reciprocity, it seemed to him that none of these problems were insoluble. In any case, he said, he would be back in touch and would try to get solutions in terms of the package. He noted that items of this nature were really secondary.

Shultz joked that the President and the General Secretary should be informed that the diplomatic establishment was unable to solve these problems, noting that such a report would probably lead to having him and Shevardnadze fired from their jobs.

The discussion next turned to NST. Shevardnadze said that he had gone over the statement except for the guidelines and the instructions to the negotiators. In terms of the basic text, he said that on the whole, it was good, and it reflected the mood of what had been accomplished since his meeting with Shultz in Geneva. It was noted that the evening before this meeting the NST discussions had reached an impasse at 12:30 a.m. Still it was observed that in terms of the basic text, there were still differences of opinion and agreement had still not been reached. It was also noted that there would not now be time to change the content of the statement, something which would affect progress.

Shultz said that as he understood it, things were not finished with the document; however, they were in pretty good shape.<sup>2</sup> He pointed out that in the portion of the document concerning strategic offensive arms, there was a problem and one important set of brackets relating to the language concerning SLCMs that General Akhromeyev had tabled at the meeting the night before. He said naturally it was not known what would emerge from the meeting that Admiral Crowe and Akhromeyev would hold later in the day. However, as a general proposition, he said the U.S. saw things in the following way. The unbracketed language says that the sides will be addressing the question of SLCMs. That question is outside of the 6000 boundary that has been set. Moreover, the U.S. has ideas on verification. The sides are committed to thinking about verification issues. In this connection the U.S. believes verification issues are more difficult than does the Soviet side; however, the U.S. is prepared to work on those issues. Neverthe-

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<sup>2</sup> A copy of the draft NST statement is attached but not printed. Documentation on the nuclear and space negotiations at the Washington Summit is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I.

less, it is difficult to move ahead, since there is no certainty about verification issues. Still, the current language does go further than before in this area, and thus it represents a certain advance. Shultz suggested waiting to hear what the military people would report after their meeting.

Shevardnadze concurred that it would be a good idea to wait.

Shultz continued that he thought it possible to find a mutually acceptable solution. Under the U.S. proposal it would be possible to find flexible language. It was noted that no attempt is being made to set top limits at present; however, it is being suggested that limits be set for missiles on submarines. He continued this is an important question that needs further discussion, adding that it is one that cannot be settled at present.

Shultz continued that the unbracketed language contained the word "limits." The word is very broad and covers such concepts as numbers and other aspects of missiles, e.g., where they would be deployed and their range. The U.S. side considers "limits" to be a useful word and finds the formulation adequate with the brackets out.

Shevardnadze interjected that the question of SLCMs is one of principle, and he noted that the General Secretary had emphasized this.

Shultz concurred as to the fundamental nature of the problem. He also pointed out another area of extreme importance, namely, the ABM Treaty. He said he had two suggestions on the paragraph in the document which concerned it. He said that accepting these suggestions would help remove most of the brackets, even if it would not remove all of them. Shultz said that he thought the sides agreed that it would be desirable to have discussions of strategic stability, especially as they got near the end of the specified period. He said that with this in mind, he had gone back and looked at the record of the General Secretary's conversation from the previous day. Shultz quoted the General Secretary's remarks to the effect that if the U.S. should ultimately decide to deploy, that was up to the U.S. after the end of the withdrawal period. Shultz further quoted him to the effect that at the end of the specific period, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the U.S. could decide what it wanted to do, and the Soviet side could accept that. Shultz said that given the joint desire to discuss strategic stability and taking into consideration the statements of the General Secretary, he had combined the two notions into one sentence. Shultz suggested that that one sentence be inserted into the text after the bracketed section at the end of the first long sentence. Shultz next read out the text and passed it over to Shevardnadze.

Shultz said that intensive discussion of strategic stability shall begin no later than three years before the end of the specified period, at

which time, in the event the two sides have not agreed otherwise, each side is free to decide its course of action.

Karpov asked about the bracketed section at the end of the first sentence. After Karpov read the document Shultz had passed over, Shultz said some, but not all, problems could be solved.

Shevardnadze seemed receptive to the suggestion, noting that it did not seem to create any problems; however, he said that the Soviet side would have to study the given suggestion.

Shultz said that there was still another issue for which text was being developed, and here it could be agreed and recognized that there were underlying differences of opinion between the sides, although attempts were being made to narrow them. In this context he said that his second suggestion was to insert in the first sentence after the word “testing” and before the comma the words “as required.” He noted that the bracketed phrase at the end of the given sentence would remain. He said in terms of that part, the U.S. side had no suggestion. He likewise noted that if these changes were to be incorporated, it would be possible to drop all the rest of the bracketed language.

Shevardnadze, who had been studying all of this and whispering with Karpov, was overheard to remark that the sense of the statement was not changed by the U.S. suggestion. Shevardnadze noted that if the changes were accepted, only one bracketed section would remain.

Shultz concurred, and he also expressed his personal opinion that he thought that the military representatives would agree with these suggestions.

Shevardnadze, though he seemed favorably disposed toward the suggestions, said that he would nevertheless have to talk with the General Secretary. Shultz noted that he would have to discuss the text with the President as well. Since a breakfast with Vice President<sup>3</sup> was about to begin, and it seemed that the Foreign Ministers would have little opportunity to discuss the document with their respective leaders before the scheduled 10:30 a.m. meeting, Shevardnadze suggested postponing Gorbachev’s meeting with the President until 10:45 a.m.

Having agreed to postpone the scheduled 10:30 a.m. Reagan-Gorbachev meeting until 10:45, the conversation ended around 9:00 a.m.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 113.

**113. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 10, 1987, 9:30–10:15 a.m.

Vice President's General Secretary Gorbachev Breakfast,  
Soviet Embassy

The breakfast discussion was preceded by 25 minutes of one-on-one discussion between the General Secretary and the Vice President.

Much of the discussion over the breakfast table was free-wheeling and somewhat difficult to follow as a result of the informal character of the exchanges.

The first topic that caught the General Secretary's interest was energy issues. The Vice President had begun by introducing Governor John Sununu of New Hampshire, Chairman of the National Governors Conference, who was seated on Gorbachev's left.

Gorbachev asked Sununu what he thought about the development of nuclear energy sources.

Sununu: I support nuclear energy, although this is a political problem for me. The Chernobyl accident reinforced the political problem.

Gorbachev: The percentage of nuclear energy produced in the United States and the USSR is about the same (he gave a figure for the percentage). This contrasts with France and Belgium, which produce approximately 80% of their energy from nuclear sources.

Sununu: Eventually both our countries will reach the levels of Belgium and France.

Gorbachev made some comments about US-Soviet cooperation in energy development, and asked Dr. Velikov to comment on the program.

Gorbachev: If nuclear power reactors were destroyed in France or some of these other countries, it would be a kind of nuclear war. The elimination of the effects of Chernobyl cost us 4 billion rubles. And this was not even the most difficult aspect of the Chernobyl situation. So the idea that one can do something when a nuclear war starts is a fantasy. Therefore if our foreign ministers cannot produce results in their arms control negotiations, they should be fired. (laughter)

Shultz: We worked on these issues this morning; now we need the military involvement.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Fritz Ermarth Files, U.S.-Soviet Summit November-December 1987 (13). No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. All blank underscores are in the original. The breakfast conversation took place at the Soviet Embassy.

Gorbachev: So I see you hold your own negotiating results in high regard. But we don't necessarily have the same opinion. (laughter)

Sununu: There are different attitudes in different states about nuclear energy. Some of our states are rich in oil or gas. Others have less and are dependent on energy imports from other states or from abroad—particularly Canada.

Gorbachev: Canada relies on you. I traveled there. They said that this or that firm is a US subsidiary. I asked, "Is Canada a US subsidiary as a country?" No, no, they would say!

Shultz: Mr. General Secretary, you should know that the United States and Canada have a bilateral trade of about \$120 billion. Canada exports more to us than we get from them.

Vice President: Some bad trade figures are coming out today<sup>2</sup>—they will have a bad effect for a few days. So you should sell your IBM stock. (laughter)

Gorbachev: We will discuss problems with your businessmen today. We will push them hard on trade. We are your biggest promoters of trade.

Vice President: Let's hear from Cooper Evans<sup>3</sup> who is a specialist on clean grain.

Evans: We are aware of the General Secretary's background in agriculture, his efforts to improve the diet of the Soviet people. I note that you have purchased a million and a half tons of soybeans from the US. I also note your interest in poultry production. Our soybean surplus is now expended. Is the USSR interested in more soybean production in the US? Are you interested in earning more foreign exchange?

Some minor points of interest: We are increasingly aware of differences in the protein and oil content of soybeans—5% protein, 3% in oil. We have never made an effort to segregate these qualities to meet the needs of our consumers.

Gorbachev: The problem of grain production is of acute concern to us. When I was in England in 1984 I asked their agricultural minister, "Who produces more grain, England or the USSR?" He said, "We do, as we sell grain to you." I said, "no, we produce 700 kilograms per capital you produce only 450." He asked me where we put the grain.

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<sup>2</sup> See Robert D. Hershey, Jr., "Trade Gap Sets Monthly Record at \$17.6 Billion." *New York Times*, December 11, 1987, p. A1.

<sup>3</sup> T. Cooper Evans, a former Republican Congressman from Iowa (1981–1987).

I noted that we waste ours on cattle fodder. We should cooperate on the production of grain and soybeans. One problem that we have had since 1979 is that our growth has slowed and this is a syndrome, a problem. Another problem is that many in the Soviet Union are afraid to rely on the US as a source of food products.

Vice President: We have learned from the past, agricultural production should not be a political weapon. I know of no one in the present Administration or in any future Democratic or Republican administration who would use a grain embargo against the Soviet Union as a political weapon.

Vice President: Speaking of Democrats, Mayor Cisneros<sup>4</sup> made the mistake of becoming a Democrat early in life. But he is an outstanding Mayor.

Gorbachev: Although he is a Democrat, he is a good man!

Vice President: Yes, and he is upwardly mobile. He perhaps can say a word or two about the state of US cities.

Cisneros: 80% of the American people live in cities. They are the focal point of our. . .

Gorbachev: With us it is 66%.

Cisneros: Most developments in education, medicare and so on occur in our cities. Also, our most serious problems are in the cities. The genius of our political system is its decentralized structures. The Federal government and the cities work effectively together.

I would like to focus on the issue of decentralization. Our country is approaching a major transition. Since the New Deal, we were centralized. But new technologies—telecommunications, television, small and medium businesses. . . . the character of the American people is to be independent. All these factors lead to the decentralization of our system. This is a major story.

Gorbachev: How about General Motors and other big firms. How will they deal with decentralization?

Cisneros: GM and other big firms are now part of an international economy. But job growth in the US is generated by the small firms.

Gorbachev: It seems that US business finds it more profitable to use cheap labor abroad.

Cisneros: In some sectors this is the case, but the US economy is now bursting with the entrepreneurial spirit. Since 1985 we have created more than 700,000 new businesses. In 1981, there were no new

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<sup>4</sup> Henry Cisneros, Democratic Mayor of San Antonio, Texas (1981–1988).

jobs because of the phenomenon you described. But small businesses created 6 million new jobs in the last decade. There is now a strong convergence of interest between the state governors and small businesses, which are creating many new jobs.

Gorbachev: What do you think about the trend to the computerization of the labor force? Is this producing growing unemployment?

Cisneros: Actually, new jobs are being created. The computer creates new jobs. But there are problems . . . . We need to improve public education and integrate ethnic groups—Latins—I'm from the Latino community—and Asians.

Gorbachev: How many Hispanics are the US?

Cisneros: 16 million . . . . A model in our country tends to stress entrepreneurial initiative. Modern technology makes it possible. Government from the top down is not necessary; telecommunications makes decentralization possible.

Gorbachev: This is very interesting. We have learned a good lesson from this. More positive than negative elements. Our machine-building is weak, our R&D has been reduced and we have had to substitute through imports. We are now eradicating this disease. We have invested two and a half more times in this five-year plan to the machine building sector. Our computer technology is advancing. Our scientists are now producing super computers, personal and mini computers, and giant computers for industry.

Velikov: We have five interesting super computer projects. Of course, we have to expand our base in micro-electronics. Our goal is to have 1.1 million personal computers and mass use computers.

Gorbachev: We never produced these in the past.

Velikov: Half of these will go to the schools, as this is the leading edge of change. We will have models for electronic mail. One of our most interesting advances in microelectronics is chips with the capacity to make computations at a rate of X billionths of a second.

Gorbachev: When will we have that computer?

Velikov: By the end of the five-year plan we should have \_\_\_\_\_, and \_\_\_\_\_ by the middle of the next five-year plan. (The figures he used were not heard by any of the notetakers.)

Gorbachev: I should add that when we started this program there were many competing firms. The young men were pushing our academics. There is never a lack of brains in Russia. Our sore point is administration, not brains. We should look at how the US is calling on us for cooperation—how you are trying to pick our brains. Is this a one-way street? If there is no coincidence of interests, there will be



no cooperation. I am saying this for a future presidential candidate (laughter).

Vice President: Dr. Mary Good of the American Chemical Society is looking at the future in her area. Dr. Brooks has been involved in exchanges of letters between school kids. Let's hear from Dr. Good, and then Dr. Brooks.

Mary Good: I am glad to talk about our exchange program. I hope that it is possible to have better cooperation in the future in the exchange of basic scientific information. You know that the American Chemical Society publishes "Chemical Abstracts." This is a fundamental data base for all chemical activity. There are major computer banks in the US and in West Germany. We are very interested in working to gain coverage of Russian research.

Gorbachev: In 1979 all our contacts with you in the scientific area were disrupted. Now we welcome . . .

Mary Good: I'd have some argument with that interpretation. You don't buy an adequate number of our chemical abstracts for your own staff—yet they all seem to have copies of them. (Laughter)

Gorbachev: That's good! (Laughter)

Mary Good: Everyone must pay their own way.

Gorbachev: I have got your idea. All our sciences are self-financed, as of next year.

Vice President: Lastly, let's turn to Dr. Brooks. He is a high school principal in Des Moines, Iowa.

Brooks: I bring you regards from our students. They are very pleased with the Summit. Your educational challenge is like ours. We have to meet the needs of our students for dealing with the real world, a technical world, a computer age. There are many kinds of computers, so they need to learn this new age. Our students are interested in an exchange program with the Soviet Union. It is a great way to break down myths between countries. Our exchanges are not just a matter of letters—although I would like to present a few of our letters to the General Secretary.

Vice President: Dr. Brooks, tell the General Secretary the level at which you teach.

Brooks: My school has 2,000 students; they're in the 15 to 18 year age range. You should read a few of these letters. They come right from the heart.

Gorbachev: I support both your ideas wholeheartedly.

Brooks: Iowa has a sister relationship with one of the Soviet states—we might expand our exchanges through this relationship—I guess it is with Stavropol.

Raisa Gorbachev: May I ask. You mentioned that to dispel myths it is necessary to have more contact. My question is what is the origin of these myths? Who is interested in creating, sustaining these myths?

Brooks: Adults are at fault. The media, and teachers.

Raisa Gorbachev: Teachers?

Gorbachev: Dr. Velikov organized a summer meeting with some American children. Their letters were published. It surprised me that 15 and 16 year old children had such a high sense of responsibility about friendship and cooperation. They have grown up thinking that our country is poor and backward, but they found out that we are an interesting country. This is the fault of advertising.

Raisa Gorbachev: I recently met some American teachers. They said this was the second discovery since Columbus. I was surprised at their sincerity—they were not myth makers.

Gorbachev: They were hard working American intellectuals—another source of future presidential candidates. (Laughter)

Vice President: One way to dispel these myths is to solve the problems that Secretary Shultz and Minister Shevardnadze are working on.

Gorbachev: They have very unpleasant work to do.

At this point the Vice President noted that time was running out. He thanked the General Secretary for his hospitality in hosting the breakfast. Informal discussion continued as the guests departed from the table.

114. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 10, 1987, noon–12:15 p.m.

## SUBJECT

The President's Meeting with Gorbachev, December 10 Noon

## PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*

Ronald W. Reagan, President of  
the United States  
George Bush, Vice President  
Howard H. Baker, Chief of Staff  
George P. Shultz, Secretary of  
State  
Frank Carlucci, Secretary of  
Defense  
Fritz Ermarth, Special Assistant to  
the President, NSC Staff  
(notetaker)  
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy  
Assistant Secretary of State  
(EUR) (notetaker)  
Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)  
Others

*USSR*

Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General  
Secretary, CPSU CC  
Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister  
for Foreign Affairs  
Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, CPSU CC  
Secretary  
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, CPSU CC  
Secretary  
Sergei Tarasenko, Special  
Assistant to Shevardnadze  
(notetaker)  
P. Palazhchenko (interpreter)  
Others

After initial pleasantries, the *President* opened by saying that he'd had a chance to review the joint statement. He understood that working delegations were now focused on the START and Defense and Space portions of the statement, and suggested that we get a report.

*Gorbachev* said that meetings were now in progress between Marshal Akhromeyev and Mr. Nitze. While they were working, he proposed that he and the President could have some further discussions of regional issues, and the President agreed.

*Gorbachev* asked to say a few words because he had the impression that the U.S. side had not appreciated fully what he had said on regional conflicts the day before. He had sought to emphasize two or three important concepts. First, that regional conflicts are very worrisome in that they inject tension into U.S.-Soviet relations. It was necessary to find some method or arrangement, some means of acting to permit an interaction between the two countries in the interest of themselves

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit, 12/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons. The meeting took place in the White House Oval Office.

and the parties to conflict. The two sides had to discuss an approach to cooperation.

Gorbachev continued that this caused tension in our relations. We had to find a method of action that would make it possible to take into account the interests of the parties to regional conflicts, as well, of course, as our own interests.

Second, Gorbachev went on, we needed to take account of the trends that have emerged, toward reconciliation among conflicting sides, toward a political settlement of problems. Regional organizations were involved too. A situation had emerged that presents a chance, if we move in a businesslike spirit, for us to play a constructive role.

Take Central America, for instance, Gorbachev said. The Guatemala agreement had been adopted. We could express a positive response to it. For example we could say both sides would not supply arms there except for small arms. This was just an idea. What was important was a positive statement.

On Cambodia, Gorbachev went on, contacts had begun between Sihanouk and the people in power. They had talked. Other forces should of course be brought in. Vietnam had given the Soviets assurances that they will withdraw. The principle of U.S. and Soviet support for a political settlement there was important. In Angola too there were good opportunities to move forward to resolve the conflict politically.

The Middle East was of course a grave conflict, Gorbachev said. It had deep roots. But the whole world believed that an international conference to solve it was necessary. He understood there were doubts about this in the U.S. But what the Soviet Union supported was not inconsistent with what the U.S. supported. There could be bilateral contacts in that framework. Israel could meet with the Arabs, with whomever it wanted. But mention of a positive response would be good for the world. The world was looking for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to cooperate in a businesslike way.

The day before, Gorbachev went on, they had concentrated on Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war,<sup>2</sup> because these were particularly acute conflicts. But with regard to Afghanistan he had felt there was no interest on the President's part. But if, without any publicity, there was an interest in resolving the problem, the Soviets could withdraw their troops and the U.S. side could stop its assistance to certain forces. If there were agreement to that, the two sides could say that as of a certain date the U.S. would stop its assistance, and the Soviet side could say that its troops would not participate in any military operations. They should let Afghanistan be neutral.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 110.

There was a basis for cooperation on Afghanistan, Gorbachev went on. But the U.S. side's attitude seemed to be: you're there, you should extricate yourselves, it's your problem. Naturally, if that were the American attitude, it would be harder for the Soviet Union to extricate itself. The two sides should do better than that.

Gorbachev noted that he accepted the language on regional issues in the joint statement. But what he wanted was practical solutions to the issues.

On the Iran-Iraq war, Gorbachev went on, he could say honestly, with no hidden intent at all, looking the President in the eyes, that the Soviet Union did not want to create problems for America. It wanted neither economic problems nor solutions which created (tragic) drama for the Administration. American forces were involved. He felt, Gorbachev said, that there was a basis for regional cooperation between the two sides in this area.

He had had a short one-on-one discussion with the Vice President on this, Gorbachev continued. The Vice President had expressed doubt that Gorbachev or the President could entrust their security interests to UN forces. He could say, Gorbachev went on, that the two sides should make those forces deserve trust. This was inherent in the first resolution. Movement could be made. But if the question arose as to a real need to cease the supply of arms, the Soviet Union would support this.

Gorbachev urged the U.S. side to think about these things. It had experienced what kind of people the Iranians were. A precise calculus of what would happen was needed. If they were pushed too hard, there would be an explosion, and then the only thing left to do would be for the U.S. to use the forces it had there. This would push the Iranians further, and doing it could be dangerous not only in the region itself. The Soviet side knew these people. It was not saying it did not want to cooperate with the U.S., with other forces involved. Iran was close to the Soviet Union; it was important to them.

The President said he thought his reply should come when they resumed (for lunch) at the White House. He just wanted to say one thing. It concerned Nicaragua; it also concerned Afghanistan. The Afghanistan government had its own military forces. If the Soviet Union departed that would be fine. But there were the mujahadin, who wanted a voice in their own government. If it were denied them, if they were disarmed, they would be at the mercy of the Afghan government. That would not permit equal participation in forming a new government. If both sides were to come together to form one, both would have to be armed. Or one would have to disband the Afghan military for them to be equal.

Similarly in Nicaragua, the President went on, the U.S. side was for a peaceful settlement. We simply wanted the Nicaraguan govern-

ment to recognize other citizens who did not agree with it. But it was never willing to do that, even though the Contras were prepared to lay down their arms. The Sandinista government just wanted to take over. Soviet supplies made it the most powerful military force in the area, not only against the freedom fighters, but more powerful than Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala put together.

Gorbachev suggested they continue at the White House.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 115.

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## **115. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, December 10, 1987, 12:40–2:10 p.m.

### **SUBJECT**

Working Luncheon with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev (U)

### **PARTICIPANTS**

The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary of State Shultz  
Secretary of Defense Carlucci  
Chief of Staff Baker  
Director Wick, United States Information Agency  
Colin L. Powell, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Ridgway  
U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack F. Matlock  
Mark Parris, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State  
(Notetaker)  
John Herbst, Director, Office for Policy Development, NSC (Notetaker)  
General Secretary Gorbachev  
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
Aleksandr Yakovlev, Politburo Member and Central Committee Secretary for  
Ideology, Propaganda, and Culture  
Anatoly Dobrynin, Central Committee Secretary and Chief, International  
Department

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Washington Summit, 12/87. Secret. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in the Family Dining Room at the White House.

Chairman Kamentsev, Foreign Economic Commission  
Central Committee General Department Chief Boldin  
Chief Administrator of the Central Committee Kruchina  
Ambassador Dubinin (U)

While walking from the Oval Office meeting, which ended at 12:15 p.m.,<sup>2</sup> to the Family Dining Room, the *President* emphasized to Gorbachev the necessity of Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. The President noted that the occupation was possible due to the Soviets' extensive support and urged them to use their influence with Hanoi. Lunch began at 12:40. (S)

*Gorbachev* began by continuing the discussion of Afghanistan from the recently concluded Oval Office meeting. He suggested that the Joint Statement<sup>3</sup> adopt the language on Afghanistan prepared by the working-group. That was enough. He suggested that the Soviets and Americans work together on Afghanistan. He said that he had decided to address this particular issue because he felt the President had responded coolly to yesterday's discussion. Now he felt the President was receptive, and business-like; and this opened up possibilities of a more useful discussion. (S)

*Gorbachev* said that maybe the Joint Statement should mention that there had been a discussion of very acute regional problems, an in-depth discussion, regarding Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Asia. The first thing many people worldwide would want to know was whether the President and the General Secretary had paid attention to regional issues. Gorbachev stated that he would really like to work together with the President to resolve regional conflicts. (S)

*The President* said that perhaps for the Joint Statement we could note agreement that the Soviet Union would stop supplying arms to Nicaragua. (S)

*Gorbachev* responded that the Joint Statement could say that the two sides accepted and supported the Contadora process and the Guatemala accords; that they agreed to look at practical measures which would contribute to the Guatemala accord process. Gorbachev added that in the process of working together, the Soviet Union was ready to stop the supply of arms to Nicaragua. This applied to all except "light arms," or "small police arms." Gorbachev said, however, that this should not be included in the Joint Statement. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* noted that the President was anxious to get regional issues on the table. So the President had cut in toward the end of their

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 114.

<sup>3</sup> For the Joint Summit Statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 1988, pp. 12–16.



conversation earlier in the day to make sure that they were mentioned. Secretary Shultz said that on the basis of general observations by the President and the General Secretary, the working groups had the opportunity to exchange ideas. Shultz said that these groups had reported to the Foreign Minister and himself yesterday; and, after that, he and Shevardnadze had agreed on the regional issues language for the Joint Statement. (S)

Shultz remarked that he and Shevardnadze thought it not wise to go into detail on each regional issue. Were we to do this, we would argue over the language and people in the areas affected would not take it well. Shultz added that we should build on the rising quality of our regional issues discussions to work together in practical ways. (S)

*Gorbachev* noted his agreement and said that there was not much in the Joint Statement concerning regional issues. He expressed the wish to share his impressions regarding the American response to his proposals yesterday. (S)

Shultz then said he felt the working group had made progress in clarifying the Soviet view that withdrawal from Afghanistan and national reconciliation need not be linked. This was necessary because national reconciliation would take a great deal of time. Also, in the end, this was something the Afghan people must do among themselves. Understanding this delinkage would help pave the way for the next Geneva round, which should concentrate on the unresolved issue of Soviet withdrawal. (S)

*Gorbachev* responded that Soviet withdrawal was definitely linked to an American obligation to cut off support for opposition forces on the date Soviet troop withdrawal started. As of that date, Soviet troops would no longer engage in military operations and the ceasefire would go into effect. *Gorbachev* emphasized the importance of the American and Soviet sides' using their influence with the parties to the Afghan conflict to promote national reconciliation. He said that the Soviet side would tell Najib—and the American side should do the same with the opposition forces—that the creation of a coalition government was their affair. They should find a balance of concessions. (S)

At the same time, *Gorbachev* continued, both the Americans and Soviets should say that they did not want the new Afghanistan to be led by either a pro-American or a pro-Soviet government. Afghanistan should be neutral and nonaligned. Of course, *Gorbachev* added, this was just his projection of how things would develop. *Gorbachev* noted that the situation could develop differently. The Soviets would withdraw and the United States could continue financial and military support for the opposition forces. This would lead to increased tension. *Gorbachev* said that he did not see how the Soviets could withdraw forces in such circumstances. There must be linkage of withdrawal and non-interference. (S)

*Gorbachev* suggested that after the meeting the two sides move the questions to a practical footing. He said that this would be well-received by public opinion. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* said that as he and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze discussed following the meeting of the working group yesterday,<sup>4</sup> the Soviet side welcomed American readiness to reaffirm support for the Geneva agreements. This resolved the non-interference issue. The missing piece in Geneva remained the timetable for a troop withdrawal. (S)

*Gorbachev* interjected "that there must be an end to American support for the opposition forces at the same time." If there was agreement on this, *Gorbachev* said, let us declare it. If the American side needed more time to think this over, it should take it. But the Soviet side wanted to engage in specific action. *Gorbachev* added that action here would demonstrate American sincerity in addressing the Afghan problem. It would also help the Soviets judge American intentions regarding other regional conflict situations. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* responded that both the United States and the Soviet Union accepted the Geneva agreements. These agreements covered the issue of outside support. According to the agreements, after the signing of the accords, a troop withdrawal would begin; and 60 days after this, American support would cease. (S)

*Gorbachev* rejoined that he understood three points in the Geneva agreements were settled. The fourth point remained to be settled. (S)

*Shultz* noted that the linkage of national reconciliation and troop withdrawal had been a problem; but now Soviet statements indicated that there was no such linkage, and the American reaffirmation of support for the Geneva accords meant that we could devote our attention to the fourth point, a timetable for troop withdrawal. This could get the process moving. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* remarked that there was no linkage "in effect" between troop withdrawal and national reconciliation. He added that national reconciliation would be a long process. (S)

*Gorbachev* said that the Soviet side had already confirmed this. He then asked if we could state that after the Summit we would begin work to consider practical, concrete measures with the parties concerned. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* agreed. (S)

*Gorbachev* then proposed that the Joint Statement on regional issues mention that Afghanistan was discussed. (S)

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 111.

When *Secretary Shultz* noted that Afghanistan was already in the statement, *Gorbachev* suggested that it mention other regions discussed, such as Cambodia, South Africa, and the Middle East. (C)

*Shultz* noted that most of these were included. (C)

*Shevardnadze* remarked that Central America had been discussed and was not in the Joint Statement. So it should be added, as should southern Africa. (C)

*Gorbachev* said that this would show the responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union—the degree of responsibility incumbent on us in handling regional conflicts. (C)

*Secretary Shultz* said that the Joint Statement noted the dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States should have as its goal “to help the parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions that advance their independence, freedom, and security.” *Shultz* added that our discussion on regional issues had been getting better and better. (S)

*Central Committee International Department Chief Dobrynin* suggested that the President and the General Secretary give instructions to improve this language even more, perhaps by adding regular consultations. (C)

Noting the hectic pace of the past three days, *Gorbachev* asked the President if he had been able to look at the proposal *Gorbachev* had passed along from North Korea.<sup>5</sup> (S)

*National Security Advisor Powell* answered that the proposal was currently being staffed; so there was no response yet. (S)

*Gorbachev* said that he could tell the North Koreans that he had fulfilled their request by giving the President their proposal, and that it was now being reviewed at the staff level. (S)

*Powell* noted that we would handle the proposal in a private manner as *Gorbachev* had suggested. *Gorbachev* remarked that the North Koreans wanted it that way. And the President, by immediately placing it in his coat pocket, showed that he too wanted to play it close to the vest. (S)

*Shultz* then said that the United States might propose to respond to the North Koreans through Moscow—perhaps through Foreign Minister *Shevardnadze*. (S)

*Gorbachev* agreed. He then asked for the Administration’s evaluation of the Gulf situation following yesterday’s discussion. *Gorbachev* said that he was asking this in a straight-forward way, since it seemed that someone was pushing the Administration to rash steps without

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 5, Document 110.

considering what might happen. This could lead to a situation that would not be satisfactory either for the Americans or the Soviets. Gorbachev thought that the UN had not used all of the potential of Security Council Resolution 598.<sup>6</sup> Gorbachev said that he was not trying to procrastinate. He knew that decisive action was needed. In an aside Gorbachev then noted it had been decided yesterday that some aspects of the conversation should be handled in a confidential manner. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* said that he saw the situation as follows: the Iraqi side had unambiguously said it would accept 598. Iran was almost impossible for UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar to talk to, never mind to get something out of. According to our intelligence, Iran had adopted a strategy of putting off the Security Council. (S)

*Gorbachev* agreed that Iran probably had such strategy; it would be hard to say anything else. (S)

*Shultz* then said that UN Secretary General de Cuellar was totally frustrated. De Cuellar felt it was now up to the Security Council to act. Shultz said that this led us to conclude that the Soviet term as Chairman of the Security Council should be a decisive one. Shultz suggested that the Soviets and the Americans work to energize the Secretary General in his mediation role pursuant to resolution 598. Shultz noted that we could aid the UN Secretary General's effort if we seriously started work on a second resolution. Shultz said that it would be useful to announce work now. This could be done by our Ambassadors at the UN. We could agree to instruct them to start. Shultz gave two reasons for this. The first was that this represented our best chance to have the UN Secretary General achieve progress on the Iran-Iraq War. Secondly, we must worry about the dignity and credibility of the Security Council, and not allow Iran to make it look foolish. (S)

In *Gorbachev's* view the American and Soviet sides thought basically the same about this. Gorbachev requested that the two sides make precise calculations regarding prospects in the Gulf. He said that he would very much like cooperation in the Security Council. He added that this could create a precedent for cooperation elsewhere—Afghanistan, the Middle East. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* agreed regarding the importance of cooperation. He remarked on his presence in the Security Council chamber when Resolution 598 was passed last July. He said that each government went around the table and spoke, and then voted. All hands were raised. All had the sense that it was a very special moment. (S)

*Gorbachev* said that he saw new elements on the Gulf war. These had to be sorted out. Gorbachev noted in this connection the new

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<sup>6</sup> Reference is to UNSC Resolution 598 calling for an end to the Iran-Iraq War.

statement by the Iraqi Foreign Minister—that Iraq was no longer against parallel implementation of all paragraphs of Resolution 598 (including that of an investigative body into the origins of the war). In Gorbachev's view, this represented fundamental movement. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* noted that Iraq accepted 598 in all its parts; (S)

*Shevardnadze* remarked that Iran said the same. (S)

*Secretary of Defense Carlucci* discussed the American military presence in the Gulf, noting that Gorbachev had raised it several times. Carlucci said that it was important to say here that the U.S. had no plans to change its current posture in the Gulf. We were currently escorting our 20th convoy, and most of these convoys had proceeded without incident. (S)

*Gorbachev* then asked if it was necessary to have that many ships in a convoy operation. (S)

*Carlucci* answered that we had now reached a steady state; so we were looking at ways to change the mix and the number of ships which would still enable us to deal with the risks. He said he was sure Gorbachev would agree that so long as American forces were in the Gulf, they must be able to defend themselves if attacked. Carlucci then noted that American forces were in a fully defensive posture; they represented no threat to Iran at all. If, however, our forces were attacked, or if it appeared that they would be attacked, they would take the appropriate defensive measures. But there would be no offensive operations, except in retaliation. (S)

*Gorbachev* said that he wanted to be clear on this. As he understood it, Secretary Carlucci had said that, since the situation was now "steady," the Americans were looking at ways to reduce their presence in the Gulf. (S)

*Carlucci* responded that he did not want to predict that there would be reductions. But we were looking at ways to meet the threat in the Gulf. If it seemed possible to reduce, we would do so because we did not wish to deploy more ships than the situation warranted; everything depended on the level of threat. (S)

*Gorbachev* then noted, with pleasure, that dessert was served, and dessert was the favorite course of the meal for Americans. Gorbachev joked that last night<sup>7</sup> the President and he had no choice but to eat all of their dessert. They decided to do so and then engage in self-criticism. (U)

*The President* agreed. (U)

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<sup>7</sup> For the text of the toast Gorbachev delivered during dinner at the Soviet Embassy the previous evening, see *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1987, Book II, pp. 1490–1491.

*Gorbachev* then remarked that he feared contacts between the Soviet and the American military had become more vigorous than his own with the Administration. According to *Gorbachev*, Marshal Akhromeyev had said that in his conversations at the Pentagon, it had been agreed to expand military contacts to keep pace with political ones. *Gorbachev* affirmed the importance of this suggestion. He said that this was consistent with the statement of the President that the Soviets and the Americans had no intention to fight—or be at war with—each other. So the military should try to establish an atmosphere of trust. (C)

*Secretary of Defense Carlucci* noted that the Soviets and the Americans should talk with each other regarding defense doctrines such as military sufficiency. (C)

*The President* then said that this discussion of military cooperation came at a perfect time. Chief of Staff Baker had just brought him a poster of a meeting on the Elbe between a Soviet and an American soldier at the end of World War II. The President said that the American soldier was now retired from the military and the Soviet soldier was part of the Summit delegation. The President said it would be wonderful if the two could meet. (U)

*Soviet Ambassador Dubinin* interjected that the Soviet and American soldiers had met three days ago at the Soviet Embassy and now there was a second picture of them together. (U)

*The President* said that we would have to get that picture to go along with this poster. (U)

When *Chief of Staff Baker* said it would be wonderful if the President and the General Secretary would sign the poster, both the President and the General Secretary agreed. (U)

*USIA Director Wick* said that he had met at USIA with Politburo member Yakovlev and the heads of TASS, Novosti, and Gostelradio. All had agreed and affirmed that there would be not only arms reduction, but also an end to disinformation. There was agreement to have joint meetings to determine where instances of such disinformation appeared. (C)

*Gorbachev* said that, in other words, both sides spoke against psychological warfare. (C)

Only with verification, *Wick answered*. (C)

*Shevardnadze* joked that disarmament would come faster than agreement on this. (C)

*The President* then remarked that Director Wick should have said “doveryai and proveryai.” (U)

*Gorbachev* then referred to his meeting with Congressional leaders. He noted that in the United States, there were many complaints and suggestions regarding Soviet human rights practices. *Gorbachev* said

that this was “very unnecessary.” He then mentioned a proposal he had made to the Congressional group: that the Supreme Soviet and the Congress organize seminars or colloquia on human rights. These should be conducted in a constructive fashion. The American side would present its analysis and the Soviet side would reciprocate concerning the human rights situation both in the Soviet Union and the United States. Then all of these questions would be discussed. However, human rights questions must be placed on a responsible footing. It would be unacceptable for one side to assume the role of a prosecutor and the other side that of the accused; or one side the role of the teacher and the other that of the student. Gorbachev emphasized Soviet readiness to discuss human rights constructively. (C)

*Gorbachev* said that soon he would be saying goodbye to the President and the President’s colleagues. Gorbachev said he had arrived at the conclusion that the third summit had been a landmark. It had witnessed important agreements and other questions had been discussed intensively. Most importantly the atmosphere had been good. There had been more elements of mutual understanding. Gorbachev said that he would like to pay tribute to the contribution of the President toward making this a successful summit, as well as to the contributions of other American participants. Gorbachev added that he would like the momentum achieved at the summit to continue. He then said that on his way to the White House lunch he had ridden with Vice President Bush. He had looked out the car window and seen Americans responding warmly to what had happened in the negotiations. When the car had stopped at a red light, he jumped out of the car and had had a spontaneous conversation with some passersby. When it was time to go, he did not want to leave the conversation. (C)

*Chief of Staff Senator Baker* interjected that this was known by American politicians as “working the crowd.” (U)

*Gorbachev* remarked that he had always had this style—throughout his entire career. He said that he had become well known around the world over the past two years because of his position. Before that, however, he had spent his entire career in the provinces. He had developed this style then and there was nothing to change. He then commented that there was more common sense in the provinces than in a nation’s capital. He quipped that if our ambassadors reported information based only on sources in the capital, he would have to seriously question their reporting. (C)

*The President* responded that he agreed more completely with this than with anything else the General Secretary had said over the past three days. The President said that he often wondered what would happen if he and other leaders closed the doors of their offices and quietly slipped away. How long would it be before people missed them? (U)



*Gorbachev* responded that in his case, within 56 days of his “disappearance” earlier this year, people had begun to say that he was dead or had been dismissed; in fact, he had done good work during this period on many things, including the visit to the United States. (C)

*Chief of Staff Baker* said that the conversations between the President and Gorbachev had given him the impression that, as politicians, they were alike in many ways:

- They were strong personalities;
- They knew what they believed;
- They knew where they wanted to go.

Baker added that this augured well for our two countries. (C)

*Gorbachev* agreed. He said that he did not often hear such complimentary assessments. Most people tried to see the problems, but that was Yakovlev’s and Wick’s department. (C)

*The President* agreed with Gorbachev, joking that he could never understand why Gorbachev opposed him on so many things. (C)

*Gorbachev* rejoined that the areas of agreement would increase and disagreements decrease, provided both sides moved. (C)

*The President* said he would like to return to the subject of Iran. He commented that some of his harsh feelings toward Iran had come from the fact that in 1978 he and the First Lady had visited there for several days. They had shopped for rugs in the bazaar. The President said that he was still trying to get even. (S)

Noting that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had left the lunch to compare the final draft of the Joint Statement, *Chief of Staff Baker* said he would go and see if it was ready. (U)

*The President* remarked that he and the General Secretary had the right to feel good about the summit. When they had first met in Geneva, the President had told Gorbachev that theirs was a unique situation. They represented two countries that could initiate another world war. Or, they could make sure that there would not be another world war. (C)

*Gorbachev* remembered this and agreed with the President. (C)

*The President* noted too that both he and Gorbachev had problems with bureaucracy. (C)

*Gorbachev* also agreed. (C)

*The President* then remembered a World War II incident when he was in the military. There was a warehouse full of filing cabinets full of obsolete records. He had asked, going up the chain of command, for permission to destroy these documents in order to make space for current records. The answer came down through the chain of command that the request was approved—so long as copies were made of the records to be destroyed. (U)

*Gorbachev* said that the President's anecdote reminded him of a joke about Russian business. Someone bought a case of Russian vodka; that person emptied the bottles by pouring out the vodka. He then returned the bottles for money which he used to purchase more bottles of vodka. This was Russian business. He then noted that this was an old joke, 30 maybe 40 years old. (C)

*The President* recalled the joke of a man who was driving down the road and spotted a chicken running alongside his car. The man sped up, yet the chicken ran right alongside of him. Then the chicken went into high gear, passed the car, and turned off on a side road. The driver of the car followed down that side road, saw a farmer and stopped to ask him if he had seen a chicken pass by. The farmer said he had seen the chicken and, in fact, had raised it. The driver asked if it was true the chicken had three legs. The farmer said yes, explaining that both he and his wife liked to eat chicken legs. Then they had a son, who also liked to eat chicken legs. So the farmer had decided to raise a chicken with three legs. The driver then asked how the chicken tasted. The farmer told him that he did not know; he had never been able to catch it. (U)

*Gorbachev* then mentioned the Russian writers Ilf and Petrov. They wrote humorous, satirical novels. They left as a heritage notebooks consisting of thoughts and ideas for writing future books. *Gorbachev* said he particularly liked one idea in these notebooks. A man was accused of driving a government-owned car to a public bath. To defend himself, the man said that he had not been to the bath for two years. *Gorbachev* said that the same could be true of our governments. We would not want to be in the position of defending ourselves by saying that we have done nothing—when we should have acted. (C)

On this note, the luncheon ended, at 2:10. (U)

116. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 15, 1987, 2–2:45 p.m.

## SUBJECT

Covert Action Update

## PARTICIPANTS

*The Vice President's Office*

The Vice President

Craig Fuller

*State*

John Whitehead

Michael Armacost

Curtis Kammen

*Treasury*

Secretary James Baker

*DOD*

Secretary Frank Carlucci

Richard Armitage

*OMB*

James Miller

*CIA*

Judge William Webster

[*name not declassified*]*JCS*

Admiral William Crowe

Vice Admiral Jonathan Howe

*Justice*

Charles Cooper

*White House*

Howard Baker

*NSC*

Colin Powell

Paul Stevens

Nicholas Rostow

Barry Kelly

Mary Henhoeffter

*Minutes*The *President* opened the meeting and made the following points:

[Omitted here are discussions unrelated to the Soviet Union]

*Judge Webster*: [Omitted here are discussions unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

—As I noted in my address<sup>2</sup> to the nation following the summit, I appreciate the support the American people have given to our policy of aiding Freedom Fighters around the globe.<sup>3</sup> Without a strong covert action capability, much of this support would not be possible.

[Omitted here are discussions unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

—Given last week's summit, Mr. President, I'll begin with the most topical part of my presentation—our media and influence program

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, NSC Intelligence Files, System IV Files, Box H381, 40776–40800. Top Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> For the text of Reagan's radio address of December 12, see *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1987, vol. II, pp. 1515–1516.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to March 31 and April 7 meetings of the Planning and Coordination Group (Reagan Library, 1988 SYS IV RWR INT 40326–40348)

aimed at the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Gorbachev's *glasnost* policy has created a new environment, in the Soviet Union promoting a freer flow of information and even fostering an internal debate about major domestic issues. We are trying hard to exploit this new environment and I brought along a prime example of the kind of work we are doing in this regard. This is an edition of the Soviet dissident magazine *GLASNOST* which is published monthly in Moscow and barely tolerated by the regime. It is, however, denied access to newsprint and normal means of distribution. [5½ lines not declassified]

—I'm told, Mr. President, that one of the articles in this particular edition is a review of the Phil Donahue television show on which Vladimir Posner, the now well-known Soviet propagandist and spokesman, was the featured guest. The author remarks wistfully that it would be nice if the Soviet Union had a few Donahues of its own who could get away with making critical or even outrageous remarks about their government's leaders and policies. [9½ lines not declassified]

—I've brought along a few other examples of our work in this area:

- [1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]
- This next item is a gift for you, Mr. President, that I think you can consider comes from the Polish people. These are souvenir stamps printed by Solidarity and sold to the Polish people in order to raise money for Solidarity activities. [1½ lines not declassified] (The President and the Statue of Liberty are featured on the stamps.)

*The President:* I'm on a stamp and so is the other woman in my life.  
*Judge Webster:*

—In August, Mr. President, you signed an MON increasing the size of the Soviet program [less than 1 line not declassified]. This was the recommendation of the NSPG review of covert action programs in April 1987 and will permit us both to exploit the greater openness afforded by *glasnost* and the technological revolution which has come to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

[Omitted here are discussions unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

117. **Memorandum From Fritz Ermarth of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell)**<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 4, 1988

SUBJECT

Gorbachev, Ligachev, and Implications for Us

I am encouraged that the attached article caught the President's attention.<sup>2</sup> We need constantly to factor a troubled and uncertain Moscow political scene into our plans for the next six months or so.

The *Washington Times* piece is one of the more extreme depictions that I have seen of Ligachev's challenge to Gorbachev; most analysts would say it exaggerates. There is little doubt now, however, that there is such a challenge, that its exact character is very important, and that our inability to establish its exact character is a measure of how little we really know about Kremlin politics . . . despite glasnost.

The best insider reports I have heard (from the Moscow correspondent of *L'Unita*) jibe with most intelligence and public information: Gorbachev, tutored by his ideological advisor and Politburo colleague Yakovlev, is for "radical", systemic, and even political reform. What kind of reform exactly remains to be defined; but it's scaring the hell out of the Party. Ligachev, on the other hand, wants a more limited reform of economic administration such as Kosygin tried unsuccessfully in the 1960s, but without the glasnost and diffusion of political authority that the Gorbachev approach seems to portend. The bureaucrats and party hacks want no reform, but are probably lining up with Ligachev as a tactical expedient. The Yeltsin affair was one skirmish in a mounting struggle. Gorbachev lost—not power so much as policy momentum; Ligachev gained.

This said, there are important countervailing points to be made. Gorbachev and Ligachev agree that some reform is needed, and they know they must overcome the resistance of Neanderthal bureaucrats and a resentful population to make anything work. They also agree that the USSR needs Detente Two from the US to make any reform formula work for the next ten years. Finally, they are capable of working together, as indicated by the fact that Gorbachev chairs the Politburo

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Chron Files, January-February 1988 (1). Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Rodman, Rostow, Linhard, and Ledsky. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Powell saw it.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is an article by Martin Sieff, "Ideologist Appears Ready to Challenge Gorbachev," (*Washington Times*, December 21, 1987, p. A8)

and Ligachev chairs the Secretariat, apparently a pattern that started when Brezhnev was ill. Gorbachev's own willingness to compromise in the conservative direction has been demonstrated.

The next six months are going to be a very critical phase. In June Gorbachev will chair an unusual CPSU Conference—like a Congress only bigger and not a regular gathering—to debate the scope of reform, especially as it affects the role and the make up (cadres) of the Party. The run up and the meeting will show whether the “radical reforms” Gorbachev has touted are back on track or stalled, and how his own efforts to build a power base are faring.

How does this affect us?

First, we have to be mentally and politically ready to accept real uncertainty about the future of Soviet politics. This means, for example, a high likelihood of puzzling twists and turns over the next six months. More seriously, it means that the United States cannot gamble on what it believes to be Gorbachev's policies continuing indefinitely into the future. This has a bearing on INF ratification: No one can really be certain that the USSR will fully and diligently implement the very unusual inspection provisions in the years ahead. That's no reason to vote against ratification. It is an added reason to plan programs to enforce implementation and react to non-compliance. It also should encourage us to gain some practical experience with the INF verification regime before trying to apply it to START.

Second, troubled domestic politics give Gorbachev added incentives to pursue inexpensive successes in foreign policy. That's one reason why he was happy with a soft-ball summit in December. He probably wants another successful summit on the eve of his critical party conference in June. This should—but not necessarily will—deter him from an all-or-nothing rush to a START agreement this spring. He wants a START agreement to cap this summit and definitively to usher in Detente Two with all its political effects in the US and Europe. This would make it very hard for any successor to the President to continue his hard-line policies. At the same time, a ratifiable START agreement will be very hard—I personally believe impossible—to negotiate in six months. Gorbachev is not in political shape to make large concessions to speed the process. My worry is that a crash effort to achieve the nearly impossible could lead either to an unratifiable treaty or to a crack-up failure that polarizes the 1988 election debate over who screwed up Detente Two.

Were Gorbachev's domestic situation fully under control, he might favor the latter outcome. In fact, as recently as a year ago, the Intelligence Community judged he was aiming for this as one tolerable outcome to his policy toward the Reagan Administration. Now I'm less sure he can take the risks involved: A possible swerve of US politics

back to the Right, or, more likely, a long hiatus in the politics of arms control as the next president, of either party, sorts through the debris left by failure to achieve a ratifiable START agreement in early 1988.

This means, it seems to me, that Gorbachev has an interest in maximizing continuity and steadiness which we ought to encourage. We should work for a START agreement with all deliberate speed, but take the greatest care on both sides that what we do achieve, even though short of a final agreement, will survive our elections and Soviet politics, and be there to pick up in 1989.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> On January 5, the President received a national security briefing in the White House Oval Office that included Powell, Negroponte, Ermarth, Howard Baker, and Duberstein. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) In his diary entry, Reagan wrote: "Colin brought in our expert on Soviet U. He sees a split developing between Gorbachev & Ligachev. We'll soon see an Ec. plan to make Soviet enterprises self supporting. In June the once in every 4 yr's. Soviet Cong. will meet. There should be some hint as to division in Soviet U. under the Glasnost plans." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, Vol. II, November 1985–1989, p. 821) On January 6, Reagan met with Shultz, Howard Baker, Duberstein, and Powell from 1:04 to 1:36 p.m. According to Powell's handwritten notes, the basic thrust of the conversation was that the "next 6–8 months can be very fruitful," but that the administration should avoid "détente." (Reagan Library, Powell Files, George Shultz (Sec. State)(1))



**118. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, January 28, 1988, 1:30–2 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

General Powell's Meeting with Georgiy M. Korniyenko

**PARTICIPANTS***US*

General Colin L. Powell  
Fritz W. Ermarth, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

*USSR*

Georgiy Korniyenko (First Deputy Chief, International Department, Central Committee of the CPSU)  
Ambassador Yuriy Dubinin  
Evgeny Zolotov (Interpreter)

*Georgiy Korniyenko* visited General Powell for what turned out to be largely a courtesy call. He opened conversation by conveying greetings to the President from Mikhail Gorbachev, noting that he had come as part of a parliamentary delegation but really to visit old and new friends in Washington. He recalled that he had worked on US-Soviet relations since 1946. He noted "by the way" that, according to a CIA biography of him revealed after the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, the US had a good assessment of his personality. CIA biographies, he observed, were objective and "businesslike", avoiding generalities and noting a person's strong and weak points; they were better than comparable Soviet biographies. He then asked General Powell to comment on prospects for the INF Treaty in the Senate.<sup>2</sup>

*General Powell* wondered how his biography in Soviet files read, and observed, in any case, he was given to straight talk, being a military officer, not a diplomat. He said he was highly confident of ratification of the INF Treaty, noted the applause it had gotten during the President's State of the Union address and its popularity in the US, Europe, and Asia. Most recently Egyptian President Mubarak had praised it.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, General Powell's Meeting with Georgiy Korniyenko 01/28/1988. Confidential. Drafted by Ermarth. The meeting took place in Powell's office. Ermarth sent a copy of the memorandum to Powell under a January 29 memorandum, requesting that Powell approve both the memorandum of conversation and an attached memorandum to the CIA and Department of State transmitting a copy of the memorandum of conversation. (Ibid.) A stamped notation indicates that Powell approved the recommendation. NSC Executive Secretary Paul Schott Stevens sent copies of the memorandum of conversation to Levitsky and CIA Executive Secretary H. Lawrence Sandall under a February 3 memorandum. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> On January 25, Reagan formally transmitted the INF Treaty to the U.S. Senate. (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1988, Book I, pp. 81–83)

According to our system, General Powell continued, there would be wide-ranging debate and careful scrutiny of every line in the Treaty, with participants serving their own political aims. All manner of amendments, reservations, and understanding would be proposed, the General predicted, and he cautioned the Soviets not to overreact. In the end, he said, the Treaty would be ratified without “killer amendments” or anything requiring renegotiation.

During the INF ratification debates, *General Powell* continued, positions would be taken by the participants on the course of START and Defense and Space negotiations. There would be close scrutiny of all verification problems and the record of compliance and violations, e.g., Krasnoyarsk and Gomel. The Administration would be admonished to be most careful about START, especially its verification, because of its direct importance to US security. (C)

As to the future of the START negotiations themselves, *General Powell* said it was hard to predict. He said it would be nice to have a START agreement to sign in Moscow, but that we should be clear that a successful summit in Moscow would not require such an achievement. It was vital, he said, to complete a START agreement carefully and correctly, so as to assure its ratification. This might take more time than we had, so we should not define a successful Moscow summit as requiring this achievement, lest we set ourselves up for a disappointment. If we hurried the completion of START, critics would condemn the product for that reason. We should work to solve remaining problems as soon as possible, but recognize that they were difficult. We faced the charge of a last-minute rush to complete INF. This experience, the General continued, should instruct us to put the most difficult issues, especially verification, up front in the negotiations, in Geneva, Moscow, and Washington. (C)

INF verification approaches did indeed provide a guide to START verification, *the General* went on, but START would be much harder because we had to verify limits not zero forces, to which *Korniyenko* agreed. In this respect, *the General* continued, we still had to reach closure on difficult issues concerning mobile ICBMs and SLCMs; moreover, we continued to have differences on ICBM sublimits and counting rules. It was vital, the General said, to do serious work on these problems and do it right. We should put ourselves in a position such that, should we get 50 percent of the way to completion by the time of a Moscow summit, we could legitimately call that a great success, take credit, and carry on in the negotiations. If, on the other hand, we displayed a rush in the negotiations to a summit deadline, then we would run into both negotiating difficulties and serious challenges in Senate ratification. With those concerns in mind, he emphasized that we would give every effort to completing START by the time of a Moscow summit. (C)

*General Powell* then turned to the D&S negotiations, where he also saw difficulties. The US continued to seek a stand-alone agreement rather than a protocol to something else, such as the Soviets sought. He noted that there had arisen some controversy about the passages in the Washington Summit Joint Statement concerning research “as required” and permitted by the ABM treaty “as signed in 1972.” *Korniyenko* interjected that there was no comma before this second passage. There was a problem here to which our best minds should be applied, continued *the General*. But he urged the Soviet side to be clear that the President’s commitment to and belief in the SDI program had not diminished in the slightest, despite his awareness that Gorbachev had a different view. *Korniyenko* interjected that the US should have no doubt that Gorbachev’s view was very different and he held it equally strongly. (C)

We would have to find a way, said *the General*, for the SDI program to continue and to be passed on to the next administration intact, without being crippled by an agreement. The General recalled that Gorbachev had granted that, at some point, the US could follow its course and the Soviet side its own different course. The US side would, in the meantime, do what was permitted by the 1972 ABM Treaty “as required” by our program, which we would describe to all. General Powell hoped our explanations would help the Soviet side to understand our aims and intentions better and that a way could be found in Geneva to resolve this difficult problem. (C)

*The General* observed that the Soviet side had recently taken positions in Geneva that seemed to make the situation more difficult. For example, it sought to stipulate as allowed only development on systems permitted by the ABM Treaty, not development permitted by the ABM Treaty. This seemed a step backward. *Korniyenko* asked whether the US draft treaty didn’t say the same thing. No, replied *General Powell*, the US D&S text tracked the Joint Statement. What it meant was clear during sessions of the December summit, among experts and between the two leaders. Moreover, the Soviet side wanted to reserve the right to build up strategic forces beyond START limits if the other side took objectionable action with respect to the ABM Treaty, with or without a Defense and Space agreement. This would be most difficult to ratify. General Powell then asked for *Korniyenko*’s comments. (C)

*Korniyenko* shared the General’s assessment of the INF ratification picture. But he found the situation in Geneva most puzzling. He agreed that the most serious difficulties were in Defense and Space. The Soviet side took the view that the best defense in this strategic area was no defense. The US side took a different view. The meaning of the Washington Summit, according to *Korniyenko*, was that we would stop trying to convince each other and simply live with the ABM Treaty

for an agreed period. The US draft D&S agreement, however, had to be seen as a plain attempt at converting the Soviet side to the US view; its very title referred to a “transition” to greater reliance on defensive capabilities. This was a conceptual reversal of the Washington outcome. This was very puzzling to the Soviet side. The US had put itself in a conceptual position that made agreement impossible and from which it would be hard to retreat. (C)

In the START area, *Korniyenko* continued, after we had simplified the matter of sublimits, the US now returned with more sublimits and sub-sublimits, regarding, for example, ICBMs with six or more warheads. He agreed that SLCMs too remained a difficult problem. (C)

Regarding SLCMs, *the General* responded that the problem was verification. Although the Soviet side claimed to have the technology for doing this, we were very doubtful about this. (C)

As *General Powell* hurriedly departed for a meeting with the President,<sup>3</sup> he asked *Korniyenko* whether Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan remained independent of the creation of a transitional regime in Kabul. *Korniyenko* replied that it did. (C)

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<sup>3</sup> On January 28, Powell met with Reagan, Shultz, and Howard Baker in the White House Oval Office from 2:04 to 2:08 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary) No substantive record of the meeting has been found.

**119. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 8, 1988

1. *Gorbachev Statement on Afghanistan*. In an unprecedented policy statement Monday, Gorbachev tackled the tough issues on Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup> He addressed US concerns by offering a 10-month withdrawal timetable, beginning May 15, to include unspecified frontloading and phasing measures (this timetable presumes a Geneva agreement by March 15). He signaled to the Kabul regime that Soviet troops would not return—if fighting continued after Soviet withdrawal, it could be handled by the UNSC. To steel the Soviet people to a withdrawal without victory, he invoked Lenin to justify peaceful relations with a non-communist Afghanistan and underscored the nation's duty to provide for vets and the families of slain soldiers. Gorbachev's declaration challenges the US, and also Zia, to either work from the Soviet offer or bear the onus for blocking settlement of the war.

Ambassador Dubinin urged rapid completion of the Geneva agreements on the basis of Gorbachev's new proposal at lunch Monday with Mike Armacost. Mike reminded him of Shevardnadze's reference to a completion of Soviet troop withdrawal before the end of 1988, emphasized the importance of pinning down details such as frontloading, phasing, troop disengagement, and monitoring arrangements, and put down a marker that Soviet aid to the Kabul regime should cease with commencement of the withdrawal process. On the issue of interim government, Mike argued that creation of an interim government would enhance stability, facilitate Soviet troop withdrawal, encourage the return of refugees, and diminish prospects of a bloodbath. Mike agreed, however, that completing a Geneva agreement is a central objective and that responsibility for an interim government must rest with Afghans. (C)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, Memoranda for the President (01/27/1988–02/08/1988). Confidential. There is no indication that Reagan saw the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Gorbachev's speech in which he announced that the Soviets would withdraw from Afghanistan within one year. ("Text of Gorbachev Statement Setting Forth Soviet Position on Afghan War," *New York Times*, February 9, 1988, p. A14)

120. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 9, 1988, 2–3 p.m.

## SUBJECT

US Options for Arms Control at the Summit

## PARTICIPANTS

The President

Mr. Donald Gregg (The Vice President's Office)

*State*

Secretary George Shultz

Ambassador Max Kampelman

Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway

*Defense*

Secretary Frank Carlucci

Mr. Peter Sullivan

*Energy*

Secretary John Herrington

*OMB*

Mr. Joseph Wright

*ACDA*

Mr. David Emery

*CIA*

Mr. William Webster

Mr. Lawrence Gershwin

*JCS*

Admiral William Crowe

Vice Admiral Jonathan Howe

*White House*

Chief of Staff

Kenneth Duberstein

Colin L. Powell

John Negroponte

*NSC*

Robert E. Linhard

Linton Brooks

William Tobey

*OSTP*

William Graham

*Special Advisors to the President*

Ambassador Paul Nitze

Ambassador Edward Rowncy

The meeting opened at 2:05 p.m.

*General Powell:* Mr. President, the purpose of today's meeting is to review and identify US options for arms control outcomes at the Summit. Would you like to make a few remarks?

*The President:* We have important issues to discuss today. If the Soviets and we have a Moscow summit, it could be the most important meeting of all. We now have a range of arms control options, but depending on how we use our time, our options will narrow. I need your honest assessments of what we can and should achieve in Moscow. I would like to use the remaining months of this Administration to the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 176. Secret. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. All brackets are in the original. Powell sent the President copies of the meeting agenda, the list of participants, and a set of talking points under a February 8 memorandum.

best advantage. I meant what I said in the State of the Union<sup>2</sup>—we should all have our work shoes on. At the same time, I know how much must be accomplished before we can conclude another arms agreement with the Soviets. I *will not* rush to an agreement for agreement's sake; so we should use this meeting to identify the options that should be protected and the work that is required to protect them. If we are to achieve our objectives, all the departments and agencies will have to work hard and work together.

*General Powell:* Thank you, Mr. President. Today, I would like to review a number of areas as we think about what we have to do with respect to the upcoming summit. Let me take a moment to review where we stand in our internal preparations for completing a START agreement.

To complete a START treaty, we need to do two things: first, we have to finish determining our initial position, and second, we have to reconcile that position with conflicting Soviet positions. I have no idea if the Soviets are prepared for serious negotiations. The tactics in Geneva suggest that they may not be. But for their own reasons, the Soviets might be anxious to complete work on a START treaty this year with this Administration. That's why it is of some significant concern that we have so much remaining to do to complete the details of our own initial START positions. For example, our START Treaty calls for three Protocols—the Conversion and Elimination Protocol, the Inspection Protocol, and the Throw-Weight Protocol. I see serious problems with our progress on all three of these documents.

We tabled a Conversion and Elimination Protocol in Geneva in October, supposedly after a thorough interagency review. After it was tabled, we began to get comments from agencies. As a result, a revision to our Conversion and Elimination Protocol was submitted yesterday to the President for the President's approval with literally a dozen changes, many of them substantive. Even as this revision is being considered, many additional changes are still coming in from agencies.

On the Inspection Protocol, we have not yet reached agreement on many sensitive issues, to include verifying compliance with RV-carrying rules, verifying compliance with ALCM-carrying rules, the conduct of close-out inspections, rules for suspect-site inspections, tagging Treaty-limited items and procedures for perimeter/portal monitoring. Instead, the current draft has placeholders in all these areas and has, essentially, a shallow listing on basic notification inspection procedures similar to INF. Even with a large number of issues we have

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union," January 25, 1988, *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1988, Book I, pp. 84–90.



had to defer, some have formally objected to the tabling of this version of the critical Protocol.

Finally, on the Throw-Weight Protocol, while limiting Soviet ballistic missiles, throw-weight has been a policy objective of this Administration since 1981. We are far from interagency agreement on how to define and measure throw-weight. The current draft Protocol lists three different options for computing throw-weight. It reflects significant disagreement on rules for flight tests; and there is no agreement on verification and monitoring ability of the Protocol provisions.

Finally, in addition to the Protocols, we have a number of problems with our draft Treaty itself. Many of these involve policy decisions. Among the outstanding issues are how we would limit and verify mobile ICBMs if we offer our position on mobile ICBMs; how we would count and verify ALCMs; how we would ultimately resolve the issue of SLCMs; and how we would limit non-deployed missiles. To deal with all these problems, we have established an ambitious formal START interagency Work Program, and it will complete our initial position, but even if we follow it, it's not going to be done until mid-April.

If a sound agreement is to be reached, we really need to get on with it now. We need to think about the alternatives to signing a treaty because of the difficulties we face. We could consider recording a Joint Statement or perhaps in a framework agreement as we consider the summit. We should note that every one of the agencies at this table has told us that our START Work Program is too ambitious focused at mid-April. So we do really need to think about alternatives, and I would like to have your views on this subject. Secretary Shultz, would you like to start us off?

*Secretary Shultz:* Mr. President, it's my impression we can get there if we give it the right priority and effort. We will need to work on many of the details, and we will need to make judgments in a number of areas. For example, we will need to make a judgment on the balance of the intrusiveness of inspections we require and the impact of the intrusiveness of our own security. These issues will be no easier eight months or two years from now. The real question is how important is this to us. I think it is important because the Soviets are a lot better than we are at producing and deploying ballistic missiles that are targeted at the United States, and that's just the cruel truth. And it has to do less with our technology and our ability to build missiles than it does with our politics.

Congress blocks our ability to deploy such missiles. A clear example is what's happening to ICBM program. So it benefits us to have placed equitable and stabilizing limits on forces, especially ballistic missiles. This is an issue of our national security.

I understand that we also have a problem, and many of us are uneasy at the idea that we are working against a deadline of a summit, but I'm not negative on that. I think that negotiating against the summit is what we need to do, because deadlines cause tough decisions to be taken. I wouldn't be the negotiator for Jimmy Carter, because he would want agreement for agreement's sake. But I have no fear that we will go bananas and grab a bad deal off the table under your leadership. I remember when Frank Carlucci and I walked away from Gorbachev in Moscow, when they refused to give us a summit date; I called back and asked him whether he wanted us to do anything different, and he said no, just press on. So from my point of view, with Ronald Reagan as President, the fact that we are working with a deadline is an advantage, not a problem. As to how intractable the details are, I can't judge—although I have a feeling I'll get into them fairly quickly now. [Laughter]

I think we're far less along in our work towards the START Treaty than we could have been, and partially it's because of INF; INF took up just too much time. My position is that we should all pledge to make an all-out effort. It would be wrong if we were not to do so; it could lead to a very grave mistake. On the other hand, Mr. President, I think I'd be very concerned if we moved towards a framework, especially if we moved in that direction too soon. Framework's not a good idea; Congress would want us to observe a framework; we'd have no verification; we'd have no leverage on Soviet behavior; we really should press for a treaty. And with respect to verification, I know there are a lot of concerns, especially about cuts in the intelligence assets in the out-year budgets. We need to really watch this; it's going to be a harder verification problem in START; we need to step up to the issue of funding for intelligence assets to accomplish this.

*The President:* [Interrupts] From my past experiences as a labor negotiator, maybe we need to do this: we need to go for the gold. You need to put down what the ideal agreement would be. After you've done that, you can decide among ourselves what our bottom lines should be—what we can and what can't give up beyond; also where there's no bargaining—those items on which we can't bargain. And we should set up the things that are not essential. Now, once you have that, then you can see the negotiating pattern of what you absolutely *must* get, what you could try for but you'd still have a good agreement if you didn't get, but the bottom line is you've got to go for the gold.

*Secretary Carlucci:* I don't disagree we should go for the gold; we should work as hard as we can. Our question, though, that has been asked today, Mr. President, is how realistic is that really. In all candor, it'll be very, very difficult to get from where we are today to a START Treaty by the summit. I've been up three times now on the INF Treaty

to the Hill with Bill (Crowe), and we've been questioned very toughly on each trip. We have to be certain that the verification to the START Treaty is very, very good. Therefore, I think we should condition public mindset that negotiations will continue beyond the summit. We should take the line that if we get an agreement by the summit, that's fine; if it takes by October, that's fine; if not, whatever we do, it will be a benchmark for the future, and we'll just keep negotiating.

I agree completely with Secretary Shultz that we should *not* go for a framework; a framework would be an absolute disaster. So, therefore, we ought to tell the public that we're going to continue to negotiate towards a good START agreement, and if we get it by the summit, that's okay.

*Admiral Crowe:* I'd associate with Secretary Carlucci. The JCS are down in the trenches, and they're worried. The INF Treaty provided some good lessons, but START is becoming 50–100 times more difficult. There are at least three areas I think are tough—by the way, you mentioned getting to bottom lines; you know, it's awfully hard to get a real bottom line in Washington. We get a bottom line often acceptable to the negotiators but not acceptable to the military.

With respect to the three areas, the first is the bombers and ALCMs. The Soviets are trying to erode our position in both these areas. We need to make sure that we maintain a good ALCM counting rule, that we protect the ALCM-range definitions that we need, and we protect the ability for us to deploy conventional ALCMs. The Soviets are going to press us on all three. These three are bottom lines. Second, we have verification. For START, we must be able to do better than monitor simply what's in being, but we must also be able to monitor what's in production. We also have to exchange data early, not at the end, because we won't be able to make the decisions we need to make in the process unless we get the information early. We need the information to make decisions.

*Secretary Carlucci:* [Interrupts] I must say, Mr. President, we've devoted an immense amount of time lately on the Hill discussing one site, Magna, Utah. We are going to have some real problems with the Defense contractors at handling a whole bunch of sites.

*General Powell:* [Interrupts] Mr. President, in the INF Treaty, we had 135 sites in the Soviet Union to look at. We are going to have to give you a magnitude about 1800 Soviet sites in the START Treaty.

*Admiral Crowe:* [Continues] Yes, Mr. President, that one plant caused us an awful lot of problems on the Hill. So we have to get out in front and notify and coordinate with the contractors and with the Congress *before* we sign a treaty. We were hit pretty hard on the Hill, Mr. President, for not talking to them *before* we signed. Therefore, all the above—these three areas—all pose questions about whether the

time frame that we are working against is realistic. I agree that we ought go forward as Secretary Shultz suggests as hard as possible, but we ought to do it with our eyes open.

*The President:* There are things that we simply can't retreat on. One of them is verification.

*Admiral Crowe:* But we're still developing our approach to verification. Mr. President, we've gone a long way; the Chiefs have gone a long way, with respect to intrusive verification techniques, and we are prepared to go even further. We are considering in order to verify, we're going to have to get on Soviet boats with their troops, and they're going to have to be able to the same for us. It's not only tough intellectually to be fair, it's tough emotionally.

*Secretary Carlucci:* Others suggested that we need to select the plants that we are going to monitor in advance, and, in fact, on the Hill, they suggested that we should, in advance of signing a treaty, have selected and completed the security upgrades at those plants before we sign.

*General Powell:* Judge Webster, do you have anything you want to add?

*Judge Webster:* The monitoring problem is ours; certainly, there is a greater number of places that we have to monitor than in INF, as Colin Powell said moving from 150 sites to over 1800. And in INF, we had no types of missiles that we had to monitor after the elimination, and in a START Treaty, we are going to have to monitor some 15–20 different types of systems. We're going to come to loggerheads very quickly with the JCS, and the issue will be the amount of the infrastructure that we want to destroy to make the thing monitorable against the amount of infrastructure they need to maintain to do their mission. The Congress knows about all the cuts that we're taking in our overhead assets in the outyears; we need to work on that.

Mr. President, I'm also worried that we may spook Congress on the INF Treaty if it looks like on the Hill that we're rushing the START Treaty. You must know that we face major monitoring problems in a tough economic environment. However, for all those reasons, I support what Frank Carlucci said—the prospects of getting to where you want to be soon are simply not so good.

*Senator Baker (Chief of Staff):* I'm a little troubled by the feel of this meeting. It's almost as if we've all decided that we can't do it. If this attitude sets in, we simply won't be able to do it. Now, we are vulnerable in some respects in that we set a date and some of you, if we don't get a START Treaty at that date, will fail. But I don't think we should worry about that. We should go forward with an honest effort to get a START Treaty, and we ought to pursue that START Treaty. In fact, I would argue that if we don't get a START Treaty, we may not have been right chasing an INF Treaty.

I remember, Mr. President, discussions we had in Miami<sup>3</sup> while we waited for an energetic Pope to finish innumerable photo ops, and you, Frank Carlucci, and I sat in the room, and I watched Frank Carlucci walk you through a long list of detailed decisions, and you made them one after the other to allow us to get down on an INF Treaty. I always felt that that was one of the most important meetings I had the honor to attend during my tenure here. Unless we decide to press on seriously forward, let Colin Powell drive this action, and get the President involved in making decisions where he needs to make them, it's going to drift away from us, and that would be the wrong legacy for you, Mr. President.

*Acting Director Emery, ACDA:* I wanted to say exactly what Senator Baker said, but he said it first. The interagency process has its drawbacks; it's slow and it's ponderous. To meet your goals and the expectations of the public, we need to identify key issues and cut through the system and get decisions as we need them. We may finish if we do this; we need to give it a good try.

*The President:* We must not ignore certain things. First of all, the situation is not the same as in INF. In this case, the Soviets want a START Treaty too. In INF we were the demanders. They had the SS-20's; we had to force them out of them. But in this case, it's very evident that they, too, want a START agreement. They feel they need START. In that context, I can't be too pessimistic. One thing of interest is that they have an innate eye to protect the homeland at all cost, and it may be that they recognized after Chernobyl that facing the nuclear forces they face, they can't do this. So I think we must press.

*General Powell:* I think we have, therefore, Mr. President, a decision, and the decision is that we'll go for the gold, and we will drive towards that end. We will need high-level involvement now. We can't stand situations where we don't get agency inputs when required. A lot of this will fall on the OSD, JCS, and the DCI. We're going to throw it into overdrive. Let's hear from agencies once on issues.

Mr. President, with respect to Defense and Space, basically our current position is that we should pursue a separate treaty on the Defense and Space area and that we should pursue a treaty that best protects SDI. Unless the Cabinet has any reason to relook at this issue, I'd like to press on to another subject.

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<sup>3</sup> On September 10, 1987, Reagan delivered remarks following a meeting with Pope John Paul II in Miami, Florida, before returning to Washington. (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1987, Book II, pp. 1018–1019)

## [No Cabinet Discussion]

*General Powell:* I'd like to turn to testing. With respect to the nuclear testing area, two options are presented: (1) to pursue the signing at the summit of a necessary additional verification Protocol to permit TTBT and PNET ratification; or (2) to pursue the signing at the summit of an executive agreement that permits the joint verification experiments to proceed. A majority of your advisors strongly prefer the first option. The problem we face in pursuing this is the Soviet position is that we must first conduct joint verification experiments, which involve monitoring nuclear tests in each other's sites. We've suggested, and it is the judgment of our testing experts, that there's simply not enough time to conduct these tests prior to the summit date. We've suggested to the Soviets on four separate occasions that we may do the verification Protocols JVE's in parallel, and not delay the verification Protocols waiting to complete the JVE's. Up to now, they have refused.

Other advisors have another point of view. They suggest that we should not attempt to press forward and break the linkage between JVE's and Protocols, because we need not accelerate our efforts in this area. The issue then before us is whether we should attempt to press forward towards the TTBT and PNET Protocols, and I believe a majority of your advisors support this course. Could I have the views of the Cabinet?

*Secretary Shultz:* The alternatives that you outlined are well stated. We certainly don't want to let the Soviets think that we *really* want the TTBT and PNET Protocols so we have to pay a price for them. We should be able to get those Protocols anyway. The major arguments for getting them is domestic. We want to avoid being blind sided by the Congress. Mr. President, you ought to remember at Reykjavik how we had a rather involved to do with the Congress—you on the phone with Speaker O'Neill and we had others on the line trying to work out a situation on the eve of your meeting with Gorbachev. The Congress is much more restrictive on testing than we would like; we need to avoid this by the current process. In addition, I don't see anybody out there wanting to test above 150 kt. Therefore, I don't see us paying a price for this. We ought to move ahead.

*Secretary Carlucci:* I'm a little confused by all this. Are you arguing that we drop CORRTEx?

*General Powell:* No, no, there's no change here. We want CORRTEx; the only issue is should we be pressed to break the linkage with JVE's.

*Secretary Carlucci:* Well, then, there's no change. I don't hear anything new, and on that basis, I think we ought press forward.

*Dr. Graham:* Neither us or<sup>4</sup> the Soviets will learn anything at all through the JVE's that will affect our position. The Soviet position is simply not logical, and they may cave based on that.

*Secretary Shultz:* The way this happened is kind of strange. The Soviets were inflexible at Reykjavik, but they got more flexible after Reykjavik. In my ministerial meeting in Moscow after Reykjavik, they suggested they had a better method for verification than our CORRTEx, and Shevardnadze seemed to display quite a bit of information about it. And I suggested why don't we do some tests comparing the two; Shevardnadze agreed. After that we were not able to put together the test program, although Ken Adelman tried. I think right now that it may not be a big thing to break the linkage between JVE's and the Protocols.

*Judge Webster:* It's our view that the Soviets will probably not want to break that linkage—that they will want the JVE's.

*Secretary Shultz:* I think you're right at one level, but the Soviets also want to ratify these Treaties. They want to show that something negotiated with the United States *can* be ratified. So I think we're going to see a different attitude at the senior level in the Soviet Union, and the issue as I see it here is do you want me to try to encourage this at the senior level and break that linkage? Do all agree?

*General Powell:* I believe that's the view totally around the table. So I think we're going to press in that direction. That's all the major points I think we can cover today. We do need to do some more work on the ABM Treaty Review and the Krasnoyarsk radar, but I think we'll refer that back to staff. Does anyone have anything else to say?

*Secretary Shultz:* There is something new that I think we ought to look at, and that is the factor of Frank Carlucci meeting with his counterpart and Bill Crowe with his counterpart. I think we can create a constructive atmosphere out of these meetings, and we ought do so. This is a very positive development.

*Secretary Carlucci:* I'll be happy to do this, but I want to make sure you understand we've been very clear with the Soviets that we don't want this to evolve into a parallel arms control channel, and therefore, any meeting that we're going to have must be carefully structured to avoid this.

*Secretary Shultz:* I agree.

*General Powell:* Thank you, Mr. President.

The meeting adjourned at 2:56 p.m.

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<sup>4</sup> An unknown hand crossed out the word "us" and added an "n" in front of "or" to change the wording to "we nor."



**121. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, February 21, 1988, 10:45 a.m.–12:45 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Shultz-Shevardnadze Meetings, February 21 Morning

**PARTICIPANTS***U.S.*

George P. Shultz, Secretary of  
State

Thomas W. Simons, Jr. Deputy  
Assistant Secretary of State  
(EUR) (Notetaker)

Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

*U.S.S.R.*

Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of  
Foreign Affairs

Sergei Tarasenko, Special  
Assistant to the Foreign  
Minister (Notetaker)

P. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

*Shevardnadze* said he did not think the two ministers needed to spend a long time on the agenda. They would speak at the plenary on the sequence and on the composition of working groups on various problems, as was their tradition.

*Shevardnadze* said he wished to raise another issue. It would be good if their colleagues would try to prepare a document on the results of their discussions. Perhaps this would not be necessary, but they should see; it had been useful in the past.

*The Secretary* suggested they see if they had something to say.

*Shevardnadze* said they should see how things developed. Perhaps they should try to formulate something in one of the working groups.

*Shevardnadze* said there would be one official event, the exchange of notes on U.S. fishing in the Soviet economic zone. That would be at 12:45. Then at 1:00 there would be lunch, and then they could continue their regular work. He understood the plenary would be short, to announce the composition of the working groups, which would then begin; at that point they could return to work in a more narrow composition. If all the questions were treated with all the participants, he said with a smile, it would not be a negotiation, but a rally.

*The Secretary* said he thought the process they had established of setting up working groups and then proceeding between them had worked well, and should continue.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow—Feb 88—Shultz/Shev. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons. The meeting took place in the Soviet Foreign Ministry Guest House. Shultz departed Washington February 19 and met with Koivisto in Helsinki, February 20–24, before arriving in Moscow on February 21.

*Shevardnadze* asked the Secretary who should be in their small sessions. *The Secretary* said that on the U.S. side it would be General Powell, the President's National Security Advisor, and Ambassador Ridgway. Then, if the subject called for it, they might bring others in, for instance Under Secretary Armacost on regional issues, although he believed *Shevardnadze* and he should have the primary discussion there. The same could happen for arms control, perhaps for other topics.

*Shevardnadze* said he would like to invite his Deputy Bessmertnykh and perhaps Karpov on a permanent basis, so to speak. On other issues, there could be others for regional matters; he had in mind Vorontsov; this could be in advance of his meeting with Secretary Armacost. The Ambassadors might be on some working group. *The Secretary* said they could float around and keep abreast of things. *Shevardnadze* said the Ambassadors should tell the Ministers what was happening.

Returning to the working groups, *the Secretary* said there should also be one on human rights. As before, the U.S. chairman would be Assistant Secretary Schifter. Then there should be a group on arms control, which could break into subgroups if it wished; on our side this would be headed by Nitze. There should be one for regional issues, with Armacost our chairman. He did not see a need for a special group on bilateral issues unless *Shevardnadze* wished it.

*Shevardnadze* said perhaps they could put two or three officials in a bilateral group to do some work for a joint statement, if the Ministers decided there was a need for one. *The Secretary* noted that joint statements always seemed to come down to Ridgway and Bessmertnykh; they could decide that later. *Simons* said he and Sukhodrev could meet after lunch on bilateral issues. *Shevardnadze* jovially said they might also meet at night. *The Secretary* suggested they agree to a fourth group on bilateral issues; on the U.S. side the chairman would be *Simons*.

*Shevardnadze* said that on arms control he understood the U.S. preferred one group, but there should probably also be subgroups on chemical weapons, conventional weapons, the better to organize the work.

Continuing, *Shevardnadze* said he saw no changes or complications with that day's program, but was a little worried about the next day's. The schedule called for 9:00 a.m. with Ryzhkov, and 11:00 a.m. with the General Secretary. It was hard to say how much time would be required for the second meeting. *The Secretary* noted that the last time they had missed lunch, but it had been worth it. *Shevardnadze* said he did not rule that out.

Then, he went on, at 3:00 p.m. the program called for completion of the negotiations. He understood this would be mainly the reports of the working groups. At 4:30 p.m. he was committed to attend a special meeting to honor the 70th anniversary of the Soviet Army. This

limited the final meeting to an hour and a quarter. If that were not enough, they could perhaps think of postponing the Secretary's evening press conference, or perhaps of working in the evening.

*The Secretary* said they should work on that. He had invited a number of Soviet intellectuals to dinner at a cooperative restaurant, but these times could be adjusted. *Shevardnadze* suggested that they decide to try to finish the meeting in a hour and a quarter, and look further if they could not. *The Secretary* said they did not have to have lengthy working groups reports; they could use the hour and a quarter effectively. *Shevardnadze* said that seemed about all.

(At 11:05 a.m. the Ministers joined the plenary. There the Secretary was accompanied also by National Security Advisor Colin Powell, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Michael H. Armacost, Ambassador Paul Nitze, Ambassador Max Kampelman, Ambassador Jack Matlock, EUR Assistant Secretary Rozanne L. Ridgway and DOD/ISA Assistant Secretary-designate Ronald Lehman. *Shevardnadze* was accompanied by First Deputy Minister Yuli Vorontsov, Deputy Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Ambassador Viktor Karpov, Ambassador Yuriy Dubinin, Deputy Minister Adamishin, Ambassador Obukhov, and USA/Canada Department Acting Director Sukhodrev.)

After discussion of the Moscow weather during the press opportunity, *Shevardnadze* suggested the meeting begin. First, he expressed a cordial welcome to Moscow to the Secretary and all their friends, whom they knew well from working with them, and he wished them a useful and pleasant stay. The Soviet side believed this meeting was a great significance. It was taking place after the signing of the INF Treaty, which both sides believed was historic. All there understood that they were facing tasks that were not simple with regard to ratification, but working in parallel they seemed to be doing the job right. The next task was to actively and purposefully work on the even more complex and important agreement for 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms in the context of preserving the ABM Treaty for an agreed period of time. The main outlines of the future agreement had been agreed at the Washington Summit, and were reflected in the joint statement agreed there. He had read through it the day before. He thought that their leaders had done useful work, and that they had a good chance to complete this complicated but responsible task before the President visited the Soviet Union. The two sides should continue this work, as had been discussed in Washington, and he believed that if both delegations in Geneva negotiated in a constructive spirit they could expect success, even though there were just three months left. There was no doubt that an agreement would be an event of historic proportions, and that the nations of the world looked to us to achieve it.

*Shevardnadze* continued that they should have detailed discussions not only of nuclear and space arms but also of questions of

accelerating the work to conclude a chemical weapons convention and matters of conventional arms. In his view the two sides needed in-depth discussions of regional issues, and also bilateral relations. Thus they had an agenda, and could approve it without much debate.

*The Secretary* suggested that Shevardnadze had perhaps missed human rights. *Shevardnadze* said human rights was a special category; he understood it should not be omitted. He understood from the speeches the Secretary had made how important it was.

The next day's meetings, Shevardnadze went on, would be with the General Secretary of the Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev, and Council of Ministers President Ryzhkov. *The Secretary* said he had warned his ambassador about what had happened last time, the impact on his luncheon; it was possible that could happen again. *Ambassador Matlock* said that was why he was not arranging a luncheon this time. *Shevardnadze* said he could not rule out a recurrence; it was a possibility.

Shevardnadze said the Ministers should perhaps consult with the members of the Secretary's delegation and his own people about whether it would be useful to complete an agreed joint statement. This had been a generally positive practice at their meetings and at the summit. If it turned out that way it would be good.

Turning to organization aspects, Shevardnadze said the Ministers had agreed on appropriate working groups. On the problems of disarmament, taking account of the U.S. suggestion, there would be a single working group on arms control, with subgroups on various problems. On the Soviet side he suggested Karpov for strategic offensive arms and the ABM Treaty; Botsanov for chemical weapons; Grinevskiy for conventional arms; First Deputy Minister Vorontsov for in-depth discussion of regional issues; and for human rights—which was not to be omitted—Adamishin. Finally they had decided on a small group to discuss bilateral affairs; on the Soviet side there would be Sukhodrev and Sredin. He wished to make sure that all the experts who had been brought in would not be left without work. He was sure the Ministers would be able to invite the experts and those in charge of working groups to consult with them as required.

Thus, Shevardnadze concluded, the program was set. The only adjustment that might be called for concerned the last meeting. It could not last more than an hour and a quarter because of some other planned events. So they would ask the working group leaders to prepare well, in order to set forth their accounts briefly.

*The Secretary* said he had a few comments.

We were in a new year, he said. We needed to take a deep breath and look at the work ahead. There was more to build on than ever before in terms of the confidence that accomplishment can bring, the

confidence gained as we show we can resolve issues and move forward across the big agenda. Our continuing dialogue on human rights has taken a more systematic and satisfactory form, the Secretary continued.

There is immense work to be done on arms control, and the U.S. side is prepared to work hard on all the issues. He thought the main task now was to finish a strategic arms agreement by the Summit. We would have suggestions, and would be prepared to talk on other aspects as well.

With regard to INF ratification, the Secretary said, we had applied ourselves to it very hard, and the Senate committees had as well. We felt it was going well. While it was impossible to know the vote until it was taken, we thought there were 80 votes in hand and counting.

Over the past two and a half years or so the regional dialogue had become increasingly fruitful. He believed there were several issues in a condition where talks could be<sup>2</sup>

The U.S. side was ready, the Secretary said, to look at a joint document to record results, but this depended on the results that would be achieved. We wanted the meetings to be as fruitful as possible. He agreed to the working groups Shevardnadze had proposed: on our sides the chairmen would be Schifter, Nitze, Armacost and Simons. As before, he thought there should be a combination of working groups with a small group where Shevardnadze and he could have others meet with them. On the U.S. side this would consist of General Powell, the President's National Security Advisor, and Ambassador Ridgway. The Ambassadors should have free rein to move among the working groups. They could be floaters, keeping informed of everything. *Shevardnadze* interjected that they could check up on everyone. *The Secretary* went on to recall that the two Ministers would exchange notes on fisheries at 12:45, and then there would be lunch. Beyond that would be work, and we were ready to work.

*Shevardnadze* said they had now discussed all the organizational aspects. If they had a joint statement they could go off to cultural events. *The Secretary* replied that life was not that way. *Shevardnadze* suggested that they get to work.

(At 11:30, with the formation of the working groups, the U.S. side consisted of the Secretary, General Powell, Ambassador Ridgway, Deputy Assistant Secretary Simons and Mr. Zarechnak; the Soviet side consisted of Shevardnadze, Ambassadors Bessmertnykh and Karpov, Special Assistant Tarasenko and Mr. Palazhchenko.)

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<sup>2</sup> The rest of the sentence is cut off in the version on file.

*Shevardnadze* said that with the agenda and procedures settled, they could get to work, and he offered the Secretary the floor. *The Secretary* thanked him.

The Secretary said he wished to begin with human rights. Over the previous two and a half years *Shevardnadze* and he had spent a lot of time discussing this issue. He took pleasure that it had become an established part of their dialogue. The lengthy and deep discussions their respective representatives had had helped clarify their understanding of each other's positions, and the factors behind those positions. The U.S. side had seen quite a number of specific cases resolved, and seen positive trends, such as the expansion of emigration from the Soviet Union. This was consistent with the objectives the Soviet side had set for itself, and we welcomed that.

Thus, the Secretary went on, their talks had been useful. And the U.S. side wanted to make them more so. It wanted to make them as extensive as possible. It wanted to involve a wide range of participants on both sides. For example, the U.S. side was anxious to talk to people who were directly responsible for emigration policy.

But we would always also be looking for the bottom line, the Secretary went on. We would be asking ourselves what specifically was taking place. As we evaluated progress, and there had clearly been movement forward, we thought that one reason was progress on human rights. We had already accomplished more than many people would have predicted three years ago was possible. And a major factor on our sides in the successes we had achieved had frankly been the movement that had taken place within the Soviet Union with respect to human rights. As *Shevardnadze* had talked, and as the General Secretary had talked, all of us on the U.S. side had gained the feeling that something important was going on.

The Soviet side had thus raised expectations, the Secretary said, and it was important that those expectations not be disappointed.

The Secretary said he thought that to the extent there was continued, significant, visible progress on human rights, it would continue to be a supportive element in other areas of mutual interest. But to the extent people felt things were slowing down, that the results were not commensurate with the expectations, or that our dialogue was being used to avoid the real issues, it would hold us back.

The U.S. side fully recognized that, as the General Secretary had suggested, this had to be a two-way street, and it was prepared to talk. It recognized that what the Soviet Union was doing was consistent with Soviet laws and self-interest, and welcomed this, because it would provide a secure foundation for further movement. It saw no reason why the concerns it had expressed with respect to emigration procedures, decriminalization of political and religious freedom of expres-

sion, and people-to-people contacts could not be addressed within the context of what it understood to be the Soviet leadership's efforts to invigorate and transform Soviet society. Indeed, it agreed with what was implicit in the General Secretary's statements: that these things were good for Soviet society. We thought he was right.

As to the specifics of our dialogue on human rights, the Secretary went on, he was pleased that we had established a regular channel through our Embassy in Moscow for review of individual cases. He would propose that such reviews take place before each of the Ministers' forthcoming meetings, so that when they got to a meeting they could focus on what might be done.

The Secretary continued that when Ambassador Schifter started his discussions he would be particularly interested in taking up some disturbing reports that emigration regulations were being applied in such a manner as to discourage new applications and keep departures at an artificially low level, particularly with respect to Jewish emigration. That was exactly the kind of development that could have a negative impact, and we would want to discuss it. There was the impression of a slowdown.

Assistant Secretary Schifter would also be prepared to respond to the specific proposals made by Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin to Deputy Secretary Whitehead last fall on cooperative activities in the human rights area, the Secretary said.

Finally, the Secretary continued, before the Ministers moved to other areas of their agenda, he wished to raise a small number of cases to which he hoped Shevardnadze would give his personal association. In doing so he wished to express on his own behalf and on behalf of the President appreciation for the fact that Shevardnadze and the General Secretary had addressed similar cases that the U.S. side had raised in the past. He remembered that Shevardnadze and he had discussed such cases in tense surroundings a year and a half before, and he was sure Shevardnadze did too, since he had seen results. He had a small list to present, with biographic material. He hoped Shevardnadze would give it his personal attention. Two of the cases were marked with asterisks; the Secretary had met the American halves in Seattle and Palm Beach recently. On divided spouses and blocked marriages, the U.S. side saw no reason why they could not be resolved. It would like to see them knocked off the agenda, cleaned up. He hoped Shevardnadze could give him some good news at some point. He thought the names would be familiar.

*Shevardnadze* said that the day before he had also been thinking about which topic to begin with, and he too had thought of human rights. He agreed that the discussion of what the Soviet side called humanitarian problems was a positive aspect of U.S.-Soviet relations.



The tone of it had made it possible to obtain dividends, the solution of certain problems. Positive experience had been accumulated. The Foreign Ministry and the State Department had a certain pattern of experience. Knowledgeable experts on both sides prepared proposals for the governments when a decision at government level was needed.

He would not go on about what was happening in the Soviet Union, Shevardnadze continued. He knew the Secretary read about it. He had read Mikhail Gorbachev's book, as Shevardnadze had noted with pleasure when the Secretary had written him. The tasks the Soviet side set for itself were not inconsistent with its international obligations. It did not wish to stop either. There could be constructive U.S.-Soviet cooperation. The Soviet side did not want to confine this to contacts between the Foreign Ministries. It had proposed a special machinery for contacts between the parliaments, a special group which could discuss urgent questions. Mikhail Gorbachev had emphasized this to the Secretary, and Shevardnadze had too. He knew this was for Congress to decide, but it would be good if it could be accelerated. The Soviet side was for such discussions not only in camera; it would be good to have it in public. *The Secretary* replied that it was a good proposal, that it should be worked out.

*Shevardnadze* said he had some more comments to make.

The Soviet side had seen the report that the State Department made to the Congress on human rights, he went on. It was not just on the Soviet Union; it was general. But on the Soviet Union, he believed it was selective and tendentious. The Soviet side did not think it was a right thing for our relations. The two sides had people who could discuss these matters, who could have sounder analysis. When the Soviet side saw such unobjective and tendentious things, it complicated efforts to cooperate. The Soviet side laid no claim to participate. That was up to the State Department. But it did believe that the U.S. side should reflect more objectively on the situation in this very sensitive area, that it should act in a more subtle and delicate way.

As a matter of principle, Shevardnadze went on, the Soviet side had the sincere intention to work not only with the U.S. but with all of Europe. He would remind the Secretary once again of the proposal for a human rights forum. The U.S. had not always taken an objective stance on this proposal. It should review its approach. The Soviet side did not want competition with Britain and France over such proposals. It thought meetings could be distributed to all three, including to Paris for the anniversary of the French Revolution. It would like to persuade the U.S. that it needed to have a meeting involving all participants, involving members of the public, discussing the issues in an open, frank manner, so that the situation could be presented and plans to democratize described.

*The Secretary* said that the human rights report had been prepared under Ambassador Schifter's direction. Schifter would be ready to discuss it with Adamishin, to go over wherever the Soviet side thought something had been improperly stated.

With regard to the Moscow conference, the Secretary went on, the U.S. side had no objection to it in principle. We had tried to set out in Vienna the behavioral things we would need to see before hand. We agreed that competition with the UK and France was not needed. The issue should be considered on its merits. We were prepared to keep an open mind on the subject. Shevardnadze said the two sides should think about it. The Soviet side did not want a conference at any price. They should try to find a reasonable procedure. It was sure one could be found. The Secretary said we would consider this. The points the U.S. side had made should be seen in terms of the General Secretary's program for the country. We did not think they were inconsistent with what he had written in his very important book. Shevardnadze said that in that case there was no disagreement, since the suggestion had been made in light of his pronouncements.

Shevardnadze recalled that the last time he and the Secretary had met he had raised the need for a delicate approach to nationalities problems in the Soviet Union and the United States. The Secretary had seemed to understand. But now these problems were being used by the Administration. This was true with respect to the Baltic Republics. Raising this on the part of the American side was without substance, and evoked protests from the Baltic peoples and the Soviet people in general. Propaganda was being made, the Secretary and the President had made statements in a spirit that should be a thing of the past. This was true not just for arms control. The approaches were outdated, from twenty or thirty years before. Now there was a new generation, new conditions. He urged the Secretary to look at these questions again.

Third, Shevardnadze said, the Soviet side had been examining seriously the families and cases the American side raised and, within Soviet laws, trying to resolve them. It had communications from U.S. citizens as well as the U.S. Government. It tried to respond.

But, Shevardnadze said, the converse was not true about Soviet presentations to the U.S. about Nazi war criminals. Soviet people were concerned with this. He had raised the case of the Brazinskis brothers three or four times with the Secretary. There had not been an answer even at the expert level. The Secretary had said that this was a two-way street. The Soviet side needed a response, a responsible manner, from U.S. agencies. The General Secretary had raised the question of the refusal of U.S. agencies to grant visas to Soviet trade union delegations. These people were not military, or terrorists. They represented workers, they represented intellectuals. This had been raised at various levels, including the General Secretary.

Not enough was being done in the Soviet Union, Shevardnadze continued. There would soon be a general conference to discuss democratization here. But the U.S. side should recognize the potential for change for itself too. The Soviet side thought death sentences for minors were inappropriate; intellectuals and academics had expressed that to him. That was why parliaments should discuss such issues. The Soviet side had raised the problems of the homeless and the aged in the U.S. It thought they were acute. When the General Secretary was in Washington he had received dozens of invitations to see how the homeless lived and died. He did not want to spoil the atmosphere of the Summit. But the problem was there.

The Soviet side said often that it was wrong that the U.S. had not adopted human rights covenants. This was an issue for the working group. But the Soviet side had counted more than twenty, adopted by the UN and by other states, to which the U.S. had not adhered.

Shevardnadze continued that he had read a great deal written in the U.S. about the psychiatric problem in the Soviet Union. The Soviet side had invited experts, lawyers, to see if anything illegal was going on, to see if there were one fact to sustain the charges. If there were, the Soviet side was ready to be held accountable, if there were abuse, illegal use of psychiatric institutions against the rights of people.

But, Shevardnadze continued, he would like to feel that the U.S. side heeded Soviet remarks about U.S. practices too. The Soviet side had lots of material. There were brutal violations of the human rights of individuals in many regions of the Secretary's country. The Soviet side looked at the U.S. side's, the U.S. side should look at the Soviet side's in an objective way. It had information that there were up to three million homeless in the U.S., including a third with children. This meant the lack of any assurance of social protection.

In the last meeting his colleagues had mentioned the problem of the U.S. black population, Shevardnadze continued. There was not one black Senator, and yet blacks were 12% of the population. There was not one black governor. With regard to discrimination, the U.S. side believed its laws were not discriminatory. Shevardnadze said he believed a lot of them were discriminatory as regards women. This should be examined. Studies showed that they were paid less, 33 percent less, for the same work. Soviet people looked at this material, and found it bizarre, something out of the Middle Ages. It showed that 60% of working mothers were in businesses where they got no benefits. Most of them got no paid maternity leave when a child is born. The Secretary should not be surprised if he had looked at this material.

Or take the Native Americans, Shevardnadze went on. As a historian by education he knew that 200 years ago there had been ten million of them, and now there were one million. This was of interest to Soviets,

who lived in a multiethnic state that helped small ethnic groups to maintain themselves and move forward. America was a powerful country. It could afford to take a different attitude to one million people, to give more attention to their needs. And not just the Soviets said so, but others as well.

Or take persecution of beliefs. Adamishin would be raising this issue. The U.S. side said there were political prisoners in the Soviet Union, but based on American statutes there would be just seventeen of them in the Soviet Union, and how many were there in the U.S.?

The Soviet side would like to approach human rights in a substantive way, Shevardnadze said. He was ready to make it the first item of the agenda, to take it up in further meetings. He thought there had been progress. But there should also be reciprocity, fairness. These were sensitive issues. The Secretary should not be surprised if certain complaints were addressed to him.

Shevardnadze noted he had conducted a monologue.

*The Secretary* said he welcomed Shevardnadze's comments on the importance of these issues, and his proposal to put them at the top of the agenda when the two ministers meet. He noted Shevardnadze's comments on the U.S. Schifter was ready to respond to them. Sometimes Soviet information was not adequate. Sometimes the criticisms were deserved. The U.S. side wanted to do better, and if the Soviet side could help by pointing up things, this would be all to the good. Societies progress by criticism, and this should certainly be a two-way street.

*Shevardnadze* reiterated that these were sensitive issues. They should be discussed in a cautious, careful way. They could be discussed, but we had to be careful.

*The Secretary* agreed, and asked if General Powell or Ambassador Ridgway had any comments. *Shevardnadze* joked that Powell probably thought only of arms control. *Powell* said that was not true at all. *The Secretary* said Ridgway might have some fierce views on human rights.

*Powell* said that what was beautiful about U.S. society was that it criticized itself more fiercely than the Soviets did. There was no black Senator now, but there had been one, and there were over thirty black Congressmen. There had been a great increase in black participation in state and local government in recent years, and Hispanic and Native American as well as black. Ridgway could probably go on about women. The point was that we welcomed criticism. It was through criticism that we improved.

*Shevardnadze* said he doubted Americans criticized themselves more fiercely than Soviets criticized themselves. One has only to read Mikhail Gorbachev's book. When he had spoken of women, he had not been speaking of Assistant Secretary Ridgway. But he still wondered why women received 35 percent less for equal work.

*Ambassador Ridgway* said Shevardnadze was using the figure for equivalent work, for the difference between a secretary's and a truck-driver's salary. Whether the two jobs were equivalent and deserved equal pay was hotly disputed. But there were laws providing that two secretaries, two truckdrivers, two traffic directors, if they were man and woman, could not be paid differently. Americans were grappling with the different problem of equivalent work. Her own view might not be typical on that score.

*Shevardnadze* suggested that the two sides continue this discussion. *Bessmertnykh* insisted that Shevardnadze was using equal work figures, based on American statistics. *The Secretary* commented that statistics are sometimes hard to use. Broadly speaking, in the U.S. system it was the market that determined how much pay would be needed to get a job done. Putting women and ethnic Americans aside for the moment, we were facing an interesting inversion of the job market. The structure historically had been that white collar workers, who had more education, were paid more. But as society shifted and education spread, the garbage man was now getting a lot more than the office worker even though he had less education. The reason was that not many people wanted to do that job, and people had to be paid a lot to do it. The question was asked, "How can you pay a garbage man more than a computer specialist in an office?" The reason was that you paid what it took to get the job done and done well. That illustrated Ridgway's point. Shevardnadze's statistics were from somebody's idea of what the relationship ought to be, but that was just someone's idea.

The Secretary concluded that it would be fruitful to get such issues out on the table in the working groups, and to discuss them more in the ministers' meetings.

*Shevardnadze* said they should direct their experts to do more in-depth discussion; if the ministers continued all the other questions would be set aside.

*The Secretary* said he would like to raise some different topics. He proposed that on arms control they begin with INF and NRRRC's, but he would also have some suggestions on how to go about strategic arms talks in order to maximize our chances of success.

On INF, the Secretary continued, there had been enough discussion with and among members of the Senate for us to be quite confident of favorable Senate action on the Treaty, and we believed it would be taken by the end of April. We had set up a new office of On-Site Inspection in the Pentagon. It had hosted the Soviets, and would be sending people to the Soviet Union. This was moving. The Secretary welcomed the technical talks that would take place over the next few weeks. It was essential to keep going, so that we could have the physical sites ready, so that when the Treaty entered into force we would be

organized in a proper way. Still, this was going well; he merely wished to take note of it.

On nuclear risk reduction centers, the Secretary continued, we were well along in our preparations. He had with him our NRRC Director, Allan Holmes, who would be happy to meet and talk with the Soviet side. That would help the two sides with many aspects of their work, including making the treaties work.

Turning to START, the Secretary said it was important to recognize that we had accomplished a great deal over the previous year. We had worked very hard at the Washington Summit, and the statement agreed there records progress that two or three years before people would have thought it impossible to achieve. The credit belonged to the two leaders. They had put their backs to it, and achieved a great deal.

Our leaders were on record that they wanted to complete a START Treaty in the first half of this year, the Secretary continued. We wanted it to be well and carefully done, but it was doable. The job was to get at it.

The INF Treaty had been well received because it was carefully drafted and included sound verification provisions. He remembered that when he had taken it and distributed it to the U.S.'s partners in NATO, they had been astonished at how thorough the verification provisions were. START would have to meet the same rigorous standards, and would be more difficult than INF. But it was still doable.

The Secretary said it was useful to recall what had already been agreed in START:

- 6000 warheads;
- 1600 strategic missiles and bombers;
- 4900 ballistic missile warheads;
- 1540 warheads on 154 heavy ICBM's;
- a throwweight ceiling 50 percent below the current Soviet level;
- a bomber weapon counting rule dealing with bombs and short-range missiles; and
- a long list of verification ideas that built upon and went beyond what is in the INF Treaty, including data exchange, various kinds of inspection, and measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means.

That was a very impressive list of accomplishments, the Secretary said. The U.S. side wanted to take advantage of it and bring this to fruition. And our view was that while there were still large items to decide, the most likely difficulty was with verification.

The U.S. view, the Secretary said, was that we need to get back into verification, to get going on it as if we were at the end of the negotiation. Our task is to transform the concepts agreed at the Washington Summit into detailed verification procedures. We had seen in

negotiating the INF Treaty that when we resolved one issue another appeared in its place. This was a pick and shovel task; it would only yield to hard work.

The U.S. Delegation in Geneva, the Secretary continued, had recently tabled a draft Inspection Protocol and a revised Protocol on Conversion of Elimination. He asked that Shevardnadze's people work from these documents to produce agreed texts of these important documents. If they found it necessary, they might want to draft their own text. The essential point was that we promptly negotiate these two key documents. We should propose to ourselves to maximize progress on joint drafting of the Protocols before we two ministers meet again. They should set the objective of having Shevardnadze's trip to Washington be the focus for getting them into as good a shape as we could.

The Secretary continued that the U.S. side had seen in discussions with the Senate that these issues come to the fore; they take up a high proportion of the total time. Arms control agreements had to pass severe tests—in the negotiating process, in ratification, and while they were in force. Verification and compliance were essential if START were to measure up to these tests.

We had seen in INF that there were many different numbers involved, the Secretary continued. START would be even more difficult. When they had talked in Washington, they had agreed that the START verification approach would include data exchanges, including declarations by each side of the number and location of weapons systems and associated facilities. We wanted to begin the process, and were prepared to be forthcoming *now*, the Secretary emphasized. We had learned from the INF experience that this important subject should not be left to the last minute. The U.S. side was prepared to table a draft Memorandum of Understanding in Geneva the next week.

This draft MOU would provide for the kinds of data that were contained in the INF MOU, but expanded and adapted to the much more demanding task of START.

The U.S. side was prepared to begin exchanging the data in Geneva that would be contained in the START MOU before the two ministers met the next month.

The Secretary said he was emphasizing this because it was important to get ahead of the curve if the two sides were to complete the task. So that was one part of what he was proposing that day—getting started right away on the data that were necessary for a START Treaty, as was agreed in Washington. He had said it was needed to avoid a last-minute rush, but far more was needed in the case of the START Treaty.

As the Soviet and U.S. sides jointly thought through the problem of how to verify a START Treaty, the Secretary went on, where they



did not have the advantages of a zero outcome, and where they had to verify with confidence the size of the remaining forces on both sides, the U.S. side believed that both would need to know much more than they now did about how each acquired, deployed and maintained strategic forces.

If they were successfully to verify, they needed to understand that better than they did now. That was true across the board, but it was especially true with regard to mobile missiles. The U.S. side agreed that they had things to be said for them, but they also presented verification problems.

The overall problem had two aspects. One was to have a better understanding of the magnitude of the on-site inspection tasks the sides would have to contemplate understanding. They were going to put this in place for INF, but that would be small in comparison to START, and the two sides needed to begin doing the things they would need to do.

The U.S. side thought that meant they would need to know more about each other's production plans and procedures, about each other's maintenance requirements and practices, and how each side replaced items which were used, wore out, or became obsolete, in order to make it possible to establish nodes at which periodic or random checks or perhaps permanent monitoring that might assure adequate confidence that ceilings would not be exceeded.

The U.S. side recognized that this would be very sensitive and difficult, the Secretary said. Our own military was swallowing and perspiring, asking what it was getting into. He had told them that if we wanted the Treaty that was the implication: the Soviet Union needed to know more and vice versa. If this was not possible, the military should blow the whistle. And it had not. *General Powell* said the military was having a bad time. *Shevardnadze* commented that U.S. military people must be very emotional.

*The Secretary* concluded that he had wished to call attention to these proposals on data exchange. He suggested that the two ministers instruct the delegations to shape up the three documents by the time the ministers met in March.

*Shevardnadze* said he would respond after lunch.<sup>3</sup> (The meeting concluded at 12:45 p.m.)

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 122.

**122. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, February 21, 1988, 2:40–5:40 p.m.

**SUBJECTS**

Defense & Space; SLCM's; ALCM's; Backfire; mobile missiles; Nuclear Testing;  
CW; summit timing

*Participants**U.S.*

The Secretary

National Security Advisor Powell

Ambassador Ridgway

Ambassador Matlock

EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)

Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

*U.S.S.R.*

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh

Ambassador Karpov

Ambassador Medvedev

Shevardnadze Counselor Tarasenko

MFA Notetaker

MFA Interpreter

*Defense and Space*

Shevardnadze opened the meeting by indicating he would like to endorse the Secretary's remarks before lunch on the significance of the INF Treaty. Moscow remained convinced, however, that INF was only the first step.

As to the Secretary's comments on the establishment of the On Site Inspection Agency, Shevardnadze could tell him that the Soviet side was in the final stages of setting up a similar agency and would soon be in a position to provide details. The entity would be composed of experts from both the defense and foreign ministries.

Shevardnadze noted that the Secretary in his remarks had referred a number of times to the Washington Summit Joint Statement. That was appropriate. In Washington it had been possible to agree on the main lines of a future treaty. A lot of work had been done before that in Geneva and by the two ministers; some work had been done since in Geneva. The Soviet side wanted to work in a businesslike fashion,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow—Feb 88—Shultz/Shev. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in the Guesthouse of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

and had given its delegation the instructions they needed to meet the task of completing a treaty on fifty percent reductions in strategic arms in the context of preserving the ABM Treaty, as had been agreed in Washington.

Shevardnadze noted that the two sides often accused the other's delegations in Geneva of passivity. But, to a degree, such charges suggested that the ministers themselves were not doing enough. In that context, the Soviet side had welcomed certain recent positive moves by the U.S. delegation, and had made some of its own. Nonetheless, if a treaty were to be achieved, the momentum thus far was inadequate. So Shevardnadze endorsed the Secretary's call for accelerated work in all areas.

Verification, Shevardnadze acknowledged, was the most difficult, sensitive and important set of issues. Moscow was prepared to examine every aspect of the question in a very positive way.

Parallel to that, however, one had to identify clearly the main obstacles to concluding a treaty. What were the fundamental political decisions which would be needed? That was where the Secretary and Shevardnadze should engage.

If the Secretary agreed with that proposition, the key became to clarify the future of the ABM Treaty. Shevardnadze said that, in reading reports from Geneva, he had the impression it was becoming central. If there were no such understanding, there would be no START treaty.

The fundamental approach, Shevardnadze recalled, had been worked out in Washington. The question of the duration of a non-withdrawal pledge had been discussed. The General Secretary had raised the possibility of a compromise in the Soviet position. But there had been agreement that, for a given period, neither side would withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Recent U.S. proposals in Geneva were disturbing in this regard. Indeed, the title of the U.S. draft treaty suggested an attempt to move away from the agreement reached in Washington. Shevardnadze did not intend to analyze the U.S. proposal, but he did want to stress that it was inconsistent with the Washington Joint Statement.<sup>2</sup> The matter should be reviewed in Washington. The ABM Treaty should be preserved as signed in 1972 and ratified by the U.S. Senate and Supreme Soviet, as had been agreed at the summit. Yet the thrust of the U.S. draft treaty was not to preserve the Treaty, but to return to the "old" U.S. approach of seeking Soviet agreement that *any* work short of deployment of actual ABM systems was consistent with the Treaty. The Soviet side disagreed with this approach, which was simply inconsistent with preserving the ABM Treaty.

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 125.

Shevardnadze suggested that it would be useful to have a more detailed discussion of the matter with Gorbachev the next day.<sup>3</sup> The Foreign Minister hoped that the Secretary would be able to give a definitive answer as to whether the U.S. was prepared to continue to work on the basis of the Washington understandings. If so, Shevardnadze was convinced that mutually acceptable formulations could be found.

Another problem which deserved attention, Shevardnadze continued, was violations of the ABM Treaty—an “old story.” The Soviet side was sure that the U.S. was concerned that no violations of the Treaty take place (NOTE: Shevardnadze gave the impression of speaking in the context of the non-withdrawal period). But there were ways of dealing with such contingencies—either through existing bodies or others. Defense Ministers, for example, could take up alleged violations in detail. Shevardnadze did not want to reopen old discussions (NOTE: Here, the implication seemed to be discussions of “permitted/prohibited activities”). But thought should be given to using existing mechanisms, including meetings of Defense Ministers, as well as considering how new ones might make a contribution.

Concluding his presentation, Shevardnadze noted that the Secretary had focused in his opening remarks on START verification. Shevardnadze had started with the ABM Treaty to emphasize the need for clarity here if there were to be a START Treaty.

THE SECRETARY welcomed Shevardnadze’s agreement that the two sides should work hard on verification even as they addressed other issues. He suggested that delegations in Geneva be instructed to complete work on the data exchange MOU and two protocols by the time of the ministers’ March meeting. Giving them a deadline would impart a sense of urgency to their work. The Secretary said he had the impression Shevardnadze agreed to this approach.

SHEVARDNADZE said that he had not specifically addressed the question of focusing on verification in START because it seemed quite agreeable to him. MEDVEDEV interjected that the Soviet side would soon be making proposals based on those already tabled by the U.S.

THE SECRETARY said that this was good. As for the ABM Treaty, it would be good to have an agreement on the issues involved there in parallel with START. We believed that such an agreement should be separate from a START treaty, but both should be pressed. The fact that there would be an agreed period for START reductions and for non-withdrawal suggested there was a relationship. We did not like the idea of attaching the two, but we had no problem with a treaty which

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 125.

contained important substance. As for what to call it, the Secretary was certain that some sort of satisfactory descriptive title could be found.

Violations, the Secretary agreed, were something the Defense Ministers might take up. We would have to see what came of their first discussion. The Soviet side knew how strongly the U.S. felt about these issues.

THE SECRETARY said that it should be possible to reach agreement. We were already in the “ballpark.” We had worked out what would happen when the non-withdrawal period was over, i.e., the ABM Treaty would remain in force, but each side could give six months notice of its intention to withdraw. We had put the General Secretary’s words on this point in the Washington Joint Statement; now we should put them in a treaty.

The Secretary said he was aware that there since had been an argument in Geneva over whether during the non-withdrawal period the sides would be able to exercise the “supreme national interest” provision of the ABM Treaty. This was standard language used in all treaties. It was not an expression on our part of any intention to withdraw. The Secretary could not help but believe that, in the end, the Soviet side could accept such a standard formulation.

The most difficult issue, the Secretary continued, was what activities would take place during the non-withdrawal period. Various formulations had been tried in Washington before the language of the Joint Statement had been agreed. The Secretary noted that Shevardnadze in his remarks had used the formula, “as ratified by the U.S. Senate and the Supreme Soviet.” This suggested an acknowledgement that there was a difference in the two sides’ understanding on this point even in 1972, which, however, was not a major issue because of unclarity with respect to the meaning of the “other physical principles” language of the Treaty. We had subsequently come to the conclusion that the Soviet view at the time was the correct one.

But it probably would not be useful to get into a legalistic analysis of the problem. As a general proposition, the President believed that the U.S. should be free to test and determine if strategic defense was feasible. We realized that the General Secretary had a different view. To some extent, they had agreed to disagree on this point as long as there was an agreed period of non-withdrawal which would provide a sense of predictability.

In that regard, the U.S. felt there had been some progress in Geneva. We had proposed a package of confidence building measures. The Soviet side had not agreed to discuss these, but Shevardnadze in his comments on verification seemed to have picked up some of our ideas. Perhaps our proposals for such things as annual exchanges of information, access to tests, and laboratory visits—coupled with an agreed

non-withdrawal period—could help provide predictability during that period.

As for other issues, the Secretary believed that everything would fall into place if it were possible to deal with the question of what was permitted during the non-withdrawal period. The Soviet side was familiar with the President's views on this matter. We agreed on the importance of the ABM area, and on the need to have it treated in some way, although not as part of a START treaty.

POWELL endorsed the Secretary's comments, and pointed out that the difficult issue was activities necessary to conduct ongoing national programs on both sides during the non-withdrawal period. Other elements of an agreement, he agreed, were already in place. He noted that the two sides seemed to be close together on the length of the non-withdrawal period and what happened thereafter.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the latter point was clear. Negotiations would begin three years before the end of the non-withdrawal period. The Washington Joint Statement had dealt with the issue.

THE SECRETARY suggested that, as a general proposition, it would be well to stick with the language of the Joint Statement in approaching this issue in Geneva. SHEVARDNADZE agreed that this was a good approach. Noting that it would be difficult to come to an understanding of the Joint Statement's language, the SECRETARY proposed that the Geneva negotiators be instructed to work on this basis, but acknowledged that, ultimately, the task would devolve to himself and Shevardnadze.

SHEVARDNADZE cautioned against reopening in such a context a discussion of what was and was not permitted by the ABM Treaty. This would rekindle an old argument. Rather, the negotiators should focus on a verification regime which would provide predictability.

The Foreign Minister proposed that it be recorded that delegations should work on the basis of the understandings reflected in the Washington Joint Statement.

THE SECRETARY said that Shevardnadze's suggestion for putting those understandings in the context of verification might be something that could be built on. POWELL endorsed this idea, noting that it went to the confidence building problem.

SHEVARDNADZE said that it would be well if the delegations worked on this basis.

*SLCM's*

Shevardnadze introduced what he referred to as another "fundamental" problem—SLCM's. Moscow knew the U.S. arguments regarding verification. The Soviets agreed it would not be easy. Gorbachev

in Washington had alluded to existing devices which could be used to facilitate verification. The Joint Statement had contained important provisions on national technical means (NTM) and on site inspection (OSI). If these means were used, and the necessary political decisions were made, it would be possible to resolve all other matters.

Shevardnadze was sure the issue would come up with Gorbachev the following morning, because it had been the subject of several meetings of the Soviet leadership. If it were not resolved, it would be impossible to resolve the general question of strategic arms limitations. So Shevardnadze hoped that the Secretary had brought some new ideas.

He emphasized that what was needed was a political decision. As with the concept of 50% strategic arms reductions, once such a decision was made, the methodology would follow. The same was true with cruise missiles. Once there was agreement on ceilings, verification methods could be found. If there were differences, they could be resolved. So SLCM's should be addressed in this framework. Ceilings were necessary, moreover, on both nuclear and conventionally armed SLCM's.

THE SECRETARY reminded Shevardnadze that the START treaty was about strategic *nuclear* weapons. It had nothing to do with conventional weapons. There was no way that the U.S. would agree to limitations on our conventional cruise missiles, whether air or sea launched. He felt the need to make this clear as a matter of principle.

As for verification, as the U.S. viewed it, the generic problem was a difficult one. That was why we had proposed, and Shevardnadze had now agreed, that we should start work now on the issues involved.

But there were different orders of difficulty as between systems. Mobile missiles were more difficult to verify than other missiles. SLCM's were the most difficult of all. We had given the matter much thought. While we were not convinced we would be able to verify a mobile missile limit, we had been able to identify at least conceptually an approach to the problem.

With SLCM's we were still at sea. We had no objection to limiting SLCM's if the Soviet side were willing to accept a declaration that they would be limited to a specific level. We did not like that approach, but we were willing to take it. The Soviets could be sure that Congress would make us live up to any agreements we made. We would prefer something more verifiable, but the problem appeared intractable.

We had considered the possibility of using NTM to determine the presence of nuclear SLCM's aboard ships, but we had concluded it would not work. We had the impression that the Soviet side had of late reached a similar conclusion. It was too difficult to distinguish between nuclear power plants and missiles. There were ways of shielding.



As for OSI, it had serious drawbacks, especially as regarded submarines. There was great reluctance on the part of the U.S. Navy, and the Secretary sensed similar reluctance on the Soviet side, to having people from the other side roaming around their subs.

So this was a problem. We could not be as confident as we could be even as regarded mobile missiles, which was also open to question. We were prepared to treat the problem of SLCM's. We were prepared to treat the problem of a limit. We were prepared to live up to any commitments. But verification had us baffled.

POWELL, in response to the Secretary's invitation to comment, reinforced the Secretary's affirmation that conventional cruise missiles, whether air or sea launched, were not on the table.

SHEVARDNADZE challenged the U.S. side to read the Washington Joint Statement on that point, and proceeded to read the Statement's language on SLCM's. When he reached the words "nuclear armed" he hesitated, said he was sorry, and mumbled that he hadn't noticed that before.

THE SECRETARY reiterated that the U.S. was prepared to agree to a limit on nuclear armed SLCM's, and was willing to work to find a satisfactory means of verifying such a limit. We had not yet found such means. We had no special insights. Powell and the Secretary had met with the U.S. Navy the week before in Washington. The Navy had reaffirmed its lack of confidence on this point. They had not said it could not be done. But they could not imagine how to do the job.

The Secretary said that there was agreement between the two sides on the importance of SLCM's and on setting a limit. We were willing to set a number. But how to verify the number was a big problem.

SHEVARDNADZE volunteered to summarize what had been said. The two sides seemed to be ready in Geneva to begin a discussion of SLCM limits, including specific numbers. The Soviet side had already proposed a number; the U.S. should follow suit. Specific types of submarines and surface ships on which SLCM's would be deployed should be identified. Again, Moscow had already made proposals. Expert groups should be established to deal with verification, including by means of NTM and OSI. They could report any progress to ministers at their March meeting.

In short, on the one hand what was needed were political decisions on SLCM numbers and types of vessels; and, parallel to this, a serious discussion of verification. Why could the U.S. not provide a number? The two sides needed to proceed on two tracks.

THE SECRETARY observed that ceilings were one thing, types of ships were another. We were not prepared to go down that track, because of our neither-confirm-nor-deny policy. We were thus leary of defining which types of warships carried nuclear weapons.

SHEVARDNADZE protested that nothing was impossible. That was the Soviet approach to arms control and other types of questions. Moscow had proposed that two types of submarines and one type of surface ship be designated. But the issue could be revisited. What was needed was a decision in principle.

THE SECRETARY said that, as a matter of principle, the U.S. was not prepared to say that we would designate specific types of warships which carry nuclear-armed SLCM's. We were willing to work on verification, but we wanted the Soviet side to have no question as to our doubts on the matter.

KARPOV said that Moscow had only felt that designating ships was the simplest approach to the problem. THE SECRETARY said he was only pointing out the problems with it.

SHEVARDNADZE urged the Secretary to give the matter further thought. This was a problem for both sides. Summarizing, he said that the discussion had produced three areas which required decisions in principle. If these could not be made during the present visit, perhaps they could be revisited in March. It was good that the U.S. was prepared to agree on a ceiling. Perhaps the working groups could discuss this. Shevardnadze proposed saying that, in principle, the two sides agreed that there should be a ceiling.

After consulting with Powell, THE SECRETARY agreed.

#### *ALCM's*

SHEVARDNADZE said that there also appeared to be some confusion with respect to ALCM's. He was not sure who was to blame for this. He was sure it was not the Soviet negotiators.

The question was counting—an important question. The delegations should find a way to resolve it. What was at stake was the U.S. insistence on using a very low number for counting weapons on a single bomber. The Soviet side knew that U.S. bombers were equipped to carry much larger numbers of ALCM's. Taking this into account, the actual number of ALCM's on heavy bombers would be well in excess of the number to be counted on bombers within the 6,000 START warhead limit. The correct number was the maximum number of cruise missiles for which a bomber was equipped. This was a proven method.

There was, however, another aspect to the problem—the range question. In the past, both sides had accepted a range of 600 km as the criterion for considering cruise missiles as strategic weapons. Coupled with the U.S. rejection of an 1,100 sublimit on heavy bomber cruise missiles, the higher range figure claimed by the U.S. would give it a significant unilateral advantage. This was a retreat from agreements already reached, and would not work.

THE SECRETARY said that we were prepared to discuss some of the issues Shevardnadze had raised in the working group. As with

SLCM's, the discussion needed to be confined to nuclear cruise missiles. Conventional cruise missiles were not on the table. This was a central point.

We were ready to discuss the range question. On the counting rule, we still have some questions. Our own approach was not a casual one. There were means of determining the capabilities of aircraft. One could go on from there. There appeared to be means of dealing with this problem.

The 1,100 bomber weapons sublimit was a real problem. It seemed to us an unnecessary constraint. If it had been introduced because of Soviet concern over our proposed counting rule, the solution was to deal with the counting rule itself. Perhaps the experts could work on that.

POWELL pointed out that there was no need for the 1,100 sublimit, since, for every bomber weapon we selected, we would have to eliminate one ballistic missile warhead. But this could be addressed in the working group.

THE SECRETARY repeated that the 1,100 limit appeared to have arisen out of concern over the ALCM counting rule. If it were possible to agree on the counting rule, perhaps that would take care of the need for a sublimit.

SHEVARNADZE said, "that's right." It was one thing when an aircraft could carry only six weapons, and another when it could carry twenty. There had to be clarity on this question. The methods were well known. "The geometry is the same geometry." As for distinguishing nuclear cruise missiles from others, Shevardnadze believed the problem could be solved. That, too, could be taken up by experts.

#### *Backfire/Mobiles*

Moving on to a new issue, Shevardnadze said it was time for the American side to drop its insistence on counting the Backfire as a heavy bomber. There were probably excessive demands in the positions of both sides at Geneva, but it was a waste of time to continue to discuss Backfire. There was not time for such discussions, and more important things to discuss. There was no reason to include the Backfire in a treaty.

As for mobile missiles, it appeared that the two sides were approaching a meeting of the minds. If agreement could be reached on a verification scheme, the U.S. proposal for a ban on mobiles could be removed from the table.

THE SECRETARY said that the Backfire *was* in fact a problem. Perhaps the working groups could solve it.

As for mobile missiles, the Secretary wanted first to make a few "philosophical comments." Both sides were attracted to the concept of

mobile missiles for survivability reasons. But the very reason for the survivability of mobiles made it difficult to verify their presence.

When considering how to verify a specific number of mobile missiles, we had come up with certain answers: by limiting the number; by corralling the missiles in ways which compromised to a degree the factor which made them survivable; by getting a better understanding of the other side's operational practices. We, for example, would probably confine mobile missiles to corrals, where we could verify them. One could imagine different doctrines, some of which could be messy. So one needed a clear idea of what was possible, recognizing that there would be a trade-off between those factors which provided for survivability and those which enhanced confidence in verification.

Another question was the problem of non-deployed systems. These could be easily hidden in the case of mobile missiles. This raised questions of monitoring production, keeping track of stocks, etc. Dealing with such problems would require a high degree of intrusiveness. The U.S. assumed that Moscow was ready to allow this.

Thus, the U.S. still believed that a ban on mobiles would be best. But we recognized the investment that the Soviet side had in mobiles. We therefore wanted to expose Shevardnadze to the kinds of considerations we felt had to be addressed in verifying mobile systems. Our own approach had not yet entirely crystalized, but we had concluded that the problems involved were of a lesser magnitude than with SLCM's

SHEVARDNADZE thanked the Secretary for his views. The Foreign Minister had found many interesting and constructive suggestions in what the Secretary had had to say that morning and after lunch. Shevardnadze was certain that Gorbachev would find them equally so, and, rather than try to address them in detail now, he would leave it to the General Secretary.

Shevardnadze could say that he felt the two sides' discussion of the mobile missile issue inspired more optimism than in the past. Once the Soviet side had had a chance to consult with Gorbachev, it would have some suggestions to make. The General Secretary would have more tomorrow. Moscow had followed closely recent U.S. statements on mobiles, including that of Defense Secretary Carlucci. He had had some interesting ideas.

THE SECRETARY said he had another question to raise—sublimits. This was an issue which should be gotten out of the way. There were several numbers which could be dispensed with. The two ministers seemed to agree that the 1,100 ALCM proposal could be dropped if the counting rule question could be dealt with. The U.S. had recently dropped its proposal for a 1,600 limit on highly fractioned missile warheads. (SHEVARDNADZE said Moscow had noticed that.) The

last item on the table was therefore the U.S. proposal for a sublimit on land-based ICBM's. We had proposed 3,000. Akhromeyev in Washington had said that the Soviet Union had no plans to have more than 3,300 ICBM's. We were prepared to agree to a sublimit of 3,300 and put the sublimit question behind us.

SHEVARDNADZE said that that was an interesting suggestion. He asked permission to sleep on it. He first needed to brief Gorbachev on this and other questions.

### *Nuclear Testing*

Noting that time was short, THE SECRETARY proposed that the ministers address nuclear testing before adjourning. Both sides considered this question important. Much headway had been made, starting with Shevardnadze's suggestion in this very room. Since then, there had been exchanges of visits to test ranges. The going was tough, because of the sensitivity of the subject matter, but progress was being made.

As the Secretary saw it, and thinking in terms of a Moscow summit, there were a variety of approaches to the problem which could be considered.

—One would be to announce in Moscow agreement on how to conduct Joint Verification Experiments (JVE).

—Another would be to announce agreement on a protocol, which the U.S. believed could be reached independent of progress on the JVE, which would enable both sides subsequently to present for ratification the 1974 and 1976 treaties on nuclear testing. This approach assumed that the Soviet side would agree that the U.S. could use the CORTEX method for its purposes, the Secretary emphasized.

—A third approach would be more difficult—to complete the protocols very quickly, so that the two sides would be in a position to seek advice and consent on the treaties in time for the instruments of ratification to be signed and exchanged at the summit.

Obviously, the level of ambition varied considerably among the options. The Secretary felt certain agreement could be reached on the JVE. If there were no linkage to the JVE (and, the Secretary noted, it appeared the Soviet delegation was prepared to work on parallel tracks), announcement of a protocol also appeared do-able. But if the two sides wanted to move, the third option was there. If protocols could be done in a month, advice and consent could be sought immediately after action on the INF Treaty. But the protocol had to be ready. So it was up to the Soviets; the U.S. could go for either of the three variants.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the third approach was acceptable. He and the Secretary seemed to be thinking along very similar lines. The Soviet side believed that this was an area where it would be possible to do everything planned even before the President's visit.

Work on the protocol and JVE's was going well, but could be accelerated further. Indeed, Shevardnadze had the impression that the Secretary was reading from his own talking points. So agreement could be recorded in the joint statement on nuclear testing.

A further question, Shevardnadze continued, was whether the two sides could go beyond the scenario the Secretary had described. Could they not, for example, agree to inform one another in advance of any nuclear test? Another possibility would be to limit the number of nuclear tests in a year. Perhaps the U.S. could consider this. Finally, since both sides were now prepared to move on the 1974 and 1976 Treaties, perhaps they could approach other nuclear powers—the British, French and Chinese—to adhere to them. Shevardnadze said he had raised this with British Foreign Secretary Howe, who had given no clear answer. All of this would give added weight to the approach the Secretary had mentioned.

THE SECRETARY said we could agree to speed up work on the protocol. The ministers could instruct their negotiators to complete a text by the March ministerial. As to Shevardnadze's other suggestions, the Secretary said that he would consult with the UK, but that he was not in a position to respond. The question of announcing tests in advance might not be a problem, since we normally announced anyway. We would think about it. A yearly limit was more difficult. We needed to get the two treaties ratified first.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the U.S. should think further about his suggestions. The Soviets had initially adopted a global approach to the testing problem. They had now agreed to seek ratification of the two treaties as a first step. But it would not be inconsistent to have a yearly limit on the number of tests. The U.S. currently did twenty to twenty five per year; the Soviets were not far behind. It would be well to set a number, even if it were a high one. How about eight per year?

THE SECRETARY raised one additional concern—nuclear venting. There was an obligation to prevent such occurrences, but a number of Soviet tests had been a problem. This was a situation which could easily be remedied. The Secretary raised in hopes that it would be possible to eliminate the irritant.

SHEVARDNADZE said he was unaware of the problem. KARPOV said that Soviet experts said there was none. SHEVARDNADZE said that this was another reason to stop testing altogether.

### *Chemical Weapons*

Noting that they had had a good discussion of nuclear testing, and opened up some good possibilities, Shevardnadze asked about chemical weapons.

THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. would like to see as promptly as possible a treaty banning CW. But there were certain issues which

required careful attention: the details of verification, data exchange, how to include all CW-capable states.

The U.S. was ready to work hard. But an example might provide some sense of why we had concerns. The Soviet side had announced CW stocks of 50,000 tons. We had announced in more technical terms where our stocks were located, and what percentage of those stocks were located at each site. We had not provided gross numbers, since, for numbers to mean anything, there had to be agreement on the concept of what was a chemical weapon. Was it the substances themselves? Was it the delivery vehicle? Then, one had to identify the locations of these weapons. Then, one had to deal with the problem of production sites. Stockpile figures could be much larger or smaller depending on the conception one used. And that got into a lot of detail.

So, as the Secretary had grown tired of hearing in the INF end-game, the devil was in the details. The task now was to get on with verification. We also needed to consider how to bring other countries into a detailed discussion. The structure of a treaty was getting there. But it was hard going. We would like to conclude the process, but did not see how it would be possible to move as fast as some had suggested. We really had to dig into the hard work. We would do so as quickly as we could.

SHEVARDNADZE recalled that in Washington President Reagan had joined Gorbachev in a commitment to work toward final conclusion of a CW convention.<sup>4</sup> Shevardnadze said he was always frank with the Secretary, and would be so in this case. It did not appear to be possible to engage as constructively with the U.S. in this as in other areas. Moscow had the impression that the U.S. was not interested in a convention because it would interfere with the start-up of its production of new CW. If there were no convention, and U.S. production continued, the Soviet Union would have to take appropriate measures, including the resumption of its own production. That production had stopped; yet the U.S. had resumed. The amounts were not important. The principle was. Moreover, the U.S. was isolated even from some of its closest allies—the FRG, the UK, Italy.

The problem of verification was admittedly serious. But data exchange should not be a problem. The Soviet Union had made proposals for a multilateral data exchange. It had accepted challenge inspections. There could be no question as to Moscow's desire for a convention.

The Soviets had even opened up their destruction facilities. Some had complained that they had demonstrated only obsolete weapons.

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<sup>4</sup> See Documents 107 and 108.



Shevardnadze had asked whether, when the U.S. showed its own weapons, it had displayed binaries. Should the two sides continue to work in this area? Or should they stop? Clarity was needed.

As for third countries, reasonable proposals had been made for dealing with the problem. A convention might come into effect only upon adherence of a certain number of states, or there might be a suspension period before entry into force.

For now, a more constructive overall approach was needed. In contrast to other areas, the U.S. position with respect to CW was simply unsatisfactory. Only the U.S. and France opposed an early convention. Production had to be terminated. The U.S. could not enjoy forever a monopoly on production.

Noting that Shevardnadze seemed to be seeking a clarification of the U.S. position, THE SECRETARY said he would try again. When he had served in the Nixon cabinet, the Secretary recalled, the U.S. had ceased CW production. No one else stopped.

The U.S. position today was exactly what it had been then. We were in favor of a ban. We believed CW proliferation was a profoundly dangerous tendency. We were ready to work hard on the problem. But we also were faced with the need to bring our own deterrent up to date to make up for the period when we had no production. Should an agreement be signed, all our stocks would be subject to its provisions.

SHEVARDNADZE called on the Secretary to look more closely at the problem. There was no way to tell how long the convention would drag on. In the meantime the U.S. was acquiring new stocks. What was the Soviet Union to do? The history the Secretary had recalled was past history. The Soviet Union had stopped production. If the U.S. was worried about numbers, it should work to conclude a convention. Procrastination was inappropriate and contrary to both sides' interest.

Perhaps, Shevardnadze concluded, the issue could be discussed in detail during their next meeting.

THE SECRETARY said that he and the Minister could argue about binaries. As for procrastination, the U.S. wanted to move as quickly as possible. (SHEVARDNADZE interjected that, in that case, it should halt production of binaries.) THE SECRETARY said that the issue was extremely difficult. The U.S. was at a disadvantage because of the decade-long hiatus in its production. We needed a temporary deterrent. We believed our binary program could well prove a spur to negotiations.

SHEVARDNADZE offered to give the U.S. 25,000 tons of CW.

THE SECRETARY emphasized that no purpose was to be served by focusing on binaries. The U.S. was ready to focus on a treaty. We were doing so in Geneva.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the ministers discuss in detail during their next meeting means of bringing the convention to a conclusion. Perhaps during the President's visit to Moscow it would be possible to make a statement on the need to accelerate work on a convention. If the U.S. and Soviet Union could prepare a sound document, it would be a positive step.

THE SECRETARY agreed to consider the idea.

#### *Summit Timing*

After a brief discussion of the agenda for that evening's session, the Secretary raised the question of the timing of the President's visit to Moscow. He pointed out that, over lunch, Soviet representatives had raised with members of his delegation the possibility of a mid-June summit. This would be too late for the President, due to commitments already on his June calendar. The latest he could consider would be the last part of May. We would prefer the week before the last week in May, i.e., the week of May 23. But an alternative could be the week beginning May 30. We were aware of the importance of allowing sufficient time to complete work underway for the summit, and had no desire to schedule the visit any earlier.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would consult on this point with Gorbachev. Perhaps it would be possible to clarify the matter the next day.

After further discussion of the evening's agenda, the meeting concluded.

## 123. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, February 21, 1988, 8:45 p.m.–1:10 a.m.

### SUBJECTS

Conventional Arms, Regional Issues (Central America, Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, Angola, Cambodia, Korea, Middle East)

### *Participants*

#### *U.S.*

The Secretary  
National Security Advisor Powell  
Under Secretary Armacost  
Ambassador Matlock  
Ambassador Nitze  
Ambassador Ridgway  
Ambassador Oakley  
EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)  
Dimitri Zarechnyak (Interpreter)

#### *U.S.S.R.*

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov  
Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh  
Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin  
Ambassador Karpov  
Shevardnadze Counselor Tarasenko  
USA Department Deputy Chief Mamedov (Notetaker)  
(MFA Interpreter)

### *Conventional Forces*

SHEVARDNADZE opened the session by suggesting a brief discussion of conventional weapons. THE SECRETARY invited him to proceed.

SHEVARDNADZE indicated that the Soviet approach was based on what Moscow considered to be the President's and Gorbachev's instructions at the Washington summit to intensify efforts to find solutions to the problems of conventional arms control. This was a complex area, but Shevardnadze wanted to single out one problem—the most important one.

Briefly reviewing the development of the Soviet position on the place of short range nuclear weapons in discussions on a European conventional arms mandate, Shevardnadze proposed that U.S.–Soviet

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow—Feb 88—Shultz/Shev. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in the Guesthouse of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

bilateral groups be established to develop a mutually acceptable formula. This, he pointed out, would enable negotiators in Geneva to reach closure on a mandate, so that substantive preparations could get under way. Shevardnadze knew that NATO would be meeting at the summit level the following week; Shevardnadze would be meeting with Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Prague February 23–24. It would be well if the U.S. and Soviet Union could take/outline a common approach to the problem in these fora. Shevardnadze suggested that the matter be either referred to Vienna or to a special working group.

THE SECRETARY said that DAS Charles Thomas of his delegation would be prepared to review whatever the Soviet side had in mind. He noted that big conceptual differences remained between the U.S. and Soviet positions on how to treat battlefield nuclear weapons. Nor was that the whole story. We continued to insist on the need for a balanced outcome at the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Conference. Amb. Schifter was working on these issues. So perhaps Thomas could listen and the matter could be reviewed before the Secretary left. The Secretary asked Powell to comment.

POWELL noted that, as an infantry officer and former commander of the 5th U.S. Corps in Germany ("the finest in all NATO"), he was always interested when the subject of conventional forces came up. He had had to cope with the problem of asymmetries in Europe from the viewpoint of a corps commander. For the moment, however, the discussion might best be referred to working groups.

SHEVARDNADZE commented that, while further discussion was necessary, what was needed was closure on a mandate. The Soviet side was prepared to address the question of asymmetries. As Gorbachev had said in Washington, the Soviets were prepared to lay their cards on the table.

THE SECRETARY observed that it was good that Defense Ministers and Chiefs of Staff were now talking. That would be an important contribution to our bilateral dialogue. SHEVARDNADZE said that this was no accident; it reflected the level the relationship had achieved. Such contacts were unprecedented. THE SECRETARY noted that it was just one of many examples of new thinking. To general laughter, SHEVARDNADZE, in a reference to the Secretary's luncheon toast, quipped that he was aware that the U.S. had had new thinking for 200 years.

### *Regional Overview*

Shevardnadze then suggested that the conversation turn to regional matters, asking the Secretary to lead off.

THE SECRETARY said he thought the two sides could take some encouragement from the fact that their regional dialogue seemed of late better to be coming to grips with the issues.

The Secretary had read with great interest General Secretary Gorbachev's February 8 statement on Afghanistan,<sup>2</sup> and had noted Gorbachev's observation that "regional conflicts are bleeding wounds," not only for the nations involved, but for the wider international community. This was a very pertinent observation. We shared the General Secretary's analysis. In fact, the President in 1985 had put forth similar ideas.

So, the Secretary continued, we were on a good track. We agreed that national reconciliation was the key to solving most regional conflicts. But this goal was elusive when foreign troops remained deployed in countries against the will of a significant segment of the people of those countries. Outside powers could encourage national reconciliation, but they could not impose solutions. In helping to create the necessary conditions for such solutions, the verified removal of foreign military forces and restraint on the flow of outside arms were key factors. And in some cases, proscribing by agreement the establishment of foreign military bases or foreign deployments of military forces could contribute to promoting national reconciliation and remove local areas of conflict from the contention of foreign powers. Finally, the U.S. and Soviet Union had to be ready, as part of the international community, to think about international efforts at refugee resettlement, reconstruction and development.

The Secretary reiterated that the U.S. welcomed Gorbachev's pledge that the Soviet Union would spare no effort to resolve regional conflicts. He assured Shevardnadze that the U.S. would be prepared to do its part, because Gorbachev was profoundly correct in identifying such conflicts as the underlying source of wider tension—a point on which Gorbachev and President Reagan had agreed in Geneva.

While in Moscow, the Secretary hoped he would have the opportunity to discuss every issue on the regional agenda. In many, there appeared to be a more fluid, looser situation than a year ago. It would be up to the ministers to see what advantage could be taken of that. The Secretary believed that, while some of the issues were still very tough, the ministers' own relationship had developed to the point that they could talk candidly about the realities they saw, about what each side was or was not prepared to do to foster concrete solutions. It was in that spirit that the Secretary had come to Moscow.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that a new atmosphere seemed to be pervading the regional dialogue. New situations seemed to be emerging

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Gorbachev's speech in which he announced that the Soviets would withdraw from Afghanistan within 1 year. ("Text of Gorbachev Statement Setting Forth Soviet Position on Afghan War," *New York Times*, February 9, 1988, p. A14)

which raised the possibility of real progress and concrete solutions. The Secretary was correct in identifying a new trend toward national reconciliation—a new harmony. That trend was evident in Afghanistan, but also in Kampuchea, where Sihanouk and Hun Sen were deepening their dialogue. There were also hopeful signs in Central America and Southern Africa. So the growth of a trend toward national reconciliation was one positive element.

A second was a stronger role for the U.N., and particularly the Security Council, in the resolution of regional conflicts. The Afghanistan settlement which was beginning to come into view would not have been possible without the efforts of the personal representative of the Secretary General. While his efforts had as yet produced no spectacular successes, the Secretary General was actively involved in the search for an end to the Iran-Iraq war, and was becoming more active with respect to Southern Africa.

A third positive factor was the greater activity of regional powers. This trend was most pronounced in Central America and Southeast Asia, but also, to a lesser degree, in Southern Africa. With respect to the Iran-Iraq war, the weight of regional states had also made itself felt. This was an interesting and encouraging trend.

Fourth was the growing importance of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in dealing with regional conflicts. Both sides understood that they could not be the “lawgivers” of the planet. But the U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship was an important factor in the international environment. The signing of the INF agreement in December had had an impact throughout the entire planet.

These four trends created conditions, Shevardnadze continued, for real solutions to regional problems. The Secretary was correct that there were many converging views between the two sides. It was important not to miss the opportunity to harness all constructive forces in seeking an end to regional conflicts around the globe.

#### *Central America*

THE SECRETARY said that Shevardnadze’s analysis was apt. On Central America—which Shevardnadze cited as an example of cooperation among the Contadora countries, we had been encouraged by the emergence of a dialogue among the five Central American presidents themselves, as opposed to the wider Contadora forum. The Secretary suggested taking up each region in turn.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed, proposing that, since the Secretary had mentioned Central America, the discussion begin there. The Soviets, for their part, had noted U.S. statements of support for the Guatemala Agreement, and considered them important. Shevardnadze recalled Gorbachev’s offer in Washington to cease Soviet military aid to Nicara-

gua if the U.S. would do the same for states hostile to Nicaragua's government. Perhaps the concept was not "popular" in Washington, but Moscow felt it was worth exploring.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that Congress had declined to provide support for the Nicaraguan freedom fighters. The U.S. was thus out of that business. If the Soviet Union would also leave the field, with respect to the Nicaraguan government, it would be well for all concerned.

SHEVARDNADZE quipped that perhaps the two sides should draw up a paper. THE SECRETARY said unilateral declarations would be better.

In a more serious vein, SHEVARDNADZE said that the Congress was one thing—the Administration another. THE SECRETARY pointed out that the Administration could do nothing without appropriations. SHEVARDNADZE asked if Moscow should deal directly with Congress in that case.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the two turn to Afghanistan.

### *Afghanistan*

The Secretary expressed the U.S. view that a real opportunity had emerged for a political resolution. Afghanistan was an important issue in U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations. It would have a dramatic impact were withdrawals to begin by the time of the President's trip to Moscow, as the General Secretary had hinted. This would be very positive. Both the U.S. and Pakistan fully supported the Geneva process and had said so publicly. We hoped that the next round would be the last.

Two issues, the Secretary explained, now needed to be faced: completing the Geneva agreements; and facilitating a comprehensive settlement.

On the first set of issues, the task was to fill in the remaining blanks in the Geneva instruments. These involved timing and modalities of Soviet withdrawal.

With respect to a timetable, we had been encouraged by the General Secretary's willingness to speak in terms of less than a year. We had noted previous statements setting the goal for a complete withdrawal by the end of 1988. We believed this should remain the goal. A short timetable would facilitate negotiation of subsequent phases and make withdrawal easier.

We also welcomed the Soviet acceptance of the principles of phasing and frontloading, and now needed to nail down the details. The Pakistanis had proposed that fifty percent of the Soviet force withdraw in the first three months of the withdrawal period. We supported that, and understood that Moscow might be considering a quarter of their



troops in each of the three next three month periods. Such a schedule would make sense.

We also believed it essential that substantial troop movements begin immediately when the agreement entered into force, and that preparations for withdrawals—such as assembly in staging areas—be observable between signing and entry into force. The Secretary suggested that the Soviets might want to drop a figure—perhaps 20,000 troops—to be moved out during the first week or two, or at least before the summit meeting. This would give an important sense of irreversibility to the process.

The areas the Secretary had mentioned, he said, were important because the obligations to be undertaken by Pakistan and the U.S. were frontloaded. Were we to act as guarantor, we needed to be able to reassure the American public that there would be no “partial troop withdrawal.”

Also important was the concept of a military standdown. Soviet experts had said, and we agreed, that such an arrangement could expedite the troop withdrawal process. We had noted Soviet statements that during the withdrawal period Soviet troops would engage in no military operations, except to defend themselves against direct attack. Both sides should work to ensure the effectiveness of such arrangements. Recent statements by resistance chief Khalis suggested that the resistance was willing to work with the Soviets to set up ceasefires. A shorter timetable, frontloading and a standdown would make it easier to elicit resistance cooperation. A U.N. monitoring force might also have a role to play.

With respect to refugee resettlement, a major goal of the agreement was to create conditions conducive to the return of the refugees. Beyond careful implementation of Instrument III, this would require massive supplies of foodstuffs, seeds, agricultural implements, and other non-military humanitarian assistance.<sup>3</sup> For that reason, the U.S. intended to continue furnishing humanitarian aid to refugees in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Indeed, this was a burden which should be widely shared, and we assumed that the Soviet Union would do its part.

Moreover, the Secretary pointed out, it appeared that concern over the refugee resettlement question lay behind President Zia’s having recently focused on the question of interim government arrangements. The Secretary recalled that, during the Washington summit, the U.S. had argued that linking this question to Soviet withdrawals would

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<sup>3</sup> Documents pertaining to the implementation of the April 14, 1988, Geneva Accords are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXXV, Afghanistan, 1985–1989.

complicate matters. Now the Soviet Union had, in fact, delinked the two issues. But Zia had, apparently, reestablished a linkage.

It was important to recognize, nonetheless, that in so doing Zia had obtained something positive from the resistance—consideration of an interim government which would include representatives from the current regime. It was also our understanding that the resistance were prepared to have such a government sign the Geneva accords. It was not yet clear that it would be possible to establish an acceptable interim government, but the effort was worth making.

The Secretary next indicated he wished to raise an issue which the two sides had not discussed before: the cessation of Soviet military aid to the Kabul regime once an agreement entered into effect. This issue loomed larger as closure in Geneva became imminent. The key to promoting stability, should an agreement be reached, would be to avoid actions that would encourage continued warfare or complicate the search for international reconciliation. For its part, the U.S. was prepared to cease military aid upon the entry into force of a satisfactory Geneva agreement.

Noting that the Declaration of Guarantees under discussion in Geneva obliged guarantors to “invariably refrain from any form of interference and intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan,” the Secretary said that the U.S. assumed that Soviet military assistance to Afghanistan constituted such interference. Perhaps this was not an issue, but it would be well to be clear about it. We assumed that *both* guarantors would cease military assistance once an agreement came into force.

This was important to us, as it would create a symmetrical situation with respect to the guarantees the two sides would undertake on non-interference, including military assistance. It would be impossible domestically for us to sell an asymmetrical arrangement on this point. In this regard, we had noted Marshal Akhromeyev’s remark that Soviet troops would withdraw with their equipment, and knew of First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov’s statement to the Pakistanis that Kabul had all the military resources it needed. The Secretary welcomed the spirit of those statements, and emphasized that Soviet assurance that military deliveries to Kabul would cease with the commencement of withdrawals would be an important element in the overall picture.

In conclusion, the Secretary said that he would welcome Shevardnadze’s reactions and views. The U.S. wanted to do all it could to make the next round in Geneva the last one, and to enable the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan as Gorbachev had proposed.

SHEVARDNADZE opened his remarks by quipping that he wondered what Vorontsov and Armacost had been up to.

This was not, the Foreign Minister said, the first time that he and the Secretary had discussed Afghanistan. As a party directly involved there, the Soviet Union had a strong stake in resolving the problem as quickly as possible. Shevardnadze could once again assure the Secretary on the instructions of the Soviet leadership that a final decision had been made to withdraw.

THE SECRETARY noted that Shevardnadze had believed him when he told him that during their September, 1987 meeting in Washington. He did not doubt it. The question which had to be addressed was, "how"?

SHEVARDNADZE said that in any complex process, there were distinct phases. The same was so for Afghanistan. At the present, the most important task was to complete the Geneva talks. Otherwise, prospects for a settlement could become quite different. All kinds of unforeseeable options could emerge if no solution were possible.

The U.S. was well aware of the agreements which were emerging as a result of the Geneva process. That process had been going on for five years with the participation of the Afghan and Pakistani governments. Only one document—dealing with the withdrawal of Soviet forces—remained to be agreed. The Soviet Union had now clarified its position. The precise number of months of the timetable was not an important issue. The Soviet and Afghan governments had reached an agreement on this point. Shevardnadze agreed that it would be ideal if it proved possible to begin implementation of a Geneva agreement by the time of the President's visit to Moscow. That was the spirit in which the Soviets had made their decision; that was an important factor in the dates they had chosen. The most important factor was that the President was coming. Withdrawals should have started by then.

THE SECRETARY noted that this point had not been lost on us.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that it seemed to him that the U.S. and Soviet Union now needed to join forces to bring the Geneva process to a successful conclusion. Anything which complicated the process should be set aside. For if the process did not come to a successful conclusion, other options might emerge. The Soviet plan was therefore linked to the next round in Geneva. If closure was reached and an agreement signed, Soviet forces would begin pulling out as planned. As to the precise timing of the withdrawal, that was a prerogative of the Soviet and Afghan governments, in accordance with the agreement which they had reached.

THE SECRETARY asked if Shevardnadze would not pass on relevant details of the agreement.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that, once the Geneva talks had reached a conclusion, the U.S. and other interested parties could be informed

on the numbers, strength and other elements relating to the withdrawal. It was hard to describe such factors in detail without solving the basic problem. The General Secretary had said, however, that Moscow was ready and willing to withdraw the major portion of Soviet forces during an initial phase, if circumstances permitted.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that the U.S. needed more detailed information to be able to decide whether any agreement which might be reached was satisfactory. We assumed that we would receive the information we needed to make that call.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that agreement would be reached in Geneva on the timetable for Soviet withdrawal. There was already agreement that the major portion of the troops would be removed during an initial phase. As to specific numbers, phases, etc., these would become clear once agreement had been reached in Geneva.

As for Zia, he seemed to be looking at a variety of options. He talked about creating a new government, but no one had any idea how such an effort could succeed. The task was complicated; there were many factors. But if he really wanted Soviet forces to withdraw, this could be achieved through bringing the Geneva process to conclusion.

Shevardnadze recalled that at one point he had called on the U.S. to lend support to efforts to form a coalition government in Afghanistan. Even then, there had been doubts in Moscow that this was feasible. Now there was no alternative to completing the Geneva process. If the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and Pakistan stayed out of the way, the Afghans would settle their own affairs. The Afghans were tired of war; the refugees wanted to return home. They would find a solution. But if the U.S. and Soviet Union or Pakistan sought to impose a new government, it would be nothing more or less than interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs.

As for the refugee question, Shevardnadze questioned the notion that the Kabul government could not establish the necessary conditions for resettlement. The refugees' return was the key to any settlement. An entire instrument in Geneva was devoted to the issue. It provided the guarantees necessary to encourage the return of all refugees—even Hekmatyar<sup>4</sup> and other fundamentalists.

As for aid to the refugees, Shevardnadze thought it would be well for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to coordinate thinking on the matter. The Soviet Union was ready to do its part. 100,000 refugees had already come home, and Moscow was helping with their resettlement. The U.S. could also play a role. So the question of the refugees was not hopeless, as the instrument on refugees made clear.

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<sup>4</sup> Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a leader of the Mujahadeen resistance in Afghanistan.

THE SECRETARY asked if the Soviets visualized a role for the UNHCR. That seemed to the Secretary a pretty good concept.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that it was not a bad concept. This was a channel which could be used. But government channels should not be ruled out—whether the government was a coalition government, a transition government, an interim government, or what have you.

THE SECRETARY asked for clarification that it was the Soviet position that the UNHCR could serve as a channel for refugee relief assistance, that aid could also flow through the government—interim or otherwise, and that it could also go directly to groups in Afghanistan. There were a variety of possibilities.

SHEVARDNADZE replied only that, at this point, there was no agreement on the final instrument. The implementation of the various elements of the agreement remained to be discussed. These issues could be addressed without delay once the Geneva process reached closure.

Turning to the Secretary's points on terminating Soviet military assistance to the Kabul regime, Shevardnadze said that the question of the disposition of Soviet military equipment in Afghanistan would also be addressed once agreement had been reached in Geneva. Under the terms of the agreement, Pakistan and the Soviet Union undertook to do certain things, and the U.S. undertook certain guarantees. If one now sought to break up what had already been achieved, the Soviet side might have to revise its position on withdrawal. The work in Geneva had been underway for five years. There was provision in the instruments for all "everything." Pakistan, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. had undertaken certain commitments. There could be no retreat from this.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that SHEVARDNADZE had not addressed the issues he had raised on military assistance.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had difficulty in doing so. It was not possible to ignore the fact that the Kabul regime was a legitimate government with which the Soviet Union had certain agreements and, thereby, certain responsibilities. Since the establishment of relations in 1921, many major agreements had been reached between the two countries. If the U.S. were now to insist that the Soviet Union terminate its commitments to the Afghan government with respect to the supply of military assistance, the Soviet Union could make the same claim with respect to U.S. military aid to Pakistan. All U.S. aid to the resistance went through Pakistan, yet Moscow did not seek to impose a cut off of U.S. military supplies to Pakistan.

The situation might be different once the Geneva process had come to an end, Shevardnadze said. Perhaps there would be no need to supply weapons in that case. Perhaps the Afghans could find a common language which would make such supplies unnecessary. Thus, Shev-

ardnadze would formulate the problems as follows: until the Geneva accords were signed, there should be no new conditions. Otherwise, the whole process could unravel. The Soviet decision to withdraw had not been an easy one. To hinder its implementation would be totally unjustified.

As for Pakistan, Zia's approach could not be considered serious. After negotiating for five years with the Kabul regime, Zia had told Vorontsov he would sign in Geneva on March 30, but not on March 15. What difference did two weeks make?

In short, Shevardnadze concluded, real possibilities had opened up for resolving the problem of Afghanistan. Would the U.S. seek to encourage them? At the Washington summit, the President and the Secretary had said that Afghanistan should be resolved as soon as possible. The Soviet decision to withdraw had not been an easy one.

THE SECRETARY replied that the U.S. supported the Geneva process. We wanted the next round to be the last. We wanted to see the General Secretary's announcement implemented.

Our role, however, was to be one of guarantor. As such, we would be under an obligation to end our own military assistance upon entry into force of a "satisfactory" Geneva accord. That meant we had to decide what was "satisfactory." The Secretary had sought simply to give Shevardnadze a sense of the major factors which would affect our decision. Thus, he had outlined our views on frontloading, and we had noted Gorbachev's apparent willingness to accept this concept. We also wanted to make clear our views on ceasefires, and had done so.

We also wanted to be certain that the Soviet interpretation of the Declaration of Guarantees meant that the Soviets, like we, would in fact terminate military assistance once an agreement entered into force. We felt it was important for Moscow to have in mind the things which would affect our decision on whether such an agreement was "satisfactory" in terms of our willingness to act as a guarantor.

In the same vein, we had wanted Shevardnadze to have the benefit of our views as to why President Zia felt it important to address the question of an interim government in Afghanistan. It was not clear whether or not the Afghans would be able to bring this about. We hoped they would.

SHEVARDNADZE interjected that the Secretary was touching on some very important questions with respect to relations between sovereign states. Moscow had important obligations to the government of Afghanistan. What kind of government that would ultimately be was not clear. But the Soviets could not just abandon their commitments. There was a legal issue here.

Frankly, Shevardnadze considered,<sup>5</sup> the U.S. should have considered the matter more carefully before expressing its willingness to serve as a guarantor in Geneva. It would appear that, when it made this commitment, Washington did not believe that the Soviet Union would withdraw. It now appeared that America was introducing new demands, just when prospects for a real settlement were materializing. The Soviets wanted to withdraw their forces. The details of the withdrawal would become clear once an agreement was reached. Moscow was not trying to hide anything. But introducing new complications had to be avoided. Shevardnadze suggested that the Secretary consider how the U.S. would react were Moscow to insist on the termination of U.S. aid to Afghanistan.<sup>6</sup>

Quoting from the Declaration of Guarantees, THE SECRETARY pointed out that the language on non-interference did not provide for exceptions on the basis of prior understandings. Noting that the two sides appeared to agree on the desirability of Afghan neutrality, he pointed out the incompatibility of a situation such as that of, e.g., Austria, with the provision of military assistance from one of the superpowers. We simply wanted to reassure ourselves that the Soviet side shared this view with respect to Afghanistan. From Shevardnadze's reaction, the Secretary was not sure this was the case. It was important to be clear on such matters as the end game approached. He asked Armacost to comment.

ARMACOST said he had two points to make. First, he recalled that in 1985, when the U.S. had been asked to undertake the role of guarantor, we had made clear that our agreement was contingent on a "satisfactory" accords being reached in Geneva. Obviously, we had to see the terms of any settlement before we could provide a definitive commitment to guarantee it.

Second, the fact that the current Afghan government was unable to exercise a fundamental function of sovereignty—control of its national territory—was a serious consideration. A major struggle was in fact taking place on Afghan soil. The Kabul regime exercised effective control over only a small portion of that territory. The resistance, on the other hand, exercised control over much of the country. Now we were being asked, in effect, to terminate assistance to groups which controlled a majority of Afghanistan's territory, while a faction which exercised significantly less control continued to receive aid. We had felt that an interpretation of the Declaration of Guarantees which

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<sup>5</sup> An unknown hand crossed out "considered" and wrote above it: "stated."

<sup>6</sup> An unknown hand crossed out "Afghanistan" and wrote below it: "Pakistan."



imposed no new obligations on either party could help resolve this dilemma.

THE SECRETARY reiterated that he had tried to outline the considerations which would influence the U.S. decision on whether it could undertake the role of guarantor for a Geneva accord. We thought the agreement which was emerging was something we could support. We wanted to do so. We therefore wanted to be clear on Moscow's views, and wanted the Soviet side to understand our own.

SHEVARDNADZE reiterated that it was impossible to start a new process after five years in Geneva, when an agreement was in sight. If the U.S. wanted the problem of Afghanistan solved, the accord had to be signed. If the U.S. was so certain as to the weakness of the current Kabul government, what was its concern? As for the Soviets, their obligations would pertain regardless of whatever government is in Kabul following the withdrawal of their forces. They could not simply nullify existing agreements.

The U.S. might consider the current government illegitimate. The Soviet Union disagreed. It had all the attributes of a sovereign government. Many states recognized it. It was represented in the U.N. Pakistan had negotiated with it for five years. This could not be ignored. The Soviet Union had obligations to Afghanistan and it would meet them. In the future there would be no flow of arms to Kabul, only food. But Moscow could not unilaterally nullify agreements which had been reached with "kings and emperors."

The main thing was that the Soviets wanted to get out of Afghanistan. As for what followed, it was not up to Moscow to determine the future of Afghanistan. The Soviets would welcome a neutral, non-aligned sovereign Afghanistan. But that was not something for the U.S. and Soviet Union to impose. Whether Afghanistan looked like Austria or Finland was up to the Afghans. Perhaps, after a Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan would move toward neutrality. But that would be determined after a Geneva agreement was reached. Once that had occurred, moreover, the Soviet side could be more specific with respect to their plans for withdrawal.

Should it prove impossible to reach agreement in Geneva, other options could emerge. This was not in the U.S. interest.

THE SECRETARY noted that Shevardnadze had said that the Soviet Union would be sending food rather than arms after its withdrawal. He hoped somebody had written that down.

SHEVARDNADZE said, "no." What the Soviets were after was peace in Afghanistan; no war, no bloodshed. This was what served Soviet interests. Shevardnadze and the Secretary had discussed this many times. The Secretary in the past had said that resolution of

Afghanistan was a key in U.S. perceptions of the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze had interpreted this as the words of one who was in favor of a just settlement of the problem. So, now, Moscow was complying.

THE SECRETARY said that the two ministers' past discussions of Afghanistan had often concluded with the recognition that we saw matters differently. That was why we had welcomed the General Secretary's recent statement. We believed the Soviet Union intended to withdraw. We were trying to help with that, and wanted to encourage the process in Geneva. That was why we had outlined the conditions which we considered important. We would continue discussing the issues with Pakistan. We would be available when the Geneva talks resumed. We hoped the process would be fruitful. There was no question that withdrawal would have an enormous impact on American perceptions.

SHEVARDNADZE thanked the Secretary for his thoughts. The Foreign Minister predicted that they would have an "intense" discussion of Afghanistan in March if there had been no agreement in Geneva.

THE SECRETARY said that we would study the situation.

#### *Iran–Iraq War*

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the ministers next take up the Iran–Iraq war. He pointed out that the problems of Afghanistan, Iran–Iraq and the Middle East were the problems of a single region.

THE SECRETARY agreed, observing that it was a mistake to see the issues Shevardnadze had referred to as isolated.

On the Gulf war, the Secretary said he had been briefed by Armacost on the Under Secretary's exploration with Vorontsov of a new concept—that of some kind of time interval between a vote on an enforcement resolution and its entry into effect. ARMACOST added that the key to the concept was the notion that the resolution would automatically take effect on a date certain in the absence of Iranian compliance.

Noting that the concept would seem to put pressure on the diplomatic process, THE SECRETARY said that it struck him as a good idea.

VORONTSOV commented that it might give the Secretary General some useful flexibility.

SHEVARDNADZE asked Vorontsov to explain the concept.

VORONTSOV indicated that an enforcement resolution would go into effect when the Secretary General felt the time was right.

THE SECRETARY clarified that entry into effect of the resolution would be deferred to a date certain unless the Secretary General felt that there was sufficient progress to propose delay to a subsequent date. Such an approach would deal with certain things that the U.S.

and Soviet Union had felt important, and would provide some extra leverage.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the idea was interesting . . . but not so simple to implement. He wanted the Secretary to know that Moscow had told the Iranians that, if they did not recognize UNSC 598,<sup>7</sup> the Soviets would at some point vote for an embargo resolution. Soviet representatives at the UN had been instructed to cooperate in work on a second resolution. Work was in fact underway on the basis of the UK draft, which, Shevardnadze noted in passing, was too much like previous, ineffective resolutions on South Africa for Moscow's liking. But perhaps it would be possible to perfect the text. But the situation was far from simple. The positions of China and of non-permanent members were uncertain. So there was a lot of work to do if there were to be a second resolution. The document itself had to be right; there had to be certainty it would pass.

As for the option Armacost and Vorontsov had come up with, it was interesting. It could make discussion of a draft embargo resolution easier. But what worried Shevardnadze was this: what if there were a second resolution and the war continued. That was likely to happen. Then there would be the same problem as with South Africa with respect to enforcing an embargo. Moscow was willing to vote in favor of an embargo; but the effectiveness of such a measure was open to question.

Shevardnadze reported that the Iranians had just hinted to Soviet Deputy Minister Petrovskiy that they might be changing their attitude. Shevardnadze was not yet prepared to accept this at face value, and Petrovskiy had not yet returned from Teheran to make a full report. But if the Iranian position with respect to 598 was changing, that would be significant. Perhaps it would be best to allow sufficient time to check this out; if Iran remained adamant, the Soviets would support a second resolution. As the Iranians would soon be visiting Moscow, Shevardnadze would have an early opportunity to clarify the matter. All of this, Shevardnadze said, was by way of informing the Secretary what was happening on the "Iran front."

THE SECRETARY recalled that, when Gorbachev was in Washington, the Secretary had told him that, while Iraq clearly accepted 598, Iran clearly did not. U.S. intelligence, the Secretary had pointed out, suggested that Iran was still playing a game to keep the UNSC from taking action. "The check was in the mail." Gorbachev had said, "Yes, I guess that's right." It thus seemed that both sides agreed that there

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<sup>7</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, July 20, 1987, which called for a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq.

was a need to act, both to end the war and to strengthen the prestige of the UNSC.

A mandatory arms embargo should be voted, the Secretary affirmed. But the U.S. would be willing to delay entry into force of an embargo for thirty days with the provision that the Secretary General could ask for a postponement if negotiations were making progress. This seemed to be a reasonable proposition.

As to the effectiveness of an embargo, the Secretary felt it could be considerable. An embargo might not be perfect, but it would represent a binding commitment. States which violated it could be approached. Costs to Iran would climb; it would have difficulty obtaining spare parts. Results would not come overnight, but, over time, it would help shut down hostilities. To enhance effectiveness of an embargo, moreover, the U.S. would be prepared to consult on means of enforcement, including by means of blockade.

The key thing, however, was to take action. The Secretary had been looking forward to the present meeting to hear Shevardnadze's views. If the U.S. and Soviet Union stood together, other countries, including the PRC, would fall in line. Beijing had informed us it would vote for an enforcement resolution if other permanent members did. The Secretary said that he hoped the issue could be revisited before he left Moscow. If something could be recorded on the subject in a final statement, it would be a constructive step.

SHEVARDNADZE said he wondered why Iran had not as yet followed up on its preparations for a massive land offensive against Iraq. VORONTSOV suggested that the Americans had convinced Khomeini to hold off. SHEVARDNADZE said that if Iran threw its full weight into a "final offensive," he was not sure Iraq could hold the line, despite Iraq's determination to fight "for 100 years." This would be deeply disturbing to Moscow in view of the Soviet Union's special relationship to Iraq. Shevardnadze admitted to concern that a second resolution could remove whatever "brake" was holding Iran back.

THE SECRETARY asked if Powell would respond to the questions Shevardnadze raised.

Admitting that one could never be certain of Iranian motivations, POWELL pointed out that previous Iranian offensives had resulted in loss of life comparable only to the slaughter of World War I. The Iranians were undoubtedly aware of the thoroughness of Iraq defensive preparations. They might have concluded that the certain losses were not worth the dubious potential gains. THE SECRETARY observed that the Iranians would attack if they thought they could prevail. Their concern for lives was not great.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the two sides agree that the Secretary General should intensify his efforts. Perez de Cuellar had yet

to make full use of the authority granted him in 598. Moscow had urged him to designate a special representative on the war with a mandate similar to that of Cordovez on Afghanistan. Shevardnadze called on the U.S. to endorse that recommendation.

The U.S. should not doubt Moscow's determination to see the war end, Shevardnadze stressed. The Soviet Union was anxious with respect to Iraq's staying power. Moscow's own prestige would be involved in a defeat. Moreover, the Soviet Union wanted American warships out of the Gulf. Shevardnadze acknowledged that their mission was not directed against the Soviet Union, but they were too close to Soviet borders for comfort. The sooner that situation could be defused, the better for Moscow.

What then might be recorded in a joint statement? The two sides could express their support for implementation of UNSC 598 and "effective steps to implement" the resolution, including by the Secretary General. There could also be language indicating that the two sides were considering next steps in terms of implementing 598.

As for the formulation which Armacost and Vorontsov had come up with, it was not a bad one. But Iraq would have to be consulted. Shevardnadze added that Moscow was in favor of active measures, and reiterated that, if a second resolution was necessary, the Soviets would work with the U.S.

THE SECRETARY said he was agreeable to working on joint statement language. He did not want to "over-interpret" Shevardnadze's words, but believed that the kinds of things which might be said were:

- The two sides supported 598;
- They supported a second resolution and will work on the basis of the UK draft toward preparing one;
- They agreed on the need for a special UN effort to take advantage of the leverage provided by second resolution during a specified period. The second resolution would enter into effect on a date certain unless the Secretary General informed the Security Council that a postponement would be worthwhile in light of what he was accomplishing.

VORONTSOV reiterated Shevardnadze's point that, as Iraq was an interested party, it would have to be consulted.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that Iraq favored a follow-on resolution.

VORONTSOV questioned whether Iraq would agree on the advisability of the "date certain" approach. Had the U.S. consulted with Baghdad?

THE SECRETARY replied that we had not. He knew that the Iraqs had been in favor of a passage of a resolution within 90 days. It seemed likely that they would welcome a resolution which went into effect

two months earlier. Perhaps the U.S. and Soviet Union could put the idea forward together and consult other interested parties later.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the joint statement confine itself to the following elements:

- Support for 598;
- Enhancement of the role of the Secretary General and his Special Representative;
- “Maybe” a third point: “We will start active work to prepare subsequent steps for implementation of 598.”

Shevardnadze explained that the third point referred to work on a second resolution.

THE SECRETARY suggested that Ridgway and Bessmertnykh work on the problem. For the U.S. to accept language on the Gulf War, however, it would have to reflect determination and decisiveness.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the two Ambassadors could work on it overnight. He quoted a Russian saying: “Bright ideas come on a dark night.”

#### *Korea*

THE SECRETARY said he had a few words on Korea. A new, elected President would take office in South Korea on February 25. This would be the first peaceful transition of power in the ROK’s history. The new president was a savvy man, a surer, more reform-oriented leader. He represented a fresh face, who would take every opportunity to showcase South Korea’s great vitality. In this connection, the Olympics would be much on his mind.

The Secretary noted in this context the significance of the KAL 858 bombing.<sup>8</sup> The Soviet side had seen the evidence implicating North Korea. Over fifty nations had condemned the act. At a minimum, the Soviet Union ought to caution Pyongyang.

For its part, the U.S. wanted to see the two Koreas play a larger role in world events. Both should be U.N. members. The Soviet Union should consider the situation created by the transfer of power in Seoul, and the opportunities this created. The Secretary added that he had the greatest respect for the new president’s predecessor, and the instrumental role he had played in bringing about the peaceful shift to civilian leadership.

SHEVARDNADZE remarked that it remained to be seen how the new South Korean president would behave. Kim Il-sung, however,

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<sup>8</sup> Reference is to the November 29, 1987, bombing of a South Korean civilian airliner en route from Baghdad to Seoul with no survivors.

had been the leader of North Korea for decades. One knew he could be believed.

THE SECRETARY said that, from what we knew about Kim, this was hardly a reassuring statement.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow had a different view. The General Secretary in handing over Kim's message had asked that the U.S. consider the initiative objectively. What was so bad about the North's initiatives? What was wrong with confederation? With reductions of armed forces? The North had made proposals for sweeping reductions in forces on the peninsula, reductions which would mean the end of the military standoff there. The only thing that the U.S. could object to was the requirement that its forces and bases be removed. The U.S. might not like that, but objectively it made good sense. The Soviets had relayed Kim's proposals not because he was their friend, but because they were worthwhile. As for South Korea, it had no reason to fear the proposals.

With respect to the KAL bombing, the Soviets had not themselves investigated the matter, but had difficulty understanding why North Korea should be blamed. It was hard to see how the bombing could prevent the Olympic Games from taking place. How would such an act benefit the North. There was no proof of North Korea's culpability; rather, there was a lot of hoopla. As time passed, Shevardnadze suspected that the incident would be determined to be a provocation. By whom, he was not sure.

As for the Olympics, the Soviet Union had said it would compete. It would have been a good thing to hold parallel games in the North. This would have contributed toward reunification.

THE SECRETARY responded that, as regards U.S. troops in Korea, it was the South Koreans, rather than we, who would worry were they to be withdrawn. They remembered the invasion and geography made Seoul particularly vulnerable.

As for the KAL bombing, we considered the evidence of a North Korean security agency role very powerful. Moreover, there were precedents—in the Rangoon bombing.<sup>9</sup> The only thing that surprised us in view of such evidence was South Korea's restraint.

As for Kim's initiatives, what were needed were not grandiose steps of the type he was proposing, but realistic confidence building measures which were already on the table.

SHEVARDNADZE urged the U.S. to look more carefully at the North's proposals. They merited careful consideration. He questioned

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<sup>9</sup> Reference is to a February 8, 1988, assassination attempt on South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan.



the utility of confidence building measures against the backdrop of enormous concentrations of military forces on each side of the DMZ. Shevardnadze said that the Secretary exaggerated the threat posed by the North.

POWELL noted that he had commanded a battalion in Korea. From personal experience he knew that there were vivid memories in the South of 1950, when Seoul was so quickly overrun. The only thing that had changed since then was that Seoul and its suburbs had grown. As for dialogue with the North, when faced with actions like the KAL bombing, the South could have little confidence in Pyongyang's sincerity. Powell said he had personally reviewed the evidence, and was convinced the world would see the KAL bombing as an act of terrorism, not a provocation. The motive had clearly been to demonstrate that South Korea was not a safe site for the Olympics.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that terrorism could serve as an instrument of provocation. The leaders of North Korea were reasonable people who would not resort to such means. As for the threat to the South, objectively it was not there. South Korea had a far larger population than the North; it had a million and a half men armed to the teeth; it had the help of U.S. military forces in Korea; it had a thriving economy. The North could never hope to challenge Seoul militarily.

THE SECRETARY said that the troop levels Shevardnadze had cited were incorrect. POWELL pointed out that the economic development to which Shevardnadze had alluded was taking place under the protection of strong South Korean and U.S. military forces. The South wanted no repetition of 1950.

ARMACOST noted that there was a fundamental difference between starting with big proposals or work on the basis of more realistic initiatives already on the table. The North's refusal to take a single constructive step in such areas as family reunification had eroded its credibility. It was hard to see how bolder proposals could be carried out when simple ones were not.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the North Koreans had made simple, practical proposals as well, e.g., meetings between representatives of the two countries. Shevardnadze reiterated that the presence of U.S. bases on the peninsula was not a helpful factor.

#### *Middle East*

THE SECRETARY gave an initial, lengthy presentation covering our current analysis of the situation in the Middle East, of his forthcoming mission to the region, and of the role we hoped Moscow would choose to play.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Secretary had a "complicated" trip ahead of him. The situation had become more acute as a result of

Palestinian mass protests, and especially in the wake of Israel's resort to repression. The situation required more active efforts by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, as well as by the UNSC and regional parties.

Shevardnadze said he appreciated the Secretary's recent letter.<sup>10</sup> He felt that the approach the Secretary had outlined contained a number of interesting points. Shevardnadze said he agreed that, without a step-by-step approach, no solution was possible.

Shevardnadze had devoted a lot of consideration to the Middle East since receiving the Secretary's letter. He continued to believe that an international conference was the best approach. This was not just a fixation, although Moscow had long advocated the idea. But the "more than explosive," situation now developing made the Soviet proposal for a special meeting of foreign ministers of UNSC permanent members particularly timely. Such a session could take stock of the emerging situation and consider how a conference might best be configured to deal with it.

In such a context, much of what the Secretary had described could be considered. The point was that it was not an either/or proposition. Moscow did not want a conference for its own sake; it wanted a setting which could embrace "the overall substance" of the region and at the same time make possible active bilateral contacts and negotiations. No other approach was possible. A conference would facilitate contacts between all parties. Calling on the UNSC permanent members to take the first step toward a conference reflected the recognition of their influence on the regional parties. A serious approach to a conference would produce measures to normalize the situation in the region and establish a solid base for a long-term settlement. Thus, Shevardnadze urged the U.S. to review its position with respect to a conference. To date, Moscow had the impression, the concept had not been seriously considered.

Noting that the Secretary had referred to Camp David, Shevardnadze stressed that Moscow rejected the approach the accords reached there symbolized. After the Secretary visited the region, however, perhaps the time would be right for a serious discussion—perhaps a day or two's worth, and particularly of the place of an international conference in any search for a settlement. The idea enjoyed broad support internationally; even in Israel, not all were against it. Perhaps the U.S. could use its influence there.

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<sup>10</sup> Documentation pertaining to U.S.-Soviet dialogue on the topic of the Middle East peace process, including Shultz's letter, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

Noting that the Secretary had urged the Soviet Union to consider its position on diplomatic relations with Israel and Jewish emigration, Shevardnadze said that Moscow had indicated—and Peres knew—that “this question” could be resolved in a positive way were a conference to be convened. On the other hand, the Soviets could not support an approach which relegated a conference to the back burner.

(THE SECRETARY briefly described our notion of how a conference might fit into the approach we had in mind, and suggested that he and Shevardnadze could discuss the issue further in Washington in March. He noted that Murphy and Pelyakov might also have met by then. He suggested that, if anything positive emerged from his Middle East trip, he could make Murphy available. He again urged Shevardnadze to consider how Israeli’s perception of a Soviet role, and of the utility of a conference, could be affected by movement on issues of interest to Jerusalem. The Secretary felt that emigration was particularly important in this respect.)

Returning to the subject of an international conference, SHEVARDNADZE clarified that he had in mind a forum which would do more than simply facilitate contacts. It should have the ability to solve problems.

Moscow had given considerable thought as to how this might be done. There might be groups dealing with overall regional problems (e.g., “geographic questions”). There could also be bilateral contacts and negotiations which would be part and parcel of the conference.

Moscow understood the Israeli concern that Israel might be isolated at an IC. That was why the Soviets had proposed to include UNSC permanent members, several of whom were friends of Israel, and could ensure the effectiveness of a conference.

Shevardnadze again urged the Secretary to give the idea of a conference further thought. Shevardnadze was convinced no more suitable means would be found. All players but Israel had already accepted the concept. Even Peres had expressed his support.

In any case, Shevardnadze was ready to meet at any time with the Secretary on the subject, or to make Vorontsov or other Soviet officials available. The Secretary had expressed some interesting ideas. Coupled with the idea of a conference, they had potential. But without a role for a conference little would be possible.

THE SECRETARY noted that the concept which Shevardnadze had just described seemed to differ from our own. He agreed that further discussions might be useful at a later stage.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed, and then briefly returned to the subject of Jewish emigration. Israel already had enough problems on its hands. If it sought to link emigration to the question of an international conference, there might be no conference. Then where would the process go?

Moscow was dealing with the issue. 8,000 Jews had emigrated. What should the Soviets do now? Force people to leave? All constraints on emigration had been removed. Those who had no secrets would be allowed to leave. As Gorbachev had said in Washington, there were no other obstacles. The Secretary could tell that to the Israelis. They should also bear in mind what he had said earlier: that the convening of a conference would open up useful channels for resolving many problems.

THE SECRETARY said it had been a good discussion, very substantive and reflecting the current state of the relationship.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed, and the meeting adjourned.

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## 124. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, February 22, 1988

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *U.S. PARTICIPANTS*

The Secretary  
General Colin Powell  
Ambassador Armacost  
Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway, EUR  
Ambassador Jack F. Matlock, Jr.  
Richard Solomon  
John M. Joyce, Deputy Chief of Mission  
A. Afanassenko, Interpreter

#### *SOVIET PARTICIPANTS*

Nikolay Ryzhkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers  
Vladimir Mikhaylovich Kamentsev, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers  
Yuliy Mikhaylovich Vorontsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Konstantin Fedorovich Katushev, Minister of Foreign Economic Relations  
Yuri Vladimirovich Dubinin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.

Following the departure of the press, Ryzhkov opened the discussion by noting that he understood there were grounds for satisfaction

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow—Feb 88—Shultz/Shev. Confidential. Drafted by Joyce. The meeting took place in the Kremlin. According to Tosec 53347, February 20, the meeting was scheduled for 9 a.m. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880147–0011)

over the previous day's discussions between the Secretary and the Foreign Minister.

The Secretary replied that indeed some headway had been made. We were attempting to solve outstanding problems a step at a time. Using that approach we had made progress in START and in other areas as well.

Ryzhkov commented that resolving these problems was indeed a formidable task.

The Secretary noted that the visit by General Secretary Gorbachev to the United States had been very successful. Among other things, it had stimulated the President, General Powell, and the Secretary himself to read Gorbachev's book on perestroika. It was a powerful book; it spoke mostly of Soviet internal affairs—perestroika and glasnost. Prime Minister Ryzhkov, of course, was at the center of all these issues, and for this reason the Secretary was looking forward to another discussion with him. Ryzhkov replied that he was happy to be able to receive the Secretary once again. He had often remembered their meeting last April,<sup>2</sup> and considered this a continuation. He noted many other familiar faces on the American side of the table—including Ambassadors Ridgway and Matlock.

Ryzhkov noted that since the previous meeting many changes had taken place in the world and in bilateral relations. A successful summit had occurred and the INF agreement had been signed. The latter was an historical step, an historical document. Further, there was room for satisfaction over the groundwork done during this past year in other areas—START, the conventional mandate and nuclear testing.

Further, there had been progress on regional conflicts, for example, on Afghanistan. New Soviet policies and this visit would make it possible to make more progress on this latter issue.

Ryzhkov continued that all of these problems had historical roots, and it would take time to resolve them. If we persisted, however, we would make further progress on them by the time of the President's visit.

Ryzhkov noted that Soviet mass media had given a very favorable portrayal of the progress made the previous day in the Secretary's meeting with the Foreign Minister. He said he had been further informed that the atmosphere had been very constructive and that also provided hope.

Ryzhkov then turned to Soviet domestic affairs. He noted his previous discussion with the Secretary had taken place when the Soviet side

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 41.

had been involved in formulating the concept for radical reforms. During that meeting he had spoken to the Secretary of ideas for economic reform. Now these ideas had been implemented in law, following discussion in the June Plenum of the Central Committee and consideration by the Supreme Soviet last fall.

Ryzhkov explained that the reform had now entered its second stage. The first, which had lasted two and one-half years, had focussed on formulation. The second stage concerned itself with implementation, with putting the country on a new economic footing. This did not mean that everything would be changed in the following two and one-half or three years. But the society had to get underway with the reform, to learn to work under new economic conditions. It was a major challenge, a difficult stage—Gorbachev had called it a critical stage.

Ryzhkov said these had been the major changes in the last ten months. What questions did the Secretary wish to pose?

The Secretary said that changes in the Soviet Union were being followed with tremendous interest in the United States. He himself personally followed the reform movement here closely. He said he found the changes so far instituted very sensible.

The Secretary continued that managing the change was a major problem. Far-reaching changes in a society brought change in the personal lives of all its members, and such change required not only management of the changes themselves but also popular expectations. This was true in many countries, including the United States. It was always difficult for a people to stop something and start something anew. How did the Soviet Union intend to deal with this problem?

The Secretary posed a second question. What was to be done about prices and the marketing system? He noted that Finnish President Koivisto had reminded him that the University of Chicago had had on its faculty a Polish economist named Oscar Lange, who had been with the University before the Secretary's time there, was a socialist. He nevertheless had contended that pricing systems were ideologically neutral. They were a technique, not an ideology. How does the Soviet Government intend to use prices to signal to enterprises when to stop production of an old item or start production of a new item?

The Secretary followed with a third question: "What's in it for us?" He noted that major changes in the Soviet Union were important for the entire world but perestroika would also mean possible new patterns of interaction between U.S. and Soviet enterprises—joint ventures, etc.

The Secretary recalled a long conversation he had had with Kosygin on the same point.<sup>3</sup> At that time, however, the Soviet economy had

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<sup>3</sup> See Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 21.

been moving in quite another direction. Even so, the question even then was still interesting.

The Secretary posed a fourth question. They had discussed the issue briefly last April. Ryzhkov, Gorbachev, and the Secretary all thought the world would be a very different place in five to ten years. The growth and rapid diffusion of knowledge was affecting how we regard raw materials. It was changing our attitudes on food and other basic requirements. What impact would this have on U.S./Soviet relations? What did we need to do to prepare for these changes to seize opportunities? The Secretary noted that some of these issues had already been addressed in the planning talks. We needed to continue this. It was a fruitful subject for discussion. The Secretary remarked that he had tried to insert this issue into the domain of public discussion in the United States.

The Secretary then noted that he had “paid his tuition” and was “ready to hear Professor Ryzhkov’s opinion on these issues.”

Ryzhkov said the Secretary had clearly outlined the questions on problems which needed to be discussed. As he understood it, the first issue concerned internal problems, and the second bilateral issues. During the previous discussion he and the Secretary had gone over Soviet internal problems in detail. Further analysis since that time had confirmed the ideas he had discussed with the Secretary at that time. The Soviet leadership was convinced that it was acting correctly in implementing these reforms. In 1985 the situation in the economy had begun to impact strongly on the social atmosphere of the country. The Soviet economy had never stagnated completely, but it had been moving forward only very slowly.

Ryzhkov continued that Gorbachev’s book explained that the leadership was convinced that it could unite the advantages of a planned economy with the principles of a consumer economy. A Russian-born economist who moved to the United States in 1925, Vassily Leontieff, had explained the difference between the Soviet and the U.S. economy very succinctly.

The Secretary remarked that he knew Leontieff.

Ryzhkov continued that according to Leontieff, any economy had two requirements: sails and a strong wind for propulsion, and a rudder for control. The U.S. economy, according to Leontieff, had powerful sails but only a small rudder. The Soviet economy, on the other hand, had only small sails and a big rudder. Ryzhkov said what the Soviet leadership was striving toward was a balance between the rudder and the sails. Achieving that balance would be a challenge for all countries.

Ryzhkov said, of course, for forward movement we need energy, not just a literary image. The Secretary was correct in describing price



reform and market relations as key aspects of overall economic reform. However, other ideas of principle also played a role in a socialist society. Ownership of property was very important. State ownership of productive capacity was at the foundation of any socialist society. Even this was being looked at. Cooperative ownership had large potential for development. Lenin thought much about this subject in his later life. The United States had a cooperative movement and during his recent visit to Sweden and Norway Ryzhkov said he had also observed the cooperative movement there. Finally, the third element was individual activity. The Soviet leadership saw no potential for revolution in this area, nor for spectacular growth, but it was another component for reform.

Ryzhkov said that a draft law on cooperative movements was now in final stages of drafting; it would soon be offered to public debate and then submitted to the Supreme Soviet for consideration. The three sides of the triangle would then be in place—the law on state enterprises, the law on cooperative movements, and laws on individual activities.

Ryzhkov returned to the Secretary's question on price reform. It was, he said, "frankly most difficult." Without price reform, however, economic reform was not possible. It was complicated because it had three interrelated components:

- wholesale prices;
- state purchase prices; and
- retail prices.

It would be necessary to change wholesale prices at the enterprise level because they conflicted with economic reform. That would be difficult, but work was proceeding on the problem.

Ryzhkov said the leadership would like most major products to be priced at world levels. That would ease establishment of internal economic balance, as well as participation in the international economy. But many Soviet factories did not have the technical capability to work at world price levels. For example, if the Soviet chemical industry worked at world price levels, it would promote use of more chemical products and less metal. But at that price level, half the Soviet chemical industry would not make a profit. Ryzhkov said the leadership was considering now what would be more advantageous—to continue these low prices or try an alternative.

The Secretary said this very interesting subject reflected the influence of global economic interdependence. The Soviet economy required that its currency be connected in some way to currencies of other countries. What were Ryzhkov's ideas on currency convertibility?

Ryzhkov replied that he saw such a need in the future but it would be difficult to achieve. The question was under consideration.

The Secretary continued that if the Soviet Union did not confront the convertibility issue, it would continue to be driven into barter approaches. This was not efficient. From the point of view of a U.S. firm considering a joint venture, rather than considering the simple issue of dollar profit or loss, it would have to consider also the complicated question of what to do with goods it received in barter in place of dollars.

The Secretary noted that barter did have its role, even outside socialist countries. Frank Carlucci, who had accompanied the Secretary during his last visit to Moscow, had run what was essentially a barter enterprise for Sears. Such enterprises were not unheard of, but they were unusual.

The Secretary had run into the issue in his first job with a firm bidding on a major construction job in another country. The firm had been told it could not be paid in dollars, but rather only with the output from the enterprise the firm had contracted to construct. It caused major problems. If the firm had built a coal mine and then was offered coal in payment, it had to consider what to do with the coal.

Ryzhkov replied that he would break down the convertibility question into two parts—domestic and global. The Soviet Union would have to face global convertibility eventually, although it would be difficult. But, he noted, the Soviet Union was telling U.S. firms interested in joint ventures that they could now have profits in foreign currency, or could use that foreign currency to buy Soviet goods. The Soviet Union was not insisting on compensation with goods in such enterprises. In the March Joint Trade Commission meeting the Soviet side would have to bring to the attention of United States firms this flexible position.

The Secretary remarked that Ryzhkov had hit on an important point and recommended that he emphasize it during the March meeting.

Ryzhkov turned to the Secretary's further question on internal problems. Economic restructuring was not something that could be accomplished in one or two years. In the present, second stage—it would last two-three years—the goal was to teach people to work in the new environment. But no one expected in that time to change the entire national economic infrastructure. That would require much time. As the Secretary understood, and this was true in any society, capitalist or socialist, perspective at the leadership level was broad, while the further down into society one went the narrower the perspective became. The individual on the street was interested only in immediate advantage and immediate results.

The Secretary interjected that a famous U.S. football coach, George Allen, had preached "the future is now." Ryzhkov nodded his head

in agreement, and the Secretary acknowledged that while Allen's idea was correct, it was not always possible to implement.

Ryzhkov continued that looking ahead required political wisdom. Nevertheless, a political leadership had to deal with today's problems. Today's problems in the Soviet context were three:

- housing for the population;
- food; and
- consumer goods and services.

The leadership was focussing its efforts on this spectrum of problems.

Ryzhkov noted time was growing short, and he turned to the second set of problems the Secretary had raised—bilateral problems. He posed a question to the Secretary, noting that political changes were underway in the bilateral relationship. The Soviet leadership welcomed these changes, realizing that the political climate in the world was largely determined by U.S./Soviet relations. But what did the future hold in this regard? Would the Japanese and Chinese “catch us, outdo us?” “Not only us, but also you?” Together the United States and the Soviet Union have only ten percent of the world's population, but they have great economic potential. Should we move away from difficult economic relations? Should we now begin a new, fruitful economic relationship? That was not possible under present conditions. Frankly, the development of economic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union depended on the political stance of the U.S. Administration. But if we did not take better advantage of present economic possibilities, he said, future generations would not praise us.

Ryzhkov said this then was the answer to the Secretary's question on the impact of perestroika on bilateral relations. This was Ryzhkov's personal opinion, but also reflected experts' views. Moreover, if the United States and the Soviet Union planned to change their economic relationship, they needed to do more than simply develop traditional trade. Eventually, for example, the Soviet Union would provide its own grain. New ways of cooperation including joint ventures and other cooperative endeavors must be found. The Soviet side greeted formation of the consortium now being contemplated. Perhaps in May it would be possible to sign an agreement on it. Perhaps we should consider signing it during the visit of President Reagan to Moscow. Leading firms from the U.S. side were considering participation in this endeavor for the first time. Ford had rejected the approach, but General Motors was still considering it. Formation of this consortium was, so to speak, a first swallow; given our vast potential, cooperation could be greatly improved.

The Secretary said he would undertake to discuss with Secretary Verity a possible role for economic issues in the summit. He acknowledged that that aspect of the summit had not been under serious consideration in Washington.

Ryzhkov said both sides needed better communication on economic ideas. Annual meetings were not sufficient. A more active economic dialogue was necessary. "So far we have only Dr. Hammer."<sup>4</sup>

The Secretary interjected that Hammer was what we call a "one-man band."

Ryzhkov said present bilateral economic relations were difficult, and required political solutions. He said he regretted having to end the meeting on this negative point. But if the issue of economic relations were to be resolved, current obstacles would have to be removed. And if we were to improve overall relations, such steps would be necessary. He said he had not understood remarks made at the Paris meeting. The Soviet side believed its new thinking had made possible the beginning of a new political dialogue with the United States. But Deputy Secretary Whitehead in Paris had said that an improvement in political relations did not lead to an improvement in economic relations.

Ryzhkov concluded his remarks by noting that time for their meeting had expired. He expressed satisfaction with the discussion and suggested that it continue in the future.

The Secretary expressed his appreciation that Ryzhkov had received him. The Secretary said he found Ryzhkov "thoughtful, impressive, interesting." He said he had found increasingly specific topics for discussion with him. The Secretary repeated his undertaking to discuss with Secretary Verity economic issues for the summit. He noted that anything featured at the summit received great publicity in the United States and in so doing a special legitimacy. Ryzhkov nodded his understanding of this point.

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Document 99.

**125. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, February 22, 1988, 11:05 a.m.–2:40 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

The Secretary's Meeting with Gorbachev February 22

**PARTICIPANTS**

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>USSR</i>
George P. Shultz, Secretary of State	Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary, CPSU CC
Colin Powell, President's National Security Advisor	Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Paul Nitze, Special Advisor to the President on Arms Control	Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, First Deputy Minister of Defense
Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs	Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee
Jack F. Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow	Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)	Yuriy Dubinin, Soviet Ambassador to Washington
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (EUR) (notetaker)	Mr. Chernyayev, Special Assistant to the General Secretary (notetaker)
Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)	P. Palazhchenko (interpreter)

*Gorbachev* welcomed the Secretary to Moscow. He said he was personally pleased to have him and his colleagues here. The two sides had good businesslike relations. He asked jokingly if relations could not be postponed for three or four years so they could work in a quiet setting.

*The Secretary* noted that *Gorbachev* had already met the leading contenders for the U.S. Presidency. There would be important elements of continuity in U.S. policy. The reason was that President Reagan had worked with *Gorbachev*, they had gotten the two sides onto a different course, and that was popular in the U.S. It had been interesting to see how attitudes in the Senate had evolved over the INF Treaty. Senators who had thought the public would be skeptical had discovered that pushing this was not popular. There were now over 80 votes committed to support of the Treaty, and the number was rising. This broad support

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow—Feb 88—Shultz/Shev. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on February 23. The meeting took place in the Kremlin.

assured that there would be important continuity. President Reagan's contribution would have a lasting effect.

*Gorbachev* said he agreed with that analysis, but with one important addition. This situation resulted from more than just the good will of the leaders of the two countries. He thought there was a more substantial reason for it. Both countries were coming to understand that they could not continue the relationship as it had been. The whole world saw that. The Soviet Union and the U.S. should therefore consider how to improve, how to normalize their relations. There were thus important substantial reasons why continuity was the prospect. The two sides needed to rebuild their relations. With that he was agreed.

He had mentioned the President, *Gorbachev* said, but he thought in addition his associates, the Administration, were also becoming convinced, like the Soviets, that we have to seek good relations, consistently, persistently, without illusions. This was necessary for both countries. The postwar period had proved that nothing good could come from the arms race. Other ways were needed. The old ways had led to an impasse—with regard to security, with regard to resources, with regard to relations between the two powers.

The latest efforts had shown what was considered Soviet policy, *Gorbachev* continued. It had been reinforced by these practical deeds, seeking new steps in cooperation with the U.S. The U.S. side's reaction or response to the suggestion he had made in Washington concerning cooperation on Afghanistan had been disappointing. The Soviet side had decided as a result to move with its own efforts. Now the U.S. side was more interested, and the Soviet side welcomed that. But the two sides should seek to move forward in all areas. This was considered policy. It was not just Mikhail *Gorbachev*. In the West they tended to personalize things. But this was more profound. By this he did not mean to imply there would be a surprise ending to the *Gorbachev* period. What the Western press was speculating was not true. He meant that this was the policy of the Soviet leadership. It had captured the sentiments of the people, workers, farmers. They wanted to improve relations with the U.S.

*The Secretary* said he agreed that the situation itself was producing changes. This was as important as leadership was for guiding them.

*Gorbachev* said then he was agreeing with the Secretary when he said that regardless of the U.S. elections or events in the Soviet Union he was convinced that this trend was gaining strength. At the same time, it was true in both countries that questions emerged, the question of whether we could trust each other. Soviet people were asking whether the U.S. was not outsmarting the Soviet Union. But perhaps such opposition sentiment helped: it did not allow us to rest on our laurels, it made us work, it made us think.

*The Secretary* interjected that sometimes people did not even recognize laurels.

*Gorbachev* continued that, more concretely, he had been trying to project a general point about the time remaining. It was true that with the elections coming up it would be harder to reach decisions, though diplomatic activity and dialogue would of course continue. But there was the question of what to bring to the President's visit. As of now the sides could achieve a great deal, if they worked actively, intensely. But if one month were lost they could achieve much less. It was true that the hardest subject was START, but a great deal could be achieved.

*The Secretary* said he agreed that a lot of work was required, but START was certainly possible; and the President was pushing in that direction.

*Gorbachev* said he wished to say one thing: we did have experience, we could analyze it and draw the lessons about the effective use of time. He had concluded that since the sides had developed the pattern of meetings between the Secretary and Shevardnadze, in Moscow and in Washington, they should use it. Geneva once again smelled of mothballs since the Secretary and Shevardnadze had started working again. In Geneva they drank tea and built fires, but they used wet wood, producing a lot of smoke but no fire. Let us do big things, he suggested, in a friendly, even a comradely way—the Secretary might not like the word, but it was a good word. The sides should use that.

*The Secretary* said that in Geneva there was perhaps not a lot of fire, but there was certainly smoke. *Gorbachev* said there was smoke and fog. He therefore thought the stress should be on the Secretary's meetings with Shevardnadze. They should use the pattern intensively. Halfway approaches were no good. They had a good thing going, they should use it well.

*The Secretary* said one thing to do was make the Geneva process do its work. They could use it between meetings. The day before he and Shevardnadze had agreed on a way to do that, so that when they met in Washington they could have a product they could work with. *Gorbachev* said he agreed with that. The efforts of the experts could be successful when the Secretary's and Shevardnadze's machinery was working at full speed; without that nothing happened. Decisions would be made in Washington and Moscow. The Soviet side now saw that decisions were needed in both the Soviet and the U.S. interest. Such meetings were necessary. He observed that the main actors on both the Soviet and U.S. sides were present. He suggested they get to work. *The Secretary* commented that here were the usual suspects, as Americans said.

*Gorbachev* said that in that context he wished to ask the Secretary for his impressions of his meetings in Moscow. It had been a marathon.



He asked who planned it that way. *The Secretary* asked if Gorbachev would like a summary. *Gorbachev* said he would.

*The Secretary* began by saying there had been a continuation of the worthwhile human rights dialogue. Both sides had told the other about the things important to it. There had been a working group. He had only a preliminary report, but he knew the U.S. side had described the things that concerned it. It had been reassured, in general, to see continued progress. That was an important element in the overall picture. He had taken special reassurance from reading Gorbachev's book and from what Shevardnadze said that the Soviet side was coming from its own analysis of what was happening in its country. That would give development a more secure place, and the U.S. side welcomed that.

*Gorbachev* asked to say that the process of democratization in all spheres also affected human rights and freedoms, the status of the individual in society. It would gain strength, and some problems would disappear as it gained strength. He welcomed the Secretary's recognition that these matters were within the Soviet side's jurisdiction, and his recognition that developments had a stable basis within the whole of Soviet society.

Turning to arms control, *the Secretary* reported that the sides had shared views concerning the INF Treaty. He had informed Shevardnadze that the ratification process was going well, that the Treaty had strong support, that he felt very confident. The U.S. side was organizing a group to administer implementation; we were preparing to go into business.

*Gorbachev* replied that there was full confidence in the Soviet leadership that the Treaty would be ratified in the Supreme Soviet, although for the first time the process was not as easy as before. They were being accused of having ceded too much for Soviet security. They had been trying to prove that equal security was assured, but were being asked how this could be when they had said it was assured before but had agreed to reductions four times as great as the U.S. There had been heated debate in the Foreign Affairs Commission. *Akhromeyev* said they were still fighting back. *Gorbachev* went on that there was still the general sentiment in the country that the Treaty would be ratified. Democratization was gaining. Everything was connected. *The Secretary* joked that he should tell Senator Helms to grab the Treaty before the Soviet Union changed its mind.

*Gorbachev* said one Soviet advantage was that the Supreme Soviet had more workers and farmers, and fewer politicians. But there were also questions from ordinary people. They were not about disarmament overall, but about why unilateral concessions had been made to the U.S. The Soviet side could not answer as he had said to President Reagan—that it knew he liked concessions. It had to explain things a different way.

*The Secretary* said he knew Gorbachev did not want all the details, but he thought there were aspects of the U.S. INF debate that were educational as the sides looked ahead. *Gorbachev* said he could see Senator Nunn and his Committee were putting on pressure. *The Secretary* said they were not doing so on this score. That was a debate between the Executive and the Legislative that was separate from this subject, and he thought the U.S. side had it in hand. In the end, he said, Senator Nunn and he could work together rather well. *Gorbachev* said the Soviet side also had the impression that the Senator was a very solid person. Not easy to work with, but solid. *The Secretary* said that was true. *Gorbachev* commented that it was always interesting to deal with that kind of partner.

*The Secretary* said there was a two-fold lesson to the INF debate.

First, people kept saying that the devil was in the details. Second, the subject of verification was a very important aspect of the debate. And it would be much more difficult for strategic arms than for INF, where classes of weapons were being eliminated. The lesson was to get at the details early, or it would not be possible to complete the treaty by the time of the Moscow Summit.

*Gorbachev* said he understood one point: before the President visited it would be necessary to have ratification of the INF Treaty. Otherwise it would be a useless, empty visit. *The Secretary* said he agreed, but there was no real doubt about ratification. He thought it would be completed by the end of April.

*Gorbachev* said he thought the Soviet side could agree on the importance of verification in the preparation of the START Treaty. He also believed the problem was more complex than for INF. The Soviet side was ready for cooperation, for intensive, even new forms of verification compared to the INF Treaty, as had been said in Washington. The sides were now doing reductions for real. Verification was needed to assure the U.S. side and the Soviet side that there would not be one-sided advantages in reductions. The U.S. side should take the same approach. Otherwise there would be no movement.

*The Secretary* said that he agreed, and that to come to grips with this, both sides needed more information on the other's forces. He and Shevardnadze had agreed the day before to instruct the Geneva negotiators to produce drafts of the two protocols and the Memorandum of Understanding in time for Shevardnadze to come to Washington, on March 22 or thereabouts.<sup>2</sup> He had talked to Admiral Crowe and the other chiefs. They were doing a lot of agonizing. But they were

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<sup>2</sup> See Documents 132–139.

ready. Shevardnadze had said Akhromeyev and his colleagues were in the same position. This was an important and serious matter.

*Gorbachev* said that since verification seemed the most difficult issue, perhaps it should receive priority attention now. Perhaps there should be a special group of experts—say scientists and military people—to single the thing out, not just as part of the general work.

*Shevardnadze* said he and the Secretary had particularly discussed ways to intensify this work, especially on SLCM's, but this could be expanded to other matters.

*Gorbachev* said the work should encompass production, inventories, deployment areas on land, at sea, under water. Of course the two sides would need reciprocal information on each other. Without it verification efforts could not be successful.

*The Secretary* said he agreed. The two sides would see to it that the Geneva delegations were equipped with experts who could work competently and effectively, so that by the time of the Washington meeting there could be results. It was a good thing to set deadlines for them.

*Gorbachev* said it was a matter of fundamental (*printsipialno*) importance that in this process of seeking solutions to all problems of strategic arms, including ABM, the sides proceed from the provisions of the Washington statement.<sup>3</sup> He said this because the draft document proposed by the U.S. at Geneva reflected the U.S. approach to strategic stability. President Reagan had taken that approach in Washington too. He (*Gorbachev*) had made clear from the outset that this was not the way to a solution. Together they had managed to find acceptable language on the subject. But if that were changed there would be no solutions. As was said here, one had to build a bridge across rather than alongside a river.

*The Secretary* said he agreed that the Washington statement should be the Bible, so to speak, of what we were doing.

He continued that he wished to make some comments in the space and defense area. The U.S. side believed that it was essential, if we were to reach a strategic arms agreement, that there also be a treaty or agreement dealing with this. It was important that it be separate, but in any case it had to be there. The U.S. side believed that the essence of that agreement was contained in the Washington joint statement. It proposed basically to take the language there as the fundamental basis for the agreement or treaty. The sides did not need lawyers to change it. Central to the concept was the idea that there should be an agreed

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the "Joint Statement on the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting," December 10, 1987. (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1987, Book II, pp. 1491–1497)

length of time not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. They had talked enough about that—they had not agreed, but they had talked a lot—and enough for them to agree that that period would exceed the length of time involved for reductions of strategic arms.

*Gorbachev* said the Washington statement had had two aspects and not just one. The first concerned interpretation of the ABM Treaty as it was understood in 1972. The second concerned the non-withdrawal period the Secretary had mentioned.

*The Secretary* said there had been a third element. The statement had used the Soviet side's language on what each side could do, with six months' notice, at the end of the agreed period. So there were three elements.

*Gorbachev* said that actually there had been a fourth element. In the U.S. side's comments on the Washington statement, it was saying that either side could withdraw at any time when it judged there was a threat to its supreme national interest. This negated the rest of the agreement. It provided for unilateral withdrawal, and then there would be no agreement. Complete clarity was needed on this, for both the U.S. side and the Soviet side. He did not think the U.S. side would want a situation where the Soviet side could decide to withdraw that way.

*The Secretary* said that, with due respect, he thought the Soviet side was creating an unnecessary issue here. That language was practically standard in all our agreements. It was in the present ABM Treaty. It was in no way related to anything else but a supreme national interest. The U.S. side would be glad to make a statement along those lines. It was a standard provision.

*Gorbachev* said he thought the exchange would be useful for continued work on this question.

*The Secretary* continued that the question of the 1972 Treaty and what "understood" meant was a matter of some controversy. Both sides knew that. There was more work to be done on that subject. Here Shevardnadze had made a suggestion that the U.S. side welcomed, and would go home thinking about. This was to look at the verification aspects of our discussion, and see if in there there was not some way to resolve this issue. He had a feeling that if the sides worked on that they might perhaps find an answer. But he knew more work needed to be done.

The Secretary said he would like to go back to the strategic arms treaty, and make some more comments. Looking at the verification issues, they were all difficult, but those concerning mobiles were a special and more difficult problem, and those concerning SLCM's even more so. There had been special discussion of each issue in the meeting the day before. The U.S. side had had the position on mobiles that they

should be banned, basically because anything agreed to would be so difficult to verify. But both sides had been working on the verification issue. Part of the discussion had been conceptual, part of it explicit. The sides were not home free. But he was somewhat more confident than in times past.

Turning to SLCM's, the Secretary continued that Akhromeyev had spoken strongly on it in Washington.<sup>4</sup> The U.S. side had examined the suggestion the Soviet side had made. It was still at a loss to see how it could be confident about verification. But the U.S. side was prepared to keep working. It also agreed that there were certain things that could be done: at a minimum this was an area that had to be treated; there should be a limit to nuclear-armed SLCM's; the U.S. side would be willing at the right time to set a number we would be prepared to live with; we would like to have it verifiable. The U.S. side did not see how that could be accomplished. But it did see that a limit was necessary, and was prepared to step up to the issue.

*Gorbachev* said that many things on strategic offensive arms had been worked on. In Washington the sides had been able to note progress on some aspects, and to take some important steps. With regard to certain concerns that the U.S. side had expressed, the Soviet side had given some more thought, and was in a position to take some additional steps.

The U.S. side had raised the issue of sublimits, *Gorbachev* went on. The sides had agreed on a sublimit of 4900 warheads on ICBM's and SLBM's. This was a basis. Continuing on sublimits, he believed the Soviet side could speak of an additional sublimit of 3300 on ICBM warheads and another of 1100 on heavy bomber warheads. Then the U.S. side had raised the issue of the heavy bomber warhead sublimit. The Soviet side understood the U.S. side needed it to be bigger than 1100, say 1300. If the sides agreed on 4900, then they might agree to add or subtract 200, if that was a problem for the U.S., say to 1300 on heavy bomber warheads and 5100 for ICBM/SLBM warheads. This was assuming that was a problem for the U.S.

*Gorbachev* continued that the Soviet side also thought there was agreement concerning Soviet heavy ICBM's—on 154 launchers and 1540 warheads. There could also be a ban on development, production and deployment of new heavy ICBM's and SLBM's. This could be agreed, but the sides would need criteria. The Soviet side was also

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<sup>4</sup> Documents relating to Akhromeyev's conversations at the December 1987 Washington Summit are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XI, START I, 1981–1991.

ready to reach agreement on the limits of acceptable modernization of existing heavy missiles.

In connection with that, Gorbachev continued, the Soviet side thought the sides could write into the treaty a ban on heavy SLBM's and a ban on heavy mobile ICBM's, and a provision for non-conversion of non-heavy launchers into heavy launchers. The Soviet side was ready to specify all that.

The Secretary had raised mobiles, Gorbachev continued. He understood there had been movement on that. To remove ambiguity, the Soviet side was ready to specify the number of mobile launchers and to specify limits on deployed and non-deployed ICBM's.

With regard to verification, Gorbachev said, the Soviet side believed that the problem with respect to mobile missiles could be solved. He did not wish to go into the details. Soviet experts agreed that mutually acceptable solutions could be found.

The Secretary had spoken about SLCM's, Gorbachev went on. The Soviet side did believe, as it had said in Washington, that this was a fundamental problem. If no solution were found it would devalue all the efforts of the two sides on START and ABM. It would make them pointless. He would use the fashionable word "compensation." SLCM's could be the start of a new arms race. He understood that the U.S. position was to agree there should be a specific limit on SLCM's, but to doubt that it could be verified. But if the U.S. agreed to the concept of comprehensive verification, including national technical means, inspections, and limits on types of ships and submarines on which they were deployed, then the task of assuring effective verification could be accomplished. If two elements were combined—verification with the obligation of both sides to abide by and not violate the agreement, and access to production facilities, ships and submarines—then the problem could be resolved. If there were no such access this could be more difficult. Systems could be configured—with lead packaging, shielding—to make it more difficult. But that would not be good for an agreement. It would be deception.

To sum up, Gorbachev said, he saw good possibilities of moving forward, and doing so faster. Solutions were possible.

*The Secretary* said he welcomed Gorbachev's comments that he saw things moving forward. He was uncertain about all the subtleties and complications. But he could see important strides in what Gorbachev had said.

The Secretary said he would like to comment on two questions Gorbachev had raised.

Returning to SLCM's, the Secretary said that on-site inspection, at least in certain cases, and identification of types of ships and submarines

both give us problems. We would have to think hard on this issue. We were prepared to set a number and live with it, but we were not at all confident about verification. However, we would keep working.

*Gorbachev* said “now you are afraid of verification.” Once the Soviet side has accepted a U.S. proposal, the U.S. side took it back. It was becoming almost a routine.

*The Secretary* said he did not know how *Gorbachev*’s navy was, but to ours the idea of people tramping around inside nuclear submarines was not attractive. We would keep working on the issue. *Gorbachev* said the Soviet navy was positively enthusiastic about the idea. *Akhromeyev* said the Soviet side’s missile people, the ICBM people, had resisted the idea of U.S. inspectors on their bases till the very end. But the Soviet Union had a government. The U.S. side also had people in power, but they did not seem to be able to break the resistance of the navy people. *Gorbachev* commented that there was after all a government (*vlast*) in both the Soviet Union and the United States. *Akhromeyev* said the Soviet side had broken their land-based people, but the U.S. side could not break its sea-based people. Perhaps that was because the Secretary was a Marine. *Gorbachev* said he thought that was an old bias. *The Secretary* offered to turn the floor over to General Powell.

With reference to the proposal for an 1100 sublimit, the Secretary continued, the U.S. side had no desire to change the 4900 sublimit. It recognized that 4900 plus 1100 equalled 6000. This was an automatic regulator. If either side wanted more than 1100 warheads on heavy bombers and ALCM’s it would have to cut ICBM’s. There was an automatic tradeoff there that both sides recognized. But in discussing this with Shevardnadze the day before, it had come through to him that this was not the problem. It had seemed to him that the Soviet concern reflecting uneasiness [was?] with the rule for counting ALCM’s.

*Gorbachev* said that was another point that had not been discussed, but what the Secretary said was true. It seemed to him that there was added clarity on that question. *The Secretary* replied that the way the matter had been left was that there was more work to do on that counting rule. As that progressed and the Soviet side got more comfortable with it, the 1100 number would probably fade away. What he had gotten was that the counting rule problem had generated the new number. The U.S. side recognized that it would have work to do on it.

*Gorbachev* said that as far as ALCM’s were concerned there were two important elements. The first was the need for clarity on the long-agreed principle that long-range strategic cruise missiles were those with a range of over 600 km. The second was that we should agree to a specific number of cruise missiles for each type of aircraft, and, as the Secretary had said, that this should be within the 6000 warheads



limit. He thought it was possible to reach an understanding on this. He did not see insurmountable obstacles to it.

*The Secretary* said that he agreed.

*Gorbachev* continued that nevertheless there were also new problems emerging. To deal with them the sides should add more experts, and make them work harder. *The Secretary* replied that the experience of the other treaty had shown that when one problem was solved, five more emerged. There needed to be an effort to put on more expert manpower and get them working intensively.

*Gorbachev* said he wished to repeat: it was his view, he was convinced, that if the sides began to work intensively right now, they could prepare good documents, good results, for the President's visit. *The Secretary* said we were determined to do that, and the President was as determined as *Gorbachev*. When *Shevardnadze* came to Washington the Secretary would keep him up all night. *Gorbachev* said he would give *Shevardnadze* a big suitcase.

*Shevardnadze* said there had been a good discussion of nuclear testing. *Gorbachev* said it seemed to him solutions were possible in this area. He did not wish to lose time on it.

What worried him, *Gorbachev* continued, was the U.S. position on chemical weapons. *Shevardnadze* said it was his impression that the Secretary of State was worried about it too. *The Secretary* asked if *Gorbachev* were worried that the U.S. side was pushing too hard to get the job done.

*Gorbachev* recalled that the U.S. draft convention submitted in 1984 had called for complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union had later decided to join this, and do so in a big way. This had not been an easy step. Then, suddenly, Mrs. Thatcher's enthusiasm had cooled. Then the Soviet side got information that this was as a result of a sign from Washington. Then the U.S. side's enthusiasm had cooled too. The Soviet side knew there was a dog buried somewhere, as the saying went. It did not know whether it was buried in the White House, in the State Department, or in the Pentagon. What would the Secretary say to a proposal to prepare by the time of the Summit a substantive statement on a chemical weapons ban which expressed the determination of both countries to complete the agreement?

*The Secretary* said he would favor it.

*Gorbachev* said that perhaps he should appreciate this statement of welcome, since the Secretary was always talking about the difficulties and complexities of chemical weapons production banning. Perhaps the U.S. and the Soviet Union should designate one chemical weapons production facility where the verification procedures that had been developed could be tried.

*The Secretary* said that was the first time he had heard of that idea. He did not have a response, but it was an interesting idea. In general there was nothing like actually doing something. The managers might see if they could fool the inspectors. It did not seem to him a bad idea. He would probably be criticized for saying that.

*Gorbachev* said it seemed to him that with regard to the verification of nuclear testing they had walked around the problem for a long time. Then they had agreed to an exchange of inspectors, and now things seemed to be moving. If one sat around and said the road was difficult, that there were many hills to climb, one never climbed them.

*The Secretary* said he would cease to talk about the difficulties, and simply work on the problem. In all seriousness, he went on, he thought, and the President also thought, that the potential dangers of the spread of chemical weapons were immense. The genie had been in the bottle a long time, and now it was out. Unless we could do something in a comprehensive way, as we had with nuclear non-proliferation, the danger was great. We needed to get a handle on this some way.

*Gorbachev* asked the Secretary what else he would like to discuss.

*The Secretary* said the two sides had discussed conventional arms, and the desirability of getting negotiations going. Of course they would not be bilateral, but among the 23. The U.S. side would like to see that go forward. They would hear the report of the working group on this today. *Gorbachev* had also mentioned the topic in his book. He had nothing more to say on that subject, but wished to take note of it.

*Gorbachev* said he could only confirm the Soviet side's interest in seeing the process take a tangible form. The longer the question of a mandate dragged out, the longer it was undecided, the more suggestions there would be from various quarters, especially the military-industrial complex, for compensation. That might start a new process that would be hard to curb. The U.S. side should bear in mind that the Soviet side wanted to work actively with it. It was important to be clear. The compensation approach was just not the right one.

*The Secretary* said that the two sides should go to work in Vienna. This was true for the mandate as such, but it was also true with regard to the importance of a balanced outcome among all elements of the CSCE process. There was a way to go. Let us work, he said; we should make some decisions. *Gorbachev* said, "Good."

*The Secretary* reported that he and Shevardnadze had spent all night on regional issues.<sup>5</sup> He thought it was the most thorough discussion on them they had ever had. He could not say he felt there had been

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 123.

any particular outcome, but there had been a good exploration, a further maturation of the two sides' discussions. For instance, this was true on Angola and Cambodia, where there was possibly promising follow-up.

The Secretary said he would be interested in Gorbachev's reactions to the discussion on the Iran-Iraq war and on Afghanistan. He had told Shevardnadze that he welcomed Gorbachev's statement on Afghanistan, which presented some perspectives. We wanted Geneva to be the last round, to end the laborious process. As that happens people seek assurances, including the U.S. side, and he had tried to explain that in detail. He would welcome Gorbachev's views, including his views on the Middle East, to which, for better or worse, he was heading.

*Gorbachev* said the Secretary and Shevardnadze had found a good time, in the dark of night, to discuss somber issues.

Gorbachev said he would first like to make a general comment to help the two sides understand what role there was for efforts to resolve regional conflicts. The first thing he wished to say was that the Soviet Union and the U.S. should give the whole world an example of how to cooperate on these issues. If they did conflicts could be resolved. But it would be necessary to be less one-sided, to take account of the interests of all parties. *The Secretary* said he agreed with that.

*Gorbachev* continued that under any other approach conflicts could not be resolved. He was saying that because he could still see mistrust on the part of the Americans. The U.S. side did not trust the sincere Soviet desire to cooperate to help resolve very painful conflicts. Perhaps this resulted from the fact that it had been mistrusting the Soviet Union for a long time. Probably this resulted from the NSC attitude. According to information he had received, at the NSC there was still the attitude that the Soviet Union was today and would be tomorrow a country with which the U.S. would clash. If that was the approach it would be hard to get solutions.

The fact that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were present everywhere in the world could however be interpreted very differently, *Gorbachev* went on. As he had said to the Secretary and also said publicly, he had drawn the conclusion that we were in a sense locked together, and should cooperate. He thought that this approach made it possible to find solutions to problems. It was a conceptual approach, but it was valid for finding solutions.

Let us see how it works with regard to Afghanistan, *Gorbachev* continued. He had brought to Washington and conveyed first to the American side the Soviet plan of action. He had asked for American cooperation to resolve this very painful problem. The Soviet side had also taken into account the American side's suggestion that it was necessary to complete the Geneva agreements without waiting for the

formation of a coalition government, without linking these two things. The U.S. side had said that a coalition government could not be created with bayonets; the Soviet side had agreed.

The conversation in Washington on that matter did not turn out well, Gorbachev went on. The Soviet side had believed that the situation around Afghanistan was one on which the two countries could cooperate, could give an example of how to approach such conflicts. In order to push the U.S. side he had made his statement. Now the U.S. side had begun to move.

Now, said Gorbachev, it seemed that some things which had been agreed should be dropped. If both sides wanted a neutral and independent Afghanistan, if both sides believed that the Afghans themselves should discuss and decide their government, what was unacceptable in what he had said?

The Secretary should see, Gorbachev continued, that after the agreements were signed the possibilities of both sides for influencing things in Afghanistan would become more limited. After his statement it had already become harder for the Soviet side to talk to its friends in Afghanistan. Each was thinking of his own interest. That was natural.

But the Soviet side still thought the U.S. had a role to play, Gorbachev said. It welcomed that. The U.S. side had wanted the Soviet side to declare it would withdraw, to set a date. That had now been done. He welcomed the Secretary's statement hoping that the next Geneva round would be the last. But the Soviet side could not dance to the changing moods of the parties there. The matter was too important. The Soviet Union could not dance a polka with any of the parties. Yet even now there were some who were impudent enough—he used the word—to say that the Soviet Union was announcing withdrawal for propaganda purposes.

*The Secretary* said that did not include the American side. It took what Gorbachev had said at face value. Shevardnadze had told him what was intended six months before, and he had been confident ever since.

*Gorbachev* said he wished to reiterate that in Afghanistan the Soviet Union had no intention of creating a bridgehead, or a base, or a road to warm seas. That was nonsense. It had never had such plans, and did not now. He could assure the Secretary of that. So he had one request, one thing to communicate. He requested the U.S. side to work to facilitate the early signing of the Geneva agreements, and to work on implementation of them to make Afghanistan neutral, non-aligned and independent. Both sides should work on that. The best thing would be for implementation to be bloodless.

Gorbachev suggested they turn to the Middle East. *The Secretary* said that before that he would like to say a word on Afghanistan. He

would not repeat to Gorbachev what he had told Shevardnadze about our concerns over the Geneva process, which we wanted to see work well. We had changed our mind from what had been said in Washington about the difficulties of forming a coalition government. *Gorbachev* interrupted to say that government would not be formed in Moscow, or in Washington, much less in Pakistan. The Soviet side was now finding out about contacts among the Afghans themselves of which it had been unaware. It would not be as simple as all that. But it was necessary to be realistic.

*The Secretary* suggested that they go on to Iran-Iraq.

*Gorbachev* asked the Secretary to tell the President he hoped the two countries would be able to cooperate on resolution of the Afghan problem.

On the Iran-Iraq problem, Gorbachev said, the Soviet side had been making efforts to see ways to resolve the problem. It had seen some new elements of cooperation emerging between our two countries, both bilaterally and in the Security Council, and welcomed that. It believed this was important both for the specifics of the problem and for future prospects in the Security Council, and valued this. It thought this should not fade away. It was ready to cooperate in the next stage as well.

At the same time, Gorbachev went on, it seemed to the Soviet side that differences were emerging in the Security Council, also between other members. The Soviet side had not failed during its Presidency; it was up to the U.S. side to be successful during its Presidency. The Soviet side would see what it could do to help.

*The Secretary* said he had spoken the day before about a little different approach. There had been no agreement on it, but it was somewhat different. The U.S. side had been thinking of a second or follow-up resolution that would have three components instead of just one:

—As now, a mandatory arms embargo against the non-compliant country, Iran. There were also two new ideas:

—An effective date would be set at some time in the future, 30 days or so. Thirty days might not be right, but we were thinking of some date, perhaps thirty.

—We would ask the Secretary General to form a special negotiating group, or name a special emissary, in any case some such device, which would focus the full attention of someone other than the Secretary General on the issue, seeing that he has so many other duties. This negotiating element would be new. The negotiator would have a date to work against. We would know that he could come back to the Security Council before the date if he chose. He could say that he was

making headway on this or that aspect, and the date could be postponed if he chose. He would have that tool. This idea came out of the discussions of the day before.

*Dobrynin* interjected that this was more flexible.

*Gorbachev* said the two sides should discuss all possibilities between them. The idea was new to the Soviet side in that kind of interconnection. The U.S. side could assume that the Soviet side would try to make a constructive contribution in that connection. It believed in something very important which he had said to the President: let us seek to ensure that the conflict did not spread in a more dramatic way to many countries. The Soviet side was for consistent steps, but they needed to be carefully thought out.

Gorbachev asked if the U.S. had considered the possibility of some step to reduce its presence in the Gulf, or did it fear that such a step would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. He thought the task the U.S. side had set for itself could be accomplished with fewer warships.

*The Secretary* said the task the U.S. set for itself had remained constant, and had been successfully accomplished. The U.S. side had recently reduced two capital ships and reconfigured its force to reflect the changing situation. What had changed was not the task but our estimate of what was needed to accomplish it. The U.S. side had no desire to keep its presence at anything like the present scale. It would like to reduce that presence. He asked Admiral [*General*] Powell to comment.

*General Powell* said Shevardnadze had raised this issue, and this had given him the occasion to point out that only two additional combatant ships had figured in our buildup over the previous eight months. Most of the force consisted of minesweepers and carriers that constituted no offensive threat. They were intended to face the mine operations threat we were most concerned about. We now knew that threat better, and that was why the previous week we had announced our adjustment. We hoped to go further as the threat was reduced, and as we understood the threat better.

*Gorbachev* joked that the Iran-Iraq war continued, but for the time being our discussion of it had ended. The two sides had agreed they should continue to consult. The Iranian problem was also present in the Afghanistan problem, he remarked. It had to be carefully weighed. *The Secretary* commented that it was also present in the Middle East problem, as they had discussed the previous night. *Gorbachev* said that was correct. It seemed that the Iranians wanted fundamentalists to prevail in forming the government in Afghanistan, and not only there. *The Secretary* said they were probably willing to take over the Kremlin, and joked "Welcome to Washington." *Gorbachev* replied that he did

not really think they could take over either the Kremlin or Washington, though they might be praying for that.

Turning to the Middle East, Gorbachev said the Soviet side had examined the new American suggestions, based on what it had received from Ambassador Matlock and communications from those Arabs with whom the American side had talked. He first of all welcomed the fact that there was some process—a weak one, but still a process—of cooperation, seeking to resolve this old international problem.

The Soviet side had waited for the U.S. side to reach the important conclusion that without Soviet participation the problem would be difficult to resolve. He believed he could find points of convergence in the efforts to resolve it. The Soviet side wanted a fair solution that took into account the interests of the Arabs, of Israel and of the Palestinians. It did not think that an approach which ignored the interests of any of the parties would work. He thought that was in a way the basis of the U.S. approach. There were perhaps some differences, but generally that seemed to be the way. One could not ignore the interests of any party. It was in that light that people looked at the proposals the U.S. side was now putting forward.

And the fact was, Gorbachev continued, that many people thought that despite the elements of flexibility the proposals seemed based on the old approach of using the conference idea as a cover for separate agreements among a limited number of countries. For example, Syria was left out. There remained in the proposals a negative attitude toward the resolution of the Palestinian issue and toward the PLO. Everyone had noticed that.

Gorbachev continued that if, on the one hand, this was a proposal to seek a truce, to relax current tensions, to have the West Bank and Gaza issues linked to efforts for an overall settlement, people would understand. If not, it would be something quite different. The Soviet side had also proposed a preparatory meeting for a conference, that would permit both multilateral and bilateral efforts. People understood that. But if there were just to be talks to provide cover for separate deals of the Camp David type, people would know this and be against it. They knew that Camp David was dead. It would not lead to a useful end result. That was why so many had doubts.

Gorbachev asked the Secretary how he envisioned things going. The proposals he had formulated seemed very vague. Perhaps that was deliberate. Perhaps they were not thought through, or perhaps that was deliberate. But there was confusion. He suggested to the Secretary that before he go to the area he think them through. Because if the U.S. were to join the Soviet Union's and the U.S.'s allies, for instance in looking for a general political settlement—of course there could be interim settlements and steps—then that would be one thing,



that could open a path in the Middle East. But if the goal was to ease tensions in order to pacify the Arabs, to take the edge off, then the effort to extinguish the flames could hardly be supported by the Soviet side.

The Soviet side was ready to seek solutions that were in the interests of all, Gorbachev said. Points of convergence could emerge. The Soviet side was ready to cooperate. He thought the Secretary should go on to complete the document that had been shown to the Soviet side.

*The Secretary* said he would like to make a few comments.

He said that our sense was that procedures—both the international conference and bilateral procedures—had reached the point of sterility because they did not contain enough substance. The day before he had gotten the sense that the Soviet side agreed. So the approach the U.S. side had taken was to identify the general outlines of a settlement that might be accepted, and on that basis to try to get a chain of international and bilateral negotiations going. People might be ready to enter who were not ready now, because they could then feel more comfortable about the substance. That was the essence of the idea.

The Secretary continued that we now want to see all the issues of concern to people up on the table promptly, within the year, including things that could change the situation immediately, or at least over a short period, and things having to do with the so-called final status. He had to say that this notion was sharply different from the Camp David concept. We believed that the touchstone of the final status had to be Resolutions 242 and 338.<sup>6</sup>

As the U.S. side conceived it, the Secretary went on, if the parties agreed the process could be kicked off by an international conference. Such an event, under the right circumstances, ought to happen promptly. The U.S. side believed that Israel had to be ready to sit down with each of its neighbors, not just with Jordan but also with Syria, with Lebanon—with Egypt it already had a peace treaty—and that the Palestinians had to be included in negotiations directly, in the context, we believed, of a joint delegation with Jordan, to negotiate about the West Bank and Gaza. In the U.S. view the PLO as such had disqualified itself by its advocacy of violence and of the elimination of the State of Israel. As he had said many times, the U.S. was ready for dialogue with the PLO when it changed its position on that matter.

The Secretary continued that he planned to go to the Middle East after returning to Washington to report to the President on his conversations in Moscow, initially for four or five days. He would see what the reactions were. The people there always wanted him to come, and he had always been reluctant to go. Once he had said he was coming they

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 4, Document 44.

had all told him why it would not work. Each immediately staked out his extreme positions, at a minimum to make a point. They knew it, but did not realize it in their gut.

But, as Gorbachev had said, it was impossible to impose solutions on others. Israel was finding that out, as others had found it out in other situations.

So, the Secretary concluded, by the time Shevardnadze came to Washington he would have visited the Middle East, and Shamir would have been to Washington. Either then or before, if there were pertinent information the U.S. side would consult further on this matter.

*Gorbachev* said he thought the present situation in the Middle East was unique. Internally people there understood the fact that a way out must be found. And in the international community there was virtual unanimity in favor of an international conference. There was no other realistic forum. Therefore some steps to normalize the situation were eagerly awaited. He believed that some steps were possible if they took into account—and he wanted to stress this—all parties. He asked why Syria and the Golan Heights had been omitted from the U.S. proposals.

*The Secretary* said that they had not been.

*Gorbachev* said he would not argue in favor of an international conference; he knew the U.S. side's suspicions would not calm down. But because there was no acceptance of a conference in the U.S. proposals, even their positive parts seemed doubtful to some people, based on what Ambassador Matlock and the Arabs had told the Soviets.

Gorbachev said he welcomed the Secretary's visit to the area. The visit of a U.S. Secretary of State could always be useful. It would provide an opportunity for them to tell their concerns to the Secretary, and for him to explain his thoughts to them. Perhaps there could be fruitful next steps. He was positive toward the Secretary's visit, but he asked the Secretary to take his initial judgment into account.

*The Secretary* said he thought Gorbachev's stress on taking the interests of all parties into account was right, was a wise observation.

*Gorbachev* said the Soviet side was ready for exchanges of views on this. It would try to make a constructive contribution. He invited the U.S. side to get rid of its suspicious attitude toward the Soviet Union and its policies in the Middle East. He believed the concept—that the U.S. had to have clashes with the Soviet Union in all latitudes and longitudes—should be abandoned. He believed the two countries should seek common approaches. For 45 years they had tried to build policies based on opposition. They should try for the next 40 or 50 years to build on the possibilities for cooperation. That would really change the world.

*The Secretary* said an important element of this should be exchanges on the shape of the future, trends in the economic, technological, military and political areas. He had no crystal ball, but he thought we needed, to coin a phrase, new thinking. If it was applied it might show the nature of our interests to be a little different from what it had been thought to be.

*Gorbachev* said he thought it was now a realistic possibility to discuss how to harmonize the interests of states. This was even true for the developed countries. At first glance it seemed unacceptable, since it seemed to mean someone would stick hands in their pockets, as they were used to doing to others. But that was only at first glance. If one looked more profoundly it was definitely true that all developed countries had a stake in seeing the process evolve on all continents, because the accumulation of economic and social problems could strike a heavy blow at the developed countries, and destroy the system of communication they had established. *The Secretary* said he agreed with that.

*Gorbachev* said the fact that we were seeking harmonizing did not mean international equalization, the creation of a drab and equal world. But all were interconnected, and needed to seek ways to harmonize on an international basis. He had tried to set this forth in an article timed for the last UNGA session. Perhaps things could continue as they were for twenty or thirty years, but that would be a huge mistake. We needed to understand that it was time to gather stones, as the saying went.

If she heard that portion of the conversation, *Gorbachev* went on, Mrs. Thatcher would say he was indulging in dreams and illusions. But he believed what he said was true, and that this had to be tackled. It was not dreams but the imperative of the times. If we could not devise adequate mechanisms for dealing with them we were in for a lot of trouble. The house would develop cracks and shatter. In fact, in many developed country international organizations that process was underway. It would be painful, but solutions could be found. In the recent EC meeting the Federal Republic had had to contribute 20 billion DM to solve common problems. *The Secretary* said Mrs. Thatcher had needed a better deal, and gotten it. *Gorbachev* said he knew that.

*Gorbachev* suggested that the two sides try to give some impetus to the work by having U.S. and Soviet scientists work on international problems, devise some kind of solution in that area. Some efforts were underway in the UN, but they would take a long time. A bilateral approach was better, and for that matter Soviet scientists were already working on these problems under instructions. The U.S. had completed the Senate hearings on the fate of the Soviet Union and had its conclusions. Now it should turn to these economic problems.

*The Secretary* said he had no doubt many would be glad for a chance to hear Soviet views and advance ours. We were doing this in two fora. The first was our planning talks. One round had taken place in Moscow, another would take place soon in Washington. The second was our Joint Commercial Commission. In the session with Ryzhkov that morning, a suggestion had been made.<sup>7</sup> Ryzhkov had suggested that the two sides find some aspects of economic relations they could develop and turn into something suitable for the Summit. There was a bandwagon, and the political side was rolling, but the economic side was not going quite so fast, and Ryzhkov wanted to hook onto the bandwagon. That was an interesting idea, and, the Secretary said, he would take it up with Secretary of Commerce Verity, who would be coming to Moscow the following month, to see what could be done.

*Gorbachev* said the U.S. side had not decided how to act in that area of the relationship, and it was not allowing other Western countries to act in that direction. But he believed the idea of a consortium was interesting. *The Secretary* noted that Ryzhkov had mentioned it too. He said Ryzhkov was an impressive and interesting man. He had had three sessions with Ryzhkov, and all had been useful. *Gorbachev* said he was pleased to hear that. He thought it could allow the Secretary to do away as soon as possible with the approach of seeing the Soviet Union personalized in one person. At the same time, he did believe that it was consistent with Soviet political philosophy to say it was pointless to deny the contribution of individuals, including political people.

Moreover, *Gorbachev* went on, perestroika was generalizing<sup>8</sup> new forces, new people, in the political, economic, cultural spheres. An interesting point had been made to him by Indian Ambassador Kaul. He said he had been asking around Moscow what perestroika meant, and was getting confused. But then he went to provincial towns, where things were on their way, and then it was clear. Whereas in the West the information was that the Soviet leadership was split, that perestroika was threatened, that the military was unhappy and would one day slap the table. *The Secretary* said jovially that he thought the military-industrial complex ran everything, that that was the explanation. *Gorbachev* said “like in your country.”

*The Secretary* said he had found it important to get visitors to go beyond New York and Washington. *Gorbachev* replied that everyone said that to see America you had to go across America. *Shevardnadze* said he hoped to get to Boston on his next trip. *Gorbachev* said he should

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<sup>7</sup> See Document 124.

<sup>8</sup> An unknown hand crossed out “generalizing” and wrote “generating” above it.

go to Princeton. He himself remembered the fine young people from Princeton at the Secretary's luncheon in Washington. *The Secretary* said they were from Yale, the rivals.

*Gorbachev* said his visit to Washington had been an important event. It had generated many hopes in the Soviet Union and the world. It seemed that those who had been saying that if the U.S. and the Soviet Union could do something it would have a good impact were right. This impression was growing. The two sides should push on.

Gorbachev asked the Secretary to convey his regards to the President and all members of his cabinet. He was ready to reciprocate the great attention he had received in Washington. Of course the content of the visit would be very important. This was unavoidable. It meant work, work, and more work. The Secretary and Shevardnadze had begun working a 24-hour schedule. They would have to go over to a 48-hour schedule.

*The Secretary* said the President had asked him to give Gorbachev his regards, and to say he was looking forward to coming. He shared the view that the visit should accomplish as much substantive progress on all aspects of the relationship as possible. *Gorbachev* said he welcomed that, and shared the view.

*The Secretary* told Akhromeyev that he was serving as a mailman for Admiral Crowe, who had asked him to give Akhromeyev a letter if he saw him.<sup>9</sup> *Akhromeyev* thanked the Secretary.

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<sup>9</sup> Not found.

**126. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, February 22, 1988, 3:30–4:10 p.m.

**SUBJECTS**

Working Group Reports; Preparations for March Ministerial

**PARTICIPANTS**

*U.S.*

The Secretary

National Security Advisor Powell

The U.S. delegation

EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)

*U.S.S.R.*

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

The Soviet Delegation

SHEVARDNADZE opened the meeting by noting that there was little time—perhaps forty-five minutes. He asked that working group leaders report on what they had accomplished, urging that they be brief and specific.

Nitze, Obukhov, Medvedev, Grinevskiy, Schifter, Adamishin, Armacost, Vorontsov, Sukhodrev and Simons made brief interventions.

[NOTE: INTERVENTIONS WERE IN MOST CASES READ FROM PREPARED DOCUMENTS AT GREAT SPEED, TO SHEVARDNADZE'S REPEATED INJUNCTIONS TO HURRY. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO RECORD THE STATEMENTS, WHICH MERELY SUMMARIZED WORKING GROUP ACTIVITIES. SEE WORKING GROUP RECORDS FOR DETAILS.]

SHEVARDNADZE thanked the working groups for their efforts. He thanked the Secretary as well, noting that he had made some important proposals on many fundamental problems in the nuclear and space area. There had also been a useful discussion of the ABM Treaty, of SLCM's, ALCM's, mobile missiles, sublimits and verification. During their meeting that morning, the General Secretary had made some new proposals. Taken together, all of this provided solid capital for the Geneva delegations to put to use, and a good stimulus to their efforts.

On other issues, a good amount of work had been accomplished on human rights and bilateral affairs. Regional discussions during the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow—Feb 88—Shultz/Shev. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in the Guesthouse of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. All brackets are in the original.

present visit had been noteworthy for their quality. They had been useful, and some interesting prospects seemed to be emerging.

Shevardnadze noted that working groups had become essentially a permanent feature of the way the two sides did business. The Foreign Ministers had found effective patterns for organizing their own work. They had clear instructions to intensify work in anticipation for the President's visit. There was little time remaining. Those instructions applied to the experts as well as the ministers. The ministers' next meeting had been set for March 23. All concerned should, Shevardnadze said, prepare thoroughly so the necessary headway could be made for the summit.

In this connection, Shevardnadze proposed that a protocol be prepared of the results of working groups, in order to measure implementation by the time of the next meeting. If the Secretary agreed, the paper could be worked up that afternoon, and successful the experts had been in fulfilling the plan. Or perhaps the procedure could be initiated in Washington. Noting that some of the rapporteurs had referred to meetings during the course of the spring, Shevardnadze suggested that as many as possible of these take place prior to his March meeting with the Secretary.

In summary, Shevardnadze said, the Secretary's visit had been constructive and productive. In addition to his meetings with the Foreign Minister, the Secretary had had the opportunity to see Gorbachev and Ryzhkov. A good basis had been laid for the preparation of documents by the time of the President's visit. Shevardnadze thanked all present for their contributions.

THE SECRETARY thanked the Minister on behalf of the American delegation for his hospitality and for an interesting and intensive program. The Secretary's meetings had been extremely worthwhile, and he shared Shevardnadze's positive assessment.

The Secretary said that the results of the visit could be divided into two categories:

- Specific agreements which had been reached and could be considered "in the bin";
- And areas where tasks had been set and priorities assigned.

The ministers had identified critical path items for a Moscow summit and had tasked the Geneva delegations to work toward these ends. From the U.S. standpoint, we would be pushing our teams hard both in Washington and Geneva. Between now and the ministers' next meeting, the Secretary expected to see real progress.

The Secretary agreed that it would be advisable to schedule as many meetings as possible before Shevardnadze's March visit. They could then review progress to ensure that there would be concrete results for the Moscow summit.



The Secretary thanked Shevardnadze once again for his hospitality, and offered Powell the opportunity to speak.

POWELL seconded the Secretary's thanks. It was interesting to note how much had been accomplished since the Washington summit. There was much work to be done, but our experiences of the past several months had shown us what was possible.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that preparing for the Washington summit had been good experience.

The meeting ended with Shevardnadze and the Secretary's leaving to join Ambassadors Ridgway and Bessmertnykh, who had been working on the joint statement released at the conclusion of the visit.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> For the text of the joint statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 1988, p. 42.

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#### **127. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, February 23, 1988

In addition to my extensive discussions with Gorbachev, Ryzhkov and Shevardnadze, I met with several individuals and groups, as I have done before, including a group of refuseniks and others whose right to emigrate has been denied. I also called on Andrey Sakharov who spoke vigorously and movingly of the abuses which are still occurring here but also recognized and complimented the positive changes which have taken place.

My last evening was spent in one of the new "cooperative" restaurants with six prominent Soviet intellectuals from various fields of endeavor. A story by the poet present epitomized the attitude of all of these men. He recounted to us how on a trip to the US in 1979 he had been shaken when he saw a film at the Air & Space Museum of the wonders of the world—with the exception of the Soviet Union—from the air. (The Soviet Government does not permit foreigners to take aerial photos of the USSR.) He realized to his horror and shame

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, Memoranda for the President (01/47/1988–02/08/1988). Secret. There is no indication on the memorandum that the President saw it.

that the Soviet Union had cut itself off from mankind and become a “blank spot” on the map of the world.

These intellectuals spoke eloquently, and frankly, about *perestroyka*, of their hopes and fears, of their recognition of the human toll caused by enforced isolation, totalitarian rule and Stalinist terror, and of their determination to find a way out, to create a more humane society. Things cannot change quickly here: institutions must be reformed, new legislation drafted, mind-sets altered. That will take time. Gorbachev and his supporters face a long slog.

The Soviets with whom I dined are excited and inspired by *perestroyka* but they are also realistic. And they are worried. The economist acknowledged the difficulties of moving to a market oriented economy and implementing price reform but maintained that could be managed over time. The playwright spoke of a “tremendous battle” over how to approach the past but pointed to the recent rehabilitation of Bukharin as an indication of the change which has occurred. The historian warned that without the elimination of Stalinism, the foundation of the present system, no fundamental change would occur. The cinematographer and the poet opined that only creating a tradition of “absolute openness” would enable the Soviet Union to transform itself into a more productive and more humane society.

I was struck and even moved by the clarity with which these men understood the defects of their society. But I also detected an anxiety that the task of reform might prove unmanageable because of long and ingrained habits and widespread resistance. Nevertheless, if these men are representative of those who are pressing for reform, there exists a real commitment among key intellectuals to change and a determination to keep working at this staggering but historic task.

**128. Telegram From the Secretary of State's Delegation to the Embassy in the Soviet Union<sup>1</sup>**

Brussels, March 3, 1988, 1017Z

5094. For Ambassador Matlock. Subject: President's Message on START.

1. You are requested to deliver the following message from the Secretary to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

2. The President and I have had an opportunity to review the progress we have made and are making in the START negotiations, and to assess the work that lies ahead of us if we are to complete our work by the time of the Moscow summit. The President told me that the recent *Washington Post* story<sup>2</sup> reflects his view that, as you no doubt agree, what we want is a good treaty, not a fast treaty.

3. In the course of our conversation, the President asked that I request that you pass to General Secretary Gorbachev the following message from him:

Begin text of President's message: I know you have been following the American press as it reports my thinking on the START negotiations. I want to be sure you understand fully that I hope we will be able to complete a treaty that serves both our interests by the time we meet in Moscow. Both of us understand, I am sure, and I have sought to convey publicly that we have a lot of work to do in a very short period of time. You should know that I have told our negotiators that we should press forward with great energy, not to get a fast treaty, but to get a good one. Assuming we can resolve the very real and tough problems involved, including those of verification, we intend to "go for it". That is what I have told our team. End text of President's message.

4. As you see, this is the position the U.S. side took in Moscow and is taking in Geneva. I hope that, in the effort to make the necessary progress, we will hear soon from the Soviet side that you accept our proposal that we exchange now the information about our strategic forces that is necessary if we are to make real progress.

5. With warm regards. End message to Shevardnadze.

**Shultz**

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N880002-0279. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. No drafting information was found. Sent for information priority to the Department. Shultz was in Brussels with Reagan, March 1–3, for a NATO Summit Meeting.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Lou Cannon's article, "Reagan Seeks to Assure Europe on Arms Accords." (*Washington Post*, March 1, 1988, p. A15)

129. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 11, 1988, 9:55–10:15 a.m.

## PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Chief of Staff Howard H. Baker  
Colin L. Powell, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
John D. Negroponte, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Suzanne Massie  
Lisa Jameson, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

*The President* greeted Mrs. Massie warmly, for he has talked with her on several previous occasions.

*Mrs. Massie* delivered an oral message to the President that she received in Moscow from Central Committee Secretary Anatoly Dobrynin. She understood that the message actually had originated “even higher,” presumably from the General Secretary. The message, tendered several days before Secretary Shultz’ arrival in Moscow for his February ministerial with Shevardnadze, began with a statement of the Soviet belief that the Administration’s overall perception of Soviet international behavior has not changed—that the President still thinks of the USSR as an evil empire whose social and political positions have placed it on the ash heap of history. The Soviets request that, if this in fact is not the President’s perception, i.e. the President believes there have been changes or could be changes in Soviet international policies, then it would be important for the President to state this prior to the Moscow Summit. The Soviets ask what concrete steps they could take over the next few months to prompt such a statement by the President. An answer could be sent via Mrs. Massie, who plans to return to the USSR on March 31st. (She will accompany a group of eleven senators who plan to stay in the Soviet Union over Easter.)

*The President* said that one thing came immediately to mind: stopping the large-scale supply operations to Nicaragua the Soviets recently resumed. *General Powell* interjected that we will consider a range of possible responses to the Soviets’ message, if appropriate. We have a few weeks before Mrs. Massie departs to think it over.

*Mrs. Massie* described her conversations with Soviet officials about religious freedom. She stressed important reforms such as permitting religious instruction for children and allowing churches to engage in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Lisa R. Jameson Files, Suzanne Massie. Confidential. Drafted by Jameson. The meeting took place in the Oval Office at the White House.

charitable activities. *The President* said this echoed what he had told Gorbachev during the last Summit. Gorbachev had complained about the brain drain from so many emigrants. The President had retorted that if everyone in the Soviet Union had freedom of religion and conscience, then, perhaps, they wouldn't want to leave. Letting hundreds of thousands out was not the only answer, the President had told the Soviet leader. It was also to make life within the USSR worth living. Gorbachev had then criticized the fence on our border with Mexico, to which the President had pointed out the basic difference between a fence that keeps people out and one that keeps them in!

*Mrs. Massie* related some of her most recent experiences and impressions of the USSR. She suggested the President visit Leningrad as well as Moscow, especially the Piskarev Cemetery where tens of thousands of World War II dead are buried. "This would be an important gesture after Bitburg," *Mrs. Massie* said, explaining that the Bitburg visit<sup>2</sup> had been very poorly received in the Soviet Union.

*Mrs. Massie* said that, especially since the Washington Summit, ordinary Soviet citizens' opinion of the President had risen to a high level. She recalled how one Soviet remembered the President's comment about a young Chinese defector (Hu Na?), that he would "adopt her" if necessary. Another Soviet, having seen the President on television, remarked about his "elegantnost'" (elegance). Still another Soviet citizen, obviously ignorant of the American system, lamented, "Can't the Reagans stay on?"

*Mrs. Massie* perceived a feeling of malaise among the Soviets she talked to, mostly educated persons and intellectuals. Rising expectations borne of Gorbachev's reforms were tempered by the realization of the basic inertia of the working force—nothing seemed to be happening. "Soviet society is undergoing an agonizing reappraisal," she said, likening the Soviet people to someone breaking out of concrete. With regard to nationality problems, she believes Armenia is only the beginning. "We're looking at a historically repressive system forced upon a basically irrepressible people," she said.

*Mrs. Massie* volunteered to help the President and the First Lady in any way she can, before, during, or after the Moscow Summit.

The meeting concluded very cordially, with friendly good-byes all around.

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Reagan's 1985 trip to a West German cemetery in which the remains of some Nazi Party Waffen-SS soldiers were buried.

**130. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State  
(Whitehead) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 20, 1988

SUBJECT

My Ride with Shevardnadze

Shevardnadze's mood in his remarks to the press at the airport and in the car was upbeat, positive, and hopeful. He said there is lots of work to be done, they want the summit meeting in Moscow to be as successful as the meeting in Washington, and he is prepared to work toward that end.

At the airport press conference he was asked if they will withdraw from Afghanistan if there is no agreement in Geneva. He declined to answer the question specifically, saying they had other options.

Shevardnadze agrees to a one-on-one meeting with you at 5:00 p.m. on Monday. On the buffet dinner and movie Tuesday evening, he said that sounds nice and it is up to us whether to do that. He said that there is lots to talk about, and you and he may want to talk in the evening. He accepts the concept of an announcement of Summit dates immediately after his meeting with the President, if there is agreement on dates.

In an exchange on Central America, he asked if Nicaraguan troops really were inside Honduras. I told him there was no question that they were, and that Ortega had lied on that point. He said if we would both stop supplying arms to Central America, things would be better. I asked whether Cuba would also stop, and he said he could not speak for Cuba, they had their own policy and make up their own minds. I pointed out it would be one-sided if Cuba continued to supply arms, including arms transshipped from the Soviet Union. He said we could talk to the Cubans.

I reported to Shevardnadze that Amb. Dubinin and I had agreed that the priority subjects for the meeting were START, Afghanistan, and Nuclear Testing, to which Dubinin had added the Middle East. I said we looked forward to hearing about his visits with Arab leaders. Shevardnadze acknowledged that he had had substantive visits, and seemed proud that the Soviets have a role to play in the Middle East.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: "Copy for your information."

Prior to going to Andrews, I took Amb. and Mrs. Dubinin to the Devils victory over the Capitals at the Capital Center. In the course of our conversation Dubinin said they were signaling us in Geneva that they understand our need for parallelism on Afghanistan. Their notion is that they would continue to supply arms to Afghanistan as they would to any friendly country, and we would continue to supply arms to Pakistan. I asked how arms supplied to Pakistan could find their way to the Mujahedin. He had no answer.

John C. Whitehead<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Whitehead initialed “JW” above his typed signature.

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**131. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 21, 1988

SUBJECT

Secretary Shultz’s Overview of Impending Shevardnadze Visit

Secretary Shultz has sent you a memo outlining his expectations and plans for the next ministerial with Shevardnadze (Tab A). The following are brief comments on points George makes.

I agree with George that we can probably fix summit dates. We proposed 23 May as the starting day; the Soviets want to start one week later to give more time for completing arms agreements.

The Geneva talks on Afghanistan remain deadlocked over our demand for “symmetry,” i.e., that the Soviets end aid to Kabul if we are to end aid to the Mujahedin. The Soviets have refused this demand, and George expects Shevardnadze to concentrate on blaming us for the deadlock. There are signs, however, that the Soviets may be able to live with some “off the record” commitment on this score. There are many forms a Soviet aid cutoff pledge could take, but we will want it as clear, explicit, and public as possible—and we should hold firm.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Fritz Ermarth Files, Chron Files March–April 1988 (1). Secret. Prepared by Ermarth. Sent for information. Copied to Bush and Howard Baker. There is no indication that Reagan saw either Powell’s or Shultz’s memorandum.



The Soviets say they will pull out without agreement in Geneva, so the pressure is not on us.

On other issues, Shevardnadze will want to hear about the Shamir visit. Central America will loom larger than previously expected, for obvious reasons. The Sandinistas are using Soviet arms to subvert a peace process they signed up to. We should make clear that this poisons the atmosphere of US-Soviet relations.

### *Human Rights*

George plans to cover the now-familiar themes and to present an updated list of human rights cases of interest to us. I think we shall need to emphasize the reform of Soviet laws and practices that underly Soviet abuses.

## **Tab A**

### **Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>2</sup>**

Washington, March 14, 1988

#### SUBJECT

Shevardnadze's Visit

Shevardnadze arrives in Washington as preparations for your Moscow summit are reaching full stride. We want to use the visit to review progress across our full agenda and focus the work of both sides as we move into the final stretch.

One concrete result of the visit will be the announcement of dates for your Moscow trip. Shevardnadze stated publicly when I was in Moscow last month that this was his intent. We are thinking in terms of a White House joint announcement following your Wednesday<sup>3</sup> meeting and lunch with Shevardnadze.

Substantively, arms control will have its usual strong claim on our attention during the visit. Gorbachev's response to your private message on START<sup>4</sup> suggests he shares your view that our objective should be a good treaty—a view you can underscore to Shevardnadze.

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<sup>2</sup> Secret; Sensitive.

<sup>3</sup> March 23; see Document 138.

<sup>4</sup> For Reagan's message on START, see Document 128. Gorbachev's response to Reagan's March 3 letter is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XI, START I.

The fact that Soviet negotiators tabled critical documentation in Geneva last week, and the businesslike way they have recently been addressing the issues, suggests their instructions are to go for an agreement.

Shevardnadze and I will review in detail the joint draft texts on verification which our *START* negotiators will have pulled together, and can try to eliminate some brackets. We may be able to put to bed the difficult question of a counting rule for ALCM's, disposing of the Soviet demand for an 1,100 ALCM sublimit in the process. I expect we will continue to disagree over how to treat SLCM's, but we may be able to have a constructive discussion on mobile missiles and will make another stab at nailing down ICBM sublimits. On *Defense and Space*, we will press our case for a separate agreement based on the Washington summit language, and share further our ideas on a predictability package if it's ready.

We will urge the Soviets to respond promptly—if they have not already done so—to our protocols for improving verification of the two unratified *nuclear testing* treaties. We need agreement soon if you and Gorbachev are to exchange instruments of ratification on this and a related treaty in Moscow, as Shevardnadze and I agreed to shoot for last month. We will also be prepared to exchange views on *chemical and conventional weapons*, but expect no major moves on either side.

Regional issues will loom large. It is unlikely that agreement will have been reached on an *Afghanistan* settlement, and Shevardnadze will seek to saddle us with the blame. We need to make him understand in unequivocal terms that we cannot guarantee an agreement that has us cutting off aid to the freedom fighters while Soviet arms continue to flow to Kabul. If Moscow hangs tough on this point, they will indeed, as Gorbachev has said, have to make their own arrangements.

Unless the Soviets have moved to honor their repeated assurances that they will work with us on a second Gulf resolution, our discussion on the *Iran-Iraq* war will also have to be sharp. We can make the point that their efforts to play all sides against the middle at the U.N. raise questions in our mind as to how they could play a constructive role in any *Middle East* peace process. Dick Murphy will have personally briefed Shevardnadze on my Middle East trip, and, in the wake of Shamir's visit, I will outline our views of how, precisely, Moscow could make a positive contribution to bringing peace to the region. We can also continue our exchange of views on *Southern Africa, Asia, and Central America*—where we will want to lay down a firm marker on Soviet/Cuban meddling in Panama.

Our *human rights* strategy will require little fine tuning. You and I can lead off our discussions with Shevardnadze by stressing the importance of progress in such areas as emigration and release of prisoners of conscience to sustainable movement in other parts of our

agenda. We should also press for resolution of the 16 cases we have identified as of particular interest to us. This month we will hold the first of a series of high-level U.S.-Soviet “roundtables” on such issues as psychiatric abuse, demonstrating graphically how far our dialogue has come in an area the Soviets once said was none of our business. We would prefer that the roundtable be completed before the Ministerial, but it may have to be held while Shevardnadze is here.

Shevardnadze’s visit will be an opportunity to take stock of progress on *bilateral issues* which could figure in a Moscow summit. Charlie Wick has asked that you and I make a strong pitch for agreement in principle on the establishment of *cultural centers* in Washington and Moscow. We have long supported this, and it makes sense to take advantage of Soviet interest in a successful summit to go for it now.

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### 132. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 21, 1988, 4:55–6:30 p.m.

#### SUBJECTS

Organizational Questions, ABM Treaty, Nuclear Testing, Afghanistan, Central America

#### PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>U.S.S.R.</i>
THE SECRETARY	FOREIGN MINISTER
Gen. Powell	SHEVARDNADZE
EUR/SOV Director Parris	(Soviet Notetaker)
(Notetaker)	Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)
Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)	

THE SECRETARY welcomed Shevardnadze, noting that the two were meeting frequently. But the more they met, the more they seemed to have to do. The present meeting was no exception.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in Shultz’s outer office at the Department of State. In a memorandum he sent Reagan later that day, Shultz reported: “My overall impression is that the Soviets have come ready to work. Shevardnadze brought with him a large delegation, with particularly strong regional and human rights expertise. Moreover, their instructions seem at first blush to be to make progress.” (Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, Memoranda for the President (03/11/1988–04/02/1988))

The President was looking forward to seeing Shevardnadze on Wednesday,<sup>2</sup> the Secretary indicated. It was well that the two ministers could have this Monday afternoon meeting. It would enable them to go over the agenda and begin discussion of certain issues. The Secretary thought that it might be particularly useful to talk about Afghanistan in a preliminary way. That was a current issue, and one important to both sides.

SHEVARDNADZE expressed his own warm greetings and those of the Soviet leadership, including General Secretary Gorbachev. He agreed with the Secretary that the more often the two ministers met, the more problems seemed to pile up. As he had driven to the Department in his motorcade, he was interested that people in the street seemed to take no notice. They seemed to think that this was natural, as it should be, especially as the President would soon be in Moscow. Shevardnadze emphasized that the Soviet leadership believed that the summit would be an important event, even if, for the moment, it could not be said that all was in readiness. And, the Foreign Minister noted, there was little time remaining.

Much, therefore, depended on the ministers discussions this week. Decisions on the President's visit would have to be taken, both with respect to dates and the substance of the visit. Substance, of course, was the important thing.

Shevardnadze said he was glad that the two ministers could have this initial meeting one-on-one. It would be well to get the agenda squared away. The Minister was also prepared to discuss other questions, including the situation around Afghanistan. This was indeed a subject of interest, particularly in the wake of the discussions which had taken place during the Secretary's last visit to Moscow. Shevardnadze said he would also be interested in having the Secretary's views on Central America.

THE SECRETARY suggested that they turn first to the agenda. He expressed his regret that Mrs. Shevardnadze had not been able to accompany the Minister, and that it had proved impossible to schedule a side trip to Boston during the visit. SHEVARDNADZE noted that it was the first time he had visited the U.S. without Mrs. Shevardnadze. Normally, she always accompanied him on his trips abroad. This time she was not feeling well, and the doctors had recommended against the trip. Shevardnadze was also disappointed to have missed Boston, but he had to be back in Moscow on March 24. Maybe next time, he suggested.

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<sup>2</sup> March 23; see Document 138.

The SECRETARY and SHEVARDNADZE spent about fifteen minutes discussing organizational matters. They agreed to retain what had become the traditional pattern of small group meetings at the ministers' level, supplemented by working groups. They agreed that there should be a single arms control group which could break off sub-groups as necessary. They agreed to establish working groups on regional and human rights questions, and that Ambassadors should oversee a discussion of bilateral issues, including those relating to the functioning of embassies in Moscow and Washington. THE SECRETARY noted that he would prefer to postpone discussion of the Middle East and other regional issues until the return Wednesday morning of Asst. Sec. Murphy.

THE MINISTERS agreed that there would be an initial plenary meeting to provide a photo op and to commission working groups. THE SECRETARY indicated that, on the U.S. side, Gen. Powell and Amb. Ridgway would participate in the restricted ministerial sessions. Outside experts could be brought in as needed.

THE SECRETARY suggested that their initial small group meeting open with a discussion of human rights, followed by initial presentations on arms control. The ministers would then break to open the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, and proceed to lunch. After lunch, they could deal with other arms control questions. The Secretary explained his suggestion for an informal buffet dinner that evening, possibly coupled with a showing of the movie, "That's Entertainment," as an opportunity for unstructured discussion of the issues. SHEVARDNADZE said he had told John Whitehead the previous evening that he was at the Secretary's disposal.

The Secretary briefly ran through the Wednesday schedule, beginning with a morning small group meeting focusing on regional issues. The ministers would then break briefly before Shevardnadze's visit to the White House, which would include a working luncheon. Should there be agreement on dates, they could be announced in a short joint press event immediately thereafter. The ministers could then reassemble at the Department for two to three hours of concluding discussion. They would hold separate press conferences thereafter.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the arrangements the Secretary had outlined corresponded to Soviet desires, and could be considered agreed.

THE SECRETARY indicated that the U.S. would be prepared to issue a joint statement at the end of their discussions if there were something to report. Ambassadors Ridgway and Bessmertnykh could look into this, as they had done so successfully in the past. SHEVARDNADZE agreed that this was a good approach.

*ABM Treaty*

SHEVARDNADZE asked if he could raise one question with respect to the Nuclear and Space talks. The issue was sensitive, and he had not wanted to address it in either the plenary meeting or in working groups. It had to do with the ABM Treaty.

Until recently, Shevardnadze explained, Moscow had been convinced that the President and General Secretary Gorbachev had reached a meeting of the minds on this question. The Washington Summit had produced a statement on the subject. It had not been easy to reach agreement on the language of the statement. But there had been agreement.

On January 22, however, the U.S. delegation in Geneva had introduced a new draft document on the ABM question.<sup>3</sup> When the Secretary had come to Moscow, he had seemed to agree with Shevardnadze that the solution to the problem which had arisen was to incorporate the language of the Washington Joint Statement<sup>4</sup> into the new document on defense and space, and to work on that basis. Shevardnadze recalled that the Secretary had referred to the Washington Statement as a “Bible,” which should not be complicated with new language.

The ABM Treaty existed and there was a need to reaffirm the two sides’ attitude toward it, Shevardnadze affirmed. The *attitude* had found expression in the Washington Statement. As to the *form*, there was an understanding that a separate agreement on the subject should be concluded. But negotiators in Geneva seemed unable to agree on how to go about this. Thus, Shevardnadze asked himself, should the two sides stick to the Washington Statement? Or should they seek new language to interpret what had been agreed? This was an important question.

Shevardnadze said that it had proven impossible to elaborate a joint draft document in Geneva, because the U.S. January 22 proposal was incompatible with the Washington Joint Statement. Perhaps it would be best just to confine the effort to the Washington Statement itself. All that would be needed in that case was to amplify verification considerations to ensure against violations.

THE SECRETARY volunteered to describe the U.S. view. We agreed that there should be a separate agreement. We agreed that the Washington Statement should serve as our “Bible.” The Washington Statement had treated certain issues: the concept of the non-withdrawal

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<sup>3</sup> The January 22 plenary statements, during which the U.S. side tabled a draft Defense and Space treaty, is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. XI, START I.

<sup>4</sup> See footnote 3, Document 125.

period; what the parties could do at the end of the period; that no later than three years before the end of the period there would be strategic stability discussions; that, during the non-withdrawal period, each side would do research, testing and development, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty.

The U.S. liked those words, the Secretary said. We realized, however, that they could be interpreted differently. In this connection, he noted Shevardnadze's suggestion in Moscow that there was a need to focus on verification of any new agreement. Soviet proposals had contained some of the same predictability ideas that the U.S. considered important. The Secretary thought that it might be possible to use the discussion of predictability to reduce ambiguities created by the final words of the Statement. We were thus trying to be responsive to Soviet suggestions.

The Secretary noted that another issue which had come up after Washington, and which he had discussed at some length with Gorbachev, was the "supreme national interest" problem. The Secretary had made the point that this was standard language in all treaties to which the U.S. was a party. We had not intended for it to be an escape hatch for deployment, and were prepared to say so. The Secretary felt that his conversations in Moscow had made this less of a problem.

That then, was the U.S. approach, the Secretary concluded. The ministers needed to find a way to reaffirm all of this to their negotiators. The Secretary had the impression that the drafting process in Geneva had become more difficult than it had to be. Part of the problem was that the issues being discussed in Geneva were not "Geneva issues," but issues which had to be resolved at a political level. This made for frustration on the part of the negotiators, but it appeared that the two sides' basic approaches were not dissimilar.

SHEVARDNADZE emphasized that he had raised the issue in private because he felt an urgent need to decide "right now" on a document dealing with the ABM Treaty. Once this were accomplished, it would be possible to move boldly in all other areas. This was a fundamental issue which needed to be resolved at the ministers' level. It could not be done in Geneva.

THE SECRETARY said he was willing to try while Shevardnadze was in Washington. He was sure that there were areas where they could make progress, but he was less sure that they could complete the job. We had been working on ideas for responding to Shevardnadze's suggestions on verification, but they could not yet be considered mature. The Secretary was prepared to push where he could, but he was not certain it would be possible in Washington to eliminate all the ambiguities of the Washington Statement.

SHEVARDNADZE stressed the importance of identifying at the political level what had and had not been agreed to on this issue. For



example, both nine and ten years had been mentioned in connection with the non-withdrawal period. This point could be left blank for the moment. They should take the same approach to other questions. But the negotiators could not go on talking forever in Geneva without results. It would affect other areas. Shevardnadze suggested that the experts be told to look into the problem so that they could report by the following afternoon what was and was not agreed.

THE SECRETARY said he thought this was a constructive approach. He agreed there was a need to get this negotiation back on track. One of the advantages of trying to work a joint statement, he pointed out, was that it highlighted areas of difference and agreement. The two sides ought to try to get to that point.

On the question of amplifying the verification aspect of the ABM Treaty, the Secretary agreed that this was not a problem for Geneva—it was for capitals. There was a need to bear down in this area so that, when a START agreement was completed, there would be a parallel understanding on Defense and Space. The Secretary knew Shevardnadze would agree that, if there were massive reductions in strategic arms, there would be a parallel need for predictability on the defensive side.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the issue be taken up the next morning.

THE SECRETARY said that he would see that the U.S. working group was alerted to the ministers' conversation. We would try to organize ourselves to deal with the issue. The Secretary said he would put Counselor Kampelman on the job.

SHEVARDNADZE urged that the Washington Statement be the basis for the effort. If the two sides retreated from that Statement, nothing could be achieved.

THE SECRETARY and POWELL said, "Absolutely."

### *Nuclear Testing*

Turning to nuclear testing, THE SECRETARY observed that, in Moscow, he had felt agreement had been reached to go for a "high option"—draft verification protocol language by the present meeting so that there could be a significant nuclear testing event at the Moscow summit. Since then, the Soviet delegation's insistence in Geneva that a joint verification experiment (JVE) precede agreement on protocol language had threatened to preclude not only ratification of pending testing treaties by the time of the summit, but even completion of the verification protocol.

The U.S. did not believe that the JVE was necessary to complete the protocol. What was necessary was for the Soviet side to agree that the U.S. was entitled to use CORRTX whenever it chose to verify

compliance. The Secretary had thought this issue had been resolved in Moscow. This had made possible agreement on the “high option.” We were still prepared to seek the most ambitious outcome, and we were aware that both sides had tabled drafts in Geneva. But we would need to work hard to make up for lost time. For our part, our negotiators had returned to Washington and were ready to work hard. We were puzzled as to where the Soviet side wanted to go. It was up to them to set the pace. We wanted to get the job done. But if Moscow insisted on doing JVE’s first, there was no way.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had looked into the matter, and concluded that work on the JVE and protocol should proceed in parallel. It was possible to proceed in this manner.

THE SECRETARY agreed that it was possible, but pointed out that a JVE could not be done in time for the summit. It might be possible to agree on the design for the JVE. It might be possible to agree on protocol language. But the actual conduct of JVE’s required certain physical preparations. These were not easy. They took time.

SHEVARDNADZE argued that parallel work on JVE’s and the protocol need not delay anything. Time would tell whether or not the JVE could be conducted before a summit. Shevardnadze was certain that a formula could be found for the protocol. He reminded the Secretary that the Soviet side had already agreed to the use of CORRTEx, noting that seismic methods should not be ruled out. The sooner the JVE were conducted, the better. That did not mean that the protocol should be delayed. The two should go forward in parallel.

THE SECRETARY acknowledged that that was one approach. He suggested that the experts work hard on the problem during Shevardnadze’s stay. He reminded Shevardnadze, however, that if the two pending treaties were to be ratified, time had to be allotted to legislative hearings, voting, etc. The process would not take as long as the INF Treaty, which was shaping up nicely. But we had hoped that, once INF was out of the way, we would be in a position to present the testing treaties for ratification. The sooner we had revised protocols, the better.

SHEVARDNADZE expressed confidence that a formula could be found.

POWELL noted that the U.S. was working hard to design JVE’s which would meet our needs, but pointed out that no tests could take place before early summer—after the summit. He agreed that work should continue on a parallel basis, but warned that time was short if the two sides were to seek advice and consent before a summit.

SHEVARDNADZE reiterated that the issue could be revisited the next day. It would be a mistake, he said, to delay the JVE until after the summit. It could be done sooner.

*Afghanistan*

Moving to Afghanistan, THE SECRETARY recalled that the two ministers had discussed the issue the previous fall in the Secretary's private office.<sup>5</sup> Shevardnadze had told him then that Moscow had decided to withdraw. The Secretary had accepted that. The ministers had agreed that it would be in the interest of all concerned were that to happen as soon as possible.

In the intervening months, they had discussed the problem a number of times. Some things had fallen into place or were about to. There had been extensive discussion of a possible interim government. The Secretary had shared some views with Shevardnadze at various points, and the Soviets had subsequently broken the linkage between their withdrawal and establishment of an interim regime. All seemed to agree that agreement on an interim government was desirable, but it was a hard thing to bring about. The Secretary believed that the Pakistanis had come to see that, too, although they felt that the more that could be done, the better.

Thus, the remaining issue was one which, in large part, had to do with the way any Geneva accords presented themselves. We felt that the accords must present themselves as balanced. The U.S. could not be asked not to support those it had supported, while the Soviet Union was allowed to continue supplies to those it had supported. What one guarantor was allowed to do, the other should be, as well. Otherwise, there would be a perception of imbalance. This was something the Secretary and Shevardnadze had discussed at some length in Moscow. The Secretary felt that there were a variety of ways to get at the problem. But it appeared that our attempts to engage the Soviets had hit a stone wall. So the Secretary had been looking forward to Shevardnadze's visit to see what progress might be made at their level. He would be interested in the Foreign Minister's views.

SHEVARDNADZE said that what he had told the Secretary in his private office remained in effect. The Soviets had decided to withdraw. They had announced a timetable: Gorbachev had initially indicated it would be ten months; in Geneva they had agreed it could be nine. The U.S. had raised phasing of withdrawals, and Moscow had decided on that, as well. Half its forces would be out in the first three months, the rest in the remaining period. Shevardnadze could not provide any further breakdown. He had personally looked into the matter, and it could not be done. But this was not a fundamental issue. By the end of the year, the withdrawal would be complete—and this would happen under the Reagan Administration.

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 72.

As for the relationship between withdrawal and establishment of an interim government, Shevardnadze said, this was something which could not be worked out in the context of the Geneva talks. Whether one talked in terms of an interim government, a coalition government, or a transitional government, such an approach was not realistic. If one looked at the range of players—from the current regime, to the Peshawar “7”, to Zahir Shah and his supporters, to the internal combatants, it was clear that it would be very hard to find a common language. It would take time. The Soviets did not want to postpone their withdrawal by establishing a linkage to interim government arrangements. Let the Afghans decide the matter.

There was a better approach, Shevardnadze suggested. Cordovez had indicated he would be prepared in a “private” capacity to use his good offices to mediate among the parties in the wake of a Geneva agreement. The Soviets and Afghan government had not yet endorsed his mission. But now the Kabul regime had reached the conclusion that such an attempt would be not only possible, but desirable. Thus, once Geneva were signed, work could get underway promptly on a coalition government.

Shevardnadze noted that the problem had recently been complicated by Hekmatyar’s election as leader of the Peshawar Alliance. Hekmatyar was a fundamentalist, a person of extreme views. It was doubtful that he could deal with the Zahir Shah faction, to say nothing of the current regime in Kabul. Hekmatyar had said he did not rule out that, in the event of an agreement in Geneva, the camps now in Pakistan would be moved to Iran. It was no accident that he had come to the fore at this juncture; trouble was in store. This had made the possibility of any linkage between withdrawal and interim government arrangements even less workable.

As for the situation in Afghanistan itself, things were winding down. Skirmishing continued, but with waning intensity. Shevardnadze had previously told the Secretary that Soviet troops had been withdrawn from twelve provinces. The figure was now thirteen, maybe fourteen. In some villages, counter-revolutionary forces reigned; in others, the Kabul regime held sway. But they lived as neighbours. That was the Afghan way. It had taken the Soviets time to understand this.

As to the problem of supplying arms, Shevardnadze wanted the Secretary to understand the situation. Since 1921, the Soviet Union had cooperated continuously with Afghanistan in various fields, including the military. Weapons being supplied to the current regime were in accordance with the terms of a bilateral treaty. It would not be understood if Moscow now sought to break that contractual relationship. Much thought had been given this point by the Soviet side, and Shevardnadze could tell the Secretary that Moscow could not accept such

a step. The decision to withdraw had not been an easy one. If followed by “such an action” it would not be understood. The Soviet Union had said it did not drop its friends. Were it to cut off their weapons, it would not be understood.

Thus, Shevardnadze, said, cooperation would continue with the current regime, as it had under the King. Moscow had no desire to terminate a relationship which had existed for decades. Afghanistan was a neighbor. The Soviet Union wanted normal relations with it.

But this raised a question. Were Afghanistan to become a neutral state, as the Soviet Union wished, what would its status be? Neutral status could be incompatible with a military supply relationship. But that would have to be decided in the future.

Another question was the military aid supplied by the U.S. to Pakistan. This was done on a government-to-government basis. The Soviet Union had no problem with that. As for those supplies which went to “anti-government” forces, the Soviet Union considered this illegal. It would be in Moscow’s interest, and in the interest of all countries in the region, for that aid to stop. If the U.S. continued such aid, it would be inconsistent with any obligations it might undertake as a guarantor of non-interference. Thus, the ideal solution would be for the U.S. not to supply Hekmatyar.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that this would be ideal for the Soviet Union, but not for the U.S. The Soviet Union, would also take on the role of a guarantor in the event there was a Geneva agreement. If the Geneva accords required that a guarantor stop the supply of arms, it applied to both guarantors equally. There had to be a consistent standard. The practical effect of such an arrangement would not be so great. The political effect would. What was needed was a way of balancing things; it was largely a question of how it appeared. The Soviet Union would have withdrawn its forces. All the factions would have to work out the aftermath. It would not be easy, but that was their task.

In the meantime, the Secretary stressed, there had to be a balance. The U.S. wanted to settle. It was in everyone’s interest that the situation in Afghanistan be settled in an orderly way. We wanted to work something out. We hoped it was possible to find a balanced way of expressing what would take place. The Secretary had been asked how this might be done. He had said that there were various ways, but that experience had shown that it was possible to work out some very difficult problems with the Soviet Union. Both sides seemed to want to resolve this one.

SHEVARDNADZE said that there was a big difference between U.S. and Soviet aid with respect to Afghanistan. Soviet assistance was on the basis of an intergovernmental agreement. The factions the U.S.

supported were not the government of Afghanistan. At the same time, Shevardnadze recognized that the U.S. had a moral and political responsibility to those it had supported. There were various options for dealing with this problem.

The first, as he had suggested earlier, was for the U.S. unilaterally to end supplies to the resistance. As much as Moscow might welcome such an outcome, Shevardnadze acknowledged that it would be unacceptable to the U.S.

A second outcome—although an undesirable one from the Soviet standpoint—would be for the U.S. not to sign on as a guarantor of the Geneva accords. The problem with such an option was that the U.S. would thereby remove itself from participation in the resolution of one of the most acute problems of the time. This was not desirable to Moscow, but could be considered. Under such a scenario, the Geneva accords would be mostly a bilateral document, with the Soviet Union participating to the extent it dealt with the dates for the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Shevardnadze emphasized yet again that this option was not desirable.

A third variant took as its point of departure the fact that the documents elaborated in Geneva did not deal directly with the question of arms supply. Thus, the issue could be omitted from the discussion entirely. The U.S. might at some point, e.g., in the event the Afghans resolved their internal political differences, decide assistance was no longer necessary. In the meantime, maybe the issue should just be dropped. Obviously, if Shevardnadze were asked by the press, he could not say he approved of the U.S. supplying forces hostile to Soviet friends. But that was the U.S.'s business.

Summing up, Shevardnadze reiterated that the first option was the ideal, but would not be acceptable to the U.S. The second was probably as unacceptable to the U.S. as it was undesirable to Moscow. The Soviets would prefer another outcome. It believed that the U.S. had a voice to be heard. U.S. involvement would make for a more stable settlement.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed. He suggested that what Shevardnadze had described as the third option held the most promise. Noting that the Geneva accords imposed certain obligations on Pakistan with respect to what went across the border, the Secretary emphasized the need to be able to state that, as far as the U.S. was concerned, we would be able to supply those whom we had aided if the Soviet Union supplied those it had supported. If we saw that the Soviet side had ceased its assistance, the U.S. would no longer have to continue its own supply effort.

In any case, the Secretary pointed out, humanitarian aid would continue. The refugees would have a tough time of it when they

returned. They would have an urgent need for seed, supplies, equipment.

The Secretary proposed that the two sides make an effort while Shevardnadze was in Washington to find a way in the context of Shevardnadze's third alternative to describe an arrangement which would be balanced in such a way that both sides could live with it. The Secretary did not know whom Shevardnadze might charge with the task, but the Secretary would ask Under Secretary Armacost to work the problem. They ought to get to work the following morning. There were a variety of possibilities which should be explored openly.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin, seconded by Middle East Countries Department Chief Alekseev, could work with Armacost. It seemed to Shevardnadze that, in the event the two sides agreed to sign the Geneva accords, it would be unnecessary to advertise that arms supplies were continuing, since the Geneva accords did not address that issue. At the same time, he supposed, Congress would probably ask questions.

THE SECRETARY assured him that this would be the case. The U.S. would have to be able to say that what we would do would depend on what the Soviet Union would do. But, he reiterated, the experts should have at the problem and come up with some ideas. If they had something to say to the ministers, they could interrupt them. It would be well to reach some meeting of the minds by the time of Shevardnadze's session with the President.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the two sides appeared to have the basis for a good discussion the following morning. If it proved possible to reach agreement on the military aid question, he added, and if the Afghan parties agreed to Cordovez's private mediation, the only obstacle to signing in Geneva was the question of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Briefly reviewing the history of the matter, Shevardnadze pointed out that Pakistan was insisting on language in Geneva which referred to respect for the "internationally recognized border"—i.e., the Durand Line. But Afghanistan had withheld recognition of the Durand Line since 1922, because it artificially divided the Pushtun nation. India also had an interest in the matter, which it had registered with the Kabul government and the U.N. Afghanistan had proposed a simpler formulation—"existing borders"—to resolve the issue. Shevardnadze expressed the hope that, if the other issues he and the Secretary had discussed could be resolved, Pakistan would withdraw its demands on the border issue. This would make conclusion of the Geneva accords a real possibility.



*Central America*

THE SECRETARY suggested that the two ministers brief their delegations on their discussion, and be prepared to meet again the following morning at 8:30.<sup>6</sup>

SHEVARDNADZE said he would first like to ask a question. What about the troops that the U.S. had sent to Honduras? Would they stay there?

THE SECRETARY replied that our troops had been sent to the region at the request of the Honduran government, and in response to Nicaragua's incursion across into Honduras. We had indicated that the force would be withdrawn within about ten days from the date of their arrival. But no precise dates had been sent. POWELL noted that this meant withdrawals could start the following weekend.

SHEVARDNADZE said he raised the question because he had been asked on arrival in Washington what the Soviet response would be. He had said that he was concerned that, at a time when Soviet forces were to be withdrawn from Afghanistan, another country was moving its troops in elsewhere. If these were just exercises, it was not a good idea.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that Honduras, confronted by a Nicaragua heavily armed by the Soviet Union, had "screamed for help." We had provided a symbolic movement of troops. There was no intention that they should become involved in combat.

SHEVARDNADZE said that was for the U.S. to decide. But the best, most reasonable solution was for them to return home quickly.

THE SECRETARY noted that Nicaragua had now withdrawn from Honduras territory, noting parenthetically that there was no way Sandinista forces could have "innocently" wandered across the sizeable river that separated the two countries. Ceasefire talks between the Managua government and the freedom fighters had taken place on schedule that same day. The U.S. continued to believe that success in those talks, followed by national reconciliation and greater openness in Nicaragua as called for by the Guatemala accords, was the way to go. But the fact that Soviet arms supplies to Nicaragua were higher than the previous year, despite the cut-off of U.S. aid to the freedom fighters, was not a good sign.

SHEVARDNADZE recalled Gorbachev's Washington summit suggestion that both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. halt supplies of arms to the countries of Central America, with the exception of police weapons. This was a serious proposal. Nicaragua had accepted it. If a country's

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<sup>6</sup> See Document 133.

neighbours were not receiving weapons, the first country would not need them either. What Nicaragua needed was to address its serious economic problems. Shevardnadze said he pressed the issue not to embarrass the Secretary, but because Moscow was interested in a serious discussion.

The ministers ended the meeting, agreeing to meet the following morning at 8:30.

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### 133. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 22, 1988, 9:25–11:25 a.m.

#### SUBJECT

The Secretary's Meeting with Shevardnadze, March 22 Morning: Human Rights, START

#### PARTICIPANTS

##### *U.S.*

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State  
Colin Powell, National Security Advisor to the President  
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)  
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy Secretary of State (EUR) (notetaker)  
Dimitri Zarechnek (interpreter)

##### *USSR*

Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Aleksander A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Viktor P. Karpov, Directorate Head, Soviet MFA  
Teymuraz A. Stepanov, Assistant to Shevardnadze  
Sergei P. Tarasenko, General Secretariat Head, MFA (notetaker)  
Unidentified Embassy notetaker  
Pavel Palazhchenko (interpreter)

*The Secretary* noted that the opening meeting and the photographs had taken a little over half an hour, so the ministers had about two hours before the NRRC ceremony.<sup>2</sup> He invited Shevardnadze to speak first, as the guest.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons. The meeting took place in Shultz's outer office at the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the opening of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in the Department of State and the opening of a parallel center in Moscow. The centers were established as a result of an agreement signed by Shultz and Shevardnadze on September 15, 1987. See footnote 4, Document 67.

*Shevardnadze* recalled that the day before they had agreed to begin the next day with humanitarian issues. He wanted to say that recently, and especially at their Moscow meeting—and he wished to emphasize that—they had had more substantial and productive discussions relating to human rights and overall humanitarian questions. He thought that trend should be continued, expanded, in the course of their work. It was obvious to him that in the past there had been a lopsided approach, with recriminations, mutual complaints, endless accusations, an accusatory mood and tone. That might continue, since without criticism there could be no movement. But in view of their experience he would like to raise the possibility of moving in parallel with criticism of the respective countries, and looking at positive experience on both sides. They could give an example at the level of ministers to the experts on how to discuss these issues.

As an example, *Shevardnadze* went on, drawing on the outlines that Mikhail Gorbachev had presented to the Supreme Soviet the Soviets had presented proposals to the Congress for a regular mechanism of discussion of these issues. They now had Congress' agreement. They should speed up on the specifics, and begin these discussions as soon as possible.

A second example, *Shevardnadze* went on, would be establishing exchanges of information on changes in the legislation of the two countries. He had in mind not only national legislation, but also legislation of the states and, in the Soviet case, the republics. It was a tradition in both countries that the states and, in the Soviet Union, the republics, including the autonomous regions, had specific institutions relating to their national character. Such exchanges could be established right after the ministers' meeting. He had with him a large group of experts, who could discuss beginning such work with the Secretary's experts.

*Shevardnadze* continued that in the Soviet Union a lot of work was going on to improve legislation, in the democratization process. This was not simple. They wanted to make their legislation fully consistent with their international commitments. Many laws were consistent, but more work needed to be done. For example, they were working on how to reduce the applicability of the criminal code provisions on capital punishment, and eventually to abolish it. He understood that there was a problem on this in the U.S. as well, especially with regard to minors. This was being discussed in the United Nations. There was for instance a West German proposal there. He thought there could also be bilateral discussions on that topic. He asked whether the legal experts of both countries could not have a special meeting on it. The Soviet experts would like that. The ministers could decide on it. Various forms were possible: a round table, small groups. The important thing was the decision to launch such discussion.

In their last meeting, Shevardnadze continued, he had commented on the human rights reports issued by the State Department. These sometimes contained a non-objective view of Soviet developments. There was bias with regard to facts, and this became part of the public domain, and distorted public opinion. He did not rule out that the same attitude existed in reverse in the Soviet Union. This could be discussed at some level. It was important for the Supreme Soviet to get accurate information on the U.S. We were at an important stage in our relationship. There was a good trend, and it should be supported across the range of our relations, including human rights.

Shevardnadze said he had been informing the Secretary of what was happening concerning the democratization of Soviet society. Enormous work was underway. It affected, for instance, freedom of conscience. They were making an effort to meet more fully the needs of religious believers. They used to deny a problem existed. They said their system was universal. Now they were working on the problems. This also concerned trade union rights; visa rules; the duration of the prohibition on exit for people possessing state secrets—the Secretary had raised this, and they were working on it; visas for temporary visits abroad; and improved conditions for journalists. They were working particularly hard on the last topic. But he had had a meeting with Soviet journalists working in Washington, and they too had problems. Your people were aware of them, Shevardnadze said.

Shevardnadze continued that a decree of the Supreme Soviet setting out guidelines on psychiatric help was being prepared. Socialist law and mercy would be reestablished. Already, from March 8, a new special article of the RSFSR Criminal Code provided for up to two years' imprisonment for anyone deliberately and illegally placing someone in a psychiatric hospital.

Nationality questions would be discussed at a large party gathering in the near future, Shevardnadze went on. They would be discussed at a Central Committee plenum, at the party conference, in Supreme Soviet sessions. They would be discussing how to improve inter-ethnic relations. How to improve all spheres of national life was an important matter of national sovereignty, in the life of the autonomous republics. The Soviets used to say the question was resolved. It was true that it was basically resolved, but as the country developed national consciousness was growing, so it was not surprising that new problems arose.

The U.S. was also a multiethnic country, Shevardnadze continued. The principle of your nationality policy is different from ours, he said, but differences like that deserved discussion. It was important to get an objective view of what was happening in both countries. If there were positive developments they could be treated more favorably, in a spirit of good will.

Shevardnadze said that specific humanitarian cases should be resolved on the basis of the principle of reciprocity. They paid attention to the questions the U.S. had raised, but the U.S. had not clarified their questions. Violations of human rights in the U.S. were of concern to their people. He had raised the names of the famous terrorists two or three times; he did not need to repeat them. There was concern about them in the Soviet Union. The Soviets studied all the U.S. requests to them, and tried to act on them. It was quite natural that they ask for reciprocity. The Secretary had very properly said that these discussions were a two-way street.

We have mentioned Nazi war criminals, Shevardnadze went on. Perhaps when the lawyers meet they could set up a special group to discuss why it was so difficult for the U.S. to move in this area. He was in favor of discussing this in a more specific way, so that the Soviet public could be informed of what had been done.

There was also racism, Shevardnadze continued. The U.S. was a highly civilized society, so that any form of racism was alarming to the U.S. side and of legitimate concern to the Soviet side. Experts could go into the details in the working group.

He had also spoken of the need for the U.S. to ratify the various human rights covenants, Shevardnadze continued. This problem was also a matter for discussion. The Soviets had been trying to bring their domestic laws into accord with their international commitments. Some decisions were needed here.

Shevardnadze said he thought perhaps he should not raise the question of the international conference. He would just say that the Soviets had proposed it, but if the U.S. was categorically against it they would not pursue it. But it seemed to them that with the process of renewal underway, with their efforts to improve democracy, it would be good for people to come and see what was happening, good to try to expand international cooperation. They did not want to compete with the French and British. They had their own ideas. The area was large enough for many ideas. They had agreed to the idea of a meeting in Paris, because of the anniversary of the Revolution. They also thought a meeting in London on information would be alright. They thought their conference could take place subsequently. He urged the Secretary to give the idea careful thought.

Since he had been discussing the need for a fair, objective picture of each country in the other, Shevardnadze continued, it would be useful to have discussions between the information services of both nations. He knew that information was mainly private in the U.S., but there is also after all a government policy. If the U.S. felt that Soviet reporting was biased, the Soviets were ready to listen. But some U.S. broadcasts about the Soviet Union were pure provocations, and irritated the Soviet side. He felt this question deserved analysis, study.

Shevardnadze said he had to raise the question of discrimination against Soviet trade unionists once again. These were denials of visas to people who were legitimately invited by American unions. Perhaps they deserved more specific discussion.

Shevardnadze observed that a rather large number of people with Soviet citizenship, of Soviet origin, resided in the U.S. Quite a few reported that they suffered persecution, difficulties in implementing rights that were normal for U.S. citizens. Perhaps the U.S. side could look at those complaints. In the context of the trends now underway in the Soviet Union, such people spoke to the Soviets more frequently. The Secretary had often raised questions involving Soviet Jews, and the Soviets had looked at them and solved problems where they could. It would be good for him to give attention to the situation of Soviet people in the U.S.

Shevardnadze said he had a letter from the children of former Soviet citizen Ogorodnikov, who had been arrested and jailed. The children wrote that during the trial there had been illegitimate violations of U.S. procedures and laws. He did not know if that were true, but if it were the principles of humanism required that it be given attention.

The working group could go into the details, Shevardnadze concluded; he had wished to give a general overview. These things affected the mood of their peoples. Things were changing for the better between the two countries, and we should be discussing these things in a spirit of mutual respect, taking into account overall relations.

*The Secretary* said he agreed a positive approach was called for. We had identified positive things happening in the Soviet Union and said so in our public statements. Perhaps it would be a good idea to formalize that in the working group. We could add to what we had said before. We had gone beyond the working group to a round table; that represented progress. We welcomed the rise in emigration levels, and the release of prisoners of conscience. We could make a list of such positive developments.

The Secretary continued that he thought capital punishment was a good subject for the working group. In this country states made the determination on whether or not there should be capital punishment. There was a particular issue concerning minors. He knew that we had invited someone from the Soviet Embassy to hear arguments on that before the Supreme Court, and he understood it would be making a ruling fairly soon.

Concerning the State Department human rights reports, the Secretary said we would welcome sitting down with the Soviet side and going through them, hearing Soviet comments. We wanted to make them as accurate as possible. He would note in passing that they had

changed to reflect developments in the Soviet Union. But going through them would be useful.

Turning to the Brazinskas', the Secretary said this was a very difficult case. The hijacking had occurred elsewhere; they had been tried in Turkey, and released; and they had then come to the U.S. We condemned and abhorred their act, but it took place before U.S. laws on which we could act were in effect, and we had no legal basis to pursue them. But he wished to reiterate our revulsion at all acts of terrorism. We also supported work on hijacking. The international regime on hijacking had matured over the past twenty years, so now there were not many of them.

We review the cases of Nazi war criminals, the Secretary continued, and pursue them. We have the same attitude toward them. Of course they had rights under U.S. law, so prosecution took time. But we had in recent years sent two back to the USSR, Fedorenko and Linnas. That showed what our attitude was.

*Shevardnadze* said he had more material on this topic. It should be discussed more specifically. *The Secretary* said "fine."

Turning to the problem of trade union visas, the Secretary continued, there was a view here, particularly strong in our trade union federation, that our unions were produced by different processes, and were thus not comparable. *Shevardnadze* had mentioned changes in the relevant Soviet laws. We would be observing them.

*Shevardnadze* asked what the problem was. He asked why the U.S. could not admit trade unionists with legitimate invitations. This did not happen in the FRG. There had to be a special situation here.

*The Secretary* observed that American trade unions had been produced by a process independent of management and outside the control of the state. Soviet unions had not been so produced, and had considerable administrative duties, for social welfare and the like, and hence management functions. So when we used the word, we meant different things. The U.S. side continued to be ready to invite Soviet trade unionists if Soviet trade unionists could also be invited by our unions at their choice. And of course we would observe the changes in Soviet laws.

*Shevardnadze* said the problem was the very specific situation where an American trade union invites someone and the U.S. Government does not issue a visa. *The Secretary* said that reflected the view of our overall trade union federation, the AFL–CIO, which stemmed from what he had said. *Bessmertnykh* observed jovially that this suggested U.S. officials were not quite free. A Vice President of the AFL–CIO had invited a Soviet trade unionist; thus the State Department is not even reflecting the view of the AFL–CIO.

*Shevardnadze* urged the Secretary to study the problem. *The Secretary* said we would study it, but he expected we would find the same strong view on the differences between our trade unions.



*Shevardnadze* said the Secretary clearly had an incorrect idea of what Soviet trade unions were like, of their management function. It was true that they were partners with management. They signed collective contracts each year. Under them the unions oversaw the fulfillment by management of its obligations in such areas as health, safety, vacations. If management violated these the union could sue. No one could be fired without the approval of the union. *Shevardnadze* said he hoped the Secretary would meet some union people when he came in April. They were interesting, worthwhile people.

*The Secretary* asked whether, if the union disagreed with management, it could express its disagreement by having workers walk off the job, go on strike. *Shevardnadze* said it could. *The Secretary* asked if it did. *Shevardnadze* said that had happened. *The Secretary* said he would be educated if he heard it had happened, on a large scale. *Shevardnadze* asked why he had mentioned a large scale. *The Secretary* noted that in our Western democracies statisticians kept track of various things, including strike days, for individual countries. He had not seen comparable Soviet statistics.

*Shevardnadze* said the Secretary should not seek a copy of a situation where private firms dominated. The Soviet worker's way of life depended on socialist production. The manager was elected by open or secret ballot. The financial situation depended on what the factory produced. If there were strikes, how would the workers be paid? But the collective contract guaranteed the workers' social and collective rights. If management did not comply with the contract they could take measures, including strikes. Strikes could take place. He knew of one large factory where the workers had taken two or three days off for discussions with management, during which they had worked problems out. He would like to take the Secretary to a large factory.

*The Secretary* said he would consider that. He had spent lots of time in factories, when he had been a labor mediator. In *Shevardnadze's* country all large factories belonged to the state, while ours were private. That got them back to the fundamental differences which explained the visa problem.

*Shevardnadze* said the U.S. gave visas to Soviet parliamentarians, and the Soviet parliament was also different from the U.S. Congress. It gave visas to Soviet scientists, who had a different basis for conducting their research. It also gave more visas to Soviet party officials than to Soviet trade union officials. There was something obsolete here.

*The Secretary* said we would see. Trade unions had a particular place in the ideological differences between our systems. *Shevardnadze* suggested the two sides study the U.S. experience with strikes. *The Secretary* said he was not advocating strikes, but without the right to strike the ability of workers to defend themselves was severely limited.

With regard to the children who had written about a bad trial for their parents, the Secretary continued, we would be happy to receive information. Ambassador Schifter would be happy to receive it. All U.S. citizens were guaranteed equal treatment under the law.

Concerning discrimination, the Secretary went on, we had severe laws prohibiting any on the basis of race, color, sex, even AIDS. Of course laws were one thing and the general consciousness of society another. We had struggled long with this issue, and had made some headway. Symbolism was important here. One of the few named national holidays, which included Washington and Jefferson, was now for Martin Luther King, Jr. That symbolized our view that discrimination was unacceptable. We were proud of the headway we had made. We were also proud that people could express complaints and fight over them. Our Civil War had to a considerable degree been fought over this issue. He could also say that in his own career, in government and private life, it had weighed heavily with him.

*Shevardnadze* said that nevertheless not all problems in this area had been solved. *The Secretary* replied they never would be. *Shevardnadze* said that was true. *The Secretary* continued that the main thing was to work at it continuously.

The Secretary said he wished to touch on some problems he had raised before.

The short list of cases he had given *Shevardnadze* in Moscow was important to him, the Secretary said. The only actions we had seen since that time were negative. One was particularly poignant. Just before going to Moscow, he had met Mrs. Vileshina in Florida. Since then, her husband Mr. Pakenas had been refused again. We could not see why they were separated. The only reason we could figure out was because he had given lectures decades ago under police auspices. We did not understand that. Mr. Schifter would go into it.

Speaking more broadly, we saw increasing openness in the Soviet Union, the Secretary went on. But we also noted the increase in violence and in arrests to discourage people from expressing their views. We had the names of 350 prisoners for political and religious reasons. We thought they should be released.

*Shevardnadze* asked the Secretary to give him their names. He was a member of the Soviet leadership, and thought the Secretary was wrong. That number was also circulating in Congress, but it was wrong. This should be an assignment for them to discuss next time in Moscow. *The Secretary* said we would give it to the Soviets right here. *Shevardnadze* said that would be fine; he would provide a file for each name.

*The Secretary* said that if the Soviets released all these prisoners, and got rid of the category of divided spouses, they would be removing

an issue in our relations. We observed what they did with prisoners of conscience. Emigration appeared to be on a bit of a plateau, and we thought lots more wanted to leave. This was important, obviously so to the Israelis, and thus important to any role the Soviet Union would play in the Middle East peace process. He had noted what Shevardnadze had said about state security. We were willing to go into cases.

Turning to the human rights meeting in Moscow, the Secretary recalled that as he had told Shevardnadze before, we were prepared to see it go forward, but the conditions had to be right. He had been struck by what Academician Sakharov had said about it. Sakharov obviously had the issue very much on his mind. He also had a list of prisoners, with perhaps 250 people on it.<sup>3</sup> He had said publicly that there should be no conference until they were released. We had also given a list of things we would like to see happen in Vienna. These were our criteria. We did not think they should be hard to meet, since they were things the Soviets were talking about under openness.

Meanwhile, the Secretary continued, the Vienna meeting was being held up basically by Shevardnadze's delegation. This was not just our opinion, but also the opinion of the neutral and non-aligned countries. The priorities were freedom of movement and of religion, human contacts, the Helsinki monitors. He thought that realistic expectations were involved, since what we were asking was consistent with things the Soviets were undertaking. We did not see why the Soviet delegation could not move more. We were perfectly willing to look at a conference if the conditions were right.

*Shevardnadze* asked what the Soviet delegation in Vienna was not doing properly. *The Secretary* said problems fell into two categories. The first had to do with prisoners of conscience. The second had to do with what was in the Vienna document. *Shevardnadze* replied that after all negotiations were going on. He thought they were going well. Things were moving with regard to human contacts. He did not think there were real problems. *The Secretary* said that was not our impression. Ambassador Schifter would go into more detail. He asked Ambassador Ridgway to comment. *Ridgway* said we had been in touch with Ambassador Zimmermann, and it was as the Secretary had described it. The two problems were prisoners and the text. If one leapt ahead this also related to the mandate for conventional stability talks. To get there a balanced outcome would be needed.

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 2345 from Moscow, February 5, the Embassy indicated that it had obtained a copy of a publication that contained the list of political prisoners "that Andrei Sakharov reported by hand to Gorbachev on January 15." The Embassy noted that the list contained the names of 286 individuals and provided these names. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880105–0149)

*Shevardnadze* said that was one aspect. But concerning the humanitarian aspect, he did not think serious problems remained. He thought they had been cleared up. *The Secretary* suggested they both look into the situation in Vienna. We thought it should be possible to get a satisfactory outcome simultaneously in all three CSCE areas. In our judgement the document was hung up basically on Soviet reluctance to move in directions the others wanted to go. The outcome hung on that.

*Shevardnadze* said the 22nd had been the deadline for proposals. The Soviet delegation had had all the necessary instructions. He thought there was no problem. When the Secretary came to Moscow they would look at the question of prisoners carefully. The Secretary had said Sakharov's list had 250 names. The Soviets would look at each and every case, to explain why they were in prison. VOA coverage on the Boston cultural events had reported demonstrations appealing to the Soviet Foreign Minister on a certain case. It turned out on checking that the person had been in prison fourteen years, but for embezzlement of state property. The case concerned a thief.

*Shevardnadze* said he was sure Sakharov did not invent the names on his list. But, he asked, who supplied the information? He could provide the Secretary with very specific data on each case. If they were prisoners of conscience, why should the authorities isolate them? They had ways to express their views. They should look at each and every case. There were not 350 prisoners in this category. He could say that with all responsibility. *The Secretary* said they should go through them here, in order to solve the problem. *Shevardnadze* agreed.

*The Secretary* asked what more there was to say on human rights. They had had a good, thorough discussion. He would pass on the notes to Ambassador Schifter. The working group could report to the ministers during the ministerial, and then continue afterward. *Shevardnadze* said he also believed the discussion had been good. It had been more specific and concrete.

*The Secretary* suggested, if *Shevardnadze* agreed, that they turn to strategic arms. *Shevardnadze* joked that they should turn to them, not use them. *The Secretary* said *Shevardnadze* could lead off if he wished. *Shevardnadze* said he never refused a legitimate privilege.

*Shevardnadze* said he had already mentioned that little time was left before the President's visit to Moscow. At the present meeting they had to hammer out the principles needed to resolve problems related to the treaty on 50% reductions. The main questions were clear.

*Shevardnadze* continued that he would like to say the Soviet leaders considered the President's visit an important event, and believed it could become a major landmark in international politics. They had every right to see it in this way, provided the appropriate documents

were ready. The ministers had received clear instructions from their leaders in Washington. They were addressed first of all to the foreign ministers and their coworkers. He could not say these instructions had been acted upon in a sufficiently intensive way. Some complaints were due the negotiators, but the ministers were also responsible.

The day before, Shevardnadze said, he had mentioned the important question of the ABM Treaty, and he would return to it later.

He wished first to single out a few difficult problems on the strategic offensive arms reduction treaty. They required collective efforts, especially at the foreign ministers' level.

The first problem, Shevardnadze said, had to do with long-range SLCM's. In Washington Mikhail Gorbachev had stressed that without resolution of that question there could be no START agreement, since without resolution a channel would be left open for building strategic offensive weapons, and nullifying the agreement to reduce them.

What should we decide?, Shevardnadze asked. Perhaps at this meeting they would have to reach agreement on a mutually acceptable figure. The Soviets had made a proposal, and had received no answer. He could reaffirm that such a ceiling on long-range SLCM's could be set at 400. This was not a new figure. Why had the Soviets proposed it? Because they thought the figure should not be too high, in order not to negate the START agreement.

The Secretary, his colleagues, the President had mentioned that verification would be difficult, Shevardnadze went on. This was true. The problem existed. But the Soviets believed it was not hopeless. A solution could be outlined.

Concerning verification of mobile ICBM's the Soviet side had submitted proposals, Shevardnadze continued. He was ready to continue the discussion, to provide more specifics. He expected the Secretary to act in the same way on a question of interest to the Soviets, on SLCM's. If the U.S. believed they were not verifiable, the Soviets were ready for joint measures to ensure that they would be verified.

What was the concept?, Shevardnadze asked. Previous proposals had focussed on national technical means, including remote monitoring. They had also proposed inspections of submarines and surface ships and at basing facilities; he wished to stress the latter. In addition, however, they could ask their experts to study the verification of long-range SLCM's by permanent inspections in specially designated arming facilities, where the systems were armed, after which they were loaded on submarines and surface ships of agreed types.

They had used this method in other areas, Shevardnadze went on, but they would have to designate a limited number of facilities, whose location would be designated in the memorandum of understanding.

In the U.S. draft there had been no mention of baseline data for SLCM's. This was not normal. Under the Soviet concept, arming them in any other location than those designated would be prohibited.

The Soviets also proposed suspect site challenge inspections, on a yearly quota. There would also be a ban on loading SLCM's on submarines and surface ships anywhere except in basing areas, for instance on the open sea. They recognized this would be a difficult limitation, but there was no other way.

If some vessels were already equipped with such systems when the agreement went into force, there would have to be demonstrations to the other side for counting purposes. The procedures for such demonstrations would have to be agreed between the two sides.

The Soviets also proposed conducting a special remote monitoring experiment in April. There would be Soviet equipment on helicopters and airplanes. The U.S. would designate ships. U.S. experts would then observe with the Soviet equipment. This could happen in the Mediterranean or in some other area. The U.S. could also test its own equipment with Soviet participation.

The Soviet side recognized that remote monitoring was not a panacea, did not provide a complete guarantee. But together with other measures it could help provide a solution.

That was what he had to say on long-range SLCM's, Shevardnadze concluded. If this key question were not resolved, one could hardly hope that a START agreement for 50% reductions could be concluded.

*The Secretary* said he thought Shevardnadze had identified perhaps the most difficult issue. Not that there were not other difficult issues, but this was the most difficult. We had thought a lot about it; we had examined it. We had not found a satisfying answer. We would take Shevardnadze's ideas, and see if they added anything. Or, because they clearly added something, we would see if they added enough. We would also look at the Soviet proposal for an early experiment, and see what it yielded for us.

We were prepared to deal with these issues, the Secretary went on. But we had not yet seen possibilities comparable to those in other areas. We were not prepared to put down a flat "no." But in the end it might not be possible to verify here. If verification proved impossible, we would be prepared to make unilateral statements, and live with them. But it would be more satisfactory to achieve agreed verification.

*General Powell* said we had spent a great deal of time examining these issues. Yazov and Carlucci had discussed them too. We would follow up Shevardnadze's suggestions. *The Secretary* said Carlucci had reported he found his conversations with Yazov constructive. They had also talked about the prospect of our top military people meeting



later this year. *Shevardnadze* noted he and the Secretary had been asking for that for a long time. It would be good if such a meeting took place. But it would be even better to agree on SLCM verification.

Shevardnadze said the question of principle was whether the sides agreed that inspections were possible. We would be having it for INF missiles. We should be applying this to ballistic missiles. *The Secretary* said the U.S. was in principle for inspection. *Shevardnadze* said if that were so, the sides were on the same wave length. The specifics could be resolved.

*The Secretary* said he wished to recapitulate what had been agreed: 1600 delivery vehicles, 6000 warheads, 4900 ballistic missile warheads, 1540 warheads on 154 heavy ballistic missiles, a bomber counting rule, various items on verification, 50% reductions in throwweight. In Moscow they had agreed to focus on verification and task their negotiators to develop three documents. This had worked out. It had been a good approach.

*Shevardnadze* said he would like to deal with the most difficult issues. If they were not resolved they would not be doing the protocols. Perhaps they should tell their experts to work especially intensively on SLCM's.

Turning to ALCM's, Shevardnadze said they should have clarity on this fundamental issue. The Soviets were proposing to count on the basis of the actual maximum number for which each bomber was equipped. This of course was on a basis of over 600 km. range. The actual maximum number for the B-52 was 28. Soviet experts believed that, and it was based on what was published in the U.S. The number for the B-1B was 22. If that were accepted the Soviets would drop their insistence on a sublimit of 1100 for ALCM's and other heavy bomber weapons. This had been discussed, and he thought the Secretary understood the basic Soviet concerns. He thought that issue could be resolved.

The third issue was verification. The Soviets suggested there be inspection of heavy bomber bases. Inspectors should look at the bombers and their equipment, and there should be demonstrations of their functioning.

*Karpov* reminded Shevardnadze of the 600-km. range figure. *Shevardnadze* said he wished to stress once again that he was talking about a 600-km. range threshold.

Shevardnadze continued that he had some suggestions to make on mobiles. At Moscow the two sides had worked on this issue, and the Secretary said that the U.S. side was more confident progress could be made than in the past. To remove grounds for U.S. concern the Soviets had mentioned their readiness to agree to a separate sublimit for mobile ICBM launchers. He could now provide a figure of 800 launchers.



*The Secretary* asked how many warheads Shevardnadze had in mind. Or was he just talking about launchers? *Shevardnadze* replied that the actual number would not be as high as 800; but there should be a limit on the total. *The Secretary* said he understood the Soviets had one system with a single warhead, and another with multiple warheads. The unit of count would be critical. The sort of mixture was important. *Shevardnadze* replied that the Soviets would decide on the number of warheads. That could be resolved. What he was proposing now was 800 missiles for mobiles under the 1600 ceiling.

Shevardnadze continued that verification would not be simple, and the Soviets understood that. Previous proposals had included national technical means, continuous inspection of production, and notification of changes in the number and location of launchers. The Soviets were ready for an expanded system, particularly for ground-mobile ICBM launchers. For baseline purposes they could agree to open the roofs of the buildings for a period of time, to assist NTM. This was already agreed for INF. There would be one such opening a year for each base. The geographic coordinates of the bases of ground-mobile launchers would be given in the MOU.

Verification of rail-mobile launchers was the hardest of all, Shevardnadze went on. The Soviets suggested that during the baseline data inspection they be corralled at bases for counting. He would say that if this could be expanded to include SLCM's all the problems would be solved. They also proposed suspect site inspection of rail cars to make sure that numbers were not greater than at the time of the baseline inspection.

The number of non-deployed ICBM's should be strictly limited, Shevardnadze continued. There should be no more than an agreed number per base, and these should be those intended for replacement. Moreover, they should be at such a distance from the base that rapid reload would not be possible. This was of fundamental importance.

Shevardnadze said he understood the need to digest all this. Serious experts should examine these ideas. The major Soviet experts had worked on them. What was emerging was a uniform system of inspection procedures.

*The Secretary* asked if Shevardnadze had some comments to make on sublimits.

Shevardnadze said he saw two alternatives:

—First, concerning reentry vehicles for ICBM's and SLBM's, the text could record a sublimit of 3300 with regard to both, and also a sublimit of 1100 for ALCM's and other heavy bomber weapons.

—Second, the possibility was open, within the 4900 warhead limit which the Secretary had said the U.S. would prefer to stick to, for each

side to mix freely between ICBM and SLBM warheads. Each side would decide for itself.

That was what he had to say on sublimits. He had also mentioned the sublimit of 1100 ALCM's and other heavy bomber weapons. But, as he had said, if the ALCM counting problem would be resolved that could be dropped.

*The Secretary* asked if they should continue on strategic arms. They had five minutes before the ceremony, and the Senators were waiting. *Shevardnadze* said in that case it was time to call a break. He had more on the protocols and the MOU. *The Secretary* agreed they should take a break and continue after lunch.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 134.

134. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 22, 1988, 1:40–4:15 p.m.

## SUBJECTS

START, ABM Treaty, Nuclear Testing, Chemical Weapons, Conventional Weapons/Vienna CSCE, Naval Limitations Proposal

## PARTICIPANTS

U.S.  
THE SECRETARY  
Gen. Powell  
Ambassador Ridgway  
EUR/SOV Director Parris  
(Notetaker)  
Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

U.S.S.R.  
FOREIGN MINISTER  
SHEVARDNADZE  
Ambassador Bessmertnykh  
Ambassador Karpov  
Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko  
(Notetaker)  
Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

## START

THE SECRETARY suggested that he respond to Shevardnadze's morning remarks on strategic arms.<sup>2</sup> The Foreign Minister had listed the areas where agreement had already been reached. It was a good list.

When the ministers had met in Moscow, they had agreed to emphasize verification. They had set their delegations the task drafting the inspection protocol, the conversion/elimination protocol, and the data MOU by the present meeting. Both sides had tabled drafts. There were joint texts to work from. There were many brackets in these texts. Some reflected larger treaty issues—mobile missiles, cruise missiles, non-deployed systems. But many of the brackets seemed susceptible to removal without much difficulty.

*Brackets*

For example, the two sides had agreed to build on the verification provisions of the INF Treaty. The language we had proposed in Geneva did that, while providing additional measures necessary because strategic systems continue to exist. The Soviet side had bracketed most of those initiatives, arguing that to change or move beyond the INF provisions might call the INF agreement into question. To the contrary, if the two sides did not go well beyond the INF verification measures,

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in Shultz's outer office at the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 133.

we would not be able to establish an effective strategic offensive arms verification regime. So those brackets ought to drop out.

A second issue was that there were non-substantive technical and linguistic problems in the treaty and protocols which were cluttering up the documents and wasting the delegations' time. The Secretary proposed that delegations be directed to clear these up. In the inspection protocol, for example, the Soviet side consistently bracketed the term "monitoring" and its variations, which the U.S. had applied throughout the protocol to differentiate perimeter/portal monitoring (PPM) activities from "inspections." This problem accounted for at least half the brackets in the protocol.

KARPOV asked if it were really only a matter of words.

THE SECRETARY repeated that we used "monitoring" only to differentiate between PPM activities and other forms of verification. Maybe some other terminology could be found. We meant no substantive difference.

KARPOV asked why, in that case, the same terminology could not be used as had been agreed upon for challenge and base line inspections. THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. was simply trying to differentiate between different types of activities by using different words. We were not trying to make a substantive point. In that case, KARPOV suggested, why not say that these were a "unique" kind of inspection. There were precedents for such situations in the INF Treaty; they should be used. THE SECRETARY said that this was a hang-up which did not reflect substance. We should try to resolve it.

With respect to the protocol on conversion or elimination, the Secretary continued, the U.S. view was that removal from accountability derives from substantially unambiguous actions as to a side's intent to proceed with elimination. Consequently, we could not agree to procedures such as the Soviet proposal that silos be considered no longer to contain an accountable missile when the silo door had been opened. Our position was that removal from accountability could only occur when a silo door had been removed, and its headworks destroyed. The Soviet proposal would allow change of accountability by means simply of notification of intent and opening of the silo doors. Since this was a commonly occurring event, and was easily reversible, we had to insist on more concrete steps.

The Secretary noted that he had tried to give Shevardnadze examples of steps which did not depend on resolution of the big issues, but which could remove many brackets.

KARPOV pointed out that it was best to eliminate silos with the doors closed, since explosives were more effective under those conditions. Why not take advantage of technical knowledge as we proceeded

in these matters? THE SECRETARY said that, in that case, the doors should be removed after the explosion. KARPOV said that could be discussed.

The Secretary proposed that working groups be instructed to make an effort to eliminate as many such brackets as possible. This would result in real progress on the protocols and MOU.

#### *ALCM's*

Moving on to ALCM's, the Secretary first stressed that the two sides were dealing only with nuclear-armed cruise missiles, as had been agreed in Washington. In this context, we considered the 1,100 sublimit proposed by Moscow unnecessary, since for every ALCM-equipped bomber a side chose, it would have to give up a ballistic missile. This was a high price to pay. We had thus welcomed the Soviet side's indication in Moscow that, if there were agreement on a counting rule and verification regime, there would be no need for the 1,100 sublimit.

SHEVARDNADZE said that it was the experts' job to come up with an ALCM counting rule, and the sooner the better.

THE SECRETARY said he wanted to address that subject. The Soviet side had complained in Moscow that the number the U.S. proposed to assign to each bomber was too low. We had given the matter further thought, and were prepared to consider a higher number. The numbers that Shevardnadze had proposed that morning were not in the ballpark. But we were prepared to consider a package along the following lines:

- An agreed number per bomber;
- No 1,100 sublimit;
- Attribution of 10 ALCM's to each heavy bomber equipped to carry ALCM's;

We understood the Soviet point on the need to distinguish between ALCM heavy bombers and systems not constrained by the Treaty, the Secretary continued. There were basically three situations which had to be considered: nuclear ALCM-carrying heavy bombers; non-ALCM bombers carrying other nuclear weapons; and conventionally equipped bombers. We were prepared to talk about means of distinguishing between the three systems. What we could end up with would be something like the bomber counting rule which had been agreed in Reykjavik.

The number we had chosen, 10, accurately reflected the loadings our bombers would normally carry. The protocol would provide a regime for verifying their basic capacity. Just as there would be no limit on the number of conventionally equipped bombers in each side's

inventory, there would be no limit on ALCM inventories. Rather, the number would be based on the capabilities of the aircraft equipped to carry them.

This, the Secretary concluded, was our proposal on ALCM's. If there were agreement on a counting rule and verification scheme, the issue could be disposed of.

SHEVARDNADZE asked how the right solution could be found. KARPOV pointed out that B-52's normally carried 12 ALCM's. Why was the U.S. proposing they be counted as carrying only 10? SHEVARDNADZE asked if agreed verification procedures would help.

THE SECRETARY said that was exactly what needed to be explored. Each side needed to be able to verify that 10 was the number that the aircraft was equipped to carry. This could be given to the working groups.

KARPOV asked what would happen if it were determined that the aircraft could carry more than 10 ALCM's.

THE SECRETARY said that one would have to look at how they were configured, and, if necessary, configure them in such a way that 10 was the right number.

KARPOV pointed out that the Soviet "Bear" bomber could carry no more than 6 ALCM's. THE SECRETARY said the U.S. should have stayed with its original ALCM counting figure. KARPOV said at least that would have been right for Soviet bombers. SHEVARDNADZE said that the counting rule should be based on the load for which a bomber was equipped.

POWELL said that what was needed was an understanding on what the expected load would be. We had set the number 10. KARPOV asked if that was the average or planned capability. Powell said it was "planned." But the working group could discuss this.

THE SECRETARY said that he assumed the Soviet side designed its aircraft for different configurations, depending on their missions. Verification regimes would have to be developed to determine how the relevant bombers were configured. We would be configured to carry 10 ALCM's. There would be a regime to verify that.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the issue be referred to experts. THE SECRETARY agreed.

#### *SLCM's*

On SLCM's, the Secretary said that he had listened carefully to the ideas Shevardnadze had presented. It was clear that Moscow had given the matter a lot of thought. We would look at what had been proposed, but were unable to say more at this time.

*Mobile ICBM's*

As for mobile missiles, the Secretary had noted in Moscow that the very features which made them attractive from a survivability standpoint made them a problem from the standpoint of verifiability. We had some ideas, which the Secretary was prepared to share on a preliminary basis. Some seemed to coincide with ideas the Soviet side had put forward.

What we had in mind was to build on the basic START verification arrangements—data exchanges, short notice OSI, perimeter/portal monitoring of missile production facilities, suspect-site inspection, etc. To this, the U.S. would add specific provisions for monitoring deployed mobile ICBM's, taking into account their unique characteristics. For example, mobile ICBM's and their launchers would be confined to restricted areas. They would be subject to periodic inspection by enhanced NTM and OSI. Missiles and launchers could depart this area only with prior notification, and only a small portion of the force could be away at any given time. As an exception, dispersal would be permitted in certain limited conditions. Their return would be confirmed by NTM and OSI. There would be simultaneous notification at the time of the dispersal. The reason for the dispersal would be provided.

The problem of monitoring non-deployed mobile ICBM's was another difficult challenge, which would require further measures. Shevardnadze had suggested this morning that all such missiles would be confined to storage areas removed from operational bases. This would amount to a kind of "zero option," except in the designated areas. This was something we could think about.

If adequate verification methods could be found, the Secretary said, the U.S. was ready to consider modification of its insistence on a mobile missile ban. In this case, there would obviously have to be a sublimit. Shevardnadze that morning had spoken of 800 launchers, but there would have to be a warhead figure as well. We felt that number should be small. 800 times any figure looked on the high side.

After consultation with Bessmertnykh, SHEVARDNADZE said that most of the missiles involved would carry only a single warhead. THE SECRETARY said that warheads would have to be limited along with launchers. SHEVARDNADZE added that it would all have to be verifiable.

*Sublimits*

Moving on to sublimits, THE SECRETARY said he had thought that the only additional sublimit issue had to do with ground-based ICBM's. We recalled Akhromeyev's statement that the Soviet Union



did not intend to field more than 3,000 ICBM's, 3,300 at the outside. So we had the impression that figure was acceptable to Moscow.

The U.S. had always been unwilling to equate ICBM's with SLBM's because of command and control considerations and the different "on station" ratios of the two types of systems. That morning, Shevardnadze had linked the two. We could not agree to that. If the Soviet side would accept the 3,300/3,000 ICBM figure, and the 1,100 ALCM bomber number fell away, we could close out the sublimit issue.

The Secretary put down a marker on suspect-site inspections under a START treaty. The basic concept had been agreed at the Washington summit. It seemed to us that the main task for such inspections should be to give confidence that the other side was not covertly producing, storing or deploying ballistic missiles or launchers beyond what was permitted by the treaty. We were not yet ready to put forward detailed ideas on this, but perhaps the ministers could address the subject during their April meeting.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had already addressed the question of a sublimit for ICBM's and SLBM's. It should be 3,300.

THE SECRETARY said that the problem was that it applied to both types of systems. ICBM's could not be equated with SLBM's.

SHEVARDNADZE said that in that case there should be simple freedom to mix within the 4,900 ballistic missile sublimit.

THE SECRETARY said that that would be the practical effect of the 3,300 limit, since, as Akhromeyev had said, the Soviet Union had no plans to exceed that figure. ICBM's warranted special consideration, in our view, because of their unique characteristics. There were strong views on this point in the U.S. Senate, he added.

KARPOV noted that the Secretary's quoting Akhromeyev did not remove from the agenda the need for an SLCM sublimit. The alternative was *no* new sublimit. The U.S. proposal for an ICBM sublimit was unfair in that 80% of the Soviet arsenal was deployed on such systems.

BESSMERTNYKH wondered, if the U.S. were to ask an "Akhromeyev" of its own how many SLCM's the U.S. intended to build, how he would respond.

THE SECRETARY quipped that "ours" wouldn't answer.

KARPOV noted that the U.S. and Soviet Union each had about 6,400 warheads on, respectively, SLBM's and ICBM's. The Soviet proposal would cut both by half.

THE SECRETARY said that was just a coincidence of numbers. The 3,300 ICBM sublimit was equitable in that it applied to both sides. SLBM's were qualitatively different because of the factors the Secretary had mentioned.

KARPOV pointed out that American SLBM's had a far higher "on station" ratio than their Soviet counterparts. The U.S. had 6,400 SLBM

warheads; the Soviet Union only 2,400. But the Soviet side had more ICBM warheads. There were real structural differences, but the two sides were in relatively the same position with respect to the number of warheads on American SLBM's and Soviet ICBM's.

THE SECRETARY observed that both sides would be limited by the 4,900 sublimit. Both would be limited by the desire to have more than one ballistic missile leg. They were historically different structures. But that did not change the fact that there were qualitative differences between ICBM's and SLBM's. The Secretary had thought this issue was resolved in Moscow. He was surprised it had resurfaced.

KARPOV said there had been no change in the Soviet position. SHEVARNADZE said that experts should work on the problem.

### *Defense and Space*

THE SECRETARY agreed, noting that he had some material on defense and space. He and Shevardnadze had gotten into the subject a bit the night before. The Secretary had asked Kampelman to look into the problem. Perhaps the ministers could see what, if anything, he had been able to accomplish.

KARPOV said he that, when he and Kampelman had spoken at lunch, Kampelman had said that the working group was dealing with the problem. But, Karpov said, the working groups could reach no conclusions. Kampelman had made some personal suggestions, which, since they were personal, Karpov did not feel comfortable commenting on. But, so far, the working groups had made no progress.

THE SECRETARY suggested that Kampelman and Obukhov be invited to join the group, and they were sent for.

SHEVARNADZE said he wanted to emphasize the fundamental importance of this question. He had set forth Moscow's views the day before, but could repeat them if necessary.

THE SECRETARY said he had listened the day before, but was not in a position to respond in detail. He suggested that the ministers hear from the experts.

When Kampelman and Obukhov arrived, the Secretary asked if he could state the problem. The two sides, he said, agreed on the language of the Washington Summit Statement. That language, assuming the duration of the non-withdrawal period were agreed and the issue of the supreme national interest clause resolved, left ambiguity as to what actions were to be conducted during the non-withdrawal period. The two sides had different views on this point. The Soviet side said, in effect, "Let it ride." We felt the need for greater clarity. Otherwise, any strategic withdrawal schedule which might be agreed to would be made hostage to potential disagreements over how

research on strategic defense was to be conducted. So there was a need to clarify this ambiguity.

The Secretary had thought that Shevardnadze's comments in Moscow on the need for work on the verification aspects of the Washington statement could be useful in this regard. The Soviet side had put forward some predictability ideas, and we had welcomed them. We had some ideas of our own on how to reduce or eliminate the ambiguity in the Washington statement. The Secretary asked Kampelman to comment.

SHEVARDNADZE asked to speak first. He agreed with the Secretary that the Washington Summit Statement language was good. Indeed, it could not be improved upon. The only addition he had ever mentioned had to do with the need to give the document a legally binding character. Moscow had since given the matter much thought, and could now agree with the U.S. that this should take the form of a separate agreement.

As for the non-withdrawal period, this should be regarded by both sides as a period to ensure stability and predictability during the process of reducing strategic arms. This would comprise both the reduction period itself and a period during which negotiations would take place on future arrangements. For Moscow, the obligation not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty during this period should be unconditional. As to the period of non-withdrawal, the U.S. in Moscow had said it should be longer than the reduction period itself. The Soviet side agreed. It was now ready to accept the U.S. proposal for a seven year reduction period. That would mean that the total duration of the non-withdrawal period would be nine or ten years.

It was true, Shevardnadze continued, that confidence that both sides would observe the ABM Treaty as signed during this period could be enhanced by verification measures. The Soviet side had thus proposed an exchange of information to clarify ambiguous sites. They attached much importance to this proposal. It would involve notification of permitted activities, as well as on-site inspections of facilities as necessary to satisfy concerns. A special protocol could be drawn up to this effect. Full use would also be made of the SCC, which should deal not only with past compliance questions, but seek to prevent the emergence of new concerns. Taken as a whole, such measures would significantly enhance confidence that the ABM Treaty was being observed.

What was not needed, Shevardnadze said, was new language. The General Secretary and President, with the help of those in the room, had succeeded in hammering out a formula. Now totally new elements were being added. This was totally inadmissible if one were serious about reducing strategic arms.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed with the way Shevardnadze had formulated the problem, particularly with respect to verification. At the same time, the Secretary believed it was possible to add verification provisions which would further reduce ambiguity. We wanted to discuss this problem. We would like to see less contention in the SCC, with its associated fall-out on a possible strategic arms reduction schedule.

The Secretary said we also had to insist that our standard supreme national interest language be included in an agreement. It was in all our agreements. We were prepared to say that this right would not be exercised on the grounds that development of strategic defense systems in themselves were a matter of supreme national interest.

The Secretary noted that he had raised these two issues with General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow, and had thought that discussion had cleared the air. The first, verification, was very important, and we realized we owed the Soviet side some ideas. In that context, he would ask Ambassador Kampelman to speak.

KAMPELMAN said that, based on his discussion with Karpov, it was the Soviet view that any attempt to agree on language beyond that of the Washington Summit Statement would complicate matters for two reasons. First, it would be time consuming, and might not be done in a reasonable time. Second, the issues themselves created new problems which could not be resolved in the near future. If that perception were accurate, the Secretary was correct when he suggested that any words on which agreement might be reached would be interpreted differently by each side.

Over lunch, Karpov had told Kampelman that Moscow would like the words of the Washington statement to mean that the U.S. would restrict SDI. Whether he actually said that or not was not the point. That was clearly the objective. If the U.S. intended to proceed with its SDI program—and it did—it would be misleading to sign an agreement which would certainly lead to tension at a later date. We did not need a formula which would guarantee future arguments. We wanted one which would minimize them.

Kampelman said he had taken the liberty of trying out on Karpov some ideas, which he had shared with U.S. scientists, for dealing with the problem. Karpov had resisted the ideas, on grounds that they would be troublesome to work out, and take time. Kampelman would be glad to summarize them.

The first was that, since the Soviet Union was concerned by U.S. defensive programs—and vice versa—perhaps there could be an exchange of information on what each side was planning. Moscow might find that some of our plans were not so troublesome as it thought.

The second idea was to try to separate weapons out of our planning. It was possible, Kampelman pointed out, to distinguish between weap-

ons and sensors. The two sides might agree that during the non-withdrawal period neither side would deploy or test space-based weapons. This, too, could give some confidence.

Kampelman noted that there might be other approaches he had not thought of. The point of the exercise, he stressed, would be to avoid arguments which would break out as soon as a piece of paper were signed. The idea would be to see if mutually acceptable arrangements could be worked out, without trying to resolve all the possible questions. That would take too long. Rather than argue over what had been signed in 1972, we should try to address what was in each side's interest today.

SHEVARDNADZE said that these ideas would have to be discussed. KARPOV suggested that he and Kampelman be excused to do so. THE SECRETARY said he hoped it would advance things to have heard some of our ideas. SHEVARDNADZE said it was the first time he had heard of the notion of singling out sensors. Kampelman said it might prove to be a terrible idea, but it could be explored.

SHEVARDNADZE said he wanted to remind the Secretary of one thing. When the Soviet side had agreed in Washington to the 4,900 sublimit, it had said that the formula on observance of the ABM Treaty was the final word, which could not be appealed. Now the U.S. was seeking new language.

THE SECRETARY said the U.S. stood by the words of the Washington Statement. We were simply acknowledging that, in the area of what was permitted during the non-withdrawal period, there was room for differences of interpretation. We wanted to clarify that. With this exception, the Washington language served both sides well. And even in the area of permitted activities, it provided a good start.

KAMPELMAN said he looked upon what the U.S. was trying to do in Geneva as carrying out the Washington Statement's charge. It was in no way an attempt to backtrack on what was signed. KARPOV said that much could be said on this point, but that the ministers' time should not be taken up with it.

SHEVARDNADZE said that this was a question that needed to be resolved before he left. If it were not, the two sides would have to recognize that there would be no strategic arms agreement.

THE SECRETARY said the U.S. might be able to make additional proposals along the lines of those Kampelman had outlined. He hoped the Soviet side would be receptive. But it would be unwise to proceed with an agreement with built-in ambiguities on observance of the ABM Treaty. The ambiguity had to be removed.

POWELL reminded Shevardnadze that the issue had emerged within a week after the Washington summit. Congress had been prom-

ised the ambiguity would be cleared up. THE SECRETARY reiterated that we were prepared to share ideas on how this might be done.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that Kampelman and Karpov should get to work—and quickly.

### *Nuclear Testing*

Moving to nuclear testing, SHEVARDNADZE noted that he and the Secretary had discussed the issue the previous evening.<sup>3</sup> The Soviet side believed that it was desirable to accelerate activity with respect both to a verification protocol and the joint verification experiment (JVE). Was there any need to revisit the issue? Or should the ministers await a report from working groups?

THE SECRETARY said that he had had a preliminary report from Ambassador Holmes. Holmes had indicated it might be possible to prepare a protocol for the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) and to complete a detailed plan and schedule for the JVE by the April ministerial meeting. By the time the JVE took place, it might prove possible to draft a protocol for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), although it would probably contain brackets. Both sides were ready to do the experiment as soon as possible. We still believed, however, that it could not be done before mid-June; the Soviet side was saying late May. In either case, it would be too late for the summit. This seemed to lead to the conclusion that the idea the ministers had discussed in Moscow of having the TTBT and PNET ratified by the summit could be ruled out.

The Secretary reiterated the U.S. view that a verification protocol could be worked out and signed in advance of the JVE if the Soviet side agreed to routine use by the U.S. of CORRTEX. But Moscow had taken the position that the test had to take place first. That ruled out the track that Shevardnadze and the Secretary had discussed in Moscow. This would make for a less impressive nuclear testing package for the May summit.

The Secretary speculated that in the Soviet Union, as in the U.S., there were differences of opinion among the community interested in nuclear testing. Those involved in weapons production wanted no restrictions; others did. In the U.S., we had broken the tension between the two groups, and were in a position to go for new protocols. The Soviet side did not appear to have accomplished this.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow could easily revert to its former position—that there should be a complete ban on nuclear testing. THE SECRETARY suggested it do so, if it thought it a good idea.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 132.

SHEVARDNADZE said he personally did not know whether it was possible to complete the protocols without conducting the experiment. The Soviet side had agreed that the U.S. could use CORRTEx on a quota basis. But it was unclear whether the protocols could be wrapped up without the experiment. His concern was that the treaties might not be ratifiable unless the necessary technical work had been done.

KARPOV claimed that U.S. nuclear testing negotiator Robinson had stated that it would be impossible to ratify treaties without technically convincing verification protocols. But there were real practical difficulties to overcome. The U.S. and Soviet test ranges used different dimensions for their test holes and equipment. But CORRTEx would only work if conditions were similar. This made calibration tests necessary.

SHEVARDNADZE asked if it would be possible to produce a document on nuclear testing for signature at the summit. KARPOV said it would be if the right approach were adopted. One way would be to set forth in a draft protocol that the specifics of verification methods would depend upon the results of the JVE. Protocols for both the TTBT and PNET could be readily prepared on that basis. The Soviet side had provided a step-by-step schedule for conducting a JVE at its Semipalatinsk range by May 28. If pushed, that schedule could be compressed to test by May 25. But U.S. experts still believed that no test could take place before June or July.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that experts could be tasked with preparing a proposal for parallel efforts on a JVE and verification protocol, taking into account the objective of signing at a summit.

THE SECRETARY asked if what Karpov had suggested envisioned completion by the summit of verification protocols and documents describing the JVE.

KARPOV said his proposal was that verification protocols be prepared for signing with the understanding that an additional "technical" protocol would be appended after the JVE.

POWELL asked if Karpov meant that the two sides would simply sign at the summit a statement describing how far they had gotten.

KARPOV said he was proposing that the two sides prepare verification protocols for each of the two treaties. At the same time, the details of a JVE would be negotiated. The protocols could be formulated in such a way as to lay out the basic principles on which verification would be based. They would also specify that actual verification procedures would be developed on the basis of the JVE, and that additional documents outlining such procedures would become an integral part of the verification protocol. When the treaties were subsequently presented for ratification, they would include the texts of the treaties



themselves, the verification protocols, and the documents detailing the verification methodology.

THE SECRETARY said this could be explored. He would want to hear his experts' opinion as to the practicality of the approach. POWELL agreed that the working groups should look at Karpov's idea closely. SHEVARDNADZE said he thought the working groups were already working in this direction.

#### *Chemical Weapons*

SHEVARDNADZE asked the Secretary if he had anything to say on Chemical Weapons (CW).

THE SECRETARY said he was not certain what kind of progress the working group was making. In general, the U.S. was proceeding on the assumption that there should be a global ban on chemical weapons as soon as possible. That was the object. At the moment, it was important to address certain key problems—verification issues, CBM's, engaging third countries. The U.S. considered the Soviet proposal for trying out verification techniques in advance to be a good one. We were discussing how to respond in the Western working group in Geneva. As for stockpile size, we needed to have more than raw numbers; issues like distribution of stocks were also important. So this was a subject we were working hard on, and would continue to do so.

SHEVARDNADZE said that he thought bilateral discussion on the margins of the Conference on Disarmament were going well, adding that he had some additional questions. First, did the U.S. agree that there should be mandatory challenge inspections, regardless of the facility involved?

THE SECRETARY replied that that was the U.S. position.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow had not been certain that that was the case. He acknowledged that the U.S. had once advocated such a view, but pointed out that that was before the Soviet side had endorsed the concept. The idea was basically a British one; if the U.S. supported it, that was good. KARPOV asked the Secretary to confirm that there had been no change in the U.S. position.

THE SECRETARY said there had not been. Some countries were uneasy with the concept, but the U.S. supported it.

SHEVARDNADZE asked if the U.S. agreed that all participants in a CW convention should have equal rights to issue inspection challenges. Perhaps, he added, this question was better addressed to working groups.

THE SECRETARY agreed that that would be a better way to proceed. As a matter of general principle, the concept appeared valid, but it would have to be managed to be workable. Perhaps something along the lines of the NPT regime should be the model.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed to defer the matter to working groups. In Moscow, he added, the Soviet side had made a number of proposals on CW, e.g., that experts should meet on a regular basis between rounds in Geneva, and that verification techniques should be tried out in advance of agreement on a convention. Perhaps the U.S. would have some response to these proposals.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that he had already indicated that we thought the idea of trouble-shooting verification techniques was a good one.

SHEVARDNADZE reminded the Secretary that another Soviet proposal in Moscow had been for a U.S.-Soviet statement on CW at the summit. Such a statement could have a strong positive effect on prospects for reaching agreement in Geneva. The Soviet side had drafted a possible joint statement which it could give the U.S. Maybe it would be possible to agree on a text in April.

THE SECRETARY said that he believed that the more we could pin down in advance for the summit, the better. This might be something in that category. We would look at the Soviet draft, and be ready with our own ideas. The Secretary recalled that the Washington Joint Statement had referred to CW. It would be well to go beyond the language of that statement, if possible.

SHEVARDNADZE said that he dwelt on CW because it was possible that a START agreement might not be reached in time for the Moscow summit. If so, what would be the result of the President's visit? Issues like nuclear testing and CW could play a role.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed. That was one reason we had been pushing on nuclear testing. In the same context, he continued, we should also give some attention to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting. It would be well to have some results to point to—along with our allies—on conventional arms.

SHEVARDNADZE said that he would have something to say on that in a moment. Returning to the Soviet proposal for testing CW verification techniques, he explained that it would be a good idea for both sides to gain experience with the procedures involved. Each side should thus choose a typical, non-military facility.

THE SECRETARY said he understood the concept. SHEVARDNADZE said, "OK, so we agree."

Moving on to conventional arms, Shevardnadze observed that the problem was becoming increasingly topical. Shevardnadze had followed closely NATO's discussion of the problem in Brussels. Certain trends were emerging. They had been touched on by Defense Ministers the week before.

The Soviet side had a new proposal: by a date certain, the members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO should publish data on their armed

forces and main types of armaments. Each side would publish data on not only its own armed forces, but those of the other alliance. Perhaps in mid-April, there could be an initial meeting between members of both groupings to negotiate the categories of data to be published. Publication itself might take place in mid-May. The data would cover the area from the Atlantic to the Urals. It could be broken down by regions—Central Europe, Southern Europe, Northern Europe. Publication of such data would create a solid basis for negotiations on reduction of conventional arms in Europe. This would be helpful in terms of reaching agreement on a negotiating mandate in Vienna.

Shevardnadze noted that he had heard many charges that the Soviet Union published inadequate or inaccurate data, that there were major asymmetries in conventional force balances. He proposed that the cards be put on the table up front, before conventional arms negotiations began.

THE SECRETARY said that the idea was an interesting one. We would discuss it with our allies.

As for the Vienna meeting, we needed to find a way to end it appropriately. That meant first of all, finding a mandate for conventional stability talks. Second, it meant a balanced outcome on the human rights side. To leap-frog over the second presented a serious problem. That was why the Vienna meeting should not go on forever, although we were prepared to stay as long as necessary to get the right results. It was the Secretary's sense that the elements of a conventional mandate were falling into place, but that prospects for a satisfactory human rights outcome were receding. We had to push hard in Vienna to bring it to a proper conclusion.

SHEVARNADZE said that human rights had been discussed earlier in the day. As for the conventional arms mandate, the Soviet side had presented a good formula in Vienna. He suggested that the U.S. and Soviet delegations work more closely to develop mutually acceptable language. Maybe it would be possible to create a group to expedite the process. It could work in Washington, Moscow, Vienna, . . . wherever. But the process needed to be accelerated.

Shevardnadze asked that the Secretary not simply turn aside his idea for publicizing conventional arms data. The mandate and data questions were related. There was a lot of discussion in the West about the need to "compensate" for the withdrawal of Pershing II's. There were many mistaken impressions with respect to alleged asymmetries. It might be that they did not exist. Focusing on data would not mean ignoring work on a mandate in Vienna; the Soviets wanted to accelerate work there.

THE SECRETARY observed that Ambassador Ridgway had spoken to Ambassador Zimmermann that morning. Zimmermann said the

situation in Vienna was not good. The human rights language being considered did not go as far as in Madrid, Helsinki, or even Bern. There was thus little reason for the optimism Shevardnadze had expressed with respect to quick action on a mandate.

SHEVARDNADZE asked why the U.S. was not happy with the Swiss package. RIDGWAY said its language was weak. It had been designed as a foundation on which to build, and, due to Soviet intransigence, had languished for weeks. Moscow had accepted it at the last minute.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow had accepted the package nonetheless. How could progress be made if, each time the Soviets accepted something, there was nothing but complaints? The Soviets had had to study the package carefully. It carried important implications for Soviet domestic legislation. But it had accepted the package. Shevardnadze could remind the U.S., if he chose, of the 34 to 1 result in Bern, but he would not dwell on that. The Soviets had met the deadline for accepting the Swiss package. But even if it proved impossible to agree on language in Vienna, should that hold up conventional arms talks?

THE SECRETARY said that was the U.S. view. CSCE was a balanced process. Its human rights aspects were fundamental to security. The kind of openness and freedom of movement foreseen in the Final Act would, if they were given free play, cause many military issues to fall away. So we insisted on a balanced outcome which addressed our human rights concerns. That was why we believed that any statement which came out of Vienna be an improvement over past documents. But the most important thing was to implement what had already been agreed to. The two ministers had talked about this that morning.

SHEVARDNADZE said that he had no objection to this approach. There was an interrelationship between human rights and security. There was no disagreement on the need to address human rights and humanitarian issues. The Soviet Union was in favor of contacts and exchanges of visits. But it should not be an either/or proposition. Moscow had now agreed to the Swiss package. Movement on a conventional arms mandate should follow. The Soviet proposal for publicizing data was designed to promote such movement.

If such a proposal was unacceptable to the U.S., there should be intensified direct work on a mandate. THE SECRETARY and RIDGWAY pointed out that work was being done in other fora. SHEVARDNADZE countered that no mandate was in sight. Additional work was necessary on a bilateral basis. The Soviet side had thought some progress had been made during the Secretary's last trip to Moscow, but Ambassador Ledogar had walked back what had been agreed in Moscow.

THE SECRETARY said he thought that bilateral consultations on conventional issues were proceeding satisfactorily. We were prepared to work on this, in close coordination with our allies. We should try to resolve our differences on substance.

SHEVARDNADZE said that this was what he was proposing. It would be good if the two sides could agree to intensify bilateral issues.

#### *Naval Limitations*

Shevardnadze said he wanted to raise a new issue, one which he had not discussed before with the Secretary—constraints on naval activities. This was a question of growing concern. Defense Ministers had touched on it the week before. The world was witnessing a continuous build-up of naval forces without any limits, even as efforts were made to bound other areas of the arms race. The Soviet side proposed for consideration the creation of an international forum or conference on naval constraints. It would involve large naval powers like the U.S., U.S.S.R., U.K. and France.

Shevardnadze recalled that limits on naval activities had been proposed by Gorbachev in his Murmansk and Belgrade speeches.<sup>4</sup> The Soviet Union had earlier made similar proposals with respect to the Indian Ocean, which had been endorsed by the United Nations. Unfortunately, there had been no movement in this area. Shevardnadze said he could understand that this might be a problem for the U.S., but it was an issue which had to be taken up at some time.

THE SECRETARY said he had listened to what Shevardnadze had said. He would take the matter up with U.S. military leaders. He doubted, however, that the Navy would think much of the idea.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow had anticipated this when it made the decision to make its proposal. But one way or another, the issue had to be addressed. The prospect of a second Stockholm CBM's conference was not so remote. If, after the Vienna meeting, a second conference on CBM's got underway, naval activities would be impossible to ignore. It made sense to get naval experts on both sides together now to begin to work on the problem. Even though the issue might not now seem urgent, it could not be postponed.

Shevardnadze noted that Gorbachev had recently proposed a major reduction in naval forces confronting one another in the Mediterranean. He had proposed the elimination of all ships capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The Yugoslavs had made a complementary call for a freeze

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 5, Document 82. In a March 16 address to the Yugoslav Parliament, Gorbachev called for a freeze on and eventual withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean.

on combatants. If the Soviet proposal was not acceptable, the Yugoslav should be. Perhaps experts could get to work on that proposal.

THE SECRETARY noted that Shevardnadze had spoken in terms of two different kinds of discussions: one on “Stockholm-type” CBM’s; the other on physical limits of the sort Gorbachev had suggested. The Secretary was glad Shevardnadze had raised the issue. It helped to put Soviet thinking in perspective. The Secretary suspected that the U.S. Navy would be more receptive to Shevardnadze’s ideas on CBM’s than to physical limits. CBM’s could be useful, the Secretary concluded, noting the key role he and Shevardnadze had played in the Stockholm end game.

SHEVARDNADZE said it was wrong to counterpose the two elements of the Soviet proposal. The Stockholm CBM’s amounted to inspections. The Soviet side had agreed to set aside their demands that naval forces be constrained in Stockholm, but had not given up the idea of constraints.

THE SECRETARY said he was only drawing a distinction between Stockholm-type CBM’s and the kinds of restraints on conventional forces which might be covered once a mandate were agreed to in Vienna. With respect to naval forces, a similar distinction could be made.

SHEVARDNADZE clarified that Gorbachev’s proposals envisioned reductions only if there were adequate inspections. There was no tension between the two.

THE SECRETARY said he understood. Stockholm I, he added, had been a breakthrough on the concept of on-site inspection (OSI). We had built on that concept in negotiating the INF agreement, just as we would build on INF in START.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that a good basis had been created. The Soviet side had had to work very hard to bring their military along on the INF Treaty verification provisions. The military had reacted strongly on the question of inspections. But now they were used to it. It was becoming routine. Naval commanders could get used to the idea as well.

THE SECRETARY said he doubted it, quipping that the U.S. Navy didn’t even let our Air Force on its ships. POWELL seconded this.

Noting that time had run out, the Secretary suggested that Press Secretaries be called in to discuss what might be given the media that evening. After agreeing that the two sides would simply describe organizational arrangements, and list areas covered during the course of the day’s discussions, the meeting adjourned.

135. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 22, 1988, 8:20–8:30 p.m.

## PARTICIPANTS

Secretary of State G. Shultz  
 Gen. C. Powell  
 Asst. Sec. R. Ridgway  
 Dr. W. Hopkins (Interpreter)

Minister E. Shevardnadze  
 Dep. For. Min. A. Bessmertnykh  
 Mr. P. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

The discussion, a follow-on to an earlier conversation, concerned possible dates for the Moscow Summit. The interpretation was done in semi-simultaneous fashion, so no verbatim record was kept.

Secretary Shultz pointed out that the President and the General Secretary as well as he and Shevardnadze desired to put U.S.-Soviet relations on a constructive, stable course. He stressed the current U.S. administration's desire to leave such a legacy. Consequently, he said, the upcoming Moscow Summit is an event of enormous significance.

Shultz said the schedule the President had in mind for the Summit was in many respects similar to the General Secretary's during his U.S. visit. For example, the President might arrive in the U.S.S.R. on a Sunday evening, at which time according to Soviet protocol, there would be an official welcome. Monday would be a "working" day with official meetings. Tuesday would also be for official meetings as well as meetings with other groups, like those the General Secretary hosted in the U.S. There would be official dinners in the evenings. Wednesday would be a final meeting and perhaps a departure ceremony, etc. However, the President would probably not leave the U.S.S.R. until the following morning.

In an earlier conversation, apparently, Shevardnadze had stated that the Soviet Union could not host the Summit during the week beginning May 23, 1988. Despite that, Shultz again expressed the U.S. side's preference to have the meeting during that week rather than the week of May 30, as had been suggested by the Soviet side. He explained that May 30 is a U.S. holiday, and that fact might distract the public's attention from the Summit. Moreover, he explained that the President's schedule for the weeks beginning May 16 and May 30, as well as for the entire month of June, was already very heavy, since it had been

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret. No drafting information was found on the memorandum. The meeting took place in the Diplomatic Reception Rooms at the Department of State.



assumed by the U.S. side that the Summit would take place during the week of May 23.

Shevardnadze said that unfortunately a meeting of the Supreme Soviet had already been scheduled for May 25–26, 1988. Although those dates had not been officially announced, he insisted it would be impossible to change the planned meeting. He pressed for holding the Summit during the week of May 30.

When the U.S. side suggested that perhaps the presidential visit could overlap slightly with the meeting of the Supreme Soviet and the President could schedule other meetings during that time, as Gorbachev had done, Shevardnadze resisted the idea, maintaining that that would distract attention from both the meeting of the Supreme Soviet and the Summit. He pointed out that Gorbachev had set aside the week beginning May 30 to devote exclusively and entirely to the Summit. He said the Soviet side wanted the Summit to take place in “ideal” conditions, and he also suggested that beyond the official meetings the President might be interested in travel to other parts of the U.S.S.R.

The U.S. side, particularly General Powell, emphasized that the week of May 30 was almost totally impossible as an option, because of the President’s already tightly-booked schedule. Moreover, he pointed out that the President would not want to be out of the country on Memorial Day, May 30. Ordinarily, the President makes various appearances in connection with the holiday; however, Powell allowed for the possibility of perhaps beginning presidential travel on the evening of May 30.

Shultz expressed some displeasure at the fact that when the U.S. advance team visited the U.S.S.R. recently, its members had not been informed that it would be impossible for the Soviet Union to host the Summit during the week of May 23.

The idea of holding the Summit during the week of May 16 was discussed briefly. There seemed to be general agreement that that date was too early for the meeting, since it would shorten the available time at the Geneva negotiations by almost two working weeks.

Given all these factors, various scenarios were briefly discussed for each of the three possible time frames. The U.S. side emphasized again the undesirability of the May 16 and May 30 options. However, Powell agreed to get in touch with the President later that very evening to see if he would agree to some alternative under the May 16 or May 30 scenarios. The desirability of the May 23 option from the U.S. point of view was reemphasised.

Shevardnadze pressed for some U.S. compromise and for having Powell get in touch with the President about his schedule as quickly as possible, since he wanted to be in contact with Moscow about all

these dates immediately, and it was necessary to factor in the 8-hour time difference.

It was left that Powell would check with the President about the May 16 and May 30 options. The U.S. preference for the week of May 23 was again stressed. From his side, Shevardnadze reiterated that for the Soviet Union it would be impossible to host the Summit during the week of May 23. He promised to inform Moscow about what had been discussed during the current conversation.

It was decided to address the subject again the next morning as the first item of business.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 137.

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### **136. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 22, 1988

#### **SUBJECT**

Shevardnadze's Second Day

Colin Powell and I met with Shevardnadze for four and a half hours today, and tonight I hosted an informal buffet supper and film. Working groups met on the full range of arms control topics, and Mike Armacost spent the day with one of Shevardnadze's deputies (Adamishin) talking about Afghanistan. Because Adamishin doubles for human rights, that working group (and a group on bilateral issues) will engage only tomorrow.

Shevardnadze and I spent most of our morning meeting on human rights. He began by complaining about U.S. practices, but he also described some changes in Soviet law and practice regarding issues we have raised with them. In particular, he said they intend "to meet more fully" the needs of religious believers and to set a time-limit on the duration of exit refusals for possession of state secrets. He said they have just enacted a law making deliberate psychiatric confinement

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ledsky Files, Soviet Union [1988 Memos—Letters]. Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

punishable by up to two years' imprisonment, and are working on guidelines concerning psychiatric assistance. He said that at our next meeting they would provide detailed data on people we consider political and religious prisoners; we will give a list. The working group will go into all these issues, and discussion will continue in a round table including experts from the private sector, after Shevardnadze leaves.

We spent the rest of the day on START and Defense and Space issues, with some attention to nuclear testing and conventional stability talks.

On START, we reviewed the remaining issues. Shevardnadze said the Soviets could accept our 7-year reduction timetable for strategic offensive weapons, provided the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty were 9–10 years and we resolved other differences on Defense and Space. On mobile ICBM's he proposed a limit of 800 missiles, but had no warhead figure to offer when I pressed him. On other sublimits, he proposed an alternative: either 3300 for ICBM's and SLBM's and 1100 for ALCM's and other heavy bomber weapons, or complete freedom to mix between ICBM's and SLBM's under the 4900 ballistic missile warhead limit we agreed to last time. He did say they could drop their demand for an ALCM sublimit of 1100 if we could agree on an ALCM counting rule, but proposed very high numbers based on maximum bomber capacity for that, and did not respond when I proposed we ascribe a more realistic 10 ALCM's to each ALCM-capable bomber. Finally, he suggested adding some new verification measures, some quite elaborate, to what they have already proposed concerning mobile ICBM's and SLCM's, including the joint verification experiment for SLCM's which Defense Minister Yazov proposed to Frank Carlucci in Bern last week. I said we would study these ideas, without holding out much hope they would be acceptable.

On Defense and Space, Shevardnadze strongly resisted the clarification of the Washington Summit language we think is necessary to avoid ambiguity. But we had a good discussion of various ideas for enhancing predictability during the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. I made a strong point that we will insist on a supreme national interest clause in the separate agreement now envisaged by both sides, since we have it in all treaties of this sort.

On nuclear testing, discussions in the working group and my exchanges with Shevardnadze ran in parallel toward agreement that we should work hard to develop a joint verification experiment and to get as far as we can on verification protocols to the two unratified treaties, and take stock in May on where we are in relation to the Summit.

On conventional stability talks, Shevardnadze pushed hard to complete the mandate under discussion in Vienna. (In the process he laid down an ominous marker that they are serious about getting talks underway on naval limitations.) I pushed equally hard on the need for a balanced Vienna outcome including human rights, and stressed

we were ready to stay as long as necessary to get it. On the Moscow human rights conference, he said they were ready to hold it after the French and British have their meetings, and urged rather plaintively that we consider it in that context. I reiterated that we are ready to accept it, but only if the conditions are right.

Mike Armacost and Adamishin spent the day discussing two alternatives on Afghanistan. The Soviet suggestion was that we achieve symmetry on arms supplies by agreeing privately that nothing in the Geneva instruments prevents either side from continuing. However, this would not be public, and they would criticize the Pakistanis for violating the agreements if they continued. By contrast we proposed that both sides declare a moratorium of several years, as a logical way of contributing to a settlement. So far neither side is interested in the other's proposal.

All in all, it was a day of hard slogging. Shevardnadze did not have much to offer, and firmness from you tomorrow will do no harm at all. When he proposed a joint statement this morning, I said we could agree to one if there was anything to say, but that we would have to see.

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### 137. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 23, 1988, 9:05–11:05 a.m.

#### SUBJECTS

Summit Dates, Southern Africa, Iraqi Scuds, Afghanistan, Middle East

#### PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*  
THE SECRETARY  
Gen. Powell  
Under Secretary Armacost  
Amb. Ridgway  
EUR/SOV Director Parris  
(Notetaker)

*U.S.S.R.*  
FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE  
Amb. Bessmertnykh  
Amb. Karpov  
Shevardnadze Aide Stepanov  
Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko  
(Notetaker)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in Shultz's outer office.

Mr. Zarechnak  
(Interpreter)

(For Portions)

Amb. Murphy

Mr. Palazhchenko  
(Interpreter)

Amb. Adamishin

Amb. Alekseev

Amb. Polyakov

### *Summit/Ministerial Dates*

THE SECRETARY suggested the ministers start by focusing on dates for the Moscow summit. They had exchanged information the night before. Sen. Baker was now getting the President's views.<sup>2</sup> Did Shevardnadze have anything to add to what he had said the previous evening?

SHEVARDNADZE said he had spoken with the General Secretary since then. Moscow had been under the strong impression that the week of May 30 would be acceptable to the U.S. In practical terms, it appeared that Shevardnadze's idea that it might be possible to postpone the Supreme Soviet meeting scheduled for the week before would not work. Thousands of deputies had already been notified; it would be unprecedented to change plans so late in the process.

As for a mid-May meeting, the General Secretary felt this was too early. Based on the previous day's discussions, it was not yet clear what the substance of the summit would be. There was a lot of work to do. It might even be necessary for the two ministers to meet in mid-May to complete preparations for the summit. The General Secretary therefore preferred the period from May 30 to June 15. Any dates during that period would be acceptable to the Soviet side.

THE SECRETARY suggested that Powell call this information to the White House.

On a possible May ministerial, the Secretary said it had always been his view that such a meeting would probably be necessary. He had not, however, wanted people to rely on the ministers to solve all their problems. But they would probably have to, in the end. The only dates that would not work for the Secretary were May 9 and 10. The best place for a May meeting would probably be in Washington, although if it made sense the ministers might meet with delegations in Geneva. Some issues, however, were best done in capitals.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that, if the summit took place in the time frame he had proposed, the ministers plan to meet in the final third of May. Shevardnadze had no preference as between Washington and Geneva; that depended on the situation the ministers faced at the

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<sup>2</sup> Reagan met with Bush, Senator Baker, and Griscom in the Oval Office at the White House from 9:01 to 9:11 a.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

time. Shevardnadze agreed that for the moment the ministers should not “advertise” that there would be a meeting to their experts.

### *Southern Africa*

Turning to regional issues, the Secretary said the ministers could be joined by Murphy and Polyakov when they got to the Middle East. There had been much discussion on Afghanistan, and perhaps Armacost and Adamishin could brief on their talks.

The ministers had had a brief discussion of southern Africa Monday evening.<sup>3</sup> We believed there was some fluidity there, and were prepared to work in parallel with Moscow. We thought that national reconciliation should be encouraged in Angola. Savimbi was ready; other African leaders seemed to be in favor as well. If it were possible to reach agreement on a schedule for Cuban troop withdrawal, we could credibly engage South Africa on getting out of both Angola and Namibia. The U.S. had reengaged with South Africa, although our relations remained strained. So we would like to work along these lines. This was a case where the U.S. and Soviet Union should be able to work in parallel.

SHEVARDNADZE said the ministers should also talk about the Iran-Iraq war.

THE SECRETARY agreed, noting that there was a particular part of that problem he wanted to raise—Iraq’s extension of the range of Scud missiles provided by the Soviet Union. The ranges now being displayed by Iraq’s Scuds brought them into the category of missiles covered by the INF Treaty. This could emerge as an issue in the U.S.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow had raised the Scud issue with Iraq. Baghdad had replied that these were “not your missiles,” and had said Iraq was capable of developing its own missiles. More seriously, Shevardnadze intimated, the Soviets had information that the Scuds’ capabilities had been enhanced with the help of some of the U.S.’s allies.

THE SECRETARY said that, if that was so, he didn’t know about it.

SHEVARDNADZE said that it was not a difficult problem technically. He reiterated that Soviet information was that U.S. friends had quietly helped Iraq do the job.

THE SECRETARY said he was only flagging a potential problem, i.e., the fact that the missiles had been shown to be convertible to ranges covered by the INF Treaty. Scuds had not in the past been counted as Treaty-limited.

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<sup>3</sup> March 21. No memorandum of conversation of this discussion has been found.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would not rule out that that might be a problem. POWELL noted that critics of the INF Treaty could make it an issue.

SHEVARDNADZE acknowledged that that might happen, pointing out that U.S. systems not covered by the Treaty could also be upgraded. That was why there were rigid verification provisions. Iraq's actions could not be considered a precedent.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed, but pointed out that the latest reports of Iraq's use of chemical weapons underscored the incredible cruelty of the war with Iran. That made it vitally important to move on a second UN resolution. It was a nightmare.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed it was a nightmare. There was cruelty on both sides. He asked if the ministers should take up Afghanistan.

After checking with Powell, who indicated that the White House would call when there was a reaction from the President on summit dates, the Secretary agreed.

#### *Afghanistan*

THE SECRETARY asked if Shevardnadze would like to lead off.

SHEVARDNADZE opened by observing that the situation at the Geneva talks was not good. As for the remaining issues, the question of how to describe the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan was a bilateral one between those two countries. It was up to them to resolve; Shevardnadze hoped they could do so. The question of a "so-called" coalition government seemed to be on the road to resolution, now that Kabul had accepted Cordovez's efforts to continue his mediation efforts after signature of the Geneva accords.

That left the question of arms supplies. Shevardnadze had stated the Soviet position on that question clearly in his initial one-on-one with the Secretary. Adamishin and Armacost had subsequently discussed it for four hours. Perhaps they could summarize their conclusions.

ADAMISHIN said that he could summarize the talks in five points.

First, the Soviet side had proposed an understanding that both sides would observe those obligations arising from the Geneva accords. Whatever was not a subject of negotiations in Geneva could not be discussed, nor could it be an issue with respect to implementation.

Second, the Soviet side had expressed the view that, if the U.S. continued arms supplies, the Soviet Union would criticize such actions, even as it criticized them already. But that criticism would not extend to accusations of non-compliance with the Geneva accords.

Third, (Adamishin noted this was not agreed) the U.S. side believed that the Soviet Union should not criticize Pakistan for violating the accords under certain conditions. The Soviet side had made clear that



it could make no guarantee on this point, because it would undermine the essence of the Geneva accords themselves, and of international law.

Fourth, there seemed to be agreement that, were it possible to come to a U.S.-Soviet bilateral understanding on the matter of assistance, each side would explain to its own public its interpretation of that understanding. There would be no agreed bilateral statement.

Fifth, Adamishin had undertaken to convey to Shevardnadze a U.S. proposal for a moratorium on assistance to any party in Afghanistan, but had made clear in doing so that such a proposal would be unacceptable from the Soviet standpoint.

ARMACOST said that was a fair summary of his and Adamishin's discussions.

THE SECRETARY asked if Shevardnadze agreed with Adamishin's assessment on the last point.

SHEVARDNADZE said the idea wouldn't work. Given the sensitivities involved, the maximum the Soviet side could accept was the proposal which he had outlined Monday evening. The decision to withdraw, he emphasized, had not been an easy one.

THE SECRETARY said he understood this. But a lot of progress seemed to have been made. We were close, but not quite there. For our part, we worried about the position a solution along the lines Shevardnadze had described would put Pakistan in.

SHEVARDNADZE said he did not believe Pakistan would be uncomfortable. Pakistan had been a party to the Geneva negotiations for seven years. The accords which had been worked out protected Pakistan's interests, but also imposed certain obligations on both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Each side would have to abide by the obligations it undertook.

THE SECRETARY asked how Shevardnadze understood the word "mercenary" as used in the Geneva documents. The term did not appear to apply to those currently opposing the Kabul regime, who were not fighting for pay.

SHEVARDNADZE, after consulting with Alekseev, read aloud relevant passages of the draft Geneva accords, which he interpreted as signifying that, in effect, conditions would be created for the return to Pakistan of all refugees. This would eliminate both the need and justification for any groups operating from bases in Pakistan. Pakistan, under those circumstances, obviously could not hire people to interfere in Afghanistan. If the resistance lost its reason for being, there would be no justification for interfering in Afghanistan's affairs.

THE SECRETARY said he had raised the question of defining "mercenaries" because it might provide a solution to the problem of military assistance. The seven resistance groups in Pakistan could not

be considered mercenaries. Perhaps it would be possible to describe a situation which had little operational relevance in a way which Pakistan would feel comfortable with. If it were possible to agree on how to describe “mercenaries,” Pakistan would not be vulnerable to allegations that it was violating the Geneva accords, and it might be possible to consider the kind of statement Adamishin had proposed.

ADAMISHIN pointed out that what was at issue was a bilateral agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan, with provisions for verifying compliance. If Pakistan violated the agreement, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union could complain. It would be a mistake to try and agree on an interpretation of the Geneva accords before they were agreed.

SHEVARDNADZE emphasized that the important thing was what crossed the border. Respect for the border was the most important thing. Any bands now in Afghanistan would not be able to cross the border once the agreement went into effect.

THE SECRETARY asked if the Soviet side saw any difference between “mercenaries” and those now resisting the Kabul regime. Could the U.S. tell Pakistan that Moscow recognized such a distinction?

SHEVARDNADZE said that there were two different categories to be considered. First, there were the refugees. They should return quickly to Afghanistan. The Geneva accords would create the conditions for that. Who would remain? One could not rule out that Pakistan would hire people to interfere in Afghanistan. It was not clear what their nationality would be.

THE SECRETARY said that those people would be “mercenaries.” But those who were already fighting could not be considered mercenaries. If the U.S. could say that to Pakistan, it might help.

ARMACOST explained that we understood the Soviet side was seriously trying to deal with the supply problem by arguing that Geneva did not deal with it. Our concern was that Moscow could subsequently interpret the Pakistani-Afghan bilateral agreement in such a way as to hold Pakistan in violation for doing something from which the U.S. was not itself barred. In the event we were obliged to exercise our right, we did not want to put Pakistan in a situation where it could be accused of violating an international agreement.

ADAMISHIN said he had proposed the day before that the Geneva accords be implemented as signed by all parties. What was not addressed in the accords could not be prohibited. It would be a mistake, however, to get onto the slippery slope of seeking to interpret the agreements. The U.S. wanted the Soviet side to accept its interpretation in advance.

SHEVARDNADZE reiterated that the matter should be handled on the basis of what had already been agreed.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the two sides say something like the following:

—Both agreed that they should be bound only by those obligations covered by the Geneva agreements;

—We asserted that, since there was nothing in the agreements on continuing military assistance, we had a right to do so, just as there was no bar to the Soviet Union's continued provision of military assistance to the Kabul regime;

—The Soviet side would criticize the U.S. for continuing its assistance; we would criticize the Soviet Union for the same thing.

—But there would be agreement that neither set of actions constituted a violation of the Geneva agreements.

If, in addition, it were possible to say to Pakistan that it would be criticized by the Soviet Union, just as the U.S. would be, but that Soviet criticism would not extend to alleging a violation of the accords, it might enable Pakistan to endorse an understanding along these lines. The key would [be] whether we could agree that only provision of assistance to "mercenaries," strictly defined, was prohibited.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the question was different for Pakistan. Pakistan undertook certain obligations as a direct party to the Geneva accords; the U.S. had different obligations as a guarantor. If there were no change in Pakistan's policies as a result of the accords, why was a document needed? If agreement were reached, Pakistan would be constrained from interfering in Afghanistan's affairs, just as Afghanistan would be barred from meddling in Pakistan.

Pakistan's biggest problem, Shevardnadze emphasized, was the return of Afghan refugees. The Geneva accords provided means of ensuring this happened. There were mechanisms—via the UNHCR—to guarantee this. This was all in Pakistan's interest. Why should Pakistan have as well the right to give weapons to those wishing to interfere in Afghanistan?

THE SECRETARY pointed out that it was the U.S. which was asserting the right to supply arms. The weapons were ours. But perhaps, he ventured, a somewhat different track might be a more productive way to deal with the matter.

The point of departure for such a track would be our recognition of the importance the Soviet Union attached to maintaining its commitment to provide arms to the current regime in Kabul. We were also aware that there would be a window between signing of Geneva accords and their entry into force, during which there would be no restraints on military assistance. Another element was Shevardnadze's reaffirmation Monday evening that the Soviet intention was to complete its withdrawal by the end of the year—in effect, somewhat more than six months from the present.

Both sides, the Secretary continued, wanted a stable situation in Afghanistan in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal. Cordovez's chances of success would be greatly enhanced by stable conditions. The discussion thus far had established that both the U.S. and Soviet Union had rights to continue military assistance after entry into effect of the Geneva accords, and would assert them. But there was also a common desire to maximize chances for a negotiated settlement.

The Secretary thus proposed that, during the withdrawal period and for three months thereafter, both the U.S. and Soviet Union observe a moratorium on the supply of military assistance to parties in Afghanistan. Both would be able to continue humanitarian assistance, which would be needed. Both would retain their rights to supply aid, but would, in effect, suspend them out of a desire to create a positive atmosphere within Afghanistan. The moratorium would be short, limited, and without prejudice to the rights of the guarantors. The Soviet side would be able during the period between signature and entry into effect to ensure that the Kabul regime was adequately equipped. Soviet motives could be explained to the regime in terms which they could accept.

The Secretary noted that this approach differed from the proposal Armacost had made the day before for a three-year moratorium. It was shorter, more limited, and consistent with what Shevardnadze and other Soviet spokesmen had said about the possibility that Afghanistan could acquire neutral status after Geneva accords were signed. In this context, we had noted Najib's recent statement of his regime's intent to pursue a policy of neutrality. The U.S. and Soviet Union could describe their joint moratorium on military assistance as a confidence building measure designed to give Cordovez the maximum chance for success. It would, at the same time, preserve the rights of all parties.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Secretary was again talking about two different things. One was the Soviet Union's supply of weapons to the Afghan government; another was the U.S. supply of forces fighting that government. The Soviet Union did not challenge the U.S. right to supply arms to Pakistan, which was a sovereign state like the U.S. Moscow's relations with Afghanistan were on the same basis. Any retreat from the principle would be a violation of bilateral treaties with Afghanistan. This would not be understood.

Shevardnadze reiterated that the Soviet Union was not challenging U.S. military assistance to Pakistan. It even understood that the U.S. felt a moral obligation to the groups it had supported. The Soviet side had made a proposal which addressed that problem. This had not been an easy decision. Shevardnadze had told the Secretary Monday that the ideal solution for Moscow would be for the U.S. to terminate its assistance. The second alternative he had outlined—that the U.S. not

be a guarantor in Geneva—was undesirable. The U.S. was an important country with influence in Pakistan. Thus, the formula Adamishin had outlined was the best compromise, albeit not the most desirable from the Soviet standpoint.

After a brief whispered exchange with Adamishin, Shevardnadze said that perhaps an alternative would be a gentleman's agreement of the sort Adamishin had outlined, with the understanding that the problem could be revisited in the future. But Shevardnadze's view was that there was a document to be signed. He could assure the Secretary that there would be no one for the U.S. to provide assistance to. They would all go home to Afghanistan.

THE SECRETARY said he hoped so. SHEVARDNADZE said he was convinced of it. An acceptable government would be found—acceptable both to the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

THE SECRETARY asked if Shevardnadze was proposing a gentleman's agreement along the lines of what the Secretary had described. SHEVARDNADZE said, "no." He had only meant to suggest that, in the future, the two sides could consider whether it was necessary to continue to provide weapons.

THE SECRETARY said that the discussion had been informative, and suggested that it be resumed after Shevardnadze's meeting with the President.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed to this, but stressed the need for a decision before he left Washington. It was pointless to sit forever in Geneva. There were other options. The Soviet Union could resolve the problem without a formal agreement. But it would be better to proceed on the basis of what had been agreed.

### *Middle East*

After Ambassadors Murphy and Polyakov had been summoned, conversation turned to the Middle East. THE SECRETARY noted that there were a number of things to discuss. He would be happy to clarify what the U.S. was proposing and to brief on his recent trip to the region. He would be interested in Shevardnadze's reactions.

The Secretary said that he might begin by stating the obvious: this was a region of the world where there were major problems. These problems had the capacity to blow up, and to involve not only the countries of the region itself, but a wider circle of countries. So if it were possible to move the peace process along, that would be desirable. But progress came by inches; it was hard to get people to engage realistically.

With this preface, the Secretary handed over a number of documents: copies of letters to Shamir, Hussein and Assad; a statement the Secretary had written in response to Shamir's arguments against the

U.S. proposal; and a copy of the statement he had made to Palestinians during his trip to Jerusalem.<sup>4</sup> If Shevardnadze had any questions with respect to the U.S. proposal, the Secretary said, he would be happy to provide clarifications.

SHEVARDNADZE observed that, after Ambassador Murphy had briefed him in Moscow, he had had the opportunity to meet with a number of representatives from Arab states. There had been delegations from the “seven,” and from the Arab League. Several foreign ministers had been included among the delegations, along with representatives of the PLO. The Jordanian Prime Minister had also visited Moscow for lengthy consultations. So it had been a period of interesting, substantive discussions on all aspects of the Middle East problem.

Shevardnadze said that, on the basis of his contacts, it was clear that the situation in the region was very complicated. The task now was to formulate a common, comprehensive approach between the U.S. and Soviet Union. On some issues, the two sides could already find common ground. Shevardnadze had told Murphy that he welcomed the Secretary’s active involvement in Middle East affairs, including his travels to the region—even if he didn’t envy the Secretary the task. He had asked Murphy for some clarifications of the U.S. approach, which he hoped would be forthcoming. For his part, Shevardnadze was prepared to share Soviet thinking in some detail.

First, with respect to the U.S. willingness to use an international conference as the means of achieving a settlement, Shevardnadze felt that the most important thing was to arrive at a clear understanding of the role of a conference. He did not exclude the possibility of arriving at a common conceptual formulation during his visit to Washington. If this proved impossible, agreement might be reached on certain elements of the concept.

Murphy’s briefing had not, in the Soviet view, been sufficiently clear on the role of a conference. This was natural, as the U.S. position was still evolving. Nor was this simply a Soviet concern. All of the Arab spokesmen with whom Shevardnadze had recently consulted had stressed the need for clarity on the substance and roles of a conference. For its part, Moscow believed that the task of a conference should be to help find solutions on the basis of a balance of interests among those concerned. How this should best be done needed to be considered.

Shevardnadze noted that, upon returning from the Middle East, the Secretary had made some important remarks about the character of an international conference. As the Soviets saw it, a conference

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<sup>4</sup> None of the documents cited has been found.

should be a continuously functioning forum which would address the disposition of the occupied Arab territories, security for all countries of the region, and a final solution to the Palestinian problem. It appeared that the U.S. shared the view that a conference should be a continuously functioning body. Shevardnadze looked to the Secretary for confirmation.

THE SECRETARY signaled that the minister should proceed, noting that that was not, in fact, the U.S. conception.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow felt that the legal basis of a conference should be acceptance by all participants of UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338.<sup>5</sup>

THE SECRETARY said that was very much a part of the U.S. approach. Moreover, we envisioned that those resolutions would not only govern attendance at a conference, but provide the context for bilateral negotiations. That meant we did not accept that the reference to “territories” in 242 was satisfied by the return of the Sinai; the West Bank and Gaza were also covered.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that, in his dealings with Arab representatives, they invariably pointed out that there were other UN resolutions. Some had insisted that these be mentioned.

Another point Shevardnadze wanted to touch on was the rights of the Palestinian people. The U.S. proposal referred to “legitimate rights” of the Palestinians. Moscow understood this to mean self-determination. This was something Shevardnadze had raised with Murphy.

THE SECRETARY said that “self-determination” in the Middle East peace process context was a term of art signifying an independent Palestinian state. We rejected that notion. We didn’t think it fit. We were thus unwilling to use the words, “self-determination,” although, broadly speaking, we supported the concept.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that “self-determination” was the only formula acceptable to all the Arab countries. Many would prefer a more explicit recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to their own nation. This was not the way to try to find a common language.

THE SECRETARY said he didn’t know what the Arabs were telling Moscow, but they were telling him in private that they were opposed to the creation of an independent Palestinian state. It would be too fragile, too exposed.

SHEVARDNADZE said that that was not, in fact, what he was being told. The Palestinians could not be ignored.

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, Document 44.



As to who should participate in a conference, Shevardnadze continued, Moscow had in mind: the five permanent members of the Security Council; Israel; the Arab countries involved in the conflict (which he preferred not to list, since even the Arabs could not agree on this point); and the PLO. The UN Secretary General should convene the conference. As for the permanent Council members, their role should be to create a positive environment for the conference, making collective or individual recommendations for mutually satisfactory solutions. It was the Soviet assumption that all five members would, in fact, participate.

Structurally, the Soviets had in mind three distinct levels. *Plenary meetings* would be held with some degree of regularity. *Multilateral working groups* would deal with problems of interest to all or most participants. Bilateral working groups or committees would address issues affecting particular Arab countries and Israel, but not at the expense of third parties. The Soviet side was not against interim steps, as long as they were taken within the context of a conference framework and linked to a comprehensive settlement. The current U.S. plan recognized the need for such a link. In this context, it might be possible to consider a transitional period in the West Bank and Gaza.

These, Shevardnadze concluded, were some areas in which the U.S. and Soviet Union could work to bring the parties together. Moscow was not entirely happy with the present U.S. position, because the concept of an international conference was not fully prepared. This was not an easy question: even among the Arabs there was no clear consensus.

With respect to next steps, Shevardnadze suggested that certain points could be included in a joint statement to be issued at the conclusion of their meetings. For their part, the Soviets expected to have further contacts in the period ahead with the Arabs and Palestinians. The Secretary would probably agree that the Palestinian problem was the key. What was needed was intensive and systematic consultations with all the Arab players. As for Israel, it was harder to assess prospects. The Soviets had not talked to the Israelis, and Shevardnadze would be interested in any insights the Secretary might have.

Shevardnadze said he thought his presentation suggested that a basis existed for more active U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the search for a Middle East settlement. Moscow was not saying that, since the U.S. plan was already in play, the Soviet Union was prepared to simply stand aside. The key was to focus on how to resolve the real issues through the efforts of all involved—the U.S., the Soviet Union, the Arabs, Israel. The Soviets were ready to roll up their sleeves to work with the U.S. or any other parties to find appropriate forms of cooperation.

THE SECRETARY said he appreciated Shevardnadze's careful description of Soviet views. Those views, it appeared, were sharply at

variance with those of the U.S., even though there did seem to be some points of intersection at the conceptual level.

The Soviet side appeared to see a conference as the centerpiece of the peace process. For the U.S., the centerpiece had to be bilateral, face-to-face negotiations between Israel and its neighbours. A conference was, in effect, something which could be convened to set bilateral negotiations in motion, and to be reconvened in some manner to hear reports. We foresaw no substantive role for a conference beyond the fact that the condition for participation would be acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiations. Thus, we had totally different perceptions as to where the center of efforts to achieve a settlement should be.

The Secretary said the U.S. agreed that the Palestinian question was a central element. As Shevardnadze could see from the statement the Secretary had handed over, we believed they had to be included in the process. But we felt they should be included in the framework of a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, not given an independent seat at the table. This was because we believed negotiations should be between states, and because the legal/administrative structure in place on the West Bank and Gaza was Jordanian. We could not concur in those territories becoming an independent state; they must in some way be attached to states which already existed. Some years before the U.S. had put forward the idea of confederation of these areas with Jordan, but that was really a question to be addressed in bilateral negotiations.

Thus, the Secretary had listened carefully to what Shevardnadze had said. But it appeared the two sides' basic concepts were sharply different. As the Secretary had said earlier, we saw the process as proceeding by inches. The constructive steps which had been taken to date in the region had come as a result of bilateral negotiations. Our concept was a comprehensive one, but its essence was in bilateral negotiations, not an international conference as such.

The Secretary said he would like to pose a few questions. First, if Jordan agreed to the U.S. plan, would the Soviet Union support a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation?

SHEVARDNADZE replied that neither the U.S., nor the Soviet Union, nor Jordan could answer that question. The Palestinians would have to be consulted, and in a serious fashion. Any attempt to ignore their rights, the rights of the PLO, would doom any plan to failure. So the Palestinians would have to have a voice in decision on the forms the process might take, just as any settlement would have to consider the legitimate rights of Israel.

Shevardnadze, in summary, confessed he could not answer the question, because he had not consulted with the Palestinians. He had

spoken with the Jordanians, who seemed to appreciate the need for close consultations with the Palestinians. As to the specific issue of Palestinian participation in a joint context with Jordan, Moscow did not rule out an alternative—an Arab-Palestinian delegation. Jordan did not rule out the idea, although it preferred a Jordanian-Palestinian arrangement.

The question of transitional arrangements, Shevardnadze continued, was among the more difficult under study. The form which Palestinian self-determination might take was the source of serious differences among the Arabs themselves, especially since the uprising. Much would depend on contacts and consultations between the various parties, including the U.S. and Soviet Union. It was hard to find common denominators in this area; Shevardnadze was less optimistic on this point now than before his talks with Arab representatives in Moscow.

Shevardnadze briefly ran through areas on which the Soviet side believed U.S. and Soviet views coincided. First, both sides believed that this was a time for intensifying efforts. Second, both recognized the need to convene an international conference, even though they had different concepts of the role of such a conference. It might ultimately prove possible to narrow these differences. Third, there was mutual recognition of the need for a comprehensive settlement.

Shevardnadze said he thought it might also be possible to say that the two sides agreed that an international conference would function on a continuous basis. He understood the Secretary had said something of this sort to Congress. If that remained his view, that would be a fourth point of common ground.

The Secretary had also referred to the “legitimate rights” of Palestinians. While the Soviet Union might express it differently, there seemed to be agreement that both sides favored an equitable solution to this problem. They were also in agreement on the importance of Resolutions 242 and 338.

So, Shevardnadze stressed, there were points of common ground. It was important for the Middle East states to perceive that the U.S. and Soviet Union were moving from a confrontational approach to a search for a settlement in the area.

Moscow was prepared to continue the search. The U.S.–Soviet dialogue in this area was only beginning. The Soviet side felt there was a good basis for continuing the discussion. Shevardnadze did not rule out that experts might work together on a continuous basis to be in a better position to advise the ministers. Noting that Ambassador Murphy knew the issues of the region better than some local leaders, Shevardnadze said that both sides had good experts. They could meet on a more frequent basis; their meetings in Washington on the margins of the ministers’ discussions should not be the end of the story. As

they travelled to and from the region, a good rule would be that they consult with one another before and after. Because, if the U.S. and Soviet Union did not combine efforts, there would be no settlement.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed, but had a few comments. It was good that we had contacts, and they should continue. But it seemed to the Secretary that the two sides' views were so far apart that it would be necessary to strain to find common ground. We were prepared to work at it. Maybe progress could be made. But the differences in strategy which the ministers' discussion had revealed would be difficult to bridge.

#### *Summit Dates*

THE SECRETARY asked if Powell had heard from the White House on summit dates.

POWELL said that the President had been able to rearrange his commitments. He could agree to a schedule which had him arriving in Moscow May 29 for an initial meeting May 30. The President would depart June 2.

SHEVARDNADZE said that this was fully acceptable. Were there any further questions?

POWELL said there were none.

SHEVARDNADZE said the visit would be a short one.

THE SECRETARY observed that, when Shevardnadze met with the President, the press would ask during the initial photo op whether dates had been set. POWELL suggested that the President and Shevardnadze simply acknowledge that they had been and mention the dates. SHEVARDNADZE agreed.

The meeting concluded without further discussion.

**138. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, March 23, 1988, 11:40 a.m.– 2:35 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

Meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze of the USSR (U)

**PARTICIPANTS***US*

The President

The Vice President

Secretary of State George Shultz

Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci

Chief of Staff Howard Baker

Deputy Chief of Staff Kenneth Duberstein

Colin L. Powell, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Under Secretary of State Michael Armacost

Ambassador Jack Matlock

Counselor Max Kampelman

Ambassador Paul Nitze

Ambassador Edward Rowny

Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway

Robert E. Linhard, NSC

Thomas Simons (State, Notetaker)

Fritz W. Ermarth, NSC (Notetaker)

Dimitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)

*USSR*

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh

Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin

Ambassador Yuriy Dubinin

General Nikolay Chervov

Ambassador Victor Karpov

Ambassador Aleksey Obukhov

Foreign Ministry Deputy Director Georgiy Mamedov

Foreign Ministry Official Teymuraz Stepanov

Foreign Ministry Official Sergey Tarasenko

Pavel R. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

The Soviets arrived at 1135 in the Oval Office. Following initial pleasantries and a multiwave photo-op, *the President* opened the meeting by saying that he wished to raise a few personal thoughts before convening the larger plenary session. He noted that there remained only two more months before the proposed Moscow summit and that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret. Drafted by Simons. The meeting took place in the Oval Office, the Cabinet Room, and the Roosevelt Room at the White House.

much which we hoped to accomplish there would be decided now. He said we should strive for maximum results in all areas, but also should be sure that progress was solid. (C)

Then *the President* turned to human rights, affirming that they were literally at the heart of the US-Soviet relationship. He said that encouraging progress had been observed in the USSR over the past two years, including the release of many political prisoners and the emergence of a freer environment for political expression. He said that some inconsistencies were disturbing, with first loosening and then tightening seen in various areas. But, as he had told the General Secretary in December, it remained vital that we maintain a continuing dialogue on human rights. (S)

*The President* said he had explained many times that our concerns about human rights did not represent an intrusion into the USSR's internal affairs but the natural concerns of a nation of immigrants who sympathized with the plight of people in their former homelands. The treatment or mistreatment of former fellow countrymen had an impact on US public opinion, making it difficult to deal with the USSR when that impact was negative. The President noted that dozens of political prisoners remained incarcerated, including many religious prisoners. He said that it would be particularly meaningful in the year of the Millenium of Christianity in Russia, were religious prisoners released. He said that the plight of refuseniks and divided spouses continued to be unfortunate. At this point he gave to Shevardnadze a list of cases of particular interest to the US.<sup>2</sup> He then noted that it was about time to announce the decision on Moscow summit dates (29 May–2 June 1988) on the portico. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* asked whether Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had any points he wished to raise in the relative privacy of this smaller meeting. *The Foreign Minister* replied that he felt no need to keep private his agreement that there should be a regular and continuous dialogue between the two countries on human rights and humanitarian issues. He noted that he and the Secretary had recently begun a new phase of this constructive, continuous, and businesslike dialogue. This area required the active attention of political leaderships. Shevardnadze said he wanted the President to know that he had proposed to the Secretary of State a permanently functioning arrangement in the human rights area which would involve legislators and working groups on both sides. He urged that issues be fully discussed and not allowed to pile up. He proposed exchanges of information on legislation and

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<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is an undated list entitled, "Cases of Special Interest to the U.S."

consultations among lawyers, for example, on policy toward capital punishment, especially on the sensitive matter of capital punishment for minors. He said that he also had given over to the Secretary a list of individual human rights cases of interest to the Soviet side and expressed confidence that they would be considered. The Oval Office meeting then broke for the announcement of summit dates. (S)

#### *PLENARY MEETING IN CABINET ROOM*

When the plenary session convened in the Cabinet Room at 1200, *the President* noted that the discussion had already begun and invited Secretary Shultz to start this round. (U)

*Secretary Shultz* said that the now regular pattern of small meetings with principals, including Colin Powell and Roz Ridgway on the US side, had been applied during this ministerial. He noted that working groups on all the arms control issues and on regional conflicts had met, that ambassadors had met on bilateral matters, and that working-group talks on human rights would be underway during the day. He said that all areas of concern were in play and that reports would be heard about them. But, first, he asked whether the Soviet visitor would like to comment on the overall ministerial. (S)

*Shevardnadze* began by conveying to the President the personal regards of Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev who, he said, warmly remembered their visit to Washington and their talks with the President and with the American people. They believed that this was a truly historic occasion. In the dynamic of US-Soviet relations, especially regarding security issues, *Shevardnadze* continued, the first constructive phase of the relationship starting with Geneva in 1985 could now be said to be over, and we were moving into a new phase. There was no need, he said, to elaborate on the importance of the INF agreement signed in Washington. The General Secretary had recently received the President's message conveyed through Secretary Shultz saying that the US side was willing to move forward on security issues, especially to accomplish a 50% reduction of strategic forces within the context of compliance with the ABM Treaty and the parameters of the Joint Statement agreed to in Washington.<sup>3</sup> (S)

*Shevardnadze* observed that he had had 23 meetings with Secretary Shultz, and could report that the dialogue was constructive and businesslike. Good experience had been gained in using a unique mechanism involving summits—an unprecedented fourth summit now impending—and the continuing dialogue of foreign ministers and experts. Now the state of US-Soviet relations was focused particularly

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 128.



on the task of completing a 50% START agreement. The President and the General Secretary had instructed the ministers and, in turn, the Geneva delegations to accelerate their work. The latter had prepared very substantial documents—on inspection, elimination and conversion, and an MOU on data exchange—which provided a basis for progress. Informed by the INF experience, these were important forward steps, in Shevardnadze's view. Despite many areas of disagreement and little time to resolve them, Shevardnadze said there was a good basis for a joint effort to reach a 50% START agreement by the Moscow Summit. The Soviet leadership believed, he said, that, while difficult, this goal could be achieved. (S)

*Shevardnadze* observed that this ministerial would lay a good basis for the Moscow summit if there was agreement on the basic question of compliance with the ABM Treaty. The General Secretary had said and the President had agreed that there would be no 50% reductions agreement if there were no agreement on the ABM Treaty, according to Shevardnadze, and it was important to be guided by this in preparing for the summit. Additional requirements existed to amplify on certain aspects of verification so as to assure against circumvention. Shevardnadze said that he had shared new suggestions with the Secretary. Another very complex issue, he continued, concerned SLCM. As discussed since Reykjavik, without a solution to the SLCM problem no START agreement could be hoped for, but a basis for proceeding had been achieved. First, it had been agreed that there would be a limit on SLCMs. The Soviets had proposed a ceiling which, whether accepted now or not, provided a basis for discussion. Both sides agreed that the verification problem, secondly, was very difficult, but susceptible to solution through hard work by the experts. The Soviet side had presented to Secretary Shultz a comprehensive concept for SLCM verification. It had not yet heard a response, but understood that this might take time to study. Shevardnadze said this concept deserved serious study, and expressed the conviction of the Soviet side the SLCM limits could be verified. Another issue, he said, concerned ALCM counting rules. Both sides had proposed counting rules, and now the effort to reach agreement must be intensified. (S)

*Shevardnadze* said it was realistic to work for documents on nuclear testing for signature in Moscow. There were two aspects that needed to proceed in parallel, the preparation of protocols and the preparation of joint verification experiments. If willingness to accelerate both processes existed, a basis for agreement existed. The Soviet side had accepted the US technical approach and the US side did not object to the Soviet seismic approach. Moving to chemical weapons, Shevardnadze said that, since a completed convention banning chemical weapons was not realistic by the time of the Moscow summit, then a state-

ment on accelerating the effort to complete a convention should be sought, a worthwhile draft of which had been submitted by the Soviet side. (S)

Regarding conventional arms, specifically in Europe, *Shevardnadze* said there was every reason to accelerate work on defining the mandate and substance of talks. Good progress was being made and acceptable language was attainable. Gorbachev, *Shevardnadze* recalled, had said the Soviet side was ready to put all its cards on the table, all its forces data. It was ready to begin negotiating on all asymmetries regarding conventional arms. Even before negotiations, it was ready to publish jointly all data about weapons pertinent to the goal of limiting conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals, data covering Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. The Soviet side was ready to publish data by region, including central, southern, and northern Europe. (S)

This in broad outline, *Shevardnadze* said, was the state of his dialogue with the Secretary. As to regional matters, he said he could not yet report conclusions. Agreed language regarding Afghanistan had not yet been reached, but he was hopeful it could be reached based on the Soviet decision to withdraw its forces. There had been discussion of Iran-Iraq and the Middle East, but no agreement yet; there would be discussion of Central America and Kampuchea, and some on southern Africa. (S)

This was the agenda, the mosaic of the ministerial, *Shevardnadze* said, and the ministers would work in a businesslike manner to build a good basis for the Moscow summit. After this ministerial in Washington, *Shevardnadze* proposed another ministerial in Moscow, suggesting a date somewhere in mid-May, to assure that the Moscow Summit was as productive as possible, something the Soviet Union and its people keenly desired. (S)

#### LUNCH DISCUSSION

Repairing for lunch in the Roosevelt Room at 1315, the party sat down at 1325 for a discussion that ranged over many topics. *The President* provided some background on the room and the construction of the West Wing. *Shevardnadze* observed that Franklin Roosevelt was the most fondly regarded US president in the USSR because of the wartime alliance and expressed the hope that something of that spirit was in the process of being revived. He said he felt very positive that the two sides' defense ministers had recently met. *Secretary Carlucci* observed that this was a good precedent and noted that it was unprecedented that two adversary states had begun a dialogue on military concepts and doctrine, saying that we had much to learn from and about each other. Queries about the age and health of former Soviet foreign minister Gromyko (reported to be fine by *Shevardnadze*) led to observations

about FRG Foreign Minister Genscher. *Shevardnadze* characterized him as reasonable and flexible, but did not wish to label him cunning, saying that while heading a small party, he held a key position. *Secretary Shultz* agreed that Genscher was important to all our deliberations and held a kind of swing vote. *Shevardnadze* noted that a visit to Moscow by Chancellor Kohl had been announced. (S)

*The Vice President* shifted the discussion to Korea by noting that former South Korean president Chun had recently visited and had expressed concern about the security of the summer Olympics. *Shevardnadze* responded that the Soviet side had decided to participate and expected no security problems, at least from North Korea; he said he had no doubt that North Korea would not be the cause of security problems. *The Vice President* said this was good to hear because we had no influence over North Korea but had manifold concerns. *Secretary Carlucci* said this had come up in his conversations with Soviet Defense Minister Yazov. While granting that the USSR might not have a lot of influence over North Korea, he urged the Soviets to exercise what they had to prevent any terrorist activities on the part of the North. *Shevardnadze* said he understood the concern but said he did not think Kim Il Sung would plan such activities because they would hurt his and North Korea's prestige. *Carlucci* said he hoped this was right, but concerns remained. *The Vice President* said such concerns were spurred by the recent bombing of a South Korean airliner.<sup>4</sup> *Shevardnadze* said he had no particular knowledge but believed that North Korean complicity could not be proved. *The Vice President* asked whether the Korean woman involved, who had confessed to the plot, was some sort of double agent. *Shevardnadze* responded that this might be and that, while he was not an intelligence expert, he thought all kinds of things were possible. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* observed that the evidence of instigation of this bombing by North Korea was not limited to the woman's confession, but included corroborative information about patterns of movement, locations, and phone conversations involving North Korea. He said that the Soviet Foreign Minister's statement of confidence about North Korea's motives and behavior was important, but that it was impossible not to reflect on the airline bombing and the earlier Rangoon bombing. (S)

*Shevardnadze* said he could not fully understand the extent of our concern because Kim Il Sung could see there was no prospect of blocking the Olympics. More likely a small group of terrorists of some kind was involved in the episodes cited. *Shevardnadze* said he knew Kim

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 8, Document 123.

personally and, respect him or not, felt it was out of the question that he would authorize such atrocities. *The President* said one theory held that the North Koreans aimed to hurt the Olympics and the South by making people afraid to fly there. *Shevardnadze* said he was confident that the Olympics would be held and establish many new world records. In the ensuing conversation about sports, *the President* observed that the Olympics grew out of the Greek tradition in which wars would be suspended to hold the Olympic games. This prompted *the Vice President* to tell an Olympic play-on-words joke involving a pole vaulter, who turned out to be a Czech, not a Pole, but was indeed named Walter (the whole matter constituting an “Olympic” translation problem for the US interpreter Zarechnak, which he successfully solved). (S)

*The President* in turn told the story of how General Secretary Gorbachev, seizing the wheel of his car from his chauffeur in the interest of speed, was pulled over by a Soviet traffic cop and then immediately let go because, having Gorbachev as a driver, the passenger in the back seat must have been truly important. *Shevardnadze* opined that the President had authored this joke, and offered one of his own—on Prime Minister Thatcher. God, it seems, was querying Reagan, Gorbachev, and Thatcher on their public records. After receiving satisfactory reports from the first two, He said to Mrs. T., “Now how, my daughter, are you doing?” To which the Prime Minister responded, “First, I am not your daughter, and, second, you are in my place!” *Shevardnadze* said he understood the President to be the original source of this joke. (C)

*The President* said he had only one story about going to heaven. Three men appeared at the Pearly Gates and were told, with room for only one, the place would go to the representative of the oldest profession. First, a surgeon claimed it on the basis that God had done surgery in making Eve from Adam’s rib. Second, an engineer claimed it because God had to “engineer” the world out of chaos in six days. The third, an economist, finally got the spot by asking, “Where do you think the chaos came from?” *Shevardnadze* said this joke must have been about Soviet Gosplan (State Planning Agency). *Secretary Shultz* winced at the thought that he was once an economist, and then proposed that the joke was really about the US House of Representatives. (C)

*The President* related a true story about Mrs. Thatcher at a London economic summit. Berated openly by a colleague for her very authoritarian chairmanship of the proceedings, Mrs. Thatcher responded to the President’s asking why she put up with such criticism by saying, “We women know when men are being childish.” Indeed, the President confessed, Mrs. Thatcher ran a tight meeting, but not excessively so. (C)

As the meal concluded, *Secretary Shultz* observed that Foreign Minister *Shevardnadze* had summarized the ministerial; he proposed that

views from some of the US participants be sought. He noted that the President's brief remarks in the Oval Office mirrored lengthier discussion by the ministers on human rights, discussions which had become systematic, regular, and reciprocal. He noted that there was a balance sheet of pluses as well as minuses. He said the US side would continue to bring up areas where it felt the Soviets were not living up to their obligations under the Helsinki Final Act. CSCE in Vienna was one area, Secretary Shultz continued, where the US and the Soviet Union needed to work more together. The pace in Vienna was falling behind the pace of US-Soviet relations and indeed behind developments within the USSR. He could not explain this, but said we needed to move ahead in Vienna toward a balanced outcome, not least because such an outcome was required to move forward on conventional arms talks. Therefore the ministers had agreed that our ambassadors in Vienna would intensify bilateral consultations aimed at moving the proceedings there into high gear. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* noted that talks in the afternoon would concentrate on Afghanistan, but that the Middle East, Iran-Iraq, and Central America would also get attention. On Afghanistan, he said, almost all was in place for a solution except an outcome properly balanced (a reference to symmetry on requirements to cease arming the parties). He said the search for a solution on this question, so far unsuccessful, would continue. (S)

*The President* mentioned the requirement for a second resolution in the UN Security Council aimed at ending the Iran-Iraq war, noting the barbaric chemical attack by Iraq on one of its own villages held by Iran, killing some 3000 people. (S)

*Shevardnadze* asked to say a few words in response to Secretary Shultz's overview. He said if the documents in Geneva were signed in the near future, then Soviet forces would be on the way out of Afghanistan even before the President came to Moscow, with half withdrawn in three months and the remainder gone by the end of the year, while the President was still in office. This, he said, was one of the most complex regional problems. As to Iran-Iraq and a second resolution, Shevardnadze said that work should be finished on the text of a second resolution. Within a week or ten days, the Secretary General would meet with the foreign ministers of Iraq and Iran. If Iran did not support Resolution 598, then the USSR would vote for a second resolution and had told this to Iran. The Soviet side had doubts, he said, as to whether an embargo would actually help end the war because both sides had great stocks of weapons; he feared it might become even more cruel. But the Soviets did agree to work on the text of a resolution and, at some stage, to adopt it. This was the spirit of the discussion when Shultz was in Moscow and continued to be the Soviet

position. *Secretary Shultz* said it was important to state publicly that the US and the USSR would endorse a second resolution if Iran failed to endorse 598. *Shevardnadze* replied that this should happen only after the Secretary General had met with the Iranian and Iraqi foreign ministers. He added that Iran now claims to support the Secretary General's plans to implement 598; it must be pressured to give a straight answer. In a week's time we would know. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* turned to arms control topics noting the importance of coming to grips with chemical weapons. The US side, he said, wanted to see results in the effort to get a ban on chemical weapons. Toward this objective he said that maybe a suitable statement for issuance at the Moscow summit could be constructed. He then asked Ambassador Nitze for a run-down on arms control. (S)

*Ambassador Nitze* reported that one large working group on arms control had subdivided into several separate groups on nuclear testing, conventional arms, START, Defense and Space. Verification problems generally, ALCMs, mobile ICBMs and their verification, heavy ICBMs, and SLCMs had been addressed. The two protocols on elimination and inspection and the MOU on data tabled in Geneva had been examined and some progress made on eliminating differences. Nitze observed that it would be important and feasible to exchange data called for by the MOU even before completing the full outline of the START agreement because the first informed the second action. The US side moved from 6 to 10 as an ALCM counting rule in response to Soviet concerns, but the Soviet side still had problems with the US position. (S)

*Shevardnadze* charged that the US was understanding the ALCM carrying capability of its very good bombers. *Nitze* responded that the counting rule of 10 was fair for the force as a whole. He went on to say that mobile ICBM verification had seen hard work and some progress. On heavy ICBM, the sides' positions were clear and disagreed. There remained problems on sublimits, but progress was being made. The main problem remains SLCMs, where the Soviet side, *Nitze* reported, had made substantive proposals which the US side was examining. (S)

*Shevardnadze* agreed that the MOU on data was important; categories needed to be defined; it would provide the basis for speeding up exchange of data. But, he said, it remained unacceptable that SLCMs were not included. *Nitze* said that the sides should start exchanging data as soon as possible. He then broached Defense and Space. (S)

*Shevardnadze* interjected by proposing to the President that the language of the December Joint Statement simply be used as the text of a document to be signed in Moscow. Not only had the two top leaders already accepted it, others present had worked on it, including Shultz, Carlucci, Baker, and Powell. If the Washington language on

the ABM Treaty was still in effect, then things could move boldly ahead. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* responded that this matter was actively being discussed; the Washington language was valid. But, he said, it contained areas of ambiguity which even the Soviets could see. This had to be cleared up. (S)

*Shevardnadze* said that efforts were being made to go beyond the Washington language; these might lead in a negative direction which would be unfortunate. (S)

The luncheon broke up at 1435. Departing, *Shevardnadze* asked the President to consider the proposal of spending more time and doing more travel in the USSR than currently planned. (C)

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### 139. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 23, 1988, 2:30–8:10 p.m.

#### SUBJECTS

Ministerial Dates, Iran-Iraq, Afghanistan, Other Regional Issues, Working Group Reports, Joint Statement

#### PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>U.S.S.R.</i>
THE SECRETARY	FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE
Gen. Powell	Amb. Bessmertnykh
Under Secretary Armacost	Amb. Adamishin
Amb. Ridgway	Shevardnadze Aide Stepanov
EUR/SOV Director Parris	Shevardnadze Aide Tarasenko
(Notetaker)	Soviet MFA Notetaker
Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)	Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in Shultz's outer office at the Department of State. In an undated memorandum, Shultz reported to Reagan: "In taking my leave of Shevardnadze, I told him we remained committed to making as much progress as we can across our full agenda between now and May 30. He said the Soviet side is as well, and I felt he was sincere in stressing the importance of doing everything possible to ensure that your visit to Moscow is a success." (Reagan Library, Ledsky Files, Soviet Union (USSR)(1))



*Ministerial Dates*

SHEVARDNADZE said it had been a good meeting with the President. It was good to have the question of a summit date resolved.

THE SECRETARY agreed. Having a date would allow work to begin on the details—both in terms of arrangements and substance. Setting dates was a way of saying we were serious. For the same reason, it might be a good idea in the joint statement to be issued after the ministers met to give the dates for their April meeting, and to indicate they would meet in May as well.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed, noting that the best time for him in April would be April 25. But he understood that was a problem for the Secretary.

THE SECRETARY said he thought agreement had been reached on the dates April 21–22 for the Secretary's discussions in Moscow, with some travel outside Moscow the following weekend. The Secretary had to be back in Washington the evening of April 25.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the April meeting should be April 21–25. As for May, the middle of the month would be best for him. THE SECRETARY agreed that the statement would say "mid-May," with precise dates to be determined later.

SHEVARDNADZE observed that the ministers seemed to have said as much as was necessary on the Middle East that morning. If their experts came up with something in the meantime, it could be reflected in the joint statement. Shevardnadze continued to believe that there ingredients of a common approach. Perhaps these could be discussed in greater detail in April, during the Secretary's Moscow visit.

THE SECRETARY said that the statement should say that the two sides had discussed the Middle East and would continue to do so. But we would have to say that our respective concepts of an international conference and how to go about it were quite different.

*Iran-Iraq*

SHEVARDNADZE said that the ministers needed to finish their discussion of Afghanistan.

The Foreign Minister had already dealt with the Iran-Iraq war. In the spirit of the understanding the ministers had, Shevardnadze could confirm that, after the Secretary General had completed his consultations with the foreign ministers of Iran and Iraq, the Soviet Union would be able to act in the Security Council.

THE SECRETARY welcomed this. The U.S. proposed to return to the U.K. draft without the modifications which the two sides had considered in Moscow for a suspension period during which the Secretary General could seek implementation of the first resolution. Perez de Cuellar was already, in effect, doing this.

SHEVARDNADZE was not sure about such an approach. The Soviet Union had agreed in principle to work on the basis of the U.K. draft, but since then many amendments had been attached to it. The time before the Secretary General's meeting with the Iranians and Iraqis should be used to work on the text.

THE SECRETARY asked Shevardnadze if he would be willing to say publicly what he had said to him in private.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, for public consumption, it might be better to state simply that, if the Secretary General's consultations produced no results, the U.S. and Soviet Union would favor "strong action." The two sides had already decided that this meant voting for a second resolution.

THE SECRETARY agreed that the phrase "strong action" should be recorded in the joint statement. If asked what this meant, the U.S. would say it referred to voting a second resolution. If asked what about the Soviet view, we would suggest putting the question to the Soviet Union. The Secretary remarked that the President's comments at the White House made clear how deeply he had been moved by recent reports of chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq war.

SHEVARDNADZE said he understood. He appreciated the need for a resolution, even though it would give him a "big headache" with Iran after the vote.

THE SECRETARY reemphasized that a decision was needed. If there were a subsequent need for further follow-up, the two sides could consult.

SHEVARDNADZE recalled that the current U.S. proposal called for the 30 day suspense period the ministers had discussed in Moscow.

THE SECRETARY repeated that the idea in February had been to enable the Secretary General to use the suspense period to seek Iranian compliance with Resolution 598. Time had passed since then, and the consultations which had been foreseen were happening. This argued for going back to the original U.K. draft.

SHEVARDNADZE said he felt the suspense period should be retained. Implementation should be based on whatever situation prevailed at the time.

THE SECRETARY said that, if the modification were retained, the suspense period should be very short.

#### *Afghanistan*

SHEVARDNADZE asked about Afghanistan.

THE SECRETARY said it was hard. He asked to review the bidding to be sure he understood the Soviet position, laying aside for the moment the question of arms supplies.

The Soviet side agreed, he recounted, that half its troops would leave in the first three months. If the Geneva accords were signed, the withdrawal would be over by the end of the year. The Soviet Union and the parties agreed that Cordovez could in a private capacity mediate efforts to reach agreement on an Afghan interim government acceptable to all parties. We assumed that was something the Soviet side would be prepared to make public. (Shevardnadze shook his head in the affirmative when the Secretary asked, “Right?”).

The Secretary recalled that the Soviet side had suggested that, as far as it was concerned, the U.S. could say it would continue to support those we had supported in the past. The Soviet Union would reserve the right to complain about this, but would not claim that the Geneva accords were being violated.

The most sensitive issue, the Secretary said, had to do with Pakistan, because there was no other realistic route for transporting supplies to the resistance. Any U.S. statement of its right to deliver arms, if it chose to do so, had to be credible. As a practical matter, we hoped this would not be necessary. We would say we would observe restraint if the Soviet Union did. If the Soviet side showed restraint, so would we. We would say this publicly.

The Secretary said he would like to have from Shevardnadze some indication as to how the Soviet Union would comment on Pakistan’s position in light of such a statement by the U.S. If, for example, the U.S. said it would continue arms supplies, and Moscow said that Pakistan would be in violation of the accords if they transited that country, that would be too contentious for us.

There were a number of factors to consider in this context, the Secretary emphasized. One was an actual supply operation by the U.S. Then there was the question of what the Soviet Union would say under those circumstances. We needed to understand what kind of position Pakistan would be in if we accepted the Soviet proposal. The U.S. would make a statement—and be ready to act on it. But under the withdrawal timetable that Shevardnadze had described of seven months or so it was not at all clear that the U.S. would deliver any supplies. We would, however, reserve the right to do so. These were the kinds of considerations the Secretary would like to get Shevardnadze’s feel for.

SHEVARDNADZE said it would not be possible to just invent something here in Washington. The Soviets had no desire to criticize the U.S.’s discharge of its obligations to Pakistan. As for American military assistance to groups opposing the Kabul government, that Moscow would criticize. The U.S. frequently criticized Soviet military assistance. The ministers could discuss this kind of thing. But to go beyond that and decide what might happen if Pakistan supplies the resistance would lead nowhere.

THE SECRETARY said he had asked a different question. Pakistan would not supply anything. The U.S. would provide any assistance. But since it was most practical for U.S. aid to go through Pakistan, questions would emerge in response not to what the U.S. *did*, but what it *said*, if we accepted the formula the Soviet side had proposed. It would be one thing for Moscow to criticize the U.S. It would be another if Pakistan were criticized. It would help for Shevardnadze to say the Soviet Union would say nothing, at least not until an actual act of supply had occurred.

After a lengthy pause, SHEVARDNADZE said that if there were no actual act of supply, there would be no reason for Moscow to invent one.

THE SECRETARY said, "Thank you."

SHEVARDNADZE added, "If there is no supply." The document the U.S. and U.S.S.R. were to sign made no reference to arms supplies. The issue was simply not covered.

ARMACOST pointed out that the instrument of guarantee in Geneva committed the guarantors to respect the undertakings of the high contracting parties. That was why the U.S. had to be concerned about Pakistan's position. A lawyer would argue that, to the degree the contracting parties have undertaken not to supply, the guarantors were involved. That was why the U.S. was suggesting a moratorium.

ADAMISHIN asked for a clarification. It was his understanding that the Soviet side was being asked not to criticize not a statement, but only actual provision of supplies. His question was: "Whose statement?"

THE SECRETARY asked what if the U.S. were to say it would support "as needed" those it had supported.

ADAMISHIN said that would be a U.S. statement, not the Pakistani statement.

THE SECRETARY speculated that Pakistan might say that it had noted the U.S. statement, and supported the U.S. in that statement.

ADAMISHIN posed a second question: would the statements be made before or after signing? And, in the second case, would the statements be seen as an interpretation of the Geneva accords? Obviously, if the statements were made before signing in Geneva, it would sound one way; if after, another.

THE SECRETARY asked Adamishin to explain. ADAMISHIN said it would make a difference in how Moscow responded.

THE SECRETARY explained that if the U.S. did what he had described, and it would be difficult for us to do so, we would say that we intended to act as a guarantor of the Geneva accords. We would say further that we felt that continuing support for those we had been

supporting was consistent with our role as guarantor. So the question of a violation would not arise. If asked, we would say that the people we supported were not covered by the accords' definition of "mercenaries," etc, since they were fighting for the freedom of Afghanistan.

ADAMISHIN interrupted to comment that, from what the Secretary was saying, it appeared that such a statement would be made before signature.

THE SECRETARY said that, when the U.S. said it would sign, it would make a statement about what it intended to do. We had major problems on this issue with Congress. The Secretary had just gotten off the phone with Sen. Byrd, who had expressed concern that the Secretary was going to give away Afghanistan. So we needed a posture we could defend. As he had said at the outset, however, the Secretary was talking about how to present what was taking place, not what would really be taking place.

POWELL observed that, if the U.S. signed and the accords were in place, the first question from Congress would be, "Does that mean we will stop aid?" We would say, "Only if the Soviet Union does." If the Soviet Union continued, we would continue. The Soviet side, Powell speculated, would criticize the U.S. statement, but not allege a violation of the Geneva accords.

The next questions would be, "If the U.S. continues arms supplies, or has to resume supplies, and if U.S. aid can only go through Pakistan, what will the Soviet reaction be if Pakistan agrees to allow such aid to transit its territory?" It was Powell's understanding that the Soviet Union would not only criticize such a decision by Pakistan, but would allege a violation.

BESSMERTNYKH clarified that the formula discussed by Armacost and Adamishin did *not* provide for symmetry between U.S. and Soviet obligations. The concept was not appropriate, because the situations were not analogous. To try to say that the U.S. would supply the opposition if the Soviet Union supplied the government of Afghanistan would be to add a new element to the formula. The Soviet formula contained no linkage to supplies.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that the U.S. was talking about a unilateral statement. We would say we were prepared to resume supplies, and that our readiness to take that step would be affected by what the Soviet Union did. That implied no undertaking by the Soviet side. It was a unilateral view.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the discussion had shown there were only two ways to resolve the problem.

The first was based on the fact that the Geneva accords imposed no obligations on guarantors not to supply arms. There was thus no

need for the U.S. and Soviet Union to discuss the matter. If the U.S. wanted to supply the resistance, it should do it. The Soviet side would not be “consultants” as to how that should be done. It was not in Soviet interests for the aid to continue. How the U.S. provided aid was its business. For public opinion purposes, the U.S. could simply point out that Geneva did not deal with arms supplies by guarantors.

A second option was for the U.S. to refrain from signing in Geneva. This was a bad option, but could not be ruled out. A document signed in Geneva on a three-way basis would involve the Soviet Union only insofar as it addressed troop withdrawals. This was clearly a less satisfactory approach. These were the two options. There was no other way.

THE SECRETARY recalled that Shevardnadze had earlier seemed to suggest that there were circumstances under which it would not allege that Pakistan had violated the Geneva accords, if the U.S. had stated its intentions along the lines the Secretary had described, and Pakistan had endorsed that statement. The Secretary asked if Shevardnadze could elaborate on that, emphasizing that he was trying to distinguish between how the Soviets would react to statements on one hand, and an actual flow of arms on the other.

SHEVARDNADZE responded somewhat testily that he wanted the Secretary to know Moscow was not tied to the Geneva process. If an agreement were signed, that would be good. If not, it would mean that the process of reaching a settlement in Afghanistan would take a different path. But Shevardnadze said he felt that the two sides had come very close to a meeting of the minds. There were still a few days in which to give legal force to something they had been discussing for many years.

Shevardnadze said he had the impression that the U.S. and Pakistan had obtained what they had most wanted from this process—dates for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Now the U.S. was trying to get more. This tactic would not work. Moscow could have not set dates and continued to bargain. Instead, it had sought to convince the U.S. and Pakistan that it was serious, that it would withdraw. So dates had been set.

The U.S., Shevardnadze alleged, had not really believed that the Soviet Union would get out of Afghanistan. As a result, it had not adequately studied the drafts when they were being prepared in Geneva. It was too late for second thoughts. To try now to nullify the accords would lead nowhere. If the U.S. wanted to continue to supply the resistance, it could go ahead, since this was not covered by the Geneva documents. In practical terms, how the U.S. did this was its problem. The Soviets knew how to get their troops out of Afghanistan. How the U.S. got arms in was up to it. But the question had to be settled today, now. That was the direction Shevardnadze thought their conversation in Moscow—and previous conversations—was leading.

THE SECRETARY acknowledged that there had been a lot of discussion on Afghanistan. That discussion had included the need for a balanced outcome. We welcomed the steps which had been taken thus far. We wanted to see the Geneva process come to fruition. But we also wanted to be in a position to avoid political turmoil here which would have an adverse impact on that process. Were we to say that nothing in the accords prevented us from continuing to support those we had supported, and that we intended to do so, we would expect the Soviet Union to criticize that statement, but not to charge that it violated the accords.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet Union would not invoke the accords under such a scenario.

THE SECRETARY said that there also had to be clarity when the question was asked as to how this affected Pakistan. If Pakistan were to state that they supported our statement, and would cooperate with us if it were necessary to resume aid, we understood that, to use Shevardnadze's words, the Soviet Union wouldn't have to "invent" anything. In effect, Moscow would criticize Pakistan's statement, but not say Pakistan had violated the accords.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Pakistan was bound by the accords not to supply the opposition. That did not apply to the guarantors. It was up to the U.S. to decide what intermediaries it used to supply aid to the resistance. But it should realize there would be efficient monitoring mechanisms, including UN inspectors, to ensure Pakistan did not supply arms. That, however, had no relation to the U.S.

Shevardnadze asked the Secretary to recognize that the Soviet Union had already made very substantial concessions. General Secretary Gorbachev himself had said that the U.S. should cut off supplies to the resistance once the Soviet Union had made its decision to withdraw. Shevardnadze did not want to dwell on the matter, but this was an important statement by the leader of the Soviet Union. Now the Soviet position was quite different: the U.S. *could* supply the opposition, and the Soviet Union would not claim a violation, although it would criticize such action.

THE SECRETARY suggested a caucus. He moved to his private office, accompanied by Powell, Armacost, Ridgway and Parris.

After a ten-minute break, the Secretary and his advisors returned. THE SECRETARY outlined the U.S. position in light of the previous discussion.

The U.S. welcomed, he said, the steps which had been taken toward a settlement of situation in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from that country. We felt there was a clear understanding that these objectives were close to being achieved. We also believed,



however, that any negotiated outcome must provide for a balance of obligations among its signatories. It was also most important that conditions be created during the withdrawal period and thereafter which would ensure the safe and honorable return to Afghanistan of refugees. In this context, the U.S. welcomed the agreement under which Cordovez would work in a private capacity to mediate among the various Afghan parties on interim government arrangements.

Under these circumstances, the Secretary continued, the U.S. felt it important for all parties—the U.S., Soviet Union, and others—to agree to a moratorium on arms shipments. The moratorium would initially run for the period during which Soviet forces would be withdrawn, and for three months thereafter. It could be extended if, as all the Afghan parties had called for, agreement could be reached on a neutral status for Afghanistan.

The U.S. side had proposed such a moratorium during the course of the morning's discussion. The Soviet side had said it could not agree. Our proposal remained on the table. Under the circumstances the Secretary had described, the U.S. was prepared to assume the responsibility of guarantor of the Geneva accords. In the absence of such arrangements, we would not be able to undertake those obligations.

ARMACOST added that acceptance by either side of the U.S. moratorium proposal would be without prejudice to its rights to supply arms to parties in Afghanistan.

THE SECRETARY said this was an important point. Acceptance of a moratorium would be without prejudice to any rights held by either side. It would be an act designed with the best interests of Afghanistan in mind.

The Secretary said that, while he could not speak for Pakistan, he knew that the Pakistanis, like ourselves, wanted to see Geneva signed.

After a lengthy pause, SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the ministers move on to the next regional issue. "On the basis which you have indicated, it will not be possible to reach agreement."

After a further pause, Shevardnadze asked what the consequences of such an arrangement would be. The negotiations in Geneva were between Pakistan and Afghanistan. They could continue. Everything that had to do with the Soviet Union had already been stated, and declared acceptable by Pakistan and Afghanistan. If Pakistan was prepared to sign, the accords could be concluded without guarantors. There was nothing tragic about that. If there was no signature at all, that, too, would not be so terrible.

*Central America*

THE SECRETARY asked if Shevardnadze wished to take up Central America. SHEVARDNADZE said that the ministers had discussed the basic elements of that issue Monday evening.<sup>2</sup>

THE SECRETARY offered to describe the situation as the U.S. saw it. Over the previous seven or eight years there had been steady movement toward more openness and democracy among most of the governments of the region. The U.S. had welcomed this trend. All of the countries involved were relatively poor. Their traditions were more feudal than militaristic.

In Nicaragua, there was a different pattern, although we saw some prospect for positive change. Nicaragua was like its neighbours in being a small, poor country. It was unique in that its government was seeking to develop a centralized, more totalitarian form. That government was putting into place a military force triple the size of any other country in the region. The ultimate scope of Nicaragua's military plans had been revealed by a senior defector and, incredibly, confirmed by Nicaragua's Defense Minister. All of this was taking place against a backdrop of massive Soviet military support—support which remained at a level of a quarter billion dollars this year, despite the conclusion of the Guatemala City agreement.<sup>3</sup> This was a massive sum by Central American standards, and there was no sign that the flow of supplies was decreasing.

In the Guatemala City accords, Nicaragua had committed itself to a pattern of internal development consistent with an open, democratic society. The standards set in these accords were frankly higher than those prevailing in the Soviet Union today, despite words like *glasnost*.

Unfortunately, the trends in Nicaragua seemed to be retrogressing, particularly in the wake of the House of Representatives' cut-off of aid to freedom fighters. Nicaragua had recently moved 1,500-2,000 troops into Honduras in an apparent effort to wipe out the freedom fighters and their supply sources. The attempt had failed, because the freedom fighters had given a good account of themselves, because of the outrage the action had provoked in the region, and because the U.S. had responded to Honduras' request for a show of support. As the Secretary had indicated on Monday, our forces would probably begin returning home over the weekend.

It had not escaped our notice that the Soviet Union maintained an aircraft in Nicaragua—ostensibly for mapping purposes. We knew, however, that that aircraft was being used for aerial reconnaissance to

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<sup>2</sup> March 21; see Document 132.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 10, Document 82.

provide tactical intelligence for Sandinist counterinsurgency operations. Such activities by the Soviet Union on the eve of ceasefire talks between the freedom fighters and Managua was hardly in keeping with Soviet calls for reduction of tension in the region and implementation of the Guatemala City accords—one feature of which was the ceasefire talks. Those talks were continuing, and the initial reports were positive. But there was never an agreement until there was an agreement. We would await the results.

The policy of the U.S. was to support the Guatemala City accords; to support the ceasefire negotiations; to join other countries in insisting that Nicaragua meet its obligations under the accords; and to be ready for direct talks with Managua in a regional setting.

When Gorbachev had been in Washington, he had said that the Soviet Union also supported the Guatemala City accords. He had also said something which apparently he had repeated to Senator Nunn and others when they were in Moscow—that the Soviet Union was prepared to reduce military assistance to Nicaragua to the level of police weapons if the U.S. did not supply arms to the freedom fighters. If the Soviet side were really interested in such an undertaking, we would welcome the opportunity to explore it. It was an observable fact that the U.S. was not currently providing assistance to the fighters.

In short, the Secretary concluded, the U.S. wanted to see Central America removed from the list of trouble spots, an area of greater stability, whose citizens would be free to get about the business of improving their economic well-being. He could assure Shevardnadze that in the context of implementation of the Guatemala City accords, and with the behaviour Moscow had volunteered, we were prepared to talk to the Nicaraguans in a regional setting, and to work with the nations of the region, including Nicaragua, to improve economic conditions.

SHEVARDNADZE recalled that the Soviet delegation had made clear during the Washington summit its support for the Contadora process, later the Contadora group and its support group, and finally the Guatemala City agreement. Moscow felt that these efforts provided the right basis for a settlement of the problems of Central America.

Unfortunately, not everything resolved in Guatemala City had been implemented. And this was not the fault of Nicaragua. Shevardnadze recalled the steps already taken by the Sandinist government: it had taken the initiative to engage in negotiations on a ceasefire; it had been the first in the region to establish a commission on national reconciliation. Looked at objectively, much had been done to advance democratization in Nicaragua. The media had been opened to the opposition on an equal basis. Nicaragua had taken the initiative at the UN to ask for monitoring/inspection of the Nicaragua–Honduras border.

Nicaragua's "solid" military forces, Shevardnadze explained, were a function of its needs. If a country did not feel threatened, it would obviously prefer to devote scarce resources to its economic development. The situation around Nicaragua was such that it did not have this luxury, and this was largely the result of U.S. policy. The U.S. appeared to be "organically incompatible" with the Sandinist regime. This was totally inappropriate. What did the U.S. have against Nicaragua's government? How were they a threat to the U.S.? Did Nicaragua need Honduran territory? No. Were it not for the bands of extremists fighting the current government, the countries of Central America would have found a solution to these problems long ago.

Shevardnadze reminded the Secretary that he had already said the U.S.'s despatch of troops to Honduras was inappropriate. But the decision was America's. It was not for Moscow to order the U.S. about. But the action was totally unjustified and had caused alarm not only in the region, but around the world. But the U.S. appeared to think that this was its personal hemisphere and it could do what it wanted.

But where was the solution?, Shevardnadze asked. The U.S. could not strangle the Nicaraguan revolution. It was the people's struggle. It was bigger than Nicaragua. The only way out was to engage in direct dialogue with Nicaragua—and Cuba, too. Unfortunately, it appeared that some Administration officials still hewed to the old, notorious policy of trying to establish an order acceptable to the U.S. in every country and in every region of the world. The U.S. had complained about Soviet shipment of arms to Nicaragua. On what basis did the U.S. ship arms to Pakistan? The U.S. did not even stop at shipping arms to governments close to the Soviet Union's borders. It aided groups fighting legitimate government all over the globe. Why should the Soviet Union not supply a government which was represented in the UN and was universally recognized.

THE SECRETARY asked to interject some comments on the U.S.'s relations with the government of Nicaragua. When the Sandinist revolution took place, the U.S. had supported it. We had welcomed Somoza's ouster. We were quick to provide economic assistance to the new regime, assistance which, on a per capita basis, had been the highest of any of our aid programs. But the revolution had gone sour. The proof of that was that many of the people who had made the revolution left Nicaragua, or were forced to leave. So we had to shift our policy.

Even then, some years later, in response to recommendations by many countries, but notably Mexico, the President had authorized the Secretary to go to Managua and talk to Ortega. Bilateral talks had been set up to support the Contadora process. There were a series of meetings in Manzanilla. But we soon found that Nicaragua was going to other governments and saying that it would not deal with them because it

was working directly with the U.S. We had been forced to break off talks, although we said we would resume them in a regional context. We had reaffirmed that position with the conclusion of the Guatemala City accords. We wanted to encourage the success of the accords, and of the ceasefire, so that the region could focus on economic development.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that that was needed. But he felt the Secretary was ignoring one fundamental issue—neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union could tell Nicaragua or any other people how they should live. This was what the U.S. was trying to do. It did not like the Managua government, so it kept raising additional requirements. The Nicaraguan people had established an order of their own.

As for Soviet arms supplies, the General Secretary had told the President that both countries should refrain on a mutual basis from providing arms. That offer remained on the table. If the U.S. was prepared to stop supplying arms to all Central American countries, so was the Soviet Union. The only exception would be police-type arms, which could continue to be provided. If the U.S. were interested, the idea could be explored further.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that the U.S. had long-standing relationships with the countries of Central America, some of which involved the supply of military assistance for purposes of keeping order. The most obvious case was El Salvador, where there was a guerrilla movement supported by Nicaragua and Cuba. This forced the Salvadoran government to maintain a larger military than they would like. We could not cut off those who were simply seeking to maintain order in their country in the face of a challenge from Nicaragua and Cuba.

As for Nicaragua, there was no U.S. assistance flowing to those opposed to the government. Even over the past few years, what aid had been provided was relatively little.

SHEVARDNADZE said the Secretary's logic was odd. The Secretary called those fighting against the Nicaraguan government "freedom fighters." He used the same term to describe those opposed to the governments of Afghanistan and Angola. Those who opposed the regimes he liked were bad people. There was an inconsistency here.

As for arms supplies, if Gorbachev's proposal was acceptable, why not get down to discussions on that basis? If it was not, the Soviet Union would meet the obligations it had to Nicaragua, just as the U.S. met its obligations to many of the Soviet Union's neighbours. Moscow didn't complain about that. Why should the U.S. The U.S. had ringed the Soviet Union with bases—big bases, and lots of them. Yazov had shown Carlucci a map the week before. When Shevardnadze had seen the map, it had frightened him.

THE SECRETARY said that all our forces were for defensive purposes. Besides, the Soviet Union was so big, it was hard not to surround it.

SHEVARDNADZE said it would cost the U.S. a lot to do so. But there were some good trends that the two sides should try to take advantage of. That was why Shevardnadze had raised the question of limiting naval activities the day before.

SHEVARDNADZE said Moscow really had no desire to arm Nicaragua if that country were not threatened. He proposed the two sides discuss the matter and see whether some mutually acceptable solution could not be found. He assured the Secretary that Moscow was not getting rich by providing weapons to Managua. It would welcome the opportunity to stop.

THE SECRETARY noted that there was now a good rationale—the U.S. was no longer sending arms to those we had formerly supported in Nicaragua. That should remove the need for Soviet arms supplies.

SHEVARDNADZE asked what about Honduras.

THE SECRETARY said that was a different question. Honduras was not invading Nicaragua.

SHEVARDNADZE asked where the contras were based. How were they armed, trained? Honduras was not rich enough to do that. There was a need for mutuality.

THE SECRETARY underscored that there was *no* aid going to the freedom fighters, wherever they were. Honduras was indeed in no shape to supply anyone. It was a poor country.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Honduran weapons were good, modern. Some said they looked much like American weapons. But there was no need to get specific.

### *Regional Dialogue*

Recalling a point Shevardnadze had made on an earlier occasion, THE SECRETARY said he sometimes thought our regional dialogue with the Soviet Union would be more productive if there were a different approach. Some headway had been made as a result of experts discussions on the Iran-Iraq war, southern Africa, and Afghanistan.

SHEVARDNADZE interrupted to say with some feeling that there had been no progress on Afghanistan. If asked at the conclusion of their meeting what had been achieved on that subject, Shevardnadze would say that it had been impossible to find common language, that no positive elements had emerged from the discussion.

THE SECRETARY replied that what he had in mind was to try to focus on what we would like to see in certain regions in, e.g., 1995 or 2000. It would not be too difficult to define emerging trends. It would

be interesting and potentially fruitful to discuss their implications for U.S.-Soviet relations.

Following further elaboration by the Secretary of this concept, SHEVARDNADZE agreed that such an approach might have merit, but pointed out that certain problems had to be addressed now. Otherwise any plans which might be developed would be in vain.

Apparently in this context, Shevardnadze said he was reminded of the relationship between the problems of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war. The Soviet Union had been true to its word in both cases. The Soviets had said what they would do, and had made clear they would follow through on any obligations they had assumed, even where it would be difficult for them. But, on Afghanistan, the U.S. had pulled back from its commitments. It had not been as good as its word. This was not a tragedy, but the point had to be made.

The Secretary in his comments on improving the regional dialogue had referred to the Soviet Union's providing missiles to Iraq. It was a fact that Moscow provided arms to Iraq. No one complained about it because it was done on a legal basis.

THE SECRETARY said he had not meant to complain about Soviet arms supplies to Iraq. He only wanted to make the point that ballistic missile proliferation was occurring.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, even if the Soviet Union voted for an embargo on arms to Iran, it was not certain the U.S. would not itself arm Iran. That was the way things were in the U.S. The Secretary of State said one thing; other members of the Administration did something else.

THE SECRETARY said that the earlier U.S. attempt to provide arms to Iran was a misguided enterprise. Its scale was inconsequential. It would not be repeated.

SHEVARDNADZE said there was no guarantee of this. The whole administration had been involved. This was not just a private firm. One of Powell's predecessors had been intimately involved.<sup>4</sup>

THE SECRETARY said that the discussion was going downhill. If the ministers started down this path it would lead nowhere.

SHEVARDNADZE protested that there was a fundamental question involved. When the Soviet Union was considering what to do about a second UN resolution on the Gulf war, one reason for its delay was uncertainty as to whether the U.S., or some private firm sponsored by the U.S., would not supply arms to Iran. Shevardnadze was still not sure.

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<sup>4</sup> Presumably reference is to either McFarlane or Poindexter.



THE SECRETARY said that, under the circumstances, he could not believe Shevardnadze was saying this.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had believed the Secretary until that afternoon, until they had discussed Afghanistan. Now his confidence was shaken. There were certain norms in any business, including “this one.” But Shevardnadze would drop the subject.

*Afghanistan*

THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. had played it straight on Afghanistan. We had made known our concerns on what we called “symmetry” for some time. This was not a new idea.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that the U.S. wanted the Soviet Union to abandon its friends, friends to whom Moscow was linked by legitimate relations. The U.S. wanted to equate the government of Afghanistan to fundamentalist bands. “We can’t accept that. You have put forward demands that are unacceptable.”

THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. had listened carefully to the concerns the Soviet side had expressed, just as, we hoped, Shevardnadze had listened to us. We had tried to put out an idea which got to the Soviet problem. The Secretary did not see why it would be so difficult for Moscow to supply Kabul with what it needed before an agreement entered into force. We had tried to respect the Soviet need to preserve the right to be able to supply the Kabul regime. We had not challenged that. We had tried to come up with a solution consistent with that. We had tried to work with Adamishin’s formula. We had not been able to find language which did the job. We were still ready to seek formulae which could describe what both sides wanted to see happen.

SHEVARDNADZE said his conclusion was that the U.S. would remain outside the Afghan settlement process. The U.S. would not be able to give orders to Pakistan. The Soviets knew the Pakistanis would make their own decisions. It was up to the U.S. to say what it would do.

THE SECRETARY confirmed that Pakistan would make its own decisions. The U.S., for its part, was ready to sign in Geneva, but subject to finding a formula which would be workable. We had tried to fit such a formula into Adamishin’s proposal. We had tried out the idea of a moratorium. The Soviet Union traditionally favored moratoria. What was wrong with one in this case?

SHEVARDNADZE replied that he could give the Secretary a long list of Soviet moratorium proposals that the U.S. had derided.

THE SECRETARY suggested that Shevardnadze offer one on Afghanistan. Or perhaps the Kabul government, which had stated its desire that Afghanistan be neutral, could, with the comfort provided by Soviet weapons provided prior to entry into force of the Geneva

accords, might itself call for a moratorium. The Soviet Union and the U.S. could honor that appeal.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had come to Washington well prepared to deal with this issue. He had had extensive consultations with those dealing with Pakistan and Afghanistan on Afghanistan questions. If he saw options other than those he had proposed, he would have given them to the Secretary.

But there was no need to dwell on the question. Shevardnadze understood that the U.S. would not act as a guarantor for the Geneva accords. Accordingly, the Soviet Union would not either. The process would proceed on a different basis. There was no need to add new language; it was simply a matter of deleting. So, what was next, Shevardnadze asked.

*Cambodia/Korea*

THE SECRETARY suggested Cambodia. Sihanouk was an asset with respect to a settlement there, because he was someone the people could rally around. The key, however, remained for Vietnam to leave Cambodia.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that there were certain positive elements. The dialogue between Sihanouk and Hun Sen was very important. Sihanouk certainly supplied a certain prestige. He was occasionally ridden by doubts and hesitations, but who wasn't? The situation was complicated, but the issues of a political settlement and national reconciliation were proceeding in a positive way in the context of the Sihanouk-Hun Sen dialogue.

As for Vietnam, its course was clear. By 1990 it would have withdrawn its troops. The process was already underway; a substantial number was already out. The Vietnamese had their own plan. There was no reason for anyone else to interfere. Sihanouk himself, Shevardnadze speculated, might have an interest in seeing certain issues resolved before the Vietnamese left. Among them: questions relating to Cambodia's governmental and national structure; relations between the opposing parties; and China's attitude. Until China's attitude were clear, one could not speak with confidence on prospects for a settlement.

ASEAN was also playing an important role, Shevardnadze said, particularly Indonesia. The Vietnamese dialogue with Thailand was less fruitful, although Shevardnadze had heard some interesting things in his talks with the Thai foreign minister. Perhaps there were prospects in this area as well.

So, Shevardnadze concluded, there were some positive trends. But much depended on how the Afghanistan problem turned out. Afghanistan was the first time there was a real opportunity for the U.S. and Soviet Union to resolve a major regional issue. If national reconciliation

proved to be an effective basis for a settlement, it would have a positive impact on prospects for solutions to the problems of Cambodia, southern Africa and elsewhere. Shevardnadze knew first-hand that the leaders of Afghanistan and Cambodia considered the trends in their two countries to be related.

Shevardnadze emphasized that it was the task of the great powers to encourage national reconciliation. This was sometimes difficult. But the choice boiled down to encouraging national reconciliation or encouraging civil wars. Afghanistan was the touchstone.

As for Korea, the ministers in Moscow had talked about the proposals which Kim Il Sung had asked Gorbachev to convey at the Washington summit. These were thoughtful proposals which warranted serious consideration. Shevardnadze did not rule out that South Korea might also come forward with serious proposals. If this happened, they, too, could be considered.

On a more general plane, Shevardnadze called for a broader U.S.-Soviet dialogue on Asia and the Pacific. The Secretary was aware of the Soviet Vladivostok proposals. The Soviet side knew of the U.S. reaction to some of those proposals; some elements of the U.S. position were by no means unacceptable. The Australian government had also had some good ideas. Could the U.S. and Soviet Union not seek to harness emerging trends and ideas in this vast area to formulate a mutually acceptable platform—like they were already doing in the Middle East? This was an area which should not be ignored. Perhaps there could be a reference to this idea in the joint statement.

THE SECRETARY said it would be good to discuss Pacific issues.

On Korea, the Secretary noted that there was a new President in Seoul, whose popular mandate gave him a stronger power base. He was still sorting out his domestic program. Once national assembly elections were over, he would have a freer hand for foreign affairs. He clearly had a bolder approach than his predecessor to dealing with the North. Once South Korea's political transition was sorted out, he would be inclined to do things. Of course the Olympic Games were currently claiming all of the South's attention.

### *Southern Africa*

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that Adamishin report on his Monday discussion of southern Africa with Asst. Sec. Crocker.

ADAMISHIN said that his talks with Crocker had revealed broad agreement on the theoretical plane, which, however broke down on questions of tactics. Both sides, for example, were opposed to apartheid. But the U.S. was not prepared to make a joint statement on recent anti-democratic moves by South Africa. Both sides wanted South Africa out of Angola, but disagreed over how this should be brought about.

Adamishin said that the most important segment of the experts' talks had to do with the U.S.-Angolan-Cuban talks. Adamishin had made clear that Moscow supported the talks and was by no means opposed to U.S. mediation efforts. But the Soviet Union strongly supported the positions Angola had taken in the discussions thus far. Adamishin's impression was that the U.S. was seeking the maximum number of concessions, particularly with respect to a Cuban troop withdrawal, without offering anything in return. Specifically, the U.S. had made clear it would not end aid to UNITA.

Both sides, Adamishin concluded, felt that the discussions were useful, and should continue.

THE SECRETARY asked to comment. Adamishin was right: both the U.S. and Soviet Union deplored apartheid. We wanted a different situation in South Africa. We had made that plain. Our own relations with South Africa were strained, although they existed.

We saw significant potential for movement on the complex of issues related to Angola, Namibia and a Cuban troop withdrawal. So, apparently, did the South Africans. Botha had recently asked to meet with Crocker; and a meeting had taken place in Geneva. So hoped to keep that dialogue open.

There was greater fluidity in the situation. If national reconciliation could get underway in Angola, it could contribute to the removal of both Cuban and South African forces from that country. That, in turn, would open up the Benguela railroad, which could have an enormous economic impact in the region. Savimbi was a genuinely popular leader, enjoying the support of 40% of Angola's population. He did not seek a military victory; he favored national reconciliation. Many African leaders were also in favor of reconciliation in Angola. Perhaps parallel demarches in African capitals to this effect would contribute to the process.

As for a Cuban troop withdrawal and Resolution 435,<sup>5</sup> what we were calling for was not unilateral concessions, but putting together a package which would be credible enough to engage South Africa's attention. South Africa at least rhetorically was committed to implementation of 235 under the right circumstances. And, of course, once Namibia had gained its independence, Angola would be cut off from South Africa.

The Secretary noted that, on the other side of the continent, the U.S. was supporting the Chissano government, along with the Soviet Union. While some in the U.S. favored supporting RENAMO, that was not the Secretary's policy, or the President's. We would welcome

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<sup>5</sup> See footnote 6, Document 162.

reinvigoration of the Nkomate accords. If the situation in Mozambique could be brought under control, the Beira corridor could be reopened. In conjunction with the reopening of the Benguela railroad, the economic impact of such a development would be important.

The Secretary noted that Shevardnadze had once commented on the potential importance of regional groupings to the resolution of local conflicts. We agreed. Southern Africa was an area where the concept could be given a chance to work. Setting local transportation systems back on their feet could make a major contribution. So these were some of the ideas we had on southern Africa. Some might be appropriate for parallel or joint efforts.

SHEVARDNADZE said that parallel efforts were probably most appropriate. Our consultations on southern Africa had nonetheless produced good results and should be continued.

Shevardnadze cautioned that national reconciliation was at a different stage in southern Africa than in such areas as Afghanistan or Cambodia. In those areas, conditions were ripe for solutions. It was still early in Africa. It was not possible to force the process. There were some ideas on the table which could be studied. The African states, for example, had suggested a UNSC meeting. Perhaps this could be supported, although Shevardnadze didn't want to make any commitments at this point. It might prove useful in focusing public attention on the problem.

### *Cyprus*

Shevardnadze noted that he and the Secretary had not in the past discussed Cyprus. But there had been requests from both the current and previous Cypriot governments that the problem be taken up in U.S.-Soviet bilateral discussions. Shevardnadze did not want to get into details, but there were some interesting ideas, e.g. for an international conference. Perhaps the U.S. and Soviet Union could do something to revive the process of finding a solution.

THE SECRETARY said he would think about it. It seemed to him that the most interesting thing going on with respect to Cyprus was the developing dialogue between Greece and Turkey. If their relations improved, it could have an important impact on the situation in Cyprus.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed. Intercommunal differences on the island would no doubt continue, but there were some positive factors: the Greek-Turkish dialogue; new leadership among the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Perhaps some way could be found to engage.

### *Bilateral Issues*

After determining that joint statements were not yet ready for the ministers' review, THE SECRETARY touched briefly on bilateral issues.

He said he particularly wanted to endorse the U.S. proposal that cultural centers be established in Moscow and Washington, and that an announcement be made at the summit. We were prepared to move ahead in this area, and were ready for detailed discussions if there were interest on the Soviet side.

Shevardnadze nodded in acknowledgement.

#### *Working Group Reports*

The Ministers then decided that, as the joint statement was still being prepared, they should hear from working groups. Nitze and Obukhov were summoned, and Obukhov briefly summarized the results of the Nuclear and Space group's discussions.

The thrust of OBUKHOV's opening remarks was that the U.S. had insisted on language which had nothing to do with the Washington Summit statement, which ministers had agreed in Moscow should be the basis for a new agreement on observance of the ABM Treaty. SHEVARDNADZE asked if that meant that nothing had been achieved in this area. OBUKHOV said that the issue had been discussed both in the working group and by Kampelman and Karpov. Obukhov was not informed on the outcome of their discussions.

NITZE challenged Obukhov's presentation of the subject, noting that the real problem was that the Washington Summit Statement language was never intended to be a self-standing agreement. A formal agreement would require greater specificity as to the meaning of "non-withdrawal." It would also have to deal with issues like the supreme national interest clause, and what should happen at the end of the non-withdrawal period. So a number of questions remained on which work had to be done.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that there were also verification questions to be addressed. There seemed to have been some headway, but more was needed. We had some ideas on how to reduce ambiguity. NITZE said that our proposal on space sensors was one such idea.

SHEVARDNADZE asked Nitze what he meant by "sensors." Nitze briefly explained the concept.

OBUKHOV noted that the Soviet side had just received the U.S. proposal. It would require expert analysis and assessment.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the key was to determine what would take place during the non-withdrawal period. The Soviet side thought that should be compliance with the ABM Treaty. If the two sides could agree on this, it would make open the field to progress across the board.

THE SECRETARY noted that that was the virtue of trying to work from a joint draft text. As had proven the case in other areas, such a device forced negotiators to identify for ministers where the problems lay. This could be done for the April meeting.

SHEVARDNADZE said this could be considered. But the important thing was not the text itself, but knowing where the differences lay. The bottom line was that the present visit had added nothing to what had been achieved during the Washington summit. If anything, the situation was less clear. So, work should continue.

THE SECRETARY agreed, but on the basis of a joint text. SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet delegation didn't consider that a useful idea. OBUKHOV explained that the U.S. text would "drown" the principles which had been agreed to in Washington. Perhaps the U.S. could provide a revised text, which dropped the additional points. NITZE noted that the U.S. text contained all of the elements of the Washington Statement,<sup>6</sup> as well as other elements we considered necessary.

SHEVARDNADZE said he disagreed with something Nitze had said earlier—that the Washington statement was only "communique language." Rather, it should be seen as the basis for everything. THE SECRETARY pointed out that Nitze had said the Washington Statement language was incorporated into the U.S. text, adding that it did not provide adequate clarity. We had provided some ideas on how to achieve that.

"OK," SHEVARDNADZE said, "let's work on a joint document." But that was not the solution. It could not be recorded that progress had been made. NITZE noted that agreement to work a joint draft text *was* progress. THE SECRETARY said that, whether it was progress or not, it should be done. He agreed with Shevardnadze that, on the whole, little had been achieved. SHEVARDNADZE said that the two sides had gotten nowhere, and asked Obukhov to continue his report.

When Obukhov had finished, Shevardnadze asked him where, in the Soviet working group's view, there had been progress during the visit. OBUKHOV said that there had been some movement on ALCM's, in that the U.S. had revised upward its proposals for a counting rule. This did not solve the problem, since, in the Soviet view, the only realistic rule was the maximum number for which bombers could be configured, but the U.S. move suggested that this issue could ultimately be resolved. While there had been no definitive progress on the SLCM question, the U.S. had agreed to intensify experts discussions on verification questions, and this, too, was a step forward.

SHEVARDNADZE asked if there had been a discussion of the detailed proposals the Soviet side had made on SLCM verification. OBUKHOV said that the Soviet side had made a thorough presentation, that the U.S. had asked a number of questions, and that Nitze had

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 3, Document 125.



raised no objections. From this, Obukhov assumed that the Soviet ideas would be studied. NITZE interjected that he had said the proposals would be studied. He had made no commitments.

THE SECRETARY asked if any brackets had been eliminated in the texts prepared to date. NITZE said Hamner felt it would be possible to remove some brackets. SHEVARDNADZE said that, as best he could tell, there had been no serious movement on NST. If the other groups had done no better, it was not clear there would be anything for the ministers to review in April.

Nitze and Obukhov were then dismissed, and Holmes and Palenikh summoned to report on the nuclear testing group's discussion.

Following their statements, THE SECRETARY asked how long it would take to complete a technical verification protocol after the JVE had been conducted. HOLMES said that remained to be seen, but that the JVE was being designed to minimize the gap. SHEVARDNADZE asked what there would be to sign in Moscow if there were no JVE results. Palenikh admitted that, without such results, it would be premature to sign anything. That was why the JVE was necessary.

SHEVARDNADZE asked Palenikh to confirm his understanding that, without conducting the JVE, there would be no documents to sign in Moscow. Assuming ideal conditions, how much time would it take to prepare the necessary documents once a JVE had been conducted?

PALENYKH said that the JVE could be conducted by the end of May. The results would be available perhaps a week later. For more substantive analysis, more time would be required. SHEVARDNADZE said that this was an important consideration for the ministers, because it bore on what could be signed at a summit.

THE SECRETARY said that Palenikh had provided a technically perfect answer. If we conducted enough tests, eventually we would know all there was to know about the subject. The question was, at what point would we know enough to be able to establish something, knowing that the situation could shift as we proceeded? We felt that it would be possible to develop a protocol without first conducting a JVE. We wouldn't know everything, but we would know enough.

HOLMES noted that the U.S. felt that no JVE was necessary to complete a protocol on the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). The Soviets were considering this idea. If they agreed, the protocol could be signed in Moscow, although its submission for advice and consent would have to await agreement on a satisfactory protocol for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT).

PALENYKH pointed out that the Soviet proposal was not to do many experiments. One would be sufficient to provide the data they

considered necessary to familiarize themselves with the CORRTEx method proposed by the U.S. But even a single test would require some analysis.

SHEVARDNADZE said to the Secretary that he (Shevardnadze) had explored after the ministers' last meeting whether or not it would be possible to prepare testing protocols without conducting a JVE. Most of the experts had said it was not.

THE SECRETARY said it was up to the Soviet side. He proposed that the ministers conclude their discussion of testing. We would do it the Soviet way, even though that meant there would probably be nothing to sign at the summit.

Palenykh departed, to be replaced by Nazarkin. At the Secretary's invitation, HOLMES read a short agreed statement on the results of the CW working group's discussions. NAZARKIN then read a much longer "personal" comment on the talks, one element of which focused on the alleged U.S. insistence on a right to refuse challenge inspections of private facilities.

Asked by THE SECRETARY if this was correct, HOLMES indicated that the problem was how to define what facilities were "relevant." Privately owned facilities, as such, were not the problem. THE SECRETARY noted that the "relevant" problem would apply to government-owned, as well as to privately-owned facilities.

A brief discussion of CW verification questions followed, after which Nazarkin and Holmes departed, to be replaced by Grinevskiy and EUR/RPM Deputy Director Moffitt.

Asked to proceed, GRINEVSKIY reported that it had not been possible to agree on a joint report. He described objections raised by the U.S. to the Soviet proposal for an exchange of data on conventional forces in Europe.

THE SECRETARY said he would like to comment on that. Every effort was being made in Vienna to complete the mandate for conventional discussions. We were also insisting upon a balanced outcome to the Vienna meeting. It was not possible simply to leapfrog that process to, in effect, begin discussions of conventional arms in Europe before Vienna had concluded. The Soviet proposal would have that effect. Moreover, our experience in the MBFR negotiations was that years could be spent arguing about data. Ultimately, we had had to try a different approach altogether. We would of course take up the Soviet proposal with our allies, but saw little to comment it.

MOFFITT noted that the U.S. had reiterated in the working group its opposition to a reference in any conventional mandate to dual-capable systems. We had also expressed reservations with respect to the proposal for discussions on naval activities which Shevardnadze had made the previous day.

Grinevskiy and Moffitt were replaced by Simons and Kutovoy, who reported on the results of the bilateral working group.

SIMONS report focused on five sets of negotiations (fisheries, transportation, basic sciences, maritime search and rescue, and cultural exchanges) which could produce documents for signature in Moscow. He noted that the U.S. had handed over draft texts on transportation and basic sciences, and would soon be in a position to provide drafts on exchanges, as well as a draft memorandum on the establishment of cultural centers under the 1985 Exchanges agreement.

KUTOVOY's response noted that there had also been discussion of cooperation in what he termed the more "difficult" areas of AIDS research, trade, energy, and the Arctic.

In response to SHEVARDNADZE's request for clarification as to what agreements might be ready for signature in Moscow, SIMONS again went over the list. SHEVARDNADZE asked if this was a realistic assessment. Both SIMONS and KUTOVOY said it was.

#### *Joint Statement/Final Assessments*

At this point, the ministers received copies of the draft joint statements for their review.

After reading the texts, THE SECRETARY expressed regret that the Soviet side had not, as Shevardnadze had earlier indicated, been willing to include a reference to "strong actions" which would be undertaken in the event the UN Secretary General's early April consultations with Iran and Iraq produced no results. SHEVARDNADZE said that such language was not needed, as nothing was said about Afghanistan. THE SECRETARY said, "OK."

The ministers authorized release of the statements.

Reflecting on the results of his visit, SHEVARDNADZE reiterated that if progress continued at this rate there would be no serious documents to sign at the Moscow summit. It was of course possible to meet and talk without signing documents. But it was discouraging that the two ministers and their delegations could meet for two days without accomplishing anything substantive. The statement was a good one, but it contained no specifics.

Shevardnadze suggested that this pointed to the need for particularly thorough preparations before the ministers' next meeting. He would be in favor of removing as many brackets and disagreements as possible.

What then, should be said to the press? Was a press conference really necessary? How would the ministers assess their work?

THE SECRETARY said that he agreed that the visit had not been very productive. He had been asking himself why this should be. In

the past, the ministers had dealt more successfully with some very difficult problems. That had not happened this time.

The problems which remained were the hard ones. But the Secretary felt that, with the right spirit on both sides, the ABM issue could be resolved. The ALCM discounting rule also seemed to be resolvable, even if, thus far, it had not proved possible to identify conceptually common ground. The SLCM issue remained tough, but we would look at Soviet suggestions. We thought that a declaration was a realistic way out of the problem; we were not optimistic about being able to verify a limit.

The U.S. desire to limit strategic arms was strong, the Secretary affirmed. The President shared this view. He wanted to get the job done. And the prospect was tantalizing when we looked at how much had been accomplished since the Secretary and Shevardnadze had first met in Helsinki. The difference was like night and day. The two START protocols and MOU which the ministers had commissioned in Moscow had been produced, albeit with lots of brackets. Many of these had to do with technical issues which should yield to further efforts. Others required resolution of broader questions.

The Secretary said he was as discouraged as anything by the failure to accomplish anything in the regional area. He felt that the overall effort we had been making in this area had been soured. Even at the most difficult moments in their relationship, e.g. during the Daniloff affair,<sup>7</sup> he had not felt such a sourness, even though the discussions were tough.

The Secretary said that he had gained the impression from his experience going back to the Nixon administration that there were rhythms to the relationship. One of the accomplishments of the past few years had been to attenuate the swings of the pendulum, while keeping the trend line moving in a generally positive direction. Perhaps the relationship was entering a downward cycle; the Secretary hoped we could pull out of it.

POWELL said that, while both sides obviously would have liked to accomplish more, they knew that they would be dealing with the most difficult questions—particularly on arms control. Powell agreed that we could work on ALCM's; SLCM's would be harder, even with the new Soviet ideas.

For his part, Powell had been most disappointed over the failure to make progress on the question of the ABM Treaty. We had felt after the Secretary's Moscow visit that there would be movement in this area. Since then, the Soviet side had not engaged. Powell emphasized

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<sup>7</sup> See footnote 4, Document 35.

that steps *must* be taken to eliminate the ambiguity in the Washington Summit Statement. This was an essential political imperative for the U.S. After the Washington summit, our negotiators had been instructed to use the Statement as the *basis* for a treaty, not as the text of a treaty itself. This ambiguity had to be resolved before we could take a possible treaty to the Senate. That was why we had put forward our proposals on sensors and verification procedures. Soviet acceptance of these would create a common understanding of what had been intended in Washington.

THE SECRETARY stressed that the approach Powell had described was intended to get away from the debate over the broad versus the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. It sought to put out information on the nature of each side's programs. This would provide greater predictability and certainty, something which the Soviet side had sought, as well as a clearer idea of what would happen during the non-withdrawal period.

RIDGWAY said that she had been reminded by some of her colleagues that in "off cycle" periods, bilateral progress could provide useful buoyancy. The report of the bilateral working group had identified a number of areas where constructive progress was being made.

THE SECRETARY observed that, seen in the long term, there were clearly stages in the development of our relationship, each with its own dynamics. The Geneva summit had had a certain air. Reykjavik was a different sort of meeting—highly charged, but, as summits went, the most productive ever. The Washington summit was a magnificent event, crowned by the signing of the INF Treaty. We hoped that there would be an even more important treaty to sign in Moscow.

But one could ask: "What about a 1989 summit?" If we concluded a START agreement for Moscow, what could be done for an encore? This was by way of saying that, for the relationship to become more normal, the time had to come when our leaders could meet, and, while it would be a major event, it need not be marked by gigantic achievements. This was a mark of maturity in the relationship. As people thought about the management of the relationship over the next five to ten years, that needed to be kept in mind.

So, the Secretary concluded, he felt a little disappointed with their meetings. But the way one accomplished things in this area was to keep plugging away. Our people would be working in Geneva. It would be even more important that people in capitals do their homework. The work in Geneva reflected what was being done in capitals.

SHEVARDNADZE said he did not think that the meetings had been useless—particularly when he read the joint statement. What disturbed him was that he had expected to be able to identify some concept for the Moscow summit, even if only in general terms. If he

were asked what that concept might be at this point, he could not answer. This did not imply that the ministers should set grandiose tasks for themselves, but they needed a clear idea of where the process was leading. Shevardnadze agreed that it would be possible to have a meeting which did not produce major results. There was plenty of precedent for that in visits by other world leaders. But U.S.-Soviet relations were special.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed completely. He thought that something could be accomplished in the time remaining. So did the President.

SHEVARNADZE said that the ministers should try to move positions closer together during their April meeting. They should try to identify more clearly a concept for the summit.

Shevardnadze said he did not want to return to all the problems the ministers had discussed. ABM was central. Unless some decisions were taken, there could be no expectation of progress in other areas. SLCM's were another important area which the Soviet side hoped the U.S. would be ready to address urgently. Shevardnadze wanted to emphasize that if there were not understanding on the ABM Treaty, there would be no agreement on 50% strategic reductions. The same went for SLCM's.

The U.S. and Soviet Union, Shevardnadze continued, had a unique chance to close off the main channels of the arms race. He did not know how Moscow's relations with the next administration would be. Perhaps they would be better. But the Soviet leadership felt that there was a unique chance to negotiate an agreement now. It should not be missed. Guided by this principle, the two sides should act more vigorously in Geneva, Washington and Moscow.

By way of a second general observation, Shevardnadze said he had known the Secretary now for some time. The Secretary knew the Foreign Minister did not hide his feelings. Shevardnadze had been deeply disappointed by the results of their discussion of Afghanistan. He did not know how to continue the discussion. The U.S. had simply decided it didn't want to help solve the problem. A major chance had existed to do something together, to resolve "the most acute problem of our time." Moscow would resolve the problem. But it would have been well to demonstrate to the world that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could work together to solve such problems. This was Shevardnadze's most acute disappointment as he left Washington.

Shevardnadze said he did not want to overdramatize this. But he had believed the two sides could do better. There was every reason to expect success.

So, Shevardnadze summed up, he had been very frank. No purpose would be served by going over the issue once more. But success would

have helped in the resolution of other problems, e.g. the Iran-Iraq war, the Middle East. The two sides had to cooperate if these issues were to be resolved. Moscow knew the mentality of the Arab world. Resolution of the Afghanistan conflict on a negotiated basis would have been a good stimulus in the Middle East.

But the meeting had been useful, despite the disappointments. There was a clearer idea of our differences. That was progress. And the atmosphere, as always, had been hospitable and constructive. Shevardnadze asked that the Secretary convey his thanks to the President for the time he had made available.

THE SECRETARY asked to respond on a few points.

On the ABM question, he urged that Soviet negotiators in Geneva be instructed to engage on a joint draft text. They should try to eliminate the inconsequential problems, e.g. the supreme national interests clause issue. We were surprised at the adverse reaction to our proposal that the ABM Treaty should remain in effect at the end of the non-withdrawal period unless a side exercised the six-month notice of withdrawal option, and hoped the Soviet side would look again at that. We urged the Soviet side to look closely at our sensors and verification proposals as a means of giving clarity to the Washington Summit Statement. Our objective was to put the issue on an operation basis, avoiding the question of broad versus narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

On Afghanistan, the Secretary expressed his own disappointment, for reasons paralleling those Shevardnadze had expressed. The Secretary felt the two sides had come close to an understanding. He hoped Shevardnadze had a better appreciation of the difficulties we had. Our moratorium proposal was an attempt to find solutions consistent with the Soviet need to maintain a certain posture, and with what, in practical terms, Moscow would want to do. It would give us the necessary sense of balance and even contribute to a solution to Afghanistan's internal problems.

If asked, the Secretary would say that there had been a thorough discussion of Afghanistan and that, from our standpoint, there were some positive results. We would welcome acceptance of Cordovez's mediation efforts. We would describe where the talks had ended up. We would not put it in a cataclysmic way, but would express our disappointment.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, if he were asked by the press whether the U.S. and Soviet Union would sign as guarantors in Geneva, he would say, "no." Was that correct?

THE SECRETARY said he would say the U.S. was prepared to act as a guarantor, and that the arrangements which had been agreed to



were close to what we needed to do so. But he would indicate that an essential element—balance—was missing. He would say we had tried to resolve this and were not successful. We remained glad to be a guarantor if the issue could be resolved.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, if he were asked what the U.S. would do, he would say the press should ask the Secretary.

The meeting concluded with a brief discussion of plans for press conferences that evening.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> For the text of the joint statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 1988, pp. 42–43.

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#### **140. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

##### **SUBJECT**

Shevardnadze Visit

Shevardnadze and I concluded his visit with six hours of intense discussion.

The principal focus of our talk was Afghanistan, where it became clear Shevardnadze lacked authority to accept an arrangement which balanced obligations between ourselves and the Soviets as guarantors of a Geneva agreement. Shevardnadze walked away from my final suggestion—a joint moratorium on arms supplies for a period coinciding with the Soviet withdrawal period, plus three months. I had hoped such a formula, which would have been without prejudice to either the Soviets' or our own rights to supply those Afghans we had previously supported, would be a face-saving way out for Moscow. Shevardnadze would not bite, indicating instead that our stance would force the Soviets to make their own arrangements. I told him that was their decision, but made clear we stood ready to sign in Geneva if our concerns were met.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ledskey Files, Soviet Union (USSR) (1). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

Colin and I pressed hard on the need to clarify the Washington Summit Statement's language on defense and space activities permitted during the period of non-withdrawal from the ABM treaty. Colin persuasively summarized the factors which made movement on this issue so important for us, and Shevardnadze seemed to agree to my suggestion that they join us in Geneva in work on a joint draft treaty text. It is clear, however, that we still have a lot of convincing to do. Nor was the picture much brighter in our discussion of START, where I urged that the Soviets take some relatively simple steps to remove brackets in the texts prepared thus far.

On other issues, Shevardnadze first agreed to language in our final statement which would have committed him to "strong action" on Iran-Iraq, but pulled it when it became clear we would not agree on Afghanistan. We had a lengthy discussion of Central America, with Shevardnadze ducking our efforts to engage him seriously on Soviet suspension of arms shipments to Nicaragua, as Gorbachev suggested at the summit. We reviewed progress in our bilateral affairs working group, where our experts were able to identify a half-dozen agreements which may be ripe for signature in Moscow.

In our concluding assessments, both Shevardnadze and I expressed disappointment over the results of his visit. I told him, however, that we should not be discouraged. The issues we are now addressing are by definition the tough ones. Some, like clarifying the Washington Statement and a range of START issues can be resolved by the time of the Moscow summit, given a realistic approach on both sides. Others—such as, it's turned out, Afghanistan—may have to be handled outside of the bilateral framework. The important thing is to end up with agreements we can live with, rather than agreements for their own sake.

In taking my leave of Shevardnadze, I told him we remained committed to making as much progress as we can across our full agenda between now and May 30. He said the Soviet side is as well, and I felt he was sincere in stressing the importance of doing everything possible to ensure that your visit to Moscow is a success.

We have planted some important seeds this week. We will see whether they bear fruit when I go to Moscow next month. In the meantime, there will be plenty of work to do here, in Moscow and in Geneva.

**141. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 12, 1988

## SUBJECT

My April Trip to the Soviet Union

*The Setting*

My meetings with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev next week in Moscow should help clarify what to expect for the Moscow summit, especially on START. Our side has done a lot of work since Shevardnadze's visit last month; if the Soviets have been equally busy, we may be able to pick up some momentum.

Shevardnadze will want to develop a substantive "concept" for your visit, and I will use this to push in areas of interest to us which might produce agreements to be finalized during your visit, or which will be ripe for discussion by you and Gorbachev. Shevardnadze also may suggest ways to record results at the summit. I will make clear to Shevardnadze that what counts most is a well-prepared and thorough discussion.

As you know, when Shevardnadze and I are in Geneva this week to sign the Afghanistan agreement, I will meet briefly with him to discuss the agenda for next week's talks in Moscow.

*The Agenda*

With the Afghanistan agreement signed, arms control will have a higher profile in Moscow than it did during Shevardnadze's visit here last month. I intend to take the initiative on the *ABM Treaty*, pressing our ideas on sensors and distinguishing testing from deployment, as a means of building on the December summit statement. I will also seek to tackle remaining issues such as Soviet reluctance to accept our standard "supreme national interests" clause in a new agreement, and Soviet non-compliance with the *ABM Treaty*.

On *START*, Soviet spokesmen continue to say they want a Treaty for the summit. We'll see how badly. I'll make a further effort to crack the ALCM counting problem. We'll also press for Soviet acceptance of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1988 Apr.-May Memoranda for Pres. Ronald Reagan. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris; cleared by Ridgway, Simons, Steven Coffey (P), James Timbie (D), Robert Farrand (HA), R. Caldwell (EUR/RPM), James Holmes (PM), and Michael Stafford (S/ARN). An unknown hand initialed for Parris and the clearing officials, with the exception of Ridgway, who initialed her concurrence. There is no indication on the memorandum that Reagan saw it.

the ideas we began introducing in Washington on verifying mobile ICBM's, and try again to capture the ICBM sublimit. I'll use the session to make clear the full range of our problems with Soviet proposals on SLCMs.

Shevardnadze and I will review progress on other arms control issues. By the summit, we should be well on the way to completing improved verification of the two 1970s treaties on nuclear testing, putting us in a good position to seek ratification of the treaties by the end of the year. The Soviets will look for our reaction to their ideas for a summit statement on *chemical weapons*, and I plan to propose another round of CW proliferation talks this year. We'll continue to make the point that the path to *conventional weapons* talks lies through a successful, balanced conclusion to the Vienna CSCE Meeting.

On *human rights*, in view of Shevardnadze's lengthy talk in Washington on *our* performance, I plan to focus sharply on abuses which stem from official Soviet policies and which violate international agreements. I will press for action by the summit on the 17 cases you raised in March, and will hit hard on Soviet intransigence at the Vienna meeting. I will reaffirm that our decision on a Moscow human rights conference will be a function of Soviet human rights performance.

On the *regional* side, there may be some follow-up on Afghanistan. I also want to probe recent Soviet suggestions of a willingness to engage more constructively on Southern Africa. I will discuss the results of my Middle East trip and press Shevardnadze on the Iran-Iraq War; Dick Murphy will be along for detailed discussions. Elliott Abrams will have had exchanges with his Soviet counterpart this week, and I can pursue anything interesting which emerges from his talks. I will reemphasize the importance of Soviet restraint in supplying arms to Nicaragua.

An April 20–21 meeting of our Bilateral Review Commission will shape up any *bilateral issues* that require high-level attention. We will review prospects for concluding agreements by the summit in areas such as cooperation in basic scientific research, transportation, and fisheries. As we have discussed, I will also broach with Shevardnadze the possibility of moving ahead with a scaled-back version of the Kiev-New York consulate exchange, with both posts to open by the end of the year. Announcement could be made at the Moscow summit.

As you know, I will be returning from Moscow via side trips to Kiev and Tbilisi. En route to Washington, I will stop off in Brussels to brief our NATO allies.

**142. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, April 14, 1988, 4:30–6:05 p.m.

**SUBJECTS**

ABM Treaty, START, Bilateral Agreements, Iran-Iraq, Middle East, President's  
Moscow Schedule, Ethiopia, INF "Future Weapons"

**PARTICIPANTS**

U.S.  
THE SECRETARY  
Under Secretary Armacost  
Assistant Sec. Ridgway  
Amb. Matlock  
Assistant Sec. Redman  
EUR/SOV Dir. Parris (Notetaker)  
Mr. Afanassenko (Interpreter)

U.S.S.R.  
SHEVARDNADZE  
Amb. Karpov  
Amb. Obukhov  
Mr. Alekseev (Director, Middle  
East Countries, MFA)  
FonMin Aide Tarasenko  
(Notetaker)  
Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

During an extended photo op, SHEVARDNADZE welcomed the Secretary, noting that he had had dinner the evening before in Moscow with Commerce Secretary Verity and General Secretary Gorbachev. Verity's delegation had been large, and Shevardnadze had quipped that the Americans had "occupied Moscow."

Shevardnadze said that it was well that the two ministers had participated that morning in the signing of the accords on Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup> It had been an indication of the level that the relationship had reached. For their present meeting, Shevardnadze noted, he was at something of an advantage, as the flight to Moscow lasted only three hours. When THE SECRETARY said that that meant Shevardnadze ought to make all the concessions, SHEVARDNADZE replied with a grin that this was no time to break previous patterns.

In a more serious vein, Shevardnadze said he had met the previous day with Gorbachev, who had emphasized to the Foreign Minister the importance of identifying now the substance of the President's Moscow visit, of identifying now any agreements to be signed in Moscow. It might not be possible to do that in Geneva, but the two ministers could start the process, and have a more detailed discussion during the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz—Shev (Geneva)—4/14/88. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in the Residence of the Soviet Minister to the United Nations, Geneva.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 123. For Shultz's statement on the signing of the April 14 Geneva Accords as well as text of the agreements, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1988, pp. 55–61.

Secretary's own visit to Moscow April 21. That visit should produce clarity with respect to the objectives for the President's visit.

Shevardnadze said he had met the previous evening with the Soviet NST negotiators. He had the impression from that conversation that things were "more than difficult" in Geneva. Much would depend on the Secretary's visit. Some work, of course, was going on in Geneva. Certain language and drafting problems were being tackled. But there were no solutions on the big issues.

#### *ABM Treaty*

Shevardnadze said that the issue of how to handle the ABM Treaty had in fact become more complicated since his March visit to Washington. Ambassador Matlock the day before<sup>3</sup> had conveyed U.S. views on the need to develop a joint draft agreement text. Moscow was not in principle against such an approach, as Shevardnadze had said in Washington. But this was essentially a technical issue; it did not get at the real problem.

Holding up a copy of the draft treaty text tabled by the U.S. Defense and Space delegation, Shevardnadze contrasted the relatively small amount of space occupied by the Washington Summit Statement's treatment of the ABM Treaty to the extensive "additions"—highlighted in green—of the U.S. January 22 proposal.<sup>4</sup> Shevardnadze said that the result of such an approach was that "nothing remained" of the Washington Statement language. He did not want to get into a detailed discussion, he said, but it would be a good idea for the ministers to reaffirm clearly to their delegations that, as the Secretary had suggested in Moscow, they use the Washington Statement language as the basis for their work. Any other approach would not yield an agreement. What the U.S. delegation was proposing would destroy the ABM Treaty.

Shevardnadze suggested that, in view of the importance of the issue, the two ministers should devote an entire session the following week in Moscow—or at least a full hour—to its discussion. If there were no agreement on this, he reminded the Secretary, there could be no agreement on 50% reductions in strategic arms.

THE SECRETARY asked to comment. He did not understand Shevardnadze's reluctance to use the joint draft text approach. The U.S.

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 9459 from Moscow, April 13, Matlock reported on his meeting with Shevardnadze, during which the latter raised similar concerns. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880749–0673)

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the draft Defense and Space Treaty the U.S. delegation in Geneva tabled on January 22. See footnote 3, Document 132. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880055–0281)

believed that the Washington Summit Statement language should be the heart of any new agreement. Its key provisions should be set out.

There were, however, some disagreements on certain issues. Some, such as Soviet reluctance to accept “supreme national interest” language which was a standard feature of our agreements, were hard to understand.

The most important disagreement, however, was the meaning of the Washington Summit Statement’s reference to the need to observe the provisions of the ABM Treaty, “while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, . . .”. There was agreement that we disagreed about the meaning of that language. During the ministers’ February meeting, it had been agreed that the two sides would “build on” the language of the Washington Statement in developing a new agreement. The U.S. sought to build in a way which resolved our differences over the wording of the Washington Statement. Experience showed it was unwise to proceed on something important when we disagreed on the meaning of language.

The U.S. had ideas on how the problem could be addressed. We had broached some during the March ministerial. The Secretary would have more to say in Moscow the following week, e.g., with respect to sensors “running free.” We hoped to be able to address other aspects of the problem as well, and had been stimulated by Soviet confidence building proposals in the context of a possible verification package.

SHEVARDNADZE said he did not want to dwell on the subject, as time was limited. But the joint draft text approach was not, in and of itself, a way out.

In response to THE SECRETARY’s comment that it nonetheless helped, SHEVARDNADZE concurred, but noted that it did not resolve the substantive disagreements. The Soviet side proposed simply incorporating the text of the Washington Statement, changing nothing, and using that as the basis for a new agreement. Verification and predictability questions could be dealt with in a legally binding protocol.

THE SECRETARY said he thought that might be a good idea. SHEVARDNADZE said that in that case the two delegations should be instructed to work on that basis. The Washington Summit Statement language should not be touched. It should be treated like the “Bible.” Other aspects—verification and predictability arrangements—could be handled in protocols.

THE SECRETARY said “We can try.” SHEVARDNADZE asked if the Soviet side could then consider that the U.S. did not oppose in principle the approach he had outlined.

THE SECRETARY said that it was “OK by us.” The negotiators should do what they could do to develop a joint draft text. This would



force people to put their differences down on paper. But there was one area where we knew there would be no agreement. There was no point in playing with words until the substance of that problem had been dealt with. Words could then be found.

SHEVARDNADZE summarized the Soviet proposal: to leave the Washington Summit Statement language the way it was—not to touch it; and to work on a joint protocol.

THE SECRETARY said that there had to be some agreement on the meaning of the language. The Soviet side, for example, had resisted incorporation of standard “supreme national interest” language. Cloudiness had arisen with respect to what happened at the conclusion of the non-withdrawal agreement. Working on the text of an agreement, as well as a protocol covering confidence building measures was an acceptable way to proceed. The U.S. basically liked the Washington Summit Statement; a way could be found to incorporate it. But the Statement did not deal with all the issues.

SHEVARDNADZE said that all unresolved issues could be handled in the protocol. THE SECRETARY said we would see how to do it. It was important to agree on meaning, or there would be problems. SHEVARDNADZE said that the U.S. had not appeared to believe that the Statement’s language would be a problem when it was agreed to in Washington.

#### *START*

Shevardnadze said that there were, however, problems in other areas. There would have to be a thorough discussion during the Secretary’s visit of SLCM’s. Clarity on this question was essential. There should also be a discussion of counting rules and ranges for ALCM’s. Mobile ICBM’s would also have to be discussed, as would the general problem of verification. Many of the proposals the Soviet side had made in previous ministerials remained unanswered. Shevardnadze hoped that the Secretary would have something concrete to say in Moscow.

THE SECRETARY said Shevardnadze had named the key areas. For its part, the U.S. had made a proposal for counting ALCM’s, and had even modified it to take Soviet concerns into account. We awaited an answer from Moscow to our latest ideas. As for verification, the Secretary’s sense was that some progress had been made as a result of his and Shevardnadze’s February instructions to their delegations to concentrate in this area.

With respect to SLCM’s, the U.S. Navy was fully engaged with the problem. Some progress had been made. But the Secretary had to say on a personal basis that he did not think a complete SLCM verification regime could be worked out by the time of the summit. The Secretary

could tell Shevardnadze from personally riding herd on the problem that we were working hard at it. Some ways to approach the problem had been identified—e.g., declarations with some elements of verification and agreement to continue efforts to solve the problem more definitively. But people needed time to settle into these kinds of issues.

SHEVARDNADZE said he understood that there were differences on both sides, but in his discussions the day before with Soviet negotiators he had felt there was not enough movement in Geneva. On SLCM's, no progress could be recorded. The Soviet side had given the U.S. a specific numerical limit; it had proposed a comprehensive verification system. It had also shared ideas on how to count ALCM's and mobile missiles, and had provided a proposal for numerical limits on mobiles. Moscow did not expect Soviet proposals to be the last word on the subject; they did believe they provided the basis for serious discussion. These were tough issues. That was why the General Secretary felt it important during the ministers' meeting to define as clearly as possible those which could be resolved by the time of the summit and those which could not.

THE SECRETARY said it was his sense that, with effort and good spirit, real progress was possible on mobile ICBM's verification and on an overall verification regime. This was the result of the effort the ministers had set in motion in February. On mobile numbers, the U.S. was still waiting to hear Soviet views on warheads; the launcher numbers which had been given could cover from 800 warheads to the total Soviet warhead ceiling.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet side would provide warhead numbers in Moscow the following week.

THE SECRETARY said he thought ALCM's were also do-able. Both sides understood the subject and had ideas on how to deal with it.

The same could not be said for SLCM's. Some important things might still be said, but the Secretary doubted it would be possible to come to closure. Intensive work on the subject was underway in Washington. Until it had reached some conclusions, delegations in Geneva could not resolve the problem.

SHEVARDNADZE said that resolution of the SLCM problem depended entirely on the U.S. Ceiling numbers might be debated further, but Shevardnadze had already outlined to the Secretary the fundamental Soviet approach. There was no fallback. Moscow knew the problem was a difficult one for the U.S., but, if a Treaty were to be concluded, a solution on SLCM's was necessary.

As for ALCM's, what was important was the method of counting them. Even before a START agreement were signed, the Soviet side would be prepared to allow the U.S. to inspect Soviet bombers to

determine their capabilities. Shevardnadze had made a real effort to understand what fault the U.S. could find in the Soviet approach to the problem. His negotiators had convinced him that the ball really was in the U.S. court. Again, Shevardnadze concluded, an effort should be made to clarify the problem when the Secretary came to Moscow.

THE SECRETARY said he would have his usual suspects with him, all ready to work.

SHEVARDNADZE, picking up on the Secretary's reference to SLCM's having to be worked in Washington, said with a straight face that he welcomed the Secretary's acknowledgment that "everything" now depended on Washington, not Moscow. The Soviets were not, he added, trying to avoid anything.

#### *Nuclear Testing/Chemical Weapons*

Switching to the subject of nuclear testing, Shevardnadze said things seemed to be moving. He indicated delegations should complete by the ministers meeting a detailed plan for the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE). Otherwise there would be no document to sign at the summit on this issue, despite both sides' earlier hopes.

On chemical weapons, Shevardnadze reminded the Secretary that the U.S. owed an answer on the Soviet proposal for a joint summit statement. This was another question which should be clarified when the Secretary was in Moscow.

#### *Bilateral Issues*

Shevardnadze said the ministers should also review what bilateral agreements might be signed at the summit. What had been prepared to date was not as impressive as it might be. There had been some progress with respect to maritime search and rescue cooperation and transportation. It would also be well to reach agreement on a new program of cooperation in the cultural sphere. Conclusion of an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation would be an important achievement.

THE SECRETARY said there was also the question of establishing cultural centers in both capitals. He agreed that there was the makings of a good bilateral list. The ministers should seek to make it impressive.

The Secretary acknowledged that there had been some progress on chemical weapons and nuclear testing since their last meeting. It would be good to make a start at the CW verification experiment the Soviet side had proposed. We would be ready to talk seriously in Moscow.

On a more general plane, the Secretary said he perceived that Shevardnadze felt the two ministers should use their next meeting to decide how the substance of the President's visit should be organized,

and what the content should be. The Secretary agreed. Some important things had to be prepared.

### *Regional Issues*

The Secretary noted that one important preparation for the summit had taken place earlier in the afternoon, when the Geneva accords on Afghanistan had been signed. This showed it was possible for the two sides to do something constructive on regional issues. There should be further discussion of regional issues in the weeks ahead. When the ministers met, they might address the Iran-Iraq war, the Middle East, Southern Africa, Cambodia. The Secretary understood that ARA Assistant Secretary Abrams was meeting even as they spoke with Abrams' counterpart.

The Secretary observed that a lot of work had also been done on human rights and humanitarian questions. The Secretary in Moscow would want to focus on a number of issues: the seventeen names he and the President had raised in recent meetings; emigration, where the numbers were up somewhat, which we welcomed; and the Vienna CSCE Follow-up meeting. The Vienna meeting seemed to be hung up for some reason. The Secretary suggested the two sides try to straighten it out so things there could fall into place.

SHEVARDNADZE said the Soviet Union agreed and was doing its part.

On regional questions, Shevardnadze thought the most acute in the wake of the Afghanistan settlement was the Iran-Iraq war. The conclusion of the Geneva accords had provided some important experience in dealing with such problems. The signature that afternoon had given new impetus to the search for solutions to other regional problems.

Shevardnadze said he had asked Perez de Cuellar during their bilateral for a read-out on his recent consultations with the Iraqi and Iranian foreign ministers. Shevardnadze's impression was that the exercise had produced no results. Perez had said he would be making a formal report to the Security Council. Then "we'll have to continue work within the framework of the understandings we've reached with you."

Shevardnadze also thought there were possibilities for working together in the Middle East. Moscow was aware of the Secretary's extended travels in the region, and had itself been in "constant" contact with Arab leaders, including Arafat.

THE SECRETARY said he had seen Gorbachev's statement on PLO recognition of Israel's right to exist. It had been an important statement.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow, for its part, saw some reasonable elements in the U.S. approach. The current Soviet approach should

likewise contain elements acceptable to Washington. So a stage had been reached in which the two sides could more actively work on the problems of the region.

THE SECRETARY said that General Secretary Gorbachev would see that the Secretary had taken some of the ideas the General Secretary had given him in February into account before locking in our approach. The Secretary would be bringing Assistant Secretary Murphy with him to Moscow, and was prepared to make him available for discussions with Soviet specialists. The two ministers should also discuss the Middle East, however.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the Middle East be considered a priority area for their discussion—and also a promising one. THE SECRETARY said dealing with the Middle East was tough work. He knew from experience. SHEVARDNADZE agreed, pointing out that Arafat was no worse nor better than the Israelis. The discussion of Middle East issues should continue, it should be more substantive. The Soviet side was prepared to meet and talk at all levels.

#### *President's Summit Schedule*

Turning to the upcoming summit meeting, Shevardnadze quickly ran down the proposed schedule at Tab,<sup>5</sup> noting that it reflected considerations raised by the U.S. advance team in discussions to date.

After reading the schedule, Shevardnadze said that the General Secretary would welcome reactions from the U.S. side. There was plenty of time to take further U.S. views into account. The General Secretary had emphasized that he wanted to do this as fully as possible.

THE SECRETARY said he appreciated the suggestions which Shevardnadze had conveyed, which appeared to be constructive and positive. He would report to the President the next day, and expected that there would be some reaction at that time. There were really two schedules involved, one for the President, the other for the First Lady. It was helpful to have the General Secretary's views, and the Secretary would be prepared to revisit the matter more authoritatively when he was in Moscow.

#### *Ethiopia*

The Secretary asked to say a few words about Ethiopia. There was a tragedy in the making there. The food aid that the Soviet Union and other countries were providing was not being delivered. The Ethiopian government was behaving badly. Millions of lives were at stake. The

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<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed is an undated proposed schedule entitled "Visit by President Reagan and Mrs. Reagan to the Soviet Union May 29–June 2, 1988."

Secretary knew that Moscow was aware of the situation, and hoped it would use its influence in Ethiopia to help deal with it.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the situation in Ethiopia was not easy. It had recently become more complicated as a result of separatist activities. The government had taken steps to restore order. It was also working hard to improve relations with its neighbors. As for drought-related problems, Shevardnadze hoped that, in addition to taking steps to restore order, the government would take steps to ensure that people received aid.

THE SECRETARY said that the two sides seemed to see the problem in the same light. He suggested they both work on it.

#### *INF Future Weapons*

The Secretary said he had a final point to raise on INF. As Shevardnadze was aware, the ratification process was going well. All three Senate committees which had examined the Treaty had voted in favor of ratification. It would move to the floor that day.

The Secretary was sure Shevardnadze was aware of certain questions which had arisen, especially with respect to the possibility that ground launched missiles of INF range could be used with future weapons technologies. The U.S. had called the Senate's attention to Ambassador Obukhov's statement in the August 25, 1987 plenary meeting, in which he addressed the question of new types of missiles, stating that the ban applies to all types of ground-launched and cruise missiles "regardless of how they are armed."

The U.S. had thus taken the position with the Senate, the Secretary explained, that, in negotiating the INF Treaty, the parties understood the term "weapon delivery vehicle" to mean any INF missile system in which the missile carries a weapon, that is, any mechanism or device which, when directed against a target, is designed to damage or destroy it. This meant that INF ballistic missiles using new weapons technologies to damage or destroy targets would also be banned. The Secretary reminded Shevardnadze that INF had been solved by adopting a double global zero approach. This applied to future as well as present ground-launched missiles of INF range. The Treaty and the negotiating record showed a common view on this question. The Secretary said he hoped to be able to tell the Senate that he and Shevardnadze had discussed this and had a common view.

SHEVARDNADZE asked Obukhov to comment. Obukhov said he would have to look at the question in more detail to understand what had been described. He needed to understand more precisely the issue the Secretary had raised. It seemed to him that the ban on new types was clear. He did not see what the question was.

THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. agreed that the Treaty and the negotiating record were sufficiently clear. He was simply putting

himself in a position in which he could say, "We agree." He took Obukhov's comment as along those lines.

SHEVARDNADZE said that this was good. It seemed to him that up to this point there had been full mutual understanding on this point. Why had the question now arisen? He would like to know more about the issue.

THE SECRETARY explained that, in the INF negotiations, agreement had been reached to include conventional as well as nuclear-armed missiles in the ban. The issue had not been easy for the U.S, but the President had made a decision, and the concept had been incorporated into the Treaty.

During the ratification process, someone had expressed concern that, while the meaning of "nuclear" and "conventional" was clear enough, at some point in the future another type of weapon could be put on missiles of INF range. Then what? The U.S. had taken the position that they would be banned, and both Obukhov's words in the negotiating record and common sense supported that view. Some Senators had asked if the Soviet side saw the problem the same way. The Secretary had said he would ask to be sure.

SHEVARDNADZE repeated that up to that point there had been no disagreement over this. The question was completely new.

THE SECRETARY confirmed that there was no disagreement. He only wanted to be able to report authoritatively to the Senate.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would look into the matter, perhaps the next day. But the Soviet side had not felt there were any differences, and there should be none.

THE SECRETARY said that was his view as well. He did not want to exaggerate the importance of the issue. But he needed to be in a position to say that Shevardnadze also did not believe there was a problem.

The meeting ended without further substantive discussion.



**143. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, April 15, 1988, 11–11:30 a.m.

**SUBJECT**

Preparations for the Moscow Ministerial

**PARTICIPANTS**

The President

The Vice President

*The Vice President's Office*

Craig Fuller

*State*

Secretary George P. Shultz

Assistant Secretary Rozanne

Ridgway

Max Kampelman

Paul Nitze

Edward Rowny

*Treasury*

Secretary James Baker

*Defense*

Secretary Frank Carlucci

Robert G. Joseph

*Justice*

Attorney General Edwin Meese

*Energy*

William F. Martin

*CIA*

Director William Webster

Robert Gates

*JCS*

Admiral William Crowe

VADM Jonathan Howe

*ACDA*

Director MG William Burns

*OSTP*

Director William Graham

*White House*

Howard Baker

Kenneth Duberstein

Colin Powell

Marlin Fitzwater

John Negroponte

*NSC*

Nelson C. Ledsy

Robert Linhard

*The President* opened the meeting by noting that Secretary Shultz would be off again to Moscow early next week. He suggested jokingly that Secretary Shultz spend a bit more time in Washington, and asked why he was always running off. *Secretary Shultz* responded that it was not he but Colin Powell who enjoyed Moscow so much.

*The President* said that he did not expect the meetings in Moscow to be easy. The issues before us remained complex and difficult. We had come a long way together by being patient and keeping a steady grip on our ultimate goals. The President promised to continue on this

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 184. Secret. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

course until the day he leaves office and to do all he could to hand this course over to his successor. The President then called on Secretary Shultz to provide a preview of the coming Ministerial meeting in Moscow.

*Secretary Shultz* thanked the President and noted that he had just returned from Geneva where he and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had signed the agreement on Afghanistan.<sup>2</sup> Secretary Shultz said that he had talked for over an hour and half with Shevardnadze about the schedule for their meetings in Moscow next week and about the Moscow Summit. It was Secretary Shultz's view that the Soviets want these meetings to be successful, and will do all they can to make the programs work. Secretary Shultz thought that, by the nature of the discussion material, one had to proceed next week subject-by-subject in Moscow to see where we might be ready for closure and the recording of progress at the Moscow Summit.

*Secretary Shultz* observed that next week in Moscow he would go through a careful review of all four items on the U.S.-Soviet agenda. There could well be another Ministerial meeting before the Moscow Summit. This second meeting could occur in mid-May, possibly here in Washington or, if prospects for reaching an arms control agreement seemed reasonably bright, in Geneva.

*Secretary Shultz* then said he would like to review the issues one-by-one. First came human rights. Both sides now recognized that this had a certain pride of place on our agenda. We have arranged for Ambassador Schifter to participate in a round-table discussion in Moscow<sup>3</sup> late next week even before the Ministerial begins. We have put 17 specific hardship cases on the table, and we will press as hard as we can on these, both next week and between then and the Moscow Summit. We will also keep working on the release of prisoners of conscience.

As for emigration, last month the Soviets permitted over 1,000 Jews to leave the USSR. This was the highest monthly total in recent years, but it is not enough and the U.S. will keep the heat on this issue. Our dialogue with the Soviets on human rights issues has improved, and we have expanded our conversations to take Soviet requests into account. But we are aware that dialogue is no substitute for results, and it is results we are after. In addition to the resolution of individual cases, we seek institutional changes, including a change in Soviet laws.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 142.

<sup>3</sup> Documentation on Schifter's conversations with Soviet officials on human rights are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLI, Global Issues II.

The Soviets as we know are full of excuses. They cite security as one reason for not letting people emigrate. They also point to the lack of family consent in other cases. But we do not take these excuses as answers, and will keep banging away on these issues as hard as we can.

*Secretary Shultz* described the Vienna CSCE Conference as stalemated because of human rights problems. He said he had raised the Vienna problem directly with Shevardnadze in Geneva. Secretary Shultz reported that because the Soviets have stonewalled on human rights in Vienna, both in words and in performance, we have been unable to conclude the mandate for conventional arms negotiations. Secretary Shultz promised to press hard on this issue in Moscow.

With respect to regional conflicts, *Secretary Shultz* recalled that our efforts in this area trace back to the President's UN speech some three years ago.<sup>4</sup> Since then, we have had almost continuous dialogue with the Soviets at the Assistant Secretary level. Countless discussions have been held on each regional problem in recent months at the Armacost level, and now at the Foreign Ministers level.

*Secretary Shultz* recalled that his most recent dialogues with Shevardnadze had focused on Afghanistan, and that last September, it was at one of these regional discussions that the Soviets had first suggested to us informally that they would leave Afghanistan by the end of 1988.

*Secretary Shultz* said that in the coming round of talks, he hoped to make progress on the Iran-Iraq issue. Secretary Shultz confided that he had had some discussion with Shevardnadze on this topic earlier this week in Geneva. The Soviet response has always been "perhaps we can do something next week." Secretary Shultz said he intended to push the Soviets on a second resolution next week in Moscow.<sup>5</sup>

Another important regional issue was the Middle East peace process. Here, too, we had seen some small progress, and we will continue to keep talking to the Soviets. One encouraging sign was the fact the Soviets had told Arafat recently the PLO should accept the existence of the state of Israel.<sup>6</sup>

*Secretary Shultz* reported that he had spoken to Shevardnadze in Geneva about stepping up Soviet support for the Ethiopian relief effort. Shevardnadze had agreed to look into this matter. Secretary Shultz said he would pursue the issue of Ethiopia in Moscow along with

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to "Address to the 40th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, New York," October 24, 1985. (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1985, Book II, pp. 1285–1290)

<sup>5</sup> Documents pertaining to U.S.-Soviet dialogue on this topic are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXI, Iran; Iraq, 1985–1988.

<sup>6</sup> Documents pertaining to U.S.-Soviet dialogue on this topic are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

Angola, Namibia and Cambodia. Perhaps headway could be made on some of these issues. In concluding his presentation on regional matters, Secretary Shultz noted that Soviet troop withdrawals from Afghanistan would begin May 15. This date did not come from the air, but seemed calculated by the Soviets to play into the Moscow Summit.

*Secretary Shultz* then turned to a discussion of bilateral issues. He said that one important topic was Embassy facilities. Our current Embassy in Moscow would have to be used for five additional years. Only now were we beginning to receive the necessary cooperation from the Soviets for the repairs and renovations that would make continued occupancy of that building possible. In other areas, Secretary Shultz thought that by the time of the Moscow Summit, agreements might be reached in such areas as transportation, basic sciences, fisheries, maritime boundaries, and cultural centers. Each one of these topics was under examination and would be pushed as fast as possible between now and late May.

*Secretary Shultz* said another important bilateral issue was the establishment of consulates in Kiev and New York. This matter had been decided in principle several years ago, but the idea of establishing a U.S. Consulate in Kiev seemed to take on new importance because of its location in a non-Russian republic. The State Department had no money to establish such a Consulate as a classified post. Instead, it was looking at the possibility of proceeding on an "open basis" where there would be unclassified reporting only. Such reporting could nonetheless be of considerable importance. During the recent demonstrations in Armenia, a good bit of the information we received was from students who happened to be in the area and who called in reports over open telephone lines. *Secretary Shultz* noted that he would be going to Kiev and to Tbilisi after his talks in Moscow, and then proceed to Brussels for a report to NATO.

*Secretary Shultz* then raised the issue of arms control and pointed out that our conventional arms control thrust most heavily depended on Vienna. We need to get the Soviets off the dime on CSCE, and especially on the human rights aspects of the CSCE review meeting. If we could do so, we could then get started on the conventional stability talks. We recognized the multilateral character of this issue, but we needed the Soviets to help us get started.

The Soviets wanted a very strong statement on CW at the Summit, and we have been working with them on this. This area is moving along quite well. We have also been working on testing and progress is being made. *Secretary Shultz* said that we were not going as fast as he would like, but it looked like there will be something for the Summit in this area.

Then *Secretary Shultz* turned to START and Defense and Space. He noted that the going here was getting very difficult. There were many

outstanding issues, and all of them hard. Our problem now was to figure out what to focus on in this environment. It looked like we could focus on the ALCM-counting rule, and on mobiles. There also was the hope to be able to negotiate something to help on SDI deployment, but our discussion this morning was quite discouraging. The Secretary concluded his summary by emphasizing that we need to work on this some more, and turned the meeting over to Colin Powell.

*General Powell* stressed that, with respect to START, we had three general parts of the problem which we have to worry about. The first part involved those things that we have agreed from the Washington Summit. This included the 6000 limit on overall weapons, the 1600 limit on SNDVs, and the 4900 limit on ICBMs and SLBMs. These issues were basically resolved; we have to work out the details associated with them. The second part involved issues on which the U.S. Government had a view, but where we need to gain Soviet agreement. Examples of these were 3300 limit on ICBMs, agreement on asymmetry on handling the modernization of heavy ICBMs, an ALCM-counting rule that counts ALCM heavy bombers as 10, basic information on the range bans for ALCMs, and the like. These we needed to negotiate with the Soviets and gain their agreement.

The problems in the third basket were the most difficult. These were ones on which we did not have U.S. internal agreement. One category of these was mobiles. Mobiles were especially difficult for two reasons. First, the Congress had not been clear on our own position and on what is likely to be given Congressional funding. Therefore, it was exceptionally hard to make military judgments supporting arms control in the absence of information about your own program. This is an extremely difficult issue to resolve in Washington.

Another issue, continued *General Powell*, associated with mobiles was verification. The verification regime was extremely hard to develop because we were breaking complex new ground. We're struggling here, but working. The second major cluster of problems was on verification itself. The issue of detailed verification was very, very tricky. For example, we still had to resolve the fundamentals with respect to suspect-site inspections, perimeter-portal monitoring, tagging, and limits on non-deployed missiles. The third cluster had to do with SLCMs. *General Powell* said he was not encouraged that we could solve this problem, especially the verification on SLCMs, anytime soon or before the Summit.

*Secretary Shultz* informed the President that he had told Shevardnadze it's not going to be possible, in his opinion, to resolve the verification questions satisfactorily before the Summit. There was just too much verification work to be done. Therefore, unless there was a breakthrough in the interim, Secretary Shultz said, that SLCMs were not

going to be ready, and also that we would not have closure by the Summit on mobiles. There was a possibility that we would be able to handle the ALCM issue and the heavy ICBM issue, and in addition, we may have to address some secondary issues like BACKFIRE and the like.

*General Powell* remarked that he would be curious as to whether Secretary Carlucci or the Chairman agreed with all this before moving forward and to talk about Defense and Space. Both *Secretary Carlucci* and *Admiral Crowe* responded that they were in complete agreement with Secretary Shultz's statements. *Judge Webster* also said he had nothing to add.

*General Powell* next mentioned that the Defense and Space situation was largely the way the Secretary of State had outlined it. We told the Soviets at the last meeting<sup>7</sup> that we needed to reduce ambiguity in this area. To do so, we suggested letting sensors "run free," and we may be close to being able to do something in this area. We're certainly close to being able to articulate our position without hesitation in this area.

*General Powell* added that the other idea that we've had was loosely called "test range in space." We were examining this now. He then explained to the President that it was like a column of air that's identified as a test range, and each side confines its systems to that column in such a manner as to show that it is not a threat to anyone. Unfortunately, we needed more study of how to explain this, how to define it precisely, and what the implications were. He then turned to Secretary Carlucci and Admiral Crowe to ask them if this were correct. *Secretary Carlucci* responded that this was exactly right. *Admiral Crowe* addressed his remarks to the President and reiterated that this was a potentially good idea. We were studying it, but there were implications for *all* of our space programs. Therefore, it could not move further without making sure we've taken an absolutely careful look.

*General Powell* then turned to the topic of the upcoming Summit, and said we would be able to demonstrate that we've made progress between the Washington Summit and the Moscow Summit. We also needed to position ourselves so that after the Summit there would be a legacy for future actions. And, finally, when we're done, if nothing else, that there would be left a firm foundation for the President's successor so that he could pick up the baton and run with it without missing a beat. We also had to work on the public dimension so that it would be clear to all concerned that we were not holding back, but that we were trying to get a good foundation. As the President has

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<sup>7</sup> See Document 142.

said in the past, it's important that we do it right, not necessarily that we do it fast. Everyone was working very, very hard. As Admiral Crowe had said often, it was not a matter of applying resources; we just needed time for the resources to produce and gather our position together.

*The President* summed up the meeting by saying that the discussion confirmed that we were on the right track. He concluded by saying that we need to keep pressure on Moscow for improved performance on human rights and constructive moves on regional conflicts. The meeting then shifted to a discussion of Persian Gulf issues.

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#### 144. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, April 21, 1988, 9:50 a.m.–1 p.m.

##### SUBJECTS

Organizational questions; President's Moscow Program; Human Rights

##### PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

THE SECRETARY

Gen. Powell

Amb. Ridgway

Mr. Parris (Notetaker)

Mr. Zarechnak (Interpreter)

U.S.S.R.

SHEVARDNADZE

Dep Fon Min Bessmertnykh

Amb. Karpov

Mr. Tarasenko (Notetaker)

Mr. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

##### *Initial One-on-One*

[Attended on U.S. side by Powell, Parris, Zarechnak; on Soviet by Bessmertnykh, Tarasenko, Mamedov, Palazhchenko.]

SHEVARDNADZE welcomed the Secretary to Moscow, noting that their increasingly frequent meetings had now reached an important stage. There was less than a month before the President's visit to Moscow. The people of the U.S. and Soviet Union, and of the world, had become accustomed to such events' being crowned by major

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow—4/88—Shultz—Shevardnadze. No classification marking. Drafted by Parris. All brackets are in the original. Pascoe's stamped initials are in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. The meeting took place in the Soviet Foreign Ministry Guest House.



achievements. The same expectations existed for the President's visit, which was natural, in view of the progress achieved in recent years.

The Secretary's visit assumed acute importance in the context of seizing the opportunity provided by the upcoming summit to conclude an agreement on reducing strategic arsenal by fifty percent, and to resolve certain other problems. The ministers' task was to answer the fundamental question as to whether this was possible. Perhaps neither side could provide an unequivocal answer. Everything depended on the positions the two sides would take in the negotiations about to begin. Just before the Secretary had arrived, Shevardnadze had been asked by reporters if he were optimistic. He had answered that it all depended on what the Secretary was bringing with him. So there were important questions which had to be clarified over the next few days.

If the ministers reached the conclusion that no START agreement would be possible by the summit, they would have to explain why. Shevardnadze was frankly worried that, in such circumstances, there would be a temptation to resort to recriminations and mutual accusations. That would be unfortunate. The situation was not a simple one. Much work had been done. There had been a real breakthrough on the INF agreement, as well as on such regional questions as Afghanistan. It was important that both sides be seen as taking a responsible approach.

What, then, were the knots which needed to be untied. The two ministers, Shevardnadze recalled, had previewed them in Geneva the week before.<sup>2</sup> Shevardnadze had said then that the U.S. had seen all the Soviet fall-back positions. Moscow could logically expect the U.S. to reciprocate. That was what he wanted to say.

THE SECRETARY thanked Shevardnadze for his comments. As for strategic arms and defense and space, the Secretary thought it would be a good idea to put working groups to work at once. The best approach would probably be to take each issue in its turn to see what could be done. We had some additional ideas on ALCM which, if they proved agreeable to the Soviet side, might allow the issue to be resolved during the present visit. There was also work to do on defense and space, and we would welcome Soviet reactions to the ideas we had shared in Washington on sensors.

The Soviet side, the Secretary recalled, had suggested putting the Washington Summit Statement language on the ABM Treaty in a new agreement, to be accompanied by a protocol or other document in which issues which have arisen could be resolved. The key for the U.S. was to reach a meeting of the minds as to the meaning of any words which might be agreed to. We were prepared for that kind of an

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 142.

approach, and might have some additional ideas to put forward shortly. But we believed much could be accomplished while the Secretary was in Moscow.

The Secretary said much had been accomplished since the Washington ministerial in removing brackets from the verification protocols. A related problem was to get started on the actual exchange of data under the MOU. We were prepared to start that process that day in a general way.

In the area of SLCM's, the Secretary recalled that he had shared with Shevardnadze in Geneva his view that it would be difficult to reach full closure during the next month. The U.S. Navy was actively engaged on the problem. In the meantime, the Secretary urged that the Soviets seriously consider the declaratory approach the U.S. had earlier put forward.

So, the Secretary concluded, the U.S. side had come prepared to work on the issues, and to continue that process between now and the summit—and even after the summit if final agreement had not been reached by then. Every effort should nonetheless be made in the weeks ahead to get as far as possible. Both the President and General Secretary, the Secretary recalled, had said to each other and publicly that they wanted an agreement, but that it must be good, well thought out. All the information had to be digested. As was the case with INF, we were breaking new ground. Both sides needed to be certain of what they were doing. We were getting there, but it was not an easy process. So, the Secretary suggested, arms control and other groups should be set up without delay, and the ministers would of course have discussions of their own on these issues.

The Secretary added that he was also in a position to provide the President's response to the suggestions Shevardnadze had conveyed the week before in Geneva on the Moscow summit schedule.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that working groups could be set up along traditional lines, and suggested that consideration also be given to release of a joint statement at the conclusion of the Secretary's discussions. THE SECRETARY said this posed no problem from the U.S. standpoint. He noted that the ministers should also consider what documents might be issued in connection with the Moscow summit. SHEVARDNADZE agreed that this was something which would need to be discussed, as would the question of a final meeting between the two ministers before the Moscow summit. THE SECRETARY suggested that the issue be addressed the next day.

Prior to moving to the adjacent conference room to join their delegations, SHEVARDNADZE informed the Secretary that Gorbachev would receive him at 11:00 the following day.

The one-on-one concluded at 10:18 am.

*Plenary Meeting*

Following brief welcoming remarks, SHEVARDNADZE announced that he and the Secretary had agreed that working groups, structured along the patterns which had been used for previous meetings, should get to work immediately.

In responding, THE SECRETARY briefly reviewed the progress which had been achieved in each of the four main areas of the U.S.-Soviet agenda since he and Shevardnadze had first met in Helsinki in July 1985. The Secretary observed that it was this ability to successfully address and resolve difficult issues which ultimately determined the nature of the relationship between the two countries. As we approached the fourth U.S.-Soviet summit in three years, the two leaders would have behind them a solid string of accomplishments dating back to the Geneva summit. The Secretary was confident that the Moscow meeting would make its own contribution to the process, which had already imparted a greater sense of stability and promise to the relationship.

The plenary session concluded at 10:45, with the ministers and their senior advisors remaining in the large “White Room” of the Osobnyak.

*President's Schedule*

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the discussion begin with the President's Moscow schedule.

THE SECRETARY indicated that he had conveyed to the President and Mrs. Reagan the suggestions Shevardnadze had provided the week before in Geneva. The President had found the General Secretary's ideas helpful and impressive. With respect to the President's own schedule, the Secretary was authorized to accept the Soviet side's proposals, with one variation. Rather than return to Spaso House after the formal opening ceremony, the President would prefer to hold his initial one-on-one with Gorbachev immediately after the ceremony. During the one-on-one, the Secretary suggested, the two ministers and senior aides might meet separately to consider how to handle any last minute developments.

As for Mrs. Reagan's schedule, the Secretary continued, she appreciated the Soviet side's suggestions, but had not yet fully made up her mind with respect to her schedule. We would respond at a later date.

The Secretary pointed out that it might be useful later during his present visit to discuss such modalities as how the leaders' one-on-one meetings should be integrated with larger meetings. There would also be a need to talk about the size of larger sessions. On the whole, the Secretary felt, involving more than the group on his side of the table (Powell and Ridgway), plus such senior advisors to the President

as Howard Baker and Frank Carlucci, tended to “make them go downhill.”

Finally, the Secretary asked if Shevardnadze could clarify Gorbachev’s offer to host a “small private dinner” during the summit. Did the General Secretary have in mind simply the two leaders and their wives, or was a larger group contemplated? Either variant would be acceptable to the President.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, while he would have to refer to Gorbachev the President’s preference to hold the initial one-on-one immediately after the welcoming ceremony, he did not expect this to be a problem. As for the rest of the program, including the roles of the ministers and the composition of various groups, this would have to be considered. Shevardnadze was sure that adequate arrangements could be worked out. Shevardnadze felt it was “understood” that the President’s and Gorbachev’s main advisors should participate in some meetings between the leaders; there would also be one-on-ones.

As for the private supper, Shevardnadze indicated that it could be assumed for planning purposes that what the General Secretary had in mind was the leaders and their wives, alone.

THE SECRETARY said this was fine. He suggested that any joint statement issued after the ministers meeting should report that a final schedule for the President’s visit had been worked out.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, as for Mrs. Reagan’s program, the Soviet side would wait for a more definitive reply. The main thing was whether or not she would go to Leningrad, as that drove much of the rest of the First Lady’s schedule.

### *Human Rights*

THE SECRETARY suggested that the ministers open the substantive part of their discussion with a review of human rights issues. He would then like to address the Middle East, so that Assistant Secretary Murphy, who had accompanied him to Moscow, could begin follow-up discussions with MFA Middle East Department Chief Polyakov.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed, suggesting that arms control could in that case be dealt with in the evening session. He expressed some concern, however, over such a delay.

THE SECRETARY clarified that he had in mind dealing initially only with the Middle East. Other regional issues could be dealt with later, after the ministers had begun their discussion of arms control.

Opening his presentation on human rights, the Secretary expressed satisfaction over the evolution of the two sides’ dialogue on human rights over the previous two and a half years. The dialogue had in a sense become a two-way street, with cooperative discussions under

way. This expanding process represented an affirmation that human rights issues had become part of the texture of U.S.-Soviet relations. Progress on human rights, or the lack of it, had a relationship to what did or did not happen in other areas. In other words, progress in other areas, such as arms control or Afghanistan, while welcome, was no substitute for progress in human rights.

The U.S. was aware of the internal changes taking place in the Soviet Union under the rubrics of glasnost and perestroika. We realized that in the main these were a function of the Soviet leadership's having concluded that it was in the Soviet Union's interest to make these changes. Against that background, the Secretary wanted to comment on a number of areas where we hoped to see movement.

First, with respect to political prisoners, the Secretary recalled that the two ministers had had a long discussion during Shevardnadze's March visit to Washington.<sup>3</sup> As the Secretary had promised, the U.S. had subsequently delivered to the MFA a list of some 300 prisoners. The list had been compiled by taking into account information provided by Soviet officials to Congressman Hoyer, in response to a request he had made a year before. Because records of such cases were not as yet open to the public in the Soviet Union, much of our information was based on secondary, rather than primary sources.

Expressing appreciation for the effort involved in reviewing the cases presented by Rep. Hoyer, the Secretary noted that the list we had provided was organized for the convenience of its Soviet reviewers. We hoped it would be possible to discuss with Soviet officials the situation of the persons we had identified. Where persons were in prison simply for something they had written or said, or for unauthorized practice of their religion, we hoped they would be set free. The Soviet Union had not punished people for such activities for the past year or so, yet people were still in jail for having done something in the early 1980's which would go unpunished today. Elimination of the political prisoner issue, the Secretary concluded, would be an important and positive step.

As for cases Shevardnadze had raised during the March ministerial—Berrigan, the Brazinkas family and Helen Woodson, they had been investigated in detail and the Soviet side had been given a full accounting. The U.S. was prepared to continue to investigate cases of concern to the Soviet side if we were provided with sufficient details. By way of example, the Secretary described in some detail the results of our investigation into the case of Helen Woodson, concluding by noting our disappointment that Soviet officials had misrepresented the

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 133.

information we had previously provided. He then briefly summarized the case of Nikolai and Svetlana Ogorodnikov, noting that discussion of convicted spies had no place in the two sides' discussion of human rights.

The Secretary noted that the evolving discussions on human rights could be useful, if both sides took a responsible approach. But talk was not enough. There was a saying in Russian, "*bol'she dyela, men'she slov*."<sup>4</sup> What was needed now was action to resolve difficult issues.

As an example, the Secretary noted that, when Soviet physicians requested permission to visit Leonard Peltier, the U.S. government had facilitated the visit, even though we did not agree with the Soviet side's characterization of him as a political prisoner. Several months later, an American organization sought to examine several Soviet political prisoners. Their appeal went unanswered. If the Soviet government endorsed the visit to Mr. Peltier, it must surely recognize the humanitarian principle on which that request was based.

Similarly, in their last discussion, Shevardnadze had raised the fate of Soviet nationals who had emigrated to the U.S. and claimed to have suffered harassment. While the U.S. was fully prepared to review such cases if the Soviet side provided the necessary details, Moscow had failed to take action on an initiative that might resolve some of these problems—a dual nationals agreement. The Secretary reiterated the U.S. side's willingness to explore this option.

On a more general level, the Secretary indicated that the U.S. would welcome more of the concrete steps which had taken place in several areas, such as emigration and political prisoners. The process was by no means unbroken, and we had recently seen some return to old practices, such as beatings and detentions. We hoped that this did not portend a reversal of the positive trends we had seen earlier. A retreat would attract more attention because of the expectations which had been generated by Soviet reforms. Expectations were the price of progress—an inescapable reality. Our main hope was to see changes in Soviet laws and institutions, and in practices, which would bring the Soviet Union into compliance with its international obligations.

But, the Secretary emphasized, we also remained concerned about the fate of individuals. We were therefore disappointed that there had been no progress with regard to the seventeen persons the President had brought to Shevardnadze's attention the previous month, and which the Secretary had raised in February.<sup>5</sup> These individuals exemplified the range of our concerns. Not all were seeking to emigrate; some

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<sup>4</sup> Roughly translated as "more action, less talk."

<sup>5</sup> See Documents 138 and 121, respectively.

sought only greater freedom of religious activity or political expression, or sought to monitor Soviet compliance with its international human rights obligations. Our list had been developed with care, and we strongly hoped the Soviet side would find it possible to act promptly and favorably on it. The Secretary expressed his hope that all of the cases we had raised would be solved by the time of the President's visit. With this in mind, he handed over a new copy of the list, with supplemental material on each of the cases.

On the issue of Jewish emigration, the Secretary made several points. He noted, first, that processing of applications for exit permits appeared to take longer than seemed justified. It almost seemed that the delays were the result of a policy to set a limit on the number of exit permits to be granted every month or quarter as a quota. If the processing were speeded up, the number of permits granted each month would obviously increase.

There also seemed to be a problem of persons who were denied exit permits on the grounds that they possessed government secrets. But many such individuals had not done secret work for a decade or more; it did not stand to reason that they had information which was still secret. Within that group were also persons who were seriously ill. Finally, there was a problem of parents having the right to veto the emigration of their grown children. In many such cases, there seemed to be no logical reason why the parents should have the right to interfere with the decisions of their adult children, many of whom are married and have children of their own.

Finally, the Secretary continued, in the year of the Millennium, the U.S. hoped that the Soviet Union would follow through on its commitment to expand religious freedom. One of the most dramatic gestures of such reform would be the release of the scores of remaining religious prisoners of all faiths. Some of these individuals were included on the list we had provided the MFA the month before; some were repeated on the list the Secretary had just handed over. But as symbolic and important a gesture as that would be, it should be accompanied by reform in laws and practices. The Secretary thus expressed the hope that Moscow would consider: elimination of requirements for religious groups to register with the government; repeal of anti-religious articles in the criminal code; legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church; legalization of religious education outside the home; increased access to religious books and ritual objects.

The Secretary noted that, during their last conversation, he had raised with Shevardnadze our disappointment with the performance of the Soviet delegation at the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting. Religious freedom was one area where the Soviet delegation had retreated from earlier expressions of the flexibility. They were now seeking to insert loopholes in the draft text which deprived it of all force.



On a more general plane, the Secretary expressed puzzlement by the Soviet delegation in Vienna's behaviour. The Vienna meeting was an important one, and both sides seemed to be committed to ending it on an early and successful basis. But that required a balanced outcome. The problem was that the Soviet delegation was not prepared to go as far in its statements as what the Soviet leadership was saying in Moscow. Nor did it square with our private discussions with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev. It was as if the Soviet delegation were taking positions from an earlier era.

The U.S., the Secretary said, was ready to work as quickly as possible to bring about a good result in Vienna. We had never imposed any artificial obstacles to progress and did not intend to do so. But we did intend to see further progress in the humanitarian sphere, and it was important that the results of the Vienna meeting improve on previous CSCE meetings. This meant that the Soviet Union would have to move considerably further than it had so far in the negotiation of the Vienna concluding document.

The Secretary noted that, in addition to working towards significant results on the human rights side, the U.S. was prepared to work constructively on the appropriate means of starting new security talks. We believed that ensuring the autonomy of the new conventional stability talks, within the framework of the CSCE process, was central to their ultimate success. Thus, the U.S. shared with the Soviet Union a common goal in a timely and satisfactory conclusion in Vienna. We were nonetheless prepared to remain at the negotiating table as long as it took to achieve a balanced, substantive result.

The Secretary concluded his presentation by expressing frustration that, given the important changes underway in the Soviet Union, Moscow was failing to take the critical steps necessary to convince its own people and the world that those changes would endure and would strengthen respect for human rights. He urged that the Vienna meeting be brought into the picture so that it could be concluded promptly and successfully.

SHEVARDNADZE prefaced his reply by noting that "We have a hard delegation" in Vienna. We tell them one thing, Shevardnadze said, "They do something different." There had, however, been some changes recently.

More generally, Shevardnadze thought it well that the U.S.-Soviet dialogue was no longer just a discussion of problem areas. Many questions were being resolved, both with respect to individuals and broader questions. Progress was taking place without creating problems in other areas. A good working relationship was developing, with the ministers addressing the fundamental problems and experts getting into more detailed discussions. A stage had been reached where the

experts were increasingly in a position to provide specific recommendations to ministers. The task now was to make the dialogue which had been established more productive.

Shevardnadze briefly reviewed with satisfaction cooperative activities already underway in various areas—exchanges between scholars, legal experts, parliamentarians; visits by unofficial U.S. groups, including psychiatrists. In the latter context, Shevardnadze noted that there had been no U.S. answer to Moscow's proposal for government to government exchanges on psychiatry. The Soviet side continued to reject unfounded allegations and accusations which had been made against the Soviet Union in this area, but improvements had been made. Moscow wanted to remove this issue from the agenda. THE SECRETARY said this would be welcome.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that the Soviet side also remained interested in exchanging information on legislation relevant to human rights and humanitarian affairs, and had handed over some initial materials on the subject during the March ministerial.<sup>6</sup> Moscow also remained interested in discussions on combatting terrorism—an issue the ministers might address later in more detail.

Shevardnadze reminded the Secretary that the Soviet side had also raised the question of Nazi war criminals in March. Since then, there had been some signs of a more constructive U.S. approach. The Soviet side had voted in favor of a U.S. initiative on the subject before the UNHCR. There had also been consultations between the Department of Justice and the Soviet Procuracy. Shevardnadze called for continued cooperation in this important area, and appealed more generally for closer cooperation for U.S. and Soviet delegations to international bodies dealing with human rights, including the Vienna CSCE Follow-up meeting. In this regard, Shevardnadze noted that the Soviet side had on prior occasions expressed displeasure with the performance of the U.S. delegation.

THE SECRETARY recalled that, during the final phase of the Stockholm CDE meeting, the two ministers had played an important role in bringing about a positive result. There was no reason the Vienna meeting could not have ended six months earlier. The ingredients were available; the ministers ought to provide a push. If there were some prospect of completing the meeting by the time of the Moscow summit, it could be a very constructive factor. A new round was just getting underway in Vienna. It would be a good thing for all concerned if we could bring the meeting to a satisfactory conclusion. Both sides had endorsed that goal; they ought to do what they could to bring it about.

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<sup>6</sup> See Documents 132–139.

SHEVARDNADZE said he was well informed about the situation in Vienna. He thought it would be possible to find a solution to the humanitarian and economic issues under discussion there. There were also some prospects on “language.” The more difficult issues related to conventional weapons—something Shevardnadze hoped to discuss in more detail later in the conversation.

Noting the Secretary’s reference to a “two-way street” in the two sides’ discussion of human rights, Shevardnadze expressed satisfaction that the U.S. now had a more realistic understanding of the need for such a relationship. In that connection, the Foreign Minister wished to raise a number of specific issues.

First, he recalled that Moscow had previously urged the U.S. to adhere to international human rights covenants which could provide the basis for bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the field. The Soviet side was disappointed that the U.S. had taken no action, even though many in Congress had endorsed the idea. Instead, Asst. Sec. Schifter had indicated on behalf of the Administration that it could not support the idea of ratifying the covenants in question. So, Shevardnadze quipped, the U.S. had complaints about Soviet human rights spokesmen, the Soviet side had its complaints about Schifter.

Another outstanding issue was visas for trade union leaders and for members of the Soviet creative intelligentsia. It was unfair of the U.S. to deny visas in such cases.

Yet another area where there had been no adequate U.S. response was terrorism. The Soviet public had a right to complain that the U.S. seemed to provide a haven for terrorists—the Brazinskis family. The case had become more acute in the wake of a March hijacking attempt in the Soviet Union, which had revived public recollections of the U.S. refusal to allow the Brazinskis’ extradition.

Shevardnadze recalled that he had given the Secretary a list of political prisoners in the U.S. during an earlier meeting. As yet there had been no adequate response. The Soviet side was aware of the U.S. position that only those who had been convicted of criminal offenses were imprisoned in American jails, but Moscow still had doubts on this score. Shevardnadze was aware, for example, of persons who had been jailed for espousing Puerto Rican independence. U.S. representatives had expressed skepticism that all “political prisoners” in the Soviet Union were criminals; the Soviet side was similarly skeptical of U.S. claims.

At the same time, Shevardnadze said, the Soviet side was not unaware of certain positive steps taken by the U.S. Moscow, for example, had appealed for more humane treatment of anti-war protesters. Subsequently, the sentences of some protesters had been reduced from 15 to 5 years. Perhaps there was no relationship to the Soviet appeal,

but this was still a positive step. But Moscow remained concerned about such issues as the imposition of the death sentence for minors. Shevardnadze was aware of U.S. arguments on this point, but found them unconvincing.

The Foreign Minister said he was also aware from contacts with U.S. and other Jewish leaders of concern that the aggressive tactics of certain Jewish circles in the U.S. on behalf of Soviet Jewry were in fact stirring up anti-semitic feelings in the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze could confirm that, while the phenomenon was limited, there was validity to such concerns, which should be taken into consideration by the U.S. government. He emphasized that he was reflecting the views of sober-minded members of the U.S. Jewish community, a factor which gave food for thought.

For its part, the Soviet side had sought to take into account concerns which had been raised by the U.S. Moscow could, for example, have turned a deaf ear to U.S. appeals on behalf of Soviet citizens who claimed U.S. citizenship. Instead, and despite the fact that the Soviet Union did not recognize dual nationality, the Soviet side had taken a different approach. It was hoped that the U.S. would respond in kind to the issues raised by the Soviet Union.

Specifically, Shevardnadze wanted to raise the case of Virginia Lynch—a U.S. citizen who had written Shevardnadze to seek his assistance in protecting the rights of her family. Shevardnadze had not personally been able to look into the case, as, he suspected, the Secretary was unable personally to become familiar with the particulars of the cases he raised with Shevardnadze. But he hoped the Secretary could look into the matter and, if the case were well-founded, encourage steps to resolve the problem.

On a more general level, Shevardnadze said he believed the role of the ministers' experts on human rights should be to provide their chiefs with solid, accurate information which could lead to practical results. In this regard, Shevardnadze had to say that the figure of 300 political prisoners provided by the U.S. was way out of line. In fact, there were just a few people in this category. The U.S. embassy should know better what was happening in this area. No one in the Soviet Union would believe the U.S. numbers if they were made public.

Shevardnadze recalled how the ministers' early discussions of human rights issues had been highly contentious, with accusations and recriminations. Now there was a qualitatively new situation. But often the lists provided by the U.S. included, for example, people who had been released ten years before. Shevardnadze raised the point because, once figures got into the public domain, they took on lives of their own. He reiterated that the U.S. Embassy should be more careful in compiling its lists. If they were well founded it was one thing; it was in neither side's interest that they be groundless.

THE SECRETARY replied that the U.S. was quite prepared to go through the lists it had provided the Soviet side to validate our information. As to specific cases raised by the Soviet side, Asst. Sec. Schifter would be providing detailed response; the Secretary had singled out a few only as illustrations. The Secretary asked Shevardnadze directly what action could be expected on the seventeen specific names he and the President had raised in recent meetings.

SHEVARDNADZE answered that it was difficult to provide an answer at the moment. He assured the Secretary that any lists he or the President provided were carefully studied by the Soviet side. Many had been resolved. But Shevardnadze could not answer the Secretary's specific question at that time. Perhaps he could say later during the Secretary's visit which cases could and could not be resolved.

After a brief discussion of how to use the afternoon session, the Secretary asked Powell to comment on the status of the INF Treaty ratification process, and specifically the issue of whether "futuristic" weapons were banned under the Treaty. POWELL briefly noted that the Senate committees examining the Treaty had now reported it out favorably, and acknowledged that the issue the Secretary had alluded to had come up. The letter Shevardnadze had provided the week before on the subject had been useful in documenting the two sides' common understanding that "weapons" systems associated with the ranges covered by the Treaty were banned. It was possible that further clarification would be necessary as consultations with the Senate leadership on this point progressed. It was not clear at this point whether the Senate would insist on amending the Treaty to deal with the issue, or whether some clarification short of that would be adequate.

Once the question were resolved, and Powell was convinced it would be, the only remaining issue was one to which the Soviet side was not a party, having to do with future interpretation of treaties. Powell felt that the process would take another two weeks to be completed, after which the Senate would briefly recess. The Treaty would probably go to the Senate floor about May 9. THE SECRETARY noted that a recent 393–7 House vote, while it had no legal effect, gave some sense of the underlying support the Treaty had come to enjoy.

SHEVARDNADZE said he understood that the "futuristic" weapons question the Secretary had raised in Geneva was important. He felt he had answered the question in Geneva, but had subsequently felt a written reply might be useful with the Senate. If the U.S. needed anything more, the Soviet side was "at its disposal."

THE SECRETARY said the key was to nail down that the Treaty applied to weapons systems.

The meeting ended without further substantive discussion.

145. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, April 21, 1988, 3:30–5:15 p.m.

## SUBJECT

The Secretary's Second Meeting with Shevardnadze

## PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>USSR</i>
George P. Shultz, Secretary of State	Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Colin Powell, the President's National Security Advisor	Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister
Jack F. Matlock, Ambassador to the USSR	Viktor Karpov, Department Head, MFA
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)	[Vladimir] Polyakov, Department Head, MFA
Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State (NEA)	Yuriy Dubinin, Ambassador to the USA
Richard Solomon, Director, Policy Planning Staff	Sergei Tarasenko, Special Assistant to the Foreign Minister
Dennis Ross, NSC Staff	Evgeniy Gusev, Deputy Section Chief, MFA (notetaker)
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (notetaker)	Pavel Palazhchenko (interpreter)
Dmitry Zarechnak (interpreter)	

*Shevardnadze* welcomed the Secretary, and said he wished to respond quickly to two questions the Secretary had asked earlier.<sup>2</sup> The first concerned a visit of U.S. physicians. There had been no request as yet for such a visit. If a request were received, there would be no problem. The second question concerned the 17 persons on the U.S. list. Of these, 7 were in possession of state secrets. They were still being refused departure for this reason, but their cases were still being considered. 3 were family reunification cases; they were being considered. 7 were in prison or in exile. The U.S. side had asked that they be allowed to leave the Soviet Union. Their cases were being considered. These were not simple cases, and he was giving the Secretary an interim report, *Shevardnadze* said.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow—4/88—Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons. The meeting took place in the Soviet Foreign Ministry Guest House. A stamped notation on the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that Pascoe saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 144.

Shevardnadze continued that there was one question the Secretary had raised which he did not wish to leave open. This was the number of political prisoners in the Soviet Union. On December 10 in Washington General Secretary Gorbachev had mentioned the figure of 22.<sup>3</sup> Since then it had been reduced. There were now 17 persons in prison under Article 70, which was widely considered in the West to be the article providing for political imprisonment. Only 17 persons are in prison under that article. This was not the 300 to 400 the Secretary had mentioned. He had wished to give the Secretary a rapid response.

*The Secretary* thanked Shevardnadze.

The Secretary continued that he had some comments to make on the Middle East. He was anxious to have Shevardnadze's views and the results of the visits the Soviet side had had. But he first wished to describe American views.

Afghanistan was not strictly the Middle East, the Secretary began, but as Shevardnadze had noted earlier it involved success in resolving difficult issues, although there were also problems ahead. It was important for the two countries to do all they could to encourage stability there. If an interim government could be achieved, the U.S. would favor that. It was important that the refugees be helped to return. It was essential that Pakistan not be subject to threats, or to the kind of violence that had taken place there. We thought that the accords were constructive.

But they were also the only constructive step he could point to in the area, the Secretary went on. Otherwise things were not going well.

Turning to Iran-Iraq, the Secretary noted that chemical weapons were being used by both sides. As Shevardnadze had remarked to President Reagan, it was important to get hold of this problem. But the weapons were being used with terrible effects. There was also a proliferation of ballistic missiles and other kinds of missiles in the area. Many had been deployed, most recently to Saudi Arabia. They added a new dimension of peril. Chemical weapons were associated with some of these missiles, and that added to that problem. The uprisings in the West Bank and Gaza underlined something we all knew: the existence of a mass of displaced persons called Palestinians. They also underlined the fact that the security problems of the State of Israel were unresolved. It was hard to come to grips with these issues. The situation could explode, get out of hand.

But the area was also replete with opportunities to help put things on a stable basis, the Secretary continued. So we were faced with both these opportunities and genuine deterioration. We were witnessing a

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<sup>3</sup> See Documents 112 and 113.



spread of radicalism, of fundamentalism. There was no doubt that the Middle East was troubling. He did not doubt that the Soviets saw it the same way.

The Secretary said he thought it was important to follow up on the image resulting from Afghanistan and the image resulting from Resolution 598 last summer to see if we could not do something on the Iran-Iraq war. In the last week the Iraqis had taken back Al-Faw. That might make things easier, since Iran would not have to retreat from it. There was also the war of the cities, which the Soviets had brought up in the UN. We were not in Tehran, but it appeared to be having a devastating effect there, with millions leaving the city. Iran had stepped up terrorism. We were not sure how directly it was involved in the Kuwait airliner affair, but Hisbollah, which was associated with Iran, had certainly instigated it.<sup>4</sup> Terrorism was being used also against Saudi Arabia. And Iran had returned to mining the Gulf. We could not stand by and watch the mining of waterways. The mines could hit Soviet ships, could hit U.S. ships. They had not been laid in a very scientific manner, but so shallowly that they could hit anything, not just tankers or warships. The U.S. action had been limited. We had tried to end it quickly, and when Iran chose not to end it, we had still acted with restraint. He was not arguing the merits or demerits, he was simply pointing out the tendency of the area to erupt, the Secretary said.

It was important to take action to end the war, the Secretary went on. The Secretary General had tried and tried, with no result. Iraq accepted Resolution 598, and Iran did not. It was time to take action.

The Secretary said he had now taken three trips to the Middle East. He had kept the Soviets posted. Assistant Secretary Murphy had talked to Shevardnadze in Moscow; he and Shevardnadze had talked.<sup>5</sup> As he had said publicly, no one had wanted to say no to an initiative for peace. He thought this was not simply to let the others take the blame, but because of a sense that though the problems were difficult, progress was possible, a sense that opportunities should not be missed.

The Secretary said he had made some proposals he wanted to talk to Shevardnadze about. The tender points had to do with what an international conference, eventually, might do; how Palestinian interests should be represented—there was no issue as to whether the Palestinians should not be represented by valid people who could speak in a legitimate way; the only issue was how; and what the terms of reference of a negotiation should be.

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the hijacking of Kuwait Airways Flight 422 earlier in the month.

<sup>5</sup> Documents pertaining to U.S.-Soviet dialogue on this topic are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXI, Iran; Iraq, 1985–1988.

He had listened carefully to what Shevardnadze and Gorbachev had said on these issues in February,<sup>6</sup> the Secretary continued, and had tried to reflect what they had said in our proposals. We held that the initiative had to be comprehensive in scope, that it had to hold out the possibility of dealing with all the issues. It had to include the Palestinians. It had to be based on Resolutions 242 and 338;<sup>7</sup> thus it involved a trade of territory for peace, applied to all three negotiating fronts. He thought these elements were at the basis of Soviet thinking as well.

The Secretary said he wished to describe our thinking, and then hear Shevardnadze's thinking, that of the Palestinians, of Mr. Arafat, of other leaders in the region, and Shevardnadze's own plans.

The Secretary continued that we envisaged the conference as the event that would start the process. We felt it should be in no position to be authoritative, to tell people what to do, to veto what they did. Why did we feel this way?, the Secretary asked.

In the first place, he continued, we did not think that in the end states would go along with what outsiders told them to do about their borders, or about their fundamental security. They would resist that kind of advice. Second, it was his feeling—and also his experience—that when force was present at intervention points, for instance the threat of government intervention in labor negotiations, it tended to abort the negotiations. Parties saved their compromise positions for other fora than bilateral negotiations, where they saw that the problem was theirs and they had to work it out themselves. If the conference were a point of reference that could be brought into bilateral negotiations, we thought it would tend to abort them. This was a view generally held in Israel. On that there was no difference between Shamir and Peres. They had a difference as to whether there should be any conference at all, but Peres certainly saw a conference as having only a limited initial role.

What, then, was the point of a conference? the Secretary asked rhetorically. First, he answered, it would get things started. It would show the international community was interested. It would receive reports on the direct negotiations. And, if by miracle they succeeded, the parties would probably want international guarantees for the results. Moreover, if there were a final status agreement, there would be major refugee problems, and they would be the kind the international community dealt with best. Unlike Afghanistan, it was not going to be clear where the refugees would go. There were limited resources in the area;

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<sup>6</sup> See Documents 121–126.

<sup>7</sup> See footnote 4, Document 44.

these were small states; they were packed close together. There was little they could do on a regional basis. Here an international effort could help. It could bring in other countries that wanted to be included, like West Germany, Japan and Saudi Arabia.

But the important thing a conference could do was get things started, the Secretary went on. Bilaterals like those between Egypt and Israel would not just happen. They would take an outside effort to get going. The U.S. was prepared for that. We saw the Permanent Members of the Security Council as one side, Israel and the states around Israel as another. Other variants were not excluded. There was the 1973 precedent, with the U.S. and the Soviet Union, rather than all five Permanent Members. That could be considered. He had to say that King Hussein was thinking in terms of all five. If an alternative proposal came from the U.S. and the Soviet Union, he might listen to it. But that was where he was currently.

Turning to Palestinian representation, the Secretary said we thought it important that it be associated with Jordan. It might also be associated with Egypt, but with Jordan there were historical associations, and association in terms of law, of education. The relationship was not warm now, but the association was there. We did not rule out association with Egypt, but we thought it important that the Palestinians be associated with states. He thought—and he found that most Arab leaders agreed—that an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza would not be viable. It would not be stable. It would be a dependency. So it was not likely to provide the kind of long-term result that would hold up.

The Secretary continued that of course the Palestinians had a sense of nationhood, of identity. He knew them reasonably well. During his business days he had worked in the Middle East; many Palestinians had subcontracted for his company. He understood and sympathized with them. But he also knew it was possible to combine a sense of identity with a larger identity. Shevardnadze felt himself to be in part Georgian; he himself these days felt himself to be Californian in that way. Being part of a federated structure could give a lot more stability. Association with Jordan would tend to do that for the Palestinians.

The Secretary went on to say that we ourselves were struggling with where to go with the initiative. Our conclusion was that we ought to try to make it more operational. On one aspect, the conference, the Soviet Union was involved, and he would be interested in Shevardnadze's thought on the structure of a conference. We welcomed Soviet moves toward greater recognition of Israel. We had noted Gorbachev's remarks to Arafat, which Arafat had been quick to deny. But he thought it had been good advice. And, he noted, the greater sense the Israelis had of an improved Soviet attitude, the greater the confidence they

would have in the Soviet presence. And of course their immense interest in Soviet Jewry was also relevant, quite aside from the aspects he and Shevardnadze had often discussed.

Thus, the Secretary concluded, the situation in the area was boiling, and the U.S. wanted to do its part. We had no hangups about working with the Soviets. It was constructive results that counted.

The Secretary noted that Ambassador Murphy had worked on the area for years and years, and asked if he had anything to add. *Murphy* reported that he and Polyakov had had one session. He was afraid he had done most of the talking, and he looked forward to hearing Soviet views on Palestinian issues, and on conference structure.

*Shevardnadze* said he would like to make a few remarks, beginning with Afghanistan.

A major step had been taken in terms of a political settlement, *Shevardnadze* said. Important agreements had been signed. They were not without drawbacks. The Soviet side admitted they had flaws. But they represented the first important attempt to work together to resolve one of the important issues of our time. It seemed to him that after the signing cooperation was just beginning. The situation would become more complex. The conflict continued. He wished to confirm that Soviet troop withdrawals would begin May 15, and be completed within the timeframe that had been stated. But having signed as guarantors made the Soviet Union and the U.S. in a sense morally responsible to the Afghan people and to the world, if the bloodshed were aggravated.

*Shevardnadze* said the Secretary had been right to point out that Afghanistan, the Middle East and the Iran-Iraq war in a way constituted a common complex. There were of course important differences. But there were also elements in common. It would be good to continue our cooperation, to help stabilize and then resolve the Afghan problem.

What worries the Soviets, *Shevardnadze* went on, is that the regime in Kabul—whether it ruled well or not well was another question—but the leaders of that regime signed the Geneva documents with the Soviets. There were also opposition leaders. They represented genuine forces, that had to be reckoned with. But recently the most extremist forces among them had been coming to the fore. *Hekmatyar* and other leaders had declared their opposition to the Geneva accords. They were declaring they would fight to the end. They wished to establish a fundamentalist regime. The U.S. should be aware of that, and assess it soberly. On the other hand there was the king, others, and other members of the Alliance Seven, who were more or less moderate. It was hard to see how a solution could be arrived at soon. But it was important to continue efforts to bring about a neutral, non-aligned Afghanistan, not hostile to the U.S., and friendly—or at least not hos-

tile—to the Soviet Union. We should continue cooperation on that platform, Shevardnadze said.

*The Secretary* interjected that a neutral, non-aligned Afghanistan was also what the U.S. wanted. It would of course be up to the Afghans to decide. But it would be up to us to abide by the conditions for neutrality and non-alignment. The U.S. side would abide by that notion.

*Shevardnadze* noted that both the government and the moderate opposition had spoken in favor of neutrality and non-alignment. Neither wanted extremism. Both the Soviets and the U.S. knew what extremist power was. They should work for a status for Afghanistan that was not against the interests of its neighbors, of the Soviet Union, of the U.S. Since they were guarantors, they were in a way responsible for making sure that all the provisions were complied with by all sides. The Secretary could be assured that the Soviet Union and the leadership in Kabul would honestly observe them. The same should be true of Pakistan and others. The most crucial work lay ahead. The U.S. and the Soviet Union had to demonstrate their ability to cooperate at this crucial stage.

Shevardnadze said he did not wish to debate the question of arms supplies. They had discussed it in Washington. But they should agree to discourage extremism. The Secretary had mentioned fundamentalism. He should have a sober view of it, in the country and in the area around.

Turning to Iran-Iraq, Shevardnadze said the actions the U.S. had taken had aroused serious Soviet concerns. That was not propaganda. Nor was it inspired by concern for the Soviet Union's relations with its neighbor Iran. He had told the Secretary the Soviets knew Iran well. They were worried that this incident would not end where it was. He was not predicting anything. But there might be complications. The Soviets wanted to contribute to resolving the war. They could not be indifferent. They were neighbors. But they also knew the situation in Iran. No group was clearly in charge. Various outcomes, various responses to the U.S. action, were possible. He prayed God that all would end well.

A second point, Shevardnadze went on, was one he was not raising for the first time: it was undesirable, in fact inadmissible for the U.S. to have such a massive naval presence in the Gulf. He was not suggesting it should leave that day or the next. But the U.S. should look to that as the final outcome. The moderate Arab states felt the same way. The people in Amman were thinking of an international agency that could create normal conditions on international waterways. The Soviets had made a similar suggestion. They thought it had to be looked into.

Turning to sanctions, Shevardnadze said, he wished to repeat that the Soviet Union was ready to cooperate in preparing a second resolu-

tion. But it had now seen new elements in the situation. He wished the Secretary to look at them, and take them into account. The Secretary had met with the Secretary General, and so had he (Shevardnadze). He had had contacts with the Iraqis and the Iranians. Shevardnadze had asked the Secretary General if his contacts permitted him to state that the Iranians did not accept 598. He had replied that he could not say that. That had been new to Shevardnadze. He had stressed that recognition by the Iranians of Perez de Cuellar's implementation plans was tantamount to accepting 598. He had even said that there was no need for formal Iranian acceptance, since in accepting the implementation plans Iran had said it had in effect accepted the resolution.

Shevardnadze said the Soviets were ready to continue preparing the new resolution, but this element was new. It was important to get a statement from the Secretary General that Iran did not accept 598. He had asked Soviet lawyers to look into the matter. He could not say he got a clear answer; he had only a tentative opinion. But the Secretary should take the real situation into account. At the same time, the Soviet Union was ready to work and see the matter through to its logical conclusion.

*The Secretary* said he had also talked to the Secretary General. His view was that he can only describe what has been said by parties to Security Council members, and that it is up to the Security Council itself to decide whether or not Iran had accepted the resolution. He personally thought the Secretary General should have taken a stronger position, but that was his view. He personally thought Iran was playing games in order to buy time, although it might turn out time was not on its side. The test of whether both accepted 598 would be if there were a ceasefire; so in a sense the ceasefire was the test of Iranian acceptance. But Iran had been dawdling. He and Shevardnadze had been discussing the issue now for four or five months. In the meantime the war dragged on. The important thing now was a ceasefire. It seemed to him that the two sides ought to press for the second resolution. Shevardnadze had said the Soviets were willing to do so, but in the end their ambassador in New York had never been furnished with adequate instructions. His understanding was therefore that Shevardnadze was reluctant. And the result was that there was no ceasefire in the war.

*Shevardnadze* said he had asked Perez de Cuellar what should be done now. He had said now was the time for a ceasefire. He thought Iran would be amenable, and then the body to investigate could begin its work. There was a second point, he continued. Iran and Iraq should sit down to negotiate, either directly or indirectly. The Secretary knew the previous position, from Geneva. This was different. The Soviets wanted the war ended. But he had to mention the new elements in

the situation. If Iran and Iraq could be gotten into direct negotiations, that would be the best. It was perhaps not realistic for now, but that was his idea.

*The Secretary* said he was all for direct negotiation. (Shevardnadze smiled wanly.)

*Shevardnadze* continued that it would of course be up to the Security Council to make a final decision. *The Secretary* said he thought Shevardnadze was wasting his time. He did not see a prospect for the Secretary General to get a ceasefire. He would be encouraged if he did, but he did not. Since Iran was taking losses, had lost the Al-Faw peninsula, the question of Iraqi control had perhaps become less complicated. Perhaps the Iranians would think it over, although it was also true that parties hesitate to compromise if they are losing. Perhaps their capacity to decide was limited, as Shevardnadze had said. But to him that only made the second resolution more desirable, since it would limit Iranian ability to prosecute the war. The U.S. would keep urging that the Soviets step up to the second resolution.

*Shevardnadze* said he agreed it was necessary to step up now to preparation of the resolution. But he did not agree that passing it now would accelerate solution of the problem. He had often pointed out to the Secretary how many weapons were available to Iran, either from the black market or from Iran's newly developed arms industry. An embargo would complicate Iran's task, but would not resolve the problem.

Shevardnadze continued that the two sides should keep considering the matter. They should give Perez de Cuellar time to report to the Security Council, and the Security Council time to decide. That process could be accelerated. The U.S. could help. The Soviets had recommended a special representative, who would be continuously working on the issue. The comparison would be Cordovez on Afghanistan. He would be constantly on the move, going to one or another capital, presenting drafts. The Secretary General had not been engaged in that way. His recent contacts had been just the fourth round since 598 was passed, and he had been to the area just once. The Soviets had great respect for him. But his activity was not adequate to the complexity of the region. Shevardnadze said he thought the Secretary shared his view on the necessity of having such a special representative.

*The Secretary* replied that he believed a special representative would be desirable. The concept we had put forward in February had envisaged a second resolution with an implementation time lag to permit such a special representative to work. But the lag we had suggested was already past. The time had been wasted. If Shevardnadze was ready for a second resolution the next day, he would be ready for a special representative the next day.



*Shevardnadze* said appointment of a special representative would not damage the chances of a second resolution, on the contrary. The Soviets would like to hear from Perez de Cuellar that the Iranians did not accept 598. PDC had told him that the fact the Iranians accepted his implementation plan meant they had accepted the resolution.

Then there should be a ceasefire, *the Secretary* said. The Secretary General and Iran would never say they did not accept 598. They would keep the waters muddy. Perez de Cuellar would say the matter was for the Security Council to decide. The Secretary said he would have preferred him to make the judgment himself, but he would not. It was up to the U.S. and the Soviet Union. General Secretary Gorbachev had agreed in December that the situation was very clear. It was now four months later, and the Soviets had not acted on that judgment.

The Secretary asked Colin Powell if he had anything to add. *General Powell* said he thought the Secretary had covered the topic well. The U.S. had, frankly speaking, been hoping for more movement. *Shevardnadze* had said the last time that we should wait to see what the Secretary General said. Powell said he thought all the bases were there to move out quickly. The situation had become more rather than less dangerous. He shared the Secretary's disappointment.

*Shevardnadze* said he was not surprised to hear the General support the Secretary. *Powell* said he was serving as an objective referee. *The Secretary* asked for Murphy's opinion. His region, it was sometimes said, ran from Marrakesh to Bangladesh. *Murphy* said it ran mostly downhill. He was afraid that if we did not move in the Council things were going to putrify in the region, in the war. The Iranians could be slowed down, over several months, if we cooperated, if we got the Chinese to cooperate. The mullahs can count. If the resolution were in effect, in six months there could be a major impact. The U.S. and Soviets had to do it. The Secretary General would not bring it about. He would not take the initiative.

*Shevardnadze* said the Secretary General could not resolve everything, but it was essential to have his report and suggestions soon, and then the Security Council could act. The Soviets were cooperating with the U.S. They should proceed then to work out the text. Whether this happened in ten days or a month was not important. What was important was that the Secretary General exhaust all his functions in the area.

Noting that the longest time *Shevardnadze* had mentioned was a month, *the Secretary* asked whether he would be willing to state that. A sense of deadline in a statement would be helpful. There had been such language in the draft statement in Washington, but *Shevardnadze* had taken it out. Perhaps he was ready for it now.

*Shevardnadze* said he did not think it would be appropriate to set a date two or three months from now. The issue could be ready for a vote in ten days. But no limit should be set.

*Shevardnadze* said there was a reason he had raised Afghanistan and the Middle East in this context. There was a reason the Soviets wished to wait a little bit. The Soviets would begin their withdrawal from Afghanistan May 15. There were interlacing interests involved, Soviet and American. They should wait for the Secretary General to report. He did not know if that would take ten or fourteen days. They should negotiate the text. There would be struggle over every word, and this would not be mainly among Permanent Members either. But he could say in this context that the recent U.S. action had been a moral or a psychological factor too. It was hard to follow it immediately with a resolution. Perhaps without the action it could have been quicker. It was for the U.S. to decide its actions, but it had made things more difficult. He did not know if tomorrow or the day after would be the time. But he asked the Secretary not to require a set date.

*The Secretary* recalled that *Shevardnadze* had mentioned U.S. naval forces and the Soviet desire that they decrease. We had said that when the threat receded, for instance when there was a ceasefire, our naval forces could return to more normal levels. We did not have any particular desire to have them there. It was tough duty, lasting a long time, a long way from home. *Shevardnadze* could be sure that the outcome he and the General Secretary desired was in the cards if there were a ceasefire.

The Secretary asked *Shevardnadze* whether they could say in a statement that they urged the Secretary General to report his judgment concerning acceptance of 598 by the parties within a week. He was suggesting something with a timeline. He asked *Shevardnadze* what he thought of the idea.

*Shevardnadze* said he thought Iran and Iraq should be in their joint statement, and not just in general terms, of ceasing the war, but in more specific terms, describing a more specific approach, encouraging the Secretary General to come forward rapidly—though it would be unethical to specify five or seven days—with his report. *The Secretary* said the report should be on what the parties accepted. They should ask Bessmertnykh and Ridgway to try to show them some language the next day, something with punch in it. *Shevardnadze* said it was not just a formal question; it would take some real work.

*The Secretary* commented that the Middle East seemed to be taking all their time. *Shevardnadze* asked if they should break. *The Secretary* said he was anxious to discuss the peace process. He was personally involved, and our government was involved.

*Shevardnadze* said he had talked about the peace process with Murphy, and their experts had met on it. The Soviet side welcomed the

fact that the U.S. and the Secretary had been active. It thought conditions were developing that were better than before for moving things forward in the Middle East. He did not want to focus on our differences. Rather, as he had said to Murphy and to the Secretary, the Soviets saw positive elements in the Secretary's plan, and had said so to the Arabs. What were those elements?, he asked.

First, Shevardnadze answered, there was the recognition of the need to convene an international conference. Of course there were continuing serious differences about the substance of the task, but the general approach was positive. Second, the U.S. had said the plan should be comprehensive. Third, the Soviets agreed with the step-by-step approach. It would be ideal if everything could be achieved at once, but this was not realistic. Arab leaders shared that view. Fourth, on the legal basis, the Soviets agreed it should be the well-known Security Council resolutions.

Is that the basis for a common platform?, Shevardnadze asked. He thought that prospect was available.

There had been meetings, Shevardnadze continued. The General Secretary and he had met with Arafat. His impression was that one could work with the Palestinians. They had shown flexibility. Some people who said one should not reckon with the movement made a mistake. Without working with the movement one could not reach a solution. One test is its impact on the situation in Israel. His impression, Shevardnadze said, was that the movement was in control of the events there, to the extent that extremists had not taken charge of the protests. The Soviets had told the movement that that would be undesirable for the Palestinian cause, would damage it.

The Palestinians were quite properly raising the need for clarity on the question of Palestinian representation, Shevardnadze went on. The U.S. thought they should be represented within a common Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. They however were also not ruling out the possibility of a common Arab delegation. He thought that should be explored.

The Palestinians thought the step-by-step approach was possible, Shevardnadze said. Polyakov was a great expert on that.

Concerning the legal basis for negotiations, Shevardnadze continued, the Palestinians also thought it should be Resolutions 242 and 338. But—and there was a “but,” he said—they also thought it should include other Security Council and UN resolutions. He knew that was a complicating factor. But he thought there was a possibility of working with them and others on that.

He had had interesting meetings with the Jordanians and Syrians, Shevardnadze said. There were very major differences between them,

but the Soviets thought that was normal at this stage. After all the major work was just beginning.

The Soviets believed that without the participation of the Security Council members, including the U.S. and the Soviet Union, no solution would be possible. And they were not being used.

The Soviets believed that the content and substance of the conference was now the major issue. They thought one should start by solving major issues. The U.S. had a different approach. But the difference was not hopeless. The two sides should work on it together. With regard to structure he felt they were getting closer.

Active work would be necessary, Shevardnadze continued. He was not ruling out the possibility that perhaps their colleagues could come up with a joint approach. Perhaps this was not something for right away, but perhaps it could be for the summit. There might be a joint statement. They could ask their experts to work on one. He was making just general remarks. Perhaps at the next meeting they could discuss common principles for the main approaches.

It seemed to him that the greatest difficulties were in Israel, Shevardnadze said. The Secretary had said that no one had said "no." But Shamir has. There is a question of who is in charge there, the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister. Shamir was more negative than Arafat. He was ready to work with the Syrians, with the Jordanians. But the Israelis were the most intransigent.

The Secretary had said that Soviet diplomatic relations with Israel would help. The General Secretary and he, Shevardnadze, had both said the Soviet Union would like to normalize relations with Israel. But that should be linked to the launching of a conference, the beginning of the Middle East settlement. That was the Soviet position, and properly so.

Shevardnadze said he did not see the need to discuss a Palestinian state explicitly, to say how the Soviets interpreted the principle of self-determination. Experts could discuss that. But without a solution to the Palestinian problem there could be no settlement. The Palestinians should choose themselves. If they wanted a federation, the Soviets said "why not?" But if they wanted an independent state they should not be deprived of it; that would be against principles.

The U.S. and Soviet sides needed continuous mechanisms for consulting on these things, Shevardnadze concluded.

*The Secretary* suggested that they see what Murphy and Polyakov could develop. But he thought they were pretty far apart. With regard to the U.S. initiative, Assad rejected it all, but wanted us to keep working on it. Shamir rejected some elements of it, but he accepted interrelationships, and accepted international auspices. He was leery

of a conference because he feared it would be authoritative. Peres accepted a conference, but was against its being authoritative.

The Secretary said that he had provided an agenda that gave people something to talk about. They could agree or disagree with it, but the label of a peace initiative was attractive. No one wanted a vacuum.

*Shevardnadze* said Murphy and Polyakov should focus on the conference. The Soviets would present what they meant by a full-scope and authoritative conference. Perhaps it would not be so terrible as the American side feared. No one except perhaps the Israelis rejected an international conference. The others were for it. We needed to get an acceptable idea of what a conference would be. That was the most essential task if we wanted cooperation for a settlement.

*The Secretary* said the U.S. side would listen carefully. We did not think an authoritative conference would work. Perhaps there was something in the Soviet concept we did not understand.

The Secretary suggested that that evening they move on to other regional issues, and listen to the reports of the arms control working group. *Shevardnadze* said he thought the ministers should have their own exchange on arms control, and hear the working group report at the end of the day, or even the next morning. *The Secretary* said that was fine with him. *Shevardnadze* said they should hear the working group the next day.

*The Secretary* said he wished to raise one topic in connection with the very fine work their people were doing on nuclear testing. It concerned the PNET protocol.<sup>8</sup> Apparently *Shevardnadze's* instructions to the Soviet Geneva delegation were that the 1976 PNET protocol had to remain intact, without changes. Changes could be introduced in the form of "explanations," but in a very awkward way. The result had been lawyerly language which the U.S. side had read to itself for a good laugh, it was so complicated.

The Secretary continued that the U.S. suggestion was that since the situation was different from 1976, the sides should draft a new protocol. The old one had been signed under Ford and Brezhnev, and had never been ratified. There was no reason why it could not be changed. PNET was practically agreed with regard to substance, but it was proving agonizing to express this. It should certainly be possible to have it ready for the summit. That was just a suggestion.

*Shevardnadze* replied that he thought the current task was to give a blessing to the joint experiment. That was the principal task. The issue of the PNET protocol was not related to the experiment. They

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<sup>8</sup> Documents pertaining to the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLI, Global Issues II.

should ask the working group what it could propose to them on the protocol. Concerning the experiment they should decide in the current meeting.

*The Secretary* said he thought that was a constructive move. It provided running room on the protocol. With regard to the JVE, the basic draft was there. Details needed to be worked out, but the sides should have them by the summit. He suggested that at this meeting the ministers say that the summit schedule is agreed, that the JVE text is agreed, but work on technical backup remains to be done. While things should be saved up for the summit, agreement on the basic text should be recorded, so that it would be done.

The Secretary said he would just like to read the Soviet PNET draft to Shevardnadze. It showed how difficult it was to write a protocol on a protocol.

The text read as follows:

“3. Information specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article II of the Protocol, in addition to cases provided for in the aforementioned paragraphs, shall also be provided to the other Party in the case where it sends notification, pursuant to Article II of this Additional Protocol and paragraph 1 of Article IV of the Protocol, to the Party conducting an explosion of its intent to determine the yield of that explosion pursuant to Article VI of the Protocol.

“4. Procedures specified in paragraph 2 of Article III of the Protocol shall be applied in the case where the other Party sends the Party conducting an explosion notification, pursuant to Article II of this Additional Protocol and paragraph 1 of Article IV of the Protocol, of its intent to determine the yield of that explosion pursuant to Article VI of the Protocol.”

(The Soviet side was moderately amused. The meeting broke up.)

**146. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, April 21, 1988, 7:40–10:30 p.m.

**SUBJECTS**

START/ABM; Other Arms Control; Direct Flights; Krasnoyarsk, Central America

**PARTICIPANTS**

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>U.S.S.R.</i>
THE SECRETARY	SHEVARDNADZE
Gen. Powell	DepFonMin Bessmertnykh
Amb. Ridgway	Amb. Karpov
Amb. Matlock	Amb. Dubinin
Mr. Parris (Notetaker)	Mr. Kuznetsov (Notetaker)
Mr. Hopkins (Interpreter)	Mr. (?) (Interpreter)

SHEVARDNADZE opened the meeting by suggesting that the ministers first take up arms control, followed by regional issues, if time permitted.

Invited to lead off, THE SECRETARY noted that he had been provided with extensive talking points on START and D/S issues. Much of the same ground would be gone over in working groups. But, as he saw it, there were several tasks at hand: to get as much agreed as possible while the Secretary was in Moscow; to assess what could be done by others in the weeks ahead; to see if there were a role for a final ministerial before the summit; to see if there were further steps which might yield an agreement on strategic arms by the summit; and, if this proved impossible, to find a work program which would take advantage of work done to date to achieve an agreement as soon as possible.

The Secretary said that what he had just said reflected his personal outlook. But he could say he also spoke for the President as well. The President had campaigned on a platform that said arms control required radical reductions in strategic arms. That was his theme song, along with the stress he put on improving the quality of the peace by enhancing the contribution of defense. Having come as far as we had, the President wanted to finish the job. But, like the General Secretary, he wanted to do the job in a good, solid way—a way that people were

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow—4/88—Shultz—Shevardnadze. No classification marking. Drafted by Parris. All blank underscores are in the original. The Soviet interpreter is not identified on the original. The meeting took place in the Soviet Foreign Ministry Guest House. A stamped notation on the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that Pascoe saw it.



comfortable with. Nonetheless, it was true that the remaining issues were difficult. So what was to be done?

The Secretary noted that he had some proposals on ALCM's which he felt represented a good way to deal with the subject. It was not clear that the Soviet side would buy the concept on which our approach was based. Another problem area was verification. Some subjects were well along, and could be pushed further. Others, like suspect sites, were relatively undeveloped, even though both sides agreed on their importance. We would soon be in a position to share some ideas, but were not there yet.

The President, the Secretary continued, was interested in reaching an agreement by the time of the summit. He wanted to complete the Treaty if that were possible. If it were not, we should nail down what we can and find a way to maintain the momentum. That was the Secretary's basic outlook. He and Shevardnadze might have a discussion of the problem at their level, leaving experts to work on the details.

The Secretary noted that in Geneva the week before he had shared his doubts that it would be possible to come up with a satisfactory, verifiable solution to the problem of SLCM's by the time of the summit. The Secretary did think there was merit in the idea of unilateral declarations, followed up [*with?*] continued work. The Secretary saw better prospects for the ALCM counting rule. Sublimit issues were also resolvable, in his opinion. And progress had been made on verification since the ministers had agreed to concentrate efforts in that area. There were other areas in START where much had also been achieved.

On D/S, it appeared the two sides' delegations were arguing about what should be included in the text, and what in the protocol, of any new agreement. There seemed to be a consensus that the agreement would involve the two types of documents. The Secretary felt it would make most sense to try to resolve substantive issues and then to decide where to put them.

With respect to the substance of D/S, the Secretary reaffirmed the U.S. view that the "supreme national interest" clause had to be an element of any agreement. The Washington Statement meant that there would be a non-withdrawal period, during the last three years of which there would be discussions on strategic stability. At the end of the period, each side would be able to do as it chose (and, the Secretary predicted, neither could foresee at this point what that might be). In the meantime, the ABM Treaty would remain in force, and the right of each side to do what it chose would remain in force. The Secretary felt that the length of the non-withdrawal period could be worked out. The real issue was what would happen during that period. We had made proposals regarding sensors, and were glad to detect what appeared to be interest on the Soviet side. We might be in a position to share some additional ideas along these lines.

The Secretary reminded Shevardnadze that he had not been reading talking points, but giving the Minister a personal assessment of how things stacked up. Progress was possible with hard work. The Secretary's concern was that people would decide it wasn't possible to "get there from here" by the time of the summit and would stop working. He did not want that to happen. The summit should be a means of making things happen. But there was also a need to manage expectations. Both sides wanted the summit to be a success. The Secretary believed that, in fact, it would be, in view of the remarkable progress the two leaders had achieved. That was what needed to be recorded. But the secret of the success of the past several years had been the substance which lay behind the documents which had been issued. This, the Secretary reiterated, was not the presentation he had been given talking points for; but it gave Shevardnadze some general frame of reference.

The Secretary thought that the Vienna meeting provided some prospects for a summit outcome. It might also be possible to focus people's attention on CW use. Human rights and regional issues were underlying sources of tension, and, if people came to be convinced that things were different, it would have an important impact on perceptions of the relationship. We wanted to leave as a legacy the notion that it was possible to have more constructive U.S.-Soviet relations. We were thus prepared to work hard to pull together the threads of the work which had been done so that the summit would be a positive contribution.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had no quarrel with the philosophy the Secretary had articulated. As for the Soviet Union's approach, he believed there was no need to remind the Secretary of statements by Gorbachev and other Soviet spokesmen. Moscow was prepared for a far-reaching approach, and the conclusion of the INF Treaty showed that such an approach was no fantasy. Moscow agreed that there was no alternative to an agreement which guaranteed workable reductions and contributed to strategic stability.

Shevardnadze agreed with the Secretary that the two sides had to press on, but was concerned that no "milestones" were emerging. He did not think the ministers should limit themselves to only general discussions. They should seek to address the main points at issue. What were these? They had mainly to do with attitudes toward the ABM Treaty. The Soviet side had provided some ideas with respect to both substance and modalities—i.e., nothing should be changed in the Washington Summit Statement, other than the possible addition of some "legal aspects." As to predictability and related considerations, these could be part of a joint protocol. The Washington Statement, however, was the two sides' "common heritage"—a breakthrough which provided the basis for work in other areas.

THE SECRETARY noted that the U.S. had no problem with the Washington statement as such. But we clearly had different views as to what the statement meant, and needed to clear that up. It was not possible to wind up with a formal agreement which embodied different views. If there were no difference as to the meaning of the Washington statement, the U.S. could simply sign the Soviet draft agreement. But we knew that not to be the case, and therefore needed to keep pushing.

SHEVARDNADZE said he understood that there were differences. The Secretary had mentioned the "supreme national interest". Issue. The Soviet side had not exhausted its possibilities for resolving the problem. If solutions were found to other issues, the two sides could work on this one. The U.S. had also talked about sensors, and the Secretary had suggested the Soviet side "welcomed" the ideas the U.S. had presented. In fact, the Soviets were not enthusiastic. Sensors were good things by themselves, but not if they contributed to the development of a space-based ABM system. So expert discussion was necessary to clarify what the U.S. had in mind.

THE SECRETARY said these were fair enough points, which could be discussed. The distinction between testing and deployment was an area which we needed to try to identify. There was no question that deployment was banned by the ABM Treaty. As for sensors, they already played a role outside of the ABM context. Both sides used them.

SHEVARDNADZE acknowledged that the sensors idea was interesting. He said he had had a fine chat about it with Soviet scientists. He suggested, however, that the ministers leave it to their experts to clarify the concept, particularly with respect to the performance characteristics of the sensors in question. Shevardnadze reminded the Secretary that the Soviet side at an earlier stage had proposed a discussion of devices which would and would not be banned. The U.S. had rejected the proposal; perhaps if it had accepted it, there would now be no argument. But this was something for the experts to look at.

Returning to the basic Soviet proposal on the ABM Treaty, Shevardnadze urged that the U.S. accept a "work program" involving no changes to the language of the Washington Statement, with all other questions, e.g. on verification, sensors, to be covered by a separate document. Perhaps experts could work overnight on fleshing out the concept, and report the next morning to ministers.

Moving on to SLCM's, Shevardnadze said the Soviet side had formulated what it believed to be a sound package for resolving the problem. Moscow had proposed a ceiling for nuclear and conventionally armed SLCM's. To elaborate on that proposal, there would be, respectively, 400 and 600 in the two categories. Shevardnadze was able to go further and state that within this 1,000 ceiling, there could be freedom to mix. But so far there had been no numbers from the U.S. side.

Moscow had also set forth a proposal for verifying a SLCM limit. The Soviets were not comfortable with ambiguity in this area. If there were no agreement on SLCM's, there could be no agreement on 50% reductions of strategic weapons, since a major path would be left open for an arms race. Soviet proposals for verification were comprehensive, involving remote detection, on-site inspection of production facilities, etc. The Secretary had said that the U.S. Navy was not enthusiastic about the Soviet proposals, but had provided no arguments. So there was a lack of clarity here. Shevardnadze had expected that the Secretary would be able to clarify things somewhat, but this had not happened.

On ALCM's as well, the Soviet position had been made clear. Shevardnadze was nonetheless prepared to elaborate further on the verification regime previously proposed. In the interest of clarity, the Soviet side proposed inspections even in advance of conclusion of a START agreement to determine the number of ALCM's each type of bomber could carry. Shevardnadze noted that he had alluded to this possibility the week before in Geneva.<sup>2</sup> Did it not satisfy the U.S.? It appeared Powell was not satisfied. Why was that? Why should on-site inspections be permitted for ballistic missiles, but not for bombers. If agreement could be reached on a counting regime, Shevardnadze said, it would be possible to reconsider the Soviet insistence on a sublimit for heavy bombers. Shevardnadze suggested that working groups consider the problem overnight and report to ministers the next morning. He noted jocularly that Karpov had gone pale.

On the question of mobile ICBM's, too, the Soviet side was in favor of being candid and honest. It appeared there was agreement in principle that there should be no ban on mobiles. The Soviet side had set out a verification regime for mobile missiles. Shevardnadze had asked his specialists to assume the role of U.S. spokesmen, in order to highlight the flaws in the Soviet approach. They had not convinced him. The Soviet proposal was an effective means of preventing any circumvention of the treaty. The Soviet side had made major concessions in agreeing to limit deployment areas for mobile missiles.

Shevardnadze recalled that the Soviet side had previously proposed a limit of 800 launchers for mobile ICBM's. The U.S. had called for a separate warhead number. He was now prepared to give that number—1,600. That would be the top limit. But Shevardnadze could see on the faces of his American interlocutors that they were not impressed. If the U.S. provided a figure of its own there could be a discussion. But so far, there had been only unilateral moves from the Soviet side.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 142.

So, Shevardnadze summarized, if one took a realistic view it was clear it would be difficult to finish work on all the remaining issues. That morning he had reflected a certain optimism. Then he had assumed the Secretary would not come to Moscow with empty hands. He had expected some new ideas from the American side.

Shevardnadze agreed with the Secretary that, if the two sides failed to produce an agreement by the time of the summit, work should continue. But there must be movement on both sides, not just one. Shevardnadze emphasized that the Soviet side did not want to take a START agreement off the summit agenda. Both sides clearly wanted one and were anxious to achieve one. But if they failed, what then? There had been some limited movement since the Washington meeting.<sup>3</sup> Perhaps the experts had developed something in their discussions. In short, the Soviet side was in favor of intensifying efforts to resolve the complex issues which remained on the table.

But a key question in any future joint work should be whether one side was seeking a unilateral advantage in the negotiations. That seemed to be the U.S. approach on the ALCM and SLCM questions. At Reykjavik, the Soviet side had appreciated that the U.S. felt most threatened by land based ICBM's, and had offered to reduce those weapons by 50%. None [on?] the Soviet side sought reciprocal treatment with respect to SLCM's and heavy bombers. That might seem an elementary approach, but it was an important one.

THE SECRETARY said that he would deal with Shevardnadze's remarks issue by issue. On ALCM's, the issue was one of distinguishing between nuclear ALCM carrying bombers and other bombers. We would be elaborating on this concept in more detail in the working group. But in essence, the number we had chosen—10—represented the load our Air Force planned to carry on most missions. What we were proposing was a rule not unlike the bomber counting rule agreed at Reykjavik. A cruise missile fit somewhere between a ballistic missile and a gravity bomb in terms of its strategic potency. We thus proposed to count—or discount—cruise missile carrying bombers by giving them the value of 10. That would be close to the reality, and we felt it was a fair approach to the problem.

On SLCM's, the Secretary said he was not certain he had followed some of Shevardnadze's comments. He hoped he had not heard the Minister seek to count SLCM's in the 6,000 warhead sublimit. We had always assumed it was agreed that they would be outside that ceiling. Had the Secretary misunderstood Shevardnadze? Shevardnadze had also cited a number for both nuclear and conventionally armed SLCM's.

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<sup>3</sup> See Documents 132–139.

It was fundamental, the Secretary emphasized, that we were talking *only* about nuclear armed cruise missiles. Conventionally armed systems were not covered. The Secretary had wanted to flag these two points.

He also wanted to repeat what he had said in Geneva the week before. The U.S. was not opposed to a limit on SLCM's. We had examined the proposals made by the Soviet side on verification of a limit, but did not feel confident it was possible to verify a number. Moreover, the Soviet suggestions would be extremely intrusive with respect to the operations of naval units. Our Navy had approached the whole issue of SLCM's with a great sense of commitment, but, at least for the moment, we had not found the answer.

As for mobile ICBM's, we saw the advantages inherent in mobile systems in terms of survivability, and had worked hard to find a means of dealing with the problem. We were prepared to talk about accountability of mobiles by such means as: confining them to restricted areas; periodic OSI and enhanced NTM; limitations on departures from restricted areas for day-to-day operations. Some means of providing for dispersal could be permitted, and specific approaches would vary with the type of permitted mobile system.

Non-deployed mobile missiles were more of a problem. We were glad to have the 1,600 warhead figure, although it sounded high at first blush.

The Secretary noted that Shevardnadze had not mentioned the ICBM sub-limit, which the U.S. had at one point thought was settled. We still believed the 3,300 figure we had proposed was a good one.

On suspect site inspections, the Secretary noted that the President and Gorbachev had agreed in Washington on "the right to implement, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures, short-notice inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring." How to implement that commitment was a problem. The U.S. was close to being in a position to make concrete proposals in this area. One might, for example, think in terms of an annual quota and certain types of locations. Our focus was ballistic missiles, as we saw no need for suspect site inspections of heavy bombers or ALCM's. One set of facilities and sites which the U.S. would consider making subject to such a regime would be those associated with ballistic missiles, but which were not listed in the Data MOU and therefore would not otherwise be subject to inspection. Another set of facilities and sites that could be subject to suspect site inspections might be those which are identified by some agreed objective criteria observable by NTM. As for the Data MOU itself, we expected by the time of the next ministerial to have put some numbers on the table.



The Secretary concluded by observing that work was proceeding in all these areas. At the same time, they were very difficult. But both sides had made proposals, and there could be more on the table in a week or two. He asked Powell if he had anything to add.

POWELL observed that we continued to raise conventional SLCM's to emphasize that such systems were not constrained by a START agreement. As for ALCM's, he emphasized that our figure of 10 was already a concession to Soviet concerns, and that it corresponded to what the Air Force in fact intended to use on its bombers. The Reykjavik bomber rule had been based on the same philosophical approach. We thus had difficulty understanding the basis of the Soviet objection, and had hoped this might be an area of progress at the present meeting. Powell emphasized that he felt the need of a better understanding of the Soviet position.

SHEVARDNADZE said he wanted first to clarify the Soviet position on LCM's. It had been agreed in Reykjavik that SLCM's would not count against the 6,000 limit.

As to Powell's query, the basis of Soviet objections to the U.S. ALCM counting rule was elementary—U.S. bombers were capable of carrying many, many more ALCM's than the U.S. sought to credit them with. American B-52's and B-1b's carried, respectively, 28 and 22 ALCM's. The Soviets could not settle for less.

POWELL protested that there were no plans to equip those types of bombers to carry the numbers of ALCM's Shevardnadze had cited. To use those figures would be to overcount U.S. capabilities. KAPROV noted that U.S. aircraft were already being equipped to carry 12 ALCM's. SHEVARDNADZE asked Powell why the U.S. opposed on-site inspection of bombers and SLCM's.

POWELL indicated that the U.S. had no objections to inspections of bombers which did not carry nuclear ALCM's. THE SECRETARY noted that there were three categories of heavy bombers which needed to be distinguished. If there were agreement on a discounting rule for nuclear ALCM equipped heavy bombers, there would be no need to inspect them. For the remainder—bombers carrying no ALCM's and bombers equipped with non-nuclear ALCM's, we could see the case for on-site inspections.

The underlying rationale for the U.S. position, the Secretary explained, was that ballistic missiles were the most potent weapon in each side's arsenal. They were fast, accurate, hard to defend against and non-retrievable. Anything that flies, on the other hand, is slower, can be recalled, and has difficulty penetrating air defenses. This had been recognized at Reykjavik in the bomber counting rule. Cruise missiles were not as potent as ballistic missiles, but we were nonetheless willing to count them as the equivalent of 10 gravity bomb-equipped



bombers. As the Air Force didn't care to put all its eggs in one basket, they would not use maximum loads on nuclear ALCM equipped bombers. All of these considerations pointed to the need for a discounting rule.

The Secretary emphasized that, as total numbers of nuclear forces were reduced under a START agreement, neither side could expect to impose its traditional strategic force structure on the other. That was why measures were needed to enable the two sides to compare the various "apples, oranges and pears" involved. We had earlier said that 6 was a good number for purposes of discounting nuclear ALCM equipped bombers. The Soviet side had said that was too low a figure, so we had raised it to 10—i.e., ten times the value of a bomber with gravity bombs. We had also bought into the idea of OSI for heavy bombers not equipped with nuclear ALCM's. Thus, the U.S. proposal was a comprehensive one in this, as in other areas. And we might soon be in a position to share additional ideas in some of these areas.

As for SLCM's, the Secretary repeated that our digestive process was underway, but would not be complete in the next few months. That was why he had commended once again to Shevardnadze the concept of unilateral statements.

SHEVARDNADZE asked again what was wrong with the Soviet proposal to determine the capacities of specific types of bombers by on-site inspection.

THE SECRETARY repeated that the U.S. was not opposed to inspecting those types of bombers about which questions might arise—i.e., bombers which had been declared not to be equipped with nuclear ALCM's. For those which had been designated as nuclear ALCM carriers, national technical means would be sufficient to ensure compliance if there were agreement on a discounting rule. If the U.S. were to equip such aircraft with conventional weapons or non-nuclear cruise missiles, that would be our problem. So we were for OSI of bombers where there was something to inspect.

KARPOV asked a series of questions relating to the technical capabilities of the B-52H equipped with rotary ALCM dispensers, and how they would be counted under the U.S. proposal. THE SECRETARY and POWELL explained that, should that type of bomber be designated as a nuclear ALCM-carrier, it would count as 10 warheads, regardless of its actual load. KARPOV asked why it was fair in that case to count Soviet bombers which could carry less than 10 ALCM's as carrying 10.

THE SECRETARY indicated that the issue was really whether one wanted to count every weapon or agree on a discounting rule. If the basic U.S. approach were accepted, one could agree on a specific number and means of ensuring it was the right one. If one did not accept the concept that cruise missiles should be discounted, the task was far

more difficult. But, the Secretary recalled, a similar approach had been accepted by both sides for gravity bombs at Reykjavik.

In response to Karpov's attempts to question the validity of discounting cruise missiles relative to ballistic missiles, the SECRETARY emphasized the vulnerability of cruise missiles en route to their targets. He noted that the two sides had agreed to assign to each MX or SS-18 missile 10 warheads. We were saying that this was equivalent to a single bomber with 10 ALCM's. Seen in those terms, our approach was a generous one.

SHEVARDNADZE said he thought the discussion had made some things clearer. The experts could pursue the matter further. It appeared that, on the question of inspecting bombers, at least, there was no disagreement. THE SECRETARY said that this was true if agreement were reached on a discounting rule for nuclear armed ALCM's. In the future, he added, nuclear and conventionally armed ALCM's might well have functionally related external differences. At this point, of course, they did not. SHEVARDNADZE suggested moving on to a new issue.

Returning to the question of mobile ICBM's, THE SECRETARY repeated that the U.S. was not opposed in principle to such systems. He felt that headway was being made on verification, especially with regard to deployed mobile missiles. We were still studying the problem of non-deployed mobiles. SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet proposal dealt with that problem. THE SECRETARY acknowledged that Soviet proposals had given us greater confidence that deployed mobile missiles could be verified; we were less certain about non-deployed systems.

Moving on to ICBM sublimits, the Secretary reaffirmed the U.S. understanding that the Soviet side would drop its insistence on a ALCM/heavy bomber sublimit if agreement could be reached on a discounting rule. SHEVARDNADZE said that the sublimit demand would be removed *if* the U.S. accepted the Soviet approach to counting heavy bombers equipped with ALCM's.

THE SECRETARY said the U.S. still believed a ceiling of 3,300 on ground based ICBM's was desirable, for reasons we had explained often in the past. Particularly in light of Marshal Akhromeyev's statement in Washington that the Soviet side did not intend to exceed this limit, we had thought the issue was resolved. The Secretary therefore had wanted to reaffirm the U.S. position.

He also wanted to underscore the importance of dealing with suspect sites—an issue both sides were struggling with. We hoped to be able to present some specific ideas in a week or two, either at the Geneva NST talks or when the ministers next met.

SHEVARDNADZE recalled that the Soviets had accepted the concept of a 3,300 sublimit for either ICBM's or SLBM's within a 4,900 ballistic sublimit. It was his understanding that the U.S. did not accept this approach.

THE SECRETARY confirmed this. SHEVARDNADZE asked if the same went for the Soviet alternative proposal that there should be freedom to mix between SLBM's and ICBM's within the 4,900 sublimit. THE SECRETARY said that the 3,300 sublimit for ICBM's was desirable because of the unique characteristics of those weapons. SHEVARDNADZE asked if the U.S. could accept any sublimit on SLBM's. THE SECRETARY said, "No." SHEVARDNADZE said it sounded like a job for experts. THE SECRETARY said the experts said the reverse. It was up to the ministers to work out the conceptual differences; experts could go to work on details.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested a brief look at verification. He noted that the reason the Soviet side had sought to focus on all the remaining substantive issues was that there was a relationship between data exchange and the resolution of questions such as SLCM's and ALCM's. Data exchange could hardly take place until these issues had been settled. The Secretary had said the U.S. was ready to begin providing data. The Soviets had their own data filed away in a safe place, but until the SLCM and ALCM issues had been resolved, they could not provide it.

THE SECRETARY suggested that perhaps some headway had been made on ALCM's. On SLCM's, the U.S. was prepared to adopt a declaratory policy; that, at least, would provide a number. "All right, SHEVARDNADZE responded, "Let's wait."

### *Nuclear Testing*

Noting that there had already been some discussion of nuclear testing, Shevardnadze said that there was now greater clarity on the issue of the JVE. The working group was addressing details and could report the next day. THE SECRETARY said he expected a good report, especially if the Minister had instructed his representative to show the necessary flexibility on the question of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty protocol. It would be good to button up that issue. SHEVARDNADZE said the effort should be made. If agreement on the JVE had been reached earlier, he added, things might be different.

### *Chemical Weapons*

Moving on to chemical weapons, Shevardnadze noted that the Soviet side had tabled a draft summit statement on the subject.

THE SECRETARY agreed that the summit outcome should include some mention of chemical weapons, and ideally something beyond

what had been said in Washington. The U.S. believed a number of things could be said. First, we had seen increasing use of CW in the Iran-Iraq war, a development which underscored the dangers of CW proliferation. Technical measures such as export controls might make it more difficult for states to acquire CW, but not impossible. They would not deter use. The Secretary nonetheless felt it was important to step up direct political pressure against users and would be possessors, e.g. by taking measures against the shipment of precursors. The U.S. had been encouraged by recent Soviet public steps in this direction, such as support for UN investigations and condemnation of specific cases of use. Bilateral consultations on proliferation had been useful, and another might be scheduled for the fall. On the multilateral front, the U.S. agreed on the need for a truly global, verifiable ban. It was now time to explore concrete aspects of the convention: the Soviet proposal for an experiment to “test out” inspection procedures was a step in the right direction. We wanted to look further at the idea, and would endorse Soviet invitations to other states to participate.

The Secretary reiterated that these ideas should be reflected in some way at the summit. Working groups were engaged on the problem, and would be heard from the next day. But we remained concerned by the verification difficulties posed by a ban, and by the difficulty of ensuring that the largest possible number of countries adhered to a convention.

SHEVARDNADZE indicated that Moscow still considered the question of concluding a CW convention to be a promising area, and said he was prepared to elaborate on ideas previously advanced in the Geneva negotiations. On the question of ensuring the security of states-parties to the convention, there was a certain convergence in the positions of the U.S. and Soviet Union with respect to procedures for the elimination and destruction of stockpiles. But differences remained over how to “even out” stocks by a given date. The Soviet side had previously suggested that this process be undertaken on a Warsaw Pact-NATO basis; the U.S. had favored a U.S.-Soviet Union basis. The Soviet side was now prepared to accept the U.S. approach.

Moscow could also accept, Shevardnadze continued, the U.S. proposal for a conference among states-parties to the convention during the eighth year of the reduction process.

Finally, the Soviet side would be prepared to join the U.S. in a joint statement of support for the concept of mandatory challenge inspections of all facilities, whether state or private, if the U.S. were prepared to endorse such an approach.

THE SECRETARY noted that ownership was not the issue. There were installations, e.g. national command centers, that needed to be protected from inspections which had nothing to do with CW. We

nonetheless understood the Soviet side's concern over the distinction between state and private facilities.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that it should be possible to reach agreement in principle on this issue, and subsequently develop a workable approach. The most important thing was to record agreement on the principle.

With respect to inspections, the Soviet side was prepared in the interest of enhancing prospects for work on a joint summit statement to raise the annual quota it would accept for \_\_\_\_? \_\_\_\_ inspections from 3 to 5, close to the U.S. position of 7. On challenge inspections, Moscow could not accept 10 per year. Shevardnadze said that these moves, along with those he had mentioned earlier, should go far toward opening the way for intensified work on a CW convention. He hoped that U.S. experts could be instructed to engage on that basis, so that the President and General Secretary could make a positive contribution in Moscow to the completion of a convention.

As for CW proliferation, Shevardnadze agreed that the issue was an important one. Moscow was prepared to make a statement with respect to non-transfer to third countries. Others might follow the example of a joint U.S.-Soviet statement on the subject.

THE SECRETARY said that Shevardnadze had said some interesting things. We would consider them to see if they might allow the two sides to express themselves more powerfully at the summit.

#### *Conventional Arms*

SHEVARDNADZE asked what about conventional arms.

THE SECRETARY replied that the situation was clear enough: the key was to solve the human rights problem in Vienna. If Shevardnadze had something specific to say on conventional forces, perhaps Powell could comment.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the two sides had had some useful exchanges on the subject at all levels, including in Vienna. The principal concern at this time was to gain a clearer understanding of the subject matter of future negotiations. Various formulas had been explored to deal with the problem of dual capable weapons, and some progress seemed to have been made. While Shevardnadze did not want to get into a detailed discussion, he did want to emphasize that this was the main issue still to be resolved at the Vienna CSCE Follow-up meeting. As he had said earlier in the day, the humanitarian and economic issues in Vienna were resolvable, since "we have some things up our sleeve." But the main thing was that it would be well to make a strong statement on conventional forces at the summit.

THE SECRETARY, noting in passing that he would not comment in detail on what was essentially an allies to allies matter, asked Powell for his reactions.

POWELL said he did not have much to say. There was a problem with dual-capable systems, and working groups were engaged on it. He had nothing to add to that discussion at this time.

SHEVARDNADZE said he understood. For their part, the Soviets had no problem with their allies, as they had already fully consulted with them on this point. It would be good to have a statement on conventional arms negotiations at the summit.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed, adding that that was why we attached such importance to a good, balanced result in Vienna. That could be hailed at the summit.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had one more question to raise—the Soviet proposal for an exchange of data on military forces located in the area from the Atlantic to the Urals. The West constantly reproached the Soviet Union and its allies over the need to take steps to reduce imbalances. Moscow had now proposed a means of getting to the bottom of the data question. The Warsaw Pact foreign ministers had applauded the initiative. What problem did the West have with it?

THE SECRETARY said Moscow could publish its data whenever it wanted. There was nothing to prevent it from doing so. SHEVARDNADZE protested that this should be done on a mutual basis.

THE SECRETARY reminded Shevardnadze that the two sides had spent fifteen years wrangling over data at the MBFR talks. So the field was not very promising. When the conventional arms talks got underway, data was a subject which would have to be treated. But we did not want to put the cart before the horse. The first priority should be to get the mandate completed. Then we could see whether it would be useful to start on data.

SHEVARDNADZE answered that in that case the West should stop talking about imbalances in the Soviet favor. Moscow was prepared to make public all relevant data, not only on its forces, but on those of other countries. The U.S. could do the same. THE SECRETARY said this would be welcome once talks got underway. SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the two sides work on language. Perhaps the issue could be decided the next day. If not, Shevardnadze would not argue the matter further. Perhaps Powell was afraid Moscow would reveal the size of his former Corps.

POWELL said that information was already a matter of public record. The same could not be said for the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

SHEVARDNADZE said there was also the related question of discussions to limit naval activities. This was an important question, as new naval armaments were in the process of being developed every day. A new arms race threatened. Shevardnadze would be frank: the

Soviet Union would be raising this issue at the forthcoming UN SSOD. Sooner or later it would have to be addressed.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that U.S. and Soviet defense requirements and alliance commitments were different. The Soviet Union covered a sixth of the globe, providing access to a wide range of theaters. The U.S. faced a completely different situation. SHEVARDNADZE said that was why a discussion would be useful. The U.S. had an advantage in ships; this had to be taken into account in discussing “imbalances” in the conventional field. THE SECRETARY disagreed, reiterating that the two sides defense needs were different and should be considered differently. SHEVARDNADZE replied that the problem was that the U.S. had an advantage in naval forces. If it were not dealt with, Moscow would have to catch up. This would mean a new arms race. He reiterated that this was an issue which would have to be discussed.

*“Direct Flights”*

THE SECRETARY said he wished to raise two totally unrelated issues.

The first had to do with Jewish emigration. The Secretary wanted to be sure that the Soviet Union clearly understood that the U.S. strongly believed in the principle of freedom of choice with respect to the destination of emigrants from the Soviet Union. If a person emigrates and a country is willing to accept him, it was our view that he ought to be allowed to go there if he wished. We did not believe a person should be told he had to go to a certain country.

The situation was complicated with respect to Israel, because many Jews saw Israel as a kind of homeland. We understood that. We were aware, however, that there had been some discussion of direct flights to Israel for Soviet Jews. The U.S. was neither for nor against such an arrangement. We were for freedom of choice, and felt it was not proper for people to be constrained to go to a given country. Freedom of choice was the fundamental principle for us. We wanted to make that clear in case there was any ambiguity on the Soviets’ part. The Secretary was not seeking any particular comment from Shevardnadze. But he wanted to be sure the U.S. position was understood in the event anyone tried to portray it in a different light.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that the Soviet Union wanted to create normal conditions for persons who sought to emigrate from the Soviet Union. But as cases differed, it was important to speak in terms of specifics.

BESSMERTNYKH suggested that the Secretary had given an authoritative statement of the U.S. position on the issue he had raised to distinguish it from how other sources might characterize the U.S. position.



THE SECRETARY said that this was exactly right. We were for freedom of choice. We were not opposed to efforts to facilitate emigration, so long as the persons involved were not constrained as to their destination.

The Secretary said that the second issue he wanted to raise was the Krasnoyarsk radar. In February, Shevardnadze had indicated that, in the event a satisfactory solution were found to the problem of the ABM Treaty, the radar would be destroyed.<sup>4</sup> The Secretary had noted positively that statement. The two sides were now working on what both hoped would be a satisfactory outcome on the ABM Treaty. But there was another issue to consider—the October deadline for conducting the ABM Treaty review. The Secretary urged that something be done with the radar by that time so that the issue of a material breach of the Treaty did not arise in connection with the review. This would be to neither side's advantage. The Secretary wanted to flag the problem, so that it could be avoided. The ideal solution would be the variant Shevardnadze had suggested—a satisfactory outcome on the ABM Treaty; and the Soviet side's proceeding as Shevardnadze had outline in February.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet position on the Krasnoyarsk radar was irreproachable. He said that there were "other considerations" which he had mentioned in February. There were "other radars." He did not, however, want to get into all of this now. Shevardnadze said he did not understand the significance of the Secretary's reference to October.

After Karpov had explained, THE SECRETARY noted that the review requirement was an action-forcing event.

#### *Central America*

Acknowledging that it was late, SHEVARDNADZE said he wished to say "two words" about Central America, and perhaps a few other regional issues.

There were some positive trends in the region: the Guatemala City agreement; the start of negotiations in Nicaragua. Gorbachev had made a proposal at the Washington summit that the U.S. and Soviet Union should both refrain from supplying military equipment to countries in the region.<sup>5</sup> There had been no proper reaction from the U.S. Perhaps it would be possible to declare a moratorium on arms deliveries to help promote national reconciliation. This could be a significant step.

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<sup>4</sup> See Documents 121–126.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 114.

THE SECRETARY offered to recapitulate the U.S. view. There had been some positive developments in the region. We supported the Guatemala City accords and the Sapoa agreement. Sandinist reluctance to meet their obligations had made it difficult to take these positive steps. Our own supply of assistance to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters had now ended. The arms which the Soviet Union continued to supply to Managua were thus increasingly incompatible with local trends. The supply of those arms should stop.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested the U.S. and Soviet Union agree to suspend shipments on a mutual basis.

THE SECRETARY observed that the U.S. supplied military assistance to Honduras and El Salvador to enable them to cope with internal problems fomented from Cuba, which also received enormous Soviet weapons deliveries. It was clear that Soviet military assistance to the region was a major problem. Our supplies were far less significant in terms of volume, and did not contribute to turmoil. To the extent Moscow was watching to be sure we were no longer supplying arms to the freedom fighters, that condition was now fulfilled—albeit not because that was the President's preference. It would be a positive step if the Soviet Union noted that our supplies had come to a halt, and announced that Moscow was therefore suspending its own arms supplies to the region.

SHEVARDNADZE termed this an unfair and lop-sided approach. What he had proposed was a businesslike, serious discussion. If the U.S. was prepared for such a dialogue, experts could be instructed to undertake it. But no unilateral Soviet concessions were in the cards. The U.S. supplied arms to Soviet neighbors, e.g., Turkey. Shevardnadze said he did not want to get into a debate, but he had proposed a constructive discussion. The situation in Central America was explosive, as the U.S. had recently had occasion to observe first hand in Honduras and Panama. Moscow had not reacted to events there; it had kept silent. But that did not mean it did not have opinions.

THE SECRETARY said that Panama was another problem altogether—the problem of what happens to a small country confronted by the enormous profits of illegal drug trafficking.

Nicaragua, on the other hand, seemed determined to build armed forces far out of scale of those of its neighbors. It received its arms from the Soviet Union. This was very disruptive. If the process continued, at some point it would not be tolerated by the United States. There was now an opportunity to gain the fruits Shevardnadze had mentioned. The Soviet Union could make a statement reflecting the present discussion, conditioned, if necessary, on U.S. restraint in Nicaragua. Such a statement would be welcomed and would redound to Soviet benefit in the region. The Secretary knew that Costa Rican President Arias had appealed to the Soviet Union to halt its arms shipments.

SHEVARDNADZE said that what he was proposing was a reciprocal arrangement. THE SECRETARY said it would be reciprocal as far as Nicaragua was concerned. There was nothing comparable to Soviet military support for Cuba, which amounted to \$5 billion per year.

SHEVARDNADZE asked what about U.S. bases in Turkey, Greece and South Korea. These countries were on Soviet borders. He had made a serious proposal which he had hoped could serve as the basis for a serious discussion.

Switching gears, Shevardnadze said that it might be useful to cover certain other regional issues briefly so that the ministers could say they had done so. Shevardnadze had in mind Southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, Asia and the Pacific—including Kampuchea and Korea—and Cyprus.

THE SECRETARY said he saw little reason to discuss Cyprus. Perhaps working groups could get into the other areas. We had seen some progress on Southern Africa since our last discussion. The Secretary felt that momentum was building in our regional discussions; we should seek to maintain it.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that there were prospects with respect to Southern Africa, and to Kampuchea as well. He also believed something useful could be done on Korea. If the Secretary did not want to talk about Cyprus, that was alright.

THE SECRETARY said that the most important thing happening with respect to Cyprus was the evolving relationship between the leaders of Greece and Turkey. It was for them, not the U.S. and Soviet Union, to decide how best to deal with the Cyprus problem. In the meantime, the UN had the lead.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that they had discussed Cyprus after all. For his part, Shevardnadze felt that the emergence of a new leader in Nicosia was a positive development. The U.S. and Soviet Union should do everything in their power to encourage a positive evolution of the situation. Shevardnadze knew that the two sides could not solve all the island's problems. But if the Cypriots were to ask him, he would say he had discussed Cyprus in general terms with the Secretary.

THE SECRETARY said he would [say] that the discussion of Cyprus had been inconsequential.

The meeting concluded with the two ministers agreeing they would resume at 9:00 the next morning.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Shultz and Shevardnadze met in a plenary session from 9 to 10:15 a.m. April 22. The meeting focused on details of ongoing START and Defense and Space talks. A draft memorandum of conversation is in Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow—4/88—Shultz—Shevardnadze.

147. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, April 22, 1988, 11 a.m.–2:05 p.m.

## SUBJECT

The Secretary's Meeting with Gorbachev April 22

## PARTICIPANTS

## U.S.

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State

Colin Powell, the President's National Security Advisor

Paul C. Nitze, Special Advisor to the President

Jack F. Matlock, Ambassador to the USSR

Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)

Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (EUR) (notetaker)

Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)

## USSR

Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary, CPSU CC

Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Sergei Akhromeyev, Marshal, First Deputy Minister of Defense

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, CPSU CC Secretary

Andrei Chernyayev, Senior Advisor to the General Secretary

Yuriy Dubinin, Ambassador to the U.S.

Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister (notetaker)

Pavel Palazhchenko (interpreter)

(During the handshake, *Gorbachev* said he had the impression that the U.S. was losing interest in moving forward. *The Secretary* replied that it was not a question of interest; the issues were genuinely difficult.)

While pictures were being taken, *Gorbachev* said the Secretary should get a badge of honor from the airlines. *The Secretary* said it was mainly the Air Force that was involved. *Gorbachev* said that if the Secretary did not have memorial buttons, Aeroflot could provide them. *The Secretary* said he was ready for a frequent flier program. *Gorbachev*

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow—4/88—Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons. The meeting took place in Catherine Hall in the Great Kremlin Palace. Pascoe's stamped initials appear in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. In Secto 9030, April 22, Shultz reported that "Gorbachev was much more confident in his meeting with me than in the October meeting during the Yeltsin crisis, when he threatened to hold up the Washington Summit for SDI. If he was still worried today it showed in his questions rather than his manner. He was peppy, reflective, indignant and humorous by turns." Ultimately, however, "he agreed with the two-pronged summit objective I had laid out—sum up, and project forward—and seemed to accept that we intend to carry on with the work you and he have begun so well." (Ibid.)

said Aeroflot could generate that too. The central government still had some impact on economic life in the Soviet Union.

*The Secretary* said he was looking forward to going on to Kiev and Tbilisi the next day. *Gorbachev* said he welcomed their inclusion in the Secretary's program. He was sure to hear something different from what Matlock reported, and what the Soviets in Moscow told him. He would form his own impressions. That was the best way to study something. He (*Gorbachev*) had no shortage of information himself. There was even excess information as far as he was concerned. He had plenty of officials who wanted to show him they were working, and sent him memos. He preferred direct contacts. It had been that way with him through his whole career. He preferred to make his own comparisons, form his own impressions.

*The Secretary* said there was no substitute for that. You have to go talk to people to hear what they have to say in their own territory, as distinct from yours. *Gorbachev* replied that that was an essential principle. That was the only way.

*Gorbachev* continued that the Soviets had been noting remarks Americans were making, including remarks by the President, and has started to have doubts that we could go on to a new stage in relations. First, however, he wanted to welcome the Secretary and the others in his party. They were old friends and negotiating partners, had been for a long time. The Soviets respected all of them. The week before he had talked to the American business people. The summit in May would be the fourth he had had with the President. Today had marked, he thought, the 23rd meeting between the Secretary and Shevardnadze. *Shevardnadze* interjected that it was the 25th. In that case, *Gorbachev* went on, it was a jubilee meeting. It was the occasion for a medal. *The Secretary* remarked that *Akhromeyev* had all the medals. *Gorbachev* rejoined that *Akhromeyev* had been in the armed forces a long time, since the war. *Akhromeyev* said he had been in 48 years. *Gorbachev* said *Akhromeyev* was a happy exception, the kind of person who did not receive unmerited awards.

*The Secretary* said *Akhromeyev* had been kind enough to give him a two-volume biography of Zhukov. He looked forward to having a chance to look at it. He had appreciated it. *Gorbachev* said Zhukov had been a major ("strong") personality, in all respects. People were still trying to understand him. *Gorbachev* welcomed the effort.

*Gorbachev* invited the Secretary to help himself to tea. *The Secretary* said he had already taken a sip. He was also big on Georgian mineral water. *Gorbachev* said that when they had started the anti-alcohol struggle—a campaign that was harder than U.S.-Soviet relations—the Georgians had done a great deal to expand the variety of soft drinks they produced. Others were only now catching up. There were some places

where consumption of these drinks had increased two or three times. *Shevardnadze* said he would treat the Secretary to some.

*Gorbachev* suggested they get down to business. He had some notes. (His notes were a file folder with all four pages covered with felt-pen scrawl.) *The Secretary* asked if those were his notes. *Gorbachev* laughed and said he had more in reserve. There were some points he wanted to raise.

Perhaps the Soviets had exaggerated possibilities at some point, *Gorbachev* said. Perhaps they had not been realistic enough in their assessment of what was possible in terms of reaching a new stage in relations. But in recent years there had been some bricks put into the structure of new Soviet-American relations. They still thought progress was realistic. And the progress the sides had been able to make was the result first of all of their more realistic approach to each other. Perhaps they were beginning to find a way out of the prison of old stereotypes, away from imposing their own approaches and views on the other, away from stressing only their own interests, things that had stood in the way of movement toward improving relations.

The problem came if one looked at recent U.S. statements. That was true of the last speech of the President too.<sup>2</sup> No matter what the circumstances in which it was given, the context, the group to which it was given, when the President made remarks it was not only for the U.S. but for the world. The Soviets had to draw conclusions from such remarks, including those made two days before. It seemed the U.S. Administration was not abandoning stereotypes, was not abandoning reliance on force, was not taking account of political realities, the interests of others, a balance of interests. And there were also U.S. actions, in Latin America, in the Middle East. They too showed a stress on force. The Soviets had to conclude that there was backward movement, a reversal. There was an attempt to preach to them, to teach them. This was what it meant to characterize Soviet foreign policy as exclusively negative, and American foreign policy as exclusively positive. The remarks might have been made in a spirit of humor. He himself liked humor, but he could not see humor as such in these recent statements.

How was one to explain this?, *Gorbachev* asked. The election campaign? The old policy affections of the President? Had the Administration exhausted some limits? Still, that was a domestic question. Again, there seemed to be a reversal, a backtracking on the recent past. Perhaps both sides had built their policies on illusions. The Soviet side had abandoned its illusions. It knew that the United States, under any

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Reagan's April 21 remarks to the World Affairs Council of Western Massachusetts in Springfield. (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1988, Book I, pp. 488–496)

administration, would build its foreign policy to protect U.S. interests above all. But the U.S. should also be led to seek a balance of interests with others.

Gorbachev continued that it had seemed there was some movement in that direction. It had been not just philosophical. It had also taken place on some specific questions. There had been some results. And now it seemed there was some sort of reversal. For instance it seemed to be taking place in one segment of the Republican Party. Nixon had taken a break for the labor of writing his memoirs to take part in political debates. He, Gorbachev, could understand why, since the stereotypes Nixon had spent so long in building were being abandoned. But the dead should not be allowed to take the living by the coattails, and drag them back to the past. We should not let old politicians prevent us from building up relations. There had been results in the past two or three years.

Gorbachev said both sides had had to overcome a lot to find new approaches. It had been difficult but necessary. The Soviets valued the contributions of the President; of the Secretary; of Mrs. Ridgway; of Matlock; of Nitze; now of Powell, who had come on the job; of Simons. Why, Gorbachev asked, should we fritter away the capital that had been built up over many months? The Soviets all had to ask: was that the political base on which the President would build his visit to the Soviet Union? Was that the approach he would be bringing? The Soviets could not permit such attacks to go unanswered. Were we all to bury the achievement?

Whom did this serve?, Gorbachev asked. In recent polls—the U.S. had more polls than the Soviet Union, but the Soviets had recently been taking some as well, including recently some joint Soviet-American polls—there was large-scale support for positive development in relations. Sincerely, he could say, he had been pleasantly surprised that most Americans thought that by the year 2000 relations between the two countries should not just be non-confrontational, but not even relations of rivalry, but rather relations of friendship. The Secretary would be seeing Georgia, and the Ukraine. The people there were for it too. The Secretary would see it better than what Matlock reported from Moscow, from rumors. He would also see their attitudes on Soviet domestic policies. But if the people were for better relations, whose will did such statements reflect?, Gorbachev asked. If better relations were wanted, whence flowed such remarks, especially from the President?

If we could not protect the atmosphere we had at the beginning of the year, Gorbachev went on, he did not see how we could have a successful visit. If the Soviets had published the President's remarks in full (and that had been their first reaction; sometimes leaders had



to stop to think), there would have been the reaction in the Soviet Union that such a portrayal of the Soviet Union, of its leadership, of its policies was unacceptable from a leader coming to the Soviet Union in a month's time.

So, Gorbachev continued, he thought it was in the supreme interest of both countries and peoples for the U.S. Administration to do its best not only to preserve what had been achieved but to engage in dialogue to continue the forward movement in relations. This was in the broad interest of the broad spectrum of their peoples, if not in that of some individual groups, those who wanted to stick spokes in the wheels of Soviet-American normalization. The Soviets were ready to prepare the visit so that it would be a major political event. This was particularly true since the last visit of an American President had been in 1974. For a decade and a half there had not been one. That very fact made the coming visit an important event, and they viewed it as such. He thought that not only the government but the people of the Soviet Union would give the President a very friendly reception, showing respect not only to the American people but also to the President himself. He had contributed much to relations in recent years. The two sides needed to act as they had until recently, and not reverse what had been achieved. They needed to prepare the substance well. There would always be something to discuss and resolve.

He was sure the American people would approve that approach, Gorbachev went on. This would also be reflected in the elections to which the President was paying so much attention, playing up to the right wing, to the hawks. Probably when he left Moscow the President would say that firmness had worked, that he had promised that and achieved it. In that case the Soviets would say that the results had been achieved because there was realism on both sides, a recognition of political interests based on the realities of today's world. That was why there had been results.

Thus, Gorbachev said smilingly, he had already come to the end of the visit, and the press conference could begin. He thought he would begin by mentioning this topic. The Soviets did not accept the approach they had seen in the recent statements of the President.

*The Secretary* said he would like to make a few comments.

First, he wished to pass on the President's warm regards. The President was looking forward to his visit to Moscow with Gorbachev. He had reviewed the suggestions Gorbachev had made concerning the schedule that Shevardnadze had passed on in Geneva the week before. He had asked the Secretary to tell Gorbachev he appreciated them. They had been thoughtful and constructive, and they had showed a degree of personal touch he especially appreciated.

Gorbachev had mentioned polls, the Secretary continued. There were many in the U.S. By and large they showed a desire for more

stable and constructive relations between our countries. There was no doubt about that. Recently there had been an interesting vote in the House of Representatives. The particular subject was INF, but it had been a way to register sentiment more broadly. It had been 393–7 in favor of the INF Treaty. He had not thought there could be that big a majority about anything in our House of Representatives. (*Gorbachev interjected that he was aware of that vote.*)

He had some comments on the flow of the relationship, *the Secretary* went on. As the President saw it, there was a whole host of reasons—some of which we see, some of which we do not fully understand—why things were moving forward, but it was evident that a new page in our relations dated from the first summit Gorbachev had had with the President in Geneva.

We had always had a very full agenda before us, the Secretary continued, and we had classified it together into four areas. If one compared the present with the time of the Geneva summit, there were identifiable, significant, concrete results in each of the four areas. Of course there were many problems, and much work ahead, as Gorbachev had said. There was a tendency to stress them. But it was also important to reflect on the achievements, as the President saw them and as he, the Secretary, saw them.

With regard to human rights and humanitarian concerns, the Secretary said, we had seen many problems resolved. We had seen emerge a systematic way of discussing these issues. And it was a two-way street. We regarded that as a very healthy development.

In bilateral relations, we had seen a sharply increased flow of visits by groups. There had been agreements reached, and there would be additional agreements reached by the time of the summit. 500 U.S. firms had been represented at the economic meeting the week before. There was thus quite a lot of action in that field.

On arms control, we were in the midst of important discussions, the Secretary went on. But we had behind us, first, the Stockholm agreement on confidence-building measures, which we had made with other countries. It had been a breakthrough, providing for the first time for on-site inspection of military activities on demand. This had been followed by the INF Treaty, which—in addition to its results eliminating classes of weapons and reducing nuclear armaments—contained a completely new element in its verification provisions, creating a new openness between the two countries beyond anything that had existed before. Some of these things would have been out of the question four or five years ago, would have been considered impossible. Nevertheless they had now been created, and were beginning to take effect.

Turning to regional issues, the Secretary said Gorbachev and the President had identified their special significance in Geneva. He knew

we had many great difficulties. But we had joined the previous July in a Security Council action that was virtually unprecedented, on the Iran-Iraq war. It had given the world a lift. He thought it was past time to follow up on that action, but that we had acted as we had was already a significant event. And last week we had signed the Afghanistan accords together. Both recognized that they marked only a stage, and that there were many difficulties ahead. But it had been a significant and important step.

So, the Secretary continued, all these things would add up to the ability to develop a relationship that was more constructive, more capable of resolving problems, and that on the basis of explicit things accomplished, and not just rhetoric.

So from the standpoint of the summit meeting in Moscow, the Secretary concluded, it was a question of reflecting on the accomplishments, and asking where we should go from here. It seemed broadly, as with other great events, to be an occasion for summarizing what had taken place, on the one hand, and on the other hand for projecting an image of the future we wished to attain.

In order to make the meeting a political success, what did we need to do?, the Secretary asked.

First, he said, it needed to be prepared well. He had to explore all the substantive areas and bring them along to fruition, or to a stage that was promising, on a realistic basis, as Gorbachev had said. *Gorbachev* interrupted to say that here the Soviets had seen some marking time, and they had seen it on specific questions. There were some elements where they could say this would change the atmosphere for the worse. *The Secretary* said that was undoubtedly true, and we would have to look at that. But there were also areas that were just difficult, and we should not gloss over that. *Gorbachev* replied that neither should we deliberately or artificially complicate things. *The Secretary* agreed, and said we could point to some. But those were problems to overcome.

Second, the Secretary continued, we should seek at the summit the right combination of businesslike and substantive activities to go with the public activities, which were also important, since they would set a tone. In that sense, the program that was falling into place was excellent. But we needed to fill in the blanks concerning what will happen, to take advantage of time available. We also had to work out the proper way to record the results. There were very many, some small, some of greater consequence, and we needed to see how to record them, to let the world know what had taken place. Then we had to set the tone. The President's emphasis would certainly be the outlook to the future.

*Gorbachev* said that outlook had to be realistic. But it seemed there were some who wanted to ascribe only the color red to the future the

Soviets saw, and not see any red in the American future, even though the color red had existed before capitalism or socialism. The weakness of foreign policy in the recent past, including Soviet-American relations, was that actual social diversity had been seen as a source of confrontation. He believed we should look at diversity and use it as a source of cooperation, for the exchange of values in the economic, social, political spheres. Whereas Abrams looked at human rights based only on the U.S. understanding of them. He thought that only with the defeat of Communism could human rights be assured. The goal was therefore the defeat of Communism, and since it could not be defeated by political or economic means, that left only military means. And that came from a person close to the Secretary of State. If that was how the President felt, it was important how he would discuss the outlook for the future. If there were no place in it for socialism, for the Soviet Union, if he insisted that the Soviet Union had to earn the confidence of the U.S. for there to be progress in relations, that would be going back to the past.

Gorbachev continued that he had to say it seemed to him the Soviet Union had already graduated from the primary school of politics. There had been progress, as the Secretary had said, and it should not be pushed back. But literacy meant taking U.S.-Soviet realities into account. The world was very diverse. There were many new countries. The two countries could live without each other, but it would be better for both to cooperate. Nuclear war was inconceivable. Those were the kinds of things he had in mind.

*The Secretary* recalled that at Geneva Gorbachev and the President had agreed that war of any kind between them was excluded. *Gorbachev* said he had just been making a brief inventory of realities. But if now the U.S. were coming to revise the achievements, to return to a position of force, imposing things on the Soviets and the world, an empire-like approach, he thought all that should have been left in the past. The Soviets did not pretend to have the final truth. They did not impose their way of life on other peoples. They told the U.S. they wanted to cooperate, they wanted dialogue, they wanted to find answers together with the U.S.

Gorbachev said he wanted to say—and not in a mean way, but in a friendly way—that the pragmatism typical of American policy was not working beneficially in this context. The U.S. needed a more philosophical approach. The inertia inherent in pragmatism made the U.S. look only to its own advantage. It needed to look more broadly, at all factors. Unless it looked more broadly, the two sides would fail on the specifics. There would be a deadend on specific issues.

Gorbachev recalled the time in that very room when he and the Secretary had looked at the diagrams the Secretary had brought, on what the world would look like in a few years in terms of economic

power, changes in forces and roles. He had welcomed their talk. It seemed to him that if that trend continued—he had thought about it a lot, and not just by himself, he had consulted experts—if it continued, then it followed that the two countries *did* have to cooperate.

*The Secretary* said he welcomed what Gorbachev had said. He believed profoundly that the near future would be quite different from five or ten years before. We needed to study it together. It will present opportunities; it will also present problems, some of which we can see already, with all due deference to the difficulties of predicting. He had worked on these issues himself. He had encouraged our policy planning talks. He would welcome the opportunities to pursue these topics with Gorbachev directly. Unfortunately there never seemed to be time to discuss them. They were always crowded out.

*Gorbachev* said once the Secretary had completed his term of office, and he had completed his, they would be free from day-to-day activity, and free for intellectual discussion. He had to tell the Secretary—and it was the first time this had been told to a foreigner—a limit to the time party and government officials could spend in their positions would be proposed. He hoped the Secretary would not divulge that to the press; they had not completed their thinking on it. There would be other far-reaching proposals put forward at the conference.

Gorbachev said he could tell the Secretary that sometimes he heard bad things about his statements that he needed cooperation in Soviet-American relations. He had information from spies like Shevardnadze, from lesser people who got their information like Matlock. He heard things Matlock did not even dream of. He heard that his efforts were taken for weakness, that he had to beg, to kneel to get cooperation, to get respect, that unless he did there would be no better dialogue. The truth was that when he said he was for Soviet-American cooperation he did it from deep conviction, and not because there was opposition at home, because he needed success. That was bureaucratic nonsense, superficial and untrue. He believed what he said. But if they let the time slip away they would lose the opportunities. He asked the Secretary to remember what he had just said; he would have heard it there for the first time.

Gorbachev said he would like to sum up: he thought the two sides had to base their efforts on what had been accomplished, and they had to make the summit a step toward a new stage for the future. He thought that was also the Secretary's approach.

*The Secretary* said indeed it was. But he wished to return briefly to one thing Gorbachev had said five minutes before. He had said that when they were both through in office, they could have intelligent discussion of larger trends. The problem was to have people in office and in charge get a sense of the trends and build them into their

thinking, so that they would be shaping what is done. The more we could adjust to the trends, the more we could change the balance of problems and opportunities in the direction of the opportunities.

The Secretary said he had always marked Gorbachev down as a person who instinctively did that. He remembered the first time they had met, when the Secretary had accompanied Vice President Bush to the funeral of Mr. Chernenko. They had sat in this very room, for about an hour and a half. Gorbachev had talked about the diversity of his interests.<sup>3</sup> The Secretary had been much impressed with his analysis and his point of view. He thought Gorbachev should carry that forward. In his visit to the United States he had made a big impact on the American people. The Secretary thought the reason was fundamentally the same reason President Reagan had such an impact: he projected someone more interested in the future than in the past.

*Gorbachev* said the present leadership in both the Soviet Union and the United States, whether he went or not, was at a watershed of a new generation of political leaders who were coming to better reflect the trends of the world than the present people did. He was pleased that Soviet and U.S. leaders had been better able to respond in the previous three years than they had before that. He felt that if Vice President Bush were elected, he would be one of them, but of course they would have to continue to prove that to each other. Of course he was now engaged in his campaign, trying to display some muscle. It was funny how change went with position. Carlucci was now somewhat different from what he had been as National Security Advisor. He had once been talking to a former central minister in the provinces, and had reproached him for representing only a regional interest, when the issue was a national problem. The man had said, well, every dog barks up its own tree.

*The Secretary* said we had the saying “where you stand is where you sit.” *Gorbachev* said that was also good in Russian. He had said what he thought was important, he commented.

Turning to the summit program, Gorbachev said he welcomed the approved program. He thought it was really a joint program. It bore a resemblance to the experience in Washington. He thought experience, when positive, should be used, and the Washington experience had been positive. He agreed there should be dialogue at the same substantive level they had had there. The President and Mrs. Reagan would also be able to have contacts with people from all walks of life.

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<sup>3</sup> The memorandum of conversation for the March 13, 1985, meeting between Bush and Gorbachev is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1981–1988*, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986.

But we needed to think of what would crown the summit, Gorbachev went on. He was not in favor of insisting on signing a treaty at every summit. There would be too many; it would be out of control. But he did not want to be disarmed at this point either. The sides would have to work hard, try to move in every area. Even if they were not able to achieve everything, it was important that the final document record and fix the progress that had been made. Both the U.S. and the Soviets wanted a good START Treaty. They would sign it when they had it, but they had to move toward it. He thought the sides had to move, and if they did, the Soviets believed an agreement in Moscow was still possible. The U.S. side seemed less optimistic, but that was a common goal. And if agreement were to be reached on important points and future provisions, there had to be movement at the summit too.

Turning to chemical weapons, Gorbachev said he understood the U.S. did not want a separate statement at the summit. But on the other hand we could not just repeat what had been said in Washington. So he hoped there would be movement there.

Finally, on conventional weapons, Gorbachev said it seemed to him that the U.S. and NATO even liked the current situation, where discussion was more or less propaganda, an occasion for accusations about Soviet conventional superiority. *The Secretary* said that was not the case. We would like to see conventional stability talks get underway. We wanted to start to grapple with the issues. We would like to see the Vienna review meeting reach a proper conclusion. He had told Shevardnadze we were puzzled, because the Soviet CSCE delegation's positions on human rights were behind the practices in the Soviet Union. That was the key to breaking things open, and we would like to see that done. If it was, that was a matter that could be ready before the summit.

*Gorbachev* said he thought what the Secretary had said was a cover. He disagreed with it. His information was that Ridgway and Nitze had told NATO that on conventional arms talks and data exchange the U.S. would say in Moscow that these things could not be decided in Moscow or in Washington, and that would be the end of it. His impression was that the U.S. did not want real progress, but just wanted to talk about Soviet superiority.

*The Secretary* rejoined that, on the contrary, we wanted progress, and the way to get it was to complete the Vienna talks, agree on a mandate, and start the exchange of data. They had had fourteen years of experience on data in MBFR, and they should do better than in MBFR. We had put forward certain ideas, on units of account and the like, that had been published. We were ready to roll up our sleeves and get something accomplished.

*Gorbachev* said he had not yet reacted to the perennial issue, also to be discussed during the President's visit, of human rights. It was



perennial because man was perennial. It was true that the two sides had certain arrangements for cooperation functioning, and the Soviets wanted to expand that. It was good also that they had agreed on a specific working group for their legislators; that had been decided in principle. But the U.S. Administration continued to make attempts to interfere in Soviet affairs. The Soviets rejected that. There were arguments to substantiate what he had said.

But, said Gorbachev, he would like to put the question of whether the U.S. would agree to take a new approach, beginning with the President's visit. The Soviet approach was that each nation had the right to choose its own way, that there should be no attempt to pressure the other side. If the U.S. did not accept that approach, the Soviet side would base itself on another approach, which was actually the U.S. approach. It would make public its concerns and demand explanations. He would say frankly that that would be interference in U.S. affairs. For instance, the U.S. had said it had twelve problems with Soviet human rights practices. The Soviets had not put forward a comparable list, because that would be interference in U.S. internal affairs.

He had to say that if the U.S. did not accept a more constructive approach, if the U.S. insisted on a policy of propaganda and interference in Soviet domestic affairs, the Soviets would respond, with all their power and might. They had been restrained. If they began to turn in that direction, it would be hard to improve the atmosphere of relations. It would be going back to the past. But they could accept the U.S. approach, and use that tone even during the President's visit. They could describe all the problems in the U.S., based on recognized human rights principles: the laws, the Presidential decisions, Supreme Court decisions. They could give all that to the press, just as the U.S. press did to them. He could tell, because every U.S. visitor hammered on these issues as if he would otherwise be afraid to return to the U.S. This was pushing toward confrontation.

Gorbachev said the U.S. side did not understand that we had different values. The U.S. valued private initiative, private property. Its media, its philosophy, its politicians all protected that. That was the choice of the U.S. Whereas in the Soviet Union they were just beginning to develop new forms of cooperation and individual work, and people were asking if that did not mean a return to private property, to capitalism, to the exploitation of the working class. They were just beginning to develop these forms, and the charges had nothing to do with reality. Matlock could read about it every day.

*The Secretary* commented that he had been to a cooperative restaurant, and had a good talk with the proprietor. *Gorbachev* rejoined that the Secretary had much more money in his pocket than the average Soviet. But the authorities had to work hard now to prove that these

new forms were consistent with socialism. Values were different. The Soviets did not impose theirs, and the U.S. side tried to impose its values on the Soviets. This could result only in aggravation, in a bad atmosphere. Maybe that was what the American side wanted. But the Soviets criticized themselves a lot. It was hard for the U.S. side to add to that.

Gorbachev said he was not yet finished with human rights. *The Secretary* said he had a few brief things to say on human rights. We accept that there is a great diversity in governmental arrangements in the world. Countries had to balance the needs for efficiency and the needs for equity, for social justice, in society. Everyone had to make that choice. If you went too far either way it did not work. But discussion on how to organize we regarded as healthy. There was nothing wrong with it. We had learned from criticism.

*Gorbachev* said he would be interested in what the Secretary had had to say about U.S. society, whether he had engaged in self-criticism on human rights. The [General?] Secretary knew what he had said about the Soviet Union. *The Secretary* said there was great freedom to criticize in the U.S. We were worried about our problems. Drugs were a problem. Crime was a problem. They would be big issues in the upcoming election campaign. Our standard of living was on the whole high. The market system had worked quite well. But there were problems. Ours was a country of great diversity, and at the lower end of the income scale, especially in the inner cities, that was undesirable. We had worked hard on it. Sometimes we were successful, at other times not. There had been a tremendous struggle on the general subject of civil rights. We had a way to go, but we had made headway. In the 1960's and early 1970's that struggle had been intense. He himself has been engaged in it. We took the point very seriously. So there was no lack of criticism. He thought that on the whole we had benefitted from it.

The Secretary continued that he had been impressed with Gorbachev's willingness to criticize. No one had criticized all aspects of society and the economy as severely as Gorbachev. But there were some things that were registered internationally, in the Helsinki Final Act, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that cut across the board. The Soviets had signed them, we had signed them. We did not think it was interference to hold up that standard and ask questions. He thought there had been tremendous progress even in his time. He said he would like to see that preserved and built on. When he had started the two sides couldn't even discuss those issues. Now they had an organized and systematic review underway. Shevardnadze had asked him many questions. He had raised issues about life in the U.S., he had raised cases. The Secretary said he did not mind. He tried to respond. He thought things had moved in a healthy way.

*Gorbachev* said there was one flaw in the Secretary's initial position. The U.S. side thought human rights were violated in the Soviet Union, but not in the U.S. That approach was visible also in U.S. foreign policy. It said the Soviet Union was all negative, and the U.S. was all good. Its economic system was all beautiful, encouraging initiative and enterprise, and the Soviet Union's was not. But people chose their own systems. The flaw was that the U.S. approach was not self-critical. It was interesting to compare. In the Soviet Union making propaganda for war was punishable under the law. In the U.S. anti-war activists were punished by prison.

*The Secretary* said they were not; they were punished only if . . . *Gorbachev* interrupted to say he had seen the U.S. laws and codes, and they were formulated in such a way that anyone who disagreed with the authorities could be accused of anything; they could even be turned against democratic people. What kind of a society was it where one could be followed and monitored, where computer files could be kept on millions of people?, he asked. What kinds of laws were the 1950's laws that the State Department referred to to keep Soviet trade unionists from visiting? Were they going to undermine the U.S. social system? He was going to stop, *Gorbachev* said. He had mentioned just one percent of what he had. He could recount all the codes, the articles the President had signed, the Supreme Court decisions, the amendments that had violated those decisions.

The two countries were different, *Gorbachev* said. The right way for them to deal with each other was to cooperate. The Secretary could see that the Soviets believed all countries had problems, and that the right way was to cooperate in science, in economics, in culture. That was the Soviet approach. It was not to try to remodel the other side. Let people think, and form their own impressions. The United States Government was not some kind of super-government that could teach the Soviets. It could not even tell Panama what to do.

*Gorbachev* went on to say that the U.S. approach was also not acceptable to the Soviets because it was differentiated too. The U.S. had learned not to notice racism, hunger or poverty in certain countries if that was not in the U.S. side's interest. For instance, both the Soviets and the U.S. had said that Islamic fundamentalism was a dangerous phenomenon. Both had stated that there were dangers if Iranian fundamentalism were allowed free rein. But the U.S. supported Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan. It probably saw some advantage to that. And now the Afghan fundamentalists wanted to move their center to Iran, where they felt an affinity. When was George Shultz right?, *Gorbachev* asked.

*The Secretary* said he was almost always right. *Gorbachev* (laughed and) said he congratulated him. *The Secretary* continued that he was

right when he said we needed a follow-on resolution, and when he said Iran could not lay mines. Iran had to be confronted when it stepped out of line. *Gorbachev* said he had some remarks prepared on that, and showed his file folder. *The Secretary* said he had some talking points. *Dobrynin* suggested they exchange. *Gorbachev* said the Secretary's were better prepared; only he could read his.

*The Secretary* said he understood *Gorbachev* had more to say on security issues. He would be very interested. *Gorbachev* asked whether he was right or mistaken in thinking that the U.S. was putting brakes on the negotiating process in nuclear testing. *The Secretary* said he was mistaken. The U.S. wanted to complete the negotiations as soon as possible. It had wanted to complete protocols for the PNET and the TTBT. The Soviet side had wanted agreement on a JVE first. The U.S. had agreed. The Secretary said he was certain that they could have the whole PNET protocol and the JVE agreement and all its details ready by the time of the summit. They had received a positive report from the working group that morning. *Shevardnadze* said the actual experiment would take place later than the Soviets would have liked. *Akhromeyev* said there had been a slowdown concerning equipment; it had arrived at the site only three days previously.

*Gorbachev* said the Soviets saw some slowdown on the U.S. side in every area—conventional arms, chemical weapons, nuclear testing. *The Secretary* said that was not accurate. In nuclear testing the U.S. had proposed to go more rapidly than the Soviets, and had adjusted down to the Soviet pace. But the JVE was now on track. A procedure was agreed; equipment was moving, was arriving. In chemical weapons some progress had been made at this meeting. He was sure the summit statement would on chemical weapons be able to go beyond what had been said at the time of the Washington summit. On nuclear and space talks issues, ideas had been put forward at this ministerial, and we were engaged. The problems were hard, and ideas had to be digested. But we were engaged, and the President wanted a treaty if it were possible by the summit, and if not by the time he left office. What we wanted in the summit statement was the registration of the progress we had made, including progress since Washington, and there had been some.

*Gorbachev* said the Soviets were ready to act in that spirit.

*Gorbachev* asked if the Secretary wanted to add anything on the Persian Gulf. *The Secretary* said he had nothing particular to add. It would be a good thing to agree on a follow-on resolution, and have a ceasefire. That offered the best change of bringing the war to an end. On naval activity, as he had told the Minister the U.S. had no desire to maintain it at the current level. It was a response to the war, a response to what had taken place.

*Gorbachev* said the Soviets understood the importance of the situation in the Gulf, including the Iran-Iraq war. He could only confirm that they were ready to cooperate with the U.S. in this area. They had already done something. But frankly U.S. activities there had made the search for solutions difficult.

*The Secretary* asked if the Soviets could join in the search for a follow-on resolution. *Gorbachev* said that in principle they were ready to work on it. There was no obstacle in principle. But what the U.S. had done had hurt the prospects. The Soviets knew the people there quite well. So did the U.S.; it had at least cooperated with Iran in the past. He had said to the President and the Secretary in Washington that one had to act with a kind of restraint, in order not to create a situation of deadend for either the Iranians or the Iraqis. They were people who were unpredictable when they were driven into a deadend. He had to say frankly that the recent U.S. action—and he was glad it was over; at least he hoped it was over—had delayed the possibility of a second resolution. If it were adopted now he could not predict how things would evolve. The Soviets were ready to work on it, but the sides would have to assess the situation as they went along. The Soviets would not lose sight of it for a moment.

Concerning Afghanistan positions were even clearer, *Gorbachev* went on. The Soviet Union and the current regime were for a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan. Iranian Prime Minister Musavi had recently received an envoy from Zia, and said his approach was that the present regime should be ousted and an alliance of fraternal fundamentalist countries created. *The Secretary* said that was not the Pakistani position. *Gorbachev* admitted that was what Musavi had said, and that he did not know Zia's response. But he felt Pakistan and the U.S. were not showing enough realism. The U.S. and Zia were tempted to try to oust that regime. He felt that was the main danger.

Perhaps he was just repeating himself, *Gorbachev* went on, but he felt it was very important. If the Soviet Union said it insisted on preserving the current regime, without a coalition or recognition of the forces of the opposition, it would not be realistic. It would not be consistent with what had been said in the Soviet-American talks. The vision of a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan had been developed together. The Soviets did not know how Afghanistan would act, especially after the Soviets had left. Not everything was clear with the Najibullah regime. The Soviets did not know everything that was happening, though they got news from many channels. But to the extent possible they would work in the spirit of the exchanges with the U.S.

That was the situation on the Soviet side, *Gorbachev* continued. What would the Soviet response be if the U.S. side acted differently from the spirit of their exchanges?, he asked. There was of course no

agreement on this, beyond the agreement to be guarantors. But the Soviets attached great importance to the way the U.S. acted in this area. After INF ratification, Gorbachev said, which he hoped would take place—he had forgotten to ask . . . *The Secretary* said that it would. After INF ratification, Gorbachev went on, the way the U.S. acted in this area would be a very important test of how much the relationship could work, and how much the old principles were in force.

The Soviet Union would watch how the U.S. acted, Gorbachev said. That would create a precedent. If the U.S. refused to interact with the Soviets in moving toward a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan, but took a different approach, the conclusion would have to be that it would be hard to hope for interaction on other regional situations. The world would doubt the value of U.S. and Soviet guarantees.

The crucial difference was that the Soviet Union pushed Najib to the extent it could in the direction of a coalition, and the U.S. would prefer his ouster, Gorbachev said. The U.S. would prefer a different regime based on a different coalition. He felt that if the U.S. went that way it would put in danger the process of political settlement. The U.S. might try to put in a regime that would just be good for the U.S., but that would not be neutral and non-aligned. The Secretary could see it was easy to talk to him. He had no smokescreen or diplomatic niceties. He spoke clear political language.

*The Secretary* said we supported a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan. We supported measures to increase political stability there, among other reasons so that the refugees would return. That was one reason we had agreed to be a guarantor. We were not smart enough to know what the people of Afghanistan would decide about their internal affairs. We knew from history that it was a country of great diversity; that there were strong tribal instincts; that there was not a tradition of strong central government. We did not know how the Afghans would work things out. We would like to see a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan take its place in the region in a sensible and responsible way. We supported efforts to help the refugees. We supported Cordovez' efforts. But as to how the Afghans would arrange themselves, we just did not know.

The Secretary asked General Powell if he wished to comment. *Powell* said he did not.

*Gorbachev* said "good" on hearing the translation. He commented that one interesting aspect might emerge. Evidently the Alliance wished to move to Iran. If the U.S. supplied military assistance, it would be supplying Iran. He had just thought of that. The rest he left to the Secretary and Shevardnadze. *The Secretary* said they would do their best.

*Gorbachev* asked the Secretary to convey his regards to the President, along with the substance of their conversation. He wished to say

he was for moving consistently to improve the relationship; he was against all impulsiveness. He would welcome it if on arriving in Moscow the President told him what he had told the President in their one-on-one meeting in Washington—Dimitri (Zarechnak) knew about it, and it was in the notes—that he was abandoning pretensions, and favored proceeding on the basis of real politics.

*The Secretary* said he took it that Gorbachev thought he and Shevardnadze should keep going. They had discussed the possibility of another meeting. He had told Shevardnadze he was prepared for one. *Gorbachev* said he agreed, but the two ministers should not work as they had been working; they should work better. *Shevardnadze* joked that he meant the Secretary of State. *Gorbachev* said no, he meant the both of them. They should work on the substance and weight of what would be discussed. *The Secretary* said that was what we wanted too.

*Gorbachev* said he had been pleased to meet again with old friends. He hoped that no one would be able to wipe out what they had done together over the previous three years to improve relations. Life demanded that. *The Secretary* said he agreed. As always, he appreciated the time Gorbachev had spent with him, and their exchange. He knew the President looked forward to being in Moscow for his own direct discussion with Gorbachev.

On parting, *Gorbachev* asked the Secretary to tell the Vice President and his candidate for President that the Soviets would be comparing what he said on campaign with what he had said in the car with Gorbachev.



**148. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Powell) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 3, 1988

**SUBJECT**

Reading on Religion in the USSR

The attached paper, presenting an overview of religion in the USSR, was prepared by my staff for your background reading. Given the current interest in this year's Millennium of Christianity for millions of Soviet believers, the plethora of events surrounding the Millennium, and Gorbachev's recent commitment to correct the "mistakes of the past" regarding religion, I thought this material would be particularly appropriate at this time.

Gorbachev, not surprisingly, tried to foist the blame for the Soviet regime's brutal suppression of religion squarely on Stalin, but as you will see, the brutality began with Lenin. Conditions are better now, and there have been some changes over the past two years. But again, as is the case with other Soviet human rights issues, the Soviets have not yet undertaken legal reforms to make these changes longlasting or to eliminate unjust statutes.

**Tab A****Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff<sup>2</sup>**

Washington, undated

**Religion in the Soviet Union: An Overview**

There has been a lot of talk and ink of late about a transformation in the Soviet regime's attitude toward religion. During the Washington

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ledsky Files, Soviet Union (USSR) (2). Secret. Prepared by Jameson. Sent for information. A stamped notation indicates the memorandum was received at 8:18 p.m. on May 3. Copies were sent to Bush and Howard Baker. Reagan initialed the memorandum next to the date. Under a May 2 memorandum, Ledsky sent Powell a copy of the paper on religion in the Soviet Union (printed as Tab A below), commenting that Reagan and other officials "should not become overly optimistic about a possible transformation in Soviet attitudes toward religion and the treatment of believers." (Ibid.) Powell's handwritten notation in the left-hand corner of the memorandum reads: "PSS/NCL/Lisa, let me have a note sending Tab A to the President. CP"

<sup>2</sup> Secret.

Summit, Gorbachev invoked the name of the Almighty in a comment (actually, he said, “God willing,” hardly a Biblical quotation), and the press immediately began speculating that he is a closet believer.

Last Saturday,<sup>3</sup> Gorbachev called in Patriarch Pimen, primate of the Russian Orthodox Church, to make a statement about greater toleration of religion and to declare that “mistakes” were made under Stalin. Again, the Western press played this as a new departure—perestroika for the priesthood.

No one should get carried away by those developments. Seven decades of brutal repression of religion cannot be erased by a few well-chosen platitudes. It was Lenin, not Stalin, who began the systematic attack on religion and set up an atheistic propaganda campaign to paint clergymen and believers as enemies of the people. It was the Bolsheviks under Lenin who arrested, tortured, and murdered Pimen’s martyred predecessor, Patriarch Tikhon. As recently as two years ago under Gorbachev, believers were still being thrown into labor camps and mental hospitals.

A remark made to Administration officials by a Soviet negotiator during the last Summit best sums up the current Soviet policy toward religion. “We no longer see religion as the ‘enemy of the people,’” he said, “but as a ‘fellow traveler.’” This remark shows that the Soviet regime is attempting to use the spontaneous rebirth of faith and interest in the churches throughout the USSR to its own advantage. The Soviets have created a situation that even more tightly intertwines rather than separates church and state. The USSR Council of Religious Affairs remains the administrator of churches and, at Party direction, sets the limits of religious freedom at any given time. Russian Orthodox dissidents argue that the official church is compromised by its subservient relationship to the State. They demand that the church be allowed to run its own affairs. Pimen and the rest of the Orthodox Church hierarchy, however, continue to serve at the state’s bidding. Pimen, in fact, is believed by many critics always to have been a pawn of the regime.

1988 is the year of the Millennium of Christianity in Kiev Rus—the thousandth anniversary of the baptism of Prince Vladimir of Kiev, whose spiritual descendants are the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians. The Millennium has drawn the attention of Christians everywhere, causing a predicament for the Soviet leadership: how to keep believers under control while turning a facade of tolerance to the world.

The regime’s strategy is to make the official Millennium celebration one of the biggest propaganda charades in history. Its basic move has

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<sup>3</sup> April 30.

been to enlist the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church, the church that, at least nominally, claims 47 million adherents in the USSR. The Church hierarchy has been working hand-in-hand with the secular authorities to prepare the official celebration, which begins two days after you leave the Soviet Union, on June 4th.

Most of the Millennium festivities are to be held in Moscow, not Kiev (where everything started in 988), and this has infuriated Ukrainians both in the Soviet Union and abroad. The reason why the Kremlin dares not celebrate appropriately in Kiev is because of the repression of the Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) and Orthodox Churches. In 1946, the Uniate Church was officially banned, and the separate Ukrainian Orthodox Church was subjugated to the Russian Orthodox Church. The Ukrainian issue is an explosive one, especially in view of the underground Uniate Church's appeal for official recognition. This Church, which owes its allegiance to Rome, but maintains an Eastern rite, claims more than ten million potential communicants. Its right to exist is firmly defended in the West, especially by the Pope, who has refused to attend the Millennium celebration in the Soviet Union unless he is permitted to visit Lithuania and the Ukraine. The Soviets have denied the Pope permission to make these visits.

Apart from all this, there is some improvement in religious tolerance. Over the past year, several churches have been allowed to build and administer old-age homes, and some church members are being allowed to volunteer time in hospitals and orphanages. Three hundred new churches (of all denominations) have been built since 1985. This is a step in the right direction, even though it hardly makes up for the seventy thousand churches that were destroyed during the first seventy years of the Soviet regime. This year, the Soviets are publishing a Millennial edition of the Bible in 100,000 copies. The dissidents say that one copy will cost about 200 rubles, the salary an average Soviet makes in a month. If they are right in claiming there are 47 million Orthodox Christians, even 100,000 bibles won't go very far.

Our hope is that these reforms continue and expand, and that there is no return to a more suppressive environment after the Millennium is over.

Laws that limit freedom of religion still remain. The most resented is the one that prohibits religious instruction outside the home. Parents are permitted to teach their own children about religion, but not other peoples' children. Churches are forbidden to establish Sunday Schools. Hebrew schools are taboo. Many people have served terms at hard labor for violating these laws.

Another repressive statute outlaws religious activity by unregistered sects. This has caused suffering to the evangelical Baptists, Seventh Day Adventists, Pentecostals, and Jehovah's Witnesses, because,

in their belief in separating church and state, these denominations do not wish to be registered. It has also led to the incarceration in prisons and mental hospitals of a large number of Hare Krishnas, who have concurrently been subjected to a campaign of denigration in the Soviet media.

Still another law permits the State to arrest conscientious objectors as draft dodgers.

There are a myriad other ways that religion is suppressed: requests for registration of parishes are delayed indefinitely by bureaucratic inaction; packages of religious literature from abroad never reach their destinations; especially-energetic priests (almost always those who oppose the state's control of churches) are exiled to rural areas.

Nevertheless, faith is flourishing as never before in the USSR, particularly among younger people. The churches are well-attended, especially at Christmas and Easter, and the main Synagogue in Moscow has an active and constant congregation. Even if—as many dread—the pendulum swings back to more repressive counter-measures, the regime will find it impossible to extinguish the light that now burns even more brightly in darkness.

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#### 149. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, May 11, 1988, 2:55–5:30 p.m.

##### SUBJECT

The Secretary's First Meeting with Shevardnadze

##### PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>USSR</i>
George P. Shultz, Secretary of State	Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of
Colin Powell, President's National	Foreign Affairs
Security Advisor	Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy
Jack F. Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to	Foreign Minister
Moscow	Sergei Tarasenko, Chief of
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant	Shevardnadze's Secretariat
Secretary of State (EUR)	

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Untitled Folder. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on May 12. The meeting took place in the Ambassador's Office at the U.S. Mission.

Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy  
Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)  
(notetaker)  
Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)  
Peter Afanasenko (interpreter)

Georgiy Mamedov, USA and Canada  
Department (notetaker)  
Pavel Palazhchenko, (interpreter)

During the photo opportunity, *Shevardnadze* said he had been asked why he arrived in Geneva so early; the last time he had been here he had been asked why he arrived so late. *The Secretary* gave him a picture of him showing the President a photo of the U.S. flag flower display in Tbilisi. In response to press questions, both said they were there to work; *Shevardnadze* told a Soviet questioner the atmosphere in the delegation was workmanlike and positive.

*The Secretary* began by saying he had told the President of the very warm reception he had received in Tbilisi, and of the good time he had had there. It had been a pleasure to see *Shevardnadze's* children and grandchildren, although he had had a hard time making friends with the youngest. He then suggested they get to work.

*Shevardnadze* said we had to move forward. But he wished to say first he had had calls from Tbilisi and Kiev, all wishing the Secretary the best. *The Secretary* said he had had good visits to both places. It was educational and worthwhile to travel to different parts of *Shevardnadze's* country. We all knew intellectually that big countries are diverse, but it did not register until you saw them. *Shevardnadze* said there was no substitute for personal experience.

*The Secretary* said they were working to make the summit a success. They needed to get hold of the issues, to get them in good order. *Shevardnadze* said he saw no reason to be pessimistic. It was in the nature of man to want the maximum possible. Maybe they would not obtain that in this case. But the leaders should review what had been done in the last years. There would be a lot to report on in Moscow. There had been a lot of results. The meeting could be a truly impressive occasion to take stock and determine the prospects for the future. *The Secretary* said he agreed totally.

*Shevardnadze* said it was becoming a tradition for them to finish up summit preparations in Geneva. *The Secretary* recalled that the first summit itself had taken place there.

*Shevardnadze* said the principal questions concerned disarmament, specifically strategic offensive weapons and the ABM Treaty. Perhaps they could return to these questions later. First he wanted to discuss the very basic questions of what could be completed by the time of the Moscow visit. They would be meeting in a small group to discuss strategic offensive arms, but the ministers should probably discuss INF matters first.

On INF there were problems that needed discussion, Shevardnadze continued. He failed to understand what had happened. The U.S. side had asked some questions which the Soviet side had answered. Then there was a new set of questions. The Soviets had sent answers. It was not clear what the problem was. They needed to discuss it. He had met with his experts through part of the night, digesting the material. The issues were mostly technical. Their experts could meet, and they could listen to them the next day. They could have a general discussion, and then take stock. It would be very desirable to complete this work while they were in Geneva.

*The Secretary* said it was essential to complete it while they were there, perhaps even that very day. There were two types of issues.

First, the Secretary said, they had to nail down what they had previously discussed on the so-called futuristic-type weapons on range at treaty-prohibited areas. He thought there was no disagreement there. We had brought with us a paper to clarify it. Ambassador Kampelman had it with him, and could meet with whomever Shevardnadze would designate to finish it off. *Shevardnadze* said he thought they had basically finished that issue. If the U.S. needed clarification, that would be fine. *The Secretary* replied that that was exactly the case; it could even be a problem of translation from the Russian. People in the Senate had asked that it be further clarified, and we had brought along some language that had been worked with the Senate.

The other set of issues, the Secretary continued, were those that had arisen between the two teams responsible for on-site inspection. It was not surprising that problems arose when two technical teams met. He thought these ought to be fairly resolvable. The guide should be the text of the treaty. The U.S. had a strong technical team in Geneva. He had brought Ambassador Glitman, who had negotiated the treaty and was coordinating the information flows with the Senate. The sooner the ministers gave instructions for the work to be done the better off they would be. He proposed that Glitman and a team meet with a Soviet team on the second set of issues, and that Kampelman and Shevardnadze's designate meet on futuristics. He hoped they could finish that afternoon and evening. He was prepared to try.

*Shevardnadze* said with Glitman the Soviet delegation would be General Chervov and many specialists, including many participants in the talks. With Kampelman, he asked Bessmertnykh, he supposed it should be Karpov; *Bessmertnykh* confirmed that it should.

On START and DST, *the Secretary* suggested that they convene a working group, which could then report to them.

*Shevardnadze* asked if this meant there would be no plenary. Would they simply instruct the working group to begin? *The Secretary* said he did not feel they needed a human rights working group; perhaps the

two of them could discuss that. The same, he felt, held for regional issues; they should discuss this area themselves. On bilateral issues, Simons was there for discussions, to the extent they were needed, with Bessmertnykh. That left arms control: INF, START and Defense and Space, chemical weapons, conventional arms.

On conventional arms, the Secretary continued, the ministers should seek to break things open in Vienna. We had not seen particular motion there, and that was where the key was. We thought very positive results in Vienna could be reflected at the summit. Shevardnadze had made many interesting statements on conventional arms, also from the standpoint of the expense of their respective defense efforts, where conventional arms played a major role, even though strategic arms took a tremendous burden when it came to deterrence. Both sides, he thought, would like to take note of movement; the key was Vienna.

*Shevardnadze* replied that the negotiations were in Vienna, but much depended on the two ministers. If they could not decide on the mandate and actual negotiations did not begin, there would be no movement to report. He was ready for more detailed discussion.

(At this point Ambassador Maynard Glitman, General Nikolai Chervov of the Soviet General Staff, and Ambassador Viktor Karpov, Soviet MFA Disarmament Department head arrived.)

Shevardnadze greeted Glitman, joking he was responsible for the whole INF mess. *The Secretary* informed the newcomers that he and Shevardnadze had decided they should meet briefly with the ministers and then with each other and their people, and should work in a positive frame of mind to resolve the remaining issues, largely related to on-site inspection. He hoped the work could be completed that day, though that would of course depend on how much could be achieved. Kampelman and Karpov would meet on futuristics. The U.S. side thought it quite possible the problem there was one of translation; it had brought some language which key members of the Senate found satisfactory.

*Shevardnadze* asked if Kampelman were in Geneva. *The Secretary* replied that he had come with the U.S. team, but had stopped by his apartment to change. *Shevardnadze* said he had reviewed all the questions relating to INF missiles, and did not see any that could not be resolved at this meeting. It was important for the experts to sit down and get to work. *The Secretary* said that was also our view; he suggested the ministers kick them out. *Shevardnadze* said he thought Karpov and Kampelman might finish first; all should get to work. *The Secretary* bid farewell to Ambassador Glitman. (Glitman and Chervov left at 3:20.)

*Shevardnadze* said he thought there should be some discussion of nuclear testing and chemical weapons, even if there were no formal working group. *The Secretary* said he had his full panoply of people



with him. He suggested they organize; on the U.S. side this would be under Paul Nitze's chairmanship. We were prepared to work in all areas. *Shevardnadze* said Nitze's partner would be (Ambassador Alexei) Obukhov. (Simons left to call them in.)

*The Secretary* said he understood they would be meeting until 5:30 p.m., and would reconvene after a break at 8:00 p.m. The U.S. side was thinking in terms of finishing by 9:30 p.m., and meeting again at 9:00 a.m. the next day, and again in the afternoon, when they could work until they finished.

*Shevardnadze* said the Soviets had the same schedule in mind; the only difference was they had envisaged working till 6:00 p.m. the first day, but 5:30 was alright. *The Secretary* explained that he had just arrived and needed time to consult with his Geneva delegation. He was sorry he could not come earlier, but he had had to host a dinner the night before and wait till all the guests cleared out. *Shevardnadze* said he had met with his people. He thought they were not optimistic about strategic offensive weapons and the ABM Treaty. They had done some good work in Geneva, but without a push from the ministers there would not be agreement.

*The Secretary* said he saw two other items for discussion. First, they should reflect on how to document the summit and the work done since the Washington summit; it would also be desirable to reflect on the progress made since the Geneva summit.

(At 3:30 p.m. Kampelman, Obukhov and Ambassador Paul Nitze, Special Advisor to the President on Arms Control, arrived.)

*Shevardnadze* said jokingly he had told Obukhov he had been too quiet recently, listening to U.S. proposals.

*The Secretary* told the newcomers he had explained to *Shevardnadze* that Kampelman would be in a position to discuss language on futuristics, consistent with what had been agreed, that was satisfactory to the Senate, with a view to finishing off the issue. The ministers were asking Nitze and Obukhov to organize the arms control working group, for discussion of chemical weapons, conventional arms, nuclear testing, strategic arms, and defense and space issues.

Nitze asked if they should report at 9:00 a.m. the next day, or take more time. He did not think his people would welcome working all night, as had happened once before. *The Secretary* replied that this was not formalized: he and *Shevardnadze* would be discussing some issues, and the others could think of making reports the next afternoon. *Shevardnadze* said he agreed. The INF people should work through the rest of the day and then report; the others should work and then report the next afternoon. *The Secretary* added, however, that if they had something urgent to report they should come and tell the ministers. *Shevardnadze* said that in principle, therefore, everything was clear.

(Nitze, Kampelman and Karpov left at 3:35 p.m.)

*Shevardnadze* suggested the ministers discuss what the summit meeting should be like, what results it should have.

Realistically, *Shevardnadze* continued, it would not be possible to reach a START agreement by the summit. Even if the ministers agreed on all the basic issues that day, it would be physically impossible to put them all on paper in time. But he would welcome, as the crown of the summit, an impressive document that summarized the results of Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington and the work prior to Moscow. What the document was called was not important. What was important was to record the results achieved.

A conceptual approach was also needed here, *Shevardnadze* went on, and a review of specific issues: where we stood on START, what had been achieved, what ground had been prepared for the future. The ministers needed to decide whether it should be one big document or two documents. His view was that it should be one big impressive document, and that it should be signed by their two leaders. It could also be without their signatures, but that would be different. A document signed by the two would evoke more response in the world, would be more impressive. He thought their negotiators should work on such a document.

*The Secretary* said he agreed that they could find something suitable, and if both leaders signed it, that would be a good concept. We had suggested two documents. We had no hangup on whether there should be one or two. There were advantages and disadvantages each way. If there were two, that would single out some issues, and the disadvantage was that other issues would look as if they were of lesser importance. But we had gotten going because there had been a tremendous amount of forward movement toward 50% cuts in strategic arms since Geneva, and it would provide continuity with the INF Treaty to register that in some way. If there were one document, there would have to be a section with that in. Perhaps *Shevardnadze's* suggestion was a good one.

General *Powell* said they should consider both possibilities.

*Shevardnadze* said the Soviet side had two drafts. He had looked them over the previous evening. The sides should consider the question of how to unite them. They should record everything that had been achieved between them. It would be a rather big document, and that was a little worrisome to him. But, he suggested, let the experts start on it. He asked *Bessmertnykh* to hand over the Soviet draft. *The Secretary* asked *Bessmertnykh* if the thick paper he had was the draft; *Bessmertnykh* laughingly said it was only a part, and pointed to his briefcase.

*Shevardnadze* said the document would have great significance. The people had wanted a START agreement. It was important to have a

substantial appeal or address to the people on what had been achieved, to make up for the fact that there would be no START agreement.

*The Secretary* recalled that when he had met with the General Secretary in Moscow they had reflected on how progress on the broad range of issues was important; nuclear arms was part of it, but not everything.<sup>2</sup> There was a certain desirability to having that perspective. Perhaps the second document could be made part of the first.

Ambassador *Ridgway* noted that this would require a conceptual change in the nature of the joint statement. *The Secretary* said the two ministers had a trustworthy working group in these two individuals (*Ridgway* and *Bessmertnykh*). They should struggle to come up with a good document. *Ridgway* said it would help to have a piece of paper from the Soviet side. *Shevardnadze* said they had one, even translated into English, for the U.S. to consider. It could not be finished in Geneva, so the U.S. could send someone to Moscow, or the Soviets could send someone to Washington, to continue and complete it. He would like *Bessmertnykh* and *Ridgway* to complete it. They were people who did not argue much, but just did their work.

*The Secretary* said the sides should aspire to settle on the structure of the document while they were in Geneva. They should make up their minds, and agree to as much language as possible. Some things, for instance the historical recitation, could be pretty well settled. Others they would work on up to and even during the summit. But they should try to have most of it worked out.

The Secretary continued that he thought they should have a process underway working the document or documents that week and in the few days before the summit. He would be arriving in Helsinki the early morning of May 26, and would be there three days. They could work there if *Shevardnadze* wanted to send someone, or we could send people to Moscow. They should agree on the process by the next day.

The Secretary said he had the idea that *Shevardnadze* and he should meet as needed during the summit. This would keep the process going and understood. For instance, on the first day there would be an arrival ceremony and then a ceremony and private meeting of the two leaders at the Kremlin. Perhaps the ministers and their associates could meet during that time to see what the problems were. If there were a place always available for that, in or outside the Kremlin, that would facilitate things if there were problems to be solved.

*Shevardnadze* said he agreed they should discuss whether there should be one document or two documents. Looking at the matter the

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 147.

day before, he had thought it would be a good thing if there could be one document, with a general assessment and various sections, for instance political-military, including strategic offensive arms and the ABM Treaty. In it they could record things that had been done by the time of the summit. In Moscow they had discussed whether chemical weapons should be treated in a separate document or as part of a joint document. There should be a section on conventional arms. There should be a big section on humanitarian issues. There should be a big section on regional matters, where there were also steps, progress to report. In the bilateral area they would be signing a very substantial number of agreements, and could mention those signed over the previous two years. If all these things were put together it would be very impressive. But there could also be two documents. They could discuss this matter. The day before he had been inclined toward one document. But those were just thoughts.

But, Shevardnadze went on, he thought the main work should be done before the summit. The sides knew the assets, the capital that had been accumulated. They could add to it during the meetings of their leaders. Or the leaders could decide there should be no document. But it would be useful to be prepared. He thought their people should get together to put the documentation in as final a form as possible. He would be giving the Secretary the Soviet suggestions on how they should work.

*The Secretary* said they would want to record what they had done in the past, but in a way that looked to the future. They should say what they had done since 1985, but they should also say this was an ongoing process. They should say that they had the people in place to do it, that they had not achieved everything, but that it was a good process. On strategic offensive weapons and defense and space, they should record results, but also give a sense of forward motion, so that people would have confidence that no matter how difficult the remaining issues the process would come to a conclusion.

A small question had arisen among the delegations, the Secretary continued, concerning the recess. He gathered they had agreed to break on May 24 so that our delegation could join the President in Helsinki. We had thought it would be a good idea to reconvene in mid- or early July. We could understand it would be desirable to reconvene at the end of June, since it was closer than July. The ministers could perhaps privately pick a date to announce at the summit, that would carry with it the notion of continuity.

The Secretary asked if General Powell or Ambassador Ridgway had anything to add. They did not.

*Shevardnadze* suggested they return to these issues after the U.S. side had looked at the Soviet ideas. *The Secretary* said that would be fine.

*Shevardnadze* said that, concerning matters related to the President's visit, if the Secretary agreed, it would be a good idea to provide for parallel meetings of leaders and ministers and other members of the delegations. This had happened at Geneva, at Reykjavik and at Washington. The Soviet side would supply working areas. How many would be needed would depend on the situation.

The U.S. side had suggested simultaneous interpretation, *Shevardnadze* went on. The Soviet side agreed that interpretation should be simultaneous throughout the duration of the summit. *The Secretary* said that would be good, subject of course to the proviso that either side could ask interpreters to slow down and repeat, or switch back to consecutive interpretation. That was a convention they had followed. *Shevardnadze* agreed.

*Shevardnadze* said they should also think of some breakdown of questions to be discussed in each session. *The Secretary* said he agreed. *Shevardnadze* said they could prepare a preliminary agenda.

—On May 29 there would be a private meeting of the General Secretary and the President at 3:30 p.m.

—On May 30 he thought it would be useful to have a plenary session in the same room where the Secretary met with the General Secretary, the Catherine Hall. *The Secretary* asked how big it would be. *Shevardnadze* said they were thinking of eight or nine on a side. For instance, on the U.S. side, in addition to the President, there could be the Secretary, Carlucci, Powell, Baker, Ridgway and Matlock, and the Soviet side would have a similar group. This would be about the same as in Washington. On the Soviet side there would be Defense Minister Yazov rather than Akhromeyev, since Carlucci would be there, but it would be basically the same group. *The Secretary* said he liked *Shevardnadze's* idea. He observed that as soon as the group got larger, it was hard to cut it below a roomful, and the quality of the meeting declined. He did not know why, but that was what happened. So he thought *Shevardnadze's* idea was about right, with an interpreter and a notetaker. *Shevardnadze* said there should be two notetakers on each side.

*Shevardnadze* said that as to the meetings of the leaders, they would decide whom they wanted with them. *The Secretary* said his sense was that this would depend somewhat on the questions under discussion, but to the extent possible Bessmertnykh and Ridgway should be there. They would have to knead the material together, and should be present to hear what was said.

*Shevardnadze* said he saw the May 30 session as a general assessment of the status and prospects of the Soviet-American relationship, and perhaps some discussion of human rights. *The Secretary* said he thought that at the initial one-on-one session the President would want to give an assessment of the outlook in a broad way. He commented that the

President also liked to say what he had to say on human rights to the General Secretary, and not to the whole world. So he expected the President would talk about human rights in the one-on-one session. That did not mean other issues could not also be discussed, or that the sides did not have a way of talking about human rights in a systematic and orderly way. But he expected the topic would be discussed there.

*Shevardnadze* reaffirmed that he expected the first meeting would touch on general Soviet-American relations, and probably the second afternoon meeting on May 30 would deal with strategic offensive arms and the ABM Treaty. Of course they could structure it otherwise. *The Secretary* said that sounded sensible to him.

*Shevardnadze* continued that on May 31 at 10:00 a.m. there would be a one-on-one in the General Secretary's office. He thought that should be a conceptual meeting, on the future of Soviet-American relations, on continuity of policies. The General Secretary would want to touch on perestroika, as well as the future of our relations. But it would be a rather short meeting. *The Secretary* joked that he had thought from the subject matter that it would last a couple of days. *Shevardnadze* joked back that it could last a month. *The Secretary* said he thought it would be useful to have some continuity with the first day's meeting. But he also understood it would be a relatively short meeting, and then the two leaders would walk to the general meeting. This would allow the President to see the inside of the Kremlin building.

*Shevardnadze* said that although they had been suggesting a broad approach, the General Secretary might wish to pick up some specific topics. *The Secretary* said that with regard to new thinking, the President had noticed the General Secretary's comments on religion. He had given this a lot of attention; it fascinated him. He would be interested to hear on an expanded basis what the General Secretary had in mind. *Shevardnadze* said the two leaders could pick and discuss what they wanted. They could put religion on the list. *The Secretary* said that would not be necessary; he had merely wanted to note that the President would be interested. *Shevardnadze* said the General Secretary would be ready. Then at the conclusion of their private talk they would walk across the Kremlin.

*Shevardnadze* continued that at the session to which they would walk they could concentrate on regional and bilateral issues.

Then at the concluding session in Catherine Hall on May 31, *Shevardnadze* continued, with the full official delegations present, they could consider the concluding documentation and consider the results of the summit.

*The Secretary* said that in considering the question of signing bilateral documents, or the PNET document—that level of material—we had been asking whether this should be done as a prelude to the



leaders' signature of the main documentation, or in some other setting not involving the two leaders. *Shevardnadze* said the Soviets had been envisaging signing of all the documents in the presence of the two leaders. *The Secretary* asked if that meant the subsidiary *and* the principal documents. *Shevardnadze* said they saw signing of four or six documents by ministers or even other officials, and then signing of the substantial document by the two leaders.

*The Secretary* said that would be a perfectly good way to do it. We had no special objection to it. But perhaps the sides should look at another option. There would be a huge press corps in Moscow. They would be looking for something to report. One possible variant would be that at the conclusion of the plenary session on regional and bilateral issues, those agreements could be signed. That would be something to report, which would be an advantage. Then the final major signing would not be diluted by separate little ceremonies. He asked Ambassador Ridgway to comment.

*Ridgway* said we had given some thought to the image and perception of a new kind of dialogue. It was a fair evaluation to say that it was not the dialogue typical of previous leaders. The previous dialogue had been associated with a grand final day, with many ministers and officials present and signing. This suggested that agreements had been reached only because of the summit, in haste, and had no value of their own. We had been careful over the past two years not to let ceremony govern the preparation of our summits. If we were successful in negotiating one, this format would also take something away from the single document to be signed by the leaders. If it were not possible to get a major document, there would be advantage to gathering the various bilateral documents together for signature, but assuming we would be successful we had been thinking it could be signed with ministers present, and the others could be signed at other points during the visit. *The Secretary* interjected again the possibility of doing this after the session on bilateral matters. *Ridgway* said that was included in the idea of doing it earlier in the visit. *The Secretary* said that of course that was not the only option.

*Shevardnadze* said they should think about these issues. The Soviet practice was to have one signing ceremony. He did not think it would take too much time. It usually took place in the Vladimir Hall, with 150–200 persons present, drawn on the Soviet side from the leadership, from among intellectuals, from Supreme Soviet deputies.

*The Secretary* said he assumed each leader would make a statement, as had happened in the past. *Shevardnadze* agreed; they would be short statements, of three to five minutes each. *The Secretary* recalled the successful experience of Geneva in 1985, after they had persuaded the leaders to make them; short, pithy statements were good.



Returning to the question of separating ceremonies, *Shevardnadze* said it would have to be carefully weighed. It was one thing to sign in the presence of the leaders; that was impressive. If they did not participate, signing would be harder to understand. *The Secretary* said he wished merely to think aloud. At the conclusion of the session on bilateral issues, the parties could go to another room, and the appropriate people could sign documents in the presence of the leaders, and each leader could make a brief statement. The statements could register that our relationship is a broad one, and say they wished to call attention that day to the bilateral elements, and the next day to the relationship across the board. He was just trying out ideas, to see if it would be desirable to break up the signing into something readily reportable, after the arrival statements and before the end.

*Powell* noted this would also be close to the model used in Washington.

*The Secretary* recalled that in Washington there had been the arrival, which was an event; then the INF signature and the statements; then the toasts, which there would also be in Moscow; and then the finale. We were looking for a counterpart to the INF signing. He urged *Shevardnadze* to think about it. *Shevardnadze* said the Soviet side would. He had no objection in principle to the separation. But he had doubts about the two leaders' attendance at a first signing. *The Secretary* said he saw some advantages to their spending three minutes there. As *Shevardnadze* had said, it would lend greater weight to the event, and they could say things on the meeting and the relationship that the press could report. It was something to think over. It was not something the President was pushing for, but he had thought about it.

*Shevardnadze* said they would think about it. The important thing was to have something to sign. *The Secretary* said there would be things to sign.

*Shevardnadze* said the Soviets would officially announce the visit May 22. They would provide the U.S. side with the text of the official announcement. *The Secretary* asked if this were routinely done. *Shevardnadze* said it was Soviet practice to announce visits in a formal way. *The Secretary* asked if this were to inform the people. *Shevardnadze* said they all knew, but since some visits were not announced officially, this one had to be too; otherwise people would not understand. There would be an official photo published in the press on the day of arrival, with a biographic note on the President. *The Secretary* said it was courteous of *Shevardnadze* to tell us about it. We did not have an official press; only an inundation of press interest. *Shevardnadze* noted that 5000 foreign journalists had already registered in Moscow.

*The Secretary* said he had mentioned Shevardnadze to his friend Katharine Graham,<sup>3</sup> who wished to interview the General Secretary and would also like to interview Shevardnadze. She had told him she would be spending some time in Leningrad; he had told her she should go to Tbilisi. She and her friend Meg Greenfield, editorial page editor of the *Post*, would be going. *Shevardnadze* said it was on the program.

*The Secretary* suggested a break (at 4:30 p.m.).

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Katharine Graham, editor of the *Washington Post*.

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## 150. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, May 11, 1988, 8:20–9:50 p.m.

### SUBJECTS

Summit Documents; Missile Tech Proliferation; Nuclear Testing; CW;  
Conventional Arms; INF; START data; Southern Africa

### PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*  
THE SECRETARY  
Gen. Powell  
Amb. Ridgway  
Amb. Matlock  
Mr. Parris (Notetaker)  
Mr. Zarechnak (Interp.)

*U.S.S.R.*  
SHEVARDNADZE  
Dep. FM Bessmertnykh  
Amb. Karpov  
Mr. Stepanov  
Mr. Tarasenko (Notetaker)  
Mr. Palazhchenko (Interp.)

### *NST Recess*

SHEVARDNADZE welcomed the Secretary and wished him success in their meeting. Returning to an issue that had been touched on that morning, he questioned whether it would be wise to adjourn the NST talks on a specific date before the summit, as the U.S. had proposed. This could create misunderstandings. It would be better to recess after the summit.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Untitled Folder. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission.

THE SECRETARY asked if Shevardnadze was proposing that the delegations simply stop meeting as a matter of course about May 24, the date the U.S. had proposed, so that delegation leaders could return to capitals for pre-summit consultations. It later be announced that the talks would resume as of a specified date. SHEVARDNADZE noted that July 12 had been suggested. THE SECRETARY said that this was acceptable.

*Summit Documents*

SHEVARDNADZE asked what the ministers should address first.

THE SECRETARY said he had some follow-up comments to their morning discussion of possible summit documents.

We had had a chance to read and reflect on the Soviet draft report and draft summit joint statement which had been handed over that morning. It seemed to us that both sides were comfortable with a joint statement that talked about progress in all areas. So that seemed to be agreeable as a base line. Perhaps there should just be a single document. But the Secretary thought it worthwhile to review our rationale in suggesting a second document in the first place.

The U.S. concern was that the two leaders would meet without an agreement to reduce strategic arms by 50%. So the purpose of the special report would be to focus on subject. It would, for example, explain why there was no agreement—i.e., that both sides insisted on a good treaty. A second purpose would be to identify areas where progress had been made and to bring out the fact that the two sides intended to continue their efforts when negotiations reconvened after the summit. Thus, the concept was to focus on strategic arms reductions.

The Soviet draft, on the other hand, included all arms control subjects. This had the effect of separating arms control from the rest of the broad agenda the two sides had developed. It ran counter to the successful framework we had built. So the Secretary had wanted to highlight the U.S. desire to focus on START in any special report. If the Soviet side did not think this a good approach, we were prepared to drop the idea and include strategic arms in a single document, along with the rest of the agenda.

If the Soviet side preferred that approach, the Secretary felt that the two sides should proceed along lines which had proved successful in Geneva and Washington. The key was to recognize what progress had been made, but to distinguish between different areas. For example, there would be a relatively full treatment of START, including in areas where much had been accomplished. In contrast, there would be less on regional issues. We might, however, supplement this by developing common briefing points which enable people to see where that dialogue was going. It was of course important to use the summit to get things

decided, but we needed also to focus on what was doable. For instance, the idea of a joint mission to Mars was interesting. The Secretary, for his part, would prefer that the Soviets went first. (SHEVARDNADZE quipped he would volunteer.) But we were not quite ready for such a commitment at this point.

The Secretary proposed that he and Shevardnadze try to decide in Geneva what was the best concept—one document or two. We were prepared to go either way. But if there were a second document, it should focus specifically on strategic arms. It was, of course, important to do as much as possible during the present visit. To this end, the Secretary proposed that Ridgway and Bessmertnykh have their working level people get together first thing the next morning to work on a joint statement and see how far they could get.

There would nonetheless be a need for further consideration of such matters. The U.S. would thus be prepared to receive a Soviet team in Washington the following week. If necessary, we would also be prepared to work in Helsinki or Washington as the summit neared.

SHEVARDNADZE said there was another possibility. If the substance justified it, there could be a separate START report.

THE SECRETARY said that that was the U.S. idea as well. But we were also open to merging the two documents. The two sides would have to be guided to some degree by the results of discussions between their arms control experts. There had been some progress since the Washington summit; but it was of the pick and shovel rather than the dramatic sort.

SHEVARDNADZE speculated that a separate START document could on the one hand record what had been achieved, and on the other contain instructions to delegations. This would underscore the continuation of the process.

THE SECRETARY noted that it would also be important to put in perspective why a Treaty had not been completed. One possibility would be to work an omnibus joint statement and a separate report, leaving open the question of whether or not the two would ultimately be merged.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that, given the centrality of strategic arms reductions and the fact that people expected a Treaty which would not be available, the two sides try to prepare a separate document on that subject. It should both reflect how much had been achieved by the time of the summit and give guidance to delegations. The document need not be lengthy.

THE SECRETARY observed that its length would depend on the degree of detail in describing what had been achieved and where things stood. The document should reassure publics that, when a Treaty was

completed, it would be the result of a carefully thought-through process. It should be clear that decisions on issues of such importance were not being taken lightly.

POWELL suggested it might be useful to hear from working groups before proceeding too far.

THE SECRETARY suggested that working level people on both sides get together to draft an omnibus joint statement in which strategic arms would be only briefly mentioned. They could also work on a report dealing with strategic arms. The ministers could review their work Thursday, and agree on a work program for next steps.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the two sides should work on a separate statement on strategic arms. He thought it would be possible to formulate an acceptable statement. There could be a second overall document on other issues.

THE SECRETARY noted that, in that case, the two leaders might best sign only the document on strategic arms, and simply issue the joint statement in their name. If the two documents were merged, the leaders would sign the combined document.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that any decision on signing arrangements await agreement on the documents themselves. For the moment, however, the two sides should assume that there would be separate documents.

#### *Missile Tech*

THE SECRETARY said he had a new subject to introduce. The issue was one which increasingly worried the U.S.—the problem of the proliferation of ballistic missiles. China had sold to Saudi Arabia missiles with ranges covered by the INF Treaty. Various countries were developing the capability to produce ballistic missiles. This was a destabilizing development, especially when combined with volatility in many of the regions involved. The Secretary mentioned the Middle East and Pakistani-Indian rivalries in this context. Noting that the two sides had briefly discussed the issue a year before, he proposed a new bilateral meeting at the experts level to explore the problem in more detail. One way to lend prominence to the discussion, he added, would be to refer to it in any summit statement. This would tell the world that the two sides had identified this as a problem and were talking about how to deal with it. The Secretary had in mind no more than a sentence.

The Secretary noted that the NPT regime, while increasingly frayed at the edges, had worked well in dealing with the problem of nuclear non-proliferation. The U.S. and Soviet Union were also engaged in a discussion of chemical weapons proliferation and how to eliminate such weapons entirely. Now a third leg had arisen—ballistic missiles.

The two sides ought to engage on this as well. The U.S. was already working with the “Summit Seven” nations<sup>2</sup> on the problem, but had come to the conclusion that the discussion had to be more comprehensive to be effective.

Asked to comment by the Secretary, POWELL concurred that the matter was one of great concern to the U.S.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the problem was acute. He thought expert-level contacts might well be the best way to start a discussion. Whether to include a reference to such contacts in a summit document was another question. But it should be possible to examine the problem before or after the summit.

THE SECRETARY said that he would be prepared to make Assistant Secretary Holmes available to discuss the matter further with whomever Shevardnadze might appoint. SHEVARDNADZE repeated that experts discussions seemed a good idea.

BESSMERTNYKH asked the Secretary for the U.S. assessment of the threat posed by the proliferation not only of ballistic, but cruise missile, technology, in the short and mid-term.

THE SECRETARY observed that people all over the world were smart. They saw that weapons existed. Once it was established that weapons could be given certain characteristics, it was natural that people should seek to copy them. Indeed, in the absence of other constraints, countries might feel obliged to do so. But if a regime were in place which discouraged proliferation, such a process became less likely.

Ballistic missile technology was currently proliferating in a number of parts of the world. The PRC clearly had no inhibitions against selling their missiles. Our approaches had been met with indignation that we would seek to interfere with their trade. Our current focus was on ballistic missiles, because that was where the problems had arisen; there was no reason that similar problems might not also arise with respect to cruise missiles. So the answer to Bessmertnykh’s question was that cruise missile proliferation was a potentially big problem which we ought to be able to address before it got out of control.

SHEVARDNADZE said that consultations should take place. THE SECRETARY said we would expect whomever Shevardnadze designated to contact Holmes. KARPOV said he had already discussed the issue with seven other countries and would be ready to meet with Holmes.

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the Group of Seven, or “G7”: United States, United Kingdom, France, Japan, Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, and Italy.

*Nuclear Testing*

SHEVARDNADZE asked whether the ministers should turn to other arms control issues or leave it to their experts.

THE SECRETARY said he had had a report from Amb. Nitze and his colleagues already. In the nuclear testing field, there seemed to be a good working spirit and the people involved felt 90% confident that by the time of the summit the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET) documents would be completed. The question had arisen as to whether we would be able to present the PNET for ratification. The answer was “yes,” although it could not enter into force until verification provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty had been renegotiated. So it appeared that there would be something on hand for the summit in this area. The Secretary asked Shevardnadze if he had a different report.

SHEVARDNADZE said he did not. He felt that this was the area where the most tangible progress had been achieved. It appeared that both of the documents to which the Secretary had referred could be signed in Moscow.

*Chemical Weapons*

Turning to chemical weapons, THE SECRETARY noted that there had been a discussion in working groups of language for inclusion in a Moscow summit statement. The Soviet side had put forward various proposals for additional work. Some of them were interesting. Our sense was that they would be best discussed at the next session of the Conference on Disarmament, but this would not preclude bilateral discussions on the margins of the Conference. In any cases, experts should continue working on statements for the summit. That approach had worked well in the past.

SHEVARDNADZE opined that it would be possible to produce a solid statement, either for separate release or inclusion in a joint document. There were good prospects for real progress in the CW area. Perhaps it would be possible to say that both countries intended to become parties to a CW convention; this would set a good example. Working groups might prepare such a statement for the ministers’ review the next day. Another idea which had come up was the possibility of parallel statements on CW for use at the UN Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD).<sup>3</sup>

THE SECRETARY said we could consider these ideas. Ministers could revisit them the next day.

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to the United Nations Third Special Session on Disarmament, held in New York from May 31 to June 26.



SHEVARDNADZE reiterated that it was up to the U.S. and Soviet Union to set an example on CW. He noted that Moscow had in the past tried to work with the UK only to find that British interest waned when U.S.-Soviet differences arose. Other U.S. allies were also interested in moving ahead on CW—the FRG and Italy among them. France was more “fluid.”

THE SECRETARY asked Shevardnadze if he would attend the SSOD. If he were, there was a possibility that the ministers could do some additional work. In the run-up to the OECD summit, however, this would be a busy time for us.

SHEVARDNADZE said he did, in fact, intend to go to New York. He would arrive June 5 or 6 and speak on the eighth.

THE SECRETARY said that the NAC Foreign Ministers meeting would run from June 9–10, and that he would depart for the Middle East immediately thereafter. Thus, it appeared he would not be in the U.S. during Shevardnadze’s visit.

#### *Conventional Arms*

Turning to conventional armaments, the Secretary said that he had been encouraged by what Shevardnadze had had to say that morning on possible new Soviet moves at the Vienna Follow-up Meeting. If there were a breakthrough in Vienna on human rights, the two sides would have to move quickly to put the finishing touches on a conventional arms negotiations mandate. We were of the view that it was useful to continue to talk about the mandate, but felt it was essential that the primary forum remain in Vienna. So we were interested in Soviet views, but considered it important to keep the discussion going in Vienna through Amb. Ledogar. Both sides should tell their negotiators to get on the front burners because human rights issues might be breaking. We were willing to work hard in Vienna to get to the point where something could be reflected at the summit.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had a similar view. If the two ministers could develop suitable language for a mandate in Geneva, afterwards the Secretary would see his allies<sup>4</sup> and Shevardnadze would be going to Berlin to inform Warsaw Pact countries. They could have a good discussion with their respective allies, and the issue could be recorded in the Moscow joint statement with the support of those allies.

THE SECRETARY said we were prepared to talk. If we could find things which were good, OK. But we had to maintain the structure of allied consultations. The more that could be done in Vienna, the better off both sides would be in the long run.

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<sup>4</sup> Shultz briefed NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels on May 13.

SHEVARDNADZE asserted that agreement had previously been reached that dual-capable systems would not be excluded from the mandate. This was a basic question. This now needed to be reflected in appropriate language for the mandate. The Soviet Union had now decided on new instructions for its negotiators. It was ready to adopt language to cover conventional arms, armed forces and equipment, with no conventional arms or equipment to be excluded based on its ability to use not only conventional but other weapons. This approach, Shevardnadze said, should be acceptable to NATO. If it were possible to reach agreement on a mandate before the summit, it would be a major achievement for the leaders to cite.

THE SECRETARY suggested that Shevardnadze transmit the language he had used to the Soviet negotiator in Vienna that evening. Without making any commitments, the Secretary felt that the two sides were getting very close. We would advise our negotiator to expect an approach. The two ministers could see where things stood the next day. The important thing was to keep the play in Vienna to the extent possible. We could call Ledogar tonight and instruct him to call in a report by noon the next day. It seemed from what Shevardnadze had said that we were getting somewhere.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the working group in Geneva also be charged to continue its work.

THE SECRETARY said they were already engaged. The procedural point, he emphasized, was critical if we were to achieve anything. Shevardnadze had earlier mentioned the French. They were our allies. They were always very demanding with respect to procedure. To do the job right, we had to be sensitive to procedures in Vienna. The Secretary was not resisting the discussion Shevardnadze proposed, but he would rather that the issue were discussed first in Vienna and then in Brussels, rather than going through Brussels to Vienna. The Secretary added that Ridgway had reminded him that this approach was similar to that the two ministers had used in facilitating the Stockholm CDE end-game. That had worked well.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would not further debate the issue with the Secretary. Negotiators could work in Vienna. But the discussion had reminded him of the outstanding Soviet proposal for an exchange of data in advance of the conventional arms negotiations. Shevardnadze had thought a lot about the idea. If the U.S., the Soviet Union and their allies adopted such an approach it would be a major step toward encouraging some of the positive trends emerging in Europe in this area. He was not convinced that the Soviet proposal was unnecessary. There had been so much talk about an imbalance on one side or the other. It would be good to get figures on the table. Shevardnadze did not understand why the U.S. feared the concept.

THE SECRETARY said we had no fear. We simply believed that the first question was to settle on a mandate so talks could begin. Maybe negotiators could take up a data exchange thereafter. But fourteen years of MBFR talks did not inspire confidence that concentrating on data right off the bat was a promising approach. Perhaps a discussion could be structured to avoid becoming bogged down. At some point, of course, we would have to deal with data, as we had in INF. So we were not resisting the idea. We had views on timing and a certain apprehension based on the MBFR experience. We were not resisting the principle.

“So be it,” said SHEVARDNADZE. He was not persuaded, but he would not push the issue. He had expected the West to applaud the Soviet proposal.

THE SECRETARY said we would be glad to receive any data the Soviet side wanted to pass on.

The most difficult area, he continued, was START and Defense and Space. Working groups were already at work and had dealt with three items already, according to the reports the Secretary had heard. The Secretary would be glad to hear any comments Shevardnadze might have, but he was inclined to await a full report from the experts when they had concluded their discussions rather than work in parallel.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed the ministers should hear from experts the next day.

*INF*

THE SECRETARY said that the most important thing to accomplish in Geneva was to deal with on site inspection issues which had arisen in the Senate’s debate of the INF Treaty. It seemed, he lamented, that the two ministers could never get away from talking about INF. But the issues which had arisen needed to be resolved. There had been a good discussion that morning, although closure seemed to be elusive. But if the Secretary went home without a solution, he could tell Shevardnadze that there was no chance that INF would be ratified in time for the summit. (At this point, there was a clap of thunder from outside.) On the other hand, if the ministers could reach agreement, there would be a good chance that the treaty could be ratified by then. It would be a huge set-back to get stalled after all that had been achieved. The things which were being discussed, while important, were basically the details. The Secretary asked Powell to comment.

POWELL underscored the importance of resolving in Geneva the issues which had arisen. The Senate was waiting for an answer on futuristic weapons and the nine inspection questions. We hoped they could be resolved the next day, so that Powell could take them right back and present them to the Senate. The Treaty could then go to the

floor as early as Monday.<sup>5</sup> That would create a high probability that instruments of ratification could be exchanged in Moscow. Powell assured Shevardnadze that the U.S. approach to these questions was not to seek advantages in resolving questions on which the Treaty was not clear. He could not overemphasize the importance of reaching conclusions the next day.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet side had not expected the latest questions which had arisen. When the Secretary had raised the futuristics issue here in Geneva, Shevardnadze had responded and thought that was the end of it.

THE SECRETARY said that futuristics had never been a real issue. But it had to be dealt with. POWELL said it had been now. THE SECRETARY said what we were dealing with on the nine questions was a self-inflicted wound arising from a desire to put implementations groups to work early. It was in the nature of that work that problems had been found. Now we had to deal with them. Maybe it was good practice.

SHEVARDNADZE said Moscow had taken the nine questions seriously. The appropriate experts had looked into the matter carefully. The Soviets thought their initial answers had been adequate. Now it turned out they were not. And when the Soviets looked at the U.S. questions, they realized they had questions of their own. So, Shevardnadze suggested, the two sides should try to resolve these on a mutual basis, should try to find optimal solutions. But Soviet as well as U.S. interests had to be taken into account. Americans, including the President, often stressed how advantageous the Treaty was to the U.S. side. But it seemed there was no end to arguments about ratification. Soviet interests also needed to be taken into account.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the principle in seeking solutions should be what was in the Treaty. What it said, that was what should be done. Sometimes one side would not like the result, sometimes another. But it was too late to begin undercutting the Treaty.

SHEVARDNADZE protested that no one wanted to change the Treaty. It was a good Treaty. The Soviet side was answering the questions which had arisen. But it needed answers from the U.S. as well—e.g., on the question of P-1a missiles on U.S. territory, on the question of stages for Pershing missiles.

THE SECRETARY asked if POWELL would like to comment. POWELL said he could not comment on P-1a's. As for stages, they were not in the Treaty, so we were surprised when the Soviet side had raised

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<sup>5</sup> May 16.

them. They had not been previously discussed. But it had been hard to explain this to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

KAPROV replied that the issue had in fact been discussed at length, briefly reviewing the negotiating history.

POWELL noted that this pointed up the need for a thorough discussion in working groups.

THE SECRETARY said he hoped Amb. Glitman and his colleagues could resolve the issues without the ministers' having to become involved. The Secretary had been asked before he came to Geneva, he mused, if he thought the Soviets were reneging on their commitments. He had said, "no." These were the kinds of problems which arose when one got down to the specifics of implementation. We were doing things which had never been done before.

SHEVARDNADZE said the Soviet side understood the situation. It had looked for and would look for the right solutions. But the U.S. should look at Soviet concerns as well. They were serious concerns which, if handled correctly, would help deal with the whole situation. Shevardnadze said he did not understand why P-1a's had reemerged as an issue. He had thought them dealt with. Experts should be told to clarify the issues and report to ministers the next day.

#### *START Data*

Shevardnadze said that, before moving on, he wanted to raise data exchange on strategic arms. Handing over a list, Shevardnadze noted that this should remove any reason for U.S. criticism that the Soviet side was withholding such data.

THE SECRETARY said he was glad to have the data. It was something which could be pointed to as evidence of continued progress.

#### *Southern Africa*

THE SECRETARY said he wanted [to] raise southern Africa before breaking off the meeting. Recent U.S.-Soviet exchanges on the region, we thought, had been particularly useful. Both sides had made visits to the region, and Assistant Secretary Crocker had met with Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin. There had been an unprecedented exchange in London involving Cuba, Angola and South Africa. Preparations were being made for another meeting. We would see what South Africa came back with, but were encouraged by their indication that they would honor their commitments with respect to UNSC Res. 435.

So, the Secretary continued, perhaps something was working in the region. In the end, it would be important for national reconciliation to fall into place for the situation to come to completion. We were aware of discussions among African countries to this end, and consid-

ered them an appropriate means of pursuing it. So developments were potentially promising. We were prepared to push.

Crocker was working hard, and was ready to meet again with Adamishin before the summit. Perhaps a signal that the leaders of the U.S. and Soviet Union considered the issue important could be constructive. Crocker had expressed willingness, the Secretary noted, to come to Geneva to meet Adamishin on the margins of the ministers meetings, but this had proved impossible. Crocker was nonetheless ready to meet.

The Secretary observed that Shevardnadze had said in the past that the conclusion of the Afghanistan accords had put our regional discussion on a more substantive plane than previously. Something new was now happening in southern Africa. Both the U.S. and Soviet Union had had a role. If an agreement could be reached on national reconciliation, Cuban withdrawal and implementation of UNSC 435, it would have significance beyond the immediate problems involved. It might, for example, make possible the reopening of the Benguela railroad, loosening South Africa's economic stranglehold on the region.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the process underway in southern Africa was encouraging. It was good that experts had been meeting. The atmosphere for their discussions had been good. It was good that South Africa was getting involved. It was also important that the Soviet Union was being consulted. It was hard to say, Shevardnadze continued, how the situation would evolve. The idea of national reconciliation was taking root in many parts of the world. So contacts should be continued, and the two sides should look for more effective ways to become involved.

Shevardnadze could say on the basis of direct contacts with the Angolans and Cubans that they wanted a solution as soon as possible. The Angolans could not afford the burden of the war; the Cubans had made a decision to withdraw their forces within the timeframe being discussed in the negotiations. South Africa was less predictable. The most important thing was for all concerned to endorse the relevant UNSC resolutions. They provided a good basis for further discussions.

THE SECRETARY said he thought the ministers should consider three things: (a) whether another Crocker-Adamishin meeting before the summit was desirable; (b) whether there should be a reference in the summit joint statement as a signal; and (c) should the summit reference emphasize the importance of national reconciliation, thereby encouraging the Angolan government not to avoid talks with UNITA. The Secretary said he understood Shevardnadze might want to think about these points.

SHEVARDNADZE said he was prepared to respond on the spot. There should be a meeting before the summit. The date could be set.

Previous meetings had been useful. As for a joint statement reference, the Soviet side had some language to propose. It might be strengthened, perhaps, by references to UN resolutions and national reconciliation. As for Angola's attitude toward UNITA, that was a different question, one which had no place in a summit statement.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that a reference to national reconciliation would itself be a signal.

The meeting concluded without further discussion.

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## 151. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Geneva, May 12, 1988, 9:10–11:30 a.m.

### SUBJECT

The Secretary's Third Meeting with Shevardnadze

### PARTICIPANTS

#### U.S.

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State  
Colin Powell, President's National  
Security Advisor  
Max Kampelman, Counselor of the  
Department of State  
Jack F. Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to  
Moscow  
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant  
Secretary of State (EUR)  
Maynard Glitman, INF Negotiator  
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy  
Assistant Secretary of State  
(EUR) (notetaker)  
Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)

#### USSR

Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of  
Foreign Affairs  
Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh,  
Deputy Foreign Minister  
Viktor Karpov, MFA Department  
Head  
Col. General Nikolai Chervov,  
Soviet General Staff  
Viktor Sukhodrev, MFA Acting  
Department head (notetaker)  
Sergei Tarasenko, Chief of  
Shevardnadze's Secretariat  
Pavel Palazhchenko, (interpreter)  
(fnu) Nagradov, Soviet Mission,  
Geneva (notetaker)

After the photo opportunity and an exchange of pleasantries, Ambassador *Kampelman* reported that he and Ambassador Karpov had reached substantial agreement on the form of the paper (on futuristics). It would be an exchange of notes between the two governments.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Untitled Folder. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons. The meeting took place in the Ambassador's Office at the U.S. Mission.



Ambassador Karpov and his counsel had recommended a few changes that morning. The U.S. side had reviewed them. It believed they strengthened the text, and did not alter its meaning. The only issue that remained concerned the form of finalizing the documents. Both recommended that it be finalized that day, without going through embassies.

*Karpov* said he had nothing to add. The texts were agreed.

*Shevardnadze* commented smilingly that Karpov and Kampelman normally reported differently: on how hard things were, on how dramatic the situation was, on how there were no solutions. This time their reports had been simple. *The Secretary* said that the more quickly they finished and established what they had agreed through signed documents, the better off the sides would be. It would be an advantage to put down and sign the agreement. *Kampelman* said they intended to do so that day. *Shevardnadze* suggested that they formalize the matter in their second session that day. He asked Karpov to confirm that it would be an inter-governmental agreement, and *Karpov* did. *The Secretary* suggested there be a little ceremony with the signing.

The Secretary then suggested they hear the reports of their INF negotiators.

Ambassador *Glitman* reported that they had reached a fair number of agreements, but he wished to focus on those issues where there were still difficulties.

The first concerned missiles coming out of Votkinsk, he continued. There was no guarantee that the size of the SS-20 containers leaving Votkinsk would be big enough to hold SS-20's but too small to hold anything else. The factory produced them assembled, and the U.S. side needed to inspect them to make sure they held only SS-20's.

*The Secretary* invited Chervov to comment issue by issue. Chervov said that on this one there was a difference of opinion about the treaty. If one followed the U.S. position as set forth by Glitman, the sides would have to revise the treaty and its inspection protocol. This question had not been in the treaty; a change in the treaty would be required. The agreement there was that the main criterion would be checking the SS-20 without its warhead in its canister. That was what was recorded. Checking it without its canister and without its warhead would require a change in the treaty.

*Glitman* said the U.S. side saw no need to change either the treaty or the protocol. The measurements were for assembled missiles as well as canisters coming out of the final assembly plant, as referred to in Article 11. The protocol called for inspection of shipments of missiles, and we knew they were assembled without their front sections. The memorandum of understanding allowed for determination of their

length and weight. It was hard to see the purpose of inspections if such systems were not inspected. We had hoped that the Soviet side would not ship systems with dimensions between those assembled without their front sections and those assembled with their front sections but in their canisters. This turned out to be a misunderstanding. Hence the Soviet side might be shipping items in containers large enough to hold an assembled SS-20 without its front end but in containers too small under the Soviet interpretation for the U.S. side to open and look at. We would have to say we could not verify if SS-20's were coming out or not.

*The Secretary* invited Glitman to go on to the next issue. That concerned site diagrams, *Glitman* continued. The sides had agreed to reciprocal inspection of the whole areas covered by the diagrams. The diagram was the whole page with everything on it. The problem concerned three Soviet site diagrams, of missile production facilities. The Soviet side now said that, contrary to the U.S. understanding, not all but only a portion of the areas covered by these diagrams was subject to inspection.

This raised legal and practical problems, Glitman said. The legal problem was that the treaty provided for no change in the boundaries on the diagram, and for inspection of everything within the boundaries. The practical problem was that in the negotiations the Soviet side had discussed—and we had prepared our diagrams to reflect that it had been agreed on—inspection of everything in the facilities on the diagrams. On our side this included the factory where cruise missile launchers are made, and the same held for the factory where Pershings are made. The Soviet side could go anywhere; the pattern was repeated.

As a practical matter, Glitman continued, if we changed what the treaty said, what was agreed to, this would reduce the areas subject to inspection throughout the document. The document was available to the public and the Senate. They would see this as a retreat from the agreement. Some corrections would be needed, concerning things like roads and distances. But those were corrigenda. What the Soviet side was suggesting would change obligations, and reduce the area that could be inspected from what the world saw. He had dealt with the Senate for some months. It had been critical. And the treaty said there would be no change in boundaries or obligations.

*Chervov* said that when Obukhov had transmitted the diagrams indicating which premises were open for inspection, there had been agreement on inspection for those areas marked and indicated by coordinates. Thus the U.S. side was trying to change, to break an agreement made by the two ambassadors. It was also understood that the U.S. and Soviet sides would be making amendments in the diagrams. The Soviet side was ready to make some by specifying the areas to be inspected.

Chervov addressed the Secretary. Pifer had given the Soviets a proposal in Moscow for a number of changes in the Soviet and American diagrams. (*Matlock* explained to the Secretary that Pifer was the Embassy political-military specialist.) *Chervov* continued that the changes proposed were not only corrigenda, but required consideration, to the point where new negotiations were necessary. The two sides' agreement to resolve these issues by May 16 was made technically and substantively impossible to implement. The U.S. proposals required further consideration. The sides should introduce as few amendments and corrigenda as possible in order to finish by May 16. Pifer had submitted these proposals in Moscow; he had not yet discussed them with Glitman.

*Glitman* commented that there was quite a difference between the corrections we felt were needed and the drastic changes in obligations put forward by the Soviet side. Ours concerned issues like page size; how a title reads; making a site name clear; whether a direction arrow was true or magnetic north; how to make boundaries distinct; how to make scales uniform. These were nowhere the same type of issue as reducing by eighty percent or more what was shown to be available for inspection. A solution was needed before the treaty entered into force, because thereafter there could be no more changes.

*Karpov* said that some of Pifer's proposals were technical, but others were more than that. He said there was a need for a brief listing of every building on a given piece of territory; for site changes, for changes of roads; for agreeing on the principles of movement between parts of facilities. *Glitman* interjected that such changes would not change obligations under the treaty. *Karpov* said he was not at all sure that the changes proposed by Pifer did not change obligations. That was a question that needed to be examined.

*The Secretary* said he was more and more depressed.

*Glitman* said the next issue was the smallest item that could be inspected. On the Soviet side this was the first stage of the SS-12, the stage of the SS-23 and the SS-CX-4, and the SS-4 launchstand. On the U.S. side it was the Pershing-II and the DGM 109 cruise missile launchstand. Agreement had been reached on these, and that was what the treaty provided for. But now the Soviets had linked this to an issue not discussed in the treaty, the location in transit of the second stage of the Pershing-II. That was not in the treaty, and this could be documented. The treaty did permit the Soviets to look for Pershing-II second stages when they came on bases. We had gone beyond that, and said that when they came on bases we would tell them how many there were and where they were. This was beyond what was required by the treaty, but we would do it. But there was no requirement to notify transit. There was a provision in the MOU for both sides to list the

aggregates of second stages, but nowhere was there a requirement to list second stages at facilities. This had been discussed in the negotiations, and rejected by the U.S. The Soviet side had accepted that. If the Soviets could accept what the treaty said, we could take a step forward.

*Chervov* said that in principle, as *Glitman* correctly noted, there had been discussion in the negotiations of a package wherein it was envisaged that the U.S. could give information about PII stages at facilities, their numbers and the changes in their numbers. Within that package the Soviets were ready to accept the *Glitman* approach. Otherwise the solution would not be consistent with what had been worked out in the process of negotiation.

*Glitman* said the U.S. could accept that. That meant that one important issue had been resolved.

Another issue had come up the night before, *Glitman* continued. The treaty specified procedures for use of equipment for inspections. The inspecting party could bring in its own equipment, and if it considered that an ambiguity existed, it could ask the inspected party to take a photograph, and that had to be done, according to the inspection protocol. We had thought that was agreed.

*Chervov* said it was agreed.

*Glitman* said it had also been agreed that at an elimination site each side could verify the technical characteristics of inspected items, by selecting eight to twelve items at random from samples of each item to be inspected, and subjecting them to measurements and weighing.

*Chervov* said the Soviet side agreed.

*Glitman* said they had also agreed to confirm the type of missiles to be eliminated, especially for missiles in canisters, by opening the front and back ends and looking through access ports, using the type of visual equipment in use at Votkinsk. The U.S. side was prepared to accept such an outcome.

*Chervov* said the Soviet side agreed.

*Glitman* said they had also reached agreement on the Soviet proposal concerning SS-12 and SS-23 stage length: there should be a corrigendum in the MOU for the 23, but none was required for the 12.

*Chervov* said the Soviet side agreed.

With regard to photographs, *Glitman* went on, although *Chervov* had to make one more check, the Soviet side had been shown the U.S. photographs, and in return it had agreed to give the U.S. photographs of the SS-12 and SS-23 with their front ends. We had agreed to accept a photo of the front section of the SS-20, which did not need to be attached. The only question was how to arrange the exchange of pictures. We had ours, and the Soviet side did not have theirs. We suggested that the exchange take place in Moscow. We needed the Soviet

photos, including that of the front section of the SS-20, and it was important to have them Friday or Saturday (May 14–15), so that the Senate debate could begin on Monday. He did not need to remind the Soviets of previous problems with Senators concerning photographs.

*Chervov* said the situation was as Ambassador Glitman reported. It was desirable to effect the exchange as soon as possible through the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. He had told Glitman about the photo of the front section of the SS-20. He asked to be allowed to think about it through lunch and report back. For the others it was as Glitman had said.

*Shevardnadze* joked that after lunch he might be in a better mood. *The Secretary* said it was therefore not a question of whether the Soviets would provide the photo, but only of how fast. *Chervov* said it would be soon.

*Glitman* continued that they had agreed on the specificity of intermediate transit points. This was a technical question. The parties agreed to provide the coordinates of the nearest city to the point where the missile was at the moment the transit was made. If the points were all railway stations, their coordinates would be given. If they were not at railway stations, the notification would be by coordinates for the nearest city and the distance and compass bearing from the city to the location.

*Chervov* said on that issue a little more discussion was required. It had not been resolved to mutual satisfaction. It needed more discussion. The problem was not only about coordinates, but also about the U.S. position that went beyond them. *Glitman* said direction and distances were needed; otherwise the Soviets could notify “somewhere in the vicinity of Moscow.” *Chervov* repeated that more discussion was needed.

*Glitman* continued that two other issues raised by the Soviets should be easier to resolve.

First, *Glitman* said, the Soviets had asked the U.S. to specify elimination sites. They were Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona for cruise missiles, and we were looking at three sites for the Pershings, including our old friend Longhorn in Texas. We had told the Soviets that informally. The problem had to do with state laws on the environment and lengthy procedures under those laws. We would be on the phone, and might have more to report. *Chervov* said that was fine.

The second issue, *Glitman* reported, concerning PLA's belonging to the FRG located in the U.S. Here discussion had been difficult. In our view they were subject to a U.S.–FRG bilateral agreement. The ministers had had long discussions on this issue. We had believed that it had been resolved and that we would hear no more of it. Those in the U.S. fell under the same program of cooperation as those in the FRG. They

were not American systems. The fact that some were in the U.S. did not make them American. They were German. We had checked the language of Chancellor Kohl's statement, in which he said that these missiles would be eliminated, and it referred to all of them, not just those in the FRG.<sup>2</sup>

Glitman continued that we thought the Soviets had raised the issue because we told them that when they came to inspect our facilities they would find some of these German missiles. According to the inspection protocol and within the boundaries of some site diagrams, there were structures large enough to hold Pershing missiles that housed German missiles, guarded by German soldiers. Under the treaty the Soviet side had the right to say it wanted to see them. They would be opened, and Soviet inspectors could look inside. This was covered by the treaty. But the treaty did not say that these missiles were American, and should be listed with their locations as American. By this logic U.S. missiles in Europe would be Belgian, Italian or German. It seemed to us that this issue had been resolved long ago in a practical way. The Kohl statement applied, and the Soviet right to inspect at such facilities was also protected.

*The Secretary* said the Soviet Union had the right under the treaty to assure itself that these missiles were German and not American. Perhaps there was a practical solution to the problem.

*Chervov* said the issue was complex. They had had a long discussion the day before. There was no need to go through it all. One thing that was confusing was why these missiles had not come to light during the negotiation. It had emerged in the previous few days. He was sure that if it had come up earlier it would have been resolved. But it was natural that it had assumed another coloration for having come up late. The day before they had discussed not only looking at the missiles but also inside them. Observing them through a window or door was not inspection.

*The Secretary* repeated that perhaps there was a practical way to resolve the issue. As the Soviet side inspected in the U.S., and saw missiles said by the U.S. to be German, then it had the right to inspect them to make sure they belonged to Germany and not to the U.S. If he understood it, that was what the Soviets were after. Perhaps the issue was under control.

*Shevardnadze* said he still could not resist expressing concern. Why had this not been discussed before during the negotiations?, he asked. He remembered their discussions in September.<sup>3</sup> They had discussed

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 71.

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 66–76.

the final determination of Chancellor Kohl. The world knew there were 72 warheads on FRG missiles. Now it turned out there were more. In any matter there had to be elementary honesty. It aggravated him that the matter had not been raised before at foreign minister level. The Soviets did not know how many there were. Perhaps the Germans had them in Japan. Kohl and Genscher had not mentioned them.

Shevardnadze asked about formal confirmation. If the situation was as Glitman described it—if these missiles belonged to the FRG—where was the legal proof? This was not a simple question. Were there launchers on U.S. territory that belonged to the FRG? If so, how many were there? This was a curiosity, an oddity, but it had to be taken into account in the future. The implications were serious. If they were not able to clarify it completely, as they had with the 72 warheads in September, the treaty would fail of ratification in the Supreme Soviet. The West German factor was special for the Soviets. It had not only a military aspect, but a political-moral aspect that was even more important, as he had said in the past.

*The Secretary* recalled that at a certain point Chancellor Kohl had made a unilateral statement that the FRG would destroy the Pershings that it owned. We had said that when it did, the cooperation agreement would be terminated. At that point the warheads would be unencumbered, and would have the same status as those that belonged to the U.S., and would be dealt with as the treaty provided for those similar warheads. That had solved the problem.

If one had a certain number of deployed missiles, the Secretary continued, one trained with such missiles to support the workability of the system. Both the Soviets and the Americans did that. It should not be surprising—it did not constitute a failure—to discover that such activity took place with regard to German missiles. With respect to the treaty, the Soviet side had the right to inspect the inventory, so to speak, of U.S. Pershing missiles. And, as Ambassador Glitman had said, as the Soviet side saw similar missiles that we said belonged to the Germans it could see by their characteristics that they were German and not ours. In the end, according to the Kohl statement, those missiles would disappear.

General *Powell* stressed that they would disappear.

*The Secretary* continued that the situation was thus entirely consistent with their discussion. The only question raised by the Soviet side was what they might see about these missiles, and we recognized that it had the right to satisfy itself that they were not ours. The Secretary read the passage from Chancellor Kohl's statement, pointing out that it covered all these missiles.



*Shevardnadze* asked where else we had such missiles. *Glitman* responded that as far as we were aware such missiles were only in the FRG and the U.S. As the Secretary had suggested, most were training systems, and inert. There were some launchers. *Shevardnadze* commented that we were negotiating partners, and asked again why the Soviet side had not known about these missiles. *The Secretary* said we had not been negotiating about them. They came under a U.S.-FRG agreement. The issue had been resolved by the Kohl unilateral statement and the information we had provided about what would happen when they were unencumbered, what we would do then. But we would not negotiate with the Soviets about our agreement with the FRG. The Kohl statement had been comprehensive in its coverage, and had been made in good faith.

*Shevardnadze* asked how it could be proved that these missiles were German. The presence of German soldiers would not be enough. *The Secretary* said he assumed there were various ways to do so, marks of ownership and the like.

*Glitman* said the Soviets could assume that the situation was the same as in the FRG itself. The concern should be the same as with the 72. If the Soviets had been satisfied that they were not ours, the same should hold for those in the U.S. The location had nothing to do with what they looked like. Those in the U.S. should be less of a problem, in terms of geography, than those in the FRG.

*Shevardnadze* asked how the Soviets were going to look around on U.S. territory. *Glitman* said this was provided for in the protocol and our site diagrams; the Soviets would be able to look. *Shevardnadze* asked if the U.S. side would provide the Soviets with locations. *The Secretary* said that was not subject to negotiation between the Soviet and U.S. sides. They had discussed this principle at great length. *Glitman* said that when the Soviets got to a site and went around it, they would have the right to go into any structure that could house a Pershing, including German Pershings. *Shevardnadze* asked if they were not stored elsewhere. *Glitman* replied that they were not, as far as we were aware. He was being frank in saying that the Soviets would find them.

*Shevardnadze* asked if the U.S. side could tell the Soviets the number, how many of these missiles there were. It had said that they existed. They were not toys, but weapons.

*Bessmertnykh* explained that the problem for the Soviets was that there was no difference between a Pershing that was German and any other Pershing. The question was whether Pershings on U.S. territory were U.S. or not U.S. This was not the same as the problem of Pershings on German territory. The Soviets needed to know what was U.S. on U.S. territory and what was not. If U.S. inspectors came to Soviet territory and found hundreds of missiles guarded by GDR soldiers, it would not be satisfied if it were told they belonged to the GDR.

*The Secretary* asked if there were GDR missiles on Soviet territory. *Bessmertnykh* said no, his example had been hypothetical. But it explained the Soviet concern.

*Karpov* asked if the U.S. side knew the number of such missiles. *Glitman* said that we did. *Karpov* asked him to state it. *Glitman* said he did not believe he was authorized to do so. *The Secretary* said that was not a matter for U.S.-Soviet discussion.

*Karpov* said the problem was that for three years the FRG would have 72 missiles in the FRG and an unknown number in the U.S. The Soviet side would not know whether these latter were being prepared to replace eliminated U.S. Pershings. It would not have a way to verify this. *The Secretary* said the Soviets did know that Kohl had made a statement that the FRG would dismantle these missiles.

*Shevardnadze* said the issue should not be left unresolved. If it were, there would be no ratification of the treaty. The U.S. had the Senate, but the Soviets had a senate too. The Soviet side had to know how many of these missiles there were, including the legal aspect. *Kampelman*, as a lawyer, would know how important that [was]. *The Secretary* advised him not to enlist *Kampelman*.

*Chervov* asked whether Congress knew about this problem. *Shevardnadze* said he did not know how people would describe it when it became public knowledge.

*The Secretary* said that the situation was as it had been worked out as a result of the Chancellor's statement. The Soviets had the ability to see these missiles, to see and check that they were not ours. Kohl's statement applied to all such missiles. There were no German warheads associated with such missiles; all the warheads belonged to us, and would be dealt with under the treaty provisions.

*Shevardnadze* said he was sure the Bundestag did not know about this issue. *The Secretary* said someone there knew about it, because they paid the bill.

*Glitman* pointed out that during the baseline inspection during the first 90 days, Soviet inspectors at all the U.S. declared facilities would see these German missiles and launchers; they would do an inventory of their numbers and location.

*Shevardnadze* asked how many they would look for, how many there were. They would not know how many to look for.

*The Secretary* noted that the negotiators had gone through the lists of issues, and some issues had been resolved, and three were left to resolve. He suggested that they should be able to resolve them before noon. *Glitman* said they would seek to reduce their agreements to writing. *Shevardnadze* reaffirmed that if there were no clarity on the Pershing issue, there would be no treaty. *The Secretary* said there should be clarity on all issues, not just the Pershing.

(A 5-minute break was called at 10:30. Kampelman, Glitman, Chervov and Nagradov left, and Shevardnadze's personal assistant Teymuraz Stepanov joined the group.)

*The Secretary* said he had one suggestion to make for the summit, for something that might be agreed to and set out there. When Secretary Carlucci had met with Minister Yazov, they had discussed a confidence-building measure concerning notifications of ICBM and SLBM launches. He had the impression that Yazov had found the suggestion useful. He saw that in the START drafts, both sides had called for advance notification of ICBM and SLBM launches, and their formulations had only minor differences. So the U.S. side would be ready, if Shevardnadze thought it a good idea, to take this out of the package and make a separate agreement of it. This fitted with the concept of the nuclear risk reduction centers we had established. It was not a major thing, but it was doable without disrupting the basic START negotiations. If Shevardnadze was interested, they could instruct their negotiators to draft an agreement that could be signed at the summit.

*Shevardnadze* said he knew the question had been raised during the meeting of the defense ministers. He said the Soviet side would examine it. Probably a week or ten days would be enough time to examine it, and they would reply. He knew their people had been assigned the task of looking at it. There was enough time before the summit.

*The Secretary* said that if the Geneva negotiators were told to complete such an agreement, it would be ready for conclusion, if that was the Soviet decision. But if they did not work on language until the Soviets made a decision, it would then be too late. *Shevardnadze* said they should be told to work out such language.

*The Secretary* asked Shevardnadze if he had additional points to make.

*Shevardnadze* noted that at that day's second session they would listen to the reports of the working group on nuclear matters. At their level they had not yet discussed these matters, but Obukhov had told him there were some points of convergence. If they accumulated enough, a good document could be adopted at the level of the President and the General Secretary.

Shevardnadze recalled that at their last Moscow consultations he had raised the issue of restricting naval activities. It seemed that the Secretary had not objected in principle. He said he would like to outline again what had been discussed.

What they had in mind, Shevardnadze went on, was a broad discussion of mutual concerns, not just with regard to their two countries, but with regard to other countries as well. This could begin with a

discussion of the naval balance between the Soviet Union and the U.S. They could seek mutually acceptable approaches on restricting activities in seas and oceans contiguous to Europe: the North, the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean.

Shevardnadze said he understood that these questions were not simple. Perhaps such questions were not convenient; perhaps the U.S. side was not comfortable with them. But sooner or later the two countries would have to deal with them. Perhaps at first this discussion should not be at the foreign minister level. But groundwork should be laid. He wanted to remind the Secretary of that.

*The Secretary* said Shevardnadze could consider him reminded. It was not a question of our being comfortable. Our naval people were thinking about it. General *Powell* said they were considering how a dialogue might be opened, but it would not include restrictions on naval activity.

*The Secretary* recalled that the INCSEA agreement involving direct navy-to-navy contacts had proved one of our most useful and longlasting agreements; it had survived many ups and downs. Perhaps that could be considered a building block. The General Secretary had suggested this topic in public. We would be making a response.

*Shevardnadze* said that if one looked at the general area of nuclear weapons, in most fields there had been some movement, even if not everywhere as much as one wanted. Talks on conventional arms were now emerging. Nuclear testing was moving forward. Only naval activities were untouched by the process. But the level of activities was such that this area needed to be dealt with.

The issue would be raised in Moscow, *Shevardnadze* went on. The leaders could make a decision in principle. It should not be left hanging, open. If the two countries were serious about stopping the nuclear arms race, they should leave any channel for it open. They had found ways to limit other channels. He also knew there were many countries that had an interest in this area. The Soviets had raised the question bilaterally. The sooner the two countries began consultations the better. He had meant to say he knew U.S. naval people were uncomfortable with the issue. So were Soviet naval people. *Powell* would know that military men were uncomfortable with limits on them.

*Powell* joked that ours were interested in limits on theirs.

*Shevardnadze* recalled that the day before they had discussed Vienna problems. The working group had defined language which, if acceptable to both the ministers, could be transmitted to the Soviet delegation in Vienna, and presumably to the American delegation too. His delegation had instructions to contact the Secretary's. At the summit they could state that taking into account discussions with their allies and others they had been able to reach agreement on a position.

*The Secretary* said he would describe his understanding of what had been done. He had heard the language that had been worked out, and thought it could be agreed on. But there were important procedural considerations. Ambassador Ledogar had been instructed to be in touch with his Soviet counterpart, and he expected to hear the results during the luncheon break. Perhaps they would be informed in the afternoon that the problem was being worked in Vienna. The U.S. side would welcome development of an outcome that the sides could identify at the summit. It would be necessary to agree on a mandate, and there were also the human rights aspects. Shevardnadze had made some comments the day before that we thought helpful. He had told Ambassador Zimmermann to start stirring the pot as well. The ministers should use their meetings to stimulate the multinational negotiating process, as they had for Stockholm. We would be in touch with our delegations at noon, and the ministers could exchange views on status in the afternoon.

*Shevardnadze* said they had given the same instructions to their people in Vienna. They were engaged in parallel activity.

Shevardnadze asked where things stood on the document to be adopted in Moscow. He thought it would have to include Afghanistan, the Middle East, the Iran-Iraq war, Central America, southern Africa, indeed the whole of Africa, Cambodia, Korea. The Soviet side had suggested Cyprus, and the U.S. side seemed to have reacted negatively. But the Soviet side would like to discuss it, and it would have to be mentioned. Perhaps the Pacific region should also be mentioned. That was a list of problems for the officials working on the document.

*The Secretary* said that Shevardnadze's listing of areas put him in a position to say all had been mentioned in this ministerial. He believed they would have to decide in general how to deal with regional issues. As he had said the day before, it could pose difficulties to mention a single topic; it raised the question of why one and not another. One alternative was to work out an understanding of how to deal with a single topic in briefing the press. In general it might be well to agree to follow the approach taken by the President and the General Secretary at Geneva: to note that tensions in various regions are a key source of tension in our relationship, and that to the extent we can help reduce them our dialogue has shown some results. We would have to consider how to reflect that in summit documentation.

The Secretary continued that he wished to touch upon a few regional topics. On most the situation was much as it had been.

Turning to Afghanistan, the Secretary said that we urged the Soviets, as they withdrew, to remove the mines they had laid. These mines tended to blow up civilians. We also urged them to provide maps of these minefields to the UN monitors.

*Shevardnadze* said he did not think that would be a major problem if what the Secretary meant was in connection with the flow of refugees. Mines would not prevent them from returning. The Soviets had not mined roads and main tracks. Some had been laid outside these, as happens in any military operation, but they were mostly on the paths of insurgents and those bringing weapons into Afghanistan, and they self-destructed some time after they were laid.

*The Secretary* asked how long before they self-destructed. *Shevardnadze* replied in three or four days.

*The Secretary* said he had heard *Shevardnadze* make two statements: that the major arteries were free of mines, and that the others destroyed themselves in a matter of days. *Powell* said we had more permanent fields in mind; for those maps would be genuinely useful. *Shevardnadze* said the Soviets were not hiding anything. They would discuss this with the Afghan authorities and the UN. More than 110,000 refugees had already returned. Mines had not arisen as a problem.

Since the Secretary had mentioned it, *Shevardnadze* continued, he thought Afghanistan should be worthily reflected in the summit document, as a good example of our cooperation, our understanding. He was not suggesting that the U.S. take up relations with Najibullah. But he was asking for a more realistic assessment of the people the U.S. supported. Take *Hekmatyar*, for instance. His views were well-known. He was reactionary and aggressively minded, and precisely because of this, he had no serious support in Afghanistan. But the U.S. had supplied him with weapons. And he was now thinking that, because his bases would gradually be removed, dismantled, fundamentalists should plan a move to Iran. *Shevardnadze* asked if the Secretary was comfortable from the point of view of U.S. interests at having groups with American weapons on Iranian territory. He thought the matter deserved attention.

*The Secretary* recalled that the General Secretary had mentioned this aspect at their last meeting in Moscow. The U.S. had no desire to supply weapons to people in Iran.

Turning to Ethiopia, the Secretary said that both sides had given considerable help to people who were starving there. According to our information things were getting worse. *Mengistu*<sup>4</sup> was ignoring the fate of his own people. The Secretary said he knew that both the Soviets and the U.S. were trying to supply them. But *Mengistu* continued to be a major problem.

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to *Mengistu Haile Mariam*, President of the People's Republic of Ethiopia.

*Shevardnadze* replied that the situation in Ethiopia was complicated. Problems had emerged in the objective situation. The problem was not Mengistu; it was mostly activation of the separatist movement. The Soviets had spoken to Mengistu. He himself understood that relatively better conditions for assistance had to be created. He had created such conditions for the UN. *Shevardnadze* said he did not know how this would work out in specific areas. Perhaps hostilities would interfere. But given the difficulties Mengistu was doing his best to try to improve food assistance. The Soviets would continue to work on him. They had allocated large assistance; so had the U.S. They were interested in having it delivered to the people. They would use their capabilities, like aircraft, to get assistance to the people.

*The Secretary* said he welcomed *Shevardnadze's* statement. However, as far as we could see Mengistu was not doing what he could to make it as easy as possible to get food to people, on the contrary. Any additional efforts the Soviets could undertake would be very good.

*Shevardnadze* said he could not fully agree that Mengistu was being obstructionist. Mengistu understood that the situation was difficult. There had been drought. The people needed help. But it appeared that separatist activity compelled him to take extraordinary steps. There was a danger that Ethiopia would split apart. *Shevardnadze* said he thought both the U.S. and the Soviet Union wanted it to remain a single country.

*The Secretary* said he wished to make one remark about Central America. They had talked about supporting peace negotiations. But we did not see Nicaraguan government behavior as consistent with the movement toward open, democratic government they had agreed to. We continued to feel that one source of this was the unwarranted arms buildup, the enormous supplies they had received and continued to receive from the Soviets and their allies. Their forces were twice those of their neighbors. We had noticed that supply flows were lower in March than they had been in January or February, and we would like to interpret that as a good sign. But with stockpiles at the level they were at, there was no need of any more military supplies. The U.S. was not supplying the resistance. It would consider it a constructive step if the Soviets stopped.

*Shevardnadze* asked if the U.S. were ready to stop supplying other Central American countries. *The Secretary* replied that other countries were fighting their own insurgencies. This was especially true of El Salvador, where insurgents were still receiving arms from Nicaragua. In assisting El Salvador the U.S. had that in mind. *Shevardnadze* said it appeared that with regard to El Salvador the U.S. answer was not good. *The Secretary* repeated that with regard to Nicaragua no arms were going to the resistance from us, and our assistance to other countries was moderate given the size of the Nicaraguan armed forces.



*Shevardnadze* said the Soviets had suggested reductions in arms supplies on a reciprocal basis. Then it had suggested a moratorium. The U.S. had not accepted that either. There were interesting trends underway, if both countries supported them. The trend toward national reconciliation was more and more evident. It could be encouraged. The Soviet Union had no special interests in the area. It had a relationship with the government of Nicaragua. That was a legitimate government, elected by the people, and the Soviets had to take that into account in their actions. With regard to support for the Guatemala process, he thought the two countries could support it more by reducing their supplies to Nicaragua and the other countries of the area.

*Shevardnadze* said he wished to raise a second point. The Nicaraguans had been ready for a dialogue with the U.S. for a long time.

*The Secretary* rejoined that the trouble with Nicaragua is that the government said and did different things. They did not follow through on what they said with actions. They had said they wanted a dialogue with us. We had started one, and they then went around saying that since they were talking to us there was no need for a direct dialogue with the resistance. So we had stopped. We have said we would be willing to engage in a direct dialogue in a regional setting, as soon as the national reconciliation process became fruitful. A dialogue had started with the resistance, but we could not say it was very productive. Meanwhile the Nicaraguan government was doing things at odds with what it had agreed to. That undermined confidence on its willingness to follow through. But we were ready for a dialogue in a regional setting if the national reconciliation process was fruitful.

*Shevardnadze* said he thought the dialogue between the government and the opposition should be encouraged. It had not been fruitless; some positive points had emerged. It might not have had big results, but the fact of dialogue was important. The trouble was that in recent weeks there had been no unity in the opposition. Ortega was saying that it was hard to see whom he should have dialogue with.

*The Secretary* asked if there were anything else *Shevardnadze* wished to bring up.

*Shevardnadze* said he thought there should be a substantial place in the overall summit document for the Middle East, following the Secretary's trips and the Soviet side's observations on the problems there. He thought the two sides had more in common than they had in the past. Both recognized that an international conference was necessary. Both were for a comprehensive solution. Both accepted a step-by-step approach. They could prepare substantial material for the joint statement. Perhaps it should not be a separate document, but it should be a major component.

*The Secretary* said they would have to work their way along. The more he worked at it, the more difficult it seemed. He was a little

discouraged, but it was important to keep working. The idea was alive, because there was an interest in peace in the area.

*Shevardnadze* noted that they had been discussing reducing or stopping supplies of weapons to Central America. No solution had been found, but they had been discussing it. He thought they should give thought to the same approach for the Middle East. Of course the countries of the area had their own production lines; such a thing would be hard to verify; but restraint could be envisioned.

*The Secretary* said he doubted it. They would just have to keep working.

*Shevardnadze* said they had often discussed the Iran-Iraq war, and set forth their positions. He did not see new elements there. He thought the main effort, at this stage at least, should be to support the mission of the Secretary General.

*The Secretary* agreed that the Secretary General was engaged, but said we thought it would be better if he got stronger support. Iran had suffered a series of setbacks recently. Perhaps that would affect its attitude. *Shevardnadze* said that was true. But the Secretary General seemed to be in a mood for more active work. The Soviet side had never rejected a second resolution. He could confirm that the Soviets thought it needed to be adopted when the time came. But the Secretary General was of a spirit to work, seemed ready to intensify work on implementation of the first resolution.

**152. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Geneva, May 12, 1988, 2:40–4:10 p.m.

**SUBJECTS**

Working Group Reports

**PARTICIPANTS***U.S.*

THE SECRETARY

Gen. Powell

Amb. Ridgway

Amb. Kampelman

Amb. Nitze

Amb. Matlock

Amb. Glitman

Mr. Parris (Notetaker)

Mr. Afanassenko (Interp.)

*U.S.S.R.*

SHEVARDNADZE

Dep. FM Bessmertnykh

Amb. Karpov

Gen. Chervov

Amb. Obukhov

Mr. Stepanov

Mr. Tarasenko

Mr. Mamedov (Notetaker)

Mr. Palazhchenko (Interp.)

SHEVARDNADZE opened the meeting by suggesting it be used to take stock. THE SECRETARY agreed. SHEVARDNADZE asked Amb. Nitze to lead off with a report of his working group's discussion of NST issues.

NITZE indicated that the two sides had begun by addressing nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles. The Soviet side had made a proposal responding to the proposal the U.S. had made in Moscow on distinguishing nuclear-armed ALCM's covered by START from conventional air-to-surface cruise missiles. As a result, there had been some convergence on this question, and the U.S. had given the Soviet side a paper documenting what it believed to be areas of commonality in ALCM limitations.

In particular, Nitze could report that: all currently existing long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles would be considered nuclear armed; future conventionally armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles would be distinguishable from nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface missiles; and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear-armed long-range air-to-surface cruise missiles would be distinguishable from other bombers. While a number of questions remained to be resolved, including the nature of the differences that would distinguish conventional from nuclear systems, agreement on the basic point that conventional

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Untitled Folder. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission.

missiles were not subject to START constraints was a significant step forward.

Nitze said that the two sides had also discussed approaches to attributing numbers of ALCM's to heavy bombers. The U.S. proposed to attribute ten warheads to each bomber equipped for ALCM's. The Soviet Union proposed to attribute a number that reflected the number of ALCM's that could be carried for one operational mission.

There had also been extensive exchanges on mobile ICBM verification, suspect site inspection, and sea-launched nuclear armed cruise missiles. While these discussions had been useful in clarifying each side's concerns, Nitze could not report convergence of views on these subjects at the present meeting.

In response to the data the U.S. had provided in Moscow on its strategic forces, Nitze continued, the Soviet side in Geneva had provided certain data of its own. The U.S. had welcomed the start of exchange of data, and looked forward to further exchanges of more detailed information on a reciprocal basis.

On defense and space, Nitze said that the working group had discussed an agreement which would build on the Washington Joint Statement.<sup>2</sup> The U.S. had put forward its ideas for reflecting in the agreement the standard right to respond in the event supreme national interests were jeopardized, and the concept that the two sides' leaders had agreed upon in Washington that, after the expiration of the non-withdrawal period, each side would be free to decide its course of action. The U.S. ideas had taken into account and responded to the proposal made by the Soviet side the previous Sunday. We hoped that the Soviet side would carefully examine the U.S. counterproposal to resolve the issues standing in the way of working out a joint draft treaty text by the time of the summit. While there had been a useful exchange of views, Nitze could not report progress on the subject at that time.

Nitze said that the U.S. team had elaborated further its idea that neither side object to the other side's space-based sensors. The Soviet response was to distinguish between sensors which were ABM-capable and those which were not. The U.S. proposal was to agree not to object to any space-based sensors.

The U.S. had also emphasized the need to correct Soviet non-compliance with the ABM Treaty, and the particular importance of dismantling the Krasnoyarsk radar prior to the ABM Treaty Review, which is required to begin by October of the current year.

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 3, Document 125.

Asked by SHEVARDNADZE to respond, Obukhov read a statement of his own, key points of which included:

- A reiteration of the Soviet position on dealing with the ABM Treaty in a separate agreement, and of the Soviet offer to discuss the threshold between activities permitted and not permitted by the ABM Treaty;

- Acknowledgement that there had been some convergence of views on mobile missiles;

- Confirmation that SLCM's remained an area of dispute, despite Soviet urging in the working group that the U.S. respond seriously to previous verification proposals and provide a number. Obukhov said that the U.S. proposal for a unilateral declaration offered no basis for an agreement.

- ICBM and SLCM sublimits had been discussed, with the U.S. still insisting upon excluding SLCM's;

- The view that the two sides seemed to be thinking along similar lines with respect to suspect sites, with the U.S. to provide additional data, including the criteria for identifying suspect sites;

- A statement that the Soviet side would study the U.S. proposal for an agreement on mutual notification of test launches;

- Agreement that agreement had been reached in the areas Nitze had indicated on ALCM counting.

THE SECRETARY commented that three things emerged from the two presentations. Building on work done at the Washington summit, further work since then had clearly produced further progress. The most significant advances had come in the area of verification. It was no mean achievement to have pulled together a joint draft text for the verification protocols and MOU, and to have gotten well into an exchange of data. So there was a need to work on how to express this at the summit.

The Secretary recalled that the two leaders had also emphasized in Washington the importance of completing a START agreement. Ultimately, that goal would be achieved. But it was now apparent that it would not be by the time of the summit. In their previous meetings, the Secretary and Shevardnadze had always said that they would keep trying to conclude a treaty by the time of the Moscow visit. They both understood that, once one admitted that the goal could not be reached, there would be a slackening of efforts. But at some point they had to start briefing in such way that the public would focus not on the absence of a treaty, but on the progress already made and both sides' determination to keep working on the problems that remained.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the working group report underscored the progress which had been made in some important areas since the Washington summit. The Foreign Minister's view was that delegations in Geneva should now direct their efforts to seeking more progress between then and the summit in key areas. They should also

begin intensive work to prepare documents for the Moscow summit. Such documents could give some sense of how much had been done both before and after the Washington summit. Shevardnadze agreed there had been progress; a good foundation had been built for future work.

The two sides' representatives should now work hard to prepare the necessary documents, Shevardnadze repeated. It would also be a good idea to have a good document on non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The fundamental issues had already been discussed. There was agreement that the basis for an agreement should be the Washington statement; everything else should be in the protocol. The object should be to have the agreement itself in time for the summit. It might be possible to agree on the period of non-withdrawal at the summit itself.

As for mobile ICBM's, Shevardnadze sensed some progress had been made. Now was the time to complete things, especially if the U.S. came forward with a number on launchers and warheads. Given the progress already achieved on verifying mobiles, it should be possible to develop some concrete language on the issue in Moscow. Any document should also reflect the progress made on ALCM's. On verification, Shevardnadze agreed with the Secretary that much had been achieved.

Shevardnadze said he remained concerned over the "passive" situation with respect to SLCM's. There had been no movement at all on this issue; it would be well if there were some before Moscow. Everything at this point depended on the U.S. The Soviets had put forward their ideas and were ready for a serious discussion.

That then, Shevardnadze concluded, was the task to be set before the negotiators—to work toward these objectives by the summit. The Foreign Minister agreed with the Secretary that the time had come to admit there would be no START agreement by then. But the progress which had been achieved could be noted. It would be possible to state that there should be a Treaty.

Responding to some of the areas Shevardnadze had singled out, THE SECRETARY noted that the U.S. thought the Washington Statement's language on the ABM Treaty was fine. Unfortunately the two sides differed over what it meant. So that language could not simply stand alone. That was what lay behind our desire to discuss the issue. The Secretary did not believe that the question of where to put what as between the agreement itself and a protocol was as important as reaching agreement on the substance of the matter. But the key was to agree on the main points of what we were discussing. The Secretary felt that some progress had been made. Since the last ministerial, there had been movement on developing a joint draft text. That was a good sign, but there was still work to do.

As for mobile ICBM's, there was progress being made. We did have a number in mind. We were ready to share it when we were

comfortable with verification. The Secretary could tell Shevardnadze our number was substantially lower than that the Soviet side had put forward. But we felt that if verification could be dealt with satisfactorily, mobiles could be a positive element in the strategic structure. So we were prepared to continue to work on the issues between Geneva and the summit. This could lead to a discussion of numbers.

The Secretary noted that there seemed to be some convergence of views on ALCM's. On SLCM's, we had already advised the Soviet side of our view that the verification schemes which had been advanced were, on the one hand, not sufficiently reliable, and, on the other, very intrusive. They gave insufficient confidence but would impose serious operational difficulties on our Navy. These considerations had led us to propose that the issue be dealt with by means of unilateral declarations. We had not been able to put a number to the verification concept proposed by Moscow. If, on the other hand, the Soviet Union could accept our concept, we could provide a number.

SHEVARDNADZE said he did not understand one thing. The Soviet side had made SLCM verification proposals which covered the main elements. Why could not a discussion begin on that basis, maybe even after the summit, with the objective of identifying positive and negative elements in the Soviet proposal.

THE SECRETARY said that Shevardnadze seemed to be suggesting something between a unilateral declaration and a verifiable number, i.e., a situation where there would be a number established and there would be things which gave comfort on verification, even though there was agreement that the verification regime was not totally satisfactory.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the declaratory approach was not consistent with dealing with the problem. Moscow saw SLCM's as a component part of all other strategic offensive arms. They should therefore be treated the same as other such weapons. A unilateral declaration was not sufficient. That was why there was a need for discussion.

THE SECRETARY said that we were working on this within the USG. As we had something new to say on the subject, we would want to talk about it. But the question did arise as to whether the standard of verification both sides had thus far demanded could realistically be applied to SLCM's.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that unless the discussion began, there would never be an answer. He asked what the ministers should take up next.

THE SECRETARY suggested that Glitman report on the work he and Chervov had done.

GLITMAN said that his discussions in Geneva had been fruitful. If the ministers approved what he and Chervov had worked out, all



of the verification issues which had arisen in the course of the Senate's ratification debate could be considered resolved. CHERVOV seconded Glitman's assessment, emphasizing that the issues were complex ones which had required much patience by both sides to resolve.

KAMPELMAN said he had a comment on a practical question. Technical groups were scheduled to meet again May 18. Kampelman had to confess he had some concern . . .

SHEVARDNADZE said he did as well. How should that be handled?

THE SECRETARY said that, as the matter had been explained to him, the issues which would be discussed were highly technical—dealing, e.g., with the number of times working garments should be laundered. The date of the meeting had been set and was known. If it did not take place, some might draw the conclusion that we were trying to put it off until after ratification. This was not, in fact, the case. The group might meet Monday, May 15, to get it out of the way.

The Secretary said it was his understanding that there were two issues which might come up at the technical meeting which might be relevant to the Treaty. One had to do with the SS-20 canister and the potency of the x-ray apparatus to be used in examining it, as well as the sweep of that machinery. The basic principle here seemed to be that the purpose of the exercise was to determine the absence of SS-20's. That should guide the technical specifications of the apparatus used. It should be able to do the work, but need not be so strong as to blow up what it was examining.

The other Treaty-relevant issue had to do with the equipment to be used to examine the end of a canister. The fact was that at this point we did not know precisely what equipment we would use. Thus we were not in a position to address the issue authoritatively. This was an issue we would need to address, but not right now.

Noting that all other issues now on the agenda could probably be worked out, the Secretary suggested that the meeting take place. It might take place early if that proved possible; but the important thing was that it take place in a good spirit. Perhaps the easy issues could be resolved first. On the two issues he had raised, the Secretary urged that neither side see problems which were not there. The U.S. team would be ready to work reasonably and sensibly.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed that cancellation could lead to speculation.

THE SECRETARY asked when the materials documenting resolution of the INF issues would be ready. GLITMAN said he hoped they had already been delivered from the U.S. Mission.

THE SECRETARY asked about the notes which would be exchanged on "futuristic" weapons. KAMPELMAN said they were

ready now. He explained that the Soviet side had expressed a preference that Karpov and he sign. They could go ahead and do that now. SHEVARDNADZE suggested that they sign. THE SECRETARY agreed, and Kampelman left to make preparations.

The Ministers agreed they should next hear from the nuclear testing working group, and Robinson, Holmes and Palenykh were summoned.

At SHEVARDNADZE's invitation, Robinson reported that agreement had been reached in six areas: on the text of the Joint Verification Experiment and 34 of 37 detailed annexes; that the text should be signed at the summit; that preparations for the JVE would be guided by the document even before it had been signed; that the two sides would attempt to complete a new verification protocol for the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty to replace the old protocol; that work would continue in parallel to develop effective verification means for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty with the understanding that final agreement on the TTBT protocol must await JVE results; and, finally, on language on nuclear testing for inclusion in a statement at the summit.

PALENYKH said he would only add that the two sides would spend the next two weeks in intensive work on the final JVE annexes.

SHEVARDNADZE quipped that the nuclear testing team not only spoke fast, they worked fast. THE SECRETARY agreed they had done a very fine, professional piece of work. SHEVARDNADZE thanked the nuclear testing group leaders for their efforts, saying that their work was approved.

Nazarkin then entered the room to join Holmes in reporting on the CW working group activities.

NAZARKIN reported that the group had agreed on language to be included in a Moscow joint statement. There had also been a discussion of issues which, in the Soviet view, would be appropriate for U.S.-Soviet bilateral discussion. The preliminary U.S. response had been positive, but Holmes had said additional study would be necessary. It appeared that the Soviet ideas could be taken up at July bilateral consultations on the margin of the CD.

HOLMES confirmed that Nazarkin's report was accurate, adding that, if it were decided to have working groups on CW in Moscow, the Soviet suggestions might be taken up there. Otherwise they could be dealt with at the CD, as Nazarkin had indicated.

SHEVARDNADZE asked the Secretary if he had seen the draft language the CW group had produced. THE SECRETARY had not. SHEVARDNADZE said he had. It was pretty good. It would be a good idea to work further on CW in Moscow. So the experts had done a good job; their work was approved. THE SECRETARY said he had no problem with a CW working group in Moscow if Shevardnadze wished.

After reading a note from Redman, the Secretary noted that there had been a suggestion that the signing of the note of futuristic weapons and of the paper on INF verification issues be opened to the press. It might be useful to have TV or photo coverage. The Secretary was thinking of what Powell would have to do in Washington the next day. Filming the event would graphically show what progress had been made. SHEVARDNADZE said he was agreeable.

Thomas and Grinevskiy were summoned to report on the results of the conventional forces working group.

GRINEVSKIY led off by reading a joint report on the working group's discussion of a mandate for conventional stability talks. Both sides, he said, saw favorable conditions for a positive outcome and for the development of a mandate text. The Soviet side had proposed a formula for describing the subject matter of the negotiations, especially as regarded dual capable systems. The proposal had been made with an eye to announcement at the Moscow summit, after consultations with the allies of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. A part of the formula was "nuclear charges will not be included."

Grinevskiy explained that his discussion with Thomas had been paralleled by discussions between the U.S. and Soviet delegations in Vienna. The U.S. delegate there had proposed certain additions to the Soviet formula which required some clarification. Grinevskiy said he and Thomas had also dealt with the Soviet proposal for talks on naval activities. The U.S. preferred to hold such discussions in the context of the Akhromeyev-Crowe meeting later this year.<sup>3</sup> The two sides, he concluded, had engaged in a useful conceptual exchange on future conventional arms negotiations. The question of the autonomy of those talks had also come up. It had been agreed that the issue was best dealt with in Vienna.

SHEVARDNADZE asked if his understanding was correct that Grinevskiy had given an agreed report. GRINEVSKIY said, "yes."

THOMAS confirmed that Grinevskiy had spoken from an agreed text. He would only clarify that it had been agreed that the summit should deal only in general terms with the Vienna negotiations on conventional arms. On naval activities, the U.S. position was that Akhromeyev and Crowe could consider *whether* to discuss the subject. Thomas noted that the U.S. understood the phrase Grinevskiy had read on the mandate to mean "in these negotiations."

THE SECRETARY observed that, in order to make the process in Vienna work, there had to be some distance between talks there and

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<sup>3</sup> Documentation on this meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIV, National Security Policy, 1985–1988.

bilateral U.S.-Soviet discussions. The Stockholm end-game was a good example of how things should work. The Secretary thought his discussions with Shevardnadze had given delegations in Vienna an impulse. We would continue to explore the procedural aspect and help to make it work better.

SUKHODREV was then summoned to give a read-out on bilateral discussions.

After running through agreements likely to be ready for signature at the summit, he called to the ministers attention certain problems which had arisen in connection with the exchange of consulates in Kiev and New York, and in connection with dealing with certain problems—notably provision of cable television—of interest to the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

In the absence of Simons, who had been Sukhodrev's interlocutor in the working group, PARRIS volunteered that the two sides list of possible agreements for the summit appeared to jibe. On Kiev, he acknowledged that Sukhodrev had accurately described the problems which had arisen with respect to use by the Soviet consulate staff of the building they had intended to occupy. He described the legal and domestic political factors underlying the situation, and sought to put in perspective the Embassy-related problems Sukhodrev had cited. Finally, he noted that Sukhodrev had failed to mention the possibility that agreement in principle could be announced in Moscow on the establishment of cultural centers in Moscow and Washington.

THE SECRETARY asked Ridgway to describe what progress she and Bessmertnykh had made with respect to possible summit documents.

RIDGWAY said that good work had been done that morning on the omnibus joint statement, and that there was now a joint draft text. There were still some issues to work, and a major conceptual problem on how to handle regional issues.

THE SECRETARY interjected that the way to handle this was through briefings by each side after the statement was issued.

RIDGWAY continued that she felt the joint statement could be wrapped up in a day or day and a half if the Soviet side could send the right people to Washington by, say, the end of the following week.

On the second document that the ministers had discussed, the working group had kept in mind the possibility that it could be collapsed into a single, overall document. The U.S. had nonetheless tabled a new "report" which took into account some Soviet ideas. Our draft had contained a large blank where substantive details could later be added. The Soviet side believed that Defense and Space as well as START language should be reflected in that section. The U.S. had

insisted that only START was appropriate. So the question was whether the document focused exclusively on START. Ridgway said she and Bessmertnykh would need guidance on that point.

BESSMERTNYKH said he agreed with Ridgway's assessment. It was good that work had begun on a preliminary text. The two sides were working according to the recipe given them by ministers: i.e., that there should be two documents, one a more traditional summary of work in a broad range of areas; a second concerned with issues being discussed in the Geneva negotiations—50% reductions in strategic offensive arms coupled with preservation of the ABM Treaty. It was impossible to conceive of a second document which dealt only with the first set of issues. The Soviet side would have to insist on the concept agreed in Washington.

It was clear, Bessmertnykh said, that of the two the second document would be the more difficult to produce. Part of the problem was that the "core" of the document depended on the result of discussions still underway in Geneva. Bessmertnykh thus seconded Shevardnadze's idea that delegations in Geneva should focus not only on the substance of their negotiations, but on developing material for the concluding document on what had been achieved since Washington. It was of course understood that work would proceed not just in Geneva, but in capitals. Moreover, Bessmertnykh added, the second document should include not just achievements, but instructions for future work. He believed it would be possible to develop the outlines for the kinds of documents which had been discussed. If the second could not be done as a separate piece, it could be included in the overall statement.

THE SECRETARY agreed that work should continue.

SHEVARDNADZE said he believed that Ridgway and Bessmertnykh had good material to work with. There was agreement in principle that there should be two documents. Shevardnadze was convinced it would be possible to pull together a good statement on the ABM Treaty and strategic arms. It should indeed include instructions to negotiators.

So work should continue. Bessmertnykh would be able to go to Washington. He might also be in Helsinki. Perhaps Ridgway could come to Moscow. The goal should be a solid document for the summit.

Moving to conclude the meeting, Shevardnadze mused that the more the two ministers met, the more problems arose. But the present meeting had showed that they could also be solved. It had been a useful, productive and necessary exchange. The discussions had been good ones. Otherwise it would have been impossible to work through the difficult questions which had arisen. That was how he would plan to characterize the meeting when asked by the press.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed with that assessment, and would follow suit.

After discussion of the state of preparations of the two INF documents, the Secretary and Shevardnadze moved to a side-room for a five-minute one-on-one.

Immediately thereafter, they witnessed the signing of the note on “futuristic” weapons, and their meeting concluded. The separate paper on INF verification issues was signed the following morning by Glitman and ?<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Presumably reference is to an unidentified member of the Soviet delegation.

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### 153. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated

#### SUBJECT

The Moscow Summit

#### *Setting*

Your visit to Moscow is the first by an American President in 14 years. It takes place against a background of solid, balanced progress across our broad agenda. We'll have even more to show for our efforts this summit than we did last December in Washington.

—There has been progress in the Nuclear and Space Talks, although not as much as we hoped, and in other arms control subjects. By working hard on START and by underscoring your determination not to let political calendars drive substance, we have kept the absence of a START Treaty from being a political liability.

—The Soviets may be close to significant new human rights moves as we near the end-game of the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Cobb Files, Background Book: Gorbachev/President's Meetings—Moscow 05/29/1988–06/02/1988 (1). Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Reagan initialed the top right-hand corner. According to another copy of the memorandum, which bears the stamped date May 16, 1988, Parris drafted the memorandum on May 14. Ridgway, Simons, Stafford, Timbie, McConnell, Schifter, and Napper cleared and Coffey and Holmes cleared for information. (Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1988 Apr.–May Memoranda for Pres. Ronald Reagan)

While they still have far to go, progress in areas we have traditionally emphasized has been sustained.

—The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan now underway represents the achievement of your top objective in our regional dialogue.

—The half-dozen bilateral agreements to be signed at the summit testify to the vigor of revived direct contacts between our two countries.

### *A Working Summit*

The temptation in Moscow may be to look backward at all that has been achieved. The challenge will be to use the meeting to prepare the ground for further progress. We want the Moscow summit to be remembered as the place where our dialogue caught its second wind, not as its highwater mark.

The Soviets appear to see things the same way. Despite some turbulence in the Soviet internal political situation, Gorbachev appears to retain the initiative at home and full authority on foreign policy. A successful summit would be an asset—although probably not a critical one—as his party conference approaches in mid-June. He has thus put great emphasis on packing as much substance as possible into your visit. We may not see dramatic moves as at Reykjavik, but I expect Gorbachev to be in a mood to do business.

We will be ready. This may well be our best chance to advance on issues which have resisted solution in lower-level discussions. There are opportunities across the board.

### *Human Rights*

I recommend you raise human rights early on, perhaps in your initial one-on-one. Tone will be important, given the sensitivity Gorbachev has shown to any hint that we are playing “prosecutor” to his “accused.” I told Shevardnadze that you are particularly interested in religion, and he said Gorbachev would be ready to discuss it.

If we are in fact in a Vienna CSCE end-game, you can focus on things the Soviets could do quickly to meet our need for a balanced outcome—release of political prisoners, liberalized treatment of religious believers, elimination of artificial barriers to emigration. You’ll also want to press for action on the cases you have raised since the Washington summit with Shevardnadze (thus far one of the 17 has been resolved, and we have been informally told two more may be soon). Gorbachev will take you to task as usual for “inadequacies” in the way we care for our citizens, and you will have to make clear the distinction, which you pointed out in your Chicago speech,<sup>2</sup> between

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Reagan’s May 4 remarks to the National Strategy Forum of Chicago. (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1988, Book I, pp. 552–558)



socio-economic issues and the political rights Moscow has undertaken to respect under international agreements.

### *Arms Control*

If we can crack certain problems in Moscow, we will be in a good position for a steady push on START in the months ahead. We want also to clarify the Washington Summit Statement's ambiguities on Defense & Space. Much of the work will be highly technical, with the focus necessarily in working groups. But you and Gorbachev will have to drive the process and make necessary in-course corrections. Our goals are to:

- Close on a formula for counting ALCMs on heavy bombers which takes into account the differences between cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, and work out procedures for converting heavy bombers to conventional aircraft;

- Agree on verification provisions for mobile ICBM's so that we can take up the question of a mobile warhead ceiling;

- Get Soviet acknowledgment of the right of a side to take steps if its supreme interests are jeopardized by unforeseen events.

- Obtain Gorbachev's confirmation that, at the end of the period during which both sides will be committed not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, each side may deploy strategic defenses if it chooses;

Gorbachev and his team will have their own agenda. They will push on SLCMs and likely will resist our attempts to pin them down on Defense & Space issues. Our best tactic is to go to Moscow with good positions that demonstrate our readiness to move forward during and after the summit in both START and Defense and Space.

We are in good shape on other arms control matters. We have already nailed down good language on next steps on chemical weapons and nuclear testing for inclusion in a final joint statement. We may be able to sign a new verification protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and an agreement on the joint verification experiment to be conducted over the summer at each other's nuclear test sites. The outcome on conventional arms talks will depend on progress in Vienna over the next two weeks.

### *Regional Issues*

Since the conclusion of the Afghanistan accords, Gorbachev has spoken of U.S.-Soviet cooperation on resolving regional issues in terms similar to those of your October, 1985 UNGA initiative. His representatives have raised the possibility of elaborating principles which could serve as a basis for joint action in specific cases. We have resisted, since such formulas mean different things to the Soviets and ourselves, insisting instead that we focus on practical steps. That should be our approach in Moscow as well.

My recent talks with Shevardnadze suggest that we cannot expect major shifts on regional issues, but we should continue pressing for constructive steps which could, in fact, serve as a basis for joint or parallel action.

You should plan to talk with Gorbachev about southern Africa. Moscow recently has quietly supported our efforts with the parties, and Soviet endorsement will be critical to a package settlement. Our senior experts on Africa will meet on May 18 to prepare for the summit discussion.

The discussion of Afghanistan will probably focus on a review of our understandings of the concept of symmetry on arms supplies. We are ready to show restraint if we see that Moscow has, in fact, cut off assistance to Kabul.

On a range of issues we are simply at loggerheads, and will need patiently to reiterate the need for a more realistic Soviet approach: in the Middle East, on the role of an international conference and Palestinian participation; in Central America, on arms to Managua; in the Gulf on a second UNSC resolution; in Cambodia, on a Vietnamese withdrawal.

I can deal with Shevardnadze on certain issues—e.g., the Korean peninsula, Japan's Northern Territories—which our friends want us to raise. The Soviets have similar issues, e.g., Cyprus, which can also be dealt with at my level.

#### *Bilateral Affairs*

The work on bilateral agreements will largely be done by the time you arrive in Moscow. You and Gorbachev could nonetheless explore means of expanding further people-to-people contacts over the long term. Gorbachev may also press on our plans for our new Chancery building in Moscow, which was seriously compromised during its construction. We will have made no final decision by the time of the summit.

We are still working with the Soviets on the modalities of signing the various bilateral agreements. Their substance (e.g., transportation, basic scientific research, fisheries) does not justify signing by you and Gorbachev. We will have worked out by the time you arrive in Moscow whether you and the General Secretary should witness the signing of these agreements, and when such a ceremony should take place.

#### *Documents*

Both sides agree that summit documentation should not only record the progress we have made but also reaffirm both sides' commitment to move forward along the same productive track.

**154. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, May 17, 1988, 2:10–2:45 p.m.

**SUBJECT**Preparations for the Moscow Summit on Human Rights, Regional Issues and  
Bilateral Relations**PARTICIPANTS**

The President

*The Vice President's Office*

Samuel Watson

*State*

George P. Shultz

Rozanne Ridgway

*Defense*

Frank C. Carlucci

John Woodworth

*Justice*

Edwin Meese

*Commerce*

Donna Tuttle

*OMB*

James Miller

*CIA*

William Webster

Robert Gates

*JCS*

William Crowe

Jonathan Howe

*OSTP*

Dr. William Graham

*USIA*

Charles Z. Wick

*WH*

Howard Baker

Ken Duberstein

Marlin Fitzwater

Colin L. Powell

John D. Negroponte

*NSC*

Nelson C. Ledsky

Robert Dean

John Herbst

*Minutes*

*The President* opened the meeting by apologizing for being late. He said that he had just come from a meeting with a group that included the Russian poetess, Irina Ratushinskaya.<sup>2</sup> He remarked that when in prison, she had smuggled out to him a letter signed by 10 people on a tiny piece of paper. He was still astounded that they were able to write so much on such a small piece of paper.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Records, NSPG 189. Secret. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>2</sup> The meeting occurred in the Roosevelt Room of the White House. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary). Reagan described in his personal diary a meeting with "American officials of a group working for human rights in Soviet U. plus several refugees from Soviet U. including Irina R. the poetess who wrote a letter & poem to me while she was in the Gulag. They were asking my help on Human R'ts. at the summit. Then an N.S.P.G. meeting—nothing exciting." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, Vol. II, November 1985–January 1989, p. 887).

*The President* said that Secretary Shultz and General Powell had just returned from Geneva, the fourth and last Ministerial prior to the Moscow Summit. The President observed that, since the last Summit, we had made some progress on human rights, regional issues and bilateral relations, but much more remained to be done. He said that we must continue to follow the same course with the Soviets—based on our principles and readiness to negotiate from a position of strength—which has guided the Administration from the start. He also added that human rights and regional issues should receive no less attention in Moscow than arms control and bilateral relations. Then he asked for Secretary Shultz's overview of the Summit.

*Secretary Shultz* responded that the President had just provided a fine overview. Secretary Shultz said that the Summit would focus on the four part agenda. He added that the Summit should be seen not as a climax, but as a second wind in U.S.-Soviet relations, which should continue to develop.

Looking at Secretary Shultz, *the President* quipped that he hated an actor who stole another actor's lines.

*General Powell* then asked whether Secretary Shultz would like to provide an overview of bilateral relations at the Summit, or would prefer for Under Secretary Tuttle to discuss economic relations. When *Secretary Shultz* answered that he had no presentation to make, *Under Secretary Tuttle* took up the issue of U.S.-Soviet economic relations. She said that superpower trade was quite small. For this year, our projected exports to the Soviets were 1.5 billion dollars and imports .5 billion dollars. This represented only .02% of Soviet GNP. Yet if U.S.-Soviet trade was small, it was visible and therefore important in our bilateral relations. Under Secretary Tuttle said that Secretary Verity achieved his objectives on both tracks of our trade policy during his April trip to Moscow. On the first track, we made the Soviets understand that there could be no change in trade status without a change on emigration. On the second, he made progress toward opening further trade in specific, non-strategic areas. In this connection, *Under Secretary Tuttle* pointed to agreement that the Soviets would have access to the Commerce Department's Moscow office; establishment of working groups with the Soviets on five areas that we chose for possible cooperation; and the publication of a commercial newsletter in Moscow.

*Under Secretary Tuttle* then recommended that we continue the two-track approach. She said that we should reaffirm the December joint statement on economic cooperation and continue to insist on major changes in Soviet emigration policy as a prerequisite for granting Moscow Most Favored Nation (MFN) status. She observed that in his 15 minute one-on-one with Secretary Verity, Gorbachev had indicated the importance of MFN, and Verity had reminded Gorbachev of Jackson-

Vanik and the need for improvements on emigration. *Under Secretary Tuttle* also suggested that the President and General Secretary Gorbachev endorse the April Joint Commercial Commission statement. Regarding possible agreements with the Soviets, she noted that they had stopped whaling, and it might be possible to conclude a fisheries agreement. She concluded her presentation with a reference to a current Commerce trade fair in Moscow.<sup>3</sup> She hoped that during the Summit, the President might find the time to stop by the fair and greet the 12 participating American companies.

*General Powell* thanked *Under Secretary Tuttle* for her comments and asked *Director Wick* for an update on cultural relations.

*Director Wick* recalled his lunch with Politburo Member Yakovlev during the last Summit and their discussion of the need to stop disinformation regarding, for instance, the spurious charge that the U.S. military invented AIDS. *Director Wick* said that Yakovlev agreed on the need to get experts together to discuss this, but only in March did the Soviets pass the word that “16 guys would arrive in Washington in two weeks” for discussions. *Director Wick* observed that *Novosti* *Director Falin*—on whom *Wick* had walked out in Moscow last June—characterized the talks publicly as an “unprecedented dialogue,” in an “easy, relaxed” atmosphere which “rarely went beyond the bounds of a constructive exchange.” *Wick* said that during the talks, we had protested Radio Moscow broadcasts from Cuba using some medium range frequencies, normally utilized by our radio stations in southern Florida. The Soviets were apologetic and promised to stop it as a goodwill gesture. *Wick* said that the April talks were broken down into five sectors. One concerned books, and it was agreed to open an American Book Center in Moscow equipped with 6,000 books. It was also agreed to have traveling book exhibits.

*Director Wick* then mentioned that Soviets had been here last week to discuss extending the Cultural Agreement signed at the Geneva Summit. The Soviets would like to sign an extension of the agreement in Moscow. But he was not sure that it would be ready. He said that we were hanging tough, for instance, regarding reciprocity in hotel rates charged for visitors under the program. While hotel rooms cost the Soviets \$35 a day here, they cost our people \$100 a day there. The *Director* concluded that the Soviets were anxious to have a successful Summit and to improve relations with us, in order to cut back on the military burden to their economy.

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<sup>3</sup> In telegram 12200 from Moscow, May 16, Matlock reported on the trade fair in Moscow and Verity's visit. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D880422-0095)

Regarding the agreement on books and publications, *the President* joked that we had better watch out for magazines about samovars, as they could make people Communists.

*General Powell* then asked Science Advisor Graham about the state of negotiations on the Basic Sciences Agreement.

*Science Advisor Graham* said that our current negotiations must be understood in light of our experience with the 1972 Agreement on Science and Technology, which was that the Soviets had gained far more from it than we had. He said, however, that there were still some areas where an exchange would be useful, particularly regarding basic sciences, where the Soviets had something to offer. After the Geneva Summit, the two sides had looked at an agreement in a few areas of basic sciences. The Soviets, of course, wanted an agreement on both science and technology; but our interagency-approved position was for an agreement just on the basic sciences. During recent negotiations, the Soviets initialed a proposed agreement. The State representative also initialed the agreement. Now we will see if we can approve interagency what was agreed with the Soviets. Science Advisor Dr. Graham added that “we may or may not have something with the Soviets on this for the Summit.”

*Secretary Shultz* said that the interagency process had already approved a position for a science agreement with the Soviets; when presented with it, the Soviets said “yes.” Now we must decide “whether we could take ‘yes’ for an answer.”

*General Powell* responded that there were problems with some language in the agreement.

*Secretary Carlucci* added that the agreement had some “loose language” which could provide a loophole for access to sensitive technology.

Regarding Secretary Shultz’s concern about taking “yes” for an answer, *Science Advisor Dr. Graham* observed that the Soviets had added words to the agreement which could give them direct access to private industry. This language had not been approved interagency. He said that as the Soviet Union had a very meager private sector, this addition gave the U.S. nothing.

*The President* remarked that a private pizza place would open soon in Moscow.

*Secretary Shultz* said that most scientists in the U.S. were in the private sector, not with the government. So in any exchange, scientists in private companies would be involved. No one has ever contested this. He noted that the phrase in question only adds: “including those (scientists) in private companies.” He then expressed his concern that by use of the interagency process, groups arrogated power to themselves.

*Secretary Carlucci* responded that there was a risk that the Soviets could get access to a sensitive data base if American scientists were connected with private companies. Our agreement with the Soviets must avert this danger.

When *Secretary Shultz* said that American scientists could participate on a personal basis, *Secretary Carlucci* remarked that they could not as representatives of their companies.

*General Powell* then stated that there was no attempt to arrogate power through the interagency process. When three cabinet officers had direct equities in an issue and disagreements, it had to be resolved interagency. He added that Bob Dean would chair an interagency group later in the week to address the issue.

*Attorney General Meese* said that we have recently had some surprising cooperation with the Soviets on the drug issue lately. While permitting the Afghans to grow poppy for export to the West, the Soviets were scared stiff of the spread of drugs in the USSR. He noted that a Justice official, Jack Lawn, had been to Moscow recently for useful talks, and they might fall in the category of bilateral relations.

*Director Wick* then added that the European press had been laudatory on INF, "especially on the efforts of George Shultz and company." Wick saw great enthusiasm in Europe for the Summit.

*The President* said that he wished to make one point on the science question. He referred to a book by a Romanian defector which he had read recently.<sup>4</sup> It detailed how, as normal business practice, Bloc countries extracted useful scientific information here. The President observed that the Soviets were openly envious of our progress in science. So we must be very careful that nobody, "in enthusiasm for glasnost," gives away information that could come back to haunt us.

*General Powell* remarked on how well plans were proceeding for Moscow. He was pleased at the way people were working together and how attention was naturally moving from substance to logistics. He expressed the readiness of all concerned to support the President at the Summit.

*The President* concluded by noting that we were headed in the right direction. He expressed his intention to press the Soviets in Moscow on human rights, regional issues and bilateral relations; and his hope to record specific additional progress in all these areas for inclusion in the Summit joint statement.

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Ion Mihai Pacepa's 1987 *Red Horizons*.



## 155. Editorial Note

On May 25, 1988, President Ronald Reagan departed for Helsinki, where he spent five days preparing for the Moscow Summit. On May 27, the President delivered a speech in Finlandia Hall in which he commemorated the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, applauded General Secretary Gorbachev's reforms, and pledged to discuss the advancement of human rights in their upcoming meeting. (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1988, Book I, pages 656–661) That day, the White House released a statement praising the Senate's ratification of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. (*Ibid.*, page 661)

On May 28, the White House broadcast a radio address Reagan had taped on May 23 before his departure. "Through Western firmness and resolve, we concluded the historic INF treaty that provides for the global elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Soviet armed forces are now withdrawing from Afghanistan, an historic event that should lead finally to peace, self-determination, and healing for that long-suffering people and to an independent and undivided Afghan nation." (*Ibid.*, pages 671–672) The President went on to reiterate the theme of human rights and spoke of U.S. aspirations "to see positive changes in the U.S.S.R. institutionalized so that they'll become lasting features of Soviet society." (*Ibid.*, page 672)

President Reagan arrived in Moscow on May 29 and participated and delivered remarks with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev at the opening ceremony of the summit. (*Ibid.*, pages 673–674) The following day, he spoke before religious leaders at the Danilov Monastery and declared: "There are many ties of faith that bind your country and mine. We have in America many churches, many creeds, that feel a special kinship with their fellow believers here—Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Orthodox, and Islamic. They are united with believers in this country in many ways, especially in prayer." (*Ibid.*, pages 674–675) Later that day, he spoke to Soviet dissidents at Spaso House. (*Ibid.*, pages 675–676)

On May 30, in St. Vladimir's Hall at the Grand Kremlin Palace, President Reagan followed General Secretary Gorbachev in a toast "to the work that has been done, to the work that remains to be done, and let us also toast the art of friendly persuasion, the hope of peace with freedom, the hope of holding out for a better way of settling things." (*Ibid.*, pages 677–680)

On May 31, the President delivered remarks at a luncheon hosted by artists and cultural leaders (*Ibid.*, pages 681–682) as well as remarks and a question-and-answer session with students and faculty at the

Moscow State University (*Ibid.*, pages 683–692) and toasts at a state dinner at Spaso House. (*Ibid.*, 692–695) Also that day, the President accompanied General Secretary Gorbachev on a walk through Red Square. Asked whether he still believed the Soviet Union was an evil empire, Reagan responded he was talking about “another time, another era.” (“Reagan’s Words: ‘Differences Continue to Recede,’” *New York Times*, June 2, 1988, page A–16)

On June 1, President Reagan delivered remarks alongside Gorbachev at the exchange of documents ratifying the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1988, Book I, pages 696–697) The two sides also released a joint statement (*Ibid.*, pages 697–705), and the President held a news conference. (*Ibid.*, pages 706–713) On June 2, the President flew from Moscow to London to meet with Prime Minister Thatcher. He returned Washington the following day.

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## 156. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, May 29, 1988, 3:26–4:37 p.m.

### SUBJECT

The President’s First One-on-One Meeting With General Secretary Gorbachev (U)

### PARTICIPANTS

#### U.S.

The President

Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Rudolf V. Perina, Director for European and Soviet Affairs, NSC Staff

Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

#### USSR

General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev

Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Acting Department Director

Vadim I. Kuznetsov, Section Chief, MFA

Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

*Gorbachev* said he greeted the President warmly, and wanted to say right away that he was very determined to continue the growing dialogue which was gaining momentum in Soviet-American relations.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988. Secret. Drafted by Perina. The meeting took place in St. Catherine’s Hall at the Kremlin.

They would be going into the details later, but he wished to say at the outset that he thought that in recent years, since the statement they had signed in Geneva, there was reason to see change for the better, and not only in bilateral relations, but, thanks to that, in the world. The most important result of the change was to make the whole international climate better and healthier. (S)

*Gorbachev* went on to say that because neither side could have done it alone, the Soviet leadership could not have done it alone. The two sides had to do it together, and had. There was an important symbolism in that. The President's personal contribution had counted for a lot. *Gorbachev* emphasized that he was not just saying nice words. (S)

*The President* said that both sides had come a long way since he first wrote to *Gorbachev* in 1985. History would record the period positively, and that was true not just for our relations. As with the INF Accord, they had made the world a little bit safer with some of the things they had done. *Gorbachev* said he agreed. *The President* continued that they still had much to do. He was particularly pleased with what *Gorbachev* was doing in Afghanistan, that he was withdrawing his troops. Afghanistan was a problem *Gorbachev* had inherited; he had not been involved in its creation. The whole world approved the courage he was showing in what he was doing there. (S)

*Gorbachev* said he would like to return to what he had said about their first meeting in Geneva. The President had mentioned it. It had been their first meeting; they would return to it again and again. It had been a difficult but necessary beginning. Looking back on Geneva, from the position achieved today, it was possible to give high marks to the important political statements that they had made there. There they had said in their joint statement that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought; that no war was admissible; that neither side sought military superiority. It had been a strong statement by the leaders of the two great powers, and it had received much attention in the world. (S)

*Gorbachev* said he wanted to invite the President to build on that Geneva experience, to make in their joint document a political statement on the same scale. Both sides and their allies now thought it necessary to move forward in arms control. Joint efforts were needed. But it was also evident that no problems in the world could be solved by military means. War made things too unpredictable. Therefore, the only way to resolve problems, including regional conflicts, was by political means. Building on their four meetings since Geneva, they should say that, in this diverse world of varied ideologies and nations, it was essential to live together in peace. That should be a universal principle. He wanted to give the President his proposed language for a draft statement. He asked the President to think about how to reflect what they had thought

about in their four meetings and would be thinking about here in Moscow. (S)

*Gorbachev* asked the President what he would say in principle to making such a statement. It was a question of reflecting policies as they were. (S)

*The President* asked if he could repeat it, and *Gorbachev* said he would pass it to him in writing. Noting that an English text was included, *the President* said he had thought for a minute *Gorbachev* thought he read Russian; no, said *Gorbachev*; the English text was there. (S)

(The English text *Gorbachev* passed to the President in writing read:)

“Proceeding from their understanding of the realities that have taken shape in the world today, the two leaders believe that no problem in dispute can be resolved, nor should it be resolved, by military means. They regard peaceful coexistence as a universal principle of international relations. Equality of all states, non-interference in internal affairs and freedom of socio-political choice must be recognized as the inalienable and mandatory standards of international relations.” (S)

After reading the statement, *the President* said he liked it, and their people should look at it. *Gorbachev* noted that he was passing it over for consideration and discussion. (S)

*The President* said he was somewhat older than *Gorbachev*, and remembered when the two countries were allies in World War II against the evil of Hitler. Then, after the war, something happened between the countries, and, as Churchill said, an iron curtain fell between them. He did not hear the term used much anymore, and he thought that in their meetings he and *Gorbachev* had something to do with that. That did not mean that all the problems between the two countries were solved, but they had done things, and could do things, in the spirit of the statement that *Gorbachev* had just given him. (S)

*The President* said he wished to digress for a minute and hand *Gorbachev* a list, as he had done on previous occasions. The United States was a country to which people came from all over the world, and many of them maintained an interest in the countries they had come from. All the cases on the list had been brought to his personal attention, by relatives and friends, and he wanted to mention two specifically. (S)

The first was that of Yuriy Zieman. He was a writer. His children were in America, and he was seriously ill, and wished to come to America for medical treatment. *The President* said he had wanted to visit him. Zieman’s children wanted to do something for him, if not to cure him, at least to ease his illness. (S)

*The President* continued that he would not go through the whole list; there were a dozen or so. But for some reason he felt a particular affinity to one man on the list, Abe Stolar. He was an American, whose parents had come to America in the time of the czars. He had been born on the very same day as the President, in the state of Illinois, so they had been born not many miles apart. When Stolar was young, he and his parents returned to Russia, and his son had eventually married a young lady in Russia. Now they had all decided they wanted to return to the land where Stolar was born, the United States, and the Soviet government gave permission to all but the daughter-in-law. So they all decided to stay behind until they could leave together. As Stolar put it, he wanted to die where he was born, and the President thought the Soviet authorities should allow the whole family to leave. He hoped he would not die on same day as Stolar, even though they were born on the same day. (S)

*Gorbachev* responded that as always when the President presented specific humanitarian problems to him, especially concerning departures, these would be given careful attention. There was no obstacle to departure from the Soviet Union but one—possession of state secrets—and that was natural, since all countries wished to protect such secrets. But basically the Soviets did not keep people against their will. (S)

*Gorbachev* went on to say that on the eve of his departure, in his statements in the U.S., in Washington, in Helsinki, the President had spoken about raising human rights in Moscow.<sup>2</sup> *Gorbachev* said with a smile that he felt it was incumbent upon him to respond, since otherwise, people might feel the President had him (*Gorbachev*) in a corner, and that more pressure should be put on him. He wanted to say that they in the Soviet leadership were ready to work with the U.S., with the Administration and with the Congress, on an ongoing basis, for solutions to humanitarian problems. He was saying that because he was convinced of it, and because it was quite clear that both in the Administration and in the Congress there were people who did not have a clear idea of what the human rights situation really was in the Soviet Union. (S)

*Gorbachev* went on to say that the Soviets had many comments to make about the U.S. human rights situation; about problems of political rights, the rights of blacks and colored people, social and economic rights, the treatment of anti-war protesters and movements. They got many facts from the U.S. press. Probably they still did not know everything well. But they were ready to listen to what the U.S. side had to

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 155.

say. They were ready to have a conversation with the U.S. Congress. *Gorbachev* said he was calling for a seminar, on a continuous basis, involving officials, legislators and academics of the two sides, to discuss what was happening in the two countries. (S)

It was not just a question of cases, *Gorbachev* continued, but of generalizations with which the Soviets disagreed; the U.S. probably heard some things it disagreed with on the Soviet side, too. But these things should be discussed. The Soviets were open to that kind of discussion. (S)

*The President* said he knew what *Gorbachev* was saying. Some of it was true, as it was anyplace, because the U.S. was a big and varied country. It had many races, and one race, the Blacks, had once been slaves. They were then freed, and discriminating against them was now illegal, but all the individual prejudices could not be immediately overcome. Some people in our country had brought them with them when they immigrated. But there was one difference: the U.S. had passed laws, and under the law no one could use prejudice to keep someone from getting a job, finding housing, getting an education, and the like. That would be against the law, and that person would be punished under the law, not because of his race or religion. (S)

*Gorbachev* responded that there were many declarations and many provisions in the U.S. Constitution and U.S. laws. The problem was to look at how they were implemented in real life. If one looked at figures on unemployment of Blacks and Hispanics, on per capita income of Whites and Blacks, on access to education and health, there were big differences. In the Soviet Union, living standards were lower, even much lower than in the United States, but there was nothing like such large contrasts among groups of people in the country when it came to pay and the like. (S)

*The President* responded that when slavery was lifted from the Blacks they started at a much lower level than others, and even the civil rights laws could not guarantee them equality when it came to jobs and schools, and the like. But when you considered that they had started lower, under the economic expansion of the past six years, wages and employment among Blacks were rising faster than for Whites. In other words, they were catching up. (S)

*Gorbachev* said he had not been inventing figures. He was citing facts from the American Congress. He did not want to teach lessons to the United States President on how to run America. He just wanted to note that the President had ideas about the Soviets, and the Soviets had ideas about the United States. Recently, the Soviets had become much more self-critical, but the U.S. had not. Once the Soviets had begun to be self-critical, it seemed that the U.S. spoke more about civil and ethical rights. Of course, the President was completing his term

as President. *Gorbachev* said he thought the President's successors would be more self-critical than he was. Maybe everything was not "alright" (*Gorbachev* used the English word) in the United States, as the President's Administration seemed to think. He wanted only to say that he was suggesting an ongoing seminar between legislators and others to examine the issues and compare notes. (S)

*The President* said he thought that was a wonderful idea. One goal of the session should be to work out misunderstandings. (S)

*The President* continued that he wished to take up another topic that had been a kind of personal dream of his. He had been reluctant to raise it with *Gorbachev*, but he was going to do it now anyway. He wanted no hint that anything had been negotiated, where we had insisted on something the Soviets had to do. If word got out that this was even being discussed, the President would deny he had said anything about it. (S)

*The President* went on that he was suggesting this because they were friends, and *Gorbachev* could do something of benefit not only to him but to the image of his country worldwide. The Soviet Union had a church—in a recent speech *Gorbachev* had liberalized some of its rules—the Orthodox Church. *The President* asked *Gorbachev* what if he ruled that religious freedom was part of the people's rights, that people of any religion—whether Islam with its mosque, the Jewish faith, Protestants or the Ukrainian church—could go to the church of their choice. (S)

*The President* said that in the United States, under our Constitution, there was complete separation of church and state from each other. People had endured a long sea voyage to a primitive land to worship as they pleased. So what the President had suggested could go a long way to solving the Soviet emigration problem. Potential emigrants often wanted to go because of their limited ability to worship the God they believed in. (S)

*Gorbachev* said that the Soviets judged the problem of religion in the Soviet Union as not a serious one. There were not big problems with freedom of worship. He, himself, had been baptized, but was not now a believer, and that reflected a certain evolution of Soviet society. There was a difference of approach to that problem. The Soviets said that all were free to believe or not to believe in God. That was a person's freedom. The U.S. side was actively for freedom, but why did it then happen that non-believers in the U.S. sometimes felt suppressed. He asked why non-believers did not have the same rights as believers. *The President* said they did. He had a son who was an atheist, though he called himself an agnostic. (S)

*Gorbachev* asked again why atheists were criticized in the United States. This meant a certain infringement of their freedom. It meant



there was a limitation on their freedom. He read the U.S. press. There should be free choice to believe or not to believe in God. (S)

*The President* said that was also true for people in the United States. Religion could not be taught in a public school. When we said freedom, that meant the government had nothing to do with it. There were people who spent considerable money to build and maintain schools that were religious. He had heard Gorbachev had recently lifted restrictions on such contributions. There were people volunteering to restore churches. In our country the government could not prevent that, but could not help it either. Tax money could not be spent to help churches. It was true there were private schools, with the same courses as public schools but with religious education besides, because people were willing to pay to create and support them. But in public schools supported by taxes you could not even say a prayer. (S)

*Gorbachev* said that after the Revolution there had been excesses in that sphere. As in any revolution there had been certain excesses, and not only in that sphere but in others as well. But today the trend was precisely in the direction the President had mentioned. There had been some conflicts between the authorities and religious activists, but only when they were anti-Soviet, and there had been fewer such conflicts recently, and he was sure they would disappear. And when they spoke of perestroika, that meant change, a democratic expansion of democratic procedures, of rights, of making them real; and that referred to religion, too. (S)

*The President* invited Gorbachev to look at religious rights under our Constitution. There were some people—not many, but some—who were against war. They were allowed to declare themselves conscientious objectors, when they could prove that it was a matter of faith with them not to take up arms even to defend their country. They could be put in uniform doing non-violent jobs—they could not escape from service—but they could not be made to kill against their religion. In every war there were a few such people, and sometimes they performed heroic deeds in the service of others. They could refuse to bear arms. (S)

If Gorbachev could see his way clear to do what the President had asked, continued *the President*, he felt very strongly that he would be a hero, and that much of the feeling against his country would disappear like water in hot sun. If there was anyone in the room who said he had given such advice, he would say that person was lying, that he had never said it. This was not something to be negotiated, something someone should be told to do. (S)

*The President* said he had a letter from the widow of a young World War II soldier. He was lying in a shell hole at midnight, awaiting an order to attack. He had never been a believer, because he had been

told God did not exist. But as he looked up at the stars he voiced a prayer hoping that, if he died in battle, God would accept him. That piece of paper was found on the body of a young Russian soldier who was killed in that battle. (S)

*Gorbachev* responded that he still felt the President did not have the full picture concerning freedom of religion in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had not only many nationalities and ethnic groups, but many religious denominations—Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim, various denominations of Protestants, like the Baptists—and they practiced their religion on a very large scale. The President would meet the Patriarch, would go to one of the monasteries.<sup>3</sup> If the President asked him, the Patriarch would tell him about the situation concerning religion in their country. (S)

*Gorbachev* said he would like to make one more suggestion. It was true that they did not have much time to do much that was new. But they should try to work not just for the present but also for the future. Perhaps the President would give thought to opening up even greater cooperation in space between the two countries. If that came out of this meeting as a common desire, that would be a good result. The two countries had good capabilities and doing something jointly would be a very big thing. It was very difficult for one country to operate in space. As he had already said to the *Washington Post*, now the Soviets would like the U.S. to begin cooperation on a joint mission to Mars.<sup>4</sup> He understood this would be a long-term project; it meant lots of work and could not be accomplished overnight. But it was important to begin, and cooperation would be very useful. (S)

*The President* said that the U.S. program had been set back by the Challenger tragedy. But he had asked his people to look into the General Secretary's suggestion. Space was in the direction of heaven, but not as close to heaven as some other things they had been discussing. *Gorbachev* said it was at least closer to heaven. (S)

*The President* noted that there was a young man giving him the signal that the wives of the two leaders were waiting. *Gorbachev* said he understood. *Gorbachev* said he wished to give the President his proposal for joint statement language on Mars. (Its English text read:)

"The two sides noted that preparation and implementation of a manned mission to Mars would be a major and promising bilateral Soviet-American program, which at subsequent stages could become

<sup>3</sup> See Document 159.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to David Johnston, "Gorbachev to Ask U.S.-Soviet Mars Trip in Talks." (*New York Times*, May 22, 1988, p. 14)

international. It was agreed that experts from both countries would begin joint consideration of various aspects of such a program.” (S)

*Gorbachev* said he was very pleased with this first discussion. It confirmed that the two leaders were still on very friendly terms. He hoped this meant they were truly beginning to build trust between the two countries. He had told Secretary Shultz—who must have conveyed it to the President—that they were just beginning to be on good terms with the Administration, and along came an election. But he still wanted movement; there was still time to accomplish many things. (S)

*The President* said he agreed. He knew it was not protocol, but between the two of them they were Mikhail and Ron. *Gorbachev* said he had noticed they were on a first-name basis since the Washington meeting. (S)

*The President* concluded that there was one thing he had long yearned to do for his atheist son. He wanted to serve his son the perfect gourmet dinner, to have him enjoy the meal, and then to ask him if he believed there was a cook. *The President* said he wondered how his son would answer. As the meeting ended, *Gorbachev* said that the only answer possible was “yes.” (S)

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## 157. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, May 29, 1988, 7:30–9:20 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Organizational questions; summit documents, Afghanistan

### PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*  
THE SECRETARY  
Senator Baker  
General Powell  
Ambassador Ridgway  
Mr. Parris (Notetaker)  
Mr. Zarechnak (Interp.)

*U.S.S.R.*  
SHEVARDNADZE  
Deputy FonMin Bessmertnykh  
Marshal Akhromeyev  
Mr. Mamedov (Notetaker)  
Mr. Sredin (Notetaker)  
Mr. Palazhchenko (Interp.)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit May–June ’88, Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place at the Guest House of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

SHEVARDNADZE opened the conversation by noting that the President and General Secretary had had a good initial meeting. THE SECRETARY concurred.

SHEVARDNADZE welcomed the Secretary and his colleagues on behalf of the General Secretary and other leaders of the Soviet Union. The summit had begun. The first meeting had been a good one. The two leaders had discussed a number of major problems and several specific issues. The first plenary meeting would be the next day.

Shevardnadze expressed satisfaction that practical work on a summit document had already begun. It would be clearer later what there would be to sign. But first the ministers ought to discuss organizational matters. As for the President's schedule, Shevardnadze thought that there were no outstanding issues. If there were, Shevardnadze was prepared to hear them.

THE SECRETARY said he thought the program was in good shape. He agreed that the first meeting had been good. It had been cordial and businesslike. That was not surprising, as the two leaders knew one another well by now. So there was a good start. The Secretary welcomed the idea of putting working groups to work early to take advantage of the momentum the leaders had established. The U.S. had brought a qualified team in each of the areas of the agenda, and was prepared to work hard.

The Secretary observed that both sides had hoped there would be a START agreement to sign by the summit. But they also agreed that they wanted a good treaty, not a fast one. Concluding an agreement would take a lot of long, hard work; but it could be done. But more important than the progress which had been made on a START treaty was the fact that the summit had focused attention on the changes which had taken place in U.S.-Soviet relations since the Geneva summit. The Secretary had had a chance to read that morning the theses circulating in advance of the 17th CPSU Conference and had been impressed by their profundity. He was certain the President would be interested in hearing about Gorbachev's plans.

SHEVARDNADZE invited the Secretary to attend the Conference. THE SECRETARY declined on grounds that it was an internal Soviet affair. He asked Sen. Baker to comment.

BAKER said the President felt he had been well received in Moscow, and was gratified. The President was realistic about the difficulties with respect to the various issues to be discussed, including strategic arms. But even though it was the last year of his Presidency, he was determined to accomplish as much as possible.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that, even though it had not proved possible to complete a START agreement, much basic work had been done

as a result of the Reykjavik, Geneva and Washington summits. There was a good foundation to build on. There was greater experience than in the past on such issues as verification, and implementation of the INF agreement would provide “unique” additional opportunities. Both sides had also acquired some experience with treaty ratification as a result of the INF Treaty. This had required some discussion, but the results were now in hand. One could therefore say that both sides were ready to continue work on strategic offensive arms on the condition of preserving the ABM Treaty. Shevardnadze turned to Akhromeyev to say the General Staff shared that view. AKHROMEYEV heartily concurred.

THE SECRETARY said this was something we would want to say in the joint statement, i.e., that we would want to take efforts to achieve treaties on strategic arms reductions and defense and space (D&S) as far as possible. We also wanted to move the substance as far as possible at the summit itself. The Secretary said he thought there were two main areas of START where progress was possible: how to count nuclear ALCM's and mobile ICBM verification. We had some ideas in both areas.

SHEVARDNADZE said he agreed. Most of the necessary work would have to be done at the expert level. Here, too, there was some useful experience. Expert groups could probably get about their business without instruction at this point, but it would be useful briefly to call them together. They could start work immediately and see how far they got.

Shevardnadze said that the most important task was to prepare the basic documentation of the summit. He had discussed with the Secretary in Geneva the possibility of two documents: one on strategic arms and the ABM Treaty and the other a summary of results and future tasks. Shevardnadze understood on the basis of additional working level contacts that the U.S. now preferred a single document, with language on START and ABM an integral part. If that was agreeable, instruction to that effect should be given to representatives.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed that there should be a single document which would include START and D&S issues. Work could proceed on that basis. Amb. Ridgway would coordinate on the U.S. side.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that this process was already well established. He asked if it might be possible to agree during the summit to a text on missile launch notifications. The Soviet side was aware of the U.S. proposal. It had discussed it and sought clarification on a few points. The remaining issues would not be major. If the Secretary agreed, experts could seek to complete a text for signature.

THE SECRETARY said he was glad to hear this and agreed to proceed on the basis that Shevardnadze had outlined. We did not feel

that the “add-ons” that the Soviet delegation in Geneva had proposed were appropriate. It would be better to proceed on the basis of the discussion the Ministers had had in Geneva. The Secretary agreed to instruct experts to that effect.

Raising an organizational point, SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the ministers plan to meet again at 2:15 May 31 for an hour. THE SECRETARY asked if this would be the normal “reporting” session for working groups. SHEVARDNADZE confirmed this. THE SECRETARY said that would be a good idea.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the single document which would be prepared for release at the summit be signed by the two leaders. They could also exchange signed protocols ratifying the INF Agreement.

THE SECRETARY agreed with respect to the INF ratification instruments. As for signing the overall document, he would take up the issue with the President. But this had not been past practice, and things thus far had worked out fine. Signing the INF protocol would lend special significance to any formal ceremony. But the President would raise the question of signing the omnibus joint statement, because it had not been discussed with him.

SHEVARDNADZE said he was not insisting, but simply felt the idea was a good one. The document could cover all aspects of the relationship, and could serve as the basis for future cooperation. Documents of this sort had been signed in 1973, 1974, and 1979.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that President Reagan thought the development of relations under his and General Secretary Gorbachev’s guidance had been better than during previous periods. A means of reflecting that had been to focus in previous documents on what had actually taken place. The Secretary agreed it was important to emphasize the breadth of the relationship—they were not dominated by any single set of issues. But this was something which would have to be discussed with the President. The Secretary needed to see how he felt about it.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that the leaders’ initial meeting had dealt with some serious issues, e.g. the idea of reflecting in the final statement some basic concepts, such as that disputes should not be resolved by military means. The President had reacted positively. The General Secretary had also raised the possibility of joint exploration of Mars. Human rights had come up as well, and the General Secretary had suggested the establishment of an interparliamentary forum on such issues to improve each sides’ understanding of circumstances in the other’s country. Often issues arose out of simple lack of knowledge. So it had been a short meeting, but it had addressed major issues. And Shevardnadze did not rule out additional new ideas being broached

the next day. Signing the INF protocol was a *fait accompli*; but a document which recorded broad based achievement and defined future activities would be even more significant.

THE SECRETARY said the President had briefed his senior staff on the General Secretary's suggestion for incorporating language of the sort Shevardnadze had mentioned into a joint statement. Our initial thought was that it would be preferable to describe the relationship in operational terms, rather than to put things the way we had in the seventies. This got back to what the Secretary had said earlier about the President's view that what he and the General Secretary had accomplished was sounder than the achievements of earlier periods. So our initial reaction was reserved. Perhaps the issue could be looked at in the context of developing language already in the draft joint statement. The Secretary asked Ridgway to comment.

RIDGWAY observed that the current draft contained not only language which had proved "tried and true" since the Geneva summit, but sections on regional and bilateral issues which sought to capture the spirit of the relationship the General Secretary seemed interested in documenting. THE SECRETARY suggested that she and Bessmertnykh work on the problem and see what they could come up with.

As for Mars, the Secretary said we would be responding in a considered way. At this point, the U.S. had no firm plans for a Mars mission of its own. To sign on to a joint mission thus put us a bit ahead of ourselves. But we would respond to the General Secretary's proposal. We were not clear on one point: was a manned or unmanned project envisioned?

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the two sides express themselves in general terms. The concept would be well received around the world. THE SECRETARY said it might be possible to say we were talking to one another and would be sharing information in a systematic and regular way. This was, in effect, a subcategory under the General Secretary's original idea. We would work through the problem and see what might be doable. SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet side would meanwhile consider the ideas the Secretary had raised.

THE SECRETARY noted that he and the minister needed to talk about human rights in the joint statement, since we had mutually developed an unprecedented approach to the problem. It was an approach which seemed to be working well. Schifter had already had two days of meetings in Moscow. Both sides seemed to be satisfied with the systematic dialogue which was evolving. The joint statement should reflect this. As for the General Secretary's idea of parliamentary exchanges on human rights, it was his understanding that they were already in progress. SHEVARDNADZE confirmed that he and the Secretary had discussed the concept earlier; what the Soviet side had



in mind now was to institutionalize the process and involve members of the public as well as legislators.

THE SECRETARY said he had two additional issues to raise on human rights. The first had to do with the Vienna CSCE Follow-up meeting. The ministers had discussed this in Geneva some weeks before. There had been some progress since. But there was still quite a distance to go. Amb. Zimmermann and his counterpart were now in Moscow. If Shevardnadze were agreeable, they could be instructed to see what could be done to take advantage of the positive atmospherics of the summit.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Amb. Kashlev had returned to Vienna. But this would not be a problem. Other experts were available to talk to U.S. representatives. The Vienna meeting was of great importance to the Soviet side. Moscow was in close contact with the neutral states and believed there were good possibilities for finding a solution in consultation with each side's allies. The neutral draft was a good basis for concluding the meeting.

THE SECRETARY agreed that it was worth our attention. But an additional important issue was performance, particularly with respect to prisoners of conscience. Schifter had gone over the appropriate lists with his Soviet colleague. This was an area in which there was great interest in Vienna, and the Secretary just wanted to flag it.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet side was studying the various lists which had been presented and seeking to resolve the issues involved. The General Secretary had suggested the establishment of a sort of standing committee to eliminate misunderstanding. For example, Shevardnadze had heard somewhere—he couldn't recall where—that there were 11,000 political prisoners in the U.S. What sort of people were these? Who were they? Under what laws had they been jailed? Experts needed to discuss the issues. The two sides had travelled an important road together of late on humanitarian issues, but it was only the first part of the road. The task now was to get a serious discussion going. That meant involving experts.

THE SECRETARY said he had seen the 11,000 figure and could not imagine where it came from. Could Shevardnadze provide lists?

SHEVARDNADZE said he had no lists; he had only heard the figure somewhere. But there should be some way to determine if this was a serious issue. The Soviet side had no interest in launching a polemic. But experts ought to address these kinds of issues.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed. The approach the two sides had developed of putting issues on the table in an attempt to understand them better was a good one. We were prepared to proceed on that basis. SHEVARDNADZE said, "OK."

The Foreign Minister said he wished to raise several organizational points. The U.S. had proposed that two documents be signed at the ministerial level with leaders present. The Soviet side did not want a cumbersome procedure. It thus suggested that signatures be divided into two stages: two documents would be signed in the Kremlin by the leaders on May 31 after the plenary session. THE SECRETARY asked if Shevardnadze meant "signed" or "witnessed." SHEVARDNADZE said, "witnessed." These documents were not of sufficient stature to be signed by the leaders. THE SECRETARY agreed.

SHEVARDNADZE continued that the two documents the Soviet side had in mind for the Kremlin signing were the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) document and the Marine Search and Rescue Agreement. If it were completed in time, the agreement on ballistic missile launch notifications might be substituted for the Search and Rescue agreement. Shevardnadze believed this was possible. THE SECRETARY agreed. He also felt it would be possible to complete the JVE, even if negotiators had to work all night.

SHEVARDNADZE said that other agreements (he mentioned fisheries, cultural programs, and transportation science and technology) could be signed in a separate ceremony at the Osobnyak by representatives of the two sides, but without the leaders' being present. The second ceremony could take place May 31 before the ministers' 2:15 meeting, and should take no more than ten minutes.

THE SECRETARY said he thought this would be appropriate. He noted that the cultural program agreement still needed to be completed. USIA Director Wick was in Moscow and ready to work to wrap up the negotiation. The President attached particular importance to the area of exchanges, and was proud of the process he and the General Secretary had set in motion in Geneva: If it were possible to build on that start by agreeing to the establishment of cultural centers, he would regard this as an especially satisfying accomplishment. The President was from the cultural world, and so it was logical he would be attracted to anything which gave it special prominence. While the Secretary was making no specific proposals, perhaps the cultural agreement could be signed by Wick in the presence of the President. The Marine Search and Rescue agreement could slip to the second signing ceremony.

SHEVARDNADZE said this would depend on whether agreement on a cultural program was reached. But if there was an agreement on test launches, the Soviet side would prefer that it replace Search and Rescue for the Kremlin signing. AKHROMEYEV underscored the desirability of signing something in the arms control area.

THE SECRETARY said he had already described the President's attachment to the cultural area. He suggested that the two sides work further on the question of what would be signed when. The Secretary

understood and agreed with the Soviet desire to reflect the full range of the relationship in the Kremlin signing ceremony. He was sure satisfactory arrangements would be worked out.

SHEVARDNADZE said much would depend on what was completed. He was not sure if the cultural agreement could be finished in time. There were financial considerations which had to be addressed. If they could be resolved, there was no reason the agreement could not be signed.

THE SECRETARY suggested giving the negotiators a good swift kick in the pants to get them going. He noted that Ridgway had reminded him that we expected the Maritime Radionavigation Agreement to be ready for signature. Did the Soviet side expect to be able to sign? SHEVARDNADZE asked if it were ready. BESSMERTNYKH said it was, adding that it would be signed at the Osobnyak.

SHEVARDNADZE asked if that was all for now. THE SECRETARY said he had two more issues to raise.

First, he wanted Shevardnadze to know that the U.S. side looked forward to some discussions at the summit of a variety of regional issues. The Secretary would be going to the Middle East after the summit—although he must be a masochist to do so.<sup>2</sup> So that might be one area to focus on.

A second could be southern Africa, where the two sides had begun to work effectively, and where we felt progress was possible. Agreement had been reached to have Crocker and Adamishin work on the margins of the leaders' meetings. We would like to highlight this work in order to stimulate further movement in the region.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet said [*side*] also favored setting up a regional working group. It might be possible in such a context to develop language on priority regional problems for inclusion in a joint statement. Moscow attached importance to the Middle East and the Iran-Iraq conflict, and felt that prospects for a southern Africa settlement were getting out of the doldrums. On Kampuchea, the Vietnamese leadership had just announced that 50,000 of its troops would be brought out.

THE SECRETARY said that this was a very welcome statement. SHEVARDNADZE said it was welcome in Moscow as well. THE SECRETARY suggested that perhaps Moscow deserved some of the credit. SHEVARDNADZE replied that the U.S. knew first hand that the Vietnamese leadership was very independent. They had taken the decision

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<sup>2</sup> Shultz traveled to Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and Syria to discuss his Middle East peace initiative June 3–7.

on their own, although Moscow had been informed in advance of the announcement.

Shevardnadze said that in approaching their regional discussion, Afghanistan would be the touchstone. This was the first time it had proved possible to go beyond searching for a solution to actual agreement. Unfortunately, Moscow had now been compelled to state publicly that Pakistan was acting in violation of the obligations it had assumed in Geneva. The Soviets knew this to be true. They had the facts.

Shevardnadze said that Gorbachev had said to him just before the present meeting that Afghanistan was the “touchstone” in U.S.-Soviet relations with respect to the settlement of regional disputes. The Soviet Union, Shevardnadze affirmed, was complying “to the hour” with the withdrawal schedule it had decided upon and intended to continue to do so. But if it saw that the other side was violating the Geneva accords, this could change. AKHROMEYEV said that another 1,000 troops had just come out, making the total withdrawal to date 11,000, along with their aircraft and other hardware.

SHEVARDNADZE pointed out that many had predicted that, with the Soviet withdrawal from Jalalabad, the city would fall to the resistance. That had not happened. AKHROMEYEV added that in Kandahar, in fact, a former rebel was now in charge of the province for the central government.

THE SECRETARY recalled that the U.S. had consistently said that it was up to the Afghan people to determine their future *[when]* Soviet forces withdrew. There had also been extensive discussions with the Soviet Union about the two guarantors’ obligations. The U.S. had proposed a moratorium on arms supplies, but the Soviet Union had been unable to accept. We understood that, and had suggested a different form of symmetry, in which reciprocal rights to supply were understood. Acting on that basis, we wanted the Afghans to decide their own fate. We had no interest in trying to influence internal developments there.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow’s only interest was in ensuring that Pakistan lived up to its obligations. The Soviet statement which had been issued on Afghanistan had reflected this. There had been no mention of the U.S., even though the United States had agreed to be a guarantor.

THE SECRETARY said he wished to raise another problem—the Krasnoyarsk radar. His concern was in the context of the defense and space talks and the requirement for a review by October of the ABM Treaty. Shevardnadze had addressed these concerns on one occasion in private. It would be useful to have something authoritative so the two sides would not be tripped up as they proceeded.

SHEVARDNADZE said he did not want to comment on what he had said earlier. The U.S. called for dismantlement. But of what? If the U.S. wanted to resolve the issue, the Soviet side had given it some options. They should be considered. The problem need not be intractable. AKHROMEYEV said the working group could take up the issue. THE SECRETARY said, "OK." SHEVARDNADZE jocularly warned Akhromeyev that he shouldn't agree to dismantle the radar without authorization.

THE SECRETARY said that he wanted to reemphasize before they adjourned how much he had been impressed by the Party conference theses. They were a very powerful and important document. If, in the course of the next few days, he could hear something of Shevardnadze's thinking on the subject, the Secretary would very much welcome it. The theses seemed to him to presage something of great importance, not just for the Soviet Union, but for the world.

SHEVARDNADZE quipped that if he and the Secretary started to discuss perestroika and democratization, it would require the whole Moscow program. The issues the Secretary had found so interesting was, more seriously, a daily concern. Shevardnadze could say that the plans which were being developed created real opportunities for relations with the U.S. and other countries. The Soviet leadership was acting in this spirit. It was not afraid of self-criticism. Maybe there was a lesson in this for the U.S. as well.

THE SECRETARY repeated that he was very impressed. He had read the General Secretary's book and a number of relevant documents. They were clearly important. But the Secretary would welcome hearing from Shevardnadze his views on the process now underway, because of the special relationship they had established.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the ministers should find time to talk. He would be glad to share his impressions and concerns.

[At this point the ministers adjourned to meet with delegations.]<sup>3</sup>

In welcoming remarks, SHEVARDNADZE noted that this fourth summit reflected the fundamental changes underway in U.S.-Soviet relations. He noted that success in building on the considerable progress which had already been achieved in many areas would in large part depend on the success of the delegations in establishing new momentum by their work. He lauded the ratification of the INF Treaty and called for accelerated work on a treaty to reduce strategic arms. He stated it would be a good thing to sign such a treaty during the term of office of the Reagan administration. Quickly reviewing progress in other parts of the agenda, Shevardnadze complimented those present

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<sup>3</sup> Brackets are in the original.

for their dedication and contributions to the process. He then quickly summarized the organizational arrangements to which the ministers had just agreed.

THE SECRETARY seconded Shevardnadze's assessment of the importance of the process the President and Gorbachev had set in motion over the previous three years. Noting Shevardnadze's reference to the INF agreement, the Secretary pointed out that the Senate's overwhelming vote in favor of ratification reflected not only confidence in the Treaty itself, but in the general course of development of U.S.-Soviet relations. He confirmed Shevardnadze's description of procedural matters and identified Nitze and Ridgway to oversee, respectively, arms control and other working groups. He reiterated his private comments to Shevardnadze on the appropriateness of seeking to conclude agreement on cultural exchanges, including the establishment of new cultural centers, at the summit.

The Secretary concluded by noting that the ministers had agreed every effort should be made to conclude an agreement on ballistic missile test launch notifications in Moscow. Handing over a draft text of such an agreement, SHEVARDNADZE asked with a grin when he could sign.

Before the meeting adjourned, the Secretary called Shevardnadze's attention to the importance of completing work in Moscow on the nuclear testing Joint Verification Experiment document. He also felt it would be possible to make concrete progress on southern Africa and the Vienna CSCE Follow-up meeting.

The meeting concluded and working groups began meeting at 9:30 pm after the ministers' departure.

158. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, May 30, 1988, 10–11:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

First Plenary Meeting (U)

PARTICIPANTS

*US*

The President  
Secretary George P. Shultz  
Secretary Frank C. Carlucci  
Senator Howard Baker  
General Colin Powell  
Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway  
Ambassador Jack Matlock  
Mark Parris, Department of State (Notetaker)  
Nelson C. Ledsy, NSC (Notetaker)

*USSR*

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev  
Chairman Andrei Gromyko  
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze  
Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov  
Politburo Member Aleksandr Yakovlev  
Secretary Anatoly Dobrynin  
Deputy Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh  
Mr. Chernyayev  
Ambassador Yuri Dubinin  
Mr. Victor Sukhodrev (Notetaker)  
Mr. Sredin (Notetaker)

While photos were being taken, *General Secretary Gorbachev* commented that the President had been warmly received by the Soviet people during his first day in Moscow. The Muscovites' feelings were sincere; nothing had been arranged for the President's benefit. It was all spontaneous. (S)

When the room was cleared, *General Secretary Gorbachev* opened the meeting by welcoming the President and his delegation. He commented that the delegation on both sides represented the most powerful and representative assemblage in many years. Indeed, it was 14 years since

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting took place in St. Catherine's Hall at the Kremlin.



there had been a visit like this to Moscow.<sup>2</sup> The people of the world looked with interest to these meetings in Moscow, which can have an enormous impact on world politics and international relations. (S)

*The General Secretary* then called attention to the warm greeting the President was receiving from the Soviet people. The response in the streets was spontaneous. It did not have to be arranged or organized. "The Soviet people have a high regard for you, Mr. President, and for the American people," continued the General Secretary. Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze have established a good working relationship. Meetings have begun between our two defense ministers. What has taken place in the last 24 hours has merely emphasized the warm sentiment the Soviet people feel toward America and the American people. (S)

"If, as you say in the West, 'politics should reflect the will of the electorate,' then relations between us should grow more cordial," *Gorbachev* continued. "You can see how the Soviet people feel. I understand the American electorate also favors a resolution of differences with the Soviet Union. Both peoples and the world at large are following the course of our deliberations. Our successes can benefit mankind. Similarly, every small mistake we make will be known around the world and lead to complaint and bitterness." "So," *Gorbachev* continued, "both of us must play our roles carefully, recognizing the importance of our task and displaying maturity and responsibility in dealing with the problems before us." The General Secretary concluded by suggesting that the two leaders continue the progress begun at Geneva. (S)

*The General Secretary* then turned to his notes and said he believed that today would be given over to a general discussion of the state of the relationship. He then called on the President to make the first comments. (S)

*President Reagan* observed that today was Memorial Day in the United States. This is the day, he explained, when our citizens honored those who had died for their country on the battlefield. The President observed that, during the preceding photo-op, when the press had asked Gorbachev if he had a Memorial Day message for the American people, the President had thought of all those who had died in previous conflicts. It had occurred to him that those sitting around the table were at that moment the most important in the world in terms of their ability to influence prospects for peace. That was the spirit in which he hoped to begin the present meeting. (S)

*The President* said that he was glad that the two leaders had begun their discussions the day before with a review of human rights issues.

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<sup>2</sup> For the memoranda of conversation from the June 1974 Moscow Summit, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Documents 186–189.

That underscored the pride of place such issues held in our relationship. As the experts would be continuing their discussions in working groups, the President suggested moving on to new subjects. (S)

Noting that the day before<sup>3</sup> he and Gorbachev had agreed on the need to find ways of dispelling preconceptions, *the President* stressed the importance he attached to continued expansion of academic, cultural and other exchanges between the two societies. People-to-people exchanges, especially among the young, would contribute directly to better understanding, and thus to improved future relations. (S)

*The President* therefore proposed that the two sides dramatically expand high school exchange programs to allow hundreds, and eventually thousands, of Soviet and American young people to visit and learn in each others' schools, and to get to know each other's country first-hand. The President said he would mention this idea in his public remarks while in Moscow, adding that specific suggestions would be shared with Soviet representatives. In essence, the US proposal was to establish lasting institutional ties between individual American and Soviet high schools. The program could begin with 25 or 30 schools the first year, building to 100 in each country the second year. We would foresee, finally, 10 students, with appropriate adult escort, from each school, for a total of 1000 students for each side per year. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said he could agree with the spirit of what the President had proposed. Before commenting in detail, however, he wanted to return to something the President had said—the notion that the people around the table had a great responsibility for seeking to change the world for the better. Gorbachev thought that in light of the progress which had been achieved since the Geneva Summit, it was possible to draw some conclusions. (S)

First, *General Secretary Gorbachev* stated, it was important that the two sides meet regularly to discuss their differences. Second, the important political consultations now underway between the two countries' leaderships—as reflected in the important statements which had been issued—was acquiring a powerful momentum in world affairs. The ideas embodied in the Geneva statement, e.g., the notion that neither side would seek military superiority, had lost none of their force. It would be well to “corroborate” the Geneva document with an equally significant statement to the effect that it would be uncomfortable to achieve by military means results with which the world could feel comfortable. (Gorbachev quipped that he could see Carlucci's reaction, but not Yazov's.) Rather, the two sides could affirm the need to resolve difference by political means. Such a statement would provide positive momentum for years to come. (S)

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 156.

As for the President's specific proposal, *Gorbachev* could say that the Soviet side accepted it and was willing to discuss it in practical terms. The two leaders' colleagues could get down to business on the idea. Gorbachev agreed that exchanges, especially among the young, were seeds which could bear good fruit later on. (S)

Moving on to arms control, *the President* noted that experts were already at work, but volunteered to summarize the state of play. The two sides' discussions on arms reductions had come a long way since the Geneva Summit. Progress had been registered across the whole spectrum of arms reduction problems, from intercontinental strategic forces to conventional forces, nuclear testing and chemical weapons. At each of the two leaders' meetings, they had been able to add another piece to the foundation. They should do the same in Moscow. (S)

The INF Treaty reduced arsenals for the first time in the nuclear age, and set a tough new standard for verification. The two sides were well along the way to a START agreement. The President wanted to move ahead and complete START and Defense and Space (D&S) treaties that year. But we had to begin with a clean slate. Before we could enter into new agreements on strategic arms, we needed an understanding on how our concerns about Soviet activities that we considered to be violations of the ABM Treaty would be resolved. This was a very important issue, as Congress raised questions on issues which were perceived as challenges. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said he had the same problem with the Supreme Soviet. He felt that Congress would have difficulty fighting against peaceful proposals; it could not afford to be perceived as militaristic. But it was up to the Administration to put the issue squarely to them. (S)

*The President* observed that it was not as easy as that. Congress was good at pointing fingers at the Administration when it lacked a good answer for issues which arose. The INF Treaty had been a success, but we had shed a lot of blood to get it. In any case, the President hoped that, at the end of his visit, he would be able to report that ways had been found to resolve the major questions blocking new agreements. The President was prepared, if Gorbachev agreed, to review what we viewed as the main obstacles. (S)

Starting with strategic arms, *the President* noted that the two sides' negotiators in Geneva were working on a draft treaty to reduce strategic nuclear arsenals by 50 percent. There were several outstanding issues he and Gorbachev ought to address. First, they should agree to sublimits on ICBMs—the most destabilizing weapons systems—so as to strengthen stability and reduce incentives for a first strike. Second, they should work out a formula for attributing numbers to the nuclear-armed cruise missiles on heavy bombers, taking into account the differences in terms of stability between these slow-flying systems and ballistic missiles. The President noted that the US still preferred to ban

mobile missiles, but was prepared to see if it were possible to pin down verification provisions for mobile ICBMs which would make it possible to determine whether limits were feasible.

Finally, because START dealt exclusively with nuclear forces, the President proposed the two sides work out procedures for removing from START constraints older heavy bombers that were converted to conventional missions, in other words, to work out means to exclude conventional bombers. The President asked if Gorbachev wished to comment. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said he had a few remarks. His impression was that everything was settled with respect to medium and shorter-range nuclear missiles. It was important that the exchange of instruments of ratification of the INF Treaty would be an element in the Moscow Summit. The importance was political: this was the first disarmament treaty in post-war history. (S)

The *General Secretary* expressed his thanks to the US team for its contribution to the INF Treaty; he hoped that reciprocal thanks would be forthcoming, as neither side could have done it alone. It was true, he acknowledged, that the US had been the first by a few hours to ratify the Treaty. It was also well that the final Senate vote had been so high—93 to 5. Neither side had expected such an impressive figure earlier. True, the Soviet side had done better—with 100 percent of the votes in favor. (S)

As for strategic offensive arms, the Soviet side had already agreed to work on the question of sublimits by linking them to resolution of the mobile missile issue. Moscow was aware that the US had concerns on this point; but so did the Soviet Union. The Soviet side, for example, wanted to apply sublimits to submarines. But if a solution could be found to the problem of mobile missiles—both with respect to a number and to verification provisions—it would also be possible to think about setting ICBM sublimits. The working group could work on the issue. (S)

As for SLCMs, *General Secretary Gorbachev* wanted to set the record straight. It had been agreed in Reykjavik that SLCMs should be constrained. If they were not, and the two sides started down the path of 50-percent reductions, it would open the gate for a whole new arms race. There must be clarity on this point. Did Gorbachev correctly understand that the US was now prepared to agree to a limit on SLCMs? (S)

*Secretary Shultz* said that the President had been talking about ALCMs. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said he had misunderstood. There was a saying in Russian: “He who has a hurt, keeps talking about it.” So here was another for the President’s collections of proverbs. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said he thought ALCMs could be discussed in a positive light. The Soviet side understood that the US felt

it needed this system. It hoped for reciprocal US understanding of Soviet concerns about ALCMs and SLCMs. There seemed to be agreement that ceilings were necessary; it would be well if the two sides could agree on numbers. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said his experts told him that it might be possible to find a solution to the ALCM problem on the basis of a compromise. If so, it would improve chances for an agreement on 50-percent reductions. Gorbachev could assure the President that the Soviet side wanted to sign a treaty while the Reagan Administration was still in power. Gorbachev had said yesterday that he had once said to Secretary Shultz that the two sides had arrived at a relationship which made it possible for them to discuss things calmly. Gorbachev was sorry that the Administration's term of office was nearing an end. It was too bad it could not be extended, like Roosevelt's. But the President should know that Moscow was ready to work on a START agreement right up to the end. (S)

*The President* said he had some points to make on Defense and Space. The objective of SDI, he explained, was to make the US and its allies more secure, not to threaten the Soviet Union. The Soviet side knew the merits of defending itself, as it devoted far more resources to strategic defense than did the US. As the two leaders had discussed in Reykjavik, the US was willing in the context of a START agreement to agree to a period of nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty, after which, unless it were otherwise agreed, each side would be free to choose its own course of action. (S)

*The President* said he could not agree to a nonwithdrawal provision until the Soviet Union had corrected its violations of the ABM Treaty. In Washington, he reminded Gorbachev, the General Secretary had made clear that he opposed the United States investigating advanced strategic defenses. Nonetheless, he had accepted that, at the end of a nonwithdrawal period, unless agreed otherwise, each side would have the right to deploy strategic defenses if it so chose. This needed to be made clear in the agreement. (S)

The US also needed, *the President* continued, the right to take necessary steps if its supreme interests were jeopardized by unexpected extraordinary events. This was standard in treaties. It needed as well to protect the right to research, develop and test advanced strategic defenses during the nonwithdrawal period, and could not accept restrictions beyond those actually agreed in the ABM Treaty. We had thus proposed an agreement not to object to each others' space-based sensors. Both sides used space to collect information for a variety of purposes. It was impossible to distinguish among these purposes. Why not agree not to make this the subject of unnecessary disputes? The two sides' negotiators, the President concluded, had put together a joint draft D&S agreement text. He proposed they be instructed to press ahead. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said that that task could be facilitated if the US could accept a single formula in the treaty—that, if one side violated the ABM Treaty, the other would be free of its obligations under the treaty to reduce strategic arms by 50 percent. Such an approach would make it unnecessary to discuss what was or was not permitted under the ABM Treaty. But Secretaries Shultz and Carlucci argued against this. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* reminded the General Secretary that the US viewed the Krasnoyarsk radar as a violation of the Treaty. The essence of the problem, however, was that the two sides did not agree on what was permitted by the Treaty with respect to research, development and testing. If that were agreed, the US would not have so many hang-ups. We had always felt that the Soviet Union agreed that during the period of strategic arms reductions, it would be a good thing to know what would be happening with respect to nonwithdrawal. But there was no such agreement. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said he could give the President some free advice—even though Henry Kissinger would have charged him millions for the favor. The President, he stated amiably, was being deceived. He had initially been deceived by former Defense Secretary Weinberger; perhaps Carlucci was now doing the same thing. Some might think that it was possible to put something in space which could give the US an advantage (even though, Gorbachev pointed out, this would be contrary to one of the principles, which had been agreed to at the Geneva Summit). But during the proposed nonwithdrawal period—nine or eight and a half years—SDI was not a workable concept. If the President would tell his military people to confine their experiments to earth, nothing would happen. There was no need during this period for research in space. Attempts to conduct such research, on the other hand, would produce suspicion and mistrust. It would lead to a cooling of relations. That was why Gorbachev felt Carlucci, with Shultz's help, was moving the President in the wrong direction. He wanted to state this in their presence so they could defend themselves. (S)

*The President* said that, before they did that, he had some things to say of his own. He had come into office believing in the instability of a world whose security was based primarily on nuclear missiles. The average person could envision and was psychologically prepared to deal with the threat of conventional weapons. But when cities could be destroyed at the push of a button, it was another thing. Shortly after entering office, therefore, he had called in America's senior military leaders and asked if it would be possible to devise a system to render missiles obsolete. They had come back after consulting with our scientific community and said that, with a lot of time and resources, it could be done. The President had said, "Do it." So SDI from its inception has been a defensive weapon. (S)



*General Secretary Gorbachev* said that the systems being developed in connection with SDI could be used for other than defensive purposes. (S)

*The President* replied that Gorbachev was overlooking the President's frequently stated belief that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought. The President believed nuclear weapons must be eliminated. When he had been informed that SDI was possible, the President had announced, if a workable system were devised, the US would make deployment of such a system available to all countries, and would not deploy until nuclear weapons had been eliminated. (S)

But if nuclear weapons were eliminated, there would still be a need to ensure that no madman could obtain the knowledge necessary to develop a nuclear weapon and blackmail the world. The situation, *the President* explained, was akin to that after World War I. Poison gas had been banned, but people had kept their gas masks. The President said he really meant this. There had been breakthroughs, and US scientists were very optimistic SDI could work. But the purpose of the exercise was to eliminate the arsenals which could bring about such destruction in minutes. The nuclear accident at Chernobyl<sup>4</sup> had shown what damage could be done with a release of radioactivity which was miniscule compared to that of even the smallest nuclear warheads. No one could be a victor in a nuclear war. (S)

*The President* reiterated that if SDI were proved workable, it could not be put into effect until nuclear weapons were eliminated. It was not an offensive weapon in any way. It was, therefore, non-negotiable, as far as the President was concerned. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* asked why SDI would be necessary if all missiles were destroyed. (S)

*The President* repeated that it was like a gas mask. It was impossible to unlearn the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons. One had to be sure that a madman like Hitler was not at some point able to build a bomb and name his terms to the world. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said one could not be too careful where nuclear weapons were concerned. He reaffirmed that the Soviet side believed SDI was not just a defensive system, but also would provide a means of attacking targets on Earth. The question also arose as to why, if one party wanted to build such weapons, the other should make it easy for him. It was one thing for SDI to defend against a certain number of missiles; it was another for it to stop that number times X. But if both sides devoted all their national wealth to such a competition, the discussions the two sides were having were meaning-

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Document 6.



less. Stability would also suffer. The capital which had been accrued in negotiations to date would be undermined; mistrust would arise; Moscow would have to consider a response. (S)

*The President* reminded Gorbachev that he had offered in Geneva to share development of SDI with the Soviet Union. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said he had to express doubt as to that offer. He pointed out that the US had refused to work out a system of on-site inspection of SLCMs aboard US warships. How could one believe that America would open its laboratories. This simply was not serious. The two sides were talking about matters of life and death. (S)

*Secretary Carlucci* noted that there was a difference between verifying an operational system and exchanging data and mutual observation opportunities relating to research and development. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said Carlucci had not convinced him. He reiterated that the two sides should proceed on the basis of the Washington Summit statement language on the ABM Treaty. In that connection, he noted that the US had raised the question of sensors. Perhaps the experts could talk more about that. But Gorbachev urged the President to think about what he had said. The President was listening only to scientists like Teller,<sup>5</sup> not to scientists, including those in Europe and the Soviet Union, who had very different views. So the experts could work, but Gorbachev hoped the President would weigh what he had said. (S)

On the Krasnoyarsk radar, *General Secretary Gorbachev* added, several things needed to be kept in mind. First, construction had been stopped. Second, US “scientists” (sic) had visited the site and found nothing. Finally, the Soviet side had expressed its willingness totally to dismantle the radar if an agreement were reached. Gorbachev reminded the President that there were also US “forward” radars which should not be forgotten. But experts could discuss all of this, “including the US sensor idea,” in Geneva. (S)

Moving to verification, *General Secretary Gorbachev* stated that the problem here was resistance on the part of the US leadership and US Navy. The President had earlier been a strong advocate of verification. Now the Soviet side had to talk the US into it. Was the earlier position a bluff? It was the same for chemical weapons. Now it seemed that factories and ships could not be included. What was to be inspected? The White House and Kremlin? The two leaders had now visited both sites themselves. They had to move forward on verification. (S)

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<sup>5</sup> Nuclear physicist Edward Teller.

*The President* said he thought both sides understood the importance of excluding certain things which bore no relationship to weapons. For example, on mobile missiles, we were talking about how to count them, not how they were manufactured. The key was to be able to determine if agreed ceilings had been exceeded. That went for the Soviet side as well. That was the problem verification had to deal with, rather than exposing techniques one side or the other was using to manufacture weapons. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said he agreed, but stressed that the two sides should be talking verification in comprehensive terms. Privately owned facilities should not be excluded. Ownership was irrelevant; the question was what could be produced. Moscow would be very stringent on verification issues. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* clarified that the question of excluding private manufacturing facilities had arisen in the CW negotiations. For its part, the US was not drawing distinctions on the basis of private versus government ownership. *Secretary Carlucci* noted that neither had we made this an issue in negotiating the INF Treaty. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* suggested that the US may have removed its demand with respect to CW. In that case, the only obstacle to conclusion of a CW convention was the US binary program. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* noted that the President had some points on CW. There had been some progress on that issue. There was a good statement to be included in a Summit concluding document. The Secretary recalled what a strong impression photographs of the effects of CW use against Kurdish civilians in the Iran-Iraq War had made at the time of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's March visit to Washington. This had redoubled our determination to come to grips with this issue. This was why it was essential that all states with CW manufacturing capability sign on to a convention. (S)

*The President* said that the language in the agreed joint statement would help bring about further progress. Nonetheless, much work remained to be done on a chemical weapons ban, especially in the areas of verification and ensuring the participation of all states. And no solutions were yet in sight for these problems. The situation was similar to that with respect to strategic defense. Given the conflicts in the world, any CW ban had to be comprehensive. Both sides ought to work toward that goal. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said he had consulted his notes, which indicated that as yet there was no agreement on the question of inspecting private and multinational plants. Was there a change in the US position? Was it true that the US was not excluding such facilities? (S)

*Secretary Carlucci* confirmed that the US was not excluding private facilities. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* welcomed this clarification. This was what he had wanted to be clear on. (S)

*General Powell* pointed out that the disagreement was over the size of the “net.” No one was talking about declaring “open season.” Categories needed to be carefully defined. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* asked how that squared with the President’s concern that prohibited activities could be taking place without the knowledge of parties to a convention. General Powell’s clarification had raised questions about the workability of a CW verification scheme. If there were a convention, anyone with a manufacturing capability should adhere. This, in turn, implied comprehensive verification provisions. But this was an issue for further discussion at another time. (S)

For the moment, *General Secretary Gorbachev* continued, he wanted to address the US proposal for an agreement on launches of missiles within national territories. *Secretary Shultz* noted that the US proposal had related to ballistic missile launches. *General Secretary Gorbachev* said that the Soviet side agreed to the proposal. It had an additional suggestion to make, but authorization should be given to finalize the US proposal for signature during the President’s visit. *Secretary Shultz* said we could do that. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* continued that the Soviet side would also like to propose that experts reach agreement—or at least begin discussions—on launches of ALCMs and SLCMs, as well as of mass take-offs of 100 or more heavy bombers, of exercises of strategic forces, and of ballistic missiles in depressed trajectories. Agreement on such steps would increase predictability and reduce the threat of miscalculation. So perhaps experts could study this even as they elaborated an ICBM test launch notification agreement. (S)

*Secretary Carlucci* asked if Gorbachev was proposing to ban depressed trajectory missile test launches, or simply to notify in advance that they would take place. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said he was talking about notification. As for depressed trajectory tests, he was not proposing a ban, but that could be discussed. The US had proposed this at one point. It could be discussed. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* noted that there were two things to consider. One was an agreement on ballistic missile test launch notification, regardless of trajectory. That could be signed in Moscow. (*General Secretary Gorbachev* interjected that he was talking about launches *within* national territories.) *Secretary Shultz* said that the second issue was a proposed discussion of notification of other activities. This was something we could certainly agree to study. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said this might be reflected in instructions to delegations in a joint statement. *The President* said that a test

launch agreement would be a concrete example of the progress being made by our START delegations. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* suggested moving on to a discussion of conventional weapons reductions in Europe. Things seemed to be moving in a good direction, and it appeared it would be possible in the near future to agree on a conference. The key was agreement on the substance of the negotiations. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had briefed the General Secretary on the Foreign Ministers' discussions in Geneva with Secretary Shultz, where agreement had been reached on a formula to describe that substance. The formula was: "the subject matter of the negotiations will be conventional armed forces and conventional armaments and equipment. No conventional forces, armaments and equipment are to be excluded because they are capable of employing other than conventional armaments. Nuclear weapons are not a subject of negotiations."

*General Secretary Gorbachev* asserted that the ministers had agreed that the formula should be referred to the mandate negotiations in Geneva for further work. If the US was willing to confirm this approach, the Soviet side was willing to decide the matter now and have that reflected in the joint statement. This would have tremendous significance. (S)

*The President* asked if Gorbachev had said that no nuclear weapons should be included. It was the US view that the Soviet side enjoyed an advantage with respect to conventional weapons. We believed that inequality should be eliminated before we addressed battlefield nuclear weapons. To focus on nuclear weapons would leave a disparity. If one were really interested in defense, neither side should retain a superiority. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* reminded the President that that issue had come up during the Washington Summit. Gorbachev had questioned whether the Soviet Union enjoyed conventional superiority when one considered the area from the Atlantic to the Urals. To resolve that question, the Soviet side had since proposed an exchange of relevant data. For some reason the US did not like the proposal. Did the President know why? It was because there was no superiority on the Soviet side. Propaganda was one thing. But facts were facts. There was a certain Soviet advantage in the Central area; but on the southern flank, NATO had an advantage of 1.5 to 1. By a different measure, the East had an advantage in tanks; but the West had an advantage in air power. (S)

*Secretary Carlucci* pointed out that the Warsaw Pact had more aircraft deployed than NATO. *General Secretary Gorbachev* said this was not a serious way of looking at the problem. (S)

*The General Secretary* again stressed that it would be good to get down to actual negotiations on conventional arms. As Moscow saw it, there should be three stages. (S)

The task of the first would be to identify and remove imbalances and asymmetries. To do that, the Soviet side proposed baseline on-site inspections to remove any differences in assessments. In a nutshell, if the subject matter of the negotiations could be identified, if there were an exchange of data right away, it would be possible to get down to negotiations and see how the data corresponded to reality, and then see how to reduce any asymmetries. (S)

A second stage would reduce forces by 500,000 on a side. A third would give the remaining forces a defensive character incompatible with the conduct of offensive operations. At any stage, the Soviet side would be prepared for reciprocal mutual reductions with respect to tactical nuclear weapons, dual capable aircraft, tanks, etc. It would also be prepared to consider agreements on measures to establish corridors separating forces from one another, nuclear free zones, and similar confidence building measures. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* asked why the US and West European governments were holding back in this area, acting as if Soviet proposals were a red flag to a bull. The two sides needed to get beyond propaganda. A good basis had been laid for statements in Moscow. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* said that both sides wanted to move ahead on conventional arms reductions. The question was how to do so. We believed the best way was to start in Vienna and complete a mandate. Gorbachev had read a statement which the ministers had discussed in Geneva. It was a good statement. But it had to be marketed to our respective allies. This would be easier if it came forward as a proposal in Vienna. If we handed our allies something which looked as if it had been agreed in advance, they would get sore. So we believed that the substance that had been talked about was satisfactory; the task now was to find a way to move forward in Vienna. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* asked what should be said in a Moscow final document on the matter. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* said that we needed to be careful. Most of the weaponry being discussed did not belong to the US. It would be better for the idea to emerge in Vienna than in Moscow. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* asked what role the Summit could play in this. Should it not confirm what Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had said in Geneva? And then it could be sent to Vienna to be finalized. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* said that the language agreed to in Geneva was good. We had agreed to get it into play in Vienna. What had happened

then, however, was that the Soviet representative had described it as “agreed.” This had riled our allies. We were now seeking to get them to agree to the approach which had been discussed. We didn’t want to aggravate the situation. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* asserted that the two sides’ recent experience in finding formulae suggested communique language could be found which, rather than cause problems with each side’s allies, would lead them to applaud. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* said that, in addition to agreeing on a mandate, there was the question of a balanced outcome to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up meeting. We needed to see some outcome in the human rights basket which would satisfy our concerns. (S)

In this regard, the Secretary had read the day before the recently published, so-called “theses” for the upcoming 17th CPSU Conference. (*Gorbachev* asked why the Secretary referred to them as “so-called.” They were in fact theses. *Secretary Shultz* said he stood corrected.) In any case, the document was clearly one of the most significant to appear in the Soviet Union in a long time. (S)

What had particularly struck the Secretary was that the Soviet representative to the Follow-up meeting ought to read the theses. The attitude he was currently displaying in Vienna would make it impossible, if applied to the Soviet Union itself, to reach what the theses described. If, on the other hand, one could get the right outcome on human rights in Vienna, it would be possible to move ahead on a mandate. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* added that the US had no problem with the concept of a data exchange, although our 14 years of experience with MBFR gave us some pause on that score. We recognized the need to get on with the substance of conventional forces. So what was needed was to give the right stimulus in Vienna, as we had been able to do during the Stockholm CDE endgame. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* asked if the President had noted the Soviet proposal that, once negotiations on conventional forces began, on-site inspections would be used to identify asymmetries and then act. Something seemed to be emerging. This reminded *Gorbachev* of a story his granddaughter had told him recently. It seemed an old man and woman one night had heard a knock at the door. Opening it, they found an egg, which they put under their hen. But when it hatched, a three-headed dragon emerged instead of a chick. On conventional forces, *Gorbachev* said, both sides needed to be sure they got what they expected, not a three-headed dragon. (S)

Moving to a new subject, *the President* noted that ballistic missile proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia threatened both coun-

tries. If not stopped or slowed down, it was certain to change the military environment in the region. The last thing either side wanted was for that to happen, but that was where things were headed. We could sit back and wait for Iran, Libya and others to marry up chemical warheads with ballistic missiles. Or we could get serious. (S)

*The President* suggested it would be possible to talk seriously about respective assessments of the problem, and about ways to apply diplomatic and public pressure on those providing the material and know-how to countries in the region, as well as about strategies for working with friends to stop or control this trend. Noting the recent use of ballistic missiles in the Iran-Iraq War, the President expressed the hope that the Soviet side was ready for such a discussion. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* agreed that this was a real problem. Moscow had been disturbed when missiles it had sold Iraq had, with the aid of Western nations, been given a range of 700 km. It appeared that China and Brazil had been involved. So the problem existed. The two sides should express their concern about this and take it into account in their practical policies. What would happen, for example, if ballistic missiles were used against France, which relied on nuclear plants for 60 percent of its power. (S)

*Secretary Carlucci* said the US was prepared to engage in such a discussion. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said he could agree in principle. He was ready to interact. But he did not want to surprise Yazov by agreeing without consulting with him. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* noted the irony of countries like China welcoming the INF Treaty and then selling missiles in the same range band to Saudi Arabia. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said that ultimately it would be necessary to involve other countries capable of manufacturing nuclear missiles. But, he said jocularly, that would be a decision for the President's successor to make. (S)

*The President* reiterated the importance in this context of ending the Iran-Iraq War. (S)

US-Soviet relations, *the General Secretary* said, could not be based solely on current realities, important though those realities were. Looking beyond the year 2000, Gorbachev could say off the record, he was convinced that the two countries were "doomed" to cooperate with one another. Many new factors were emerging which would force the two to cooperate. So the positive atmosphere which had been established over the past three years had to be preserved. The capital which had accumulated should be put to good use. (S)

*The President* said that the people around the table could make a major contribution to peace in the future. (S)



*General Secretary Gorbachev* said he agreed. Noting that the time allotted for the meeting was up, he quipped that the two leaders had learned to be punctual. (S)

He and the President, *the General Secretary* concluded, had acquired a good deal of experience in dealing with one another. Different issues were always emerging. But they called forth new energies. (S)

*The President* agreed, and the meeting concluded after the two leaders engaged briefly in informal conversations with their delegations. (S)

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## 159. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, May 30, 1988, 2:28–2:47 p.m.

### SUBJECT

The President's Meeting with Monks in Danilov Monastery (U)

### PARTICIPANTS

#### U.S.

The President

The First Lady

Secretary of State George Shultz

General Colin L. Powell, National Security Advisor

Thomas Griscom, Director for White House Communications and Planning

Jack Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow

Rudolf V. Perina, Director for European and Soviet Affairs, NSC Staff

(Notetaker)

William Hopkins, Interpreter

#### USSR

Metropolitan Filaret

Archimandrite Tichon

14 Unidentified Monks

After the President delivered his prepared remarks, the press was asked to leave and an *unidentified monk* delivered a message of greeting to the President. He said that the monastery wished to greet the President on behalf of all members of the Russian Orthodox Church, which had traditions dating back a thousand years. He said that when the

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988. Confidential. Drafted by Perina. The meeting took place in the Father Superior's residence at Danilov Monastery.

grace of the Holy Spirit acted in the hearts of people, the world would be saved from destruction. The President had come on a mission of peace, and if the Summit meeting advanced the cause of peace, Jesus Christ would be present. He concluded by asking God to bless the Summit and to fulfill the prayers of both Russian and American Christians that this mission of peace be successful. (C)

*Archimandrite Tichon* then asked to say a few words about the members of the monastery. He said they included people of varied ages; he himself was 40 years old but some were older and some much younger. Some were still in religious schooling. He briefly introduced each of the monks present and their duties in the monastery. (C)

*Tichon* went on to say that he had earlier served at a different monastery. But the year before he had been appointed Abbot of Danilov Monastery. Restoration of this monastery had been underway since 1983, with the intention to complete as much of it as possible in time for the Millenium celebration of the Church. The restoration was financed by contributions from believers, both money and precious objects which they donated for this purpose. The government was now returning other monasteries to the Church, and several had been returned just in the past year. (C)

*Tichon* added that the monastery was grateful for the visit by the President and believed the President's mission would contribute to peace. He said that the problems which the President had mentioned in his prepared remarks were at present finding satisfactory solution. He concluded by saying that he prayed the President's talks with General Secretary Gorbachev would prove successful. (C)

In response to *Tichon's* mention of his (*Tichon's*) age, *the President* quipped that if anyone was self-conscious about age, they should remember that he had celebrated his 39th birthday 38 times. (U)

*Tichon* asked the President if he had any questions. (U)

*The First Lady* responded that she would have a question. She said that, out of curiosity, she would like to know if those present believed that the Church in Russia would ever be free of the state. (C)

*Tichon* responded that the Church was separate from the state under the constitution. Both Church and state had their own responsibilities: the Church to teach the faith, and the state to lead the political life of the country. (C)

*The First Lady* asked if believers and non-believers in the Soviet Union would ever have equal opportunity for advancement in life. (C)

*Metropolitan Filaret* said that this was what the Church hoped for. It was hoped that, after the meetings between the President and the General Secretary, all such problems would go away. *The First Lady* said she hoped so also. (C)

*The President* said he had already discussed this subject with General Secretary Gorbachev. The United States was one nation under God, but church and state were totally separated. The government could not interfere in the affairs of churches in any way. (C)

*Filaret* said it was the same in the Soviet Union by law, but the Church was trying to make sure that the law would be fully implemented. (C)

*The President* said he hoped the Church would win. *Filaret* concluded the meeting by saying that Christ would win. (C)

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## 160. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, May 31, 1988, 10:08–11:07 a.m.

### SUBJECT

The President's Second One-on-One Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev

### PARTICIPANTS

#### U.S.

Ronald W. Reagan, President of the  
United States

Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy  
Assistant Secretary of State  
(EUR) (notetaker)

Rudolf Perina, Deputy Director,  
NSC Staff (notetaker)

Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)

#### USSR

Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General  
Secretary, CPSU CC

Georgiy Mamedov, Section Chief,  
MFA (notetaker)

Pavel Palazhchenko (interpreter)

*The President* said he knew Gorbachev was aware of the American habit of giving gifts from friends, and also knew something of American wardrobe. He had a gift from a friend in the American West that he wanted Gorbachev to have, a denim jacket. *Gorbachev* said it was a memorable gift. He asked if it was his size. *The President* regretted he had had no way of knowing that. *Gorbachev* said it would be in any case a marvellous souvenir. This was one he would keep at home.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on June 1. An NSC version of the memorandum of conversation, drafted by Perina, is Ibid. The meeting took place in Gorbachev's private office at the Kremlin.

*The President* said he also had a small insignia pin for Gorbachev. *Gorbachev* said he had seen the President wear it the day before, and envied him for it; the President must have noticed him looking at it very carefully.

Gorbachev said that since the President was in the Kremlin for the first time on this trip, he had given the President a scale model as a gift. *The President* asked Gorbachev to forgive him for not having thanked him for his magnificent gifts. He wished to do so on his and Nancy's behalf. He now had a crown of his own. *Gorbachev* recalled that Nancy had mentioned the scale model the night before. It was precise, but of course much reduced. In actual size the Kremlin wall perimeter ran more than two kilometers.

Gorbachev said he noticed the President had notes, but before the President spoke (here Gorbachev moved to his desk) he wanted to show the President something pleasant, some of the letters and cables sent to him and to the President. He wanted to show the President just a few of those sent to him at the Kremlin.

The first was from Norilsk, the northernmost city in the Soviet Union, above the Arctic Circle. The writer had sent it to the President here. To commemorate this visit he had called his first daughter Reagana. He hoped the visit would be a symbol of peace and friendship. His city, street and apartment address were shown.

Next was one from Yerevan, Gorbachev went on. The writer said he had seen the President give his 1986 greetings<sup>2</sup> to the Soviet people, and when his son was born he had named him Ronald after the President. In accordance with convention, he asked the President to become godfather to his son.

Someone wrote from Togliatti on the Volga, where they made cars, Gorbachev continued, and had named his newborn daughter Nancy in honor of the President's wife.

From Grodno in Byelorussia, there was again a son, again named Ronald, and again a request that the President be the godfather.

Another was from Yerevan, addressed to both of them: it spoke of the mothers of the world with tears in their eyes, hopeful and confident that reason and humanism would prevail, that there would be an agreement. The writer wished the President all the best. She was a widow of a colonel who was a war veteran.

Another came from Ivanovo, in the Ukraine. It was a textile town, where many women were employed, and the message was to both of them, from a woman, a mother and grandmother, on behalf of all

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<sup>2</sup> For Reagan's 1986 New Year's Greeting, see *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1986, Book I, pp. 1–3.

women in the textile district. Gorbachev noted that half of Soviet textiles were produced there. She asked them to decide to eliminate all nuclear weapons. There had been many similar letters.

Here was a veteran from Gomel, in Byelorussia, Gorbachev continued. He had probably heard the President's TV interview,<sup>3</sup> where he praised Russian women. He wrote that America had not had a war for 150 [years?], while Russia had had so many. There were many others.

Gorbachev said he would give the President all these messages. They were still coming in, but when they were all there, he would transmit them to the President through the Embassy. This was just a small portion of them. He had told Nancy about them, and—here he laughed—she had asked that they be given to the President.

*The President* said he would receive them with pleasure and respond to them; he would send photos to the children named after him or Nancy.

*Gorbachev* said that would be greatly appreciated. These messages had not been organized. They were still coming in. They much resembled the kind of letters he got from America. Some mentioned difficulties; some questioned whether it was right to expand interaction with America. When he replied to them he explained the interests at issue, for the two countries and the world. That was why, he said and the Soviet leadership said, the Soviet Union and the U.S. had a special role.

*The President* said we had such people too. But he had one simple rule: you don't get in trouble by talking to each other, and not just about each other. *Gorbachev* said "right."

*The President* said he had read Gorbachev's book *Perestroika*. He had come with some questions about where Gorbachev was going, what steps he wanted to take to make life better for the people, what actions could be taken.

*Gorbachev* said he assumed the President had not had time to read the theses for the party conference that was going to take place in about a month. He guessed he had not had time to ask his experts about them. They provided answers to many of the questions that were being asked here, by the Soviet Union's western partners, and also by other socialist countries. He would like to say a few brief words about perestroika.

The pivotal thing about perestroika was democratization, Gorbachev continued. This referred to economic arrangements, but also to all other spheres. They wanted to expand autonomy (*samostoiatel'nost'*)

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<sup>3</sup> Presumably, reference is to Reagan's May 20 interview with Soviet television journalists Valentin Zorin and Boris Kalyagin. (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1988, Book I, pp. 665–671)

in production enterprises, among workers, in the republics and the regions. Economic accountability had to be introduced. Cooperative enterprises were being expanded, and the people welcomed this. There was also the democratization of life. Individual enterprises of people were also being expanded.

*The President* interjected “yes,” but *Gorbachev* continued that there would be more freedom for cooperatives and individual producers in the market.

In the political sphere, *Gorbachev* said, the main thrust was also more democratization. This was also true for the Party. It had to give up some of the functions it should not properly have. It should concentrate on developing political guidelines for domestic and foreign policy. When it came to management of the economy this would be done more and more by elected bodies, by the Soviets. They were also doing substantial work on legal reform, reform of the courts and legal institutions, including criminal law. They were also finishing up a document reforming the electoral system. They would be giving greater scope to social organizations and initiatives.

In all this, *Gorbachev* went on, there was one fundamental thing that he did not conceal from the President: it was their firm position that all these efforts were directed to developing socialism. While socialism was capable of movement, the people supported it and would even more in the future. It had been interesting that when they had published the draft law on cooperatives, and the draft law on the socialist enterprise, people wrote to the Central Committee and to the press asking if these laws did not represent a retreat from socialism, if they would not result in a gap between rich and poor in Soviet society. So there was discussion. *Gorbachev* said that was normal. He thought the Soviet Union was the No. 1 country in the world when it came to debate. There was more here than in America.

*The President* said the Soviet Union was an enormous country; there was a mass of people out there, and they were not all at the same level. There were geniuses out there who could really contribute if given a chance to use their initiative. To take an example, he visited various industries, and he had visited one motorcycle plant called Harley-Davidson. They were an established firm, and now suddenly they were losing business to the Japanese motorcycles that were being imported. *Gorbachev* knew that the first reaction in such a case was to call on the government for help, to restrain the numbers of imported Japanese motorcycles. *Gorbachev* nodded and said that was protectionism.

But, continued *the President*, instead of that management had called in the people from the assembly lines. From the top managers to the assembly lines they had opened up discussion on what to do. They got ideas from people who had been working there for years, suggesting

improvements on how to do things better. And a reorganization had followed. They had reorganized the assembly lines. They had reorganized spare parts; previously they had been stored together at a distance, now they were brought by conveyor to where the worker could reach over and get them. And the company was now making ten new models.

*Gorbachev* asked if they were competitive. *The President* replied that they were really competitive. Their business has flourished.

*Gorbachev* said the Soviets were now also looking at far-reaching forms of reorganization. They were now leasing land and means of production for five to ten years; productivity in these cases had increased by a factor of 1.5 to 2, immediately. They were introducing ways to give people incentives, and the quality was already better.

They had dealt a blow to large monopoly enterprises, *Gorbachev* went on. The U.S. had capitalist monopolies, they had socialist monopolies which often did not produce efficiently. For instance, there had been only one factory making combine harvesters. It had dictated to the market. Now there were three. The factory at Krasnoyarsk, like Harley-Davidson, had been on the verge of collapse. The collectives did not want to buy its products, and it had wanted the authorities to force them to. They had said “no,” it was up to the factory to change and produce better combines. Now they are producing a good combine. It was sold around the country; it was appreciated even in Siberia.

In their socialist society, *Gorbachev* went on, they did not want to level things out like a table. (He pounded on the coffee table in front of them with the flat of his hand.) The principle of the economy had to be that as you produce, so you earn. The better worker, the better scientist would be paid more.

*The President* said that even before you entered the world market, your best customers were your own people, who produced the goods and also bought them with their earnings. *Gorbachev* said that was exactly the case. The Soviet Union was a huge market. He had the impression that America was making up its mind whether to work with that market, whether to expand cooperation. Most countries had already made that decision in the affirmative. But in America there were old stereotypes at work. He knew that some people were asking why help the Soviet Union expand; wouldn't it be better for it to be weak?

*The President* said he did not feel that way at all. *Gorbachev* said he was not saying the President did, but there were people in the United States who were telling him differently. But there had been hearings in Congress that went on for many months. They had promised to send him the transcripts, and he had them. Of course it was up to the



businessmen and the Administration. The Soviets did not want to impose themselves. They were not begging for friendship.

*The President* said some people in Congress had passed and sent him a protectionist trade bill. He had vetoed it, and the veto had been upheld. It would have protected us against imported products that other people made better than we did. He had vetoed it, and Gorbachev knew what a veto meant.

*Gorbachev* said that the President might not know it, but the U.S. had very high protectionist barriers to trade with the Soviet Union. For instance, tariffs on Soviet goods began at 20% and went up to 220%. The dead were still controlling the living. Jackson was long dead, but his amendment lived. Instead of most-favored-nation tariff treatment, the Soviet Union received most-unfavored-nation tariff treatment.

*The President* said that had to do with the problem they had often talked about, with human rights. People believed that the Soviets discriminated against practitioners of religion and the like, and that was their way of trying to work that out. The two of them had had discussions on that. Gorbachev surely knew where we stood.

Addressing the President, *Gorbachev* asked what would happen if the Soviets began to inject such questions into bilateral relations, for instance in the security field. He asked whether the Soviet Union should make claims on the U.S. on the rights of Hispanics, of whom there were 6 million without citizenship or the condition of American Indians on reservations. He asked whether the Soviets should say that because there were problems in the U.S. there should be no treaty, whether the Soviets should pass amendments of the kind that Congress had passed concerning the Baltic Republics, or the Ukraine. The Soviets could comment concerning individual U.S. states, for instance. Where would that take the Soviet-American relationship? But that was the wrong way to go. It was a heritage of the Cold War, and it should be expunged. It really called for shock therapy, Gorbachev concluded.

*The President* replied that there was a difference between banning people for the practice of religion, like Jewish people who had no synagogues, and things like that. In our country there were sociological factors at work. Our Indians, for instance, retained their own customs. We had provided millions of acres of land to them so that they could live an Indian life. Of course they were free to go outside those reservations; no one said no; and many did, and became like other Americans. But the choice was theirs.

Turning to the Hispanics, the President said that the problem there was illegal entry. Good Lord, he said, Miami had been taken over by refugees from Castro's Cuba. They became citizens like everyone else. But we also had a long border with Mexico, where they sneak in to

try to get jobs. Those were the illegal immigrants. There was a limit to how many such people your economy could absorb.

At the interpreted reference to Miami, *Gorbachev* interjected that he could not believe the 6 million without citizenship all came from Cuba. He said when the Soviet side had comments, the President was unwilling to accept criticism. Zarechnak finished interpretation of the preceding paragraph.

Gorbachev explained that he had not wanted to go into these issues; he had merely mentioned the problem of Soviet-American economic relations. The President had comments about Soviet life, the Soviets had comments about American life; that did not mean they should stop economic relations.

*The President* responded that he wanted to explain how things were. The Cubans had been refugees from political persecution. We had accepted them, and given them citizenship. It was like the boat people from Vietnam. For example he had a letter from a young man. In it he told the President that ten years before he had been in a boat off Vietnam. The country had been conquered, and the boat was out of food and water. Then a ship had found them, and he had been brought to an island refugee camp. The President said he did not know how long the young man had been on the island, but the total difference had been ten years, and subtracting time on the island, he had been in the U.S. probably less than ten years. He had learned our language; he had graduated from high school with honors; he had received a scholarship from Harvard University; and he wrote the President, at 23, as a student at a medical college. That was what was meant by refugee status.

But concerning illegal entry, the President continued, they had recently passed a new immigration law aimed at coping with illegal entry of people from countries like Mexico. There were quotas for legal immigration. But because there were so many illegals, with homes and jobs but insecure status, the law said that those who had come before 1982 had only to report and they would be given citizenship.

The President continued that such stories fit what Gorbachev wanted to do with perestroika. He had met a young lady, who had been educated as a professional pianist. Then, after she graduated, she had developed arthritis. It affected her hands, so that she could not play the piano. She was at home with a diploma but nothing to do. One day an aunt had reminded her that she could bake brownies, little American cakes, that were the best her family had ever tasted. The aunt suggested that she sell them to grocery stores, to pick up a little money and keep busy. That was three or four years ago.

*Gorbachev* asked if she didn't now have a prosperous business. *The President* replied that she employed 35 people, and earned more than \$1 million a year. She sold to the airlines; she sold to top restaurants.

Addressing the President, *Gorbachev* said he had to say once again that, since they had decided to move forward toward the future and expand bilateral relations, it was important to clear the logjams from the past. There were a lot of them to clear. He thought we needed greater mutual dependence, to ensure greater predictability in relations. We were now totally independent of each other economically. It seemed that we did not need each other. But that was not true. Life itself showed that we needed each other. We need to cooperate more and more. As the President said, that was God's will.

*The President* recalled that 500 American businessmen had come to see Gorbachev. *Gorbachev* said it was true they had been here. But they had to operate in a kind of cage of protectionist measures and political restrictions that impeded trade. They were not adopted by President Reagan but by others. Gorbachev said he saw this changing. He welcomed the fact that the President had welcomed the consortium idea. There had been three American businessmen who had followed along the path Premier Ryzhkov had taken in Siberia. When they returned, they told Ryzhkov they had thought Siberia was a godforsaken place inhabited mainly by bears. But they saw that it was a highly developed place, and were convinced there was good business to be had there with new and modern cities.

Godspeed to them, Gorbachev said. But he thought the President should listen—he was not giving the President a lesson, just thinking aloud—he thought that if the President listened to one person one day and another the next day his policies would be too changeable. But if he felt the mood of the people he would feel the changes underway. People in both the U.S. and the Soviet Union wanted to expand cooperation, and policies at the President's and Gorbachev's level should reflect that.

Gorbachev continued that perestroika was meeting with some resistance in certain quarters of the country. But he and the other leaders with him were not going to play with that resistance, because they felt that the people were for perestroika. And he felt that the crucible of perestroika would overcome the resistance.

*The President* said we felt we had what perestroika would give Gorbachev, and we were for it; he had said so in his speeches. But there was a great obstacle, which would affect economic relations and every negotiation on disarmament. But there are certain things that revealed high technology that we had and the Soviets didn't. They would help in a military way. They could not be sold, therefore. Probably the Soviets had such things that they would not make available to us.

What was the answer to this problem?, the President asked. In their meetings he and Gorbachev had to continue to [*do the*] job they had

started: to eliminate the distrust that had led to the great armaments. If they could eliminate mistrust, the feeling that they threatened each other militarily, then those restrictions too could go.

*Gorbachev* said he welcomed that statement. *The President* said there would be opposition. Let us move ahead, *Gorbachev* said, to build more trust. Of course it was important for the two of them to do as much as they could while Ronald Reagan was still President of the United States, and to ensure continuity and consistency after he went for the foundation they had laid for moving forward.

*The President* said he would do all he could to make sure that his successor moved along that line. He hoped and prayed it would be George Bush; he knew he (Bush) shared all these ideas. *Gorbachev* suggested they begin their walk. *The President* continued jokingly that if it were a Democrat, he would have to warn *Gorbachev* against him. *Gorbachev* said jovially that during the previous evening's dinner he had told Carlucci that the Soviets favored extending this Administration's time in office. But then he had found out that George Shultz was an ex-Marine and Carlucci had been in the Navy, and that both opposed certification of naval forces, he figured it was alright for the Administration to go. But, he concluded, that was just a friendly joke.

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## 161. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, May 31, 1988, 2:20–3:25 p.m.

### SUBJECT

Working Group Reports

### PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

THE SECRETARY

Lt. Gen. Colin Powell

Amb. Ridgway

Amb. Nitze

Amb. Matlock

U.S.S.R.

SHEVARNADZE

Marshal Akhromeyev

DepFonMin Bessmertnykh

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting took place in the Foreign Ministry Guest House.

## Working Group Participants

*Notetakers*

Mr. Robertson

Mr. Andrusyszyn

At the beginning of the plenary meeting, THE SECRETARY noted that the President would be speaking at Moscow State University that afternoon and asked that the meeting end punctually at 3:15 p.m.

SHEVARDNADZE opened the session by stating that the Working Groups had worked the previous day into the early morning hours and had resumed their work on the morning of May 31. He asked that the reports be brief, but to the point.

*NST:* Amb. NITZE led off with a report on the arms control working group, stating that the two sides had long, extensive, and productive discussions on the issues. On ALCM's, the two sides had reached a large measure of agreement and had produced a paper which recorded the areas of agreement. Similarly, there was a large measure of agreement on mobile ICBM's, and a paper on these areas of agreement was prepared.

Amb. NITZE continued that work remained on issues in other areas. SLCM's were discussed at length, but no progress was made. There was also discussion about the relationship between the ABM Treaty and offensive arms reductions. There had been some progress in the clarification of views, but no substantive progress had been achieved.

Amb. NITZE noted that the U.S. side had stressed its concerns over Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty and had demanded the dismantlement of the Krasnoyarsk radar facility prior to ABM Treaty review scheduled for October this year.

Marshal AKHROMEYEV agreed that good work had been done. Work had practically concluded on the issue of notification of Ballistic Missile Launchers. The two sides continued to work toward solutions on the relationship between the ABM Treaty and the future. On mobile ICBM's, AKHROMEYEV agreed that headway had been made on verification, creating a basis for more specific agreement on numbers. Looking ahead, AKHROMEYEV said that the two sides would try to do something on the relationship between the ABM Treaty and a Strategic Arms Treaty as a basis for the main document.

THE SECRETARY commented that the results of the working group sounded constructive and that it was good to see movement in two areas that had been especially sticky. Amb. NITZE asked that the English versions of the papers on ALCM's and mobile ICBM's be made part of the record.

SHEVARDNADZE asked that those responsible for the arms control working group finalize their work. Anything agreed upon had to

be reviewed, but it would be desirable that progress on these issues be reflected in the Joint Statement because many would be interested in knowing what had been agreed in Moscow. SHEVARDNADZE wondered whether the arms control portion could not be a separate section in the Joint Statement, as was done in Washington.

THE SECRETARY added that it was important to reflect in the Joint Statement that there had been advances since the Washington summit. The question was the degree of detail. It should be left up to the people working on the Joint Statement to determine how best to record this progress. There were many pages in the arms control report. THE SECRETARY noted that he was thinking about how readable the document would be and the balance of it.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed and suggested that if the entire report was not incorporated in the Joint Statement, the heads of the working group could initial their agreed reports as the basis for future work. THE SECRETARY concurred.

*Nuclear Testing:* Mr. PALENYKH, for the Soviets, noted that in two working group meetings, the sides had focused on the completion of the elaboration of an agreement on the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE).<sup>2</sup> There was active work on this issue, and although the sides did not agree on all issues, the two delegations had completed an agreement on the JVE that had been signed that day. It represented the basis for further headway in continuing negotiations. On the basis of the results of the JVE, the Soviets would seek to complete the Protocol of the 1974 Treaty and the Treaty's ratification. The Soviet side would also intensify work on the Protocol of the 1976 Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions.

Amb. ROBINSON added that the Agreements signed that day were in fact fully responsive to the instructions the Ministers had given the negotiators in the December 9th Joint Statement, in that the JVE would fully address all concerns about the methods proposed by either side for verification purposes.

ROBINSON noted that in the work being pursued on the JVE, new levels in on-site presence for verification had been achieved—more than 50 people on each other's test site today. By the time the tests were carried out later this summer, that level would increase to 90.

In continuing the negotiations on the two testing treaties, the work could be divided into two parts for each: before the JVE and after the JVE. We had set a goal of completing a new Protocol to the Peaceful

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<sup>2</sup> For text of the agreement on the Joint Verification Experiment and other agreements signed in Moscow see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1988, pp. 42–45.

Nuclear Explosions Treaty prior to the JVE, and then the TTBT after the JVE tests had been conducted and the results analyzed.

*Chemical Weapons:* Mr. NAZARKIN, for the Soviet side, said that the two sides had agreed to the following report which he read aloud:

“The draft text of the summit joint statement with regard to chemical weapons was agreed.

“An exchange of views was continued on issues that may be the subject of bilateral discussions. It is proposed to instruct the two delegations at the ninth round of the bilateral Soviet-U.S. consultations on chemical weapons (July 11–29, 1988):

- to elaborate a joint paper on the order of destruction of chemical weapons stocks and CW production facilities;

- to explore criteria and a formula for the composition of the Executive Council;

- to continue discussion of challenge inspections with particular attention to the development of procedures;

- to discuss initial parties to the convention, on an illustrative basis, based on the agreed categories, with a view to ensuring the participation of all CW-possessing and CW-capable states in the convention;

- to discuss views on CW data exchange both on a multilateral and bilateral basis;

- to hold an exchange of views on a multilateral experiment to test procedures for international verification of non-production of chemical weapons in commercial industries and on technical aspects of CW destruction.

“The two sides agreed to review procedures for UN investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons at the fall round of the Soviet-U.S. consultations on the non-proliferation of chemical weapons.

“The two sides agreed that the delegations of the USSR and the United States at the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament would exchange information on their contingency unilateral statements on chemical weapons.”

SHEVARDNADZE said that there were not many steps left for a convention. THE SECRETARY commented that the sides were pushing along on this issue and had made a lot of progress in the last few months.

After noting that this was an accurate rendition of the joint report, Amb. HOLMES noted that he had met Mr. KARPOV the previous day concerning Ballistic Missile Proliferation. They had agreed to recommend incorporating into the Joint Statement that a one-day bilateral meeting at the experts level would be held in September at a location



to be agreed. The purpose of this meeting would be to exchange views and information on ballistic missile proliferation, to identify common interests, and means on how to cope with this problem. The date, location, and agenda of the meeting would be transmitted through diplomatic channels.

THE SECRETARY commented that we should get hold of this problem before it got hold of us. SHEVARDNADZE responded that this was a serious subject, and that it had been raised in the proper manner.

*Regional Issues:* Mr. SOLOMON stated that the two sides had agreed on the text of a joint report to the Ministers. SOLOMON added that he would like to comment on specific regional issues and that Mr. Crocker would comment on Southern Africa, time permitting. SOLOMON then read aloud the following report:

"The regional working group sustained the intensive discussions that have developed over the past three years at the Ministerial, vice-ministerial, and expert levels. It considered a number of issues which, the two sides are convinced, represent a destabilizing factor in the international situation. In particular, situations around Afghanistan, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Central America, Indochina, Southern Africa, and the Korean Peninsula were discussed. The exchanges were marked by increasing candor and a sense of potential for further progress that seems to characterize our overall relationship.

"A frank, overall assessment of these exchanges is that their primary benefit lies in clarifying the concerns, assumptions and the interests of the two sides.

"The sides focused on new developments in individual regions of the world. They reaffirmed that early political settlement of regional problems meets the national interests of the two sides as well as broader interests of peace and security.

"At the same time, they noted that encouraging political processes of national reconciliation in different conflicts is proving to be extremely difficult. Nonetheless, efforts must continue with the potential for progress seemingly greatest in Angola, Cambodia, Nicaragua, and the Arab-Israeli dispute.

"The discussions between the two sides were aimed at finding additional common ground in their respective positions as well as convergence where their positions differ.

"Having taken note of the remaining differences, the sides at the same time favored further development of Soviet-U.S. dialogue on regional issues with a view to actively searching for ways to unblock regional conflicts by peaceful means on the basis of a balance of interests of all the parties involved."

At this point, SHEVARDNADZE left the meeting for an undisclosed reason for five minutes. Upon his return, Mr. CROCKER presented the U.S. report on Southern Africa.

The exchanges in Moscow, CROCKER noted, indicated that there was important common ground on some aspects of the search for a Namibia-Angola settlement. These included the necessity for a settlement entailing the complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Angola and the achievement of Namibian independence. The two governments had signalled the need to sustain momentum in the negotiations in recent months, notably at the London meetings of early May, and through early follow-up exchanges in which the South Africans were prepared to respond to the Angolan/Cuban proposal discussed in London. The two governments both indicated their support for establishing September 29, 1988—the tenth anniversary of the UN plan for Namibia—as a target for resolving the outstanding differences. We had also agreed that it would be useful to register that fact in an appropriate manner.

CROCKER continued that there were also important differences remaining. On the issue of peace and reconciliation between the parties inside Angola, both recognized the reality that there was an unresolved problem in Angola and that it must be resolved politically, not militarily. The Soviet side continued to believe that this could best be resolved once South African and Cuban withdrawals were agreed, and it urged that all outside support to UNITA cease in this context. The U.S. believed the internal Angolan question had to be addressed in parallel with the other issues in order to avoid an impasse in that negotiation and to resolve the U.S.-Soviet role in Angola's affairs. We agreed to remain in contact on the timing and content of reconciliation in Angola on which we had exchanged views in Moscow.

In conclusion, CROCKER observed that overall, the regional exchanges underscored the value of continuing efforts to identify areas of common ground that may offer potential for more practical, operational work. From the American perspective, shared general principles were no substitute for concrete actions that addressed the realities of each regional conflict on its own merits.

In response, ADAMISHIN stated that, while he did not differ much with what Mr. Crocker had said, he wanted to make a few points. The Soviet Union supported the search for a political settlement in southwestern Africa. There would be more talks in the near future. It was the Cubans who had proposed the anniversary of the UN plan as the target date for resolving outstanding issues. On substance, the Soviet Union wanted a just settlement, taking into account the balance of interests of all sides. The Soviet Union could accept what was acceptable to SWAPO, Cuba, and Angola. This would include a cessation of inter-

ference in internal affairs; and the decolonization of Namibia on the basis of UNSCR 435;<sup>3</sup> Cuban troops could be removed on this basis. There was also a need for stabilization of the problems in Angola; the Soviet Union did not deny there were such problems. It also supported a political settlement of problems by Angolans themselves and could see security guarantors, perhaps under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council. Adamishin concluded by saying the two sides should not try to come up with more differences, but should try to help both parties in arriving at a just settlement.

SHEVARDNADZE commented that the two sides should agree where possible. The Soviet side was not making a special effort to highlight Southern Africa in the Joint Statement—that would mean similar attention would have to be paid to other regional issues.

THE SECRETARY responded that the Joint Statement would reflect what Mr. Solomon had reported. The presentation on Southern Africa was for THE SECRETARY'S benefit. It was useful to find common ground we could agree on; it was also useful if in respective press statements we had parallel answers. THE SECRETARY added that in this case, as in others, there was a great deal more positive progress on regional issues than when he and SHEVARDNADZE had started two and a half years ago.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the two sides could formalize their progress in the final document. The regional issues should be addressed in general terms; what had been presented was good as a basis for future work and consultations.

*Human rights:* Mr. SCHIFTER stated that the discussions had once again taken the form of dealing with broad issues on human rights and with specific cases. On the broad aspects, the U.S. side had observed similarities to what had been revealed previously, namely the encouraging developments in perestroika and glasnost. In this round, there had also been useful discussion on new laws in the Soviet Union. In the working group, there had been discussion of collaboration on (1) forensic psychiatry and (2) the administration of justice and the rule of law. The U.S. side looked forward to discussion of these subjects in the near future. On specific cases, there had been truly excellent relations between the two delegations in terms of exchange of information as well as resolution of a significant number of cases. The two sides continued to develop contacts and to have meetings to exchange information for the purpose of resolving cases in between high-level meetings. SCHIFTER noted the excellence of work by the staff of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, adding that the U.S. side deeply appreciated

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 6, Document 162.

it. He added that if other Soviets shared the work and commitment displayed by Soviet MFA officials, then the Secretary General could sleep better at night.

Mr. GLUKHOV said he shared Mr. Schifter's assessment except for his compliments addressed to MFA officials. He noted that the two sides had indeed had a dialogue for some time for the purpose of understanding each other better and for progressively working to resolve human rights problems. Some differences remained, but mechanisms for the resolution of cases was beginning to take shape. It was apparent that we would have to abandon a confrontational approach, both multilaterally as well as bilaterally. He also mentioned Gorbachev's proposals for seminars on human rights problems in which Parliamentarians on both sides could participate.

ADAMISHIN interjected that before the U.S. delegation left Moscow, the Soviet side hoped to resolve several cases to which the U.S. side had drawn attention.

*Conventional Forces:* Amb. ZIMMERMANN reported that the U.S. side had suggested at the opening that there needed to be a clear understanding between the American and Soviet sides on how to avoid certain problems that arose at the last Ministerial meeting regarding the introduction into the Vienna talks of ideas developed by the two sides in these bilateral meetings. It was very important that discussions identified as confidential in nature be treated as such.

The U.S. side explained why the ideas for meeting the Soviet concern on subjects that had been discussed at the last Ministerial in Geneva and in Vienna now were no longer possible.

ZIMMERMANN added that the U.S. side had laid out three obstacles to progress on achieving a conventional mandate:

- the question of autonomy (the U.S. side had described its views on that subject);

- the need for a balanced outcome to the Vienna follow-up meeting in order to launch the new conventional stability talks; progress in the human rights area is key to progress in this regard; and

- the Soviet Union's stated concern over the question of the possible exclusion of dual-capable systems.

The Soviet side had indicated that aircraft, with the exception of carrier-borne and fighter aviation, should be included in the subject to the negotiations. On aircraft, the U.S. side recalled the NATO view that the sides should focus on those force elements that were critical to the ability to take and occupy land—such as tanks and artillery—and asked the Soviet side how it would distinguish between fighter and ground-attack aircraft, noting that the U.S. will have only one aircraft that fitted into the pure fighter category.

The Soviet side suggested some additions to the draft joint statement. These did not seem useful to the U.S. side.

The Soviet side, ZIMMERMANN continued, had raised the question of consultations on naval forces. The U.S. side said that naval forces were not accepted on the agenda.

The U.S. side, noting that it continued to believe there was no problem regarding the possible exclusion of dual-capable systems, suggested a potential way to meet the Soviet concern through a unilateral Soviet statement that would be agreed in advance and not challenged by the 23. The Soviet side did not seem to believe that this solved its problem.

In response, GRINEVSKIY stated that the two sides did not have an agreed text or report. The sides had a thorough exchange on the language developed on May 12 in Geneva concerning dual-capable systems, with clarifications added in Vienna and the additions introduced by the Soviet side regarding the exclusion of carrier-borne and fighter aviation. GRINEVSKIY then read aloud the following text:

“The subject of the negotiations will be the conventional armed forces, conventional armaments and equipment of the participating states based on land. No conventional armed forces, armaments, or equipment will be excluded from the subject of the negotiations because they can use other weapons in addition to conventional ones; nor will they be singled out in a separate category in these negotiations. Nuclear charges, carrier-borne and fighter aviation are not included in these negotiations.”

GRINEVSKIY continued that there was broad convergence between the two sides on this text with the exception of aviation. If the U.S. dropped its demand to exclude the mention of aircraft, the sides could agree to this text.

The U.S. presented its considerations on how this language should best be advanced in Vienna, and suggested the Soviet side should table it so that it did not appear to be a U.S.-Soviet agreement. The sides believe the language should be sent to Vienna.

The U.S. side showed great interest in the proposals advanced by Gorbachev. The Soviet side responded to ideas posed by the U.S. side, and there was a business-like and serious discussion of those proposals. GRINEVSKIY concluded by saying the sides had continued their traditional exchange on naval activities. The U.S. side rejected formal talks, but believed that it would be possible to continue informal bilateral discussions in this area.

*Bilateral Issues:* SUKHODREV read the following agreed report:

“The Bilateral Affairs Working Group focussed its attention, as it has traditionally done, on three categories of issues: the current status

of topics on the agenda and the corresponding positions of the two sides; the program of current negotiations, contacts and exchanges; and new ideas and proposals of the two sides.

"In particular, it reviewed the current status: of negotiations on an agreement on cooperation in the area of basic scientific research and its implementing Memoranda of Understanding; on maritime shipping; on delimitation of the Pacific maritime boundary; of consultations on legal issues between the two countries, including legal aspects of law of the sea; on air and maritime transportation safety; and on effective cooperation in combatting illicit international narcotics trafficking; of negotiations on cooperation with regard to emergency clean-up of pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas; and of other issues.

"Both sides expressed satisfaction with the preparation, in connection with the Summit, of a number of important new intergovernmental agreements: on cooperation in transportation science and technology; on maritime search and rescue; on fisheries; the implementing program for 1989–1991 under the General Exchanges Agreement; and others.

"The two sides agreed to continue discussion and consideration of steps to expand cooperation on issues involving the Northern Pacific and Arctic areas. The Soviet side recalled its previous proposals for establishing a legal basis (through agreements) for U.S.-Soviet interaction on Arctic issues. The American side believes that the most effective approach to pursuing this discussion is in the framework of existing bilateral and multilateral agreements and fora.

"The Soviet side made a number of new proposals. It proposed consideration of the question of initiating interaction between the border control agencies of the two countries and the preparation of an appropriate bilateral document on practices concerning the boundary between the two countries in the Bering Strait. The Soviet side also drew to the U.S. side's attention the initiative of the Moscow Aviation Institute concerning establishment of an international center for training space science specialists by U.S. and Soviet institutions of higher learning.

"The Soviet side confirmed its proposals concerning: protection and preservation of the stratospheric ozone layer; the establishment of cooperation in the field of energy; and the Soviet program for launching foreign payloads on Soviet rockets. The U.S. side noted its interest in mutually satisfactory solutions to problems arising from the situation of persons having a claim to citizenship in both countries.

"During the discussions, the two sides also touched on issues concerning the opening of consulates general of the U.S. and the USSR in Kiev and New York, as well as the living and working conditions of their diplomatic and consular representations on the other's territory.

“The two sides agreed to conduct the next round of consultations on the range of bilateral issues in the spring of 1989.

“Without prejudice to the positions of either side on individual issues, the two sides have thereby put forward a broad program for further work on developing U.S.-Soviet interaction in various areas, including preparation of new agreements.”

SIMONS noted that it was an agreed report. The U.S. side would only note in addition that it was very much looking forward to the negotiations on cultural and information centers under the three year implementation program signed that day.

SHEVARDNADZE asked that the experts complete their work on a Joint Statement. He noted that there were outstanding arms control issues and that there still was not a clear position on conventional arms. The experts, he stated, should do more work so that the leaders could have prepared texts the following day.

THE SECRETARY added that the texts should be completed by the time of the leaders’ meeting—in Washington, we had not quite made it.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that the leaders would not sign the statement. THE SECRETARY agreed, but added that the statement should be available. SHEVARDNADZE added that it could still be signed; it was a good document.

The meeting concluded at 3:25 p.m.



## 162. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, June 1, 1988, 10:05–11:20 a.m.

### SUBJECT

Second Plenary Meeting (U)

### PARTICIPANTS

#### US

The President  
Secretary George Shultz  
Secretary Frank Carlucci  
Senator Howard Baker  
General Colin Powell  
Assistant Secretary Rozanne Ridgway  
Ambassador Jack Matlock  
Nelson Ledsky, NSC (Notetaker)  
Mark Parris, Department of State (Notetaker)

#### USSR

General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev  
Chairman Andrei Gromyko  
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze  
Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov  
Politburo Member Aleksandr Yakovlev  
Secretary Anatoly Dobrynin  
Deputy Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh  
Mr. Chernyayev  
Ambassador Yuri Dubinin  
Mr. Victor Sukhodrev (Notetaker)  
Mr. Sredin (Notetaker)

While photos were being taken, several questions were shouted at the President and General Secretary Gorbachev. The first was from an American reporter, who asked if it were true that the President was not feeling well. The *President* replied that he had slept well and that he was feeling fine. (U)

The second question in Russian inquired as to whether there had been any surprises as yet at the Summit. *General Secretary Gorbachev* responded that our joint effort was devoted to eliminating surprises and to establishing a relationship based on greater predictability. (U)

The President was then asked to assess progress at the Summit. The *President* replied that the meetings had been proceeding in an

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988. Secret. Drafted by Ledsky and Parris. The meeting took place in St. Catherine's Hall at the Kremlin.

excellent manner, and that he was pleased with the progress to date. A further question concerned progress in the START negotiations. The President replied that these negotiations were complicated, but that profitable work was continuing. To another question as to whether there were fewer problems in START now than before the Moscow Summit began, the President's reply was "Yes, there are fewer problems now." The President answered a follow-on question about SDI by responding that there had been no breakthrough or new major development. (U)

The *President* and the *General Secretary* then said that they would be having press conferences later and would take additional questions at that time. As the room was being cleared of reporters, the President and the General Secretary shook hands across the table several times for photographers. (U)

The *General Secretary* then opened the session by observing that the last few days had been full and productive. He joked that he would be asking President Gromyko for salary increases for all participants, given the difficult conditions under which everyone was working. The General Secretary then asked the President whether he would agree to the following schedule: Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary Shultz would report briefly on their discussions and those conducted by experts and working groups. Then, suggested Gorbachev, the two leaders could respond and proceed to a discussion of regional issues in some detail, because these had not been touched on in previous plenary meetings. (S)

*President Reagan* agreed to this arrangement, and the *General Secretary* then asked Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to begin. (C)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* recalled that, based on instructions of the President and the General Secretary, discussion was arranged at the Ministerial and working level to study individual questions. Results by the experts and working groups could be summed up as follows: A draft Joint Statement had been prepared for approval.<sup>2</sup> There are portions of it that are quite weak, in the Soviet view, but on the whole it is a solid paper, which records improvements across the board in our relationship. It sets forth the achievements we have reached in arms control, regional issues, bilateral matters and humanitarian affairs, the four agenda items we agreed to in Geneva in 1985. (S)

*Shevardnadze* said the Joint Statement analyzes the main trends in Soviet-American relations since Geneva. It records the many differences that still persist in our relations, but it lists the positive changes that

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<sup>2</sup> For the final version of the Soviet-American Joint Statement released on June 1, see *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1988, Book I, pp. 698–706.

have occurred. These changes are rather impressive as stated in this document. The Joint Statement could gain if a general provision were added “along the lines our two leaders discussed on Sunday.”<sup>3</sup> Shevardnadze then read the following three-sentence paragraph, which, he claimed, should raise no issue of principle:

Proceeding from their understanding of the realities that have taken shape in the world today, the two leaders believe that no problem in dispute can be resolved, nor should it be resolved, by military means. They regard peaceful coexistence as an universal principle of international relations. Equality of all states, non-interference in internal affairs and freedom of socio-political choice must be recognized as the inalienable and mandatory standards of international relations. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* reported that the President had reacted positively to this formulation. Some of the phrases were not accepted by the American side, and compromise language was proposed by the Soviets. These changes too proved unacceptable to the American negotiators. Shevardnadze said he hoped the United States would still give consideration to the Soviet formulation. It was not yet too late to accept this language. At a minimum, US views on this paragraph should be explained more fully. (S)

The Joint Statement as it now stood, *Shevardnadze* continued, reflected the many new ideas which had been developed these past few days in Moscow. The text recorded our agreement to establish an expanded framework through which human rights issues could be discussed in a new, positive spirit. The statement talks of the possibility of flights to Mars, records our agreement to discuss the growing problem of ballistic missile proliferation, and lists our agreement to expand the exchange of school students. It also provides information on the seven new bilateral agreements reached and signed at the Summit. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* then began a quick review of the progress made in the political and military sphere. On arms control, he said, there had been difficulty in making substantial progress toward the 50-percent reduction, but that both sides had agreed to continue with the Geneva negotiations and provide negotiators with fresh impetus. Shevardnadze noted also the continuing problems in relating the ABM treaty to a reduction of strategic arms. He spoke, too, about the lack of progress with respect to airborne cruise missiles and SLBMs, but noted that some advance had been made on counting rules for ALCMs and heavy bombers. Some convergence of ideas in these two fields had been achieved, and both sides have agreed to give detailed instructions to their respective delegations. (S)

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<sup>3</sup> May 29. See Document 156.

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* said the two sides were divided on a variety of other key issues. The US has refused to set ceilings on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) or agree to on-board verification. The United States remains committed to the idea of unilateral statements without verification. Shevardnadze said the Soviet position on this subject was clear and fixed. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* went on to note that the agreement on ballistic missile launch notification had been signed on Tuesday<sup>4</sup> and that in the area of nuclear testing, agreement had been reached to conduct two joint verification experiments. This agreement, signed on May 1, opened up good possibilities for putting into force the protocol of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and accelerating work on the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty. It was our joint hope, said Shevardnadze, to complete the verification protocol even before the joint verification experiments were conducted in the summer of 1988. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* then said that he would like to review where matters stood on conventional arms. *General Secretary Gorbachev* interrupted to ask what had happened at the conventional mandate discussions in Vienna. The *Foreign Minister's* reply was that a working group had been reviewing this subject. The formula for the mandate at Vienna had been the main issue discussed. Some convergence of positions had been recorded, except for aircraft, and the two delegations in Vienna would be invited to pursue the issue further. The *Foreign Minister* said the US has expressed some interest in the Gorbachev proposal on conventional arms set forth on Monday,<sup>5</sup> and was willing to consider further informal discussions of this proposal. The Americans, on the other hand, Shevardnadze reported, were opposed to discussion of naval forces. The Soviets, in contrast, attached great importance to such a dialogue. (S)

In the area of chemical arms, the two sides had made progress, and this was reflected in the Soviet-American Joint Statement. There was certainly agreement on the need to prevent proliferation and to arrange effective verification. (S)

On regional issues, *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* said that all the regular topics had been discussed. He mentioned specifically the Horn of Africa, the Persian Gulf, Angola, Korea, Cambodia, the Middle East, and Central America. Each topic had been reviewed at the experts' level and between the Foreign Ministers on Tuesday. On each, deep and serious differences remain. In a few areas, the method and proce-

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<sup>4</sup> May 31.

<sup>5</sup> May 30. See Document 158.

dures for settlement seemed in sight, but further work was required. With respect to Southern Africa, there had been talk of speeding up implementation of UN Resolution 435.<sup>6</sup> This was certainly in everybody's interest. In the Middle East, one could say there was a better understanding of each other's positions and the differences that separate us. These differences concerned the nature and functioning of any future international conference. There was also the Palestinian representation question. Shevardnadze said that he and the Secretary of State had agreed to hold further conversations on these issues, perhaps even a long session devoted exclusively to this complex set of problems. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* said there had been no change on either side with respect to the Persian Gulf or Iran-Iraq war. On Afghanistan, both sides understood that strict compliance with the recent UN-sponsored agreement was essential.<sup>7</sup> The behavior of Pakistan was cause for concern. Only yesterday, there had been a serious attack on Soviet troops. One soldier was killed, two were wounded, and three others were missing. This incident and others like it could not be overlooked by the Soviet Union, and served as the basis for deep concern. (S)

With respect to Central America, *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* said, no new elements had emerged. The US adheres to its position, thus blocking possible progress between us. (S)

Some new element seemed present in Cambodia. The United States appears receptive to the idea of an early withdrawal of 50,000 Vietnamese troops, and wants to encourage the possibility of dialogue between the Vietnamese and Prince Sihanouk. With respect to Korea, the US perceives no change in the policy of the North. The Soviet side, in contrast, stated its belief that the leadership in North Korea was prepared for North-South talks on a broad range of issues now. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* then turned to bilateral matters. He said he would briefly summarize the situation by noting that many points of agreement had been identified and that serious discussion had taken place wherever disagreements still existed. Our negotiators had worked hard in a constructive and businesslike atmosphere, and further progress in this area was certainly possible, including new areas of cooperation. All of this is reflected in the Joint Statement. (S)

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<sup>6</sup> Reference is to United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 of September 29, 1978, which called for the establishment of an independent Namibia and the withdrawal of South African forces.

<sup>7</sup> Reference is to the Geneva Accords of April 14, 1988.

*General Secretary Gorbachev* thanked the Soviet Foreign Minister for his presentation, and called upon Secretary Shultz to make any additional comments the US side felt necessary. (C)

*Secretary of State Shultz* thanked the General Secretary and commented in extremely favorable terms on the work that had been done over the past two and a half days. He said the experts discussions had produced good results, and that the work had gone on in the best of spirits. He said Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had provided a good outline of the results, and that he needed to go over only those points where our own perspective on issues was needed. (S)

With respect to the draft Joint Statement, the *Secretary* called it a powerful document, containing important substance. The tonal language was just right. The Statement should provide an impetus both for our future work and the resolution of existing problems. The Secretary continued that the US side had discussed the additional political paragraph which Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had mentioned earlier, but that we believed the draft before us represented a clearer statement of where our current relationship stood. The Secretary then read the relevant paragraph from the Joint Statement:

“The two leaders are convinced that the expanding political dialogue they have established represents an increasingly effective means of resolving issues of mutual interest and concern. They do not minimize the real differences of history, tradition and ideology which will continue to characterize the US-Soviet relationship. But they believe that the dialogue will endure, because it is based on realism and focused on the achievement of concrete results. It can serve as a constructive basis for addressing not only the problems of the present, but of tomorrow and the next century. It is a process which the President and the General Secretary believe serves the best interests of the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union, and can contribute to a more stable, more peaceful and safer world.” (S)

*Secretary Shultz* described this paragraph as a strong and powerful endorsement of the process that the two sides had set in motion. We believe we should stick to this paragraph and not make further changes. (S)

Turning to the four-part agenda, Secretary Shultz talked first about START. We had made some headway on ALCMs and the question of verification for mobiles. Fruitful work had been done in these areas, and this was reflected in the Joint Statement. The Secretary then read the two relevant paragraphs:

“The two leaders noted that a Joint Draft Text of a Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms has been elaborated. Through this process, the sides have been able to record in the Joint Draft Text extensive and significant areas of agreement and also

to detail positions on remaining areas of disagreement. While important additional work is required before this Treaty is ready for signature, many key provisions are recorded in the Joint Draft Text and are considered to be agreed, subject to the completion and ratification of the Treaty.

Taking into account a Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the sides have continued negotiations to achieve a separate agreement concerning the ABM Treaty building on the language of the Washington Summit Joint Statement dated December 10, 1987. Progress was noted in preparing the Joint Draft Text of an associated Protocol. In connection with their obligations under the Protocol, the sides have agreed in particular to use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers for transmission of relevant information. The leaders directed their negotiators to prepare the Joint Draft Text of a separate agreement and to continue work on its associated Protocol." (S)

The *Secretary* said there had been no progress in Moscow on the issue of sea-launched cruise missiles. On defense and space, the discussions this week helped establish a better understanding of how we should go about clarifying the meaning of the statement at the Washington Summit. The talks did not, however, identify anything special to report to Ministers at this time. The Secretary noted that the issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar is still outstanding, and warned that this must be dealt with before the ABM review conference in October. (S)

The *Secretary* asserted that the nuclear testing area represented the week's major success story. Our negotiators, he said, should be congratulated for bringing in an agreement on joint verification experiments. The details of that agreement, which runs to 191 pages, shows that careful and detailed work between our two sides is possible and can be achieved in a reasonable amount of time. (S)

With respect to chemical weapons, the *Secretary* said that good realistic language had been developed and included in the Joint Statement. This, in turn, provides a good basis for further work at the Geneva Conference in July, when complicated, sensitive verification problems will still need to be addressed. (S)

The *Secretary* then referred to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's comments about missile technology, and called the agreement reached between the two sides on the notification of launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and SLBMs an important new step taken during the Moscow Summit. (S)

With respect to conventional forces, the *Secretary* said he would like to make three points. First, we needed to recognize that negotiations on these issues are among 23 countries, and not between the Soviet Union and the United States. Second, we needed to reach a balanced outcome in Vienna, a fact reflected in the Joint Statement. Finally, the



two sides shared the view that conventional force talks should be autonomous from the regular CSCE process. The Secretary acknowledged Soviet interest in including something about naval forces in the conventional stability mandate. The US was simply not prepared to do this, he insisted. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* interrupted to say that the naval forces question was separate from the conventional arms mandate issue. The *Secretary* replied that nonetheless the United States is on the whole resistant to any discussion of naval forces. The Secretary continued by saying that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had correctly identified aircraft as a major problem in the mandate discussions. The Secretary concluded by saying that on the human rights side of the Vienna meeting, we are now operating from a draft developed by the neutral and non-aligned countries. Work on this draft was going very slowly. (S)

The *Secretary* then turned to regional questions. He declared that the two sides have had increasingly good discussions on specific issues over the past two and a half years. Virtually every open question has been touched on in the working groups. Perhaps, suggested the Secretary, he would say a word about a few of the issues where new opportunities seemed to be opening.

One such area was Southern Africa. Here, we plan to press the parties to resolve their differences by late September, the tenth anniversary of the passage of Security Council Resolution 435 on Namibia. More work needs to be done, but it was important to keep this part of the US-Soviet dialogue going strongly. (S)

Less dramatic progress had been produced in other areas. The US still favored a second resolution to follow-on Resolution 598,<sup>8</sup> as a means of putting pressure on the participants to end the Iran-Iraq war. The *Secretary* claimed there had been good discussions on the Middle East, but that the complexity of the issues did not lend themselves to resolution in a short exchange. The issues themselves were of great concern to both sides. One example was the growing danger of chemical weapons and missiles in the area. The Chinese had recently sold weapons to Saudi Arabia in exactly the range the US and Soviets had banned from their own inventories. (S)

The *Secretary* noted that the President had decided to send him back to the Middle East. Perhaps this was merely designed to show the Secretary's capacity for masochism. In reality, the trip was valuable

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<sup>8</sup> Reference is to United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 of July 20, 1987, which called for a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq.

as a means for keeping the peace process alive, something, the Secretary said, he believed was essential. (S)

The *Secretary* then moved on to East Asia, where, he said, interesting developments had occurred in Cambodia. The Vietnamese should talk to Sihanouk, so that a process of national reconciliation can begin to be brought about. The Secretary said that without going into all other regional questions, it was perhaps worth noting that the South Koreans had proposed talks with North Korea, especially with regard to security at the Olympics. This was also a matter that Secretary Carlucci had spoken about to President Gromyko. We were also aware that SA-5 missiles had been installed in North Korea, in places that can reach Seoul. This then is a natural source of additional concern, as planning for the Summer Olympics proceeds. (S)

The *Secretary of State* then turned to bilateral issues. He said these had not been considered at the very top level, but that discussion between the two sides had been smooth. The two sides were developing what we hoped would turn out to be long-lasting relations. We are particularly proud of the agreement reached to expand high-school-age exchanges, and of the agreement in principle to negotiate on cultural centers. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* noted that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had not commented on human rights, but that important work had also been done in this area. Even before the summit started, intensive discussions had begun on individual cases and institutional questions. The discussions had proven fruitful. Both sides can take pride in the substantial improvements that have been achieved and are reflected in the Joint Statement. The Secretary said that if one took a longer view and examined developments over the three-year period since Geneva, progress on human rights had come further than in any other area of our four-part agenda. Still more work needed to be done but, compared to where we were when we started, "this was simply a different world." (S)

*Secretary Shultz* concluded his remarks by commenting briefly on the text of the Joint Statement. He noted that this had been worked out by Assistant Secretary Ridgway and Deputy Foreign Minister Besmertnykh. It was a solid document, reflecting the fact that we are increasingly able to deal with problems and find solutions agreeable to both sides. The Secretary said he hoped the document could be approved and issued later today. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* asked the President to outline his attitude toward the two reports which had been given by the Foreign Ministers. (C)

*President Reagan* said he agreed with what had been presented. A long list of problems had been outlined, but it was increasingly clear that these problems could be resolved. Opportunities abound for the

two powers to correct difficulties around the world. We should not overlook these chances. (S)

The *President* asked, "What problems do we really have? The mistrust between us needs to be eliminated." Our two countries possess the ability to solve issues, and there are enormous humanitarian needs around the world. One such problem exists in Ethiopia. There, the President said, the government prevents volunteers from reaching the starving and the needy. We can put a stop to this. We can tell the government of Ethiopia that it simply can't continue with the policies it is pursuing, that it must let the international agencies and volunteers distribute food and medicine to the needy. (S)

The *President* then spoke briefly about the continuing horrors in the Persian Gulf. The loss of life in both Iran and Iraq was enormous. There was no prospect that the war would end soon and every prospect that, without our involvement, the killing and brutality would go on. Regional conflicts, said the President, have a way of drawing others in. Neither of us wants that, and we shouldn't allow it to happen. On the contrary, it's in our mutual interest to defuse tensions and promote regional stability. (S)

The *President* then referred to Afghanistan. He said the settlement there was a tangible step in the right direction. He noted that General Secretary Gorbachev had said that the settlement could serve as a model for ending other regional conflicts. The President commended Gorbachev for his leadership in taking the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan, and noted that it paved the way for the Afghans to settle their own future and enjoy genuine self-determination. The US, the President continued, favors a stable, neutral, and non-aligned Afghanistan, and we are prepared to work with you to ensure it. (S)

The United States is prepared for the same spirit of cooperation in dealing with the problems of the Persian Gulf, the *President* said. The area is becoming much more dangerous with ballistic missiles and chemical weapons. The President added that together we have the unique potential for helping to bring a halt to the Iran-Iraq war. Recalling what he had said in Geneva, the President insisted the two powers had the potential for determining whether there is war or peace. The President suggested that the two superpowers opt for peace. The President concluded his remarks by saying "Let's work together to make this a better world." (S)

*Secretary Shultz* then addressed General Secretary Gorbachev and said jokingly that speaking for the bureaucrats around the table he wished to inquire whether the Soviet side approved the Joint Statement. If so, it could be readied for issuance later that afternoon. (S)

The *President* stated his approval, but *Gorbachev* said he would like to make a few comments. He began by saying that the Joint Statement

was a solid document, which accurately summed up our mutual efforts over the recent past. The document contained elements that record the progress made in the bilateral and regional areas. General Secretary Gorbachev noted that the art of politics is the art of the possible. In that spirit, he was ready to accept the Joint Statement if nothing more could be accomplished, but he asked to approach one subject again on the level of principle. (S)

The *General Secretary* began by reviewing the ground, he said, we had covered together since Geneva. He said he had re-read the Geneva statement carefully. That document says specifically that the two sides had agreed to live in peace; that a nuclear war should not be fought and could not be won; and that the two sides would develop an agenda for the resolution of problems in four basic areas. This was an important global statement. Why could not a similar political global statement be arrived at today? What stands in the way of agreement on a statement which I handed the President on Sunday and which seems to have been rejected by the drafters of the Joint Statement? (S)

What we called for in the Soviet draft, continued *Gorbachev*, was a political approach to problem-solving. What it said was that we all have to respect the rights of others. What is wrong with that? It follows from all we said together these past three days. Why can't we incorporate this basic idea into our statement? It would give the document a powerful political basis, Gorbachev said. It would strengthen the text, and suggest to the world that we have taken another important step forward. (S)

We are the two major holders of nuclear weapons. We know from our own discussions that regional issues must be solved through political approaches. We know that we must live in peace, that there is no alternative to the political resolution of disputes. This is the will of both our people. They know that the sovereign choice of other people must be respected. Frankly, we have both said all these things in our own way on many previous occasions. You have made such statements; I can quote, Mr. President. We have made similar unilateral statements. Wouldn't it be much better if we could say the same thing together? It would help both of us and would send an important signal to the entire world. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* continued by suggesting that he and the President had reached tentative agreement on Sunday on such a statement.<sup>9</sup> Gorbachev recalled that he had handed the text of his suggested paragraph to the President in English, that the President had read it and said he liked it. I think his exact words were, "I respond

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<sup>9</sup> May 29. See Document 156.

positively to this.” I think, said Gorbachev, that the President’s wishes should be respected. Can we not, asked Gorbachev, simply make a correction in the text to include our paragraph, and the entire statement would then be ready for issuance? (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* then turned to Secretary Shultz and said, “George, this is a good statement (referring to the Joint Statement), but it can be made better. The President, in fact, was the first in Geneva to make some of the statements I referred to earlier. Can we not proceed to use the language I suggested to the President on Sunday?” (S)

*Secretary Shultz* then pointed to the objectionable phrase “peaceful co-existence” and to other unacceptable phraseology in the draft paragraph. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* responded adamantly, “We have already removed the phrase you objected to (peaceful coexistence), although we don’t believe it is a bad phrase. What is it in the text that you are against? I see the President is hard put to find any faults. What do you say? Isn’t it better that we put our thoughts on this subject together to create a new and powerful political statement?” (S)

*Secretary Gorbachev* then turned to Assistant Secretary Ridgway and with a smile said, “As the English say, women are the second civilization. You are the only representative of that civilization here. The President had agreed to this paragraph on Sunday. What is in it that is not acceptable to you?” (S)

At this point, *Secretaries Shultz and Carlucci* pointed out other difficulties in the Soviet language, and explained that there were at least four or five phrases that carried political baggage that the US did not favor. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* turned to Defense Secretary Carlucci and said, “Now Frank has gotten involved in this! All right, we understand your objections to certain words, but we have already developed a second formulation which I discussed with the President. All we are asking for is a statement that confirms there are to be political solutions, not military solutions, to international problems. The statement represents an effort to develop a political guideline, and the Soviet side would be happy if you could agree in principle to a statement that says this. Such a text would improve the Joint Statement and make it a more powerful document.” (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* asked that the American side reflect on his comments for a few moments while he went on to say a few things about regional issues. First, the Soviet Union was quite serious in wishing to go on record in favor of changing the way regional conflicts were resolved. The American side could be sure that the Soviets would cooperate in a constructive spirit in the resolution of problems around

the world. We will not act on our own, continued Gorbachev, in a way which does not consider American interests or the interests of our own allies and friends. Soviet policy would be based on realities, and this would provide a sound basis for working together. Gorbachev added, "The hand of Moscow will be a constructive hand." (S)

The first success in this policy was Afghanistan. *Gorbachev* said this was a complex issue. The choices before us were difficult and the decisions we took will not be easy to implement. But Afghanistan is now a thing of the past. We have reached our agreement. Let's untie the Afghanistan knot and use it as a basis of untying other regional knots. (S)

*Gorbachev* observed that the world was looking to see if we two can work for "real reconciliation on the basis of a balance of interests." The General Secretary said that he would not like to see things come apart in Afghanistan. The Soviets had begun to implement the agreement that was reached. There were, of course, many problems and complications. Pakistan was a problem. So, too, was the idea of a different coalition government. The Soviet side was not against a new political coalition and was willing to cooperate in its selection, but the possibilities from the Soviet side were limited. (S)

What *General Secretary Gorbachev* said he feared were developments in the other direction, namely, the creation of a fundamentalist, Moslem government. He stated energetically that Soviet troops continued to be fired upon; so has the Soviet embassy in Kabul, and Soviet garrisons still in the field. If this continued, Gorbachev insisted, the Soviets will have to respond and make adequate adjustments. Both of us will be the losers if the agreement does not go into effect smoothly. (S)

We need to cooperate, *General Secretary Gorbachev* insisted. If we don't, if we each act only on the basis of our own interests, we won't be able to achieve anything—anywhere. (S)

The *General Secretary* agreed that the Iran-Iraq war was also a major test. He said that, in the abstract, the completion of a second resolution was acceptable, but that "we must be careful not to push Iran into a corner." The General Secretary said that the Americans had had a long-term relationship with Iran but that Iran was a Soviet neighbor and a serious problem. The General Secretary concluded by saying, "We must be firm, flexible, and constructive. We are ready to cooperate." (S)

The *General Secretary* then turned to a discussion of the Middle East peace process. He said there was the beginning of convergence and the development of good, common ground between us. There was a general understanding of the need for an international conference, but the requirement still existed to bring our views together on the nature of such a conference, which could not simply be an umbrella with no influence on the outcome. To be sure, the two Superpowers

could not impose a solution on the Arabs. We cannot insist they accept what they do not want. The General Secretary suggested that bilateral talks or trilateral talks would be required. We need to bring our views together on Arab participation. We also need to know what Palestinian self-determination means to the US. We should both be prepared to push the parties toward a compromise. The Soviet side is ready to do its part, and once the conference convenes, we will be prepared to consider the regularization of our diplomatic relations with Israel. (S)

In the Middle East, only by cooperating together can a solution be reached, the *General Secretary* insisted. Without such cooperation, no solutions will be possible. (S)

With respect to Southern Africa, the *General Secretary* said he welcomed the conference that had recently taken place in London and he had only praise for US mediation efforts. On this subject, the US seemed to be taking a more realistic approach. There were clearly possibilities based on the well known resolution (presumably 435) which provided for the independence of Namibia. There also seemed to be new opportunities in Angola which the Soviets were ready to talk about cooperatively with the United States. (S)

The *General Secretary* then turned to the question of Ethiopia. He noted that the Soviet Union was providing relief assistance in the form of food and economic aid. He said the Soviet Union lacked the capacity to deliver a political ultimatum to the Ethiopian government. This was not, in any case, the Soviet method. Moreover, the Soviets did not believe the Ethiopians were dodging their responsibilities to their own people or preventing relief assistance from reaching the needy. (S)

With respect to Central America, *General Secretary Gorbachev* said it looked as if the US was holding up progress. Nonetheless, there had been interesting developments in recent months. In this connection, the General Secretary said, he was willing to reaffirm what he had said in the White House in December, namely, Soviet readiness to discuss arms supplies to the region. The Soviet Union was willing to refrain or limit assistance to police arms or non-offensive weapons. The Soviet Union was willing to act with the United States, but the US seemed uninterested or unwilling to work cooperatively. The General Secretary added that the Soviets would not interfere with US initiatives, but that these initiatives and current American policy will not be successful. (S)

The *General Secretary* insisted he was somewhat perplexed by the American position on Korea. He said, as far as he could understand, the North Koreans were ready to negotiate. Talks could begin right away. It was the United States who objected to a process of accommodation. In contrast, the North Koreans were ready for a process of settlement, including eventual reunification of the country. (S)

The *General Secretary* said similar possibilities for making progress existed in Cambodia. The Vietnamese have now taken a very important



initiative, a step that again demonstrates the willingness for cooperation which exists in the Socialist camp. (S)

The *General Secretary* said that this summed up what he wanted to say about regional issues. His conclusion was that many possibilities for fruitful cooperation and constructive interaction existed. The two sides needed merely to grasp the chance. Neither could dictate solutions. Each had to accept the requirement for political settlements. The approach must be on the basis of a balance of interests. The Soviet Union is ready to be an active partner in this process. He said Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze should continue to work together in reaching for compromise. Their consultations should be intensified, along with a continuation of expert discussions. There are important contributions we can make together, if we proceed to work cooperatively. (S)

*President Reagan* suggested that the Gorbachev presentation was a little one-sided. He agreed that the two sides could play an important role in maintaining a peaceful world, but the facts and the history of the regional conflicts could not be set aside so simply. The problem of Angola was certainly one area where history could not be ignored. The President then traced Angolan developments from the end of World War II until the time Portuguese colonialism ended. The Western hope was that the Angolan people would come together and create a government based on democracy. What actually happened was that one faction within Angola appealed for outside help, which led eventually to the entry of 40,000 Cuban troops in the country. Another faction (UNITA), under a popular leader named Savimbi, remained in the field. The President said that Savimbi's only goal was the establishment in Angola of a government in which people could choose their own destiny. The result, however, has been a civil war lasting more than a decade. Outside foreign troop assistance to one side or another in Africa had to stop. (S)

The *President* then recounted the history of the Korean problem, recalling that US involvement came under the aegis of the United Nations banner after the North Koreans had attacked the South. Today, the line established during the Korean War still exists, and, as far as we know, the North Koreans have not given up their wish to control the entire country. (S)

The *President* then turned to the history of Nicaragua, pointing out that the previous dictator (Somoza) had agreed to step down when the Sandinista movement promised in writing to the Organization of American States that it would institute democratic processes in the country. The Sandinistas had promised a free press, free labor unions, freedom of religion and a full, pluralistic society. Yet, when they took power, they began to exile and execute some of their own leaders and

repress the population rather than institute the democratic reforms they had promised. No one elected the present leadership in Nicaragua, and the promises the Sandinistas made in writing were never carried out. It was under these conditions that the Contra revolution arose, and that US assistance to them began. (S)

The *President* concluded by saying that, if we and the Soviet Union are to work together, we cannot act in ways that do not allow people freedom of choice. For example, the Nicaraguan people must be given the opportunity to set up the democracy they thought they had fought to achieve. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said he would keep his response to this presentation brief. In general, he said, the American assessment as to the cause of regional problems was at variance with Soviet assessments. If we go back and talk about history, he said, there will be no way of resolving current problems. This was certainly true in Angola and Central America. We must search for solutions, he insisted, on the basis of political methods and a balance of interests between us. If the Americans are ready to cooperate, we are ready to work with you; otherwise, we can wait. (S)

We are in no hurry in Nicaragua, since pluralism already exists, *General Secretary Gorbachev* asserted. There are something like 15 parties. We have sent no Soviet advisors, and we cannot be considered responsible for what has occurred. At the same time, we cannot on our own cancel the will of the Nicaraguan people. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said that he would like to sum up the discussion in this way: there are promising situations on many regional issues. We can develop a cooperative approach and strive to reach agreements which can be of assistance. This won't be easy or necessarily quick. The United States cannot solve regional problems itself. There are simply dozens of Arab interests that need to be considered. There are endless problems in Africa. There is a complex situation in Indo-China. But good prospects are opening up, and the Soviet Union is ready to work with the Americans in searching for answers. (S)

President Reagan said, "Yes, perhaps if we worked together, things could be accomplished." But in Nicaragua, we are closer to the scene, and we believe we have a better grasp of the situation. The President then recalled meeting [with?] a Nicaraguan whose ears had been removed by the Sandinistas, and used this as evidence of the cruelty and brutality of the current regime in Managua. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said he was aware that the facts in Central America were often terrible but that Somoza had been no less cruel or harsh than the present Nicaraguan government. Indeed, the terrible situation that prevails in these regional conflicts should act to push us towards constructive results. (S)

The *General Secretary* then said the discussion had to be brought to a conclusion. The most meaningful part of the President's visit to Moscow was about to end. Tonight, there would be a ballet, another short meeting in the morning and the press conferences. There was no value in trying to develop points we could make together at the press conference; each of us was free to say what he wishes. The Soviet assessment is that the Summit has been a major political event, where progress has been made on both bilateral and international issues. I trust your assessment will be somewhat along these lines. The General Secretary thanked the President for the effort made during the summit, for the progress achieved and for the extensive discussion and detailed work that had been undertaken. I would appreciate it, however, continued the General Secretary, if the President could look again at the political statement, which he was shown on Sunday, to see whether he could not agree to it as it would give the summit a character and intrinsic importance it might not otherwise achieve. (S)

*President Reagan* said he did not want to be the skunk at the picnic. The discussions had been useful and productive. The relationships which had developed were friendly and natural. We believe that the Joint Statement, as it was written and agreed, is a sufficient support to the developing political process between us, and it is all that we think is needed. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* responded actively, saying that the President had the choice, but seemed unwilling or reluctant to exercise the authority that was clearly his. "Should we record," asked the General Secretary rhetorically, "that the Americans would not agree to the paragraph because of George Shultz or Frank Carlucci? Are they the intransigent parties? Is one of them a revisionist? If not, perhaps we need to look for a scapegoat elsewhere. Perhaps, Ambassador Matlock or Assistant Secretary Ridgway? But let us not move in this direction. Rather, let us both carry our discussions to new heights so that your successor will realize that we made the maximum effort and that our results were good and effective." (S)

*President Reagan* said that it was his view great progress had already been made. There was no reason to suggest there was disagreement because this would disappoint many people around the world. (S)

*General Secretary Gorbachev* said it was only his thought that we ought to end this Summit on the most positive note possible. There had been long and sharp discussions but he could certainly agree there was no reason to end on a note of confrontation. But what was wrong with the language which the Soviet side had proposed? "Tell me, Mr. President," the General Secretary suggested, "that you will be able to accept this text after all." (S)

*Secretary Shultz* insisted that the Soviet language made the American side uncomfortable, and that it contained phraseology which we

found difficult to accept. In our view, we had taken the original Soviet language and reshaped it into a form we can endorse. We think the result is the strong, positive statement, now contained in the joint text. (S)

At this point, *Gorbachev* suggested that the American side would perhaps want to caucus separately and reexamine the Soviet paragraph. He recalled that the Soviet side had already removed the language that the Americans had considered unacceptable, including the phrase “peaceful coexistence.” He then repeated his request that the American side huddle together and reconsider the Soviet language. (S)

The plenary recessed at this point, and the two sides huddled briefly, whereupon the *President* decided again not to accept the Soviet text. He and Secretary Shultz walked over to the side of the room where General Secretary Gorbachev and his advisors were standing and told the Soviets that, “we prefer to keep the Joint Statement as agreed on Tuesday evening.” There was a brief further discussion lasting some two minutes, during which the *General Secretary* tried to argue, but when he saw that he was making no headway, he quickly reversed course and agreed to the Joint Statement text as drafted in the Working Group. (S)

The meeting adjourned at this point, and all the participants walked out of the room together to the ceremony in which the INF documents of ratification were exchanged. (C)

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### 163. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Moscow, June 1, 1988, 8:30–10:30 p.m.

#### PARTICIPANTS

U.S.  
President and Mrs. Reagan  
Secretary and Mrs. Shultz  
D. Zarechnak, Carolyn Smith  
(Interpreters)

USSR  
Gen. Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev  
Foreign Min. and Mrs. Shevardnadze  
P. Palazhchenko, E. Lagutin  
(Interpreters)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988. Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information was found. The discussion during the farewell dinner took place at a Government Dacha outside Moscow.

Shortly after the dinner started, the General Secretary asked about the President's speech at Moscow State University.<sup>2</sup> Secretary Shultz noted that the students had been very responsive, and the General Secretary alluded to the "universal principle", which had also been the subject of discussion for the Joint Statement.<sup>3</sup>

The General Secretary poured some vodka, and Secretary Shultz, turning to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, recalled the vodka in Geneva. Mrs. Gorbachev then asked Secretary Shultz if he remembered the first question she had asked him in Geneva. When he replied that he did not, she declined to remind him of what it was.

Mrs. Reagan noted that people were standing in the theater that evening. There followed a discussion of the cost of theater tickets in the Soviet Union (very low), and the cost of books. The General Secretary compared the very low cost of his book, *Perestroika*, in the USSR, with the \$20 it cost in the U.S. He also mentioned that he had received the collection of President Reagan's speeches in the Russian translation.

Secretary Shultz asked if the Summit was getting a lot of media coverage in the USSR. Gorbachev replied in the affirmative, and noted that recordings were being made of all the TV broadcasts, and copies would be sent to the President.

The President inquired about the General Secretary's concern about the President being shot, and the subsequent lateness of the President's arrival at the theater. Gorbachev indicated that the concern was not on his part, and that there had never been any trouble with a dignitary's arrival at the Bolshoi. He seemed annoyed that the President had arrived late.

Secretary Shultz brought up the General Secretary's and the President's walk around Red Square. Gorbachev indicated that certain "provocative" questions about nuclear arms were directed at the President. Secretary Shultz noted that at the President's press conference, the President had spoken of his desire to see a world free of nuclear weapons. Mrs. Gorbachev mentioned that she had spoken to the press while waiting at the art gallery for Mrs. Reagan, and noted that the press were rather quiet as a whole.

Gorbachev noted the large number of questions asked at the press conference.

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<sup>2</sup> See Reagan, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With the Students and Faculty at Moscow State University," May 31, 1988. (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1988, Book I, pp. 683–692)

<sup>3</sup> See Document 162. See also "Joint Statement Following the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting," June 1, 1988. (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1988, Book I, pp. 698–706) For the controversy surrounding Gorbachev's use of the term "peaceful coexistence" in a draft of the Joint Statement, see Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 1104–1105.

Secretary Shultz indicated that he felt that the press realized that something important was taking place, and they stood back and refrained from being provocative. Gorbachev agreed with this assessment. He added that the INF Treaty was an achievement for the whole world. He also said that questions had been asked at the press conference about regional issues and their resolution. He again alluded to the universal principle.

Secretary Shultz said that he thought that he and the Foreign Minister should focus on regional issues at upcoming ministerials. Gorbachev indicated his hope that discussions of these issues by the ministers or their deputies would take place 2 or 3 times a year. The process of improving US-Soviet relations should not be undermined by regional conflicts.

In connection with the press, the President recalled what President Johnson used to say about them: if one day he were to go down to the Potomac and walk across the river, the press would report the next day that "The President can't swim".

That reminded Mrs. Gorbachev of a Soviet Chukchi joke (like the old "Polak" jokes in the U.S.): a Chukchi is concerned about the new General Secretary because he is not like the former one, who would read and read and read. The new one doesn't look at any paper at all when he speaks, which apparently indicates that he cannot read!

The General Secretary then started to tell a joke about himself which he said he had heard in Washington, but Mrs. Gorbachev stopped him before he got very far. However, he had said enough for the President to recognize the joke—and the President said: "Is it the one about the man standing in line for vodka. . . .?", and Gorbachev laughed, saying, yes, it was, and he liked it (I presume that the joke, although it was never actually repeated at the dinner, is the following: A man is standing in line in the Soviet Union, waiting to buy vodka. He finally gets fed up, says he's going to kill Gorbachev for making people stand in line for vodka, and leaves. Several hours later he returns, and is asked by the man he was standing next to, "Well, did you kill him?" He replies: "No, the line there was even longer than here.").

The Gorbachevs mentioned the various stories in *Time* magazine and other places about Mrs. Reagan. Mrs. Reagan said that the press had asked her about these things all during the trip to Leningrad, but that she refused to dignify those kind of questions with replies. Gorbachev mentioned that there had been a story in the press about an island being especially created on which the Gorbachevs would vacation—total fiction. Mrs. Reagan replied that all those stories in the U.S. press were the same type of thing. Mrs. Gorbachev said that leaders should be able to trust in the confidence of the people that work with them.

Secretary Shultz agreed wholeheartedly, and indicated that he had no respect for people who write such things. They are Judases and this is what he tells reporters that ask questions about this.

The mention of Judas led Gorbachev to recall that his wife had studied and taught about religion, but that he had been connected with religion only twice in his life, one of which events he did not remember (when he was baptized) and the other just recently, when he had met with the Russian Orthodox Church hierarchy. The President mentioned that he had heard that many old churches had been won back recently in the USSR. The talk of religion reminded him of a story about the Pope and the lawyer who died and went to heaven. St. Peter asked them who they were, and when he found out, he took the Pope inside to show him his quarters. It turned out to be a rather ordinary apartment. The lawyer was certain that if the Pope got such ordinary quarters, his would be worse. But St. Peter showed him to an enormous mansion. When the lawyer asked in surprise why the Pope had gotten an apartment, and he had gotten a mansion, St. Peter explained that there *[were]* many Popes in heaven, but he was the first lawyer.

Gorbachev said that nothing had ever come of his law degree, but it was economics that he now knew better and was interested in more, to which Mrs. Gorbachev added that he had been successful in becoming General Secretary.

Gorbachev indicated that the “Theses” which were to be discussed at the upcoming Party conference contained a provision to the effect that elected officials should be allowed to remain in office for only two terms (of five years each). Mrs. Gorbachev added that the term of office should be as long as the Party and the people decide. Gorbachev continued that the press asked him how long he would remain General Secretary, and he replied that it would be as long as the people let him.

Mrs. Reagan asked if the General Secretary thought that this proposal would be adopted, and Gorbachev replied very categorically that he thought it would. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze indicated that there was also a proposal that an official might be elected for a third term. Gorbachev said emphatically that he thought that the two-term rule would be adopted. Mrs. Gorbachev interjected that even in France the term of office is 7 years, with a chance for re-election. Gorbachev added that the whole issue was being very actively discussed. He recalled President Roosevelt, and Mrs. Gorbachev added that he was remembered in the Soviet Union as the one that established diplomatic relations with the USSR. The President indicated that President Roosevelt’s situation at the end of his life was tragic. One of Roosevelt’s sons had told President Reagan that the Democratic Party leaders, sure that Roosevelt would be re-elected, talked him into running for a fourth term. Since Roosevelt was very sick at the time, this guaranteed his early death.



Mrs. Gorbachev made an allusion to the ways of God.

Gorbachev mentioned that stress, can, however, also mobilize one's resources, and the President said that this was what happens in time of war.

Gorbachev mentioned President Zia of Pakistan and wondered why he had chosen to dissolve Parliament.

Mrs. Gorbachev said that anyone who understood the East well should raise his hand. This reminded the President of a joke about a scorpion and a frog. The scorpion comes up to a river, and wants to cross it. He sees a frog sitting there, and asks the frog to take him across. The frog is concerned that the scorpion will sting it as they are going across, but the scorpion assures it that he wouldn't do that, because he would then drown, since he can't swim. This sounds logical, and the frog agrees. But as they are making their way across the stream, the scorpion stings the frog. As they are both sinking, the frog asks, "why did you do this?", and the scorpion answers: "Well, this is the Middle East."

The President then asked Mrs. Gorbachev if the General Secretary had told her the joke which the President had told him in Washington about Gorbachev leaving his dacha late one morning. Gorbachev said that he had forgotten to tell it to his wife, but it was a good joke, and suggested that the President tell it, which he did: The General Secretary is late leaving his dacha for work one morning, so he tells his driver to sit in the back, so as not to get into trouble for speeding. As they are zooming down the road, they pass two motorcycle policemen, and one of them gives chase. When he returns, the other asks, "Did you give him a ticket?", to which the first replies, "No." The other asks why not, and the first answers that he didn't because a very important person was in the car. "Who was it?" asks his partner. "Well, I don't know who the fellow in back was, but his driver was Gorbachev".

The President then told another joke about an aide to Gorbachev coming to tell him that five thousand people had gathered outside the Kremlin, to which Gorbachev replied, "So what? Let them gather". The aide then returned to say that ten thousand people had gathered, to which Gorbachev gave the same reply. Again the aide returned to say that fifty thousand people had gathered, and that they were all wearing red and eating. Gorbachev answered—"What's wrong with that?", to which the aide replied: "They're all eating with chopsticks!"

Gorbachev noted that the Reagans should now be well-acquainted with the color red. They had seen it in the White House, in the Kremlin, on Red Square, and in the wine at the table. Mrs. Reagan said that she heard that it was an insult if a guest to an event in the Soviet Union wore red. Mrs. Gorbachev was very surprised, and said that this was absolutely untrue. Knowing that red was Mrs. Reagan's favorite color,

Mrs. Gorbachev always tried to wear a different color—blue or beige or something else. Mrs. Reagan remarked how misleading the information they receive from the press can be.

The subject of mistakes led Gorbachev to recall a “Radio Yerevan” joke; Radio Yerevan is queried: “Is it true that academician Arzumanyan won a car in the lottery?” Radio Yerevan’s reply is that it’s true, except that it was not academician Arzumanyan, but soccer forward Arzumanyan. And it was not a car, but a ball point pen, and he didn’t win it, he lost it. But otherwise everything is correct.”

Gorbachev also told a joke about the rivalry between the Armenian and Georgian national soccer teams. It seems that the Georgian team was scheduled to play the Brazilians, and they were wondering what they could do to beat them. The solution was to have the Brazilians dress up in Armenian uniforms, which would get the Georgians so fired up that victory would be guaranteed.

Secretary Shultz recalled his visit to a church in Georgia, and the time he had spent with an artist there. Mrs. Gorbachev mentioned that he was an old friend of hers. Secretary Shultz added that the artist had been commissioned to make a sculpture for a locality in the Washington, D.C. area to commemorate the INF Treaty.

Secretary Shultz also fondly recalled his meetings with the Foreign Minister’s children and grandchildren, noting that some of them speak English well, and that the Foreign Minister’s daughter-in-law teaches English Literature. When Secretary Shultz asked where she had studied English literature, she replied that it was at the University of Tbilisi. In connection with Armenians, the President recalled that that nationality had often been referred to in the context of “the starving Armenians”. This led Mrs. Gorbachev to mention that Russia was only one part of the Soviet Union. There were other, older republics. Her father was a Ukrainian. It would be good if Secretary Shultz, in addition to the Russian Republic, could visit the Central Asia republics, Armenia, the Baltic republics, the Ukraine. Gorbachev added that a summer cruise across the Arctic would also be interesting. Mrs. Gorbachev continued the list of places to see: the Far East, Siberia, the Steppes, Stavropol. Secretary Shultz agreed; just as it was not enough to see Washington to know the U.S., it was not enough to see Moscow to know the USSR. Places like Sochi, Leningrad and Kiev were all so different from Moscow and from each other. Gorbachev noted that he liked Kiev and Tallin. It was such a big country.

Gorbachev mentioned that Russia once had a foothold in California, and the President added that as it had turned out, it had been unwise, from the Russian point of view, to have given that up. The President noted that everyone on the U.S. side of the table was from California.

The President then said that he hoped he was not being tactless, but in the Book of Revelation it was said that when the third angel

blew his trumpet, a star would fall to Earth that would poison one-third of the land, one-third of the waters of the land, and people would die when they drank it. The star's name was "wormwood", which is "Chernobyl" in Ukrainian.

Gorbachev replied that it was a great tragedy, costing the Soviet Union billions of dollars to clean up. He mentioned the effects that a major war would have only as a result of the destruction of atomic power plants. This would apply in the U.S. and USSR, and even to a greater extent in a country like France, where such a large percentage of the power comes from nuclear energy.

The President recalled that the energy released by Chernobyl was less than the energy released by one nuclear warhead. Secretary Shultz mentioned that the title of Dr. Gale's book about the incident was "Final Warning", and Mrs. Gorbachev agreed that this really was a "final warning", adding that Europe was covered with nuclear power plants.<sup>4</sup> The President said that human error was the reason for the accident, and that the same thing had occurred at Three Mile Island.<sup>5</sup> Gorbachev indicated that if Chernobyl caused such difficulties, what would it be like if this were to happen to hundreds or thousands of such plants? The story of Chernobyl is a story of people working together tirelessly to liquidate the problem. Secretary Shultz mentioned the heroic efforts he had read about in connection with the accident.

Gorbachev confirmed that Chernobyl really was a final warning, and then he recalled the tragedy of the Challenger, and the attractive faces of those that had died in that accident.<sup>6</sup>

Mrs. Reagan asked the General Secretary if he had read Dr. Gale's book. Gorbachev replied that he had not, but that he had a lot of respect for Gale, and that it was obvious that he was a serious and dedicated person.

At this point Mrs. Gorbachev indicated that dinner was over, and invited the guests for coffee into an adjoining room. The party split up into two groups: the Reagans and Gorbachevs in one and the Shultzes and Shevardnadzes in the other.

Mrs. Gorbachev told the President and Mrs. Reagan about the heavy responsibility and burden one bears in public life, and both she and Gorbachev talked about how important it is to have good personal relations and good memories.

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<sup>4</sup> Reference is to Dr. Robert Peter Gale and Thomas Hauser, *Chernobyl: The Final Warning*. (New York: Warner Books, 1988) A physician specializing in treating cancer, Dr. Gale coordinated Soviet efforts to care for victims of Chernobyl.

<sup>5</sup> Reference is to the 1979 partial nuclear meltdown in Pennsylvania.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to the January 1986 break up of the Challenger space shuttle just over a minute into its flight leading to the deaths of its seven crew members.

**164. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, undated

## SUBJECT

Your June 1 Dinner with General Secretary Gorbachev

While the memory is still fresh, I want to record for you my thoughts on the remarkable evening you, Nancy, O'Bie, and I had with the Gorbachevs and Shevardnadzes. The dinner at the Tsarist palace they styled a dacha was an historic occasion between our two countries and deserves to be recorded for posterity.

My first impression was of the liveliness of the conversation and the easy conviviality of the evening. Gorbachev seemed determined to match you joke for joke and even Raisa told a couple to spice up the conversation. There were hardly any lingering signs of rancor from the tough conversation of the morning or of any desire to return to old arguments. Indeed, the Gorbachevs and Shevardnadzes went out of their way to make it a pleasurable evening. It appeared they would have been happy to prolong it even longer than they did.

I was struck by how deeply affected Gorbachev appeared to be by the Chernobyl accident. He commented that it was a great tragedy which cost the Soviet Union billions of rubles and had only been barely overcome through the tireless efforts of an enormous number of people. Gorbachev noted with seemingly genuine horror the devastation that would occur if nuclear power plants became targets in a conventional war much less a full nuclear exchange. Gorbachev agreed that Chernobyl was a "Final Warning" as Dr. Gale had called it in his book.<sup>2</sup> It was obvious from that evening that Chernobyl has left a strong anti-nuclear streak in Gorbachev's thinking.

Gorbachev showed open pride in your accomplishments together, mentioning that the INF treaty was an accomplishment for the entire world. While the Gorbachevs commented on the good press coverage of the Moscow Summit in our two countries and around the world, they betrayed some frustration at Western media stories on them personally. Gorbachev registered an interest in more discussions with us on regional issues, and his joke about dressing a Brazilian soccer team

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow Summit 5/29–6/1, 1988. Secret. An unknown hand wrote in the upper right-hand corner: "6/24/88."

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 163.

like Georgians so their Armenian opponents would get fired up was an ironic reference to his major nationality problems at home.

Finally, both the Gorbachevs revealed something of themselves during the evening. Evidently true lovers of the ballet, they recalled fondly how they had watched standing from the upper balconies in their student days. Gorbachev noted that his only two connections with religion had been his baptism which he could not remember and a recent meeting with Soviet church leaders. His comment that he had never used his law degree brought out a strong defense of his successes in life from Raisa. She also remarked to you on the responsibilities and burdens of leadership. Both expressed a confident sense of national pride in their descriptions of the variety of the Soviet Union, remarks which came across to me as genuine and not overbearing.

In sum, Mr. President, the evening was a fitting climax to your four summits with General Secretary Gorbachev. O'Bie and I were honored to take part.

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**165. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, June 23, 1988

SUBJECT

Discussion with Soviet Ambassador

Soviet Ambassador Dubinin called on me today before his return to Moscow this weekend for the Party Conference and summer holidays. He delivered a letter to you from General Secretary Gorbachev which I am attaching. Dubinin promises the photo album in a day or so.

Dubinin also delivered a letter from Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to me on the Middle East, which, among other things, agrees that a meeting between Assistant Secretary Murphy and his counterpart, Polyakov, would be useful. We have proposed July 21–22.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Nelson Ledsky Files, USSR [1988 Cables (06/22/1988–07/14/1988)]. Secret; Sensitive. Powell sent the memorandum to Reagan under cover of a June 24 memorandum. Reagan initialed Powell's memorandum next to the heading; and Ledsky also initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner.

<sup>2</sup> Documents pertaining to U.S.-Soviet discussions of the Middle East are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.

Dubinina expressed the hope that the Geneva talks would get off to a good start when they resume July 12, and I told him we were working hard with our negotiators to make that possible. I assured him that our instructions from you were to make progress where possible, and noted that both candidates to succeed you are broadly in favor of 50% reductions in strategic arms, as is the American public. I also told Dubinina that we planned to keep pushing in all the other arms control areas, including conventional stability, chemical weapons and nuclear testing. With regard to the latter, I reminded Dubinina that there should be no delays in the Joint Verification Experiment, inasmuch as we needed to submit the TTBT and PNET verification protocols<sup>3</sup> to the Senate in August if they were to be ratified in this Administration.

On regional issues, I told Dubinina about my plans to visit Southeast Asia and Central America this summer, and said I would communicate with Shevardnadze after those trips if it was useful to do so. On Cambodia, I pointed out that both we and the Soviets agreed that a return of a Khmer Rouge regime was not what we sought for that country. On Central America, I noted that our differences were sharper. On Southern Africa, I hoped we would see some reflection of our Moscow discussions at the Cairo meeting.

Dubinina asked me about the Toronto meetings, and I briefed him, referring him primarily to the public statements, but also explaining how you had described the Moscow summit to your counterparts in Toronto. I wanted that to get back to Gorbachev, and I think it will.

Dubinina raised the question of Soviet prisoners of war from Afghanistan. The Soviets are trying to account for their missing in action, and know some Soviet soldiers have resettled here. We will proceed cautiously, making sure not to hand over to the Soviets any information the war veterans do not want them to have. I made it clear we had no intention of leaning on anyone to go home, or to stay, for that matter. We may be able to provide information in some cases.

Dubinina said he had Moscow's answer to your short list of special human rights cases. The picture is mixed. Among the emigration cases, five (including the Zieman, Charney and Tufeld cases that we already knew about) are resolved, but four are held up by "knowledge of state secrets," and a technicality is invoked in the Gordievskaya case of interest to the British. The Stolar case was not mentioned. The other seven political cases are in various states of consideration of a pardon or parole. We are still analyzing the list, which holds out hope of further progress, but I told Dubinina I considered it an interim response.

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<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, 1981–1991.

Finally, I suggested that, as has been the practice, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze might plan to come to Washington just prior to the opening of the U.N. General Assembly in September, for meetings with us. I told Dubinin I thought it would give a healthy impetus to the work of the U.N.G.A. if we met—and were seen to meet—productively beforehand. But the prime purpose, and the reason I think Shevardnadze should also call on you, would be to move the substance forward.<sup>4</sup>

## **Attachment**

### **Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan<sup>5</sup>**

Moscow, undated

Dear Mr. President,

I see your letter as a confirmation of the importance of the relationship developed between us, as evidence of your good feelings.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, along with significant political results, our meeting in Moscow has been given an encouraging human dimension—not only in terms of our personal liking for each other, but also in terms of warmer relationship between our peoples and their more correct perception of each other.

The importance of all this transcends even the US-Soviet dialogue, whose regularity and pithiness are highly appreciated by our allies and the world community at large.

Raisa Maximovna and I have warm recollections of the hours that we spent in an open and spontaneous give-and-take with Mrs. Reagan and yourself. We are very pleased that you had an opportunity to see our people, speak with them, feel their sentiments and see that they sincerely want to build relations with America in the spirit of friendship, understanding and cooperation. The Soviet people, in turn, have met you up close and have come to appreciate your good will, and your role in everything that has been accomplished by our two countries together.

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<sup>4</sup> Documents on this issue are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XL, Global Issues I.

<sup>5</sup> No classification marking. Printed from the unofficial translation, which bears Gorbachev's typed signature.

<sup>6</sup> Reagan's undated letter to Gorbachev is in Reagan Library, Ledsky Files, Moscow Summit President's Letters to Raisa and Mikhail Gorbachev 05/23/1988-06/03/1988.



We are sending you a photo album. May it remind you and your wife of the remarkable days you spent in the Soviet Union, days that are destined to be part of history.

With our best wishes to Mrs. Nancy Reagan and yourself.

Sincerely,

**Mikhail Gorbachev**

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## **166. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, July 11, 1988, 2–3 p.m.

### **SUBJECT**

Review of Covert Action Programs

### **PARTICIPANTS**

*Office of the Vice President*

Craig Fuller

Sam Watson

*State*

John Whitehead

Michael Armacost

*DOD*

Secretary Frank C. Carlucci

Richard Armitage

*Justice*

Attorney General Edwin Meese

Douglas W. Kmiec

*JCS*

General Robert Herres

Vice Admiral Jonathan Howe

*CIA*

Judge William Webster

[*name not declassified*]

*OMB*

Joseph Wright

*White House*

Kenneth Duberstein

Colin L. Powell

John D. Negroponte

Marlin Fitzwater

*NSC*

Paul Stevens

Barry Kelly

Nicholas Rostow

Mary Henhoeffer

### *Minutes*

[Omitted here are discussions not related to the Soviet Union.]

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<sup>1</sup> [Source: Reagan Library, System II Files, INT #2 Intelligence Files, 8490035–8890278. Top Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*]. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.]

Mr. President, the enhancement of the Soviet/East European program under the Memorandum of Notification of 3 August 1987 came at a most opportune time in history. The additional funding is being used to expand the production and distribution of our propaganda material in the Soviet Bloc where *glasnost* has stirred an unprecedented demand for our books, periodicals, and audio and video material.

We are also giving additional support to groups seeking democratic change, including advanced technology to publish and spread information inside the Bloc. [3 lines not declassified] Here is an underground monthly newspaper ([less than 1 line not declassified] underground newspaper) produced and distributed clandestinely. It is a good example of how modern technology—in this case mini-electronics and computer publishing—is shattering the ability of totalitarian regimes to control the news. (The President commented that the fellow in the [country not declassified] publication looks just like him.)

This simple pamphlet (Russian-language propaganda pamphlet), ostensibly written by the Communist youth organization [1½ lines not declassified], illustrates our ability to participate in the Soviet debate over *glasnost*. Six thousand copies were infiltrated into the Soviet Union, claiming to support Gorbachev's reform program, but demanding democratic reforms well beyond what the regime will tolerate. The pamphlet was openly circulated and triggered a KGB investigation. We recently learned that students called in for questioning by the KGB claimed they supported the pamphlet's message and were involved in circulating it.

Despite the importance of the printed word, Soviet and East European audiences continue to rely on short wave broadcasts from the West for uncensored information. [6 lines not declassified]

I also have a poster (Hungarian poster commemorating the 30th anniversary of the execution of Imre Nagy in 1958) which may not appear significant to us, but to thousands of Hungarians last month, it was a reminder of the 1956 Soviet invasion and the execution two years later of their former Prime Minister, Imre Nagy. [1 line not declassified]. Thousands of copies were displayed in public places and helped draw large crowds to a demonstration in Budapest. This event coincided with a major commemorative ceremony [less than 1 line not declassified]. A distinguished European audience attended the ceremony, which featured the installation of a bronze statue of Nagy secretly cast in Hungary.

[1 paragraph (7½ lines) not declassified]

I am pleased to note that the Soviets appear to have decreased their disinformation activity, and we think this is partly due to our efforts to publicly expose specific Soviet active measures campaigns.

[3 lines not declassified] Soviet defectors are playing a key role by providing us with inside information and by [1 line not declassified].

[Omitted here are discussions not related to the Soviet Union.]

## 167. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 16, 1988

### SUBJECT

Gorbachev Letter on Krasnoyarsk

Soviet Ambassador Dubinin called on me today. He delivered a Gorbachev letter responding to your August 12 message<sup>2</sup> on Krasnoyarsk (an unofficial translation is attached). Gorbachev:

—writes that we should not let “mutual” complaints about ABM Treaty compliance undermine what we have achieved;

—recalls the Soviet offer to dismantle the “equipment” at Krasnoyarsk if we agree to observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972;

—repeats alleged Soviet concerns about U.S. radars at Thule and Fylingdales Moor (although without linking these directly to Krasnoyarsk) and the Soviet request to visit the Thule radar; and

—offers to discuss measures to convert Krasnoyarsk into an international space research center, and invites U.S. scientists to travel there to explore this.

There is no suggestion of any physical changes to the radar facility in the process of its proposed conversion to a “center for international cooperation in peaceful space activities.” I put the question directly to Dubinin; he could not answer.

The Soviets appear to be seeking a fig leaf to resolve the Krasnoyarsk issue. At first glance, this seems little more than a variation of the “joint manning” idea informally floated to General Burns during the ABM Treaty review. If so, our response can only be negative: it neither

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8890725, 8890750). Secret; Sensitive. According to an attached NSC correspondence profile, Reagan noted the memorandum and letter on September 20.

<sup>2</sup> Attached at Tab B but not printed is Reagan’s August 12 letter to Gorbachev calling on the Soviet leader to dismantle the radar at Krasnoyarsk and defending the modernization of the U.S. radars at Thule and Fylingdales as being permitted under the terms of the ABM Treaty.

corrects the violation nor lengthens the lead-time for ABM breakout that the Soviets have gained through construction of Krasnoyarsk to date. In fact, conversion of the radar to a “research center” would presumably entail our agreement to completion and activation of the radar.

Whether Gorbachev’s letter represents the final Soviet word or an opening gambit setting the stage for Shevardnadze to offer something more substantial next week remains to be seen. I intend to press Shevardnadze hard on meeting our concern over Krasnoyarsk, and tell him that this idea does not suffice.

### **Attachment**

#### **Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan<sup>3</sup>**

Moscow, September 13, 1988

Dear Mr. President,

I have read your letter of August 12 very carefully.

I would like, in the frank and constructive spirit that characterizes our dialogue, to share with you my thoughts regarding the question of ABM Treaty compliance raised in your letter.

This question has been repeatedly discussed both by ourselves and by our experts, most recently during the latest consultations to review the ABM Treaty. In the course of the negotiations the sides have stated their concerns regarding compliance with the treaty. Regrettably, thus far the US representatives have failed to provide persuasive answers to the questions we raised, while the Soviet side has clarified in great detail the situation surrounding the radar which was under construction in the Krasnoyarsk area, having reiterated that it is not a missile attack warning radar. In light of our answers the complaints expressed again and again by the US side cause perplexity and suggest that, perhaps, there are some other, more far-reaching calculations behind them.

I think you will agree with me that it would be impardonable if our mutual complaints about the violations of the ABM Treaty were to undermine all that we, thanks to the efforts of both sides, have

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<sup>3</sup> No classification marking. Printed from the official translation prepared in the Division of Language Services, Department of State, which bears Gorbachev’s typed signature.

succeeded in accomplishing to improve US-Soviet relations. With the aim of not allowing this to occur we have, as a gesture of good will, not only discontinued the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, but have also expressed willingness to dismantle its equipment, if our countries reach agreement to observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972. Such a solution would represent a true confirmation of the commitment of the sides to the ABM Treaty, a commitment about which you, Mr. President, have repeatedly spoken and written to me.

At the same time I cannot fail to emphasize that we are increasingly concerned over the situation that has arisen in connection with the construction of US radars in Thule and Fylingdales Moor. In the assessment of our experts, the now operational Thule radar is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. Your specialists deny that. But, as you know, an American proverb says: "Seeing is believing". So we are hoping that you will agree to a visit of this radar by Soviet specialists.

As for the Krasnoyarsk radar, I wish to inform you of our decision which will once and for all put an end to all speculations about its nature, to wit: we are ready to establish on the base of this radar a center for international cooperation in the interest of the peaceful use of outer space. This center could be incorporated into the system of a World Space Organization which we proposed, so as to make it possible for all states to participate in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.

We are prepared to discuss with United States' representatives, as well as with other interested countries, the concrete measures that would make it possible to transform the Krasnoyarsk radar into a Center for International Cooperation in Peaceful Space Activities. I would like, through your intermediary, to invite American scientists to visit the Krasnoyarsk radar in order to discuss the questions connected therewith.

In conclusion, I wish to express my hope that your administration, Mr. President, will be guided in its practical actions by the desire to preserve the ABM Treaty as an important instrument for maintaining strategic stability in conditions where our two countries—I believe the agreement on that is not far away—will be implementing the 50 percent reduction in their strategic offensive arms. In this context, we will expect the US side also to take practical steps which would remove our concern over the US radars in Greenland and Great Britain.

Respectfully,

**M. Gorbachev**

**168. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>**

Moscow, September 20, 1988

Dear Mr. President,

I take advantage of the visit by Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard A. Shevardnadze to Washington in order to continue our private discussion.

In one of our conversations in Moscow it was suggested that we might have a chance to meet once again this year to sign a treaty on drastic reductions in strategic offensive arms in the context of compliance with the ABM Treaty. Regrettably, this goal that both of us share has been set back in time, although I continue to think that it can still be attained, even if beyond this year.

I take some consolation in the awareness that still in effect is our agreement to do the utmost in the remaining months of your presidency to ensure the continuity and consistency of the fundamental course that we have chosen. As I recall, you said you would do your best to preserve the constructive spirit of our dialogue, and I replied that in that respect our intentions were quite identical. And so they are indeed, which is a source of great hope for our two peoples.

Four months have gone by since the summit talks in Moscow—a short period of time given the dynamic and profound developments in international affairs and those that fill the political calendar in the Soviet Union and the United States. Still, a great deal has been accomplished in putting into effect the jointly agreed platform for the further advancement of Soviet-US relations. For the first time in history, nuclear missiles have been destroyed, and unprecedented mutual verification of the just begun process of nuclear disarmament is becoming an established and routine practice. In several regions of the world, a process of political settlement of conflicts and national reconciliation has got under way. The human dimension of our relations, to which we have agreed to give special attention, is becoming richer. Ordinary Soviet people continue to discover America for themselves, marching across it on a peace walk, and right now, as you are reading this letter, another public meeting between Soviet and US citizens is being held in Tbilisi.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Gorbachev (8890725, 8890750). No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation, provided by the Soviet Embassy, which bears Gorbachev's typed signature. Shevardnadze handed the original to Shultz at their September 22 meeting. See Document 170.

Someone might object that in the past, say in the 1930s or 1970s, Soviet-US relations also had their upturns. I would think, however, that the current stage in our interaction is distinguished by several significant features. The four summit meetings over the past three years have laid good groundwork for our dialogue and raised it to a qualitatively new level. And, as we know, from high ground it is easier to see the path we have covered, the problems of the day, and the prospects that emerge.

A unique arrangement for practical interaction has been established, which is supported by fundamental political affirmations and, at the same time, filled with tangible content. This has been facilitated by the principal approach on which we agreed already in Geneva, i.e. realism, a clear awareness of the essence of our differences, and a focus on active search for possible areas where our national interests may coincide. Thus, we gave ourselves a serious intellectual challenge—to view our differences and diversity not as a reason for permanent confrontation but as a motivation for intensive dialogue, mutual appreciation and enrichment.

Overall, we have been able to achieve fairly good results, to start a transition from confrontation to a policy of accommodation. And this is, probably, not just a result of a frank and constructive personal relationship, although, obviously, personal rapport is not the least important thing in politics. Paraphrasing a favourite phrase of yours, I would say that talking to each other people learn more about each other.

And yet, the main thing that made our common new policy a success is, above all, the fact that it reflects a gradually emerging balance of national interests, which we have been able in some measure to implement. We feel, in particular, that it is favorable to the development of new approaches, of new political thinking, first of all in our two countries—but also elsewhere. The experience of even the past few months indicates that an increasing number of third countries are beginning to readjust to our positive interaction, associating with it their interests and policies.

Ironically as it may sound, it is our view that the strength of what we have been able to accomplish owes quite a lot to how hard it was to do.

It is probably not by a mere chance that the jointly devised general course in the development of Soviet-US relations is now enjoying broad-based support in our two countries. So far as we know, both of your possible successors support, among other things, the key objective of concluding a treaty on 50 percent cutbacks in Soviet and US strategic arsenals. In the Soviet leadership, too, there is a consensus on this.

And yet it has not been possible to bring the Geneva negotiations to fruition, a fact about which I feel some unhappiness. It is our impression that we have to tango alone, as if our partner has taken a break.



In another letter to you, I have already addressed the matter which you raised in your letter of August 12 regarding compliance with the ABM Treaty.<sup>2</sup> I think you would agree with me that it would be unforgivable if our mutual complaints of violations of the ABM Treaty resulted in undermining what we have been able to accomplish to rectify Soviet-US relations through the efforts of both sides.

I would like Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to the United States and his talks with you and Secretary Shultz to result in reviving truly joint efforts to achieve deep cuts in strategic offensive arms. Our Minister has the authority to seek rapid progress on the basis of reciprocity in this exceptionally important area.

Today, the process of nuclear disarmament is objectively interrelated with the issues of deep reductions, and the elimination of asymmetries and imbalances, in conventional arms and complete prohibition of chemical weapons. In these areas too, there is a good chance of making headway toward agreements.

I am confident, Mr. President, that you and I can make a further contribution to the emerging process of settlement of regional conflicts, particularly to a consistent and honest compliance with the first accords that have already been concluded there.

In Moscow we also reinforced the foundation for a dynamic development of our bilateral relations and helped to open up new channels for communication between Soviet and American people, including young people and artists. All these good endeavours should be given practical effect, and we stand ready to do so. I am aware of your deep personal interest in questions of human rights. For me too, it is a priority issue. We seem to have agreed that these problems require an in-depth consideration and a clear understanding of the true situation in both the United States and the Soviet Union. Traffic along this two-way street has begun and I hope that it will be intense.

Our relationship is a dynamic stream and you and I are working together to widen it. The stream cannot be slowed down, it can only be blocked or diverted. But that would not be in our interest.

Politics, of course, is the art of the possible but it is only by working and maintaining a dynamic dialogue that we will put into effect what we have made possible, and will make possible tomorrow what is yet impossible today.

Sincerely,

**Mikhail Gorbachev**

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<sup>2</sup> See footnote 2, Document 167.

# 169. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 21, 1988

## SUBJECT

Shevardnadze's Speech to Foreign Ministry

On July 25 Shevardnadze made a remarkable speech to the professional staff at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (others were present as well, including Marshal Akhromeyev).<sup>2</sup> We have just received the English translation of the lengthy speech; attached are some noteworthy excerpts.

Shevardnadze is scathing in his criticism of past Soviet practices and behavior. He recognizes that the Soviet image was undermined by statements such as Khrushchev's "we will bury you," and by "incorrect steps against friends"—a reference to the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia.

His remarks are also illuminating with respect to current Soviet thinking. For example, he asks rhetorically what the Soviet Union thought it was doing as it tried "over the last fifteen years to achieve a 'chemical rampart'." He admits that the Soviet build-up of chemical weapons "cost colossal amounts of money." In a comment revealing of the man, Shevardnadze asks "what impressions have we established of ourselves and our intentions in continuing to stockpile weapons which can only be described as the most barbarian?"

These are only a few examples of the stunning admissions and cases of "new thinking" in Shevardnadze's speech. You might find it interesting to look through the excerpts prior to your meeting with him on Friday.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, 1988 Sept. 21 Mtg w/ President. Confidential. Drafted by Wolff; cleared by Pifer and Evans. The memorandum is an unsigned copy. There is no indication Reagan saw the memorandum, although he wrote in his diary the day he met with Shultz about Shevardnadze's upcoming visit. (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, Vol. II, Number 1985–1989, p. 949) According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan and Shultz met in the Oval Office from 1:30 to 2 p.m. (President's Daily Diary, September 21, 1988)

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed are excerpts from Shevardnadze's July 25 speech.

<sup>3</sup> September 23; see Document 177.

**170. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 22, 1988, 10–10:35 a.m.

**SUBJECT***The Secretary's Meeting with Shevardnadze*—Initial Organizational Meeting**PARTICIPANTS**

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>USSR</i>
George P. Shultz, Secretary of State	Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Colin Powell, National Security Advisor to the President	Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)	Viktor P. Karpov, Directorate Head, Soviet MFA
Jack Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR	Yuriy V. Dubinin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
Alexander R. Vershbow, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs (notetaker)	Sergey Tarasenko, Special Assistant to Shevardnadze (notetaker)
Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)	Pavel Palazhchenko, MFA (interpreter)

*Shevardnadze*, putting on his headset, noted that in order to disarm one needed first to arm oneself.

*The Secretary* said that following usual practice we would propose to discuss the organization of our work and resolve any other lingering problems, after which we would proceed upstairs for a photo of the delegations and a brief plenary session.

*Shevardnadze* agreed but first said he wanted to say warmly hello and extend the best wishes of Gorbachev and Gromyko to the Secretary.

*The Secretary* said he appreciated that; he always looked forward to his meetings with Shevardnadze. The President as well was looking forward to seeing the Foreign Minister, as was the Vice President. The Secretary noted that he had spoken with the Vice President, since it didn't seem to him that the arrangements for their meeting were quite right. As a result of their conversation the Vice President proposed that the Minister join him for breakfast at 8:00 on Friday.<sup>2</sup> He was looking forward to a candid personal discussion. Given this approach, the Vice President thought the right composition would be just himself,

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Ministerial Memcons. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Ridgway. The meeting took place in Shultz's office at the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> September 23. Shevardnadze met with Bush and Shultz from 8–9 a.m. on September 23 in the Vice President's Residence. The memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1989–1992, vol. XXXI, START, 1989–1991.

the Secretary and Shevardnadze, but if the Soviets wished to bring along an additional person there would be no objection. The Vice President wanted this to be an informal wide-ranging conversation about the future, and he wanted Shevardnadze to hear his thoughts. Two interpreters would also come along and take the notes.

*Shevardnadze* said he agreed it was clear that the Vice President himself should decide on who should attend and he would think about that question as well.

*The Secretary* said we proposed to take the usual approach, with working groups to get into motion right away. For our side Ambassador Nitze would chair the Arms Control Group; this group could subdivide into groups on nuclear and space issues, nuclear testing, chemical weapons, and conventional arms. Mr. Schifter would be chair human rights working group, Mr. Solomon the group on regional issues, and Mr. Silins the group on bilateral affairs.

*Shevardnadze* said he agreed we had developed a good pattern of working together and agreed there should be working groups. He had the same list of subjects, although there were other names of course. On arms control and disarmament the Soviet delegation would be led by Ambassador Karpov with sub-groups set up on strategic offensive arms and ABM, nuclear testing and non-proliferation, chemical weapons, and conventional arms. The regional group would be led by member of the MFA Collegium Vladimir Polyakov; the group on humanitarian questions would be led by Mr. Glukhov, an expert well known to the U.S.; on bilateral problems Mr. Sredin would lead the Soviet side and he would expect active participation by the two Ambassadors as well.

*Shevardnadze* added that he thought the Secretary and he would also have a lot of work to do. He thought there was basic understanding that the sides should aim to conclude the meeting with an agreed document called a joint statement or something else. They should instruct the working groups to prepare language that could be included in such a statement. He noted that the Soviets had presented a draft and Ambassador Ridgway had provided an unofficial U.S. proposal as well. He noted that, of course, the section on NST issues was not yet filled and it would take some work to do so. But the aim should be to provide the Ministers a text without brackets despite the experts' automatic desire to put things in brackets whether the Ministers wanted this or not.

*The Secretary* commented that this was a new disease: "bracketitis." *Shevardnadze* responded that he would remember that term.

*The Secretary* said he agreed that it would be a good idea to end the meeting with a statement. We had two drafts as a starting point

and we had found that we have people who can handle this question well. We should feed raw material to them as the meetings develop.

*The Secretary* then suggested a possible sequence of subjects beginning with human rights and the Vienna CSCE meeting, then turning to arms control questions including Krasnonyarsk. After the lunch they could continue with regional and bilateral issues, so that by the time the first day's afternoon session was over all areas would have been touched upon. On Friday morning they could go back and revisit these subjects, perhaps bringing in working group representatives as necessary. The afternoon just before the President's meeting they would have a final session to hear the reports of the working groups and wrap up the joint statement.

*Shevardnadze* said he agreed to the agenda and sequence of discussion proposed by the Secretary. He said he understood that the Secretary hoped that the discussions could be completed in two days.

*The Secretary* replied that we should certainly aspire to do this. It would be good if the President's meeting could be an occasion to report our results, after which we could make our public statements. Nonetheless, it was obvious that if important things remained to be done he would be available on Saturday.<sup>3</sup> However, he understood that *Shevardnadze* would be in New York for some time and there was always a possibility to meet whenever something useful could be done. He noted that the two Ministers would see one another at the Secretary General's luncheon the following Friday in New York. Again, he thought that they should try to finish the meeting by the afternoon of September 23.

*Shevardnadze* said he agreed, adding that a great deal would depend on how well the working groups proceeded and what material they provided to the Ministers. The Soviets were ready to work on Saturday morning as well but that was just an option and he agreed it was desirable to finish on Friday. *Shevardnadze* said he had a letter from Gorbachev to the President. He would be giving the original to the President but wanted to give an advance look to Secretary Shultz. He then handed over copies of the Russian original and an English translation.<sup>4</sup>

*Secretary Shultz* said that he wanted to make one additional point. He had recently obtained a full translation of *Shevardnadze's* speech to the MFA conference in July and had read it in full.<sup>5</sup> *Shevardnadze* quipped that this would qualify his hard labor. *The Secretary* responded

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<sup>3</sup> September 24.

<sup>4</sup> See Document 168.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 169.

that this was not in fact the case. He had been very much impressed by the speech, finding it far-reaching and thoughtful. He thought he had benefited from reading it. At some point he would like to hear more about the speech—to hear Shevardnadze develop some of the thoughts he had put forward, as these had been presented in a broad plane, whereas our ministerial meetings tended to focus on individual issues.

*Shevardnadze* said he had said nothing that was absolutely new in that speech. It was a consolidated reflection of what Soviet leaders had been saying at party conferences, in speeches by Gorbachev, etc. His speech had been an attempt to synthesize the main guidelines and priorities of Soviet foreign policy in the context of the new political thinking.

*The Secretary* responded that in the spirit of consolidation and reflection, he had discussed with Ambassador Dubinin the possibility of giving prepared toasts at the luncheon that day, and he had written one which had quoted from Shevardnadze's speech. He then spelled out the three citations from Shevardnadze's address (full text of toast attached),<sup>6</sup> adding that he would not quote the Minister if he objected.

*Shevardnadze* replied with gratitude and expressed no objection. He noted that Secretary Shultz's article had recently been published in the Soviet academic magazine *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, and that it had been read by Soviet leaders—including by Gorbachev—as well as by political scientists. It was important that the President had also agreed to write an article for publication in the Soviet Union. This form of cooperation showed the level that we had reached—one that would have been impossible to have imagined 10 years ago when we tried to limit the flow of information rather than promote it.

*The Secretary* agreed that it was quite extraordinary. Shevardnadze had referred to developments in the last three years. His own thinking was that in just two or three years we saw many of the major problems shifting. He noted that Ambassador Dubinin had been present at his Middle East speech and this typified how we were now addressing regional questions.<sup>7</sup>

*The Secretary* then raised one final procedural question, the dinner at Blair House that evening. He explained that he wanted Shevardnadze to see the newly-reopened Blair House since, the next time the General Secretary visits, we would hope that he would stay there as Brezhnev did in the 1970s. Thus he planned to give Shevardnadze a tour of the

<sup>6</sup> Attached but not printed.

<sup>7</sup> Reference is to Shultz's address before the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on September 16. (Department of State *Bulletin*, November 1988, pp. 10–12)

house before sitting down to dinner. He noted that he had taken care that, in the renovation, a nice suite was set up for the Foreign Minister. The Secretary then ran through the guest list, noting that if the Soviet side wished to bring two more people, they would be welcome. We were not sure whom to invite beyond the Minister and Mrs. Shevardnadze, Bessmertnykh, Ambassador and Mrs. Dubinin, and Ambassador Karpov, since we did not like to delve into Soviet internal affairs.

*Shevardnadze* said the only problem he could see was that some of his people had wives back home. But he thanked the Secretary for the gesture and promised to respond later.

The Ministers and their colleagues then proceeded to the Monroe Room for the opening plenary session.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> See Document 171.

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## 171. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 22, 1988, 10:40–10:50 a.m.

### SUBJECT

The Secretary's Meeting with Shevardnadze: Organizational Plenary Session

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *U.S.*

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State  
Colin Powell, National Security Advisor to the President  
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)  
Jack Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR  
plus heads and members of working groups  
Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)

#### *USSR*

Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister  
Viktor P. Karpov, Directorate Head, Soviet MFA  
Yuriy V. Dubinin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.  
plus heads and members of working groups  
Pavel Palazhchenko, MFA (interpreter)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Ministerial Memcons, Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pifer; cleared by Vershbow. The meeting took place in the Monroe Room at the Department of State.



After a photo opportunity in the Franklin room with full delegations, *the Secretary* said the sides had an established work pattern that was productive and familiar. The ministers had had their organizational meeting and planned that working groups would proceed as in the past. On the U.S. side, the arms control working group—which could subdivide itself—would be headed by Ambassador Nitze, the human rights group by Ambassador Schifter, the regional group by Mr. Solomon, and the bilateral group by Mr. Silins.

*The Secretary* continued that the ministers expected productive work. The groups should bring suggestions they had to the ministers' attention; working group heads might be asked to take part in the ministers' meetings.

*The Secretary* commented that the ministers expected a hard-working, business-like meeting that would accomplish as much as possible. He recalled that, when Shevardnadze had suggested two years before that all working groups gather to present their reports to ministers, people on the U.S. side found what was happening astonishing. The desire was to continue to produce the astonishing, so that it became the norm.

*Shevardnadze* said it would be hard to add to the Secretary's comments. The sides had a unique arrangement using the best minds of both; if there was progress, it was a result of that arrangement. He and the Secretary had decided there should be a full-scale discussion.

*Shevardnadze* observed that this would probably be the last time that all the people present would be gathered in this setting, at least the last time this year. He hoped the meeting would conclude with substantive results; there were no differences between him and the Secretary on this.

*Shevardnadze* said Ambassador Karpov would head the Soviet arms control working group, which would in turn would have subgroups on START, the ABM Treaty, nuclear testing and nuclear nonproliferation, chemical weapons and conventional arms. Mr. Polyakov would head the regional group, Mr. Glukhov the human rights group, and Mr. Sredin the bilateral group, in which Ambassadors Matlock and Dubinin would make a contribution. *Shevardnadze* closed by asking the sides to work on a good final statement.

*The Secretary* instructed the groups to begin work, and the plenary concluded at 10:50 a.m.

**172. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 22, 1988, 10:55 a.m.–noon

**SUBJECT**

*The Secretary's Meeting with Shevardnadze*—First Small Group Meeting: Human Rights, CSCE, Conventional Arms Control

**PARTICIPANTS**

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>USSR</i>
George P. Shultz, Secretary of State	Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Colin Powell, National Security Advisor to the President	Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)	Viktor P. Karpov, Directorate Head, Soviet MFA
Jack Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.	Sergey Tarasenko, MFA
Alexander R. Vershbow, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs (notetaker)	Yuriy V. Dubinin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)	Sergey Mamedov, USA & Canada Department, MFA (notetaker)
	Pavel Palazhchenko, MFA (interpreter)

*The Secretary* said that the ministers had about an hour to open their discussions, after which they would proceed to a lunch to which he had invited several congressional leaders. He invited Shevardnadze as guest to lead off the discussion.

**HUMAN RIGHTS/VIENNA MEETING**

*Shevardnadze* said that, as had been decided, he would begin by discussing humanitarian issues and human rights. The sides had been able to say many times that in the recent period our discussions have become more constructive and have led to some mutual understanding. The results in the human rights area had been reasonably good. These discussions were not only between the Foreign Ministry and the State Department. We were also applying the potential of public opinion, of researchers and the academic community, and discussions in these channels were most welcome.

*Shevardnadze* said that in this area he wanted to note Secretary Shultz's personal contribution in making a constructive process possible. He noted that U.S. and Soviet legal experts had recently met in

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Ministerial Memcons. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Ridgway. The meeting took place in Shultz's office at the Department of State.

Washington and were continuing their discussions. Physicians were also taking part in this dialogue. In this regard Shevardnadze wanted to note that the U.S. did the right thing when it allowed Soviet medical experts to visit Mr. Peltier.<sup>2</sup> This initially had been the subject of much discussion and press commentary but now the visit was an accomplished fact. In the near future a group of U.S. physicians would be visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Ministry of Health and would receive full information on all problems, including that of psychiatric care. Again, this was a useful step.

*Shevardnadze* said that the sides were gradually beginning to implement Gorbachev's proposal for a seminar of representatives of public opinion to discuss and assess the state of affairs in our two countries. Another useful development was the fact that the Supreme Soviet and the U.S. Congress would be holding a meeting in November and the Soviets were ready for a good discussion there as well. For its part, the Soviet side had established a public commission for cooperation on humanitarian and human rights affairs and this was becoming very active. This organization included authoritative and expert people on these problems. It was looking very seriously and responsibly at all the personal cases that had been raised by the Secretary, the President, U.S. Congressional leaders and the U.S. public. As his colleagues would confirm, Shevardnadze was paying personal attention to this organization to declare it was proceeding in a responsible way. On the one hand this was because the U.S. was raising specific cases; on the other hand it was because these cases affected individuals' lives, a question to which the Soviet leadership could not be indifferent.

*Shevardnadze* said he wanted to provide some information about the lists the Secretary and the President had recently presented. He did not know whether the Secretary was interested in the numbers. *The Secretary* replied that he was indeed interested.

*Shevardnadze* then proceeded to recount the following: The President had presented a list of 17 names. There had been a positive resolution of 11: six were those who were called refuseniks; three were prisoners who had been pardoned and would not serve any further time; as for one individual, the time of his imprisonment had been reduced by one-half, and in the case of another individual a decision had been made to release him from a psychiatric hospital since he had been judged not dangerous to the community. Two other cases regarding the ending of exile were now being considered. Three further cases were not yet resolved; there was still a problem of knowledge

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<sup>2</sup> Reference is to Leonard Peltier. See "Soviet Doctors Examine Inmate at U.S. Prison," *New York Times*, June 25, 1987, p. A-25.

of state secrets. Another individual had not made any official request to leave the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze said the specific names in this context would be given in the Working Group.

*Shevardnadze* said he had wanted to add one clarification regarding people whom the U.S. had mentioned in its lists of political prisoners. Some of these had been convicted for criminal offenses and the Soviets could not agree with qualifying them as political prisoners. He wanted to note that as a fundamental matter the Soviets could not agree that they were suffering for their political or religious beliefs.

*Shevardnadze* noted that sometimes the U.S. cited figures in the hundreds or even thousands of people who were imprisoned for political or religious offenses. On September 2, the U.S. Embassy had presented a list of 295 names described as political prisoners. This list had been checked by the competent authorities and the review had shown that the U.S. list was a distortion of the situation. For example, with respect to Article 70 on anti-Soviet agitation (a conviction which in the U.S. is considered to be a political crime), there were at present only three people imprisoned under this article and nine further in internal exile. With respect to Article 190, dissemination of false information insulting to the Soviet system, there were only three people in prison.

*Shevardnadze* said the numbers of those imprisoned for religious beliefs (Article 227) were very few; under the article separating the State and the Church (Article 142) there was no one presently serving time.

As for the special psychiatric hospitals—all of which had now been transferred to the authority of Ministry of Health—*Shevardnadze* said only 29 persons were currently committed. These had been checked by experts and deemed to be genuinely ill. *Shevardnadze* added that these figures had been checked and double-checked.

*Shevardnadze* said he wanted to inform the Secretary that work on reviewing all these cases was continuing. Before the end of the year there would be no one in prison under any of the articles viewed as political crimes by the West. He wanted to repeat this “with due responsibility”: there would be no people incarcerated for political offenses. With respect to compulsory psychiatric care, he added, the situation was more complex, since the people were in fact ill.

Regarding family reunification cases—divided families, divided spouses—*Shevardnadze* presented the following survey: of the total of 65 cases, 17 had been allowed to leave, seven further cases were still being reviewed, three individuals had decided not to leave even though they had received authorization, and 18 had not applied officially. Of the remaining cases, 18 continued to be denied visas for reasons of state secrets and this included 10 cases for which the refusal had been confirmed at the highest level by the Commission of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. In addition, one individual had died.

*Shevardnadze* reiterated that the Soviets were working to improve their legislative procedures and laws. They were continuing to review the period of secrecy limitations and they were doing everything possible to take into account the discussions in Vienna. They believed that in these matters it would be possible to find a reasonable solution.

*Shevardnadze* said he had one additional concern to raise: namely, that people leaving the Soviet Union to reside in the U.S. were regarded as political refugees. This should be inadmissible. At one time the U.S. had explained that this had been done to facilitate the provision of financial support; but it had turned out that the U.S. side was having difficulties in receiving some Soviet citizens. The important thing, *Shevardnadze* said, was that the Soviets couldn't fundamentally agree that these people were political refugees. If this policy continued it would become an obstacle to continuing the process.

*Shevardnadze* said the Secretary had raised the question of Vienna issues and he wanted to say a few words in this regard. He understood that the priority issue was resolving outstanding problems. To finish the Vienna meeting additional steps should be taken very soon. The Soviet Union was doing things in this respect, and there would soon be new proposals put on the table in the interest of finding a mutually acceptable solution. These included:

1) With respect to contacts among people, the Soviet side was ready to reach an agreement on the basis of the international bill of human rights. The Soviets did not believe new institutions should be invented; rather we should use established international documents;

2) On cases where there is an urgent need to leave one's country and on which the U.S. insists on 3-day notice, the Soviets believed this matter could be resolved; in fact it was being heatedly debated;

3) With respect to freedom of religion, the Soviets could agree to joint approaches on, for example, religious education, dissemination of religious publications and materials, development of contacts between believers, and the purchase of religious material and cult objects.

These were questions that were now being debated in Vienna, *Shevardnadze* added. As for exchange of information, he understood that the 35 participants in Vienna were close to agreement. It was important that all the parties show a desire to find a solution. In sum, the Soviet delegation had the authority to make compromise proposals on all these principal issues. Other than these questions, there was nothing very complex outstanding in Vienna.

*Shevardnadze* said the Ministers had earlier discussed follow-on conferences on human rights, including the possibility of holding such a conference in Moscow. The following suggestions were now taking shape in Vienna: a conference on humanitarian problems in Paris to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution; as a second stage a conference in Copenhagen; and as a third stage a confer-

ence in Moscow around 1991. This approach seemed acceptable to most Western countries. If the U.S. did not support it the Soviets could abstain from supporting conferences in Paris and Copenhagen, although he did not think this was the right way to proceed.

*Shevardnadze* reiterated that the Soviet Union would like to host a human rights conference taking into account all the requirements of the Helsinki Final Act. This was a sincere proposal, he stressed. The Soviets did not have to make the proposal, but had done so because they wanted to show the world what was happening inside the Soviet Union. The Soviets would appreciate it if the U.S. delegation were to change its attitude on this question. He knew that many West European states took a positive view.

Next, *Shevardnadze* continued, he wanted to raise a few questions which had previously been raised with the U.S. side and which the Soviets believed might have been resolved:

1) Nazi war criminals: The Soviets would continue to raise this question. It was an important concern for the Soviet people and not a capricious matter. He urged the Secretary to appreciate the urgency of the issue. Some things had already been done with respect to prosecuting Nazi war criminals—two people had been deported by the U.S.—but the process should continue.

2) The Brazinskis family.<sup>3</sup> This was an old question, but *Shevardnadze* said he had to raise it again and again in the hope that it would be resolved positively.

*Shevardnadze* noted that in our bilateral contacts in the humanitarian field, the Soviet intention was to facilitate a constructive discussion and foster all opportunities for cooperation. For this an international legal basis was needed. This was necessary because in the U.S. Constitution such rights as the right to education, housing and medical care were not mentioned. All of these things, however, were being discussed intensively in the world by government officials and intellectuals.

*Shevardnadze* noted that out of 22 international documents on human rights the U.S. had ratified only six. He emphasized that the Soviet Union believed that these instruments should be the foundation for structuring our relations in this area. The instruments that had not been ratified by the U.S. included basic international covenants on human rights. There might be reasons cited for not ratifying, but he looked forward to the U.S. doing so nonetheless. This, he reiterated, was a necessary basis for progress. *Shevardnadze* noted that the U.S. had not ratified the covenant on economic, social and cultural rights or, more surprisingly, that on civil and political rights. He was raising

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 9, Document 66.

these now because Soviet law-makers would be raising them in other fora in addition to personal human rights cases.

*Shevardnadze* said he had one further concrete question to raise: that of the Soviet scientist Aleksandrov, who had disappeared several years ago in Spain. Based on trustworthy information, the Soviets believed he was residing in the U.S. If so, it should not be a problem to inform the Soviet side of this. If Aleksandrov wanted to remain in the U.S. that was his decision. His wife, concerned about his whereabouts, had written to the President but had received no answer.

*The Secretary* thanked Shevardnadze for his comments, which were quite helpful. He thought that this two-way dialogue was a good one. He noted Shevardnadze's statements on this occasion and previously that what was happening inside the Soviet Union was the result of their own review of practices in the context of Soviet interests. Some of these changes might intersect with U.S. concerns and this was the reason for conducting a dialogue. As he had said before, the Secretary sensed that the Soviets were doing things they regarded to be in their own interest and not in response to U.S. concerns. This was fine, indeed it was preferable because the changes would have more staying-power on this basis.

*The Secretary* noted that we had established a more systematic and broadened dialogue on human rights and they would be hearing from the working group on some of the specific cases. The U.S. had seen a great deal of progress and had not hesitated to say so, expressing the view that what was taking place was positive, but that more needed to be done on an urgent basis.

*The Secretary* said that the first of the categories on which we focused included release of political and religious prisoners. He noted Shevardnadze's statement that some of the individuals on the U.S. list had been convicted of some other kinds of crimes and that these needed to be considered in a different context. The U.S. wanted to take up each case one by one. We believed that in many instances the so-called crime was something that did not in fact represent a crime, or else it was questionable that any crime had taken place at all. We asked the Soviets to review all of these cases in this light. Although there might be names on our list that should not be there, we believed that the "true list" was longer than the list the Soviet side had acknowledged to be relevant to the political prisoner criterion.

*Shevardnadze* intervened to say that he was ready to talk to Ambassador Matlock if given the details of these cases. *The Secretary* said that we had plenty of details to provide. But certainly the people that were on the Soviet-acknowledged list should all be released promptly.

*The Secretary* said that a second category on which we sought progress was cases involving family reunification. We saw no reason



for denying visas for any of these and would like to see the situation cleared up. The President liked to talk in terms of a “zero option” as he had done with the INF issue. We should get all of these cases out of the way so that they no longer plagued us. He mentioned in particular the family members of Abe Stolar and the case of Kosharovskiy.

*Shevardnadze* said he believed Kosharovskiy had been resolved. He then consulted a list and admitted this was not correct. A secrecy problem still persisted but the case was being studied again. *The Secretary* commented that Kosharovskiy’s access to secrets went back 17 years, and there wasn’t much of value in the first place as far as we could see. The Secretary said that there was also a special situation with Mrs. Gordievskaya. While this was a special case, he wanted to point out that we have been willing to facilitate visits to the USSR by Mrs. Souther and Mrs. Howard. This was a humanitarian precedent that he hoped the Soviets would keep in mind with respect to the Gordievskaya case.

A third category about which we did a lot of thinking, *the Secretary* continued, was emigration. The recent figures for Jewish emigration were very encouraging. The rate had reached a healthy level and we hoped it would continue. In this context he wanted to make a comment about the principle of freedom of choice. In the past, the Secretary noted, *Shevardnadze* had stated his adherence to this principle. We had had lots of discussions with our friends in Israel on this subject. We believed that the best way to get at the problem was to do everything possible so that Jews who wished to emigrate from the Soviet Union could choose whether they go to Israel or the U.S. (or another country) while they were still in the Soviet Union. In practice this meant that they should not have to show that they had a first-degree relative in the U.S., but rather should be treated in the same way as those with such close relatives—i.e. on the same basis as applicants to Israel. If the choice could be exercised in Moscow rather than in Vienna, it would be a much healthier situation. The Secretary added that we had differences of view with the Israelis, who wanted to put heavy constraints on the choices of Soviet emigrants and insist that they go to Israel. He and *Shevardnadze*, however, had agreed in the past on the principle of freedom of choice, so we ought to look at how we could arrange things so that Soviet Jews could come directly to the U.S.

*The Secretary* said that he had already remarked that the secrecy prohibition was often applied arbitrarily. He took note of *Shevardnadze*’s comments about reviewing some of these cases. There was also a problem when parents were allowed to introduce unwarranted obstacles to the departure of their children from the Soviet Union. Another issue where we looked for further progress was jamming; in this area, however, as in the case of emigration, we recognized there were positive changes to which we already could point.

*The Secretary* said Shevardnadze had mentioned that the Soviets were working on changing their criminal code. The U.S., he said, would regard changes or the elimination of certain articles as an important step toward institutionalizing the changes underway in the Soviet Union. Changing these articles would assure of the staying power of the changes. We focused especially on Articles 70 and 190 (which involved political crimes) and Articles 142 and 227 (which covered religious offenses). We also would like to see movement, the Secretary said, on permitting the teaching of religion and the distribution of religious materials. The promotion of Jewish culture and religious life in the Soviet Union was particularly important to the American Jewish community.

As for the Vienna CSCE meeting, *the Secretary* said that we would very much like to see a successful conclusion. We were ready to stay as long as it took to this end. We believed that the neutral/non-aligned (NNA) document on human rights needed strengthening, especially with respect to human rights monitors and the right to form organizations. There also should be provisions in the document limiting the use of access to secrets as an obstacle to emigration. Finally, the Secretary noted, we both had a Romanian problem and needed to see how this could be overcome. On the security side of Vienna there were a number of problems. We could not accept the NNA desire to be part of the conventional stability talks but must insist on autonomy.

As for the Moscow human rights conference proposal, *the Secretary* continued, Shevardnadze knew we had neither said yes nor no, but had spelled out the things that would influence our opinion on the proposal. The Soviet side had responded on some of these indicators and we would keep our minds open. He expected to meet next week in New York with Western colleagues, some of whom Shevardnadze would meet with as well, and he was sure that they would continue to discuss this question. The criteria the U.S. had laid out were the things that were important and essential from our standpoint. If these conditions were met, and guarantees provided regarding the access and openness for the conference, we would be prepared to consider the question. The Secretary added that he understood Shevardnadze's viewpoint, and we acknowledged there had been positive steps which would not be overlooked. In sum, the issue of a Moscow conference was under active consideration but the key question was Soviet practices and behavior. The Secretary thought that the two of them might return to the subject later during their talks.

With respect to Nazi war criminals, *the Secretary* said that the U.S. and USSR were of one mind. We were prepared to work within the limits of our own procedures and would continue to do so. Regarding ratification of international legal documents, the Secretary said that

some of these do present problems but he would take Shevardnadze's comments on board.

With respect to the Brazinskas case, the Secretary said that the two of them had discussed this before and he had nothing new to offer. He was glad to hear Shevardnadze raise the issue again, but would not repeat the problems that we have with this case. Regarding Aleksandrov, he was personally not familiar with the matter. *Ambassador Matlock* said that we had checked with all U.S. agencies and none of them had any idea on the whereabouts of Mr. Aleksandrov. *The Secretary* said that we would nonetheless be glad to check again and would try to respond to the letter to the President from Aleksandrov's mother. We obviously understood the family concerns when someone disappears. *Shevardnadze* quipped that there was one agency that might know but they wouldn't tell the Soviet side. *The Secretary* asked which organization Shevardnadze had in mind. *Shevardnadze* replied: "Guess." *Ambassador Matlock* repeated that we had checked with *all* agencies.

*The Secretary* said that he welcomed Shevardnadze's comment about the physicians who had been able to examine Mr. Peltier and the future visit by U.S. psychiatrists. He noted there was one organization, Physicians for Human Rights, which would like to visit Soviet prisons and he drew Shevardnadze's attention to this proposal.

Regarding the Vienna meeting as a whole, *the Secretary* recalled that two years ago the Stockholm discussions were at a stage similar to that where the Vienna talks currently stood. At that time he and Shevardnadze had discussed the contentious issues and had "punched up" their delegations; this had been quite helpful. He was prepared to do this again so that the U.S. could send new instructions to Warren Zimmermann with a view to bringing the meeting to an end.

*Ambassador Ridgway* said we had a checklist of things we would like to see agreed in Vienna. We were prepared to instruct Ambassador Zimmermann and Ambassador Ledogar to work closely with Ambassador Kashlev to take up the various unresolved issues. Many of these were very complicated and could not be settled here. *The Secretary* said that the U.S. would nudge Ambassador Zimmermann and hoped the Soviets would do the same with Ambassador Kashlev.

*Bessmertnykh* intervened to say he wanted to make one correction to a point the Secretary had raised. The Soviets, he said, had in fact replied through Ambassador Schifter to the proposal of the Physicians for Human Rights. The situation had been fully described and all the people that this group wanted to visit were now free. *The Secretary* said he would check with Ambassador Schifter.

*Shevardnadze* said he agreed the Ministers needed to instruct their delegations to cooperate more actively. If it were possible to conclude Vienna successfully, many questions of concern to the U.S. would be

resolved. He cited in particular the time limits on secrecy prohibitions; there was some difference between the Eastern and Western positions but this could be resolved. Jamming, Shevardnadze continued, was also under discussion and he thought the NNA proposal on this was a good one. He had already covered religious issues and noted again that solutions were possible. As for the Romanians, this was not a simple matter. The Soviets were working with their Romanian friends, but the Romanians had their own proposals. Some of these, he said, were not so complicated—for example, on social rights. Perhaps the West could borrow some of the Romanian suggestions that were not especially out of line.

*The Secretary* replied that we could look at the Romanian proposals, but in general their attitude was difficult for everyone else, including Soviet allies, to accept. Romania was a peculiar country. *Shevardnadze* repeated that he thought that this was an obstacle that could be cleared if the U.S. gave the Romanians support on some questions.

#### CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

*Shevardnadze* then began the discussion of conventional arms control. He said there were two questions regarding Europe that he wanted to call to the Secretary's attention. The first concerned Gorbachev's proposal in Warsaw for a European Summit on disarmament questions. It would be preferable if the conditions were right to hold such a meeting after the negotiations began. Such negotiations would include all European states plus the United States and Canada. A summit of this kind, the Soviets believed, would give a push to the resolution of issues that needed political impetus.

The second issue *Shevardnadze* wanted to raise concerned the establishment of a Center for the Reduction of War in Europe. Our two countries had achieved much bilaterally with the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers: many had had their doubts at the beginning, but the NRRCs were now working efficiently. The Soviets did not need an answer now to the idea of an European Risk Reduction Center, but hoped the Secretary would instruct his experts to work on this question. Some European governments supported the idea, others were undecided, and a few were a bit negative on the idea.

The important thing in Vienna, *Shevardnadze* continued, was to make progress toward agreement on the mandate. He wanted to address this a bit and perhaps continue it after the lunch. It seemed that the two sides' positions were closer and a great deal of work had been done in resolving disagreements on the objectives of the negotiations and other components. One major question remained, however, as to the subject matter of the talks. The latest language that the sides were working on largely reflected both sides' interest but had

one major obstacle: fighter aircraft. The Soviet side disagreed with the inclusion of fighter aircraft. Taking into account the fact that carrier-based aircraft and other systems were outside the framework of negotiations, and given the fact that on the Western side as well as on the Eastern side fighter aircraft had defensive functions, the Soviet side asked its partners to remove this kind of aircraft from the subject matter of the talks. Perhaps the sides' experts could sit down together for more detailed discussion of this issue. But he wanted to stress that it was desirable to find common ground. This was a matter of concern to Soviet allies as well.

*Shevardnadze* said that if agreement could be reached on excluding fighter aircraft, we could expect the Vienna meeting to finish before the U.S. election. This would enable us to conclude in late October or very early November with a very impressive final document and then conclude the Vienna meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers. If we finished the Vienna meeting successfully, *Shevardnadze* added, it would be the most significant political event since Helsinki. In addition, this would also make it possible for the two Ministers to meet again in Vienna for what would be their "jubilee" meeting (number 30, by Soviet count).

*The Secretary* replied that we too would like to see the Vienna meeting wound up, but only if it were wound up in a good way. The fighter aircraft issue had been put on the table very suddenly and it puzzled us. If there were anything useful to the offense, the Secretary thought it was control of the air; this gave an essential role to fighter aircraft. The Secretary noted that the Soviets had raised the problem of dual-capable weapons and we had gone back and forth on this issue. We now had language which to a certain extent met Soviet concerns. We had proposed this reluctantly but nonetheless had done so in the interest of reaching agreement. Then along came the fighter aircraft issue. As we understood it, the Soviets had 8000 aircraft in this category, aircraft which were very useful in offensive operations but which would be taken off the table. This was not something we could go along with. The Secretary reiterated that we could discuss language on dual-capable systems and we could have a working group discussion here in Washington. We and our allies would be in New York and could discuss the issue further there, but the Soviets would find that U.S. views and those of our allies on the fighter aircraft question were the same.

*The Secretary* said there were two other issues by our reckoning which needed to be resolved. One was the area of application, which largely concerned whether the territory of Turkey along the border with Syria, Iraq and Iran should be covered. We believed that given Turkey's strategic concerns some of this territory should be excluded.

Another outstanding problem was that of autonomy, *the Secretary* continued. The U.S. felt that a way must be found to construct the talks so that the NNA countries did not end up as part of the process. We had no problem reporting to them, but did not believe they should participate. So these were the three problems that we saw still outstanding: fighter aircraft, zone of application, and autonomy. If these could be resolved—as well as finding solutions to outstanding human rights problems—we could have an agreement to conclude the Vienna meeting on a positive note.

*Shevardnadze* said the Secretary had mentioned 8000 Soviet fighter aircraft but had not mentioned thousands of U.S. carrier aircraft. *The Secretary* rejoined that carrier aircraft were not involved in this negotiation. *Shevardnadze* in turn said the Soviets continued to believe they should be included. On dual-capable systems we seemed to have a good substantial solution. In any case, he said, we should allow the working group to discuss these issues further. If the sides could agree on the subject matter of the talks, then the area question could be resolved. The Soviets were aware of Turkey's position and believed an agreement could be reached, but the key question for the Soviet side was the subject matter.

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### 173. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 22, 1988, 3:30–6:30 p.m.

#### SUBJECT

*The Secretary's Meeting with Shevardnadze—Second Small Group Meeting: Arms Control Issues*

#### PARTICIPANTS

##### U.S.

George P. Shultz, Secretary of  
State  
Colin Powell, National Security  
Advisor to the President

##### USSR

Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister  
of Foreign Affairs  
Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy  
Foreign Minister

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Ministerial Memcons. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow and Evans; cleared by Ridgway. Vershbow initialed for both Evans and Ridgway. The meeting took place in Shultz's office at the Department of State.

Paul H. Nitze, Special Advisor on  
Arms Control Matters  
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant  
Secretary of State (EUR)  
Jack Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to  
the USSR  
Alexander R. Vershbow, Director,  
Office of Soviet Union Affairs  
(notetaker)  
John M. Evans, Deputy Director,  
Office of Soviet Union Affairs  
(notetaker)  
Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)

Viktor P. Karpov, Directorate Head,  
Soviet MFA  
Sergey Tarasenko, MFA  
Yuriy V. Dubinin, Soviet  
Ambassador to the U.S.  
Yevgeniy Gusarov, MFA (notetaker)  
Pavel Palazhchenko, USA & Canada  
Department, Soviet MFA  
(interpreter)

## DEFENSE AND SPACE/ABM TREATY

*The Secretary* suggested that they begin with strategic arms and invited Shevardnadze to open the discussion. *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* said there was reason for some satisfaction about the results achieved to date. We not only had completed the INF Treaty but also other useful agreements. Moreover, despite our great differences in START, positive assets were increasing gradually. It would be desirable to make the process more dynamic, but he understood the objective reasons why this was not possible.

*Shevardnadze* said that the President and Gorbachev had both said many times that it was necessary to use to the maximum the existing opportunities, to make good use of the experience we had gained. The question was what we needed to do to conclude our interaction with real progress. He wanted to begin with the most difficult problems where the prospects were not very bright. He had in mind the situation with regard to the ABM Treaty. Time had shown that the road we mapped together in searching for an agreement on the ABM Treaty was the only possible basis for agreement. This was what the joint statements of the Washington and Moscow Summits made clear. In the future we needed to stick to the same course: the provisions and the language agreed upon in Washington. One of the most important fundamental issues was the relationship between adherence to the ABM Treaty and START. He wanted to reemphasize the Soviet Union's fundamental approach.

Regarding the specific problems that had emerged, *Shevardnadze* said he wanted to begin with the problem of sensors. The Soviets had considered very carefully this question and all aspects of the U.S. proposal. They had concluded that unlimited permission of sensors in space would seriously undermine the ABM Treaty. It would not be consistent with our objectives. At the same time the Soviets could agree to discuss the problem in hopes of finding a mutually acceptable agreement. The Soviets proposed that this question be considered in the context of Soviets' suggestions that had been made earlier with



respect to reaching an agreement on a list of devices that would be permitted in space. At the outset the sides would have to agree that the launching of space based sensors would be conducted under conditions of verification with inspections. On this basis the Soviets would be prepared to continue the dialogue in the working group and in the negotiations in Geneva.

The next question, *Shevardnadze* continued, concerned the sides' mutual concerns with respect to the ABM treaty. Our two leaders had discussed this question thoroughly. It was very important not to permit our differences to result in an undermining of everything we had achieved through mutual efforts. The U.S., *Shevardnadze* said, was aware of the most recent proposals by General Secretary Gorbachev at Krasnoyarsk. The U.S. was also aware of the Soviet side's other suggestions regarding the Krasnoyarsk radar. The Soviets were very sincere in trying to set aside everything that stands in the way of solving this problem. Soviet proposals called for creating on the basis of that radar a center for international cooperation for peaceful space research.

*Shevardnadze* said he wanted to tell the Secretary frankly that the Soviets had not wanted to make a public statement and would have preferred to address this issue at the working level in private confidential discussions. They had made it public, however, because of certain propagandistic steps by the U.S. with respect to Krasnoyarsk by the Administration (an "uproar of accusations" against the Soviet Union alleging violations and, indeed, statements that Krasnoyarsk was almost a material breach of the Treaty). Because of these statements the Soviet side had to react publicly. *Shevardnadze* explained that the space center would be included in the system of a world space organization and that it would be possible for many countries to participate in its research efforts. The Soviets were ready for experts from the U.S. and the USSR to lead the way in the process of practically implementing this decision. This would imply visits to Krasnoyarsk and joint work to look at the equipment there.

*Shevardnadze* added that another Soviet proposal was still on the table. If the sides were able to agree on a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty the Soviets would dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar. This, however, would be a pity because the radar provided a good basis for joint use for peaceful purposes. But he repeated that the old proposal was still in effect. It would be helpful if the U.S. side were to consider Soviet proposals and respond in kind. He had in mind Soviet concerns about the U.S. radar in Greenland as well as the rocket probe launch facility at Shemya Island. He urged that the U.S. let Soviet experts visit these facilities. While he was no expert, *Shevardnadze* said Soviet specialists were certain that these were clear viola-

tions of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets had permitted members of the U.S. Congress and scientists to visit Krasnoyarsk, so it was quite logical to expect the U.S. side to respond similarly with visits to its facilities.

*Secretary Shultz* replied by saying he was sorry the Soviet delegation had responded negatively to the U.S. sensors proposal. He noted Shevardnadze's expression of readiness to continue the discussion on this proposal, however, and said the U.S. intended to pursue it further. In the U.S. view, it was impossible to distinguish between the functions of sensors of different kinds. It would lend itself to serious disputes if we tried to differentiate. This was why we thought our proposal would be helpful and fit the situation well. As we had looked at the situation in the defense and space talks it seemed to us that the length of the non-withdrawal period, based on discussions between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev, should fall into place without difficulty. The U.S. also felt that the question of what happens after the period of non-withdrawal had been settled at the Washington Summit by Gorbachev's statement (he had said that, at the end of the period, each side would be free to decide its course, while in the meantime the ABM Treaty would remain in effect). In Geneva, however, disagreement had broken out on this question.

The most difficult question, *the Secretary* continued, continued to be what would occur during the non-withdrawal period. The sensors proposal was an attempt to address that along with our proposed confidence-building measures. Much good work had been done with respect to the predictability protocol, and we should instruct our negotiators to get that portion of our work completed. Many things already had been agreed, such as data exchange and observation of tests. We did not think mandatory on-site inspection would work, however—we had sensitive facilities and so did the Soviets. But there was a lot of good material in the Protocol and we should get it done to pass along to the next group.

The Krasnoyarsk radar, *the Secretary* said, was a very troublesome issue. There was a wide bipartisan consensus that the radar, because of its location and orientation, was a violation of the ABM Treaty. Shevardnadze had said this issue had the potential to be a major disruptive force, and he believed the Minister was right. *Shevardnadze* interjected that he had not said that. *The Secretary* rejoined that, in that case, he would say it! We had to consider what we would do in the absence of any agreement on this issue. We had studied the General Secretary's letter<sup>2</sup> and would like to raise some questions about his proposal.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 167.

The problem with the Krasnoyarsk radar, *the Secretary* said, was that it is one of the critical items identified in the ABM Treaty as representing a long lead-time item for a territorial ABM defense. The ban on LPARs except on the periphery was a sort of insurance policy against ABM breakout. The existence of the radar was the problem. It might be used for other purposes, but it could easily be reconverted to an LPAR. Thus, knowing the origins of the LPAR limits, we had to ask what Gorbachev had in mind:

—Was he proposing to dismantle the radar and establish a space science center in its place? If so, we might “dig into that one.” We didn’t see the location as ideal for such research, but if that was the proposal we could look at it.

—Another variation was that Gorbachev meant the radar would be completed, with additional parts added for space research purposes. For reasons he had already explained, the Secretary said, that would not do the job.

We needed to know whether the plan was to dismantle the radar and put something else useful there, or whether it was something else. The Secretary added that the U.S. had no problem with salvaging equipment from Krasnoyarsk and recovering it for other uses.

There was also a major problem, *Secretary Shultz* continued, with Soviet activities at Gomel. The movement of radars from a test range to another site was, in itself, a violation. We did visit the site, and the Soviets had explained their plans; now those plans were being carried out. Ambassador Karpov had spoken about a “radical solution” to Gomel during the ABM Treaty review, and we would like to know what was meant by this.

With respect to Thule and Fylingdales, *the Secretary* said, these radars had been grandfathered under the ABM Treaty. We did not regard them as in any way parallel to Krasnoyarsk.

*Shevardnadze* asked whether the radar in Greenland was a phased-array type. *The Secretary* said he could not give a description. *General Powell* intervened to say that this question was irrelevant. The point was that the radar was at a site in existence at the time the ABM Treaty was signed; the Treaty allowed such radars to remain and modernization was permitted under the Treaty.

*Shevardnadze* asked whether, if it was an LPAR and was outside national territory, it was not a violation. *The Secretary* replied that it was not a violation as long as the Treaty grandfathered such radars. *Shevardnadze* said he agreed that modernization was permitted, but using the site for an ABM radar was a violation, in the Soviet view. *Karpov* added that, after signing the ABM Treaty, the sides were barred from building outside their national territory phased-array radars with a potential greater than 3 million.

*Shevardnadze* suggested that the U.S. let the Soviet side visit Thule. If there were no violation, the Soviets would take the issue off the agenda. *The Secretary* replied that “what you see is not as important as what we say.” The radar was there before the Treaty was signed and could be modernized. If the Soviets visited, they would see that it was being modernized. The same thing occurred with the U.S. visit to Krasnoyarsk: the Congressmen took photos; the visit confirmed what we already knew: that an LPAR was being built at that location.

*Shevardnadze* asked the Secretary to imagine the Soviet side had violated the ABM Treaty with the Krasnoyarsk radar. Then, after the two countries had agreed in Washington and Moscow that the ABM Treaty would be observed for a specified period of time, the Soviets put forward a proposal: if that issue was settled, the Soviets would dismantle the radar. This seemed to solve the problem. And now, the Soviets were offering a further step: to transfer the radar to the use of Soviet, U.S., Indian, Japanese and other scientists. If these scientists found elements that confirmed the radar was a violation, those elements would be removed and the building used for scientific purposes. *Shevardnadze* added that the Soviets could present this case to any audience and it would agree the U.S. position was indefensible. Why destroy the radar if it could be used for science?

*The Secretary* replied that there was a reason why not: Under the ABM Treaty regime, there were provisions aimed at making it difficult to break out of the Treaty. The chief one was the prohibition on battle management radars inside national boundaries and pointed inwards. Since it took a long time to build such radars, we could see them coming. That was the theory underlying the Treaty and that was why we regard Krasnoyarsk as a serious problem. It was not just a technical violation without real meaning; it had a lot of meaning.

*Shevardnadze* asked what would be so bad about making the radar into a laboratory for the use of world science or a world space organization, a place for peaceful research, for tracking space objects, to be used collectively not only by Soviet scientists? If there were certain elements of the radar that are inconsistent with the ABM Treaty, these could be removed. If not inconsistent, then all other devices and instruments could be used for peaceful purposes. This was a very noble idea and a reasonable solution, taking care of both the political problem and the interests of scientists. *Shevardnadze* asked the Secretary to please think again about the proposal, as it opened up an interesting prospect. As for the Greenland and UK radars, the Soviets believed they could seriously and earnestly say that these were violations of the ABM Treaty. If LPARs were there, they were violations. If no LPARs were there, then let the Soviets visit to confirm that there were no grounds for complaint.

*Karpov* said that when the Secretary spoke of modernization, one had to note that there were five radars at Thule and Fylingdales when the ABM Treaty was signed, but not one of them was a phased-array radar. Now LPARs with a potential much greater than 3 million were being built. These could have been built legally in Connecticut or Washington, but they should not have been built at Thule or Fylingdales.

*Shevardnadze* noted that Gorbachev had *not* conditioned his proposal on the U.S. doing the same thing to its disputed radars as Gorbachev had proposed to do with Krasnoyarsk. *Secretary Shultz* replied that he had noticed this. We contend that no matter what exists at Thule and Fylingdales, these were permitted, modernized radars. When it came to using Krasnoyarsk as a site for scientific research, however, there was a question as to what existed there. If it was an LPAR, then it was a problem. If there was a significant proportion of what is needed for an LPAR, it was also a problem. If the LPAR was gone, that would be a different story. This was why he had asked whether the Gorbachev proposal entailed dismantlement or substantial alteration of the radar. Whatever the Soviets might say about Thule and Fylingdales, the Secretary added, they were far away from U.S. national borders.

*Shevardnadze* said he had been told that, when scientists met at Krasnoyarsk, they would be able to decide what kind of equipment could be preserved and what should be taken away. If there were elements that represented a violation of the ABM Treaty, then the Soviets would remove them. He reiterated that keeping the radar functioning would be useful for world science. Many countries' scientists would jointly determine its use as a laboratory. With some emotion, *Shevardnadze* stressed that he thought this was a good idea. If there were elements of concern, the Soviets would be ready to dismantle them and convert the installation. The aim, he said, was to remove this problem from contention as well as to make the radar available to help implement the plans our countries had for space exploration. This was a mission that could only be accomplished by big countries like the U.S., Soviet Union, and Japan. *Shevardnadze* noted that there was a big building at Krasnoyarsk, with much costly equipment—all of this could be used. But the Soviets had made a political decision: they were ready to do something useful for world science and were surprised the U.S. had reacted so negatively.

*The Secretary* said his reaction was not negative, but one of questioning what will be at Krasnoyarsk under the Soviet proposal. If the LPAR were there, in whole or in part, then the problem would not be solved. If something else was implied, then we could work it out. The Working Group should delve further into this idea. But if the idea was to use an LPAR for scientific purposes, this would be a problem.

*Shevardnadze* said he wanted to confirm the Soviet aim: to preserve at Krasnoyarsk *only* that equipment needed for scientific purposes. *Karpov* added that he had told General Burns that various options existed for converting the radar. They had discussed dismantling the transmitter antenna and replacing it with a parabolic antenna. This was a radical solution, one which would remove any concern about the radar's use for early warning of ballistic missile launch.

*The Secretary* suggested that the Working Group continue this discussion. He could not say he was very optimistic, but he accepted that it was a good faith effort to resolve the problem. He asked again for the Soviets to explain what would be a "radical solution" at Gomel.

*Karpov* replied: To eliminate what exists there—to eliminate the base for the antenna. *Shevardnadze* broke in to say that "Gomel is not a problem; let me assure you of this. Let us not fan that issue into a big problem; it's a matter that can be taken off the agenda quickly." As for Krasnoyarsk, *Shevardnadze* continued, he wanted to ask the U.S. again to take a very careful look at the Soviet proposal—to think of what the U.S. would want to see done so that it was sure Krasnoyarsk was only a research center. Let us allow our experts to work on the problem. Do not dismiss the Soviet proposal out of hand: that would shape public opinion in a way that the U.S. would find difficult to cope with, he warned, since the U.S. would have trouble explaining what was wrong with the Soviet proposal for a genuine scientific research center at Krasnoyarsk. If the U.S. didn't trust the Soviets, then it could come and see the radar for itself. Let the experts come and decide, *Shevardnadze* concluded.

*The Secretary* said that the Soviet proposal would be a great idea if it meant there would be no LPAR at Krasnoyarsk, in whole or in part. There might be ways to change the physical characteristics of the radar such that it would be dismantled in terms of its ability to operate as an LPAR.

*Ambassador Ridgway*, referring to *Shevardnadze's* comment that the Gomel issue should not be allowed to become a major problem, commented that our concerns had been exacerbated by the fact that construction work was continuing at Gomel. This made management of the issue more difficult.

*Shevardnadze* asked what U.S. experts had found at Gomel. If there was a violation, then why would the Soviets have invited experts? The fact was that they did not find anything. But he repeated that Gomel was not a big problem, since there was not a big structure involved. Krasnoyarsk was much larger. Gomel was a simple matter that could be solved. *Karpov* noted that at Gomel there was simply a rotating tower on which a mirror antenna had been placed.

*Shevardnadze* invited U.S. experts to visit Gomel again, and quipped that he was considering visiting Gomel himself. Regarding Krasnoy-



arsk, he again urged the U.S. to look carefully at the Soviet proposal. It was a serious one presented in good faith. When Krasnoyarsk becomes a facility for space cooperation, perhaps the U.S. could do the same thing at Thule.

*Secretary Shultz* said that his understanding of the Gomel problem was that, while the sides were allowed to have ABM radars at test ranges for experimental purposes, they were barred from moving them to other locations. So simply moving the radar was a violation. Beyond this, one must ask why the negotiators had made this a violation. The answer was that they did not want lesser radars to proliferate, since a large number of such radars could add up to a significant capability. Therefore, when the radar was moved, it was a technical violation. Now that we were seeing the parts reconstructed, it exacerbated the situation. *Karpov* said the Soviets were not building at Gomel.

*General Powell* noted that, in the fall of 1987, we seriously considered whether the Gomel matter constituted a violation. We judged that, on technical grounds, there was no doubt, although we reported to Congress that this was a minor problem. Inspectors subsequently visited Gomel. But the problem had since become more serious with the renewal of assembly activity there. In December we would need to report again to Congress on the status of the issue, and this activity would turn a small problem into a big one.

*Shevardnadze* suggested that the sides decide on the following course: At Gomel, where there was nothing that constituted a violation, the U.S. should come and visit once again and have its experts take another look. The Soviets had a vital interest in removing all irritants in this area. The inspectors could go for 10 days or two weeks, if they wished. In our joint statement, we could note the readiness of the Soviet side to allow this to happen.

*The Secretary* replied that it was not a secret what was happening at Gomel. When our people visited, they were openly shown the plans, and now we were seeing those plans carried out. It was not as though we were mystified about what was going on. It was the fact that the radar was there that posed the problem. We had no problem verifying what the Soviets had been telling us.

*General Powell* explained that it was the simple presence of those components that was the issue. The simplest solution would be to remove them to a test range or destroy them. The question was not the purpose of the radar, but its location. And if the work continued, this meant more of a problem for our December compliance report.

*The Secretary* said that what the Soviets called a van was, in fact, a radar. *Shevardnadze* said it really was a van. The Soviets may have done something they shouldn't have, taking it from one place to another. But if they had wanted to violate the Treaty, then why would



they have invited U.S. experts to come inspect the facility? Did the Secretary think the Soviets were naïve or trying openly to provoke the U.S.?

*The Secretary* said he did not think Gomel was a big enough deal to warrant all this trouble. *Shevardnadze* said: “I have an interest in resolving the issue.” He said he would ask Karpov and the highest authorities to go there to see the site. Removing one van was not going to be a problem. *General Powell* said it was more than just one van that was involved. Other components that had been moved to Gomel also had to be eliminated. We now knew what’s there based on our experts’ visit. He added that, before we had included Gomel in our compliance report, we had raised this issue with the Soviets privately in an effort to resolve it.

*Karpov* said he wanted to point out that there was no radar at Gomel of a kind deployed at test ranges, but only a rotating tower on which mirror antennas and other devices had been placed. This was not the same kind of antenna as was located at test ranges.

*The Secretary* said he would like to tell the Soviets again precisely what we considered a violation. *Powell* argued that this was surely a problem we could solve. *Shevardnadze* said he agreed. The Soviets recognized the concerns of the U.S. side and wanted to find a solution. He confirmed the Soviets’ readiness to receive U.S. experts again at Gomel, after which, he joked, they could all go together to Greenland. *Secretary Shultz* said this should wait until the summer. *Shevardnadze* said he was ready to go even in winter. *The Secretary* said they would need to ask Danish Foreign Minister Elleman-Jensen.

*Shevardnadze* suggested that the sides think of language on Krasnoyarsk, to see what might be possible here. The Soviets were not sure what the U.S. wanted, what conditions had to be satisfied. He had confirmed the Soviet Government’s readiness to ensure that it becomes a scientific facility. If this approach was acceptable, we could say this in the joint statement.

*The Secretary* said the U.S. was looking for something that fixed the radar so that, from a physical and operational viewpoint, it was not a phased-array radar in whole or in part. This was the essence of the problem. If, in the process, something useful was created, this was fine—a creative idea. But if what was being proposed was to have scientists use the LPAR, Gorbachev’s proposal would not solve the problem.

*The Secretary* recalled the Soviets’ Moscow offer that, in connection with a satisfactory arrangement on the ABM Treaty, they would dismantle the radar. Of course, we hadn’t been able to work this out. On the other hand, if we could resolve the problem by accompanying dismantlement with a statement that expressed satisfaction with the

ABM Treaty as it stands, leaving aside what we were negotiating in NST, we could do that too. If this idea was of interest, then there were several solutions to explore. But the essence of the question was that we cannot wind up with something that had the physical characteristics of an LPAR in whole or in part.

*Shevardnadze* said: "We agree on this." Let us give the task to the experts to find a way to do this. Of course, an inventory would need to be taken of the equipment and structure to see what elements were incompatible with the Treaty. These would need to be dismantled. What was not incompatible could stay in place and be used for science. On the basis of the Secretary's proposal, *Shevardnadze* concluded, work could be done.

#### START

##### *SLCMs*

*Shevardnadze* said he would like to open the discussion of START with one of the most difficult questions: SLCMs. He knew the Secretary didn't like to discuss the issue, but it could not be avoided. He reminded the Secretary that in the Washington Summit joint statement the sides pledged to reach agreement on quantitative limits on nuclear-armed, long-range SLCMs, and to look for mutually acceptable verification measures to enforce those limits. Unfortunately, the U.S. delegation had been trying to avoid any specific discussion of SLCMs and was attempting to remove the subject from the agenda. But he wanted to say that a treaty on strategic offensive arms would not be possible if such a channel for circumvention was not closed. Therefore, the working group should look seriously at the SLCM question.

*Shevardnadze* said that, in Geneva, the negotiators had on the table a major package of Soviet proposals for SLCM verification. The Soviets had suggested use of NTM, remote verification, inspections, checks at production and arming facilities. He proposed that detailed discussions now begin on these proposals, one-by-one or all together. If any one proposal was unacceptable, the Soviets were prepared to discuss U.S. concerns. But a process of specific discussion had to begin.

*Shevardnadze* said that while the Soviets wanted to understand U.S. objections to their verification proposals, it was also important to decide what would be the numerical limits. Sooner or later, this must be done. If possible, an agreed limit could be reflected in the joint statement from this ministerial. The Soviets proposed an upper limit of 400 nuclear-armed SLCMs and 600 non-nuclear SLCMs. What did the U.S. have to say? Would the questions be shelved for good or was the U.S. side ready to discuss the question of numerical limits?

*Secretary Shultz* replied that the U.S. did not have any doubt that SLCMs were important and we were prepared to discuss the subject.

Our feeling was that it was very difficult to verify satisfactorily whatever limits might be agreed. The Soviet side has been very energetic and creative. We had examined every proposal and discussed each one with the Soviet side, and we had tried to devise things we might ourselves propose. But we had found the process very frustrating.

*The Secretary* explained that our problems with SLCMs could be divided into two categories: approaches we did not believe would do the job; and approaches that might do the job but would be so intrusive as to reconfigure our navy and constrain the way our navy operates. This would not be verification, but a change in naval operations. At this point, the Secretary explained, the navy had told him that it did not see a way to solve the SLCM verification problem. We had proposed, as a way of recognizing the verification problem, that the sides make unilateral declarations. We admitted that this approach could not be verified. Rather, each country would declare the number of nuclear-armed SLCMs it intended to deploy; if it became necessary to change the number, a side could do so. If this approach were acceptable to the Soviets, we would name a number.

*The Secretary* added, in this regard, that we could not accept limits on conventional SLCMs as the Soviets had proposed. We had a fundamental principle that START deals only with nuclear arms. We had made a distinction in our ALCM proposal. As for the Soviet-proposed figure for nuclear-armed SLCMs, our unilaterally-declared figure—if we were to agree on a declaratory approach—would be much higher than 400.

*Shevardnadze* rejoined that SLCMs were a part of the overall agreement. He thought the question would have to be resolved; it went back to Reykjavik, where it was decided that SLCMs had to be settled. Discussing *whether* there was to be a solution was pointless. The Soviets could agree, however, that limiting SLCMs was difficult. The Soviets had been looking at various ideas and they knew the U.S. had been looking at some ideas as well. They continued to believe their devices for verifying SLCMs, while not taking care of the whole problem, could serve as a subsidiary element in a verification scheme. In any case, while we might not be able to solve the problem at this meeting, we should agree to proceed step-by-step, starting with agreement on a *number* even if we do not have agreement on the verification arrangements. We should proceed with joint experiments on verification, but in the meantime agree on a numerical limit as a first step.

*The Secretary* said he would like to try to rearrange *Shevardnadze's* proposal. Recognizing that the SLCM problem had been on the agenda since Reykjavik and that it involved an important class of weapons, the way to proceed should be to start with unilateral declarations. If this were acceptable, then the U.S. could go back and review its thinking

and provide a number, while continuing to work on verification. The Secretary added that we recognized that the declaratory approach was not fully satisfactory to either side. Some in the U.S. would criticize the lack of measures to verify Soviet compliance, whereas U.S. compliance would be ensured by the fact that Congress would be looking down our throats. Thus we were not offering the declaratory approach as an ideal solution. Nonetheless, we believed that problems like this “yield to the weight of continued insistence.” We would say to our Navy: You’ve got to resolve this problem; get a fresh batch of Admirals and keep looking; tell us how many new ideas you have looked at in the last month (since they do think of things after a while).

Recapitulating, *the Secretary* said he was not advocating the declaratory approach, since he accepted it was unsatisfactory. But the Minister was asking for a way to get started. Having heard the CNO and CJCS hold forth on the subject of SLCMs, we were not likely ever to have anything that represented a satisfactory verification regime. Our approach was a way of starting to surround the problem and keep the pressure on it. Shevardnadze had said we should start with the number; in our view, the number had to be fit into something.

*Shevardnadze* replied that it appeared that it would be very difficult to move forward on SLCMs, as well as on other questions. This was because the U.S. did not seem to have decided the basic questions of verification. Why had we been able to agree on INF? Because we moved boldly on verification with on-site inspection, challenge inspection, suspect-site verification and the like. On SLCMs we were in a kind of impasse because, the U.S. claimed, its naval people did not want to be verified by another country. This applied to the U.S. air force as well. For this reason, *Shevardnadze* explained, he did not really emphasize SLCM verification: he knew the U.S. was not disposed to allow inspections of its navy, and therefore he thought we could achieve small progress by giving the delegations the boost provided by an agreed number.

*General Powell* commented that the Secretary’s proposal was a bold one. We were ready to provide the number of nuclear-armed SLCMs we would have. Verification would be brought to you by the U.S. Congress. Just as the Soviets knew our inventory now, so they would be able to get all the information they might need from our Congress. This would not require any of the intrusive on-site inspection that was such a problem for our navy. The Soviet side, for its part, would have the option to build its own required number of SLCMs.

*Secretary Shultz* pointed out that the U.S. was more vulnerable to Soviet SLCMs than vice versa, with so many major cities on our coasts. He urged that *Shevardnadze* look seriously at the declaratory approach; this was not an inconsequential matter.

*Shevardnadze* said that if the U.S. could agree to record a numerical limit for SLCMs, this could be reflected in the joint statement. Why have separate unilateral statements when we could record a mutual number (300, 400, 500) in the joint statement?

*The Secretary* said we had no problem with an equal upper level. But we had to start with the concept that it was in the form of a declaration—a voluntary piece of information, with both sides saying they will have no more than “X” SLCMs. *Shevardnadze* asked whether this meant no more than a certain level. *The Secretary* replied that each side would have the right to change its number if circumstances warranted (although he had no doubt that the U.S. would pick a “safe” number at the outset).

*Shevardnadze* replied that this was not acceptable. *The Secretary* said he had gone back to the declaratory approach because *Shevardnadze* had argued that we should at least get started on addressing SLCMs. Even if our idea was not satisfactory—or perhaps because it was not satisfactory—it would, once adopted, put pressure on our people to exercise more creativity. *Shevardnadze* said, all right, let us have our experts give it another try.

#### HEAVY BOMBERS/ALCMS

*Shevardnadze* said the sides should try to find a compromise on heavy bombers and their armaments, as well as on mobile ICBMs and verification. These were items where the delegations could, in short order, draft language for inclusion in the draft Treaty. On ALCMs, he would not run through those provisions already recorded at the Summits. The Soviet position was that:

- All heavy bombers regardless of armament should be counted in the 1600 ceiling.

- For each type of heavy bomber, the maximum number of accountable ALCMs should be determined.

- Short-range missiles and gravity bombs count as one in the 6000 warhead limit.

- Non-nuclear ALCMs are not counted.

- There will be separate basing for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear warheads and those not so equipped.

- Verification of baseline data will be by both NTM and on-site inspection.

*Karpov* interjected that these were the main elements, without all the details.

*Shevardnadze* said he wanted to say a few words about the range criterion and the counting of ALCMs on various types of bombers. The Soviets believed the U.S. should modify its position. Soviet arguments against revision of the agreed 600-km range criterion were well known. Unfortunately, the U.S. delegation in Geneva, in insisting on revising

this threshold, had not even supplied arguments in support of this change.

*Shevardnadze* also wanted to call attention to the U.S. delegation's negative approach to the question of counting ALCMs on various types of heavy bombers. Whereas it stated in the summit joint statement that agreement should be reached on counting rules for each type of heavy bomber—i.e. a different number for each type—the U.S. continued to propose the artificial number 10 for all heavy bombers. This would put the USSR in an unequal position. The Soviet proposal for a 600-km range cut-off and for counting the maximum number of ALCMs on each type of heavy bomber has been set forth in detail in Geneva.

Finally, *Shevardnadze* said, he wanted to raise the question of inspections. This was also of fundamental importance. The Soviets believed there should be inspections of heavy bomber bases. After entry-into-force of the Treaty, but before implementation began, the Soviets proposed that all types of heavy bombers should be shown to the other side (those equipped for ALCMs, those equipped for short-range missiles and gravity bombs, and those not equipped with nuclear missiles). Such a demonstration would help both sides to distinguish (based on functionally-related observable differences) those types of heavy bomber from one another, and to help demonstrate that ALCM carriers cannot carry a greater number of ALCMs than agreed.

*The Secretary* replied that this might be a promising area. There had been some activity on the U.S. side and it would seem some progress could be made. We too would like to see this issue resolved, along with verification and mobiles. Rather than commenting on all aspects of *Shevardnadze's* presentation, he wanted to focus on the question of how to account for the number of ALCMs.

*The Secretary* recalled that the sides were now agreed on attributing numbers to bombers. The U.S. proposal, he said, was to attribute 10 to each heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs; these would be distinguishable from non-ALCM-equipped bombers. This number would mean that a B-52 equipped for ALCMs would count just as much as an SS-18, despite the big differences between ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. We believed that, in this light, the Soviets should understand why a number like 10 is appropriate.

*The Secretary* noted that in Geneva, the Soviet side had suggested the possibility of attributing different numbers to different bomber types because their capacities were demonstrably different. The U.S. side was prepared to consider a proposal attributing different numbers to different types so long as the maximum number was no more than 10. Some would count as 10, some at a lower number.

*Shevardnadze* asked whether some would count at a number greater than 10. *The Secretary* said the Soviet side had also raised the question



of equipping heavy bombers with huge numbers of ALCMs—multiples of 10. We had no plans to do this. We had put forward in Geneva a ban on conversion of aircraft other than heavy bombers into heavy bombers. This, the Secretary said, should help resolve any concern the Soviet side might have about the possibility of converting large aircraft to carry large numbers of ALCMs. We were prepared to find other forms of assurance.

Summing up, *the Secretary* outlined the following package:

- Attribute 10 ALCMs to existing heavy bombers equipped for ALCMs
- Attribute 10 ALCMs to future bomber types unless the sides agree otherwise
- No 1100 sublimit on ALCMs and bomber weapons
- No limits on ALCM inventories
- No conversion to heavy bombers of aircraft constructed for other purposes.

Under this approach, we would be ready to:

- Consider a proposal to attribute a number smaller than 10 to specific types of existing heavy bombers
- Consider a range cut-off somewhat lower than 1500 km (a figure which he knew bothered Shevardnadze; *Shevardnadze* replied: “Yes it does”).
- Work with the USSR on ways to meet concerns about very large numbers of ALCMs on future bombers.

This was an effort to come to grips with proposals the Soviet side had made, *the Secretary* concluded. They reflected quite a lot of give, and we hoped we could get somewhere on this basis.

*Shevardnadze* said he had one question. What was the U.S. attitude on inspections to check heavy bomber types? The U.S. had proposed a figure of 10, but there were other numbers possible, such as 22 or 28. The Soviets understood a compromise was needed, but they would need to have a look at the heavy bombers.

*The Secretary* replied that, if the Soviets agreed to the U.S. approach, the sides would assume that each distinguishable type of heavy bomber equipped for ALCMs would count as 10. The only verification needed would be to confirm the bomber type. The actual weapons load might be more or less than 10. But we were prepared to work so that there could be no extravagant number of ALCMs on a heavy bomber. We had no thought of deploying numbers like 60 or 70 which the Soviet delegation had cited. The Secretary added that we were not opposed to on-site inspection—we were doing a lot of it under the INF Treaty. But this was not something either side necessarily relished. Therefore, if there were ways to resolve issues without OSI, this would be better.

*Shevardnadze* said the problems of verification were really not so terrible as far as bombers were concerned. After all, Secretary of Defense



Carlucci had been in the cockpit of the most modern Soviet plane. *The Secretary* said he had flown on a B-1 and it had scared the daylights out of him. *Shevardnadze* suggested that the experts look into the new U.S. proposals.

#### MOBILE ICBMs

*Shevardnadze* said he thought it was quite possible to take a decision on mobile ICBMs. What was needed was to reach complete agreement on verification. He said the Soviets were prepared to agree to a figure of 100 square kilometers for the restricted area for road-mobiles. This could be recorded in the data MOU. The U.S. side, he noted, had also said it was interested in reaching agreement on tagging mobile ICBMs. In the spirit of this proposal, the Soviets believed agreement should be reached on a system of registration: for all missiles built after entry-into-force, the mobile launchers and associated missiles would be registered. The same registration would also apply to SLBMs, ALCMs and SLCMs.

*Shevardnadze* said another area where a mutually acceptable position could be found would be to establish sublimits of 800 mobile ICBM launchers and 1600 warheads on such launchers. If the U.S. was not ready to accept these numbers, the Soviets would like to hear a figure that would be acceptable.

*The Secretary* recalled that mobile ICBM verification was another area in which the two sides had made real progress in Moscow. Agreement had been reached on a large number of elements of common ground. Last week, Ambassador Hanmer had described in Geneva some new proposals which took into account Soviet ideas. In light of the discussions in Moscow and Geneva, the Secretary said, we had also developed some language reflecting further thoughts on mobile ICBM verification and suspect-site inspections. Once we had agreed on verification, we would be prepared to reconsider our proposal to ban mobile ICBMs and to table a number for mobile ICBM warheads. The Secretary added that we thought this number would need to be much lower than the Soviet-proposed 1600.

*The Secretary* concluded that we had a lot of material for the working group to work on, and it would perhaps be possible to get far enough on mobiles and ALCMs to wrap these up during these talks. If so, it would be very welcome. *Shevardnadze* suggested that the ministers perhaps give stricter instructions: that the working groups should make substantial progress on mobiles and ALCMs. What the Secretary had said gave him hope. Let us see what the working groups can do in terms of agreements that can be reported to ministers the following afternoon.

*ICBM WARHEAD SUBLIMIT*

*Secretary Shultz* said it would be good to wrap up the question of an ICBM warhead sublimit. He recalled Marshal Akhromeyev's statement that the USSR did not intend to deploy more than 3300 ICBM warheads. Our problem was with heavy missiles, the most destructive and destabilizing ones in the Soviet arsenal. The U.S. proposals would ban new types, modernization and flight-testing of heavy ICBMs. The problem was that the Soviet Union possessed such heavy missiles, but the U.S. did not. One way to solve this problem was to gradually phase them out. If the Soviet side objected to banning flight-testing, the outcome would be one-sided. We would prefer to phase them out, and the technological trends favor that. We were willing, the Secretary said, to consider other outcomes, but not to grant the Soviet Union a permanent monopoly. And we would rather not have heavies ourselves, although that would be one option for us if we needed it.

*Shevardnadze* said he did not think the Soviet side was prepared to discuss banning modernization. The right approach was to concentrate on sublimits. There were two options here, and the figures were already known to both sides. Within the total of 4900 warheads on ballistic missiles, the sublimit on ICBMs would be 3300, but there would also be a sublimit on SLBMs. If that was not acceptable, the Soviet side would be ready to accept another solution: each side would be free to determine the composition of its warhead mix. This was not new, but the Soviet side had looked at the possibilities. *Shevardnadze* added that he would like to reach agreement on this soon, even before leaving Washington.

*Secretary Shultz* observed that ICBMs and SLBMs were very different, and noted that we had been around the circle many times on this question; he did not propose to go around it again.

*Shevardnadze* said the two sides should also finish up their work on exchange of data. The exchange of baseline data was very important, and should apply to all strategic offensive arms covered by the treaty: ICBMs, heavy bombers, SLBMs, and SLCMs. He suggested that the pace of work on exchange of data be accelerated because of its importance.

*The Secretary* noted that both sides had already submitted some data. He said he basically agreed with the Foreign Minister that we should proceed with an exchange of data.

*SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS*

*Shevardnadze* suggested that the working groups be instructed to accelerate their work on this. There was also another issue on which the Foreign Minister recalled he had written a letter, namely that of an agreement on limiting the numbers of warheads on existing missiles.

He said it would be possible to exchange letters on this at the present meeting, thus producing a substantive result.

*Secretary Shultz* recalled Ambassador Dubinin's having brought the proposal to his attention on September 19th.<sup>3</sup> He said the U.S. side had studied it carefully and aggressively, and agreed that breaking elements out of the START agreement would be possible, but we had a number of questions and some additional points to make on the subject. On-site-inspection was a very big undertaking in START, and there was a lot of language that went with the concept. We would have to see how it came out in the working group. *Shevardnadze* agreed with this approach.

*The Secretary* added that the problem of the Krasnoyarsk radar intersected with our willingness to do anything in the area of strategic arms. We would have to see that resolved. *Shevardnadze* agreed that the discussion should continue in the working group. But he thought something should be possible, since there were already thousands of warheads and their numbers should not be increased. *Shevardnadze* said he had understood that questions would be raised about his proposal. Still, he thought it would be good if we could conclude something. The *Secretary* told *Shevardnadze* we had found the suggestion constructive and were studying it in that spirit.

#### NUCLEAR TESTING

*Shevardnadze* observed that the Nuclear Testing Talks<sup>4</sup> seemed to be going well. The Joint Verification Experiments had gone well and were truly unique. The degree of understanding and cooperation achieved by the agencies and scientists of the two sides was impressive. It was very important, however, not to lose momentum. Also, it was important to assess the results of the experiments and to agree, finally, on the verification protocols. *Shevardnadze* emphasized that it was important to finish the drafting of the new single verification protocol for the 1976 PNE Treaty during the third round of the NTT now in progress, and to submit it for ratification by the Supreme Soviet and the U.S. Congress before the term of President Reagan expired. *Shevardnadze* said it would be good if the two ministers could review the results of the work, and possibly sign the documents in the concluding moments of the Vienna CSCE Ministerial. Overall, things were going well.

*Secretary Shultz* said he agreed that things were moving well in nuclear testing. He thought it should be possible to complete promptly

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the third round of the Nuclear Testing Talks, which began in Geneva on August 29.

the protocols. President Reagan would like very much to send them for ratification, and was anxious to do so. We were close to completing the PNET protocol, and should now try to resolve remaining issues. One of those was the question of on-site activities. We had proposed that they be possible at the 25 kiloton level. The Soviet side had proposed on-site activities at any level. We thought 25 kilotons was a good level and that this was an important issue to resolve. The Secretary thought the nuclear testing people had done an eminently good job, and mused that if anyone had suggested even two years ago that the Joint Verification Experiments would happen, both he and Shevardnadze would have dismissed it out of hand.

*Shevardnadze* suggested saying something to support the continuity of negotiations. *Secretary Shultz* countered by saying he wanted the talks on the testing treaties completed.

#### CHEMICAL WEAPONS

*Shevardnadze* said the thing to do with chemical weapons was to destroy them. *Secretary Shultz* agreed, saying he was all for that, and was more concerned every day, as a human being as well as an official, about the proliferation of chemical weapons. Now the weapons had actually been used. Everyone knew it. Iraq admitted it. We were faced with a dangerous situation, and wanted to work urgently with the Soviet side, the Secretary said. There was work to be done bilaterally and multilaterally at the Conference on Disarmament. The last round of talks was productive, he said, adding that the Soviet delegation had been cooperative.<sup>5</sup> The key was to make progress on the outstanding issues. We were now into the details. The Secretary said we needed to see more openness on Soviet CW programs and information, on stockpiles. The proposal for visits to CW production facilities should be made concrete, the Secretary said.

*The Secretary* said he had noted the reference to chemical weapons in *Shevardnadze's* speech, and had appreciated it very much. The United States would certainly do everything it could to stem the erosion of international constraints on use of CW. We felt we had to speak out against use of chemical weapons, and hoped others, including the Soviet Union, would do so as well. We were concerned by the evidence that Libya is on the verge of having a full-scale production capacity. Certainly the U.S. worried more about Qadhafi than did the Soviets, but these weapons lent themselves to use not only by states, but by terrorists. This was only one example of the proliferation problem.

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<sup>5</sup> The Conference on Disarmament met in Geneva July 7–September 20 for its second session of the year.

The President, *the Secretary* continued, was very upset by this issue. He planned to make a proposal addressing the problem in his speech at the U.N. on Monday.<sup>6</sup> The Secretary wanted to inform the Minister of this ahead of time in hopes that he would think about it and support it. The proposal called for convening a conference of the signatories to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other concerned parties, to consider actions they might take to reverse the erosion of the 1925 Treaty. The United States thought this was necessary to strengthen the world norm against CW use. The President's initiative would not interfere with the efforts in Geneva to negotiate a global ban on CW; rather, it should give an impetus to those efforts. The Secretary noted that there would be a meeting of the Permanent Five Foreign Ministers next week in New York, and thought the President's initiative should be considered there along with other things that needed to be said on CW.

*Secretary Shultz* invited Shevardnadze to review with him the evidence of CW use by Iraq on the Kurds. Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz had acknowledged on July 1st that CW had been used in the war with Iran. As recently as September 15 the Iraqi Minister of Defense had said Iraq believed it had the right to defend itself however it chose—in direct contravention of the Geneva Protocol. Iraq was using this rationale to justify the use of these weapons. A U.N. investigator confirmed their use on March 28, at about the time of Shevardnadze's visit to Washington, and the Secretary recalled seeing photographs of the carnage that had sickened everyone. There was an attack on Ashrafabad with mustard agents, and Kurdish refugees had testified to other attacks in late August. The eye-witness claims were uniform, even though they originated from different places. Reports had been received by doctors, journalists, and an American Embassy officer. Most of them spoke of quiet, air-dropped bombs that emit a yellow gas. There had been thousands of victims.

For the Minister's private information, *the Secretary* added, the U.S. has been able to confirm by national technical means that there has been CW use. The Secretary had personally reviewed the evidence and found it very, very convincing. He added that when the United States had condemned Iraq's use of CW, it was certainly not to disrupt relations with Baghdad, but because we felt so strongly that the CW problem was getting out of hand. We have had complaints from certain friends in the Arab world who seemed to think we were trying to make up to Iran, but there is nothing to that. CW was an overriding problem that had a big head of steam behind it. The Secretary added

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<sup>6</sup> Reagan addressed the United Nations General Assembly on September 26. (*Public Papers: Reagan*, 1988, Book II, pp. 1219–1226)

that he did not want this information to get into the public domain, especially until the President had made his proposal.

*The Secretary* asked General Powell if there was anything else. *General Powell* said there was not.

*Shevardnadze* said he shared fully the Secretary's concern. The danger was indeed great, and the possibilities of proliferation were limitless. Many countries now had the ability to produce chemical weapons. *Shevardnadze* did not know about Libya, but he did see proliferation of CW as a problem and thought the scope could become serious. Frankly, he thought the world had wasted much time: the problem would have been easier to solve fifteen years ago. Still, it was not too late. If we wanted to end the danger, we needed only to conclude our work on a CW ban. Why were chemical arms being used? Because there was no strong mechanism to prevent their use. The world needed a mechanism that facilitated the inspection of any facility that could produce chemical weapons. To recall the 1925 Protocol was not enough. Much depended on the U.S. and the USSR. Recently we had been cooperating quite well. There was good movement at the Conference on Disarmament, where our positions were now much closer. *Shevardnadze* said he had some suggestions as to how we might move forward.

*Shevardnadze* said the Soviet side welcomed the fact that the United States had, last July, publicized the locations of its CW facilities. The USSR favored the principle of reciprocity and stood for openness. If the U.S. would make public the volume of its reserves of CW, the USSR would be able to make available data on its facilities, including their location, and to agree on an exchange of visits to CW facilities, *Shevardnadze* said. CW production in the USSR had been halted, so this step would have the purpose of accelerating progress on the convention. In addition, *Shevardnadze* said, the Soviet side would like to publicize the location of its storage facilities if the U.S. would declare locations of its storage facilities outside U.S. national territory. The Soviet side assumed U.S. allies would agree to this inasmuch as they had been actively pushing for a CW ban.

*Shevardnadze* went on to say that though we had a joint document on CW and CW production facilities, before signing a convention there was the question of the timing of a second stage of data exchanges and verification of the data submitted. The Soviet side wanted to make a compromise proposal for an exchange of views to take place right before approval of the convention by the CD (initialing of the text of the convention). As for the arrangements for verification of the data exchange, we needed a system based on updated and precise data that each side has presented. Unlimited verification should not take place without a convention. The Soviet side had other specific proposals that would be explained in the working group. In order to make decisive

progress in the multilateral talks, it would be necessary to solve the question of commercial industries.

*Shevardnadze* also wanted the Secretary to know that the Soviet side had decided not to prohibit laboratory synthesis, for scientific purposes, of small quantities of supertoxic lethal agents that have the properties of military agents or are on List #1 of key precursors. This had been the subject of differences in the past, but the Soviet side had decided to give its permission for the parties to allow synthesis of substances on List #1, contingent on there being a very strong ban on CW production in commercial enterprises. As for a national experiment for procedures for verification, we've reached agreement on that. We would name the facility to be used. We wanted to verify production of key precursors. He wanted to lay this out. The Soviets' new proposals would enable us to move forward quickly.

*Shevardnadze* added that he had no information on Iraqi use of chemical weapons, but thought there was probably something to it, and that alarm was indeed justified. Some armed groups in Afghanistan had chemical weapons in their possession. Terrorists might have them. The world needed a strong convention and an effective method of verification. It would be good to have the experts look at these proposals and report to ministers on what was possible. For this Washington meeting, it would be good if in the joint statement the two sides could record strong language on CW with specific proposals and understandings.

*Secretary Shultz* suggested asking the Joint Statement team to work on that, and noted that the working group would have a lot to work with. He acknowledged that *Shevardnadze* had expended a lot of effort on this subject, and agreed to push hard to complete a treaty at Geneva. In the meantime, it was necessary to dramatize our determination to deal with the problem.

*The Secretary* recalled Vice President Bush's speech to the CD in 1984, during which he had presented the U.S. draft CW treaty.<sup>7</sup> The Vice President had followed the issue closely and would be interested in *Shevardnadze's* views at the breakfast the following morning.<sup>8</sup>

*Shevardnadze* also remembered the Vice President's statement, and said that if we acted in the spirit of that statement we would be able to complete job.

*Secretary Shultz* suggested starting with regional issues the following morning (September 23).

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<sup>7</sup> For Bush's April 18, 1984, speech before the Conference on Disarmament, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1984, pp. 40–43.

<sup>8</sup> See footnote 2, Document 170.



*BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION*

*Shevardnadze* said there was still one arms control problem to discuss, namely, that of missile technology. He suggested that it be treated in the working group, as it would be good to have preliminary discussions prior to the meetings scheduled for September 26.<sup>9</sup>

*Secretary Shultz* confirmed with Ambassador Karpov that he would be meeting with Ambassador Holmes the following Monday.<sup>10</sup> He added that he had spoken to the Chinese about missile technology. The Chinese had gradually been taking an interest in the subject and might eventually be brought along. The Secretary said he had told the Chinese it was ironic that just as the Americans and the Soviets were eliminating missiles in the intermediate-range category, the Chinese were producing and selling them to others. He said the U.S. looked forward to the discussions.

*Shevardnadze* noted that missile technology was no less a danger than chemical weapons. Some of the Israelis' neighbors—he would not name names—had acquired such weapons, and the Israelis themselves had missiles that could even strike Soviet territory, not to speak of Arab lands.

*The Secretary* quipped that in the Middle East he never threw a lighted match on the table.

*The Secretary* asked if we had received the two extra names for the Blair House dinner, and was assured that we had. As for the breakfast with the Vice President, the Secretary explained that it was intended as a free-wheeling, private, informal discussion of the future, to which the Minister was invited to bring one colleague and an interpreter. Did he intend to bring anyone?

*Shevardnadze* said he would like to bring Bessmertnykh, with whom he figured he had a relationship characterized by trust.

*The Secretary* said he would see the group at Blair House at eight o'clock.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> See Document 175.

<sup>10</sup> September 26.

<sup>11</sup> See Document 174.

174. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 22, 1988, 8–10 p.m.

## SUBJECT

The Secretary's Dinner with Shevardnadze

## PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*

Secretary and Mrs. Shultz  
 Lt. Gen. and Mrs. Powell  
 Amb. Kampelman  
 Amb. Nitze  
 Amb. Matlock  
 Assistant Secretary Ridgway  
 Dr. W. Hopkins (interpreter and  
 note-taker)

*USSR*

Foreign Minister and Mrs.  
 Shevardnadze  
 Deputy Foreign Minister  
 Bessmertnykh  
 Amb. and Mrs. Dubinin  
 Amb. Karpov  
 Mr. Stepanov Senior Assistant to  
 the Foreign Minister  
 Mr. Tarasenko, Chief, General  
 Secretariat of MFA  
 Mr. P. Palazhchenko (interpreter)

The substantive portion of the dinner conversation concerned the subject of ethnicity and growing religious fundamentalism, and the Soviet government's attitude toward these phenomena and human rights.

*Secretary Shultz* observed that, since the roots of the people in the U.S. traced from all parts of the world, it was always very interesting for Americans to hear about different places as well as to visit them. He recalled a trip he had once taken to Turkey and Greece. In Greece he visited the Minister of Foreign Affairs who had a world map on his wall. In the place where most maps show Turkey, there was only the designation "Asia Minor." He observed that around the world at present one could see powerful and conflicting forces which increase the sense of ethnic identity in many national groups. He referred to the current situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. He asked what the Soviet Government intended to do to handle the situation there.

*Shevardnadze* replied that indeed there were many problems in the region because of ancient ethnic and religious conflicts. He noted that, whereas the United States had a mixed population which had blended into one, in the Soviet Union an attempt had been made to preserve the ethnic character of the various national groups. Because of that

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Ministerial Memcons. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Hopkins; cleared by Ridgway. The meeting took place at Blair House.

fact, a number of problems came about and had existed for a very long time; however, those problems had either been ignored or handled by the government in ways which were no longer acceptable. The times were now such that different solutions must be sought to help resolve current problems. He observed that now it was necessary to value every single individual. The government could no longer act precipitately to solve such problems. People would no longer tolerate such government action. Therefore, it was necessary to seek new solutions.

*Shevardnadze* noted that in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh the current dilemma was complicated further by certain intricate constitutional prohibitions which disallow shifting lands from one political jurisdiction to another, or regions seceding from a republic, even when a majority of the population voted to do so. Despite all that, *Shevardnadze's* remarks implied that, if there should be a constitutionally-permissible vote in a republic to secede from the Soviet Union, in view of new attitudes and approaches, even that would have to be accepted. However the point, he said, was to create conditions in the USSR such that there would not be any desire on the part of the populace to secede or to engage in ethnic, religious and territorial disputes. Conditions must be created so that each nationality would see that it was in its interest—culturally, economically, politically and socially—to remain a part of the Soviet Union. Partially, this could be accomplished by attempting to solve the fundamental long-standing conflicts of an ethnic, religious nature. He alluded to the ancient vendettas which existed, e.g., between the Armenians and the Turks, as well as to the fact that in his native Georgia there were many diverse ethnic groups represented, and education was offered in at least seven languages.

*The Secretary* said that in certain places in the world today a kind of religiosity had appeared that was “intolerant” in the old sense, i.e., “if you are not with us, you are against us.” He noted that few countries were composed of representatives of only one ethnic group. Most countries had a mixed population. The United States had the largest such mixture. The mix in the Soviet Union was of a very different nature and had come about for different historical reasons.

*The Secretary* continued that historically nation-states had asserted their sovereignty; the tendencies about which General Secretary Gorbachev and *Shevardnadze* had spoken about, he observed, testified to the fact that the world was now a more integrated entity. Consequently, sovereignty no longer carried the weight it once did. Furthermore there was a time when information coming into this or that country and which was available to people could be managed. Such was no longer the case. Peoples and groups of people were interacting more and more. So, in attempting to manage the foreign policy of a country, leaders were now contending with new phenomena. As he had noted

in his luncheon remarks, the Secretary said, what Shevardnadze had identified in the speech he had quoted was true and responsive to these points.<sup>2</sup>

*The Secretary* said that Shevardnadze's remarks suggested an awareness of the fact that "simple" formulas were often fraught with difficulties. For example, the notion of self-determination, as a general principle, was something that was recognized as good. One of the factors involved in the U.S. Civil War, for example, was the principle of self-determination. However, in that instance the North, attempting to preserve the Union, prevented the South from realizing for itself the principle of self-determination.

*The Secretary* observed that the notion of self-determination could be viewed in various settings; take, for example, Lebanon. If a president were not found for that country in the following day or so, there would be collapse of the government. Drawing on Shevardnadze's remarks he noted that it was possible for certain enclaves to desire to be alone and independent. However, they would not be able to survive economically and politically by themselves. When such areas got lost in the notion of "self-determination," it led to something that was not workable for them. In Lebanon a rather bizarre situation was at hand, namely the U.S. was working with Syria to find a president for the country. While conditions might stabilize, ethnic and religious assertiveness were threatening to break the country up. He noted the especially tragic nature of the situation, for it was a beautiful country, the flower of the Mideast. He said that Christian factions must recognize a broader confessional base for the government.

*General Powell* remarked that of six newly-appointed cabinet ministers, three Christian and three Moslem, the latter three had resigned. The possibility of allowing a vote near the Green Line was brought up. It was observed that Syria was against that. The situation in Lebanon was described as crucial; however, some potential for resolution existed, if necessary measures were taken in a timely fashion.

*The Secretary* continued that the case of Lebanon represented an illustration of an extreme situation which showed what happened when narrow interests take control. That led to a breakdown of order and a destruction of community. He tied this to the situation which came about when there was no toleration of others. To that extent, despite the sweep associated with Iran and its sense of invincibility, the fact that Iran had not gotten its way was perhaps a good thing.

*The Secretary* noted that it had been a long and interesting day. He said in some respects the present conversation had been as interesting

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 169.

as any that had yet taken place. He thought his and Shevardnadze's dialogue more and more had the character of a true exchange: on the one hand views were shared concerning broad developments; on the other hand solutions were discussed to particular problems which the U.S. and the Soviet Union were attempting to solve. Such conversations increased his respect for Shevardnadze. He expressed his appreciation for the opportunity to explore with his counterpart those deep trends which affected the world now and that would continue to do so in the future.

*Shevardnadze* expressed similar sentiments. The evening concluded shortly after 10 p.m.

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## 175. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 23, 1988, 9 a.m.–12:10 p.m.

### SUBJECT

*The Secretary's Meeting with Shevardnadze—Third Small Group Meeting: Regional Issues, Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk Speech, Nuclear Testing, Conventional Arms Control, Krasnoyarsk Radar*

### PARTICIPANTS

#### U.S.

George P. Shultz, Secretary of State  
Colin Powell, National Security Advisor to the President  
Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of State\*  
Richard Solomon, Director, Policy Planning Staff\*  
MGEN William Burns, Director, ACDA\*  
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)  
Jack Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR

#### USSR

Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister  
Vladimir Polyakov, Head, Near East Department, MFA\*  
Viktor P. Karpov, Head, Arms Control & Disarmament Directorate, MFA\*  
Sergey Tarasenko, MFA  
Yuriy V. Dubinin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.  
Igor Palenykh, Soviet Ambassador to the Nuclear Testing Talks\*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Ministerial Memcons. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Ridgway. Vershbow initiated for Ridgway. The meeting took place in Shultz's office at the Department of State.

Paul Robinson, U.S. Ambassador  
to the Nuclear Testing Talks\*  
Charles Thomas, Deputy Assistant  
Secretary of State (EUR)\*  
Jay Castillo\*  
Alexander R. Vershbow, Director,  
Office of Soviet Union Affairs  
(notetaker)  
William Hopkins (interpreter)

Oleg Grinevskiy, Ambassador at  
Large, MFA\*  
Yevgeniy Zolotov, Soviet Embassy  
(notetaker)  
Pavel Palazhchenko, MFA  
(interpreter)

\* for portions of the meeting only

The meeting opened with an exchange of pleasantries about the ongoing Olympic Games. *Shevardnadze* commented that it was good the games were proceeding normally. The atmosphere was good. He knew the U.S. had had some concerns, but it seemed that order was being maintained and he hoped it would continue.

*The Secretary* suggested that the nuclear testing Ambassadors be summoned for discussion with the Ministers. He said he had also asked ACDA Director Burns and our verification expert Jay Castillo to talk with Ambassador Karpov about the Krasnoyarsk and Gomel problems. *Ambassador Dubinin* confirmed that they had already begun to talk. *Shevardnadze* reiterated that he had an interest in achieving real clarity on this question so that there was no misunderstanding. *The Secretary* remarked that we had great confidence in our people.

*Shevardnadze* asked whether they should wait for the explosives people to arrive or begin with regional issues. *The Secretary* noted that he had asked Under Secretary Armacost to join for the regional discussion. *Shevardnadze* sent for Ambassador Polyakov.

*Shevardnadze* said there was one question he had not covered the previous day. While he understood the U.S. was not very enthusiastic about it, at some point our countries would have to begin at least at the expert level to discuss the problem of naval activities. He knew this was not a simple problem for the U.S. but we would have to begin sooner or later.

#### GORBACHEV'S KRASNOYARSK SPEECH

*The Secretary* replied that he had read with interest Gorbachev's speech at Krasnoyarsk. Some of the things that he had proposed were not interesting to the U.S. but some had potential. One issue on which Gorbachev had spoken was incidents at sea. In this area we had a good working relationship. Of course, we talked about problems on a worldwide basis, but the U.S. was ready to follow up on incidents-at-sea type issues in the context raised by Gorbachev. We supposed some of these talks would be between our military representatives; this could be very constructive.

A second subject in the Krasnarysk speech, *the Secretary* continued, were his comments about the Asian part of the Soviet Union and Soviet economic development. The U.S. had heard much about the opening up of the port of Vladivostok. He thought that Gorbachev had made some interesting comments. It was necessary to open that area up if Soviet economic relations with the U.S. and the Pacific countries were to expand. Gorbachev's proposals were general ones so at some point in our ongoing discussions we would be interested in hearing more details. To the extent that his proposals offered a basis for economic interaction, we were certainly prepared to participate. The Secretary said he had raised this in part because the draft joint statement alluded to economic subjects; we now had created one.

*Shevardnadze* said that since the Secretary had mentioned it he would not list all of the points in Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk statement. He knew the U.S. side was giving attention to that speech. He would say only that the Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk statements were characterized by one important element: a desire to replace confrontation by cooperation in that region. Instead of confrontation and standoff the Soviet side wanted more cooperative relations. Of course, the U.S. and Soviet Union both had interests in that vast region. He believed we should begin a businesslike debate on how to cooperate. Until now our course has been quite different. One of the main questions to be addressed was how to reduce the level of military competition. Of course, in order to make progress we needed expert discussions and then large-scale political decisions and concrete actions. He had to say that there had been much response to the Soviet proposal in the region. The reactions varied but overall there was much interest.

*The Secretary* said he understood Assistant Secretary Sigur was scheduled to meet with Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev in early November. This would provide an occasion to explore some of these issues, in addition to discussing the Cambodian and Korean situations.

*Shevardnadze* said he wanted to emphasize some important details. The Soviets believed it was quite realistic to discuss the question of a non-increase of nuclear weapons in that region. There were too many nuclear weapons over there. A second example was the proposal for consultations between the major naval powers on a non-increase in the levels of naval forces. The Soviets had been speaking a great deal about confidence-building measures. Shevardnadze asked why we could not discuss these on a multilateral basis: a lowering of tensions and confidence-building measures in the area where Soviet, American, Chinese and Korean interests converge. As for reducing military activity, Shevardnadze said he knew the U.S. position but believed the question had promise for the future.

*Shevardnadze* said he wanted to add that he agreed there should be discussions of the security of sea lines of communication, and that



we should have multilateral consultations on preventing incidents at sea and in the air space over the open seas. We should not postpone such discussions since they were in the interest of all countries. We should also try to decide on an international conference on turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. A conference on the subject was being prepared by the UN for 1990 and it would be good if we could find some common ground. Another point also suggested by Gorbachev concerned beginning discussions on such problems among the Soviets, the U.S. and the Chinese, as these were the permanent members of the Security Council with special responsibilities in the region.

*The Secretary* said he appreciated Shevardnadze's comments. As he had said, some of the proposals Gorbachev had made were not of interest at the present time but others did hold some promise. What we should do is have our experts at the November talks sort things out. Thus far in our East Asia talks we have had largely stiff discussions about Cambodia and Korea. We should talk about more positive things. The same applied to the Korean peninsula. The General Secretary's speech said things on this subject which would lend a different tone to our discussions. The U.S. was prepared to consider relations with North Korea after the Olympics. Beyond that, there were other positive comments which we would be prepared to discuss with respect to economic developments. Sigur would explore these in November.

*Shevardnadze* said that the economic aspects of our cooperation did deserve discussion in the spirit of Gorbachev's speech. The Soviets were ready to get together with their American colleagues and to include representatives of economic agencies. The proposals Gorbachev had made would be advantageous to people with an interest in developing economic cooperation. The Soviet side had more specific ideas about possible projects and would be ready to engage in such a discussion. The Secretary suggested that one of the things Sigur and Rogachev should try to do is work out how such an economic meeting would take place, how would it get itself organized. Shevardnadze agreed with this. The Secretary said he would ask Sigur to be ready to engage in such a discussion.

#### CAMBODIA

*Shevardnadze* said he thought we would be able to establish a rather useful dialogue on Cambodia. In the working group he understood there had been a good discussion the previous day.<sup>2</sup> One positive element was the fact that China had become involved. Whereas Beijing

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<sup>2</sup> Memoranda of conversations from the regional working group meetings are in Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Political Subject and Chronological Files, Lot 00D471, September '88 Ministerial.

used to stand off at some distance, it now had decided to become more active. The Soviet and Chinese Deputy Foreign Ministers had had a useful meeting with rather fruitful results. Consultations between the U.S. and Soviet Union were also useful. Shevardnadze asked whether his side had anything specific to add.

*Polyakov* said that in the regional group they agreed that the involvement of China has been a positive new element. *Shevardnadze* asked whether there was a discussion of the possibility of convening an international conference on Cambodia. *Polyakov* said there had been an exchange of views on this subject. Shevardnadze said he had mentioned this because the four Khmer groups all were in favor of an international conference. Perhaps the Ministers should try to take a decision on this.

*Secretary Shultz* said that on the Cambodian problem he had had a considerable series of discussions in July with the ASEAN countries, Prince Sihanouk, and the Chinese. He had sent his thoughts to Shevardnadze after each meeting. Since that time there had been the Jakarta informal meeting, which had been all right, and the Soviet meeting with the Chinese on which we had several reports. Thus the Secretary thought things were moving along but certain ingredients still remained the key:

1. Vietnamese commitment to a withdrawal was the essential prerequisite. Shevardnadze himself had said that the Soviet Union would welcome this. The Vietnamese have made some comments and we had to press them to accept a front-end loaded timetable. This was as important an ingredient as it was in Afghanistan.

2. The U.S. shared with the Soviet Union an absolute unwillingness to take part in anything that would bring Pol Pot back into control. The U.S. had had very blunt talks with the Chinese on this and we believed they understood that point. It is a very important issue and involved China giving some assurance on cutting its support to the Khmer Rouge once the process was under way.

In the U.S. view, *the Secretary* explained, there were four different parties in Cambodia that would one way or another need to be involved: the democratic resistance, the Khmer Rouge, the current Hanoi regime, and Prince Sihanouk. Sihanouk was a figure around whom people were prepared to rally. This was something that was not present in Afghanistan. For everything necessary to occur there would need to be international involvement of some kind, the Secretary added. Whether or not this would take the form of an international conference or some other kind of international role on the ground we did not know. Obviously the UN would have to be the organizing point.

On U.S. relations with Vietnam, *the Secretary* said we would like to establish more normal relations but this would require getting the POW/MIA issue out of the way. This was a humanitarian issue. It

seemed to go on and off the agenda; right now we were at a more progressive stage. We hoped this could continue so we could get the issue out of the way. And of course, in addition to the POW/MIA issue, Vietnam needed to come to grips with the Cambodian problem. If these issues could be dealt with satisfactorily we would be prepared to step up relations with Vietnam. We have said as much publicly as well as privately.

Returning to Cambodia, *the Secretary* said the Chinese had offered an interesting formula: none of the factions should have control and none should have in its leadership people objectionable to the others. This was their solution to dealing with the Pol Pot question, at least as expressed to the Secretary by Deng Xiao Ping. If we added some kind of international presence as well, this would not be a bad formula. *Under Secretary Armacost* added that this would be a procedural way of ensuring a coalition that would be broadly acceptable. *The Secretary* noted that this was an area where we shared a common view with the Chinese.

*Shevardnadze* said that on the question of a Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, the Soviets had every reason to say that the Vietnamese were ready to act as they had promised. In fact, they were doing so in practice. He believed the Vietnamese supported a general dialogue among the Cambodian parties. He agreed with the Secretary that Sihanouk was an interesting person and, to a substantial degree, the key to a settlement. Sihanouk's dialogue with Hun Sen was developing in a good way and this process did not exclude the participation of other forces. A very interesting element was the fact that the Chinese seemed to have decided on a way to build on their relations with the Khmer Rouge and Pol Pot by, on the one hand, having relations with the grass roots of the group and, on the other hand, maintaining separate relations with the leader. There was more clarity in the Chinese approach than in the past.

But no matter how the Cambodian dialogue develops and regardless of the fact that in the final analysis the solution was up to the Cambodian people, *Shevardnadze* said the Soviet Union felt that international guarantees were necessary. This was why Moscow was pushing the idea of an international conference. The Soviets did not rule out the possibility of international guarantees by the UN Security Council and other forms of verification. Vietnam was a small country with big problems and therefore a settlement without some international assistance—especially by the UN and the five Permanent Representatives—would be difficult. These were the Soviets' general suggestions. They believed a process was underway and it was good that the U.S. and the USSR were interacting.

As for U.S.-Vietnamese relations, *Shevardnadze* said he had recently spoken with the Vietnamese Foreign Minister and leadership. For their

part they favored expanding relations with the U.S. They understood there was a special problem with the MIAs and were trying to give assistance. The Soviets and the Vietnamese believed the situation was ripe for progress. The Vietnamese were quite positive on this.

#### NUCLEAR TESTING

At this point the Ambassadors Robinson and Palenykh arrived. *Shevardnadze* said he hoped the Ambassadors would not explode the Ministers.

*The Secretary*, addressing his remarks to Ambassador Robinson, said that he and *Shevardnadze* had had the idea of asking each of the NTT Ambassadors to come and hear the Ministers' conviction that it was definitely possible to get the protocols for the PNET and TTBT finished this year—indeed, the sooner the better. There was certainly plenty of time for President Reagan to submit these protocols to Congress before he leaves office. This should preferably take place in the fall. He understood that the sides were fairly close on the PNET and that considerable work had already been done on the TTBT. The principal thing, the Secretary said, was to impart to the Ambassadors the notion that problems should be solved.

*Shevardnadze* said he agreed with what the Secretary had said. What the two Ministers were interested in was the time factor. The previous day they had spoken of the desirability of work being completed to end the Vienna meeting. This was also realistic. When the Ministers meet in Vienna they could be able to assess and report what had been accomplished on nuclear testing. The Secretary reiterated that the pressure was on, although we must get a good agreement.

*Ambassador Robinson* said that he and his Soviet counterpart could feel the pressure. They arrived at the ministerial with nine unresolved issues in the PNET protocol. They had been able immediately to resolve three of the most longstanding questions and had done preparatory work which he believed reduced the areas of disagreement to one or possibly two issues. Perhaps they could reduce this to zero although it depended on work that would take place that afternoon.

*The Secretary* commented that it would be good if they could reflect this progress in the joint statement: that all basic issues had been resolved.

*Ambassador Palenykh* said that a great deal of work had been done on the text of the PNET protocol. The previous day the working group had removed many brackets in the draft agreement and Ambassador Robinson was correct that most of the principal questions will be resolved. The one question remaining was that of the yield threshold at which the right to conduct on-site inspections would begin. The U.S. proposed 25 kilotons, the Soviet Union 50 kilotons. The Soviet proposal

was based on ideas the U.S. had previously raised in the last round. However, the U.S. had injected a new element and this had created a sticking point. If this could be resolved, work on the PNET could be finished soon.

With respect to the TTBT, *Palenykh* said, the Soviets were now analyzing the results of the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE). Experts were working hard on the data and would compare notes beginning in mid-October. With these results it would be possible to draft specific language for the TTBT protocol. Nonetheless, despite this need for study, if work were conducted intensively they should be able to meet the deadline set by Secretary Shultz.

*Shevardnadze* asked how many weeks after mid-October would be required. *Palenykh* replied that 4 to 6 weeks of hard work would probably be enough. The experts, however, had to analyze the results of the JVE before this could begin. As Ambassador Robinson had said, a great deal of work on the legal aspects had already been done. Now the important thing was to get the technical issues resolved and find the right mix of seismic and hydrodynamic measures. So with further work the TTBT could be finished. The PNET could be finished in one month.

*Shevardnadze* asked whether the TTBT could be finished before the end of the year. *Palenykh* said it was possible if the sides pushed hard. *Shevardnadze* said the sides should accelerate work on both protocols. There should not be any insurmountable obstacles.

*Palenykh* said he did not think there were any such obstacles; we just needed to bring our positions a little closer. Although our scientists sometimes had different views, solutions should be found. The JVE showed that we could resolve difficult technical questions together and this same result should show up in the protocols. For the purposes of the joint statement, *Palenykh* added, the sides could note that both expressed satisfaction over the successful conduct of the JVE; that they were close to completion of work on the PNET protocol; and that Ministers had instructed their delegations to intensify work on the TTBT protocol.

*Shevardnadze* commented that he didn't like such words as "maximize" and "intensify." *Palenykh* said that they could set a firm date for completing the PNET, but in the case of the TTBT they could only say it could be finished before the end of the year. *Shevardnadze* said the end of November would be even better. *Palenykh* said the scientists might object to this.

*The Secretary* said that if the teams reconvened in mid-October, they should try to reduce the amount of further work from six to four weeks. *Palenykh* said they needed four weeks for the PNET, but the TTBT would require more work and analysis. *Shevardnadze* commented that there were three months from now to November. *General Powell*

suggested setting the goal of Thanksgiving and *the Secretary* added: "And don't deliver us a turkey." *Palenykh* said that the date of the second JVE was a driving consideration. We now needed weeks and months to absorb the data, but he agreed it was desirable to set some deadlines.

*The Secretary* said he hoped the Ambassadors felt the fact that at the political level their leaders would like to see them finish the job. Therefore, if the Ambassadors ran into problems and needed to refer back to capitals they should know they would find people there ready to resolve disputes quickly. *Robinson* said he did not disagree on the bottom line. He wanted to add some comment on the outstanding issue in the PNET protocol. The Soviet proposal had previously been to allow hydrodynamic measurement for any PNE, whereas the U.S. had earlier proposed hydrodynamic measurements only for tests over 50 kilotons. After considering the Soviet proposal we saw some value in having inspections below 50 kilotons in order to plug some loopholes, and came up with a 25 kiloton trigger. We thought this would be readily acceptable, but then the Soviets returned to the original U.S. position of 50 kilotons as the trigger for all inspections. In other words, some time in the summer our trains passed. *Palenykh* said that *Robinson* had not made clear that the on-site inspections proposed by the U.S. were different from those the Soviets had first proposed. They included a large set of elements that did not represent simple acceptance of the Soviet position but a much broader set of procedures. The Soviets did not believe these were necessary in the area between 25 and 50 kilotons, but they were looking for a way out.

*Robinson* said that with respect to the TTBT the negotiating record showed that this had initially been negotiated very quickly, whereas the PNET had taken longer and thus provided a better basis on which the sides could now build. The protocol that we had negotiated was even better than the 1976 protocol of the PNET. The outstanding question was how quickly we could establish acceptable conditions for the operation of one another's experts at our test sites. This was an area where governments could help the negotiators.

*Secretary Shultz* concluded this portion of the discussion by urging the Ambassadors to get back to work and find a solution to the 25/50 problem. *Shevardnadze* said he was in full solidarity with *Secretary Shultz*. He suggested that the negotiators give the Ministers a list of what they wanted governments to resolve. As in the Olympics, they should go for the gold medal. *The Secretary* said there were two gold medals waiting.

#### KOREAN PENINSULA

*Shevardnadze* said he wanted to add a few words on Korea. We had seen certain trends emerging that pointed toward a better dialogue

between the North and South. We believed the Olympics were contributing to that process. There had been some interesting suggestions by the North. Moscow also believed that South Korean ideas deserve special attention. The Soviets supported contacts that had already been initiated such as meetings between parliaments and at other levels. In addition to North-South contacts, the North Korean leadership has been expressing a readiness to engage in a dialogue with the United States. They had asked the Soviets to pass this to Washington; it could be that conditions have ripened for an improvement in U.S.–DPRK relations.

*Secretary Shultz* said he agreed the Olympics were so far moving forward without disruption. He was sure Moscow had helped in influencing the North Koreans to this end. The U.S. viewed the statement by South Korean President Noh Tae Woo of July 7 as very important—a shift of gears in its statement of readiness for new flexibility on North-South contacts and contacts with the North by other countries. He agreed with Shevardnadze that encouraging a direct North-South dialogue was a good idea. In his speech at Krasnoyarsk, Gorbachev had spoken of greater trade with South Korea and this was a very interesting point. On the other side of the coin we saw that Moscow was still supplying sophisticated new weaponry to North Korea and this was a major problem. We were, however, pleased with the compromise reached on the inscription item for the ROK on the occasion of its 40th anniversary. The ROK's proposal to speak at the UN was designed to further the ongoing positive developments and not to promote confrontation. The Soviet Union had played a constructive role in this.

Regarding U.S. relations with North Korea, *the Secretary* said we were prepared to review our policy after the Olympics. The key things that would influence our decisions were: (1) toning down of the vitriolic anti-U.S. propaganda by the North; (2) return of the remains of five U.S. soldiers that had been held by the DPRK; and (3) creating a more fruitful tone for the discussions on military CBMs at Panmunjom. As Shevardnadze knew, the U.S. had started down the road of improving contacts a few years ago, but after the sabotage of a Korean airliner—which we believed was carried out by North Korea<sup>3</sup>—we broke off the process. Now we were ready to review things again. But he stressed that, as in so many areas, the Korean peninsula was an example of the more promising regional dialogue we have developed. He supposed Soviet influence was in part responsible for the favorable developments there.

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<sup>3</sup> See footnote 8, Document 123.



*Shevardnadze* replied that the Secretary's comments provided a good basis for businesslike discussions. He would talk to his friends in North Korea in order to give them an idea of what had been said.

#### AFGHANISTAN

*Shevardnadze* said that the signing of the Geneva accords had been an extraordinary event. He thought it would be correct to say that after the signing, a complicated and difficult process had begun, but one which was aimed at moving toward a solution. Today, however, the Geneva accords were threatened. We were in a situation in which one side was complying faithfully with all provisions while the other ignored them.

*Shevardnadze* said he did not want to build up a tense atmosphere in this meeting, but there were many facts that he could cite. The Soviets had completed the first stage of their withdrawal and had honestly complied with all aspects of the agreement. There could not be any serious accusations against the Afghan side. Some allegations had been made by Pakistan but the Soviets had checked, as had international observers, and none of these violations had been confirmed; this was only natural because the Afghans had an interest in complying with the accords. The Soviets were prepared to continue carrying out the schedule of withdrawals and to help in the process of forming a coalition government. But the other side was acting unscrupulously. The Pakistanis were violating all provisions of the Geneva accord. The Soviets had cleared many of the routes of mines, only to see these being used for the supply of arms. Whole caravans of weapons were moving along the roads and the conditions for the Afghan people were becoming worse.

*Shevardnadze* said his second concern was the fact that camps in Pakistan continued to exist without change, serving as training grounds for armed groups. A so-called transitional government was functioning on Pakistani territory and issuing openly anti-Afghan propaganda. So nothing had changed. If anything, the situation was now more grave. This was the policy advocated by the former Pakistani President, and it seemed the current leadership was unable to change direction.

*Shevardnadze* said the Soviet Union, for its part, wanted to honestly comply with all its obligations, but if interference continued the Soviets might be forced to review this policy. This would not be a desirable development. The Soviets knew their responsibility and how significant it would be to change course with respect to their own interests and the cause of promoting regional settlements in general. "But look at the other side," he said: Pakistan was a friend of the U.S. Under Secretary Armacost had met with Pak leaders. Perhaps they should consider the possibility that the Soviet Union might revise its schedule of with-

drawal. Soviet withdrawal, after all, was what the Pakistanis wanted most. So how would a delay affect their own internal situation, which was rather complicated at present? Shevardnadze said he was suggesting that some way be found to exert influence on the Pakistani leadership to make them comply with the Geneva Accords. He would be meeting with Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan in New York and intended to have a very principled discussion with him. It would be good if the U.S. exerted its influence as well.

Continuing, *Shevardnadze* said that the Soviets had a real interest in establishing dialogue among the Afghan parties. But any attempt to ignore the PDPA was inadmissible. They represented a significant force, with armed strength of 250,000 men. The domestic opposition as well as the internal and external resistance had many problems. The regime, in comparison, represented the most organized force. At the same time, *Shevardnadze* said, the Soviets did not want the PDPA to preserve a monopoly of power. Moscow wanted to see a real coalition government. Together the U.S. and the USSR could help establish a dialogue.

For its part, *Shevardnadze* explained, the PDPA was ready to talk even to Hekmatyar,<sup>4</sup> the most extreme resistance leader, to Khalis, as well as to the moderates with whom they were already able to deal. The Afghan regime was also ready to negotiate with the leaders of the internal opposition. He noted that 18 provincial leaders were former members of the opposition who had once been engaged in armed struggle. This showed that a coalition government was not just a matter of words but something that was being done in practice. The cabinet also showed this fact with 19 of 30 ministers from the opposition or non-party members. *Shevardnadze* said the RA Prime Minister, who had just visited Moscow, was a very interesting politician who had a broad mind; he used to work for Zaher Shah. Other Afghan figures were also ready for true power-sharing. So the Soviets felt it was very important that we work together and try to push for a settlement of the Afghan problem.

It was one thing to sign an accord and another to get the problem resolved, *Shevardnadze* asserted. He repeated that the Afghans are ready to negotiate with Zaher Shah and believed that he should accept some post in the government; which post this would be was something to be negotiated. There were also some important figures now living in the U.S. who should participate. The Foreign Minister added that Cordovez's proposals were very interesting and should form the basis for an internal dialogue.

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<sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Document 123.

*Shevardnadze* said the Soviets had lodged very serious complaints against Pakistan for practices amounting to state terrorism. When a country encourages mass bombings of peaceful towns with explosions all the time, there was nothing to compare it with; this was unprecedented behavior. While we might be outraged by events on the West Bank, they were nothing compared to what was happening in Afghanistan. *Shevardnadze* described a recent incident in which a car packed with 1.5 tons of explosives had been found in the center of Kabul. Thousands of people could have been killed if it had not been detected. The Soviets had spoken to the Pakistanis about this.

*Shevardnadze* said that as a result of Soviet exchanges with the U.S., Moscow had tried to tone down its statements toward Pakistan in the interest of promoting a final settlement. In U.S.-Soviet relations, Afghanistan was and remains the central problem among the regional issues. The Ministers' exchanges have been very useful, as have Soviet meetings with Under Secretary Armacost. But the Soviets felt that we should proceed from consultations to more specific things. He had recently met with the new Pakistani Ambassador to Moscow, Abdul Sattar (a very solid diplomat) and he had told the Soviets that Armacost was urging him to find common ground. If this were true, the Soviets could only welcome it.

*Shevardnadze* recalled that Gorbachev had told the President that Afghanistan was the touchstone in our relations. The Soviets had made a hard political decision that was in the U.S. as well as Soviet interest. Movement had begun toward a settlement; let us now join our efforts to achieve a final settlement. The Soviets did not want to look for other options such as revising the Geneva accords. This was possible, but not desirable.

*Shevardnadze* added that it was noteworthy that India was now speaking out for the progressive forces in Afghanistan, while also supporting a coalition government. Many groups within Afghanistan were also for a progressive regime. The Chinese had substantially altered their view because they understood just what Islamic fundamentalism would mean. Recently there had been changes in the Iranian attitude. In sum, the attitudes of Afghanistan's neighbors were evolving in favor of a solid and substantial settlement.

*Secretary Shultz* replied that he appreciated *Shevardnadze's* comments. The U.S. wanted to be a constructive force. He wanted to lay out how the U.S. saw the current situation. First of all, the goal we wanted to reach was an Afghanistan that was governed according to the wishes of its own people and was neutral and non-aligned. Our behavior was guided by that overarching objective. *Shevardnadze* interjected to say the Soviets also wanted a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan.

*The Secretary*, continuing, said that at the time of the signing of the Geneva Accords we had made clear that we did not recognize the current regime as a legitimate one and that we considered ourselves free to support those we have been supporting; the Geneva agreement would not affect this. We had had lots of discussions in this room on the subject. We agreed that in order for our shared objective to be achieved, Soviet withdrawal was essential. Shevardnadze had told him this was the Soviet intention some time ago—that the Soviets expected to be out before the end of 1988, although the deadline was February 15, 1989. It was obvious that Soviet withdrawal is the key condition to a settlement in Afghanistan.

Regarding Pakistan, *the Secretary* said that as far as we knew UNGOMAP, having investigated Soviet and RA allegation, had no real criticisms of Pakistani behavior. The major reason was that the military forces inside Afghanistan were already well supplied and did not need additional weapons. Moreover, they had been very successful in capturing stockpiles of weapons from the Afghan Army and had built themselves up into a formidable fighting force, as well as developing strong popular backing. The Secretary said the U.S. had concerns about Soviet and PDPA activity. We saw military options in support of the regime rather than being confined to self-defense of withdrawing Soviet troops (which Gorbachev had said was the Soviet intention). We saw cross-border air raids and had concrete evidence, including one captured pilot who had subsequently been returned. We saw evidence of high-altitude bombings, including bombings from Soviet airfields, and we continued to be deeply concerned about new mine-laying and difficulties in clearing existing minefields such as by failing to provide maps to the UN. The Secretary reiterated that the U.S. commitment to the security of Pakistan was very deep. Any intrusions into Pakistani territory were of great concern to us.

With respect to our own actions, *the Secretary* said we had urged the resistance to exercise the maximum restraint and not to make it difficult for the Soviets to withdraw. There were still three million refugees in Pakistan and two million in Iran; we would like to see them returned. If there was going to be an Afghan government that reflected the wishes of the Afghan people, those outside the country should be brought back; their presence would probably be a stabilizing force.

*The Secretary* reiterated that mines remained a great inhibition to the return of refugees. He believed that more could be done to remove existing mines and stop further mine-laying. To the extent that the Mujahidin were laying mines we had expressed our views to them. He urged the Soviets to clear the mines and support Prince Sadruddin's efforts in mine awareness and mine-clearing. As for economic and

humanitarian aid, the Secretary said we understood the Soviets were committed to giving multilateral assistance through the UN. Half of U.S. humanitarian assistance was going to multilateral programs (about \$70 million). Another \$70 million were being provided on a direct basis. We intended to continue our bilateral programs but expected to move in the direction of more multilateral aid, whereby more mileage could be obtained. We would be interested in hearing about Soviet aid plans. We thought that efforts to improve the quality of life inside Afghanistan would improve the overall atmosphere.

With respect to a political settlement and a transitional government, *the Secretary* said we thought it would be desirable to construct such a government; we supported Pakistani efforts and those of Cordovez to bring this about. Perhaps Shevardnadze should discuss this subject further with Yaqub Khan, who we understood might have some further thoughts. Any proposal for a coalition government had to meet one simple test: Will it get support from organized groups inside Afghanistan? This was not something the U.S. or Soviet Union could impose; he was only offering an analytical statement. Any accord that took place under the auspices of the PDPA would not be supported by the Mujahidin. Different auspices needed to emerge and the U.S. was ready to be part of the solution.

*The Secretary* reiterated that we had always urged that, as Soviet troops withdrew, there should be a transitional government. It was desirable to put such a process in motion, but hard to bring about in practical terms. The U.S. believed that steps which encouraged the refugees to return and the Afghans to think about their own future would have a positive impact. Multilateral humanitarian aid would help in this regard. The Secretary said he too would be meeting with Yaqub Khan, as would President Reagan. We would share our analysis and inform Yakub of what Shevardnadze had said. We thought that the Geneva Accords, even with our current differences, represented a major achievement.

*Armacost* noted that there were many ideas on an interim government floating around right now. Yaqub Khan had some ideas he wanted to test with Shevardnadze. Zaher Shah had others, but he wanted to underscore what Secretary Shultz had said: The test of whether a proposal was viable was not whether *we* liked it, but whether the Afghan people would support it.

*Shevardnadze* said he agreed with this. The U.S. and USSR could contribute to the dialogue and encourage it along, but they could not form the transitional government. Nevertheless, without a dialogue with the current regime on the part of Zaher Shah and the Peshawar Seven, there would not be an interim government. So this was the basis on which to proceed: encouraging a dialogue.

*Shevardnadze* stated that the information possessed by the U.S. about alleged Afghan violations was inaccurate. It would be illogical for them to engage in such raids. The Soviets had made a sincere proposal in asking Pakistan for specific proof; but they didn't have any proof. It was possible for planes accidentally to stray over the border into Pakistani territory but there had been no raids. As for mines, *Shevardnadze* said the Soviets were presenting maps of minefields to the UN. The real problem, he added, was that the opposition was out of control. After roads that had been mined had been cleared, convoys of rebel troops were moving along them. The return of the refugees was underway with 250,000 already back, and these people were getting Soviet assistance. He said Soviet contributions to the international fund were twice that of the U.S. and urged the U.S. to help in international channels as well.

*Shevardnadze* said he wanted to suggest that the Foreign Ministers of the four signatories to the Geneva Accords meet in New York to assess the situation, perhaps with the presence of the Secretary General. Such a meeting would not be a forum to complain, but a place to evaluate the situation and perhaps make decisions on how to deepen the process of implementing the accord. If the Secretary was not prepared to answer this proposal today perhaps he could do so tomorrow. The Soviets had in mind a short meeting of 1 to 1½ hours to review further implementation of the Geneva Accords.

*The Secretary* asked which four Foreign Ministers *Shevardnadze* had in mind, U.S., USSR, Pakistan, and China? *Shevardnadze* replied that he meant the Afghans not the Chinese. *The Secretary* rejoined that we do not recognize the Kabul regime. He recalled that the signing procedure in Geneva had been a very strange one.

*Shevardnadze* said he remembered this well, but he thought the U.S. could make a similar statement after the meeting as it had in Geneva. He again urged that the Secretary think about it. It would be useful to show that those who had signed the Geneva Accords were ready to complete the work.

*The Secretary* replied that the U.S. was ready to try to be a part of the solution and was not interested in creating more problems. We were on the side of greater stability.

*Shevardnadze* said he wanted to emphasize again the Soviet position and the Soviet interest. As he had said clearly, the Soviets want to deal with a neutral Afghanistan. The USSR had excellent relations with Finland, with good neighborly cooperation. Future Soviet-Afghan relations could be at the same level as Soviet-Finnish relations, and Moscow expected the U.S. would have relations in the future with a neutral Afghanistan. He urged the Secretary again to think about the proposal for a meeting in New York of the four signatories of the Geneva Accords.

*Shevardnadze* then suggested that the Ministers bring in their conventional arms control experts. *The Secretary* agreed but said that he first wanted to say a few words about other regional issues.

#### SOUTHERN AFRICA

*The Secretary* said there had been a lot of progress on a Namibia/Angola accord. The Soviet role had been constructive and this was a good example of cooperative efforts aimed at achieving concrete results. Another round of talks was about to take place. The key question now was to get a front-loaded withdrawal schedule and to bring about national reconciliation talks between UNITA and the MPLA. The U.S. had the feeling the Soviets were trying to help, and there was a major head of steam building up among African leaders. The Secretary assured *Shevardnadze* that Savimbi was ready to come to the table and be a reasonable interlocutor.

*Shevardnadze* said he did not have much comment to offer. The Soviets noted the importance of the process of achieving a settlement and reconciliation in southern Africa and also noted the active work of U.S. representatives. The USSR was only an observer but was trying to do what it could. The Soviets welcomed the U.S. role in the process and would try to contribute to the further developments. The Soviets understood that the key problem was the timetable for Cuban troop withdrawal. This, he said, would have to be resolved in the negotiations. As for Moscow exerting its influence toward reducing the length of the timetable, Soviet possibilities were limited.

*Shevardnadze* added that with respect to internal reconciliation inside Angola, this was a very sensitive issue and any activity on the part of the Soviet Union could have a negative impact. The Soviets had been pushing the Afghans toward national reconciliation but there was a different kind of situation in Angola; Moscow did not want to interfere. The Angolans first needed to get more ripe for national reconciliation. The Soviet Union wanted to be actively involved but in the final analysis it was up to the parties themselves. *Shevardnadze* added that he did not rule out the possibility of a further meeting with the Angolan leadership in the near future. On that occasion, the Soviets would discuss all problems in an effort to resolve the conflict.

#### MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

On the Middle East, *the Secretary* said the situation was very dangerous and it was hard to bring the parties to a realistic appraisal of their own positions. He had recently given a speech which he had sent to *Shevardnadze*; that statement was designed to be brutally frank with everyone. Israel had to face up to certain things, as did the Palestinians. The U.S. believed it was essential to keep the notion of the peace process alive. We had discussed the general lines of a settlement. It seemed



that U.S. and Soviet views on an international conference—both its immediate and longer-term role—were coming closer. In any case, if we could keep the process alive, there might be something to discuss after the Israeli elections.

*Shevardnadze* said he also believed our two countries were cooperating constructively on the Middle East. He appreciated the importance of the Secretary's Middle East missions and knew this was a very difficult effort. At the same time, the situation was getting very complicated with the rebellion in the West Bank and the Israeli response. In the wake of King Hussein's disengagement from the West Bank, progress depended on a political program being presented by the Palestinians and on how Israel would behave. In that context, some new possibilities were opening up in addition to an international conference (which the Soviets had long supported and which had realistic prospects). *Shevardnadze* proposed that we study the possibility of a direct Palestinian-Israeli dialogue by arranging a meeting between Israeli Foreign Minister Peres and Yassir Arafat. The Soviet Union would like to consult with the U.S. on this. Moscow had seen signals on both sides in favor of such a meeting. The Soviets understood there were problems on the Israeli side with respect to the Prime Minister, but a meeting between Arafat and Peres could be promising. Perhaps sure a meeting could be arranged with the participation of the Secretary General and the five permanent UNSC members, without excluding the participation of other involved parties.

*The Secretary* asked whether *Shevardnadze* meant other Arab countries and Israel. *Shevardnadze* said this was correct; perhaps this could be arranged, although the main participants would be Arafat and Peres. He added that this was one possibility; it might not be a realistic one, but Soviet representatives were searching for something. Why didn't we have preliminary consultations? *Shevardnadze* said he was planning to have meetings in New York with Arafat and Peres.

*The Secretary* expressed puzzlement. He did not believe Arafat was coming to New York. *Polyakov* corrected his Minister, explaining that he would be meeting with Kaddumi and not Arafat. *Shevardnadze* said perhaps we could invite Arafat to New York. In any case, he said, more realism was now becoming evident on the part of the Palestinians.

*Shevardnadze* then said he wanted to set forth the basis on which the Soviets believed the dialogue should be conducted:

—An international legal basis for a Palestinian state provided in UN resolution 181.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> UNGA Resolution of 181 of November 29, 1947, also known as the Partition Plan of Palestine.

- Acceptance of resolutions 242 and 338.<sup>6</sup>
- Solution of the problem of refugees on the basis of relevant UN decisions.
- Granting the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and establishment of their own independent state.
- Establishment of a confederative union of that state with Jordan.
- Recognition of the right of Israel to exist.
- Renunciation of terror or violence in the spirit of the Cairo declaration.
- Convening of an international conference to be attended by all parties concerned, including the PLO and the five permanent representatives of the UN.

These elements take into account suggestions the Secretary had made, Shevardnadze explained. They also incorporated ideas proposed by Peres and those proposed by the Palestinian leadership. The Soviets would not say these points provided a universally acceptable basis, but they were a solid point of departure.

*Shevardnadze* said that previous Soviet comments on the convening of an international conference remained valid, but Moscow was dissatisfied on one point. The Soviets had spoken in the past of creating a preparatory committee and they thought it unfortunate that the U.S. had not supported this. If American support had been available, things would have already begun to move. He suggested, however, that the platform he had described above could be the basis for work, asking whether we should otherwise negate all this.

*The Secretary* agreed we needed to keep working but the basic points Shevardnadze had laid out were not all realistic. Resolution 181 envisaged a territorial arrangement that was out of the question today. The facts on the ground precluded such a solution, just as they precluded a return to 1967 borders. Moreover we could not negotiate as if the only issue was the structure of a Palestinian state that has already been agreed upon. There were many who did not agree on the desirability of a Palestinian state, including the U.S. and perhaps every Arab country, if their leaders were asked privately. Self-determination was a good principle, but tricky in its application. What it had come to mean in the Middle East was an independent Palestinian state and nothing else, so it was not a principle we could support for that reason.

*The Secretary* added that he personally believed that the right course for now was to do things that maintain the spirit of the peace process and the image that we were discussing issues constructively. But for the near term he thought the Israelis would look at any new idea strictly in terms of how it would affect their election. A meeting between Arafat and Peres before the election would be out of the question.

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<sup>6</sup> See footnote 4, Document 44.

Moreover the PLO must agree to other points on Shevardnadze's list starting with a statement that they are ready to negotiate. The position they take in negotiations is up to them—they could advocate an independent Palestinian state if they wished—and this would become an issue that the negotiating process needed to address. But first they had to accept the necessary conditions to begin the negotiations.

*Shevardnadze* said, "all right, but we should continue to think about the problem." We needed to consider the fact that after King Hussein's statement, the PLO was acquiring a new status. Many things were changing and already had changed. If these developments were to be ignored it would be hard to find a common denominator.

*The Secretary* replied that the PLO had acquired a new opportunity, but whether it acquired new status would depend on what it did with that opportunity. The history of the Middle East was one of missed opportunities. This was why he thought the task now was to hold open the opportunities and to recognize that, one month before a key election in Israel, it would be very difficult to get Israeli politicians to do anything bold. He noted that Peres had called explicitly for Israel to trade land for peace. This was very bold in Israeli political terms, although there was the obvious question of what land would be traded.

*Shevardnadze* agreed the situation was very complex. *The Secretary* added that it was also explosive.

*Shevardnadze* concurred: it was more explosive and potentially more troublesome than Iran-Iraq, Cambodia and other regional conflicts. He noted that he and the Secretary had spoken the previous day about ballistic missile technology; the spread of this technology created a dangerous situation in the Middle East. Pushing the peace process forward was very difficult but postponing decisions was very dangerous. He suggested that the ministers note in their joint statement that they were in favor of convening an international conference and for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East dispute.

*The Secretary* reminded *Shevardnadze* that what he favored was direct negotiations among the parties. We supported a conference only if it was a helpful way of getting to direct talks.

*Shevardnadze* said this was what he meant.

#### CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

At this point Ambassador Grinevskiy and Mr. Thomas joined the discussion to discuss conventional arms control. *Grinevskiy* reported that at their working group he and Thomas had discussed a broad range of issues, in accordance with his minister's instructions. The sides had given particular attention to the problem of excluding fighter aircraft from the mandate of the new conventional arms talks. Normally the sides had been able to report some mutual understanding, but

unfortunately on this occasion they had not been able to reach agreement. In effect, Grinevskiy said, he could only report an impasse. The Soviets had presented the following arguments for excluding fighter aircraft:

—Such aircraft were not part of the potential for surprise attack, prevention of which was an agreed objective of the future negotiations;

—Fighter aircraft were a counterbalance to those elements of NATO forces that were not covered, such as carrier-based aircraft.

*Grinevskiy* said the U.S. had objected to the exclusion of fighter aircraft by presenting the following three arguments: that fighter aircraft also had a powerful offensive potential and could not be distinguished from strike aircraft; that the issue had been injected by the Soviet Union at the final stage of the mandate talks and was a delaying tactic; and that exclusion of fighter aircraft from the mandate would not prevent the Soviet Union from raising the exclusion of such aircraft in the negotiations themselves.

*Shevardnadze* commented that his representative had complied with his instructions. *Thomas* commented that *Grinevskiy* had accurately described the U.S. position on the exclusion of fighter aircraft. He wanted to underscore that if the Soviets insisted on including this phrase in the mandate, it would ensure that there would be no way to finish the mandate in a reasonable time. This was normally the kind of question that was not addressed in the mandate discussions, since it was a counting rule problem best addressed in the negotiations themselves. If the Soviets dropped their language there would be no impediment in the mandate to raising fighter aircraft exclusion in the negotiations themselves. The U.S. would not agree with this, but it could be discussed. He reiterated that if the Soviets dropped the language they would lose nothing and would speed up the process of completing the Vienna meeting. *Thomas* added that the West had accepted the proposal that had been made by *Karpov* to *Genscher* during his recent visit to Moscow and, in doing so, we had been extremely forthcoming. He repeated that unless the issue were dropped it probably could not be settled for a long time, if at all, since we could not discriminate between fighter aircraft and other aircraft.

*Shevardnadze* said the Soviet Union had taken on board the argument that they could raise this issue at the negotiations themselves. This made it possible to look for a way out of the impasse. He said the Soviet Union perhaps could accept no direct mention of fighter aircraft exclusion in the mandate. To this end, it had the previous day composed a new text. A paper was handed over to the U.S. representatives (attached).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Not found attached.

After the U.S. side had reviewed the text, *Thomas* said that it appeared that there was a possibility to work out an agreement on the basis of the new Soviet proposal, but some items needed to be discussed at length. Perhaps he and *Grinevskiy* should get together again.

*Shevardnadze* replied that he wanted to say frankly that all U.S. arguments and concerns had been taken into account to the maximum extent possible. This was the most that could be done; all elements of NATO language were incorporated.

*Thomas* replied that one element was missing: that nuclear weapons would not be a subject of the negotiation.

*Shevardnadze* replied that it was, in fact, in the text. It was then discovered that the Soviet courtesy translation had omitted this sentence.

*The Secretary* said the Soviet proposal was very encouraging. *Thomas* said he needed to remind the Soviet side that these issues were under discussion in a multilateral negotiation in Vienna and that the U.S. could not speak unilaterally for its allies. We already had an agreed proposal based on the Karpov-Genscher formula; it would be easier if we could return to that without any change, since our allies had already accepted it.

*Grinevskiy* replied that this new proposal was based in practice on what was given to Genscher with very few changes.

*The Secretary* suggested the experts seek to minimize the differences. He noted that he would be meeting with key allies the following week in New York and perhaps on the basis of this new proposal we could bring the Vienna meeting into focus.

*Shevardnadze* said he would be having informal meetings with his own allies and with some U.S. allies. He would be having very specific discussions with Genscher, Dumas and Howe and he thought a central element of these talks would be the mandate. It would be good to have a U.S.-Soviet agreement in principle going into that week of discussions; without U.S.-Soviet agreement there could be no agreement in Vienna. He reiterated that the new Soviet proposal was a very good basis for agreement. He agreed that the experts should work on the text and if they failed to reach agreement, they should both be expelled from the country.

#### *BERLIN INITIATIVE*

*The Secretary* then suggested that they return to the question of the Krasnoyarsk radar now that Ambassador Karpov had returned. He asked for General Burns and Mr. Castillo to join the discussions as well. While waiting, the Secretary said he wanted to express U.S. disappointment that the Soviets did not see fit to move favorably on the President's Berlin initiative.

## KRASNOYARSK RADAR

Burns and Castillo joined the discussion. *General Burns* reported that he had discussed the Krasnoyarsk and Gomel issues at length with Ambassador Karpov. They agreed that the Krasnoyarsk problem needed to be resolved, but they disagreed on the extent of dismantlement and destruction that would be required. The Soviets argued that only the transmitter antenna had to be dismantled; they claimed the building could be retained and only the face of the antenna destroyed. The Soviet side also agreed that the Gomel issue could be resolved in the context of a solution to Krasnoyarsk, although the sides were unable to agree on words to reflect their present positions.

*Ambassador Karpov* said he would like to add that the Soviets had taken into account in their proposal the concerns expressed by Burns. The main difference was in the scope of the possible dismantling of the LPAR at Krasnoyarsk. The Soviets believed these questions should be given to experts for further consideration. Based on the mission of the future space research center, they could determine what should be done to the radar. To write into the text of the joint statement today the scope of the future dismantlement effort would not be possible.

*The Secretary* replied that he accepted that this might be the case, but that he believed our experts would need clear instructions. Part of their guidance should specify what space research activities would be allowed; and they should also have negative guidance, that is instructions specifying the kinds of equipment that could not be present at Krasnoyarsk when it was converted to a space research center. In short, the experts could not have an entirely free hand but rather needed instructions on the negative and the positive side.

*Karpov* said the Soviets had suggested language to the effect that their side was ready to have experts meet to develop specific measures to ensure that the Krasnoyarsk radar would be converted to an international space research center; that this would include dismantlement and destruction of specific devices there, including elements of the phased array and of the structures, along with the introduction of other equipment. This language would make clear that the only difference between the sides was the exact scope of the future dismantlement. The Soviets believed it was desirable for the experts to look at the complex aspects.

*The Secretary* said that perhaps some different language would offer a way out of the problem. *Burns* said that the sides had already discussed language and it seemed unwise to provide so general an instruction to the experts. Some rather fundamental decisions had to be made. We needed agreement that the LPAR as it currently existed—with a transmitter and a receiver—needed to be dismantled. At the

same time, the U.S. had no objection to the removal of the electronics for other uses.

*The Secretary* asked whether language could be devised which spoke of dismantling those elements which lend themselves to the long lead-time problem.

*Burns* replied that there were a number of structures at Krasnoyarsk that were suitable for use as a space research center; only two structures were of concern, the transmitter and receiver. By eliminating these structures all advantages for ABM breakout would be removed. If these were not eliminated, on the other hand, there would still be some ABM potential. The Soviet side, *Burns* explained, had suggested two things: that the transmitter be eliminated and the receiver maintained. This would preserve the less egregious half of the LPAR, but would not eliminate the whole threat. If the structure were eliminated, on the other hand, it would restore more of the lead time. In sum, there was no way the problem could be resolved if the structure were not affected in some major way.

*The Secretary* asked whether *Burns* meant to say that any language agreed had to make clear it was a particular structure which had to be dealt with. *Burns* replied that this was correct: there was only one structure involved; we were not talking about the power plants, offices or any other building that might be useful for scientific purposes.

*The Secretary* suggested that the sides reflect on this. The Ministers now needed to break to have lunch and return for the working group reports.

*Shevardnadze* said that the ministers should clarify the general approach. The Soviet side had expressed a readiness to work closely so that all elements and components would be rendered exclusively for the use of the international space research center. If the sides could not agree on language for the joint statement, they could not mention the subject at all.

*The Secretary* said the words we are looking for should state that Krasnoyarsk would not be available as a phased array radar. *Shevardnadze* urged that the sides look for more general language. *The Secretary* responded that we understood that the Soviets wanted a positive twist and we were not afraid of that. That was what we should try to achieve.



**176. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Washington, September 23, 1988, 1–2:30 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

The Secretary's Meeting with Shevardnadze: Final Plenary Session

**PARTICIPANTS**

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>USSR</i>
George P. Shultz, Secretary of State	Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Colin Powell, National Security Advisor to the President	Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)	Viktor P. Karpov, Directorate Head, Soviet MFA
Jack Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR	Yuriy V. Dubinin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
plus heads and members of working groups	plus heads and members of working groups
Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)	Pavel Palazhchenko, MFA (interpreter)

The *Secretary* opened the meeting by noting that reports had already been heard that morning from the Nuclear Testing Working Group and the Conventional Arms Working Group. The Secretary asked the Regional Working Group to complete the report it had started earlier.

*Regional Working Group*

Mr. *Solomon*, noting that both sides had agreed on common language, read the text of his report (attached).<sup>2</sup> Ambassador *Polyakhov* stated that there were no differences over principles between the two drafts of the joint statement. He said the working group would prepare a one-part joint statement. The *Secretary* and *Shevardnadze* agreed that the joint report provided an adequate basis to summarize progress in the regional working group for the joint statement.

*Bilateral Issues*

Mr. *Silins* read text of his report (attached).<sup>3</sup> Mr. *Sredin* noted that there had been tangible results in the development of bilateral relations

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S–IRM Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Ministerial Memcons, Secret. Drafted by Stephenson, Stoffer, and Wolff; cleared by Pifer and Vershbow. Vershbow initialed for the drafters and for Pifer. The meeting took place in the Monroe Room at the Department of State.

<sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed is the “Regional Working Group Report to Ministers.”

<sup>3</sup> Attached but not printed is the “Bilateral Working Group” report.

including a significant increase in contacts. The summit had given positive impulse to bilateral affairs. Issues needing to be addressed include: maritime boundaries, world pollution, atomic reactor safety, change in world climate, basic research, air and maritime transportation safety. He noted the Soviet side had expressed dissatisfaction with current trade and economic ties. Positive changes had come about in the number of regular contacts and the U.S. reaction to Soviet initiatives had been positive. He said the Soviet side had prepared a joint part for the joint statement.

*Crocker-Vasev Talks on Africa*

Assistant Secretary *Crocker*, noting that *Vasev* was not yet present, read his statement (attached).<sup>4</sup>

*START and Defense and Space Working Group*

Amb. *Nitze* read the U.S. side's report (attached).<sup>5</sup> Amb. *Obukhov* noted that the working group had addressed a wide range of issues, including aspects of the START negotiations and ABM Treaty compliance. He noted disagreement had occurred over the Krasnoyarsk radar. Special attention had been given to ALCMs and mobile ICBMs on which the Soviet Union had suggested new proposals, which the U.S. side had agreed to consider further. *Obukhov* stated that new elements on which agreement had been reached were recorded in the minutes of the working group. He said that the U.S. side had not responded to a Soviet proposal on long-range SLCMs. The issue of non-launch into space was discussed as was the issue of prohibiting an increase in existing numbers of warheads on ICBMs. Discussions on these questions would continue in Geneva. He said the Soviet side had agreed on language for inclusion into the joint statement.

*Chemical Weapons Working Group*

Assistant Secretary *Holmes* read a joint report (attached).<sup>6</sup> He added a unilateral U.S. statement pointing out the U.S. side: invited the Soviet side to join in a call for an immediate international investigation of evidence of Iraqi use of CW against its Kurdish population, and expressed its concern over the evidence that Libya has established a CW production facility and is nearing full-scale production. Amb. *Nazarkin* noted that the Soviet side too was concerned by reports of the proliferation of CW. The Soviet Union condemned not only the

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<sup>4</sup> Attached but not printed is "Summary Points—Crocker/Vasev Discussion."

<sup>5</sup> Attached but not printed is the "Report of the START and Defense and Space Working Group."

<sup>6</sup> Attached but not printed is the "Report to the Ministers by the Chemical Weapons Working Group."

transfer of CW but also their use. He added that proper consultations were needed on this issue.

*Human Rights Working Group*

Amb. *Schifter* presented his report (attached).<sup>7</sup> Mr. *Glukhov* reported that the spirit of the discussions had been open and businesslike. He noted the U.S. interest in the on-going process of reform taking place in the Soviet Union. He said the Soviet side had expressed its desire for an early and successful conclusion of the work in Vienna. *Glukhov* reported that the group had discussed how to ensure the continuation of activities during the U.S. presidential transition period. The group also discussed guidelines for parliamentary exchanges and meetings of working groups and expert level groups.

*Nuclear Testing Working Group*

The *Secretary* noted that reports had already been received from the Nuclear Testing Working Group. He asked if anything new should be added. Amb. *Robinson* read an agreed statement (attached).<sup>8</sup> Mr. *Palenykh* said he agreed with the U.S. statement.

*Conventional Weapons Working Group*

Amb. *Grinevskiy* noted that after the group's earlier report to Ministers (during the morning small group meeting)<sup>9</sup> they had continued on the fighter aircraft issue. He said there was practical agreement between the sides on a text for the mandate for Conventional Stability Talks, but disagreement remained on Soviet language referring to land-battle-capable systems. *Grinevskiy* described the U.S. position that such language was not specific enough nor was it necessary. EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary *Thomas* said that the U.S. side did not see the introduction of "land-battle-capable" helped the Soviet Union in any way. The U.S. objected to the phrase because it was ambiguous and attempted to prejudge certain issues which should be discussed in the negotiations themselves. In any event, nothing in the current mandate language would preclude the Soviet Union in the eventual negotiations from raising its desire to exclude fighter aircraft.

*The Secretary's Concluding Remarks*

The *Secretary* stated that the foregoing reports demonstrated that the working group process was worthwhile. He noted some significant progress in certain areas and not very much in others. On the whole,

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<sup>7</sup> Attached but not printed is the "Human Rights Working Group Report."

<sup>8</sup> Attached but not printed is the "Nuclear Testing Group Report to Ministers."

<sup>9</sup> See Document 175.

however, there was a contribution made in all outstanding issues. The Secretary stated that the prospects for concluding the Vienna CSCE review meeting in the near future were better than he had thought at the beginning of the Ministerial. He was reassured that the nuclear testing effort could fall into place. Furthermore, our joint concerns about CW were more evident. This increased the prospects for success in the Geneva CD negotiations and would help sound alarms around the world given the present threatening environment. He noted that we continue to make progress on human rights and humanitarian affairs: the contrasts on these issues with the situation three years ago was perhaps the greatest. Bilateral issues also continue to move along. The Secretary noted that the general improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations had played a role in defusing regional hotspots such as Afghanistan and the Gulf war, and could be particularly useful in the future in Africa. He concluded by expressing his satisfaction that both sides had managed to turn into normal what seemed extraordinary not long ago.

*Shevardnadze's Concluding Remarks*

*Shevardnadze* said he agreed with the Secretary that the sides could take satisfaction in their work to date, although there remained elements of disappointment. He noted that there was real progress on nuclear testing, with completed protocols to be done by year's end, and on CW. He observed that positions have moved closer on a mandate for conventional arms control and that greater understanding had been attained in regional issues. As far as those working on human rights issues, *Shevardnadze* noted approvingly, "let them work on." As for ABM and NST issues, however, there was practically no movement. In general, useful work had been accomplished over the months and he thanked all the assembled experts and the Secretary for their "good hard work."

177. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 23, 1988, 3:30–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze of the USSR

PARTICIPANTS

*US*

The President

Secretary of State George P. Shultz

Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci

Kenneth Duberstein, Chief of Staff to the President

Colin L. Powell, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President for Press Relations

Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State, European and Canadian Affairs

Ambassador Jack Matlock

Nelson C. Ledsky, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Peter Afanassenko (Interpreter)

*USSR*

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh

Ambassador Yuri Dubinin

Gennadiy Gerasimov, Department Head, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Viktor Karpov, Department Head, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Teymuraz Stepanov, Senior Assistant to the Foreign Minister

Aleksey Obukhov, Head of Delegation, Nuclear and Space Talks

Sergey Tarasenko, General Secretariat Head, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Georgiy Mamedov, Deputy Department Head, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

*The President* greeted Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in the Oval Office, and the two walked out into the Rose Garden with Secretary Shultz for a series of photographs.<sup>2</sup> When the picture-taking was completed, the President and Secretary Shultz escorted their guest back into the Oval Office, where the formal discussion between the two delegations took place. (S)

*The President* began the meeting by welcoming the Soviet Foreign Minister to the White House. He said he looked forward to this conversation. He asked that his personal greetings be conveyed to General

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Ministerial Memcons. Secret. Drafted by Ledsky. The meeting took place in the Oval Office at the White House.

<sup>2</sup> For the record of the informal exchange among Reagan, Shevardnadze, and reporters, see *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1988, Book II, pp. 1213–1214.

Secretary Gorbachev, and recalled with great fondness his own visit to Moscow some four months ago.<sup>3</sup> (S)

*The President* said that both sides should be proud of what they have been able to achieve over the past few years. Much more remained to be done, both in our common interest and in the interest of all other nations in the world. The President observed that the process that had been set in motion would not end with his Administration. The consistency of policies and the continuation of discussions, as represented by this meeting in the Oval Office, will serve both our countries well in the years to come. The President mentioned specifically the progress made in human rights, arms control, the resolution of regional conflicts, and the expansion of cooperative exchanges, especially people-to-people contacts. The President observed that all this progress shows what can be achieved when two countries recognize differences, but seek ways to overcome their mistrust. (S)

*The President* noted that there were still four months remaining before he left office. He said he did not intend to remain idle during this period, especially since opportunities existed for additional progress. The President suggested there were a number of things he especially wanted to work on during these final months, but said that before going into detail, he would ask the Soviet Foreign Minister and Secretary Shultz to report on the meetings they had been having together over the past day and a half. (S)

*Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* thanked the President for his comments and for his gracious greeting. He said he wished to begin by extending best regards to the President from General Secretary Gorbachev and the other members of the Soviet Leadership. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze recalled that before leaving Moscow, General Secretary Gorbachev had told him that he and all the Soviet people remembered the President's visit to Moscow in June, a visit that had made a deep imprint on Soviet-American relations. The General Secretary had also said that our two countries had been able to score some important successes over the past several years. We had developed a unique relationship and could be proud of the developments that had occurred between us. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* said he wanted to emphasize personally the special role the two leaders had played in these developments. It would have been hard to imagine two or three years ago that US-Soviet relations could have reached this level. Shevardnadze recalled he had told Secretary Shultz that the whole world breathes a sigh of relief as they see the relationship between our two countries develop,

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<sup>3</sup> See Documents 156–163.

and as we make progress together on arms control, regional conflicts, humanitarian issues and bilateral relations. Historians will certainly record all this, and stress how important these developments have been for mankind. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* observed that summing up the titanic work of our two leaders and reflecting on what needed to be accomplished next formed the core of the General Secretary's letter to the President. Shevardnadze noted that an advance copy of this letter had been given to the State Department and the White House, and at this point, he handed the original of the letter from General Secretary Gorbachev to the President.<sup>4</sup> The Soviet Foreign Minister said the Gorbachev letter represented an attempt to evaluate what has been done and to speak to the need to consolidate these achievements. Those were not simple tasks, but they were tasks the two sides could cope with. Imbedded in the letter was the concept of mutual understanding and respect, something close to both our people. "You must have felt that spirit when you were in Moscow, Mr. President, both through your talks there with our leadership and in your discussions with all levels of our people." Foreign Minister Shevardnadze continued by saying that the Soviet leadership sought to be in close touch as well with the American people, and thought the desire of most Americans was to build and develop still further cooperation between our two peoples. Both sides want to enhance stability in US-Soviet relations and to achieve additional real results. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* said that he could characterize his discussions with Secretary Shultz yesterday and today as extremely useful. They had covered the full range of issues normally on our agenda. Shevardnadze noted that this was the 29th meeting between the two Foreign Ministers. There had also been four summits between General Secretary Gorbachev and the American President. This was unprecedented in US-Soviet relations. Even Defense Ministers, Shevardnadze observed, were now meeting and competing with the Foreign Ministers in exchanging views. (S)

*Secretary of Defense Carlucci* broke in to note that there had not been anything like 29 meetings between US and Soviet Defense Ministers. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* replied that the Defense Ministers had started late, and thus were somewhat behind. Nonetheless, meetings between Defense Ministers were an important sign. They were a positive and very good development. They showed that something new and special was developing in our relationship. The Soviet Foreign Minister went on to recall that Secretary Carlucci had been shown the

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 168.



latest Soviet aircraft. He had even been allowed to go inside one. The Soviet Defense Minister in turn had visited advanced US military installations. Even though nothing concrete had resulted from either visit, the events themselves were important. (S)

*Secretary Carlucci* complained in jest that he had not been allowed to fly the Soviet plane, to which the *Soviet Foreign Minister* replied “perhaps next time.” (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* continued by observing that what was really important was that specific results had been achieved between our two countries. Those who know history will appreciate how far we have come. Never before have our two countries exchanged experts, had open discussions, and sent professionals into each other’s country to observe how specific agreements were being carried out. The Soviet side believes it important to preserve these arrangements and to reach further agreements in discussions “of our well-known four part agenda.” (S)

“Let me start with humanitarian issues,” said *Shevardnadze*. If one looks back at our discussions beginning in 1985, one recalls how heated and discordant they were. Now they are quiet and constructive. We are searching for solutions. There have been real changes on our side, and some movement on the US side, at least in your willingness to listen to our positions and to examine your own behavior. This is real progress. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* noted that the two sides were also able to cooperate in a new manner on regional issues. In many areas, we have been able to proceed from rivalry to cooperation. To be sure, suggested *Shevardnadze*, confrontation remains easier than cooperation. But we have come to identify our mutual interests in some problems, and this is a common and major achievement. Without the Soviet Union’s cooperation in Afghanistan, for example, the Geneva Accords would never have been achieved. There are encouraging trends now present in Cambodia as well, and perhaps even on the Korean peninsula. There is also some prospect for real results in southern Africa, despite the complicated issues involved. Possibilities even exist in Central America. The real results achieved have been reflected and recorded in the Joint Statement we will be issuing this afternoon. (S)

Progress in the nuclear and space talks have been more modest, *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* suggested. We have been able to reaffirm the Washington Summit language on the ABM Treaty. Some limited advance has also been made on air-launch cruise missiles and mobile missiles. The two sides have instructed their negotiators to use every hour of every day, and to allow no pause or slow-down in efforts to reach agreement on specific points in the arms control area, and to create and improve wherever possible the atmosphere for negotiations. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* acknowledged his awareness of the American concern for the radar at Krasnoyarsk. "The Soviet side takes a sober view of this problem," which is the subject of a good part of the letter from General Secretary Gorbachev.<sup>5</sup> It is also a subject where the Soviet side has made known its views to the general public. We have decided to remove this obstacle to our relations, concluded Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, by turning the Krasnoyarsk site into a place for world space research. We will invite scientists from all countries to work with us to restructure and convert the Krasnoyarsk station for specific peaceful outer space use. Shevardnadze said his government would also be inviting congressmen and people from Third World countries to come and view the changes. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* claimed good progress had also been made in the conventional arms control area. The problem of a conventional mandate in Vienna needed to be solved, because we want negotiations on conventional arms reductions to begin before the end of 1988. We were not able, Shevardnadze continued, to remove all problems in the mandate area, but we were able to draw our two positions closer, and we now believe we have a good basis to complete our work and to draft agreed language in Vienna. We also think some good progress has been made in our efforts to ban chemical weapons. This is a complex and grave problem. All of us are concerned by this problem, to which the Soviet side has brought some new proposals and "to which we understand the American side is also prepared to bring fresh ideas." With respect to testing, agreement on the two open protocols can be reached, so that treaties can be sent to our respective legislatures for ratification by the end of the year. All that we have achieved and the problems that we still face are reflected in the Joint Statement which we have prepared together.<sup>6</sup> (S)

With respect to bilateral relations, a good start has been made. Our exchange programs are moving in the right direction so that programs between ordinary people, scientists, politicians and students have begun and are growing. Not enough has been achieved with respect to trade and commerce, and the Soviet side is ready to move this topic forward in US-Soviet relations whenever the Americans are ready. Obstacles still exist, *Shevardnadze* said, but he declined to speak of detailed problems, and expressed optimism that trade and commerce could be developed further between the US and the USSR. (S)

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<sup>5</sup> See Document 167.

<sup>6</sup> Reference is to the September 23 "Joint Statement on Soviet-United States Relations." For the text, see *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1988, Book II, pp. 1214–1216.

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* asked to say a final word about the impetus to relations provided by the personal rapport between the two Foreign Ministers. He said that he valued greatly his relationship with the Secretary of State and wished to make that clear now in concluding his report to the President. (S)

*President Reagan* thanked the Soviet Foreign Minister for his detailed presentation and said he would like to pick up on only a few of the points which the Soviet side had mentioned. First, there was the question of Krasnoyarsk. This radar is not a new issue, but it is one that greatly troubles our relationship. We have discussed this subject all the way back to Geneva in 1985, and the continued existence of this problem goes to the heart of our dilemma about arms control. As I have said on many occasions, the President continued, we do not mistrust each other because we are armed, but we are armed because we mistrust each other. So the sources of mistrust must be eliminated, and one of them certainly is the Krasnoyarsk radar. (S)

*The President* observed that there would be a new person in the White House in 1989, and he wanted the arms control process left in such a way that old violations had been corrected, and new agreements could be signed and ratified. If, however, the new President and the Congress were faced with old violations, it would be more difficult to conclude and ratify a START or a Defense and Space agreement. The President observed in this connection that he had dealt with four General Secretaries during his term in office and that the current Soviet Administration would soon be dealing with its second American Administration. Because of these kinds of changes, the President observed, it was important to continue to make progress on such subjects as human rights and, wherever possible, to institutionalize that progress through changes in law. (S)

*The President* said the next US Administration—whether Democratic or Republican—would be just as concerned about human rights as this one has been. Both sides must do everything possible to maintain the progress we have made. The President insisted that all political and religious prisoners in the Soviet Union must be released. Also of concern were divided families, separated spouses and people who have claim to US citizenship. The President observed that US interest was not limited to individuals, and that he and Secretary Shultz had been frank in calling for changes in laws, policies, and practices that conflict with international human rights obligations and the Helsinki Agreement. “If the Soviet Union makes these changes, then individual cases could be resolved automatically, without the kind of political problems they now cause.” Moreover, if there are changes in legislation, fewer people would want to leave the Soviet Union, the President suggested, and Soviet society as a whole would benefit. (S)

*The President* said he would like to conclude his remarks by noting again that the Krasnoyarsk radar issue was particularly hard to swallow at a time when a variety of additional arms control treaties were under discussion. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* said he would only say a couple of words in response to the President's presentation. He noted that he had sought in his summary to emphasize the positive aspects of our relationship. He had not dwelt on Soviet complaints against the United States. Both sides knew what the difficult issues were. The Soviet Union speaks today of its problems openly, perhaps more than Americans do. (S)

As for the Krasnoyarsk radar, *Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* insisted that the Soviets wanted to close the book on this issue, and that he had so told Secretary Shultz during their conversation yesterday.<sup>7</sup> The Soviet Union planned to invite American and other scientists to view the Krasnoyarsk site, and to participate in altering that installation so it could be used for peaceful space research. "We will remove the elements that concern you, and ensure that nothing at this site causes problems." At the same time, the Soviet Union remains concerned about the radar at Thule, Greenland, and a radar station in the United Kingdom. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze suggested that Soviet scientists be invited to view these installations. Building trust must be a two-way street, Shevardnadze concluded. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* said he would like to make just a few comments. The meetings over the past two days were good both in tone and substance. A fair amount of work had been reviewed. Some real progress had been made. Above all, there had been continuity of discussion. Our discussions constitute a way of producing results that people view as constructive. "Mr. President," Secretary Shultz continued, "between now and the time you leave office, we believe there will be new achievements to point to." There are good prospects for concluding the Vienna CSCE meeting and achieving a balanced outcome. The conventional stability talks could start before January. All of our allies will be in New York next week, and we will try to put into motion with respect to the Vienna conference things we have talked about with the Soviets yesterday and today, and drive things forward at least a bit. (S)

With respect to nuclear testing, which we have talked about all through this Administration, there are good prospects for bringing the necessary protocols into existence and moving forward this year. We have made some progress on other arms control issues as well. To be

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<sup>7</sup> See Document 173.

sure, regional issues and human rights stir up more distrust and attention than anything else. We want to work together to resolve existing hot spots. Every success has a ripple effect on the solution of other problems, and we are resolved to push things forward as far as we can in the months ahead. (S)

On human rights, there has been continuing evolution of positions and gradual progress. We have established a good pattern of discussion in our working groups, and the Soviet side has told us it intends to issue new decrees and draft new legislation which will institutionalize the kind of changes that we have been looking for. (S)

The Krasnoyarsk radar, *Secretary Shultz* insisted, is the kind of problem that must be solved now. The Secretary said he could not say for sure if recent Soviet ideas would move things along. The Soviet side has offered to turn the radar into a center for space research. Perhaps this is a positive development. What we need is a Soviet commitment that the things at Krasnoyarsk that violate the ABM Treaty will be removed. We have talked about language that would perhaps get us there. Further talk, however, seems required. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* said we still have found no handle to solve the problems in Thule, Greenland, or the United Kingdom, but perhaps we will do this too at a next stage. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* said both Thule and the United Kingdom were grandfathered by the ABM Treaty. All that is taking place there now is normal modernization. The United States has made this clear on at least 100 previous occasions. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* acknowledged that Secretary Shultz had said this yesterday and on previous occasions. He suggested, however, that the issue be taken up again on "a serious and sustained basis." Why not let Soviet scientists come and view these sites, Shevardnadze suggested. (S)

*The President* noted at this point that the Western radar sites had met the terms of the ABM Treaty, and that nobody to date had ever suggested they did not. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* observed for a second time that the two sides were perhaps on a path towards solving the radar issue, and that further discussion at this point would not be productive. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* agreed but said he was honor-bound to note that, with respect to Krasnoyarsk, the Soviets had made another proposal, namely, if the US side reaffirmed its willingness to observe the ABM Treaty for a period of ten years, the Soviets would be prepared to remove the Krasnoyarsk radar altogether. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* did not comment on this point, but sought to conclude this discussion by noting our requirement for a good clear agreement on this subject. (S)

*The President* then said that he would like to mention one additional subject that had not yet been raised. He recalled that in June 1987, he had gone to Berlin and made a speech in front of the Berlin Wall, a speech which called upon the Soviet Union to work with the West to improve the situation in that city.<sup>8</sup> It had perhaps been unrealistic to have suggested then that the Berlin Wall be torn down in its entirety. The President said he realized that the division of Germany and of Berlin was a product of World War II, and the feeling on the part of the Soviet Union and many others that Germany should never again be allowed to be the strongest and most dominant power in central Europe. But since we had talked earlier about the elimination of mistrust between us, one clear way of eliminating mistrust in Europe would be to allow the two parts of Berlin to work together, and the two parts of Germany to work together. This would be good for Europe and the world. (S)

*The President* continued that in 1987 he had outlined specific proposals for improving the situation in Berlin, including making the city a European aviation hub, bringing international conferences to Berlin and arranging major sport festivals in the city, including some future Olympic game. The President noted that the Soviets had now responded in a disappointing manner to these ideas. Since true stability in Europe could only come if the aspirations of Berliners and Germans for positive change were met, our offer to work with the Soviets remained open, and we hoped that the Soviet side would still agree to meet with us, the British and the French to discuss possible improvements for Berlin. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* said that the President's statement and speech at the Berlin Wall and his view of the role of Berlin had evoked a harsh negative response in the German Democratic Republic. The German Democratic Republic believed these remarks reflected an attempt by the United States and the West to interfere in the domestic affairs of the GDR. The Soviet Union and the United States had been cooperating in discussing the solution of various regional questions, but one of the principles in these discussions has been respect for the interest of third countries. The GDR, as Ambassador Ridgway well knew, was a sovereign state whose interests could not be interfered with if progress was to be made. (S)

*President Reagan* said his proposals represented no attempt to interfere with anyone. In our discussions of regional issues, we were well aware that it was up to the parties concerned to solve a good part of the problem themselves. Our role in regional problems was to help

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<sup>8</sup> See Document 54.

remove existing road blocks, so that the people on the ground could do what they wanted. That was all we sought to do in Berlin. The city was divided unnaturally and artificially. If the two of us would agree to remove the obstacles so that air traffic could be expanded and the city could have international meetings, it would benefit all the people who live in Berlin. The future of the city and of the two existing German states should be left to the Germans to decide. But the Germans had every reason to live cooperatively together, and that was all the US proposals were aimed at accomplishing. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* said that the President was misinformed if he thought the questions related to Berlin and the division of Germany could be resolved simply. He recalled the long work required to complete the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin. Some 15 years were needed to develop that document. An effort to revise this agreement should not be undertaken lightly. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said some of the things the President had said sounded sensible and were indeed quite interesting, but his presentation skimmed over the fact that there existed two sovereign German states. There was also the separate political entity of West Berlin, and an existing Four Power Agreement. If we tried to tackle the Berlin problem alone, we might never get anywhere. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* agreed that the Berlin issue presented major difficulties. The Olympic subject, for example, aroused many emotions. He recalled, for example, the 1936 Olympics in Berlin at which Adolf Hitler refused to shake hands with US Olympic winner Jesse Owens. (S)

*General Powell* suggested that we were running out of time, at which point *the President* said in conclusion that we have made great progress on many issues and that, while he did not want to create new problems, it was important to remember that there were still a number of existing difficulties which could not be ignored. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* at this point reached into his briefcase and handed the President letters to Mrs. Reagan from children at the school she had visited in Moscow in June. (S)

*The President* looked at these letters, noting they were in English, and said he would be very happy to give them to Mrs. Reagan. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* then closed the meeting by handing the President a commemorative INF Treaty medal which had just been minted in the Soviet Union. The Foreign Minister said this was the first medal off the press, and that there would be only a few additional copies made. (S)

*The President* thanked the Foreign Minister for the medal and for the useful discussion which had just taken place. He wished the Foreign Minister well and said he hoped he had a useful visit to New York



next week. He said that he would be reading the Foreign Minister's speech to the UN, and would be talking to Secretary Shultz about further sessions the two Foreign Ministers would be having together in New York. (S)

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## 178. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

New York, December 7, 1988, 8:20–9:20 a.m.

### SUBJECT

The Secretary's Meeting with Shevardnadze

### PARTICIPANTS

U.S.	USSR
Secretary of State George P. Shultz	Foreign Minister Eduard
Assistant Secretary Rozanne L.	Shevardnadze
Ridgway	Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr
Ambassador Jack F. Matlock	Bessmertnykh
Assistant Secretary Richard	Ambassador Yuriy Dubinin
Schifter	Teimuraz Stepanov, Aide to
Nelson Ledsky, NSC Staff	Shevardnadze
DAS Thomas W. Simons, Jr.	Georgiy Mamedov, USA and
Alexander R. Vershbow, EUR/	Canada Department, MFA
SOV Director (notetaker)	(notetaker)
William Hopkins, interpreter	Mr. Groshev, interpreter

After an exchange of pleasantries *Secretary Shultz* invited Shevardnadze, as guest, to speak first. The Secretary said he would appreciate anything Shevardnadze could say about developments in the Soviet Union and about Gorbachev's speech to the UNGA to be delivered later that morning. He noted that he would be sitting in the U.S. Chair at the speech. The Secretary added, with respect to the agenda for this meeting, that he also wanted to talk about human rights and to pass on some late information about the Angola/Namibian negotiations on which we have worked effectively together.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, December 1988 Governor's Island. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Simons, Ridgway, Collins, and Haines. An unknown hand initialed for the drafting and clearing officials. The meeting took place at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

<sup>2</sup> Negotiators had issued a statement in November regarding a calendar for phased withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

*Shevardnadze* commented that if he started with the Soviet internal situation, the Ministers would be late for the UNGA session. He said the most important question he wanted to discuss was the meeting that day between our countries' leaders.<sup>3</sup> *Shevardnadze* said he believed that, in both form and timing, the Governors Island meeting represented the completion of a very important stage in US-Soviet relations and the beginning of a dialogue with the new Administration.<sup>4</sup> We had laid a solid foundation for that dialogue and he wanted to stress on behalf of General Secretary Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership their appreciation for the input Secretary Shultz had made. The Soviets believed the leaders' meeting should demonstrate to the entire world the commitment of the Soviet leadership and the U.S. Administration to the principle of continuity.

*Secretary Shultz* replied that he was sure the President and the President-elect shared the sense of satisfaction with what had taken place. President Bush would, of course, want to put his own stamp on things; but as Bush had told *Shevardnadze* when they met in September, the Vice President wanted to see a continuation, a further development of this relationship.<sup>5</sup>

*Shevardnadze* said that everything which had been accomplished in our active dialogue, both at the Summit and ministerial levels, had become an asset for our two nations and for other countries. We could not step back from this process but needed to intensify it by making use of our rich experience. One practical idea he wanted to suggest was to issue a brief document on the results of the Governors Island meeting. This would not address specific aspects of relations, but since this was a concluding meeting, it would be good to have a very brief final document. The Soviets had a draft which also took into account the anniversary of the INF Treaty. It was offered simply as food for thought.

*The Secretary* replied we were glad to receive *Shevardnadze's* suggestion; he would pass it along to the President. It was our view, however, that we probably did not need a joint statement since this was a different kind of meeting. We would, however, study the draft. *Shevardnadze* said that if the U.S. found the draft acceptable, this would be all right; but the Soviets did not insist on a joint statement. *The Secretary* said he always looked at Assistant Secretary Ridgway when the subject of joint statements arose. *Shevardnadze* said he knew whom to look at as well. *The Secretary* quipped that she looked downcast at the prospect of no joint statement.

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 180.

<sup>4</sup> Vice President George H.W. Bush was elected President on November 8.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 2, Document 170.

*Shevardnadze* said he wanted to describe in general terms Gorbachev's speech to the UNGA.<sup>6</sup> He knew the Secretary would be participating in the session and this was also an indication of the new character of our relations. The speech would be of a philosophical and conceptual nature but it also had some specific ideas. He did not think the proposals would make the U.S. uncomfortable since they involved the Soviets' own commitments.

*Shevardnadze* said the first element concerned the implementation of the Soviet Union's defensive military doctrine. Up until now this had taken place at the conceptual level; now the Soviets are starting the practical implementation. The Soviets had developed a concept of "defensive sufficiency." As a first step toward this concept, Gorbachev would be announcing substantial unilateral reductions in the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe, the western part of the Soviet Union, and Mongolia. While the speech would contain specific numbers he would just say now that the reductions would be substantial. The Soviets had in mind armed forces and armaments in the European part of the Soviet Union amounting to several hundred thousands of men, several thousand tanks, a great number of artillery pieces and combat aircraft, as well as substantial reductions in airborne forces, especially in Eastern Europe.

Continuing, *Shevardnadze* said the speech also spelled out decisions that been taken on human rights and humanitarian problems. The General Secretary would cite specific proposals on people-to-people contacts, secrecy, family reunification—the whole range of problems will be addressed. In addition, Gorbachev would explain Soviet views about the economic aspects of cooperation among states at the contemporary stage of development. He would speak of ecological problems and make proposals with far-reaching consequences. All these issues would be addressed not in a confrontational spirit but free of polemics and in the spirit of cooperation. Gorbachev would speak of a transition from an economy of weapons to an economy of disarmament. *Shevardnadze* repeated that numbers and figures would be given in the speech. He believed that this important Soviet initiative would contribute to a successful wind-up of the Vienna meeting and to the more dynamic development of negotiations in all areas—conventional, chemical, nuclear, and space arms.

*Secretary Shultz* commented that it would clearly be a significant statement and he would listen with great care. *Shevardnadze* said that in general there was no propaganda in the speech (or almost none). It

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<sup>6</sup> On December 7, Gorbachev addressed the United Nations General Assembly and announced a unilateral reduction in Soviet conventional forces. See "Gambler, Showman, Statesmen," *New York Times*, December 8, 1988, p. A-34.

would be a businesslike, fundamental statement in the spirit of the "new thinking."

Regarding the Vienna meeting, *Shevardnadze* said he wanted to offer a few comments. He believed our countries should steer matters toward completing the meeting soon, given that the Secretary and he had agreed to take part in the conclusion. Based on contacts with Foreign Ministers from Eastern and Western Europe, *Shevardnadze* believed there were real prospects for concluding the meeting on January 6. He knew that the Secretary would soon be having important contacts with his European allies so he thought it would be good if the Secretary could discuss with them the goal of finishing Vienna by this date. If we ended on on January 6, we could rationally plan for the two Ministers to participate in both the end of the Vienna meeting and the Paris CW conference on January 7.

*The Secretary* said he would like nothing better than to conclude the Vienna meeting and to mark the event jointly with *Shevardnadze*. He liked the idea of a traveling road show moving from Vienna to Paris. In a way there was a connection, since conventional arms control, our concerns about human beings in the CSCE process, and our attempts to raise consciousness about chemical and biological weapons were all of a piece. It would be a good idea to wind things up in Vienna, the Secretary said, and he would carry *Shevardnadze's* thoughts to the NATO Ministerial.

*Shevardnadze* said that at Vienna there were essentially three unresolved questions. The first was how to relate the negotiations among the 35 and the negotiations among the 23. The French had recently made proposals on this subject but the Soviets supported in principle the NNA position. It would be good if NATO could make clear its own position. *The Secretary* replied that we had worked out our differences with the French after some struggle and had tabled a proposal reflecting the results of those negotiations. We believed it was broadly in accord with previous US-Soviet discussions.

*Shevardnadze* said the second question was the geographic zone. The Soviets thought that, having made major concessions, they had resolved the issue. But unfortunately the Western countries had returned to their old positions, and this could oblige the Soviets to return to their previous positions as well; this would only complicate matters.

*The Secretary* said he was not up-to-date on the status of this issue and asked Assistant Secretary *Ridgway* to comment. *Ridgway* said there were proposals on the table for an exchange of Soviet and Turkish territory that would be excluded from the scope of the talks. The question was how much of Turkish territory and how much of the Soviet Transcaucasus would be excluded. We had some problems with

the latest Soviet proposals since they did not seem to reflect the balance between these two regions. But she thought we would be able to work this out in negotiations, although this would mean a struggle for our experts. *The Secretary* added that he would highlight for the U.S. delegation that this was an issue which we should be able to work out.

*Shevardnadze* said he wanted to clarify the Soviet position since this would perhaps be useful for Shultz's upcoming discussions with U.S. allies. The Soviets assumed that in those parts of Turkey to be excluded from the mandate there should not be any foreign bases. As a big concession, the Soviets would not seek to exclude too large an area of the Transcaucasus in return. It was on this basis that Moscow thought there was a compromise. *The Secretary* said he thought that this issue had been resolved as well and suggested that our experts be instructed to do what they were told.

*Shevardnadze* said the third unresolved question at Vienna concerned follow-on meetings. There had been many proposals. Taking into account Gorbachev's UNGA speech, *Shevardnadze* did not believe these questions should become a problem. Compromises were possible, but there needed to be reciprocal movement from East and West.

*The Secretary* said he wanted to address the area of human rights. We saw genuine progress relevant to our conditions for a Moscow human rights conference. He had set out U.S. views on this question in his letters to *Shevardnadze*. We welcomed the recent movement. While not privy to how the decisions were made, he could not help but feel that *Shevardnadze* personally, together with Chairman Gorbachev, had played a role in the recent positive developments on jamming, increased emigration, resolution of individual cases, etc. But certain things that are important to us still remained to be done, the Secretary explained. Perhaps in his speech Gorbachev would issue some undertakings about institutionalization of change. This would be fine and we would listen carefully for such assurances.

We continued to have problems with divided family cases, *the Secretary* continued. We were now down to 32 cases of which 11 were on the way to resolution. This, however, left 21 cases still unresolved and we could not see any reason why these should not all be cleared up. In this regard we should carry over the "zero option" from the INF area. On dual nationals, the Secretary said he understood the Soviets had assured us these would be dealt with. There was still quite a number of refuseniks, however, who had been blocked from emigrating for many years. A large number had recently been notified that their security restrictions had been lifted and we welcomed this, especially the case of Yuliy Kosharovskiy; but there remained quite a number of refuseniks still denied exit visas.

Regarding prisoners of conscience, *Secretary Shultz* continued, we recognize there may be individuals who are in prison because of ordi-

nary crimes even though we classify them as political prisoners. We in some cases have similar problems (for example, activists who have destroyed government property albeit for political purposes). On these disputed cases, the U.S. would like to see some mechanism whereby we would agree to go through these cases and sort them out. The U.S. had proposals to advance in this regard.

*Shevardnadze* said that in Gorbachev's speech these problems would be addressed. He added that if we were speaking of zero options, the Soviets would figure out how to do it in this area as they did in the area of INF. He added that the Soviets would not pay any price for a Moscow human rights conference and did not believe it would be a tragedy if no such conference were agreed. But, as he had told the Secretary, steps were being taken as a result of perestroika's own rules.

*The Secretary* commented that he agreed fully and in fact felt much better that these changes were being made because of perestroika and not as concessions to the U.S. Perhaps we should switch sides: the Secretary would insist on a Moscow human rights conference and *Shevardnadze* could reluctantly agree. The key thing was that we keep at it. We would listen to Gorbachev's speech with great care.

*Shevardnadze* noted that there were proposals at Vienna for follow-on meetings in other areas as well—environment, science, etc.—with countries such as Italy, the FRG, the UK, and Bulgaria wishing to host meetings. He believed that there might be five or six follow-up meetings. What is important is to support the initiatives of those countries.

*Secretary Shultz* replied that he agreed the environment was an issue of tremendous concern. He had recently been briefed by scientists on global warming and found their thinking quite convincing. This problem had to be faced up to. There was no way one country can deal with these important matters by itself; somewhere in this area we should find a way to move forward together. The Secretary said we continued to believe there should be a limited number of follow-on conferences so that people don't spend their whole time in meetings. The U.S. wanted to cover the various subjects but not to have so many conferences that they lose their meaning.

*Shevardnadze* quipped that perhaps the new Secretary of State should travel more than Shultz. *The Secretary* replied that he had covered more than a million miles. *Shevardnadze* commented that the Secretary was correct on the importance of environmental problems. An ecological catastrophe was coming and this represented a greater danger than nuclear weapons.

*Secretary Shultz* said he wanted to make a few comments on chemical weapons. He had recently learned that there were areas in France that were still roped off today because of the residue of CW used

during World War I. Moreover, recently he had seen a study of what it would take to clear the Shat-al-Arab waterway of sunken ships. One of the problems in this case was that our experts had found CW residue: Iran and Iraq had fouled a waterway that had been used for centuries, and it was a serious question how we might clean it up. This would have both immediate and long-term effects just as serious as nuclear radiation.

*Shevardnadze* said the primary task on CW was to conclude a convention banning these weapons. The Soviets thought there were good prospects for this. The Paris conference would be a good opportunity. The attitude of many countries had changed, especially that of the French, and we clearly should be making more headway on a CW convention. He wanted to offer a specific proposal: perhaps after the Paris conference it would be useful to have a special meeting on CW at the Foreign Minister level. *Shevardnadze* said he understood that this would be a multilateral meeting, but much depended on the U.S. and Soviet positions. *The Secretary* asked whether *Shevardnadze* meant a meeting in Geneva related to the CD or a special ministerial. *Shevardnadze* responded that either approach was possible, but the main focus should be on CW.

*Shevardnadze* said he had another idea, this one concerning the resumption of talks on nuclear and space arms. We unfortunately had not had enough time to untangle all our positions and complete a START treaty this year. There were still major problems awaiting resolution. It would be good if the sides could agree to resume the talks on February 15 in Geneva. And the side should try from the start to impart a dynamic character to the negotiations. *Shevardnadze* suggested that perhaps before February 15, if Foreign Ministers had not met personally by that time, they should exchange special letters to ensure that each side understood how the other approached the next round. Sometime later it might be useful to have a Foreign Ministers meeting on START.

*The Secretary* said that Vice President Bush would have to address this subject. The U.S. had suggested resuming NST in mid-February, but obviously the new President would want to review for himself all the issues. The Secretary added that Bush has experienced people so he did not know how much time this review would take. But he did know his successor James Baker and he knew he was anxious to meet with *Shevardnadze*.

*The Secretary* then digressed to explain the basics of our governmental system. George Bush had been elected but he was not yet inaugurated, so he was being careful to do nothing that showed a presumption he was already President. He would attend the Governors Island lunch as Vice President. James Baker was well known but had yet to go



through Senate hearings. The Senators would ask all sorts of questions. The Secretary added that anyone who is nominated to a senior position is well advised to keep his mouth shut and do his homework, doing nothing to suggest that he assumed the Senate would confirm him. This was why Baker had decided not to be present at the Governors Island meeting. The Secretary said that when Shevardnadze began to deal with Baker he would find him a person who was able to carry out what he believed in. He was a close friend of Vice President Bush and would likely be liked and respected in Congress.

*Shevardnadze* thanked the Secretary for this very important explanation. He noted that he had received a letter from Baker that expressed the wish to continue our dialogue and to maintain businesslike relations. *The Secretary* remarked that the new Administration would need some time for rest and review. *Shevardnadze* said that some rest was fine, but too much rest was not a good thing.

*The Secretary* said he wanted to raise southern Africa. The efforts the Soviet Union had made to support our negotiating efforts had been great and represented an example of how we could work together effectively. We were of course disappointed that the South Africans had pulled back at the last Brazzaville round. But we had worked on them and now had them back to the table, so we were prepared to have another go in Brazzaville. Our aim was to have the protocol agreed before the parties arrived. We believed South Africa was on board and were trying to reach the Cubans and Angolans. Soviet efforts would be critical in this regard. It was possible we could finalize the deal as early as the coming weekend, thereby permitting signature in New York in the latter part of December. The Secretary added that we would push hard on national reconciliation. We appreciated the sensitivity of this issue for the Soviets but knew Moscow had been helpful.

*Shevardnadze* replied that the Soviets had the same feelings and would shortly be having contacts with Cuban leaders. They would act on the basis of our joint experience in solving regional problems.

*Secretary Shultz* said he wanted to mention the nuclear testing talks. The two of them had nursed these along and it was a disappointment that the TTBT protocol had not been finished. We had finished the PNET protocol and would be ending the current round on December 15. We hoped to have a joint draft text with brackets at that time so that we could see the areas of common ground. He had recently met with Ambassador Robinson and would try to ensure we could finish the job as soon as possible.

*Shevardnadze* said he agreed it was bad that we had not been able to complete the two protocols by the end of year, even though we had agreed to do so. He suggested that we set as a goal for our delegations

the completion of all the papers by the first meeting of our Foreign Ministers under the new Administration.

*The Secretary* said he would be interested in hearing about the Soviets' talks with the Chinese on Cambodia.<sup>7</sup> Perhaps this could take place while their bosses were meeting in private. *Shevardnadze* said he was ready for that.

*The Secretary* said he wanted to mention the Krasnoyarsk radar. The Soviets had said that their intention was to deal with the radar in the context of an international space center. We hoped we could do this. As we have made clear, however, the radar needed to be dealt with in a way that the large building were altered or destroyed so it did not contain the long lead-time items—in other words, so that the ABM capability were removed.

*Shevardnadze* replied that in his speech Gorbachev would state that the radar had been handed over to the Academy of Sciences. This offered very interesting prospects for using the radar in the peaceful exploration of space; there would be invitations to scientists. The Secretary replied that he knew this and thus had asked Andrei Sakharov what the Academy of Sciences was going to do about Krasnoyarsk. Sakharov, however, did not seem to have focused on the question.

*Shevardnadze* said that, before concluding the meeting, he wanted to clarify one point. While Gorbachev in his speech would speak positively about US-Soviet relations, there was one critical statement regarding the denial of a visa to Arafat. He wanted to know if there had been any change in the U.S. position; if not, they would stand by the words in the speech.

*The Secretary* suggested that he and *Shevardnadze* have a private word on this subject. But the visa decision had been taken and had not been changed.

#### *Private Meeting*

In their private meeting *the Secretary* explained that the Swedish Foreign Minister had asked us to provide him with a statement of what the PLO would need to say in order to establish a dialogue with the U.S. We had provided him with such a text, which he had undertaken to pass to Arafat. We had been informed that Arafat was prepared to say something that we would view as satisfactory; he might even be saying it at the time of this meeting. If the statement were satisfactory we would respond accordingly.

*The Secretary* said he wanted *Shevardnadze* to be aware of this. This initiative was totally unknown except to a small number of individ-

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<sup>7</sup> See Document 179.

uals in the U.S. government. If it did not work out, the U.S. had agreed not to publicize the matter. No other government knew anything about this; but given his close personal relationship with Shevardnadze he wanted him to know.

*Shevardnadze* said he understood the sensitivity and thanked the Secretary for the information.

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## 179. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

New York, December 7, 1988, 1–1:35 p.m.

### SUBJECT

The Secretary's Pre-Luncheon Conversation with Shevardnadze

### PARTICIPANTS

<i>U.S.</i>	<i>USSR</i>
Secretary of State George P. Shultz	Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
MGEN Colin Powell, National Security Advisor (at beginning only)	Aleksandr Yakovlev, Chairman Foreign Affairs Commission, CPSU Central Committee (at beginning only)
Ambassador Jack F. Matlock (at beginning only)	Anatoliy Dobrynin, Advisor to Chairman Gorbachev (at beginning only)
Alexander Vershbow, EUR/SOV Director (notetaker)	Mr. Groshev, interpreter
William Hopkins, interpreter	

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* began by handing over the text of an oral message from the North Korean government. *The Secretary* said the U.S. had sent the North Koreans a message recently and noted that the Soviets had helped in delivering it. We would study the North Korean reply closely.

*The Secretary* said he had listened with interest to Chairman Gorbachev's UN speech. It was as Shevardnadze had described it in their morning meeting,<sup>2</sup> and seemed to be an important and constructive

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, December 1988 Governor's Island. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershow; cleared by Simons, Collins, and Haines. An unknown hand initialed for the drafting and clearing officials. The meeting took place in the Admiral's House on Governor's Island.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 178, footnote 6.

contribution. Naturally, he would want to study the speech carefully. But his first impression was that there was a great deal in it.

*Shevardnadze* commented that he didn't think there was anything in the speech that would make the U.S. uncomfortable.

*The Secretary* agreed. It was very constructive and thoughtful. There were good proposals and the human rights material was very interesting. He thought the relationship between perestroika and human rights actions had been spelled out quite clearly, just as *Shevardnadze* had been doing in private for some time. The U.S. would follow up; Ambassador Matlock would want to discuss the details and their implications so that we have a firm grasp of the significance of Gorbachev's proposals.

*Shevardnadze* agreed that Matlock should follow developments closely. *Yakovlev* interjected that the Soviets would be following Matlock's perestroika. *The Secretary* pointed out that Matlock would be returning to the Soviet Union before *Shevardnadze* and would be able to report to the Minister on what was going on.

*The Secretary* expressed sympathy for the victims of the morning's earthquake in the Caucasus, noting that it had taken place near to *Shevardnadze's* home republic of Georgia. *Shevardnadze* said the earthquake had mainly hit Armenia. Thousands had been killed, as the earthquake measured 8 on the Soviets' scale. *Gen. Powell* said that he understood it was 6.9 on the Richter scale. *The Secretary* commented that coming from California, where people are preoccupied with earthquakes, he knew that 6.9 was a very high reading.

*The Secretary* noted that *Shevardnadze* had promised to fill him in on his discussions with the Chinese Foreign Minister on Cambodia.

*Shevardnadze* said that the visit of Foreign Minister Qian had been good in many respects. They had agreed on a summit meeting; the details would be worked out at some time in late January. *The Secretary* asked whether the summit would take place in the first half of 1989 and whether it would be in Moscow. *Shevardnadze* said that this was the planned timing, but the venue would be Beijing. This was in part an effort to take into account the health of Chairman Deng Xiaoping.

*The Secretary* commented that despite his health one should not underestimate Deng's vigor. *Shevardnadze* agreed that Deng was a very clever, wise man. *The Secretary* added that Deng was deferred to by everyone in the Chinese leadership; this was a genuine recognition of his authority. He noted that the Chinese also had deep respect for Chairman Gorbachev. *Shevardnadze* commented that there is false authority and recognized authority. Deng's authority clearly was in the latter category.

Regarding Cambodia, *Shevardnadze* said the Chinese had become more actively involved and the discussions with Qian had been very

constructive. The Chinese and Soviets were more and more coming into agreement and had the same attitude toward the same issues. First, they agreed on the goal of a four-party coalition as a condition for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. They also agreed on the cessation of arms supplies at a certain stage. The Chinese were insisting on a more prompt Vietnamese withdrawal. The Soviets, however, did not think this was a complex matter because in principle the timeframe for withdrawal had been defined: the Vietnamese had said they would withdraw their troops by 1990 even if there were no agreement among the four groups.

*The Secretary* asked whether this meant the end of 1990.

*Shevardnadze* replied that the Vietnamese were ready to withdraw even earlier—for example, if an agreement among the Khmer groups were reached in January 1989, Hanoi was prepared to withdraw its troops earlier. But if there were no agreement at all, all troops would still be out by the end of 1990.

*The Secretary* noted that he had spoken previously with *Shevardnadze* about the critical importance that the Khmer Rouge not return to power. It was also important to learn that the Chinese were prepared for an agreement to end arms supplies at some point.

*Shevardnadze* said there was, indeed, agreement in principle with the Chinese on both these points. The Soviets and Chinese agreed that while the Khmer Rouge should participate in the agreement, they should not be represented in their former sense, i.e. Pol Pot and his clique who had been involved in the infamous events should not take over.

*The Secretary* asked whether the Chinese were content with this.

*Shevardnadze* said, yes, they had had very good negotiations including a very important two-hour meeting with Gorbachev.

*The Secretary* commented that Foreign Minister Qian was very able and well informed. *Shevardnadze* agreed that he was very qualified and a pleasant man, a businesslike person who thought in concrete terms.

*The Secretary* said that he believed that the general improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and China could have potential for increasing general stability in the Asia-Pacific region. If tensions around Cambodia could be reduced and the situation on the Korean peninsula settled down, giant steps forward would be possible. This was a region of immense vitality, the Secretary noted, with U.S. trade with the region now exceeding that with Europe.

*Shevardnadze* said he had told the Chinese Foreign Minister that the better Chinese relations were with the U.S., the better it was for Soviet interests. He had also said that if Sino-Soviet relations became more normal, U.S. interests would not be jeopardized.

*The Secretary* said that this was his view as well. Old ideas of the “China card” and the “Soviet card” had once been prevalent but had become outmoded. What Gorbachev had said in his speech about an integrated world was much more to the point.

*Shevardnadze* noted that these cards had been played quite recently. *The Secretary* rejoined that we had *tried* to play them. *Shevardnadze* remarked that it was good that we had overcome that approach: this was the new political thinking in practice.

Turning to Korea, *Shevardnadze* said the Soviets were beginning to establish economic and trade relations with the ROK although they had not established relations at the government level.

*The Secretary* replied that this was wise and the U.S. favored such steps. The South Koreans had a very dynamic economy. They were very tough people who worked very hard.

*Shevardnadze* agreed that the ROK economy was very dynamic but said the Soviets were interested not only in the economy but in improving their dialogue with Seoul.

*The Secretary* replied that such a dialogue would have a major impact on North Korea. But just as we were holding out our hand to the North they were beginning to have some trouble.

*Shevardnadze* said that the North Koreans were ready to talk with the U.S. The oral message he had presented suggested a tripartite dialogue. If the U.S. were to agree to such a step it would help Moscow enhance its relations with South Korea.

*The Secretary* said he would study the message, but noted that he was in the position of a person on the way out. His aim was to try and complete things that had already been started; it was up to the new people to start new things.

*Shevardnadze* remarked that he doubted the Secretary would be able to settle fully into retirement and that he would not be able to abandon politics altogether. *The Secretary* said it was true that the President-elect, Secretary-designate and Treasury Secretary<sup>3</sup> were all close personal friends. At the same time, they would want to do things by themselves rather than Shultz’s way. *Shevardnadze* said they would not, however, be able to find a better advisor.

*The Secretary* commented that he and *Shevardnadze* had managed since their first meeting in Helsinki to help things along in important and useful ways. They had developed trust and confidence in one another. Thus he had told Secretary-designate Baker that, when Shev-

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Vice President Bush, James Baker, and Nicholas Brady, who replaced Baker as Secretary of the Treasury on September 16.

ardnadze said he would do something, Baker could count on it. By the same token he had told Baker to be very careful in telling Shevardnadze he would do something. This was the only way to build trust.

*Shevardnadze* said he agreed. His relationship with the Secretary was unique.

The two Ministers then discussed some gifts that had been exchanged among their children. *The Secretary*, recalling his visit to Soviet Georgia, noted that a sculptor from Tbilisi had recently visited the U.S. He had explained his attempt to commemorate the INF Treaty by turning destroyed missiles into a statue. *Shevardnadze* said he had heard of this project and had discussed providing material from a destroyed Soviet weapon. The sculptor now wanted part of a U.S. missile. *The Secretary* quipped that this would represent a real defense conversion plan.

The discussion ended as the President, Vice President and Chairman Gorbachev emerged from their private meeting,<sup>4</sup> after which the Secretary and Shevardnadze joined the leaders for lunch.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 180.

<sup>5</sup> See Document 181.

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## 180. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

New York, December 7, 1988, 1:05–1:30 p.m.

### SUBJECT

The President's Private Meeting with Gorbachev

### PARTICIPANTS

#### *U.S.*

The President

The Vice President

Nelson Ledsky, NSC Staff Director  
(Notetaker)

#### *USSR*

Chairman Mikhail S. Gorbachev

Viktor Sukhodrev, MFA USA/  
Canada Department  
(Notetaker)

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, December 1988 Governor's Island. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Ledsky and Simons. The meeting took place in the Commandant's Residence at Governor's Island.



Thomas W. Simons, Jr., STATE/  
EUR (Notetaker)  
Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

Georgiy Mamedov, MFA USA/  
Canada Department  
(Notetaker)  
Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

*The President* commented that there would be five waves of media representatives. *Gorbachev* responded that that was not the most difficult task they were facing. *The President* said the first wave would be Soviet and the last from international media. *Gorbachev* said each time they met the weather got better. *The President* replied jovially that we arranged that.

Turning to substance, *Gorbachev* said he hoped what he had said at the UN had not contained surprises.<sup>2</sup> He had wanted to address the logical construction of what had been done in recent years, as a matter of real policy. This was their fifth meeting. It was not a negotiating session, but at the same time it was their fifth meeting, and it was special, taking place as it did in this group.

*The President* said it was a pleasure for him to commemorate their meetings. He well remembered standing in front of the house before the lake in Geneva, waiting for *Gorbachev* at their first meeting. Most of his people thought at the time it would be their only meeting.

*Gorbachev* said it was true that they had much to remember, and much to look forward to as well. This was true not just in a personal sense. The most important thing they had done was to begin movement in the right direction.

*Gorbachev* commented that the Vice President was listening, but probably saying to himself “let them talk.”

A media representative asked *Gorbachev* why he had announced troop cuts at the UN. *Gorbachev* replied that, as he had just told the President and the Vice President, what he had announced was a continuation and implementation of what he had first outlined on January 15, 1986.<sup>3</sup>

*Gorbachev* said he appreciated what the President and he had accomplished in recent years. They had made a joint analysis, undertaken joint efforts, and taken real, specific steps forward. He had now outlined certain additional ideas that demonstrated the realistic nature of the policy and added to it. He had issued an invitation to work together, not just to the U.S. What he had said was grounded in common sense and experience.

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<sup>2</sup> See Document 178, footnote 6.

<sup>3</sup> Reference is to a speech *Gorbachev* delivered on January 15, 1986, calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons within 15 years. See Serge Schmemmann, “*Gorbachev Offers to Scrap A-Arms Within 15 Years*,” *New York Times*, January 16, 1986, p. A-1.

*A journalist* asked him if he expected the NATO Allies, including the U.S., to reduce as well.

*Gorbachev* replied that he had made clear that these were unilateral steps, undertaken without reference to the Vienna mandate. He had been discussing the range of disarmament, humanitarian and economic questions with the U.S. and the Soviet Union's European partners. As for this meeting, it was not for negotiations; it resulted from his being in New York, and the President's and Vice President's invitation to meet on that occasion. He hoped it would be a useful meeting.

*A journalist* asked if there was opposition to the cuts in his country. *Gorbachev* said the answer was "no."

*The President* commented that *Gorbachev's* Russian "nyet" sounded a little like "yes." *Gorbachev* replied with a smile that the answer was still "no."

Referring to the camera lights, *Gorbachev* commented that they were between a burning fire and bright lights. *The President* said that as a veteran of television he had found that the lights can make you look twelve years younger. *Gorbachev* replied that when he had landed at JFK and made his remarks to the press, he had been facing right into the sun, and it had been worse than TV lights.

*Gorbachev* asked why the island was called "Governors" Island. *The Vice President* replied that it had been given to the British governors for their use in colonial times, and the name had stuck. *The President* said it was now the headquarters for our Coast Guard, and they were meeting in the commandant's residence.

*The President* asked *Gorbachev* if he had ever told him about President Lyndon Johnson's remark concerning the press. Johnson had said that if he ever walked from the White House to the Potomac and walked out on top of the water, the press would report that the President could not swim. *Gorbachev* laughed, and said the President had indeed told him the story before.

After the media had left, *the President* said he had a little memento for *Gorbachev*. It commemorated the moment in Switzerland during their first meeting when they had stopped in the parking lot. *Gorbachev* thanked the President. *The President* asked if he could read the inscription, and *Gorbachev* assented. The President quoted the inscription that they had walked a long way together to clear a path to peace, Geneva 1985–New York 1988. *Gorbachev* said those were good words, and he especially appreciated that they were written in the President's own hand; he thanked the President.

*Gorbachev* said that he would tell the larger group the same thing, but he wished to say here that he highly valued their personal rapport, and the fact that in a rather difficult time they had been able to begin

movement toward a better world. *The President* replied that as he left office, he was proud of what they had accomplished together. One reason for it was that they had always been direct and open with each other. *Gorbachev* agreed.

*The President* said they had accomplished much. There was much yet to do, but they had laid a strong foundation for the future. What he had done had been based on the values that have guided our hand, the values we subscribe to in this nation. That commitment to promoting trust and confidence remained. He asked the Vice President if he had something to say.

*The Vice President* said he did not, except to comment that the picture the President had given Gorbachev was also symbolic of the distance the two countries had come. He did not get to be President until January 20, but with reference to the three year span since the picture was taken, he would like to think that three years from now there could be another such picture with the same significance. He would like to build on what President Reagan had done, as he had told Gorbachev when they had met at the Soviet Embassy, even before the Presidential campaign had gotten underway.<sup>4</sup> He would need a little time to review the issues, but what had been accomplished could not be reversed. He wished to build on what President Reagan had accomplished, working with Gorbachev.

*Gorbachev* said he understood the Vice President's words as a very important assessment of what they had been able to achieve in the years just past. It seemed to him that the prospects for Soviet-American relations were good. He could only repeat what he had told the President on many occasions: the Soviets knew what a country the U.S. was, what its role in the world was, what its people were like. There was a lot of respect in the Soviet Union for the United States. They had cooperated together, and there were good prospects for this to continue.

*Gorbachev* said he agreed with Vice President Bush on the need to build on the assets the two leaders had piled up. There was a lot they could accomplish together. Here in this company, he wanted to say while they talked as friends that he would treasure the memory of all they had been able to do together in these last years. Certainly he agreed with what Mr. Bush had said about moving forward, and building on what had been achieved. But it was also proper that they try to add to it. Gorbachev said he knew Mr. Bush would become President Bush only in January. He would bring new people with him. Today, *Gorbachev* said, he was working with President Reagan. He did hope that

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<sup>4</sup> See Document 113.

the President would also treasure his memory of their joint work to solve problems that the whole world wanted to see solved.

*The President* noted that it was a tradition of their meetings that he come at some point to the subject of human rights. *Gorbachev* said the President would now be able to tell the press he had raised it again. *The President* said he was pleased to hear about the steps the Soviets had taken the week before on emigration and on jamming. He was pleased with the progress that had been made in the human rights field since their last meeting.

*Gorbachev* said he had presented certain thoughts in this regard in his UN address. *The President* said he had had a brief report on it, and it all sounded good to him. As he had done previously, he would like to present a list<sup>5</sup> of about half a dozen names of individuals he would like *Gorbachev* to look at. Accepting the list, *Gorbachev* commented that perhaps they had already left. *The President* said that would be fine, if true.

*The President* went on to say that we were all on *Gorbachev's* side concerning the reforms he was trying to make in the Soviet system. *Gorbachev* said he had lots of work and an interesting life. Their country had become a different one. It would never go back to what it had been three years before, regardless of whether he or someone else were leading it.

*The President* said he would be watching after he returned to private life, and cheering *Gorbachev* on. *Gorbachev* invited him to come to the Soviet Union as a private citizen. *The President* said that would be nice. *Gorbachev* said they would take good care of him. *The President* suggested they go in to lunch.

*Gorbachev* said he valued what the President and Vice President Bush had just said. He also wanted to continue on a consistent basis, without rushing. There was a lot to do together. He urged the Vice President to think about it. He had a little time in which to do so, although, on the other hand, it was already less than two months before he would become President.

Noting that he would be putting together a new team, *the Vice President* said this was not from dissatisfaction with those who were in the job now. Some of those might be leaving. Some cabinet members would stay on, others would not. The theory was to revitalize things by putting in new people. He believed that *Gorbachev* knew Jim Baker. He did not think he had met Brent Scowcroft,<sup>6</sup> but he was well known to many people on the Soviet side. *Gorbachev* said he knew of him. *The*

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<sup>5</sup> Not found.

<sup>6</sup> Bush's selection for National Security Advisor.

*Vice President* continued that others would be coming on board over the next few weeks. He would like Baker to continue what the President had done with Secretary Shultz: good and frequent contacts with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. *Gorbachev* said he thought that would happen. *The Vice President* said that Secretary Baker would obviously want to get together first with his colleagues in NATO, and then with Shevardnadze. They should get together with their people to decide on things that had not been resolved.

*Gorbachev* said he fully understood, and found it important that the Vice President was thinking in terms of tackling and deciding and solving problems. *The Vice President* said he had no intention of stalling things. He naturally wanted to formulate prudent national security policies, but he intended to go forward. He had no intention of setting the clock back; we wanted to move it forward.

*The President* suggested again that they go in to lunch. *Gorbachev* assured him and the Vice President that on the Soviet side there would be full and constructive cooperation. *The Vice President* added that he would have the additional incentive of having the President on the phone from California getting on his case and telling him to get going.

*The President* said he wished to remind *Gorbachev* of something he had said at their first meeting in Geneva. He was not sure he had told the Vice President about it. He had told *Gorbachev* that they were two men in a room together who had the capability of creating the next world war, or the capability of bringing peace to the world. Now, all these years later, he thought it was evident that they had decided to keep the world at peace. *Gorbachev* agreed that it had all begun at Geneva.

181. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>

New York, December 7, 1988, 1:40–3:10 p.m.

## SUBJECT

The President's Luncheon with Chairman Gorbachev (S)

## PARTICIPANTS

## US

The President

The Vice President

Secretary of State George P. Shultz

Kenneth Duberstein, Chief of Staff to the President

Colin L. Powell, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State, European and Canadian Affairs

Ambassador Jack Matlock

Thomas W. Simons, Jr. (Notetaker)

Nelson C. Ledsky, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

## USSR

Chairman M.S. Gorbachev

Aleksandr Yakovlev

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

Anatoliy Chernayev

Anatoliy Dobrynin

Yuriy Dubinin

Viktor Sukhodrev (Notetaker)

Georgiy Mamedov, Deputy Department Head, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
(Notetaker)

Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

*President Reagan* warned Chairman Gorbachev that they would again be facing five waves of newsmen and photographers. (S)

As the first wave entered, *Chairman Gorbachev* said he had just been told about the earthquake in Armenia. On the ferry over to the island, he had had a telephone conversation with Moscow. The earthquake had also affected Azerbaijan and Georgia, but with many fewer casualties. In Armenia there had been vast destruction. The earthquake had registered 8.0. Yerevan had not been hard-hit, but elsewhere in Armenia there was lots of destruction, much loss of life, and extensive casualties.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, December 1988 Governor's Island. Secret. The meeting took place in the Commandant's Residence at Governor's Island. Drafted by Ledsky and Simons. Paul Schott Stevens sent the memorandum of conversation to Levitsky under a January 9, 1989, memorandum, indicating that it was a "revised" and "reformatted" draft of the President's luncheon with Gorbachev, which is the version printed here. (Ibid.)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said he had talked to Ryzhkov, who said one village had just disappeared. While he had been in the house on the island, he had written a telegram to the people of Armenia. A government commission had been set up to assist people. This is of course the way life is—good and bad mixed together. (S)

*The President* said that with tragedies like this, you sometimes get the feeling of being warned. The United States had recently had an earthquake in California, but it had been mild, with no loss of life. (S)

*The Vice President* asked if there was any estimate of lives lost. (U)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said he had not yet seen an estimate, but he had heard it was at least many hundreds. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* commented that if a whole village was destroyed, there would be lots of casualties. (S)

*The President* asked if it were really true that a village had just disappeared into a hole in the earth. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said it was. Relief work would begin with the military forces that were already in the area. Eventually all medical services would be involved. (S)

A media representative asked the President what he thought of Gorbachev's troop cut proposal. *The President* replied that it was not a proposal, but a decision that he heartedly approved of. Another press representative asked if the President would be doing the same thing. *The President* replied that some adjustments might be called for if what Gorbachev had announced left us with superior forces in some areas. However, we don't see the situation that way, since even with the Soviet cuts, their forces would be vastly superior in Europe. (U)

A media representative asked the Vice President for his view. *The Vice President* said he supported what the President had said. (S)

Amid laughter, *Chairman Gorbachev* said that was one of the best answers of the year. (U)

As one group of pressmen left, the *Vice President* commented that at least we could all now hear what was being said. In the quiet that followed, *Chairman Gorbachev* said that the press would probably say the company was not very talkative. (U)

*The Vice President* commented that he had seen Chairman Gorbachev's UN speech on TV, and he seemed to have had a full house, with every seat taken. (U)

*Secretary Shultz* said those in the hall had been very attentive. (U)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said he had also noticed the quiet when he was speaking, and had asked himself whether it was a good or a bad thing. It was unusual for him to have quiet when he talked. In the years of *perestroika*, he had gotten used to having a response to everything he said. (S)



*The President* said he had had the same experience recently, and then remembered that people were listening to a translation through earphones. There was bound to be a delayed response. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* replied that he had thought the same thing during his address. (S)

*The Secretary* commented that when Chairman Gorbachev had finished, the burst of applause was genuine. (U)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said he wanted to stress that he was committed to what he had said at the UN and in front of the house as they were coming in. If we had succeeded in moving forward in these last three years, it was only through common efforts, and that was the only way for the future too. (S)

The final wave of media departed, and *Anatoliy Dobrynin* commented jovially that that probably meant that the dinner was over. (U)

*President Reagan* said he would like to begin the lunch discussion with a few remarks about the development of our relationship since the meeting in Moscow in June.<sup>2</sup> There had already been some discussion of the things that had gone into “the changed relationship” of recent years in the private meeting in the other room. The President said he and the Vice President had made it plain that they approved of these changes and were pleased that we had continued to make progress together since Moscow on all four points of our agenda. *The President* also noted, he had not said “*dovieray no provieray*” once during the meeting. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* replied that when people come to study the President’s time in office, someone should try to count up how many Russian proverbs the President knew. Those he had heard from the President showed he had selected them very carefully. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* went on to say that in the Soviet Union people were so busy that they had no time to analyze things, but in a larger context the President deserved some kind of merit award for his knowledge of Russian proverbs. People in the Soviet Union remembered the President’s visit to their country very well. (S)

*The President* said he remembered his visit too; he had come back home with only warm feelings for the Soviet people. (S)

Turning to regional issues, *The President* said the Soviet Union played an important and welcome role in negotiations to secure Namibian independence and the removal of foreign troops from Angola. The President expressed the hope that our two countries could work on other regional issues in the same cooperative spirit. (S)

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<sup>2</sup> See Documents 156–163.

*Chairman Gorbachev* replied that it might be important for him to recall a conversation he had had with Secretary Shultz on the eve of one of the Secretary's visits to the Middle East. He had said to Secretary Shultz that it was good that the US had decided that the Middle East problem could not be solved without the participation of the Soviet Union. Now that the US had reached that conclusion, the Soviets could make a constructive contribution in the Middle East. The Soviet Union favored constructive cooperation on all problems, including regional problems. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said he wanted to make a second general point. He wanted the US not to be suspicious of the Soviet Union on regional issues. The Soviet Union was not intriguing against the US. It was a good moment to make that point with the Vice President present. When the Soviets talk about Asia and the Pacific, or did something there, it was not to harm the US. If they did something in Europe, it was not to create difficulties for the US or to weaken its links with Western Europe. Gorbachev said that if both sides just continued as they had for decades, working against each other, nothing good would come of it. (S)

Neither country acted as some kind of saint, *Chairman Gorbachev* continued. There were also real contradictions between the two countries. At the same time, the two countries had real interests in common. The problem was what to do—what conclusions to draw from this situation. Chairman Gorbachev said his conclusion was that the two sides should continue along the same track they had been following. The Soviets saw no advantage to themselves in weakening US security. They saw no advantage in causing an upheaval in the world economy. That would be bad for the US, but it would be bad for the Soviet Union too. "Let us therefore move beyond the subject matter and the conditions of the 1940's and 1950's," Gorbachev said. We have been able to achieve something, and looking at both the President and the Vice President, he could say that "continuity" was the name of the game. "Let us not build castles in the air. Let us not operate on the basis of illusions, but of real policy." (S)

We should therefore be able to work together on all regional problems in a constructive way, *Chairman Gorbachev* continued. If the next President has some remarks or questions on these issues, he would like to hear from him. He might respond with some remarks or questions of his own. He especially supported the President's comment, favoring continuation of the tradition that Shevardnadze and Shultz had been able to establish between themselves. He hoped no one would be offended if he said that the relationship he wanted Secretary Baker to establish with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze was one that bureaucrats by themselves could not accomplish. All the forces we have at our

disposal should be deployed to improving Soviet-American relations. Chairman Gorbachev added that he understood the Vice President's statement to mean that he too understood the importance of the relationship between our two countries. (S)

*The President* noted that there were still major differences between us. The radar at Krasnoyarsk, for instance, was unresolved and remained a serious concern. We also need to keep on working in Geneva for an effective, verifiable ban on chemical weapons. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* replied that he thought he had put an end to the Krasnoyarsk problem. The installation had been transferred from the military to the scientists. This had been done to make life easier for the next President. Secretary Shultz has already spent so much time on this problem that the Soviet side had decided to turn the matter over to the scientists. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* said he had listened to the portion of Gorbachev's address concerning Krasnoyarsk and noted that the word Gorbachev had used had been translated as "dismantle." (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* replied with a smile that he bet the Secretary had written that down. He said he could confirm the translation. It was another victory for the Secretary. The important thing was to make life easier for the next President. (S)

*The Vice President* interjected that there were other areas he could use some help on, if that was what the Soviets had in mind. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* responded jocularly that the Vice President was probably now thinking of what else he could ask for. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* suggested helping end the US budget deficit. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said the Soviets could not solve the US budget deficit. The US could not solve the Soviet deficit. But working together, we could help each other with both deficits. (S)

Returning to chemical weapons, and referring to the upcoming Paris Conference, *the President* said that he believed the two sides could cleanse the whole world of these weapons if they stood together against them. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* replied that he had to say the Soviets had gained the impression that the US seemed a little cool toward solving this problem. This had been of concern. If the President was now saying that the US would cooperate on this issue, that was an important statement. The Soviets were ready to work together with us, and such cooperation would be extremely symbolic. (S)

*The President* said he had seen some TV footage on the use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war. He would never forget the picture of the dead mother with her dead baby, killed by poison gas. The world did not need such things. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* asked the President if he knew where that gas came from. (S)

*The President* answered that we did not. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said the Soviets didn't either. After Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had discussed the issue some time ago, the Soviets had asked their intelligence people to find out where the chemical weapons had come from. They had also asked them the same question concerning modernized ballistic missiles. Here, they had learned that it was a Western country that had supplied the weapons. (S)

*The President* said we had intelligence which indicated that a number of smaller countries were developing these weapons. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* replied that the Soviets had found that Asians and also some Latin American countries were helping increase the range of missiles, but it was mainly countries in Western Europe who were involved. (S)

*The President* said we needed to work on those issues. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* agreed and said it would be good to have bilateral consultations on non-proliferation of both missile technology and chemical weapons. If Secretary Shultz has not yet packed his bags, he still had time to consult with the Soviet Union on these issues. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* noted that during the election campaign the Vice President had expressed himself as forcefully as anyone on the subject of chemical weapons. It had been the Vice President who had tabled our treaty draft in 1984. (S)

*The Vice President* confirmed his great interest in this subject. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* acknowledged the Vice President's interest in eliminating chemical weapons, but asked if he was not somewhat less enthusiastic about a 50% reduction in strategic offensive weapons. (S)

*The Vice President* said Gorbachev had it half right: he was indeed enthusiastic about curbing chemical weapons, but he was equally interested in a 50% strategic reduction if we could get the problems worked out. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said both issues were part of the same big complex of arms control negotiations. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* then said he would like to drink to the President's health, in the Russian fashion. (S)

*The President* responded that he would be doing so with California wine. The President then recounted that he had been asked what he would recommend that Chairman Gorbachev see in New York. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* asked what the President had replied. "California," *the President* said. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said that required no translation. (S)

*The President* continued that our intelligence indicates that Qaddafi is building a chemical weapons plant so big that it can satisfy Libyan needs and supply other users on a commercial basis. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* replied that he could not say anything about that. The Soviets did not have such intelligence. US information might be accurate. The Soviets would look into it, because they did not want proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons or missile technology. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* said we would be pleased to brief members of the Soviet government, experts, anyone *Chairman Gorbachev* wished to designate, on the information we have. We could also do it through Ambassador Matlock. *Chairman Gorbachev* nodded his agreement. (S)

*The Vice President* said he did not think anyone had much influence on Qaddafi. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said there was an element of truth to that, but that at the same time agreeing to a chemical weapons convention with strict implementation could influence many States. We should get on with such a convention without delay. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* said he had come across two facts recently that had impressed him deeply. There existed an area in France that was still roped off because of contamination from chemical weapons during World War I. He had not known that before. It also turned out that the cleanup of the Shatt al-Arab following the Iran-Iraq war was going to be a tremendous job, and one reason was that there were still unexploded chemical weapons in the waterway. Experts said they would be difficult to deal with. So both sides in the war had ended up contaminating their own historic waterway. (S)

*Foreign Minister Shevardnadze* recalled that *Gorbachev*, in his UN address,<sup>3</sup> had called 1989 the decisive year for movement against chemical weapons. He was pleased to note that the US side was taking a vigorous stand against such weapons. (S)

*The President* said he hoped Vice President Bush was listening. (S)

*The Vice President* said the trouble with chemical weapons was that they could be built by anyone—even in small garages. Verification was a really hard problem. We had differences with our Allies and some of the Soviet's friends as well on this issue, not on the desirability of eliminating chemical weapons, but on how to verify their elimination. We need to move on this issue, but it was one that would be very difficult. (S)

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<sup>3</sup> See Document 178, footnote 6.

*Chairman Gorbachev* agreed there were difficulties, but this should make us re-double, not abandon our efforts. Similarly, he knew that in working with the US on 50% reductions in strategic arms, the Soviet side had not persuaded the US that both space weapons and sea-launched cruise missiles had to be dealt with. (S)

The Soviet Union was in an unfortunate position, *Chairman Gorbachev* joked. There was a lot of naval influence in President Reagan's Administration. Shultz had been a Marine, for example. There would now be even more naval influence with President Bush. He knew that Powell was an Army general, but he called him Admiral anyway. Things just seemed to get ever more complicated. (S)

Returning to chemical weapons, *President Reagan* said he only wished to point out that we were the two big kids on the school ground, and that if we worked together, we could bring the world closer to eliminating chemical weapons. Here was an area where the big boys could have influence. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said he agreed with what he called the President's profound statement. Working together to pressure others would improve the chances for concluding a chemical weapons convention. And since the President-elect had been involved for many years, and had tabled a treaty draft in 1984, he hoped he would speak out vigorously on the issue. (S)

*The Vice President* said Gorbachev had himself a deal. (S)

With regard to Gorbachev's comments on the Army, the Navy and the Marines, *the President* confessed that he had not succeeded in his dream of restoring the horse cavalry. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* smilingly replied that the Soviets could have helped on that in a practical way. When he had lived and worked in the Caucasus, he had found that there were many breeds of horses there. For instance, there was the mountain horse, a unique breed that felt as well in the mountains as we do in the city. The Soviets provided them to the frontier guards. Also there was the largest stable of Arabian horses in Europe. Many were sent to America, for as much as \$1 million apiece. (S)

*The President* said Arab horses were a big business in this country. (U)

*Chairman Gorbachev* noted that they were the liveliest horses in the world. (U)

*The President* said Arab horses were the progenitors on one side of all the English thoroughbreds racing in the world. Every English thoroughbred in the world traced its heritage back to one of three Arab horses of King Charles—Dolphin Barb, Byerly Turk and one other. (U)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said he understood the President was a good horseman. (U)

*The President* replied that he had been a Reserve Officer in the Cavalry. (U)

*Chairman Gorbachev* recalled that when he had been a young boy living in a village, he had dealt with both horses and oxen, and his favorite thing had been taking the horses to water. They had ridden them without saddles or bridles, and it had been great. Now he no longer knew which side of a horse to approach to mount. Maybe horses had changed in the meantime. (U)

*The President* said there was an amazing phenomenon with horses in the world, including in the US. Handicapped children were being brought to horse facilities for therapy. Not just children were involved, but mainly children. They rode around rings, and the help they received was amazing. (U)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said he knew there was scientific data showing horseback riding was useful to health. It was especially good for kidney disorders. (U)

*The President* said he had heard from one man who ran such a stable that a father had asked why riding was good for his handicapped child. He had replied that the minute the horse takes its first step, every muscle in the child's body responded. The President said he had checked this out the next time he had ridden—and it was true. (U)

*Aleksandr Yakovlev* interjected that it had not always been so. In 1970 Governor Reagan of California had received a group of Soviet journalists, including Yakovlev, in Sacramento. He had arrived ten minutes late, was limping a little, and had explained that there had been a contest with a horse and the horse had won. He asked whether the President had forgotten this incident. (S)

*The President* said he remembered the meeting. The problem was with legs, which were important in horseback riding. It was difficult to hold a horse when one had a thigh problem. The President said he had a thigh bone that had been broken in six places, not in a riding accident but in a ball game. When it was pressed too hard, it was possible to irritate his thigh. The President added that he rode regularly and thought it improved his health. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said he regularly rode in a car. (U)

*Secretary Shultz* said the President had not yet given up on the cavalry. (U)

*The President* recalled the old cavalry saying that there is nothing so good for the inside of a man as the outside of a horse. The President then observed that the conversation had not yet touched on Gorbachev's reforms within the Soviet Union. We were very supportive, and the President asked the Chairman to say a word on where he thought the reform process stood. (S)



*Chairman Gorbachev* asked whether the President was also undertaking reforms? Did he believe everything was fine in the US, or was simply leaving problems to the next President? The Chairman continued by saying that he thought it was appropriate for the US to watch closely what was happening in the Soviet Union. The United States needed to understand what was going on. The Chairman then said that he had heard that the new President was getting advice from both the right and the left in the United States. Experts on the right were saying that with the Soviet Union so involved in reform, with its economy so weak, with its ethnic strife so severe, the moment had clearly come to create an upheaval and perhaps destroy the country forever. He could only say to the Vice President what he had said many times already to President Reagan: we two would not be able to move forward and build a new relationship if we frame policies on illusions or mistaken views. It was unrealistic for either side to hope or expect that the other could not function at home or abroad. Let us be realistic, and base our policies on realism. (S)

*Perestroika* is our business, *Chairman Gorbachev* continued, whether anyone likes it or not. It is what we need. As to the question of whether the Soviet Union would emerge stronger or weaker from current policies, the Chairman said he always replies that if he did not expect his country to be stronger—politically, economically, and socially—he would not have embarked on reforms. The Soviets had no secrets from anyone. They wanted to be more successful, to become a more dynamic and confident society. At the same time, they expected to maintain their commitment to peace, to disarmament, and to their cooperation with the US. (S)

*The President* protested that he had meant only that he had heard reports of opposition to *perestroika*. As he had said to Gorbachev in the other room, we supported Soviet policies. There are a small group of Americans like those Gorbachev had just described, but a recent poll showed an overwhelming majority of Americans, over 80%, liked what had been going on between our two countries. There would always be a fringe, but most Americans liked what had been happening. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* rejoined that some on that fringe said the goal of *perestroika* was to deceive this President and especially the next President. (S)

*The Vice President* replied that no serious American, no faction, Democrat or Republican, right, left or center believed that. (S)

*The President* explained that our freedom allowed people to sound off even in favor of ridiculous views. There was a fringe that still believed Hitler was a nice guy. (S)

*Secretary Shultz* said, "Nobody I know." (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said that in any big country it was possible to find any number of fringe groups. But the masses, the majority in the Soviet Union, the overwhelming majority, pinned its hopes and plans on *perestroika*. It is our revolution and it will endure. Everyone accepted this. The real difficulties begin as we implement our policies. They demand real change by everyone—from Politburo members to ordinary workers. People see new things which they don't like or understand. (S)

Concerning Armenia and Azerbaijan, it is always easy to talk about ethnic problems. They are certainly present. Some Armenians ask for greater autonomy because of an accumulation of problems. The former Azerbaijani government had not been active enough in dealing with these problems. It had allowed them to fester, rather than resolving them. (S)

But did anyone think that a government as big as ours could not solve the problems of 130,000 people who live in a Baltic republic? *Chairman Gorbachev* insisted that this was not the problem. In these and other republics, *perestroika* threatened certain individuals—those who are corrupt or take bribes. Of course, no one admits to such acts. Instead, people start to howl about ethnic problems rather than put their own house in order and move against corruption. People had to abandon their old ways and learn to live in accordance with the law. Those who refuse to do so inject foolish slogans in an effort to cover-up their misdeeds. (S)

This was only one of the problems with *perestroika*, *Chairman Gorbachev* continued. The government was also reducing the numbers of officials and those being reduced certainly did not applaud *perestroika*. Nonetheless, a majority of people were for a renewed society. They wanted forward movement, and a process was underway which just could not stop. (S)

*The President* commented that we have more in common than he had realized. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* replied that he had been told the same thing by the American economist, John Kenneth Galbraith. Galbraith had asked why the Soviets were against the idea of convergence. *Chairman Gorbachev* said he had replied that he was not opposed to it, but that the two countries were simply different. Galbraith had said no, they had one thing in common—bureaucracies in both countries that could destroy them both. (S)

*The President* said that when he got home from Moscow, he was conscious of how much the people on the street there—even though he had, of course, had limited contact with them—wanted change. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said that even the opponents of *perestroika* now say loudly that they are for it. This was because it was impossible to be against it in any group of workers in the country. (S)

*The President* said bureaucracy just tends to grow in any country. In our country, we had made great economic gains through *perestroika* of our own. There were of course critics, who wanted to get back in charge of the bureaucracy, so they could start issuing instructions to the people again. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said Prime Minister Thatcher had told him how hard it had been when she had begun *perestroika* in the United Kingdom. She had advised him to forge ahead. (S)

*The President* said he had come to believe that bureaucracy everywhere lived by one cardinal rule: protect yourself. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said that seemed to him an international rule. To summarize, Chairman Gorbachev said, the process of *perestroika* was expanding, and its strong side was that democratization would be introduced in all areas of Soviet life. But demagogic and extremist elements were taking advantage of existing difficulties. The Soviet Union would defend democracy; it would deal with these people, forcefully if necessary. It was in a sense a dialectical process, which had to be pursued. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* then said he wished to introduce a topic that he wanted the next President to think about. This was whether we would also be able to develop closer commercial and economic relations with one another. (S)

*The Vice President* repeated that no serious group in America wanted *perestroika* to fail, or the Soviet Union to fall apart. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* responded that we should not try to make each other similar. We were different and would continue to be different. (S)

*The Vice President* suggested that the real question was not whether people wanted *perestroika* to fail. The question was rather whether or not it would succeed. This was a question for economic groups, business people with money to invest, or those who might be interested in joint ventures. They needed to have confidence that Soviet economic policy would succeed. One was glad to hear Gorbachev say that these policies would continue. No one in this or the next Administration wanted them to fail. But would they succeed—that was the essential question. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said that not even Jesus Christ could answer a question like that. All he could say, and he could say it firmly and confidently, was that the Soviet Union had embarked on the path of change in all areas—economic, political, cultural, humanitarian—as a matter of firm choice. There would be headway made; there would perhaps also be some backsliding. It was a matter of struggle. It was a complicated process. But the process would continue. (S)

*The President* said he had asked the question precisely because we were totally behind the process. We knew how complicated it was; we had some of the same problems. (S)

Since this would be his last meeting with Gorbachev while he was in office, *The President* continued, he wished to raise a glass to what Gorbachev has accomplished, to what they had accomplished together, and to what Gorbachev and the Vice President would accomplish together after January 20. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said he could join in that toast, and asked whether the Vice President did too. (S)

*The Vice President* said he did. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said jovially that that was their first agreement. Chairman Gorbachev continued that he wished to thank the President, the Vice President and all their colleagues for responding to his suggestion of a final meeting. They had said more to each other during this meeting than during some negotiations. That showed there was a new atmosphere, and even a new rhythm, in our relations. There was no need to probe for each other's position; now we just went to work. He thanked the President once again for his hospitality. (S)

*The President* reminded Gorbachev of the importance of continuing and expanding exchanges of people between the two countries. (S)

*Chairman Gorbachev* said he well remembered their first handshake at Geneva. (S)

*The Vice President* asked Gorbachev what he should properly be called: Chairman, President or General Secretary. *Chairman Gorbachev* said "whatever is easiest." (S)

**182. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

December 8, 1988, 10:21–10:33 a.m.

SUBJECT

Telephone Call between the President and First Lady and Chairman and Mrs. Gorbachev

PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*

The President

The First Lady

Rudolf Perina, Director, European and Soviet Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

Dimitry Zarechnak, Interpreter, Language Services, Department of State

*USSR*

Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev

Mrs. Raisa Gorbachev

Unidentified Soviet Interpreter

*The President* said he received word the night before of Chairman Gorbachev's early departure from New York and wanted to express how sorry he was that the Chairman had to leave. He understood, however, that the Chairman had no choice but to return to his own country and be with his people following the tragic earthquake of the day before. *The President* said he spoke for all Americans when he expressed his deep personal sorrow at the loss of life caused by this earthquake.

*Chairman Gorbachev* thanked the President for his understanding and condolences. He said he had received details the night before of the magnitude of the earthquake. Four cities, including the big city of Leninakan, had suffered severely, and the loss of life was considerable. Thousands of people had been in schools and factories when the earthquake struck between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., and many people died under the rubble. *The Chairman* said that under the circumstances, he could not continue his visit but rather had to go back and lead the relief effort. He thanked the President for all his help.

*The President* asked the Chairman to let him know if there was any way the United States could be of assistance, either bilaterally or through the international community.

*Chairman Gorbachev* thanked the President and said that, if necessary, he would let him know and act upon his kind offer.

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ledskey Files, Soviet Union (USSR) [Gorbachev New York Visit 12/07/1988]. Confidential. Drafted by Perina. Reagan spoke on the telephone from the Residence at the White House; Gorbachev was in New York.

*The President* said that he wished to tell the Chairman again how much both the Vice President and he had enjoyed meeting with the Chairman. It had been a very useful meeting for both sides. *The President* wished the Chairman success in the future, a safe journey home, and Godspeed.

*Chairman Gorbachev* replied that he also valued the meeting of the day before. He said that the President had taken very important steps in the concluding phase of his term which were in the interests of the peoples of both countries and of peace. He wished to thank the President for these.

*The President* thanked the Chairman and said that the First Lady would like to speak to Mrs. Gorbachev.

*The First Lady* said she knew that the President had just been speaking to Chairman Gorbachev, but she also wanted to express her sympathy on the terrible tragedy of the earthquake. She sent her personal sympathy and was so sorry about this tragedy.

*Mrs. Gorbachev* thanked the First Lady and said that it was, indeed, an enormous tragedy which forced the General Secretary to cut short his stay. They would be leaving to return to Moscow in two hours.

*The First Lady* said she understood but was sorry that the visit would be cut short and that Mrs. Gorbachev and her husband could not see more of the United States. As they had discussed, she hoped that Mrs. Gorbachev and her husband would come back to visit with her and the President in California. But she understood that at this time it was important to return and be with their own people.

*Mrs. Gorbachev* thanked the First Lady for remembering them, for the telephone call, and for the words of sympathy. She wished the First Lady the best of health and well-being, and said she hoped they would meet and talk again.

*The First Lady* said that, as they had told each other before, destiny had brought them together for their husbands, their countries and the world. She looked forward to seeing Mrs. Gorbachev again in Russia or in California.

*Mrs. Gorbachev* replied that she hoped for this also.

*The First Lady* added that if there was anything that the United States could do to help, we would be ready, and she wished Mrs. Gorbachev a safe trip home.

*Mrs. Gorbachev* thanked her and sent best regards to the President.

*The First Lady* said she would tell the President and also wished to send her best wishes to President Gorbachev.

The conversation ended at 10:33 a.m.

**183. Memorandum of Conversation<sup>1</sup>**

Paris, January 8, 1989, 2:30–4:05 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

The Secretary's Meeting with Shevardnadze

**PARTICIPANTS***U.S.*

Secretary of State George P. Shultz  
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant  
Secretary of State for  
European & Canadian Affairs  
Jack F. Matlock, U.S. Ambassador  
to the USSR  
Charles Redman, Assistant  
Secretary of State for Public  
Affairs  
Nelson Ledsky, NSC Staff  
Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy  
Assistant Secretary of State,  
EUR  
Alexander Vershbow, Director,  
EUR/SOV (notetaker)  
Gary Crocker, INR/PMA (CW  
briefing only)  
Jay Castillo, CIA (CW briefing  
only)  
Sue Biniaz, L/OES (signing  
ceremony only)

*USSR*

Foreign Minister Eduard  
Shevardnadze  
Ambassador Viktor Karpov Head,  
MFA Arms Control and  
Disarmament Administration  
Yakov Ryabov, USSR Ambassador  
to France  
Teimuraz Stepanov, Aide to  
Shevardnadze  
Vadim Perfilyev, Deputy  
Spokesman, MFA  
Mr. Ryabinkov, MFA Treaty and  
Legal Department  
Vasiliy Sredin, Deputy Director,  
USA Department, MFA  
(notetaker)

*Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons*

*Shevardnadze* said he thought the CW conference was going quite well and was being conducted in a good atmosphere.

*Secretary Shultz* agreed that the conference was proceeding in excellent fashion. He had listened to *Shevardnadze's* speech and considered it very good.<sup>2</sup> *Shevardnadze* had reiterated some things we had heard

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz-Shevardnadze Meeting Paris, January 1989. Secret; Sensitive. All brackets are in the original. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Simons, Ridgway, Creagan, and Collins. An unknown hand initialed for Creagan and Collins. The meeting took place at the Soviet Ambassador's Residence. Shultz traveled to Paris January 6–8 to attend the Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 657 from Paris, January 8, the Embassy reported highlights of *Shevardnadze's* speech earlier that day. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])



before and this was reassuring. We were especially pleased with the emphasis on inspections of alleged violations and with Shevardnadze's statement that the UN Secretary General should have the authority to conduct investigations with no country able to refuse an inspection. All of these positions, the Secretary said, had been well put.

*Shevardnadze* said he had read the Secretary's speech<sup>3</sup> and believed it also contained many interesting things. If we were to move in the direction indicated, a convention banning chemical weapons was within reach.

#### *U.S.-Soviet Relations*

Turning to the formal agenda, *the Secretary* noted that there was not much time and the Ministers had some interesting documents to sign at the end.

*Shevardnadze* agreed it was unfortunate they had little time, but having worked together for 3½ years he wanted to say once again how gratified he was by what he and the Secretary had done together. 1988 had been a very interesting year, a turning point in overall U.S.-Soviet relations. Great impetus had been provided by the meetings in Washington, Moscow and New York. It was striking to compare the atmosphere at those meetings with that of the 1985 Geneva Summit (which was already very good). *Shevardnadze* said he appreciated the Secretary's personal contribution to the positive developments in U.S.-Soviet relations and he hoped that this meeting, their 31st, would be useful and fruitful. He did not know whether any fundamental issues could be resolved today or any new agreements reached, but it was still a meeting of some importance.

*Secretary Shultz* said he agreed that many important things had happened over the last year. It was indeed a turning point in our relations and in world developments. There was a different atmosphere, reflecting a greater ability to solve problems—southern Africa being a good example. The Secretary recalled that it had been a very striking experience for him to sit at the UN and sign the documents bringing into effect the Namibia/Angola accords.<sup>4</sup> He was very pleased to have been able to say that it could not have come about without the cooperative, supportive relationship between the United States

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<sup>3</sup> Reference is to Shultz's January 7 address before the Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. For the text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1989, pp. 4–6.

<sup>4</sup> Reference is to the protocol of Brazzaville, signed by the United States, South Africa, Cuba, and Angola on December 13, 1988. For the White House statement, Crocker's remarks, text of the protocol, as well as Shultz and Reagan's December 22 statements, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 1989, pp. 10–12.

and Soviet Union. In fact, the parties could not have done it without our help.

Continuing, the Secretary said he was very grateful to Shevardnadze, who had been a fine partner and a good friend. Of course, the leadership of Chairman Gorbachev and President Reagan had been key to the process of improved U.S.-Soviet relations. The two Ministers could not have done what they had done without a push from the top. Thus we owed our leaders a debt of gratitude. The Secretary added that he hoped and trusted that President-elect Bush and Secretary-designate Baker would seek to ensure continuity. He knew that they also saw the importance of our relationship and wanted it to remain creative and constructive.

*Shevardnadze* said the Secretary had just said something important. It was very important to preserve the dynamism and the atmosphere that we have shaped. On this basis we should further expand U.S.-Soviet relations for the benefit of international security. This was not, he added, just a slogan, but a real policy. Based on what Bush and Baker had said, as well as the comments of other members of the incoming team, he believed there was a very sincere desire to preserve continuity and to expand cooperation further. This was because it was in the interest of both our countries. As for reminiscing, *Shevardnadze* said that one day he and Secretary Shultz would have the opportunity to do so at a place where they could relax—perhaps in the United States, Georgia or Siberia—since they had a lot to reminisce about. He added that while many colleagues from previous ministerial meetings were not present on this occasion, these were good people with whom the Soviets had debated and he wanted Secretary Shultz to pass on his regards and words of appreciation to all of them.

*Secretary Shultz* said he would be glad to do so. Regarding the agenda for this meeting, he wanted first to make some points about the Vienna CSCE meeting. He also had some material to pass along about the Armenian earthquake and he wanted to brief *Shevardnadze* on the Libyan chemical weapons plant. At the end he wanted make a brief mention of our new embassy problem. *Shevardnadze* said he agreed and asked the Secretary to go first.

#### *Vienna CSCE Meeting*

*The Secretary* said that he had two topics he wanted to mention in the context of bringing the Vienna meeting to a rapid conclusion. He hoped we would be able to finish promptly so that he could personally participate in the closing ceremony.

His first point, the Secretary said, concerned the U.S. decision to agree to a Moscow human rights conference as one of the follow-on meetings to Vienna. This was a decision that he and the President felt

was the proper one. We were moving ahead on the basis of what we regarded as immense changes in the Soviet Union; we felt good about the fact that these changes were based on the Soviets' own conclusions about what was good for their country. This provided a very solid foundation. As Shevardnadze knew, we had not been able to resolve all the issues we had raised in connection with the Moscow conference. Recalling what Ambassador Matlock had said in passing along the Secretary's recent letter,<sup>5</sup> it was very important that the progress continue. This would be very critical to us in cementing political support for our decision. That decision was a controversial one but the Secretary said he did not mind standing up for it.

The Secretary went on to note that Chairman Gorbachev's speech to the United Nations contained references to changes in the Soviet Union's legal arrangements and the rule of law.<sup>6</sup> We had read with great attention this passage because the institutionalization of change was very important to us. It was something we would be looking for in the future. The Secretary added that there was a fair number of refusenik cases still outstanding and we wanted to work our way through these as well. There were two people in particular on peoples' minds in the U.S.: Sergey Petrov and Georgiy Samoilovich. Any news on these cases would be most welcome.

Continuing, the Secretary said there was also a question about how we would review various cases. We have a procedure with respect to psychiatric cases. For criminal cases in which there may have been a miscarriage of justice, we have agreed there will be a procedure to review them one by one. For example, the U.S. would like to see as much as possible of the court records. It was important that we get the details of this procedure pinned down, since this would be very important to maintaining political support for our decision on the Moscow conference. But the Secretary reiterated that the decision had been made; we were comfortable with it and would proceed with it. At the same time, it was obvious that if there were some major move back to old conditions it would be impossible for any Administration to go to Moscow. But we have full confidence that this will not be the case.

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<sup>5</sup> In telegram 1031, January 4, the Embassy instructed Matlock to present to the Soviet Foreign Ministry Shultz's letter to Shevardnadze on the proposed Soviet human rights conference. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N890001–0025). Matlock responded in telegram 205 from Moscow, January 4, that he had delivered the letter to Bessmertnykh, who "read the letter, expressed his initial understanding that it indicated the U.S. had 'decided to participate in a Moscow human rights conference,' and said he would inform the Foreign Minister of its contents." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, N890001–0031)

<sup>6</sup> See Document 178, footnote 6.

*Shevardnadze* said that he now believed we could say with confidence that the Vienna meeting would be completed within the proposed timeframe of January 17–19. This was certainly desirable. There still were differences over the geographic zone for conventional arms talks; here he was referring to the position of Greece, since the Soviets and Turks had found a solution to their differences. There were also some other obstacles but the Soviets believed all of them could be overcome. *Shevardnadze* added that many participants, including himself, hoped that Secretary Shultz would be able to attend the conclusion of Vienna, since this was only fair and right. It should be possible to complete the meeting in time so that he and the Secretary could have another meeting and see the Vienna woods together.

*The Secretary* remarked that we would not be able to have a “walk in the woods.” *Shevardnadze* said that in any case their meeting could be accompanied by the music of Johann Strauss. Secretary Shultz quipped that, in that case, they could have a “waltz in the woods.” *Karpov* commented that the U.S. should have no reason to worry about a “waltz in the woods” now.

*Shevardnadze* said he wanted to convey the Soviet Union’s gratitude for U.S. support of the idea of a Moscow human rights conference. The Soviets believed that the idea itself was appropriate in view of trends, not only in the USSR but also in other countries. The U.S. decision was of fundamental importance. The Soviets understood the process involved in formulating the U.S. position and they knew as well of Secretary Shultz’s personal contribution. For this they wanted to express special appreciation. In recognition of the Secretary’s role, *Shevardnadze* believed he should attend the Moscow conference as a guest of honor; he would be sent the first invitation. *Shevardnadze* added that he expected the conference would be an interesting forum. There would be a lot to say and a lot to show. Moreover, in the intervening period the Soviets planned to do a lot to implement their plans and intentions. Thus the Moscow human rights conference would be an important event.

Continuing, *Shevardnadze* said that if we succeeded in finishing the Vienna meeting, the next stage will be to begin negotiations on conventional arms. While this was an issue for the new Secretary of State, the Soviets believed it would be good if we could decide that both of the new conventional security negotiations should begin at the level of Foreign Ministers. This would emphasize the negotiations’ importance, while also providing an occasion to discuss other issues.

Further, *Shevardnadze* said, the Soviets believed we should consider a meeting at the Summit level of European countries plus the U.S. and Canada to review the initial results of the conventional negotiations. *Shevardnadze* added that he wanted to emphasize the impor-

tance of the unilateral reductions in conventional forces announced by Gorbachev in New York. These opened up possibilities for a major breakthrough in reducing the military stand-off in Europe. He repeated that it would help the negotiations if we were to begin them with a meeting at the Foreign Minister level and later on—during a subsequent stage—at the summit level.

Returning to the Vienna endgame, Shevardnadze said that, as a practical matter, it was important that we push for solutions involving as few amendments as possible so that we could finish by January 17. In the Soviet view the draft concluding document of the neutral and non-aligned (NNA) countries was consistent with the interests of the West and the East. The Soviets had no objections to the document in its present form. It was, of course, a compromise reflecting the interests of all participants. The GDR had had some problems but these had now been taken care of. The Romanians also had some problems. Perhaps, Shevardnadze suggested whimsically, the U.S. should work on the Romanians and the Soviets on the Greeks.

*Secretary Shultz* responded that the U.S. agreed the language in the NNA draft was pretty good, although we believed it needed strengthening in two areas. The most important of these was human rights monitors. Here we would like to see some specific reference to the right to form such groups. We noticed that in Gorbachev's UN speech he had used words that supported this concept; perhaps this could provide the basis for a solution.

Regarding the Greek problem, the Secretary said he frankly did not know how this would be resolved. The Greeks were very stubborn and the dispute was not an East-West issue but a reflection of tensions over Cyprus. Perhaps the Greeks would change their minds as in Stockholm, or perhaps they would opt out, in which case we would have conventional stability talks among 22 rather than 23. Alternatively, the Greeks might refuse to sign the concluding document but participate in the negotiations. In short, we were struggling with the problem. These were some possible solutions to which he simply wanted to call Shevardnadze's attention while we waited to see how our discussions with the Greeks evolved.

*Shevardnadze* said this was clearly a problem that could not be resolved today but he suggested that the two ministers ask their delegations to work intensively with the Greeks and the Romanians. He added that he also understood that Canada had some hesitation about the Moscow human rights conference. This also would need to be addressed if we were to meet the goal of completing Vienna before January 20.

*The Secretary* replied that he could tell Shevardnadze privately that the Canadians would be agreeing to the Moscow human rights

conference the following week. He was more concerned about the Greek problem than about any other. There were ways we might conclude the Vienna meeting without resolving this problem; while it would not be satisfactory to exclude Greece from participating in the conventional talks, we might have to accept this.

Returning to the Moscow human rights conference, the Secretary reiterated that the more we see clear indications that progress is continuing, the stronger the support will be for the conference. Thus to the degree that the Soviets were able to find things they could do in the near term, it would help us a lot.

The Secretary said that one other issue on which the U.S. still had problems was the number of follow-on conferences. We hoped that the number could be reduced from 11 since we were reluctant to see a proliferation of conferences. *Assistant Secretary Ridgway* said the U.S. believed that 8 or 9 were sufficient and we were willing to have one additional meeting in the East apart from the Moscow human rights conference.

*Shevardnadze* said he did not believe there were going to be problems on this score. He noted that while the Czechs had asked to host an economic conference, their Foreign Minister had told him the day before that Prague would agree to remove this proposal from the agenda. *Secretary Shultz* said that he agreed that this issue would probably fall into place.

*Shevardnadze* said that he would be meeting with the Greek Foreign Minister the following day. While he would not take full responsibility, he would try to persuade the Greeks to drop their objections to the geographic solution worked out between the Turks and Soviets. He added that he had had a very good meeting with the Turkish Foreign Minister, whom he had found in a very good mood. *The Secretary* commented that the Turkish Foreign Minister was always in a good mood, but this did not affect the substance of the Greek problem.

*Shevardnadze* said he wanted to say a few words on some specific cases the Secretary had raised in the past. Regarding the “list of six” (the last six cases remaining on the President’s list, presented to Gorbachev in New York), there had been some further consideration and some positive decisions. Kosharovskiy had been allowed to emigrate; there were no longer any obstacles to the emigration of the Stolar family; Lukyanenko had been pardoned; the Barats had been allowed to have their Moscow residence permits restored; and Mrs. Gordiyevskaya had made no request to leave. *Shevardnadze* said he had additional information on other cases, but given the limited time he thought it would be best to provide this to Ambassador Matlock in the coming days.

*Shevardnadze* went on to emphasize that the Soviet Union was embarked on perestroika—a revision of structures that would lead to

the establishment of a state based on law. This could not, however, be done overnight. Nonetheless, some laws had already been promulgated and work will be completed by the spring. Draft legislation had first to be discussed by the people. The end result of this process would be a new Soviet constitution. Shevardnadze added that, with the completion of the Vienna concluding document, there would be more guarantees that human rights problems in all countries would be addressed in the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act.

*Secretary Shultz* said Ambassador Matlock would be ready to talk with anyone Shevardnadze might designate on other cases, since human rights issues were high on our agenda.

*Shevardnadze* suggested that it would be Bessmertnykh, Adamishin or himself. The Soviet side was ready to discuss any question raised in a substantive way. Regarding *Secretary Shultz's* points about an arrangement on legal questions, *Shevardnadze* said the U.S. idea had been favorably received and had been discussed with the Soviet law and order agencies. These agencies had agreed to the approach, and it was now necessary to discuss practical arrangements for a mechanism to sort out the facts on disputed cases. *Secretary Shultz* commented that this was a positive statement.

Following consultation with Sredin, *Shevardnadze* said that the two cases *Secretary Shultz* had raised (Petrov and Samoilovich) both still involved security objections, but the review would continue. It was possible that some cases would not lend themselves to a solution, but having a joint forum to discuss these issues could help produce results.

*Secretary Shultz* said that we believed that it would be advantageous to have Foreign Ministries involved even if the legal agencies had a dominant role in this review process. We have found that the presence of MFA people can be helpful.

*Shevardnadze* replied that this was certainly going to be the case. The Ministry of Justice, the Procurator General, the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Internal Affairs would all be involved on the Soviet side, along with the MFA. In addition, there was already a parallel arrangement between the Supreme Soviet and the U.S. Congress and this too could be helpful. Thus we should be able to sort out these cases.

#### *Armenian Earthquake Assistance*

*Secretary Shultz* said he wanted to say a few words about Armenia. We knew that the earthquake situation was entering a new stage. Immediate relief efforts were over and the Soviets were now turning their attention to reconstruction and related matters. We appreciated how many problems the Soviets faced, and thus we had been thinking about various ways in which the U.S. could help. The Secretary then handed over papers listing areas in which U.S. government agencies



and private groups might be prepared to contribute (attached).<sup>7</sup> He added that he thought Shevardnadze's comments in his CW Conference speech about outside aid to Armenia had been very generous in their thanks for outside aid. The Secretary then asked DAS Simons to present copies of letters from the heads of U.S. agencies to their Soviet counterparts providing further information on the kinds of activities that might be possible.

*Shevardnadze* said that he would like to say on behalf of the Soviet leadership and people that the USSR was very grateful to the President, Vice President, Secretary Shultz and all Americans for their generous support—moral, psychological and material—following the Armenian tragedy. This was the opinion of all Soviet people and U.S. aid was deeply appreciated. The new offers the Secretary had presented would be carefully considered with the understanding that the U.S. government was pursuing a policy that would contribute to the further humanization of international relations. This showed how we have entered a new phase of international politics, and much of the warmer climate can be credited to the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. Shevardnadze repeated the Soviet Union's warm and cordial gratitude. There were indeed many problems in Armenia—some towns simply no longer existed, as U.S. citizens participating in the relief effort had seen. The Soviets would consider the U.S. offers and be in touch. [FYI: Subsequently, *Assistant Secretary Ridgway* and *DAS Simons* stressed to *Sredin* in private that the material presented illustrated the kinds of cooperation that might be possible but did not embody specific offers requiring a reply by the Soviet side. END FYI.]

*Shevardnadze* noted that members of the U.S. scientific community and the Soviet Academy of Sciences had already taken steps to pool their efforts in forecasting natural disasters. Both our countries have had many painful experiences, and there was considerable potential that had been largely untapped. Other countries too, such as Japan, have had their achievements in responding to natural disasters. Against this background, Shevardnadze suggested that it would be good if the U.S. and Soviet Union were to develop a joint initiative for pooling international efforts in this area. Of course there already were some international activities of this kind ongoing, but these could be broadened.

*The Secretary* replied that this struck him as a good idea with some potential. As a Californian he was aware of the problem of earthquakes. We also had to worry about other kinds of disasters such as hurricanes;

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<sup>7</sup> Attached but not printed is an undated paper entitled "Armenian Earthquake Disaster: Prospective U.S. Government Cooperative Efforts."

Bangladesh had recently had three quarters of its territory covered in water, and the U.S. was helping evaluate that country's plans for responding to the crisis. The Secretary said he agreed that we should look for ways we can cooperate in predicting and lessening the effect of natural disasters since this was important to all nations.

*Shevardnadze* suggested that he and the Secretary ask their people to think together about what could be done bilaterally, multilaterally, and in the UN framework. Some organizations were not functioning efficiently enough, particularly in the UN, and the U.S.–USSR could be the initiators of efforts to revitalize these organizations.

#### *Libyan Chemical Weapons Program*

*Secretary Shultz* said that time was running out and he wanted to offer *Shevardnadze* a briefing on the Libyan chemical weapons plant. He noted that the Libyan plane incident of the previous week<sup>8</sup> was one in which, from our standpoint, U.S. pilots had acted in self-defense. The carrier from which they were operating was nowhere near Libya and the planes were nowhere near the suspected chemical works. The aircraft had made five efforts to disengage and only fired when the Libyan fighters had engaged in the kind of close pursuit suggesting hostile intent. At the UN, we had shown films of what our pilots saw and we believed this made our case clear.

Turning to the CW plant the Secretary said that it is not yet finished and we do not believe it is ready to go into full production. We had raised the question because we would like to see it prevented from becoming a CW producer.

*Shevardnadze* said that, based on the material the Soviets had seen, they continued to have a negative attitude about what had happened with the Libyan aircraft. He had not seen the films or talked with the U.S. pilots, but he believed it was an extremely unpleasant incident. There was a very substantial military presence in the region including forces of the U.S., the Soviet Union and others. The region was oversaturated with arms and thus any incident could have disastrous consequences. This was why the Soviets had reacted so sharply.

As for the alleged CW plant, *Shevardnadze* continued, the Soviet Union had people in Libya, including military advisors and engineers helping in the construction of military installations, but they had no personnel at the facility in question. Soviet relations with Libya were normal and they had no information about a plant capable of producing CW. The U.S. had made accusations that were very serious even in

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<sup>8</sup> On January 4, two U.S. F–14s shot down two Libyan MiG–23s over international waters in the Mediterranean Sea.

the case of a country headed by an objectionable regime. It was wrong to make such accusations without corroboration. Once such charges were raised the issue should be investigated in a serious way. Even if the Libyans had decided to develop CW, we all knew their level of technical know-how: they could not do this by themselves. Thus we needed to go to the source to find those guilty of helping.

Shevardnadze went on to say that there had been talk about Iraqi CW use and now there were accusations about Libya; in the future there would be accusations of other countries. His principled position was that investigations should take place into what was happening. Groundless accusations were not what the Soviets stood for. The Libyans themselves had categorically denied they were building a CW plant. Moscow had no data to confirm that they were, although perhaps Soviet intelligence services had not paid sufficient attention. Thus he was glad to see the U.S. information but he repeated that the U.S. should go to the source and the UN Secretary General should have the authority to investigate in such cases.

*The Secretary* replied that he welcomed Shevardnadze's statement. It meant that, if there were a chemical weapons plant in Libya, then Shevardnadze would be upset. He was glad Shevardnadze wanted to know all the facts. When the subject had arisen at the Governors Island meeting,<sup>9</sup> the Secretary recalled that he had said the U.S. would be glad to brief on what it knows. Thus he had asked Mr. Crocker to provide a briefing for Shevardnadze, recognizing that this was not as thorough a briefing as might be given to intelligence specialists.

*Shevardnadze* said that he did not object to the briefing although he could not be a fit opponent for Mr. Crocker. *Secretary Shultz* said that, in any case, Crocker's presentation was not meant to be definitive. (Crocker and Castillo then joined the meeting.)

*Crocker* briefed on the technology center at Rabta, referring to line diagrams that had been prepared in Russian for today's meeting. He noted that there were two main areas at the facility, a metal fabrication plant and a chemical plant. We knew a lot about the former since the Japanese had given us a lot of information—that it could produce both large and small precision metal pieces including artillery shells, bombs, and other weapons capable of delivering chemical weapons. Moreover, there was a plastics area that could make the special plastic parts needed to hold CW. In building this part of the facility, Crocker explained, the Japanese had obtained the assistance of 12 companies from different countries. These had also spoken with us and, thus, we were convinced that this part of the facility had a military purpose. The entire facility

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<sup>9</sup> See Document 181.

in fact had a very high security aspect, being surrounded by a double fence and, more recently, by extensive air defenses and troops. It had been well protected from the very beginning (we had been watching since 1986).

Crocker said that we knew less about the chemical plant since no one admitted to having helped build it. The construction was carried out covertly and we believed that given its large size it could produce many tons of chemical agents. The key building was the large production area in the center. It had a high capacity air system on the roof, which meant that the building below could handle very toxic materials. There was also a remote control center at one end which had been very solidly built, plus large storage tanks. The chemical weapons facility was well protected, having been built into a mountain side.

Crocker noted that the Japanese had initially been told by the Libyans that it was a desalinization plant but no Japanese technicians had been allowed in. Qadhafi now was saying the plant's purpose was to produce pharmaceutical chemicals. We had our doubts, however. Of course the facility could produce many things; it was by definition multipurpose. But our evidence on Qadhafi's chemical weapons program was not limited to watching this one facility. Crocker explained that Qadhafi had started his CW program around the same time as Iraq and Syria. He had not been as successful as those countries, however, since some of the countries from which Libya had sought to buy chemicals and equipment had cooperated with us. The Libyans had originally tried to produce CW at Tripoli but after the U.S. bombing had moved the project to the facility at Rabta.

Continuing, Crocker stated that we knew there were currently precursors for mustard gas and nerve agent at Rabta. We were concerned that if chemical agents were produced, the Libyans would use them in view of the fact that we already had evidence of Libyan CW use along the Chad border and signs that the Libyans may have given CW to Somalia; there was, of course, the additional risk that Qadhafi would provide CW to terrorist organizations.

Crocker, concluding the briefing, reiterated that we did not believe the plant was yet producing CW since there had been some serious problems in August, 1988. Thus there was still some time to prevent the plant's use. Crocker noted that if Qadhafi would like to prove that Rabta was not a chemical weapons plant, there would have to be elaborate inspections along the lines we were discussing in the Geneva CW talks.

*Shevardnadze* asked whether the Soviets could keep the diagrams and *Crocker* agreed. *Shevardnadze* asked his colleagues if they had any questions.

*Karpov* commented that what Crocker had just shown was a workshop, and no one could say what this workshop could produce.

*Shevardnadze* noted that the Soviets had asked Qadhafi about the facility (it was their moral duty to do so in view of Moscow's cooperative relationship with Libya) but he and all other Libyan leaders had denied it was a CW plant. Moreover, Qadhafi had said he was ready to accept inspectors and *Shevardnadze* had heard that reporters had been invited to the plant. *Karpov* added that the Libyans had said the plant was not yet operational, but that they would allow inspections once it was functioning.

*Secretary Shultz* said it was interesting what Qadhafi had done with the reporters, and asked *Redman* to elaborate. *Assistant Secretary Redman* explained that the reporters, after three days' wait, had been taken on a bus trip to the plant. The trip, however, took place after dark and the bus did not stop moving, so the reporters were unable to see anything.

*Secretary Shultz* said that, in any event, a one-time inspection would not be a satisfactory solution—otherwise we would not be working so hard in Geneva. There would have to be a capability for surprise inspections and for repeated visits. The Secretary added that he recognized that today's presentation was the first information *Shevardnadze* had heard about the Rabta plant and he appreciated the spirit in which it had been received. We did not believe this should become an issue between us since it was one in which we had a shared interest. He welcomed *Shevardnadze's* statement that he would continue to put questions to the Libyans. If they were genuinely prepared to show the facility, perhaps the Soviet Union could get its experts there. This would be constructive.

*Shevardnadze* replied that he was not a specialist in chemistry. Perhaps Soviet experts would look at the plant and perhaps they would find something; it was hard to judge just by a diagram. The important thing, however, was to find the truth of the matter. The Soviets would ask questions officially and maybe do something unofficially. Both sides had an interest in not having the production of chemical weapons anywhere. On this he could say that the Soviet Union had an unambiguous and definitive position: chemical weapons should not exist, and there should be no channel for circumvention through any other country, be it Hungary, Korea or Germany.

*Shevardnadze* said that he could not say that the U.S. experts had persuaded him about the Libyan plant. *Secretary Shultz* replied that we recognized that *Shevardnadze* could not make a judgment on the basis of this brief description, but we wanted to show the Soviets that we had approached the question seriously and that our charges were not frivolous ones designed simply to needle Qadhafi. We had a lot of information, some of which we could disclose and some of which we could not. All of our analysts—who tend to be skeptics—were in this

case very comfortable with the assessment that the intention of the Rabta facility was to produce CW.

The Secretary added that we agreed the Libyans could not build or operate such a facility on their own. Part of our task was to find out where the expertise and the precursors were coming from. He reiterated that the U.S. did see precursors for CW at Rabta. These substances had been obtained in a clandestine way and evidence like that generally made one suspicious.

*Shevardnadze* said the Soviet Union received all kinds of information from various sources, but he tended to treat such information very warily and gingerly. Very often data whose accuracy had been checked and double-checked later proved to be erroneous. Nonetheless, he appreciated the U.S. information and the Soviets would do what they could to determine what the facility is all about. But he wanted to ask the Secretary one question: What was the U.S. intention? Was it to achieve a stabilization and normalization of the situation or to see it become more grave? He noted that after the aircraft incident Libya and other Arab countries had been asking this question of the Soviets and thus it was very important to know U.S. intentions. The aircraft incident was in the past; what about the future?

*Secretary Shultz* replied that we intended to continue our diplomatic efforts to call attention to the Libyan CW project and to do everything we could to prevent its maturing into a CW plant. This was why we were talking to the USSR and our allies, and why we were trying to identify the sources and call people to account. We hoped this effort would be successful. Regarding Libya more generally, the Secretary continued, our problem was Libyan behavior. When Libya behaved normally, we would have no objections to normal relations. But Qadhafi's behavior was beyond the pale and as a result we had no formal diplomatic relations. The Secretary reiterated that U.S. planes had been in no way aggressive and he was sure *Shevardnadze* would understand that any pilot must defend himself. That self-defense was the objective was shown on the films.

*Shevardnadze* said he wanted to separate the two questions. He agreed we should look into the circumstances surrounding the aircraft incident, but he was particularly worried about future U.S. actions regarding the CW plant. The Soviets had bitter experience in the past: the U.S. had carried out attacks involving the killing of people. If this were repeated it would be quite unacceptable. The U.S. should first investigate the facts of the situation.

*The Secretary* said that we hoped that the plant would not come into being as a producing CW facility. If we and the Soviet Union both saw that it was producing CW, then we would have a serious problem on our hands. For our part, we would clearly want to stop it from

operating. This was why we were making so much noise now: to prevent this from coming to pass.

*Shevardnadze* said that if the Soviet Union saw that it was a CW plant, it would cooperate and consult with the U.S. But the Soviets were not sure that it was a CW plant, and he believed we should look at the problem without fanning tensions.

*The Secretary* replied that this was good. At his press conference he would say that the U.S. had provided information to the Soviets about the Libyan facility and, while the information was not of sufficient depth for the Soviet side to make a judgment, the sides had agreed that they both would deplore any new CW facility and that *Shevardnadze* had agreed to look into the problem.

*Shevardnadze* said this was fine, but it would also be necessary to say that the Soviet Union opposed production of CW in any country, including Libya. This could be said with all responsibility. It would also have to be stated that the Soviets had asked Libya about the plant, but the Libyans had denied it was for CW. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union would take note of the U.S. information. In a private aside, *Karpov* urged *Shevardnadze* to add that the issue should be resolved only by peaceful means; *Shevardnadze* told him that this was another question. (Crocker and Castillo then departed.)

#### *Moscow New Office Building*

*Secretary Shultz* said that the Ministers had two agreements to sign. Before finishing the meeting, however, he wanted to say a word on our Moscow Embassy building. Just how the question would shake down was not clear. The President had decided that the new office building should be torn down and rebuilt. This decision would now be reviewed by Congress. In the meantime, there had been a suggestion by some American businessmen of the possibility of buying the NOB. They had told us that the Soviets would be prepared to provide another site in Lenin Hills for a new U.S. building. Ambassador Matlock has subsequently asked whether this was in fact the case. The Secretary said that the U.S. would be interested in knowing if another site would be available, without saying that this is necessarily the course we would want to follow. In any event, we would need to renegotiate the 1972 agreement in order to change the mode of construction in a way that would put it more fully into our own hands. He wanted to flag this as an issue that was going to be coming up.

*Shevardnadze* said that he was aware of this question, as it had indeed been raised by Ambassador Matlock and others. It was not a simple problem. He had personally wanted to buy the NOB for the MFA—after all, it had a good setting and good eavesdropping equipment. Seriously, though, the question was a complicated one and he



could not decide at this time. However, the Soviets would look into the whole range of possibilities.

### *Afghanistan*

*Shevardnadze* said he wanted to make a few comments on Afghanistan before they proceeded to the signing ceremony. Perhaps Mr. Armacost could work more actively with respect to an internal Afghan dialogue. The U.S. and the USSR had had good contacts but things were not working out well between us. Ambassador Vorontsov had been very active, meeting with the Pakistanis and the resistance, but these groups did not want to talk about national reconciliation. They believed that the current Afghan President would just pack up and go to Washington or Moscow following the departure of Soviet troops; this, however, was unrealistic. The only reasonable solution is reconciliation on a solid and sincere basis, with regard for the interest of all groups. The Soviets did not want to violate the Geneva Accords, *Shevardnadze* said. They had signed those accords and would fulfill them. But he just wanted to raise this issue with Secretary Shultz.

*The Secretary* said he welcomed *Shevardnadze's* last statement. We agreed that it would be desirable to establish an interim government so as to avoid a chaotic situation. As far as we can see, however, it was hard to see a blend of Najibullah and Mujahidin ever jelling. We were continuing to talk with the Mujahidin and the Pakistanis. The Paks were also convinced it would be desirable to have an interim regime and we would continue to work on it. But the Secretary reiterated that we did not believe it would possible to marry these two groups. On his return he would talk to Armacost, who works actively on the question, as does our Ambassador to Pakistan, Robert Oakley.

### *Signing Ceremony*

*The Secretary* proposed that they proceed to the signing ceremony. He commented that the two agreements showed that our work is continuing. It was possible that the Basic Sciences Agreement could provide a framework for cooperation on dealing with natural disasters. *Shevardnadze* replied that this was something he was going to say. The Basic Sciences Agreement provided a framework to explore things like that. *Shevardnadze* said these agreements were very important. We were getting used to signing things. While it may seem ordinary, the signing of agreements was still an important event.

The two Ministers then proceeded to the next room where they signed the *Agreement for Cooperation in Basic Scientific Research* and the *Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation to Combat Illegal Narcotics Trafficking*.

Following the exchange of documents *Secretary Shultz* said he welcomed the opportunity to record a significant pair of achievements,

one dealing with the control of drugs the other with scientific research. *Shevardnadze* said he agreed these were very important agreements and another important step in the building of U.S.-Soviet relations.

The signing ceremony concluded at approximately 4:05 p.m. and was followed by a brief coupe de champagne.